PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

FIRST ANNUAL PALO ALTO CONFERENCE

An International Conference on the Mexican-American War and its Causes and Consequences with Participants from Mexico and the United States. Brownsville, Texas, May 6-9, 1993



Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site
Southwest Region
National Park Service

Cover Illustration: "Plan of the Country to the North East of the City of Matamoros, 1846" in Albert C. Ramsey, trans., *The Other Side: Or, Notes for the History of the War Between Mexico and the United States* (New York: John Wiley, 1850).

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Edited by
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National Park Service
Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site
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In order to meet the challenges of the future, human understanding, cooperation, and respect must transcend aggression. We cannot learn from the future, we can only learn from the past and the present. I feel the proceedings of this conference illustrate that a step has been taken in the right direction.

John E. Cook
Regional Director
Southwest Region
National Park Service

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INTRODUCTION

A. N. Zavaleta
The University of Texas at Brownsville in Partnership with Texas Southmost College

The colonization of the North American Continent and the founding of New Spain and New England is bound with the common threads of a shared history. The colonies battles for self-identity and independence, as well as their struggles for organization and self-rule took place simultaneously and for similar reasons. It is not surprising, therefore, that the historical paths of these two great neighbors of North America would ultimately lead to conflict and war. Claims to the precious resource of unsettled land and boundary disputes served as the spark that ultimately ignited the war between the neighbors. The war's eventual outcome led to more than a century of post-war hostility and mistrust between Mexico and the United States.

The past one hundred years have been marked by cordial but cautious relations between the two governments and by a constant drama over immigration issues and economic questions. This period of nervousness between the neighbors has been defined and periodically supported by surges in the nationalistic fervor of the neighbors. During the early period, the neighbors recorded their respective histories describing their relationship as well as the explanations which most benefited and supported the emotions of their peoples and natural identities.

Because Mexico and the United States share a common border, it fits that the societies, cultures, and economies of the border would grow together creating a cultural region unlike that of either of the two progenitors, and that the hybrid border region would suffer from the neglect and avoidance of its parents. Only recently, after nearly one hundred and fifty years, is the border recognized as the defining factor in our shared legacy.

Our interwoven threads of common history suggests that the two neighbors would eventually come to realize the mutual benefit that can be realized by their proximity. The cooling of passion in favor of calmer heads demands that we re-visit our common history and thus plan for our mutual success and prosperity in the next phase of our common destiny.

Most observers agree that Mexico and the United States are ready to move into the next phase of their future as neighbors. It should be noted, however, that there are those nay-sayers who seek to undermine and delay this inevitability. A nation's historical course may not be rushed and the revision of nationalistic history takes generations for acceptance. The re-visitation of our history as neighbors will assist in our re-assessment of our past and our future as neighbors.

In this regard, no other event in the interrelated histories of Mexico and the United States is as important as the Mexican-American War. The war serves as a focal point of historic definition and understanding of the national psyche of Mexico and the United States. The Mexican-American War also serves as the most important point of

reference we have for the understanding of our relationship as neighbors in the approximately one hundred and fifty years that have passed since the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo in 1848. Importantly, both countries have only recently been able to deal with the historic reality of the war within the context of mature neighbors. Thus Mexican and American scholars are now beginning to place new importance on the war and to re-define it and its many neglected or avoided aspects.

With the establishment of the Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site in Brownsville, Texas, the scholars and interested parties of these two great nations have begun to convene to discuss and re-examine the war in an open and professional setting. While the historical significance of these efforts will not be completely appreciated for years to come, the establishment of the historic site and the events which it supports such as conferences, publications, and evaluations, will one day serve as historic reference to the initial stages in our understanding of the next phase of Mexican and American bi-national development.

Eight of the nine articles presented in this volume were originally papers presented at the First Annual Palo Alto Conference held at The Historic Brownsville Museum and the Instituto Tecnológico de Matamoros in 1993. The nine articles are an eclectic representation of the scholarship currently being conducted that re-examine the Mexican-American War. Four Mexican and four American scholars present nine different themes that either directly or indirectly help us to understand the origins and actions of the Mexican-American War. The articles are combined with the transcripts of the meeting. Each article melds with the others to pull into clear focus the importance of the continued study of the Mexican-American War.

Joseph Sánchez, director of the Spanish Colonial Research Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico, begins the collection of essays with "General Mariano Arista at the Battle of Palo Alto, Texas, 1846: Military Realist or Failure?" Through a careful review of the Mexican sources, Sánchez sheds new light on General Arista's performance at the first battle of the Mexican-American War. Sánchez finds, as did the Mexican army's Supreme Tribunal almost one hundred and fifty years ago, that Arista, although tentative and overly cautious, followed standard battlefield procedure consistent with contemporary tactical practices and battlefield conditions.

Pedro Santoni, of California State University at San Bernardino, presents an intriguing examination of the Mexican patriot Valentín Gómez Farías and his role in the war with the United States in his paper, entitled "A Fanatical Patriot with Good Intentions: Reflections on the Activities of Valentín Gómez Farías During the Mexican-American War." Santoni describes the dearth of material written about the political, economic, and social dynamics of the Mexican post-independence years and especially the war years, 1845-1848. The story of the *puros*, the *moderados*, and the conservatives, in the shaping of Mexican politics provides valuable insight to the structure of Mexican politics both before and after the Mexican-American War.

The noted Mexican-American War historian, Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, of El Colegio de México, presents an article entitled "El Contexto Mexicano, Angulo Desconocido de la Guerra." Zoraida Vázquez proposes that the lack of Mexican investigation of the Mexican-American War has permitted the history of the war to be described only through the eyes of the American victors. She states Mexican interest in the Mexican-American War is represented by only a few frustrated authors who have felt it necessary to defend Mexico. Zoraida Vázquez points out the role of "*comerciantes extranjeros*" who favored the federalists, the number of internal government changes that

had taken place in the period after the Mexican war of independence and before the Mexican-American War, and the role of the Catholic Church in Mexican history. These factors and others led to the Texas separatist movement and ultimately to the conflict between the United States and Mexico.

Miguel Soto, from the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, asks the question, "Could The Mexican-American War Have Been Avoided?" Soto examines the political, economic, and social dynamics that characterized the United States and Mexico at the beginning of the nineteenth century. While Mexico and the United States had grown together in many ways, the internal political strife experienced by both nations after the Mexican war of independence helped to shape the eventual politics of war.

Donald S. Frazier, of McMurray University in Abilene, Texas, provides the reader with a view of the "Confederate Imperial Designs on Northwestern Texas." Frazier's work deals with our need to understand the "origins of southern imperial ambitions." Manifest Destiny is often placed solely in the context of the United States as a whole. In this way the divergent social, political, and economic characteristics of the southern versus the northern areas of the United States in the early nineteenth century are often overlooked. This article provides us with a view of the Mexican-American War as an important national event which served as a dress rehearsal to the American Civil War.

Mexican scholar Jesús Velasco-Márquez, of the Universidad de las Americas-Puebla, describes with clarity United States political and geographic sectionalism which served as a driving force leading the United States directly into the war with Mexico. Velasco-Márquez accurately explains the fragile nature of the American union in the early part of the nineteenth century and the steps which were taken to ward off the dissolution of the infant nation and to ensure the continuation of Manifest Destiny throughout the nineteenth century.

In "The Boys for Mexico: Organization of the American Army on the Eve of the Mexican-American War," Richard Bruce Winders of Texas Christian University, describes the often overlooked and extraordinary efforts that were taken by the young United States in order to muster an army for its war with Mexico. In describing Command, Support, and Combat, Winders depicts a nation only marginally prepared and organized to fight a war with Mexico which had a fully active European-style army.

Donald S. Frazier's "The Disputed Border: An Encyclopedia of American-Mexican Conflict 1821-1854," describes the preparation of an encyclopedic work which is intended to examine the fact that, "up to this point there exists no single reference work where students and scholars alike can turn to for quick information concerning the somewhat bewildering saga of American and Mexican relations during the Middle Period."

Salvador Díaz-Berrio, from the Dirección de Monumentos Históricos, of the Instituto Nacional de Antropología y Historia, in Mexico City rounds out the text by examining the "Rehabilitación de Fortificaciones: Valor Histórico, Contexto y Marco Natural." This article presents the Mexican perspective on the value of the preservation and restoration of Mexican military sites as critical to the maintenance of the Mexican historical and cultural identity. In his article, originally written in 1983, Díaz-Berrio outlines INAH's concern for the numerous sites of military significance which have either fallen into ruin or are now threatened by urban development in Mexico.

The nine papers and the 1993 conference transcripts presented in this volume do not pretend to re-write or to re-define the nature of the armed conflict between Mexico and the United States in 1846. They do, however, represent a recent and bold attempt to

initiate vigorous investigation of the facts surrounding the Mexican-American War and its rightful place in Mexican and American history.

This understudied and little understood war has not received the historical recognition that it deserves. This omission is clearly due to the political sensitivities which continue to exist between the two nations and their people. The United States and Mexico now literally find themselves at the threshold of the twenty-first century with a new treaty--NAFTA--which is expected to prepare the way for the next era in the interrelated destinies of Mexico and the United States.

This publication, supported by the National Park Service, unites the contributions of Mexican and American scholars as well as that of all of the 1993 conference participants and sponsors and serves to build a bridge between our national identities, through scholarship and continued good will. This document is testimony to the need for the continued re-interpretation of the events of the Mexican-American War. The Second Annual Palo Alto Conference was held at the University of Texas at Brownsville in 1994 and the conference proceedings are being prepared for publication at this time.

All neighbors everywhere experience conflict during their histories, the emotions generated by conflict and change. Mexico and the United States must continue to redefine their shared history and geography in order to insure their mutual prosperity and harmony as neighbors. The promotion of the importance and re-interpretation of their shared histories is just one way to promote continued and lasting friendship between Mexico and the United States.

GENERAL MARIANO ARISTA AT THE BATTLE OF PALO ALTO, TEXAS, 1846: MILITARY REALIST OR FAILURE?[1]

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General Mariano Arista sat attentively before the military Board of Inquiry in Mexico City, which was investigating Mexican losses at the battles of Palo Alto, Resaca de Guerrero, and Matamoros that had occurred in May 1846. Aware of possible charges against him, Arista had requested an inquiry, hoping to clear his name.[2] Impeccably dressed in a dark blue uniform which set off his handsome red beard, Arista began the defense of his conduct during the Texas campaign by praising the action of his men at Palo Alto, the first major battle of the Mexican War.[3] The general's face was tense as he presented his testimony against accusations that he had mismanaged his troops on the battlefield. As he spoke, the inquisitors quietly perused the reports by Arista's junior officers[4] that described the frightful beating suffered by Mexican soldiers on the afternoon of May 8, 1846 at the hands of General Zachary Taylor and his American army. Listening intently, the officers of the Board of Inquiry, who had begun their proceedings in mid-May, were cognizant of the reality that at Palo Alto and Resaca de Guerrero the Army of the North had been virtually destroyed. Moreover, they realized

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[1]"General Mariano Arista at the Battle of Palo Alto, Texas, 1846: Military Realist or Failure," first appeared in *Journal of the West*, 9 (April 1985):6-21. The author gratefully acknowledges Ms. Carol Williams, publisher of *Journal of the West,* for granting permission to reprint this version.

[2]*Fallo Definitivo del Supremo Tribunal de la Guerra, al Examinar la Conducta Militar del Exmo. Sr. General D. Mariano Arista en las Acciones de Guerra que Sostuvo al Prinicipio de la Invasión Americana* (México: García Torres, 1850), 2. (Hereinafter cited as *Fallo Definitivo.*) Pánfilo Barasorda, *Pedimentos Presentados en la Causa Formada al E. Sr. D. M. Arista* (Mexico: Lara, 1849), 20. Mariano Arista, in correspondence dated June 26 and 29, 1846 asked that only a council of war inquire into the battle so that his name could be cleared. A formal inquiry had begun on June 9, 1846 in Mexico City. *Pedimento Presentado en 14 de Mayo del Presente Año* (1846), Lafragua Collection, Biblioteca Nacional de México.

[3]*Campaña contra los americanos del norte* (México: Ignacio Cumplido, 1846), 4. (Hereinafter cited as *Campaña contra.*) "Al ser llamado ante un consejo de guerra el Escmo. Sr. General D. Mariano Arista, para responder de su conducta como general en jefe del ejército del Norte, deben los sucesos de su epoca presentarse sin pasión ni animosidad, y las acciones de guerra del 8 y del 9 de Mayo procsimo (sic) describirse tales cuales han pasado." Previously, Arista attempted to excuse his presence at the inquiry but quickly added to his correspondence "No rehuso marchar a la capital...pedía con encarecimiento que mi causa se formase donde los testigos pudieran ratificarse y carearse a mi presencia, como lo quiere la ley..." *Segundo Pedimiento Presentado el dia 9 de junio del Presente Año, Mexico 9 June 1849*, (1849), Lafragua Collection, Biblioteca Nacional de México, 22.

[4]Six officers under Arista were interrogated by General Francisco Pardo, *fiscal militar*, and nine other officers testified before the Tribunal. "...y en la cual consta que el Supremo Gobierno dispuso que todos los oficiales del ejército del Norte que viniesen a esta Capital..." *Fallo Definitivo*, 9, 30.

inescapably that the Mexican defense of the north had collapsed. More than once during his testimony, General Arista asserted that his men had fought bravely. When he had finished speaking, the investigators were satisfied that they had learned all they could about how the outnumbered American army had overwhelmed Arista's valiant Mexican troops. Quietly they feared the worst, for Palo Alto significantly foretold Mexico's fate in the war against the *norteamericanos*.

In the course of the investigation the Board thoroughly reviewed the events leading to the battle of Palo Alto. They recalled that in 1845, when the United States annexed Texas, Mexico charged that its sovereignty had been despoiled by the American Congress since Texas theoretically still belonged to the Republic of Mexico.[5] Months of negotiations and threats between the two nations failed to resolve the issue. With the advent of a more aggressive and militarist government under Major General Mariano Paredes in 1846, Mexico began to mobilize the army to assert its controversial ownership of Texas. Amassing troops at Matamoros, the Mexicans determined to cross the Río Grande and stop any American attempts to occupy the south Texas plains below the Río Nueces.

As Mexico prepared to defend its sovereignty, United States President James K. Polk, evaluating the situation, decided not to take any chances in dealing with the Mexican government. While, on the one hand hoping to restore normal relations with Mexico, Polk, nonetheless, was prepared when matters deteriorated to initiate negotiations for the purchase of certain Mexican lands. For instance, when John C. Slidell, the United States negotiator, attempted to confer with Mexican officials, he was rudely rebuffed and given his passport. Already, as if ordered into combat, American warships were sighted in Mexican waters near Veracruz.[6] And, on June 23, 1845, Brevet Brigadier General Taylor, commanding approximately fifteen hundred regulars, left Fort Jesup, Louisiana, bound for Texas. Leading seven companies of dragoons to San Antonio, Taylor directed the infantry to proceed by sea from New Orleans to Aránzazu Bay on the Texas coast.[7] The following month they camped at Corpus Christi and by mid-summer Taylor joined them there. His force now numbered more than thirty-five hundred men. Mexican scouts reported Taylor's moves to their commander at Matamoros who in turn informed his superiors. To the militarist Mexican government under Paredes, Polk's contradictory actions were insulting, naive, and foolhardy.

Mexican intelligence reports read by the inquirers revealed that by the end of July, Taylor and his army were camped at Corpus Christi, near the mouth of the Nueces River. There, he awaited further instructions from his commander-in-chief, President Polk. Once news of Slidell's failure and rebuff reached Washington, D.C., Polk ordered Taylor to move his troops southward to a point just opposite Matamoros. Beginning his advance on March 8, 1846, Taylor took twelve days to reach the Arroyo Colorado (near present day Harlingen) which he crossed.[8] Veering eastward to the Gulf of Mexico, the United States Army first bivouacked near the coastal village of Frontón de Santa Isabel

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[5]*The Texas Revolution and the Mexican War: 1820-1852* (Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Washington, D.C., 1959), 34-35.

[6]José María Roa Barcena, *Recuerdos de la Invasión Norteamericana (1846-1848)*, 3 vols. (México: Porrúa, 1947), 1:37.

[7]Roa Barcena, *Recuerdos*, 1:35.

[8]W. L. Marcy, Report of December 5, 1846, 29th Cong., 2nd Sess. *House Executive Document No. 4*, 46-47.

(on Point Isabel) just north of Matamoros. Upon learning of Taylor's advance some of the Mexican villagers at Frontón abandoned their homes, burning them as they left.[9] Nevertheless, Taylor secured Point Isabel, established a supply base, and constructed a defensive post which he called Fort Polk, adjacent to the charred remains of Frontón. Four days after arriving at Point Isabel, on March 28, Taylor with his main force took possession of the north bank of the Río Grande hardly a musket shot from Matamoros.[10] By April, Taylor's army was well established in southern Texas.

During Taylor's march from Corpus Christi to Point Isabel and Matamoros, Mexican scouts had kept a close watch on the American movements. Not only were they aware of Taylor's march southward, they also watched the American soldiers erect an earthen-walled star fortress called Fort Texas just across the Río Grande from Matamoros.[11] Although the Mexicans made no attempt to dislodge Taylor at that time, they continued to monitor and report American activities in the area to their command headquarters at Matamoros. Simultaneously, at Matamoros, Mexican troops worked diligently constructing earthen defenses and positioning almost their entire artillery along them.[12]

Meanwhile, far away in Mexico City, the Council of War collectively made a major decision. On April 4, 1846, General José María Tornel y Mendívil, minister of war and marine, appointed forty-four-year-old Major General Arista to command the Army of the North.[13] Proceeding northward from Monterrey to Matamoros, Arista, with orders from Tornel y Mendívil to attack Taylor's force on the Río Grande, formulated a plan to stop the Americans from advancing any further south.

Upon arriving at Matamoros, Arista mobilized the various Mexican troops that had been gathering there for several months.[14] At that northern outpost were close to three thousand troops with twenty artillery pieces, commanded by General Francisco Mejía.[15] The assembled forces included a battalion of *Zapadores* (sappers), several regiments of foot soldiers including the Second Light Infantry and the First and Tenth Line Infantry as well as the Seventh Cavalry, one squadron of auxiliary troops from different villas of the north, various presidial companies, and one battalion of the local national guard. From Tampico the newly-arrived Sixth Infantry and a battalion of the Coast Guard joined the force.[16] And on April 11, Pedro de Ampudia, a Cuban temporarily designated *general en jefe*, arrived with the Regiment of Light Infantry of Mexico to be joined by General Anastasio Torrejón.[17] Under Torrejón was the Fourth Infantry comprised of soldiers from the states of Mexico, Puebla, and Morelia. With them stood the Eighth Cavalry with six artillery pieces and eighty cannoneers. Together Ampudia's and Torrejón's personnel added two thousand two hundred soldiers to the

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[9]Roa Barcena, *Recuerdos*, 1:61.

[10]Ibid.

[11]K. Jack Bauer, *The Mexican War: 1846-1848* (New York: Macmillan, 1974), 9-10.

[12]Bauer, *Mexican War*, 42.

[13]*Campaña contra*, 4; *Fallo Definitivo*, 16.

[14]*Campaña contra*, 5.

[15]Roa Barcena, *Recuerdos*, 1:61.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid.; *Campaña contra*, 4.

army at Matamoros under Mejía. Arista assumed supreme command of all these troops totalling five thousand two hundred men and twenty-six pieces of artillery.[18]

As he sat before the Board of Inquiry, Arista, like his junior officers before and after him, testified on the following events. On April 23, just outside Matamoros at Rancho de Soliseño, Arista reviewed his troops.[19] Afterwards he met with his staff in a council of war. Standing around a table they studied a map showing the land north of Matamoros. Pointing to Frontón de Santa Isabel and Fort Texas where Taylor's troops were stationed, Arista proposed deploying a contingent of Mexican troops between them to cut their line of communications.[20] That, Arista mused, would force Taylor to commit his troops to action. Somewhere between the two points, Arista reasoned, a battle would occur. As Arista's Army of the North bivouacked at Rancho de Soliseño, President Paredes issued a manifesto to the Mexican people, the contents of which were previously known to the field commander. The manifesto clearly acknowledged that a state of war existed between the two countries.[21] After reviewing his troops, Arista explained the situation to them. As the general paced before them, he perceived that their morale was high, that they were ready for combat. Brimming with confidence, the red-haired general gave the junior officers their orders to march. With a wave of his arm, General Torrejón led his troops out of Rancho de Soliseño, the first unit to move out on April 24, 1846.[22]

After waving farewell to their comrades at Rancho de Soliseño, Torrejón and sixteen hundred men marched toward an obscure spot called Palo Alto, between Fort Texas and Frontón de Santa Isabel.[23] That same day Torrejón's troops crossed the muddy Río Grande at La Palangana, about twenty miles upstream from Matamoros. Once on the north bank, he dispatched scouts and resumed his march in a northerly direction. Later that day Torrejón's scouts reported that seventy *norteamericanos* were camped at Carricitos not far from his rear.[24] Quickly Torrejón conducted a council of war and decided to attack the Carricitos encampment with a small detachment. Rejoining Torrejón the next day, the officer of the detachment indicated that the skirmish had been short and the Americans had been routed. The march continued.

However insignificant, at least momentarily, the clash at Carricitos seemed to Torrejón's command, it was not so to General Taylor. When Taylor learned that the Mexicans had crossed the river, he sent patrols of dragoons to determine their positions.[25] One patrol, led by Captain Seth B. Thornton, was the group attacked at Carricitos by Torrejón's feisty soldiers. In the brief encounter Thornton's command suffered eleven killed, six wounded, and forty-six captured.[26] Seizing the opportunity,

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[18]Roa Barcena, *Recuerdos*, 1:62; *Campaña contra*, 4.

[19]*Campaña contra*, 4; Roa Barcena, *Recuerdos*, 1:62.

[20]Roa Barcena, *Recuerdos*, 1:62. Arista's plan included cutting Zachary Taylor's communications between Point Isabel and Corpus Christi. See Ynstrucciones, Mariano Arista, Soliseño, April 24, 1846, Exp. X/2174, Archivo Histórico, Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional; and Arista, Soliseño, April 24, 1846, Exp. X/2174, Archivo Histórico, Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional.

[21]Lynn I. Perrigo, *The American Southwest* (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York: 1971), 158.

[22]*Campaña contra*, 5; Roa Barcena, *Recuerdos*, 1:63.

[23]Roa Barcena, *Recuerdos*, 1:63; *Campaña contra*, 5.

[24]Bauer, *Mexican War*, 48.

[25]*The Texas Revolution*, 37-39; *Campaña contra*, 5.

[26]*The Texas Revolution*, 37-39.

Taylor sent a message to President Polk describing the engagement.[27] On May 11, two days after Taylor's message arrived in Washington, the House of Representatives approved a bill authorizing war against Mexico. The next day the Senate voted in favor of the war proposal, and on May 13, President Polk signed it.[28] The United States was now committed. But out on the flat plains of south Texas, time stood on the threshold of the first week of May 1846.

April ended with a Mexican victory and May began with a flurry of activity as both armies jockeyed for positions. The Board of Inquiry noted that on April 28, just north of Fort Texas, Major Rafael Quintero attacked a party of Texas Rangers under a certain Captain Samuel Walker.[29] In the ensuing firefight five Rangers were killed and four were captured as Walker and his patrol scrambled for the safety of their fort. Torrejón, who earlier had reached the place called Palo Alto along the Point Isabel-Matamoros road, had accomplished his mission. The road was cut.[30] And a nervous Taylor paced the grounds at Fort Texas trying to figure how to protect his split command. He knew--and Torrejón knew--that Taylor had only a few days' supplies left and the cache was at Point Isabel.[31] Torrejón had only to wait and see what would be Taylor's move. But now chance in the form of a bad decision intervened and turned the Fates of War on their heads. Miles away Arista with the main force had advanced past Matamoros to the Río Grande and was having difficulty in getting across the river which, as usual for this season, was high. Also, rumors abounded that Taylor was sending snipers to "assassinate" Arista as he forded the river. Consequently, Arista requested that Torrejón return to assist and protect the troops at the crossing.[32] So a perplexed Torrejón and his command broke camp and headed south. As the inquirers weighed the consequences of the move, their patience with Arista began to wear. They realized now what the field commanders had known at the time.[33] Taylor's scouts quickly reported the new intelligence. Mobilizing his force, Taylor with approximately two thousand three hundred men and two hundred empty wagons marched out of Fort Texas. The remainder of his men, some five hundred soldiers, were left behind under Major Jacob Brown.[34]

Two objectives were on Taylor's mind as he raced across the flats of Palo Alto. The first was to strengthen Fort Polk on Point Isabel before Arista could take it; the second was to resupply Fort Texas before the Mexican troops which by now had crossed the Río Grande could lay siege to it. Torrejón's abandonment of his strategic hold of the road near Palo Alto had afforded Taylor the opportunity to shift his forces, and Arista's delay in crossing the river bought the time the Americans needed to accomplish their maneuvers.

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[27]Bauer, *Mexican War*, 48; *Campaña contra*, 5.

[28]Bauer, *Mexican War*, 48; *Texas Revolution*, 39.

[29]Bauer, *Mexican War*, 48.

[30]Roa Barcena, *Recuerdos*, 1:62.

[31]*Campaña contra*, 5.

[32]Ibid., 5-6.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Jeremiah M. Scarritt to James Totten, May 12, 1846, Letters Received, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Record Group 77, National Archives, cited in *Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site, Boundary Study* (Santa Fe: National Park Service, 1980), 15; *Campaña contra*, 6.

Based on Mexican scout reports, the inquirers knew that Taylor and his men had hurried out of Fort Texas at noon on May 1.[35] From a distance the Mexican scouts could see the huge cloud of dust kicked up by Taylor's men, horses, and wagons. Stopping to rest only at midnight, the Americans camped at Palo Alto.[36] Early the next morning they pushed ahead to Point Isabel which they reached on May 2, after nearly twenty-four hours of marching. Once there, a joyous Taylor must have breathed a sigh of relief for he had traveled the course unimpeded by Mexican troops. Quickly the Americans began the tasks of strengthening Fort Polk and the supply depot, and loading the wagon train for Fort Texas.[37]

Meanwhile Arista, now on the north bank of the Río Grande, marched his men to Palo Alto. By that time, he later testified, he realized that Taylor had eluded him.[38] On May 3 the Mexican army arrived at Palo Alto where Arista called a council of war. Studying their maps the council concluded that by waiting they could still cut Taylor's line of communication between Point Isabel and Fort Texas. But Palo Alto lacked sufficient water for Arista's large army.[39] On the other hand, the Mexicans calculated that Taylor could take a short cut to Fort Texas by marching south of Palo Alto. Accordingly, Arista pulled out to a new position, a place called Tanques de Ramireño, which had an abundance of water and where he could watch the junction of the trails to the Fort Texas-Matamoros area. He arrived there with 3,461 men on May 5.[40]

While waiting for Taylor to make a move, Arista gave General Ampudia orders to join General Antonio Canales and begin the siege of the five hundred Americans at Fort Texas. Taking twelve hundred thirty men and four pieces of artillery, the Cuban-born Mexican officer immediately began his mission. With him marched the Fourth Regiment of Infantry, the company from Puebla, and one company of sappers.[41] By nightfall Ampudia was within cannon shot of the American position. Canales and his men had been there since the day before. Together they besieged the Americans whose supplies were running low.

Because Mexican intelligence indicated that the Americans could only hold out for fifty hours more, Arista had given Ampudia express orders that no assault take place.[42] In the meantime, periodic barrages on Fort Texas from the artillery at Matamoros began. The intermittent bombardment lasted from May 3 to May 9. On the morning of May 6, Major Brown was severely wounded. He died three days later, shortly before the fort was relieved by Taylor's forces.[43] The American casualties during the six-day siege totaled two killed and eleven wounded. Despite the assault, the

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[35]*Campaña contra*, 6.

[36]Bauer, *Mexican War*, 49.

[37]Ibid.

[38]*Campaña Contra*, 6.

[39]Roa Barcena, *Recuerdos*, 1:64; *Campaña contra*, 6.

[40]Roa Barcena, *Recuerdos*, 1:64, states that water was a factor in making the move. Nevertheless, *Campaña contra*, 7, states that the move to Tanques de Ramireño was based on the fact that Arista "supo había otro camino, o más propiamente, otro punto en que se reunían los caminos del Frontón al fortín..."

[41]*Campaña contra*, 7.

[42]Ibid.

[43]Edgar S. Hawkins to Zachary Taylor, December 1, 1846, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., *Senate Document No. 388*, 31-37.

Americans refused to surrender. (After the major's death, Fort Texas became Fort Brown. In time the fort became Brownsville.)

On May 7, Mexican scouts patrolled the area and crisscrossed the plain east of Palo Alto.[44] One party, trotting their horses along the Point Isabel road could find no trace of the enemy. After examining the countryside they returned to an *ojo* to water their horses. There they saw a runaway American mule and horse which had come to drink.[45] Was it a sign that Taylor had begun his march from Fort Polk? Or, were these strays from Taylor's previous march across Palo Alto?

Riding fast through the early morning mist of May 8, Mexican scouts brought their horses to a halt in front of General Arista's headquarters tent. Dismounting, they saluted their commander and reported that Taylor and a large complement of troops with many wagons had left Frontón de Santa Isabel the day before.[46] Since this message conflicted with an earlier false report indicating that Taylor had not yet begun his march,[47] Arista was disposed to take his time and wait. But to make sure, while his men were preparing breakfast he sent out another patrol to reconnoiter the road to Santa Isabel. That group, under Lieutenant Inés García, had gone just past Palo Alto when they were ambushed by an advance party of Texas volunteers. The Americans fired first. García's horse fell under him, his hoof shattered by a shot. Stunned, García quickly recovered and ran for a clump of nearby trees. Drawn by the sound of gunshots, a contingent of Mexican cavalry rushed to join the skirmish barely in time to save García from captivity.[48] Not a moment was lost in sending hard riding messengers back to Arista. The news in the camp was electrifying. Within an hour, Arista and his men marched northwesterly to block Taylor's advance.[49] Before leaving, Arista sent a recall message to Ampudia, still at the siege of Fort Texas.[50] By a quarter past noon, Ampudia, with the Fourth Regiment of Infantry, a company of sappers, a *remuda* (remount or pack train) of two hundred horses and two artillery pieces, was on his way. Worried that he would not get to Palo Alto on time to reinforce Arista, Ampudia pushed his men ahead.

At high noon Taylor's scouts reported sighting the Mexican army approaching Palo Alto. Near there, on the edge of the plain, the Americans with an odd calm filled their canteens at a *bolsón* that held rain water.[51] Aware of the Mexican presence in the area, Taylor cautiously proceeded onto the flatland, leaving his heavily-guarded wagon train to the rear. Almost simultaneously, the two armies stepped onto Palo Alto within sight of one another. Louis Berlandier, the Swiss botanist who served as General Mejía's adjutant, was there and the inquirers read through his account: "At about 1:15 in the afternoon, we passed through a little clearing in the chaparral that opened onto the plain of Palo Alto. We saw our scouts coming toward us at breakneck speed, announcing the

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[44]Jean Luis Berlandier, "Itinerario: Campaña de Palo Alto y Resaca de Guerrero," MSS-310, Western Americana Collection, Yale University, 150. Manuscript translation by Frank Mares.

[45]Berlandier, "Itinerario," 152.

[46]*Campaña contra*, 8.

[47]Berlandier, "Itinerario," 153.

[48]Berlandier, "Itinerario," 154-55.

[49]*Campaña contra*, 8-9.

[50]*Campaña contra*, 8.

[51]Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant* (New York: Da Capo, 1982), 44; Zachary Taylor, Report of June 12, 1846, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., *House Executive Document No. 209.*

approach of the enemy who came on the road."[52] Taylor's scouts likewise were surprised at the proximity of the advancing Army of the North. Racing to their respective armies, yelling warnings, the scouts reported to their commanders, while field officers shouting orders maneuvered their units into a battle line. Horses neighed, mules brayed, soldiers yelled, and artillery caissons, wheels grinding and squealing, rumbled into position as they splashed through the rain-soaked ground. Curiously, a squadron of American cavalrymen, under Lieutenant Jacob Blake, raced toward the deploying Mexican right flank, stopped within a few hundred feet of the Mexican artillery, and turned back at great speed.[53] Then a silence fell over the field. The two armies, less than a half mile apart, faced each other. The wind blew over a cloudy Texas sky.

Looking across the field with his spy-glass, Arista observed the American line. He noted that Taylor had stopped along the curve of the road in the same place where the Mexican troops had camped on May 2, 3, and 4.[54] He could see the long oxen-pulled wagon train laden with supplies for Fort Texas. To Taylor's right, American troops occupied a distinct mound of earth that stretched along a wash.[55] Turning to Taylor's left flank, Arista saw a low brushy area, and more troops poised for action behind the scrub. In back of them, near the rear of the wagons waited the watchful rear-guard. In front of them all, just beyond the formation, a column of troops had advanced and positioned its artillery. Moving his spy-glass across Taylor's line once again, Arista surmised that the front line was concave, possibly with a collapsible center. From a distance, he observed Taylor's artillery park. Although Arista, like Taylor, prepared for a bayonet charge across the field,[56] no one at that moment realized the tremendous advantage held by the Americans. Still the artillery caught Arista's eye.

Before beginning his march from Frontón de Santa Isabel, Taylor had decided to bring whatever artillery he could spare at Fort Polk to defend Fort Texas,[57] leaving it to his artillerymen to choose the mix of guns. Aside from a battery of two 18-pounder siege guns, Taylor had with him two batteries of field artillery. One battery was comprised of "three or four" 12-pounder howitzers.[58] With Taylor rode the resourceful and innovative Major Samuel Ringgold. Ringgold, an Indian wars veteran, commanded one of the two field batteries. Sometime in his career the experienced Ringgold had devised what he called the "flying artillery." By mounting a 6-pounder howitzer on a large-wheel caisson he could increase not only its maneuverability but its usefulness under combat conditions. Pulled by horses and manned by specially trained gunners, the "flying artillery" could be quickly moved, unlimbered, fired, and moved again. Although Ringgold believed that his innovation was an improvement over conventional artillery,

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[52]Berlandier, "Itinerario," 156.

[53]Taylor, Report of June 12, 1846, *House Executive Document No. 209.*

[54]*Campaña contra*, 9.

[55]Berlandier, "Itinerario," 153.

[56]*Campaña contra*, 9; Pedro de Ampudia, *Manifesto del General Ampudia a Sus Concuidadanos* (México: Ignacio Cumplido, 1847).

[57]Nathan Covington Brooks, *A Complete History of the Mexican War: Its Causes, Conduct and Consequences* (Chicago: Rio Grande Press, 1965), 125.

[58]John James Peck, *The Sign of the Eagle: A View of Mexico, 1830-1855* (San Diego: Union-Tribune, 1970), 22.

it was yet untested.[59] For the moment Taylor, unaware of his advantage, faced the formidable Army of the North.

The scratching sound of the scribes' pens could be heard in the background of Arista's voice, and now the Board paid close attention: Arista was describing his deployment of his own men. Of his 3300-man battle line, less than a mile and a half long, the scribes recorded:

> Ours was no more than an extended...line, two men deep, without secondary lines, nor reserves, nor any concentration of troops whatsoever. Our artillery was situated between the brigades and the cavalry was in two sections. The smaller cavalry unit, under Coronel Noriega, held the extreme right flank, while the other much larger unit under General Torrejón was on the left.[60]

Behind the line Arista parked his baggage train and set up a hospital at a safe distance, some 800 varas (733 yards) and 1500 varas (1,375 yards), respectively, to the rear of the left flank.[61]

There was other testimony on the disposition of the troops. Berlandier described the Mexican line by noting that,

> While these movements were taking place, General Arista gave the order to his successively arriving troops, to converge on the right and to form the battle line, which extended on the right from a little rise in a succession of extremely flat hills, behind which there was a little pool with one to two feet of water...Our left extended from the other side of the plain against the woods and marshes, difficult to overcome, near the road by which the enemy had to pass. A battery of four pieces of artillery occupied the center, and the other pieces of smaller caliber were set out on the right and left wings. A small squadron of light cavalry was situated on the right wing at the foot of the hill, while the rest of the cavalry occupied the left where the squadrons of volunteers watched the road and the vicinity of the chaparral by which the enemy would have been able to advance. The artillery park was situated behind the center of the line, and farther back, near the edge of the wood, was the ambulance. Behind the right wing, slightly sheltered by the hill of Motitas, the provision carts were positioned for the duration of the battle, retreating only a little into the chaparral.[62]

Looking at a map of the battlefield, the inquirers studied the alignment of the first position held by Arista's men. On the left flank they identified Torrejón's position, where one squadron of cavalry sat on the road blocking Taylor's advance and three other squadrons with two cannons extended their line off the road to the right. After an interval of several hundred yards the line continued toward the right.[63] Ampudia and his men soon arrived. "I made my movement [from Fort Texas] within one-half hour and, within

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[59]Grant, *Memoirs*, 44.

[60]Donald E. Houston, "The Role of Artillery in the Mexican War," *Journal of the West* 9 (April 1972), 284.

[61]*Campaña contra*, 9.

[62]*Campaña contra*, 11.

[63]Berlandier, "Itinerario," 159-60.

the hour, I was part of the battle line along with the Fourth Regiment, one company of sappers, 200 auxiliaries and two 8-pounders," reported Ampudia.[64] Next to Ampudia's troops were the Tenth and Sixth Regiments of Infantry with five artillery pieces. The center of the line was held by the First Regiment of Infantry. Finally, the right flank was anchored by the Battalion de Zapadores and the unit of light cavalry under Noriega, who was situated against a low rise on the extreme right flank.[65] One other unit almost missed the attention of inquirers. Far to the left of Torrejón's cavalrymen, hidden from Taylor's sight by high chaparral, was General Canales with four hundred horse soldiers, *rancheros*, whom Arista hoped would be available for shock, that is for a swift cavalry charge against Taylor. As it turned out, Canales stayed out of the entire battle, *sin acción*.[66]

Taylor shifted his force to conform with the Mexican line. The extreme right flank, lying on the road, facing the Mexican cavalry, was held by Colonel James McIntosh's Fifth Infantry. To his left was Major Ringgold and his "flying artillery." The Third Brigade under Lieutenant Colonel John Garland confronted the Mexican center. Garland's command was made up of the Third Infantry under Captain Lewis N. Morris and the Fourth Infantry under Brevet Major George W. Allen. Between them were placed the two ox-drawn 18-pounder iron guns, commanded by Lieutenant William Churchill. The left flank consisted of a battalion of artillery, serving as infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Childs. Next to Childs on the left was another unit of "flying artillery" under Captain James Duncan, and on the extreme left stood Captain William Montgomery and his Eighth Infantry. Behind the front line, forming the right wing on the road, was Captain Walker and the Texas Rangers, and on the extreme left was Brevet Lieutenant Colonel William Belknap and Captain Charles May's dragoons. General Taylor set up his command post behind the two lines. At the rear, Captain Croghan Ker and his dragoons were a reserve and protected the wagons,[67] which by now had formed a square.[68]

The land between the two armies was flat, with low, shrubby mesquite. From Taylor's view the land had a very slight upward elevation of little consequence. The land in front of Taylor's right wing contained a slight depression that was quite muddy because of the recent rainfall.[69] In the ranks was young Ulysses S. Grant who later wrote: "Where we were the grass was tall, reaching to the shoulders of the men, very stiff, and each stock was pointed at the top, and hard and almost as sharp as a darning needle."[70]

The Mexican line looked formidable, their bayonets and lances glistening in the sunlight[71] that passed between clouds. But their artillery was poor quality, the gunpowder and shot inferior, and the musketry antiquated. Arista's cavalry, equipped with lances and carbines; comprised the effective arm of the Army of the North. But their horses were jaded and lacked the stamina that would be needed in the next few

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[64]*Campaña contra*, 9.
[65]Ampudia, *Concuidadanos*.
[66]*Campaña contra*, 9.
[67]*Campaña contra*, 10.
[68]Taylor, Report of June 12, 1846, *House Executive Document No. 209*.
[69]Berlandier, "Itinerario," 163.
[70]Grant, *Memoirs*, 44.
[71]Ibid.

hours of battle. What Arista did have to his advantage was superior numbers, and the choice of terrain.[72] General Arista reviewed the entire line, exhorting his men to combat as he rode his horse before them.[73] To the martial music of the Mexican drummers and trumpeters the troops cheered him, yelling "¡Viva México! ¡Viva México!" The Mexican soldiers were enthusiastic; and between cheers the Mexicans heard hurrahs from across the field by the American side in behalf of their own general and country.[74]

The well-disciplined Mexican troops had been ordered to wait until the American line was within firing range; they waited.[75] When Taylor's men were in place he gave the order to advance. A few minutes later, about 2:00 p.m., the slow-moving American line was approximately eight hundred yards from the Mexicans.[76] Arista's men opened fire first with artillery, then with muskets and carbines.[77] One of the first rounds made a direct hit on an American artillery caisson. Its driver was killed instantly. Seeing the hit the Mexican soldiers yelled "¡Viva México!"[78]

But soon the inferior weaponry of the Army of the North began to reveal itself. Most of the Mexican shot fell short and rolled through the tall marsh grass toward the American troops who easily sidestepped them.[79] Now they realized that the Mexican canonry "only fired solid shot," not the explosives that soon would be crossing the other way. Taylor halted the advance.[80] His troops had taken seven or eight hits.[81] The *norteamericanos* now took their turn in the duel at Palo Alto. Ringgold and Duncan galloped their units of "flying artillery" into positions one hundred yards in advance of their line and rapidly returned fire.[82] While the artillerymen went to work on the Mexican line, the American Eighth Infantry fell back slightly in order to anchor the left wing against a flanking movement. Meanwhile, Churchill's 18-pounders opened fire at long range with explosive shell and began to hit Ampudia's infantry which had just arrived from Fort Texas. The inquirers noted Ampudia's testimony in which he stated:

> The artillery which was already on the battle line commenced firing before the 4th Regiment had been positioned, and returned the hostile and well-aimed fire on our gallant forces which ignored the ravages upon them and concluded their move into position as if they had been in a grand parade of troops.[83]

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[72]Berlandier, "Itinerario," 61, states that Arista's men at Palo Alto totalled 3,369 men with 10 artillery pieces of four, six and eight pounders. Roa Barcena, *Recuerdos*, 1:79ff, states that 190 men were at the siege of Fort Brown and 1,350 were at Matamoros. "Estado que manifiesta la Fuerza de la Division del Norte en el campamento de Palo Alto, Numero I," *Campaña contra*, shows 3,461 men of which 332 were under General Canales who stayed out of the battle.

[73]Berlandier, "Itinerario," 164.

[74]Berlandier, "Itinerario," 164.

[75]*Campaña contra*, 9; Grant, *Memoirs*, 94; Berlandier, "Itinerario," 166.

[76]*Palo Alto Battlefield Boundary Study*, 21; Roa Barcena, *Recuerdos*, 1:79.

[77]*Campaña contra*, 9.

[78]Roa Barcena, *Recuerdos*, 1:79. *Palo Alto Battlefield Boundary Study*, 21.

[79]Grant, *Memoirs*, 45.

[80]Ibid.

[81]Berlandier, "Itinerario," 166.

[82]Taylor, Report of June 12, 1846, *House Executive Document No. 209.*

[83]Ampudia, *Concuidadanos.*

Several times the Mexicans timed how long it took the sound of an American cannon to arrive after they had seen its flash, to determine the ranges reached by the *norteamericanos*.[84] The distances, well over one-half mile, were further than the Mexican artillery could reach, but American artillery from that distance was not always accurate. The Mexicans reported that "most of the balls passed over our line and fell to the rear of the field hospital, which was obliged to change position."[85] Meanwhile, the Mexicans were able to correct their aim after which "we saw several [American] soldiers fall."[86] Both sides continued firing, and, even after the battlefield was filled with smoke, continued to fire without being able to see.

The inquirers praised the tenacity of the Mexican troops who withstood the assault for almost an hour. The American artillery had a devastating effect, and still the discipline and bravery of the Mexican army held firm.[87] During the most violent barrage of canonry, Ampudia dashed across the rear to Arista's command position and demanded that the general act at once. Angrily, Ampudia reported, "I called the attention of His Most Excellent Sire, General-in-Chief, to the necessity that we must charge with bayonets, just as we had previously discussed..."[88] To Ampudia, Arista's response was incomprehensible. Arista explained that he was going according to plan. Ampudia continued his testimony, "Already many of our valiant had been killed or wounded without fighting."[89] Finally Arista ordered the line to advance twenty varas (eighteen yards) to a new position. Ampudia said this was done in order that the second line should not be near "the first to fall, hearing their moans."[90]

The change to a new position took place during a lull in the battle. There was a fire which Arista at first thought was an American ruse, but it was not; ejected cannon wadding in front of the American line had been touched off by sparks of Ringgold's artillery and had set the grass afire.[91] A strong wind blowing in from the sea and diagonally cross the battlefield toward the Mexican line intensified the fire and caused a great deal of smoke, covering the center and left of the Mexican line.[92]

The right wing of the Mexican army was clear of smoke, and from behind the smoke screen they saw a contingent of enemy cavalry supported by light artillery attempt a flanking maneuver. The Mexicans turned their cannons on the horsemen, who retreated after having lost some men.[93]

During the smoke Arista maneuvered the various units on the line by posting general and special guides while commanders shouted the orders to advance.[94] The disciplined Mexican line pivoted on its left flank so that the right flank, which had taken heavy casualties, advanced approximately eighteen paces. As the maneuver took place,

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[84]"Croquis de la Batalla dada en Palo Alto el 8 de Mayo de 1846," signed Francisco Segura, in *Campaña contra*.

[85]Berlandier, "Itinerario," 166.

[86]Ibid.

[87]Ampudia, *Concuidadanos* and *Fallo Definitivo*, 19.

[88]Ampudia, *Concuidadanos*.

[89]*Segundo Pedimento Presentado el día 9 de Junio del Presente Año*, 23.

[90]Ampudia, *Concuidadanos*.

[91]Ibid.

[92]Berlandier, "Itinerario," 167.

[93]Roa Barcena, *Recuerdos*, 1:80.

[94]Ampudia. *Concuidadanos*.

the Mexicans perceived another American flanking movement developing on the Mexican left flank. Arista ordered Torrejón with his cavalry and presidial companies to pursue the American maneuver across the west side of the road.[95] Riding hard through the chaparral, Torrejón and his men ran into marshy terrain just before the *norteamericanos* opened fire with their cannons and muskets.[96] The marsh and the grapeshot bogged down the cavalry charge. Torrejón pulled back to the cover provided by the chaparral and the billowing smoke of the battlefield fire. As Torrejón's attack developed, Taylor ordered the Fifth Infantry to reinforce the right wing.[97] The move was timely. The Fifth Infantry moved into position, formed a square, and took aim. Just then, Torrejón and his men, who had wheeled around and regrouped, charged out in column through the smoke cover. The Americans opened fire and caused many casualties among the Mexicans with a single volley.[98] Again Torrejón fell back, regrouped, and bypassing the Fifth Infantry, swung around to Taylor's rear to hit the wagon train.[99] By that time Taylor's Third Infantry had moved into position to counter the move, and after a skirmish Torrejón retired, but even this was bloody. Two guns from Ringgold's battery, commanded by Lieutenants Randolph Ridgeley and Samuel G. French, had moved up next to the Fifth Infantry and prepared to fire. They were supported by a company of Walker's Texas Rangers. When Torrejón's cavalry went by it was caught in a deadly fire of canister, grape, and spherical case shot. Those of Torrejón's lancers that did not fall were routed.[100]

Arista's watch marked the time through that long afternoon. It was nearly four o'clock when Torrejón and his battered command returned to the line.[101] Many were wounded. Most reported to the field hospital behind the Mexican right wing. The gunfire slackened but more of the prairie grass ignited and the spreading smoke and flames obscured the opposing lines. Both sides used the time to attend to their wounded, collect their dead, obtain water, and prepare for the next phase of the battle.

The lull lasted almost an hour.[102] When the smoke cleared both armies had completely shifted their positions. Taylor had moved the two 18-pounders and Twiggs' Fifth Infantry down the road to the position formerly held by Torrejón. Twiggs was now Taylor's right wing. Ringgold and Duncan had moved their batteries forward with the infantry. In effect, the entire American line had pivoted counterclockwise about thirty-five degrees.[103]

Meanwhile, the Mexican line pivoted counterclockwise to conform to the American position. On the extreme left Torrejón pulled back, but the left wing located about four hundred yards east of the road remained more or less stationary. The right flank advanced four hundred yards in an arc in correspondence to the pivotal maneuver.

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[95]Berlandier, "Itinerario," 169.

[96]*Campaña contra*, 10.

[97]Taylor, Report of June 12, 1846, *House Executive Document No. 209*, 2-3.

[98]Ibid.

[99]Ibid., 2-3; *Campaña contra*, 11.

[100]Roa Barcena, *Recuerdos*, 1:66; *Campaña contra*, 11.

[101]Taylor, Report of June 12, 1846, *House Executive Document No. 209*, 2-3.

[102]*Campaña contra*, 12; Berlandier, "Itinerario," 170.

[103]Seymour V. Conner and Odie B. Faulk, *North America Divided: The Mexican War 1846-1848* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 38.

The Mexican field pieces were moved up to new positions.[104] Arista hoped to neutralize the American artillery.

It was almost 5:00 p.m. The Mexican army faced west, and the Americans looked into the easterly sea breeze. On the north side of the two armies the smoldering smoke continued to blow across the battlefield. The lull was broken by one word which sounded across the battle line, "¡Fuego!" The Mexican artillery opened fire first,[105] directed against Taylor's right wing and the two 18-pounders that had caused so much havoc to the Army of the North. Quickly Taylor ordered the Fourth Infantry to move up and support the guns. But the Mexican shot took effect.[106] There were several American casualties, including the death of Captain John Page. Of this incident Grant later wrote,

> In this last move there was brisk fire upon our troops, and some execution was done. One cannon-ball pushed through our ranks, not far from me. It took off the head of an enlisted man, and the under jaw of Captain Page of my regiment, while the splinters from the musket of the killed soldier, and his brains and bones, knocked down two or three others, including one officer...[107]

Taking his dragoons to the American right front, Captain May attempted to strike the Mexican left, but intense fire from the Mexican field pieces and muskets thwarted his advance. A charge from Torrejón, and May retreated to the American line, losing two men wounded and four horses killed. The Fourth Infantry which had been moved up to support May was pulled back. The Mexican batteries continued firing into Taylor's right flank.[108] Pacing his horse along his men, Ringgold was struck down by a 4-pounder shot and taken from the field. (He died two days later, aware of the outcome of the battle.)[109] But for the moment, the Mexicans pressed the American right wing.

As pressure on his right wing mounted, Taylor ordered Childs to move his artillery/infantry battalion from the left flank across to support May. Seeing this, Torrejón regrouped his cavalry for a strike against the Americans and the 18-pounders. Childs and May hurriedly formed a square and braced for the attack. Torrejón charged.[110] But Churchill managed to turn his big guns around and fire at him just in time.[111] Torrejón retreated, returning fire with small arms as he did so. Both sides suffered casualties.

Meanwhile, Taylor's left flank underwent a test. Arista ordered Colonel Cayetano Montero's light cavalry, the Guarda-Costa de Tampico, and a unit of light infantry, to turn Taylor's left flank. But the Mexicans were spotted making the maneuver.[112] Lieutenant Colonel Belknap moved Duncan's "flying artillery" forward to counter the Mexican advance. Under cover of the still billowing smoke, Duncan dragged his artillery

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[104]*Campaña contra*, 103; Berlandier, "Itinerario," 170.

[105]*Campaña contra*, 12.

[106]Taylor, Report of June 12, 1846, *House Executive Document*, 2.

[107]Grant, *Memoirs*, 45.

[108]Roa Barcena, *Recuerdos*, 1:66.

[109]David Twiggs to Taylor, June 12, 1846, *House Executive Document No. 209*, 14.

[110]Taylor, Report of June 12, 1846, *House Executive Document No. 209*, 3.

[111]Ibid.

[112]Ibid., 3; *Campaña contra*, 13.

to a point on the extreme left flank. As the Mexican infantry moved through the haze, Duncan fired at them at point blank range. Montero's cavalry also charged at Duncan but he divided his batteries to strike back at both Mexican units.[113]

Round after round of canister, solid shot, spherical case, and grape hit the Mexican soldiers. Mexican casualties mounted as cavalry and infantrymen fell before Duncan's guns. From a distance Ampudia watched the catastrophe. Reporting to the Board of Inquiry he wrote, "The sun which set on the horizon and shined in front of our battalions, came to increase the element of disadvantage by not permitting us to see the enemy well."[114] The Mexican soldiers, lying low on the ground to avoid the hail of shot and shrapnel, tried to return the fire but were frustrated by the setting sun on the flat battlefield shining directly into their eyes. Ampudia continued, "Already desperation showed itself in the facial expressions of our soldiers, who filled with a burning rage, shouted petitions that [Arista] allow them to hurl themselves on the Americans or pull them out of cannon shot range."[115]

At a stretching gallop, Ampudia raced from the left flank to Arista and "announced to him that it was my judgement that those battalions would disband if he did not accede to their demands, I had no success..."[116] Ampudia then ran his horse to the right flank to see if the troops there were ready to form. But by that time the sun had set and Ampudia acknowledged that "we hardly had any light."[117] Besides, Duncan's cannons had been reinforced by Ker and the Eighth Infantry. Much of Arista's force had retreated out of range of the American batteries, except for a group of cavalrymen who charged Duncan's artillery only to be repulsed by a round of canister. By 6:00 p.m. the Americans had again advanced their military and caught a good half of Arista's troops in a deadly fire.[118] There, the Mexicans, unable to return effective fire, were frustrated as they saw more of their comrades fall. From his horse, Arista could see his men move as eerie shadows in the gray light of sunset.

The Mexicans were not yet ready to quit when night fell and ended the battle; they still had the next day. That night a truce was called. The deafening explosions of battle gave way to the smaller battle sounds that had been masked, the calls and moans of the wounded. The red-yellow light from Mexican torches could be seen in the dark as crews walked the battleground picking up their dead and wounded. Both armies camped at Palo Alto that night. Arista planned for the next day. He hoped to meet Taylor at Resaca de Guerrero a few miles to the south. At dawn, Taylor's men saw the Mexican army pull out.[119] Cautiously, Taylor planned his pursuit. He knew that he had hurt the Mexican army here at Palo Alto but realized they were not yet defeated. Even with their tremendous losses they still outnumbered his force.

Arista's commissary report indicated 102 men had been killed, another 129 wounded, and 26 lost or deserted.[120] In all, his casualties totalled 257 men. However,

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[113]Taylor, Report of June 12, 1846, *House Executive Document No. 209*, 3.

[114]Ampudia, *Concuidadanos*.

[115]Ibid.

[116]Ibid.

[117]Ibid.

[118]Roa Barcena, *Recuerdos*, 1:80.

[119]Taylor, Report of June 12, 1846, *House Executive Document No. 209*, 3.

[120]"Estado de los muertos, heridos y despersos en las acciones del 8 y 9 de Mayo de 1846 en Palo Alto y Resaca de Guerrero, Numero 2," *Campaña contra*.

Lieutenant George Meade who interrogated captured Mexican officers concluded that the Mexican dead at Palo Alto numbered closer to 400.[121] Berlandier later stated that:

> On the Mexican side there were about 300 men dead or wounded. The Americans lost about 200 dead and wounded, and among them a Major Ringol [sic] who commanded an artillery battery. These numbers, which the Americans don't want to confess, evidently prove that if we had sufficient munitions, and if we had shot as much as they, the number of their dead and wounded would indeed show that in this battle their artillery was hardly superior to ours, despite its magnificent construction and their excellent artillerymen.[122]

In the same statement, Berlandier reported that the Mexicans fired "only 850 cannon shots, while the enemy had let off more than 3,000" rounds.[123] Despite his casualties, Arista still had between 3,000 and 3,200 men on the battlefield at the end of the day. Taylor had over 2,000 men at his command. Unlike Berlandier, most of the combatants agreed that Arista had been outgunned. The traditional bayonet charges that Arista and Taylor had anticipated never took place. The American artillery had made the difference.

Before pursuing Arista, Taylor secured his wagon train by erecting earthworks and gun emplacements around it. On May 9 at about one o'clock in the afternoon, Taylor began his march down the Point Isabel-Matamoros road. Within two hours the Americans encountered a force of Mexicans at Resaca de Guerrero near Brownsville. There, after fierce hand-to-hand combat, the Mexicans were defeated. Meanwhile, Arista continued his retreat to Matamoros. Within days, Matamoros fell to Taylor's guns. The Army of the North, broken in spirit, retreated still farther south.

After the fall of Matamoros, Arista marched his men to Mamulique near Monterey. From there Arista wrote his first explanation of his conduct at Palo Alto. Reviewing his correspondence, the Board of Inquiry took note of charges made by Arista against his junior officers including Ampudia and Canales. Ampudia, charged with sedition, contested the accusation that he had allegedly spread the rumor that Arista had betrayed his men by failing to follow the battle plan. Canales, who never did enter the battle, was charged with cowardice. But there were many other accusations and counter-accusations as Arista and his officers tried to salvage their reputations.[124] In one of his letters Arista offered a patent reply to his accusers. "There is no better response to those who, without facts, and guided only by ignoble passions, tarnish the honor of their distinguished chief, than the contempt and notoriety of their deeds," he wrote.[125]

Nearly four weeks had passed since Arista's retreat from Matamoros to Mamulique, whence he moved his command to Linares near Saltillo, then before the war's end, to Tetecala, south of Mexico City. All the while he had kept up a steady correspondence with the inquirers. His case, interrupted by the American invasion of

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[121]Brooks, *A Complete History*, 136.

[122]Berlandier, "Itinerario," 172.

[123]Ibid., 176. "Circular, Ministro de Guerra Y Marina," May 21, 1846, Expediente XI, Archivo Histórico, Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional.

[124]*Segundo Pedimento Presentado el día 9 de Junio del Presente Año*, 17-35, passim.

[125]Arista to José López Uraga, Mamulique, June 26, 1846, in *Campaña contra*, 6.

Mexico, was eventually reviewed by the Supreme Tribunal of War.[126] The Tribunal appeared to be satisfied that Arista did have a sound battle plan, did deploy his men under the known conditions at the time and did, according to eyewitnesses, participate in the battle by riding his horse up and down the battle line throughout the action reviewing the status of his men, exhorting them to do battle and examining the conditions on the field. Proper alignment of his troops for the anticipated bayonet charge across the field seemed to be the controversial point. The Tribunal felt that Arista had acted properly by advancing his line in preparation for his attacks. Furthermore, Arista had not lost the battle. It was considered an indecisive engagement between the two combatants. Regardless of the fact that the next day's battle at Resaca de Guerrero turned into a disaster, Arista's decision to abandon Palo Alto, presumably for a more advantageous position, was logical. At any rate, Taylor who had entrenched himself at Palo Alto would have to start over again at a new battle site, thus losing his advantage.

In the end the Tribunal agreed that Arista had been outgunned by the American army. He went down fighting; *perdió peleando*, were the words of vindication.[127]

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[126]*Fallo Definitivo*, 1-30, passim.

[127]Carlos María de Bustamante to Sr. Oficial Mayor del Ministro de la Guerra, Silao, 24 de Junio de 1848, and *Documentos con la sumaria formado al Gral Mariano Arista*, Expediente X/2177, Archivo Histórico, Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional.

A FANATICAL PATRIOT WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: REFLECTIONS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF VALENTIN GOMEZ FARIAS DURING THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR[1]

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Both Mexican and foreign historians have written extensively about the separation of Texas and its annexation to the United States, and how this event culminated in the Mexican-American War of 1846-1848. Mexico's political instability and severe economic crisis, as well as a lack of international assistance, hindered its ability to meet effectively the United States threat. The resulting loss of more than half its territory to the United States contributed to Mexico's underdevelopment, gave rise to a deeply-rooted Yankeephobia, and exacerbated the bitter internal ideological conflict which afflicted the country for the next two decades.[2]

Despite the war's significance, relatively little has been written about what transpired politically, socially, and economically in Mexico during the crucial years 1845-1848. As diplomatic historian David Pletcher noted in 1977, "the widest gap in Mexican War history that remains to be filled by up-to-date scholarship is that of Mexican domestic history during the war."[3] A number of recent books and articles have shed some light on this void, but the political intrigue and party battles that transpired during the war have yet to receive, for the most part, adequate attention.[4] This essay

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[1]I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Ralph Salmi of the Political Science Department at California State University, San Bernardino, for his comments and editorial insights.

[2]Richard Griswold del Castillo, *The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: A Legacy of Conflict* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), xii; Charles Hale, "The War with the United States and the Crisis in Mexican Thought," *The Americas* 14 (Oct. 1957), 153-75; Ralph W. Kirkham, *The Mexican War Journal and Letters of Ralph W. Kirkham*, ed. Robert Ryal Miller (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1991), ix.

[3]David Pletcher, "United States Relations with Latin America: Neighborliness and Exploitation," *The American Historical Review* 82 (Feb. 1977), 45.

[4]Three historians have delved into Mexico's domestic situation In this period with some care. Miguel Soto has examined the conspiracy that General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga headed against the republican system in *La conspiración monárquica en México, 1845-1846* (México: EOSA, 1988). An abbreviated version of this study entitled "The Monarchist Conspiracy and the Mexican War" appeared in Douglas W. Richmond, ed., *Essays on the Mexican War* (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1986), 66-84. One may also consult my own "A Fear of the People: The Civic Militia of Mexico in 1845," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 68 (May 1988), 269-88, and Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, "The Texas Question in Mexican Politics, 1836-1845," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 89 (Jan. 1986), 309-44.

Other noteworthy recent publications on the Mexican War include Robert W. Johannsen, *To the Halls of the Montezumas: The Mexican War in the American Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); James M. McCaffrey, *Army of Manifest Destiny: The American Soldier in the Mexican War, 1846-1848* (New York: New York University Press, 1992); Robert Ryal Miller, *Shamrock and Sword: The San Patricio Battalion During the Mexican War* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990); Cecil

addresses some of the issues surrounding Mexico's fratricidal internal struggles by focusing on the activities of Valentín Gómez Farías and his political associates in the period 1845-1848. These were the radical federalists, who took the name of *puros* in 1846.[5]

Historians of the Mexican-American War have neglected to fully examine the political, social, economic, and military role of Gómez Farías and the *puros* during that conflict. Nineteenth-century accounts of the war that are highly critical of the disorderly behavior of Mexico's political groups, such as those penned by José Fernando Ramírez and Carlos María Bustamante, make passing reference to the *puros*, as do the monographs of highly respected scholars such as Pletcher, Michael P. Costeloe, and Cecil Allan Hutchinson. Yet these chronicles did not focus on the *puros*, and many details about their actions during the Mexican-American War remain obscure. Then there are those historians, such as the late Jesuit priest Mariano Cuevas, who have diffused widespread misconceptions about the *puros*. Cuevas blamed Gómez Farías and the *puros* for Mexico's military and diplomatic defeat in the war with the United States. He argued that the *puros* were a corrupt faction that sold out Mexico to the Americans.[6]

The relative dearth of scholarly writing on Mexico's internal situation during the war with the United States is partly due to the complex nature of nineteenth-century Mexican politics. The political spectrum in early republican Mexico was divided into three major parties--*puros*, moderates (*moderados*), and conservatives--whose members often shared temporarily similar principles. At the same time, however, intrafactional conflict often plagued these groups. Thus, even such an astute contemporary journalist as Guillermo Prieto hesitated to delineate the precise make-up and goals of the Gómez

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Robinson, ed., *The View from Chapultepec: Mexican Writers on The Mexican-American War* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1989); Barbara Tenenbaum, "Neither a Borrower nor a Lender be: Financial Constraints and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo," in *The Mexican and Mexican American Experience in the 19th Century*, ed. Jaime E. Rodríguez O. (Tempe: Bilingual Press, 1989), 68-84; and Griswold del Castillo's aforementioned *The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo*.

[5]According to one nineteenth-century Mexican politician, the nickname of *puro* given to radical federalists was born during the popular demonstration of October 14, 1838, when a mob continually clamored that it wanted "a constitution without a tail and pure federation." José María Bocanegra, *Memorias para la historia de México independiente, 1822-1846*, 2 vols. (México: Imprenta del Gobierno Federal, 1892), 2:760-61. Another important nineteenth-century statesman asserted that the *puro* sobriquet was first used in October 1846 as a result of the appearance of a newspaper entitled *El Federalista Puro*. José María Lafragua, "Miscelánea de política," in *Memorias de la Academia Mexicana de la Historia* (1943-1944), 42. Although the origins of the *moderado* and *puro* factions can be traced to the late 1820s and early 1830s, it seems likely that the nickname of *puro* began to be used with increasing frequency in 1846. For ease of reading, I will refer to the radical federalists throughout this essay as *puros*.

[6]Carlos María Bustamante, *El nuevo Bernal Díaz del Castillo o sea, historia de la invasión de los anglo-americanos a México* (México: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1949); José Fernando Ramírez, *Mexico During the War with the United States*, ed. Walter B. Scholes, trans. Elliot B. Scherr (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1950); Michael P. Costeloe, "Church-State Financial Negotiations in Mexico during the American War, 1846-1847," *Revista de Historia de América* 60 (Jul.-Dec. 1965), 91-123, and "The Mexican Church and the Rebellion of the Polkos," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 46 (May 1966), 170-78; Cecil Allan Hutchinson, "Valentín Gómez Farías and the Movement for the Return of General Santa Anna to Mexico in 1846," in *Essays in Mexican History*, eds. Carlos Castañeda and Thomas E. Cotner (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958), 169-91; David Pletcher, *The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon, and the Mexican War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1973); Mariano Cuevas, *Historia de la nación mexicana* (México: Editorial Porrúa, 1967), 636-84.

Farías-led *puros* and their rivals during the war with the United States. He commented that it was "extremely difficult to classify political parties and to determine the causes of each social movement."[7] The 1971 statement by American historians Seymour V. Connor and Odie B. Faulk echoes Prieto's viewpoint. They declared that Mexico's wartime political panorama was "really impossible to analyze" because it "turned like a kaleidoscope into different patterns" on a daily basis.[8]

Donald Fithian Stevens' recent book, *Origins of Instability in Early Republican Mexico*, represents a major step toward clearing up Mexico's perplexing political landscape. Stevens identified five areas--state organization, methods of social control, state power and economic intervention, Church-state relations, and the value of the colonial experience--that help categorize *puros*, *moderados*, and conservatives. Debate over these issues often turned into vicious conflict, but none of the three different political groups was strong enough to win hegemony. This helps explain Mexico's paralysis in the mid 1840s and the *puros*' inability to forge a unified resistance amidst a foreign invasion.[9]

Puros and *moderados* shared several convictions. Both wished to limit the Catholic Church's economic and political privileges. *Puros* and *moderados* also sought to break the regular army's control over politics by establishing a volunteer civic militia. But *puros* and *moderados* disagreed over the means of accomplishing these goals and in other areas as well. The *puros* favored a republican form of government and a powerful, interventionist state. They believed that a strong state would promote economic development and restrict the Church's prerogatives. The *puros* looked to the urban masses, commonly referred to as the *léperos* or the *leperada*, as a source of support for their agenda. On the other hand, *moderados* identified a republic with mob rule and the 1793-1794 French Reign of Terror. They accepted a republic reluctantly in 1823, and preferred, like conservatives, a constitutional monarchy. *Moderados* wanted a weak state that would not hinder the free exercise of their economic power, and they did not demand that reforms to limit the Catholic Church's power be implemented without delay. Finally, the *moderados* feared the lower classes. Their apprehension toward the *leperada* is most vividly illustrated by their belief that enrollment in civic militias should be limited to property-owning citizens.[10]

In general terms, conservatives sought to salvage those elements of the Spanish colonial state that had benefited them. They wanted a strong centralized government. By the mid nineteenth century this entailed establishing a monarchy. Conservatives hoped to create such a vigorous state by allying the Catholic Church with the regular army. This state would enforce a hierarchical social structure and restrict social mobility. Like most *moderados*, conservatives feared the participation of the lower classes in politics. Finally, conservatives hoped to promote their wealth and preserve their privileges through the deliberate use of state regulation and economic intervention.[11]

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[7]Guillermo Prieto, *Memorias de mis tiempos* (México: Editorial Porrúa, 1985), 252.

[8]Seymour V. Connor and Odie B. Faulk, *North America Divided: The Mexican War, 1846-1848* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 141.

[9]Donald F. Stevens, *Origins of Instability in Early Republican Mexico* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 110

[10]Ibid., 29-31, 34-36, 111.

[11]Ibid., 29, 37-38, 110-11.

Yet socioeconomic factors or divergent ideologies do not always adequately explain the disagreements between the *puros* and their rivals, especially between 1845 and 1848. During this time, personal jealousies proved to be just as important in dividing the *puros* and their antagonists. At times the foremost *moderado* statesman, Manuel Gómez Pedraza, refused to settle his differences with *puro* leader Gómez Farías because of petty considerations. Debate over foreign policy, such as finding a way to solve the Texas question, also exacerbated hatreds between the various factions and heightened domestic instability.

Between 1845 and 1848, Gómez Farías and the *puros* advocated the pursuit of a belligerent policy against Texas and the United States. They also promoted the benefits that a return to federalism under the auspices of the 1824 constitution would bestow upon Mexico. Gómez Farías sincerely believed that this package of reforms best suited Mexico's needs. Implementing these objectives would solve Mexico's political, economic, and social problems, as well as halt the United States' expansionism. But the *puros* only held power for eight months, between August 1846 and March 1847, and even then their control over Mexico's destiny was tenuous at best. Consequently, their efforts proved unsuccessful, and several American historians have questioned the wisdom of Gómez Farías' policies. In his classic study of Mexican liberalism, Charles A. Hale has written that the "resurgence of federalism at the very moment that war [with the United States] was beginning" is one of the "ironies of the 1847 episode," because the need for effective defense against invasion has been a classic argument in favor of centralization.[12] Gene Brack also has noted that a significant number of Mexican politicians and army leaders were cognizant of the country's military weaknesses, and thus "scarcely hungered for war" with the United States.[13]

The criticism these scholars have directed at Gómez Farías and his objectives must be placed in perspective. His dogged determination to reestablish the 1824 charter, reconquer Texas, and resist the United States' invasion should be evaluated in light of the hostile political, social, and economic environment in which he had to operate. Thus, rather than judge him a failure because he did not reach his goals, Gómez Farías' conduct should be measured against the obstacles that he encountered at a time of foreign war and domestic chaos. The multitude of problems that afflicted Mexico would have nullified the efforts of a stronger and more cohesive political party to organize a more energetic resistance to the United States.

Advocacy of federalism should have earned the *puros* nationwide support in 1845. As the renowned Mexican historian Josefina Zoraida Vázquez has recently argued, federalism was "a real force during much of the nineteenth century."[14] Many public-spirited Mexicans believed it to be the only political alternative that held out a promise for future stability. Centralism, as embodied in the 1836 constitution known as the *Siete Leyes*, had failed to deliver development and security, and was completely discredited. Monarchism lacked public sympathy; after advocating in 1840 a European monarchial regime as the solution for Mexico's ills, Yucatán writer José Miguel

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[12]Charles A. Hale, *Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora, 1821-1853* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 208.

[13]Gene M. Brack, *Mexico Views Manifest Destiny, 1821-1846: An Essay on the Origins of the Mexican War* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975), 172-75.

[14]Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, "Los años olvidados," *Mexican Studies* 5 (Summer 1989), 314.

Gutiérrez Estrada had to go into hiding. Finally, a military dictatorship, as represented by the 1843 charter commonly known as the *Bases Orgánicas*, had proven detestable. The 1824 federal constitution had once symbolized the dawn of a more prosperous era, and thus was an attractive alternative in 1845.[15]

The *puros*' war cries should have also secured them widespread backing, as Mexican statesmen had sought to maintain their country's territorial integrity since independence, especially in the present-day American Southwest. To protect the area against United States' expansionism, the leaders of the new Mexican republic encouraged Americans to settle in Texas during the 1820s. But the differences in customs between the American settlers and the Mexicans, in addition to the problems that racked the Mexican national government, heightened tensions and probably made conflict inevitable. The prevailing uneasiness exploded into war in 1835. At that time General Antonio López de Santa Anna moved to replace the 1824 constitution with a centralist charter, a maneuver that suspended political autonomy to Texas. As a result, a majority of the American settlers in that territory had revolted by the fall of 1835. Although Santa Anna rushed north and twice defeated the Texas rebels in March 1836, he had little choice but to sign a treaty recognizing the independence of Texas to avoid being lynched after his embarrassing defeat at the battle of San Jacinto on April 21, 1836. Mexico's congress later repudiated this agreement, but to no avail. Texas existed as an independent republic for the next nine years, and the Texas question figured in the programs of all political factions since that time. Mexican leaders could not relinquish national claims to Texas for numerous reasons, including their sense of honor and pride, a strong idealistic streak, as well as a multitude of political considerations.[16]

Gómez Farías and his associates, however, could not act on their own to obtain political power and bring these plans to fruition. The *puros* had no choice but to woo the army given the military's role as arbiter of national politics in nineteenth-century Mexico. In 1845, thus, the *puros* used the press to launch a vigorous propaganda campaign exalting the army's honor and repute. In addition, the two most important political plans proclaimed by the *puros* in 1845--those of June 7 and December 3--sought to diminish the military's apprehensions with regard to Gómez Farías and his associates. Both plans promised to take care of the army's urgent needs. The August 4, 1846 plan used to justify the rebellion of the Ciudadela, which brought the *puros* to power, widely

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[15]Jan Bazant, "From Independence to the Liberal Republic, 1821-1867," in *Mexico Since Independence*, ed. Leslie Bethel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 16-17; Michael P. Costeloe, "The Triangular Revolt in Mexico and the Fall of Anastasio Bustamante, August-October 1841," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 20 (Nov. 1988):338-39; Ramón Eduardo Ruíz, *Triumphs and Tragedy: A History of the Mexican People* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), 180; Barbara Tenenbaum, *The Politics of Penury: Debts and Taxes in Mexico. 1821-1856* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986) 45-46, 53.

[16]McCaffrey, *Army of Manifest Destiny*, 1, 4; Michael C. Meyer and William M. Sherman, *The Course of Mexican History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 338-40; Pletcher, *The Diplomacy of Annexation*, 66-67; W. Dirk Raat, *Mexico and the United States: Ambivalent Vistas* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992), 65; Josefina Zoraida Vázquez and Lorenzo Meyer, *The United States and Mexico* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 35-36; Vázquez, "The Texas Question," 310.

publicized the union of the people and the army. The *puros* were in control of Mexico's destinies, and supposedly counted on the military's complete endorsement.[17]

But the army's full-fledged support never materialized. Memories of Gómez Farias' 1833-1834 reform program, which sought to limit the power and influence of the Church and the army, predisposed renowned military leaders like General Mariano Arista, who commanded the Army of the North, against him. Arista's correspondence clearly illustrates the disdain that many army officers felt toward the *puros*. He referred to them as *descamisados* (shirtless ones), sansculottes, and anarchists.[18] General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga shared Arista's sentiments. In fact, Paredes partly justified the December 1845 rebellion that he spearheaded against the administration of President José Joaquín Herrera on the grounds that it was necessary to prevent power from falling into the "hands of the rabble."[19]

Other leading military figures turned away from the *puros* for purely opportunistic reasons. The loyalties of individuals such as Generals Joaquín Rangel, Juan Nepomuceno Almonte, and Valentín Canalizo, who at one time or another pledged their support to Gómez Farías, lay with Santa Anna; the affections of General José Mariano Salas, who served as interim president between August and December 1846, rested with the *moderados*. These generals did not hesitate to betray the *puros* whenever circumstances dictated. The *puros*, consequently, also suffered from the self-seeking and partisan aspirations of eminent army officers. This proved to be but one reason why their endeavors failed.

Santa Anna's deceitfulness further hindered the *puros*' efforts to rally public-spirited Mexicans behind their banner. Political circumstances and the dismal performance of Mexico's military in the war's initial battles--Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma--forced Gómez Farías to place the *puros*' fate in Santa Anna's hands during the spring of 1846. In the eyes of many, only Santa Anna could save Mexico from a humiliating defeat at the hands of the United States. Santa Anna, however, showed himself to be an incorrigible opportunist. He only desired dictatorial power and repeatedly attempted to ditch the *puros* to reach this goal, as his July 1847 interview with Spanish minister Salvador Bermúdez de Castro revealed. In this conference Santa Anna admitted that he had supported Gómez Farías in 1846 to facilitate a return to Mexico from his Cuban exile. The *puros*' excesses, he argued, had proven federalism to be completely impractical as a political system. Santa Anna concluded that the ouster of Gómez Farías and the establishment of a military dictatorship were the only means that could save Mexico from its impending ruin.[20]

The activities of the Gómez Pedraza-led *moderados* also adversely affected the *puros*' efforts to direct Mexico's affairs during the war with the United States. In 1845

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[17]Plan and manifesto of the June 7, 1845 revolt, in *La Voz del Pueblo*, July 5 and 19, 1845; "Plan de los verdaderos liberales," in *La Voz del Pueblo*, addendum to its Dec. 3, 1845 edition; "Plan de la Ciudadela," in Manuel Dublán and José María Lozano, eds., *Legislación mexicana*, 42 vols. (México: Imprenta del Comercio, 1876-1904), 5:143-46.

[18]Mariano Arista to Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, Monterrey and Mamulique, June 16, Aug. 24, and Nov. 10, 1845, Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga Papers, Nettie Lee Benson Collection, University of Texas, 469, f.142, 174 and 452, f.143.

[19]"A la nación mexicana," San Luis Potosí, Dec. 15, 1845, *El Siglo XIX*, Dec. 20, 1845.

[20]Salvador Bermúdez de Castro to Primer Secretario, Mexico City, July 27, 1847, in *Relaciones diplomáticas hispano-mexicanas (1839-1898)*, 4 vols. (México: El Colegio de México, 1949-1968), 4:125.

President Herrera and his *moderado* advisors proved reluctant to take on the reconquest of Texas and to reestablish the 1824 federal constitution. This lack of political acumen revived old antagonisms and fostered the disintegration of the alliance that *puros* and *moderados* forged in December 1844 to topple Santa Anna's dictatorship. Although both factions put aside their differences to resist the monarchist plot instigated by the Spanish government during the spring of 1846, discord between *puros* and *moderados* again flourished after early August of that year. The *puros* held political power, and the *moderados* left no stone unturned in their efforts to undermine the political influence of Gómez Farias and his associates. Selfishness became the *moderados*' guiding principle. They rejected all of the *puros*' conciliatory gestures and also launched the February 1847 rebellion of the "*Polkos*" at the same time that the American army under General Winfield Scott landed in Veracruz.

