Manassas
National Battlefield Park
Chapter 7: Great America in Manassas
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Chapter 7
GREAT AMERICA IN MANASSAS

"We intend to honor or celebrate the great things that make the United States," proclaimed Marriott official David L. Brown in a congressional oversight hearing in 1973 when he described the Great America theme park his corporation planned to build adjacent to the Manassas National Battlefield Park. Guests would have the opportunity to participate in living history and become involved in things that played a part in the development of the United States. Skeptics feared the entertainment complex would produce a "carnival atmosphere" next to the battlefield. As Congressman John Seiberling pointedly remarked when touring the battlefield, Marriott wanted to replace an "authentic piece" of American history with "something that's fake." Eying the promise of increased tax revenues, more jobs, and a boosted local economy, many Prince William county residents, including a voting majority on the board of county supervisors, embraced Marriott's proposal. [1]

The Marriott theme park proposal confronted the Park Service with questions central to historic preservation in an age of rapid change. These questions would reverberate years later when a shopping mall and a Disney theme park, among other projects, were proposed for the area. What say did the NPS have over the development of lands adjacent to national parks? How could the Park Service protect the lands in its care while also respecting the decisions of local communities? Left unresolved in the 1970s was the question of whether the Marriott tract, known to have historical significance to the Second Battle of Manassas, should be annexed to the national park. As indicated in this and subsequent chapters, Park Service officials consistently addressed land development outside the Manassas battlefield park's boundaries on a case-by-case basis. Little attempt was made to act proactively and set an agenda for the future.

Setting the Stage: Marriott's Proposal

Early in 1973 the Marriott Corporation announced its intention to build a theme park on 80 acres of a 513-acre tract adjacent to the Manassas National Battlefield Park. To coincide with the nation's bicentennial in 1976, Marriott planned to re-create six historic areas that would reflect the idea of "Great America." According to the original proposal, guests could visit different sites important in American history, including a New England seaport, a New Orleans French market, the Southwest, the frontier Yukon, a rural town, and the turn-of-the-century Midwest. In addition to these areas, created through architectural styling and landscaping, there would be amusement park rides, musical productions, and craft displays to entertain guests. Marriott anticipated two million visitors each year during the theme park's May-through-September season. [2]

On the same parcel of land, Marriott later planned to build a specialty shopping center where people could purchase goods made by on-site artisans. A hotel would house visitors. Marriott also wanted to develop an additional area of approximately 185 acres as an industrial park. Light industry and research and development firms would be housed in one- to two-story buildings placed in a landscaped setting. [3]

Before Marriott took shovel to dirt, state and local governments had to assess and consider a variety of things. The catering services and hotel chain needed commitment on zoning permits and support facilities from Prince William County and the Commonwealth of Virginia. The existing agricultural zoning had to be switched to commercial usage, and a special use permit was required for a 350-foot landmark structure planned in the theme park. Additional special variances were needed for an undetermined number of 100-foot structures. Marriott requested that the state build an interchange on Interstate 66, which would allow direct access to the property. Marriott considered the interchange essential to the project and threatened to abandon the site if it were not approved. Other services were also crucial to the Marriott proposal. Prince William County had to ascertain if its existing water and sewer capacities could accommodate the projected increased usage and then construct lines to serve the site. And there were environmental factors to consider, including the effects on water and air quality in the county. Safety features relating to fire protection and crime needed to be addressed. Taking into account all of these requirements, the board of supervisors had to assess the impact of the project on the county's overall financial health. [4]

Effects of the theme park and light industrial area on neighboring Manassas National Battlefield Park also required consideration Marriott originally chose the site because it met certain selection criteria, none of which were proximity to the battlefield park. After selecting the site but before making a public announcement, Marriott considered the relation between its development and the national park. The corporation concluded, without seeking input from the National Park Service, that the most significant impact would be increased visitation at the battlefield, which Marriott considered a benefit for the national park. Satisfied with its site choice, Marriott began negotiating with the Prince William Board of County Supervisors for zoning and support services. The National Park Service remained unaware of the project until Superintendent Berry and others saw a story describing Marriott's plans "splashed across" the front page of the Washington Post in mid-February. [5]

