Operation Torch

A part of the high-level planning conducted by the American and British governments called for the formation of a military ring around Germany to be tightened as the war progressed. The occupation of French North Africa was seen as a first step in that process. It also would open the Mediterranean to Allied supply convoys and save the long haul around the Cape of Good Hope.

Rear Admiral H. Kent Hewitt became the Commander of Amphibious Forces, Atlantic Fleet (ComPhibLant) in April 1942, and the planning for the North African operation, to be known as Operation Torch, was begun in earnest.

During the planning, PhibLant expanded from a force of three transports to one of 28 transports, in anticipation of transporting 37,000 Army troops and 250 tanks, plus their combat equipment and supplies.

The operation called for U.S. forces to establish firm and mutually supporting lodgements in the Casablanca area of French Morocco, on the Atlantic coast of Africa, and simultaneously, with a combined American-British landing force, to seize the Oran-Algiers-Tunis area in the Mediterranean.

The objectives would be to seize control of the entire area of French Morocco, Algeria, and possibly Tunisia; to be prepared to take action against Spanish Morocco; and to facilitate air and ground operations against Axis forces in the western desert.

There were important political considerations involved, since this area was under control of the Vichy French Government. It's president, Marshal Henri Petain, according to the terms of the French surrender, had agreed to collaborate with the Germans. It was known that the French Navy, represented by Admiral Jean Darlan, was intensely loyal to Petain and, under the watchful eyes of the Axis powers, would probably oppose the landing.

The Vichy French, especially members of the naval service, were known to be bitter toward the British Royal Navy, and hostile toward the activities of the Free French, represented by General Charles de Gaulle. Under these circumstances, it was impossible to predict the kind of reception the task forces could expect in French North Africa.

There was a slight American presence in North Africa during the period, working among the French in an effort to ease the way for the landing force. The two most prominent individuals were Robert Murphy, U.S. counselor accredited to the Vichy Government, and his principal military assistant, Marine Colonel William A. Eddy, who had been assigned to the American Legation in Tangier, Algeria, as an assistant naval attache for air in April 1942. Their diplomatic efforts helped to modify the resistance to the eventual landing operations. Eddy's assistant, Marine Lieutenant Franklin Holcomb, contributed to the cause by locating and smuggling out of Morocco two boatmen from Casablanca who were familiar with the complex hydrographic problems in the area. They helped to pilot the landing force.

Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower established his headquarters in London as Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Forces (CinCAEF) on 14 August, in time to get involved with the planning for Operation Torch. Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham was given overall command of the operation. Colonel Eddy traveled from Morocco to brief Eisenhower and his staff on the operation. Eddy went on to Washington to brief the service chiefs and President Roosevelt. Eisenhower, favorably impressed, appointed Colonel Eddy to be the senior military attache for Africa.

Col William T. Clement, who narrowly escaped capture by the Japanese at Corregidor in Manila Bay, was assigned to work on the plans for the cross-channel invasion of France on D-Day, 6 June 1944. At the end of this duty, he was promoted to brigadier general and assigned as assistant division commander of the 6th Marine Division, then on Guadalcanal preparing for Okinawa. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 522257

Meanwhile, it was determined that weapons training was needed for U.S. Navy boat crewmen who would be involved in the Algerian portion of the landing as part of the Eastern Task Force. In September 1942, Marine Corps instructors were brought in from Londonderry and London to establish a three-week training camp at the naval base in Rosneath, Scotland.

From Londonderry, Lieutenant Colonel Louis C. Plain and Captain William E. Davis led a detail of 25 enlisted Marines. The London Detachment sent First Lieutenant Fenton J. Mee and 15 enlisted men. At the end of the training period these three officers and 30 of the enlisted group were divided up into six teams and assigned to six different ships as a part of the landing force; the remaining 10 enlisted men returned to their base in Londonderry.