Institutional factors also hindered the *puros*' efforts to organize a powerful resistance against the United States. The benefits that the *puros*' hoped would accrue from the restoration of federalism never materialized. An August 22, 1846 decree restored the 1824 federal constitution as the law of the land,[21] but the expectations aroused by this measure, as José Fernando Ramírez wrote in early May 1847, turned out to be a "hideous nightmare."[22] Most states lacked the resources to assist the national government. Prieto commented that all states "suffered on account of the war [by late 1847]; revenues hardly covered the most basic necessities, bank drafts were completely paralyzed, the countryside was in a state of abandonmemt, [and] roads were deserted."[23] Perhaps the most vivid description of the relationship between the states and the national government during the war came from politician Melchor Ocampo; in 1848 he described it as one of "systematic anarchy."[24]

The reasons for this lamentable situation, however, remain a mystery. As Professor Vázquez recently noted, Mexican federalism, as well as its functioning, awaits an in-depth study.[25] Nonetheless, it would not be far-fetched to suggest that the failure of federalism in the mid-1840s is rooted in Mexico's war of independence. According to American historian John Tutino, that struggle strengthened the leaders of many peripheral regions in Mexico, and they were increasingly able to block the efforts of central elites to rule the nation.[26] In any case, and until a definitive explanation emerges, historians will have to be content with concluding that federalism failed to provide Gómez Farías and his supporters with the elements to forge a stronger, more stable Mexico, and obstructed his efforts to continue the war after the American army occupied Mexico City in the fall of 1847.

The role that the vibrant Mexico City press played in the *puros*' quest to reign supreme in Mexican politics cannot be underestimated. Newspapers such as *La Voz del Pueblo*, *El Amigo del Pueblo*, and *El Estandarte Nacional* widely publicized the *puros*'

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[21]Dublán y Lozano, *Legislación mexicana*, 5:155-56.

[22]Ramírez, *Mexico During the War*, 143.

[23]Prieto, *Memorias*, 293.

[24]Moisés González Navarro, *Anatomia del Poder en México, 1848-1853* (México: El Colegio de México, 1983), 378.

[25]Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, "Un Viejo Tema: El Federalismo y el Centralismo," *Historia Mexicana* 42 (Jan.-Mar. 1993), 626.

[26]John Tutino, *From Insurrection to Revolution in Mexico: Social Bases of Agrarian Violence, 1750-1940* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 216-17.

goals in 1845. The press, however, proved to be both friend and foe of the *puros*. Just as these journals proved to be potent weapons that allowed the *puros* to revile President Herrera's regime throughout 1845, *moderado*-controlled newspapers like *Don Simplicio* and *El Republicano* constantly berated Gómez Farías and his adherents as of September 1846. Both factions used the press to animatedly air out their differences, but the *puros*' sources of journalistic support between August 1846 and early 1848 were not as influential as they had been in 1845. The *puros* never regained the upper hand in this arena, and the media became as insidious an enemy as those military leaders that searched for their own self-aggrandizement.

The *puros*' ties with the lower classes of society, commonly known as the *léperos* or the *leperada*, also adversely affected Gómez Farías' aspirations. He enjoyed widespread support among the populace, especially that of Mexico City, and repeatedly tried to mobilize the urban masses throughout the 1830s and 1840s in support of his policies.[27] As Prieto commented in his memoirs, "the masses instinctively acclaimed and followed Gómez Farías, who had at his command a veritable army of shirtless ones (descamisados)."[28] This association seriously hindered the *puros*' efforts to establish an alliance with *moderados*, conservatives, and senior army officers during the war with the United States.

The debate that Mexican statesmen engaged in over creation of a civic militia vividly illustrates the existing suspicion and dread concerning the lower rungs of society. Since the civic militia had spearheaded military resistance during the December 1844 rebellion that toppled Santa Anna's dictatorship, members of the active political public believed that this institution would become one of the bulwarks of the new regime headed by President Herrera. Moreover, Gómez Farías and the *puros* realized that a powerful civic militia could assist Mexico in the war effort against Texas and the United States, and they attempted to develop such a force since early 1845. On the other hand, senior army officers, as well as conservative and *moderado* politicians, viewed the militia as a tool that would enthrone the *puros* and provide the *leperada* with political power. Thus, the *puros*' political enemies strived to nullify the militia's influence. The end result of this state of affairs was that the *puros* could not create a weapon that might have helped them consolidate their hold on power. Even more significantly, the manipulation of the civic militia prevented both *puros* and *moderados* from having at their disposal a force that might have significantly aided the Mexican republic in the battles of 1847.[29]

The divisions that permeated Mexican society in the mid 1840s aggravated these problems. Those institutions that had been a bastion of colonial society and early republican Mexico, such as the Church and the army, proved unsuited to help the national government resist a foreign invasion. Not only did the Church provide financial backing for the February 1847 rebellion of the "*Polkos*," but recent scholarship has demonstrated that members of the upper clergy abetted the efforts of United States' peace

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[27]David Brading, *The Origins of Mexican Nationalism* (Cambridge: Center of Latin American Studies, 1985), 94; Michael P. Costeloe, "A *Pronunciamiento* in Nineteenth Century Mexico: '15 *de julio de* 1840'," *Mexican Studies* 4 (Summer 1988), 259-60; John Lynch, *Caudillos in Spanish America, 1800-1850* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 339: Stevens, *Origins of Instability*, 36-37.

[28]Prieto, *Memorias*, 190.

[29]Santoni, "A Fear of the People," 270-71, 274-75, and "The Civic Militia of Mexico During the War with the United States, 1846-1848," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Southwestern Historical Association, Austin, Texas, Mar. 20, 1992.

commissioner Nicholas Trist to bring about a cessation of hostilities in late 1847 and early 1848.[30] Meanwhile, numerous contemporary thinkers blamed the army for Mexico's defeat at the hands of the United States. Perhaps the most renowned of these commentators was *moderado* sympathizer Mariano Otero. He argued in his pamphlet *Consideraciones sobre la situación política y social de la república mexicana en el año de 1847* that the army was "undoubtedly the most immediately responsible for our loss of national honor."[31]

The problems spawned by the army's decay and the Church's lack of patriotism were compounded because the new liberal nucleus that would shape *Reforma* Mexico had not fully developed by the mid 1840s.[32] This cleavage prevented Mexico from developing a sense of national identity by the time of the war with the United States. Otero maintained that Mexico's defeat in this conflict had been brought about by the fact that "there has not been, nor could there have been, a national spirit, for there is no nation."[33] The United States, on the other hand, did not face this handicap in the mid 1840s. Manifest Destiny served as a guiding ideology that allowed the United States to surmount, if only temporarily, sectionalism and internal political conflict.

In the final analysis, the blame for Mexico's inability to organize an effective resistance against the United States should not rest solely on the shoulders of Valentín Gómez Farías and the *puros*. Their goals may have been far-fetched and somewhat utopian. They also sometimes promoted their political program recklessly and in less than ideal circumstances. One must also acknowledge that at times Gómez Farías may have lacked the necessary sophistication to adequately judge and appraise the hopes, fears, and motivations of the United States and other Mexican military and civilian leaders. Nonetheless, Gómez Farías and his political associates put forward specific solutions for Mexico's problems in the mid 1840s that did not, unlike the public proclamations and private communications of individuals like Gómez Pedraza and General Santa Anna, conceal selfish aims. Thus, the *puros*' political enemies must also bear responsibility for Mexico's tragedy of 1846-1848.

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[30]Tenenbaum, "Neither a Borrower," 79-80.

[31]*Consideraciones sobre la situación política y social de la república mexicana en el año de 1847*, (México: Valdés y Redondas, 1848), 27.

[32]Jesús Reyes Heroles, *El liberalismo mexicano*, 3 vols. (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1982), 2:388.

[33]*Consideraciones sobre la situación*, 42.

EL CONTEXTO MEXICANO: ANGULO DESCONOCIDO DE LA GUERRA

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A pesar del recuerdo que guardan los mexicanos de la guerra con los Estados Unidos, apenas si la han historiado. Como período de perdidas, de inestabilidad, de amenaza externa, en la que el país se sintió impotente ante la maraña de problemas que enfrentaba el país y con el trauma de la pérdida de un territorio tan extenso, su historia se quedó en el olvido. Esto ha sido costoso, porque sólo ha quedado la impresión de incapacidad, sin cobrar conciencia de la imposibilidad que representaba el reto.

La falta de investigación del lado mexicano ha permitido que la historia de la guerra sea parcial y sólo se conozca la visión de los vencedores o la de los frustrados mexicanos contemporáneos que por estar inmersos en los problemas, no alcanzaban a ver el panorama completo o tenían interés en defender una posición partidarista, que más tarde se repitió como verdad.

En la historiografía de la guerra, México aparece simplemente como un país caótico, gobernado por dictaduras militares, que no lograron imponer el orden, y no obedecían ninguna ley: casi una caricatura de país. Desde luego que no es fácil explicar cómo la nación heredera de la grandeza novohispana fue incapaz de enfrentarse a la sucesora de las trece colonias. Sin embargo los estudios de historia social y económica de los últimos años nos han ayudado a reconstruir la difícil transición de la Nueva España a la modernidad y su alto costo. Han ido apareciendo una serie de explicaciones que van desde las reformas borbónicas, que desvertebraron a la sociedad novohispana, y el costo de las guerras desafortunadas de España que la descapitalizaron y endeudaron a su colonia más rica. A esta situación hay que añadir la sangrienta y larga lucha de independencia, llevada a cabo sin aliados y su entrada en la arena internacional en un momento inoportuno, porque la preocupación por la legitimidad y el temor al radicalismo revolucionario iban a dificultar su incorporación.

Mas su importancia misma había de ser fuente de su debilidad al hacerla centro de las ambiciones de las nuevas potencias comerciales. Al imán de sus minas, cuya riqueza divulgaría el libro del Barón Von Humbolt en su *Ensayo Político sobre el Reino de la Nueva España*, se agregaba su potencial como mercado para un competitivo comercio y la extensión de su territorio, que brillaba ante los ojos de los norteamericanos desde los primeros días de su independencia, y su posición estratégica, que Gran Bretaña y Francia trataron de utilizar para detener la expansión norteamericana. El resultado fue que ningún otro pais americano iba a enfrentar tantas amenazas externas como México. De esa manera, a pesar de la madurez que había alcanzado como el reino más importante de la Corona española, las amenazas continuas iban a retrasar la consolidación del Estado y hacer fracasar los sistemas de gobierno que experimentaría, debilitándola.

Los historiadores han seguido relatos contemporáneos o la interpretación liberal que subrayaba la división interna, con el faccionalismo, la preponderancia del ejército y de la Iglesia y la corrupción de sus gobernantes. Se explica que los historiadores contemporáneos exageraran la percepción de una realidad llena de cambios, puesto que la comparaban con su recuerdo melancólico del orden y la grandeza colonial. A ello habría que agregar que como actores en la vida política, utilizaron la historia como instrumento para justificar su participación en los hechos y sus puntos de vista. Y es bueno recordar que la interpretación liberal iba a justificar su desafío a las creencias populares, en la necesidad de terminar con el caos anterior o para disculpar la dictadura de Díaz. Por eso es necesario reconstruir los acontecimientos y revisar las interpretaciones tradicionales, que el liberalismo triunfante habría de convertir en visión oficial.

Por supuesto que hubo inestabilidad, como en todos los nuevos estados y como consecuencia de la adopción del liberalismo como doctrina dominante, que en todas partes generó discordia. La inestabilidad era natural como producto del acomodo de grupos sociales en ascenso, de la debilidad de un nuevo Estado asediado por problemas financieros y obligado a hacer frente a las amenazas externas. Pero también fueron factores la inestabilidad las presiones extranjeras sobre los gobiernos; algunas veces, al alimentar acusaciones de que los gobiernos servían a los intereses extranjeros; en otras, al aprovechar la oposición las presiones para justificar los golpes de Estado. Mas un caso más frecuente fue la participación activa de comerciantes y cónsules o vicecónsules extranjeros en los pronunciamientos militares, ya fuera para conseguir descuentos en los impuestos de importación, práctica constante de los rebeldes para obtener dinero, o bien, para favorecer el cambio a un gobierno no proteccionista o receptivo a sus demandas. Los comerciantes extranjeros favorecieron a los federalistas, que eran librecambistas hasta 1841. El movimiento que surgió ese año iba a ser organizado por los comerciantes, que venían presionando la abolición de un impuesto de 15% sobre artículos importados y como no lo consiguieran, el británico Francisco Morphy visitó a los generales Antonio López de Santa Anna, Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga y Gabriel Valencia y concertó el pronunciamiento. Por eso el gobierno dictatorial que resultó del movimiento abolió el mencionado impuesto y la prohibición a los extranjeros de adquirir bienes raíces.

Hace falta también aclarar que el número de cambios de gobierno se ha exagerado. Una buena parte de los innumerables cambios presidenciales que se mencionan, no toma en consideración que la constitución requería que cuando el presidente se ausentaba de la capital, se eligiera un sustituto, pero sin que por ello dejara de ser el titular del ejecutivo. De manera que cuando se habla de once presidencias de Santa Anna se pasa por alto las salidas periódicas del general a su hacienda de Manga de Clavo durante las cuales seguía siendo el ejecutivo titular. Por otro parte, si analizamos al grupo gobernante, notamos una continuidad en los ministerios de Estado aún a través de los cambios en el ministerio, ya que por lo general los oficiales mayores mantuvieron el puesto por períodos largos, lo que aseguró una gran continuidad.

También hace falta revisar la acusación a la Iglesia y al ejército de haber apadrinado los movimientos "conservadores." En primer lugar hay que recordar que las corporaciones no fueron monolíticas, sino que estuvieron divididas al igual que la sociedad en general. Que el ejército inició y participó en los pronunciamientos es incuestionable, pero lo hizo por igual en apoyo de cambios liberales y conservadores y generalmente a instancias de los civiles.

Al ejército y a la Iglesia se les ha achacado también la imposición del centralismo para preservar sus fueros y privilegios. Los grandes interéses materiales de la Iglesias y los pronunciamientos abiertos del ejército por la religión y los fueros en 1833 y 1856 se han considerado como prueba contundente. Tal interpretación pasa por alto que los borbones y las cortes españolas en 1810-1812 y 1820-1822, habían impuesto el predominio del Estado sobre la Iglesia y la habían debilitado. La independencia aumentó su debilidad al causarle una gran sangría y por la acefalía a la que la condenó la falta de relaciones con el Vaticano. Desde luego que la Iglesia mantuvo "las opiniones que debía tener en defensa de sus fueros e inmunidades," pero no las sostuvo con la fuerza de las armas, como bien arguyó Luis Gonzaga Cuevas en su libro *El Porvenir de México*. En varias ocasiones se opuso a las medidas que la afectaban, pero en general lo hizo por los canales legales. Los religiosos, al igual que los civiles y los militares, se iban a adscribir a los diversos partidos y no sólo participó en las logias, sino que los obispos de tendencias liberales desempeñaron un papel importante en las reformas. Si revisamos los planes políticos y las actas de adhesión, encontraremos que sólo dos, el del Padre Arenas en 1827 y el de los curas Carlos Tepisteco y Epigmenio de la Piedra, fueron lanzados por religiosos, en ambos casos absurdos. Es cierto, eso sí que los políticos de tendencia conservadora como Lucas Alamán utilizaron sus conexiones con eclesiásticos en sus manipulaciones políticas. Es importante notar que aún en la actitud desafiante del obispo Pablo Vázquez en 1834, al ordenar a los párrocos de su diócesis que informaran a los feligreses sobre el desacuerdo de la Iglesia con el decreto estatal de ocupación de bienes del clero regular en Veracruz, incluía la advertencia de la obligación que tenían de obedecer a las autoridades civiles. En realidad, los gobiernos de todas las tendencias, presionaron a la Iglesia y a sus bienes, pues la consideraron como la fuente del financiamiento más barato que podían obtener.

Otro de los lugares comunes en las referencias a la historia de México es hablar de militarismo, muestra también ignorancia. La corporación era reciente, pues se había empezado a establecer en 1765 y el ejército novohispano apenas alcanzó doce mil hombres. Fue la lucha independentista la que multiplicó su número y generó un ejército paralelo, el de los insurgentes que, al unirse al realista en 1821 hizo que entonces alcanzara la alta suma de ochenta cinco mil hombres. Pero la crisis de la hacienda pública no tardó en reducirlo a un número más o menos estable de unos treinta mil, cantidad rídicula si se considera su objetivo de vigilar y defender un territorio tan extenso como el mexicano.

Un ejército que había conjugado intereses tan contrastantes como los de los realistas y los insurgentes, no podía ser monolítico y en su seno se desarrollaron todas las tendencias, republicanos y monarquistas, iturbidistas y borbonistas, centralistas y federalistas. De esa manera el ejército participó en el establecimiento del Imperio y en su derrumbe, en la fundación de la república federal y de la central y en sus entierros. A través de su participación consiguió encumbramiento y ascensos, pero también quedó condenado a la corrupción, la indisciplina y la deserción. Uno de los movimientos que provocaría, el de 1832, iba a resultar costoso, ya que al enfrentar a las milicias estatales con el ejército permanente, devastó a las dos instituciones en dos famosas batallas en las que murieron sus mejores elementos.

El ejército obtuvo privilegios por sus "servicios" a la independencia, por establecer la república y "defenderla," pero resulta dudosa la acusación de haber monopolizado los recursos del país. La imposibilidad de establecer un eficiente sistema fiscal y las deudas acumuladas por el Estado para defenderse de las amenazas externas,

lo dejaron en manos de los usureros, comerciantes nacionales y sobre todo extranjeros que descubrieron que prestarle, en condiciones leoninas, era un negocio redondo. El pago de interéses por préstamos usurarios representó el gasto principal y absorbió los pobres recursos con que contaban los gobiernos.

Otro tema que es necesario revisar es el de la independencia de Texas, siempre explicado a base de los argumentos de su Declaración de Independencia, un documento político dirigido a justificarse y a lograr el apoyo norteamericano. Las acusaciones al gobierno mexicano eran injustas. Los texanos no padecieron ninguna tiranía militar, habían sido ciudadanos privilegiados de la República a los que se había concedido tierra gratís y exención de impuestos durante siete años--extendida por tres más--y permiso para importar todo lo que requirieran para la colonización. No colaboraron en los gastos que causó la defensa de los indios de las praderías. Sus quejas recibieron consideración y casi todas fueron resueltas a su favor. Así en 1829 se les eximió de la abolición de la esclavitud, a pesar de que los esclavos habían sido introducidos sin autorización, a condición de que no introdujeran uno más, la que desafiaron mediante el mecanismo de firmar un contrato ficticio entre amos y esclavos. Las justas demandas de un sistema de justicia más adecuado y mayor representación fueron resueltas en 1834 con las reformas aprobadas por la legislatura del estado de Coahuila y Texas. El departamento se dividió en tres jefaturas y se establecieron nuevos ayuntamientos; además se implementó el "Plan para el mejor arrego de la administración de justicia en Texas," que estableció el juicio por jurado--a pesar de ser tan ajeno a la tradición jurídica hispánica, publicándose en inglés y español y garantizando a los reos el ser juzgados en su propia lengua y concediendo el nombramiento de Juez Superior del circuito de Texas a un angloamericano. La queja sobre no poder ejercer su religión resultaba cínica, puesto que la entrada se había limitado a colonos católicos, ya que tanto la Constitución de 1812 como la de 1824, que habían jurado respetar, declaraban que la intolerancia religiosa y se habían comprometido a respetar las instituciones nacionales.

La justificación del establecimiento del centralismo como causa de la separación también es objetable. En realidad, el desafío de los estados de Zacatecas y Coahuila y Texas a la limitación de las milicias estatales, aprobada por el Congreso nacional, parecía anunciar la desintegración del territorio nacional. El temor que había despertado el movimiento independentista texano fue aprovechado por el grupo minúsculo que apoyaba la propuesta centralista, para popularizarla e imponerla.

Sin duda los especuladores de tierras, entre ellos Esteban Austin y su socio, el expansionismo que representaban los recién llegados como Samuel Houston, el esclavismo de los colonos sureños convencidos de que la institución no podría mantenerse en México y el establecimiento de las primeras aduanas, al cumplirse la extensión del plazo concedida en 1833, fueron sin duda las causas de la independencia, pero no eran mencionables en la declaración de independencia. Es fácil deducir que no se mencionara la esclavitud como causa, pues hubiera restado apoyo en muchas partes de la unión americana y comprometido su reconocimiento. Mas basta dar un vistazo a la constitución texana para calibrar el peso que tuvo. Inspirada en las leyes esclavistas más radicales del sur, aseguraba que los esclavos existentes en Texas mantendrían su estado de servidumbre, el Congreso no podría prohibir la entrada de esclavos a la república, ni tendría poder para emanciparlos. Declaraba que ni los mismos propietarios podrían liberar a sus esclavos sin consentimiento del Congreso, a menos que los enviaran fuera de los límites de la misma.

El muy manido tema de la dictadura en el contexto de la independencia de Texas y de la guerra con los Estados Unidos no toma en cuenta que en realidad la dictadura, antes de la época de Porfirio Díaz, fue excepcional y nunca tuvo la fuerza que tuvo en otras naciones hispanoamericanas. Santa Anna la ejerció dos veces y brevemente: de octubre de 1841 a junio de 1843 y de abril de 1853 a agosto de 1855. Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga la ejerció en forma aún más breve, de enero a julio de 1846.

Desde el punto mexicano la pérdida de Texas fue determinante como causa de la guerra, por el apoyo velado del gobierno norteamericano y el abierto de los estados y los ciudadanos. La paranoia que llegó a tener el Estado mexicano con Estados Unidos tenía bases sólidas. Los periódicos texanos y norteamericanos desataron una campaña de desprestigio contra el vecino país, que más tarde justificaría el expansionismo. La retórica de sus políticos era amenazadora. La reproducción de esos artículos en la prensa mexicana iba a despertar una actitud belicosa en la opinión pública, pero los gobiernos mantuvieron una actitud prudente al tener conciencia de la débil situación del Estado mexicano. Tal vez el más grande error haya sido no reconocer la independencia de Texas, sobre todo aprovechando las ofertas de Gran Bretaña, tan interesada en mantener la existencia de la república texana de garantía franco-británica para su frontera.

La cuestión de impuntualidad del pago de las reclamaciones era comprensible ante la bancarrota hacendaria mexicana y significaba la base para que los gobiernos norteamericanos albergaran la esperanza de lograr obtener el terreno anhelado sin recurrir a la guerra. Pero esto era imposible para los mexicanos. Los historiadores norteamericanos han tenido dificultades para comprender que México no vendiera el territorio que de todas formas iba a perder, pero para los mexicanos representaba un legado esencial, imposible de enajenarse.

Lo más dramático para México fue que los Estados Unidos, su modelo desde el establecimiento de la república, se convertiera al mismo tiempo en el principal enemigo. Una vez desatada, el resultado de la guerra era previsible. Los Estados Unidos había aprovechado las circunstancias favorables que habían acompañado su aparición como Estado y había crecido con un dinamismo singular. Los dos países que eran similares en territorio y población en 1804, empezaban a mostrar una gran asimetría que con el tiempo se ahondaría. México apenas rebasaba los siete millones de habitantes y su vecino ya pasaba los veinte. Los Estados Unidos contaba con recursos, hombres, oficiales entrenados con técnica bélica moderna. México no sólo carecía de todo, sino que se iba a encontrar en 1845 en medio de dos amenazas: la conspiración monárquica organizada por la Corona española, con la aprobación franco-británica, y la del expansionismo norteamericano. Es decir, débil, sin recursos y dividida entre monárquicos, republicanos moderados y federalistas, iba a hacer frente a una guerra injusta.

A pesar de todo, si consideramos que el país lograra salvar Baja California y Tehuantepec y sobrevivir al movimiento para absorber todo México, desatado durante el 1847, y mantener su unidad, a pesar de los múltiples males que acompañaron la firma del Tratado de Guadalupe, podemos decir que el país tuvo suerte. La experiencia dramática serviría para consolidar su identidad nacional e hizo despertar a una generación que ya no había conocido la paz y el orden colonial y se empeñaría sin trabas a construir un Estado nuevo.

COULD THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR HAVE BEEN AVOIDED?

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Now that with or without NAFTA (the North America Free Trade Agreement) the tightening of social and economic relations between Mexico and the United States is becoming a reality, it is more important than ever to assess realistically the circumstances that led to war between the two countries in 1846 and also to examine to what extent such an event could have been avoided. One can say that it was both American expansionism--that eagerness for acquiring territory that John L. O'Sullivan expressed so vividly in his editorial in the *Democratic Review* in the summer of 1845--and the political turmoil within Mexican society that propitiated the outbreak of the war. While it might not be difficult to illustrate the former motivation--and it will be clearly illustrated later--as far as the latter situation is concerned, it is pertinent to point out what a sharp politician, José María Gutiérrez de Estrada, said in 1840:

> If we do not change our pace, if we continue the way we are, with this anarchy and chaos that we are confronting, we are going to be an open invitation to foreign intervention and it might not be more than twenty years before the flag of the stripes and bars might be waving on top of the National Palace.[1]

As it happened it was to be seven years, not twenty, when that very thing occurred. Indeed it does not seem a wonder that what had been the wealthiest colony of the late Spanish Empire, whose famous resources had been widely advertised by the writings of Alexander von Humboldt, would be an open invitation for any power to come and take advantage of, especially during the political upheaval that followed the consummation of independence in 1821. Afterwards, only the first president was able to complete his full term in office, but he did not survive without facing threats to his authority. Over the succeeding five decades, no one who held the executive power was able to do so either.

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[1]John L. O'Sullivan "Annexation of Texas," *The United States Magazine and Democratic Review* 17 (July and August, 1845), in Frank Freidel, Norman Pollack, and Robert Crunden, eds., *Builders of American Institutions. Readings in United States History*, 2 vols. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), 1:251-57. José María Gutiérrez de Estrada, "Carta monárquica," in Justo Sierra, Gutiérrez de Estrada, and Mariano Otero, *1840-1850: Documentos de la época* (Mexico: Secretaría de la Reforma Agraria-Centro de Estudios Históricos del Agrarismo en México, 1981), 49-114; the quote is on page 85.

It was in that complicated scenario that open invitations to populate Texas were made to foreign--mostly American--colonists.[2] There quickly developed, however, interests that diverged from those of Mexico, even though several Mexicans participated in the speculative enterprises--generally associated with land--that unfolded. Even up to the last minute, during 1835, there were various attempts to use the support of the colonists and the *empresarios*, as well as those of their entrepreneurial relations in the United States, to intervene in the political problems of Mexico. As is widely known, Texas became independent in 1836 and in the following years she obtained the recognition of various countries. But many Mexican authorities would not share that view.[3]

In fact, in Mexico the Texas issue was what would today in the United States be called a political football. It became a symbol of alleged inept government, proof presented by opposing currents in national and regional politics of the corruption or even treasonable behavior of their enemies. In spite of the fact that most people and even most Mexicans saw the annexation of Texas by the United States as logical or even inevitable, the open recognition of this evolution, or earnest public attempts to negotiate the territory's peaceable transfer eventually became political suicide.[4]

In the same year that Gutiérrez de Estrada made his prophetic remark about the National Palace, another important politician and thinker, Lucas Alamán, proposed (probably through British persuasion) the recognition of Texas independence. He felt it was essential in order to avoid a large confrontation that might endanger the retention of other Mexican territories. Both men were accused by various political groups of being traitors, first because they recognized and admitted that Mexico was not able to solve such problems on her own, and second, because they were willing to forfeit part of its national territory for expedience.[5]

In the following years the issue of Texas annexation aroused serious and divisive debate in the United States In fact, in 1844 one of the first attempts to incorporate that region into the Union failed in the Senate, but the presidential campaign of James Polk,

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[2]"Colonization Law of the State of Coahuila and Texas, March 24, 1825," in J.P. Kimball, ed., *Laws and Decrees of the State of Coahuila and Texas* (Houston: Telegraph Power Press, 1839), 15-23; "Ley federal de colonización, August 18, 1824," in Manuel Dublán y José María Lozano, eds., *Legislación mexicana o colección completa de las disposiciones legislativas expedidas desde la independencia de la república*, 40 vols. (México: Imprenta del Comercio, 1876-1912), 1:712-23.

[3]Andreas Reichstein, *Rise of the Lone Star: The Making of Texas*, trans. Jeanne R. Wilson (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1989); Malcolm McLean, ed., *Papers Concerning Robertson's Colony in Texas*, 18 vols. (Forth Worth: Texas Christian University Press, and Arlington: University of Texas at Arlington Press, 1974-1993). See also an upcoming article "La disputa entre Monclova y Saltillo y la independencia de Texas," *Revista de Historia* (Winter 1993).

[4]José Fernando Ramírez, "México durante su guerra con los Estados Unidos," in *Documentos inéditos o muy raros para la historia de México*, ed. Genaro García, (México: Porrúa, 1975), 513.

[5]"Dictamen leido el 3 de junio de 1840 en el consejo de gobierno, sobre la cuestión de Tejas", (México: Imprenta de la Casa de Corección, 1844), quoted in Reynaldo Sordo Cedeño, "El Congreso en la Primera República Centralista," 2 vols. (Ph.D. dissertation, El Colegio de México, 1989), 2:583-84. To cure the political anarchy that prevailed in Mexico, José María Gutiérrez de Estrada proposed the establishment of a monarchy with a European prince. The reaction towards such a proposal was so negative that he was forced to flee the country and never return. From Europe, however, he continued to be concerned with Mexican politics and, ultimately, intervened in the positioning of Maximilian as Emperor of Mexico in 1864. José Fuentes Mares, *La Emperatriz Eugenia y su aventura mexicana* (México: El Colegio de México, 1976), 86.

based on an annexationist platform that advocated Texas for the South and Oregon for the North, resolved the quandary by demonstrating the appeal of that policy among the voters. And even before the new executive took office in 1845, the new congressional procedures that offered Texans to join the Union were completed. Thus, Texas annexation became almost a certainty for the United States, and a major test for the political system in Mexico appeared upon the horizon.[6]

In April 1845 the ministers of France and Great Britain in Texas convinced President Anson Jones to postpone the procedures for the final decision of the Texans until a Mexican proposal could be heard. Charles Elliot, the English agent, went to Mexico City to convince the administration of José Joaquín de Herrera to recognize Texas independence. Herrera agreed to this, along with most of the congressmen, but with one condition; that Texas was to remain independent from any other nation.[7] This proposal was "too little, too late", and the Republic of the Lone Star disappeared and became part of the United States with the overwhelming majority of Texans supporting the move.

The compromising attitude of Herrera did not go unnoticed by the radical liberals led by Valentín Gómez Farías. A few weeks later on June 7, along with some of the military, the liberal leader tried to overthrow Herrera accusing him of treason for trying to recognize Texas independence. Clearly illustrating the volatile political situation in Mexico, Gómez Farías was willing to sacrifice some of his dearest political principles, such as the elimination of the *fueros* (the judicial privileges of the church and the army), in order to gain support from those very same corporations to overthrow the pacifist, liberal regime of Herrera.[8] The radical political leader maintained and even increased his antagonistic attitude towards any diplomatic solution of the Texas dispute at the end of 1845, when President Herrera was then ready to negotiate in the aftermath of an accomplished fact: the annexation of Texas to the United States.[9]

This latter instance, however, is one in which we will focus, since it serves to illustrate a question that was raised at the beginning of this essay; that is, the possible avoidance of the war. But in order to review the diplomatic mission of American envoy John Slidell in 1845, some background of the debate in Mexico is required.

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[6]Charles Sellers, *James K. Polk: Continentalist, 1843-1846* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 67; David Pletcher, *The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon, and the Mexican War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 149, 184-85.

[7]*Memoria del ministro de relaciones exteriores y gobernación leida en el senado el 11 y en la cámara de diputados el 12 de marzo de 1845* (México: Ignacio Cumplido, 1845).

[8]"Proclama y plan del pronunciamiento del 7 de junio de 1845," *La Voz del Pueblo*, July 5, 19, 1845, and transcribed in Pedro Santoni, "Los federalistas radicales y la Guerra del 47" (Ph.D. dissertation, El Colegio de México, 1983), 445-58. Not only was Valentín Gómez Farías contradictory by opposing a liberal politician for his pacifist attitude but he had supported Texans' opposition to the process of centralization in Mexico in 1835, and participated in the alliance between Texas and Yucatán from 1841 to 1843. It was only in 1844, when it seemed like the fate of Texas was about to be decided between the United States, Great Britain, and France, and not Mexico, that Gómez Farías became antagonistic to any foreign intervention in the decisions pertaining to Mexican territory. In fact, the very separation of Texas from Mexico in 1835-1836 had opened the door to unlimited foreign intervention.

[9]Miguel Soto, *La conspiración monárquica en México, 1845-1846* (México: Eosa, 1988), 91-92; flier in *La Voz del Pueblo*, signed by "Los Liberales Verdaderos", on December 3, 1845, Valentín Gómez Farías Papers, Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas at Austin, 1323, 1324; the proclamation is also in Santoni, "Los federalistas radicales," 459-64.

During the early heated debate over Texas annexation in the United States in 1843, northern abolitionists made clear their view that if the incorporation of that territory implied a war with Mexico, the United States would never annex Texas. In response to such overtures, Mexican officials stated that annexation would indeed mean war between the two countries.[10]

By making that move, however, one has to wonder whether those Mexican authorities were not guilty of miscalculating the direction of American politics. As we have seen, the combined expansionist promises of the presidential campaign of 1844 offering Texas and Oregon transformed the scenario and the possibility of annexing the former came much closer to reality.

In March of 1845, when the congressional procedures were completed for the incorporation of Texas, the Mexican government did not declare war on the United States, but simply retired its minister from Washington. This move was reciprocated by the American authorities, who removed their minister from Mexico City. On June 4 the Herrera regime published a "call to the defense of the national territory" threatened by the "imminent" incorporation of Texas to the United States This move was not meant as a declaration of war, but only as a defensive measure. What followed then was a diplomatic impasse between the two nations.[11]

To break the logjam, in a sharp diplomatic move the Polk administration astutely asked the Herrera government if it would be willing to receive an envoy in order to solve the "pending issues" that existed between them.[12] The Mexican response was affirmative. The documentation relating to the proposed negotiations reveals what each nation considered were the "pending issues" and enables us to make some evaluations as to what were the possibilities for the two parties to reach a pacific agreement.

On November 10 Secretary of State James Buchanan issued the instructions that were to guide Slidell's mission to Mexico.[13] First of all, there were outstanding claims of American citizens against the Mexican government; most of them consisted of demands for retribution over seizure of ships during critical times such as in 1829, when a Spanish expedition of reconquest landed near Tampico. Others complained of confiscations of goods from ships that allegedly avoided payment of custom duties. Also, surprisingly enough, there were petitions for indemnification from various entrepreneurs from New York who had invested in projects of colonization in Texas and whose properties were damaged during the military efforts to recover that province for the

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[10]Juan Nepomuceno Almonte to Abel P. Upshur, Washington, November 3, 1843, in Carlos Bosch García, ed. *Documentos de la Relación de México con los Estados Unidos, III. El Endeudamiento de México, (Abril 1836-Noviembre 1843)* (México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1984), 625-26.

[11]Almonte to John C. Calhoun, Washington, March 6, 1845, James Buchanan to Almonte, Washington, March 10, 1845, and "Junio 4 de 1845. Se convoca a la nación a la defensa de la independencia nacional, amenazada por la usurpación de Texas" in Bosch García, ed. *Documentos de la relación de México con los Estados Unidos, de las reclamaciones, la guerra y la paz. (1 de diciembre de 1843 a diciembre 22 de 1848)*, (México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1985), 452, 457-58, and 526-27.

[12]Buchanan to John Black, September 17, 1845, Black to Buchanan, October 17, 1845, and Black to Manuel de la Peña y Peña, October 15, 1845 in William Manning, ed. *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Inter-American Affairs, 1831-1860*, 12 vols. (Washington: 1932-1939), 8:167-69, 761-68.

[13]"Instrucciones del Secretario de Estado Buchanan al Enviado Especial John Slidell", Washington, November 10, 1845, in James K. Polk, *Diario del Presidente Polk*, 2 vols., ed. Luis Cabrera (Mexico: Antigua Librería Robredo, 1948), 2:55-69; this document is also available in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States*, 8:172-82, but the specific quotations correspond to the former.

Mexican nation in 1836--an ironic plea since many of those same entrepreneurs had also invested heavily in the Texans' revolutionary activities against Mexico.[14]

Three claims conventions were held between 1839 and 1843 and as a result of those deliberations the Mexican government committed itself to pay $3,336,837.05 in claims reparations to the Americans. After paying only a few installments, Mexico was unable to carry out its payment responsibilities.[15] It was undoubtedly clear to everyone that as a result of the turmoil that prevailed, Mexico's national treasury confronted perennial bankruptcy. Thus, the American reasoning went, if Mexico could not comply with her debts through cash payments, was there any other way for her to solve such "pending issues"? Indeed, there was one: the resolution of debt obligations through the transfer of some sections of her territory.

As far as Texas was concerned, she had obtained her independence in "one of the most decisive and memorable victories recorded in history," so there was nothing further to discuss.[16] A different situation pertained to New Mexico and California. To acquire those territories, and an international border that would include the port of San Francisco, the Polk administration was willing to assume the cost of its citizens' claims and pay twenty-five million dollars.[17]

A comparison of the amounts at stake--a little over three million dollars for the claims and twenty-five million for the purchase of territory--clearly shows what were the "pending issues" for the Polk administration: the acquisition of new realms to enlarge the American domain. Such lands could be obtained through the "civilized" channel of purchase or through the violent procedure of war, something for which various Mexican officials had already appeared eager.

With these instructions Slidell sailed from New York. After a very rapid trip, he landed in Veracruz in two weeks. The Herrera government asked him to remain at Jalapa while it prepared the diplomatic environment to receive him; but, true to form with Polk's impetuousness, Slidell continued on and arrived in Mexico City on December 7.

While reviewing Slidell's credentials in the following days, the Mexican authorities realized that the certificates lacked a condition that Herrera himself had set up

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[14]Clayton Charles Kohl, "Claims as a Cause of the Mexican War" (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1910), appendices 1 and 2; Powathan Ellis to Juan de Dios Cañedo, June 13, 1840, in Anthony Butler Papers, Barker Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin. Ellis mentioned the claim of Gilbert Livingston Thompson, who "suffered destruction of property by the Commanding General of the Mexican army in Texas in 1836". About the participation of New York businessmen in the Texas Revolution see Feris A. Bass Jr. and B.R. Brunson, eds., *Fragile Empires. The Texas Correspondence of Samuel Swartwout and James Morgan, 1836-1856* (Austin: Shoal Creek Publishers, 1978).

[15]Glenn Price has showed that when the Polk administration used the Mexican debt from the claims as a justification for a war with Mexico, the U.S. owed various creditors of Europe over two hundred million dollars but none of them threatened her with a military conflict. See his *Origins of the War with Mexico: The Polk-Stockton Intrigue* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967), 24. Although this was true, it is important to bear in mind that a few years earlier the French government waged war against Mexico using as a pretext a debt of only $600,000. Thus, it is clear that at least at that time it was not the amount of a debt that determined whether a military intervention in another country took place but rather the weakness of the debtor to defend itself against foreign aggressions. See Faustino Amado Aquino Sánchez, "Intervención francesa, 1838-1839. La diplomacia mexicana y el imperialismo del librecambio" (B.A. thesis, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1992).

[16]Buchanan to Slidell, November 10, 1845, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States*, 8:178.

[17]Ibid., 180-81.

in his response to the suggestion in October of receiving an envoy to work around the diplomatic impasse: Slidell had not been sent as a special or extraordinary envoy, but as an ordinary plenipotentiary minister. This was unacceptable because the aim of the Mexican authorities was to solve this one crisis, not to restore normal diplomatic relations. In order to strengthen his position, Herrera submitted the credentials to an analysis of the *consejo de gobierno* (government council), so the refusal of the American minister would not be attributed to a lack of commitment on his part.[18]

A peculiar move of the Herrera administration--one which illustrates what it understood as "pending issues" between the two countries--took place. On the very day that it passed the credentials for analysis, through his Minister of Foreign Relations, Manuel de la Peña y Peña, Herrera issued a circular to the governors of the departments of the country trying to gain their support for the diplomatic negotiations that, in fact, they were already willing to begin.[19] Cautiously, Herrera tried to convince his subordinates to support a negotiated solution to the Texas crisis, as opposed to advocating a war against the United States that, considering the pitiful state of the Mexican economy and its poor military preparations, would probably be devastating and catastrophic.

It is quite clear that Herrera wanted to avoid being accused of treasonous intent when he ended his document in quite an ambiguous fashion. He stated it was not his purpose to demand from the governors a "definitive" statement, either in favor of or against a war, but only an opinion about each department's state of readiness to face armed conflict. But in the very next paragraph he indeed requested from them an answer "at the shortest time, in the categorical, decisive and resolute manner in which has been stated."[20]

Regardless of these fearful ambiguities and besides the fact that this document proves unmistakably the awareness that existed among some politicians as to what could happen--and did happen--to Mexico in a confrontation with the United States, the Herrera circular shows one thing very clearly: had the difficulties over Slidell's credentials been solved, for the Mexican pacifist administration the only pending issue between the two countries was that of Texas.

It is perplexing and ironic to see how this mild president went to so much trouble and delicately formed reasoning to convince his collaborators of the possibility of opening negotiations over the loss of Texas, while for the Polk administration that very matter was a *fait accompli* and the real "pending issue" was the acquisition of other territories from Mexico.

As it turned out, the Herrera administration ran out of time in its efforts to receive Slidell and to set up negotiations to solve the diplomatic crisis. But now we can see that even if Herrera's pacifist government could have received the American envoy, and if Texas' loss could have been negotiated, Mexico would have found that the Texan

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[18]"Comunicación del ministro Peña y Peña al consejo de gobierno, diciembre 11 de 1845", in Polk, *Diario*, 2:70-73.

[19]"Circular of the minister of foreign relations, Manuel de la Peña y Peña, to the governors of the departments, México, December 11, 1845," in Antonio de la Peña y Reyes, ed. *Algunos documentos sobre el tratado de Guadalupe-Hidalgo y la situación de México durante la invasión americana* (México: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1930), 3-26. The departments were equivalent to states in the centralist form of government, though they lacked legislatures. Instead, they had very selective juntas, and their governors were appointed by the central authorities.

[20]Ibid., 26.

territory that it had sacrificed so painfully was just an appetizer for a forever-hungry neighbor who aimed for New Mexico and California. The possibility of their reaching any negotiated solution under such circumstances was quite precarious.

As was stated, Herrera ran out of time. In addition to the sharp opposition of the radical liberals, he faced a nemesis in the form of a "hawk" opponent seeking political advantage in the nation's perilous situation. Four days after sending his circular to the various departments, General Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga issued a manifesto accusing the president of trying to avoid a "glorious and necessary war" by giving away part of the national territory. With this warrior's banner, Paredes was able to overthrow the pacifist regime and within two weeks take office.[21]

Even though the Paredes government did not launch a war against the United States, it certainly provided the Polk administration with the ammunition it needed to justify its belligerent attitude, and obtain an overwhelming majority of votes in Congress for the war. Slidell was finally rejected and hostilities broke out on what President Polk conveniently defined "American soil."[22]

Thus, it becomes clear that a fundamental disagreement between the eager-for-territory Polk administration and the pacifist regime of José Joaquín de Herrera over the "pending issues" of the two countries existed and even if they had a chance to exchange their diplomatic views, it's unlikely that negotiations could have avoided war. As it was, the volatile political situation in Mexico, so vividly expressed in the call for a "glorious and necessary war," closed that diplomatic option even more drastically. In the end, both the aggressive administration of Polk, and the no-less-belligerent one of Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga slid irrevocably into armed conflict.

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[21]"Manifiesto y Plan de San Luis Potosí", December 14, 15, 1845, in Berta Ulloa and Joel Hernández, eds., *Planes en la nación mexicana* (México: El Colegio de México-Senado de la República, 1987), 289-90; Pletcher, *Diplomacy of Annexation*, 358-59; Miguel Soto, "The Monarchist Conspiracy and the Mexican War" in *Essays on The Mexican War*, ed. Douglas W. Richmond, (College Station: University of Texas at Arlington-Texas A&M University, 1986), 66-84.

[22]During the war, political enemies of President James Polk, like Abraham Lincoln, pointed out the debatable character of such pretensions since, in fact, the area between the Rio Grande--or Bravo--and the Nueces River was (in current diplomatic terms) a "disputed area," since it had served formerly to divide not only Texas and Coahuila, but also the province of New Santander--the modern state of Tamaulipas--and Texas. Abraham Lincoln, speech in the United States House of Representatives, January 12, 1848, in Freidel et al., *Builders of American Institutions*, 1:261-67; Sellers, *Polk: Continentalist*, 407-8.

CONFEDERATE IMPERIAL DESIGNS ON NORTHWESTERN MEXICO

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> We must have Sonora and Chihuahua. With Sonora and Chihuahua we gain Southern California, and by a railroad to Guaymas render our State of Texas the great highway of nations.--Colonel James Reiley, Sibley's Brigade.

The origins of southern imperial ambitions are old, their roots deep. Americans, especially Southerners, had long manifested a penchant for expansion. Pushing inland from coastal enclaves, they carved an empire from the wilderness. Eventually, this outward momentum of the nation became concentrated on expansion to the west--although Americans attempted to push north and south, the path of least resistance lay to the sparsely-settled west. The drive for expansion continued even when impractical. During the American Revolution and the War of 1812, American attempts to take Canada had failed miserably. Expansionists had better luck against adjacent areas tentatively held by Spain and, later, by the nations descended from its colonial empire. Southerners, with proximity to hispanic domains, naturally became skilled expansionists. Land-hungry agrarians with a talent for things military, they were the principal agents and proponents of an ever-expanding American empire. Southerners gloried in this role and, throughout the first seventy years of American history, could be found in the forefront of national expansion. The southerner became the archetypal imperialist.

Texans, the offspring of southern imperialism, wore the mantle comfortably. The state had a long history of nationalism, or, more accurately, localism. Lone Star soldiers and politicians had always been ardent expansionists. The state had also compiled an impressive résumé of imperialistic military adventures, and its fighting men were leaders or partisans in most of the more notorious attempts at armed expansion. The creation of empires suited the Texas temperament.

Texas was, after all, born in battle. The spirit of revolution, the promise of glory, and bounties of free land had attracted an adventurous breed of men to the young republic. Mostly from the Deep South came a mix of outcasts, drifters, and professional adventurers along with respectable, civic-minded men and ambitious planters. All came to build their dreams, and many tended to support military solutions to most problems of state. In the 1830s and early 1840s war in Texas was a reality, and men who savored combat splashed across the Red and Sabine Rivers in ever growing numbers. Their successes in "Rangering Companies" against Mexicans and Comanches led the Texan

leadership to indulge in dreams far in excess of the republic's actual ability to accomplish.[1]

Texan imperialism blossomed with independence as the vision of a vast Texan empire took shape. With no historical justification, leaders claimed the Río Grande from source to mouth as the national border. This included Santa Fe, the great El Dorado at the foot of the mountains, as the rightful plunder and possession of the new nation. Other proposals urged Texas lawmakers to acquire, through purchase or by force, large tracts of northern Mexico from the Gulf to the Sea of Cortez. Texan claims expanded as the United States maneuvered the Texas boundary to meet its own territorial ambitions. In an effort to place an American claim on the Pacific coast, President Andrew Jackson urged Texas to claim California.[2] Capturing the spirit, the bellicose *Columbia Telegraph and Texas Register* boasted in 1837 that "The army of Texas will display its victorious banner west of the Rio Grande, and when once its conquering march shall have commenced, ...the roar of the Texan rifles shall mingle in unison with the thunders of the Pacific."[3]

Early faith in this destiny led Texans to establish their national capital, Austin, on the frontier and away from the established centers of population. Expansionist Texan president Mirabeau B. Lamar, who extravagantly predicted an empire from sea to sea, boasted that the rustic log cabin settlement would serve as the "seat of future empire."[4] The men charged with locating the capital concurred, anticipating the time when "a great thoroughfare shall be established from Santa Fe to our seaports, and another from the Red River to Matamoros, which two routes must always of necessity intersect each other at this point."[5]

Texans persuaded themselves that their claim on eastern New Mexico was legitimate, and volunteers were eager to establish control of the region. In 1837, the inhabitants of Río Arriba, or northern New Mexico, revolted, sending an encouraging if mistaken signal to the Republic of Texas.[6] As a result, starting in 1841, Texan forces made three separate attempts to invade, control, and coerce Santa Fe into the dominion, each meeting with bitter failure. These reversals, however, did nothing to dampen the Texans' unfounded claim to New Mexico east of the Río Grande.[7]

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[1]D. W. Meining, *Imperial Texas: An Interpretive Essay in Cultural Geography* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969), 38-39. This work deals extensively with the concept of Texas imperialism.

[2]William C. Binkley, *The Expansionist Movement in Texas, 1836-1850* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1970), 29.

[3]*Columbia Telegraph and Texas Register*, September 16, 1837. See also Binkley, *The Expansionist Movement in Texas*, 16-42.

[4]Herbert Pickens Gambrell, *Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar: Troubadour and Crusader* (Dallas: Southwest Press, 1934), 245. See also Asa K. Christian, *Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar* (Austin: Von Boechmann-Jones, 1932) and Mirabeau B. Lamar, *Papers*, 6 vols., ed. C. A. Gulick (Austin: Baldwin, 1921-1927). Also see John Edward Weems and Jane Weems, *Dream of Empire: A Human History of the Republic of Texas, 1836-1846* (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1986).

[5]Quoted in Meining, *Imperial Texas*, 42.

[6]Janet Lecompte, *Rebellion in Rio Arriba, 1837* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985), 61-62.

[7]The three expeditions included General Hugh McCleod's attempt in 1841, Colonel Charles Warfield's 1843 raid on the village of Mora, and Colonel James Snively's "Battalion of Invincibles" expedition the same year.

The most famous and tragic attempt on Santa Fe occurred in 1841. With the backing of President Lamar but not of the legislature, General Hugh McCleod of the Texas army trusted Zebulon M. Pike's maps and attempted to follow the brackish Red River to its presumed source in the Rocky Mountains. McCleod reasoned he could reach Santa Fe by this route while avoiding the Mexican-controlled southern route through Chihuahua. The Texans would arrive at the New Mexican settlements unannounced, allowing the rebellious population time to rally to the Lone Star standard before the garrisons could react. To mask the military nature of the mission, Texan merchants took along several heavy freight wagons, intending to conduct trade with the inhabitants whether or not the anticipated uprising materialized.

The campaign was a disaster. Pike's conclusions were wrong, and the expedition found itself near the head of the Red River but hundreds of miles from the Rocky Mountains. In addition, a late start, poor planning, and the waterless void of the *llano estacado* combined to defeat the invaders. Instead of being heralded as liberators, the famished expeditionaries surrendered to the poorly-equipped Mexican militia without a shot being fired. For the ragged group of starving Texans, their suffering had only begun. The Mexicans marched the survivors south to imprisonment in the notorious castle of Perote. Guards executed those who could not keep up, taking the dead men's ears as trophies. After crossing the deserts of New Mexico and Chihuahua, the Texans eventually reached the prison east of Mexico City on the road to Veracruz. Mexican officials eventually repatriated the survivors, who carried with them many bitter memories.[8]

Ultimately, in 1845 the United States and Texas annexed each other, thereby fulfilling both nations' expansionist goals. The United States continued its westward drive. Texas, under the aegis of the American military, expected at last to achieve control over Santa Fe--a feat it had failed to accomplish on its own. Nevertheless, Mexico refused to let Texas, which it still considered a province in rebellion, be swallowed up by the United States, so war followed. By 1848, however, Mexico's armies had been defeated, and the Americans occupied a third of its territory. The treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, which concluded the war, left the United States in possession of this vast area.

Acquisition of this so-called "Mexican Cession" gravely aggravated sectional issues then plaguing the United States. Southerners were determined to maintain the balance of power in national politics by extending slavery westward into the new territories. Abolitionists were equally determined to exclude the peculiar institution from them. To expansionists, the consequence of this growing national deadlock was obvious--internecine political conflict would curtail the acquisition of any new territory in the future.[9]

For the South, other unsettled problems caused by the acquisition of the western territories were equally acute in 1850. The discovery of gold in California the previous year and the resulting surge in its population had enabled that territory to petition for

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[8]An excellent reprint of a primary account of the 1841 Santa Fe Expedition is George Wilkins Kendall, *Narrative of the Texan Santa Fe Expedition*, 2 vols. (Austin: The Steck Company, 1935). For a comprehensive treatment of the border fighting between Texas and Mexico, see Joseph M. Nance, *After San Jacinto: The Texas-Mexican Frontier, 1836-1841* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1963) and his *Attack and Counterattack: The Texas-Mexican Frontier, 1842* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964).

[9]A discussion of Manifest Destiny serving as a cure to national instability can be found in Thomas R. Hietala, *Manifest Design: Anxious Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).

statehood as a free state, much to the southerners' outrage. Free Soilers had advocated successfully for New Mexico territory to be a western barrier to the extension of slavery, and now the southerners lost California. Despite the militant posturing in the South, Henry Clay's Compromise of 1850 passed and temporarily averted a clash between North and South but bitter feelings lingered. Aggravated by a host of other grievances, southerners now felt surrounded.

With slavery blocked in the western territories, the only remaining outlet for slavery was in renewed foreign conquests. Mexico remained the great object of fascination for southerners and many Americans. These expansionists saw in Mexico's extensive yet sparsely-settled territory an escape from sectional difficulties. As a result, it became the principal target for filibustering expeditions from the United States. Starting in 1851, raids into that nation occurred on an almost annual basis. Little evidence links these marauders to any sectional orientation or ideology--most seemed to have pursued personal gain. Some attempts took the form of military and financial support for Mexican revolutionaries like Santiago Vidaurri or José Carvajal. Other filibusters followed the more conventional method of outright conquest.[10]

What developed, then, during the decade of the 1850s, was a distinctly southern vision of manifest destiny. Southerners correctly saw their Republican opponents as hostile to slavery and despaired of ever making peace with them. Filibustering, openly discouraged by American officials, had proved ineffective, and by the end of the decade, southern expansionists were convinced that new territory could be obtained only if the South seceded. Only then would Mexico and Central America fall "like ripe fruit" to a southern nation. An empire composed of the existing American slave states, Mexico, Cuba, and California could be built. This vision soon had many adherents, including Jefferson Davis of Mississippi and William Samford of Alabama.[11]

The Knights of the Golden Circle, or KGC, epitomized the complete sectionalization of Manifest Destiny. Organized by George Bickley in 1855, this secret military society's goal was to secure Mexico and the Caribbean basin as parts of a slave empire. The Knights took their name from their plan for establishing an imperial capital at Havana, Cuba, and extending their realm in a "Golden Circle" through the Upper South, along the Gulf of Mexico, the Spanish Main, and across the Caribbean.[12] In a proclamation to his "knights," Bickley reveled in the superiority of Americans and exhorted them to "Let our railroads and telegraph lines reach from Canada to Patagonia. Let our ships carry our manufactures to the inmost recesses of the continent. Let our cities rise on the Amazon as they have on the Mississippi." By 1859, this organization had become a powerful subversive force in many parts of the South.[13]

Ultimately, the growing national tension led to an eruption. The election of Abraham Lincoln on November 6, 1860, aggravated the angry mood of the South and its supporters. In Charleston, South Carolina, mobs milled in the streets, eager for more news and defiant over the prospect of Republican rule. Secessionists raised "Palmetto

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[10]Robert E. May, *The Southern Dream of a Caribbean Empire, 1854-1861* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1973), 147-48.

[11]May, *Southern Dream*, 235-36; David M. Potter, *The Impending Crises: 1848-1861* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 198.

[12]May, *Southern Dream*, 148-49.

[13][George Bickley], *Rules, Regulations and Principles of the K.G.C., issued by Order of the Congress of the K.C.S. and the General President* (New York: Benjamin Urner, 1859), 6-7.

Flags" and talked openly of forming a southern Confederacy. "The tea has been thrown overboard, the revolution of 1860 has been initiated," trumpeted the *Charleston Mercury* the following day.[14] On November 10, the state legislature ordered a convention to meet in Columbia on December 17 to consider secession.[15]

A rebellious South was jubilant over the prospect of achieving the destiny the North had long denied it. When the South "shook itself free of the Puritans and the Devil," an anonymous writer for the *Charleston Mercury* asserted, Chihuahua and all the "Gulf country" would be added to the Confederacy. The *Macon Daily Telegraph* predicted similar glory. "Then will the proudest nations of the earth come to woo and worship at the shrine of our imperial Confederacy."[16]

The decade of the 1850s had born bitter fruit, and the impasse caused by slavery, states' rights, culture, and imperial ambition had finally sundered the nation. The majority of southerners had been gradually alienated from the Union over these issues. One by one, southern states formally seceded. Once out of the Union, they were certain the march to empire could proceed.[17]

The secession convention of the state of Texas met on January 28 and moved to effect separation from the Union. On February 1, after debating the wording of the ordinance, the delegates overwhelmingly adopted the measure 166 to 8. The convention then organized a general election, slated for February 23, to ratify its action.[18]

At the same time, the other seceded states had moved to link their fates. On February 4, 1861, delegates met at Montgomery to form a provisional government. They framed an imperialistic constitution that guaranteed slavery in any "new territory" acquired. The meeting then elected Davis, a long-time proponent of annexing Mexico, as president. Before the end of the week, representatives from Texas arrived, promising the imminent secession of their state and its intention to join the Confederacy.[19]

With troops gathering and the secession ordinance before the voters, Texas was on the verge of exciting events. Secession and the Confederacy offered the state many new avenues for expansion and the promise of economic boom times. Texas could achieve a satisfactory solution to the question of its western boundary by aligning with Arizona and New Mexico both politically and economically. Texan armies could also develop client states in Mexico, with possibilities of later annexation. Texas would then become the thoroughfare of empire. James Reiley, soon to become a colonel in the Confederate army and a key player in General Henry H. Sibley's New Mexico campaign, was adamant on this point. "We must have Sonora and Chihuahua," he wrote. "With Sonora and Chihuahua we gain Southern California, and by a railroad to Guaymas render our State of Texas the great highway of nations."[20]

In the ensuing War for Southern Independence, the new Confederacy continued to uphold the old American justifications for expansion. National security required that

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[14]*Charleston (South Carolina) Mercury*, November 7, 1860.

[15]Elijah Robinson Kennedy, *The Contest for California in 1861* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1912), 72-73.

[16]*Charleston Mercury*, December 7, 1860 and *Macon (Georgia) Daily Telegraph*, February 28, 1861.

[17]May, *Southern Dream*, 232.

[18]Ibid., 188-91.

[19]Ibid., 243, 246.

[20]James Reily to John H. Reagan, January 26, 1862, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Series 1, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1897), 50:825-26.

the Confederacy's western and southern flanks be secured. Commerce would benefit from the raw materials of Mexico and the American Southwest as well as from ports on the Pacific coast. And there remained the perceived need to uplift the indolent societies of Hispanic America, even against their wishes.[21] Empire and Manifest Destiny had been a national mission since colonial days, and now southerners, employing the instrument of secession, sought to restore the nation to its historic course and to carry forward the standard of empire that the North had abandoned. Southerners, through the Confederacy, would revive the American dream of empire and their ultimate target was Mexico.

[21]May, *Southern Dream*, 243.

SECTIONALISM AS A MAJOR DRIVING FORCE IN THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR

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No war has been as controversial for so long a time in American historiography as the war with Mexico. This absence of consensus originated in partisan political conflict but persisted as history writing became more scholarly and, supposedly, more objective. Several interpretations have been set forth, among which stand out those that emphasize the sectional interests as a major cause of the war. Within this school, however, historians were divided. Some maintained the war was a product of a southern "conspiracy of slavocracy," others contended instead that it was caused by the "land-hunger" of the West, and still others affirmed that the commercial interests of the North were even more influential.[1] Perhaps no one of those explanations, on its own, is sufficient to clarify the causes of the war; yet unquestionably sectionalism was a major force in leading to war. Therefore, this paper will analyze why the sectional conflict became an important component of the Mexican-American War.

In the history of the United States, from 1774 to the decade of the 1850s, the growth of an assertive nation that became a continental power is generally emphasized. This view stresses the pursuit of reform and democracy, population growth, the expansion of the economy, and the enlargement of territory. Yet without denying those features, one can also note the history of an infant and insecure country trying to consolidate itself. From this perspective, the swell of sectionalism, the risk of secession, the lack of social consensus, the cyclical economic crises, and the paranoid response to perceived external threats can be highlighted. This period is confounding in that the United States appeared to be, from the very beginning of her independent life, a well-organized state, but at the same time, a very weak nation.[2] The union was possible because there was consensus in a very important issue: the ideology of liberalism. America represented a liberal society even before liberalism was formulated, so its principles were easily assimilated, mainly because it emphasized individual interest as a legitimate aim, and underscored diversity and competition. In short, the United States since 1789 embarked upon a singular experiment: to create a nation out of a state, which in turn found support in an individualistic and selfish ideology.

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[1]Ramón Eduardo Ruiz, *The Mexican War: Was it Manifest Destiny?* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1963).

[2]Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981).

In 1789 the Constitution of the United States was ratified and the first President inaugurated. This seemed to imply that "a most perfect union" had been designed and that a new nation had emerged. However, two of the states--Rhode Island and North Carolina--still had not ratified the Constitution. This divergence was not new. In the processes of ratifying the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution there were evident differences of interest among the states, as well as differences of opinion within the states. In fact, both documents were the result of bargaining and compromise, which did not transcend those differences, but only appeased them. Hence, those diverse interests would reappear periodically as political coalitions or as disrupting movements. In sum, the emergence of the United States was the product of political and ideological consensus, but not of a social, economic, and cultural cohesiveness.

In the period from the ratification of the Constitution to the Civil War, two major trends dominated American history: sectionalism and expansionism. Both were rooted in the early colonial experience, but they received new impulses as a result of those contradictory conditions of political cohesiveness and social, economic, and cultural fragmentation. Also, both were inextricable linked. Consequently, they continuously affected the political life of the country.

Between 1790 and 1820, thanks in part to European conditions, the United States not only was able to resume her economic growth, but also increase significantly her territory. The expansionist drive was evident in the Louisiana Purchase, in the attempts to conquer Canada during the War of 1812, and finally in the occupation of West Florida and the acquisition of East Florida.[3] This expansionism responded to a kind of paranoia of an external danger as well as social pressure; yet, it has been interpreted as a result of nationalistic assertiveness. On the other hand, during that period, the United States showed disruptive sectional symptoms. By the end of George Washington's second term, they were evident in the first American Political Party system, and although it appeared they tended to dissipate during the so-called "Era of Good Feelings," sectional harmony was more illusion than reality.[4] Even expansionism, which sometimes seemed to be a cohesive issue, ended up being a disruptive sectional one. The Louisiana Purchase was opposed by the Federalists, while the Adams-Onis Treaty was criticized by southern and western interests because the treaty forfeited Texas due to northern pressures.[5]

In the 1820s and 1830s the United States entered a critical period which lasted until the Civil War.[6] The population increased significantly--in part as a result of new waves of immigration--and was in constant movement. Americans occupied not only the territories acquired the decade before, but also they moved to Texas, the Pacific coast, and the lands between. The westward movement was produced by several push and pull factors, not the least of which were economic. The economy of the United States continued growing and diversifying, but unevenly in regional terms and in the pace of growth. In fact, this period began with a recession--the Panic of 1819--and ended in a recession--the Panic of 1836--at a time when "King Cotton" started fighting the battle of the tariffs with Yankee industrialism. This strife became more complex with the introduction of a moral component: the Abolitionist movement.

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[3]Julius Pratt, *Expansionist of 1812* (New York: Macmillan, 1925).

[4]George Dangerfield, *The Era of Good Feelings* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1952).

[5]Carl Shurz, *American Statesman, Henry Clay* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1899).

[6]Avery Craven, *The Coming of the Civil War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

Sectionalism became the dominant factor of political life in the United States. It touched every issue and affected every institution. Compromise became the most efficient way to solve problems; however, those solutions were only temporary, and the settlements so achieved were increasingly more difficult to attain. Political parties were constantly in search of formulas to maintain their internal cohesiveness and their national support; yet, there was a proliferation of single-issue and regional parties. In every presidential election, the parties were hunting desperately for a man and an issue that could go beyond sectional lines. A token of this political disarray could be seen in the fact that between the administrations of James Monroe and Abraham Lincoln, only one president--Andrew Jackson--was elected to a second term.

In the political arena, expansionism became entangled with the problem of sectionalism. The stance of some prominent political figures on this issue is revealing. For instance, John Quincy Adams, after being a staunch expansionist in the 1820s, was by the 1830s a dedicated anti-expansionist. Others, such as Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, Martin Van Buren, and John C. Calhoun became very cautious and selective when approaching the issue. Hence, territorial expansion could be seen from two different perspectives. On the one hand, it could be a disruptive element of the Union if it favored only one section. On the other hand, it could be a unifying component if the gains were evenly apportioned. Above all, given the social and economical tendencies as well as the political conditions, expansionism appeared to be the best alternative either to obtain sectional gains or to maintain the sectional balance. In the last consideration it became the only possible way to preserve the Union. Nevertheless, as history proved, it still was a potentially disruptive and dangerous quest.

By the end of the 1830s, the United States was facing serious domestic problems. The Panic of 1836 exacerbated already tense sectional relations. Southern interests were seriously affected by the tariffs of 1828 and 1832. In fact, the latter engendered the Nullification Movement in South Carolina, in which the possibility of secession was suggested. Meanwhile, in the north the abolitionists were making a political issue out of slavery. The "gag resolutions" reached the floor of the House of Representatives in 1837, and two years later the Liberty Party appeared in New York. Politically, the south became very defensive. It felt a loss of strength, particularly in Congress where the free states dominated. Under these circumstances the acquisition of territory became an alternative. Hence, the expansionist mood was reassumed more aggressively than before, and the sectional confrontation was an important component of it. For Americans, to increase territory was a viable option to be able to maintain the Union as it had been originally devised. Expansionism developed as a way to maintain the sectional balance between slave and free states, as conceived in the Missouri Compromise. Nevertheless, the renewal of expansionist policies also exacerbated the sectional conflict.

Southern leadership took the initiative by reviving the old project of annexing Texas. This was immediately denounced by northern politicians as a conspiracy to enhance the slave states' power.[7] Confusion infiltrated American political leadership. American ambitions towards Texas were evident since the Louisiana Purchase, as if it was part of that acquisition. Later, during the negotiations of the Adams-Onis Treaty, the Monroe administration insisted on that twisted pretension. In the end it was abandoned mostly for sectional reasons. Nonetheless, the Adams and Jackson administrations sought

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[7]Frederick Merk, *Slavery and the Annexation of Texas* (New York: Knopf, 1972).

to purchase Texas. The offers made by envoys Joel R. Poinsett and Anthony Butler were strongly rejected by the Mexican government.[8] When Texas became independent, however, Jackson was unable to accept the Texans' request to annex to the United States, because it was already a divisive issue. He had to appease himself only with recognizing its independence from Mexico.

During its nine years of independent life, Texas was a wedge that aggravated both Mexico and the United States. For the United States, particularly the southern states, Texas became an earnest competitor in the cotton market. Also, her closer relation with Great Britain was perceived as a danger; mainly because the later was then an advocate of international abolitionism. In 1843, the John Tyler administration and the southern leadership of the country, headed by Calhoun, took the audacious and risky step of resuscitating the old, coveted goal to acquire Texas. However, the first attempt--a bilateral treaty--was rejected in the United States Senate, by a vote of thirty-six to sixteen due to Calhoun's narrow southern justification. The north saw a southern conspiracy to increase political power. So a new device was elaborated, since the two-thirds vote required to ratify a treaty in the Senate had failed. That device was a joint resolution of both houses, which required only a majority vote in each. Yet, Congress adjourned before it was able to come to a vote.[9]

Meanwhile, the electoral campaign of 1844 approached. Except for Calhoun, the most important politicians and the possible candidates for the 1844 presidential election reacted cautiously, although they had expressed openly their expansionist inclinations before. The leading candidates, Clay of the Whig party and Van Buren of the Democratic party, tried to exclude the Texas annexation issue from the campaign. Clay got the nomination unanimously. But Van Buren did not, instead the Democratic National Convention, on the ninth ballot, chose James Knox Polk, with an expansionist platform calling for "the re-annexation of Texas and the re-occupation of Oregon."

The American public was no less confused. Despite all the rhetoric of "Manifest Destiny," the opinion among the citizens and their political leaders was divided over expansionism and slavery. This situation affected the electoral results of the 1844 presidential election. Clay's defeat was due to the loss of New York's electoral votes, which in turn was due to the Liberty party's anti-slavery campaign that pictured him as a disguised slavery advocate after he retracted from his original position against the immediate annexation of Texas.[10]

It is very important to point out that the initial project of annexing Texas only favored southern interests. But the formula designed in the Democratic platform of 1844 distributed the expansionist gains to southern, northern, and western interests. It was a compromise that apparently bound together opposing claims. Hence, expansionism became provisionally a national issue to which the writings of John L. O'Sullivan, gave a missionary content.[11] The results of the 1844 presidential selection were close enough

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[8]Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, *México ante el mundo. Historia de sus relaciones exteriores. Tomo 1* (México: Senado de la República, 1990).

[9]Merk, *Slavery and the Annexation of Texas.*

[10]Craven, *The Coming of the Civil War.*

[11]Frederick Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History. A Reinterpretation* (New York: Vintage, 1963).

as to destroy the myth of a cohesive national expansionist mandate. Nevertheless, the results were an important element in congressional approval of the joint resolution, which was still possible only after a harsh debate and by a close vote, particularly in the Senate.

In the meantime, the Mexican government made her last effort to avoid the annexation of Texas. The administration of José Joaquín Herrera tried unsuccessfully to gather support for a negotiated resolution with the Texans. In Texas, President Anson Jones was willing to pursue an independent way. But in the United States the prospect of a negotiation between Texas and Mexico jeopardized Polk's program, the Democratic Party platform, and the issue that apparently was unifying Americans. Therefore it was essential to undo any independent negotiations. Polk presented a better alternative to the Texans: the assumption that their territory extended to the Rio Bravo.[12] This was an additional obstacle to any possible negotiated solution with Mexico. Under those conditions, Polk decided upon a two-fold policy. First, he ordered the reinforcement of the defense of the Texan border. Second, he sent John Slidell as a regular envoy in November 1845. The instructions that Slidell received from Secretary of State James Buchanan went beyond the settlement of the Texas' border; they included a demand of the unpaid installments of the damage claims, and an offer to purchase the territories of New Mexico and California. Considering the internal conditions of Mexico, it was obvious that this mission was not opening the means of negotiation or presenting "an olive branch." Firstly, because if it was already politically risky for any Mexican authority to negotiate the Texan issue, then to accept its linkage to the claims issue and surrender more territory would have been politically suicidal. Furthermore, to receive Slidell as a plenipotentiary minister would mean that regular diplomatic relations were reassumed, which would have legitimized the annexation of Texas and the assumption of her borders without any negotiation.

The Polk administration was aware of those conditions; therefore, the Slidell mission was not really looking for a negotiated settlement, as his critics in Mexico and the United States pointed out. Once elected, Polk was committed to pursuing his expansionist promises as he stated in his inaugural speech. Also, in his first annual message, he set out the so-called "Polk Doctrine" or Polk's "Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine", bringing to the original program the component of an alien danger, meaning the British.[13] With this he tried to make the expansionist project a national security issue. Yet on the Oregon issue his administration was willing to compromise.

Considering the country's sectional conditions, the international climate, the party promises, and Polk's personal commitment, it was essential to achieve the expansionist program set forth, at any cost, but to minimize the expense. The Union depended on it; so Mexico's territory had to be the target. In short, he was trapped in the expansionist program because the American Union was too.

The conditions ripened by the middle of 1846. Mexico's refusal to receive Slidell and to open negotiations under the terms proposed, along with American readiness to accept a compromise solution on the Oregon issue as expressed in Buchanan's offer to

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[12]Ibid.

[13]David M. Pletcher, *The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon, and the Mexican War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1975).

England, opened the path to pursue the goal. In March 1846 General Zachary Taylor occupied the territory between the rivers Nueces and Bravo. The territory had never belonged to Texas; a fact recognized not only in Mexico but even among such prominent Americans as Calhoun, the architect of the annexation. In April, the Mexican government ordered General Pedro de Ampudia, and later General Mariano Arista, to defend that territory. At the end of the month a minor skirmish took place at Rancho Carricitos on the left bank of the river, followed by two battles on May 8 and 9 in the disputed territory.

Meanwhile, President Polk, without knowledge of those actions, had already decided to ask Congress for a declaration of war on two arguments. The first was that Mexico refused to receive Slidell's mission. The second claimed Mexico withheld payment of the damage claims of American citizens. But after receiving news from General Taylor he made the military actions the key point of his message sent to Congress on May 11. He stated that Mexican troops had crossed the boundary of the United States, had invaded American territory, and had shed American blood on American soil. All of those arguments were misleading. The issue of the invasion was questionable because the boundary of Texas, legally did not reach the Rio Bravo. The argument of the claims was untrue because Mexico had agreed to pay them in installments, and had paid three of them. She had not complied with the subsequent payments because of the economic strains she faced, and not because she refused to acknowledge her commitments. On Slidell's mission, it was obvious that there were shortcomings in his instructions. On May 13, Congress formally declared war, with minor opposition. However, some important figures opposed it, among them Adams in the House of Representatives; while in the Senate Daniel Webster was absent and Calhoun, after vehemently challenging Polk's arguments, refused to vote.[14]

Shortly afterwards, the expansionist program, which tried to be a compromise, but was a divisive issue in the first instance, continued to be so. There was authority, yet there was not a cause, a national motif. The early plans of the Polk administration, which expected a short war with immediate gains, started falling apart; every push to continue the war or get appropriations for it caused internal friction and debate, despite the military victories. On August 8 the Wilmot Proviso brought the sectional problem back into politics, in the midst of the so-called Manifest Destiny era. The debate over the acquisition of territory and expansion of slavery was linked to the issue of the legality of the war. Both houses of Congress were divided not only along sectional lines but also along party lines. Certainly new compromises were devised, but the debate continued in the press and in the mid-term election of 1846 in which the president and the Democratic party lost support.

The year 1847 was critical. In Mexico the army of General Winfield Scott advanced undefeated on its way to Mexico City, while the vacuum of leadership in Mexico brought the country to social chaos. The United States, although military victorious and in possession of practically all Mexico, was again internally divided. Furthermore, the moral and legal authority of the president was seriously questioned.

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[14]John R. Collins, "Sectionalism and Political Fragmentation," in *The Mexican War, Changing Interpretations*, eds. Odie B. Faulk and Joseph A. Stout, Jr., (Chicago, Swallow Press, 1973).

Under those conditions, Nicholas Trist was sent as peace commissioner. His instructions insisted on the previous American demands: the recognition of the Río Bravo as the limit of Texas and the forfeit of California and New Mexico. Yet a demand for Lower California and the right of transit across the Tehuantepec isthmus was added. Also, he was entrusted to make an offer of fifteen million dollars--which he could increase to thirty million--and the cancellation of the unpaid damage claims for the desired territories. Trist's commission faced the problem that the political crisis in Mexico did not allow the settlement. Certainly there were some political groups that supported the treaty process, but there was no group or individual that had enough popular backing to negotiate without facing the blame of treachery. So the war continued.

Between August and September 1847 the war reached its climax with a chain of dramatic events that ended with the occupation of Mexico City, on the very same day of the traditional celebration of Mexico's independence, September 15. This outcome was not only a shock to Mexican pride, but also the last blow to the already weakened political and military authority. Antonio López de Santa Anna quit the presidency, and soon after was deprived of military command. A provisional government moved to the city of Querétaro. The ideological fight was momentarily suspended and the bellicose mood of public opinion almost disappeared. This allowed the moderate political wing to achieve some room for negotiation. Finally, there were rumors of a movement in the United States proposing the annexation of "all Mexico" and the suspicion that some Mexicans supported it. All of these conditions created a favorable climate for reaching an agreement. If at a certain moment the war and its continuation had been seen as a matter of survival, now the peace was justified in the same terms.

Paradoxically, in the United States the military victory brought more problems. In Congress and in some state legislatures, as well as in the American press, the war continued to stir debates. In northern cities such as New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Boston the "All Mexico" movement was strong, but the south was adamantly against it, mostly for racial reasons. Also the anti-slavery radicals harangued about the slavocracy conspiracy, while the Whig conservatives continued denouncing a war of conquest. Even the political theses of "popular sovereignty" and "free soil" were advanced. Finally, an electoral year was approaching.

That was the background that led to the negotiation and ratification of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. The first contacts between Trist and the Mexican commissioners took place before the occupation of Mexico City, but without success. On November 1847, the Mexican government agreed to reopen the negotiations. By then Trist had been recalled, but when the Mexicans pointed out that official notification taking away his authority had not been received, he decided to stay and negotiate. Trist's decision received General Scott's support because both were opposed to Polk's political attitudes and his intention to pursue further acquisition of Mexican territory.

The negotiations took place between November 1847 and February 1848. In territorial terms, Mexico relinquished all claims to Texas, established the boundary on the Rio Bravo, and agreed to cede California and New Mexico (presently the states of Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, California, and Utah, and parts of Colorado, Wyoming, and Oklahoma). Mexico got an indemnification of sixteen million dollars and the assumption by the United States of the unpaid damage claims ($3,250,000), that after the treaty was ratified was reduced. The treaty was signed on February 2, 1848 and sent for ratification to the respective governments. The process was complicated by the internal conflict in each country. President Polk received it on February 19, and even though he

disliked it, he sent it to the Senate without any recommendation. On March 10 its ratification was approved, with minor amendments and the elimination of article 10, by a vote of thirty-eight to fourteen. Seven Democrats and seven Whigs voted against it; six of the Democrats were radical expansionists who insisted that the treaty did not get enough land, the other Democrat and the Whigs criticized it for taking too much.[15] The Mexican Congress approved the ratification on May 25, and the exchange of instruments took place on May 30. The American army evacuated Mexico City on June 12, and the last troops sailed from Veracruz on August 2.