With the publication of that article, battlefield park neighbors and other county residents drew up on opposing sides. A voting majority of the board of county supervisors, known as the "Four Horsemen" and led by Supervisor Ralph Mauller, welcomed the tax income that the projected $35-million development would bring. The sobriquet "Horsemen" alluded to what opponents saw as the potentially Apocalyptic consequences of the Marriott development or perhaps to the supervisors' perceived effort to ride roughshod over opposition. The Four Horsemen saw the Marriott project and the projected tax revenue it would generate as a way to address recent changes. The county had experienced explosive growth, with its population increasing from 50,000 persons in 1960 to more than 111,000 in 1973. Tax revenues were needed to provide these new residents with schools, sanitary processing facilities, and health and safety services. Homeowners could carry only a portion of the burden, so county officials sought other sources. Industry and businesses, drawn to the county by the recent opening of Dulles International Airport and the completion of two major interstate highways, provided an attractive funding resource. The Marriott development represented just the type of income generator that county supervisors, especially the Four Horsemen, were looking for. [6]

Many local residents were also enthusiastic about the Marriott proposal. C. Mason Gardner, who lived within five miles of the battlefield park and represented thirty members of a pro-Marriott ad hoc committee, argued that Prince William County needed an expanded tax base to ease rising property taxes. In Gardner's mind, Marriott provided a perfect remedy to this situation. After the development was completed, the corporation would pay its share of taxes but not require the additional services—such as schools—that residential construction needed. Gardner pointed to other potential benefits: sales tax revenue would increase, businesses would gain a boost from tourists, and summer employment possibilities for local young people would expand. [7]

Others considered the Marriott proposal a threat. Gilbert LeKander, who had worked with Annie Snyder against the 1969 national cemetery proposal, joined forces with Memory Porter and the Prince William League for the Protection of Natural Resources. The league included some one hundred Prince William County residents who questioned the value of the Marriott development. Snyder, who was recovering from a skiing accident, stayed behind the scenes during the opening salvos of the debate. [8]

Porter, as president of the league, argued that approving development on the Marriott tract would open the door for further commercial rezoning in the surrounding area. Availability of increased capacity public water and sewer lines and the presence of both an entertainment facility and an industrial office complex would encourage other businesses to consider the remaining space. Porter feared that the existing agricultural-residential area would be replaced by gas stations, food outlets, repair shops, shopping centers, and other convenience facilities. She argued that with these added buildings, the county would experience rising traffic, noise and air pollution, and the general degradation of the aesthetic and historic aspects of this section of the county. Porter pointed out that the water quality of nearby streams would inevitably decrease from storm runoff over parking lots and road surfaces. Crime and the incidence of vermin would increase. [9]

Of particular concern to Porter and LeKander was the effect the Marriott development would have on the battlefield park. Porter expressed concern about the visual impact of the projected 350-foot-tall structure and the undetermined number of 100-foot-tall structures. These tall modern edifices would intrude on the historical scene and become constant reminders of the twentieth century as park visitors attempted to step into the past. Porter and her fellow supporters remembered the Gettysburg Tower controversy, in which a corporation won local zoning approval, over adamant preservationist opposition, to build a 307-foot observation tower on private property adjacent to the Gettysburg National Military Park in Pennsylvania. Battlefield park supporters in both Pennsylvania and Virginia were particularly sensitive to high-rise structures as a result of the Gettysburg controversy. Projected visitation at the Marriott theme park brought further questions regarding adequate lodging and camping facilities. Porter argued that existing services would not be able to accommodate the surge of Marriott visitors. Instead, the battlefield park's proximity and inviting open fields might encourage large-scale unauthorized camping. [10]

Defining the National Park Service Position

The instant polarization of views, with Porter and her fellow supporters adamantly opposing the Marriott proposal and others strongly favoring construction of the theme park left the National Park Service with a limited range of options. The agency could join one side, but this would involve complications. First, Superintendent Berry and other NPS officials needed specific and reliable information about the theme park proposal and its relation to the battlefield park. To get the hard facts, Berry approached Marriott when news of the proposal first broke and explained that the National Park Service would not be an ally, but the agency had not decided to be an opponent. If Marriott refused to sit down and provide the information the agency needed, Berry explained, "I will have no choice but to oppose because I will fight the unknown." Marriott agreed to cooperate with the Park Service and began conferences with the agency in March 1973.