On 31 October 1942, the Marine Detachment in London was disbanded and most of the unit transferred to Rosneath to establish a Marine Barracks there. Captain Thomas J. Myers, formerly a company commander with the unit in London, was placed in command. He was assisted by Lieutenants Frank R. Wilkinson, Horton J. Greene, Truman J. Lyford, and Alexander D. Cereghino. Lieutenant Weldon James was also present as a public affairs officer. Lieutenant Colonels Walter I. Jordan and John B. Hill visited Rosneath briefly before being reassigned to the States in November. Some key enlisted personnel remained in London on detached duty, to carry on their original assignments at ComNavEu.

Command of the Western Naval Task Force (TF 34), for the landing in Morocco, was given to Rear Admiral Hewitt. It was comprised entirely of U.S. forces. Two of his key staff members were Marine officers — Lieutenant Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, as assistant operations officer, and Major Francis Millet Rogers as assistant intelligence officer.

Major General George S. Patton's Western Task Force provided the troops for the Morocco landings. Ships of the task force left from various east coast ports in late October 1942 and, once assembled in convoy, formed an armada of 100 ships, dispersed over the ocean in an area of some 20 by 30 miles. Yet it was said "that a flag hoist on Admiral Hewitt's ship, Augusta (CA 31), could reach the entire fleet in ten minutes."

Then-LtCol Homer L. Litzenberg served on the staff of Task Force 34 commander, RAdm H. Kent Hewitt, in Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa. He later served with the 4th Marine Division in the Pacific War and retired after the Korean War as a lieutenant general. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A31943

The task force was heavy on fire power to counter the threat from the French capital ships Richelieu and Jean Bart (with 15-inch guns), and the possible intervention of German warships. Included were the new battleship Massachusetts (BB 59) (with nine 16-inch guns); the Texas (BB 35) and New York (BB 34) (each with ten 14-inch guns); the carrier Ranger (CV 4) and four escort carriers; heavy cruisers Wichita (CA 45), Tuscaloosa (CA 37) and Augusta; light cruisers Savannah (CL 42), Brooklyn (CL 40), Philadelphia (CL 41), and Cleveland (CL 55); 38 destroyers; four submarines; and many lesser ships. Marine ship's detachments were on board all of the capital ships and the carrier.

Unlike the French army, the French navy had not been hammered by the Axis and was still full of fight and prepared to resist. In France, the navy was responsible for coastal defense in the broadest sense, including coast artillery and offshore aerial reconnaissance. These activities were under the command of Vice Admiral Francois Michelier.

The convoy crossed 4,000 miles through submarine-infested waters at an average speed of 14 knots, in order to fulfill a scheduled D-Day of 8 November 1942. The principal operation plan called for a main landing at Fedala, 14 miles north of Casablanca, with secondary landings at Port Lyautey, 65 miles north, and at Safi, 125 miles south, of Casablanca.

H-hour was 0400 but there was confusion in the dark of night, so the first wave landed more than an hour late. Naval shore batteries supplied the principal opposition to the landing, supplemented later by strafing attacks by French aircraft. Many ships of the French navy were involved. Some were sunk by U.S. ships, others escaped. Several U.S. task force ships were lost to shore battery fire and German submarine torpedoes. However, fighting on shore in the Fedala area was over in a matter of hours. Colonel Litzenberg went ashore in this area and remained for a few days with General Patton's headquarters. By 11 November U.S. soldiers were in position to attack Casablanca, but since the French defenders declared an armistice, that attack was cancelled.

Major Rogers, who was fluent in French and Arabic, went ashore at Fedala with the mission of arranging the berthing in Casablanca of Admiral Hewitt's flagship, Augusta. On D-Day, Rogers went into hostile territory to seek out French Vice Admiral Francois Michelier, to try to negotiate the surrender of all French military personnel in Morocco. He was subsequently used as an interpreter for peace negotiations with French officials and was awarded a Silver Star Medal for his courageous efforts. Rogers remained on Hewitt's staff throughout all of his subsequent amphibious operations in the Mediterranean area .

Major General Homer L. Litzenberg, USMC

As a major, Homer L. Litzenberg was assigned to Headquarters, Commander-in- Chief, U.S. Fleet, and served in England during combined planning with the British on the conduct of the war. He also participated in the amphibious assault of Casablanca, French Morocco, in November 1942.