The United States was victorious and had become a continental power, extending her territory from ocean to ocean; but in the words of Frederick Merk,

> The war...left behind sectional strains that began the process of breaking the old bonds of union, especially the national political parties, and replacing them with sectionalized parties. In the fierce struggles occurring over the organization of the Mexican cession, the Free Soil party was born, the crises of 1850 occurred, and the Republican party was foreshadowed, which, when it triumphed in 1860, led to the secession of the Southern states.[16]

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[15]Ibid.

[16]Frederick Merk, "Dissent in the Mexican War", in Samuel Eliot Morison, Frederick Merk, and Frank Freidel, *Dissent in Three American Wars* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

THE BOYS FOR MEXICO: ORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN ARMY ON THE EVE OF THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR

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"Well may we be grateful that we are at war with Mexico! Were it any other power, our gross follies would have been punished severely." These words from thirty-one-year old Second Lieutenant George Meade, the future hero of Gettysburg, reflected the doubts plaguing many of his profession on the eve of the Mexican-American War.[1] Ultimately the United States won an astonishingly quick and easy victory, but officers such as Meade had reason for concern over the United States's ability to win a war with Mexico.

Mexico's leaders boasted that their republic possessed an army exceeding twenty thousand soldiers. Frequent campaigns to stamp out numerous rebellions had seasoned both officers and men. This force reportedly stood ready to defend its country from any encroachment on Mexico's sovereign territory. The Mexican press extolled the virtues of the Mexican soldier over the rascality of the northern barbarians. In hindsight, we know now that this war-like posture lacked substance. In 1846, though, crushing defeat by the United States was by no means a foregone conclusion.[2]

Neglected for years by Congress, the United States Army seemed unequal to the task ahead. Many cost-conscious congressmen believed a small regular force, supported by the militia in emergencies, to be adequate to defend the nation's borders. The military situation quickly changed from defense to offense, however, once President James K. Polk announced that war had commenced. No longer satisfied with the Río Grande as the line of battle, Polk ordered the army to invade Mexico. The United States Army consisted of less than eight thousand officers and enlisted men, mostly scattered across the expanding nation in small detachments at more than one hundred posts.[3]

Alert to the nation's unreadiness for war, President Polk and his administration acted with haste in order to mobilize a force capable of defeating Mexico.[4] The basic framework for the army's mobilization and the rules for its discipline existed prior to the war's commencement. By utilizing existing army organizations, and creating new ones

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[1]Justin H. Smith, "Our Preparations for the War of 1846-8," *Military Historian and Economist* (1917):42.

[2]Justin H. Smith, *The War with Mexico*, 2 vols. (Glouster, MA: Peter Smith, 1963), 1:156-8; Martin Woodrow, *The Mexican-American War, 1846-48* (London: Osprey Publishing, 1989), 20.

[3]William Addleman Ganoe, *The History of the United States Army* (New York: D. Appleman, 1924), 196.

[4]Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *History of the Military Mobilization in the United States, 1775-1945* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1955), 69; Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States During the Mexican War* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914), 203; Smith, "Preparations for the War," 27-28.

as the need arose, the United States fielded one of the most successful armies in its history. The initial lack of manpower prompted congress to call on state governors to provide large numbers of volunteers. By the summer of 1848, more than one hundred thousand Americans--the overwhelming majority of whom were state volunteers--had served at some time during the Mexican conflict. Together the regulars and volunteers made up "The Boys for Mexico," a title bestowed on American soldiers by one popular patriotic songster.[5]

The United States's mobilization for its victory over Mexico deserves attention. Personal diaries and reminiscences, by themselves, are merely vignettes that tell only part of the story. Most writers have concentrated on broad military or political histories of the war that treat the army as an amorphous mass. A scarcity of materials on the materials on the army's mobilization and organization during the Mexican-American War exists. Thus an examination of the army's command, support, and combat elements will fill a void while bringing into focus one of the most successful armies that our nation has ever sent into battle.

Command

According to the Constitution of the United States, the office of commander-in-chief is reserved for the president, a duty President Polk embraced during the Mexican-American War.[6] Polk, elected in 1844, had campaigned with the twin promises of acquiring all of Oregon Country from the British and annexing Texas to the Union.

Although his supporters called him "Little Hickory" in reference to his mentor, Andrew Jackson, Polk lacked "Old Hickory's" martial background. Regardless of his inexperience in military affairs, Polk played an active role in planning the strategy of the Mexican-American War and its subsequent conduct through his office as commander-in-chief.

The nation's founders placed the defense of the United States in the hands of the War Department. Created as one of the three original executive departments, the department faced the immense task of overseeing all aspects of the nation's military, both regular and militia. The head of the department chief occupied a seat in the president's cabinet.[7] From 1845 to 1849, William Learned Marcy served as secretary of war, consulting with Polk on matters of his department--including the prosecution of the war in Mexico.[8] Marcy could not exercise command in the field as the War Department did

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[5]Upton, *Military Policy*, 221.

[6]James K. Polk's personal diary best describes the personal interest he took in directing the war. Allan Nevins, ed., *Polk: The Diary of a President. 1845-1849: Covering the Mexican War, the Acquisition of Oregon, and the Conquest of California* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1952). Also see, Paul H. Bergeron, *The Presidency of James K. Polk* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1987).

[7]Ganoe, *History of the United States Army*, 95.

[8]Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army*, 2 vols. (Gaithersburg, MD: Olde Soldiers Book, Inc., 1988), 1:16. William Learned Marcy was born in Massachusetts in 1786. Admitted to the New York Bar in 1811, Marcy was active in state and national politics. He held the posts of New York comptroller (1823-1829), New York associate supreme court justice (1829-1831), United States Senator (1831-1832), New York governor (1833-1839), secretary of war (1845-1849), and secretary of state (1853-1857). Marcy is remembered for his 1832 address regarding the Spoils System when he remarked, "to the victor belongs the spoils." Marcy died in 1857.

not constitute an actual part of the army.[9] Through his office, though, the secretary of war issued the orders that implemented presidential directives and congressional legislation that affected the mobilization, deployment, and maintenance of the United States Army in the fight against Mexico.

A specialized staff assisted the secretary of war in managing the army. Divided into ten separate departments, each oversaw some important aspect of army life.[10] In theory, the general-in-chief coordinated the activities of the departments--but in reality, the department heads often bypassed this chain of command and communicated directly with the secretary of war. Major General Winfield Scott, the general-in-chief when hostilities commenced, retained his position throughout the war despite differences with his superiors, Polk and Marcy.[11] A hero of the War of 1812, Scott resented taking orders from men whom he considered military novices. Unimpressed by the pompous general, Polk looked in vain for a replacement for Scott. Even the general's indiscreet remarks about a "fire in his rear" from the direction of the White House, indicating his mistrust of the president, did not prevent Polk from eventually ordering Scott to join the American army in Mexico.[12] Fortunately for the army, bickering between the commander-in-chief and his top general did not interfere with the staff departments in the performance of their duties.

A network of companies, battalion, regiments, brigades, and divisions provided the army with a simple framework for both logistic and combat organization. According to one ex-army officer, Fayette Robinson, a regiment was actually "a miniature army" because it contained all the elements of command and staff that existed in the army as a whole.[13] Composed of ten smaller units called companies, regiments were the basic building blocks of the army. A smaller unit, the battalion, described any number of companies more than one but less than ten that acted as a tactical organization.[14] Companies in a battalion usually belonged to the same regiment, but this was not always the case. Two or more regiments placed under one commander composed a brigade. Two or more brigades could be linked to form a division. An "army", such as Taylor's Army of Observation, consisted of two or more divisions. Each general selected a staff to help him carry out the command and staff duties associated with running his brigade or division.[15]

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[9]Henry L. Scott, *Military Dictionary* (Yuma, AZ: Fort Yuma Press, 1984), 547.

[10]Fayette Robinson, *An Account of the Organization of the Army of the United States of America*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: E.B. Butler, 1848), 1:32.

[11]Heitman, *Historical Register*, 1:17, 870. Winfield Scott entered the army in 1808 as a captain of the Third United States Artillery. He rose to the rank of brigadier general in 1813 and was breveted major general for his victories over the British at the battles off Chippewa and Niagara. In 1815, Scott traveled to France as part of a committee sent by the War Department to study European systems of drill. On his return to the United States he published a translated edition of infantry tactics, patterned after the French model, under his own name. His manual remained in use by the army from 1817 to 1861. Promoted major general in 1841, Scott assumed the post of commander in chief of the army that same year. He retained that post until he retired in November 1861. Scott died at West Point, New York in 1866.

[12]Smith, *War with Mexico*, 1:197-200, 354; Marcus Cunliffe, *Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America, 1776-1865* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1968), 310-17.

[13]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:28-29.

[14]Ibid., 1:28-29; Major General Winfield Scott, *Infantry Tactics: Or, Rules for the Exercise and Manoeuvers of the United States Infantry*, 3 vols. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1840), 1:1.

[15]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:85.

Three categories of officers existed in the army: staff, field, and company. Staff officers planned and supervised strategic and logistic operations.[16] Although the chief of each army staff department held the rank of colonel, the rank of other staff officers below him depended on their level of responsibility. The second group of officers, called field officers because they were assigned to and commanded regiments in camp and on campaign, consisted of colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors.[17] Company officers--captains and lieutenants--composed the third category and commanded the different companies within each regiment.[18]

The United States used a confusing two-tiered system of rank for its officers: actual rank and brevet rank. Officers initially received a commission from the United States Congress conferring their actual rank. Congress then issued a new commission to mark each officer's additional promotion. Thus, an officer's commission from Congress determined his actual rank which established his pay level as well as his duties and privileges. The Senate, however, could award brevet, or honorary, rank to an officer in recognition of meritorious service or valor. An officer who received a brevet could be addressed by his honorary title, but he would not draw any additional pay unless he actually performed the duties associated with the higher rank.[19] Conflicts over different interpretations of this system led to several notorious disputes between high level officers.[20]

Shortages plagued the army's officer corps before the outbreak of the war. The prospect of enduring the privations of army life while waiting for promotion prompted many low-ranking officers to resign their commissions and seek more lucrative employment in civilian life. Unfortunately for these junior officers, no provisions existed for retiring, aged, or infirm officers. Many who held high rank in the army were old veterans from the War of 1812 kept on the officer list drawing their pay but performing no actual service. This not only blocked promotion for younger, more able officers, but created a shortage of field officers fit for duty. At the beginning of the war, conditions had deteriorated to the point where out of the four artillery regiments, only four of the twelve field officers were present for duty: illness and old age prevented the other eight from serving with their regiments. Matters were as bad in the infantry with a third of its field officers absent from their regiments. In fact, of the five infantry regiments with Zachary Taylor's Army of Observation, only six field officers (fifteen being the proper number) were present for duty. Of these six field officers present, two held commands above their actual rank. One colonel with a brigadier general brevet, William J. Worth, commanded a brigade. Taylor, himself only a colonel with the brevet rank of brigadier

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[16]H.L. Scott, *Military Dictionary*, 570-73.

[17]Ibid., 283.

[18]Ibid., 168.

[19]Ibid., 111.

[20]Robert Selph Henry, *The Story of the Mexican War* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), 42,45; William Seaton Henry, *Campaign Sketches of the War with Mexico* (New York: Arno Press, 1973), 71, 115; Rhoda van Bibber Tanner Doubleday, ed., *Journals of the Late Major Philip Norbourne Barbour and his Wife, Martha Isabella Hopkins Barbour* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1936), 31-32, 71-72. A dispute over brevet rank arose between Colonels David E. Twiggs and William J. Worth causing the latter to leave the army prior to the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. Worth, who had been awarded the brevet rank of brigadier general in 1842 for his services in the Florida Seminole War, was upset that the War Department considered Twiggs his superior. Worth returned to the Río Grande once he learned that war had begun.

general, commanded the entire force.[21] The shortage of officers remained a severe problem throughout the war. Many former officers returned to the military during the war, but most elected to serve with the volunteers rather than rejoin the regulars.[22]

Soldiers performed their daily routines under the watchful eyes of the company's noncommissioned officers. The army's many sergeants and corporals composed this important class of enlisted men. Noncommissioned officers held their rank at the discretion of their colonels and captains, but unlike other officers of higher rank did not receive a commission from Congress.[23] Each company had five sergeants and eight corporals who supervised the privates while they performed their duties. Men appointed sergeants or corporals had proven themselves knowledgeable in both the drill and army regulations and had often chosen to make the military their career. Noncommissioned officers were entitled to privileges, such as a mess separate from the privates, in keeping with their rank. The regulations warned officers not to reprimand sergeants or corporals in public as this lessened an NCO's authority.[24] The senior sergeant, or first sergeant, kept the company's records, conducted roll calls, and assigned men to various details. The first sergeant was also known as the orderly sergeant because of the large amount of paperwork associated with his duty.[25]

Privates composed the last link in the army's chain of command. Often scorned by the civilian population, one citizen described a group of recruits on their way to training camp at Governors Island, New York, as "a fine set of candidates for the State prison."[26] While the officers class consisted of native-born Americans, many immigrants filled the ranks of the enlisted men. These souls had come to the United States seeking refuge from the political and social upheavals the racked mid-nineteenth-century Europe. Once in the United States, anti-immigrant prejudice prevented many of these men from gaining employment. Thus many immigrants from England, Ireland, and Germany found the army to be a safe haven that provided them with food and shelter while they learned the customs of their newly adopted country. The prevailing attitude in the nation that only "nair-do-wells" joined the military effectively kept many Americans from the regular army's ranks. Those who did enlist usually were either seeking adventure or trying to escape their pasts. The hardships of a five-year enlistment held little incentive for those who might have bolstered the army's thinning ranks.[27]

Support

Managing the army required the coordinated efforts of the army staff departments. These ten departments kept the army fed, clothed, armed, nursed, and paid

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[21]Upton, *Military Policy*, 206; Henry, *Campaign Sketches*, 129-31.

[22]Upton, *Military Policy*, 216.

[23]War Department, *General Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1841* (Washington, D.C.: Gideon, 1841), 9.

[24]War Department, *General Regulations, 1841*, 11, 12, 17, 22.

[25]War Department, *Revised Army Regulations of 1861* (Yuma, AZ: Fort Yuma Press, 1980), 19; Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:31-32.

[26]George Ballentine, *Autobiography of an English Soldier in the United States Army* (New York: Stringer & Townsend, 1853), 31. George Ballentine enlisted in the army in 1845. His account is one of the few that exist from an enlisted man's perspective. The life of a recruit is covered in great detail.

[27]Ibid., 13-14.

so that it could perform its duties when called on by the commander-in-chief. Under the direction of the secretary of war and the general-in-chief, the staff departments quietly conducted their operations, providing cohesion and standardization throughout the military. The officers and men of these departments played a crucial, but unglamorous, role in the success of the American army in the Mexican-American War that is often overlooked.

The Adjutant-General's Department linked the various components of the army together by acting as a clearinghouse for all official correspondence. In addition to this important activity, the members of the department kept account of the health and whereabouts of all army personnel. Official documents, such as general and special orders, morning reports, and court martial proceedings were placed on deposit in the adjutant-general's office. Army recruiting also fell under the jurisdiction of this department. As many additional lower ranking officers as were needed could be assigned to the department in order to help it perform its imposing duties.[28] Colonel Roger Jones, a distinguished veteran of the War of 1812, served as adjutant-general.[29]

The Inspector-General's Department, the smallest of the staff departments, carried out the vital task of evaluating the army's performance. Officers in this department were attached to the office of the general-in-chief. Two permanent members traveled throughout the country inspecting forts and camps, checking on the condition of the buildings, personnel, and material while grading the army's overall state of readiness. The immensity of this task made it necessary for field officers from permanent regiments (those officers with the rank of colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major) to be detached from their units periodically and sent on inspection tours. Although this helped the overworked inspector-general, Colonel George Croghan, the practice had a detrimental effect on regiments.[30]

The Medical Department provided health care for the army. In addition to establishing hospitals and dispensing medicine to sick and wounded soldiers, the officers of the department supervised the selections of posts and camps to ensure salubrious settings. Medical officers periodically inspected army provisions looking for mold, weevils, and worms that might adversely affect the health of the nation's soldiers. The surgeon-general, Colonel Thomas Lawson, directed the efforts of the Medical Department.[31] The army assigned one surgeon and two assistant surgeons to each regiment. The Medical Department consisted of personnel other than surgeons. Hospital stewards, enlisted men with the rank of sergeant, acted as apothecaries and oversaw

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[28]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:33; War Department, *General Regulations, 1841*, 135-48.

[29]Heitman, *Historical Register*, 1:38, 582. Colonel Roger Jones served as adjutant-general from 1825 until 1852. Jones began his military career in the Marine Corps in 1809. During the War of 1812, while a captain of artillery, Jones received a brevet to major for his services at the Battle of Chippewa. An additional brevet to lieutenant colonel was awarded for gallantry at Fort Erie. Jones advanced in grade by additional brevets for faithful conduct and died a brevet major general in 1852.

[30]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:39-40; War Department, *General Regulations, 1841*, 148-54; Heitman, *Historical Register*, 1:39, 339. Colonel George Croghan served as inspector-general from 1825 until 1849. Entering the army as a captain in 1812, Croghan participated in the defense of Fort Stephenson. He died in 1849.

[31]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:40-41; War Department, *General Regulations, 1841*, 287-339; Heitman, *Historical Register*, 1:42, 619. Colonel Thomas Lawson began his career in military medicine in 1809 when he entered the United States Navy. He served as a regimental surgeon during the War of 1812. Appointed surgeon-general in 1836, Lawson held the post until his death in 1861.

hospital wards in the surgeon's absence. During times of crises, such as epidemics or in the aftermath of battle, soldiers were detailed from the ranks to serve as nurses in the hospitals. Women hospital workers, called matrons, cooked and washed for patients. United States army hospitals in Mexico sometimes employed local women as matrons.[32]

The men and officers of the army eagerly looked forward to the arrival of the officers of the Pay Department. The paymaster-general, Colonel Nathan Townson, presided over eighteen paymasters.[33] Although army paymasters held the rank of major, they were not entitled to any field command.[34] The department had jurisdiction over all sutlers, civilian shopkeepers licensed by the government to accompany specific regiments. Although sutlers often inflated their prices, soldiers lined up to buy luxuries that the army did not supply. These government-licensed merchants, who extended credit to those without money, had the right to stand beside the paymaster on payday in order to collect payment from customers with tabs. Although payday supposedly occurred every two months, on the frontier or on campaign, long lapses between the paymaster's visit were normal.[35]

Soldiers relied on the Quartermaster Department to fill life's basic needs: food, clothing, and shelter.[36] A permanent staff of thirty-seven officers, headed by Brigadier General Thomas S. Jesup, strove to met this monumental demand.[37] The department's duties included providing permanent and temporary shelter as well as transporting and issuing provisions for both men and beasts. Civilian teamsters, hired to assist the overworked enlisted men assigned to the department, drove the caravans of wagons required to keep the army supplied. In addition to operating its own fleet of sailing ships and steamboats, the Quartermaster Department contracted with private shipowners to carry equipment and provisions to Mexico. The department also supervised government workshops and private manufacturers that produced uniforms, tents, knapsacks, haversacks, canteens, and other items used by the army.[38]

Army procurement fell under the jurisdiction of both the Quartermaster and the Subsistence Departments. Quartermasters had the authority to make purchases in locations where troops were operating in order to satisfy the army's immediate needs. Thus, quartermasters might buy meat, vegetables, fodder, and draft animals at local markets.

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[32]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:41-42; War Department, *General Regulations, 1841*, 305. Surgeons held the rank of major, while assistant surgeons with five years of service were captains, and those with less were lieutenants. For example of matrons in the army, see John B. Porter, M.D., "Medical and Surgical Notes of the Campaigns in the War with Mexico," *The American Journal of the Medical Services* 35 & 36 (1858):349, 351; *Compiled Service Records of the Mississippi Volunteers in the War with Mexico*, National Archives, M863, 9 Rolls, Records of Matron Magdalene [Reyes] Rages, Roll 7.

[33]Heitman, *Historical Register*, 1:42, 968, 2:590. Colonel Nathan Townson entered the service in 1812 as a captain of artillery. Recognized for his part in the action against the British at Fort Erie and Chippewa, Townson emerged from the war as a brevet lieutenant colonel. In 1822, he was appointed paymaster-general, the post he held until his death in 1854.

[34]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:44; War Department, *General Regulations, 1841*, 340-62.

[35]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:45; War Department, *General Regulations, 1841*, 35-37.

[36]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:54-55; War Department, *General Regulations, 1841*, 179-256.

[37]Heitman, *Historical Register*, 1:40, 573. Colonel Sidney Jesup entered the army in 1808 as a second lieutenant but by 1813 he had risen to the rank of major. He received two brevets for the battles at Chippewa and Niagara. In 1818, Jesup was appointed quartermaster-general, the post he held until his death in 1850.

[38]Erna Risch, *Quartermaster Support of the Army: A History of the Corps, 1775-1939* (Washington, D.C.: Quartermaster Historian's Office, 1962), 231-99. One chapter is devoted to the successes and failures of the Quartermaster Department in the Mexican-American War.

Quartermaster funds also covered the cost of transportation and lodging. Bulk rations such as hundred-pound barrels of beef, pork, flour, and hard bread were purchased by the eight officers of the subsistence department who tried to secure good quality provisions at the lowest possible price.[39] Colonel George Gibson, the commissary-general of the army, supervised the activities of the Subsistence Department.[40]

Arming the military was the responsibility of the Ordnance Department. In addition to issuing weapons to the army, the department also supervised the production of muskets, rifles, cannons, gunpowder, and accouterments to ensure these items met government standards. While the department contracted with some manufacturers to produce arms, it also operated its own arsenals that turned out thousands of weapons complete with accessories.[41] These important duties were the responsibility of Colonel George Bomford.[42] An ordnance sergeant assigned to each army post had the responsibility of maintaining weapons in good working order.[43]

Although their roles sometimes overlapped, two separate departments of army engineers existed. Officers and men attached to the United States Engineers established and maintained the nation's permanent posts and fortifications. This corps numbered nearly forty-five officers and was commanded by the chief engineers, Colonel James G. Totten.[44] The Military Academy fell under the jurisdiction of the United States Engineers.[45] Colonel John J. Abert held the office of chief topographic engineer and directed the Topographic Engineers.[46] Officers of this department surveyed routes for new roads and recommended sites for new posts. Active on the western frontier, the Topographic Engineers conducted many mapping expeditions throughout the mid-nineteenth century.[47] Members of both corps figured conspicuously in the fighting in Mexico.

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[39]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:41; War Department, *General Regulations, 1841*, 257-86.

[40]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:56; War Department, *General Regulations, 1841*, 257-86, 363; Heitman, *Historical Register*, 1:40, 453. Colonel George Gibson entered the army as a captain of infantry in 1808. In 1818 Gibson was appointed commissary-general of subsistence, the post he held until his death in 1861.

[41]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:81-83; War Department, *General Regulations, 1841*, 160-78.

[42]Heitman, *Historical Register*, 1:33, 228-29, 943. Colonel George Bomford entered the army as a second lieutenant of engineers in 1804. He was appointed chief of ordnance in 1832. Bomford died in March, 1848, while American troops were still in Mexico. His successor, Colonel George Talcott, began his military career in 1813. He held the post of chief of ordnance until his death in 1851.

[43]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:31.

[44]Heitman, *Historical Register*, 1:43, 966. Graduated third in his class at West Point, James G. Totten entered the army in 1802 as a second lieutenant of engineers. Promoted to chief engineer in 1838, Totten retained the post until his death in 1864.

[45]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:60-61, 73; War Department, *General Regulations, 1841*, 154-58.

[46]Heitman, *Historical Register*, 1:43, 150. Nineteenth in his class at West Point, John J. Abert declined an appointment upon graduation in 1811. After entering and then leaving the army on one occasion, Abert accepted the appointment as chief topographic engineer in 1838, the post he held until his retirement from the army in 1861.

[47]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:75-79; War Department, *General Regulations, 1841*, 158-60.

A special relationship existed between the staff department and the rest of the army. Whether in camp or in the field, troops must be constantly provisioned and damaged, warn out, or lost equipment replaced. The old adages warning that "an army marches on its stomach" and "for the want of a nail, the battle was lost," contain more than a grain of truth. But in wartime, it is the soldier who does the fighting, not the man who supplies him, who receives the adulation and attention of his countrymen.

Infantry, artillery, and dragoons formed the combat elements of the United States Army prior to the Mexican-American War. On the eve of hostilities with Mexico, the army consisted of eight infantry regiments, four artillery regiments, and two dragoon regiments. On paper, the army numbered 8,613 men, but it had actually sunk much lower. In the year preceding the war the army's strength had dipped to 5,300--its lowest level since 1808. The various companies of these fourteen regiments of infantry, artillery, and dragoons were spread out across the nation at more than a hundred military posts. The Mexican-American War reunited some regiments whose companies had not served together as a unit for ten or more years.[48]

Each regiment reflected an organization similar to that of the army's staff departments. Senior officers of the regiment were the colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major. Officers assigned to the regimental staff helped the colonel to carry out his duties. Second lieutenants fresh from West Point were routinely assigned to regimental staffs, a duty that familiarized them with army operations while they gained experience supervising small details of troops. The regiment's quartermaster and commissary (officers as the ones just described) provided for the immediate needs of the regiment. Another regimental staff officer, the adjutant, acted as the colonel's secretary, freeing his commander from mundane paperwork. This important officer, selected from among the regiment's more experienced and promising lieutenants, helped to mark the regiment's place whether on the march or in battle. A surgeon and two assistant surgeons rounded out the regimental staff.[49]

A noncommissioned staff also assisted the colonel in running the regiment efficiently and smoothly. At large posts, an ordnance sergeant repaired and maintained weapons and ammunition in good condition and in working order. The sergeant major, the regiment's senior enlisted man, acted as the adjutant's aid. The principal musician led the regimental band that provided entertainment as well as the music to which the army marched and fought.[50]

Women made up an important part of regimental life. Whenever possible, officers's wives joined their husbands stationed at permanent posts. Thus when not on campaign, officers and their families maintained regular households. Officers's children

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[48]Ganoe, *History of the United States Army*, 196.

[49]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:41, 88; War Department, *General Regulations, 1841*, 8, 9, 12, 13; H.L. Scott, *Military Dictionary*, 571. Scott wrote, "The Regimental Staff embraces regimental officers and noncommissioned officers charged with the functions, within their respective regiments, assimilated to the duties of adjutant-general, quartermasters and commissaries. Each regiment has a regimental adjutant, and a quartermaster, appointed from the officers of the regiment."

[50]Ballentine, *Autobiography of an English Soldier in the United States Army*, 122; Napoleon Jackson Tecumseh Dana, *Monterey is Ours!*, Robert H. Ferrell, ed. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1990), 8.

roamed the post under the protective eye of the soldiers. Supporting a spouse on army pay was difficult for an enlisted man, but a few men in the ranks did choose to marry. Army regulations allowed each regiment to hire four laundresses to wash and sew for the men. Like sutlers, laundresses attended payday to collect from soldiers to whom they had extended credit. Usually the wives of noncommissioned officers, these laundresses and their families occupied a spot on most posts called "Soap Suds Row." Most women and children stayed behind when the troops marched off to war.[51]

Subdividing regiments into smaller units called companies facilitated their management and deployment. Ten companies, each commanded by a captain, constituted a regiment.[52] Congress had previously established the minimum strength of each company at sixty-four enlisted men, but sickness, desertion, and detached duty caused the level of companies to fall far below the prescribed number.[53] Besides the captain, other positions of command within each company included one first lieutenant, and one second lieutenant, as well as five sergeants and eight corporals. Sergeants performed the functions of quartermaster and commissary on the company level.[54] Each company was divided further into two equal parts called platoons: the platoon, in turn, was divided into two smaller parts called squads or sections.[55] These small units provided the work details that were required for fatigue and guard duty. Soldiers considered their company as "home" because they worked, played, ate, slept, and sometimes died within its family-like environment.

The army's basic building blocks--regiments and companies--could be arranged in various combinations. A military unit of less than ten companies, but more than one company, was designated a battalion and was usually commanded by a lieutenant colonel or major, depending on the unit's size.[56] A battalion was usually composed of companies from the same regiment, but under special circumstances this custom was ignored. A unit larger than a regiment, called a brigade, could be produced by linking two or three regiments together under one commander. A brigadier general commanded an organization of this size.[57] Two or more brigades could be placed together under the command of a major general and organized into a unit called a division.[58] Both brigadier and major generals were aided by officers who performed the various duties of the army's staff departments.[59] Several divisions operating in one theater, commanded by the most senior officer present, comprised an army.[60]

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[51]War Department, *General Regulations, 1841*, 37; Stewart J. Miller, "Army Laundresses: Ladies of Soap Suds Row," *Nebraska History* 61 (1980): 421-36.

[52]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:28-29; Scott, *Infantry Tactics*, 1:1.

[53]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:29; Upton, *Military Policy*, 198-99; Barbour, *Journals of Major Philip N. Barbour and Martha H. Barbour*, 73, 75. According to Phillip Barbour, the regular infantry regiments with Zachary Taylor on the Río Grande had reached a low level in late May, 1846. In order to remedy the situation, some companies were broken up, and their men transferred to bring the remaining companies up to strength. Surplus officers were sent to the United States on recruiting duty.

[54]Scott, *Infantry Tactics*, 1:4.

[55]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:28-29.

[56]H.L. Scott, *Military Dictionary*, 82.

[57]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:85; H.L. Scott, *Military Dictionary*, 121.

[58]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:85; H.L. Scott, *Military Dictionary*, 395.

[59]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 1:85-88; War Department, *General Regulations, 1841*, 2, 6; H.L. Scott, *Military Dictionary*, 570.

[60]War Department, *General Regulations, 1841*, 4.

Infantry composed the bulk of all nineteenth century armies. Troops of this class sometimes bore the designation "foot." Armed with flintlock muskets, infantry consisted of two categories. Heavy infantry, also called infantry-of-the-line, trained to fight shoulder-to-shoulder in rigid lines of battle. Light infantry, the second class of infantry, operated as skirmishers and fought in open order. In theory, a regiment's two flank companies--those companies on the right and left of the regimental line of battle--served as light infantry.[61] In practice, though, all infantry companies in the United States Army received the same training and functioned equally well in either role. Officers instructed infantry recruits using a drill manual bearing the imposing title, *Infantry Tactics: Or, Rules for the Exercise and Manoeuvres of the United States Infantry*, prepared for the army by the commanding general, Winfield Scott, officers commonly referred to the manual and its drill as "Scott's" for brevity.[62]

Artillery was also categorized as heavy and light. Heavy artillery garrisoned the nation's permanent fortifications. Artillerists of this class also served the heavy siege guns used in wartime.[63] Light artillery had undergone revolutionary changes prior to the war. Equipped with new lightweight, horse drawn guns, these mobile artillerists could rapidly maneuver and deploy, going into action before the enemy had time to react. Soldiers sometimes called light artillery "Flying Artillery" because of the speed at which it could move. Patterned after the British light artillery, Major Samuel Ringgold deserved credit for introducing this system in the United States Army.[64] Although highly effective in Mexico, only five companies--or batteries as artillery companies were also commonly called--had been equipped as light artillery at the start of the war.[65] Although light batteries rarely exceeded six guns, instances occurred occasionally when eight guns were placed together.[66] Captain Robert Anderson's translation of a French manual, *Instruction for Field Artillery*, appeared in 1839 and was used to train soldiers in the methods of light artillery.[67] Ironically, the majority of American artillerymen in the Mexican-American War were organized into a unit designated the Artillery Battalion and fought throughout the war as infantry.[68]

Unlike most European armies which had several classes of cavalry, the United States used only a type of light cavalry called dragoons.[69] Armed with pistols, carbines, and sabres, dragoons theoretically could fight equally well on horseback or on foot. As an economy measure, Congress had ordered the Second United States Dragoons

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[61]Scott, *Infantry Tactics*, 1:1, 2, 562.

[62]Donald E. Graves, "Dry Books of Tactics: U. S. Infantry Manuals of the War of 1812 and After, Part II," *Military Collector and Historian* 38 (1986), 173-77.

[63]Windrow, *The Mexican-American War*, 14.

[64]Lester R. Dillon, Jr., *American Artillery in the Mexican War, 1846-47* (Austin: Presidial Press, 1975), 19.

[65]Windrow, *The Mexican-American War*, 14; Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 2:81; War Department, *General Regulations, 1841*, 19-20.

[66]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 2:174-75; Dillon, *American Artillery in the Mexican War*, 30. The battery commanded by Captain John M. Washington, Company B, Fourth United States Artillery, consisted of eight field guns at Buena Vista.

[67]Ganoe, *History of the United States Army*, 187, 554; Dillon, *American Artillery in the Mexican War*, 63.

[68]Robinson, *Organization of the Army*, 2:181; Windrow, ed., *The Mexican-American War*, 14; H.L. Scott, *Military Dictionary*, 61.

[69]H.L. Scott, *Military Dictionary*, 154.

dismounted and converted into a rifle regiment in 1842. This act left only one mounted regiment to cover the entire United States and its western territories. Fortunately, Congress reversed its decision and this regiment was again outfitted as dragoons in 1844 just in time to perform valuable service in Mexico.[70] Mounted troops were sometimes referred to as "horse." Although organized into regiments, slight differences existed in the structure of the dragoons. One term used only in the dragoons--squadron--referred to a unit composed of two companies: no unit of equal size existed in either the infantry or the artillery. A government publication, simply entitled *Cavalry Tactics*, served as the basis for instruction for the dragoons.[71]

The militia system had been adopted as a means to supplement the regular army. According to the Constitution, the president could call on the military in order "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repeal invasions." With the American Revolution fresh in their minds, the nation's founders had chosen to rely on the militia system for its defense rather than maintain a large standing army. Thus every free, able-bodied white male citizen between the ages of eighteen and forty-five were required by law to enroll in his state's militia. The United States Army served as the pattern for these state armies as militia officials organized their citizen-soldiers into companies, regiments, brigades, and divisions. The governor of each state served as the commander-in-chief of his state's military forces and usually had the power to appoint militia officers. The United States government provided arms and equipment for the state militias and paid them whenever they were called to serve the federal government. When on active duty, militia were bound to obey the "Rules and Articles of War" that governed the behavior all United States soldiers. Once called into service by the president, militia troops could not be kept in service more than three months, the legal term of service for this class of troops.[72]

Two widely-used training manuals existed specifically for the use of the militia. The first, an abridged version of the manual developed by Scott for the infantry, had been in use since the early 1820s. The other, *A Concise System of Instruction and Regulations for the Militia and Volunteers of the United States*, first appeared in 1836 and was referred to as "Cooper's" after the book's compiler, Brevet Captain Samuel Cooper. Most professional soldiers, however, agreed that the militia generally lacked the training needed to make them useful in an actual military campaign.[73]

Despite the plans of the founding fathers, the militia had proven itself unreliable in the past. During the War of 1812, for example, the New York militiamen had refused to leave the borders of the United States in order to participate in the invasion of Canada. In many cases when the militia was called to active duty, much of their three-month term

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[70]Heitman, *Historical Register*, 1:66. For a technical history on the dragoons, see Randy Steffen, *The Horse Soldiers: The Revolution, the War of 1812, the Early Frontier, 1776-1850* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1977).

[71]Ganoe, *History of the United States Army*, 190.

[72]Upton, *Military Policy*, 197; War Department, *General Regulations, 1841*, 81-83; H.L. Scott, *Military Dictionary*, 419-24.

[73]Ganoe, *History if the United States Army*, 122, 179; War Department, *Abstract of Infantry Tactics: Including Exercises and Manoeuvres of Light-Infantry and Riflemen: For the Use of Militia of the United States* (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, Little, and Wilkins, 1830), unnumbered page; Brevet Captain Samuel Cooper, *A Concise System of Instruction and Regulations for the Militia and Volunteers of the United States* (Philadelphia: Robert Desilver, 1836), 3.

of enlistment had expired and the men clamored to go home by the time they had assembled and reached the front. In many states, the militia had deteriorated into social clubs that met only a few times a year so members could drill, eat, and drink.[74]

Another class of citizen-solders--the volunteer--existed within the framework of the United State's military tradition. Troops of this class occupied a position somewhat between the enrolled militia and the regular army. The president, responding to a national emergency, could request troops from individual states. Men wishing to heed such a call assembled at a location and time announced by the governor. Once there, officials of the state militia organized the men into companies and regiments and an officer of the United States Army mustered the volunteers into federal service. At that point, these state troops were no longer militia under the command of the governor, but instead, United States troops under the jurisdiction of federal authorities.[75]

Major differences distinguished volunteers from the regular army. States that provided volunteers retained a strong attachment and pride in their soldiers. The volunteers themselves tended to identify with their state, and not the federal government. Organized under state militia laws, volunteers elected their own officers and many time wore state uniforms or even selected clothing of their own design. These factors helped the volunteers preserve their individuality. Unused to the rigors of actual military life, volunteers commonly chafed when expected to strictly abide by the army's regulations. With time and training, though, they could become useful soldiers.[76] But these citizen-soldiers were essentially "citizens" first, and "soldiers," last.

Despite its initial unpreparedness in early 1846, the United States Army developed into a superior military organization during the war with Mexico. Once war was declared, congress passed legislation to expand the nation's military force. Much of the credit for the success of the United States rested on the staff departments responsible for overseeing the army's mobilization and operation. Faced with chronic troop shortages and lengthy supply lines, the army met the challenge and achieved startling victories. Subsequent events dispelled the fears of a young Meade and other doubters as "The Boys for Mexico" proved themselves a match foe their Mexican foes.

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[74]Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States*, 63-64.

[75]H.L. Scott, *Military Dictionary*, 643-44.

[76]Windrow, ed., *The Mexican-American War*, 6-8; Smith, *War with Mexico*, 1:207; Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States*, 71-72.

AN INTRODUCTION TO *THE DISPUTED BORDER: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN-MEXICAN CONFLICT, 1821-1854.*

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The Disputed Border: An Encyclopedia of American-Mexican Conflict 1821-1854 is a work whose time has come. Up to this point there exists no single reference work where students and scholars alike can turn to for quick information concerning the somewhat bewildering saga of American and Mexican relations during the Middle Period. Quite literally, the literature in this field is lacking. This work will fill that void neatly and succinctly, providing a platform and catalyst for future exploration on this intriguing episode in both American and Mexican history.

The reasons for such scholarly lapses are simple. American and Mexican historians tend to view their fields in a vacuum. Mexicanists naively assume certain things to be true of American history while Americanists often disregard what is occurring south of the Río Grande as unimportant. Neither group of scholars by themselves are adequately equipped--either because of a lack of familiarity with languages or sources--to rectify this problem. To overcome this conundrum will require a scholarly liaison and group effort on a scale unprecedented in this field; a project such as *The Disputed Border: An Encyclopedia of American-Mexican Conflict 1821-1854.*

Both countries are entering a period of unparalleled cooperation and opportunity. Items such as the North American Free Trade Agreement seem to herald an inevitable shift in focus away from Europe and towards Latin America. In essence, America is discovering Mexico. At the same time, Mexicans are enjoying a period of relative prosperity, fostering a renewed curiosity over their nation's role in the world. Central to this intellectual exploration, both north and south of the Río Grande, is the issue of the historic distrust between the "Sister Republics." Distortions and myths concerning that critical period 1821 to 1854 have clouded understanding. In addition, the one-hundred-and-fiftieth anniversary of the Mexican-American war will occur in 1996, focusing attention on relations between the two nations. This project will give these seekers a tool that is both timely and balanced. *The Disputed Border: An Encyclopedia of American-Mexican Conflict 1821-1854* will be the right project at the right time.

Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, the foremost Mexican scholar of this period, once asserted that indeed the United States and Mexico once had much in common. Both were born of revolution, both started with lofty goals of republicanism and the rights of man. The United States, however, developed in a time when Europe was distracted by protracted wars. Mexico, on the other hand, emerged at a time when both Europe and the United States were aggressively expanding their empires. Whereas the United States had a pleasant, protected childhood, she claims, Mexico had to grow up quickly in a bad neighborhood.

There is much to be said for this hypothesis. In 1821, Mexico emerged from the debris of the Spanish Empire. After a brief flirtation with old-style monarchy, the new nation declared itself a republic and, in 1824, presented a constitution modeled on that of the United States. Mexico at that time sought cooperation and understanding from its northern neighbor. In fact, Mexico welcomed immigration from the United States, admiring the republican virtues and enterprising spirit of its pioneering people. The northern borderland of Texas would become the seamless joint between these two nations--a noble experiment in blending two distinct cultures dedicated to the same intellectual ideals.

The year 1821, then, seems a logical place to start *The Disputed Border: An Encyclopedia of American-Mexican Conflict 1821-1854.* It is the beginning of American and Mexican interaction. This is not to say that the project will not reference earlier events or allude to episodes prior to this date. For organizational purposes, however, 1821 is a convenient, deliberate date.

By 1854 all of this high-minded idealism had crumbled into dust. In the words of one observer, the new relationship between the United States and Mexico was characterized as "Poor Mexico. So far from God, so close to the United States." Indeed, the same American virtues of enterprise and republicanism had proven to be a curse on the relations between the two nations. In the thirty-three year interval between independence and the final transfer of significant property to the United States, Mexico faced chronic revolution, internal discord, and eventual Balkanization. Restless Americans used these distractions south of the Río Grande as both a cover and a cause for aggressive expansion into the present-day American Southwest. This was both a formal policy of the United States government and an informal impulse of common "frontiersmen."

This erosion of Mexico is easily broken into four steps. From 1821-1832 relations between the United States and Mexico worsened as thousands of legal and illegal immigrants streamed into Texas from the neighboring American territory. From 1832 to 1846 Texas fell to a mix of these American-Mexicans and unashamed American adventurers as revolutionaries declared the Republic of Texas and struggled for nearly a decade to cement this claim against Mexican attempts at reconquest. The crescendo continued from 1846 to 1848, a deeply divided Mexico defended itself from the aggression of the United States during the Mexican-American War, ultimately leading to a loss of a third of its national domain. After the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, relations between the United States and Mexico remained strained with semi-annual invasions by filibusters and periodic intrigues to create new republics along the Río Grande punctuating this troubled period.

The Gadsden Purchase of 1854, then, marks the final act of territorial aggrandizement and the final stabilization of the disputed border between the United States and Mexico. From that point both nations faced serious domestic threats in the form of civil wars. The parallel paths of sister republics, so it seems, continued.

This work will comprise one volume of some 250,000 words. In addition, dozens of maps, lithographs, drawings, charts, and photographs enhance the utility of the finished product. Charts and graphs, too, will be employed to clarify themes and concepts within the work. As a model for length, editors will consult Simon and Schuster's *Encyclopedia of D-Day* or similar products.

The Disputed Border will be divided into four sections. Each of these will be prefaced with a short contextual essay written by leading historians from the United States and Mexico. These eight pieces, averaging between 1,000 and 1,500 words, will

serve as an introduction and interpretation of each of these periods as they relate to the general thesis of *The Disputed Border*. This will equip readers to more effectively use the encyclopedia and to incorporate it as a research tool. The periods will be 1821–1832, 1833–1845, 1846-1848, and 1848-1854.

Using this framework, entries will be keyed to these essays. Topics will include places, events, things, and people who play principle roles in that period. In addition, the editors will include so called "X and . . ." entries which will deal with larger themes such as "Women in the Mexican War," "Slavery and Texas," and the like. Extensive cross-referencing will tighten the organization, reference similar topics, and lead the reader back to the contextual essays for greater understanding of the "big picture." Blind entries will also be used to help readers navigate the fact-filled pages of this extraordinary work.

Other searching aids will also be built into *The Disputed Border*. Beside a comprehensive index, an alphabetized chart of names with life dates will be built including all people listed as biographical entries. This will enable users to search at a glance key figures from this time period. In addition, time-lines, geography tables, and other tools will facilitate the location of chronological events and will enable readers to establish linkages between related place and event entries.

THE ENTRIES

Contextual Essays:

1821-1832. The Mexican author of this section's contextual essay will focus on the emergence of Mexico as an independent nation, its relationship to other nations, and its struggle for self-definition. The Colonial period will be briefly explained. Political and intellectual trends will then be discussed. Special attention will be given to current interpretations of the Mexican revolutionary and republican experience, and the gradual descent into political disunion and internecine conflict. Emphasis will be given to the promising beginnings of the Mexican nation which almost immediately struggled against pressures from European, American, and internal sources. This author will also explain why Mexico would invite Americans to settle portions of the Mexican national domain and how this invitation evolved into the decree of 1830 which effectively outlawed the very process that had previously been encouraged.

The United States historian writing about this period will explain the phenomena of Jacksonian democracy and what the implications are for a westering nation. The growth of American enterprise and the entrepreneurial spirit as a factor leading to contact between the Untied States and Mexico will be discussed, as will historical precedents at American attempts to push the border southwest at the expense of its Hispanic neighbors.

1833-1845. The task of the Mexican author of this contextual essay will be to explain the chaos of Mexican politics, the rise of strongmen like Antonio López de Santa Anna and the problem of revolutions and coups that stalked the nation. The revolution in Texas should be placed in a national Mexican context which will include discussions of the Yucatecan connection, the inability to reconquer the rebellious province, and national strategies of dealing with the problems on the northern border.

The American author of this contextual essay will discuss the growth of "Manifest Destiny" and the effect of the Texas Revolution on the United States. The

growing sectional rift within the nation will be discussed, as will annexation, Sam Houston's diplomacy, the role of England and France, and the deterioration--both financially and militarily--of the Republic of Texas.

1846-1848. This period, defining the "Mexican-American War" in the United States or "The Invasion of 1847" in Mexico, will most likely be ground-breaking scholarship for many readers. The failure of Mexico to defend itself from American invasion and, in many ways, the failure of Mexico as a nation during this crises, will be examined. National strategy will be explored and answers to tough questions will be sought. Military analysis of the Mexican army and its performance on the battlefield will also make this essay a valuable starting point for readers who may be unfamiliar with the "Mexican side" of the United States' first foreign war.

The American counterpart in this essay will explore causes and consequences of the war. The somewhat passive aggression of the United States from previous periods turned to active, deliberate provocation during this period; the task of the author is to explain why. Analysis of the American army's performance on the battlefield and explanations for its extraordinary success in the face of dangerous odds will be sought. Political divisions within the United States will also be discussed as will the peace movement and anti-war activists.

1848-1854. The Mexican angle on this essay may include discussions of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo and its implications for the nation. Filibustering, Apaches, and lingering suspicion of the United States mark this period in Mexican history, as does the continuation of political polarization within the nation. The story of the last significant boundary adjustment--the Gadsden Purchase--marks a final defeat for Mexico at the hands of the United States, but one which is claimed as the most expedient solution for the nation. This saga of internal political intrigue coupled with constant pressure from outside forces will mark the final chapter of the discussion of Mexico's role in *The Disputed Border*.

The United States, in the meantime, undergoes a boom of expansion and spasms of imperialism on an unparalleled scale. The California Gold Rush, Filibusters, and dreams of a trans-continental railroad continue the friction between that nation and Mexico. In this essay, however, things are changing. The United States is losing its focus concerning *The Disputed Border* and the old urges for expansion at Mexican expense are becoming subordinate to sectional conflicts that will eventually lead the nation, like its sister republic to the south, into civil war.

Topical Entries:

The bulk of the work will be composed of hundreds of entries ranging in length from 250 to 1,500 words depending on the subject. Authors will be urged to be thorough and fair in their investigation of the topics. A short bibliography will be included with each piece. Authors will be compensated ten cents a word for their contributions.

Biographical Entries:

Adams, John Quincy
Alamán, Lucas
Almonte, Juan Nepomuceno
Alvarez, General Juan
Ampudia, General Pedro de

McCulloch, Henry
Micheltorena, General Manuel
Mier y Teran, Manual
Mier, Fray Servando Teresa de
Milam, Ben
Miñon, General Vicente
Monroe, James
Moore, Commodore William
Mora y Villámil, General Ignacio de
Morelos, José María
Murietta, Joaquín
Othón, Manuel
Page, Captain John
Paredes y Arrillaga, Mariano
Patterson, Major General Robert
Pecheco, General Francisco
Pedraza, Manuel Gómez
Peña y Peña, Manuel de la
Peña, Enrique
Perry, Mathew
Pico, Andres
Pico, Pío
Pierce, Brigadier General Franklin
Pillow, Brigadier General Gideon
Poinsett, Joel
Polk, James K.
Price, Brigadier General Sterling
Quitman, Brigadier General John A.
Rangel, Joaquín
Rea, General Joaquín
Rejón, Manuel Crescencio
Ridgely, Captain Randolph
Ritchie, Lieutenant Thomas
Robertson, Sterling C.
Romero, Eligio
Romero, Vicente
Rusk, Thomas J.
Salas, Mariano
Santa Anna, Antonio López de
Scott, Major General Winfield
Seguín, Erasmo
Seguine, Juan
Sherman, Sydney
Shields, Brigadier General James
Slidell, John
Smith, Brigadier General Persifor F.
Smith, Justin
Snively, Jacob
Sterne, Adolphus
Taylor, Major General Zachary
The Great Western
Thompson, Waddy
Thornton, Captain Seth B.
Torrejón, General Anastasio
Toucey, Isaac
Travis, Colonel William B.
Trist, Nicholas
Twiggs, Brigadier General David E.
Ugartechea, Domingo de
Urrea, General José
Valencia, General Gabriel
Valencia, Joaquín
Vázquez, General Ciriaco
Victoria, Guadalupe
Walker, Captain Samuel
Walker, Robert J.
Walker, William
Warfield, John
Webster, Daniel
Wilmot, David
Wool, Brigadier General John E.
Worth, Brigadier General William J.
Zavala, Lorenzo de
Zerecero, Anastasio
Zozaya, Manuel

Places:

Acapulco
Alabama
Arizona
Army Departments
Baja California
Bent's Fort
Brazos de Santiago
California
Camargo
Campeche
Casa Mata
Castle Perote
Cerralvo
Chapultapec
Chihuahua
China
Coahuila
District of Columbia

Distrito Federal
Fort Brown
Gadsden Purchase
Guerrero
Matamoros
Mesilla Valley
Mexican Cession
Mexican Geography
Mexico in 1821
Mississippi
Monclova
Monterrey, Nuevo León
Monterrey, California
Morelos
National Road
New Mexico
New Orleans
Nuevo Leon
Oregon
Puebla
Republic of Mexico in 1846
Republic of Texas
Republic of the Río Grande
Republic of the Sierra Madre
Rio Grande City
Saltillo
Santa Fe
Santa Fe Trail
Sonora
Sutter's Mill
Tabasco
Tamaulipas
Texas
Thorns, Horns, and Stingers
Tlaxcala
United States and Mexico in 1848
United States in 1846
Valley of Mexico
Veracruz
Walnut Springs
West Point

Battles and Campaigns:

Taylor on the Rio Grande
Battle of Palo Alto
Battle of Resaca de la Palma
March from Corpus Christi
Death of Colonel Cross
Siege of Fort Brown
Thornton Affair
Capture of Monterrey
Battle of Monterrey
Bishop's Palace
Victoria and Tampico
New Mexico Secured
Capture of Santa Fe
Pueblo Revolt
La Canada
Embudo
Taos
Santa Cruz de Rosales
Doniphan's March
Battle of Brazito
Battle of Sacramento
Wool's March
Relief of Worth at Saltillo
California Secured
Frémont and the Bear Flag Revolt
San Pascual
San Gabriel
Lower California
Siege of San José
San Antonio
Saltillo and Buena Vista
Battle of Buena Vista
Capture of Veracruz
Veracruz Landing
Siege of Veracruz
Alvarado Expedition
Acapulco
March to Mexico City
Cerro Gordo
Contreras and Churubusco
Molino del Rey
Chapultepec and Mexico City
Belén Gate
Defending the Road to Mexico
Colonel McIntosh's Command
Rio Calaboso
Major Lally at Paso Ovejas
Las Animas
Siege of Puebla
Huamantla
Atlixco

Tabasco Expedition
Texas Revolution
- Goliad
- Coleto Creek
- San Patricio
- Refugio
- Alamo
- San Jacinto
- Anahuac
- Nacogdoches
- Velasco
- Gonzales
- Siege of Bexár

Texas-Mexican War
- Santa Fe Expedition
- Somervell Expedition
- Míer Expedition
- Vázquez Raid
- Woll's Raid
- Dawson Massacre
- Snively Expedition
- Warfield Expedition

Antigua Expedition
Burrita Expedition
Republic of the Sierra Madre
Republic of the Río Grande
War of the Reforma
Yucatecan Revolt
Spanish Invasion of 1829
The Pastry War

Events:

Adams-Onís Treaty (1819)
All of Mexico Movement
Annexation of Texas
Archives War
Black Bean Episode
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty
Convention of 1832
Convention of 1833
Decree of 1830
Election of 1824
Election of 1828
Election of 1836
Election of 1840
Election of 1844
Election of 1848
Election of 1852
Fredonia Rebellion
Gadsden Purchase
Gold Rush
"Hasty Plate of Soup"
Kansas-Nebraska Act
Louisiana Purchase
Mexican Independence
Missouri Compromise
Naval Blockade
Ostend Manifesto
Plan de Casa Mata
Plan de Iguala
Polk's War Message
Revolution of Ayutla
Runaway Scrape
Scott's Armistice
Slidell Mission
"Spot" Resolution
Taylor's Armistice
Ten Regiment Bill
The Cosultation
Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo
Treaty of Velasco
Turtle Bayou Resolutions
Upton Survey
Wilmot Proviso

"X and . . .":

African Americans
Agiotistas
American Newspapers
Amusements
Art
Atrocities
Boundary Commission
Camp Followers
Castes
Catholic Church
Caudillos
Centralists
Collaborators
Comanches
Communications
Conservatives
Constitucionalistas
Crime/Punishment

Pennsylvania Volunteers
Popular Sovereignty
Public Meetings
Regular Army, Mexican
Regular Army, United States
Re-mustered Volunteers
San Patricio Battalion
South Carolina Volunteers
Tennessee Volunteers
Texas Constitution
Texas Declaration of Independence
Texas Government
Texas Navy
Texas Rangers
Texas Volunteers
United States Army of Observation
United States Army of the West
United States Army, Organization
United States Marines
United States Militia
United States Navy
Uniforms, Mexican
Uniforms, United States
Virginia Volunteers
Voltiguer Regiment
Volunteers, Mexican
Volunteers, United States
Weapons
Wisconsin Volunteers

Art and Illustrations:

Woodcuts and lithographs exist to illustrate almost all major figures and episodes of the war. Some photographs are also available.

Charts & Lists:

Polk's Cabinet
Texas Government, 1836-1845
Texas Presidents and Governors
State Governors, 1846-1848
U. S. Congressmen, 1846-1848
U. S. Army Departments, 1846-1848
Timeline
Mexican Generals
U. S. Generals
Volunteers in the United States Army
Organization of the Mexican Army, 1836
Organization of the Mexican Army, 1846
Organization of the Texian Army, 1836
Organization of the Texian Army, 1842
United States Army, Old Establishment
United States Army, New Establishment
Bio Finder
Mexican Governments, 1821-1854
Revolutions in Mexico, 1821-1854

Maps:

Taylor on the Rio Grande
Battle of Palo Alto
Battle of Resaca de la Palma
March from Corpus Christi
Siege of Fort Brown
Monterrey Campaign
Assault on Independence Hill
Battle of Monterrey
Bishop's Palace
Victoria and Tampico Campaign
New Mexico Campaign
Capture of Santa Fe
Pueblo Revolt
Doniphan's March
Battle of Brazito
Battle of Sacramento
Wool's March
California Campaigns
San Pascual
San Gabriel
Saltillo and Buena Vista
Battle of Buena Vista
Veracruz Campaign
Veracruz Landing
Siege of Veracruz
Alvarado Expedition
Acapulco
March to Mexico City
Cerro Gordo
Contreras and Churubusco
Molino del Rey
Chapultepec and Mexico City
Belén Gate

Defending the Road to Mexico
Siege of Puebla
Huamantla
Tabasco Expedition
Texas Revolution
Goliad
Coleto Creek
Alamo
San Jacinto
Anahuac
Nacogdoches
Velasco
Gonzales
Siege of Bexár
Texas-Mexican War
Battle of Mier
Antigua Expedition
Burrita Expedition
Republic of the Sierra Madre
Republic of the Río Grande
War of the Reforma
Yucatecan Revolt

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As one of the most innovative and unique projects of its type, *The Disputed Border* will became standard issue to any university library that is serious about American and/or Mexican history. Its broad-based approach, readable tone, and comprehensive coverage will make it a classic and often-used addition to the reference section. Our contributors will be nationally-known and teaching at institutions around the country. Schools that admire their work will certainly purchase this ground-breaking volume.

This project will especially appeal to scholars and students in the American Southwest. In Texas, the history of the state is required of any student wishing to teach history in the public schools. As a lawyer needs a library, many of these students and their professors will make *The Disputed Border* an integral part of their collection. This single, easy-to-use volume will more than compensate for the lack of literature in the field--a boon to teaching professionals who need a survey knowledge of the period and topic. This popularity will only increase as Mexico and the United States forge closer ties that will directly and immediately affect the borderlands, leading to an increase in historical inquiry. *The Disputed Border's* far-sighted approach will also make it popular in other states with strong regional identities like Louisiana, California, Arizona, and New Mexico.

Sophisticated Mexican students and scholars would welcome a Spanish version of *The Disputed Border.* Scores of the contributors will be Mexican; their students and admirers will certainly be interested buyers. For Mexico, this period in history is understudied and misunderstood, but there seems to be a trend among scholars in that nation to throw off the myths and dead-hand of history and to seek greater understanding. For them, *The Disputed Border* comes at a critical time.

The strongest recommendation for *The Disputed Border* is its broad appeal. Consumers with an interest in military, Texas, Mexican, and American history will welcome its publication. There will also be content that appeals to more specific tastes, including entries on social, diplomatic, and expansionist history. If these readers have even a passing interest in nineteenth-century history, this book is for them.

REHABILITACION DE FORTIFICACIONES: VALOR HISTORICO, CONTEXTO Y MARCO NATURAL

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Las Fortificaciones en el Conjunto de los Bienes Culturales

En el conjunto de los bienes culturales las fortificaciones se caracterizan por los siguientes aspectos derivados de su función original.

1) Por tratarse de construcciones militares, su valor militar todavía supera en ocasiones su significado cultural y se utilizan aún como construcciones militares.
2) Por este mismo carácter militar, muchas veces han llegado hasta nosotros, en forma de ruina.
3) Frecuentemente no se trata de elementos aislados sino relacionados con estructuras urbanas, como perímetros de las mismas o puntos fuertes o particulares asociados a ellas.
4) Son estructuras relacionadas esencialmente con el espacio circundante, por su misma razón de ser, y por lo tanto con elementos naturales (litorales, accidentes topográficos, etc...). Son frecuentemente elementos "mixtos" (según clasificación IPCE) del patrimonio cultural o cultural y natural (según Convención de UNESCO de 1972).
5) Manifiestan claramente un cambio en su forma constructiva para responder al elemento directamente inventado en contra suya: la artillería. Hay un "antes" y un "después de la artillería", y por consiguiente reflejan un cambio tecnológico.
6) Son una expresión de la ideología y de la estructura de la sociedad que produjo estas construcciones, en una primera fase y después de las sociedades que las heredan, en tiempos posteriores.

Las Fortificaciones en América

Al llegar los europeos a América no encuentran artillería, son ellos quienes la traen. Durante el siglo dieciséis, marcado por la expansión española, la tipología de los elementos fortificados corresponde a las formas y sistemas medievales, anteriores al desarrollo de la artillería, desconocida por los indígenas americanos.

Esto puede apreciarse en conventos, palacios fortificados, fuertes o recintos amurallados que en buena medida son parecidos a las fortificaciones prehispánicas, diferenciándose por mayores alturas y el uso de sistemas constructivos europeos.

Hacia el final del siglo diecisiete, la confrontación entre europeos (todos ellos poseedores de artillería), sobre todo franceses, ingléses y holandéses que amenazan el

control español, particularmente en las ciudades costeras, provoca intensos trabajos para fortificar un gran número de puertos. Desde Buenos Aires y Montevideo al sur, hasta Montreal y Québec al Norte en la fachada Atlántica y desde Santiago al sur, hasta California al norte, en el Litoral Pacífico.

Los puntos estratégicos para el comercio con Asia, en el Pacífico, y los puertos de las islas del Caribe, escala y paso obligado entre la metrópoli y la parte central del continente, independientemente de su propia importancia productiva, se protegen con construcciones variadas, por ejemplo Acapulco, Campeche, Cartagena, La Habana, San Juan, Panamá o Veracruz.

Temiendo a veces incursiones Tierra Adentro, desde esa época aparecen también puntos fortificados para cuidar accesos y vias de comunicación desde los puertos hacia otras poblaciones o regiones del territorio interior, como en el caso de Haiti, por ejemplo.

En esta segunda fase, que se prolonga hasta la época de las independiencias nacionales, son ya construcciones diseñadas en función del uso defensivo y ofensivo de la artillería.

Relación entre Fortificaciones Europeas y Americanas

En términos generales pueden señalarse algunas diferencias entre las fortificaciones europeas y las americanas. En el primer caso:

1) Son edificaciones testimonio de numerosos acontecimientos históricos y militares.
2) Han cambiado de manos frecuentemente, durante su historia.
3) Están relacionadas generalmente con la historia de una población o una región.
4) Ideologicamente son representativas de una ciudad, de una región, de una dinastía o de un gobernante.
5) Actualmente suelen poseer mayor valor constructivo y como documento técnico y estético.
6) En el caso de los recintos urbanos éstos han operado como limitantes estructurales del desarrollo urbano, densificándose las ciudades a su interior.

En el caso de America puede decirse:

1) Son edificaciones que poseen una historia más corta y son muchas veces testimonio de un gran acontecimiento histórico.
2) Frecuentemente están relacionadas con la Independencia Nacional o con la defensa del país frente a invasiones.
3) Se relacionan muchas veces con la historia de una nación; son elementos importantes para la configuración de la identidad nacional.
4) Ideologicamente suelen ser símbolo de un pasado colonial y de un presente independiente.
5) Actualmente y por lo anterior suelen poseer mayor valor como documento histórico.
6) Los recintos urbanos se superaron desde el siglo diecinueve en la mayoría de los casos, al presionar sobre ellos un desarrollo urbano más acelerado, tanto al interior como al exterior de las murallas.

Lo anterior se relaciona con la ideología de las sociedades que heredaron estas edificaciones y nos lleva al fenómeno característico de esta "segunda historia" que incide sobre el patrimonio cultural.

Desarrollo Moderno y Situación Actual de las Fortificaciones

El desarrollo se ha traducido muchas veces en agresiones a las fortificacianes más destructivas que las logradas por la misma artillería. Relacionando el impacto del desarrollo actual con las características propias de estos elementos, encontramos lo siguiente; según el orden planteado en el punto 1):

1) Una interesante contradicción cuando resulta que las fortificaciones mejor conservadas son las que mantienen su función militar aún cuando se reconozca aún formalmente su valor y función cultural.
2) En el caso de las ruinas, que más podrían asociarse al patrimonio arqueológico que al arquitectónico, se ha tratado a veces de reconstruirlas--como en el caso de otros elementos arqueológicos--cayendo en la falsificación y suprimiendo parte de la historia misma materializada en este tipo de restos. Esta contradicción es explicable a veces por la misma importancia de las ruinas como símbolo nacional.
3) En muchos casos el explosivo crecimiento urbano en Latinoamérica, más allá de los límites de las lineas amuralladas o en la vecindad de puntos fortificados, ha modificado sustancialmente el espacio en torno a las fortificaciones, cuando no las ha eliminado por completo. Desde la construcción de calles, pavimentos, estacionamientos, pasos a través de las murallas, hasta la destrucción completa, son hechos frecuentes.
4) Si el desarrollo urbano ha afectado los recintos "limitantes" de las ciudades, el mismo desarrollo ha alterado también el marco natural de elementos aislados, ruinas y restos, palacios y conventos, cuando la topografía propia de los sitios fortificados no ha sido suficiente para defenderlos.
5) Otra contradicción se presenta cuando el enemigo y también la razón misma de ser de las fortificaciones, es decir los cañones, que ocupaban posiciones claras y precisas en las estructuras fortificadas se utilizan prácticamente como elementos muebles o decorativos y en forma incongruente (tipo de piezas y posición).
6) Las alteraciones recientes se basan en la ideología de sociedades desarrollistas que no atribuyen aún un valor histórico y cultural a las fortificaciones antiguas. Desde el siglo pasado estos elementos se han visto bajo diferentes ángulos:

a) Como símbolos de la época colonial.
b) Como estorbo para el desarrollo, especialmente en el caso de las ciudades.
c) Como símbolos de las luchas de Independencia.
d) Como construcciones aún útiles desde el punto de vista militar.

En los dos primeros casos se favorecerá su destrucción, tomando además en cuenta que por su propia estructura constructiva son verdaderas canteras de material disponible para ser reutilizado al desmontarse.

En los dos últimos casos se propiciará su conservación, especialmente en la última, por el valor de uso, que en última instancia es el que asegura la permanencia de

los inmuebles. Aún así, cuando se utilizan aún para fines militares (en muchas ocasiones ya anacrónicos) y mientras se adquiere conciencia de su valor fundamentalmente histórico y cultural es recomendable, de acuerdo con el espíritu de la Convención de UNESCO de la Haya de 1954, que se instruya a los usuarios en sus programas formativos sobre la importancia de la conservación y el mantenimiento adecuado de estos inmuebles.

Posibilidades de Rehabilitación y Reutilización

Hablando de uso actual, la apreciación y conciencia del valor histórico debe plantearse como base para cualquier acción de rehabilitación o reutilización.

En ocasiones, por lo atractivo de su situación y lo obvio de su antiguedad--por tratarse de construcciones que ya no se realizan--son factores de atracción turística y por lo tanto, lo más simple consiste en pensar que por el tipo de espacios y volumenes sirven como fondo para actividades turísticas.

En el momento que la fortificación se considera "fondo" y no "figura" se está situando en un segundo plano en relación con la actividad que se plantea en primer plano. En el caso de pensar en espectáculos y festivales, como ha sucedido frecuentemente, el problema principal consiste en la importancia y el carácter de permanencia que se atribuye a la serie de elementos de apoyo para el espectáculo; asientos, gradas, plataformas, vestidores, bodegas y otros servicios...pero principalmente a las instalaciones de sonido y de iluminación. Aunque la mayoría de estos elementos pueden ser muebles y las instalaciones pueden llegarse a concentrar en puntos estratégicos, específicos y bien diseñados sin afectar mucho el contexto, no es fácil lograr una deseable reversibilidad.

Hemos visto graderías y plataformas "provisionales"--o diseñadas como tales--que permanecen años y años, pero lo más grave ha sido, en más de una ocasión, el diseño, la ejecución y sobre todo el mantenimiento de las instalaciones.

No se trata de condenar absolutamente la posibilidad de realizar estos espectáculos pero por el mismo carácter temporal o puntual de estas actividades, debemos pensar que los inmuebles y su contexto poseen otro nivel de permanencia y son potencialmente visitables continuamente. Una posibilidad de uso, durante períodos más largos y accesibles a mayor número de personas.

En algunos casos estas actividades parecen ser capaces de proporcionar ingresos--e incluso divisas--pero a cambio de inversiones iniciales generalmente fuertes, cayendo a veces en situaciones de dependencia tecnológica. Otras veces se han planteado actividades que impiden a la mayoría de la población el acceso a estos elementos del patrimonio, y no pensamos ya solo en espectáculos sino en restaurantes, albergues, paradores, hoteles o espacios para reuniones culturales.

Estos últimos casos pueden ser adecuados en ciertos casos particulares cuando es posible conciliar el acceso y uso de sectores amplios de la población.

En el caso de América partiendo del valor histórico como base para proponer acciones de utilización y más aún si estamos en presencia de elementos significativos relacionados con una independencia nacional, podemos ir ajustando las alternativas de uso más adecuadas. Los contenidos educativas y de divulgación del patrimonio cultural, pensando en el peso específico de la población infantil y juvenil, especialmente en los paises latinoamericanos, adquieren una importancia fundamental, que permite además relacionar el significado de estos elementos del patrimonio con otros de la misma época y región cultural (como por ejemplo la arquitectura civil, popular o vernácula).

Como en cualquier operación de restauración o de rehabilitación no será posible ni deseable establecer prescripciones; se tratará de conciliar componentes diversas que pueden agruparse en dos grandes instancias. El respeto a valores históricos, de identidad nacional y educativos que en el fondo nos llevarían por una parte a la concepción de cierto tipo de museo--de espacios abiertos y cerrados--y museo vivo en términos de comunicación y divulgación.

Por otra parte el aprovechamiento de los valores de uso--ya no militar--sino uso caracterizado por consideraciones culturales, escuelas, espacios de reunión, e incluso alojamiento (albergues juveniles) puede ser muy aceptable en función de los casos específicos.

En estos casos suele suceder que por la misma tipología de los espacios interiores de las fortificaciones surja la necesidad de realizar nuevas edificaciones en su vecindad; es evidente que mediante un buen diseño puede lograrse una adecuada integración tanto en espacios interiores como en el contexto exterior sin afectar el espacio y marco natural propio a las construcciones históricas. Como elemento fundamental en cualquier caso debe considerarse el marco social, será necesaria la incorporación y participación de la población vecina o próxima a éstos edificios históricos para asegurar su conservación y rehabilitación.

TRANSCRIPTS OF THE FIRST ANNUAL PALO ALTO CONFERENCE

EDITOR'S NOTE

What follows are the edited transcripts of the First Annual Palo Alto Conference held in Brownsville, Texas on May 7-9, 1993. I have taken some liberties in editing the conference transcripts, but in doing so I was guided by two objectives. On the one hand, I wanted to produce a readable and informative text. To that end I've omitted redundancies and non-pertinent interjections that are common in the discourse of even some of the most experienced public speakers. I've refrained from including any editorial remarks and I've also excluded all audience reactions such as laughter, which by the way occurred rather frequently. On the other hand, my primary goal was to let the speakers speak for themselves. Therefore, the presentations stand faithfully enough as they were presented.

A word of thanks goes to Dr. Joseph P. Sánchez, Director of the Spanish Colonial Research Center (SCRC), and his staff who assisted greatly in the production of these transcripts. Pacifica Casares of the SCRC spent untold hours transcribing the proceedings from audio tapes to word processor, and SCRCers Jerry Gurulé, Jerome Branche, and Julia Othick helped in editing the Spanish presentations.

Aaron P. Mahr Yáñez

REMARKS BY THE HONORABLE SOLOMON P. ORTIZ
Delivered at the Dedication of the Palo Alto Battlefield
May 8, 1993

One hundred and forty-seven years ago today, the first battle of the Mexican-American War was waged, setting in motion a history which fascinates us, and touches us, even today. Our very presence here today represents a victory of large proportions. While the Mexican-American War is principally noted in U.S. history books only in timelines of U.S. conflicts, this conference has opened the door to a more complete knowledge of this aspect of our mutual histories. On another level, today is a victory in another, more recent, battle in the long fought battle for recognition of this very important chapter in Mexican-American history. Our gathering today illustrates a legislative battle of considerable dimensions.

In these days of budgetary constraints, funding any project is next to impossible, so the authorization and establishment of the Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site of Brownsville is indeed significant. We arrive here today by being as persistent and as stubborn as those who fought here so very long ago. This battlefield will be a unique addition to the United States National Parks System. Let me tell you why.

It is the only historical site in the Parks System that commemorates the Mexican-American War. This rugged battlefield is the site of one of the only two battles of the Mexican-American War fought on American soil. The historical significance of this war was a defining one for the young nation of the United States, for the republic of Mexico, and for the descendants of both countries who populate our communities today. Knowledge of the oversight of this conflict was instrumental in our legislative efforts to recognize this chapter of our histories.

The Mexican-American has consistently been a major omission in U.S. history. This omission has a hidden cost. Because who we are is shaped by where we come from, it is fundamentally important for us to come together to examine those events which shaped our history and set our feet on the path which leads us to the dedication of this battlefield. The bottom line is this: it is not the battlefield which brings us together today, rather it is the new era of cooperation which exists between the United States and Mexico.

Since the days when our ancestors met on this battlefield, we have grown together as flowers upon their graves. The cultures and traditions of Mexico and the United States are intermingled not by design, but by fate and circumstance. We have grown up together as family. We have come to understand that our futures are interwoven and that we share an economic and cultural bound. The most important element of this shared bond is, of course, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The spirit of the Free Trade Agreement has brought about a mutual frankness, and a new-found respect for one another.

The omission of the Mexican-American in U.S. history has prevented generations of Mexicans and Americans from learning how our relationship has evolved. The spirit

of cooperation generated by this unique conference takes a giant step in establishing a more complete history of our dual relationship. This conference is a unique way to document our extensive family tree.

The battles of the Mexican-American War, and its eventual conclusion, dramatically influences the young republic of the United States on a number of levels; militarily, economically, and socially. Militarily, the West Point Cadets tested here would eventually populate the highest ranks of the military leadership of both the Union and the Confederacy in the Civil War not twenty years later. The sheer military skills of the young American officers who first fought here, may have been just the precise instrument which prolonged the Civil War in the United States. Interestingly enough, three future Presidents met on this battlefield: General Zachary Taylor, later the twelfth U.S. President; Mexican Commander, General Mariano Arista, later a Mexican President; and Lieutenant Ulysses S. Grant, later the Union forces Commander, and eventually U.S. President.

On a social level, the battle of Palo Alto produced a number of firsts, some of which would influence the fields of medicine and journalism forever. It was here that medics first introduced ether for use as an anesthetic. For the first time, military engagements were reported by telegraph, enabling the chain of command to make timely and strategic decisions. The world's first war correspondent, George Wilkins Kendall, began his career at the Battle of Palo Alto. Peter Jennings, he was not; but George Kendell was the forerunner of the modern news correspondent.

All across the Southwest, our mutual histories and customs are mingled--and they are evident in our daily lives. Our commonalities are evident in the food we eat, the music we prefer, and the dual languages we speak.

Economically, the outcome of the war immediately benefitted the United States with the addition of the Southwest to the nation's territory. The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo in 1848 was a special turning point in the history of the U.S. This frontier significantly impacted the debate raging in the U.S. over the fundamental question of slavery. The rugged western frontier provided a new stage for those who wanted to begin again; and many did just that in a land that demanded tremendous strength and resilience from those who occupied her.

The fortitude demanded of those who inhabited the West then may have permanently imprinted itself on the psyche of Americans who still inhabit the West. A migration of U.S. citizens to the rugged West joined the existing Mexican population--who had just become U.S. citizens--making the American Southwest the most flavorful melting pot west of the Mississippi. This cultural blending produced some of the most enduring legacies of the American west: the *rodeo*, the rodeo; and the *vaquero*, the cowboy.

Today, our economic fortunes are profoundly bound together. The Free Trade Agreement has the potential of making North America the largest, most prolific, most prosperous, and most efficient trading zone in the world. Despite the Mexican reversal at Palo Alto, it was a Mexican who first advocated the commemoration of the site we dedicate today. So it is that adversaries become friends and allies. I wonder if our ancestors could have possibly foreseen the profound bonding between our countries.

I believe that it is absolutely essential for free countries, who share much more than a border, to examine the history of this conflict, and thus build a more complete knowledge of how we can work to the mutual benefit of one another today. The

establishment of this site provides all of us with the opportunity to examine the changes wrought by this conflict, in a way that honors those who bore the duty of battle.

The collaborative venture of this conference is a positive beginning to understand the differences of our past and the similarities of our future. I commend the historians, scholars and anthropologists who have given of their time and energy to supplement our education of the history of the Mexican-American war, and the consequences for both nations. The dedication of this battlefield can be the basis upon which we, the descendants of those who fought and died here, can continue the process of learning and understanding our mutual history.

Soldiers fight for their homes, for their families, and for their way of life. That is who fought and died here, on this noble battlefield. Men and boys who loved their families, their homes and their way of life died here, in a cause they all considered of the highest priority. Let us acknowledge their service and their sacrifice today, as we dedicate this worthy battlefield.

We would, however, be remiss if we simply dedicated a battlefield and went on our way. We must dedicate ourselves to learning much more about our history, so that we will know more about ourselves. When we are secure in the knowledge of ourselves and the history of our countries, we will be better equipped to move confidently into the next century. The security that comes from this knowledge will make us better helpmates for one another as we move forward economically, socially, and politically. Let us leave this place dedicated to that ideal of working together to ensure understanding, and to avoid conflict in the future. Thank you.

THE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE FIRST ANNUAL PALO ALTO CONFERENCE

[Friday, May 7, 1993: Morning session]

DR. ANTHONY ZAVALETA: Good Morning. Continuing into the afternoon and throughout our conference we need to keep time on task so let's get started with this. Let me welcome you this morning to hopefully, what will become the First Annual Palo Alto Battlefield Conference. I want to welcome you. My name is Tony Zavaleta. I've passed out a yellow sheet of paper which has the names and the titles of the presentations for this morning's session only. Dr. Sánchez will be working this afternoon. I'm on the faculty of the University of Texas at Brownsville and currently the dean of the College of Liberal Arts, in partnership with Texas Southmost College. So, on behalf of the National Park Service, the city of Brownsville, the various historic organizations in the city of Brownsville, Cameron County, the state of Texas, and Texas Southmost College, I want to take just a brief moment to welcome you all here and to tell you how wonderfully pleased we are that on such short notice you were able to come. Many of you are giving final exams, probably as you sit here you have somebody back at your university giving an exam for you. We're so very, very pleased that this thing has come together. We have to thank Tom Carroll, with the National Park Service, for all of the work that he's done in addition to all the fine folks from Brownsville.

With no further adieu, I would like to introduce the honorable Pat Ahumada, the mayor of the city of Brownsville, who will welcome you to our community. Mayor Ahumada.

PATRICIO AHUMADA: Thank you, Dr. Zavaleta. We, at the city of Brownsville welcome you to our community. I believe Brownsville's very unique and I think that you will come to agree with me. I want to thank the Historical Brownsville Museum for playing a big part in making this possible. I also want to thank Texas Parks and Wildlife, the University of Texas at Brownsville, and TSC, the Brownsville Convention Visitor's Bureau--which promotes our city to let other people know how unique Brownsville is, and the Palo Alto Committee that has worked so hard for such a long time to make this a reality. I would also like to pay special thanks to KERA-TV and Sylvia Komatzu for bringing her distinguished scholars to our city and participating in this event.