During the course of these meetings, the Park Service outlined its four major concerns about the theme park: (1) the location and uses of the 350-foot tower; (2) possible pollution and planned mitigations; (3) access to the theme park and whether Marriott expected significant travel along Lee Highway through the battlefield park; and (4) Marriott-provided picnicking and camping facilities to reduce recreational pressures on the battlefield park. Marriott agreed to take these concerns into consideration when finalizing its theme park plans, but the corporation did not provide a detailed site plan for the Service to review. [11]

A second factor that influenced the National Park Service's reaction was the increasing fervor of debate. In Berry's mind, supporters and opponents of the Marriott proposal had fallen into the trap of engaging in hysterical rhetoric, a tactic the Park Service wanted to avoid. The four controlling members of the board of county supervisors so fully supported the Marriott plan that they attracted more than the usual amount of attention. A group of residents joined together to publish a newsletter reporting on county board meetings in an attempt to increase public surveillance of the Four Horsemen's activities. Opponents to the theme park also contributed to the rising tone of the controversy by presenting what Marriott vice president David L. Brown called a "parade of horrors" of potential, but not probable, environmental and social effects of the theme park. [12]

Questions about the historical significance of the Marriott tract gave the Park Service further reason to avoid joining either side of the controversy. Former superintendent Francis Wilshin, keeping active in park affairs while living in Fredericksburg, Virginia, provided the Prince William League in March 1973 a historical evaluation of the Marriott property that supported incorporation of this tract into the battlefield park. Wilshin argued that the Marriott tract "profoundly influenced" the Union and Confederate battle strategies at Second Manassas. General Robert E. Lee established the Confederate nerve center and a signal station on Stuart's Hill in the western part of the tract. Under cover of the woods on this property, Lee concealed the major portion of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet's wing of 30,000 men. Knowing Longstreet was on the tract but unaware of his exact position, Union Maj. Gen. John Pope gravely weakened his left by advancing on Maj. Gen. Stonewall Jackson's troops in an unsuccessful and bloody attack at Deep Cut. Seizing on this defeat, Lee ordered Longstreet's troops into action and launched a successful counterstroke. Longstreet emerged from his woodland screen to hurl Pope's weakened left to Chinn Ridge and Henry Hill. A second Confederate victory at Manassas resulted. [13]

Joseph Mills Hanson, the historian who had developed the interpretive narratives for the Bull Run Recreational Demonstration Area and had served as the national park's second superintendent, was well aware of the historical events connected with the land later purchased by Marriott. Hanson had argued in his 1937 report on the park's proposed boundaries that its southwestern edge should extend half a mile west of the apex of Stuart's Hill to include the area where Longstreet's troops had deployed, screened by the topography and the vegetative cover. However, Hanson had placed a low priority on acquiring this land because it had not seen the heavy fighting that other areas experienced. He had ranked land acquisition based first on the intensity of fighting a given tract saw and second on how acquisition would assist in park development, especially the construction of an internal system of park roads. In the first round of obtaining lands, Stuart's Hill had been a low priority. [14]

Stuart's Hill was included in later efforts to expand the battlefield park's boundaries. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Superintendents Hanson and Myers tried to convince Congress to add Stuart's Hill to a larger battlefield park. Opposition from the Prince William Board of County Supervisors successfully defeated this proposal, and the resulting 1954 law set the designated western park boundary east of Stuart's Hill along Highway 622 and Compton's Lane. In the early 1970s the National Park Service revisited the idea of acquiring the Stuart's Hill tract when Sen. Alan H. Bible and his park subcommittee requested a review of the boundaries of certain national parklands. The National Capital Region's Land Use Coordination office investigated possible changes to the Manassas battlefield park boundaries, including the incorporation of Stuart's Hill, just as the Marriott proposal became public and the debate soared. [15]

The National Park Service avoided taking sides for several reasons. The Service needed hard data on the theme park and its effect on the battlefield park, which the agency sought through discussions with Marriott officials. The Park Service needed to present itself as a responsible party separate from the immediate hysteria, and this required that the agency avoid voicing an opinion until it had received all the information from Marriott. And the Service needed to determine the best course of action toward a piece of property known to have historic significance for the Second Battle of Manassas. In Berry's opinion, this neutral stance kept the agency above the fray and helped the park come out "with more respect for its ability to act calmly in the midst of a firestorm." This neutral stance did not prevent park officials from conducting meetings with the involved parties, which continued throughout the controversy. [16]

The Park Service also insulated itself from potentially damaging political undercurrents. Prince William officials committed the county as early as 16 February to Marriott's theme park and office building complex by voting to sign a letter of intent. This agreement outlined the county's determination to provide the necessary public services, highway access, and special permits for the project. Open opposition to the Marriott proposal by the Park Service would be seen as interference in local governmental affairs. In contrast, had the Park Service endorsed the plan, other charges might surface. In the national arena, the Marriott Corporation and the executive branch bad unofficial ties because President Richard Nixon's brother, Donald Nixon, headed Marriott's theme park division. Such circumstances made it necessary for the Park Service to act dispassionately and reasonably. [17]