General Litzenberg was born in 1903 and began his service in the Marine Corps as an enlisted man. In 37 years of service he proved himself to be a leader in combat with the award of the Navy Cross, the Army Distinguished Service Medal, three Silver Star Medals, and the Legion of Merit.

He served with the 24th Marines in the Marshall Islands and the V Amphibious Corps in the Saipan and Tinian campaigns.

As commander of the 7th Marines, he went to Korea on 1 September 1950, and led that unit in the Inchon landing and the Chosin Reservoir campaign that followed.

Subsequently, Litzenberg served as the base commander of Camp Lejeune, and then as Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island; senior member of the Military Armistice Commission in Korea; and Inspector General of the Marine Corps, before his retirement on 31 May 1959.

He died on 27 June 1963.

The landings in the Port Lyautey area were successful, but stiff resistance was later encountered and the shore batteries were not silenced until the following day. The town was taken on the 9th and the airfield the following day. An armistice was declared on the 11th.

The Safi landing found little resistance, except from shore batteries, and the Army tank units were ashore by the 11th, ready for their move on Casablanca. A party from the Marine detachment of the USS Philadelphia, operating under command of the Army 47th Infantry, landed at the Port of Safi on 10 November and proceeded to the airport to guard that facility until relieved the following day.

Colonel Francis M. Rogers, USMC

As a captain in the Marine Reserve, Francis Millet Rogers left his position as a Harvard University professor of foreign languages and civilizations to come onto active duty in World War II.

He was a student of western Europe an languages and was particularly fluent in French and Portuguese. In 1941, he was assigned to the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet (PhibLant) and established at Quantico what was possibly the first armed forces foreign language school on the east coast. When Rear Admiral H. Kent Hewitt was given command of the PhibLant in late 1941, Rogers joined his staff as an intelligence officer.

In this capacity he performed distinguished service in three landing operations in the North African theater of operations. These were: Operation Torch in Morocco, Operation Husky in Sicily, and Operation Avalanche in Salerno. In the Morocco landing on 8 November, Major General George S. Patton, Jr., as the landing force commander, awarded a Silver Star Medal to Major Rogers for his service in negotiations with French Vice Admiral Francois Michelier, which led to the surrender of Vichy French naval forces to the Allies.

After his return from overseas, Rogers was assigned to duty with the staff of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King in Washington, D.C., until 19 October 1945 when he was released from active duty and returned to the Harvard faculty.

Colonel Rogers died on 15 August 1989.

The Eastern Naval Task Force of Operation Torch was scheduled for a simultaneous landing over Algerian beaches in the Mediterranean. This force was assembled in the United Kingdom and consisted primarily of Royal Navy warships and Allied merchant marine transports. Unlike the U.S. Navy, there were no troop transports in the Royal Navy. The British simply leased merchant ships as needed and converted them to troop transports. The landing force consisted of 23,000 British Army and 10,000 American Army troops. Because of their perceived hostility towards the British, it was hoped that the Vichy French would view this as an American operation and, therefore, offer less resistance. The Eastern Task Force, including the Marines from Rosneath, sailed from the United Kingdom on 25 October, bound for Algeria. The Center Task Force which had the mission of seizing and securing the Oran area of Western Algeria, had planned night landings at 0100 on 8 November in three localities: one southeast and north of Arzeu (20 miles east of Oran), a second 14 miles west of Oran, and the third about 27 miles west of Oran. By H-hour plus 2 there was also to be a frontal assault on the Port of Oran by two British ships. Their mission was to breach a harbor boom chain and land onto the dock a commando unit which would seize French naval vessels in the harbor.

(click on image for an enlargement in a new windwo)

Little opposition was encountered in the three landing areas, except for some fire from coastal batteries and aircraft strafing. By the evening of the 9th, the ground troops held three of the important airfields in the vicinity, had captured 2,000 prisoners and 90 aircraft, and were ready to assault the city when a truce was called.