I was talking with a couple of gentlemen, and I was asking them if they knew Spanish. One of them told me, "Well, I am certified to teach it, but I forgot it a little bit because I don't practice it." I'm going to tell you a little bit of a joke while you're here and I hope that you will appreciate it. It's a bilingual joke, so I think you will see the humor in it.

There was this mouse that was teasing this cat all the time and the cat got frustrated and tried to figure how he could capture this mouse and, in this particular time, the mouse ran into the cubbyhole and the mouse and the cat were in a Mexican standoff. So, after awhile the mouse said, "Well, the cat's bound to get tired and leave," and the

cat started thinking, "Well, maybe I need to go and try again." Then, it finally dawned on the cat to be creative and all of a sudden there was some barking and the mouse said, "Well, I got it made now. Now the cat's on the run." So, he comes very bravely out of this cubbyhole and before he knew it, the mouse was captured and the mouse was looking all the way around trying to find the dog, his savior. He couldn't find it and as the cat was about to eat him, the mouse asked the cat, "May I ask you one question before you eat me?" and the cat says, "Sure, I can grant you that." He says, "Where is the dog?" and the cat responds to him, "In this day and age, you have to be bilingual to survive." It's very true and it's becoming more true with the free trade agreement and the focus that has been placed on our city.

But let me tell you, here in Brownsville we feel that we are very unique. I think that a lot of people find, when they come here, how unique Brownsville and it's culture, history, and it's geographical relationship are. What we're seeing here now is a closeness and understanding between our neighbors. I know that there was a time when there was divisiveness and now there is unity.

We work very well with our neighbors. We promote goodwill and better understanding together. We work together to bring economic growth for our region because we are so co-dependent. Once we were divided, but now our roots are so integrated that there is no way that we could be divisive again. I think that's because we learned from our past that we need to work together and promote peace and goodwill.

I will take the liberty to apologize that the mayor of Matamoros is not here. The secretary of the Department of the Environment and the governor of Tamaulipas were here last night and I was with them. The mayor asked me to apologize for him, and I know he feels the same way as I do because we work very closely. What we do affects each other. So we must never forget that as we try to build a better relationship. We must learn from the past.

I know this project has been an undertaking since 1970, but this administration was committed to making it happen and supported the efforts of those who started it. We're finally seeing it become a reality and it's taken the support of people such as yourselves, Texas Parks and Wildlife, and the citizens of Brownsville. We thank you for making it possible. Congressman Ortiz was very instrumental in giving it the support and the teeth to get the resources to do it. So, on behalf of the citizens and this administration, let me express the significance and the importance this national park will have for Brownsville. I believe preserving our history is preserving our identity. We cannot forget where we came from and we must learn from the past, as I stated earlier. I believe Brownsville-Matamoros is a prime example to the world of what two cities on the border can do in cooperation and in goodwill to promote peace. Our two cities are so committed. It's just a great feeling when you come here and visit. When you cross the border, you feel the same atmosphere; the people of Matamoros are so willing to give of themselves, to make the visitors welcome, to make you feel at home. One of the favorite expressions we have is, "*mi casa es tu casa,*" "my home is your home," and that's how we try to make you, the visitors, feel when you come here. This example of how two communities can work together, can be discouraging for those who are trying to undermine the free trade agreement. You can see that free trade already exists and has existed because our two cities have been so dependent upon each other.

So, ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the city, once more I would like to thank you for coming. I would like to ask you to come back again. When you have more time,

I hope that you will explore. I know that you have a hectic agenda, but if you get the opportunity, bring your family and I know that you will enjoy your stay here. Brownsville's very unique and we appreciate you coming. Thank you.

DR. ZAVALETA: Thank you very much mayor. This morning we're also very honored to have three members present from the Texas Southmost College Board of Trustees along with the executive director of Texas Southmost College who also represents the University of Texas. I would like to call Mrs. Mary Rose Cárdenas, the chairperson of the board of Texas Southmost College, on behalf of the college and the university, to say a few words because they are tri-sponsoring the conference. Mrs. Cárdenas.

MARY ROSE CARDENAS: Thank you Dr. Zavaleta and, again, I'd like to welcome you on behalf of the trustees of Texas Southmost College to our area. Texas Southmost College, in partnership with the University of Texas at Brownsville, is very proud to have been asked to participate in this event. We are also very honored to have all of you here. I am also very, very proud to have our board here.

We are a working board and are supportive of everything that is going on in this community that is positive. We all know that projects such as this conference and the Palo Alto National Park Dedication is the result of the cooperative efforts of many, many people. I also would like, at this time, to recognize Mr. Walter Plitt who has been so dedicated for so many years. Our job is not done. We must continue to work with our legislators in the federal government to request funds so that we can make Palo Alto National Park what it should be. Thank you so much and I hope you enjoy your stay and please come by and visit our campus. Thank you.

DR. ZAVALETA: Thank you, Mrs. Cárdenas. Also, I would like to briefly recognize Dr. Joseph Zavaleta and Mr. Tony Carnesi and Mr. Michael Putegnat from Texas Southmost College sitting back there.

I remember the first time I met Tom Carroll not too many months ago. He walked into my office unannounced and introduced himself. He told me who he was and what he was doing and that he wanted to have this conference in May. Now, I come from a tradition where you submit your abstract two or three years before and you wait and see. I told him, "Tom, you're crazy. You can't do this. There's no way, in this amount of time that you'll be able to pull this off," but here we are today and he's done it. It's a phenomenal job that this man has done. What a resource for the National Park Service. They, of course, are the driving force behind all of the events this week and so I must ask Tom Carroll to come up and say a few words. Tom.

THOMAS CARROLL: Thank you, Dr. Zavaleta, that is very fine. I'm very pleased to have each and every one of you here and to welcome you on behalf of the National Park Service. I wasn't planning on saying anything, but the Park Service is very proud to be here and I think we have a very unique legislative mandate, as you'll read in some of the documents that were passed out to you. Palo Alto's legislation covers the whole period, the colonial period to today. It's with your help that we'll be able to figure out exactly what we should be doing and how we should go about it. We're most appreciative of having people from both countries involved in this and, just quickly, I would like to thank everyone in the Valley that helped make this possible and around the country. But this is a conference and so I'll let the historians, etc., start. Thank you.

DR. ZAVALETA: Thank you, Tom. Finally, before we begin, we must thank our gracious hosts. Here we are in this beautiful facility, the Yturria Education Center, which is associated with the Historic Brownsville Museum. I would like to thank Mr. Bruce Aiken and his staff for welcoming us into this beautiful facility here in Brownsville, and while I'm at it also for the renovation of the train station and this museum. We thank you so very much.

We welcome those folks who are seated in the back to find chairs. There is no formality here or protocol. We're colleagues in our interests in the events that took place almost a hundred and fifty years ago. So come and sit around the table with us.

We have to keep time on task. We're already running a few minutes behind, but I bet I can catch up. So don't think me rude if I tap you and tell you that you have two minutes to go or something like that. We have the whole weekend to interact with one another and have some informal collegial interaction, but we have to, as far as the presentations go, keep on task.

So, without further adieu, we'll begin by inviting Robert J. Burke and Steven Butler to come forward please. Mr. Burke is the vice president of the Descendants of Mexican War Veterans and he'll have a few words. He'll be followed by Steve Butler who will talk about the "Aims and Objectives of the Descendants of the Mexican War Veterans in Regard to the Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site." Mr. Burke.

ROBERT BURKE: Thank you doctor. You will not have to tap me on the shoulder, I'll be very brief. My name is Bob Burke. I am a businessman from Dallas, Texas. I came to Texas from Pennsylvania while in the United States Army. I fell in love with Texas and after my five-year tour of duty I came back to Dallas and settled here.

When I first arrived in Texas, I thought about historical sites in Texas. Ha! What did we have? We had the San Jacinto Battlefield and the Alamo, and that was it. Compare that to Pennsylvania, which was the cradle of liberty and all that sort of stuff. We had Gettysburg for the Civil War, we had Valley Forge, we had Independence Hall in Philadelphia, and on and on you went. That's why it is so important for us to dedicate Palo Alto Battlefield, the site of the first battle of the Mexican-American War in Texas.

When our kids were growing up, we brought them down here to South Padre Island for fifteen years in a row. We went through Port Isabel, and the only thing I thought about Port Isabel was that somebody built a two-bit lighthouse over there, but there was also a bridge to that wonderful island of South Padre. I didn't know anything ever occurred down here. You might ask, what is my interest now in the Mexican-American War since I didn't know anything about it in the past?

My great-grandfather, whose name was Bob Burke, came over to the United States during the potato famine. He was an Irish man who left his country because everybody was starving to death. I accepted that and said, "Well, so what. It didn't amount to anything," but then I grew older and fought in World War II. Everybody who fought in World War II and served in the Armed Forces is now in their seventies. It's getting to the point where more than half of us are probably passed away and the rest of us are becoming ancient veterans. As you grow older you take more of an interest in history. About fifteen years ago, I started investigating the military career of the first Bob Burke who came to Texas. It's been very much fun, very rewarding, and I take a great deal of pride in the part the Irish played in the Mexican War. Now the original Bob Burke was not an officer, he wasn't even a noncom. He was just a buck private in General Wool's army, which was formed in Alton, Illinois by a group of Guard units that

were trying to grow from memberships of about five people each up to a company strength of about fifty. Now the Irish were being discriminated against all up and down the East Coast because there was something like three million Irish that came here and nobody wanted them. So, a number of these Irish moved into the Midwest looking for work on farms because that's all they could do was to be farmers. They were running around in Alton, Illinois, up and down the streets there, something like two thousand of them. Alton, Illinois was there before St. Louis was ever developed. It was the gateway across the Mississippi into the wild wilderness. Well, General Wool was ordered to create an army and he started in Alton, Illinois. He got most of these Irish drunk and they all signed up to go with him on this glorious trip down to romantic Mexico. It happened right after the Palo Alto battle. I don't know the exact date, it was probably about a week afterwards, but news traveled very slowly. We didn't have any television news in those days, it had to travel by horseback. So they found out that war had been declared, we were going to fight Mexico, and they figured, "Let's recruit all these Irish." Well, after passing out the whiskey, all two thousand ended up joining Wool's army. Wool was the third ranking soldier in the U.S. Army after Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott and so he ended up bringing his group down to New Orleans and over to San Antonio from Fort Lavaca where they had basic training. They were joined by other outfits from Indiana, Illinois, Arkansas, and so forth. About 90% of Wool's army was Irish. They had never fired a gun in anger. From San Antonio, Wool was supposed to go and take over Chihuahua. But he found that the Mexican army had left Chihuahua so he went over to Parras, Mexico and sat and waited.

Now about that time, President Polk was getting very, very unhappy with Zachary Taylor. He became about as popular as Patton was during World War II. But he was a hero; he had won at Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, Matamoros, Monterrey, and he was sitting over there in Saltillo. So, President Polk said, "Well, I think we'll go and invade Mexico with an amphibious landing at Veracruz." So, he took away all of the fighting men of Zachary Taylor's army and ended up leaving Taylor there with just about five hundred men. But Santa Anna was coming up from San Luis Potosí with about twenty-five thousand men. Twenty thousand made it, so Zachary Taylor pulled over Wool's army and they joined over there. That's when they had the battle of Buena Vista.

I have visited many of these places myself. I've been to Alton, Illinois, to Lavaca, to Chihuahua, to Monterrey, to Camargo, Port Isabel, Buena Vista, Palo Alto, and Resaca de la Palma. I am so thrilled to see the dedication of this battlefield at Palo Alto.

About four years ago, I joined the newly-organized Descendants of Mexican War Veterans. Our president, Steve Butler, will now address you and tell you about this organization. Steve, take it over. Thank you.

STEVEN BUTLER: Good Morning. I'll try to be brief and I apologize because I'll probably be reading from my prepared notes. I didn't have a lot of time to practice my speech. Before proceeding to my paper, which is "The Aims and Objectives of The Descendants of Mexican War Veterans," I thought that a brief history about our organization would be in order. About ten years ago I discovered that my great-great-grandfather was a veteran of the Mexican-American War and that he spent the summer of 1846 in this very valley. He was with the First Alabama Regiment of Volunteers which was, to the best of my knowledge, encamped at a place called Camp Belknap, across the Río Grande from Barita. Later on, he went to Camargo and then served

garrison duty at Tampico. He was involved in the siege of Veracruz and the Alvarado expedition, and finally was discharged in May 1847.

When I discovered that my great-great-grandfather had been in the Mexican War, I was very intrigued. I found very little from U.S. history lessons in school about the Mexican War. All I knew was that it was sandwiched somewhere in between the War of 1812 and the Civil War. I wanted to learn more about it so I read as many books as I could find and, in fact, I acquired quite a large library in the process. I also wanted to see if there was an organization I could join which honored those veterans. Many of you here are aware that there are many organizations in the United States which honor veterans of various wars, such as the Daughters of the American Revolution, the Sons of the Confederate Veterans, and so on. Unfortunately, I found that there was only one society that was in any way connected with the Mexican War and this was the Aztec Club of 1847. Like Bob's ancestor, mine was a buck private and so that left me out of the Aztec Club. The members of that club have to be descendants of officers.

On Saturday, May 13th, 1989, the Descendants of Mexican War Veterans was founded in Dallas, Texas. Attending the organizational meeting were myself and four other men, two of whom are at this conference today; Mr. Robert Burke, our current vice-president, whom you've already met; and Mr. Dennis DuPriest, our Secretary and interim Treasurer. Dennis, would you mind standing and let everybody see you? Thank you. We also have--I noticed on the guest list--three of our members here at this conference who are not on the board; Linda Vance of Austin;-- Linda, would you let everybody know who you are?--also Dr. Tony Knopp of the University of Texas at Brownsville, who told me yesterday that he is going to be busy giving exams today; and Mr. Jenkins Garrett of Fort Worth who is also a member of our association. I don't see him in the room today. I guess he's not here right now. Our original vice-president, Mr. Thomas Legette, unfortunately died last fall and our ranks were made less as a result of that and we were very sorry to have that happen. However, in four years we have gone from those original five members of the first meeting to a little short of two hundred members residing all over the United States and Canada. In fact, we have a couple of members who reside overseas, outside of North America. We are incorporated as a non-profit organization by the state of Texas and are a federally-recognized, tax-exempt, 501-C-3 organization. The majority of our members, both men and women, are the actual descendants of U.S. veterans of the Mexican War, but our ranks also include a handful of associate members who have some special interest in the war. I would like to also take this opportunity to invite anyone here today who either has a veteran ancestor or would just like to join to us as an associate to see me sometime during this conference. I'll be glad to give you some information about our group.

We consider ourselves heirs in spirit to the National Association of Veterans of the Mexican War, an organization founded in 1874 by a veteran of the war. His name was Alexander Kennedy, and he had been working as a printer in New Orleans when the war broke out. He came to the Río Grande Valley during the summer of 1846. He was mustered out. He was one of those three-month volunteers they didn't keep very long. He went back to New Orleans and waited about six months and then joined up as a twelve-month volunteer and saw action in central Mexico. In 1874, he founded the National Association of the Veterans of the Mexican War and because we feel a special bond to that group, we've incorporated their seal into our own organizational seal. We also feel a bond of spirit with a group called the Dames of 1846, which is no longer in existence, also. This was a women's auxiliary found in 1901, in Fort Worth, by a lady

called Mrs. Moore Murdock, who was the daughter of a Mexican War veteran, and that organization, unfortunately, ceased to function when she died in 1932.

Currently, our activities include the publication of a quarterly newsletter and publication of what, I believe, is the only magazine devoted to the Mexican War, *Mexican War Journal*, which I have a copy of here and I'd be glad to add anybody to our subscription list, if you would like to do that. We also hope, in the not-too-distant future, to publish an index listing the names of every U.S. veteran of the Mexican-American War. There were some 116,000 of those.

Now, I'd like to talk to you about what we have done in our past efforts in regard to Palo Alto. Literally from the day our organization was founded, we have had an interest in the preservation of Palo Alto. In fact, on the day our organization was founded, the Dallas Morning News ran an article about Palo Alto and the efforts to preserve it down here in Brownsville. That very evening, I called Sam Griffin and discussed the matter with him. Afterwards, letters were written to both Texas senators at the time, the Honorable Lloyd Bentsen and Phil Gramm, expressing our desire to see the federal government do something about saving the battlefield. After we learned of the efforts of Texas Congressman Solomon Ortiz to do so, we wrote him letters of support and mailed his office petitions calling upon Congress to pass the bill which he had introduced. Copies of our petitions and correspondence concerning Palo Alto were given to the Palo Alto National Committee for their use as they saw fit, particularly in regard to the congressional hearings which were held on the Palo Alto bill.

Now, that the bill has been signed into law, we, the Descendants of Mexican War Veterans, are pleased and honored that we were able to play some small role in the creation of this, the newest of our country's national parks.

The future of Palo Alto: We have no doubt the National Park Service of the United States will do all it can to preserve and protect the Palo Alto Battlefield in an appropriate manner. We look forward to the day when visitors will be received there as they are on similar battle sites and throughout the United States.

Our organization's objectives, as listed in our bylaws, include these two which are of particular relevance to Palo Alto:

To perpetuate the memory and spirit of the American soldiers and sailors who served their country during the U.S.-Mexican War of 1846-1848; and, To secure and memorialize historic sites within the boundaries of the United States which are connected with the history of the U.S.-Mexican War of 1846-1848 by erecting markers or other monuments thereon.

In keeping with these objectives, it is the hope and the intent of this organization to erect one or more monuments or memorials at some future date on the land which will make up the Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site. Of course, we realize we must first seek permission from any U.S. government agencies, such as the National Parks Service, which would have any interest in such a thing and work within any guidelines set by them.

However, what we have in mind, if we are permitted to do so, is to erect a modest monument or memorial which does not commemorate the battle itself, since there are already such monuments in place, but instead would memorialize the American soldiers who fell in the battle at Palo Alto or died of wounds that were received there, such as was the case with Major Samuel Ringgold. We have also discussed the possibility of erecting a monument which honors all American soldiers who served throughout the Mexican-American War. Currently, we have no particular design or theme chosen for

any such monuments or memorials. Additionally, I would like to call upon the Palo Alto National Committee and any other interested parties both in the United States and Mexico to consider something else; a joint effort with ourselves to raise funds to erect a separate monument at Palo Alto which does not commemorate the war or any of its soldiers, but is instead similar in theme, if not design, to one which stands on the Gettysburg Battlefield National Historic Site in Pennsylvania. Dedicated by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1938, it is a monument not to war, but to peace. Such a monument, I believe, would be most appropriate for the Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site, for today's generation of Mexicans and Americans are trying, now, not to fight with one another as in 1846, but to come together as friends so that the people of both countries may benefit.

Further, I believe the dedication ceremony of such a monument would be most appropriately held on May 8th, 1996, three years hence, the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the battle. I have a vision of the President of the United States and the President of the Republic of Mexico coming together to dedicate it, as symbolic of the desire of our two countries to live together in the peace and friendship we both agree is essential in our world today.

It is my express wish that all those who are in attendance here today, as well as others who could not be here, may consider this idea and hopefully take steps to turn in into reality. Thank you.

DR. ZAVALETA: Thank you very much, Mr. Butler. We'll now hear from Jeff Mauck, formerly of the University of Texas-Pan America, who will speak to us about the Indiana volunteers. Jeff.

DR. JEFFREY MAUCK: Three years ago, I came down to the Valley from Indiana. At the time, I was writing my doctoral dissertation. I came here for a number of reasons. Having grown up and lived all my life in Indiana, I thought that it was time to see some of the rest of the country and, as well, I needed a job and at UT-Pan Am they were so generous as to give me a visiting lectureship, which they extended for three years. That has lead to my living in the Valley for about three and a half years. I very much enjoy living here and during that time I got involved in the Palo Alto project. In a roundabout way, rather than trying to give my paper, I'm going to speak about my research. When I came down to the Valley, I was primarily a student of U.S. foreign relations. I studied with David Pletcher at Indiana University and did my dissertation on the Gadsden Treaty between the United States and Mexico of 1854. I was also really quite a Civil War buff and met another such person at the UT-Pan Am, our math chairperson, Dr. Joe Chance. Joe introduced me really to serious inquiry into the war with Mexico and we visited the battlefields and it wasn't too long after I met Joe that he gave me a diary and suggested that I read it because he said that it was one of the best diaries of an American volunteer serving in Taylor's army. As I picked up the diary to read it the first lines were, "We left New Albany for the new war at 1:30 AM." New Albany is my hometown in Indiana and the diary was of a member of the company of volunteers from my hometown in New Albany, a company that called themselves the "Spencer Grays." They came with Taylor's army as a part of the second Indiana volunteer regiment. It went into Mexico. I started really just poking around to try to find what I could without any real thesis, without any methodological approach, without any long-term goals. I found there was a good deal of information and I started looking into a more or less social-cultural history of some of the Indiana volunteers:

I'm not interested in recounting all of the battle of Buena Vista, the tactical maneuvers, and what not, instead I want to look at this group of individuals as men and I want to ask a number of questions. What motivated them to join the army as eighteen and nineteen-year-olds and march thirteen hundred miles from the Ohio Valley to the Río Grande Valley and put their lives on the line? What did they think about the war with Mexico? Did they feel it was justified? Did they believe Polk's statements about the necessity of war? What kind of interaction did they have with the Hispanic culture of the Valley? What type of interaction did they have with the environment of the Valley? And furthermore, I'm investigating the issue of militarism, nationalism, and perspectives of men's proper role of war at this time.

It was interesting because when I was doing this, it was simultaneous with the Gulf War. I remember I heard a marine in the Gulf War say, after a reporter from CNN asked him, "Are you afraid?" "Oh, yes" he said, "I'm afraid, but I've got a job to do." A volunteer in the Mexican War would have never used those words. They had a different concept of how men should behave in war and what is unique about this Indiana outfit is that they were part of the ill-fated second Indiana regiment which was "disgraced" at the battle at Buena Vista when, after fighting for some time, they fled in a hasty retreat. Their story made it to the newspapers, and the whole town took great offense at the way they were treated in the papers. The fact that they fought for some time and ran, which most of the volunteers at Buena Vista did sometime during that day, made them cowards in the eyes of many. I want to look at the culture that produced that type of treatment and look at its roots. Were they really cowards? My conclusion is that they were really not cowards. Really, in a way, they were victims of a philosophy of warfare and the proper role of the military of the United States that was related to republican values of the time, in which the United States tended to rely on citizen soldiers, oftentimes commanded by politicians, who were either elected by the soldiers or appointed, if they had a higher rank, by politicians, not for their military competence, but rather for their political future. Americans believed that type of army and fighting force was adequate to defend the nation's security. Many people forgot that we had really fought the revolution to a draw and fought the War of 1812 to a draw. They portrayed those wars as glorious victories over the best armies in Europe. So these men came down here with really a distorted view of what war was like and what it took to prevail at war. Without going into all the methodology, that's what I'm working on. I think that the important thing about the conference is to share our ideas and what we are working on.

I want to read one quote to you that I recently came across. I found two complete diaries from members of the company, the original eighty members, which I was fortunate to do. One was this published diary. I managed to get the original manuscripts on microfilm. I found another manuscript diary at the Minnesota Historical Society. One of the things that I noticed was the perceptions that these men have of the environment, the vegetation, the weather, and to some degree, even the people are very similar to the perceptions that I had when I first came to the Valley. I thought when I came here, "This is the most horrendous environment that I have ever been in." Working in archeology out at Palo Alto, I can realize, believe me, that it's different.

Frank Stribner was a volunteer with the Indiana regiment who later became a brigadier general in the Civil War. His father founded my hometown. He came down here and turned twenty-one years of age in the mountains of Tamaulipas, maybe Coahuila. He wrote this about the Valley and this is just a Hoosiers perception of the Río Grande Valley. He said, "It is universally admitted that chaparral cannot be described.

The largest trees, that do not exceed in size the peach or the plum tree, are very crooked and ill-shaped." He's talking, of course, about the mesquite, which for a Hoosier, doesn't look much like a tree. It's more of a bush. "With leaves somewhat like the locust the intervals are filled up with a kind of barren-looking undergrowth. I have not done this subject justice. In order to have a full and clear conception of the chaparral, you must see it and feel it too. Two days occupied in clearing it away, for preparing for an encampment will give one a clear idea of its character. The expression so common with us is, 'all of the bushes have thorns and all of the insects have horns.'" I think of those words working with Charlie Haecker out at Palo Alto, wading through that brush. I've got stickers everywhere under the world, in the world, and chiggers and everything like that. I thought it was something I would mention, but this is what I am working on and I have a manuscript here that is about twenty single-spaced pages, but we're not going to have time. If you want to share ideas about this, I think that it is important.

A couple of books I will mention very quickly, for those of you who are interested in the U.S. volunteers and the U.S. soldiers in the war, there's a recent study by James McCaffrey, at the University of Houston, called, *Army of Manifest Destiny*, which is very good. There is also some recent work by Dr. Joe Chance at the University of Texas-Pan American, including an edited diary and a study of the Mississippi volunteers, and his work is moving forward. We're doing work on the North American soldier in the war. What we need now is more understanding of the Mexican foot soldier, the common man and what his experience was of the war to balance this picture. So, I encourage anybody that is thinking of doing research, that is a topic that I think is out there, possibly for a dissertation, or article-length study and would be very beneficial because, as I said, we do have a lot of work on the American soldier. Maybe I'll sit down and let us get on with it.

DR. ZAVALETA: Thank you very much, Jeff. That was very informative. We will now hear from Alejandra Aldred, who is the Chief of Interpretation and Visitor Services at Bent's Old Fort National Historic Site. Alejandra.

ALEJANDRA ALDRED: Thank you. "Bent's Old Fort and the Mexican-American War." The strained relations between the United States and Mexico, which had existed ever since Mexico had declared its independence in 1846, reached a crisis in the spring of 1846. On May 13, 1846, war was declared by President Polk, who ordered Colonel Stephen Watts Kearny, commanding the first dragoons at Fort Leavenworth, to organize what was to be called the Army of the West. It's immediate purpose was to protect commerce on the Santa Fe Trail. Following this, New Mexico and California were to be invaded and captured. The total number of troops organized by Colonel Kearny for the Santa Fe expedition, including various companies of the first regiment of the dragoons and Alexander Doniphan's Missouri volunteers, was about seventeen hundred. The Army of the West left Fort Leavenworth in separate sections. The first companies marching from the post on June 5, and the last on July 6. Kearny had selected the mountain branch of the Santa Fe Trail as his route to Santa Fe for several reasons. It had the most dependable water supply for his men, some of the forage for his horses and cattle, and Bent's Old Fort was available for use as a supply base.

Bent's Old Fort was a private enterprise of fur trading posts located on the mountain branch of the Santa Fe Trail. It was owned and operated by three men: William Bent, who handled the Indian trade and traded with the Comanche, the Kiowa, the

Arapaho, and the Southern Cheyenne; and Charles Bent, who handled all of the business aspects of the company. St. Vrain handled the Mexican trade. He gave up his U.S. citizenship to become a Mexican to do that.

The hardships of the trail soon took their toll on the volunteers. Some of the men became ill and had to be sent back, but most of the troops continued on through sand, wind, and mosquitoes, arriving at Bent's Fort late in July. Bent's Fort was an obvious staging area for the army.

The fort and its surrounding area must have been a busy place during the week the army gathered. In addition to Kearny's seventeen-hundred-man force, there were about four hundred merchant wagons with teamsters and scouts camped within nine miles at Bent's outpost awaiting protective escort into Santa Fe. Including in this tremendous encampment were a thousand mules and three thousand horses. The damage caused by this concentration of hungry animals is attested by Francis Parkman who visited the post in August after the army left, "The grass for miles around was cropped close by the horses of General Kearny's soldiery," he said. The loss of this grass was a serious blow to the fort's delicately balanced life-support system.

The fort itself was also placed under a heavy strain. Room had to be made for the thousands of pounds of supplies Colonel Kearny wanted to store there. During the two years following his departure, the evidence indicates Bent's stored about 35,000 pounds of army supplies in the warehouses. Soldiers were still stationed at the fort as late as August 1847, to protect and keep inventory of the supplies. Many of the soldiers became ill on the trip from Fort Leavenworth, and room had to be made for them inside the fort where they could be cared for. Many of these remained after the army left. One of those included James Abert, a topographical engineer with the Army of the West.

Susan Magoffin was one of the first white ladies to travel the Santa Fe Trail. She is very important to Bent's Fort because she kept a very descriptive diary of the activities and of the people who were there. She mentions in her diary following the army's departure, "the fort is quite desolate. Most who are here now, of the soldiers, are sick. Two have died and have been buried in the sand hills. Other soldiers crowded into the fort to make purchases." This is a slide of our trade room. Of course, Bent's Fort is a total reconstruction and it is furnished with some of the items that the travelers would need or use during the time.

If possible, they acquired other civilian foods to supplement a poor army diet. This placed a heavy strain of the Fort's own food supplies, especially because the fur company headed to St. Louis to resupply for the upcoming season. They had not planned on the Army of the West showing up and cleaning them out. Of the daily activities, Susan Magoffin says, "There is the greatest possible noise in the patio, the shooing of horses neighing and braying mules, the crying of children, the scolding and fighting of men." She adds, "The fort is crowded to overflowing for Kearny has arrived and it seems the world is with him." This is the slide we couldn't get to show up. We tried, but it didn't work.

The armies' survival created havoc for William Bent's business. The fodder for miles around had been devastated, the fort stores decimated, its rooms filled till overflowing, with sick soldiers and finally the presence of so many soldiers kept Bent's Indian trade customers at a distance. Colonel Kearny asked William Bent to scout on his march to Santa Fe, but because of inadequate compensation, William Bent refused. Kearny realizing he needed Bent's experienced hand, sent a peacemaker after him and,

finally, able to secure his help, the army stayed at the fort less than a week. The first main unit had arrived July 27-28, and by August 2, 1846, the army headed southwest.

The passing of these troops was to have a greater effect on Bent's life than those initial inconveniences suffered during the summer of 1846. The passing of these troops marked the end of an era. It marked the beginning of immigration and settlement by the white man and eventually the extermination of the Indians.

We do have a video called "Bent's Old Fort: Castle on the Plains" and there's also one called "They Came to Build: The Total Reconstruction of the Fort as it Looks Today." Thank you.

DR. ZAVALETA: Thank you very much, Alejandra. I believe that our next speaker, Celso Garza Guajardo, was not able to make it or at least is not here yet, but we're fortunate that his colleague, Carlos Gustavo Leal Velazco, from the same institution, the Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo Leon, who will be speaking with us Sunday morning, is here this morning and has graciously agreed to describe his colleague's work for us. Carlos.

CARLOS GUSTAVO LEAL VELAZCO: Hablaré a partir de una visión retrospectiva. En nuestro centro de investigación de historia regional, realizamos trabajos que consolidan una filosofía hacia el tratado de libre comercio, hacia nuestra frontera, y desde luego estos trabajos han tenido una repercusión en todos los demás estados norteños de México.

Esta idea es parte también de la histórica forma en que desde Nuevo León, desde Monterrey en 1581, cuando se capitula a Luis de Carbajal y de la Cueva, se da esta población, esta colonización, a los demás estados norteños y posteriormente se consolidan las provincias internas de oriente. Estos trabajos de investigación son realizados por gente especialista y agrupan lo mismo decretos, mapas, tradición oral, documentos específicos como memorias de guerra, partes de los acontecimientos. También hemos incorporado lo que es la cultura, las tradiciones, y la forma cotidiana de vida.

Este tipo de trabajos ha dado por consecuencia coloquios, seminarios y congresos, principalmente asentados en la ciudad de Monterrey. Algunos de los trabajos que se han publicado son, por ejemplo, el que le tocaba ahora hablar al Profesor Celso Garza Guajardo, que por motivos mayores no pudo estar presente en esta sesión tan importante, tan vital ahora en este tiempo, y menciono este trabajo como *Nuevo León: Destino y Desafío*, una compilación del Profesor Celso Guajardo que más tarde se agotó. Vamos a hacer una reimpresión para después enviárselos a algunos de las bibliotecas principales de Tejas sobretodo y de la Unión.

Para terminar, la idea que se da en el otro lado en la parte que nos corresponde editar, que es Nuevo León, sigue habiendo una ideal de la vinculación que existe entre las mentalidades, entre las inteligencias, para poder ver la frontera de una forma diferente, una forma en que están vinculados todavía los procesos de comercialización, de política y de cultura, porque muchas de las familias que originalmente se asentaron en Nuevo León siguen viviendo en estos lugares. Siguen teniendo algunas de las costumbres, siguen guardando esas tradiciones.

Entonces se sigue irradiando ese proceso cultural y probablemente en un futuro esto conduzca hacia un entendimiento de que la frontera es únicamente una forma jurídica, y que nuestros pueblos, nuestra cultura, esta más alla, el individuo está más alla de lo que significan las fronteras. Muchísimas gracias.

DR. ZAVALETA: Gracias, Carlos. We will hear from him again as I said on Sunday morning. I told you we'd catch up in time, also, didn't I? We'll now hear from Donald Frazier from Texas Christian University who will speak about "The Encyclopedia of the Mexican-American War." Mr. Frazier.

DR. DONALD FRAZIER: I want to go ahead and send around a brochure put out by Simon and Schuster advertising this year's release, *The Encyclopedia of the Confederacy*. This is the format that we are going to be pursuing on the project that I'll be discussing today. Just pass that around--just as long as I get it back, that's fine.

Let me introduce the publisher and what the publisher's projects have been to date. In the field of academic reference, Simon and Schuster has made a firm commitment to putting out encyclopedia series on various topics including an encyclopedia of Christopher Columbus, an encyclopedia of the Confederacy, an encyclopedia of D-Day, etc.

My colleague at Texas Christian University, Bruce Winders, approached me with an idea that perhaps there needs to be an encyclopedia of the Mexican-American War, but something a little more than that, something that puts the entire war into context. We took this concept and are building around the central theme of the Mexican-American War. We have come up with a project that Simon and Schuster has bought off on, very fortunately, and that's what I'm going to pitch to you today. I'd like to, if possible, have a little bit of questions at the end of this.

Okay, a bit of introduction. The principle players so far are me, I'm an assistant professor of American history at Texas Christian University, and Bruce Winders, my colleague at Texas Christian University. I think Simon and Schuster needs no introduction.

I want to talk about the scope of the work. What we want to do is to build, in encyclopedic form, a picture of the borderlands, the disputed border, *la frontera*, before there was a border. Then, we want to impose the border on it, chronologically, and then discuss the implications, the ramifications, and the result of a border being placed there.

As far as a date range that we are kicking around at this point, we are kicking around the dates 1832 to about 1853-1854. That's the two-decade time period. There are several reasons for this sort of thinking. By using this particular date bracket, we can provide a context for the entire Mexican-American War, which is so often lacking in any sort of presentation or treatment of that particular episode in both Mexican and American history. It's just this war that appears out of the blue one day and you have American armies invading Mexico. There are some very sharp encounters and then the war disappears one day and a third of Mexico is gone. All of this just seems to appear out of the mist. What we want to do is we want to go back in time and look at some of the roots of this conflict and then project forward from the war and look at some of the results.

Also, this sort of time bracket will allow us to use particular strong personalities, such as Antonio López de Santa Anna, as vehicles to carry this story through time. He's vilified and he's a hero, it depends on your perspective. But he is a key player throughout this entire time period and it would make no sense to have this man appear from the mist, participate, and then disappear again. We need to look at his entire political career during this time period.

Other episodes that are of interest to the borderlands area and this particular era in both American and Mexican history can be included. Take, for instance, the Republic

of the Río Grande, I believe that there's a paper scheduled on that later on. Filibustering is still very poorly understood and very poorly treated in academic scholarship. The War for Texas Independence, as I have been informed it's currently being called, or the Texas Revolution to other people, that can be treated in-depth and be given the treatment that it needs to place it in the context of both Mexico and the United States. Also, by going into the 1850s, we can discuss things like the United States non-compliance to certain articles in the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo and then ultimately the Gadsden Purchase.

Another goal of this particular project is to identify sensitivities and to strive for inclusiveness, which is kind of a bug word these days in the industry. We want to blend key elements of Mexican history with American history to produce an even treatment, an amalgam, if you will, of this period. This is analogous to braiding; braiding strands into one common row. It's a common history to everybody in this room.

This project will provide a ready reference. That's why we think that this project is important. It will provide a ready reference on the shelf as a point of departure for future scholarship on this time period. This we see is a critical key; a critical first step towards stimulating research in the area.

Now then, why am I here? Why am I speaking to you? I saw this Palo Alto conference as an incredibly convenient way to meet and interact with some of the most active minds in the field. Everybody in here is interested in this. That's important to me. I'm interested in getting feedback from you about this project, about what you'd like to see this project become.

I'm interested also in topical studies, topics that need to be covered that maybe would get overlooked if you weren't here to champion them. Also, my key at this meeting, and in subsequent ones, will be to establish a network of talent that will help in the following ways: number one, as I said, suggesting entries, and number two, intellectual support, and to a certain degree, guidance. From this point, that's the project.

In closing, let me give you an address and then I want to open the floor to questions. The address, if you're interested in the project, you have something that you are interested in putting forward, you want to be in contact with me for any reason, I can be reached at the department of history. My name is Don Frazier, don't put any of the other, you know, bells or whistles on the name, I'm Don. Don Frazier, I'm at Box 32888, Texas Christian University, that's in Fort Worth, 76129.

Okay, there's the project in a nutshell. The format of the project is coming around. We're using *Encyclopedia of the Confederacy* as a model. They had thousands, literally thousands, of articles, hundreds of contributors, big names in the business, lesser names in the business, no names in the business, people that were interested in the Confederacy. We want to do the same thing with this neglected time period in American and Mexican history.

Concerning a Spanish edition, in about three weeks I'm going to talk to the Vice President of Academic Reference about that. I can think of nothing more suitable than putting a Simon and Schuster title in Spanish and in English. I mean, that really wraps up the entire project very, very effectively.

Now they are looking at this from a real New York bias. They are interested in selling books, pure and simple. They are looking for markets and I think if we put out a Spanish language edition, then they are going to increase the book sales, I think that they'll buy off on that. I really do, and I think that it's vital, absolutely vital.

Publication, that's one thing I didn't mention, we're shooting for a 1995 publication, which means that we are going to be busy, very busy in the coming months. We're going to get this project launched this summer and we're going to be charging ahead full speed from that point on.

UNKNOWN: Would you consider entries outside of this time period?

DR. FRAZIER: Sure, make you're argument in writing. Also, there was some debate on whether or not the GAR, the SCV, etc., the Sons of the Confederate Veterans, the Grand Army of the Republic Association, should be included in the *Encyclopedia of the Confederacy*. I think that they ended up not including them, because there were too many. I mean there were already four volumes, there were 200,000 words, which is a sizable project. Something like this might be a little different. For our project I envision, two volumes, maybe three. I envision as many volumes as Simon and Schuster would let me have. Let me just go ahead and hit it like that. I'll be perfectly frank. Now it may be prohibitively expensive, but if Simon and Schuster puts the entire weight of their organization behind this project. They can have surprisingly deep pockets. So, if they are intellectually committed to this, we'll see it. What may happen, before we get a Spanish language version, in reference to your other question, is you may have to find an interested third party publisher to buy the Spanish language rights. That's a deal that we can put together. That's not a problem. You know, there's somebody out there that would like nothing more than to have a completed manuscript by the biggest names in the field and all they'll have to do is translate it, put the binder on it, and market it in Latin America, from Mexico to Patagonia.

UNKNOWN: Would it be a possibility for other institutions to take off a certain aspect of the project?

DR. FRAZIER: Oh, certainly. The way that the *Encyclopedia of the Confederacy* works, is that there was an editorial board, then an editorial advisory board, and then the people of Simon and Schuster asked these people to come with students, associates, colleagues, who would provide entries, etc. Certainly. I want this to be a representation of a broad range of educational institutions north and south of the border. Certainly.

We want to put in as much information as possible. We will have longer topical entries and shorter, event-oriented entries. Hopefully, there's going to be a nice mix of both. We have approached this particular issue by word length. For example, according to our editorial board, this particular incident may only warrant two hundred and fifty words, whereas this particular incident may warrant a thousand words. That's exactly how we'll handle it. What I want to do is get as much of the small stuff in there as possible, because there is going to be somebody that's going to read that page and they're going to see all of those two hundred and fifty-word entries and say, "Whoa! That's fascinating!" And at the bottom of each of these articles is going to be one, two, maybe three bibliographic entries. Larger articles will have even more extensive bibliographies. That's why I say that this is a critical point of departure for future scholarship and there's going to be somebody who wants to know about the founding of Brownsville.

I say let's try to include all that we can. You'll see that brochure going around on the *Encyclopedia of the Confederacy*. It's got a list of the articles and you'll find

omissions. You'll find general things like sheep skinners not in there and I'm personally offended.

What I'm wanting to do also, now that we're in the planning stage, is to have broad interpretive essays, maybe about a thousand-word length, or one thousand two hundred and fifty words, for each of the three periods. Intellectually I've got this project compartmentalized into three volumes or three periods. One being the formation of the border, from about 1832 to about 1845; then the period from about 1845 to about 1848; and then from 1848 to the end of the series, which would be about 1853. I'd like to have broad, contextual essays separating each of these segments. Other questions? Well, I've made one dean happy, I'm out of here. Thank you.

DR. ZAVALETA: Thank you so very much. We do have a couple of minutes before our scheduled break and I feel that it would be appropriate if there any questions for any the presenters this morning. We will at this time or any discussion that we might be able to generate in the next couple of minutes. Were there any questions for Mr. Burke, Butler, Mauck, or Ms. Aldred, anything? Yes sir.

DR. PEDRO SANTONI: Don't you think that maybe the lack of work on the Mexican foot soldier may be because the majority of Mexican soldiers couldn't read, couldn't write, and thus they didn't leave any testimonies, in comparison to, say, the American rank and file?

DR. MAUCK: It is difficult, very difficult to find sources. I think also that's due to the outcome of the war.

DR. SANTONI: Yeah. That's true, too.

DR. MAUCK: Americans sensed and recorded a glory in their fighting, and with the Mexican soldiers maybe it's a different experience. There exists a great number of diaries and manuscripts in the United States from these volunteers. Look, for instance, at Tutorow's bibliography. We're having more difficulty finding information on the common soldier in Mexico. In fact, for the Army of the North, we're not even sure who that soldier was, you know, where these men were from. There's a lot of questions that remain open, but we need that kind of scholarship for the parks because we want to present this story. This is just my opinion. We need not only a military history, but kind of a social history and a cultural history of the war. We don't have that as of yet.

CHARLES ROBINSON: If I can interject something there, too. It's like they were saying on the availability. I was doing research on the battle of Palo Alto for an article and another important point is the difference in legal and social attitudes in Mexico. Many who were literate, were not necessarily free to write what they were saying. There were several accounts written by officers immediately after Palo Alto, Mexican officers, putting the blame squarely where it belonged, at the top. But these accounts were suppressed almost immediately and most of the copies were destroyed and are virtually impossible to get hold of. Henry knows of one example. You can hardly find any examples anymore, except one or two. The Mexican government clamped down hard on any soldier's account that had anything to do with what went wrong.

DR. ZAVALETA: Thank you, Charles. Yes sir.

UNKNOWN: Did the government clamp down or did the officers, Mariano Arista and the other officers present, want to save themselves politically from what had happened?

UNKNOWN: Well, in certain cases you had the kind of situation where the officers in command were the government, particularly in the case of Santa Anna. It's hard to tell who suppressed what.

UNKNOWN: And he was in exile.

UNKNOWN: Right. Arista, of course, watched his fortunes drop immediately after the defeats of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, and the withdrawal from the border. Shortly after that, Santa Anna returned. So, it's hard to tell who is looking to blame who, but the general attitude of everybody was that they couldn't afford anything that would reflect badly on the Mexican arms or Mexican command, particularly after Santa Anna came back in and was trying to re-rally the nation and rebuild an army from scratch.

DR. ZAVALETA: Thank you, Charles, we had a comment over here. Yes, sir.

UNKNOWN: Part of the problem also is the simple fact that the Mexican military archives, which are a crucial aspect of this research, are generally not open to outside researchers. It's a major problem, but we can go to the U.S. national archives, pull some service records for the Indiana troops, Illinois troops, and even Arkansas troops. Those service records have a lot of information. They detail who the guy is, his marital status, what his occupation was, color of his skin, color of his eyes, height, etc., but this book's not complete because of the Mexican military archives.

UNKNOWN: Those intentions are related to the fact that there are two sides to that question, I mean, the University of Texas bought a lot of Mexico's national treasures.

UNKNOWN: Right.

UNKNOWN: ...and major collections of papers and hauled them away.

UNKNOWN: They are available to the researcher, however.

UNKNOWN: Yeah, I guess you're right, but how would we feel if somebody bought Thomas Jefferson's papers and hauled them away to another country.

UNKNOWN: I agree.

UNKNOWN: It's a very common point, the problem is that right now we're dealing with trying to do more research and yet we are impeded by the past sins of our academic ancestors who researched the Texas Revolution or the Mexican War. We're being held responsible for those and that's one of the problems we have.

DR. ZAVALETA: Thank you very much. Yes, sir.

DR. JESUS VELASCO: I just want to make a brief comment to the comments of the gentleman. I'm Jesus Velasco from the University of the Americas in Pueblo, Mexico. I have to say something in regard to censorship in Mexico during that time.

First of all, there was a very weak government in Mexico, several governments, and they didn't have enough power to create the censorship that he is talking about. As a matter of fact, one of the very few periods in which Mexico had a very free press was at that time. High cronyism in the press itself became a kind of handicap to organizing within Mexico and there were several books published at that time. There were also some very important critics, one of whom was Carlos María de Bustamante. In the *Apuntes for the War with Mexico*, which was published just after the war, they were very critical of the leadership in Mexico. So, I don't think that interpretation is correct. He's probably thinking about what is happening now in Mexico and trying to overlap with the past. I don't think that it is a good argument with which to analyze the period.

DR. ZAVALETA: Thank you very much. On that note, which is greatly appreciated, I want to thank you. We're going to take a brief break, but I think that this lively and spirited debate is exactly the type of interpretation and reinterpretation which is so very critical to us. That's why we appreciate your presence so much. We're right on schedule, so let's stand up and stretch and get a refreshment and come back precisely at 10:45. [Break]

DR. ZAVALETA: I want to say how absolutely wonderful that intellectual encounter was. I also want to reemphasize our purpose here, which is not to interpret, reinterpret, or reinvent history as we think it might have been, but rather to share with one another our interpretations of history from all perspectives. I'd like you to know that my particular family has been located on this river since 1684. My ancestors came to the river in 1684. We've seen countries, flags, and armies come and go, and haven't really cared about any of them, on either side. It's always been a bother for us. Life goes on, you know, for the true descendants of border families: one decade or century, you're in one nation; and another passes and your in another nation, and so forth; but life goes on for us. We appreciate that on behalf of the members of the Republica del Río Grande.

Next, we're going to hear from Tom Fort. Is Tom here? I don't know if I've identified Tom. Tom Fort is the assistant director and curator of exhibits at the Hidalgo County Museum and he will speak to us about the Halls of Montezuma, or how a small museum can produce a major exhibit on the Mexican-American War.

TOM FORT: I'm not going to try to go into a great deal of detail about this project. I'll give you a little background. Among other things, it's very gratifying to see all of the people who have turned out for this conference. I'm certainly not a scholar of the Mexican War, but I recognize a number of the people here who are, including a number of those who helped our museum with this exhibition. This project began back about three years ago with the proposal or suggestion by the late Hubert Hudson of Brownsville. We owe him a great debt of gratitude for germinating this exhibit and for making it the success that it was. He was the one who suggested an exhibition of original lithographs and maps of the period that he owned. We thought that this was an interesting idea. We had a brand new exhibit gallery and annex building, and it seemed like a good way to show this material to the public.

As we began to consider how to do an exhibit, the thought of possibly acquiring or borrowing some supplementary artifacts of the period occurred to us. And so, as this thing began to develop, I began to write inquiries and make telephone calls to a few people--the few that I knew--who might be able to give us some direction on borrowing military artifacts, for example, from the period. Actually, we weren't exactly sure what we were getting into. It literally took off and grew into a much larger, more in-depth exhibition than we had ever imagined. There is so much that one can say about the war with Mexico on both sides from the political, social, and military aspects. However, we are a museum, and my own background is primarily in history with an interest in military history, and I've never had an opportunity to really deal with this period. Therefore, we sort of thought, "Well, the lithographs that Mr. Hudson was making available primarily were those that depicted the popular concept of the war's military events in the 1840s. So, maybe we could simply try to limit our focus to the lives or the typical outlook on life of the soldiers of the period." We wanted to try, to the best of our ability, to at least present it from the view of the American and the Mexican soldiers. This was the sort of philosophy that we went into on this project.

The title for the exhibition we simply drew from the popular phrase of the day noted in a number of American diaries, again influenced by the sort of concurrent publication of *The Conquest of Mexico*, by Prescott, which had a great deal of influence among a number of the American officers in Scott's campaign farther south. We have had a number of people ask us if we hadn't misspelled the word Montezuma, which we understand correctly is supposed to be Moctezuma from the Aztec king, but this again was a quotation from the period and this is why we left it as it is. We made a selection from the number of the original lithographs and maps available. The search for the artifacts for this exhibit lead from Tucson, Arizona to Santa Fe, New Mexico to Arlington, Texas, and Dallas, Austin, Washington, D.C., North Carolina and so on. In some cases, we simply asked one person or one museum if they had anything and they'd say, "Well, yes, we've got this and this and you might ask somebody else." Anyone contemplating doing this kind of an exhibition certainly will find a good deal more available than you would think right off hand.

As the number of possible things that we could borrow sort of accumulated, we began to design this thing with an idea toward presenting not just items hung on the wall, but also sort of a layout of different free-standing panels and exhibit cases and what-have-you to hold these various items. Now, we'll simply look at a number of these things that will indicate how this hall was laid out. Our gallery is one large room, about sixty by sixty feet. Although large on paper, it begins to shrink rapidly when you begin to lay out a fairly good sized exhibition such as this one was. In some cases, by simple good luck, we wound up with an array of different media to exhibit in this presentation. We had not only artifacts, but also through the University of Texas at Arlington, Jenkins Garrett Collection, a number of Mexican War documents, broadsides, sheet music, letters, diaries, etc. We also, of course, had the original lithographs and maps and the San Jacinto Museum allowed us to at least have copies of some of their original daguerreotype collection. Combat-related material that is traceable or documented to Mexican-War use is extremely scarce we discovered, extremely scarce. This is the one and only artifact that we were able to borrow that was identifiable with a particular action; a sword belt said to have been worn by Lieutenant Theodore Chadborne of the U.S. Eighth Infantry regiment at the battle of Resaca de la Palma, where he was killed.

This one we kind of had in a display case by itself just because of the nature of the object. It does seem to be the only one that we know of, and the only one that we were able to obtain on loan. It was traceable to a specific action, in this case, the actual second battle of the war which occurred the day after Palo Alto, right here on the outskirts of Brownsville.

The exhibit was not laid out in a chronological order, we weren't trying to follow any particular pattern of events. We did have it broken down roughly into the two campaigns. This particular side of the gallery is Zachary Taylor's northern campaign. Material relating to Scott's southern campaign is on the other side. We made an attempt to procure at least one or two artifacts relating to Kearny's campaign with the Army of the West, but we were unable to do so. We were fortunate in acquiring some original uniforms which were exhibited elsewhere in the gallery, however we wanted to show, as best we could, the types of field or combat uniforms that the soldiers of the day probably would have been wearing. In this case we resorted to what were clearly identified as replicas and recreations of American and Mexican army uniforms of that period. Of the Mexican army soldiers on the other side, we have one of these displayed out here which you all can look at. These were made for us by a gentleman in Pennsylvania who also does work for the National Park Service. Original Mexican broadsides were displayed in the case between these two. On the other side of the gallery the display told primarily about Scott's southern campaign. We obtained copies of some of the James Walker paintings from the West Point Collection, which led to the focal point of this exhibition. A collection of six original uniforms from the period, officers' uniforms, courtesy of a contact that I was able to make through the good graces of Steve Butler and the Descendants of Mexican War Veterans, is shown here. One of their members has a large collection of Mexican memorabilia and an acquaintance of that person's had what became our primary focal point of the exhibit; a uniform that belonged to General Santa Anna. The most unusual exhibit was a uniform attributed to General Arista, who was in command of the Mexican forces at the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. Here is the uniform of Santa Anna, himself. This was a dress uniform captured by the American forces in January, 1848, at least the story goes, and was brought back into the United States by Captain Jack Hayes of the Texas Rangers. It's a very ornate and extremely impressive uniform, certainly this was the high point of our exhibition and when we started this project we never had any idea of being able to obtain something like that on loan. The three American army uniforms also were from the same collection, two of which are attributed to personalities from the Mexican War. The uniform on the middle figure, in particular, was worn by Governor James Pinckney Henderson of Texas who also commanded Texas volunteers during the campaign.

We had a number of other smaller military artifacts from assorted collections. Some of these were from the American and others were from the Mexican side of the conflict. Here are muskets of the period, a Mexican naval officer's sword, a lancer's helmet, and assorted medallions and metals. Some of these were from veteran's organizations that were formed after the war itself, including the Aztec Club. The lithographs included views such as Taylor's camp at Corpus Christi, the death of Major Ringgold at Palo Alto, and a view of Monterrey made after the fighting in the battle of September 1846. The final phase of the exhibit included other pictorial representations such as an original daguerreotype camera of the period, borrowed from the San Jacinto collection, or a selection of some dragoons found in Sam Chamberlain's original watercolors done during the northern campaign. If you've read *My Confession* or are

familiar with Sam Chamberlain then you can certainly appreciate these things. It's still one of the greatest stories or folk tales to come out of the war.

We will close on this note that we received a good deal of favorable public response to the exhibit. We noticed that many people never even heard of the Mexican War, or as has been remarked earlier, heard of a cursory mention in high school. It was pure coincidence and good luck that our project overlapped with the final stages of creating Palo Alto as a national historic site. We certainly hope that the interest shown in the Mexican War continues on both sides of the border, particularly in this region where the war began, and that the good relations that have prevailed between our two countries will continue and possibly maybe lay the groundwork for some sort of large joint exhibition project in the future in which collections from both sides could be brought together in one place. It would certainly be a knockout. We will be here through the lunch hour. We had a tight schedule down here. Two of us are down here from the museum.

If anyone has any questions or would like to talk further, certainly please feel free to do so. Many of the titles on the war that were mentioned or that have been published in recent years are available through our museum. Thank you.

DR. ZAVALETA: Thank you. In the interest of time, our next presenter is Eric Ratliff from the University of Texas at Austin, who will present on "Grave Interpretations: Information From a Mass Burial at Reşaca de la Palma," which was just mentioned in Tom's discussion. Everybody knows of the battle from the next day.

This presentation holds great interest for me because as a high school student and college student Eric worked on the construction crew of the Palo Verde subdivision in Brownsville, Texas. During that construction work, we began to discover to burial remains. And now Eric has gone on to study physical anthropology at the University of Texas. So, Eric, welcome.

ERIC RATLIFF: My report, today, focuses on events which took place at Resaca de la Palma on May 9, 1846, the day after the hostilities at Palo Alto. This information is important to this weekend's dedication of the Palo Alto Battlefield for several reasons. One, the battles were very close in time and geographic location. Two, the outcomes were similar. And three, the archaeological site of Resaca de la Palma, formally designated as 41-CF-3, represents the lives of those who fought in the two battles; not only from the material artifacts that were uncovered, but also in the human remains that still have their individual stories to tell. Presented here are brief summaries of the battle, the archaeological excavations, and the skeletal remains. Afterward, I will show how this information can be used to reconstruct not only the battle, but also the people who were a part of it.

After the battle on the plains of Palo Alto, General Mariano Arista pulled the Mexican Army south into the thick chaparral before daybreak on May 9, 1846. With reinforcements from Mexico, his forces numbered between five and six thousand at Resaca de la Palma. The American army of approximately twenty-two hundred soldiers followed to prevent them from regrouping and mounting a counter-attack. Initially, General Zachary Taylor sent small parties into the thick brush to find the enemy, as he waited for the long wagon train to catch up. After all the troops were assembled at four o'clock in the afternoon, the American artillery continued along the road southward, with infantry on either side, heading toward the Mexican Army positioned in the dry river

bed. The American attack focused on the western flank, and the Mexican artillery set up on either side of the road. Fighting was fierce and the chaparral precluded an organized attack or defense. Assaults by the American cavalry silenced the Mexican artillery batteries and the Mexican troops pulled back in disarray. Arista's camp was captured and the town of Matamoros was soon filled with wounded Mexican soldiers. Many eyewitness accounts tell of the human destruction at Resaca de la Palma. Official reports describe two hundred and sixty-two Mexican dead on the battlefield, while noting that many more died while trying to cross the Río Grande. This number probably represents the bodies that U.S. soldiers buried the day following the battle. There are other reports following the war which described the graves of the fallen soldiers. On March 18, 1848, Helen Chapman passed through the Resaca de la Palma area noting, "One of the long beautiful green vistas...pointed out by Major Scott as the scene of the deadliest fighting. As we rode down to the spot, all along in relief against the green grass, were the blackened boned of horses and men, fragments of shoes, of woolen cloth, of harness, of capes, fertile proofs of a deadly encounter. They are mostly Mexicans who fell in that line and there they remained unburied, some were buried by our soldiers and some remained where they fell." For a hundred and twenty-one years, the battlefield was silent.

On April 1, 1967, during construction of a housing project in north Brownsville, human remains were uncovered by heavy machinery. Three graduate students from the University of Texas at Austin came down and excavated the site over the next six days. This was only one of the mass graves in the area, but the contractor decided to ignore the others after seeing how long the archeological process took and covered them over. Looting at the site, which is right here on the map and today in someone's backyard, was also a problem and a number of skulls were taken by interested locals. A total of thirty separate burials were excavated, along with many commingled remains. Skeletal material and artifacts were then transported to the University of Texas and examined by other archaeologists and physical anthropologists, but no report developed from these preliminary results.

In early 1992, while reviewing other skeletal pathology studies at the Texas Archaeological Research Laboratories in Austin, I came across the sets of remains from Resaca de la Palma, and noted that they had not been studied in over twenty years. What follows is a description of my methods of analysis and what I have learned from the soldiers of Resaca de la Palma. To begin my analysis, I examined each of the individual burials according to standard forensic procedure, noting the age and sex of individuals, preparing an inventory of remains, and describing any pathologies or abnormalities noted in the skeleton. Most of the burials are incomplete, consisting of only several bones or a cranium. Only six skeletons could be considered a complete individual. Many of the burials are represented only by legs and/or arms. These remains are well preserved and not fragmented, so it is unlikely that they were dismembered by artillery fire during the battle. Most of the individuals are males who were between the age of twenty and forty years of age at the time of their deaths. There are several unusual aspects of this skeletal sample considering it comes from a battle site.

First, is the number of females. There are at least two, possibly four, remains of women that were uncovered in this mass grave of twenty-eight individuals. Modern biases toward women in combat have made this discovery difficult for many to accept, but as noted by Elizabeth Salas in her book, *Soldaderas in the Mexican Military*, women were an integral part of the Mexican army. In addition to the traditional roles associated with camp maintenance, women also participated in battle.

Another interesting feature is the lack of trauma resulting from the battle. One tibia, the lower leg, shows a large projectile, about twenty-one millimeters across, embedded near the knee. And another individual has a cut mark, probably on a sword, on the back part of the humerus, most likely as a result of this position. In another case, a large projectile was found in the torso area of an individual. Personal accounts from the battle note that firearms were not particularly useful because of the dense chaparral undergrowth, but it is difficult to imagine such violent deaths that do not leave some evidence in the skeletal remains. No other cut marks or fractures were found that could have been the result of lethal injuries.

In addition to the primary burials excavated as distinct features, there were hundreds of bones that were not identified with any of the primary burials. Trying to associate the commingled remains with the primary burial was a frustrating exercise. There are no excavation notes, few photographs, and only one weathered drawing which shows the position of the remains as they were excavated. With this drawing and a large space in the laboratory, the site measured approximately fourteen by ten feet, I was able to lay out the burials in the position they had been found during excavation. For two weeks, I attempted to match some of the unassociated remains with the primary burials, and only had a limited success. Construction machinery disturbed only a small portion of the site, so the disarray of the burials must have taken place at the time of burial or shortly thereafter. Again, Helen Chapman in 1848, describes another mass grave near the spot where Arista's camp had stood during the battle, "Further on...we came to a very beautiful spot, a large green open space which was the camping ground of General Arista where all his baggage and booty was found. On the opposite side of the road are two large circular places where the turf has been turned up and there lie the bodies of those who fell upon the field. Two large pits were dug and into were thrown Americans and Mexicans. On the camping ground of Arista, are three or four graves, two of sergeants and two, I believe, of officers whose bodies have since been removed." The passage indicates that remains of specific individuals had been removed after their initial interment following the battle. This is not unusual, as the Custer Battlefield Site at Little Bighorn was also subject to subsequent reconnaissance expeditions to take the remains of fallen soldiers to their families. This may explain the jumbled and incomplete nature of the skeletons in the mass grave.

Many artifacts were found along with the remains, although the most distinctive items were not part of the archaeological investigation. A belt buckle from the Mexican Tenth infantry was found by one of the construction workers and fortunately photographed before removed from the area. Unfortunately, I don't have that photograph. Many more were certainly lost to looting during the nights at the site. Another important find was a hunting horn emblem from the headgear of a soldier in the Fourth infantry. Other items from the equipment of the regular army include scabbard tips and several types of metal buttons.

Captain William S. Henry noted that three captains and four lieutenants from the Mexican army were buried at the battle site. Officers were certainly well-equipped, but many of the recruits did not have a similar experience. Most of the artifacts are from the clothing of irregular troops, generally Indians from the surrounding area. Approximately 80% of all artifacts are buttons made from animal bone, with several different styles reflecting individual artistry. Some fragments of cloth were also preserved and in the neck area of many individuals, small metal hooks and clasps were found. Clothing could have been looted from the bodies, particularly those of the officers, but I believe this

evidence gives us an accurate representation of the Mexican army at this battle, where the poorly equipped and trained locals suffered the greatest losses. Much of the army was conscripted "by sending out recruiting detachments to capture Indian men for service."

While the officers and regular soldiers wore splendid costumes and were provisioned well, the *presidiales* and other irregular soldiers lived under poor conditions. Life for many of these people was physically demanding, as observed in the skeletal remains. There is evidence of arthritis, pulled tendons and ligaments, and other indicators seen in other populations from stressful environments. The skeletons exhibit numerous traumatic incidents which occurred many months, or even years, before these people died on the battlefield, such as fractured ribs, collapsed vertebrae, backbones, or broken and fused fingers. There are also a large number of foot injuries in this sample, comparable to other farming populations who walk over uneven ground without shoes, and also due to problems with large, hoofed animals stepping on their feet.

In addition to describing the lives of those who participated in this battle, we can also use this site to reconstruct the battlefield. Artifacts found indicate the presence of the members of the Fourth and Tenth infantries, along with many irregular soldiers. As noted by several authors, the Tenth infantry was located along the front line just east of the road and the Fourth infantry made up the second line of defense, with irregulars following behind Arista's camp. During the battle, forces on the western side shifted over toward the road. This is the area where many of the graves were noted as having been dug and noted by Helen Chapman near Arista's camp. Convergence at Arista's tent is apparent and I would assume that this grave is one which Helen Chapman saw during her travels in 1848. There is even an account of some Mexican soldiers killed at Palo Alto, but buried at Resaca de la Palma. While this is not the grave on which I am reporting, it is possible that other individuals were interred at Resaca de la Palma who didn't necessarily take part in the battle.

This work is currently in progress. A final report on skeletal remains will be finished later this month, but there is still much more to do with the artifacts and archival research before this story can be completed. Thank you.

DR. ZAVALETA: Thank you very much, Eric. It took twenty years, but I'm glad somebody came along to look at the remains.

We'll next hear from Pedro Santoni from California State University at San Bernadino who will speak about the "Bulwark of Independence or Haven of the Mob?: The Civic Militia of Mexico between 1846 and 1848." Pedro.

DR. PEDRO SANTONI: Actually, I'm going to pull a little switcharoo on you. I hope you won't mind. The militia paper is a bit on the long side. Since I'm going to be talking tonight, what I'd like to do is give a brief overview of something that I've been working on for the past ten years, my dissertation. I began it in 1983, and it's just about ready to be submitted to a publisher in book form. What I'm trying to do in my dissertation which I've titled "Militant Patriots: The Radical Federalists of Mexico, 1845-1848," is to place the activities of Valentín Gómez Farías and the radical federalists in perspective. Despite the war's significance, relatively little has been written about what transpired in political and social terms in Mexico in the mid 1840s. Today, we have with us David Pletcher whose work on this period, *The Diplomacy of Annexation*, is an excellent book. In 1977 he wrote that the widest gap in Mexico War history that remains to be filled by up-to-date scholarship is that of Mexican history during the war. Although there are a

number of recent books, articles, and dissertations that have shed some light on this topic, for the most part the political intrigue and the party battles remain obscure topics. So basically what I'm trying to do in my book is to examine the activities, successes, and failures of Valentín Gómez Farías and the radical federalists during the Mexican War.

Part of the problem with this gap or lack of writing has to do with the very complex nature of nineteenth-century Mexican politics. In very broad terms, we can define the political spectrum in early republican Mexico as being divided into three major parties: radicals, moderates, and conservatives. But, on the other hand, the members of these parties at times often shared similar principles. At the same time, these groups were often plagued by interfactional conflicts. As a result, even a very astute observer of Mexican politics at this time, Guillermo Prieto, hesitated to delineate the precise makeup and the goals of the radical federalists during the war with the United States. In 1971, about one hundred and fifty years later, in a book called *North America Divided*, Seymour Conner wrote that Mexico's wartime political panorama was "really impossible to analyze because it turned like a kaleidoscope into different patterns on a daily basis." However, in a recent book by Drexel University's Donald F. Stevens, he has tried to demystify the wartime political panorama. Dr. Steven's has identified five areas: state organization, methods of social control, state power and economic intervention, church-state relations, and the value of the colonial experience to separate the issue that distinguished these three factions.

Radical federalists in general terms favored a republican form of government and a powerful interventionist state. They believed that such a state would promote economic growth and limit the privileges, in political and economic terms, of the Catholic Church. The radical federalists also wanted to break the regular army's control over politics by establishing a volunteer civic militia and they looked to the urban masses as a source of support for their agenda.

I've gone beyond that. I've taken some of Dr. Steven's analysis, but I've added that socio-economic factors or different ideologies don't always adequately explain the disagreement between the radical federalists and their rivals, especially in the years 1845 to 1848. During this time, personal jealousies proved to be just as important in dividing Mexican politicians. In many instances where the radical federalists' rivals would issue a law or an initiative, the radical federalists would say, "Well we're not going to let you have it." Then their rivals would come back and say, "We're not going to let you play with our ball." It was similar to the big bully who, if he doesn't play first base or pitch, he'll take his ball and bat and go home and nobody gets to play. So to a degree there's a sort of rivalry that undermines efforts to prepare a strong resistance against the United States.

There are a number of works that make reference to the radical federalists, yet there's a lot that needs to be analyzed about their social composition, ideology, and activities. For instance, there are a number of books written about the Mexican newspapers during this time, including one by Jesus Velasco. They are very valuable because they study the arguments that a number of Mexico's political groups used to justify war against the United States. What I'm trying to do is go beyond some of these books, and try to link the arguments that were presented in the press to see how these arguments and ideas undermined the different governments in Mexico.

There are a number of biographies about Gómez Farías and Santa Anna, but Gómez Farías' biographers have not explained the reasons that led him to form a number

of alliances with many prominent army leaders during the time of the war. This is important because Gómez Farías on the one hand is trying to raise a civic militia which threatens the army, yet at the same time, he is looking to the army for support. So, Gómez Farías was in a sort of Catch-22 situation.

At the same time, those who have studied Santa Anna highlight his relations with several United States personalities. They highlight his military leadership, but they don't spell out the reasons for the publicity that characterized his relations with both the radical federalists and their rivals during the war. Santa Anna's trickery, Santa Anna's deception, became especially pronounced after he came back to Mexico in August of 1846. He returned with the help of Gómez Farías, yet eventually Santa Anna turned around and helped topple Gomez Farías in the spring of 1847.

To conclude very briefly, Gómez Farías and the radical federalists, between 1845 and 1848, had two major goals: they wanted to reconquer Texas and they believed that a return to federalism under the 1824 constitution would allow Mexico to take its place among the world's leading nations. Yet a number of historians have cast doubt on Gómez Farías's policies, as well as on his organizational talents.

Charles Hale has written that the resurgence of federalism at the moment that the war began is ironic because the need for effective defense against invasion has been a classic argument in favor of centralization. Gene Brack has noted that a significant number of Mexican politicians and army leaders realized the country's military weaknesses and scarcely hungered for war against the United States. Donovan Oliff of Auburn University has stated that Gómez Farías was not an effective, practical leader, and Cecil Robinson has written that Gómez Farías tended toward the abstract and never quite comprehended the weaknesses of the general run of humanity. While these criticisms are somewhat valid, I think they should be placed in perspective.

Federalism was a real force during much of the nineteenth century in Mexico, and the failure of the centralist constitutions in the mid-1830s and early 1840s made federalism a viable alternative again in 1845. It should also be remembered that the Mexican leaders could not relinquish their claims to Texas for a number of reasons, such as a sense of honor, of pride, and a multitude of political considerations, and while Gómez Farías' expectations may have been unrealistic, his determination to pursue these policies should be commended in light of the hostile political and economic environment in which he had to offer it.

His original goals may have been unattainable, but I don't think that it's too far fetched to suggest that he would have been able to organize a more viable, a more energetic resistance to the United States if domestic support had been more forthcoming.

So, rather than judge Gómez Farías and the radical federalists as failures because they did not reach their goals, I think in the future, Gómez Farías and his associates should be measured against the obstacles that they encountered at a time of war and domestic chaos.

DR. ZAVALETA: Very, very nice, thank you. Well done. Mr. Santoni and an international panel of experts will be speaking this evening in Matamoros and then again here tomorrow morning.

We are very fortunate, now at this time, to hear from Christopher Marvel with the National Park Service, Denver Service Center, who is the planning team captain for the General Management Plan and the Concept Plan in interpretive perspectives for the Palo Alto Battlefield Center. Christopher.

CHRISTOPHER MARVEL: That's quite a mouthful. I think it's real important that we realize how special it is to plan for a National Park. There are many cultural things in the United States, all over the country, that we recognize through national monuments and all of the other things that states recognize, but once something becomes or is elevated to national park status, it receives a visible recognition of a very, very high level of importance to this country. You all are aware that on June 23, 1992, President Bush signed the Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site Act which established the 3,400 acre site and we've been working on our general management plan for about a year now. We've involved some people from Mexico and the last year, of course, to put it in Carlos Rugerio's words it was *muy importante* when he recognized how important a project this really is. It really is a credit to Brownsville that we have Palo Alto and all the people that have worked on it. It's going to be a project that's very important for Mexico and the United States and I feel very privileged and fortunate to work on a project of the caliber of Palo Alto. I hope that we can create something that is not just a park but also something that serves the interests of the blend of cultures that we have in this area, something that recognizes the values of the United States and Mexico. I think that it is appropriate before I speak to you a little bit about planning for a National Park, that I give you a little idea of what the National Park Service is about because it has a very, very special mission. It's different than other agencies in the federal government. If I can get my slides. Am I going forwards or backwards here? There we go. Whoops! I knew this was going to happen. Can we take a moment and could I just turn my slides around? Let's make sure we have them in right.

DR. ZAVALETA: In the interest of time we'll switch speakers in order to give Chris a chance to get the slides straight. It's not his fault. They've been obviously tampered with by international agents of foreign powers, so to remain unnamed. So, at this time if I could ask Kevin Young...Kevin was here...Did he step out? He stepped out someplace. Why is my session breaking down? Is this a reflection upon my career?

Now we will have Kevin Young who is always ready and on the spot. He's a historian from San Antonio who will speak to us about "Documenting *el Soldado Mexicano*: 1835 to 1848." Kevin.

KEVIN YOUNG: Boy, that's getting caught the bad way. I had initially prepared a much longer paper which I'm going to kind of put to the side on the subject and instead work a little off some notes.

Being very much involved in the Texas War for Independence period, this is a subject matter that has kind of plagued me and some of my colleagues and fellows over the last twenty years now. In the last six years what got me really fired on the subject of trying to ascertain and help document the Mexican *soldado* and the Mexican Army aspects of this entire period from 1835 to 1848 was a night in San Antonio.

I worked as the historical advisor on a film called "Alamo: The Price of Freedom" and when we opened that film at the San Antonio IMAX, we had some concerned individuals outside our front door with protest placards and stuff who were concerned that we were not representing the Tejano, that's the Hispanics from Texas who were fighting for the Texans.

One of the protesters, who is a fairly well known academic in the San Antonio area, was reading a list of the Tejano heroes of the Alamo and said "these men have been neglected," and about that point, the light came on and I said, "You know, no one

through this whole thing has even issued anything about the other Hispanic participants in the battle of the Alamo: the guys in the Toluca, San Luís, and Zapadores battalions; the six hundred men who died on the morning of March 6, 1836 for the honor of the Republic of Mexico while taking the Alamo from that band of North American barbarians inside, to coin a phrase. That really motivated this thing along.

Sometimes in this course of this research, you get those golden moments where you think everything's going well and you're really on top of this and then reality comes and slaps you on the side of the face. We had a crowd coming out from the showing of the film, "The Price of Freedom," and one gentleman was incensed. Somebody pointed to me and said "there's the historian go talk to him," and the guy said, "I don't believe that film," and I said, "Well, what's the problem, sir?" and he goes, "You actually show one Mexican soldier killing one Texan and everybody knows that it took twenty Mexicans to kill one Texan." At which point had I had a Brown Bess musket I would've hit him over the head.

That's part of the problem. The Mexican soldier is the overlooked, the faceless participant in the struggle for the Southwest and/or the defense of the Southwest from 1835 to 1848. There is a lot of misconception about the men who formed up the Mexican Army. A lot of it has to do with popular-culture images. A lot of it has to do with the lack of respect, and a lot of it has to do with a lack of research.

When you delve into trying to document the Mexican *soldado*, you really are limited in published works, and I think that many of the people here have already run into that problem. It basically, in my viewpoint, runs down to two gentlemen. Unfortunately, they're both dead. General Miguel Sánchez Lamego and Joseph Hefter. Sanchez Lamego was an author of several historical articles and booklets on this period in Mexican military history including an excellent history of the Zapadores battalion in 1949. Two of his best works, the one on the Zacatecas campaign in 1835 and the second on the siege of the Alamo from the Mexican point of view, are published in English and are still available in research libraries on this side of the Río Bravo. But almost all of the research falls really to one individual and that's Joseph Hefter, who was an American-German mining engineer living in Mexico and destined to become the historian of the Mexican *soldado* of the nineteenth century. Hefter published a small booklet in 1957 called *El Soldado Mexicano*, which is today a highly collectable reference on the Mexican army in the Texas War for Independence and Mexican War periods. Hefter's books were based on available information at the time and are far from being complete as the author openly admits in his introduction. Hefter's death left the field wide open and his tiny history remains the published source on the Mexican *soldado*.

I will try to generalize a little bit about the Mexican *soldado* and these are generalizations because again the research is still very much lacking. The average Mexican *soldado* of this period was a conscript. Mexico employed conscription as its principal mean of recruitment. Mexico is not alone in this. Most of the European countries are doing conscription. One reason it gets so disdained from particularly American viewers is that the United States is decidedly against conscription as the riots during the American Civil War would show later on.

The Mexican system worked by lottery that was held every October. The recruits were trained at San Luís Potosí or Mexico City. Now there's a long list of professions that existed to exclude many from the draft and that usually meant that the lower classes ended up in the ranks. A system of substitutes did exist for those who could afford to hire a replacement in case he got drafted. Volunteers in the Mexican Army served for

eight years, conscripts served for ten. Recruits were usually no less than sixty inches tall which placed them between five feet, four inches and five feet, eight inches in height, and additional research can be done. Details such as religion, age, marital status, trade, color of hair, eyes, and skin color can also be surveyed in their military archives. The army was racially mixed. Most *soldados* were of some degree of Indian blood. There's a lot of references, of course, to the Mexican army going out and grabbing Indians out of the fields.

There's a great problem in Texas studies of the Texas War for Independence. One of the battalions used by General José Urrea included a garrison of troops primarily recruited in the Maya districts in Yucatan. You will now read in several secondary accounts of the Texas Revolution that Santa Anna's army at the Alamo consisted primarily of Mayan-Indian recruits. Well, they weren't there. As a matter of fact, they were not very good at being infantrymen. Urrea didn't like them. He almost lost the battle of Refugio because of the fact that they couldn't carry an assault against the mission and eventually he just posted them as guards. This goes a long way in showing some of the problems in the stereotypes, particularly from the American historians, toward the Mexican army. In contrast to this, there was at least one "pure" unit, the active commerce regiment of Mexico, whose officer corps and ranks were drawn from the professional community as volunteers, and contributed to the unit fund which paid for weapons and uniforms.

Non-Mexican *soldados* were an exception. Excluding the San Patricio battalion during the 1846 war, there were no masses of Europeans or Americans in the ranks. By the way, Mexican *soldados* were paid a grand total of sixteen pesos per thirty day month and the line company or the standard soldier was paid fifteen pesos. Primarily his pay paid for everything, including his food, so that didn't leave much money to send home to the family. Now the officer corps was alarmingly different than the rank and file. Most of the senior officers were political chieftains and their subordinates less than well-trained and disciplined. One British officer found them "totally ignorant of their duty."

In 1833, Mexico had established a military academy that graduated only one hundred cadets every three years. Which means by the time of the Mexican War the professionally-trained corps were sublieutenants in the ranks, they were not up into the commanding companies yet or into the senior structure. In many cases the junior officers attempted to save the course of a battle while senior officers simply left the fighting.

Now one lagging tradition is that the Mexican army was overpopulated by foreign officers, even to the ridiculous statement that former Napoleonic marshals had been imported to help recruit or recreate officers for the Napoleon of the West, as Santa Anna was called. A survey of the senior officer corps does not support this. Many of the so-called foreigners were old veterans of the War for Independence. What is important is the social and political issues here. Despite their loyalty to the Mexican republic for most of their careers, many of the non-Mexican-born officers were considered privateers even by their fellows. Their involvements in various political uprisings did not help alter this perception. The fact that five out of the nine senior officers in the 1836 Mexican Army of Operation were foreign born, does not compare favorably to the figure that all eleven field battalion commanders were natives.