The National Park Service and its employees had learned from past experience the difficult lesson that the Service must keep attuned to political forces to protect the agency's overall goals and avoid the pitfalls of participation in acrimonious public debate. Wilshin's removal from the superintendency during the national cemetery controversy served as a recent reminder of the costs of taking a firm stand for preservation without considering the political implications. Similar dilemmas had occurred in the for mative years of the national park system. When the city of San Francisco successfully petitioned the United States government in 1913 to dam the Yosemite's Hetch Hetchy Valley for a reservoir, national park supporters lost an important battle. The strength of local political support for the dam and of federal interest for promoting resource use over resource preservation left the keepers of national park lands with a lasting awareness of the power of politics. Once established in 1916, the National Park Service and its agents clashed from time to time with local political interests over dams, roads, and other developments that threatened national park lands. Sometimes the Park Service won, many times compromises ruled, and always the agency grappled with the delicate balancing act of upholding its mission while also addressing political exigencies. [18]

Congress Looks at the Marriott Theme Park

Despite its attempts to stay out of the clamorous debate, the National Park Service continued to garner attention from theme park opponents and Congress. Opponents wanted to know what information the Park Service obtained from Marriott and how this data would influence the agency's decision on the proposal. When it became clear that the Park Service had deferred a decision until Marriott submitted detailed site plans, these opponents went to Congress for action. The Civil War Round Tables of Alexandria, Virginia, and the District of Columbia asked Washington lawyer Frederick Simpich to appeal on their behalf to the House Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation. The Round Tables wanted Congress to hold hearings to determine whether the amusement park would have a detrimental effect on the Manassas National Battlefield Park. If assurances of the integrity of the national park could not be obtained, these organizations wanted the federal government to acquire the 513-acre tract by out right purchase or scenic easements. [19]

The national parks subcommittee needed little prompting from the Round Tables to investigate the Marriott project. One committee member, Ron de Lugo (D-V.I.), lived on the boundary of the Manassas National Battlefield Park and knew how similar developments affected other areas of the country. He wondered how Manassas could be saved from "giant traffic jams" and unauthorized camping if the theme park opened. Another committee member was suspicious about the haste with which the Prince William County officials had pushed the Marriott project. A congressional hearing would bring out the facts for public review. Initial questioning of National Park Service Direct.or Ronald H. Walker at a recent hearing on other matters had further convinced committee members that the issue needed exploration. [20]

Congressional query into the Marriott proposal was limited to the theme park's impact on the national battlefield park. Decisions on the rezoning of the tract from agricultural to commercial use and the special use permit for tall structures remained in local hands. Congress, however, had authority to step into the debate if federal roads or other improvements were involved. If testimony presented at the oversight hearing indicated that the theme park would be detrimental to the battlefield park, Congress also wanted to know what action the National Park Service was taking to protect the park. Legislation had not been proposed in relation to this issue; hence, the congressional hearing was a quest for background information as part of the committee's oversight role. [21]

Supporters and opponents of the Marriott proposal packed the 3 April oversight hearing. David Brown, vice president of the corporation's theme park division, tried to assure Congress that Marriott had every intention of being a good neighbor to the battlefield park and the surrounding community by accepting their suggestions and following them "within any kind of reason." Other proponents of the theme park emphasized the tax revenue benefits the project would give Prince William County. Porter, LeKander, Simpich, and other concerned individuals expressed their misgivings about the effects of traffic, pollution, and crime. Raymond Humphreys, a neighbor of the park, fervently argued that to desecrate the hallowed ground of the battlefield by the "infringement of crass commercial enterprise" was to "trample the most sacred" of all American institutions. Porter especially worried that ancillary facilities springing up around the Marriott park would destroy the aesthetic and historic values of the Manassas National Battlefield Park and the surrounding areas. In response to these different concerns, theme park opponents reintroduced the idea of the federal government acquiring the Marriott tract. [22]

During his testimony on 3 April, NPS Director Walker drew criticism from Congress and theme park opponents for not taking a stand on the Marriott proposal. Subcommittee Chair Roy A. Taylor (D-N.C.) noted that in his thirteen years as head of the national parks committee, Walker was the first director to say Interior could not take a position because it did not have enough facts. Walker explained that Marriott had been cooperative in holding initial meetings with the Park Service, but the agency needed detailed site plans to determine with confidence the theme park's potential impact on the battlefield. This explanation failed to satisfy. Civil War Round Table representative Simpich concurred with Congressman Taylor's observation and requested that the subcommittee urge Interior to be creative in its thinking rather than be content to tell Congress why it could not act. LeKander ended his testimony with the cutting observation that former NPS Director Conrad Wirth knew how to protect the park system, implying that Walker did not. [23]