The U.S. Marines in the Arzeu landing party were in three groups: Lieutenant Colonel Plain with 11 enlisted men, Captain Davis (who spoke French) with six Marines, and Sergeant Arnold Arrowood with six Marines. Upon landing, they found so many French ships lying at anchor that not enough officers were available to take them over, so the job was given to the enlisted Marines, with one man assigned to each ship, complete with its crew. Some sniper fire was encountered, but they were able to deal with it and suffered no casualties.

It was quite a different story for the six Marines on board HMS Hartland, which along with HMS Walney, both former U.S. Coast Guard cutters, had the mission of opening the Port of Oran. Running without lights at 0300, they were picked up by searchlights on shore and engaged by naval gunfire from French ships inside the harbor, coastal artillery on the bluffs, and machine-gun cross fire from the jetties. Hartland missed the boom on the first try and, in backing off for a second attempt, ran the gantlet of withering fire in an effort to come alongside the dock long enough to discharge its landing party. Marine Corporal Norman Boike, who was on board, reported "four-inch shells coming through the cutters sides like blue flame." Their vessel was soon without power and adrift, and the dead and wounded were piling up on the deck and in the water. Although wounded himself, Boike was able to jump overboard with a raft and, along with First Sergeant Fred Whittacker and other Marines, sailors, and British commandos, who had initially been trapped below deck, rescue some of the wounded and make his way to shore. Both vessels sank with heavy losses, estimated to be 450 out of a total of 600 men who were on board. Two Marines were lost in this action (Privates First Class James Earhart, Jr., and Robert F. Horr) and the rest, along with all those who landed, were taken captive as they came ashore. However, they were released as soon as the armistice was signed. Horr was listed as missing in action and Earhart was buried in the American Cemetery which was established at Oran.

In the Algiers area, the landing took place as planned at about 0100, unopposed except by coastal forts. Coastal batteries opened fire on forces afloat and did some damage. The boom at the harbor was also rammed by two British destroyers, one of which suffered some damage, but nothing like that at the Oran harbor.

By 8 November, the city of Algiers had surrendered, and a friendly welcome was extended after all fighting had ceased. French Admiral Jean Darlan was taken into protective custody and issued the order to his forces for suspension of all hostilities in Algeria and Morocco, and urged all elements of the French fleet to join the Allied cause.

General Eisenhower was reportedly infuriated by the decision of the French to resist. To spare further casualties and speed the war effort, however, he agreed to negotiate with Darlan, in spite of the latter's notorious reputation as a Nazi collaborator. Their agreement permitted Darlan to become governor-general of French North Africa, in exchange for a promise to have the French Army lay down its arms. The agreement brought great criticism of Eisenhower.

The U.S. Navy established an operating and supply base in Oran, which soon became the most important base of its kind in North Africa. A Marine detachment was established at the base and Captain Davis and Lieutenant Fenton Mee, along with all of the enlisted Marines who had participated in the landing, became members of the detachment. Davis became the security officer and Mee was made detachment commander. Lieutenant Colonel Plain joined the Naval Force staff in Oran and remained until his transfer to the States a short time later. The detachment remained in Oran until 12 March 1943, when it was disbanded and all personnel returned to the States.

The Marine Detachment, American Embassy, London, was re-established at ComNavEu on 21 January 1943, and Captain Thomas J. Myers was placed in command. The Marine Barracks at Rosneath was disbanded and its personnel transferred either to London or to Londonderry.

The detachment was reduced in size to 30 enlisted men. Two Marine lieutenants, Paul Cramer and Walter Pickerel, and a number of enlisted Marines, who had been under instruction at the Royal Marines Military School in Devon over the previous few weeks, were detached and returned to the United States.

On 3 February, the Navy established a new command, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters at Oran. Hewitt, now promoted to vice admiral, was placed in command, and as also Eighth Fleet commander directed to prepare for more landings in the Mediterranean.