Between 1835 and 1846, the Mexican Army underwent two organizational changes. Prior to the Zacatecas campaign of May 1835, the standing or the *permanente* national army was organized from numerical battalions to ones named in honor of the heroes of the Wars for Independence. The national guard or *activo* regiments were simply

organized into battalions. Owing to the 1833-1834 civil wars, both *activo* and *permanente* battalions could be considered veterans. Mexican battalions were organized into eight companies consisting of some eighty *soldados* each. Rarely were the companies of the battalions at full strength. Usually the company stayed at between thirty-four to forty-four *soldados*. One company was designated as *ligero* or light, while the second was designated as grenadiers. The third was the rifle company which was used as flankers while the grenadiers were made up from the picked veterans and generally used as a reserve. The other six companies were the line or the center companies and did the bulk of the battalion's fighting. The structure for this army is derived from the Spanish and it actually goes beyond that. It is derived from the Anglo-Portuguese-Spanish army formed by the Duke of Wellington to drive the French out of Spain and the peninsula during the Napoleonic wars. It is not based on the French Army, rather the British system.

In 1839, the army was reorganized again. Two battalions, one drawn from the permanent and the other from the *activos* formed a new numerical line infantry regiment. The local militia units were formed into battalions who, along with coastal guards, were designated to serve as garrison troops. Most of them, nevertheless, saw considerable action as *activo* troops. In 1841, they created light infantry units, or regiments, and these were designed to work as advanced skirmish troops. As the pressures of campaign losses mounted, the light infantry found itself fighting as regular infantry. The Mexican army fought the 1846-1848 war under this system.

The line companies were armed with various patterns of British Brown Bess muskets, a weapon which had seen services before the American Revolution. The majority of the arms used by the Mexican ranks were the East India pattern musket used during the Napoleonic Wars. It shot accurately a .75 caliber round ball about sixty yards. An eighteen inch tri-blade bayonet could be fixed to the weapon. The Mexican light infantry and rifle companies were generally armed with the British Baker rifle, a relic also of the Napoleonic Wars. The Baker fired a .61 caliber rifle roundball about two to three hundred yards. A rather long sword bayonet could be attached to the side of the barrel. Despite its age, the Baker was still an excellent weapon. Mexican gunpowder was considered poor by most armies' standards, being rather high in sulfur content. Contemporary accounts state the Mexican cartridges were often overcharged to give the weapon more punch. The result would be an intimidating flash at the face and a considerable kick. American and Texan accounts claim that often Mexican troops fired from the hip, perhaps in an effort to reduce the discomfort of the discharging weapon. One Texan remembered that he was amazed that a Mexican sergeant took nearly pointblank range at him only to drop the weapon to his side and fire from the hip, causing the shot to go high, much to the gratification of the surviving Texan.

On the other side of the coin, Mexican riflemen were apparently very good shots, as Texans at the 1835 battle of Béjar could attest. There's a record of a de la Garza who hit Texan commander Ben Milam, who apparently was on the run from across the San Antonio River with a shot from his Baker rifle.

Another supply problem was the occasional issue of the wrong ammunition. Mexican troops were certainly not alone in this ordinance problem, it happened to American troops as well, but was little comfort to the light infantry regiments issued Brown Bess ammunition for their Baker rifles as happened at one battle. One area where the Mexican seemed to have great advantage was the cavalry. We can go on about horse culture differences but I won't get into it.

The Mexican regular cavalry units were supplemented by irregular auxiliaries, primarily ranchers. Arms for the cavalry consisted of a wide variety of *escopetas*, short barreled carbines, swords, ropes, and of course, the lance. The latter weapon was the deadliest, most reliable the cavalry soldier could carry. In several instances it almost proved fatal to the Americans armed with simple shot pistols and swords.

It is often overlooked that the first skirmish of the Mexican War was a Mexican victory and one attained by the excellence of the Mexican cavalry. Texans had a healthy respect for Mexican cavalry and worked to develop a system of tactics to defeat it. Most of Mexico's cavalry could be considered as light; small men on small horses. And only one cavalry regiment a division unit was formed in the 1840s. They performed swift and almost decisive service in the April 20th skirmish at San Jacinto. Only at the siege of the Alamo where frontier presidio companies fought as infantry and at San Jacinto on April 21st where the cavalry found themselves unsaddled and walking their horses to water did the Texans ever have any success over the Mexican cavalry. Some of the success of Mexican cavalry in the field could be credited to a series of very capable field commanders, including José Urrea.

I could get into the debate about Mexican uniforms but that could probably take up an entire session. Let me just say this quickly. Mexican uniforms were not French. One fellow at a lecture at an SMU talk got up and said, "Oh yes, the Mexican Army bought all of their gear directly from France," meaning their uniforms and accouterments. First of all, Mexican uniforms from any period don't exist in the French service. They're actually based on the Spanish uniforms and they were locally produced as the regulations and invoicing shows. The accouterments were also locally produced. One way we know this, besides invoicing, is that the French cartridge box is for a .69 caliber musket and the Mexicans were using .75 caliber muskets. A Mexican cartridge won't fit in a French cartridge box. There's also a tendency to want to use the 1828 drawings done by an Italian as representative of the Mexican army. These are the ones that you see in every movie about the Texan campaign, except "Alamo: The Price of Freedom." I'm talking about the tall shako with the bull's-eye on top, apparently so the Texans can aim better, and the high wings on the shoulders. Those, according to Hefter's research, are not the uniforms of the Texas or Mexican War period.

I'll try to wrap this up briefly. There's a lot of work to be done on the Mexican soldier. We got into some of the problems earlier. If there is anyone out there that knows of anybody, particularly in the Mexican military, that is interested in helping to document *el soldado mexicano*, give him my name. I'd love to talk to him—take him out to dinner or anything. We need this research. Not only for Texas studies, but for United States studies and Mexican studies, as well. Hopefully the Palo Alto National Battlefield's creation and its interpretive goal, which is outstanding, is going to open up a whole new area to allow studies of this type to be done. I also hope, in one passing comment, that once Palo Alto becomes a reality as a land-based park and the research is done up at UT-Austin, that those thirty-eight remains of Mexican *soldados* can quit being the MIAs of the Mexican War and be reinterred with full military honors and I'll talk to anybody afterwards that's got a chance. It's time for lunch, I think. Thank you.

DR. ZAVALETA: Thank you very much, Kevin. Chris will give his presentation and show us his slides during the lunch hour. That way we will not impose on Dr. Sánchez's program this afternoon. So, thank you very much for a very, very successful morning session. Let's have some lunch.

[Break]

DR. ZAVALETA: Let's maximize the opportunity to hear once again from Chris Marvel of the National Park Service, remembering that he is the Planning Team Captain for the development of the interpretive plan and perspectives for the Palo Alto Center. Chris.

CHRISTOPHER MARVEL: Thank you and I have my slides now put together properly. I would like you to consider what I was saying before about planning for a National Park being very special and how important it is for all of us to realize that Palo Alto can be a park or it can be a park in terms of the way that we would go about developing it and getting the participation of all of the necessary interests in doing that. What I'm going to try to do today is give you an overview on Park Service planning and also, before I do that, give you an idea of really what is the National Park System and how it looks at things, how the logic for planning is derived for one of our units.

The National Park Service originally dates back to 1916 and it was established for two reasons: one is to conserve resources and two is to provide use. When we say something like use, we're not talking about just using a piece of land, we're talking about giving something back to somebody who's coming there. We're talking about interaction with particular resources and giving people what we call visitor experience. Of course in the National Park system, this is the Organic Act. The other piece of information that you ought to bear in mind is that each park that is set up in the National Park system has its own specific piece of enabling legislation which sets about its own purpose. This is a sunny afternoon at Smith's Point on Long Island. This is not what we consider use. This is not visitor experience. This is a crowded condition and is the type of thing that we would hope to avoid in terms of interaction between people in someplace like Palo Alto.

We want people to have the necessary experience to come away with something. Really what the National Park Service represents is the nation's national natural and cultural heritage. We are keepers of that heritage. This is a picture of the Capital Building. This is in the National Park system. It gives you an idea of the heritage that we have.

National Parks have a great diversity of units. We have everything in them. I'll just go over a few of the things that we have in our system and give you some examples of what's in the National Park system. Of course we have national parks which contain a diversity of nationally significant resources that are spacious and encompass a large area of land and water areas, and we have national monuments that are intended to preserve at least one of those nationally significant resources. They're usually a little bit smaller and lack the diversity that a national park would have. We have national recreation areas which are lands and waters that are set aside primarily for recreational use. Generally these areas possess resources that are well above the ordinary quality of other recreation areas. We have recreation areas in this country that are managed by the Forest Service and the BLM, but if they are in the National Park system, as a national recreation area, they usually have a tremendous amount of diversity. I'll give you some examples, this is the Grand Canyon. This is Acadia in Maine. This is another shot of Acadia which also has some historic aspects to it. This is Rainbow Bridge down in southern Utah, it's also connected to Glen Canyon, which gives you an idea of what I'm talking about. The purpose of this particular piece of land is that it has the largest natural bridge in the world. It's about a one hundred and forty acre site. It's a national

monument. This is the Ozark and it's a national recreation area. This is Cape Cod, a national seashore. We also have national historic sites and national battlefields, like we have at Palo Alto, and they usually commemorate prehistoric and historical events of national significance. We have national monuments, which are primarily commemorative and we also have national parkways. We also have some things called affiliates. There are about thirteen affiliate units of the National Park System in the United States. This is Fort McHenry. I'll give you an example of some of the historic sites: Fort Stanwick, these are all in the east. This is Earthworks at the battle of Yorktown. This is actually a battlefield, this is Morristown, a visitor's center there. Of course, it's designed fairly. You know that this is the Lincoln Memorial, some of you may well be familiar with that, but all of these emulate the image of heritage in this country, whether it is natural or cultural. This happens to be the International Peace Garden. This is another. It's an international park on which I happened to work on the general management plan. It's in North Dakota. Here's another shot of it. The clock towers there commemorate the longest unfortified border between two countries, the United States and Canada. It is a National Park Service affiliate run by a private corporation, but is managed under the mandates of the Service. Here's another shot of the clock towers.

One of the things that we do first in planning for a national park, any unit of the Park Service, is that we look at it from the standpoint of what we call park purpose. We basically look at it and ask ourselves as a team, "Why was this area established as a national park? Why did Congress pass the legislation?" If you go back to what I said before, we have an Organic Act and we have the enabling legislation for each park. Why did Congress put this together? Why do the people of the United States feel it merited the importance to become a national park? We also look at what we call park significance, which relates to what we call visitor experience, getting back to what makes this area special and why the area is important to our natural and cultural heritage. That basically identifies the things that we want people to take away with them. When they come to visit a national park, we want them to take something away from that park in terms of an experience.

Of course, this is the legislation for Palo Alto. I don't know if you can read it, but it's fairly broad. I'll just read these two paragraphs. It sets kind of the logic that the planning team is dealing with. "In order to preserve for the education, benefit, and inspiration of present and future generations, the nationally significant site of the first battle of the Mexican-American War and to provide for its interpretation in such matter and to portray the battle and the Mexican-American War in its related political, diplomatic, military, and social causes and consequences, there is hereby established the Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site in the state of Texas." Number one for the battle, number two for the whole of the Mexican-American War. It's amazing to me that it took one hundred and forty years for this country to have a representative sample in the park system for the Mexican-American War. We have no other unit in the park system that deals with the Mexican-American War. This is the only one.

The legislation also says "in furtherance of the purposes for this act, the Secretary is authorized to enter into cooperative agreements with the United States of Mexico and other owners of Mexican-American War properties within the United States of America for the purposes of conducting joint research and interpretive planning for the historic site and related Mexican-American War sites further defines interpretive information and programs shall reflect the historical data and perspectives of both countries and the series of events associated with the Mexican-American War." So very important words.

In planning for a national park, of course, we are engaged in a general management planning process. This is mandated under the National Environmental Policy Act. We are doing an environmental impact statement for this. There are three steps to the typical planning process. First, we identify the problems that need to be solved, then we choose solutions or construct alternatives to those, and finally we choose the best one. Then we go through a process of issue identification which calls for really two things that use our staff. After an internal process, we go out to the public and ask them what the issues are. What are the concerns? What does the plan basically need to address for planning? We have data collection which we've been undergoing for about nine months now, we develop alternatives in response to the issues, select a preferred alternative, come out with a draft plan, and then a final plan, and we document that with a record of decision. This normally takes about two and a half to three years.

In general, the management principles that engage National Parks can be broken down into three categories: for natural areas, as I said, we deal with the natural and cultural heritages, for natural areas, for recreation areas, and for historic areas and natural areas. The principles basically represent the finest examples of our nation's lands and waters; features that are scenic, scientific, educational, and inspirational. Natural area management also strives to preserve resources unimpaired thus providing for diversified use and enjoyment by people. Developments are limited to minimum necessities and appropriateness so that the least damage will be done to park resources. When the National Park Service looks at resources, it looks at protection first, and then, with a little bit less of a mandate, the visitor-use aspect of it because there are always arguments of how much use do you get and how do you maintain the aspect of not impacting the resource so that it is preserved for future generations. That's a classic argument in park development.

Rather than promoting use, we want anybody who comes to an area to take away with them something that related to the country's natural and cultural heritage because that's what really we're all about.

So, this is an example of some natural areas. The Grand Tetons in southeastern Wyoming. This is Bryce Canyon in Utah. These parks all have specific enabling legislation to look at and guide planning for them. In this case, the scenic value of the canyon was the primary purpose of the park.

This is one that I happen to be working on in central Utah. It's Capital Reef National Park, it's about 250,000 acres. National parks represent a large realm of values so we have both natural and cultural things in Capital Reef. That's another picture of the historic area in Capital Reef and in the background, the area that Capital Reef was established for, which is an example of the geology of the area.

With recreation areas, of course, we are talking about outdoor recreation being the primary objective. These can be scenic, historic, scientific, and other resources that are managed to preserve their values to be compatible with the recreation mission of the area. Visitor-use emphasizes participation in outdoor recreation within the natural environment and again the physical developments are placed to support outdoor recreation pursuits while specific design and location strive to retain the resource values and a natural environmental setting. This is not what we're talking about when we are talking about recreation. This is not what we want. This just happens to be a picture of an R.V. park and of course you can see how something like that would interfere with what we would want to project in terms of visitor experience.

This is the Delaware Gap. This is the national recreation area in the East. This the Big Horn Canyon in Montana. It's a national recreation area set up in the Rocky Mountain region basically for the water and the scenic area. This is a national river. You can see recreation being used there and, of course, we have also historic areas which Palo Alto would fall under. Historic area management is directed toward maintaining and restoring the historical integrity of structures, sites, and objects significant to the commemoration and illustration of the story. You go back to the original legislation that the park was set up for to kind of figure out what that should be. Visitor-use management seeks to provide authentic presentations of historic structures, objects, and sights and the memorialization and commemoration of historic individuals or events. Physical developments are kept to the minimum necessary to serve visitors and management needs and are designed to minimize and prevent the despoliation of any historic scenes or values. In the case of Palo Alto, we would be looking very carefully at creating an environment or development that would compliment, but not derogate, any values that we considered significant to telling its story. This is the Edison Historic Site in New Jersey. Some of you may recognize this. This is Independence Hall in Philadelphia. This is actually a national historic park. This is the fort part of Morristown National Historic Park and this relates to the Minuteman National Historic Park, part of the Revolutionary War. It's Northbridge in Massachusetts and this is the Boston National Historic Park. This is the Charleston Navy Yard and I think that it is fitting for me to end on a sunset photograph and just say that I hope I've given you a little glimpse of the way the National Park Service comes at some of the logic it uses in planning for national parks and some of the ways that we go about planning. If there are any questions that I can entertain, I would.

UNKNOWN: Chris, as I understand it, because Palo Alto is basically our only Mexican War site, on this side of the border, the development of the plan in the presentation at Palo Alto will cover not just the battle, but the entire scope of the period in the war, right?

CHRISTOPHER MARVEL: That's correct, yeah. If you look at the enabling legislation which I had a slide of and you read through it, really what Congress is charged us to do is look at the whole of the Mexican-American War, the diplomatic, social, and economic courses and consequences for the whole thing, not just from the perspectives of the United States, but also from Mexico. It's just a privilege to be involved in a conference like this where I heard this gentleman over here talk about the very thing that the National Park Service would hope to do in its interpretation of things. Suggestions of the idea of this gentleman here where we're looking at the idea of peace, not war, is what we're all about. The coming together of two cultures; I think, is what makes Palo Alto so special. It gives it the potential and I am emphasizing the potential, to be a national park in the system, not at this level, but at this level. Any other questions? Thank you.

DR. ZAVALETA: Thank you so very much, Chris. The afternoon program will resume promptly in about ten minutes at one o'clock. Before that, before we turn it over to Dr. Sánchez, I think Kathy Guajardo from the Historic Brownsville Museum, would like to make an announcement regarding the trip this afternoon. Kathy?

KATHY GUAJARDO: Thank you, Tony. This is an announcement for those of you would are going with us to Saltillo Sunday afternoon. We need to fill out visas. I have the forms and I'll be here for the next three days. You must have either a passport, a birth certificate, or a voter registration card. If you do not then you have to fill out an affidavit. Is there anybody other than Dennis who is going on the trip that does not have one of those things? Just see me during the day or sometime during the next couple of days and I'll show you how to fill out your visas.

UNKNOWN: I have to make a few announcements on our trip to Matamoros. First, a reminder that we need quarters to cross the bridge; twenty-five cents to go across and fifty cents to get back, so have your quarters ready. The other thing concerns those people who need to park their vehicle. There's been arrangements made for parking your vehicles at the Municipal parking lot behind the Jacob Brown Auditorium. Now, they have asked us to put one of these behind your windshields inside your car for identification. We have these at the registration table. So, if you are planning to park there, be sure and get one of these for inside your car. That's it.
[End of session]

[Friday, May 7, 1993: Afternoon Session]
DR. JOSEPH SANCHEZ: Bien venidos a esta sesión de la tarde. Vamos a seguir prontemente con las ponencias sobre la batalla que se dió el día 8 de 1846 en Palo Alto. Como la mayoría del auditorio es de habla inglés, vamos a presentar las ponencias en inglés. Good afternoon and welcome to the afternoon session of the conference on the battle of Palo Alto. I just announced that since most of the people here are English-speaking, we will continue to present in English with a couple of exceptions who will present in Spanish.

I would like to say that this first conference is very important. It has a signal distinction in that it begins a conference which we hope has many years of longevity. Tom Carroll and his people here at Palo Alto and the people here in the community, as well as those from the museum, deserve a lot of credit for putting this conference together. Those of you who have put conferences together know that this is quite a major undertaking. It's not an easy chore to put a conference together, especially one which has been lacking for so many years such as this one on the battle of Palo Alto and the Mexican War.

We have a star-studded cast for this afternoon in which many subjects will be covered, and I will present them individually, but first I would just like to read off the names: Glen Kaye, who is from Santa Fe and I'll give him a fuller presentation as he gets up to speak, Joseph C. O'Bell, Richard Bruce Winders, Emiliano Saenz de los Reyes, Norma Morales, Donald S. Frazier, Alma Yolanda Guerrero-miller, Charles Haecker, and Alfred Richardson and Norman L. Richard. I haven't had a chance to meet all of the presenters. I assume all are here.

I see that I am first on the program. My name is Joseph Sánchez and I'll be the emcee. I was going to present in Spanish. I did give my notes in Spanish over to the translator but I'll present in English. I do want to set up a couple of house rules. One, is that each of us has about fifteen minutes, unless you want to yield some of your time to the next speaker and I will be giving you the three minute warning. I suppose I'll have to do it to myself now that I will be presenting this first paper on the Mexican view about the Army of the North in south Texas. I will read it to you, primarily because when Tom

Carroll asked me to make this presentation, a few months ago, we were talking about presenting a full paper and I came up with about forty pages which I think would be insufferable for this afternoon, but as many of you have already had lunch, I know the problem I'll have, this afternoon is keeping you all awake. So, I only have one word of advice for all of you: focus, focus, focus.

Back around 1979-1980, I had the opportunity on behalf of the National Park Service, to go down to Mexico City and look up records on the first battle of the Mexican War. At the Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional and in the Archivo General de la Nación, I found a number of records dealing with the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de Guerrero, and in these particular records were those of the Board of Inquiry which examined the principles of war. That is what my presentation is about. I don't have time to present the whole paper so I'll only present about seven or eight pages of it which will give you an idea of what the rules of war were to the Mexican army and how they followed each step along the way. I will bring you right up to the battle and then let the rest of the session take care of the battle itself as many of you have heard parts of it already. So, I'll begin.

In his *Campaña Contra Los Americanos*, that is his report on the campaign against the Americans, General Mariano Arista described his military operations in the battles at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma as well as at the American sieges of Matamoros in the opening hostilities of the Mexican War of 1846 to 1848. From *Campaña Contra Los Americanos*, operative definitions of Mexican principles of war can be gleaned. The principles of war are a checklist of basic requirements for strategists and tacticians to consider in planning their action. They vary according to the technology of the period, the culture which uses them, and the historical context in which they are cast. Nineteenth-century commanders depended, as did Arista, on certain time-honored principles of war which governed their conduct on the battlefield. The checklist used by General Mariano Arista included the use of objectives, intelligence reports, offensive action, security of forces, concentration and economy of effort, flexibility, mobility, simplicity of plan, use and choice of terrain, cooperation, morale or maintenance of morale, and administration. Arista's campaign against the Americans in south Texas offers insight into historical application of the use of the principles of war in nineteenth-century Mexican military operations.

When the Mexican Army of the North commanded by General Mariano Arista engaged the American army under General Zachary Taylor in May 1846, both had planned their operations on the assumption that their respective enemy responses were predictable. At Palo Alto, both generals planned to fire their artillery at one another at the start of the battle before ordering the troops to fix bayonets and charge across the battlefields. Instead, the valiant, but under-prepared Mexican soldiers witnessed a new tactic against which their leaders failed to respond effectively. Inadvertently, meanwhile, the Americans discovered that with the innovative use of artillery, they did not need to charge. Despite the clamor from his troops to order a charge, Taylor was content to let his artillery carry the day. Besides, the Americans were outnumbered by at least twelve hundred troops.

Meantime, at Matamoros, Mexican troops worked diligently to construct earthen defenses and to position almost their entire artillery along them. By late April, the Mexicans had amassed fifty-two hundred men and twenty-six pieces of artillery at Matamoros. On April 23 at Rancho de Soliseño immediately outside of Matamoros, Arista held a council of war. At the council, he and his senior officers studied a map of

the area which indicated the deployment of American troops at Fort Texas, Fort Polk, and Carricitos. The most recent intelligence reports on Taylor's forces were presented to the council. Arista then proposed stationing a contingent of troops on the road between the two American forts to cut their line of communication. That done, he would cross the Río Grande with more than thirty-four hundred men, lay siege to Fort Texas, where he knew Taylor was located, and then move against Fort Polk. Arista's intelligence reports indicated that the Americans had four to five days supplies at Fort Texas and would not last long under siege conditions. He hoped to force Taylor's surrender.

One method used by Mexican officers to raise the morale of their troops was to appeal to their sense of nationalism and patriotism, just as Arista had done by reading a presidential manifesto to them. Before Arista arrived at Matamoros, his second in command, General Pedro de Ampudia, published a circular on April 18, 1846, and had copies of it posted for his soldiers to read. He may even have had, as was customary, a crier read it in the plaza. Ampudia had orders read to them. Sixteen hundred men under General Anastacio Torrejón were ordered to march to an obscure place called Palo Alto and cut Taylor's line between Fort Texas and Port Isabel. They were the first to move out. Crossing the Río Grande at La Palangana on April 24, Torrejón's scouts reported about seventy *norteamericanos* camped at Carricitos. In order to secure his line of communications with Arista, he sent a small detachment to drive them out of the area. The next day, the officer of the detachment reported that after a brief skirmish the Americans had been routed. Torrejón had wisely protected his rear with that action. His men reached Palo Alto and camped there. The road was cut and his objectives were completed. Taylor was now trapped at Fort Texas, and his command appeared to be perilously spilt in two.

Two objectives were on Taylor's mind as he raced across the flats of Palo Alto. The first was to strengthen Fort Polk on Point Isabel before Arista could take it. The second was to resupply Fort Texas before the Mexican troops, which by now had crossed the Río Grande, could lay siege to it. While the Mexicans temporarily lost their initiative, Taylor at least had gained valuable time and opportunity.

As Taylor reached Point Isabel, Arista, now on the north bank of the Río Grande, marched his men to Palo Alto. Although Taylor had eluded them, Arista had still managed to split Taylor's command, but the split was to Taylor's advantage. On May 3, Arista called another council of war to assess their objectives and situation. By interposing his army at Palo Alto, Arista had seen to it that Taylor's line of communication was still cut, and at that time the siege of Fort Texas was undertaken. Thus, Arista felt his original plan of offensive action was intact. However, other factors influenced a slight change in plan. The first was that Palo Alto lacked sufficient water for his troops, the large army, and their horses, mules, and oxen. On the other hand, the Mexicans reasoned that Taylor could take a short cut to Fort Texas by marching south of Palo Alto. The prediction of Taylor's move, that he would try to reinforce and supply Fort Texas, was accurately done by Arista, but anticipating where and when Taylor would make his move proved difficult. Arista nonetheless reasoned that Taylor would attempt to assist Fort Texas soon. Accordingly, Arista pulled out to a new position, a place called Tanques de Ramireño, which had an abundance of water, and where he could watch the junction of trails to the Fort Texas-Matamoros area. He arrived there with 3,461 men on May 5, and for the next few days, he sent out his scouts in various directions to learn whether Taylor had commenced his movement.

On May 7, Mexican scouts patrolled the plain east of Palo Alto. At a water hole, they found a stray American mule and a horse, probably lost when Taylor marched to Fort Polk earlier. The next day, however, an advance guard of Americans ambushed a Mexican scouting party which escaped the trap to warn Arista that Taylor had left Fort Polk and was marching toward Palo Alto. Within an hour at mid-morning, Arista and his men marched northwesterly to block the American advance. Before leaving, he sent a recall message to Ampudia, still at the siege of Fort Texas. By a quarter past noon, Ampudia with his Fourth Regiment of Infantry, a company of sappers, a *remuda* of two hundred horses and two artillery pieces was on its way. The strategic efforts of Arista's offensive action had worked. He had been able to force a battle in terrain of his choosing. Morale among the Mexican troops was high, as was their confidence in their leader.

At high noon Taylor's scouts reported sighting the Mexican army approaching Palo Alto. Before proceeding further, the Americans stopped at the *bolsón* that held rain water to fill their canteens. Aware of the Mexican presence in the area, Taylor cautiously advanced toward Palo Alto, leaving his heavily guarded wagon train to the rear. Almost simultaneously, the two armies stepped onto Palo Alto within sight of one another. Arista's hard-riding scouts rode toward the Mexican army, announcing that Taylor's main force was approaching them on the road to Matamoros. Likewise, Taylor's scouts, surprised by the proximity of the Army of the North, raced to the American army yelling warnings not to advance. Immediately both armies formed their battle lines while the cavalry unit, under Lieutenant Jacob Blake, raced toward the deploying Mexican right flank, stopped within a few hundred yards, a few hundred feet of the Mexican artillery and turned back at great speed. Then, a silence fell over the field. The two armies, less than half a mile apart, faced each other. The mid-afternoon sun indicated it was close to two o'clock.

The Mexican army stood ready for orders to attack. Arista described in great detail the deployment of his thirty-three hundred-man battle line, which stretched nearly a mile. With full attention to security and concentration of his forces on the battlefield and with emphasis on the elements of flexibility and mobility, Arista reported, "Ours was no more than an extended...line, two men deep, without secondary lines nor reserves, nor any concentration of troops whatsoever. Our artillery was situated between the brigades and the cavalry was in two sections. The smaller cavalry unit, under Colonel Noriega, held the extreme right flank, while the other much larger unit under General Torrejón was on the left." Behind the line, Arista parked his baggage train and set up a hospital at a safe distance about 800 varas, 733 yards, and 1,500 varas, 1,375 yards, respectively, to the rear of the left flank. In expectation of the cannonade, Arista's deployment was logical. His careful avoidance of "any concentration of troops" was aimed at reducing casualties, especially if the hostile artillery would be limited in its use during the action.

Anticipating a bayonet charge, the Mexican artillery was placed between the brigades to protect the troops. The two cavalry units would be mobile and flexible in their maneuvers to thwart any American flanking movements. Colonel Noriega's cavalry on the right and General Torrejón's horse soldiers on the left would be used for either offensive or counter-offensive movements as required. Arista's tactical preparations rested mainly on the predictability of Taylor's conduct on the battlefield.

Identification of Arista's principles of war are evident in the development of his troops. Their tactical strengths and weaknesses only became evident when the innovative

"flying artillery" came into play. Staunch belief in the predictability of his army's responses caused Arista to align his men as follows: on the left flank to the left of the road facing north was one squadron of cavalry under General Torrejón. His objective was to block the road and stop Taylor from advancing on it. On the right side of the road, Arista placed three squadrons of cavalry with cannons in tow. A space of several hundred yards to the right of them was left empty until it was filled at the commencement of the action by General Ampudia's men. His was the Fourth Regiment of infantry, one company of *zapadores*, two hundred auxiliaries and two eight-pounders. Next to them was the Tenth and Sixth Regiments of infantry with five artillery pieces. The center was held by the First Regiment of infantry. The right flank was anchored by the *Batallón de Zapadores* and a unit of light infantry under Noriega on the extreme right flank. One unit missed the attention of Taylor's scouts. Far to the left of Torrejón's cavalrymen, hidden from sight of the Americans by high chaparral, was General Canales with four hundred horse soldiers, *rancheros*, who Arista hoped would be available for shock, that is, a swift cavalry charge against Taylor's forces. As it turned out, Canales stayed out of the entire battle, inexplicably, *sin acción*.

Until the firing of the first shot, Arista had followed, as guides to his military operations, standard notions of the principles of war. Yet, it is a truism that not all principles of war need to practiced to achieve success on the battlefield. In the judgment of the Tribunal of War in Mexico City, which reviewed Arista's military operations, conduct and adherence to the principles of war as guides to his plan, especially up to the commencement of the battle, he had met their expectations. Only one point, which related to an action taken by Arista before the battle, caused raised eyebrows among the members among the Board of Inquiry: this was his recall of Torrejón at Palo Alto on May 1 to assist the troops in crossing the river, an action which permitted Taylor to escape to Fort Polk for supplies. The move allowed him to add the "flying artillery" to his force. The members of the Board of Inquiry, however, recognized that while Arista had been concerned with the security of his army, he had still cut the American line of communication. All things being equal, hypothetically at least, it would now be up to Taylor to break Arista's grip at Palo Alto and, of course, the rest is a question of how did Arista secure his forces on the battlefield? How did he try to protect them? And, of course, his biggest move to protect his men took place after the battle on May 9 when he moved them down to Resaca de Guerrero where the high chaparral would hopefully better protect them against the artillery that was being used by the American army.

In the end, the Board of Inquiry forgave Arista, and they noted that Arista "*perdió peleando*," that he went down fighting. Our next speaker is Glen Kaye. He is Chief of Interpretation and Visitor Service at the Southwest Regional Office of the National Park Service in Santa Fe. He has spent twenty-five years as a Park Naturalist and Interpreter in parks from Hawaii Volcanos National Park to Cape Cod National Seashore. As you can see, he has seen the widespan of the United States. He now coordinates the Interpretive Planning and Development for the parks of the Southwest Region for the National Park Service. He is author of numerous publications on park, human, and natural history including *Hawaii Volcanos: The Story Behind the Scenery*, *Cape Cod: The Story Behind the Scenery*, and *Rocky Mountain National Park and the Story of its Origin*.

Without further adieu, I would like to present Mr. Glen Kaye who will speak on "Interpretive Planning in the National Park Service."

GLEN KAYE: Thank you, Joseph. I find myself in the awkward position of both being a subscriber to *Modern Maturity* and having a mouth full of orthodontic hardware, so if you will forgive my speech, I will struggle with my diction.

Let me pass out something for you, it's a reference on some of the planning processes that we go through. I also have this in Spanish, for those of you that would like a set afterward.

Let me talk about the communication of ideas and the way people learn. We have to keep these in mind as we go through our planning process because people come to parks in various states of mind. Some come to have confirmation of their belief systems and the way they were instructed in the history of the world and how the world works. Others come perhaps with an idea that parks will give them a wider vision of the world, and they are more receptive to information that may contradict their belief systems. Certainly, this is going to be the case for many people that come to Palo Alto Battlefield. So, interpreters will be going through an exercise of waving their arms, looking at the what-ifs, wide-open to all of the possibilities, and then, we will slowly shake down to what is practical to do, what is financially feasible to do, and what is effective with the medium or the various mediums with which we work.

Now, we will be working from the guidance of the enabling legislation and the general management plan which will give us some direction as to the what and where. But that is a very large umbrella, and out of that we will start looking at more specific plans. One of which is called interpretive prospectives. An interpretive prospective is oriented toward media. That is, it focuses on the slide exhibits, audio-visual programs, visitor center exhibits, and the like. Of course, we can't do that until we have some land in hand and have an understanding of the topography of the terrain, and the limits and possibilities for road development and trail development, so that will be occurring down the road, but how do we get there? Obviously, research, research, and more research and serendipity that comes out of research so that we can get beyond the surface and pass the popularly held views.

One thing that we recognize, as Carl Sagan pointed out, is that once information passes into print, it takes on an authority of its own and so we come to this process with a healthy skepticism because we know inevitably we will find fresh points of view that can clarify the story.

Growing up in Oregon, I had a certain mental set about the story of the pilgrims landing in the New World, and when I got to Cape Cod and started digging into the literature, I found what extraordinary rascals these people were, in addition to being troublemakers. The first thing that they did when they got to Cape Cod was to steal a pot full of corn from the Indians and give thanks to God for the goodness that was given to them. So, I begin to see the stories that we were given with a more critical eye and certainly we will be going through that process here.

Our approach will be one of a team effort. This is not for one person to do. This takes critical review by archaeologists, anthropologists, historians, and even naturalists and we recognize, of course, that this will call for pluralistic treatment. Revisionist history is not just something to do because it's popular, it's because it is essential as we come to new insights about the past and thus we go through periodic revision of these various documents that you see before you.

We also look at themes, goals, and objectives. Recently, I was visiting a city in Kentucky along the Cherokee Trail of Tears and they had a great many plans that they wanted to execute to talk about the story of the Cherokees and their personal holocaust.

As we began to talk with them, we found they had actions in mind. They wanted to build this building and build this trail and do this, this, and this. And I said, "Well, what are your themes? What are the essential ideas that you want to communicate?" and they said, "Well, we don't know, but we want to build this visitor's center. We want to build this trail. We want to do this." The planning process they were following, we would call, "ready, fire, aim," or "fire, fire, fire," and really, what we want to do is "ready, aim, fire."

So, what are the themes for Palo Alto battlefield? What do I mean by a theme? It is a unifying idea and there will not just be one unifying idea, there may be several. One may be something along this line. The battle of Palo Alto is an outgrowth of several centuries of colonialism by the European powers that invaded the New World. That is a unifying idea.

We will have goals and there will be a variety of goals for a park. Many of which are to solve the problems of management. One of the goals will be to reduce the loss of archeological values by the visiting public.

At Rocky Mountain National Park, where I worked for a number of years, we had ten people a year being killed by various accidents in the park. Mountain climbing, white water, being struck by lightening, and so forth. One of our principle goals there was to reduce the loss of life to less than two per year. That was a very quantifiable effort and as long as we kept having ten people a year killed by various events, we knew we weren't doing our job.

Goals are long term. They're open-ended in terms of accomplishments. Objectives would be quantifiable efforts usually done on an annual basis; they are incremental steps toward reaching those goals. So, we're trying to keep in mind the distinction between themes, goals, and objectives and not start acting on objectives before we've identified our themes and goals.

What works and what doesn't? There have been a variety of studies in museums. The Smithsonian, in particular, has done some interesting studies and also there is a magazine out called *Curator* that has some interesting insights in terms of what works. There was a study a number of years ago that I found quite intriguing because most of us are comfortable with the written word and when we go into museums and we've planned exhibits, we put textbooks on the wall. We'd love to have lots of information, but in one particular study, they found that the most effective means of communication were motion pictures or audio-visual programs. The second most effective was music. The third most effective were audio sequences. The fourth were scale objects. The fifth were relief objects, and in many parts we have relief models of the landscapes. People love these. They are very expensive. You may spend forty thousand dollars for one the size of a single table, but they are very popular. Only then do we get down to authentic objects, and after that, touch and manipulation activities. In their in study they went down through several more categories until they finally got to the least effective elements in exhibits and those were text, back-lit slides and transparencies, mounted photographs, and flat work, that is art work silk-screened on a wall. Whether instructive because we put all our energy or too much of our energy into those photographs on the wall and the text, they have the least effectiveness for people.

On that plan you'll see that we have five different elements that we will be looking at for Palo Alto down the road. The publication plan isn't necessarily for Uncle Sam to produce. There will be a cooperating association selling books, within the facilities down the road, these will be managed by Southwest Parks and Monuments

Association and because of their scale in operating throughout the Southwest, they will have the capability and be involved in producing a variety of publications, posters, sets of slides, postcards, and other educational materials. Furnishing plans, we don't know if we need that or not. Those are very expensive commitments to get into furnishing structures. Paving plans, self-explanatory and way-side exhibit plan, I've talked about.

So, those are some of the directions that we will be going. In all of this we try to keep in mind some of the principles of the way people learn and one of the best was illustrated by Plutarch, several centuries ago. As the first interpreter, he expressed the thought that the mind is a candle to light, but not a vessel to fill and that's the approach we expect to take with interpretive development at Palo Alto Battlefield. Thank you very much.

DR. SANCHEZ: Are we still focusing? My mother taught me a neat phrase when I was little, which applies to interpretation: "Cada cabeza es un mundo," each head is its own universe, and she would say there's you and there are those other universes that you have to deal with so, I guess an interpreter quickly learns what Glen Kaye was just talking about. In the planning area, it's a very complicated effort.

Our next speaker is Joseph O'Bell. I asked Joseph O'Bell to give me a little bit of biographical information. He's got a fascinating background. Listen to this: he says he comes from a multivariate background, but in 1951 he was a batboy in Cleveland, Ohio, for all visiting major league teams and he got to see Joe DiMaggio's last year and the beginning of Mickey Mantle's first year. Already we have a qualified speaker just on that alone. In 1968, he traveled almost everywhere: Holland, England, Austria, Greece, Israel, Italy, France, and came back to Brownsville after all that. In the 1970s, he spoke at various conventions of the National Association of Theater Owners and at one convention, he met actor Jack Lemmon. Two of his early friends are Ben and Francis Hooks, who for many years have headed the NAACP and, I guess, he likes to see himself as a full-time Christian who is going to give you the word on his favorite subject, "Palo Alto: A Most Appropriate Site for Promoting Whole-Hearted Reconciliation." Joseph O'Bell.

JOSEPH O'BELL: I was born in 1936 and the only reason I mention that is it helps me remember the fact that it was just when I was two years old that the National Geographic Society went ahead and sponsored a series of eight expeditions that were the very first to reveal, in our time that we live in, the full splendor, the absolute splendor, of the very noteworthy Gulf Coast culture of the very first millennium B.C. it was Olmec art that was one of the great features of these eight expeditions which went on till about the time I was ten years old in 1946. It was also the National Geographic Society that produced research that helped me to see the New World's very first people, who built one of the very first great cities and center for the most powerful, political, and cultural force in the New World: the city of Teotihuacán. Teotihuacán's most dominant ancient structures are the pyramids and those pyramids were built more or less about the time of Jesus Christ, who inspired our well known BC and AD. Those pyramid structures are still there, right now, in 1993. Those pyramids are still there, some two thousand years later and it was the joy of my life, back in 1975-1976 to climb those pyramids to the very top.

It was about 1000 BC that the Olmecs were the dominant force on the Gulf Coast. Around the time of Charlemagne which is more or less the seventh and eighth century AD, Teotihuacán was totally destroyed or almost totally destroyed. Those

pyramids are still standing though and it was long before Christopher Columbus discovered the New World that the Toltecs were the dominant force of the Central valley of Mexico. Around the time that Columbus finally reached the New World, the Aztecs became dominant.

I, myself, am married to a woman who traces her lineage directly back to the Aztecs. She's from the state of Jalisco in Mexico. The only reason that I've started out like this, by mentioning some very ancient history pertinent to both the United States and Mexico, is that I would like to see both Mexico and the United States together do all that they can to study the oldest history, the most ancient history, of the New World. Right here, in the greater Brownsville area, of course, at the sight known as Palo Alto, our two countries fought a battle and started a war that still has some very real lingering negative feelings and attitudes that are unpleasant for both sides.

I'm just one member of an enormous network of binational people who want to turn the Palo Alto battlefield into a national historic park, that is binational, not national. Ever since I first learned about Palo Alto, I have passionately desired to use the very site of that battle where our two countries went to war with each other. I have wanted to use that very same site to have lots of superb people of both countries share the very human and the very spiritual opportunity of reconciliation with each other. I think that virtually all of us have many different opportunities to experience the bonding together, most wholesomely, most genuinely, most magnificently, of individual citizens of our two countries, and I think that this process must become a priority for all Americans and for all Mexicans. I'll go so far as to say that I personally see the Palo Alto site as a sacred site for promoting and practicing on an ongoing basis, the truest, the most positive, the most worthwhile reconciliation between our two peoples.

Some of you will recall that it was several years ago when we raised American, Texan, and Mexican flags over the Palo Alto battlefield. I believe that it was the very first time since the day of the battle, May 8, 1846, when we did it several years ago. That was the first time that I know of since the day of the battle that flags were raised over that battlefield; American, Texan, and Mexican flags. If you were there, you recall we did not have anyone, anybody, except three very young children raise those flags. One American child raised an American flag, one Texan child raised the Texan flag, and one Mexican child raised the Mexican flag. We did that for a very specific reason: in order to very humanly dramatize our desire to have Palo Alto now represent a whole new generation of entirely new, entirely positive, entirely wholesome, entirely good, binational sharing. I think that it is the most profound deeply spiritual yearning on the part of many of us to use the very site where the Palo Alto battle was fought to commemorate the whole war between the United States and the republic of Mexico. We should begin to use this site for many, many years to come. It is most profound to use this very site to work together, our two countries working together, in order to achieve complete binational healing, complete cooperation in all of the multivariate aspects and dimensions of life affecting our two countries.

It is our dream that Palo Alto will never, ever again signify anything more, anything better, than the best of both countries. I personally dream of the United States and Mexico helping each other to become the two best national neighbors on this entire planet. I dream of us, the binational neighbors, now reaching out to each other. I dream of us, together, achieving awesome greatness in education, awesome greatness in scientific research, in the whole network of medicine and health, awesome greatness in the whole intricate network of what we call business, awesome greatness in the entire

political process that needs our binational best and all that is in anyway part of true art and true entertainment.

You know all that is involved in respect for and worthy service of the one living God. We both believe in and we both must keep each other's honor.

I see such similarities in that flag up there. This one up here. *Díos y libertad* and all the symbolisms and even the color are so similar to each other. American flags and Mexican patriotism. The last thing I wanted to say in regard to all of this is *¡Viva lo mejor de los dos paises! ¡Viva! ¡Viva! ¡Viva!* Thank you.

DR. SANCHEZ: I didn't even get to use my three minute sign on Mr. O'Bell. His point is very well taken and I'll tell you why. I was just thinking that in the Mexican archives there's a document by Antonio López de Santa Anna. You know him mostly because of the fall of the Alamo, but he was also president of Mexico several times. Prior to his exile in 1855, President Antonio López de Santa Anna decreed that everywhere that Mexican soldiers died in the war of 1846, should be considered sacred ground; and if I hear Mr. O'Bell correctly, likewise for American soldiers.

Our next speaker, Bruce Winders, is from Texas Christian University where he teaches and is currently working on his Ph.D. He's been conducting research in the United States-Mexican War for ten years and his focus is on the United States Army from 1846 to 1848. Mr. Winders will talk on the "Organization of the U.S. Army in 1846."

BRUCE WINDERS: If I may have a moment to put equipment up here. I would like to thank Dr. Sánchez for his paper on the battle of Palo Alto. Part of the problem that we have studying the war with Mexico is that we've not studied it from a Mexican perspective, we've studied it from a U.S. perspective, and I think that conferences like this and others that I have attended, are a good opportunity for us to begin to put the pieces together and build a broader story of what is taking place during the war, before the war, and after the war.

The talk that I am giving today is information from the dissertation that I am doing and it's entitled "The Boys From Mexico," and it is an analysis of the U.S. Army in the war with Mexico. It comes from a song title of the period. The song goes on about the boys from Mexico. It refers to going down to Mexico for gold and booty and things that are not in the spirit of what we are trying to do here today. But I think that it is descriptive of these people, these Americans that went to Mexico.

When you think of the army, you probably are thinking of guns or shooting each other. This is not what I am trying to do. We have a lot of information on how the battles were fought and when we talk of the army in Mexico and we've said this today, when you're talking about the Mexican army or when you're talking about the U.S. Army, it's Scott's army, it's Taylor's army, it's Wool's army and we have the idea of this amorphous mass, this body of troops, under the leadership of somebody and they're down here and they're all the same. When I began looking at the army I discovered they're not all the same. You have a make-up of regulars, you have a make-up volunteers, and there are differences between the regulars and the volunteers. What I am building up to is I am trying to create an overview of the U.S. Army in Mexico. I've had people say, "Well, aren't you going to do the Mexican army, as well?" and I think you've seen the problems inherent in that, and I'm really not prepared to do that. In the beginning today, the Mayor told a story about the need to be bilingual. The person he was referring to was certified to teach, but wasn't very good in Spanish. He was talking

about me, and I will admit to that. In anything that you do you have to have a vocabulary. Here we are talking about a war with Mexico, the U.S.-Mexican War, whatever you're going to call it and we're talking about armies. But you need a vocabulary before you can begin to understand what's happening, why things are happening the way that they are. For instance, if you look at the way that the U.S. Army is organized in 1845-1846, well, we normally assume Taylor is down here because he's been ordered down here. Taylor's maybe the best person for the job or just happens to be there. This is happening in his military district and so that's why he's here because he is commander of the district that includes Texas so, by right, that's why he's here. What I want to give you is a framework for the army, how it's put together and how it operates, so that when you are reading reports and when you're reading diaries, some of this may make a little more sense.

The way the army is organized indicates that it is not a bunch of soldiers out there doing whatever they want to, but there's a reason, there's a philosophy behind it. You have the Commander-in-Chief and you have the Congress directing the actions of the army. Under that you have the War Department and they're setting the policies. Underneath the War Department, you have the General-in-Chief or a Commanding General; Winfield Scott in 1845-1846. But these people can't do everything by themselves and so there are administrative staffs to see that things are done. Just like the flow chart that went around and that we were talking about in the earlier session, you have an Adjutant General Department which is in charge of communication such as keeping records and keeping track of where the army is. You have an Inspectors General Department which sends out inspectors to see what the army is doing, to see what sort of shape it's in, checking its proficiency. Underneath that, you have a Medical Department and you have a Quartermaster Department. You have to have food; therefore the Subsistence Department and the Ordinance Department. You have two categories of engineers: the U.S. engineers and the topographic engineers. This is the governing body for the army. In a sense this is the command structure, this is the support structure. The combat arm in the army at this time consists of two regiments of dragoons, four of artillery, and eight regiments of infantry. So, this is the U.S. Army in 1845-1846.

The basic unit in the army at this time is a regiment. Before we look at a regiment, let's look at one of its building blocks; a company. We were speaking of a company of Indiana troops earlier today and Mexican companies. In the Mexican army, this is similar. But what I want you to see is how this overall command structure filters down to the personal, everyday level.

In a company, in the way that it's organized at the beginning of the war, you have sixty-four privates. You have a command structure, you have a captain, you have three lieutenants, five sergeants, eight corporals, and they're in charge of these men. Now there may be sixty-four, but some of them may have been stung by scorpions, some of them are deserting, so that's a high number. The company levels, down here in 1846, are much lower than sixty-four, but that's set by Congress. Now in the rank of officers, there is a captain, lieutenant, second lieutenant, and third lieutenant, but there is no official third lieutenant in the U.S. Army at this time. If you read the diaries you may come across people like Ulysses S. Grant, who's a brevet second lieutenant because he's waiting for a rank to open up. This is where these people are put. They're there to learn how to run a company or how to run a regiment. There is also an orderly sergeant who writes reports that are signed by the captain and then they go to the adjutant general. You have a quartermaster sergeant who draws materials from the Quartermaster Department,

those reports go to the quartermaster general. You have a commissary sergeant and an ordinance sergeant, so it's tied into the overall structure.

Now in a regiment, you have ten companies, which adds up to ten captains and ten groups of sixty-four men each. You have your command structure; you have a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, and a major. Then you have your support staff. There's your adjutant, who's sending his reports to the adjutant general; the quartermaster, who's getting reports and getting supplies from the quartermaster general, the sergeant major, and these companies are aligned on the line of battle in a particular order. My slides are a bit too fat for this, but the way it is organized on paper is that on the right flank and on the left flank, you have companies of light infantry. These are troops that are specially trained, often armed with rifles, to go out before the regiment and clear the path or guard its flanks. They were supposed to be elite troops. In practice this had fallen by the way side and all troops were being trained as light infantry. But the key to this organization is that on the right flank you have your most senior captain, the person that has the most experience, because the flanks are where you are most vulnerable. On the left flank you have your next senior captain. Therefore, you put your experienced people on the outside so that it's alternated back and forth so that you don't have all inexperienced people on one side, all experienced people on the other.

If you read the literature it talks about regiments. If you put one or two regiments together then you have a brigade. Therefore, you'd have three colonels reporting to the brigadier general and you have the same command or the same support structure in place. It sometimes irritates me when I read something that talks about a company and you get the idea that the company is out there acting independently. Although, there were independent companies. Attached to these companies was a surgeon and possibly engineers. If the governor or his son is down there, he has positions called aides-de-camp who act as aids for him, or there are lieutenants attached to these units. Nevertheless, this is the brigade structure. This may be very elementary, but it's an elementary system, and if you don't understand how it works, then these armies are just amorphous masses of soldiers out there. Now, if you take several brigades and put them together, then you have a division, with the same support structure in place. So, you have an inspector general, adjutant general, quartermaster general, in short, the same people. So, you're reproducing, or you're getting a layer of, in a sense, bureaucracy, that this particular unit fits here, within another unit.

Now what I've been able to find what helps me is that rather than seeing all these people together, I've been trying to pick out what's different about them. There are four different ways, four different times, that troops are raised during war. The first time is when a war is not officially started, but Taylor's army of observation that this is built on the army as it is established by Congress, without volunteers, such as was the case with the pre-war army down at Palo Alto. After war is declared, you have Taylor calling for militia, so things are beginning to change. You have a General Edmund P. Gaines in New Orleans, who has a reputation of being analogous to Chicken Little, suggesting that when an emergency arises, he issues a call for militia troops. Then, you have Congress's official call for fifty thousand volunteers. This is happening in the summer of 1846. Then a little later, Congress says, "We can't fight this war with the troops that we have. We're going to have to have more," and so there are more troops that are called. Finally, in February, Congress makes an attempt to federalize or get rid of the volunteers by passing a law for ten new regular regiments to come in, a ten regiment bill. I'll end with a graphic here showing the old regular army. The new regulars that were called in, this is

the group of volunteers. And if you look at this, it appears that the volunteers are doing the bulk of the fighting down in Mexico and I'll leave you this. This is misleading; that these volunteers, this number of over one thousand is inflated. If you start subtracting people, you start to get at the boys from Mexico, who're actually there, and what they're doing. And at this point I'll conclude and thank you for having me here.

DR. SANCHEZ: Thank you very much. I can't wait till you get your paper published or dissertation done.

I am honored to present our next speaker and I will do so bilingually. First in Spanish and then in English.

Señor Emiliano Saenz de los Reyes nació en Matamoros, Tamaulipas en 22 de abril de 1927. Socio fundador en enero de 1970 de la Sociedad Tamaulipeca de Historia, Geografía y Estadística de Tamaulipas, quedando con el cargo de secretario de la cual fue presidente en trece ocaciones en los años 1977, 1983, y 1985. Nombrado cronista de la ciudad en forma italica, en septiembre de 1988, socio fundador de la sociedad de cronistas de ciudades y vias de Tamaulipas en el año de 1989. Resultado electo tesorero. En marzo de este año fue designado coordinador de los cronistas del norte del estado. Socio fundador del club literario del Dr. Manuel F. Rodríguez Braida. Socio fundador de la casa de la cultura de Matamoros. Saenz de los Reyes es más amante de investigar que escribir.

Señor Emiliano Saenz de los Reyes was born in Matamoros, Tamaulipas on the April 22, 1927. He is the co-founder of the Tamaulipas Historical, Geographical, and Statistical Society. Aside from holding the presidency from 1977 to 1983 and 1985 of the society, he presently serves as secretary. In 1988, he was named chronicler of the city. He is co-founder of the Association of Chroniclers of Cities and Routes in Tamaulipas which he founded in 1989, and he was elected to the office of treasurer. This year, in March, he was designated to be the coordinator of the chronicles of the north of the state of Tamaulipas. He is also co-founder of the literary circle of Dr. Manuel F. Rodríguez Braida and co-founder of La Casa de Cultura de Matamoros Saenz de los Reyes. Along with his administrative talents, he is much fonder of researching than of writing.

His presentation, su presentación, will be on the "República del Río Grande." Profesor Saenz.

EMILIANO SAENZ DE LOS REYES: Buenas tardes a todos. Carlos III, por cédula del 5 de abril de 1786, concede asilo y tierras a colonos de los Estados Unidos, y a realistas ingleses, desamparados después de la paz de 1783. Se inicía, a partir de entonces, la colonización de la Luisiana. Entre los primeros, acuden James Wilkinson y el Barón de Bastrop, quienes poco después iniciarían las invasiones contra Texas. Acogiéndose a las concesiones de España, llega también a Luisiana, procedente de Virginia, Moisés Austin, obteniendo una legua cuadrada de tierra. Era en el año de 1797.

Dos años más tarde, Carlos IV revoca la cédula de su antecesor y Austin no logra la ratificación de su contrato. La disposición real, sin embargo, llegaba tarde. Miles de colonos habían invadido no solo la Luisiana sino los territorios que lindaban con el de Texas. En ese tiempo ocurre la primera incursión armada de Felipe Nolan, protegido de Wilkinson.

Moisés Austin aparece en Bejar en 1820, representando a tres cientas familias de Luisiana que deseaban colonizar tierras de Texas. El comandante de las provincias internas, Joaquín Arredondo, aprobó dicha solicitud el 17 de enero de 1821. Muerto

Agustín, en junio, su hijo, Esteban, llevó adelante la colonización en el territorio comprendido entre los ríos Colorado y Brazos. Se logra la independencia de España en 1821, y Austin debía revalidar su concesión con el gobierno mexicano. Para lograrlo, llega a la ciudad de México en abril de 1822.

El 25 de mayo, la regencia envía al congreso la documentación sobre Texas. No sólo, Austin solicitaba tierras para asentar a diez mil familias Irlandesas y de las Islas Canarias. La comisión de colonización, en el dictamen correspondiente, recomienda la cesión de dos mil leguas para asentar a quince mil personas. En la exposición de motivos se recoge la experiencia anterior e inmediata sobre la política norteamericana ante aquellos territorios: "la situación de Texas-se decía- su fertilidad y abundancia de agua la hacen superior a cualquier provincia del imperio."

Estas ventajas y su proximidad a los Estados Unidos despertaron tiempo después, el deseo de los Estados Unidos de apoderarse de ella, deseo que verán realizado si nosotros no tomamos las providencias necesarias para impedirlo. La comisión no fue ocultada al congreso, "...de nuestra negligencia a este respecto puede atraer sobre Texas la misma suerte que la de las Floridas," que proclamó su independencia.

Surgió en ese momento la idea de separar la provincia de Texas del territorio de Coahuila y formar un nuevo estado libre y soberano. Austin vino nuevamente a México el 18 de julio de 1833 a gestionar la separación. Aducía que Texas tenía todos los recursos necesarios y condiciones requeridas para lograr su soberanía local, que necesitaba una organización estatal propia, que su población llegaba ya a cuarenta y seis mil quinientos habitantes, que Texas no estaría nunca en paz mientras siguiera unida a Coahuila. Finalmente anunció un trastorno del orden si no se tomaban medidas.

Gómez Farías protestó por aquellas amenazas y mandó a Juán Nepumoceno Almonte a hacer una investigación. Santa Anna se opuso a la separación de Texas pero ofreció a Austin influir para que el gobierno de Coahuila decretara las reformas que desearan los tejanos. Austin regresó satisfecho con tales promesas pero al llegar a Saltillo, Coahuila, fue detenido y conducido a México. Estuvo preso hasta que se dictó la ley de amnistía el 3 de mayo de 1835.

La misión confidencial que trajo Almonte a Texas consistía en investigar la capacidad militar de los colonos, divulgar entre los negros esclavos la idea abolicionista, y seleccionar algunas tierras baldías para formar allí una colonia de negros libres a los que podrían venir los negros residentes en los Estados Unidos que quisieran vivir en un país libre. Se pretendía asimismo, fundar una colonia con indios Comanches a los que se les darían tierras en Nacogdoches, lo que serviría como antemural frente a los Estados Unidos. Finalmente en su informe Almonte recomendaba el envío inmediato de dos mil hombres si se quería conservar aquella provincia.

Don Valentín Gómez Farías había puesto el dedo en la llaga. ¡La Esclavitud! Nada podía alarmar tanto a los colonos yanquis como la abolición de la esclavitud. Esta era, en realidad, la clave de todo el conflicto. El cultivo del algodón se había desarrollado extraordinariamente a partir del invento de la despepitadora, y las de Texas eran tierras esencialmente algodoneras. La nueva máquina multiplicaba por mil la producción de los esclavos. El sur de los Estados Unidos se transformaba de pronto en el primer proveedor de algodón en el mundo. Antes de la despepitadora, la explotación era de unas ochenta y tres mil libras en 1820. Ese volumen se había aumentado a ciento veintisiete millones de libras. El cultivo del algodón que por sus características sólo podían hacer los negros, convirtió a la esclavitud en una institución propia de los estados sureños. El auge del algodón trajo como consecuencia la demanda de esclavos.

Cuando en 1835 se produjo el movimiento centralista, las colonias anglosajonas de Texas tomaron la bandera del federalismo. Pues Texas formaba un estado juntamente con Coahuila, y si la soberanía de Coahuila y Texas había sido violada, los Texanos tenían el derecho de insurección para reestablecer el régimen constitucional. El hecho es que parecía un fenómeno interno, aunque en realidad era de caracter diferente. Santa Anna, que había venido a Texas 24 años antes como oficial del virreinato para someter a aventureros mezclados con insurgentes, quiso repetir aquella proeza, en mayor escala y con mayor gloria.

Partió con seis mil hombres seguró de aplastar la rebelión. Al principio todo le sonreía, pero su ineptitud puso término desastroso a la campaña. Sorprendido en San Jacinto, el 21 de abril de 1836, cayó prisionero de los tejanos, y cometió la acción indigna de ordenar la retirada del resto de las fuerzas. Así quedó Texas independiente. Y durante nueve años nunca se envió una fuerza que sometiera ese territorio, que constituído en república independiente, fue reconocido como tal por Estados Unidos, Inglaterra y Francia.

Es un error común creer que la guerra de los Estados Unidos contra México fue para adquirir el territorio de Texas, ya estaba en posesión de aquel país desde años atrás, ese girón del viejo territorio de la Nueva España, cuando la administración norteamericana resolvió adquirir también Nuevo México y California con este fin, emprendió la guerra.

El 27 de Mayo de 1839, Don Antonio Canales Rosillo, y los coroneles José María González y Antonio Zapata, sublevados en favor de la federación contra el gobierno mexicano, pretenden formar la república del Río Grande, con varios territorios del norte. Entre las fuerzas reclutadas figuran norteamericanos y texanos con sus jefes respectivos, Ruben Ross y S.W. Jordan. En los meses de septiembre y octubre del mismo año, Antonio Canales Rosillo convoca a una convención de delegados para organizar la república del Río Grande.

El 17 de enero de 1840, por fin se celebra la convención que con mucho tiempo de anticipación se había convocado. Es presidida por Antonio Canales Rosillo y José María Carbajal. Esta tuvo lugar en Laredo. Canales proclama la república del Rio Bravo, la primera declaración formal de una república tan largamente anticipada en la frontera del Rio Bravo.

La convención declaró su independencia de México, seleccionando como presidente a don Jesús Cárdenas, que había sido jefe político del distrito norte de Tamaulipas, como miembros del consejo y delegados por su estado, Francisco Vidaurri, por Coahuila, Manuel M. Del Llano, por Nuevo Léon, Juan Nepomuceno Molano, alcalde de Matamoros y primer gobernador subteniente de Tamaulipas. Antonio Canales Rosillo continuara como comandante en jefe de las fuerzas militares y don José María Carbajal actuaba ya como secretario.

El consejo instalado en Laredo, se trasladó casi de inmediato a Guerrero, también allí se izó la bandera, la cual tenía dos franjas horizontales de igual anchura, la superior blanca y la inferior verde, del lado del asta había una franja roja del mismo ancho paralela al asta en la que se apreciaban tres estrellas blancas en línea vertical. Las tres estrellas pudieran haber simbolizado los tres estados directamente implicados. A todos se les pidió jurar fidelidad a la bandera en una solemne ceremonia que se efectuó en la plaza, la razón de haberse desplazado a Guerrero, era la existencia de una imprenta.

Este consejo reclamaba toda la extensión de terreno conocida como Tamaulipas hasta el Río Nueces, y Coahuila hasta el Río Medina, y hacia el interior hasta alcanzar

las montañas comprendiendo Nuevo Léon, Zacatecas, Durango, Chihuahua y Nuevo México.

Posteriormente Canales vino el 29 de abril de 1840 a Texas a solicitar la ayuda, habiendo tenido una conferencia con el Presidente Mirabeau Bonaparte Lamar. Dicha ayuda le fue negada por ser la política de esta república no inmiscuirse en los asuntos mexicanos, máximo cuando estaba en tratos con nuestro gobierno para que le fuera reconocida su independencia. Canales logró en cambio reclutar numerosos aventureros que movilizó hasta el Río Bravo.

El historidador don Toribio de la Torre, nos informa que los acontecimientos que nos inclinan a pensar que influyeron en el ánimo de los federalistas, para que terminara el conflicto y diera fin a su movimiento separatista, fueron en primer lugar, el acoso constante que ejercían las fuerzas del gobierno central sobre las huestes federales, la reciente muerte del coronel Antonio Zapata, elemento de indudable valía en sus filas, y la derrota y captura del general Lemus en presidio de Rio Grande, por el teniente Colonel Menchaca. Ya se habían perdido las esperanzas de triunfar, más grave aún era la altañería e insubordinación de los mercenarios extranjeros.

El autor nos dice que éstos, desde la llegada a Victoria con las fuerzas de Molano, principiaron a cometer escándalos y tropelías que alarmaron a la población. Otro tanto sucedió en Jaumave donde los elementos mexicanos de la tropa mostraban su preocupación por el comportamiento de una chusma tan indómita. Molano siguió al frente de ella con la esperanza de aprovechar la primera ocasión que se facilitara para poner término a una guerra que ya no podía ser útil de manera alguna a la causa que invocaban, sino una fuerza en quien había mucho que fiar y además, embarazoza.

La ocasión llegó cuando sondeos para volver a la paz fueron hechos por subalternos del general Mariano Arista, ante Canales y Molano. Eso aunado a la carta que recibió Canales del coronel del ejército texano, H.W. Harnes, que fue fechada en Bexar el 26 de julio de 1840, en la que comunica que en unos días más estará en Laredo, ya que la pretensión de los federalistas al país que comprende entre el Nueces y el Río Grande, había herido los sentimientos del presidente de Texas. Por lo tanto la anhelada República del Rio Grande para los Texanos y República del Rio Bravo para los mexicanos, no llegó a realizarse.

No obstante de haberse fijado la frontera entre México y Estados Unidos en 1848, continuaba la pretensión de diversos grupos de angloamericanos, especialmente los habitantes de la linea fronteriza, de ampliar los terrenos ganados durante la guerra de intervención. Se seguía con el proyecto de separar los siete estados septentrionales ahora con el nombre de la República de la Sierra Madre.

Los puntos de dicho proyecto son los siguientes; cuando en el curso de los acontecimientos humanos tiene necesidad un pueblo de romper los lazos políticos que lo han unido con otro para tomar entre las provincias de la tierra el lugar a que le dan derecho las leyes naturales y divinas, un justo respeto a la tierra del género humano exige que declare las causas que lo impelen a tal separación.

La historia del gobierno actual y de los anteriores de México es todo de injurias y usurpaciones. Son nueve artículos los que marcan y todos terminan; "Nos declaramos libres." Por lo tanto nosotros el pueblo de los estados septentrionales de la Sierra Madre de México, apelando al supremo juez del mundo de la justicia de nuestras intenciones, solemne y públicamente declaramos que estos Estados Unidos son libres e independientes. Que rompen toda alianza con el gobierno mexicano y cesa toda relación política con todo gobierno, y que como estado libre e independiente tienen pleno poder para hacer la

guerra y construir los actos a que tienen derecho la protección de la providencia divina, nosotros el pueblo empeñamos mutuamente nuestra vida, nuestra fortuna y nuestro honor.

Se sacan las espadas, se tiran salvas. "Ahora, mueran los tiranos. Matamoros, México, 16 de Junio 1849." Desgraciadamente se me termina el tiempo, pero todo esto está ligado con el combate de 1851 por el que Matamoros tiene los títulos de invicta y heróica.

José María Carbajal que peleó primero con un grupo con Jesús Cárdenas y con otros por hacer la República del Río Grande y posteriormente la República de la Sierra Madre en 1851, volvió otra vez a combatir. Tomaron Camargo, Reynosa, y diez días duró el combate en Matamoros, pero no pudieron tomar Matamoros.

Investigando quien era Carbajal, al cual el gobierno de los Estados Unidos había detenido y puesto en libertad siendo que decían que había perjudicado grandemente las relaciónes entre México y los Estados Unidos. Pues, no era así. Porque siguiendo con el curso de la historia observamos que cuando llegó Don Benito Juárez al poder como presidente de la República, José María Carbajal fue nombrado gobernador de Tamaulipas, porque era la única persona que podía tener entrevista con el presidente de los Estados Unidos de Norteamerica para pedir un préstamo para el gobierno mexicano.

Por eso nosotros decimos que José María Carbajal, que se educó aquí en Estados Unidos, es un traidor para los mexicanos. Eso le hirió mucho a un descendiente de él, que es un licenciado que vive en Matamoros y que en una conferencia, en una entrevista, que le hicieron por radio, mencionó que él no estaba de acuerdo, y yo lo reté para que nos enfrentáramos y yo le presentaba todos mis argumentos para decir que José María Carbajal fue un traidor para México. Gracias.

DR. SANCHEZ: The question always comes up in regard to how did the Mexicans feel about the north and Professor Saenz has given us another answer.

The Republic of the Río Grande indicates how the people of the north felt about the protection of lands north of the Río Grande and about the violation of Mexican sovereignty which was the result of U.S. expansionism. It was the principle cause of the war from the Mexican point of view.

I can't wait to see his paper in publication. Que se publíque pronto, Profesor. We have a, yes sir?

UNKNOWN: I wanted to ask him or anybody else a question. In Coker's book, *The News from Brownsville*, she describes this rebellion in 1851 as the "merchants of war." She calls it the "Merchants of War." Is that what you are talking about?

UNKNOWN: That's what I wanted to clarify. What is the Republic of the Sierra Madre?

DR. SANCHEZ: La pregunta es ¿Qué es la relación entre la república del Río Grande y la Guerra de los Mercantes de 1851?

EMILIANO SAENZ DE LOS REYES: Sí. Son los mismos gentes, la misma entidad.

DR. SANCHEZ: They're the same people. The answer is yes. Quiere saber si es la misma guerra o si es otra cosa. ¿Es la misma guerra?

EMILIANO SAENZ DE LOS REYES: Sí. Es la misma guerra y son las mismas pretencionas.

DR. SANCHEZ: It's the same pretensions no matter of the causes is what he is saying. Ah, Tomás, how long is our break?

TOMAS: Fifteen minutes.

DR. SANCHEZ: Let's synchronize our watches to mine.

TOMAS: It's now 2:35. Fifteen minutes max?

DR. SANCHEZ: Fifteen minutes from this moment till about a quarter til.
[Break]

DR. SANCHEZ: Our next speaker is Norma Morales and I will present her in Spanish.

Norma Morales es la presidente actual de la Sociedad Tamaulipeca de Historia, Geografía y Estadística en la ciudad de Matamoros. También es subdirectora y fundadora del Instituto de Bellas Artes de Matamoros que fue establecido en 1969, directora de actividades cívicas de la ciudad de Matamoros desde 1972 a 1977, fundadora de la Casa de la Cultura y miembra de La Sociedad Tamaulipeca de História, Geografía y Estadística de Matamoros desde 1975. Su presentación va a ser la "Colaboración de Historiadores Para Formar el Museo en la Casa Mata de Matamoros."

I would like to present our next speaker who is Norma Morales who is the President of the Society of History, Geography, and Statistics of Tamaulipas in Matamoros. She was also the subdirector and founder of the Instituto de Bellas Artes en Matamoros founded in 1969. She was the director of civic activities in Matamoros from 1972 to 1977. She has also been the co-founder or founder of the Casa de La Cultura and is a member of the Society of History, Geography, and Statistics of Tamaulipas in Matamoros since 1975. Without further adieu, I present Profesora Norma Morales.

NORMA MORALES: Cuando me invitaron a participar, para hablar sobre la colaboración de los historiadores de la ciudad de Matamoros con el Museo Casa Mata, lo hicimos con mucho gusto. Hablar de Casa Mata y sus fortificaciones; la antes ruina conocida con el nombre de Casa Mata, mudo testigo de nuestras numerosas--por fortuna se ha terminado--luchas fratricidas, está situada frente que se llamó "Plaza de Iguala," más tarde, "De Los Cuarteles," posteriormente "Plaza de la Independencia," finalmente, "Plaza Mata," y ahora ocupa dicho predio frente el parque y alberca Chal.

Está limitada al norte por la calle Guillermo Prieto, antes, San José; al sur por la calle Santos de Gollado, antes México; al oriente por la calle República de Guatemala, antes de Cortés, y al poniente, colinda con la propiedad de la señora Felipa Piñeda Viuda de Ramírez que da precisamente a la calle Cero, antes Guadalupe. Ocupa una superficie de dos mil quinientos cincuenta metros y siempre ha sido considerada una propiedad federal pero últimamente otorgada al municipio.

No obstante los diversos cambios de titulación, aparece últimamente como Museo Casa Mata. Las fortificaciones y fuerzas que circundan al Matamoros antiguo ya desaparecieron. En los años de 1913 a 1915 se reconstruyeron parcialmente y en algunos sectores se le mejoraron, pues con casetas de ladrillos para el uso de metralladoras por

las fuerzas constitucionalistas. De esta tema, Tom Carroll tiene un amplio trabajo con mapas preciosos ilustrativos. Este fuerte que esta ubicado frente al deportivo Eduardo Chavez, representa para Matamoros de ayer una sólida muralla para la defensa de la ciudad. Ya en esos años ultimos la ubicación encontrábase en despoblado. En la salida de lo que se llamó Puertas Verdes que era el antiguo camino a Bagdad y también a lo que es hoy el ejido de los tomates.

Si uno se sube a la atalaya, puede observar la panorámica estratégica que tiene al norte, pues desde allí es perfectamente visible el fuerte Brown de esa vecina ciudad, de donde partían las tropas que invadieron a Matamoros durante la intervención norteamericana. De allí se desprende la importancía que tuvo Casa Mata cuyas recias paredes eran cañoneadas por las tropas invasoras. La Casa Mata fue el apoyo principal del general Francisco Arle para batir a las fuerzas del general José María Carbajal en 1855. Cuando un grupo de filibusteros tejanos contratados por Carbajal trataron a toda fuerza de tomar la plaza de Matamoros y donde la participación del pueblo reforzado por el general Avalos en defensa de la soberanía e integridad nacional, le valieron a la ciudad de los titulos de leal, invita y heróica. El museo Casa Mata es para todos nosotros símbolo de otros años, símbolo también de luchas que Matamoros tuvo por su libertad. La fortificación de la Casa Mata se levanta ahora en una mole de piedra en medio de un buen cuidado jardín. Es nuestro primer y último baluarte. Desde entonces Casa Mata está considerado íntimamente ligada a la historia de nuestra ciudad. Fue antes señal de triunfo bélico porque quién poseía el fuerte poseía también la ciudad. Hoy es señal del triunfo del espíritu al dar albergue al pasado épico y cultural de Matamoros.

En 1975 a los cien años de construído, a instancias del ingeniero Oscar Aguirre Lisondo presidente municipal quien solicitó a la cuenta federal de mejoras materiales que lo reconstuyera, y se convertío en el bello museo que es ahora, donde se guardan reliquias de la ciudad y al mismo tiempo sirve de marco para diversos actos culturales. Hay un hermoso pórtico de hierro forjado que separa este monumento de ayer y hoy, y de la nueva y progresista ciudad al abrirse para dar paso a cada visitante relatablos del pasado. Es un ejemplo para los hombres de hoy. Todos Uds. van a poder apreciar este edificio, este tesoro, esta tarde cuando los acompañe a visitar el museo Casa Mata.

No quisiera yo dejar desapercibido el trabajo de la gente que ha colaborado ampliamente con el museo. Don Eliseo Paredes Manzano, cronista hasta su muerte de la Ciudad de H. Matamoros, y a la vez primer presidente fundador de la Socidedad Tamaulipeca de Historia, Geografía y Estadística, fue el apoyo más fuerte que tuvo Casa Mata, no nada más para su reconstrucción, sino para solicitar ante sus compañeros de la Sociedad de historia, todo el apoyo necesario para volverlo a reforzar, hacer bellos jardines, y hacer salas de exposición; y cuando el tiempo cambío y entró la maestra Marta Covarrubias, ella, a instancias de su actividad que despliega, solicita la colaboración de un señor muy altruista en la ciudad de H. Matamoros, don Filemón Garza, y en el mismo edificio Casa Mata se construye la sala Valle del Pilar que nos sirve para hacer todo tipo de actividades, es un salón de usos multiples. Lleva el nombre de María del Pilar Garza de Garibay.

Este salón está equipado, está alfombrado, podemos hacer exposición de pinturas, conferencias, conciertos de piano, podemos tener muchos eventos de tipo cultural. También, gracias al señor Filemón Garza, en el mismo edificio que alberaga Casa Mata se hizo el archivo histórico con el nombre de Filemón Garza, el quería dejar un recuerdo perdurable. Allí se guarda el archivo histórico de la ciudad, lo que se haya podido rescatar del siglo pasado, y está muy bien protegido por su director, casí siempre ha sido

el profesor Andrés Cuellar Cuellar, antiguo presidente de la Sociedad de Historia, y ahora director del archivo histórico.

La actual directora doña Margarita Felicia de García, tiene también a su cargo ahora, el tratar de volver a iniciar más edificaciones porque ya es muy pequeño para el nuevo archivo. En esta tarde vamos a poderlo recorrer y vamos a poder apreciarlo y disfrutar un rato este bello museo. Nos dará mucho gusto acompañños. Muchas gracias.

DR. SANCHEZ: Muchas gracias. Ojalá que se pueda trabajar una colaboración entre el Museo de la Casamata, la Sociedad Tamaulipeca de Historia, Geografía y Estadística y el Servicio de Parques Nacionales en un futuro próximo. Our next speaker is Donald S. Frazier. He is an assistant professor of American history at Texas Christian University. He is author of several articles on the southern military and Civil War topics. Also, he is a contributor to various encyclopedias as follows on subjects such as World War II, World War I, the *Handbook of Texas*, and *The Encyclopedia of the Confederacy*. His book will be *Blood and Treasure: Confederate Imperialists and Texas Soldiers in the American Southwest*, and it will be published by Texas A&M Press. It is scheduled to be out in 1994. It will be out just in time for Christmas, right? Just so we can do all our book shopping then. His subject this afternoon is on "Confederate Imperial Designs on Northwestern Mexico."

DR. DONALD FRAZIER: The actual working title of this paper is "The Legacy of Mexico: Texans, Southerners, and Dreams of Empire." The origins of Southern imperial ambitions are old, their roots deep. Americans, especially southerners, had long manifested a penchant for expansion. Pushing inland from coastal enclaves, they carved an empire from the wilderness. Eventually, this outward momentum of the nation became concentrated on expansion to the west. Although Americans attempted to push north and south, the path of least resistance lay to the sparsely settled west. The drive for expansion continued even when impractical. During the Revolution and the War of 1812, American attempts to take Canada failed miserably. Expansionists had better luck against adjacent areas tentatively held by Spain, and later, by the nations descended from its colonial empire. Southerners, with proximity to Hispanic domains, naturally became skilled expansionists. Land-hungry agrarians with a talent for things military, they were the principal agents and proponents of an ever-expanding American empire. Southerners gloried in this role and throughout the first seventy years of American history they could be found in the forefront of national expansion. The Southerner became the archetypal imperialist.

Texans, the offspring of southern imperialism, wore the mantle comfortably. The state had a long history of nationalism, or more accurately, localism. Lone Star soldiers and politicians had always been ardent expansionists. The state had also compiled an impressive résumé of imperialistic military adventures, and its fighting men were leaders or partisans in most of the more notorious attempts at armed expansion. The creation of empires suited the Texas temperament.

Texas was, after all, born in battle. The spirit of revolution, the promise of glory, and bounties of free land had attracted an adventurous breed of men to the young republic. Mostly from the deep South came a mix of outcasts, drifters, and professional adventurers along with respectable, civic-minded men and ambitious planters. All came to build their dreams, and many tended to support military solutions to most problems of state. In the 1830s and early 1840s, war in Texas was a reality, and men who savored

combat splashed across the Red and Sabine rivers in ever-growing numbers. Their successes in "Rangering Companies" against Mexicans and Comanches led the Texan leadership to indulge in dreams far in excess of the republic's actual ability to accomplish.