Outside the hearing room, other members of Congress supported the National Park Service's decision to delay taking a stand on the Marriott proposal. Speaker Tip O'Neill (D-Mass.) saw the political value of seeking information and establishing dialogues among the different parties until all the needed data became available. In recognition of Berry's particular role in this process, O'Neill asked that Berry be considered for a superintendency of two historical parks in Boston in which O'Neill had a special interest. Berry accepted the offer and left the Manassas National Battlefield Park in late spring 1973. [24]

The National Park Service continued its neutral stance when Richard Hoffman replaced Berry as superintendent. Hoffman, a self-described "down-home, crusty type of guy," met on several occasions with both preservationists and Marriott officials to obtain information. His unpretentious appearance made him seem approachable. His previous experience at the Glen Canyon National Recreation Area, Fire Island National Seashore, and Isle Royale National Park provided him with an understanding of conflicting use patterns. He was also the first nonhistorian appointed to the superintendency at Manassas, furthering the change in management style that Berry had initiated. In his initial meetings with theme park opponent Annie Snyder, now recovered from her accident, and ardent Marriott supporter Ralph Mauller, Hoffman succeeded in leaving each person uncertain of the Park Service's leanings on the issues, thereby retaining the agency's neutral position. Hoffman also managed to garner help from Prince William County supervisor Mauller on other issues affecting the battlefield park, including information about a proposed community college on the park's borders. In discussions with Marriott's David Brown, Hoffman continued Berry's efforts to obtain further clarification of plans for the theme park. [25] With the NPS remaining neutral, events played themselves out on the local and national level. Resolution of the Marriott controversy is a significant barometer of a similar debate fifteen years hence.

Marriott Stalled: The Local Level

While the administration at the battlefield park was changing, Prince William County rushed forward with its review of the Marriott proposal. In what opponents called a "crash program," Prince William officials quickly addressed the different points of the county's 16 February letter of intent with Marriott. Two significant aspects of the letter involved adequate sewer and water facilities and the necessary rezoning and special permits. By the end of February the board of supervisors had begun negotiations with the state Water Control Board to obtain certification of additional capacity in the Upper Occoquan Sewer Authority. The board also pushed to hold meetings with the towns of Manassas and Manassas Park to investigate borrowing some of their projected sewer capacity and water supplies for the Marriott theme park. The county would need these sanitation and water facilities to meet the anticipated demand. [26]

To address the rezoning and special use issues, the supervisors asked the county planning commission to report on expected effects of the Marriott complex on Prince William County. In mid-March the planning department issued a preliminary report which indicated a "positive attitude" toward Marriott despite the lack of sufficient data for immediate recommendation of the proposal. Two weeks hater, on 3 April, the planning commission issued its revised report, which recommended passage of the rezoning request but listed a series of conditions for the special use permit. These conditions reflected the remaining unanswered questions about the complex, including adequate access roads, protection of water quality, and the need to buffer the national battlefield park from the theme park by the planting of trees. County planners also wanted assurances from Marriott that construction of a hotel and other amenities would wait until economically justified and that both Marriott and the county would work out a mutually agreeable rezoning if the corporation decided not to build the theme park. [27]

Driving the approval process was the realization that Marriott might soon abandon Prince William County. The corporation's options with ten property owners to buy the designated 513 acres expired on 7 April. Marriott had previously encountered opposition in Howard County, Maryland, twenty miles north of Washington, and had decided to consider Prince William County as an alternative. Having won this coveted opportunity, county officials did not want the corporation to renew its search. The planning commission accepted good faith efforts on the part of the county and Marriott to work out such remaining problems as protection of water quality and construction of adequate roads. [28]

Fully aware of the 7 April deadline for land options, the board of county supervisors met on 5 April to review the rezoning and special use permit request. The supervisors asked Marriott to clarify a range of issues, including sewers and road access, before voting unanimously in favor of the proposal. The board rezoned 335 acres next to the Manassas National Battlefield Park for the Great America theme park and an adjacent 178-acre tract for a light industrial park. For the special use permit, the supervisors attached the conditions that the planning commission had placed in its 3 April report. Individual board members also wanted assurances that the Marriott project would not divert road construction finds from other districts in the county. [29]