It was intended that the seizure of Algeria and Morocco quickly lead also to Allied occupation of Tunisia, opening the Mediterranean coast for staging to carry the battle northward. However, the Axis made a strong stand in Tunisia and gave way only grudgingly against the combined forces of the British Eighth Army and American forces, led by General Patton and Major General Omar Bradley. German and Italian forces in Tunisia finally surrendered with some 150,000 men on 13 May. This serious loss for the Axis provided the Allies air and sea supremacy throughout the southern Mediterranean, and permitted a convoy route to be opened through to the Suez Canal.

The decision of the Allies at this point was to rule out an invasion of France in 1943, but they did agree (at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943) that the next move would be an invasion of Sicily. This operation would maintain pressure on the enemy. Operation Husky was set for 10 July.

Brigadier General Richard H. Jeschke, USMC

At the start of World War II, Colonel Richard H. Jeschke was the commander of the 8th Marines, and he led that unit in combat in the Guadalcanal operation.

After this action, Jeschke was flown back to Washington and sent to the Mediterranean in May 1943, to the staff of the VI Amphibious Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, as Force Marine operations and training officer. In this capacity he participated in the landings at Sicily with the Western Naval Task Force. He also participated in the amphibious assault landing and subsequent operations in Normandy, France, from 1 June to 1 July 944.

During this period, to keep the Force commander informed, Colonel Jeschke made frequent liaison visits to front-line Army combat units ashore, and was subsequently awarded the Legion of Merit for this service. France awarded him the Croix de Guerre. Colonel Jeschke retired in 1949 and for having been decorated in combat was advanced to brigadier general on the retired list. He died on 15 December 1957.

General Eisenhower received his fourth star on 11 February and was designated the Supreme Commander, North African Theater of Operations, with three British subordinates: General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander (ground forces), Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham (sea forces), and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur William Tedder (air forces). Each had an American subordinate: Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., U.S. Seventh Army; Vice Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, ComNavNAW, and Lieutenant General Carl A. Spaatz, Northwest African Air Force. Operational forces were divided, with Admiral Hewitt in charge of the Western Naval Task Force embarking General Patton's Seventh Army, and British Vice Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsey, commanding the Eastern Naval Task Force, embarking Lieutenant General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery's Eighth Army.

Operation Husky would employ an assault force consisting of four American divisions, four British, and one Canadian, against a defense force comprised of two German and six Italian divisions. However, the enemy units were capable of quick reinforcement from the Italian main land across the narrow Straits of Messina.

The bitter lessons of Dieppe and Oran were taken into account. The seizure of enemy airfields, rather than the assault of enemy ports, was selected as the first objective. The emphasis was still on achieving tactical surprise, which ruled out pre-landing air and naval bombardment; a decision which Hewitt did not favor.

The landing formation was both unusual and bold, with eight divisions landing abreast on a broad front, allowing only a minimal force in reserve and quite a distance removed. Measured in terms of the initial assault, it was to be the greatest amphibious operation ever to that date, involving a total of 2,800 ships and assault craft. Unfortunately, the landing forces had no integration of command for air support, either tactical or strategic, resulting in many problems for the landing forces in obtaining timely air support. The mistake was rectified in subsequent operations.

Vice Admiral Hewitt had under his command 580 ships and 1,124 shipborne landing craft to be employed in transporting General Patton's Seventh Army, which was divided among three attack forces. These were TF 86, under Rear Admiral Richard L. Conolly, with light cruisers Brooklyn and Birmingham (CL 62) and eight destroyers for escort and gunfire support; TF 81, under Rear Admiral John L. Hall, with light cruisers Savannah and Boise (CL 47) and 13 destroyers; and TF 85, under Rear Admiral Alan Kirk, with light cruiser Philadelphia and 16 destroyers. Admiral Ramsey had 818 ships and 715 shipborne landing craft for his landing force, composed mostly of British and Canadian troops.

Rear Admiral Conolly had a most difficult task: that of moving some 25,000 men from Africa to Sicily in a fleet of landing ships, tank; landing craft, tank; and landing craft, infantry, which was designated JOSS Force. Travelling in a convoy of seven columns, they were slowed at times to a speed of two and a half knots by strong winds and heavy seas. This was the first shore-to-shore amphibious operation to make such extensive use of these landing ships. The Sicilian coastline presented a further complication. Because it was known to be fronted with false beaches which would prevent landing ships from placing their troops and equipment on the shore, pontoon causeways were brought along to bridge the gap. The newly developed amphibious truck, called DUKW, was first employed in this operation and met with great success. False beaches presented no problem for the DUKWs, which could continue in land, as needed, with their cargo.