Texan imperialism blossomed with independence as the vision of a vast Texan empire took shape. With no historical justification, leaders claimed the Río Grande from source to mouth as the national border. This included Santa Fe, the great El Dorado at the foot of the mountain, as the rightful plunder and possession of the new nation. Other proposals urged Texas lawmakers to acquire, through purchase or by force, large tracts of northern Mexico from the gulf to the Sea of Cortez. Texan claims expanded as the United States maneuvered the Texas boundary to meet its own territorial ambitions. In an effort to place an American claim on the Pacific Coast, President Andrew Jackson urged Texas to claim California. Capturing the spirit, the bellicose *Columbia Telegraph and Texas Register* boasted in 1837, "The army of Texas will display its victorious banner west of the Río Grande, and when once its conquering march shall have commenced, the roar of the Texan rifles shall mingle in unison with the thunders of the Pacific. Routes shall be established from Santa Fe to our seaports, and another from the Red River to Matamoros, which two routes must always of necessity intersect each other a this point."

Ultimately, in 1845, the United States and Texas annexed each other, thereby fulfilling both nations' expansionist goals. The U.S. continued its westward drive. Meanwhile, Texas, under the aegis of the American military, expected, at last, to achieve control over Santa Fe; a feat it had failed to accomplish on its own. Mexico, however, refused to let Texas go. War followed. By 1848, Mexico's armies had been defeated, and Americans occupied a third of that nation's territory. The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, which concluded the war, left the United States in possession of this vast area.

Acquisition of the so-called "Mexican Cession" gravely aggravated sectional issues then plaguing the United States. Southerners were determined to maintain the balance of power in national politics by extending slavery westward into the newly-gained territories. Abolitionists were equally determined to exclude the peculiar institution from them. To expansionists, the consequence of this growing national deadlock was obvious; internecine political conflict would curtail the acquisition of any new territory in the future.

For the south, other unsettled problems caused by the acquisition of the western territories became acute in 1850. The discovery of gold in California the previous year and the resulting surge in its population, had enabled that territory to petition for statehood as a free state. This infuriated Southerners. Free Soil advocates wanted New Mexico as a western boundary to the extension of slavery and so it had become; wrested by the United States away from Texan control and now California. Despite the militant posturing in the South, Henry Clay's compromise of 1850 passed and temporarily averted a clash between North and South. Bitter feelings lingered. Among other grievances, southerners now felt surrounded.

With slavery blocked in the western territories, the only remaining outlet for slavery was in renewed foreign conquests. Mexico remained the great object of fascination for southerners and many Americans. These expansionists saw in Mexico's extensive yet sparsely settled territory an escape from sectional difficulties. As a result, it became the principal target for filibustering expeditions from the United States.

Starting in 1851, raids into that nation occurred on an almost annual basis. Little evidence links these marauders to any sectional orientation or ideology; most seemed to have pursued personal gain. Some attempts took the form of military and financial support for Mexican revolutionaries, like Santiago Vidaurri or José Carvajal. Other filibusters followed the more conventional method of outright conquest.

What developed, then, during the decade of the 1850s, was a distinctly southern vision of Manifest Destiny. Southerners correctly saw their Republican opponents as hostile to slavery and despaired of ever making peace with them. Filibustering, openly discouraged by American officials, had proved ineffective, and by the end of the decade, southern expansionists were convinced that new territory could be obtained only if the South seceded. Only then would Mexico and Central America fall "like ripe fruit" to a southern nation. An empire composed of the existing American slave states including Mexico, Cuba, and California could then be built. This vision soon had many adherents, including Jefferson Davis of Mississippi and William Sanford of Alabama.

The Knights of the Golden Circle, or KGC, epitomized the complete sectionalization of Manifest Destiny. Organized by George Bickley in 1855, this secret military society's goal was to secure Mexico and the Caribbean Basin as part of a slave empire. The Knights took their name from a plan for establishing an imperial capital at Havana, Cuba, and extending their realm in a "Golden Circle" through the upper South, along the Gulf of Mexico, the Spanish Main, and across the Caribbean. In a proclamation to his "Knights," Bickley reveled in the superiority of Americans and exhorted them to "Let our railroads and telegraph lines reach from Canada to Patagonia. Let our ships carry our manufactures to the inmost recesses of the continent. Let our cities rise on the Amazon as they have on the Mississippi." By 1859, this organization had become a powerful subversive force in many parts of the South.

Ultimately, the growing national tension led to an eruption. The election of Abraham Lincoln on November 6, 1860, aggravated the angry mood of the South and its supporters. In Charleston, South Carolina, mobs milled in the streets, eager for more news and defiant over the prospect of Republican rule. Secessionists raised Palmetto flags and talked openly of forming a southern Confederacy. "The tea has been thrown overboard, the revolution of 1860 has been initiated," trumpeted the *Charleston Mercury* the following day. On November 10, the state legislature ordered a convention to meet in Columbia on December 17 to consider secession.

The rebellious South was jubilant over the prospect of achieving the destiny that the North had long denied it. When the South "shook itself free of the Puritans and the Devil," an anonymous writer for the *Charleston Mercury* asserted, Chihuahua and all the "Gulf country" would be added to the Confederacy. The *Macon Daily Telegraph* predicted similar glory: "then will the proudest nations of the earth come to woo and worship at the shrine of our imperial Confederacy."

The decade of the 1850s had born bitter fruit and the impasse caused by slavery, states' rights, culture, and imperial ambition had finally sundered the nation. The majority of southerners had been gradually alienated from the Union over these issues. One by one, southern states formally seceded. Once out of the Union, they were certain, the march to empire could proceed. So, in many ways, the *norteamericano* victory over Mexico ultimately precipitated the American Civil War.

The secession convention of the state of Texas met on January 28th and moved to effect separation from the Union. On February 1, after debating the wording of the ordinance, the delegates overwhelmingly adopted the measure one hundred and sixty-six

to eight. The convention then organized a general election, slated for February 23, to ratify its action.

At the same time, the other seceded states had moved to link their fates. On February 4, 1861, delegates met at Montgomery, Alabama to form a provisional government. They framed an imperialistic constitution. They guaranteed slavery in any new territory acquired. The meeting then elected Jefferson Davis, a long-time proponent of annexing Mexico, as president. Before the end of the week, representatives from Texas arrived, promising the imminent secession of their state and its intentions to join the Confederacy.

With the secession ordinance before the voters, Texas was on the verge of exciting events. Secession and the Confederacy offered the state many new avenues for expansion and the promise of economic boom times. Texas could achieve a satisfactory solution to the question of its western boundary by aligning with Arizona and New Mexico both politically and economically. Texan armies could also develop client states in Mexico, with possibilities of later annexation. Texas would then become the thoroughfare of empire. James Reiley, soon to become a colonel in the Confederate Army wrote, "We must have Sonora and Chihuahua. With Sonora and Chihuahua we gain southern California, and by a railroad to Guaymas render our State of Texas the great highway of nations."

In the ensuing war for Southern independence, the new Confederacy continued to uphold the old American justifications for expansion. National security required that the Confederacy's western and southern flanks be secured. Commerce would benefit from the raw materials of Mexico and the American Southwest as well as from ports on the Pacific Coast and there remained the perceived need to uplift the indolent societies of Hispanic America, even against their wishes. Empire and Manifest Destiny had been a national mission since colonial days and now southerners, employing the instrument of secession, sought to resort the nation to its historic course and to carry forward the standard of empire that the North had abandoned. Southerners, through the Confederacy, would revive the American dream of empire. The ultimate target: Mexico. Thank you very much.

DR. SANCHEZ: You can always tell the university professor. He had that right down to the last second.

I think Tom Carroll is going to have his hands full with about ten thousand topics. Professor Frazier has added one more. The Mexican War as a cause of the Civil War and if you could imagine what the Compromise of 1850 did to precipitate the Civil War, then you can begin to see how the Mexican War, with its first battle, began to make some changes. Then again, in 1998, we'll have our one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and then in the year 2008, those of us who will be around to celebrate that one with Tom Carroll, will be looking at the Civil War commemoration and we can invite Professor Frazier to give us an update on his paper. Our next speaker is Alma Yolanda Guerrero-miller. I will present her in Spanish.

Alma Yolanda Guerrero-miller está estudiando para su doctorado en historia en la Universidad de North Carolina. Durante 1990 y 1992, fue coordinadora del Colegio de la Frontera Norte. También es fundadora y directora de CIMTA, que es el Centro de Investigación Multidisciplinaria de Tamaulipas. Sus publicaciónes incluyen *La Perspectiva de Género en la Historia Regional*, es una memoria del encuentro fronterizo y fue publicado por la Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez. También, *Agapito González*

Cavazos: el moviemiento obrero fronterizo y otras publicaciones entituladas *Cuesta Abajo* y "La Mujer Fronteriza: Ante la Cultura Popular Mexicana" in *Women's Issues of the Border*, que está en prensa ahora en Berkeley. Su presentación va ser "Encuentros y Desencuentros: Mujeres en el delta del Bravo, 1750 a 1850."

Alma Yolanda Guerrero-miller is studying for her doctorate at the University of North Carolina and between 1990-1992, she served as a coordinator of the Colegio de la Frontera Norte. She is also the founder and director of CIMTA, which is the organization she represents. She has several publications, one of which will be out this summer, *Agapito Gonzalez Cavazos y el moviemiento obrero.fronterizo*. With that I give you doctor-to-be Alma Yolanda Guerrero-miller.

ALMA YOLANDA GUERRERO-MILLER: Las mujeres siempre nos sentimos importantes cuando llegamos a un evento de hombres y definativamente vengo con otra perspectiva. Es de una historia que no es polítca, ni militar, ni de las relaciones diplomáticas, ni de algo que se pueda anunciar con trompetas.

Estamos abriendo el abanico un poco más para ver la vida cotidiana y enfocar un grupo importante de la población que generalmente no se incluye en las investigaciones principales de historia, la historia de la mujer. Se trata de mujeres a las que les seguimos la pista en placazos que encontramos en diarios, reportes de reconocimientos, en reportes militares, en reportes consulares, y a veces las encontramos por omisión.

Permítame decir, a manera de introducíon, que la mujer fronteriza al igual que las demás mujeres en las culturas occidentales, han sido excluidas de conocer, seleccionar, e interpretar historia. Además, su contribución histórica ha sido descuidada e ignorada támbien. Ya que hasta épocas muy recientes, todos los historiadores eran hombres. Solo escribieron lo que los hombres hicieron y consideraron importante, y a eso que ignoraba la experiencia femenina le llamaron historia y exigieron validez universal.

Sin embargo, han habido movimientos. Han habido procesos económicos que han movido el tapete a esa hegemonía del conocimiento, y han obligado a los académicos contemporáneos a ampliar sus criterios e incluir cuestiones femeninas en sus investigaciones. Así en los últimos veinte años han surgido estudios femeninos con el propósito de integrar y valorar el papel de la mujer en los procesos históricos.

En México, como en toda América Latina, la intención de entender la mujer como un ser autónomo e independiente, su rol dentro de la familia, y su impacto en la sociedad, ha generado un gran interés en todas las áreas sociales.

Las historiadoras desgraciadamente, también hemos llegado tarde y ha sido últimamente que hemos tomado las herramientas del análisis histórico para rescatar toda esa experiencia que se ha quedado atrás, y aquilatado bajo el análisis histórico. El papel de la mujer toma, entonces, un giro distinto del que percibieron y del que perciben aun hoy en día sus contemporáneos.

Es en ese contexto que voceamos nuestras reflecciones. Es ahí donde coincidimos en esta conferencia que crea un nuevo espacio de investigación, que abre ventanas al pasado, y que permite rescatar también, una historia desconocida y descuidada en las principales corrientes del quehacer histórico.

La historia de las mujeres fronterizas, las mujeres del delta riobravense--y no va a ser posible poder meter en estos quince minutos, cien años--pero lo que sí creo que puedo hacer, es tocar o apuntar ciertas crestas o picos, donde las vamos a encontrar en una manera atrevida tomando al toro por los cuernos, viviendo la oportunidad a participar

en la creación de una vida material y cultural en condiciones adversas donde dejan impresa su huella, su marca, en un período que fue de primeros encuentros, algunos tensos, violentos, de rechazo, dolorosos, otros llenos de curiosidad, identificación, intrecambio y alternativa entre los grupos poblacionales; indígenas, españoles y extranjeros que dieron origen a nuestra sociedad hoy binacional y fronteriza.

Esta investigación o este reporte que comparto con ustedes es parte de un trabajo más amplio que hemos hecho sobre una historia social y económica de Matamoros. En el transfondo de las cosas que quiero señalar, encontramos una muy dura experiencia colonizadora, una lucha por la soberanía en una región inhóspita, una región que se debatía entre inundaciones y sequías, un movimiento independentista, la oportunidad de un libre comercio, la separación de Texas, la guerra México-Estados Unidos; una línea divisoria.

Y las mujeres quedan atrapadas en dos puertas. El pasado con formas tradicionales, y un futuro incierto que implica siempre un cambio. El delta del Bravo fue tierra de encuentros. En 1828, era un territorio virgen que ensayaba la convivencia de sus pobladores con sus limitaciones físicas. Las condiciones azarosas de una área a merced de un río inconstante, de un territorio mínimamente comunicado, no apto para la agricultura, víctima, unos de otros, de saqueos, indígenas a españoles, españoles a indígenas, extranjeros a nacionales y nacionales contra todos. Una población que ni nativa ni extranjera, padecía los excesos de herencias de administraciones coloniales y los cambios políticos internos e internacionales. Con una búsqueda de nuevas oportunidades y aceptando y adoptando actividades y actitudes que se avenieran a las circunstancias.

Con todo esto dicho, encontramos tres grupos de mujeres que quiero apuntar nada más. Un grupo de mujeres indígenas que en las formas más tradicionales, donde carecían de un gobierno central organizado, donde pertenecían a bandas indígenas que se caracterizaban por ser orgullosos aun de su aperiencia física; donde las mujeres tenían un quehacer importante en esa comunidad, donde culturalmente defendían la autonomía de los campamentos tradicionales, y aunque convivían en grupos familiares, como decía, carecían de un gobierno organizado o un sentido de unidad.

Allí el apego a las tradiciones familiares fue decicivo en la evolución de las tareas. Sin embargo, el papel de la mujer en esas tribus fue visto por los españoles en una visión diferente. Las veían casi como esclavas de los indios porque a ellas les tocaba recolectar, curtir, limpiar los animales, aún hermosear a los hombres. Y el encuentro de esas mujeres indígenas con el español se da en dos planos; uno un tanto benévolo, que hasta pudiéramos pensar en él de las misiones, con esa actitud un tanto protectora, que la tenemos que cuestionar los historiadores, porque rompen todo un universo y una cosmovisión; y otro violento, que se da con los primeros colonizadores de Monterrey y Saltillo, donde sufren persecución, secuestro, separación de las familias, migración, exterminio.

El otro grupo de mujeres, las mujeres colonizadoras, las que vienen a vivir en la nueva tierra, donde la apertura de la región significa la apertura de una nueva cultura, porque quedan aislados del centro, como decía, las características de la regíon van a darle el sesgo, o van a dar la característica prinicipal que va a definir la vida de la gente del norte, y donde la llegada del extranjero fue más que el contacto con una cultura diferente, con una comida, con un lenguaje, con mercancías, con expectativas, con mobilarios dentro de la casa.

Fue un convivir de todos los días, y donde las mujeres, generosamente dieron apoyo a los recién llegados, las mujeres indígenas en su tiempo; las españolas a los

extranjeros. Aun, en el caso de la llegada del ejército americano, tenemos; recién nos acaban de sacar en la prensa el diario de Helen Chapman, donde con lujo de talles, nos marca las experiencias que vivieron y donde el ojo puritano observa el medio vestir de las mujeres mexicanas, donde los cuellos altos y las mangas largas no cabían, y donde se analiza o se observa a la mujer que es compañera del soldado americano o la víctima de su violación, y los hijos que quedan de un encuentro que quizás no fue el mejor, y donde surge una línea divisoria.

Pero las relaciones que se establecen en esta región entre familias, las redes de mujeres no advierten esa línea política a pesar de que está dada. Los apoyos en la vida cotidiana se mantienen, las preocupaciones van desde la comida hasta cuestiones de salud. En la epidemia de cólera en marzo del 1849, el dolor las une. Si contamos la población de Brazos, Santiago de Boca del Río y de Matamoros y Brownsville, vemos que como el treinta por ciento de su población es afectada. Todas las familias pierden cuando menos algún miembro, y las mujeres pasan de una familia a otra, recetas que son para ellas, cuando menos, la esperanza de una curación.

Y lo que esto nos da, es una visión de un contexto cambiante, que alteró el universo de la comunidad norteño pero particularmente el ámbito femenino, donde las cambios se dieron en los elementos más basicos de la vida diaria; el tipo de habitación, el uso del tiempo, la comida, el vestido, las creencias religiosas. Y pudiera perderme en este momento en un análisis de género, y acercarme más a lo que pudiera ser el análisis de las ideologías patriarcales y pudiéramos ir a lo que es la práctica en los hogares.

Pero lo que yo quiero notar aquí, es que la experiencia femenina, o al observar la experiencia femenina, tenemos una historia donde se rompe la mayor parte de las categorías de análisis, y donde las periodizaciones y los conceptos tienen que revisarse, y aquí en el delta del Bravo, encontramos una experiencia donde existen tres respuestas. Una confrontación permanente entre las viejas y las nuevas formas de vivir, una participación voluntaria o involuntaria que da de aceptación y conflicto. Y otras donde la mujer activamente decide participar y darle forma a esa historia donde ella es protagonista.

En esos cambios que se dieron en el delta, gran parte del peso recae sobre las mujeres que, tomando fuerza del pasado, se abren al futuro buscando nuevas formas de sobrevivencia. Rechazan o transforman lo viejo y lo nuevo, o lo nuevo ante lo viejo, debatiéndose entre el pasado y un nuevo futuro, pero es de manera aislada donde cada mujer va tomando las decisiones que ella y su familia necesita y en ese hacer cotidiano se van tejiendo los hilos, marcando los días, creando la cultura, la historia de este delta. Y para los que nos dedicamos al quehacer de la historia, el análisis de las experiencias de la mujer nos da un material más rico, más detallado, más profundo; una historia más integrada, que no puede quedar fuera de las corrientes principales de la investigación histórica. Y me atrevo a sugerir al Sistema Nacional de Parques de Estados Unidos, integrar, en una de sus temas de este parque, que en esta ocasión se va a dedicar, la experiencia de las mujeres del delta del Bravo, antes, y durante la saga de lo que es la guerra México-Estados Unidos. Gracias.

DR. SANCHEZ: Perhaps Profesora Guerrero-miller has added now the depth of the humanities, the human aspect, of the battle of Palo Alto. I think the theme that she recommends is certainly worthwhile and important for us to look at because it speaks to us and the generations after the battle of Palo Alto.

Our next speaker is Charles Haecker, who is an archeologist for the Southwest Region, National Park Service in Santa Fe. He received his B.A. in anthropology at the University of Georgia in 1973, and his M.A. in archeology at Eastern New Mexico University in 1976. His specialization is in historical archeology. Since 1970 he has worked on several sites, a seventeenth and eighteenth-century colonial site in Virginia, Colonial Williamsburg, and a Kingsville plantation. He has also worked on the Yorktown battlefield as well. Additionally, he has worked on the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth-century sites in South Carolina and Georgia, sixteenth-century Spanish prison sites, and along the Georgia coasts, nineteenth-century plantation slave quarters, Civil War battlefields around Atlanta, a nineteenth-century homestead, the military posts in New Mexico and Colorado, as well as Eskimo villages in Alaska.

His presentation will be "Artifact Pattern Analysis of Palo Alto Battlefield." I should say that I spent last evening with Mr. Haecker as we watched the sun go down on Palo Alto battlefield because we wanted to test one little theory there. The Mexicans said that the sun got in their eyes in the last phase of the attack and could not attack effectively. They had a point. We actually found reasons why the sun setting in your eyes does not permit you to see the target in front of you. Mr. Haecker.

CHARLES HAECKER: I would also like to thank Dr. Sánchez for his excellent presentation earlier, it's going to save several paragraphs from my having to refight the battle.

The battle of Palo Alto, fought on May 8, 1846, is the first major encounter of the Mexican-American War. The estimated fifteen-hundred acre battlefield is located eight miles north of the international boundary of the Río Grande, just outside the present-day city of Brownsville, Texas. So, I am going to get rid of all of these paragraphs.

The National Park Service is presently involved in developing Palo Alto into a National Historic Battlefield Site. For planning purposes, an archeological sample survey of the battlefield was required.

The primary goal of this survey was to ascertain the approximate location and extent of both the Mexican and American battle lines. The project research design described the major categories of ordnance and equipment that, if found, would be unique identifiers of each of the two opposing armies. If present in significant amounts, such identifiers would result in determining approximate battle line positions, possibly even identifying the location of specific regiments and batteries.

The ideal artifact patterning would include significant clusterings of Mexican solid cannonballs, each cluster indicating the general location of a targeted U.S. battery; a mixing of Mexican and, to a lesser degree, U.S. ordnance and equipment on the western edge of the battlefield, reflecting the flanking attempts conducted here by both armies; and linear concentrations of Mexican equipage, intermixed with U.S.-derived shrapnel, to identify the Mexican battle line.

Research conducted prior to the survey did not raise any false hopes about finding such a pristine patterning. The battlefield has been subjected to artifact collecting beginning almost as soon as the smoke of battle cleared.

On the morning following the battle, U.S. soldiers and camp followers were selectively gathering such prized souvenirs as Mexican lances and swords. At the same time reusable and/or repairable U.S. equipment and ordnance were gathered, as well as

any of the obvious personal effects that had been dropped by the U.S. soldiers during the battle.

Soldiers stationed at Palo Alto during the Mexican War reportedly spent their off-duty hours combing over the battlefield looking for relics. Apparently, intact Mexican weapons and insignias were the most desirable objects to these early relic collectors. Such items represented trophies of war by the victors. It is less likely that U.S. soldiers of the Mexican War would have collected military accoutrements relating to their own army. Cannonballs, shrapnel, and other prosaic scrap metal items probably also would have been let alone by the soldiers, however such items were objects of curiosity to civilians who soon began visiting the battlefield.

Relic collecting pressures on the battlefield presumably decreased after 1853, the year when the wagon road that bisected it was abandoned, thus discouraging access. Battle artifacts became harder to find due to vegetation regrowth and soil deposition. By the turn of the century, there were few people alive who remembered exactly where the battle lines were positioned.

Unfortunately, the twentieth century was not kind to Palo Alto battlefield. During the early 1900s the battlefield and its surrounding area were used as an artillery firing range by the army. Now there was the problem of site damage due to the scattering of thousands of lead shrapnel balls and these were sometimes mistaken for Mexican War musket balls by later archaeologists, but not by me. Really.

During the 1920s the battlefield was opened up to farming. One farmer reportedly removed cannonballs from his plowed field and dumped them into a ravine. In 1960, a land developer graded a series of proposed roads within the battlefield, exposing numerous artifacts to relic collectors. Possibly the greatest source of site damage was the use of metal detectors during the last thirty years. Areas not covered by protective vegetation were being picked clean of their sub-surface artifacts.

In 1979, Texas A&M archaeologists, under contract with the National Park Service, surveyed a portion of the battlefield in the first archeological attempt to identify Palo Alto battle lines. Using two metal detectors and a magnetometer, they found only twenty Mexican-War vintage artifacts within a sampled two hundred-acre area. Which is not encouraging when one considers that there had been some eight thousand battle participants.

The 1992 and 1993 surveys applied the recommendations made by that of Texas A&M, thirteen years earlier. That is, greater use of metal detectors while abandoning the proton magnetometer. The latter instrument was found to be virtually useless within the project area in 1979, due to numerous recent man-made anomalies and the relatively small variation caused by isolated artifacts.

For the purpose of this re-survey, the National Park Service purchased a metal detector that works well in both salt water and on land and is capable of automatically screening out false readings due to ground minerals and conductive sea salt that was probably a main problem for the earlier survey. Metal detectors have advanced a great deal in the past fifteen years.

Our metal detector proved to have a valuable feature because the soil at Palo Alto contains soluble salt in excess of six thousand parts per million, in addition to mineral fertilizer concentrations which can cause false readings. You think you have a piece of metal and in fact you don't. For the same reason many of the volunteers who are serious relic collectors use similar models which also have this screening feature.

The 1992-1993 sampling strategy involved random stratified placement of thirty-six survey units, to ensure that the various historically documented and aerially defined battle activity areas would be sampled and let's see.

Oh great. Can you all see that? Can you turn off these lights? Would that help? Okay. The survey units measured either five hundred by one hundred feet or thirty-five hundred by thirty feet, depending upon the openness of the battle activity area. Prior to its survey, each unit was delineated and, if necessary, its vegetation cover removed by mowing. In this case, as you can see, it was plowed already, so this made our work a lot easier. These stakes laid out as our guides. We do not go outside our control units. As you can see here, we have mowed the grass.

Those surveyors operating metal detectors were aligned at fifteen foot intervals and oriented along the long axis of the survey unit. The surveyors proceeded in line, using a sweeping motion, with each operator covering a sweep of approximately five to seven feet.

The surveyors pin-flagged surface artifacts and points targeted by their metal detectors, then continued their survey. A follow-up crew excavated the targeted areas provenanced, and collected the artifacts. Artifact locations were then measured to within one inch accuracy in distance, using a total station that was positioned on a permanent grid station. Provenanced data was later processed, to produce a map of artifact distribution. So, we would come within one one-thousandth of a foot accuracy if we wanted to be that accurate.

What you're looking at here is a Mexican cannonball. A copper cannonball that's a four or eight-pounder. I'm not sure offhand.

A total of sixty acres were intensively surveyed in this fashion, representing an estimated 3% sample of the battlefield. Survey results were unexpectedly rewarding. The 1992 and 1993 surveys recovered seven hundred and twenty one battle-related artifacts; a ratio of approximately twelve artifacts per surveyed acre. This was a profound improvement over the 1979 findings, which yielded a ratio of approximately one to ten surveyed acres.

The two surveys conclusively identified evidence of Mexican and U.S. cannonading that thwarted both sides cavalry flanking maneuvers on the western end of the battlefield and the final position of the Mexican battle line.

There is also some material evidence suggesting the position of one of the U.S. batteries, denoted by a relative concentration of Mexican cannonballs.

Negative information, that is, absence of battle-related artifacts within several of the sample areas, also has aided in the extrapolation of generalized boundaries of the battlefield. In other words, future researchers will increase the cost-efficiency of data recovery by knowing where not to survey within the project area.

The success of the 1992 and 1993 surveys is attributed, in part, to the use of technologically superior metal detector models. However, it was also obvious that a top-of-the-line metal detector will not compensate for the shortcomings of the operator. One skillful operator, one of ours, was a volunteer who had been using a metal detector for years. He was especially adept at locating artifacts that were both small and deeply buried. Some beginner operators, such as myself, using the same model of metal detector found significantly fewer artifacts and I would also like to say that unlike the 1979 survey, the 1992 and 1993 surveys were largely dependent upon volunteers, several of whom were present every day of the survey and I'd like to thank them today, three of which are here with us: Robert García, Bob Anderson, and Jeff Mauck. Thanks very

much for your help guys. I'd also right now like to show you what my extrapolation with the battle lines looks like which is I think a bit different from how it has been interpreted. The Mexican ornaments were made of copper. Now, it shows that you do have a pattern appearing where you have, as one should expect, the Americans moving toward the south, the Mexicans toward the north. So, we still have patterning, even after over one hundred and fifty years we can still get that pattern.

This is the battleline as it has been interpreted over the years and I believe this holds up fairly well. Here's the American battle line, the Mexican battle line, and the various regiments. Something of significant note, here is the Palo Alto pond, the resacas. This is a feature which shows up on aerial photos, and it's only noted on a few sketches. It's a very significant aspect of the battle.

Here is a second phase wherein the Americans move their regiments over to force back the Mexican flanking attempt. We did get material here from the American shrapnel firing at the Mexicans. This did show up. I should also mention that we did not identify the Mexican first line. We did identify, I believe, where the Mexicans were located during the second phase of the battle.

Now, this is a bit different from the usual interpretation. At first, I should also note, this is the so-called Arista Hill. These are a series of dunes that were covered with mesquite that no longer exist and it should be noted in any interpretation of the battle. For whatever reason they are not here today. These black areas represent dense concentrations of Mexican and U.S. artifacts, Mexican uniform and weapons, and American ordnance. We have a concentration here, a concentration around this marshy area. This is where we found the primary concentrations of the Mexican line and, as Dr. Sánchez noted, the Mexicans had the sun in their eyes, because they were going out there on May 6, around 7:00 PM. For that to have happened, they would have had to have been facing almost west, versus other descriptions of the battle where you had the Mexican line running approximately at a forty-five degree angle. It was further to the west and the Mexican line swung much further in this direction than has been described in the past. At least this is my present theory and theories can be changed as more information comes in, but I also believe that the Mexican line collapsed to a great extent.

Here is a concentration of cannonballs fired at Duncan's battery, and another concentration of material here. They collapsed the Mexican line, wheeled it around, and collapsed back. They fell back on this group of the infantry, which in fact, they moved further this way, as well. So, consequently, you get a great concentration of material right here. Is that it? Okay. Thank you.

DR. SANCHEZ: Thank you very much, Charles. Our last presentation is by Al Richardson and Norman Richard. Both are longtime members of the biology faculty at Texas Southmost College and most recently the University of Texas at Brownsville. Al Richardson is an expert on native plants of the lower Río Grande and Norman Richard works on local ecological systems and has prepared presentations for Texas Parks and Wildlife.

NORMAN RICHARD: Our first project with the Palo Alto Battlefield Site is a biological inventory so we're compiling a list of those plants and animals that inhabit the area. Now, you've had a lot of information about the history of the site, and something about the artifacts, but it turns out that the site is a very important for wildlife also. If you look at the historical descriptions, you find that it's described by Bonnel in 1840 and by E.

Kirby Smith in 1846 as mostly prairie with intermittent mesquite chaparral. Today most of the site of the battlefield area has been modified highly. There have been crops planted there, a canal has been dug on the north side, which interrupts the roadway from Port Isabel that no doubt Zachary Taylor traveled and the resacas are basically resaca scars that maintain water only during the wet seasons. In some places it's more or less semi-permanent, but those are waterways that were taken advantage of by the ranchers. That is a cut that would have been an old resaca scar in which the tanks have been built. This particular tank runs east and west. It's one of the resacas that Charles Haecker showed you. It's a good place for analysis because the sub-strata, of course, holds water. But this particular tank we surveyed a few weeks ago for fish and we found nine species of native fish there, including mullet, and no introduced fish and no threatened or endangered species at this point, but there may be black-spotted newt and Río Grande Lesser Siren, which are both threatened species, in some of the other waterways.

One of the animals that's very predominant on the site right now is the willet. The willet is one of the food chain items for the large predators of the airway, the raptors such as the white-tailed hawks and others.

Now, I mentioned that there were prairies. There are some places that are really almost monocultures of species as the sea-oxeye daisy, the Barrichia, and it's rather pure. This is probably the site of, more or less, where *el tule chico* existed. The drainage pattern has allowed it to become a prairie of one species. Now, where the salt is very strong, you'll find holophytic plants. These are such plants as glass-fort and sea blight. These are strongly saline-loving plants and so that's the kind of prairie. One of the animals that's breeding there, at the moment, is the scissor-tail fly catcher. The populations are fairly high and they like small shrubs that stick up above the surface. Some of the time they perch in small trees for courting and for hunting insects.

Smith described varieties of flowers that were beautiful. The battlefield area was beautiful from the standpoint of flowers and we're finding the same thing. This is the spring. This is the plant called Clappia and what do those willets eat? Willets eat fiddler crabs and the clayey soils are percolated with holes in which the fiddler crabs live and this is a particularly highly-tolerant animal. It can stand extremes of drought and extremes of salinity. It's the most widely tolerant animal that you could imagine in the arthropod group and it's yucca sub-silindrica. Also, there's a high population of plains wood rats and these are the nests. They are built in and among the cactus, prickly pear cactus, or under a mesquite tree. Of course, that is an animal that would support a number of predators in the food chain. No one, to my knowledge has observed ocelots or jaguarundi, but the habitat is suitable and those are two very endangered animals.

Now, this is a view of Arista's Hill and it's amazing how tall that hill is compared to the surrounding areas. It's a very important wildlife habitat. Some of the plants there make berries that are very useful for migratory birds. This is the migratory season and there are many birds like Black-burnian warblers and northern orioles that are passing through right now. So, it's one of the vegetated areas that becomes very important for the northward migration of a number of neotropical bird types, at least that spend the winter season south. Their populations are substantially declining. So, one of the great values of this property is the fact that it has wildlife value.

Now, the cactus plants in this area are a range of colors from the reds to the yellows and with the salmon colors in between. There are beautiful flowers. There are a lot of cacti there. The prickly pear cactus, for example, is in this area, and Dr. Richardson tells me they are found in three colors and all of the ranges in between. No

where else in the prickly pear's range do you find that. So, there's some plants and the range of colors that complex can be. The cacti was protected from collection so there are quite a few different varieties of cacti. That's, of course, what most people know as the horse crippler or Turk's head. This is often called the Christmas cactus, in Spanish the *tasajillo*, and it is in the same genus, Opuntia, as the prickly pear cactus. It looks very different. This is called the twisted rib cactus and this one is the mammillaria or nipple cactus and this one happens to be the ladyfinger cactus. They have been blooming right now and Dr. Richardson has been able to get some good pictures of the plants there, which will help document the inventory. Now, Smith describes the prickly pear cactus as growing to the height of fifteen or twenty feet. As far as we can tell, the tallest plants there are about twelve feet at the moment. We were thinking about that and we think maybe the 1933 hurricane probably toppled them down. It was a direct hit and maybe these have grown since 1933, but it's possible, I think, that they may have been even taller than that during the period of about 1846. The populations of doves, particularly morning doves, is extremely high. Dr. Richardson photographed that morning dove nest. You also have the Texas tortoise which is listed as threatened by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department. It's also listed by the Texas Organization for Endangered Species as threatened. Now when the evening comes to the battlefield, this appears to be one of the important animals for predators also and so there are all kinds cottontail rabbits that appear, however there's also blacktail jack rabbits and coyotes and a number of other animals that since we're just starting on the project, since March, we haven't yet photographed. We hope to have a good inventory for the time when the visitors center is open and those species can be available by slide for those that are interested. Now, anyway, we think of the battle, but we think of the place where it occurred, which was called the grass prairie. That particular site is a location for a visitor from Mexico that comes here only during the summer and that's a Botteri sparrow and the Botteri sparrow uses that habitat exclusively. The battlefield is where they're concentrated. Now they are listed as threatened and also category two federally. There are several animals that are category two, which means that we don't know enough about them. It may be that they should be listed as threatened or endangered, but we have to learn about that. So, don't forget to think about the value of that site as wildlife habitat for endangered and threatened species especially.

DR. SANCHEZ: I wish to thank all of our speakers for this afternoon and especially you, our audience, for focusing for the last couple of hours. I would like to thank our translators as well for I think they did a remarkable job all day long. Again, thank you.

UNKNOWN: We'll be going to Mexico now so we'll drive over to the city parking lot which is just one block past International. If you're parked at the Fort Brown, you can go on and park there, but put the Palo Alto conference thing in front of your windshield. That way they'll let you park in the city parking lot free and your car will have police protection while we're in Mexico, but we'll go across the bridge and meet at García's. So, I guess we'll just do our best to meet at García's or should we wait there before we cross? Try and stick together as much as we can, I guess. The bus of the Municipality of Matamoros is meeting us at Garcías.
[End of session]

[Friday, May 7, 1993: Evening session]
UNKNOWN: El día primero de mayo de 1993 a las siete horas en la sala María del Pilar del Museo Casa Mata. La Sociedad Tamaulipeca de Historia, Geografía, y Estadística de Matamoros.

UNKNOWN: Esta conferencia es de gran regocijo para nuestra clase y para nuestros estudiantes y los profesores que están con nosotros en nuestro clase sobre la historia de la ciudad en la frontera. Es exactamente nuestro tópico de la clase y un gran regocijo para nosotros. Tenemos que agradacer especialmente a Norma Morales por la parte que ella ha tenido en todo esto y también especialmente a Tom Carroll y a todos los organizadores, especialmente a Sylvia Komatzu.

Lo que va a pasar, me han dicho que debo explicarlo un poco. Primeramente vamos a tener presentaciones del Dr. David Pletcher, profesor de la Universidad de Indiana y la Dra. Josefina Zoraida Vásquez del Colegio de México, y los otros profesores en este panel que van a discutir después un poco; el Dr. Jesús Velasco-Márquez, de la Universidad de las Américas, el Dr. David Weber de Southern Methodist University, Dr. Miguel Soto de la Universidad Autónoma de México, y Dr. Pedro Santoni de California State University en San Bernardino.

Antes de empezar, quiero decir dos cosas. Los estudiantes de nuestra clase y primeramente, Tom Carroll, le invitan a Uds. a venir, gratis, a las conferencias mañana por la mañana en el Museo Histórico de Brownsville para oir las presentaciones allí a las nueve de la mañana. Están Uds. todos muy bienvenidos a venir allí y ojalá que puedan venir. Es el tiempo de nuestras pruebas finales en la universidad, pero ojalá que haya oportunidad para oir estas presentaciones. La otra cosa que debo comunicarles, es que el Tecnológico nos ha indicado que en vez de tener nuestras presentaciones en la semana que viene, nos reuniremos el viernes que viene a las ocho de la noche--no aquí en el campus, pero en la clase Hidalgo.

UNKNOWN: On behalf of the scholars present we just want to say how delighted we are to be participating in the First Annual Palo Alto Conference and we're also delighted to be with the Border History class tonight. Given the late hour and the limited time, we'll just be hearing from two of the scholars tonight, but of course as Professor Kearney said, we welcome you to attend tomorrow morning at nine o'clock to hear all of the presenters.

We'll begin this evening with Doctora Josefina Zoraida Vásquez and as you've heard she has written extensively on the subject of the U.S.-Mexican War. She is at the Colegio de México, but this year is at Stanford University on a Fulbright scholarship at the Center for Advanced Studies and Behavioral Sciences. Doctora Vázquez.

DR. JOSEFINA ZORAIDA VAZQUEZ: Después de un día de hablar de la guerra con los Estados Unidos, me gustaría hablar un poco en términos generales de la parte mexicana, que es la peor estudiada. Tal vez porque fue una época de pérdidas, de inestabilidad, de grandes dificultades. Los mexicanos hemos descuidado esa parte de nuestra historia y ha quedado en detrimento nuestro. ¿Por qué? Quedaron solamente los documentos del pasado que escribieron las gentes que estaban un poco involucradas en la lucha política de entonces.

Entonces nos queda una idea bastante equívoca, bastante incompleta y sobre todo, podríamos decir partidaria. Los historiadores han leído pocos documentos, sobre todo los

del siglo veinte, sean marxistas, sean historicistas, sean positivistas, pero han estado repitiendo lo que habían dicho los mexicanos de aquella época que estaban de uno o de otro capítulo. A mí, desde el principio que yo trabajaba en el período, me parece que desde la independencia hasta la guerra con los Estados Unidos, que algo había que no estaba explicado bien.

Esto de que dejábamos la historia de México, de ese país tan grande, tan importante, reino de la Nueva España, la joya más preciosa de la corona española, que era el presupuesto más grande del imperio español, que lo sostenía desde las Floridas a Cuba y hasta las Filipinas y todavía mandaba dinero a España; ¿Cómo era posible que de repente fuera el país tan facilmente vencido por los Estados Unidos? Algo allí necesita ser bien explicado. Bueno. Me ha costado mucho trabajo porque empecé estudiando la guerra y después la república centralista por aquello de que perdimos a Tejas, porque no habían centralistas y como eso tampoco me pareció suficiente, hasta la independencia y después, el siglo XVIII.

Empiezo a entender el asunto. El otro día, cuando estaba en un centro tan distinguido como el "Center for Advanced Study of Behavioral Sciences," de repente de uno de los sociólogos distinguísimos que hay allí, me dijo en la hora del lonche, "¿Cómo es posible que un país tan chico como México haya osado declararle la guerra a los Estados Unidos?" Entonces yo le tuve que indicar que en primer lugar, no era tan chico. En el segundo lugar, no declaramos la guerra, nos la declararon.

Entonces, había esta absurda falta de comunicación. El imperio español igual que el imperio británico, cada día me convenzo más, tuvieron una trayectoria bastante semejante. Después de la Guerra de los Siete Años, Inglaterra empezó a ordenar y a tratar de convertir a los reinos que habían sido parte de la corona de Castilla.

México, para entonces, ya era parte del comercio internacional. En parte, ilegalmente y en parte legalmente. ¿Que sucedió con esto? Tuvieron que terminar como un especie de sociedad y estaban funcionando bien, como creo que han mostrado muy bien los libros de Brian Hamnett. No era funcionamiento de los Estados Unidos--era otro--pero estaba funcionando bien. Crearon una nueva división, una división que más o menos correspondía a las redes comerciales, eso estuvo bien hecho desde la independencia, pero la hicieron depender directamente de España.

Al hacerla depender de España le quitaron el poder al virrey, es decir trataron de hacer un federalismo, pero centralizado en Madrid en lugar de México. Se rompió, la en cierta medida, no se rompió porque no es fácil cambiar las cosas, pero se interrompió la forma en que había funcionado la colonia. Y después los benditos reyes borbones se metieron en las guerras a favor de la independencia de los Estados Unidos contra Inglaterra, a favor de los Hapsburgos en contra de la revolución francesa y luego a favor de Napoleon. Entonces, México estaba en bancarrota desde la última década del siglo pasado. Otra diferencia, una diferencia grande con los Estados Unidos, fue que ellos se independizaron en una guerra poco sangrienta, corta y inmediamente fueron ratificadas su independencia. Con otra bendición cuando hicieron su segunda constitución, la que todavía es vigente, se armó la revolución francés y tuvieron tres décadas de guerras en Europa. México se independizó en 1821 cuando Europa estaba tranquila y los Estados Unidos ambisiosos de territorio. Fuimos asaltados por los españoles, por los frances y por los norteamericanos. No nos dejaron en paz los poderes europeos, no pudimos experimentar ningun gobierno y entre diferencia europea o norteamericano. ¿Que quería decir? Todo esto incluso en que el país practicamente no pudiera ni siquiera consolidarse. Esto explica en parte la debilidad del país en ese momento. Creo que sería muy bueno

aclarar algunas cosas. Aclarar, por ejemplo, el impacto que ha tenido la independencia de Tejas que para justificarse se utilizó la Declaración de Independencia de los Estados Unidos y los historiadores en lugar de buscar las verdaderas razones o tratar de explicarla, han seguido la Declaración de Independencia de los Estados Unidos con la independencia de Tejas. El centralismo realmente no tuvo. Al contrario, el lugar de ser causa de la separación se impusó para evitarte que el país se desintegrara. Se habla mucho siempre tanto dentro del contexto de la independencia de Tejas como en el de la guerra del dictador Santa Anna, en las dos ocasiones Santa Anna no era dictador. Y no puede ser como la frase que ha utilizado de Octavio Paz ese símbolo del dictador latinoamericano. Ese sería el Doctor Francia o Rosas. El poder de Santa Anna se caía cada rato. Los dictadores duran tiempo, controlan, no tienen congresos. El hacía eleciones. Entonces ésto explica la debildad. Lo que pasa es que habíamos sido asaltados de tantas partes. Habían roto la estructura social de la Nueva España. No los podíamos enfrentar contra el otro. Habíamos perdido en la independencia, la mitad de la fuerza de trabajo. Teníamos seis millones y media y despues de la independencia que teníamos menos de seis millones. Los Estados Unidos tenía más o menos la misma población, en los cuarenta tienen más de veinte millones. Como Uds. ven, había una desparidad total. Muchas gracias.

SYLVIA KOMATZU: We'll hear much more from Profesora Vásquez tomorrow morning. Now we'll move on to Dr. Pletcher.

DR. DAVID PLETCHER: Well, we've all had a long day. I'm glad to be the last of the speakers in the series. Today, you've heard a good many talks about Mexico and the war and the United States and the war, but you haven't heard any talks about the outside powers, the international aspects, of the war and you may have concluded from that, that it was a simply a bilateral war, a bipowered war, between the United States and Mexico alone. The reason for that is that none of the European powers were interested in intervening. I'd like to analyze briefly for you today the reasons why none of them intervened. I'm talking mainly about England, France, and Spain. The only Western European powers who could have played any sort of role. It is not likely that any of them were able to, or could, or wanted to, send forces across the Atlantic to help Mexico. I think that was always out of the question, but it's quite possible that England or France could have lent money to Mexico or could have given diplomatic support. They were both strong enough to do that and yet they did not. Spain acted against Mexico, plotted against Mexico to establish a monarchy, and that actually helped the Americans and weakened the Mexicans. Therefore, such effort as the European powers did put forth actually worked in favor of the Americans.

To understand what the British, French, and the Spanish tried to do during the Mexican War we have to go back very briefly to the Texas Revolution. Britain and France, without Spain in this case, were much interested in the Texas Revolution for one particular reason. They wanted to set up a buffer state between Mexico and the United States and play balance-of-power politics. The British, in particular, were always interested in restraining the growth of the United States to prevent it from becoming too powerful in the New World, as it threatened their colonies and their economic power. So, the British tried to set up Texas as an independent state in the hope that it would restrain the western expansion of the United States. They failed to do so. Those of you who know the history of Texas and are interested in it will know why. I am interested

today in talking about the effect of the British policy, French policy, and Spanish policy on the Mexican War. After the failure of the British and the Mexicans to restrain the Texans from joining the United States, the British had a mixed view of giving any help at all to Mexico. They were dependent upon Mexico, for one thing, for the repayment of the enormous debt which the Mexicans had built up through the 1820s and the 1830s and 1840s to British bankers by borrowing money. They had the interest from that, on these loans, which amounted to a great deal of money for that time, but the Mexicans had not paid. The British had become exasperated with the Mexican delays and the Mexican excuses at the time when the vital British effort to prevent the annexation of Texas failed. The prime minister of Britain, Lord Aberdeen, said to the Mexican minister to Britain, "The trouble is with you Mexicans, you have inherited the Spanish habit of always doing things too late," and there was something in that. So, the British were exasperated with the Mexicans, but they still wanted to prevent the United States from enlarging itself too much at the expense of the Mexicans. So, when the United States invaded Mexico, the British were held off. They did not try to dissuade the United States, but they remained neutral until it looked as if the United States were going to win. After Scott landed at Veracruz and captured the city very quickly, the American minister to Britain, George Bancroft, was surrounded at receptions by members of the British court and officials and politicians of the British government who said, "How did Scott manage to capture Veracruz so easily?" and they were enormously impressed. The British were always impressed with military strength. They were much surprised. Again, when Scott went over the mountains into the valley of Mexico, the Duke of Wellington who was at that time a military genius of the age and had beaten Napoleon, said, "Scott has lost. He cannot capture Mexico. He will be defeated bit by bit by the Mexicans. He can't afford to retreat." This did not happen, of course, and Wellington was all the more impressed by the performance of the American army so that at the end of the war, the British held back from any sort of direct aid to Mexico. But they were afraid that the conquest would go on and on until Mexico was divided up and ceased to exist as an independent country. That would have made the United States too powerful so that the end result of the British policy was that they helped make peace. They served as mediators between the Mexicans and the United States. When Scott and Trist were in Mexico City trying to communicate with the Mexican government, the British minister and his aids served as messengers between Mexico City and the Mexican government and helped to bring about a peace and to melt a stubbornness of the Mexicans who were trying to avoid negotiating. This, of course, helped the Americans because the Americans wanted to negotiate too and they could not manage a long occupation of Mexico or a complete conquest of a country. So, the net result of the British policy, for interests, was to help the United States.

As for the French, they played the same sort of policy in Texas, but between the end of the annexation of Texas and the outbreak of the Mexican War, the French broke relations with Mexico for a completely different reason, having nothing to do with the American-Mexican crisis so they were out the picture all together and they played no role whatsoever. That leaves the Spanish as agents, as possible interveners, in the crisis between the United States and Mexico. Spain had her own interests. Spain wanted to reconquer Mexico or reassert her influence over Mexico and so she tried to do what the French tried to do in the 1860s. That is, she chose a princeling from the Spanish royal family and proposed to set him on a throne in Mexico. The intrigue was carried on by the Spanish minister to Mexico, Bermudes de Castro, and the Spanish foreign office. As long as the Americans were north of the Río Grande or were not making very much

headway in their invasion of Mexico, the Spanish could hope for some success, but after the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, the whole Spanish intrigue collapsed and Bermudes de Castro gave up his efforts to line up conservative politicians to support a Spanish monarch or monarchy in Mexico.

As so often happened in U.S. history, European powers could not deploy their impressive forces in the New World to restrain the Americans. This was due partly to distance, but even more to involvement in their own affairs. In particular, during the 1840s, Britain and France were so suspicious of each other that neither dared to get entangled in North America. Thus, Europe's distress was often America's advantage and the various other forces canceled out so that in the end, the British were the only active power in Europe regarding the Mexican question, and Great Britain was led to work on behalf of the Americans, and their intrigues, their diplomacy, worked in favor of the Americans, rather than the Mexicans. Thank you.

SYLVIA KOMATZU: We have heard some distinct perspectives tonight and we do have time for a few questions. Do you have any comments or questions for Dr. Pletcher or Doctora Vázquez.

UNKNOWN: I just have one comment, and that is how the official sanction of the election, for the times of the public defenses the United States was carrying all of them. I have not read any memoir of any Texan that mentioned it other than Houston and his immediate circle that were actually forced. Most of them voted against it than admitted to it and it was a very rigged election. There were two lists: for and against, and you went and signed your name to one or the other. It was not a secret ballot and the pro-American faction was standing there, with rifles, watching who signed. So, in my way of thinking, that annexation election was rigged from the word go, and it wasn't unanimous among the Texans as it has been made out to be since.

DR. PLETCHER: I would say that this is not the subject on which I was talking and I am not an expert on Texas history, but such of what I do know about Texas history leads me to believe that this is not a correct interpretation. I have not seen any major historian who has supported this.
[End of session]

[Saturday, May 8, 1993: Morning session]
UNKNOWN: Me gustaría presentarles al director del Centro Noreste del Instituto Nacional de la Antropología e Historia. Arquitecto Javier Sánchez García, que muy amablemente llegó aquí para estar con nosotros hoy en día, representando la directora general del Instituto Nacional de Antropología y el Distrito Federal, María Teresa Franco. Bueno. Y ahora, es la hora de Sylvia Komatzu y su muy distinguido grupo de profesionales historiadores de los dos paises. Bueno, no quiero tomar más tiempo.

SYLVIA KOMATZU: Good Morning. It's good to see everyone again today. What we'd like to do this morning is have time to encourage an exchange between the panelists and the other members of the conference. So, what we would like to do is have each panelist give a presentation, of about ten minutes, and then we'll leave time for a couple of questions after each presentation before moving on to the next speaker and that should also give us enough time at the end of the program to have general discussion, as well.

We'll begin this morning with David J. Weber. Dr. Weber is professor of history at Southern Methodist University. He's the author or editor of dozens of articles and fifteen books including *Foreigners in Their Native Land: Historical Roots of the Mexican Americans, The Mexican Frontier: 1821-1846, The American Southwest Under Mexico,* and *The Spanish Frontier in North America.* We're pleased to have you here today, Dr. Weber.

DR. DAVID WEBER: Some years ago, the folklorist at the University of Texas, Amerigo Perez told a joke that he had heard in Mexico City. Two cab drivers are talking about the Mexican War and its terrible results and one said, "Yes, they took half of Mexico," and the other said, "Yes, and it's the half with the good roads." Well, this half and half kind of story is what I want to focus on a bit because this happens to be the one area that I know something about. I'm not much of an expert on the actual war itself, but the comment last night that Josefina Vásquez made, that some of you heard, that how does one explain how the Viceroyalty of New Spain, which had been the jewel of the Spanish crown should, within a matter of a fairly short amount of time, be vulnerable to an attack and successful invasion of the United States and then lose the war. The same kind of question applies, I think, to the northern area of what was then Mexico. How do we explain how the Americans so easily, relatively easily, now I want to emphasize relative on this, took New Mexico and took California during the war? The explanation can be seen in many grounds, but I want to just argue that one of those explanations has to do with the ambivalence, political ambivalence, of many of the frontiersmen who lived in this region, from Texas all the way to California and for very good reasons.

Here, as we've heard over and over again, is a rather sparsely populated area of Mexico and when Mexico achieved its independence in 1821, an area that might have expected to be governed politically by itself, that here, very quickly was a federalist constitution put into place, one modeled after that of the United States, in part, that gave states rights, but what actually happened in practice was that Texas was linked to Coahuila as one large state. The *tejanos* had very little autonomy then to govern themselves, New Mexico and California were not governed at all autonomously, rather, they became territories in the new system. They didn't have enough population to be states or enough political clout to be states. Territories were to be governed under regulations set up by the federal Congress in Mexico City and Congress never got around to doing that all the way until 1835, by which time this system went out of business and a new, more centralized government came into being. Therefore, people living in California and living in New Mexico were still following rules and laws laid down by the Spanish Cortes, even though they were to be part of an independent Mexico. There was a great deal of confusion simply in political terms and relatively very little local autonomy. Now that political situation that I am describing to you in very brief terms, represents just one institution that under Spain, functioned quite well, but under independent Mexico fell into a kind of transition period as Mexico was building a new, independent country and trying to define itself politically for the people on the frontier. Politically then, the system didn't work very well.

Another institution that had worked reasonably well under Spain and it had certainly had been a strong institution of the frontier was the Catholic Church. Under independent Mexico, the church received a series of blows, one of which was simply the expulsion of many Spaniards, and many of the churchmen on the frontier happened to be Spaniards, and they happened to be Franciscans. In fact, there was practically no

clergyman on the frontier who was not a Franciscan in the 1820s. Many of them left. By 1846, on the eve of the war, the only Franciscans left on the whole frontier were nine in California and one in New Mexico. They were to be replaced with secular clergy, with parish priests, and there was a great shortage of those in all of Mexico, not just on the frontier. So, there weren't a lot of priests available to send north and some of the frontiersmen suspected in fact that priests would prefer to be in Mexico City, Puebla, Veracruz, and some place with a more comfortable parish, a little better income than to be up living on the edge of the lands of the so-called barbarians on the northern frontier in California and New Mexico or a place like Texas.

Another institution that had worked reasonably well under Spain was the military, which by the end of the colonial period had fashioned at least a kind of détente with Indian raiders across the frontier, whether Apaches, Comanches, or other lesser groups. With the coming of Mexican Independence, the military challenge in the northern frontier increased, rather than decreased, because westward moving Anglo-Americans were arming Indians, selling them guns, selling them gun powder, ever farther west, ultimately all the way to California and Indian attacks stepped up.

Meanwhile, the Mexican military had become increasingly politicized. A good many units were stationed in the central part of the country where it was to their political advantage to be on hand, or at least to the advantage of their commanding officers to be on hand. Should there be a coup, there would be the opportunity for perhaps a cabinet position, if not the presidency itself, and for frontiersmen this was a bitter pill. Mariano Chavez from New Mexico complained bitterly in 1844. He said, "We are surrounded on all sides by many tribes of heartless barbarians. Almost perishing and our brothers, instead of helping us, are at each other's throats in festering civil wars." Those key institutions, then, political institutions, the church, the military, worked less well in a way for frontiersmen than it had before.

The economy, on the other hand, improved substantially, but to Mexico's detriment, the economy improved in the wrong direction. Trade increased with the United States and Americans began to move onto the northern frontier. First into Texas, then New Mexico, California, in not very large, but significant numbers in terms of investment and in terms of stimulating what had been a fairly backward economy. Along with those Americans had come, of course, a certain amount of cultural change: Americans spoke English, were Protestants, and, as it turned out, might not have been terribly popular, but at least were not the devil. One gained familiarity then. The *mexicanos* across the frontier gained a certain familiarity with Anglo-Americans, some of them very familiar as they married Anglo-American males and had bilingual, bicultural families. And so it was evident by the 1840s to officials who came north from Mexico to the frontier to investigate, that there was a growing problem, of political loyalty, of cultural loyalty even, to the center of Mexico. Now, this comes as no surprise to Mexican historians, who understand very well that Mexico at this time might even arguably have not been a nation, as we understand it today, but rather a series of strong regions. The north then was simply another one of those regions. But I think to Americans, to Anglo-Americans who are trying to understand this war, we tend to see the United States fighting Mexico and all Mexicans are essentially alike, then. We homogenize Mexico with this period, except that we divide them into different political parties in the center. I want to say that it's just not the center then where there is a difference between liberals and conservatives, but regionally then, there were considerable differences, too. In saying this now, I want to be sure I'm not

misunderstood. I'm not justifying the United States takeover of this region. I think that this was a pure out and out war of aggression. I'm not saying that Mexicans in the region were just simply waiting for Anglo-Americans to come and deliver them somehow from Mexico. I am saying that they were ambivalent politically and that their loyalty to central Mexico was weak. If they had their druthers, I think most of them would have preferred to still be in Mexico after the war was over, but that wasn't the case and it wasn't worth fighting arduously and losing their lives for it. Except in one rebellion in New Mexico and one rebellion in California, by and large, this was a relatively easy conquest then. I think in part because of this ambivalence then that I've tried to give you some reasons for. Thank you.

SYLVIA KOMATZU: We'll have time for a couple of questions if anyone would like for Dr. Weber to speak further.

DR. WEBER: We have to be very careful when we talk about sparsely populated that we are talking of human beings, some of whom happen to be Indians, and some of whom happen to be Mexicans. The Mexican population numbered something like three thousand five hundred in California and about thirty thousand in New Mexico, unless we count in New Mexico hispanicized pueblo Indians. In which case you can add another ten thousand or get up to about forty thousand. I think we should count those pueblo Indians because in many ways they had ceased to be what Mexico defined as Indians. Mexico now defined all Indians as Mexican citizens. Once Mexico became independent, these legal distinctions were broken down. The understanding was "The constitution now says we're all equal, but damn it, these people are not as equal as we are, they are still making war on us, they still refuse to recognize that they're Mexicans and that they live in Mexico." So, one doesn't want to count Indians who don't think of themselves as Mexicans then I think that would be reasonable, but about forty thousand then in New Mexico about three thousand five hundred in California, somewhere around the same in Texas.

SYLVIA KOMATZU: Any other questions before we move on? I'll stand on my tiptoes so we don't have to change this for our next presenter. In the meantime if someone could come up and change this for Jesús that would be great. Next we have Dr. Jesús Velasco who is a professor of history at the Universidad de las Americas in Puebla. His books include *La Guerra con los Estados Unidos*, *La Cultura en México*, and *La Guerra del Cuarenta y Siete en la opinión publica en México*. Dr. Velasco.

DR. JESUS VELASCO: Fundamentalmente lo que quiero hacer en esta ocasión es, más que presentar una ponencia, compartir con ustedes algunas de las inquietudes que en el momento tengo para enfrentarme al estudio de la Guerra entre México y los Estados Unidos. Quiero partir de una premisa fundamental. Considero que este acontecimiento es el acontecimiento más importante de las relaciones entre ambos países. De este acontecimiento quedan marcados los elementos que van a determinar aún nuestras relaciones en este momento, no sólo desde el punto de vista político; sino desde el punto de vista también económico, social y humano.

La marca de la guerra está presente a unos cuantos kilómetros de aquí: en la frontera que divide a estas dos ciudades y que se prolonga a lo largo de toda la frontera. Su huella queda en la población mexicana que quedó en el territorio de los Estados

Unidos y que conformaría un problema sumamente importante para la sociedad norteamericana. Su huella queda en una conciencia por lo menos muy marcada del lado mexicano, tal vez más olvidada del lado norteamericano. Su huella queda en un temor que evidentemente es justificado y que, tal vez, en un intento novedoso de acercamiento, trata de borrarse; pero es difícil. Yo diría que la Guerra entre México y los Estados Unidos sin duda alguna es un acontecimiento que si bien no es una herida abierta; sí, es una cicatriz, que es difícil que desaparezca. A partir de esto, creo que es importantísimo, tanto para los historiadores mexicanos como para los norteamericanos, dar una razón justa, lo más objectiva posible, acercándose lo más a la verdad de lo que significa este hecho justamente para que estos elementos que acabo de mencionar puedan ser mejor entendidos y en el futuro plantear...También porque aunque sea obsoleto, creo que la historia es un instrumento importante para planear nuestro futuro y entender nuestro presente. Como países vecinos que somos tenemos esta obligación. Bien. Creo que si analizamos, como decía la Doctora Vásquez, la historiografía sobre la guerra, nos vamos a encontrar con un fenómeno singular. En primer lugar, tanto en México como en los Estados Unidos, el acontecimiento no ha sido estudiado tal vez con la importancia que tenga. Otros acontecimientos han atraído más la atención de los historiadores; pero no solamente de los historiadores sino también de los cineastas y de los escritores. En el caso de los Estados Unidos la Guerra Civil, en el caso de México la Guerra de Reforma o de Intervención Francesa, o la misma Revolución de 1910 han, por así decirlo, atraído más la atención y el interés de los historiadores. Y la Guerra con los Estados Unidos, en ambas partes, ha quedado relativamente resagada. Aquí hay posiblemente alguna asimetría también que mencionar. Es, sin duda alguna más abundante, la investigación que se ha hecho más en los Estados Unidos que en México en términos de números y, como decía la Doctora Vásquez, muchos de nosotros los historiadores mexicanos hemos de alguna manera asumido algunas posiciones que se han derivado de la historiografía norteamericana. Pero la historiografía norteamericana presenta singularidades especiales. Es una historiografía que casi siempre termina en una polémica o en un debate por una parte, o bien, en una exaltación patriótica. Hay una historiografía de acusaciones, de búsqueda de conspiraciones, de ataques partidistas y hay, por otro lado, una historiografía caracterizada por la obra de Jonathan Smith, de la exaltación, de la superioridad norteamericana y de la debilidad mexicana.

Del lado mexicano, después de todo, hemos sido un poco más consistentes. A lo mejor nuestra posición de perdedores en la guerra nos ha hecho ser un poco más unificados. No, sin duda alguna, también existe una bibliografía, una historiografía polémica. Hubo momentos de acusaciones partidarias utilizando, la guerra, como argumento de posiciones partidarias. Pero digamos; la historiografía científica ha sido más consistente y en esta consistencia prácticamente hemos encontrado que sí fuimos agredidos, de que sí fue una guerra injusta, de que los argumentos que se utilizaron para la declaración de guerra prácticamente no eran, casi ninguno de ellos, argumentos que se podían sustentar plenamente. Pero bien, esto no nos deja, no nos avanza mucho. Creo que tampoco debemos continuar esta tradición de las acusaciones. Lo que debemos continuar haciendo es ver un poco más a qué se debió esa guerra. Creo que ayer lo mencionaba el Dr. Frasier, es que la guerra se da como parte de un proceso más largo. También la Doctora Vásquez hacía mención de cómo ella fue tratando de encontrar un explicación de la guerra y, apartir del 47, fue hacia atrás. Hacia el siglo XVIII. Yo creo que ese es el problema. La guerra se inserta en un período más largo y debe verse como parte de ese período más largo. Los límites hacia atrás pueden ser del siglo XVIII en

México. Pueden ser prácticamente desde la colonización de ambos países. Pero creo que un punto de referencia hacia adelante de la guerra es justamente la Guerra Civil en los Estados Unidos y la Guerra de la Reforma e Intervención en México que prácticamente acaban resolviéndose en la misma década: en 1865 los Estados Unidos y en y en 1867, México. ¿Y qué nos revela este fenómeno? De que los Estados Unidos hayan enfrentado una guerra civil en la década de las sesentas y México haya confrontado una guerra civil importante también en la misma década con resultados sumamente importantes porque en el caso de los Estados Unidos se resuelve el problema de seccionalismo. En el caso de México, se resuelve el problema del debate ideológico sobre la forma de gobierno: el monarquismo o la república. Yo creo que esto tiene mucho que ver con la Guerra entre México y los Estados Unidos. Es parte de...en el caso de los Estados Unidos...Yo creo que hay un problema fundamental al analizar, a los Estados Unidos, y a la guerra dentro de este fenómeno y es el siguiente. Los Estados Unidos, después de todo, es un país en formación. A lo mejor es muy atrevido el concepto que voy a dar pero a mí me parece que los Estados Unidos es un estado muy bien organizado a partir de la Constitución de Philadelphia, pero en búsqueda de la unidad nacional casi podría decir que es un estado que trata de crear una nación y está en este proceso. En este mismo proceso el seccionalismo se le presenta como el elemento disruptor y el expansionismo acaba siendo un elemento que se involucra con esta idea de mantener la unión, de crear la nación y el seccionalismo acaba siendo un elemento fundamental. Yo creo que por ejemplo, si tomamos algunos personajes importantes antes de la historia de los Estados Unidos en este momento, vamos a encontrar un enorme inconsistencia en términos de su propuesta expansionista. Calhoun es el arquitecto de la anexión de Tejas. Sin embargo, es un oponente brutal de Polk. Es un crítico muy fuerte de la declaración de guerra. John Quincy Adams, como Secretario de Estado de Monroe y, en las negociaciones del Tratado Adams-Onis, está buscando la anexión de Tejas y finalmente la adquisición de Tejas como parte de Florida y finalmente decide que no es conveniente por el problema seccional. Posteriormente lo vamos a encontrar en la Cámara de Representantes acusando al sur de una conspiración esclavista. Votando en contra de la Guerra con los Estados Unidos cuando él, como Secretario de Estado y como Presidente, fue un expansionista abierto que determinó ese cambio. La posición de Henry Clay no es muy diferente. Henry Clay acusa a Adams en la Cámara de Representantes en el momento de la ratificación del Tratado Transcontinental de haber abandonado a Tejas. Y, posteriormente, lo vamos a encontrar con una posición no totalmente en contra pero bastante más tibia y mesurada en las eleciones de 1844 con respecto a la anexión de Tejas.

Hay una enorme inconsistencia. La misma selección de Polk en la Convención Demócrata de 1844 no fue una selección fácil. Fue una convención demócrata bastante difícil. Salió este "dark horse" como candidato con una política expansionista pretendiendo la reanexión de Tejas y la reocupación de Oregon. Entonces no es un período fácil en la historia de los Estados Unidos. Es un período donde tal vez los problemas internos de los Estados Unidos acaban traslapándose llegando a esta situación del conflicto con México. Por el lado mexicano también es difícil. Las circunstancias internas de México eran bastante complejas. Es decir, es un período que es muy difícil todavía de entender. Es un período que nos causa mucha angustia a los mexicanos porque se nos va de los manos la comprensión de muchos hechos. Todavía hay un enorme debate sobre quiénes eran centralistas, quiénes eran federalistas, cuáles eran las posiciones exactas. Pero lo que sí es importante es que estas mismas circunstancias internas crearon

muchos conflictos, en primer lugar, para poder resolver el problema de Tejas, ya fuera la reconquista de Tejas o ya fuera el reconocimiento de su independencia. Hay un vacío de poder en México. Hay un problema bastante serio de liderazgo que impide tomar este tipo de decisiones y que se acaban convirtiendo en parte del debate interno de México. Entonces en México también había las condiciones internas para no poder dar una solución a estos problemas que eventualmente serían utilizados por la política norteamericana para resolver un problema interno de los Estados Unidos. Yo creo que aquí hay algo también sumamente interesante. Recientemente se ha utilizado un modelo teórico de las relaciones internacionales para tratar de dar una mayor comprensión a las relaciones entre México y los Estados Unidos y este es el modelo de la interdependencia. Yo creo que este modelo sí ayuda mucho a explicar las relaciones entre México y los Estados Unidos y sobre todo que es extraordinariamente útil para entender también las relaciones del pasado. Hay este traslape de intereses en los Estados Unidos con la correspondiente asimetría. Generalmente no nos ha tocado la mejor parte pero sobre todo este traslape y los períodos de conflicto se han dado justamente en los momentos en que en los Estados Unidos hay importantes crisis. Esto acaba afectando un poco la relación y, simultáneamente, también la posición de México ha sido más difícil de enfrentar o dar solución para aminorar el conflicto con los Estados Unidos justamente cuando nosotros hemos padecido también una crisis de tipo doméstico. Creo que la Guerra entre México y los Estados Unidos ejemplifica claramente esta problemática. Yo creo que de allí es importante conocerla y tal vez tomar este elemento para planear hacia el futuro, como pueden ser nuestas relaciones. Muchas gracias.

SYLVIA KOMATZU: And do we have any questions for Dr. Velasco and if you do, please go to the microphone so that we can have it translated. Any questions?

UNKNOWN: You said that the problem with the war with the United States in the nineteenth century goes further back. How much further back are you talking about?

DR. VELASCO: Well, it all depends. Desde mi punto de vista, yo tomo como punto de partida para la problemática de la guerra a partir del caso de los Estados Unidos: la creación del estado norteamericano con la Constitución de Philadelphia. ¿Por qué? Porque la Constitución de Philadelphia para mí ya revela sí la problemática, la cual se va a enfrentar los Estados Unidos hasta la Guerra Civil. El problema seccional ya está planteado, el problema de la esclavitud y la solución, el compromiso de las tres quintas partes. Está planteado el regionalismo norteamericano. ¿Qué es la Constitución de Phildelphia? Un documento extraordinario, jurídicamente maravilloso, pero el producto de compromisos, de avenimientos que no acaban resolviendo totalmente la problemática y, es más, que se va a enfrentar los Estados Unidos a una resolución de esos problemas. Creo que las Enmiendas XIII y XIV son claramente, en la concepción de los Estados Unidos, la solución de aquellos problemas que se habían dejado pendientes en Philadelphia. Entonces creo que es un punto de partida importante para ver esta problemática del período de formación de los Estados Unidos que para mí, tiene una culminación dramática en la Guerra Civil y de la cual de este período es parte importantísima la Guerra con México. Los mismos resultados de la guerra, la adquisición de California y la admisión de California como estado libre en la unión americana, rompe el equilibrio que se había tratado de crear con el compromiso de Missouri. Es un período, de la década de 1850 a 60, donde los compromisos son cada vez más frágiles.

Se llegan a compromisos, el Compromiso de 1850, etc., pero cada vez son más frágiles. Entonces para mí es un punto de partida. En el caso de México, pues, un poco tomaría yo como punto de partida...En la historia, estos puntos de partida son siempre un tanto arbitrarios. Todos sabemos. Pero la Independencia de México; claro, la Independencia de México, como la doctora Vásquez nos mencionaba, es incomprensible si no nos vamos a las reformas borbónicas, etc. Entonces, yo pondría como punto de partida: la Independencia de México.

UNKNOWN: As a historian I am fascinated by your question. We often think of history as not being terribly useful for understanding the present, much less the future, but I would push this back too, as I am sure many of my colleagues would. We could go back, for example, to sixteenth-century relationships between Spain and England that set the tone for kinds of attitudes in which Protestants despised Catholics. It helps explain the kind of racism that developed in the United States, which developed very early toward peoples with different colored skin, back in the colonial period. Much of that, then, is evident by the time of the war, especially to Mexicans who understood perfectly well the anti-Mexicanism in the United States and the racism and the anti-Catholicism.

Another way to look at this, back in time, is to say from the point of view of Mexico: here the United States expanded into Florida, which pushed Spain essentially out of Florida, pushed the French out of Louisiana, pushed Indians farther and farther west, and now where does the United States stop by 1846? That is a kind of series of expansions. The American population grew extraordinarily. In 1790, the population of the United States hovered around four million, that was 1790. In 1820, the population of the United States was nine million six hundred thousand. That growth occurred in three decades. While Mexico's population, as Dr. Vásquez explained last night, is flattened out by the wars for independence that which took one out of every ten Mexican lives, most of whom, those one of ten, happened to be young men of fighting age, thereby devastating the economy as well as future population growth. So, you have kind of a disequilibrium here. If you want to figure out what the source of the disequilibrium is, it certainly isn't in 1845, 1844, the sources go way, way back and there's much more that could be said about this.

SYLVIA KOMATZU: Thank you. Our next presenter is Miguel Soto. Dr. Soto is at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. His publications include *De Agutistas: Politicos y Conspiradores*, *La Conspiración Mundarcia en México*, and *Las Intereses Particulares en la Conquista de California*. Dr. Soto.

DR. MIGUEL SOTO: Well, maybe I will set a different tone here, I can't talk as specifically about some of the conditions in which the war came about, but I won't leave out some general reflections about what happened.

I have become convinced, through the years, that the conditions of the two societies, Mexico and America, favor and in a way propitiated, the war that came about in 1846. On the one hand, I see American expansionism, which certainly flourished in the middle of the 1840s, particularly with the political campaign of James Polk and the consequences that it involved and were so aggressively expressed by John O'Sullivan in his *Democratic Review*, when he coined the phrase, the "Manifest Destiny" of American society to expand and extend democratic institutions all over this continent. On the other hand, I see Mexican society and the internal conditions that were presented, in a way,

by Dr. Vásquez last night. Mexico was not the only country in Spanish America after the Spanish order was overthrown to be unable to establish a new order, a national order. It was very difficult all over Spanish America. So, there was a turmoil something like what is happening today in eastern Europe, it resembles very much the disintegration of a very centralized power, and that's what happened with the Spanish Empire in Spanish America. There are many differences, of course, language and many considerations must be taken into account, but there was a polarization and rapidly developing political situation that occurred in Mexico. By 1840, a Mexican politician, José María Gutierrez de Estrada, said, "If we continue the way we are, with this anarchy and chaos that we are confronting, we are going to be an open invitation to foreign intervention and it might not be more than twenty years before the flag of the stars and bars might be waving on top of the national palace." This was in 1840 and it was not twenty years, it was seven, precisely, when that happened. In that year, also, Lucas Alamán and other important Mexican politicians proposed, probably because of British persuasion, the recognition of Texas Independence in order to avoid a large confrontation that might endanger or put in jeopardy other territories of Mexico that might be in dispute as well. Both of them, Gutierrez de Estrada and Alamán, were called traitors because they were trying to admit and recognize that Mexico was not able to solve problems on her own and, in the second case, to even give away part of the national territory. In 1845, five years later, José Joaquín de Herrera tried to avoid, twice, a major confrontation because of the loss of Texas. First, in the late spring, he was willing to recognize Texas independence, as long as Texas would not annex or become part of another country. In December of 1845, when annexation was completed, Herrera was willing to negotiate the loss of Texas to the United States. In both cases he was accused by liberal radicals and radical liberals as a traitor. People like Valentín Gómez Farías accused him of once again trying to give away national territory and Gómez Farías and his supporters were willing to sacrifice some of their dearest political principles, such as the elimination of the *fueros*, or judicial privileges of the church and the army, in order to gain support from those corporations to overthrow the pacifists regime of Herrera. That goes to show you the level of disintegration and division that existed in Mexican society. Finally, Herrera was not overthrown by the liberals, rather he was overthrown by Mariano Paredes de Arriaga, who--and recall that Dr. Pletcher mentioned some of this last night--was supported by the Spanish government which was trying to establish a monarchy in Mexico. As sort of a defensive measure, the Spanish authorities, after seeing the British and the French efforts to stop the annexation of Texas fail, saw that American expansionism was very powerful and it may not have stopped in Mexican territories. So, that in order to save at least Cuba and Puerto Rico, they intervened in Mexico, trying to be like a hook for attracting the other major monarchies of Europe to confront the United States. So, they provided money and resources in order to overthrow the republican government of Herrera. In the end, though, when the fighting started, as Dr. Pletcher said, Mexico was left alone and she fought a lot of the war alone, and suffered its catastrophic consequences.

Now, on a different level, seeing the specific conditions in which the war came about, I would say that the idea that emerges is the unavoidability of the war. On the one hand, we have the Polk administration asking Herrera, the pacifist president, if he was willing to recognize and to receive an American envoy to solve the pending problems between the two nations after Texas annexation. Herrera said yes, that he was willing to receive this American envoy. but considering the pending issues between the two countries, it becomes clear what were the possibilities of really sitting down and

negotiating a solution to their problems. For the Herrera regime, there's a very important document, a circular that is sent to the various authorities in the various departments of the country, asking for support for a diplomatic negotiation in order to avoid a major conflict with the United States. The main issue there is the pending problem of Texas, the loss of Texas, and nothing else. For the administration, the instructions to special envoy John Slidell, concerned the pending claims of American citizens against the Mexican government that the Mexican government had admitted but was unable to pay. They amounted to a little more than three million dollars. And then the real pending issues were the possible acquisition of New Mexico and California for which it was willing to pay over twenty-five million dollars. In the end, Slidell was never received by the Herrera regime, but had he been received and presented his instructions to the Herrera regime, not even the Herrera regime, the pacifists of the Herrera regime, could have received and negotiate with him the loss of more territories than Texas. So, at that point, the war wasn't even avoidable.

One might think that it is justifiable to a certain extent, the view held by some Americans that these territories were unexploited, unused, and uncared for, and that the American society was the main recipient of so many immigrants and that they could use the land. I would say, really, that's a valid consideration then. But therefore, today, it would be a valid consideration that the amount of immigrants coming to the United States to work because there are all these available jobs ready for someone who is willing to do it, to cover them.

Another consideration that is very much related to that is certainly the religious background, the religious view of war and how their resources should be used. There is to a certain extent a difference between the Protestant and the Catholic background as to how the resources should be used. The Americans could not forget by any means that the land would be wasted there without being used. As for Catholic ownership, the view of ownership is, "Well, it was there and it's mine and I will use it whenever I please." I might say, once again, if one looks at demographic considerations, one might say, "Well, to a certain extent it was justified for some people to use those resources." But if one sees how the actual procedures of the distribution of land took place, the image doesn't emerge that quickly. Beginning with the Texas situation, the land companies that intervened and participated in the process of the separation of Texas from Mexico, all the way from there to the end of the Mexican War, when one sees the American volunteers coming back to the United States and then being received by some kind of vultures, that is to say, agents of land companies who bought their script for fifty cents so the soldiers would renounce the land granted to them by the American government. So once again, the democratic view of appropriation of land, like that of Fredrick Jackson Turner and his view of the American frontier, doesn't prove valid. It was really big companies that were appropriating and caring for the lands. That adds just one more element of injustice to that war between Mexico and the United States. Thank you very much.

SYLVIA KOMATZU: Any questions or comments? Would you go to the microphone, please? Thanks.