Perceived benefits from the Marriott theme park and light industrial complex countered the unresolved issues noted in the planning commission's April report. Certainly the projected $35-million Great America park and its expected multi-million-dollar tax revenues swayed supervisors toward approval. But social factors also played a role. Prince William supervisors cited Marriott's reputation as a "root-beer-to-riches, wholesome, family-oriented business" as a significant factor in granting the rezoning. Here was a company seen to be economically successful and committed to the same values as county residents. Such an image made Marriott attractive as a kind of antidote to rapid changes in the county. Significant population increases in the county over the past decade had led to an increase in crime. Fifty-seven people had been arrested recently in the county's largest drug raid. Marriott's promises of jobs, tax revenues, and a recreational outlet for county residents provided the needed assurances that the bad effects of county growth could be counterbalanced with promising economic development. [30]

The county supervisors' ideas about the beneficial aspects of the Marriott proposal failed to convince the Prince William League for the Protection of Natural Resources. Porter and Snyder continued to oppose construction of the theme park and light industrial complex. They wanted to protect the battlefield park from what they saw as uncontrolled development. They also wanted to preserve some of the last open spaces in the county. In an attempt to nullify the rezoning decision, the league filed a lawsuit against the county, arguing that supervisors had not given ample time to opposing view points during the board's 5 April meeting. County officials had allowed nine people opposing the Marriott proposal and twelve supporters to speak. Almost ninety people had attended the April hearing, including Anthony Lapham, attorney for the Prince William League, who called the board's actions "prejudged and preferential" toward Marriott. The league also alleged that the county had violated a state code by advertising the date of the meeting for fifteen days instead of the required nineteen. [31]

These issues temporarily halted work on the Marriott project. In January 1974, in the midst of addressing the charges in the lawsuit, the county's legal advisers determined that the rezoning and special use permit were invalid because of insufficient advertising for the April 1973 meeting. Supervisors, unaware of a 1968 state code that set a minimum of nineteen days for advertising a board meeting, questioned whether the rest of their post-1968 zoning determinations could go unchallenged. County officials wanted the Marriott decision grouped with all the other questionable rezonings and either set aside or validated by passage of special legislation in the Virginia General Assembly. [32]

Meeting the conditions of the special use permit proved more difficult to overcome. To address concerns over water quality, Marriott proposed to build its own spray sewage irrigation facility, which would handle waste until the expected 1980 opening of the Upper Occoquan Sewer Authority plant. The sewer authority, the agency that would review and approve Marriott's sewage treatment proposal, tabled discussion of the independent plant until Marriott could provide detailed engineering plans. Questions over access to the Marriott tract also stalled construction. In November 1974 the Federal Highway Authority approved the requested additional interchange at Interstate 66 but indicated that no federal interstate funds were or would be available for the project. The authority also placed four conditions on its approval, including the preparation of a full environmental impact statement. The state of Virginia also indicated its approval of the proposed interchange, although it refused to provide funding. [33]

The federal request for an environmental impact statement signaled the end for the Marriott proposal. When questions arose in 1973 and 1974 over freeway access and the legality of the county rezoning decision, corporate officials delayed the anticipated opening of the theme park from the original date of 1976 to 1978. Marriott had planned to open the theme park in time for the nation's bicentennial celebrations, recognizing that tourists traveling to Washington, D.C., for special festivities would consider spending a day at the theme park. Although Marriott had to delay the opening, the company remained committed to the project until the request for the environmental statement. The federal government wanted a detailed statement, which would require at least a year to complete. Marriott had theme park projects in the works in California and Illinois, and the corporation decided to focus on these sites until they were "well off the ground." Without the National Park Service ever stating a position, Marriott placed its Virginia Great America on the "back burner" and proceeded with other more promising projects. The threat to the park appeared dead, or at least moribund. [34]

The National Park Service's decision to stay neutral on the Marriott proposal saved the agency from taking a potentially controversial stand against local governing boards and politically influential individuals. The agency gained experience in addressing adjacent land-use controversies while also defending the lands under its charge. Yet nagging issues remained. At what point should the Park Service take a stand and embroil itself in heated debate? How should the agency approach opposing sides once it has taken a stand? To what extent should political realities shape the Service's steps to protect its parks? Over the next fifteen years, the Manassas National Battlefield Park and National Park Service would confront each of these questions as the abandoned Marriott tract generated new controversies.


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©1998, Pennsylvania State University Press
adhi/chap7.htm — 01-Apr-2001