Major General Robert O. Bare, USMC

At the start of World War II, Colonel Richard H. Jeschke was the commander of the 8th Marines, and he led that unit in combat in the Guadalcanal operation.

In World War II, while serving on the staff of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey, Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Colonel Robert O. Bare worked on the planning of the Normandy invasion. He was later awarded the Bronze Star Medal while attached to British Assault Force J during the invasion.

A graduate of the Naval Academy, Class of 1924, Bare achieved early recognition as a distinguished rifle and pistol marksman in the Marine Corps.

After his return from England in 1943, he served in the Palau and Okinawa campaigns in the Pacific in World War II. In the Korean War he was the assistant division commander of the 1st Marine Division and was awarded a Distinguished Service Medal and a Legion of Merit.

Bare held additional assignments as Director of the Marine Corps Development Center at Quantico and as Director of Personnel at Headquarters Marine Corps.

He died on 30 September 1980.

Vice Admiral Hewitt's Western Naval Task Force staged from ports in Algeria. General Patton and his staff were embarked on Hewitt's flag ship, Monrovia (APA 31). Once again, Marine Major Rogers was on board as a staff member. On D-Day he went ashore and was given the job of supervising the loading of Italian prisoners onto LCIs. Colonel Litzenberg had been replaced for the landings on Sicily by another Marine officer, Colonel Richard H. Jeschke, who had served briefly in liaison with U.S. Army forces in Morocco.

The landings, on 10 July, were made in darkness at 0245 over an area embracing some 37 miles of shoreline in the Gulf of Gela. Once again the enemy was not surprised, but the landing ship force did remarkably well despite heavy surf and accurate gunfire. In some places the beach areas were mined and a number of vehicles were blown up. There was little combat air patrol over the target area.

On 20 July, the dictator Benito Mussolini was removed from power in Italy and Hitler ordered a withdrawal of Axis forces from Sicily. The mountainous terrain assisted the enemy's ability to fight a series of rear guard actions in the direction of the Straits of Messina, where the retreat was a short run across in ferry boats to the toe of Italy. Allied forces tried to intercept this movement by leap-frogging along the coast in a series of amphibious landings, but they lagged too far behind the fast-moving enemy forces to cut them off or to inflict significant losses. In the space of six days and seven nights, ending on 17 August, the Germans had withdrawn to the mainland with 40,000 troops and the Italians 62,000, so an opportunity to capture a large enemy force was lost to the Allies. An important major objective of the operation, seizure of Sicily, was accomplished.

In June 1943, Marine Colonel Robert O. Bare arrived in London in civilian clothes, as prescribed by regulations (because he had a stopover in Foynes, Ireland), for special duty with ComNavEu. His special duty involved an assignment to the Office of the Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander. The Supreme Commander to head this office (General Eisenhower) had not yet been designated, so the officer in charge was Major General Frederick Morgan, British Army, with the responsibility of conducting planning and preparations for Operation Overlord, formerly Neptune, the cross-channel invasion to come.

Bare was detailed as "staff officer plans" in the naval section under Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey. He had the task of selecting British beaches for practice landings and naval gun fire training. The area selected was Slapton Sands, near Dartmouth. The British government evacuated more than 3,000 citizens from the area.

In October Bare traveled on a British ship to the Pas de Calais area of France as part of a fake invasion force to test German reactions and to try to mislead them about Allied intentions.

Marine Colonel James E. Kerr also participated in the planning phase for Operation Overlord. He was assigned as a training officer on the staff of Commander, Landing Craft and Bases, Eleventh Amphibious Force, Europe. His duties involved the supervision of amphibious training of personnel for all landing ships and craft to be used in the invasion. Both Kerr and Bare remained through all of the planning phases for Overlord and then participated in the landing.