UNKNOWN: Dr. Soto, how much Polk, how much Manifest Destiny? In other words, if Polk had been defeated in 1844 or for some reason he had been obstructed from attempting to obtain his goals, would a war have occurred? Do you think from your

observations of American society, government, etc. that a war with Mexico and the take over of the Mexican territory would have occurred, anyway?

DR. SOTO: My impression is yes. I would answer it on two levels. One, we as historians would minimize precisely that question. If the Mexicans had not been so divided wouldn't those lands have been grabbed, anyway? I guess I'd have to say yes, but as historians, our first duty is to explain how things actually happened. That is the way it happened.

Now, on the second level there is, on the one hand of course, American territorial expansion and on the other hand, Mexican political division. But this didn't help matters at all. So I see specific conditions in which the two countries went to war, but there was not very much room for negotiation, I would say that. Some authors have argued that California could have been taken just like Texas. I would say that after the Texas experience, no Mexican politician would be willing to sit down and do nothing because, even for political, mere political reasons, that meant fighting a nationalistic banner. When Paredes de Arrillaga decided that a war was needed, he said we don't need to win the war, what we need to do is to restore the national honor on the battlefield and to get a better indication for what is lost already. So you see, they started a realization there, an acceptance, of that loss of territory. But not so easy, we are not going to make it easy for them to take it. It has to be through a war. A war that put Mexico on the verge of ceasing to exist as a nation. Those were the conditions that were confronted on both sides, I would say. Any other questions? Yes.

SYLVIA KOMATZU: I think we might move on because actually Dr. Pletcher is also going to address the subject of Manifest Destiny. I think we can talk of that later. There might be some other comments from our panelists. If you could just hold your question and next we will have Josefina Zoraida Vázquez. Doctora Vásquez is professor of history and chair of the Center of Historical Studies at the Colegio de México. Her books include *United States and Mexico* and *Mexicanos y Norteamericanos ante la guerra del '47.* Doctora Vázquez.

DR. JOSEFINA ZORAIDA VAZQUEZ: Es difícil para mí hablar oyendo a mis colegas porque no estoy completamente de acuerdo con todos los planteamientos. Creo que una de las cosas que nos tocaría a los mexicanos es aclarar el período. Este período tan confuso de 1821 a la guerra que yo creo que todavía no se comprende. Claro que tiene raíces, como David Weber estaba diciendo, entre el enfrentamiento entre protestantes anglicanos y españoles católicos. Claro que tiene antecedentes en la admiración, tan notable. El caso de México es muy dramático porque el modelo a seguir para los políticos mexicanos a pesar de que seguimos el constitucionalismo gaditano, el modelo era los Estados Unidos. Entonces, al mismo tiempo que seguimos el modelo norteamericano que había sido tan exitoso porque todo lo había favorecido...al mismo tiempo ese modelo era el principal enemigo. En esto estriba el dramatismo de la guerra y sigue estando, es decir, para Salinas de Gortari, éste es el modelo; pero al mismo tiempo ve pues lo que está viendo en estos momentos. Pero es muy difícil estudiar esta época porque está cargada del partidarismo de la época. La interpretación que nosotros arrastramos es la interpretación liberal, de los liberales mexicanos que ganaron en la reforma. No es lo que sucedió. Yo no encuentro centralistas prácticamente. He encontrado diez centralistas. La Constitución Centralista de 1836 trató de resolver el

problema de ese momento por un compromiso político entre liberales y centralistas porque en ese momento tenían un problema de intervencionismo norteamericano y de otros países. Los franceses estaban a punto de asaltar México. No teníamos reconocimiento de España. No teníamos reconocimiento del Vaticano siendo un país católico. Por eso no había sacerdotes. Porque no había obispos que los implementaran. Entonces, era un país con muchas condiciones. Yo diría que se nos olvida. Estamos siempre pensando, y esto es la tragedia de los mexicanos por el modelo norteamericano, siempre nos confrontamos con lo que pasa en los Estados Unidos. Este fue un pais que tuvo mucha suerte. Que empieza a no tenerla hora. Un día de estos, los historiadores van a ver con más claridad lo que pasa en México porque la Nueva España fue el país más importante del continente. Los Estados Unidos eran unas colonias allí, sin importancia. Este era parte de la Nueva España. Esto era la potencia de América y justamente en esa importancia estuvo su debilidad. ¿Por qué? Porque fue, digamos, esta rica...con tantos recursos, nación que todos quisieron tomar una partida. En nuestros días podemos ver lo que está sucediendo con algunas naciones en la guerra de Iraq, en la de Somalia. ¿Por qué hay tantas luchas en Somalia? Porque los rusos por un lado y, los norteamericanos por el otro, armaron a los partidos contendientes, un poco de esto pasó. Eso nos debilitó. Pero, por otro lado hay una razón muy obvia en todo el mundo occidental. El liberalismo fue una fuerza muy disolvente. Nosotros tendemos a ver...porque los países se olvidan de las cosas. Y esta nación creció, el expansionismo absorvió todo el faccionalismo norteamericano. Yo recuerdo a nuestra querida Nettie Lee Benson, que siempre insiste, era lo mismo en los Estados Unidos que en México. La diferencia es que los mexicanos no tenían una misión que sobrepasara a las pequeñas pasiones faccionales como fue el expansionismo. Porque pueden echarse la culpa que eran los esclavistas sureños y los banqueros especuladores de Boston y de Nueva York y que los del oeste...Todos tenían interés en las tierras. Los pequeños porque no tenían tierras y las crisis económicas los afectaban y, los grandes, porque querían especular. Entonces, ahora en México no había esa fuerza unificadora. Sí, había los británicos y los norteamericanos ayudando a los liberales radicales. Los españoles ayudando a los conservadores y los franceses a los que pudieran. Y en México, en esta situación de haber perdido a tanta gente y en esta situación espantosa que pasa cuando todas las fuerzas están en contra, es muy difícil encontrar el camino. Entonces, tenemos que deshacer un poco la historia como la hemos visto. Sí, claro que ha habido partidarismo en las interpretaciones de la guerra en el tiempo, sobre todo los conservadores dijeron, ves, te lo dije: por copiar a los Estados Unidos. ¿Y qué dijeron los liberales? Por no haberlos copiado bien...¡Vamos a copiarlos bien! Y los dos se acusaron...Pero encontraron los dos. Los seres humanos siempre queremos encontrar a alguien que tenga la culpa y entonces hubo unos caballitos de batalla que sirvieron mucho: la iglesia, el ejército y Santa Anna. Santa Anna, el dictador, incluso cuando no era dictador. Fue un dictador cuatro años, dos del 41 al 43 y luego del 53 al 55. Y, las dos veces, el dictador más inefectivo de la historia. ¿Por qué? Porque no quería parecer dictador. Quería ser el elegido del pueblo. Tenía una especie de prepriísmo de ser popular. Esta cosa, bien pensado con los reyes españoles y, Iturrigaray fue el primero que anduvo por todas las provincias haciendo...asistiendo a los encuentros de gallos, etc. Es decir, había un populismo digamos a la Jackson también porque después de todo aquí también ha habido ese tipo de políticos. Pero, curiósamente, no tuvo nunca fuerza suficiente. Es muy interesante ver las elecciones en su época. Cualquiera diría que el ejército hubiera hecho lo que hacen en algunos países en serio cuando el ejército es en serio. Perdieron las elecciones. Siempre que se hacían elecciones

mandaban...claro he visto los despachos de que tratar y que se gana la gente. No sé como dicen porque no dicen lo que nos conviene, tienen unas formas curiosas de decir. Lo resultados son: lo logramos. Les ganaban siempre. Siempre salían los federalistas porque casi todos eran federalistas. ¿Por qué eran federalistas? Porque el territorio era tan grande que obviamente nadie quería depender de la lejanía del centro. Si ustedes ven, yo venía viendo en el mapa...y venía viendo abajo...Desgraciadamente había demasiadas nubes...pero en el territorio de los Estados Unidos hay toda esta planicie grande como que invitara al expansionismo...y luego vienen las Rocallosas...allí fue más difícil. Pero en México, por todos lados donde Uds. salgan hay montañas. Entonces era un país con muchas dificultades de comunicación. Por ejemplo las trece colonias estaban comunicadas hacia el mar para comunicarse con Inglaterra y entre sí. Casi no hay que ver que trabajo lo costaba a Franklin ir de Boston a Pennsylvania, porque no habían esas montañas. Era muy difícil solucionar el problema de la comunicación. Ahora, no estoy de acuerdo en que no existiera lealtad. Entre más estudio a los mexicanos del norte; encuentro que son los más mexicanos contra la idea que nosotros tenemos a veces en el centro de que la frontera termina en San Luis Potosí o de que ya lo para acá es otra cosa. Claro que otra cosa, porque están viviendo en condiciones diferentes. Pero encuentro incluso los acusados de traidores, digamos, un personaje que es muy importante en esta región es Canales. En esta época resulta que él tenía esa idea de, voy a ocupar a estos tejanos porque hay esa idea de no...Era una región que tenía ciertas raíces diferentes de...Yo puedo usar a los tejanos contra los centralistas y ganar. Se da cuenta del peligro cuando los tejanos lo tienen. Su interés es caer sobre Saltillo y sacar un botín. Entonces dice no. Esto no es lo que yo quiero. Entonces hay condiciones que tenemos que explicar para entender realmente y...¿Por qué es importante explicar la debilidad mexicana? Porque los ganadores nos han hecho un gran publicidad en contra. Casi la historiografía de esta...tan racista y tan justificadora de haber tomado lo que no era suyo en el caso de los tejanos, sobre todo que nos hicieron toda esa propaganda, no sólo terminamos perdiendo sino además aguantando la propaganda que ha durado siglo y medio y que no va a ser fácil cambiar. Es muy difícil convencer a un norteamericano, lo estoy oyendo todos los días, incluso con los candidatos en California, sobre la visión que tienen de los mexicanos. Hay gente que está obsesionada...el problema de California, que estaba en una situación económica espantosa por el fin de la Guerra Fría, pues tiene también su caballito allí para explicar...todos estos ilegales mexicanos. Yo le decía el otro día a un californiano, bueno, que se vayan...y ésto se paraliza porque ellos son los que están haciendo todos los trabajos útiles. No va a caminar nada. Se va a acabar la basura, las casas, los niños se van a quedar sin quien los cuide, las fábricas, todos los trabajos más importantes porque los pensadores pues al fin y al cabo los que pescan la cosecha, los que hacen los trabajos pesados son los mexicanos. Entonces tenemos que cambiar esta idea simplista y absurda porque eso estorba nuestra comprensión del asunto. Van a ser 150 años de la guerra y ya pasaron 150 años de la independencia de Tejas, y la independencia de Tejas no se ha visto con ninguna de clase de mínimo de comprehensión. Creo que es hora de que los dos hagamos una revisión a fondo terminando hasta donde es posible los prejuicios. Yo sé que nos separan estilos diferentes de cultura, tipos diferentes de ver la vida, acercamientos a las razones fundamendales de estar aquí y ahora; pero creo que es hora de que lo entendamos. Ya estamos viviendo en un mundo diferente. Todavía sigue la simetría pensando sobre los mexicanos. El país que era tan importante, ahora es el menos importante, pero tampoco esa apinchurrienta economía del último, después de todo. ¿Quién piensa en México como la doceaba economía del

mundo? Es decir, es un país relativamente todavía importante. Pero es muy difícil en la mente norteamericana, todavía sigue siendo este país al que hay que mostrar como incapaz, débil, estúpido para gobernarse. No era una forma, era muy difícil integrar algo que se había desintegrado por la guerra, por la intervención extranjera de todo mundo y, es decir, por todo aquello que había convocado no sólo la debilidad sino la importancia, la riqueza, la plata mexicana circulaba por todo el Asia. El imperio británico en gran parte pagaba a su burocracia en pesos mexicanos por eso el peso era la moneda que se usaba en China, en Asia. Entonces hay que ver las cosas de un aspecto...El acercamiento del Dr. Pletcher anoche entregando viéndolo como un fenómeno más que tuvo en ese momento lugar en México con motivo del enfrentamiento del los poderes imperiales, imperialistas económicos que surgían, entre ellos, los Estados Unidos. Muchas gracias.

SYLVIA KOMATZU: Do we have any questions? Yes, you need to go to the microphone. Thank you.

UNKNOWN: It seems to me that the Northwest Ordinance of 1785 was a very important piece of legislation that gave direction for controlled growth of the United States and gave the common man hope for improvement of his condition. Did that legislation in anyway influence post-revolutionary governments in Mexico? Did they consider it had any potential to help the common person of Mexico?

DR. ZORAIDA VAZQUEZ: In what sense?

UNKNOWN: To improve their economic condition, to give them encouragement to embrace their government that loved that.

DR. ZORAIDA VAZQUEZ: Well, it's difficult to say. It's very important. Another misunderstanding is to think that...empecé a hablar en inglés. Me parece que es muy difícil comparar las dos cosas. En México, y esta es otra cosa que creo que los norteamericanos a veces no entienden, mal entienden el legado de la sociedad destamental. Curiosamente en la mente de los mexicanos, porque había una sociedad tan injusta, una sociedad en donde la riqueza estaba acumulada en un grupo pequeño, los indios tenían un pasar mejor porque estaban considerados en una situación especial. Sin embargo había grupos que no tenían ninguna posición en aquellas sociedad que se había creado por conquista. Entonces hay un sentido mucho más agudo de hacer algo socialmente. Incluso creo que uno de los problemas que surgen en México es que al establecerse el republicanismo federal. Es un federalismo más radical que el de los Estados Unidos y es una sociedad más democrática porque le da el voto a todos los hombres mayores de edad. 25 años si son solteros y, no me recuerdo, creo 20 años si son casados. Entonces, esto era radicalísimo en el mundo de esa época porque al fin y al cabo el modelo de la Constitución de Cadiz que es la que nos heredó esta visión, fue la Constitución Francesa de 1791. Es decir, nosotros no estábamos considerando...Ya de hecho se había abolido la esclavitud durante la independencia. En realidad los esclavos que quedaban, eran los que estaban entrando a Tejas. Entonces este mismo radicalismo dificultó el funcionamiento del nuevo país, pero en todos los programas, sobre todo en los moderados y en los liberales radicales, hay la esperanza de crear un mundo de un...México de propietarios pequeños, que fue el sueño también de los liberales de 1857.

Curiosamente terminaron con las leyes que protegían a los indios y los indios en realidad fueron víctimas del liberalismo y no de la situación hispánica. Entonces yo no sé en qué sentido usted ve como la esperanza de la Ordenanza del Noroeste porque en realidad las gentes que entraron a Tejas, es porque perdieron todo en la crisis de 1817, por ejemplo el caso de Moses Austin y casi todos los que entraban. Claro que entraban muchos especuladores de tierras de las Carolinas y de otras partes, de Alabama sobre todo, pero de cualquier manera, muchos eran de los que se habían quedado endeudados y sin nada por las crisis norteamericanas. En realidad la Ley de Colonización Mexicana era muy generosa porque prácticamente estaba regalando la tierra. Así es que sí había una especie de promesa no como promesa porque tampoco la Ordenanza del Noroeste tenía ese objeto de proponer si no de más bien solucionar un problema seccional, pero creo que lo había. Tal vez en los pensadores mexicanos más claro por la disigualdad social.

UNKNOWN: Hasta la fecha los enfoques han sido basados en la política del expansionismo pero quizás deberíamos de ver el tipo de la economía. Es decir, la base de valor de México, de la economía mexicana era una base extractiva.

DR. ZORAIDA VAZQUEZ: No. Ya eso se ha demostrado. Por falta de apoyo a la historia política, está olvidada la historia política; pero la historia económica y social se ha estudiado mucho. Y ahora se han descubierto todas las cosas que mal entendíamos de la historia económica. En realidad, el fuerte de la plata estuvo floreciente durante la primera mitad del siglo XVIII; pero la segunda mitad decae, incluso las reformas borbónicas, lo que intentan es revivir el extraccionismo. El fuerte en ese momento es el comercio. El comercio tanto legal e ilegal porque ya había mucho contrabando con Gran Bretaña y aún con los Estados Unidos, pero aún el legal. Hay un resurgimiento. Ese es el fuerte de la economía Mexicana y, luego la agricultura. Hasta ahora pensaba que las haciendas habían sido nada más un lujo para dar nobleza a la gente. ¡No! Eran muy buenos negocios.

UNKNOWN: Sí, pero era un buen negocio para la economía interna.

DR. ZORAIDA VASQUEZ: ¡No, no, no, no!

UNKNOWN: Se exportaba de...

DR. ZORAIDA VAZQUEZ: ...se exportaba por ejemplo ya grandes cantidades de cochinilla, de añil, de algunas cosas y empezaba el azúcar por ejemplo.

UNKNOWN: Porque la base de la colonia norteamericana de la Nueva Inglaterra era una base de exportación de productos agrícolas y desde un principio estaba la colonia norteamericana, íntimamente ligada al comercio mundial.

DR. ZORAIDA VAZQUEZ: Bueno, bueno.

UNKNOWN: Y la economía mexicana por haber comenzado sobre una base de extracción tenía más bien un comercio interno.

DR. ZORAIDA VAZQUEZ: No.

UNKNOWN: Que si estaba...que no era para minimar...para hacer mínimo el comercio interno.

DR. ZORAIDA VAZQUEZ: No, no, no.

UNKNOWN: ...el comercio interno, pero y porque aún en los principios de la colonia este...¿Cómo se llama? Una profesora Gutiérrez...ha demostrado...Lolita Gutiérrez ha demostrado que aún en los principios de la colonia la economía interna era bastante fuerte usando las diferentes haciendas y encomiendas que fueron las predecesoras de la hacienda, en una economía bastante extensiva, pero interna. Y la economía de exterior era una de extracción. Por ejemplo, si vemos aquí en esta región, hay mucho interés. Los comerciantes llegan a esta región...aquí, en los principios del siglo XIX. Se comienza a formar Matamoros en esa época. Y...es un comercio que entra con efectos de los Estados Unidos y de Europa y que llegan...suben a Camargo y luego a Monterrey, y luego a Saltillo, pero los productos mexicanos que salen son mínimos en comparación con la plata, por ejemplo, que sale. Mi punto de vista es que es un economía fuerte, de riqueza, etc., pero el tipo de economía es una de extracción y no está ligada con el sistema económico europeo del mismo modo que la colonia norteamericana. Por lo cual, la colonia, la expansión norteamericana, no es solamente una misión política cuasi-religiosa del Manifest Destiny, pero sí, efectivamente, es un expanción basada sobre una economía que necesita crecer contínuamente.

DR. ZORAIDA VAZQUEZ: Bueno, le voy a tratar de explicar a ver si puedo. No quiero ocupar mucho tiempo porque tienen que...pero es importante. Yo creo que hay diversas faces. Hay una face del siglo XVI en que México se inserta en el orden mundial. ¿Es verdad? La plata mexicana y la plata peruana crean la inflación terrible en Europa, que un poco obstaculiza incluso el comercio en Europa. Los ingleses y los holandeses saben manejar esta inflación a su beneficio. De todas maneras hay una inestabilidad en la economía del siglo XVI. El XVII en la Nueva España es como diríamos el siglo de la consolidación. Aparentamente sale menos plata y siempre se ha pensado que es una especie de recesión en la Nueva España. No, lo que pasa es que se está consolidando. Los nuevohispanos empiezan a producir lo que necesitan y no exportan ni importan tanto. El siglo XVIII, se inserta en la economía mundial y, entonces, lo que sucede en la primera mitad, es la expansión de la plata a través de ese incremento de la plata que ya es casi el mercado mundial de la plata, el mercado mundial de México es muy importante. Entonces se inserta, con la economía de la Gran Bretaña, la de los Estados Unidos y por supuesto con España que empieza a ser también un gran país económicamente hablando. Se recupera. Ahora bien, con la independencia y la apertura, la bendita libertad de comercio fastidia las manufacturas, la Guerra de Independencia termina con la agricultura, con la ganadería, con la minería. Entonces viene, es decir, en el momento en que realmente abiertamente nos podemos insertar en el mercado mundial. En realidad las condiciones han variado y entonces viene esta...digamos...gran recesión y retracción en México que no se recupera hasta la segunda mital del siglo XIX.

SYLVIA KOMATZU: Our next speaker is David Pletcher, Professor Emeritus of History at Indiana University. His books include *Rails, Mines, and Progress: Seven American Promoters in Mexico, 1867-1911*, and, of course, *The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon, and the Mexican War*. Dr. Pletcher has just completed a sequel to this book

called the *Diplomacy of Trade and Investment: 1865-1898*, which takes a global look at the subject. Dr. Pletcher.

DR. DAVID PLETCHER: Thank you, Sylvia. I would like to talk to you today, for a few minutes, on Manifest Destiny and try to show its relationship to the Mexican War by asking the question, was it a driving force behind the American people or was it simply a rationalization of intentions, motives, that they already had in mind?

First of all, what is the literal origin of the term? It comes, as historians have determined, literally out of an editorial written by an American expansionist, John L. O'Sullivan, for a New York newspaper in about 1846, but it was not written about the Mexican crisis, it was written about the Oregon crisis. So, it applies, originally, to the Oregon situation and our relations with England, rather than our relations with Mexico, but it is quite clear that it is applicable, or is an implied application, to the situation with Mexico. It fit the Mexican situation, in other words, as well as it fit the crisis with England, which was going on at the same time.

Now, secondly, what does it mean? Well, if you translate it, if you expand this two-word phrase, Manifest Destiny, it means something like this: God has given the United States either the encouragement or the right to expand beyond its borders. Why? Because of superior government and society. In other words, because of its democratic system. It is a kind of statement of divine favoritism that God is in favor of democracy and since the United States has the purest, the best form of democracy, God has given the United States, as a kind of chosen people, the right to expand and extend its rule over neighboring peoples and presumably peoples in other parts of the world. Perhaps if you use the term, reveal, rather than manifest, revealed destiny of the United States. This would be clearer from the beginning because revealed connotes revelations and revelations connotes the Bible, especially as the fundamentalists view the Bible.

Now, this is a part of a ponderous nineteenth-century style that will be familiar to anybody who has read Fourth-of-July addresses in the United States over the nineteenth century, when they bloomed and flourished purple passages, you know, you have to allow for this sort of exaggeration, but it does represent the view which many Americans had of their civilization and of themselves and it was one of the most objectionable things that the Americans took abroad with them. Foreign peoples almost without exception, whether they were being conquered or not, objected to the proud Yankee, that talkative Yankee, who could not be silenced. He talked forever about how glorious American civilization was.

Now, how far did the Americans intend to expand? This varied from person to person. The extreme expansionist wanted to go all the way from the icy north to Tierra del Fuego at the end of South America and then they would consider where else to expand in the islands or other territories. But most expansionists, most who used the term Manifest Destiny, did not intend to expand so far. Mexico, of course, was an automatic target since it was so close--so was Canada, but the element of practicality must be combined with this creation spirit of Manifest Destiny. Did it mean immediate war? Immediate conquest? Not necessarily. A good example of that is John Quincy Adams. During the period when Adams was a policy maker in the early 1820s, it is quite apparent from his writings that he intended for the United States to annex Cuba at sometime in the future, but all he wanted during his immediate tenure of power or during his lifetime was for Spain to continue to control Cuba. He wanted the United States to take over eventually and so he opposed any sort of arrangement by which Britain might

annex Cuba because it would be much harder for the United States to take it away from Britain than to take it away from Spain. So, you have to include in the definition of Manifest Destiny an implication of practicality, the United States was not destined to annex all of the western hemisphere day after tomorrow, but perhaps sometime in the future. Fifty years? Hundred years? Who knew? The Americans were fond of looking into the future. Now where does this come from?

If you try to trace the origins of this feeling before the phrase Manifest Destiny was put together by John L. O'Sullivan, you can go all the way back to English society before the settlement of North America by the English. I cite only one case, Shakespeare. If you read certain plays of Shakespeare, notably *Richard the Second* and *Henry the Fifth*, you find in there a glorification of England as a semi-paradise. This is Manifest Destiny, of a sort, in the making. It's the germ of Manifest Destiny and when the English began to colonize and even more when they began to trade with the rest of world outside of Europe, then they began to develop the idea of England as a chosen exporter of goods and exporter of ideas. I cite in this case an English writer who is much less well-known than Shakespeare, but maybe familiar to some of you, Richard Hakluyt.

After the discovery and after, beginning with the settlement of North America, Hakluyt began to write about some of these English ventures abroad and some of his writings include some of these ideas of a destined expansion. This is where the Manifest Destiny of the Americans starts along with many other ideas, for example, that came out of England.

Now, tracing it into the American colonies is not difficult. Massachusetts Bay is probably the best example. The Puritans were fond of describing themselves in Massachusetts as a "city upon a hill." What did they mean by that? They meant a city lighted up at night on a hill where everybody could see it and its example was to be followed by everybody else. Now, that is a developing germ of Manifest Destiny. A center of culture, a center of civilization deserving to be imitated by other people. Following through the colonial period you find other examples. I'm not going to try to cite them all, I don't have time enough and I think you'd find it repetitive, but the thing that probably encouraged the growth of this Manifest Destiny spirit more than everything else was the western movement.

As Massachusetts and the other New England colonies and the central and southern colonies began to expand into the foothills over the mountains into the Ohio valley and so on, this idea of a force pushing them from behind or from above, was the force that justified to them what they were doing, especially what they were doing to the Indians. When you get into the Revolutionary and Post-Revolutionary period, you'll find such men as Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson full of the spirit of expansion. They didn't say as much about the Almighty, about providence, as the Puritans did, for example, but they meant there was a kind of divine force or unspecified force coming from behind and pushing them. Even before the end of the Revolutionary War, Franklin was talking about annexing Canada and shortly after the war, Jefferson began to be interested in the Mississippi valley and then in Oregon, sending out Louis and Clark while he was president. So, this idea of a push to the west, justified by the American system of government, develops and grows during the early part of American history.

Now by about 1820, one finds then through reading American writings, reading speeches in Congress, reading addresses of presidents like Washington and John Quincy Adams, you find the Manifest Destiny spirit just about fully developed. Only the phrase was lacking and it was surprisingly late in coming. It took another twenty-six years

before John L. O'Sullivan wrote his editorial in which he, apparently for the first time, put these two inflammatory words together, manifest and destiny. The feeling of a destiny to expand existed in other countries throughout the nineteenth century, which was a century of great colonization. In Africa and Asia you find the other principle colonizing countries doing the same thing, developing this ideology of a God-pushed expansion. The English phrase that is probably most repeated is Kipling's phrase, "The white man's burden," but this is a burden that the white man does as a favor to the rest of civilization; to expand British culture, British law, British constitutionalism.

Now this is very late in coming, Kipling is in the 1890s, the early 1900s, but he is again like John L. O'Sullivan, crystallizing what has already been developed as far back as Shakespeare. Crystallizing it so that it is in a key phrase, a tag phrase that is easy to remember. "White man's burden." "White man's burden." Who could forget that? The French also felt a civilizing mission. Well, you don't have to live in France very long before you realize that the French regard the French language as the purest language, the French philosophy, the French culture as the center which should be imitated abroad and the whole French colonial system, centered as it is in the French language, in the French and Paris, is an illustration of this expansion pushed from within, pushed from above. And if you examine the Italian and, even more, the German system of colonization, you will find much the same thing. There is no need to repeat the examples, so that what you have is the development in other countries of the same sort of Manifest Destiny spirit which is obvious in the case of American history. I'm not saying this to justify Manifest Destiny. I'm simply showing that it is paralleled to developments in other countries. How about Spain and Spanish America? Well, one can go back even further in Spanish history and its relationship with the Spanish-American part of the Western hemisphere. The idea of Christopher Columbus and the legend or the myth of Saint Christopher carrying Christ on his shoulders across a raging stream is symbolic, a kind of elaborate symbolism, of the Spanish carrying the Christian Church or the Roman Catholic Church across the Atlantic Ocean into the New World. This is a kind of divine mission which is a part of the so-called *leyenda negra* of the Spanish which stood behind or flew behind the Spanish exploration and establishment of settlements.

Now, what is the connection, then, with the war between the United States and Mexico? Is it a driving force or is it a simply a rationalization? I think this differs with the person to whom you put question; that is, the person living at the time or the later historian. I think that they all have different answers. Some would say fifty-fifty. Some would say sixty-forty, on one side. Some would say sixty-forty on the other side, and so on and so on. I doubt that anybody would argue seriously that the war was due to completely 100% one or 100% the other. My own answer to the question, if you were to press me, would be that both are important, but that Manifest Destiny is more a rationalization, than it is a driving force, although I would not eliminate the driving force. What percentage? Well, that sort of thing can't be quantified really. I'd say perhaps, sixty-forty, perhaps seventy-thirty. I wouldn't go beyond seventy-thirty. What is a rationalization? Well, when I speak to classes about this I say, "Well, you imagine that you have studied hard through the evening and somebody asks you to go out for a beer and you want to do it, but you feel that you ought to study. So you work up arguments. 'Well, I'm tired. My mind is getting tired. A couple of beers will help.'" You need a good deal more spirit, with a good deal more...well, I don't need to go on, you see what I mean, he's rationalizing. He's already made up his mind or already more than half made up his mind. What I'm saying is that the Americans had more or less made up

their minds that they wanted to expand, not over all of Mexico, that idea was not present at the beginning of the war except among the very few extremists, but they want a few areas, they want Texas, first of all, they want California. The lands in between, well, who knows, maybe some of them, but they do want some Mexican territory.

Now, they have to justify this. This is why I say that arguments like Manifest Destiny are more a rationalization than they are a driving force, but this is really not a choice that we have to make here on this occasion. I think that it's enough to say that the American people were steeped in the idea of Manifest Destiny decades before the crisis with Mexico. It was natural, even inevitable, that the Manifest Destiny arguments should be used to justify a cause that seemed doubtful to a good many moral Americans. Thank you.

SYLVIA KOMATZU: Any questions or comments? Yes, can you go to the microphone?

UNKNOWN: While that's certainly convincing and I read in Richard White that it's possible that at the time there were a lot more Americans who were ambivalent or undecided about this question then maybe it would appear if you read the Fourth-of-July speeches and the newspaper columns. He cites as evidence that it really did take ten years to annex Texas after it once became independent and that a lot of Americans were feeling less convinced about that, and that later appeared or can appear as you look back. Do you feel that he could make a case to that extent or do you feel that the ideology was so pervasive that...

DR. PLETCHER: Well, my answer would be that this is why I think that it is more rationalization than it is a driving force. Although, I think some could argue the opposite. I wouldn't follow that argument. I quite agree with you that there was a strong opposition of force and that the long time that it took to annex Texas is strong evidence of that. I'd say that the nucleus and perhaps the largest part of this opposing force was militantism, the anti-slavery feeling. I didn't try to discuss all of the ideologies involved in the American attitude toward Mexico, there just isn't time enough, but certainly the anti-slavery part of the attitude is important and Manifest Destiny could be used to counter that anti-slavery argument. There is a strong moral element to abolitionism or anti-slaverism and if you can show a strong moral element in the expansionist cause, then you can negate, you can cancel out, the moral element in the anti-slavery movement. Are there any other questions? Sure.

UNKNOWN: I had one question very quickly. In my survey of U.S. history, particularly here in the Valley, there is a sense that the dispute was over south Texas and I try to emphasize to my students that, in my mind, California was more important to Polk than the land between the Nueces and the Río Grande, can you say a couple of words about the importance of California in the eyes of the Polk administration?

DR. PLETCHER: Well, let me say first of all, that you can list the causes that were cited at one time or another for going to war with Mexico, even the matter of the debts owed by Mexico to Americans. California is certainly an important cause. South Texas; that is, the border question of the Río Grande border and the claims of the Texans to the Río Grande border is another. And then you have Manifest Destiny. Those are four and there are probably more that if you sit down and think about it, you can work out.

I would repeat what I said earlier that each person would have his own feelings. To some persons the California issue became the most important, even though it is kept underground, or kept under wraps, most of the time. To some people, the money men, the bankers, would say that the debts are more important, but I think that you put them all together and which are they? Driving forces or rationalizations? Some of them were rationalizations to one person, some to another. It's a difficult question and it's practically impossible to set up percentages and to quantify as people say. Trust the student.

I would also say that there was one person in the United States who had more clout at this time than anybody else and that was President Polk. What he thought was more important than what any single American or perhaps any dozen Americans thought at this time. And even in his case, even though he left an elaborate diary which is a fascinating document to read, you can't be entirely sure of what he was thinking, but I'm sure that he was thinking of California. I assume, that California was more important to him than it was to a great many Americans, but it's a very slippery question when you try to assign percentages to these motives. You do it in a class because the students have to have something to write in their notes and feed back in an examination.

DR. ZORAIDA VAZQUEZ: Me gustaría decir algo al respecto. Creo que también tenemos que considerar el lado mexicano. Para el lado mexicano era muy importante la reclamación injusta de Tejas hasta el Bravo. Y aún en las discusiones del Tratado de Guadalupe, que yo creo que también hay que aclararlo y verlo con cuidado, todavía al final, cuando México ya estaba vencido, ocupado, etc., seguíamos insistiendo en que hasta el Nueces. Y los diplomáticos de todo el mundo estaban de acuerdo con México que era injusta la reclamación. Incluso la frontera actual de Tejas no corresponde a lo que Tejas fue nunca. Era gran parte Nuevo México. Entonces, eso...Incluso se tomaron parte de lo que era antes Tamaulipas. Esto es muy importante del lado mexicano. Por eso, los estudiantes de esta región puede ser que tengan algo que ver con esa cuestión del lado mexicano. Era una cosa muy, muy importante.

SYLVIA KOMATZU: And finally, we'll end with Pedro Santoni who teaches history at California State University at San Bernardino. As we heard yesterday, he is now completing a book called *Militant Patriots: The Radical Federalists of Mexico, 1845-1848.*

DR. PEDRO SANTONI: I have a few of my former professors here, so hopefully I'll make them proud. We're going to switch gears a little bit here and I guess I should raise this thing. There we go. I would just like to talk very briefly about one of the forgotten institutions of Mexico and that is the role of the civic militia during the war between Mexico and the U.S. The civic militia basically emerged in Mexico in the 1820s as a tool to protect states' rights and to try to control the political influence of the military, but with all of the turmoil in Mexico, it never got quite organized. It became a political football. When the federalists were in power, they would organize it, revive it. When they were out of power, the centralists would come in and eliminate it and it is important to take a look at the militia during the war because it shows Mexico's military weaknesses, it highlights the political divisions, and it also shows the social gap that prevented the development of a unified nation.

In early 1846 General Paredes came to power and, besides the issue of Texas, argued that we have to fight. He was also concerned with the Herrera government's attempt to raise a militia, so when he came into power he disbanded the units that Herrera had raised. For about five months, very little is heard about the militia, but with the outbreak of war and the dismal results that Mexico found in the early battles of the war, newspapers, as well as conservative politicians, began to scratch their heads and say, "Hey, we've got to do something," and they called for Paredes to raise a militia to fight the United States. But Paredes was scared. Paredes felt that if he raised a militia, he might find himself out of power. Just to give you an idea, in July of 1846, when they were discussing in Congress whether to declare war or not against the U.S. and the minister of war and a number of other legislatures cried out, "You have to put in this decree that we have to have a militia," the call simply fell by the wayside. Well, Paredes was ousted and in August of 1846, Gómez Farías and the liberals came to power, amid a wide outburst of enthusiasm. "Okay, we're going to raise a militia," the policy makers said. Expectations were up to "We're going to raise over one hundred and twenty thousand men and we're going to kick some booty. Okay? We're going to go and simply, Santa Anna's coming back, we have the citizen soldier, and we're just going to kick some tail." But between August and December of 1846, there were a number of problems that precluded the effective organization of this institution.

The government's attitude in very general terms was on again, off again. Sometimes they would pass a law trying to raise the militia then they would turn around a couple of months or a couple of weeks later and pass another law that contradicted the previous one. The government also took away the authority to lead the militia from the state governors. It gave it to the states military commandments and state governors were really upset about this.

There was a near absolute lack of weapons, ammunition, and apparel. A number of militia commanders wrote to the government and they told them, "Our uniforms are swimming in lice, give us clothes, give us uniforms." There weren't any.

The weapons were out of order. They were useless. The militia's weapons were of a different caliber than that of the army so in terms of material, the militia had that problem. There was also an unwillingness of many of the enrollees to report for duty and probably above all, the political enemies of Gómez Farías saw in the militia a threat to Mexico's stability. Gómez Farías' political enemies called the militia, among other choice words, a drunken rabble, riff-raff, and so Gómez Farías' enemies created their own militia unit basically made up of their own wealthy, elite units. So, there were two groups, two types of militia units in Mexico by late 1846. You have the wealthy elite units and then you have Gómez Farías with his own units, composed mainly of the urban masses. The militia, this rivalry, exploded in what is best known as the Revolt of the Polkos in February 1847, where the elite, wealthy units with the support of the church, tried to topple Gómez Farías, as General Winfield Scott was landing in Vera Cruz. It resulted in Gómez Farías's eventual ouster in March of 1847.

So, by April of 1847, with the U.S. Army ready to march inland after having taken Veracruz, Santa Anna was back in power. There's a debate. What are we going to do? We've got to--and, again, the Mexican government had no choice but to--call on the militia. In the early summer of 1847, they made attempts to revive this institution, but the same problems that I mentioned earlier existed. The institutional problems precluded its organization, its effective organization I should say, but by the late summer of 1847, it seems that a esprit de corps had emerged. Why? Probably because many

Mexican citizens felt they had to do something to prevent the Americans from simply waltzing into Mexico City. There is very little information on the militia during the summer of 1847, but by the time the American army had reached the outskirts of Mexico City, the militia was called on to play a significant role in the battles for the capital. And it did play a very great role. The civic militia, especially those units that had led the attempt to oust Gómez Farías in the rebellion of the Polkos, fought very, very bravely and this was recognized by both foreign and Mexican politicians. Nicholas Trist in his reports said that the militia was the finest fighting force that Mexico had put out in the field and Mexican politicians were so pleased with the militia's performance that they felt that after the war the militia would be a key element in helping Mexico ensure its eternal peace, its security. These expectations, however, didn't quite turn out to be fulfilled quickly. It took a number of years for the militia to flourish. Political rivalries, institutional hurdles, as well as what Mariano Otero described as the characteristic self-centeredness and indifference with which Mexicans regarded public affairs, precluded the militia from becoming a vital force in helping to rebuild Mexico after the war. The method, however, that Mexican leaders used to overcome these hurdles, are an area that needs to be researched.

The liberal victory in the Ayutla revolution in the mid-1850s was due in large part to the militia. During the Mexican *Reforma*, liberal leaders called for the strengthening of the militia and the militia played a big role in the liberal victory in the Three Years War against the conservatives and in the French Intervention. It eventually became, in the 1860s and 1870s, a defender of states' rights and a nucleus, it became the nucleus, for the army of Porfirio Díaz in Mexico and that's a short wrap.

SYLVIA KOMATZU: For our remaining time, we'll take comments or questions directed toward any of this morning's panelists so we'll just open up for discussion. Anyone want to start? Yes. At the microphone, thank you.

UNKNOWN: You were mentioning Canales on the border here and I'm thinking back to what you were saying yesterday that Carbajal was described as an enemy of the central Mexican government. Would it be possible to describe him as an enemy of the central Mexican government, but at the same time perhaps, a hero to the economic interests of the northern Mexicans?

DR. ZORAIDA VAZQUEZ: Let's see if I understand. El problema con Canales y Carbajal se extiende a muchos mexicanos en el momento. ¿Usted se refiere al momento de la independencia de Tejas o después?

UNKNOWN: En cincuenta y uno.

DR. ZORAIDA VAZQUEZ: Ah. En el cincuenta y uno...Bueno. En general, con la actitud de los mexicanos del noreste hay siempre el temor de que favorecieran los intereses tejanos. Entonces se ha interpretado el Plan de la Loba como un...y le han inyectado todos una meta de formar la famosa República del Río Grande. Esa idea viene del "disque" plan de formar una República de la Sierra Madre, que fue una idea lanzada por Luis de Santangelo en Nueva Orleans, seguida por Joe Fisher en Tejas, es decir una idea de "wishful thinking of the Texans to have something in between Mexico and Texas." Y después, cuando se levanta Carbajal, por la Plan de la Loba, que en realidad,

fue inspirado por sus problemas personales, de vender sus tierras en Tejas, y tratar de llevarse mercancía a México consiguió permiso de meter...pero cuando vieron la cantidad de mercancía que quería meter, le impidieron porque tenía que pagar los impuestos. Entonces, típico del tiempo, él se rebeló en armas. Pero, los Tejanos volvieron, los expancionistas que no estaban contentos con no haberse llevado Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, Chihuahua y Sonora, pensaron que era un buen momento de inyectarle una meta mayor. Entonces, hay en los papeles de Carbajal en la Defensa y en Relaciones, este Plan de la Loba con un plan para la República del Río Grande, pero se puede ver que no tiene nada que ver con los políticos mexicanos ni con el Plan de la Loba. El Plan de la Loba simplemente es un plan típicamente federalista, pidiendo lo que después se instaura que es la región esta de libre comercio en la frontera que fue un problema tan grande entre México y los Estados Unidos. Y que no se pudo quitar porque aún Díaz tuvo que luchar siendo muy dictador contra el Congreso que se oponía porque le convenía a los estados del norte para su desarrollo económico. Entonces, creo que el pobre de Carbajal, cargó con esta duda de si estaba traicionando los intereses...yo creo que sus intereses eran comerciales, como sucedió con muchos hombres de la frontera.

UNKNOWN: This is for anyone on the panel. Years ago we were required to read Bernard De Voto's *Year of Decision, 1846, Manifest Destiny*, is that still a very valid book? And my other question is, is there the Mexican side to the American Manifest Destiny?

UNKNOWN PANELIST: I read Bernard De Voto's book so long ago, I don't remember now about the interpretation. What I think one recalls most vividly about it is its prose style though and that is what made it so attractive at the time and makes it an enduring volume. The second part of your question was, is there a Mexican equivalent to Manifest Destiny? Do you mean by that a desire to expand? Or, Did Mexico fully understand what the American Manifest Destiny was about? Oh, yes, indeed. Yes. As early as 1821, independent Mexico's first diplomatic representative to Washington said that the Americans are an expansionist nation. We need to be terribly alert to this or they are going to overrun Mexico. I think in the United States we often think of Mexico as being a kind of passive party to this operation of Manifest Destiny, suggesting that while the United States is running amuck across the continent that Mexico is busy with its internal problems and doesn't know what is going on. Nothing could be further from the truth. Mexico had diplomatic representatives in Washington all during these years. The Mexican foreign office is full of newspaper clippings and reports from the United States. Mexican intelligence was very good and Mexico made quite serious efforts to try to counter U.S. Manifest Destiny by moving immigrants from Mexico, European immigrants, into Texas, for example, and American immigrants, which was a great failure of course, but the purpose of that was quite logical at the time. Dr. Vásquez's references to the 1820s when Mexico opened up the border of Texas to people from the United States to come and settle, with the understanding they would become Mexican citizens is a good example. This was done with the understanding that the Americans were coming anyway as illegal aliens, they were crossing the border into Texas and taking up residence there. So it seemed like a good idea to perhaps make them become Mexicans, then they would join our side and help be a buffer against further Anglo-American immigration. The same thing occurred in California. There was an attempt to counter-colonize California, too, so that there would be a more critical massive

population there to prevent a takeover. Mexico, given its resources and its problems that we've discussed, was very aware and took steps to try to counter this, but imagine today if the United States is trying to somehow seal off the border with Mexico with all of our advanced technology and we can't do it, there's no way that Mexico, at that time, could prevent these human waves from moving westward.

DR. ZORAIDA VAZQUEZ: Yo quería aclarar algo. A menudo se ha tratado de justificar el expansiomismo norteamericano diciendo que también ha habido un expansionismo mexicano, hablando de Centro América. Y los guatemaltecos se lo han tomado muy en serio y tienen grandes resentimientos contra México, por la parte que formaron parte del Imperio Mexicano y además porque Chiapas decidió anexarse a México y separarse de Guatemala. Pero, creo que eso se necesita aclarar y es fácil aclararlo cuando recordamos simplemente que la Nueva España comprendía hasta Costa Rica. Es decir la frontera entre la Nueva Granada, Panamá ya era parte de Nueva Granada, Panamá, no existía como parte separada si no la hicieron existir los Estados Unidos para construir el canal, pero toda la otra parte formaba parte del virreinato, pero se administraba separadamente de Guatemala. La anexión al tratado...al Plan de Iguala realmente los hizo independientes sin tener que luchar. Tuvieron la suerte de no tener una lucha independentista sino anexarse al Plan de Iguala. ¿Por qué se anexaron al Plan de Iguala? Una de mis alumnas que es nicaraguense, ha estudiado esto bastante cuidadosamente y siempre se ha acusado de que Iturbide mandó sus tropas a obligarlos. ¡No! En realidad, Iturbide estaba tan ocupado en conseguir que se anexaran todos a su plan cuando empezaron a llegar las anexciones de las intendencias centroamericanas, de las provincias centroamericanas al Plan de Iguala, para separarse de lo que ellos llamaban la tiranía de Guatemala. Ahora bien, cuando se termina el imperio, pues no tiene órdenes y lo que hace es reunir a las provincias centroamericanas en Guatemala y ellos deciden separarse y se retiran. E inmediamente el gobierno Lucas Salamán plantea la petición de los centroamericanos y el reconocimiento e inmediatamente se les da. Entonces, creo que esa...si por allí va la pregunta esa acusación ha sido bastante gratuita. Claro que Chiapas, se separara de México en 1823, pero se anexa al aceptarse la Constitución Federal de 1824. Las razones son que a unas élites en Chiapas no les convenía estar anexas a Guatemala. México estaba mucho más lejos de Chiapas y, Guatemala estaba allí juntito.

UNKNOWN: En dirección a lo que decía el profesor Weber yo quisiera completar lo siguiente. Si en México había una muy clara conciencia no solamente del Destino Manifiesto, sino de las tendencias expancionistas norteamericanas y además algo sumamente importante por lo menos la élite política, educada mexicana sorprendentemente conocía la historia de los Estados Unidos, conocía la cultura norteamericana muchísimo más de lo que en la actualidad sucede. Los periodistas mexicanos que publicaron el periódico *El Tiempo* y *El Siglo XIX* tenían clarísima conciencia inclusive hasta de los procedimientos, el papel que jugaba el Congreso, etc., etc. que dicho de paso nada más por comparación, el otro día en un noticiero radiofónico mexicano, un locutor estaba comentando sobre una carta que enviaron 27 senadores republicanos al Presidente Clinton apoyando el tratado de libre comercio y decía este muy escuchado periodista mexicano: "Bueno, ya tenemos 27 votos con estos senadores republicanos habrá algunos demócratas por ahí. Ya tenemos los 51 votos para que se apruebe el Tratado del Libre Comerio en el Senado de los Estados Unidos pero se le olvidó que los tratados no se aprueban por mayoría de votos sino por dos tercios. Y es

uno de los mas importantes noticieros que se escucha en México. Ese error no le hubiera pasado ni a un redactor de *El Tiempo*, ni a un redactor de *El Siglo XIX*. Bueno, realmente la prensa mexicana de esa época, era una prensa bastante bien preparada y conocedora de lo que eran los Estados Unidos y ojalá en esta época la prensa mexicana tuviera ese nivel de conocimiento.

SYLVIA KOMATZU: Well, before we conclude this morning, we have one more speaker. So Dr. Sánchez will introduce Dr. Gilberto Hinojosa.

DR. JOSEPH SANCHEZ: Muy buenos días. Primero quiero agradacer el panel para sus presentaciones magnificas en esta sesión de esta mañana. Good morning, first I would like to give a word of appreciation to the fine work the panel did with its presentations this morning.

Oh, Tom Carroll asked me to make one announcement and that is that the tapes for all of these sessions will be available. He predicts that he might have around six tapes and they'll be around $22.00 plus $2.00 for mailing and the National Park Service will also make some transcriptions of the proceedings as well.

It is my pleasure to present an old friend and colleague, this morning, Dr. Gilberto Hinojosa. If I had introduced him a few weeks ago, I would have said that he is an associate professor of history at the University of Texas at San Antonio. As of just recently he has been appointed to the Dean of Humanities and Fine Arts at Incarnate Word College in San Antonio. He has various publications on the Spanish and Mexican frontiers and the history of south Texas. His book, *A Borderlands Town in Transition*, is a history of Laredo, Texas, and he has also published *Tejano Origins in Eighteenth Century San Antonio*. His presentation will be on "Mexican Americans and Accommodations to the New American System: the Case of Don Francisco Yturria and His Business Partners." Dr. Hinojosa.

DR. GILBERTO HINOJOSA: I was asked to participate in this conference although I am not speaking on the Mexican War because the Yturria family will host the participants in the conference this evening. I thought it was very appropriate, and Mr. Carroll agreed, that we should talk briefly about the post-Mexican War period.

In 1986, I had the pleasure of being asked by the Yturria family of Brownsville to organize the papers of their great-grandfather, Don Francisco Yturria. Don Francisco's and the family's fame and fortune came from his mercantile business and bank, as well as from his ranch and other land holdings.

Don Francisco was born in Matamoros on October 4, 1830. His father, Manuel María Yturria, most probably was born in Mexico City, was an officer in the Mexican Army, and participated in some of the battles in the Mexican War. Previously, he had assisted General Mier y Terán after his famous *visita* of Texas in 1828. The young don Francisco was a clerk in the store of one of the four merchants in the city of Matamoros. After the war, with the Río Grande being set as a boundary, the merchants moved their operations from Matamoros to the Texas side to be closer to the actual port of Matamoros which was on the island of Brazos Santiago. Don Francisco moved with the merchant with whom he had been clerking, but by 1852 don Francisco had established his own business here in Brownsville and thus was able to take advantage of the windfall profits resulting from the Civil War cotton trade.

A relatively young man when he made his fortune, don Francisco had married Felicita Treviño who brought extensive landholdings into the marriage. The ranch lands would provide strong support for the family estate in later years and would yield oil and gas revenues in the twentieth century.

Throughout the nineteenth century, however, it was don Francisco's mercantile and banking interests that gave the family position and prestige. Actually, the history of the Yturria family, to some extent, reflects the history of some of the landholding families in south Texas. They took the steps to make sure that their lands were registered according to the new legal system. Whenever they procured enough capital, they moved into the American business world, both in the cattle business as well as in merchandising. A new book being prepared by Armando Alonso shows how in an era of insecurity they took the family lands and distributed them to individuals so they could be registered by individuals, rather than as family possessions. Thus, they played the game in the new, more capital intensive economy in the United States. However, not everyone was able to withstand the recurring recessions and repressions. Many old family lands were subdivided.

I don't want to give my topic any less importance, of course, than the very important topics that have been discussed this morning. However, the Mexican War begins Mexican-American history and the rancheros that lived in this area of the Nueces and Río Grande river valleys, sought to stake out their future in a new and different way than they had done in the past.

Our host is but one example of many who did that and created the basis later on for Mexican-American power and prosperity. Thank you very much for the invitation and we'll see you the rest of the day.

SYLVIA KOMATZU: And, again, I'd just like to express our deepest appreciation to each of our panelists this morning for their very thoughtful and stimulating presentations. Thank you.
[End of session]

[Sunday, May 9, 1993-Morning session]
DR. ANTHONY KNOPP: I would like to introduce Jenkins Garrett and Gerald Saxon. Gerald is the director of Special Collections of the University of Texas at Arlington and Jenkins Garrett is a legend here in Texas history. He's a man who had his own publishing company of historical works and he was the primary motivating source behind the Mexican War collection up at the University of Texas at Arlington, but I'm going to let Gerald Saxon tell you more about that. Gerald.

GERALD SAXON: Thank you, Tony. It sure is a pleasure to be here this morning. I think we are probably the hard core here at nine o'clock on Sunday after a fairly long evening. What I want to do is tell you a little bit about the Special Collections that we have at UT-Arlington. Some of you might be wondering, what is somebody at UT-Arlington here doing in Brownsville talking about the Mexican War? I think you'll be very impressed with the fact that we have one of the finest and strongest Mexican War collections in the nation in Arlington. What I've done is put together some slides and I want to tell you a little bit about our holdings in a general way and then focus on some of the holdings that we have relating specifically to the Mexican War. There are a couple

of things I want to mention first before Mr. Garrett comes up as well. Number one is we're doing a Mexican War bibliography at UT-Arlington. Jenkins Garrett, who's going to follow me to talk to you a little bit about how the Mexican War materials were put together at UTA, will say a little more about that bibliography, but let me just tell you that Texas A&M Press is going to be publishing it. It's going to be over six hundred pages, it's going to be a bibliographical description of the items in our holdings. We have over twenty-five thousand items that are going to be described in our Mexican War bibliography and it covers everything from general histories to political and diplomatic histories relating to the war, to military histories and registers, to campaigns and battles, to congressional speeches, congressional documents, general orders, maps, manuscripts, newspapers, broadsides, broadsheets, etc. It is a wonderful collection and we think that the bibliography is going to be extremely popular for those people who are doing research on the Mexican-American War.

Secondly, let me encourage that those of you who are doing research come visit us at UT-Arlington. We are a collection that is open to the public. You don't have to be a staff member. You don't have to be a faculty member. You don't have to be a student to use our holdings. We encourage that they be used. They're catalogued so that they can be used. In fact, today, I speak to you more as an archivist and as a library administrator than as a historian, although, I am all of those. But I'm coming more from the archival and library perspective this morning just to give you an idea of what we have. Lastly, as a way of introduction for those of you who are automated and are automated at your house or automated in your office, you can access our holdings through your computer and you can access it directly from your office through your house, etc. as long as you have some sort of dial-out software. You can dial into the UTA computer system and you can get bibliographic information on all of our Mexican War materials. As you can see, scholarship has come a long way, as have archives and librarianship.

So, without further adieu, let me have somebody turn on the slide projector and I'll give you a brief overview of special collections at UTA.

As most of you know, UTA is in Arlington, Texas and Arlington is between Dallas and Fort Worth. It is easy to get to, extremely easy to get to, and nestled in the largest metroplex in Texas. What I'll be talking about is our Special Collections division. We're on the sixth floor of the UTA Central Library. The Central Library is one of three facilities on campus. We have twenty-five thousand students at UTA so it's a very large university. Oftentimes people ask me, "Well, if I come to do research, where am I going to park the car? What kind of facilities do you have?" We do have parking directly behind the library so there's usually no problem in finding access to parking space. What I'll be dealing with primarily today is what we call the Jenkins Garrett Library and Mr. Garrett is going to be following me in talking a little bit about our Mexican War holdings. I wanted to give you just a brief overview.

As I mentioned, Special Collections is on the sixth floor of the library. We have the entire sixth floor, except for the administration which we continue to try to expel from the sixth floor but they refuse to go. This gives you some idea of the physical space in Special Collections. It's a very nice facility and very comfortable for those people who are doing research. This is the Jenkins Garrett Library and it is a regular special collections which means that when you come in, like all archives and manuscript repositories, we ask you to do certain things. We ask you to lock up briefcases. We ask that you lock up purses, if you're a lady; backpacks, if you're a student. We ask that you use pencils when you are using our holdings. We ask that you check out a few things at

a time. It is a non-circulating collection, which means that nothing leaves the library. All the research has to be done inside the facility. Some of our major holdings relate to Texas and this is the Cabeza de Baca 1555 account of his journeys through Texas. We have many books, but what I would like to talk about more specifically are the Mexican War items that we have.

When the library was built in 1974 and Mr. Garrett may tell you this, we thought that with this bank of manuscript boxes, it would take us approximately thirty to forty years to fill it. Well, so much for library planning. Right now, like I mentioned, we have all of the sixth floor of the library, we have space in the basement in two locations, we have space on the fifth floor, and we're looking at off-site storage now, and we've only been a division of the library for twenty-five years. We have manuscript materials that measure over six thousand linear feet. To an archivist that means something. If you can visualize manuscript boxes or Hollinger boxes. A Hollinger box is about a half a cubic foot. So, if you can think of twelve thousand Hollinger boxes, it would more than fill this room just of the manuscript and archival materials that we have.

What I wanted to do is give you an idea of the formats of materials that we have. Probably the only thing that we don't actively collect, relating to the war, would be artifact materials, but we do have some 3-D objects in the collection, but it's not a focus of our collection at UTA.

Our collection tends to be paper materials such as books, periodicals, and manuscript materials. This is Chamberlain's *Recollections of a Rogue*. Could somebody focus that? I don't have quite a focus on this remote control. The item at the bottom of the screen is the John Meginness diary. Meginness was a Mexican War prisoner. He was an American who was captured and kept a diary. The diary has never been published, so it's an ideal manuscript item that's unpublished. That would be a wonderful thing for somebody to look into. We have congressional documents at UTA and virtually all of them deal with the Mexican War. We have made strong efforts in Mexico to make sure that we're documenting both sides of the war at UT-Arlington. We have Mexican government documents, state, municipal, as well as federal government documents. As for published personal accounts of the war, we have literally hundreds of them at UT-Arlington and many of them in wonderful condition, as you can see here. Almost all of these reflect specifically on naval engagements in the war. We have broadsides, broadsheets, and posters; again, hundreds of items relating to the war. This is a military poster asking for volunteers to come fight on the American side, but we have Mexican broadsides and broadsheets, as well.

General orders issued by the American armies: we have almost a complete set of general orders from the army. So, we've been very good customers for some book dealers in the Northeast and book dealers in the Southwest. The general orders are a wonderful source of research for those of you looking at the military aspects of the war as well as the social aspects of the war both in south Texas and into northern Mexico and central Mexico.

Broadsides from the Mexican point of view, broadsides that were issued when the American armies were in Mexico, broadsides that the United States armies would issue in Spanish as well as in English are a part of our Mexican War holdings.

Maps; I'll talk a little bit about our map collection a little later, but specifically, we have a number of maps relating to the Mexican War. Battle maps, battle plans, government maps from both the United States government and the Mexican government.

We have manuscript maps that some participants in battle made and you can see it, again, these are maps of Palo Alto.

Sheet music; oftentimes that's overlooked in studying wars. We have a very nice sheet music collection at UT-Arlington. Over one hundred pieces of sheet music that commemorate one thing or another about the war, either the death of a soldier, the celebration of a general, somebody's mentioned Ringgold, somebody's mentioned May, somebody's mentioned all of these people over the course of the last few days, but we have sheet music that specifically relates to those gentlemen who fell in battle. Again, more sheet music. We have tapes of some of this sheet music where in the past we've hosted Mexican War conferences at UTA and have had musical groups come and perform this martial music.

George Wilkins Kendall. The Kendall papers at UT-Arlington. There are some New Orleans *Picayunes* in the back and, of course, Kendall was the publisher and an editor of the New Orleans *Picayune*. We have his personal papers at UTA. Kendall wrote an unpublished history of the Mexican War shortly after his involvement. He was one of the first military correspondents, one of the first professional correspondents, that covered the war. Representative Ortíz last night recognized Kendall as being the first modern war correspondent. If he's not the first, he's certainly one of the first and we have the Kendall papers at UTA that came directly through the Kendall family. Kendall also followed the Santa Fe expedition into New Mexico in the early 1840s, if you recall, and was a very prolific writer. It was Kendall reports, in many cases, that were being reported to the president in Washington, DC, oftentimes before the military reports would come through. These are just some of the things in the Kendall collection, a daybook, of course the daguerreotypes in the Kendall collection and Kendall is perhaps best noted, as far as the Mexican War is concerned, with doing this portfolio. The war between the United States and Mexico, which he published in 1851, it was and still is today, a collector's item. It's a beautiful account of the war. It deals with twelve of the battles of the war with Mexico. This is Palo Alto in that particular item. You see those mountains in the background. Where did those mountains go? Of course this is also from the Kendall-Nebel portfolio. This is Winfield Scott marching into Mexico City and there are ten other lithographs that are a part of that portfolio. Those of you who know Ron Tyler know the Summerlee Foundation and will know that this is going to be reproduced, the Kendall-Nebel portfolio will be reproduced in facsimile form soon. It's an elephant folio, so it's extremely large. It currently sells for about five to six thousand dollars if you can find a copy intact today. Well, the Summerlee Foundation is going to republish a facsimile version of this and offer it for sale within the next year so you might want to, if you're a Mexican War collector, you might want to get a copy. Also, there are a number of graphics that were produced in the Mexican War. In many ways this was a war that mirrored how we covered wars today. There were journalists following the armies into Mexico, they were writing accounts. Sometimes these cases would be translated visually by people either on-site or by people in Philadelphia or New York. We have hundreds of graphics, many embellished, many you wouldn't recognize what they were actually trying to depict, but this is an important aspect of the war people overlook and they're very visual.

We have sketchbooks of U.S. Army volunteers and sometimes U.S. Army regulars who might have kept sketchbooks. I put this in for Mr. Garrett. This is James K. Polk, his favorite president. We have engravings of all the major participants in the military and the political aspects on both sides of the Mexican as well as the United

States side of the war, but this gives you at least some idea of the types of things that we have at UTA. They are virtually all cataloged, they're all useable, they're all open, and I encourage you to use them.

Newspapers; we have literally hundreds of newspapers that relate to the war. Both newspapers that were produced in Mexico by the Mexican authorities, as well as newspapers produced by the American army and newspapers in the United States that relate directly to the Mexican War, similar to the newspapers that you see in the back of the room. Finally, I didn't want to leave without giving you some other aspects of what we have in Special Collections in a very general way. For those of you who have studied Texas history, you'll know something about Robertson's colony in Texas. Those papers are housed at UTA and some of you may know Dr. Malcolm McLean who just finished a nineteen-volume compilation of the Robertson colony. The Robertson colony was an empresario grant similar in some ways to the Stephen F. Austin colony and nineteen volumes have been published relating to it. We've done extensive microfilming at UTA in Yucatan, as well as in Honduras, and interestingly enough, that microfilm can help you understand the Mexican War as well. We microfilmed from 1636, all the Yucatecan archives; the state, the ecclesiastical, and the municipalities in Yucatan. We microfilmed from the 1600s through 1936 and that's a particularly rich resource that hasn't been tapped that well. We lend microfilm on interlibrary loan. More Yucatecan materials. We started as a labor collection and I'm not going to dwell on it, but just to let you know if your dealing with labor or labor topics we would be very interested in helping and you can see these are just some labor photographs. That has nothing to do with the Mexican War, but that has everything to do with our labor holdings.

We do oral histories at UTA. We're the university archives and surprisingly enough UTA has been a school in Arlington for almost one hundred years. We started in 1895. We're a regional historical depository where we have the historical records for the five counties that surround Tarrant county to the west and there they are and then finally, I mentioned maps.

We have over fifty-five thousand maps at UTA. Historic maps; this is a 1493 of the world. Our earliest map that shows the three continents, Africa to my bottom left, Europe just above that, and Asia, and then we have maps going all the way into the early twentieth century. Many of those maps are Mexican War maps. If you are interested in atlases in geography, which give you another interesting glimpse of the war, we have over a thousand U.S.-produced atlases and geographies that date from the 1780s to the 1900s. It is interesting to see how the war was depicted for schools in the school geographies. It's an untapped resource that I certainly encourage somebody to come take a look at and then finally, this is the map room. Very comfortable, very easy to work in. Let me conclude by saying this. At UTA we have a staff of eleven people in Special Collections and we employ nine students a semester so we have about twenty people who are there to help you in one way or another. We encourage that the collection be used. It's a phenomenally rich collection that relates to a number of topics, not just the Mexican War, but we're perhaps best known for our Mexican War holdings, our Texana holdings, and our map collection.

Let me open it up for questions real quick. Does anybody have a question? Does it surprise you that we have this material at UTA? It shouldn't. You should know about these things. You know, people ask me specific questions all the time: "Do you have this?" "Do you have that," and it's very difficult when your collection is so large to say

whether we have it or not, but we do have a great deal. It is a phenomenally rich collection.

What I would like to do is turn over the microphone to Jenkins Garrett because the reason that the collection is there and the reason that we had somebody put it together is Mr. Garrett. He started collecting Mexican War materials long before it became possible for other people and really fashionable. Mr. and Mrs. Garrett donated their collection to UTA in the early 1970s, 1974, and since that time have been helping us to build that collection and to augment it. So if you know of Mexican War items that are out there, we certainly would like to know about them, as well. Mr.Garrett, I'm going to turn the microphone over to you.

JENKINS GARRETT: I'm not going to talk about what's in the collection. They asked me the question, "How in the world did you get to being a devoted Texana collector?" and "How did you ever get into collecting the Mexican War?"

I took a course in history, under Walter Prescott Webb back in 1932 and I came out of that experience with Dr. Webb of feeling a pride and a curiosity about everything I could find about Texas. But when I began, I didn't care whether the book was paperback or first or thirteenth edition or what. I was acquiring Texas material for my own use and information. I ran into a dealer, I was not even familiar with the fact that there were dealers at that time, back in the late 1940s, who said, "Look, you keep buying these paperbacks and second and third editions, you know, get first editions and get hardback books, if they are available, and you can build you a collection that has some worth when you get through with the books." I, with the help of men like Pletcher, John Jenkins in Austin, and Bill Morrison in Waco, I really started thinking in terms of collecting a more comprehensive collection of Texas.

The more I read and the more I thought about it, the 1846 annexation was not the whole story of Texas. There was a war. I didn't know much about it. The dealers didn't seem to know much about the Mexican War and about 1950, I guess it was, I was talking to Mr. Pletcher about the fact that Texas was really not recognized by many of the foreign nations, and that the story of Texas was not over until the end of the Mexican War and he said, "Well, why don't you get into that field?" The beauty of it is that I don't know of any dealer that handled those items and I do not know of anybody's collecting that, so it's something maybe to get into because it does have such a great relationship to Texas and he said that another fine thing about it is that I doubt if there's over two hundred books that have ever been written about the Mexican War.

Well, the more I got into the literature, one of the early items was *Call to Arms* that you saw and I, at first, thought that it was a Texas item and when I read more about it, it was the Mexican War and then I saw how Texas was really the key to the opening up of the United States as a nation of the world as its territory was extended from the Atlantic to the Pacific. To me, Texas was the main character and was the key that opened up this nation's future. Then I became more or less a compulsive buyer and you people understand compulsive buying. You know, when you come in with some more books when you've made a trip and your wife says, "Where are you going to put 'em?" and I had moved all of the Book of the Month club books out of the shelving to take care of this new material. I remember one time my conscience hurt me a little bit from a trip that I had made seeing different second-hand bookstores and collectors and dealers. I had the books in the back end of the car that I drove. It was an old Chevrolet and it was about to play out on me and I needed a new car so I had bought one, but the back end of that

car was full of my books and I told the dealer that I bought the car from, "Well, I'm not going to trade in my car right now, I'm going to keep it." But where we lived at that particular time, I had to park the old car over really about one foot onto a neighbor's yard and my wife kept saying, "Why don't you sell that old thing?" and I said, "Well, I'm going to get around to it." So finally, one day when she was at the beauty parlor, I moved all the books up in the attic and I'll tell you, I found the answer to that. As we would go into a bookstore, in England or wherever we were, my wife would go with me many times and stand on one foot and then the other and said, well, after about an hour, she'd say, "Isn't it time to go on back to the hotel?" Well, one day in London, it was a dealer who also had a lot of maps and she started looking at these maps and brought one over and said, "Look, this is what they knew about the Gulf of Mexico in 1700." The main thrust at that time was the collection, our Texana, and she got the idea that it would be a wonderful thing for her to collect maps that would show the development of the knowledge of the map makers, the development of the information about the area around the Gulf of Mexico. From that point on, there was never any objection to my collecting books or manuscripts and what not because I would say, "Well, what are you going to do with this map?" and so we both became compulsive collectors. My wife built a very, very fine collection of maps that show the development of knowledge of the Gulf. Putting it together with my wife's help, we did finally gave the collection to the University of Texas at Arlington and they developed some wonderful facilities there for it, but that's not the end of the story. I was thrilled in seeing all of the awards last night. This was a community effort that brought you to this conference. Immediately after the library was established, the university was very generous in funding it. Several foundations in the area became interested in helping build the collection. Individuals started leaving their family papers there because they knew that they would be safe, especially with the competent staff that was just now described. The thing is just built. What my wife and I did was get it started and then the community jumped in, just like they've done on your celebration here, and helped us. Now we're looking forward to spending even greater funds, and the whole idea of it is to build a collection for our research and that's the way it started.

DR. KNOPP: Anybody have any questions for Mr. Garrett? I should announce that if you have any questions for any of our speakers, when we have an opportunity, please go to the mike back there so that they can translate. That's what those things are along the tables and if you were not here before, if you need a translation, just pick it up.

Dr. Tony Zavaleta will not be here today. There are some health problems within his family and he informed me yesterday that he will not be able to make his presentation today. So, we are going to move right along to our next topic and the speaker is Mr. Thomas Carroll who is the superintendent for the Palo Alto National Historic Battlefield Site. Mr. Carroll has been the mover and shaker for the conference here and so it's a great pleasure for me to be able to introduce him although if he wants me to, maybe I'll help him pass those things out so he can come up and make his presentation.

THOMAS CARROLL: Good morning. I have two topics this morning I would like to mention. The first one, the ring of fortifications around Matamoros, I spoke about during our visit to Matamoros on Friday. I did a paper on this subject for Dr. Milo Kearney's border history class sponsored by the University of Texas at Brownsville and the Instituto Tecnológico de Matamoros.

If you look at the cover page on the H. Matamoros handout, you see the map that Yolanda González prepared for the tour of Matamoros. The map Yolanda has redrawn dates from roughly 1873-1874; it records the alignment of the encircling ring of fortifications around Matamoros that was begun in 1863. If you turn to the next page, you'll see how this map and other similar maps compare with a modern map of the historic center of Matamoros. You can see how the ring of fortifications follows Avenida Diagonal Cuauhtemoc on the southwest and Calle 21 on the west. At the northern end of Calle 21, the line of fortifications goes to the north-northeast to Fort Paredes that was begun in 1832 and was located adjacent to the Rio Grande or Bravo. The alignment of the fortifications is reflected in the alignment of the buildings and properties and in an alley that covers over half of the distance between Fort Paredes and Calle 21. On the eastern and southeastern side of the historic center of Matamoros can be seen the curving streets that show where the small forts, embankments, and moat were once located. The junction of the northeast-southwest curving streets, on the eastern side of the city, with the southeast-northwest Avenida Diagonal Cuauhtemoc on the south side of the historic city indicates the location of the Fortín de San Fernando with its elevating bridge.

The way I became interested in the fortifications around Matamoros was as a result of Dr. Salvador Díaz Berrio, of the National Institute of Anthropology and History, asking me if there were any remains of the city's fortifications, apart from the Casa Mata. I said that I did not know. My lack of knowledge about the fortifications of Matamoros stimulated me to chose this subject for the Border History class, which we met with at the banquet and evening session in the Instituto Tecnológico de Matamoros. Along the defensive alignments around the city, I was able to find what I felt could potentially be a few physical remains, apart from the street and property alignments. I uncovered in my investigations and with the help of Yolanda González who had the Berlandier microfilm in the University of Texas at Brownsville's Special Collections, Berlandier's 1845 map of Matamoros. To really know that this map was of Matamoros, we had to copy the microfilm and then cut and paste putting the plan of the city back together. If you turn to the next page, you'll see that map. In addition, there is a book that came out recently called *The Tennessee Volunteer*; it has a map from 1846. In this map and in Berlandier's detailed map you can the alignment of fortifications around Matamoros that was in existence during the Mexican American War. This alignment is significantly different from the defensive alignment that dates from 1863, although there are points that both defensive systems share. Construction of the embankment around the city began in 1839. The Panteón Viejo you visited you'll see on the southwest corner of the historic zone. If you turn to the final map, you'll see how these earlier maps conform to the modern city map.

It's sort of rough the type of work I did, but I thought that it was interesting that I hadn't heard anyone really talk about two lines of fortifications or about the two defensive system alignments being so different. My primary purpose was to try to provide a preliminary study that would interest historians, historical architects, etc. to take a closer look at Matamoros. As you look at the map of the city, you know, it's really remarkable how you can find the traces of the past right in the alignment of the city today, and this to me is one of the things about Matamoros that I appreciate so much. Walking through the downtown area I have the feeling that for one hundred years or so the city was basically within these walls, and so you get a feeling for the width of the streets and everything. You get also a feeling of a unique, medieval type of city where people lived behind forts, moats, and embankments and departed from the city on

elevating bridges. The defensive alignments and works reflect the military technology of the mid-nineteenth century that were developed, in part, to defend against cannons. It should be noted here that the streets in the center of the historic zone and the core of the city were well developed prior to the construction of the encirclement of the city in 1839 by defensive embankments. I think Matamoros is exceptionally interesting, and I believe that this type of study ties into the general type of work that the park would be doing, hopefully, at sites all around the U.S. and Mexico in cooperation with Mexico and others interested in the study and preservation of historic sites of the mid-nineteenth century.

The second subject I will mention is the very rough draft of the Palo Alto Battlefield resource management plan. If you look at the list of project titles, you can see how I'm looking at the research potential for the park. Now no one's reviewed this or looked at it, and it's got a long way to go before it's final, but as you look through there you can get an idea of the way a typical Park Service-type of approach to research and resource management is developed. There is a complete archeological survey, which will begin once we own the land and have the necessary funds. Next, see the archeological reconnaissance Charlie Haecker is completing, then test excavations that would follow on the archeological survey for where you have the things that need to checked out in order to be understood. The archeological overview and assessment should be done before you get too far into your archeological work.

Now, historic resource studies are also listed there. This sort of project documents what the resources are, the available materials, etc. Historic resource studies are major documents in the National Park Service and average about two or three hundred pages, depending on the property that you're working with. I've planned one for the Palo Alto Battlefield and one for Taylor's northern campaign. The other one cites the war of 1847, based upon the agreements we arrive at, that could go all the way from the Mississippi into Mexico. The project is so vast that it might go on for fifty or one hundred years. One way to look at that is at the different levels of documentation for individual sites. The next one, the theme study, is also a major study of the Mexican-American War. It is essential that historians from both countries work together identifying the major themes of the Mexican-American War, identifying and documenting the significant sites, and then identifying how the sites fit within the broad thematic framework. This type of research begins to provide the basis for a comprehensive view of a major part of history. This is the typical way that we would undertake a major, comprehensive study of a subject as broad and complex as the Mexican American War.

I worked at Salinas Pueblo Missions National Monument and other parks and this is the way programs are put together. Now, there are individual characteristics that are contained within a park's enabling legislation and those that will become evident as work is undertaken at the site; these are critically important in the approach the park takes to resource management and research. Due to the complexity and the scale of what we are working with here, I think we need to have a lot of outside review and feedback into the resource management plan. Such input would also contribute to the general management plan and the development of a concept plan because all of these documents determine to a large degree to what depth we would get into the various projects. Your input will help us to determine what should be our role in this vast story. I would like to have all of you be part of our planning process. We'll be better able to go ahead both in the resource management plan and on the general management plan because of your input and ideas. It's not numbers necessarily that count, although that's important, but it's the ideas that people come up with. Sometimes one idea just floating out there begins to make sense

and it fits perfectly. As we have seen, this conference is important for researchers but it is also important for planners, interpreters, and managers.

That's my presentation. Thank you very much. You have made this conference a reality. My sincere thanks to you, to our fine masters of ceremonies, to Bruce Aiken and his staff, and to all of those from both countries who contributed so much to the remarkable success of this international gathering.

DR. KNOPP: Thanks, Tom. Is Mr. Leal Velazco here? Gustavo, Carlos Gustavo Leal Velazco? No? Not here at this time? Well, let's proceed on to another one of the infamous denizens of Brownsville, Mark Lund, who is the city heritage officer with the city of Brownsville and has been a major player in the development of the historical resources of Brownsville. So, it's a real pleasure for me to introduce Mark. Are you all set with what you need?

MARK LUND: There you go, that's better. You can hear me okay? Thank you very much for coming to Brownsville. We hope you've enjoyed the last several days here. I'm going to talk to you about the Fort Brown earthworks. There we go, that's the first slide. Most of you have probably seen the Fort Brown area when you saw the golf course yesterday. The Fort Brown area dates back to 1846 and it's very important for a number of reasons. Okay. We know that Zachary Taylor came down from Corpus Christi and he had his orders from President Polk and, think about it, when he was here, how did he make his decision on where he was going to build this fort? Why did he build it on the banks of the Río Grande river? Well, there were a number of considerations.

Some of those were military considerations. They had very good military engineers who realized that from a certain spot they could hit the army bases on the Mexican side and, hopefully, they would avoid being hit by the artillery coming from Mexico. So, that's one consideration, but I think there's a more important thing to think about with this site. Julia García mentioned that at first it was called Fort Taylor. Some of the soldiers when they were digging the earthworks, and we're talking about digging a pile of earth some eight or nine feet high and many feet wide, called it Fort Texas.

I think that the most important thing to think about is it was a very symbolic action. This was really the whole basis of the conflict: the Mexicans claimed the boundary was the Nueces River, way up by Corpus Christi, while the United States troops were here to make good the claim from Texas. When Texas was annexed the U.S. demanded that the southern border between the two nations would be the Río Grande. So, it's very symbolic that Taylor didn't build this fort miles from Matamoros, he built it right opposite Matamoros. That's what the significance of the site now is; that you can go out there and off in the distance you can see Mexico especially when you get on the levy that dates from 1930 or 1940, you can see pretty much the ground somewhat as it was at that time in 1846.

Now, it's a little bit disturbing that you have the parking lot and you have the golf course, but considering what could have happened, you know, you don't have a housing development or what have you. You have some of the integrity of the site. You have a view and although you don't have a perfect view of the way Matamoros was in 1846, you can see the cathedral that dates to 1825. I think that the symbolic reason is very important in that Taylor built that fort there to say to the Mexicans, "Look, we're here, and we're making good the claim," and so the military considerations about where exactly they sighted the fort is interesting, but also the symbolic reason is very important

now. Recently we were talking about what we do in our job performances for the city of Brownsville. As a planner, part of my job for the city is to protect, preserve, and promote the city's historic resources. Most of my work involves historic structures, but here is a historic resource, a site that dates back to 1846. It's of immense value for research and also just for people to understand, even for the ordinary school children. Unfortunately, many, many people in Brownsville and many visitors have no idea that this is anything other than a golf course. Here you can see the bridge that goes across the river and at this point you are standing on top of the levy and looking sort of to the west. When the levies were built, this fort was essentially cut in half and the levy came through large sections of this fort. Think of a fort that was a star with six points to the star. That was the shape of the earthworks. So, unfortunately, a large amount of the earthworks were destroyed, but between this view and it would be off to your right on this, you'll see little bunkers, what we call the driving range on the golf course. Those are the remaining earth mounds that have eroded over time and that's what's left of what was the original fort and even though large portions of it have been destroyed and disturbed, we think that what's left is still very significant. Okay. We've talked about the symbolic reasons.