Marine pilots Majs Peter D. Lambrecht, left, and Homer J. Hutchinson are shown with Wing Commander L. N. Hayes, commander of RAF Night Fighter Squadron 256, at RAF Station Ford in Sussex from which they flew missions in May 1943. Photo courtesy of BGen Homer J. Hutchinson

Meanwhile, in the Pacific, the Guadalcanal operation (August 1942) had revealed to the Marine Corps the need for an adequate night air defense capability. Marines who served in the Pacific reported the constant presence of Japanese aircraft buzzing over the combat areas at night, keeping everyone awake. They collectively earned the nickname "Washing-Machine Charlie."

To provide for future night air operations, a cadre of aviation personnel, including six officers and five enlisted men, was sent to England in February 1943 for training with the Royal Air Force (RAF). Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Montgomery was in charge of the group and was the primary liaison with the RAF. Lieutenant Colonels Guy Morrow and Marion M. Magruder were designated to obtain detailed knowledge of the British fighter control and direction system, including facilities, personnel, and equipment, and to facilitate the acquisition of the equipment by the Marine Corps. Major Peter D. Lambrecht and Captain Homer G. Hutchinson, Jr., were selected for operational training as night fighters, and Captain Edward Hicks was to be trained as a night fighter ground air controller. The five NCOs were assigned to train as air borne intercept radar operators (ROs).

Maj Hutchinson stands in front of the Bristol Beau fighter in which he fought. Photo courtesy of R. J. Hutchinson, USMC (Ret)

The five aviators of the group were initially assigned to RAF Station Coltishall for three weeks of flight training in Bisley and Blenheim aircraft. They wore dark goggles and read fluorescent instrument dials to simulate night instrument flying.

Lambrecht and Hutchinson were then sent to RAF Station Cranfield for operational training with the twin-engine Bristol Beaufighter, and in employing airborne radar to intercept enemy aircraft at night. Great emphasis also was placed on the ability to visually identify various aircraft types to help avoid firing on friendly planes. At this point the two officers were joined in the cockpit by their Marine ROs, Sergeants Nestor Tabor and Pete Hales, now qualified as radar operators in the British air borne intercept system.

When this phase of training had been completed, the two USMC teams were sent to Sussex on 6 May to join RAF Night Fighter Squadron 256. They were immediately assigned to night combat air patrol over the English Channel. It was here that Hutchinson learned to appreciate the ability of RAF ground controllers; these technicians had the difficult job of keeping friendly bombers and fighters separated in a crowded air space, while attempting to pick up enemy intruders. Lambrecht, Hutchinson, Tabor, and Hales, spent three weeks at this station flying night combat air defense missions against the Luftwaffe.

Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery subsequently served as the first commander of Marine Aircraft Group 53, a night-fighter group, from 1943 to 1945. Lieutenant Colonel Morrow became the first commander of a Marine night-fighter operational training detachment in 1943. Lieutenant Colonel Magruder commissioned and commanded VMF(N)-533 in 1943 and Major Hutchinson was his executive officer. Major Lambrecht commanded VMF(N)-541 in 1944, and in August 1952 was killed in action while flying a night-fighter combat mission in Korea.

Another group of Marine officers who arrived in London at this time, on a secret mission, came from the Plans and Policies Division of Marine Corps Headquarters. They included Lieutenant Colonels James P. Berkeley, Edward Hagenah, Harold O. Deakin, Norman Hussa, and John Scott. All spent a week in London on the way to the U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters Command to take part as observers in the next invasion, which would be the landing, designated Operation Avalanche, at Salerno, Italy on 9 September 1943. While in England, they spent their time with opposite staff numbers in U.S. and British organizations. Berkeley, for example, a communications officer, visited the Royal Navy School of Signals at Eastleigh and the British Army Signal Center at Cheltenham; Deakin went to Devon to view amphibious training.

The decision for the Salerno operation had been agreed upon at the Trident Conference in Washington, D.C. on 12 May 1943, as an effort to take Italy out of the war and to engage as many German divisions as possible prior to a major cross-channel invasion. Unfortunately, the two-month delay between the landings on Sicily and Salerno would enable the Germans to bring 13 divisions into Italy with their top leadership, Field Marshals Erwin Rommel, in the north, and Albert Kesselring, in the south. The Italian surrender on 8 September seemed to have little effect on the German occupation force and its determination to prevent a rapid conquest of Italy.

The command structure for Operation Avalanche was much the same as in previous operations in North Africa, with Vice Admiral Hewitt as the Western Naval Task Force Commander. Marine Major Rogers was once again on board Hewitt's flag ship, the Ancon (AP 66), as a staff officer. Under Hewitt was a largely British Northern Attack Force under Commodore G. N. Oliver (with the British X Corps), and a mainly American Southern Attack Force under Rear Admiral John L. Hall (with the U.S. VI Corps). The leading force was the U.S. Eighth Army under command of Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark.

Rear Admiral Conolly was again in charge of the JOSS force of landing ships. The five Marine officers from Washington were embarked with this force at Bizerte, Tunisia, each on a separate LST carrying British troops.

Colonel Berkeley said that his LST, which landed about H-hour plus 2, immediately came under fire from German artillery and was so damaged that it had to withdraw for repairs to its elevator mechanism before returning to unload. As a result of this experience he gained great respect for German artillery and its ability to mass artillery fire on a target. Lieutenant Colonel Deakin landed at 0340 in an assault boat wave with a battalion from the Royal Hampshire Regiment.

Air support was better organized than for the previous Operation Husky as a result not only of consolidated control but also the presence of escort carriers. H-hour was set at 0330 and there was no naval gunfire preparation in the interest of achieving surprise, but there were heavy casualties in early waves from both beach defenses and aerial attack. Later waves had the benefit of some excellent naval gunfire support, which helped to break up a German armored counterattack against the beachhead. Major Rogers was assigned duty as liaison officer between the Ancon and the British X Corps commander, Lieutenant General Sir Richard McCreary on HMS Hilary.

After the landing operation, all five Marine officers returned to Palermo, Sicily, on Admiral Conolly's flagship, Biscayne (AGC 18), for a short visit with two Army generals, George S. Patton and Lucian K. Truscott, Jr. Lieutenant Colonel Berkeley recalls the visit with some grim humor. He said they began to discuss the value of naval gunfire at the landing and Patton interrupted with a comment that naval gunfire was "no damn good." Truscott disagreed, reminding him that naval gunfire "saved us at the landings in Sicily." From there they flew to Oran to brief Admiral John Hall, and then returned home on 23 September.

It may well be that naval gunfire support and air power made the difference in the success of the Fifth Army at Salerno. However, by staying on station, the Navy paid a heavy price. The Luftwaffe attacked with a newly developed radio-controlled glide bomb, sinking a number of vessels, and damaging the U.S. cruisers Philadelphia and Savannah and the British battleship Warspite. The bomb which struck the Savannah killed an entire U.S. Marine gun crew manning one of the turrets.

After the Normandy D-Day landing on 6 June 1944, Marine Col Richard H. Jeschke, second from right, who was an observer at the landing, went ashore with LtGen Omar Bradley, left and MajGen J. Lawton Collins, second from left. The officer on the right is unidentified. After the war, Gen Bradley became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1949. Photo courtesy of Col Richard Jeschke, USMC (Ret)

This costly campaign was concluded when the Germans began a withdrawal on 16 September and Allied forces entered Naples on 1 October. Military analyst J. F. C. Fuller considered Salerno to be "the most absurd and senseless campaign of the entire war."

The delay at Salerno only compounded the problem for the next amphibious assault in Italy, scheduled for 8 November but delayed until 21 January 1944. This was the Anzio operation, called Shingle, which would turn out to be one of the costliest operations of the war with more than 5,000 members of the landing force killed.

There was great controversy in the planning phase among the Combined Chiefs about the wisdom of making this landing. In the end, Prime Minister Churchill prevailed with the argument that unless Rome was taken, Italy would never be free of German domination.