One thing that is very interesting for the city of Brownsville, and Dr. Knopp and Milo Kearney in their book, *Boom or Bust*, talk about that this land after it became incorporated into the United States in 1848, is that it was originally the commons area of Matamoros. It's interesting for Brownsville history in that a huge amount of our history was determined by this land because it was the original townsite that was developed by Charles Stillman and his partners. There were legal implications on whether the city of Brownsville should get that land or Stillman and his partners would get the land. There were claims that somebody who was a member of the Cavazos family and a resident of Matamoros, had never signed off their portion to the city of Matamoros, and so, for that reason, they had legal standing to a part of that land. The idea was that the municipal land would go from Matamoros and then become the property of the city of Brownsville. So, you have this whole business of murky legal claims and later, in the 1870s, the United States Congress appropriated money to try and buy out the claimants. So, locally that might not be of a big interest to you folks, but to us the whole murky legal challenges between the political factions, what we call the reds and the blues, all stems from the fact that this land was a common area of Matamoros. That was the area where the people were planting crops or they ran their cattle or their sheep, so there are maps that you can look at and you can see what was on the ground. There were a few small structures or wooden shanks along the riverbank when Zachary Taylor showed up and started digging the fort.

Now, there are a lot of interesting stories that are associated with the fort. I won't go into all of them, but some of them should be mentioned because what we want, and you saw our heritage trail marker that's outside of this building and the one that we dedicated yesterday, is for the tourists and the visitors to go to the site and to have some knowledge of what happened there. We can't tell them all the stories by having fifty plaques, but we can begin by putting some out there as part of the heritage trail. They will at least know that it's just not a golf course, but that earthworks were built there in 1846. We look forward to when Palo Alto is a fully-established national park, because this land is federal land, it's IBWC land, the International Boundary and Water Commission owns those territories. The city has a recreational license to use the facility for recreational purposes and that's why we have a golf course there, but we hope that

this federal land will have walking tours and we will have park rangers available there to lead interpretive tours so that people will know some of the stories associated with this site. Some of the stories are very, very interesting, in fact, the key part of the whole battle of Palo Alto is that you had Jacob Brown in charge of five hundred men, sieged here at Fort Texas. The fort was not completely built when the artillery shells started coming over from Matamoros. That was a great incentive for them to finish the fort and they finished the last wall in record time. Sergeant Weigart was out on the wall while that was being done. Perhaps Mr. Aiken yesterday mentioned to you how he was killed and then after they buried his body, a shell landed on his grave and disturbed the grave. If you think about it, if Jacob Brown hadn't died we might have ended up being Weigartsville, so that's interesting.

What's also interesting is that you had "The Great Western," six-foot-two-inch Sarah Borginnis who was a very colorful character. Later on in the war in northern Mexico when she overheard somebody slurring or discouraging Zachary Taylor, she punched out one of the soldiers, knocked him out cold with one punch. She's a very colorful character. You have the matter of the drama, with the fort bombed out and one of the Texas Rangers, Sam Walker, who snuck into the fort to gather information and confer with Jacob Brown, asking "Will you be able to withstand this siege." And he then again snuck out of the fort, went back to Taylor, who was at that point at Fort Polk, or Point Isabel on the coast, making sure that fort would hold up. Taylor was in a dilemma there. He needed to get back to Fort Brown or Fort Taylor at that time to relieve the siege, but he didn't want to leave the fort along the coast, the Gulf of Mexico, undefended because then if that got destroyed by the Mexicans, his whole line of supplies would have been destroyed. So he was bringing his wagon train down and then, you know the story of Palo Alto, of Arista moving up to intercept. So, all of those stories, all of that drama ties in with what was going on at Fort Taylor or the earthworks.

By May 6, Walker has returned to Zachary Taylor. He's told him that he thinks that the fort will hold up. Well, Jacob Brown was out inspecting the fort and he was hit by a shell in his leg. He was injured, a very popular commander. He was taken to the medical tent and he told the soldiers, "Men, go to your posts, I am but one among you." And they went back to their posts. They were very calm instructions and it was a very dramatic moment. When people learn of all this, when they are there at the site, it is a very dramatic, very moving place.

Well, then you think about that they had the encounter at Palo Alto and we think of this as a two-day battle, really, because really the results of Palo Alto were inconclusive. Arista's troops retreated, they withdrew, even though they very much in a great position on May 9, to really give Zachary Taylor a huge defeat. In fact, Taylor before they moved on May 9, conferred with his officers and he asked all of the officers, "Well what do you think?" and a majority favored halting right there and not advancing and waiting for further reinforcement. But then the last person, one of the last junior officers said, "Well, General, we whipped them today, we can whip them again," and Taylor after the majority of the officers said, "No, let's wait," said, "You're right, we can do it," and they moved ahead. So, you have that dramatic moment. And then they had the event at Resaca de la Palma, really that is the conclusive part of the battle because at that point Arista was in a good position by having set up along the resaca. He had more troops, and the artillery would not be a big factor at Resaca de la Palma. It's fascinating that the Americans were able to prevail at that particular day. What is very interesting to me is that you have Jacob Brown who died that morning. In other words,

the siege was lifted that afternoon, the ninth, and he didn't live to know that the gallant actions of himself and his men let them prevail. What I think is also interesting is that some of the Mexican troops retreated on different planks in good order, but some of the troops panicked and there was a retreat and many drowned in the river. The river is right there visible from this area and you think about some of those Mexican soldiers who drowned in the river, it's also very moving. I think one of the priests drowned in the river and he had ministered to the wounded Mexican soldiers at Palo Alto and at Resaca de la Palma. So, if you know the story of that, it's very moving. The human element.

So, this is not just an area to hit golf balls. This is a very important historic site. The setting has been disturbed somewhat, but a large part of it is intact and if people know the story of what happened there, they will find it very moving. My task, and the city's task, is to work with the Park Service so that we can provide interpretation. We will also have to work with IBWC and I think that you know that the 1966 Preservation Act requires that federal agencies work with the state agencies. It's an unusual aspect of that federal law. You have to work with the Texas Historical Commission to make sure there's no adverse impacts. We have a project that will be to the east, the Los Tomates bridge that we want to build and then there will be some rearrangements of the levies in that area. We want to make sure that there's no disturbing of these grounds and that the actual whole, big golf course is not the historical landmark. The landmark, I was surprised to learn after I checked into it further, is only a small rectangle of some two to three hundred yards by eight hundred yards. So, it is not the whole golf course, but we want to make sure that when they do any work on altering the levies or relocating levies that nothing happens that would disturb the earthworks. So, we will be working with the federal agency to make sure that preservation of the earthworks takes place.

I hope I've shed some light on this subject for you. I hope you may have learned something. I'll try to answer any questions you may have. Thank you. Yes, go ahead.

GLORIA BLISSMORE: Okay, I'm Gloria Blissmore and Mark I wanted to ask you about the location of the hotel. It's on part of Fort Brown, right?

MARK LUND: Alright, where the hotel is used to be the national cemetery in 1911. You really have two Fort Browns. In fact when I got to town in 1985, it was very unusual to me they kept saying, "a fort," and I kept saying "Well, where is the fort?" Well, after Brownsville was established in 1848, this area flooded, so they moved the fort up to where it is now, in other words, to where the hospital is. Where the hotel is in the 1800s, the late 1800s and early 1900s, that was a national cemetery and those bodies were dug up and moved to Alexandria, Louisiana in 1911. There's a national cemetery now, in Louisiana, where most of the soldiers, some of those soldiers, might have been people who had been buried all the way back in 1846, but most of them were Civil War people who died in the Civil War, in the 1860s. Many, many people died, of course, of disease because at Fort Brown there was a lot of yellow fever and other diseases in the 1800s. So, where the hotel is now, was an island cemetery, it was not connected with a bridge, they had to go out there by rowboat or I think a launch. Actually they had a tombstone and a little gravestone marker, and many of them, the gravestone markers, were used as part of an apartment building on Jefferson Street, which they've since remodeled for the second time and those gravestones were taken out. Yes.

UNKNOWN: At the remains that are there, it's difficult to visualize the fort. I can imagine for someone who has no knowledge of the Mexican War and who goes there and sees the golf course, that it's even more difficult for them to imagine that something took place. Are there any plans to mark out the boundaries to show people the extent of the fort?

MARK LUND: That's a good question. We had a project and we actually hired architects and had drawings put together and we actually got clearance from the Historical Commission about what we call breastworks reconstruction, where we were going to extend a section of the breastworks and build them back up with new, clean hills so that people could visualize better the breastworks. I think that's a good idea, but when we consulted with Neil Mangum from the Park Service out of the Santa Fe office, he suggested that there may be artifacts at the ground. He suggested that had we built the breastworks, we would cover up those artifacts. What I would like to see, eventually, because I think that this is important, is for *cómo se dice*, children of all ages, but not just schoolchildren, but people of all ages who want to see what the breastworks looked like and that would be appropriate. Maybe it can even be arranged when we reconstruct the levies where they would take out the levy that cut the thing in half and rearrange it in such a way. In fact, in that levy there's probably a lot of artifacts. A good idea would be to have the National Park Service do some archeological surveying of what's there and then to arrange for some area of the breastworks to be restored so that we see what the original height was. I think that in the meantime, what we can do is to have displays and drawings and models that will give somebody an idea of what they looked like. Yes sir.

UNKNOWN: On a similar vein, I have essentially the same job you do, except on a contract basis down in Port Isabel and what we are doing right now, working with the Parks and Wildlife Department, is a general renovation and creation of a historical district on Maxin Street centered around the lighthouse which was built within that outmost bastion point at Fort Polk in 1852.

Now, unfortunately, when Port Isabel was really developing into its modern form in the 1920s, the bluffs were cut down which wiped out most of what was left of Fort Polk. What we are doing is working with the Parks and Wildlife Department and the state archeologist going in there, in that square that the lighthouse is on, for an archeological survey for a visitor's center which will be built on the far end of the block from the lighthouse and it will be a replica of the old keeper's quarters. Now, for what is left of the Fort Polk site, which is not covered by buildings, or pavement, or actually cut down and bulldozed into the sea, we are going to be building a low wall just to mark the perimeter, where the line of wall used to be and then cut into Maxin Street and put paving blocks across the street to recreate the angle of the wall and then over in the municipal lot, down beyond where Purdy's used to be, there is a possibility that, since we're not going to be disturbing anything anyway of any significance of that spot, we may try to reconstruct a section of breastwork, although that is entirely tentative.

MARK LUND: You make me feel good that I got a golf course to work with, by comparison.

UNKNOWN: Be grateful that you have that much to work with because we're having fits.

MARK LUND: We got one more question.

UNKNOWN: I just wanted to make a comment that one of the things that the Park Service is working on at the Civil War sites is we're doing documentation of five hundred of the Civil War battlefields and I think that this also should come into play when we begin to work with significant Mexican-American War properties. The first thing to do is identify where these properties are, what they are, put them on a modern topographic map to find exactly what's there, and then you can get it into a computer program and then if any new modern developments are going in, you can begin to access the immediate impact so that is a resource base, a computer base program. I think it is going to be excellent for the Civil War and I'd like to see it, if at all possible, adopted into Mexican-American War properties.

MARK LUND: I think Joe Linck's got a question.

JOE LINCK: Yeah, I just wanted to compliment you on everything that your doing for Fort Brown, but also to the gentleman from Port Isabel. Port Isabel is, perhaps, in my opinion, one of our most valuable, single valuable historical resources that has anything to do with the Mexican War here, certainly much more important than any single battlefield, as far as strategic areas go. The fact that it's been so totally ruined by modern development is something that everybody should see here. It's something that we should all try to prevent in the future; that historical resources as valuable as Port Isabel have been so completely decimated by modern commercial development. Today, there's literally nothing there, as far as the Mexican War is concerned. The lighthouse came much later and it's built up, and as he said, it's been pushed into the sea and bulldozed and subdivided and there's almost nothing left so it's a good example to use to emphasize the importance of historical preservation.

CHARLES ROBINSON: I should remark in reference that we have become suddenly very conscious of what has been lost and the name of the district, as we redo it, will be the Fort Polk-Port Isabel Lighthouse Historic District, so at least people know what was there and what we are trying to recreate.

DR. KNOPP: Thank you Mr. Robinson. One of our presenters was a little bit late, but he's here now, and so I want to introduce Mr. Carlos Gustavo Leal Velazco from the Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León and he's going to make a presentation on "Santiago Vidaurri y la República de la Sierra Madre."

CARLOS GUSTAVO LEAL VELAZCO: Quiero continuar con el tema que estaba tratando la colega porque nuestra investigación está ubicada precisamente en un edificio en una gran hacienda de Nuevo León que es de 1670 y tenemos algunos de los problemas en cuanto evidencias arqueológicas, en cuanto el proceso educativo que se debe de tener y, sobre todo, que es la continudad que debe de tener todo esto como un patrimonio universal. Sin embargo, en esta conferencia de Palo Alto que nos parece muy importante, nosotros hemos escrito un trabajo que hemos titulado "Santiago Vidaurri y la República de la Sierra Madre," porque sobre todo, pensamos que tiene algo que ver con el sentimiento, una filosofia, que en este tiempo está cerrando un título. Si me permiten Uds., voy a pasar a continuación al tema.

DR. KNOPP: As one might anticipate, we are beginning to run a little behind and so we'll kind of have to save questions for individual discussion later. We're also at break time and I wanted to give you a chance to stretch, but as I am used to giving orders to my students in a three-hour class, I tell them you can have a break, but only ten minutes so be back here in ten minutes because we're going to start.
[Break]

DR. KNOPP: I will now introduce George Esber of the Southwest Region, who is going to talk about "Ethnography at Palo Alto." George.

GEORGE ESBER: Thank you. I want to thank Tom Carroll for inviting me to the conference and for telling me that I was going to be on the program. Actually I don't have a whole lot to say at this point, but what I would like to be able to do is give you a little bit of background on one of the studies that the Park Service would like to undertake for the Palo Alto Battlefield Site.

I'm a cultural anthropologist who came to the Park Service about two years ago. I had been in a university teaching situation as associate professor of sociology and anthropology and I came to the Park Service because I saw an opportunity to develop a new kind of program that the Park Service had never had. Most of the information that we have had in the past for sites such as Palo Alto has come from archeology and history. With this new initiative, the Park Service is attempting to bring ethnography or cultural anthropology into the information base in order to help explain and interpret the sites within our system. Ethnography is involved with the study of contemporary cultures and it's been very interesting to me to hear the programs and the papers that I have heard presented and especially yesterday to witness the intense interest on the part of the contemporary community of Brownsville as to the significance and the meaning of the Palo Alto Battlefield Site. That's the kind of information that ethnography is interested in for incorporating into its programs.

In the regional office, what we attempt to do is provide assistance to the various park units within the region. Now, what I came here for was really two purposes, maybe three purposes. One was to attend and participate in the conference, but another was to try to learn something more about the park so that the kind of assistance that we provide from the regional office is very much in line and in gear with what is happening at the community level. Then another purpose that I have is to see what I can do to work with the regional office of the Park Service and the park and the organizations within the community to develop cooperative agreements so that the kind of information that we would like to have becomes a part of the Park Service interpretation and part of its programs. Many communities were involved with the Mexican-American War and many communities now know, as part of their history, the events of that war. That history takes on many different kinds of meanings for each particular community. What we would like to do eventually is to develop cooperative agreements that will bring us information to tell us about the importance of the war for contemporary communities.

I'm not just talking about dealing with the history in the past, and that's all very important, but how has that past become a part of the contemporary communities self-identification? How they see who they are, where they are, and what part the war has played in their history. This will include some of the American Indian communities that have impacted by the war. How do they now look back upon their experiences as part of the war and how should that become a part of Park Service interpretation? One of the

mandates of the park's legislation is to reflect back on the war and to use that as an opportunity for developing a better understanding between nations.

In order to accomplish that end, it's necessary for us to be able to develop an understanding of all the component communities that were a part of this larger mosaic. When we have an understanding of how the importance of the war serves as a part of the identity and a part of the community past, and the cultural history for each of those component communities, then we'll have a better understanding for developing what the congressman yesterday in his speech about developing a more complete history said. So that's a part of the intent of the ethnographic program and that's part of what we'll be looking at in trying to develop the kinds of agreements that will bring us information about all the communities that have a stake in the history of the Palo Alto Battlefield Site.

So, that's why I'm here, I'm here to learn, to take back to Regional Office with me what I'm learning here about the involvements of the peoples and the relationships of the war and to know something about the importance of this war for the communities of today.

If I can answer any questions about ethnography or how the new program will impact on this particular battlefield site, I'd be glad to answer those questions. If not, that's all the time I'll take. Yes.

UNKNOWN: I don't know whether this question should be addressed to you or to Mr. Mallory, but I have either heard or read somewhere that the best way and the quickest way to ruin a site is to declare it a National Park. What do you say to that?

GEORGE ESBER: In New Mexico, we have had some considerable problems with areas that have been deemed especially significant to communities, especially if those communities are American Indian communities because there's a current wave of interest among a lot of people to adopt that as their own and to, in a sense, take it away from the people who have the closest and dearest interests in those areas. We're very aware and very sensitive to those kinds of concerns and one of the reasons why I'm interested in being here and learning about the importance of this battlefield site to the local communities, is to try to make sure that we don't take it away from people who it belongs to.

We want to keep the interests local. We want to develop cooperative agreements with people locally and to maintain that kind of community interest that I have seen in the short time that I have been here so far. Does that answer your question? We are aware of the kinds of problems that you're talking about.

DR. KNOPP: Whenever we talk about the history of this region concerning anything to do with water, Joe Linck comes to mind. Joe Linck is going to make a presentation on "Brazos Santiago Harbor." Joe.

JOSEPH LINCK: Thank you and good morning. On the east tip of Brazos Island lies a beautiful deep-water bay that is inaccessible to automobiles today. Heavy sailing yachts routinely enjoy this harbor's deep anchorage and hidden beach with its calm, clear, blue-green watercolor. Few people realize that this is a location of the lost harbor of Brazos Santiago. This naturally occurring deep harbor's role was as a vital link in the world's trade route to the twenty-two-hundred-mile-long Río Grande river and the rich Spanish

haciendas and mines of Monterrey, Saltillo, and Chihuahua. Brazos Santiago harbor, previously known as the Port of Matamoros, was the best anchorage for deep-draft ocean vessels anywhere along the Gulf Coast between Tampico and Galveston. Indeed, it was the only natural harbor that wasn't the mouth of a river.

River mouths on the gulf all have shallow shifting sandbars. The long, barren stretch of the Gulf Coast is made up of waters that are dangerously shallow for any deep-hold ocean-going vessel. It is a turbulent coastline, flagged with shallow beaches, hurricanes, and year-round, wind-whipped waters. The only safe refuge along this entire distance between Tampico and Corpus Christi was Brazos Santiago. Here the deep-draft sailing vessels of the early days could anchor and take on readily-available fresh water due to the proximity of the Río Grande, purchase food from the many Indians present, safely beach and repair their vessels, as well as unload their cargoes. Early Spanish nautical charts reflect the depth of twenty-one feet at the entrance to this harbor and up to twenty-nine feet inside. Charts dated at the time and after the arrival of Zachary Taylor show much less water depth. This curious difference has still not been explained. From Brazos Santiago harbor, merchandise was normally shipped to Matamoros on shallow draft sailboats, or later, in steamboats. These lightweight vessels would load cargo at Brazos Santiago, enter the ocean, make the swift, but dangerous eight-mile run down the beach to the mouth of the Río Grande. There, they would make the difficult crossing over the constantly-changing shallow bar at the mouth of the river. It averaged only about three to four feet of water depth at the mouth of the river. The shallow-draft steam or sailboats would then make their way on to Matamoros, Camargo, or to any point in between. The other method of transporting cargo from Brazos Santiago to Matamoros was the more expensive overland route, by ox-drawn wagon. This land route involved multiple handlings of merchandise, however, which drove up costs. First, the cargo had to be loaded onto a shallow-draft vessel that transported across the Laguna Madre to Port Isabel. Then, it would have to be all rehandled again, unloaded from the shallow vessel onto the dock at Port Isabel. Then, it would have to be handled again and loaded onto wagons. From there it would have to make the slow, rough trip to Palo Alto prairie and onto a point close to present-day Brownsville on the left bank of the Río Grande. There it would have to be rehandled again and reloaded into small boats to cross what, then, was normally a very wide river.

The road from Port Isabel to Matamoros was over thirty miles long and could take a wagon train two to three days to make the trip, in good weather, Indians permitting. It is important to remember that while a wagon train might average ten miles per day, a sailing vessel could average the high velocity of ten miles per hour. This explains the economic importance of water transportation in the early days. One of the first cargoes to enter Brazos Santiago came in 1823. Credit goes to a Señor Martín de Léon, a wealthy area rancher. Mr. Tom Lea narrates the story best in his book entitled, *The King Ranch*. Señor Martín was persuaded by two mariners he met while in New Orleans to charter their schooner which was currently available. Martín was impressed with their description of a hidden deep-water harbor somewhere near the mouth of the Río Grande. Martin decided to speculate and he purchased merchandise in New Orleans for the voyage. Apparently he made a fortune selling his cargo here because there followed a boom in this New Orleans-Monterrey trade route via Brazos Santiago harbor that Martin had helped pioneer. Interestingly, the owners of this schooner, the men who persuaded Señor Martín to charter her were wanted at the time by the state of Tamaulipas for piracy. This goes back to a lot of the hidden history of the Gulf of Mexico, especially

the Mexican coast and the Texas coast. There's a lot of things in our history that are yet unexplained. Tom's presentation on the "Fortifications of Matamoros," the walls around Matamoros, we're not sure why those walls were built, but we haven't found out why yet, we expect to, but interestingly, Campeche, Progreso, Veracruz, and Tampico for other gulf ports, also had walls just like the ones in Matamoros and those walls were built, we know, for defense against pirates of the Caribbean and the buccaneers who routinely sacked those cities. In the museum in downtown Veracruz, in the port of Veracruz, they have a quite a write up on the walls that used to surround the city. The walls were taken down because at that time medical knowledge was in its infancy and people felt that perhaps the swamp gases that were causing yellow fever were being trapped in the city by these walls. So, that was the reason that they were removed from the city of Veracruz. It might, perhaps, be the reason that they were removed from here in Matamoros as well.

In 1846, Zachary Taylor and Commodore Conner were not slow to recognize the value of Brazos Santiago harbor and the Río Grande in order to facilitate their invasion of northern Mexico. In fact, control of this harbor was their first military objective here. Arguably, U.S. occupation of the Mexican government customs house at Punto de Isabel was the first hostile action in the Mexican War. Taylor brought with him a large fleet of steam-powered riverboats.

After the war was over, this riverboat fleet was sold to private operators here, and these boats further stimulated trade along this very old trade route. By the end of the nineteenth century, over two hundred total steam vessels had been used to provide transportation on the Río Grande. This industry serviced Brazos Santiago, Port Isabel, Matamoros, Brownsville, Reynosa, and as far up river as Camargo, Mier, and Río Grande City. Brazos Santiago and the riverboats which lived from its trade were the vehicles that allowed the great fortunes of Captains King, Kennedy, Stillman, Yturria, de Léon, et al., to be made. This international trade union industry profited handsomely from Brazos Santiago's strategic location and deep water. Many great personal fortunes were made that enabled these entrepreneurs to found and establish the region economically.

After the Mexican War was over in 1848, many of the Matamoros trading companies moved across the river to Mr. Stillman's new real estate venture; the new Brownsville Town Company. Stillman shared the profits from his steamboat business with Captain King and Kennedy and his profits made from international trading provided much of the capital used to found the town of Brownsville.

The well-known King Ranch located between Brownsville and Corpus Christi was a massive real estate investment, even by today's standards. Large sums of money were invested, not only in land, but also in improvements. Few people today realize that the fortune Captain King needed to develop this ranch was made here in the riverboat business. King's first career was as a riverboat captain, not a rancher. He made his money on the boats and spent it on the ranch.

The historical importance of Brazos Santiago is much greater than many historians acknowledge. Typically they do not include control of this strategic deep-water harbor and the Río Grande as a major cause of the Mexican-U.S. War of 1846. In those pre-railroad and pre-motorized vehicle days, access to a maritime port and one of the longest rivers in North America, was a primary necessity. Certainly this port and its river were a more valuable asset than the untamed expanses of the then useless wild-horse desert which is the more popular reason given for the war. This was the name given to

describe the disputed land lying between the Río Grande and the Nueces River that both the U.S. and Mexico claimed. Why did Mexico decide to resist the U.S. so passionately over this useless land at the edge of nowhere, called the Wild Horse Desert? Why did the U.S. want it so bad? Why would both sides have been willing to fight a war over this wilderness and land boundary issue? In his excellent book, *The King Ranch*, Tom Lea states that the real reason was control of Brazos Santiago harbor, the only practical funnel through which commerce poured into northern Mexico. Naturally Mexico was more interested in defending a natural port strategically located next to the mouth of her longest river than the untamed expanses of the Wild Horse Desert.

One of the things I wanted to mention is that I really like the way the historical society of Tamualipas and the one in Matamoros both include the word geography in their names. Our historians have tended over the years to become extremely specialized in a lot of ways and we're overlooking, I think at times, the importance of geography in the study of history. If you take a map of North America today, eliminate all of the interstate highways, eliminate the railroads and highlight the three most important rivers, excuse me, the two most important, the two longest rivers emptying into the Gulf of Mexico on the North American continent, you'll have two rivers: Mississippi and the Río Grande. It becomes obvious at a glance the importance of a river such as the Río Grande that goes all the way from the Gulf of Mexico past Santa Fe into Colorado. It could have been, perhaps, as important as the Mississippi, had things turned out differently. There's quite a bit written by the Corps of Engineers and the quartermaster department, here at Fort Brown and the one at Brazos Santiago, right after Taylor arrived here on this very same subject. Evidence of Port Brazos Santiago as a historical important site prior to 1823 is difficult to document. Brazos Santiago is certainly one of the oldest in Texas. Spanish vessels had been shipping gold and silver from Veracruz for many years prior to that time, approximately three hundred years prior to the arrival of Mr. Martín's vessel. These ships sailed continuously from Veracruz to Havana and on to Spain during those years. Prevailing trade winds and safety considerations prompted most to choose a Texas-coast-hugging route to Cuba, rather than crossing the open gulf. This route brought the slow-moving gold and sliver-laden vessels very close to Brazos Santiago. The attributes of Brazos Santiago's deep water, isolated location, and the Río Grande's readily available fresh water could not have gone unnoticed by the Caribbean and gulf privateers and pirates. Unfortunately, these adventures didn't keep written records of their activities. For this reason, little is known and less is documented prior to 1823 about what might well be the state of Texas's first port. It was written in 1749, however, that the area where present-day Brownsville and Matamoros is located, was inhabited by mulattos who were cattle thieves and represented a security threat to the colonies above Reynosa. Obviously, ships had transported these mulattos to these shores utilizing the secret harbor of Brazos Santiago. Martín Salinas, in his new *Indians of the Rio Grande Delta*, provides even more evidence of the existence of the African negroes and mulattos present in this area prior to the existence of Matamoros.

Sadly, little in the way of physical evidence survives today of Brazos Santiago harbor, where warehouses stood and many majestic tall sailing ships used to anchor, lighting their cargoes to shore. Now, only sea gulls wander. Literally hundreds of men must have toiled under the hot sun manhandling these labor-intensive cargo-transfer operations. Yet little physical evidence survives today of this very important harbor in the history of Mexico, the United States, and world history. Thank you.

DR. KNOPP: Our final two presentations today are related; both having to do with the Caminos del Río Project and I think Mr. Creasey wanted to begin. Michael Creasey, of the Southwest Region of the National Park Service, "Los Caminos del Río Heritage Project: A Binational Effort."

MICHAEL CREASEY: Thanks, Doctor. One of the things that I would like to talk about takes a little different direction than the National Park Service has been taking over the last few years, and that's in regard to how we are looking at landscape protection. I would like to talk about what I see as some of the directions that the National Park Service is taking in a large scale. First, I'll focus on landscape protection and then get specific on Los Caminos del Río Heritage Project. Following my discussion, Carlos Rugerio will talk more in detail about the architecture along what we are calling the Río Grande corridor.

Throughout its organizational history the National Park Service has had to adjust its policies in response to demand and opportunities for the larger American social and political systems. These changes have been especially dramatic since 1960. In that time growing interest-group power has challenged the National Park Service to become more accountable for development and management actions. Over the last decade, Congress has been redefining the role of federal government and protection of natural and cultural resources in the nation. Faced with--and we heard this yesterday--a lot of the political folks involved with budget constraints and the public desire to acquire new properties for the National Park Service to actually have more park areas, the National Park Service has been challenged by Congress to develop long-lasting, supportive, and cost-effective alternatives for protecting these important natural historic and cultural resources.

One of the purposes of the National Park Service involves partnership planning and management. The National Park Service, in various ways, works cooperatively with state and local governments and private organizations in the study, analysis, and protection of local resources. Typically, the National Park Service plays a facilitator role and works with these groups to develop alternative methods for their protection. Also, typically they are a mix of both public and private ownership. That's where I think it's somewhat challenging for us, as government folks, to take a look at both public and private lands and develop management strategies for those important resources whether they be locally, regionally, nationally, or internationally significant.

Not surprising is the amount of the heritage conservation efforts taking place. There's been a lot of requests for the National Park Service to facilitate processes where people can take a look at their regional culture and natural areas and provide some support for trying to develop appropriate protection measures. Now we are seeing the emergence of a new type of park and we are seeing Palo Alto as a new park area being developed and at the same time we're seeing a concept, such as Los Caminos, being developed, and they are tied hand in hand. There has been a change of terms over the past couple of years, but our project addresses a heritage area, and I feel that heritage areas studies or designations represent a process which allow all concerned individuals, organizations, and governments to work together to identify the resource values of an area, and develop strategies for its protection, interpretation, and enhancement.

The heritage area concept is being applied in a variety of ways. They've been termed heritage parks, heritage trails, heritage corridors, heritage areas, etc. The difference primarily is shape and size and the type of resources. Typically, when we look at an area, we're looking at an area that is going to provide a unique American

experience and typically there's an emphasis overlapping significant natural, cultural, and recreational resources. Also the planning process would be cooperative decision making, respect for private-sector initiative, local or home rule, primary reliance on more effective use of existing government resources and authorities, and integration of heritage conservation objectives with economic development needs for our region. It's a good idea to take a look at regions and park areas and landscapes. However, sometimes pulling it all together is a difficult task because of the multi-jurisdiction issues, as well as public and private lands and how you regulate or protect resources on private lands. I've been working with a group of people over the last few years trying to further develop this concept. It's kind of interesting because Luther Prost, who's over at the Sonoran Institute in Tucson, has some interesting proposals. He says that government agencies, community groups, and conservation organizations have increasingly come to realize that this fragmented and poorly organized authority to manage land use has failed to sufficiently protect the cultural and ecological integrity of critical landscapes and ecosystems in America. Many critical landscapes spread across several jurisdictions and may cross several states, and in the case of Los Caminos, national political lines. All too often, local, state, and federal agencies have a singular mission. I deal with this time and time again, and one of my major tasks over this last year has been to get different interests groups together to talk with each other so that they can understand the interplay between cultural resources, natural resources, and community life. For example, the chambers seem to promote tourism, the environmentalists seem to want to protect habitat, historic architects want to protect historic structures, without giving a whole lot of thought to communities or some of the tangible elements of culture. Governments often regulate or even in some cases the regulations don't make any sense for protection. Seldom do we combine these efforts to look at landscape in a holistic way. In addition, many agencies and organizations fail to consider the overall regional impacts activities on functioning natural systems, community life, or the region's historic integrity. In most instances, the lack of a regional coordinating entity within a defined landscape, such as the Los Caminos, results in the degradation of the significant cultural and ecological resources due to incremental and unplanned land use decisions.

The aversion to governmental intervention and unwillingness to pay full land acquisition costs have spawned efforts to force or entice local governments and landowners of significant properties to adjust land use in ways that would meet conservation objectives while providing for appropriate economic development. In response, I think we've seen some encouraging land-use practices over the years, cooperative land-use management, such as an area called the Pinelands Reserve in New Jersey or the Columbia River Gorge. I just got back from talking with those folks last week and it was an interesting process where it's both a regional entity, two states, the National Forest Service, as well as others, getting together to protect scenic resources along the Columbia River Gorge.

The National Park Service has developed a concept paper called, American Heritage Landscape Program which outlines a possible framework for a national system of heritage areas. What we did, I guess it's been a little over a year right now, but we convened some of the top cultural geographers in the nation out in Arizona and asked them, "What are we talking about here? How do you define a significant cultural landscape and what is a cultural landscape and some of the difficulties with protection measures?" Let me read quickly a paragraph that they identified as the concept here. It said, "Americans are discovering America. Whereas in the past we have tended to talk

about our heritage in terms of isolated heroes, heroic events, and natural wonders, today we are becoming increasingly interested in something larger. In the intricacies of the American landscape where the natural and the cultural, both humble and the grandiose, fuse together in a distinctive regional pattern and wear layers, accumulating over successive generations eventually impact and impart a deep and reflective path to the scene. The richest of these landscapes, perhaps more than any other national symbols, represents the essence of the American experience." I think in a conceptual way that's what we're after. Bonnie Lloyd also termed cultural, they have a bunch of quotes here, and she said, "The revolutionary and invaluable idea behind heritage area is thinking in terms of whole, complex landscapes and identities," and I think that's what we're trying to do with Los Caminos. The National Park Service was invited to get involved with the Texas Historical Commission, it was a request, to take a further look at what we're talking about with heritage corridors from Laredo down to the Gulf of Mexico. That was about a year ago and I guess what initiated that was a document called a A Shared Experience which was drafted by the Texas Historical Commission under the guidance of Dr. Mario Sánchez. Mario outlined an architectural assessment of the corridor, but he also suggested some ideas of how we might be able to tie this into a larger idea, either through some type of national or international designation recognizing several important themes throughout the Valley, that is to say throughout the corridor. We've taken it a step further. We, on October 30 of last year, signed a collaborative agreement with eight Mexican agencies, nine U.S. agencies and organizations and basically said, "Yeah, we agree that this is significant, that we should be working together on developing some strategies for protection as well as enhancement." I think what's taking place at Palo Alto is a micro scale of what we would like to see on a macro scale, to take place throughout the entire two-hundred-mile-long corridor. We brought in another component to the overall corridor concept whereby we're trying to sell this as an area, I don't mean sell it in a sense of, as I think the director of tourism Dianne Freeman said last night, as a "tourist type" of proposal, although one component of heritage areas is targeted economic development, i.e. equal tourism or cultural tourism. But I think that we're trying to sell this to people who live in the area and try and get them to understand and recognize what is so important. Seeing the community output from last night and over the last couple of days has just been incredible. I was talking with some folks last night and I said, "Typically, the National Park Service doesn't get this kind of a response when we open up our doors as a new National Park." I think what you identified as a possible threat to community values is something that is very real out there. That we're not always welcome in communities makes this very interesting. In this example we can say, "There's ways that we can look at this event and recognize it." I think that what we're trying to do is to recognize what's significant. Open natural and ecological systems of this area and the cultural events of this area are extremely significant and we're trying to hook up those two interests so that they can recognize that themselves.

I guess the other component which I will mention is that there is an economic development interest and the way that we got kind of involved with this was because lots of communities, lots of states, lots of political leaders were very much interested in having a state park in their backyard and that was not necessarily because of the significance of that resource. Instead, it was purely for the fact that people wanted economic gain from National Parks through tourism. Our response has been to say, "We can recognize local, regional, national, and international values of resources and at the same time provide for economic development. I think that the lower Río Grande is a very

unique case. I got a phone call last April from the Southwest Regional Office. I was in the Mid-Atlantic looking at heritage areas and landscapes in Appalachia at the time. I was just wrapping some things up and when they called and asked me if I would be interested in coming down to the Texas-Mexico border, which I knew very little about at the time. I decided that this would be a really challenging project to get involved with and was quite pleasantly surprised to find that the resource values in this area are just absolutely incredible. As far as an American experience goes, I think this is one of those truly unique places in both northern Mexico and the United States.

Just quickly about what we're up to as far as a process. We've developed a task force primarily made up of Governor Ann Richards who has an executive order asking for state agencies asking to look at the Los Caminos project and provide technical assistance to local communities and develop a plan. We were asked to facilitate that planning process by the Texas Historical Commission which laid out the plan. We gave them some ideas and we've worked together with both Mexico and the U.S. in seeking information from both so-called technical resource experts as well as the general public that provides its input. Right now, we're in the process of developing resource assessments that take both the public input as well as the technical expertise and try to develop some conceptual ideas of how we might be able to pull this region together through a common heritage.

From the resource assessment stage we'll be going into the heritage plan which should hopefully lay out some organization feasibility and look at how we might be able to protect that through some type of management structure, the likelihood of attracting funding support, leverage for other actions, revitalization strategies and policies to improve physical and economic conditions of the area. I would suspect that within the next couple of years we're going to see this legislation, the so-called America's Heritage Area Legislation, be pushed through. It was quite encouraging for me to see the last draft of this proposed legislation or concept paper. In the first paragraph it listed as one of those unique American experiences the lower Río Grande, so we're real encouraged by the respect that we're getting paid at the national level. I hope that over the next couple of years, we see things happening at a regional level as well as some of the local activities that are taking place.

DR. KNOPP: To continue on with this particular topic of the Caminos del Río project, we have Carlos Rugerio, the historical architect intern for the National Park Service. Carlos.

CARLOS RUGERIO: Para mí es muy importante dentro de este proyecto como comentaba mi compañero, considerar dos aspectos de preservación patrimonial. Hemos visto que el proyecto de los Caminos del Rio involucra una gran cantidad de ciudades con valor histórico. Sucede que gran parte de estas ciudades se relacionan con los hechos históricos de la batalla México-Americana y el deterioro urbano que sufren estas ciudades a lo largo de la frontera, ha generado una pérdida cuantiosa de sus recursos patrimoniales.

El objectivo básico de mi plática es de alguna manera hacer un diagnóstico de las condiciones actuales de las poblaciones a todo lo largo de la frontera, y no solo a lo largo del Rio Grande, sino poblaciones que si bien se encuentran sobre la frontera, tienen su vida y su razón de ser en función de ésta. A grandes rasgos mi plática tiene la finalidad

de poder diagnosticar cuáles son los factores y los agentes de deterioro que han alterado las ciudades de la frontera.

La documentación de estos recursos es uno de los aspectos que considera el proyecto binacional, "Los Caminos del Río," el cual tiene como objetivo principal, el de promover y desarrollar planes de rehabilitación, principalmente de los recursos que involucran a las ciudades de la frontera, así como el de desarrollar proyectos binacionales que fortalezcan los vínculos de los habitantes de las poblaciones a todo lo largo de ésta con los Estados Unidos.

Otro de los aspectos muy importantes que ha generado el deterioro de estas poblaciones, es que no existe una dependencia destinada a la su protección. Actualmente, la ley que rige para la protección de cuidades en la república mexicana, es una ley promulgada en el año de 1972. Esa ley tiene como finalidad principal, la de preservar, promover, y declarar zonas de monumentos. Esta declaratoria, este instrumento para poder declarar zonas de monumentos, es el elemento que sirve para proteger la población, que a su vez se complementa con una reglamentación y documentación de edificios históricos.

Sucede que existe dentro de las oficinas del Instituto Nacional de Antropología, una centralidad de esta institución. Tenemos exemplos como Tlaxcala y como Puebla, con una cantidad de cuarenta y cuatro municipios, donde tienen oficinas del Instituto para salvaguardar este patrimonio. Sin embargo, para la zona norte del país, tenemos una sola institución que viene siendo el Centro Regional de Monterrey, que es la encargada de la preservación tanto del Estado de Coahuila, como de Tamaulipas y Monterrey.

Realmente, la magnitud de los recursos patrimoniales, con solo una dependencia para preservarlos, hace que es imposible salvaguardarse, con lo que ha venido a generarse un gran deterioro de estos recursos. Si bien la declaratoria de Palo Alto es una declaratoria ligada con un campo de batalla, gran parte de los recursos que se relacionan con la batalla, se desarrollan a todo lo largo del territorio mexicano. Esos recursos, en este caso, recursos ligados con el patrimonio construido, son importantes. Es importante aprovechar esta coyuntura para poder salvaguardar este patrimonio.

Más o menos, esta plática esta apoyada en un recorrido diagnóstico para poder dectectar estos recursos patrimoniales. A grandes rasgos, pasaré unas transparencias para darles una idea de cuales son los elementos a salvaguardar. También, quisiera señalar que dentro de este recorrido, hago una serie de recomendaciones que es importante considerar. También quisiera señalar que dentro de la ley del setenta y dos, que es la ley de sitios y monumentos, que es la que rige actualmente y la que protege esas ciudades, hace una división un poco radical que limita las posibilidades de preservar esos recursos.

Por un lado considera patrimonio histórico a toda la arquitectura hecha dentro del virreinato hasta el año de 1899, y dividiendo por medio de otra oficina que se llama la "Dirección Nacional de Bellas Artes," que es la que está encargada de la preservación de toda la arquitectura del siglo veinte. Por lo que hace una división de trabajo que hace que por un lado el instituto tenga ubicadas sus oficinas en todo el estado, y por otro, Bellas Artes, que concentra en la Ciudad de México. Eso hace que en la práctica las ciudades no tengan una atención más puntual.

Dentro de estas recomendaciones, considero seis puntos muy importantes que deben considerarse para la salvaguarda. Uno de esos puntos es el desarrollo de planes de rehabilitación urbana. Considero dos tipos de ciudades. Un tipo de ciudad que es la que tiene mayores antecedentes históricos, que son las ciudades que funda Escandón a mediados del siglo dieciocho, y que de alguna manera han ido conservando su estructura-

-unas en menor proporción que otras; y un tipo de ciudad más moderna, pero que se ha ido transformando con este desarrollo urbano y alterando visualmente.

Dentro de esta división de tipos de ciudades, considero que las ciudades que han conservado su estructura histórica deben de ser declaradas zonas de monumentos. Hace rato comentaba que el estado de Tlaxcala, que es uno de los estados más pequeños, y que cuenta con cuarenta y cuatro municipios, tiene diez declaratorias de zonas de monumentos. Si consideramos Tamaulipas, que tiene alrededor de cincuenta o más municipios, o los cincuenta y tres de Nuevo León, nos damos cuenta de esa gran falta de atención por parte de estas dependencias para la salvaguarda del patrimonio.

Dentro de las recomendaciones que hago para las ciudades que de alguna manera se han ido modificando con este desarrollo, es desarrollar planes de habilitación urbana declaratoria de zonas de las siguientes poblaciones; Matamoros, Camargo, Mier, Charrago, Marín, Saltillo, y de otras del mismo corredor como Guerrero Viejo, Diaz Ordaz, y Villanueva. Estas ciudades tienen una estructura urbana muy importante que han ido conservando y de alguna manera en las últimas épocas, han ido alterándose y perdiéndose una gran cantidad de edificios con valor patrimonial.

Dentro de estas recomendaciones, es la de elaborar reglamentos de preservación urbana, así como manuales de mantenimiento que integren a la comunidad con su patrimonio. Es muy importante que la preservación del patrimonio urbano esté ligada y en función de los intereses de la comunidad. Integrar a la comunidad va a ser el papel final que se debe de tener para esta salvaguarda del patrimonio; la creación de oficinas regionales del Instituto de Bellas Artes, y del Instituto Nacional de Antropología con la poblaciones de los estados de Coahuila y Tamaulipas; desarrollo de proyectos binacionales enfocados al rescate de los recursos patrimoniales naturales de la región en toda la frontera de ambos paises; formación de parques ecológicos y de reserva natural a lo largo del río y regeneración y saneamiento de éste.

Es muy importante señalar que no solo los recursos patrimoniales desde el punto de vista del patrimonio construido es importante salvaguardar, sino el patrimonio intangible. Esas tradiciones, las costumbres, toda esa gran riqueza que caracteriza esas poblaciones también forman parte del patrimonio, también es importante salvaguardarse.

Otro de los aspectos que quiero señalar es que básicamente este recorrido diagnóstico que se hace dentro del corredor, está apoyado en la línea que sigue el general Taylor en su ruta hacia el sur. Aquí tenemos una vista del Fort Brown. Y vemos como dentro de los recursos, las litografías dan una visión de cuáles eran las características de las ciudades en el siglo pasado y cómo se han ido alterando.

Esta es otra vista. Vemos cómo las transformaciones de la arquitectura se han ido dando sucesivamente, pero en muchos de los casos han ido en el detrimento de estas estruturas. El río San Juan en Camargo, y la presidencia municipal--y vemos cómo las estructuras se van modificando. Vemos en la parroquia de Mier, cómo tienen diferentes historias, y van añadiéndose a los edificios nuevas estructuras.

Estas son las condiciones en las que se encuentran Mier, en deterioro urbano, y la pérdida de recursos patrimoniales está cada día mayor. Es importante rescatar los sistemas constructivos, tanto las tradiciones que se tenían del uso de materiales en esta zona como el adobe y la madera. Vemos el grado de deterioro y la importancia de la perservación de esta arquitectura.

Esta es una vista de la plaza principal de Saltillo donde al fondo podemos ver este portal que es muy interesante y que actualmente ha sido demolido y modificado. Y se va alterando la ciudad y perdiendo su carácter de ciudad histórica.

Esta es una vista que nos puede recrear un poco y dar una idea de la tipología de la arquitectura. Es una arquitectura ecléctica que retoma los elementos clásicos. Vemos como los enmarcamientos de puertas y ventanas van a ser el elemento a decorar y cómo en la actualidad este tipo de arquitectura se ha ido degradando y deteriorando.

Esta es una vista de la parroquia de Santiago en Saltillo y vemos cómo las transformaciones han sido continuas. Esta ya es una vista de la actualidad. Estas son vistas de litografía del siglo pasado donde vemos el carácter horizontal de las ciudades. Vemos que son edificaciones de uno a dos niveles con una arquitectura marcadamente ecléctica y neo-clásica.

Aquí vemos cómo se van alterando los bloques de manzana, y se van remetiendo estructuras que rompen la homogeneidad del bloque de manzana. La alteración por elementos visuales como la electrificación hacen que los edificios pierdan gran parte de su carácter. Esta una vista de la batalla en Buena Vista. También es muy importante el preservar las vistas panorámicas ya que por ejemplo, vamos a ver con Monterrey, se han ido haciendo edificaciones a todo lo largo de los cerros y se van alterando visualmente las panorámicas y el contexto.

Esta es una vista tomada desde el Cerro del Obispo. Tenemos el Palacio del Obispado, un edificio muy importante que forma parte de los recursos patrimoniales de la guerra. Esta es una vista del siglo pasado donde podemos apreciarlo. Este es un detalle de la riqueza de la arquitectura de toda esta región. Es realmente significativo que va desde un barroco tardío donde la asimetría va a ser la característica, y después va a dar su paso a esta arquitectura ecléctica de neo-clásicos y neo-góticos.

Monterrey se hizo una gran degradación y una gran pérdida de sus recursos patrimoniales. Dentro de estos recursos, no solo los de la frontera son importantes, sino también en todo la ruta tomada por el ejército norteamericano encontramos lugares importantes. Cerca del Cerro Gordo en Veracruz, existe lo que era la hacienda de Santa Anna que actualmente es un museo del mueble donde encontramos una gran riqueza de recursos patrimoniales. Este lugar fue propiedad de Santa Anna y aquí fue donde se casó.

Esta es una vista de la ciudad de México donde podemos ver que, entre los edificios importantes que juegan un papel determinante dentro de la guerra está éste, el castillo de Chapultepec, como podemos ver un poquito. Y con la vista del castillo de Chapultepec, termino. Muchas gracias a todos.

DR. KNOPP: That almost concludes our business today. We're going to have a brief business meeting, so to speak, for those of you who would care to stay to discuss the project for next year in terms of a Palo Alto Conference. So I guess we'd say that the official, formal structure has terminated here and those who will remain behind I invite you to gather up here so that we can discuss plans for the next, the Second Annual Palo Alto Conference.

[End of session. End of Transcripts]

BREVES NOTAS DE REFLEXION SOBRE LA PRIMERA CONFERENCIA INTERNACIONAL DE PALO ALTO

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En mayo de 1993, el Servicio de Parques Nacionales/National Park Service (NPS) de los Estados Unidos coordinó la Primera Conferencia Internacional de Palo Alto como parte de las Ceremonias de Dedicación del Campo de la Batalla de Palo Alto. El evento atrajó un grupo interdisiplinario que en diferentes sesiones recordó, rescató, narró y analizó el más importante y controvertido conflicto de los dos vecinos: la guerra de México y Estados Unidos (1846-1848). Con diferentes voces y enfoques especialistas consagrados, administradores, e historiadores y simpatizantes locales contribuyeron a presentar un debate enriquecedor. Se inició un diálago internacional, que, más allá de visiones y concepciones esterotipadas, subrayaron y contextualizaron la importancia o significado de los diferentes actores y eventos. Un nuevo foro donde unos académicos se conocieron, otros se reconocieron pero donde, sobre todo, se dió la oportunidad de compartir, estimular y retar el conocimiento del pasado.

Estos párrafos incluyen breves reflexiones sobre los participantes, los temas y las ideas principales que, en las mesas de análisis y tambien informalmente, propusieron nuevas acciones y rumbos en la investigación y el quehacer intelectual-académico para este período histórico.

Acerca de los Participantes

La diversidad del grupo enlazó presentaciones de historiadores especialistas con una larga trayectoria y experiencia profesional--unos, en el pasado colonial de la región, hoy fronteriza; otros, en la guerra México-Estados Unidos, y, otros más, en la definición de frontera--con estudiantes de posgrado o recién egresados que inician sus pininos, con profesionistas de disciplinas varias, con escritores locales, y con amantes de la historia. La heterogeneidad de los participantes al mismo tiempo que enriqueció el debate y la experiencia colectiva, mostró niveles y temas en el análisis que polarizaron la atención y el interés en el evento.

Temas

Conforme el objetivo propuesto por los organizadores, el tema general fue identificar y puntualizar la importancia histórica de la guerra México-Estados Unidos para ambos paises. Sin embargo, la persistencia de la pluralidad, diversas áreas de especialidad y diferentes niveles, definieron los tópicos, su complejidad y la organización de los mismos. Así, las presentaciones oscilaron desde presentaciones formales hasta reportes

y reflexiones sobre: a) perspectivas nacionales--desde ambos países--en la historia política, diplomática y militar; b) historia social y regional en la ahora frontera oriente México-Estados Unidos; y c) percepciones, en las comunidades locales en el delta riobravense, del impacto de la guerra. Además, conforme a los intereses particulares del NPS--y el Parque Nacional de Palo Alto--en cada sesión se mantuvó presente también, d) la importancia, definición y planeación de un parque nacional.

Retos

Todos los participantes recibieron o aportaron algún reto: individual y/o institucionalmente; para los académicos, éstos pudieran sintetizarse en profundizar en la investigación, estimular nuevos estudios y promover su difusión. Durante el evento fue clara la necesidad de diálogo entre los diferentes niveles representados. Es decir, difundir y acercar el conocimento existente en sus trabajos especializados en un lenguaje fluido, accesible a los no doctos. Quedó manifiesta la ventaja de los trabajos colectivos y la necesidad que existe, sobre todo, en la frontera de trabajos generales, síntesis en las diferentes áreas que incluyan perspectivas de ambos países.

Igualmente quedó el reto de incorporar nuevos enfoques y perspectivas (i.e., regional, de genero). Y la urgencia del análisis de la historia social que rescate las particularidades las sociedades y culturas que se encontraron, influyeron, chocaron y se fragmentaron con la presencia y acercamiento de mexicanos y americanos en la región.

Otros Beneficios

La Conferencia de Palo Alto permitió también la identificación y el acercamiento a archivos locales, colecciones privadas y periódicos en el espacio físico y sobre las batallas que justificaron la guerra México-Estados Unidos. Un acercamiento informal entre los participantes identificó intereses comunes en la investigación y reconocer las limitaciones actuales. Sugirieron nuevos rumbos, se evidenció la preocupación por recuperar lo descuidado hasta ahora y la importancia de conservar y apoyar el nuevo espacio que este foro creó.

Comentarios Finales

En efecto, a medida que se desarrollaron las sesiones de la Conferencia de Palo Alto, fue obvio que se estrenaba un nuevo foro de análisis que paradójicamente--en relación a la batalla en discusión--sentará las bases que cimentaran un lugar de encuentros, debates y difusión de un pasado que habla de tiempos idos, de ejércitos y guerrillas, de dudas y de orgullos, de voluntarios y traidores, de triunfos y amarguras, de hostilidades y camaraderia, de la riqueza de un pasado que fortalece la herencia cultural de los dos países.

Es importante notar que a pesar de los estimulantes resultados de la conferencia surgieron algunos huecos que se quedan como tarea para el futuro. Como siempre pasa en este tipo de eventos, la ausencia de trabajos escritos o entregados antes de las reuniones impidió un conocimiento previo del material, la ventaja de una discusión más amplia o aprovechar al máximo la experiencia de los especialistas. Sobresalió el interés en buscar y promover la continuidad del evento. Que no quede como un encuentro de colección, único y en el olvido.

Asimismo resulta claro que en el primer avance, fuera de los principales intereses o avenidas de la investigación académica quedaron las especificidades regionales. También quedaron fuera los análisis económicos y el peso, a nivel local, de la experiencia histórica donde la guerra México-Estados Unidos fue una experiencia dolorosa en la que México llevó la peor parte y la huella queda en el reclamo de los historiadores y los archivos locales.

Resulta curioso que los enfoques se concentraron en el conflicto y que ningún análisis consideró relaciones familiares, los hogares bi-culturales, las familias y posesiones que la guerra unió y dividió. Los trabajos fueron más bien generales donde tampoco se incluyeron los lazos de amistad, los intereses económicos externos y las fortunas que se colapsaron o extendieron. Tampoco asistieron los patrones culturales, ni el impacto de la presencia del ejército americano que se mantuvó estacionado, controlando la región por un período de casi dos años; ni se consideraron las estructuras informales de poder que cortan y van, al igual que las relaciones antes mencionadas, más allá de la ideología política, de las lealtades nacionalistas, de las periodizaciones.

Por otra parte es cierto que la relación México-Estados Unidos está de moda, en el centro de debates internacionales; mas las conmemoraciones de Palo Alto han sido un trago amargo para los mexicanos e influyeron en las respuestas a la Conferencia. No es posible ignorarlo porque pudiera perderse la importancia de un espacio y un evento que sentaron el primer peldaño para que los especialistas en el significado histórico de la guerra Mexico-Estados Unidos compartieran, analizaran y profundizaran en ambas perspectivas.

La coincidencia temporal entre las ceremonias de Dedicación del Campo de Batalla de Palo Alto y la Conferencia dió lugar a un primer asombro seguido de escepticismo y poco a poco la reflexión dió paso al contexto del presente siglo que ha acrcado a las dos naciones; y en la última década, nuevos eventos, intereses y nuevas administraciones redefinieron sus relaciones y se preveen cambios más profundos; y entonces se afianzó la certidumbre, la necesidad de recuperar, conocer y difundir la versión y la perspectiva propia.

Porque es cierto que las conmemoraciones pretenden unir a partir de una herencia común mas los hechos históricos que revivió la Conferencia de Palo Alto hablan de un pasado común, pero uno que resalta nuestras diferencias. Pues en medio de ellas, en el centro, destaca la guerra México-Estados Unidos y el impacto que tuvo en el desarrollo de ambos países. Fue evidente que necesitamos rescatar nuestra historia con el propósito de presentar una visión más completa: revalorar las experiencias compartidas, la importancia del conocimiento de las raíces, de los resentimientos, de los encuentros y coincidencias, de las visiones esterotipadas que plagan y marcan la enterrelación.

Y las dos perspectivas--la de México y la estadounidense--deben buscar y encontrar la participación real de todos los actores, desde las figuras políticas y los ejércitos hasta los guerrilleros mexicanos norteños que frenaban y atemorizaban las fuerzas americanas; los soldados voluntarios del norte que regresaron a quedarse a estas tierras y las marcas que la guerra dejó en la memoria de ambos pueblos. En este contexto, el espacio que se abrió para discutirlas, alcanza gran relevancia, permite profundizar en el diálago, buscar respuestas y conjurar los mitos.

La Conferencia de Palo Alto que por definición parte de una ruptura entre México y Estados Unidos se convirtió en un lugar de encuentro, un foro fructífero y coincidieron las ideas: la riqueza de ambas historias y la necesidad de profundizar en ellas, la importancia de difundir el conocimiento compartido, editar las memorias; y

quizás, ¿por qué no apoyar los objetivos previstos y enriquecerlas con publicaciones periódicas, cuadernos de trabajo y/o compilaciones que nos mantengan al día con el estado del arte en la literatura y estimulen nuevas investigaciones? ¿Por qué no incluir como participantes activos a los centros de estudios superiores regionales, una membresía y un comité directivo, es decir, por qué no institucionalizar la Conferencia?

Un mejor entendimiento de las relaciones México-Americanas del hoy y el mañana surgirá de un conocimiento más profundo del pasado compartido, de la historia política pero también de eventos particulares, de las influencias culturales, de los cambios y lo que persiste y cobijará a todos aquellos personajes que le dieron forma a nuestra herencia, que en efecto, es común. Un pasado que no es posible cambiar pero que tampoco debe ignorarse sino indagarse, apropiarlo, reconocer las diferencias y entre las huellas de la historia atisbar las imágenes del futuro y fortalecer la afirmación de lo nuestro.

BRIEF NOTES REFLECTING ON THE FIRST PALO ALTO CONFERENCE

Alma Yolanda Guerrero-miller
Centro de Investigación Multidisciplinaria de Tamaulipas
Matamoros, Tamaulipas, México
Translation by Thomas Carroll
Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site

In May of 1993, the National Park Service of the United States coordinated the First Palo Alto International Conference as part of the Dedication Ceremonies of the Palo Alto Battlefield. The event attracted an interdisciplinary group which during different meetings remembered, described, narrated, and analyzed the most important and extensively discussed conflict between the two neighbors: the war between Mexico and the United States (1846-1848). With different perspectives and focuses, dedicated specialists, administrators, and local historians and supporters contributed to a very enriching discussion. An international dialogue was initiated that, surpassing stereotyped visions and misconceptions, underlined and gave context to the importance or significance of the different people and events. Most importantly, the new forum--where some scholars knew each other and others met--gave an opportunity to share, to stimulate, and to challenge our knowledge of the past.

These paragraphs include brief reflections on the participants, the themes, and the main ideas that, in formal analysis and in informal discussions, proposed new actions and directions in historical research for the intellectual/academic community involved in this period of history.

About the Participants

The group's diversity interwove presentations of specialized historians with exhaustive knowledge and professional experience--some on the colonial history of the borderlands; others in the history of the Mexican-American War; and still others in the definition of the border--with presentations of post-graduate students, or those who have recently completed their post-graduate work and are taking their first steps as professional historians, with those of professionals from various disciplines, local writers, and lovers of history. While it enriched the discussions and collective experience, the heterogeneity of the participants, upon analysis, exhibited differing experience, understanding, and perceptions of issues that polarized attention and interest in the event.

Themes

The general theme, in conformance with the objective of the organizers, was to identify and delineate the historic importance of the Mexican-American War for both countries. However, the heterogeneity of the conference participants, deriving principally

from diverse specialty areas and the wide range in experience and academic training, defined the topics, their complexity, and their organization. Thus, the presentations ranged from formal presentations to reports and thoughts on: (a) national perspectives of both countries on political, diplomatic, and military history; (b) social and regional history of what is now the eastern portion of the United States-Mexico border; and (c) the perceptions, in the local communities of the Rio Bravo Delta, of the war's impacts. In addition, according to the more specific interests of the National Park Service for the newly created Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site, the importance, definition, and planning needs of a national park were discussed in each session.

Challenges

All the participants received or contributed challenges related to our current state of knowledge or our perceptions, individually and/or institutionally: academicians were able to synthesize, through in-depth research; to stimulate new studies; and to promote dissemination. During the event, the need was clear for dialogue between the participants and institutions represented due to their different backgrounds, interests, and knowledge. This is to say, it is important for scholars to effectively communicate with non-specialists in a fluent language that is understood by all. The advantage of collective tasks was evident--above all else--in the difficult challenges represented by general works that require synthesis of various disciplines and the integration of the perspectives of both nations.

Similarly, the challenge remains of incorporating new focuses and perspectives (i.e., regional, gender) as does the urgency to study and analyze the social history of the region in order to identify and preserve the data, societies, and cultures that found themselves influenced, embattled, and fragmented by the new social environments created by both Mexicans and Americans living in the borderlands.

Other Benefits

The Palo Alto Conference permitted the identification of, and access to, local archives, private collections, and periodicals on the sites and battles of the Mexican-American War. An informal and close relationship among the participants led to the identification of common interests in research and the recognition of the current barriers to research. New avenues of research were suggested; a preoccupation was evident to recuperate what had been ignored until now and to conserve and support the new space that this forum created.

Final Comments

In effect, in consonance with the progression of the sessions of the Palo Alto Conference, it became obvious that a new, analytical forum was premiering that paradoxically--in relation to the battle being discussed--was laying the foundations that would formulate a place of encounters, discussions, and dissemination of a past that speaks of times gone, of armies and guerrillas, of doubts and prides, of volunteers and traitors, of triumphs and bitterness, of hostilities and camaraderie, and of the richness of a past which strengthens the cultural heritage of the two countries.

It is important to note that in spite of the stimulating results of the conference, some gaps resulted and these are left as tasks for the future. As always happens in this type of event, the lack of papers written or delivered before the meetings impeded a prior knowledge of the materials, the advantage of wider discussion, or the opportunity to take maximum advantage of the experience of the specialists. The interest in seeking and promoting the continuation of the event was outstanding. It should not be left as a unique, forgotten artifact.

Likewise, it is clear in this first step that regional specialties remained outside of the principle interests or avenues of academic research. Also remaining untouched were economic analysis and the trauma at the local level of the historic experience, where the Mexican-American War was a painful experience in which Mexico suffered the most--the scar remains in the reclamations of local historians and in archival materials.

It is curious that the focuses concentrated on the conflict itself and no analysis considered family relationships, bi-cultural homes, or the families and possessions which the war united and divided. The works were usually general in nature and did not include friendship ties, external economic interests, nor fortunes that were won or lost. Neither were the cultural patterns presented; nor the impact of the presence of the American army which remained and occupied the region for a period of almost two years; nor did it consider the informal structures of power that cut through and transcended, as do the above referenced relationships, political ideology and national loyalties.

Another matter is that it is certain that relations between Mexico and the United States are in vogue, in the center of international discussions; the commemoration of Palo Alto has been a bitter drink for Mexicans and was influential in the responses to the conference. It is not possible to ignore this because one might lose the importance of a space and an event that marked the first step for specialists in the historical significance of the Mexican-American War that they shared, analyzed, and studied in depth from the perspectives of both nations.

For Mexicans, the temporal coincidence between the Dedication Ceremonies of the Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site and the Conference gave place first to surprise followed by skepticism and, little by little, reflection gave way to the context of the present century that has drawn both nations closer together; and during the last decade, new events, new interests, and new administrations redefined their relationships and even deeper changes are foreseen; and then the certainty strengthened, the need to recover, to know, and to diffuse their own version and perspectives.

It is certain that the commemoration intended to unite based upon a common heritage, in addition to the historic events that the Palo Alto Conference revisited that speak of a common past--but one that brings out our differences. In the middle of our differences, in the center, looms the Mexican-American War and the impact it had on the development of both countries. It was evident that we need to redeem our history with the proposition of presenting a more complete vision: to reevaluate the shared experiences and to know the importance of the roots, the resentments, the encounters, the happenings, and the stereotyped visions that plague and mark the interrelationship.

And the two perspectives--that of Mexico and the United States--must search and find the true participation of all the main characters and forces, from the political figures and armies to the Mexican northern guerrillas that slowed and terrorized the American forces, the volunteer soldiers from the north that returned to remain on these lands, and the marks that the war left in the memory of both peoples. In this context, the space that

opened to discuss these themes achieves great relevance: it permits penetrating dialogue, searches for answers, and avoids myths.

The Palo Alto Conference, that by definition is part of a rupture between Mexico and the United States, was converted into a meeting place, a fruitful forum where ideas coincided: the richness of both histories and the necessity to study them in depth, the importance of spreading the shared knowledge, to publish the diaries and records; and perhaps--why not?--to support the proposed objectives and to enrich them on a regular basis with publications, work notebooks, and/or compilations that can keep us current with state-of-the-art literature and stimulate new investigations. Why not include the regional study centers as active participants, creating a membership and a directive committee; in other words, why not institutionalize the conference?

A better understanding of Mexican-American relations of today and tomorrow will result from a more profound knowledge of the past we share, of the political history, but also of individual events, of cultural influences, of the changes, and of what persists, and will include all those individuals that gave form to our heritage, which is in fact a common one. A past that is not possible to change should not be ignored either, but rather needs to be investigated and remembered, acknowledging the differences, and within the roots of history to scrutinize the images of the future and strengthen the affirmation of what is ours.

REMARKS FROM THE SUPERINTENDENT

Thomas Carroll
Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site

In these brief notes, I would like to acknowledge my sincere appreciation to Alma Yolanda Guerrero-miller for her discerning and evocative insights into the significance and potential of the first Palo Alto Conference. I strongly support her views and feel that they express the overall feelings of most if not all of the conferees. It was indeed an honor for the Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site and the National Park Service, in conjunction with the University of Texas at Brownsville; the Instituto Tecnológico de Matamoros; the City of Brownsville; the City of H. Matamoros; the Sociedad Tamaulipeca de Historia, Geografía, y Estadística; the Historic Brownsville Museum, the Museo Casamata, the Brownsville Convention and Visitors Bureau, the Palo Alto National Park Committee; and many others to host this first international gathering. The conference would not have been the success it proved to be without this assistance, and that of Sylvia Komatzu of KERA-TV and the distinguished panel of scholars attending the conference who are assisting Sylvia in the production of a major documentary on the Mexican-American War.

The University of Texas at Brownsville, in coordination with other co-sponsors from Mexico and the United States, is hosting the second International Palo Alto Conference on February 11 and 12, 1994. The site for the 1995 Conference has not yet been designated but the wish of the conferees to meet in Mexico was evident; a preliminary invitation to host a conference in Monterrey was graciously extended by the Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo Leon.

This conference is important in opening the "new space" and dialogue that is central to the international purposes for this unique new unit of the National Park System. The following extract from my letter of invitation to potential participants in the Palo Alto Conference provides the context within which many of the conference participants prepared their presentations:

> The [first] Palo Alto Conference is modeled on the Gran Quivira Conference (for Borderland scholars, interpreters, and site managers) and the Pecos Conference (for Southwestern Archeologists) with their focus on mixing formal and informal presentations and panels in a relaxed environment that contributes to discussions and closer relations between workers in a specific subject area.
>
> Participants are invited to either make formal presentations on their work or to informally report on what they have been doing during the past year and what is planned for the upcoming year. Each morning and afternoon session will have a moderator that will introduce the speakers and provide some control on the length of the presentation, usually limited to about 15 to 20 minutes. A synopsis

of a lengthier paper can be made. The intent of the Palo Alto Conference will be to publish the proceedings and the papers...

Presentations are invited on any subject within the broad purpose provided by Congress for the park in its enabling legislation, Sections 3(a) and 6 of Public Law 102-304, approved June 23, 1992:

In order to preserve for the education, benefit, and inspiration of present and future generations the nationally significant site of the first battle of the Mexican-American War, and to provide for its interpretation in such a manner as to portray the battle and the Mexican-American War and its related political, diplomatic, military, and social causes and consequences, there is hereby established the Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site in the State of Texas...

In furtherance of the purposes of the Act, the Secretary is authorized to enter into cooperative agreements with the United States of Mexico...and with other owners of Mexican-American War properties within the United States of America for the purposes of conducting joint research and interpretive planning for the historic site and related Mexican-American War sites. Interpretive information and programs shall reflect data and perspectives of both countries and the series of events associated with the Mexican-American War.

Basically, the park is to deal with the events and the political, diplomatic, social, and military causes and consequences of the Mexican-American War (roots extending into the Colonial period, etc. and consequences that affect both nations today) with historical data and perspectives of both Mexico and the United States. In addition, the authorization to enter into cooperative agreements for the purposes of research and interpretive planning treats individual properties in their own right and in their role within the overall framework of the war. By cooperatively researching the Mexican-American War and portraying this history to the public, it is hoped that the park will not only help increase public understanding of the histories and the continuum of international relations of the two neighboring nations, and correcting a major omission in U.S. history--the Mexican-American War, but also contribute toward a future of understanding, non-intervention, and brotherhood--not war--between all nations and peoples.

...[The National Park Service is] just beginning to work with the public on developing the major planning documents for the future management and development of the park. The ideas generated at this conference will help to give our planners and historians input as to the role that the park should play.

March 10, 1993

The central theme of the Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site was referred to in the National Park Service's 1982 *Study of Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site: Texas* that was submitted to Congress in 1983:

It [the Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site] is at once, a point of departure and a point of arrival. As a point of departure, the Battle of Palo Alto represents

a rupture of relationships between two neighboring countries that has not yet healed. As a point of arrival, the commemoration of the Battle of Palo Alto serves as a reminder that peace, unity, and brotherhood--not war--is the heritage for which the Americas must strive.

Dr. Joseph P. Sanchez

The following selection from *National Parks for the 21st Century: The Vail Agenda* is consistent with the park's legislative mandate that the perspectives and historical data of both Mexico and the United States be portrayed:

> The idea that a single 'Truth' exists regarding historical and environmental events has been critically challenged...We recommend that the National Park Service encourage managers and interpreters to better interpret controversial events and sites and incorporate multiple points of view into interpretive programs.

Again, I would like to thank the many individuals from both Mexico and the United States whose generosity, openness, knowledge, and involvement have been so very important in helping to guide the National Park Service in the management and development of this national historic site for the benefit of both Mexico and the United States. This international endeavor is totally dependent upon the good will and understanding of the peoples of both nations.

CONFERENCE PROGRAM

May 6-10, 1993, Park Dedication Ceremonies

May 6, Thursday

Historic Brownsville Museum's Mary Yturria Education Center
641 East Madison, Tel. 210-548-1313

5:00 p.m.-7:00 p.m.: Registration [4:00-6:00]
6:00 p.m.-8:00 p.m.: Social Gathering [5:00-7:00]
Hosted by Historic Brownsville Museum

May 7, Friday

Historic Brownsville Museum's Mary Yturria Education Center

8:00 a.m.-10:00 a.m.: Registration [7:00-9:00]
9:00 a.m.-9:15 a.m.: Welcome [8:00-8:15]
-Patricio M. Ahumada, Mayor, City of Brownsville, Texas
-Tomas Yarrington Ruvalcaba, Presidente Municipal, Ciudad de H. Matamoros, Tamaulipas (or a representative)
-Mary Rose Cardenas, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Texas Southmost College

9:15 a.m.-12:00 Noon: Presentations [8:15-11:00]
Emcee Dr. Anthony N. Zavaleta, Dean, College of Liberal Arts, University of Texas at Brownsville
-Robert J. Burke, Vice-President, Descendants of Mexican War Veterans
"Aims and Objectives of the Descendants of Mexican War Veterans in Regard to the Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site"
-Jeffrey G. Mauck, formerly at the University of Texas Pan American
"Indiana Volunteers in the Mexican-American War"
-Alejandra A. Aldred, Chief, Interpretation & Visitor Services, Bent's Old Fort National Historic Site
"Bent's Old Fort and the Mexican-American War"
-Celso Garza Guajardo, Director, Instituto de Investigaciones Historicas Neoleonenses, Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo Leon
"La Formación de la Frontera Norte de la Nueva España"
-Donald S. Frazier, Texas Christian University
"The Encyclopedia of the Mexican-American War"

BREAK

-Tom A. Fort, Assistant Director and Curator of Exhibits, Hidalgo County Museum
"The 'Halls of Montezuma': How a Small Museum Made a Major Exhibit on the Mexican-American War"
-Eric Ratliff, University of Texas at Austin
"Grave Interpretations: Information From a Mass Burial at Resaca de la Palma"
-Pedro Santoni, California State University, San Bernardino
"Bulward of Independence or Haven of the Mob: The Civic Militia of Mexico, 1846-1848"
-Christopher C. Marvel, National Park Service, Denver Service Center, Palo Alto Battlefield NHS Planning Team Captain for the General Management Plan/Development Concept Plan and the Interpretive Prospectus
"Planning a New National Park"
-Kevin Young, Historian, San Antonio IMAX
"Documenting el Soldado Mexicano: 1835-1848"

Noon-1:00 p.m.: CATERED LUNCH [11:00-12:00]
-The KMBH-TV program "Palo Alto: A Battle That Changed America" will be shown in a separate room during lunch. (28 minutes)

1:00 p.m.-3:45 p.m.: Presentations [12:00-2:45]
Emcee Dr. Joseph P. Sanchez, Director, Spanish Colonial Research Center, Southwest Region, National Park Service, University of New Mexico
-Joseph P. Sanchez
"The Defeat of the Army of the North in South Texas: An Examination of Mexican Military Operations in the First Battles of the Mexican War"
-Glen Kaye, Chief Interpreter, Southwest Region, National Park Service
"Interpretive Planning in the National Park Service"
-Joseph C. O'Bell, previously Chairman of the Palo Alto National Park Committee of the Brownsville Kiwanis Club
"Palo Alto: A Most Appropriate site for Promoting Whole-Hearted Reconciliation"
-Richard Bruce Winders, Texas Christian University
"Organization of the U.S. Army in 1846"
-Emiliano Saenz de los Reyes, previously Cronista de H. Matamoros
"La Republica del Rio Grande"

BREAK

-Norma Morales, Presidente de la Sociedad Tamaulipeca de Historia, Geografía y Estadística de H. Matamoros
"Colaboración de Historiadores Para Formar el Museo en la Casa Mata, H. Matamoros"

-Donald S. Frazier, Texas Christian University
"Confederate Imperial Designs on Northwestern Mexico"
-Alma Yolanda Guerrero-miller, Centro de Investigación Multidisciplinaria de Tamaulipas
"Encuentros y Desencuentros: Mujeres en el Delta del Bravo, 1750-1850"
-Charles Haecker, Archeologist, Southwest Region, National Park Service
"Artifact Pattern Analysis of Palo Alto Battlefield"
-Alfred Richardson and Norman L. Richard, University of Texas at Brownsville
"Biological Survey of Palo Alto Site"

Bus Tour of Matamoros-Walk across new bridge to meet bus at Garcia's (bus courtesy of Instituto Tecnológico de Matamoros). Tour leaders are members of the Sociedad Tamaulipeca de Historia, Geografía, e Estadística de Matamoros: Andrés F. Cuellar and Norma Morales.

4:00 p.m.-6:30 p.m.: Visit various historic sites, including Casa Mata and Plaza Hidalgo, [3:00-5:30]
Evening Presentations and Events in Library at the Instituto Tecnológico de Matamoros

6:30 p.m.-7:00 p.m.: Social Hour
-Mariachi by the Preparatoria Ricardo Flores Magón
-Ballet folklorico performances by the Instituto Tecnológico de Matamoros) [5:30-6:00]

7:00 p.m.-8:30 p.m.: Banquet [6:00-7:30]
-Accordian music by Andres Cuellar
8:30 p.m.-11:00 p.m.: Presentations by members of special panel to Conference participants and Dr. Milo Kearney's Border History Class, UTB and IT sponsored. [7:30-10:00]
Emcee Sylvia Komatzu, KERA-TV Dallas
Panel of Scholars:
-Dr. David M. Pletcher, Professor Emeritus, Indiana University
-Dr. Josefina Zoraida Vásquez, El Colegio de México
-Dr. Jesus Velasco-Márquez, Universidad de las Americas
-Dr. David J. Weber, Southern Methodist University
-Dr. Miquel Soto, Universidad Autónoma de México
-Dr. Pedro Santoni, California State University, San Bernardino

11:00 p.m. Take bus back to new bridge [10:00]

May 8, Saturday

Historic Brownsville Museum's Mary Yturria Education Center

9:00 a.m.-11:30 a.m.: Special Panel to discuss Mexican-American War, moderator Sylvia Komatsu, KERA-TV Dallas [8:00-10:30]
-Dr. David M. Pletcher, Professor Emeritus, Indiana University
-Dr. Josefina Zoraida Vásquez, El Colegio de México
-Dr. Jesus Velasco-Márquez, Universidad de las Americas
-Dr. David J. Weber, Southern Methodist University
-Dr. Miguel Soto, Universidad Autónoma de México
-Dr. Pedro Santoni, California State University, San Bernardino

Tentative Presentation
-Gilberto Hinojosa, University of Texas at San Antonio
"Mexican Americans and Accommodation to the New American System: the Case of Don Francisco Yturria and His Business Partners"

11:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m.: LUNCH (a la carte at Ft. Brown Hotel and Resort) [10:30-12:00]

1:00 p.m.-5:45 p.m.: BUS TOUR [12:00-4:45]

1:00 p.m.: Bus leaves from Ft. Brown Hotel and Resort [12:00]
1:10 p.m.: Ft. Brown, 1846. Tour Leader: Bruce Aiken, Executive Director, Historic Brownsville Museum [12:15]
2:00 p.m.: Dedication of the City of Brownsville's Heritage Trail Marker for the Palo Alto Battlefield at the Brownsville Convention and Visitor Bureau Information Center, Expressway and FM 802 [1:00]
-James Pace High School Marine Corps Jr. ROTC Drum and Bugle Corps to play Mexican Army infantry and cavalry bugle calls.
2:30 p.m.: Kiwanis Flag Raising Ceremony at the Kiwanis Palo Alto Park, junction of FM 511 and Paredes Line Road [1:30]
-John Chosy, president of The Kiwanis Club of Brownsville
Welcoming remarks and introduction of guests
-Hon. Carlos Cascos, County Commissioner, Cameron County, Precinct 2
-Hon. Antonio Garza, Cameron County Judge
-Hon. "Kika" de la Garza, 15th Congressional District
-The Raising of the Flags
-United States of America: Concepción "Kino" Camarillo, Curator of the Stillman House Museum
-State of Texas: A. R. "Ray" Circe, past president, Kiwanis Club of Brownsville

-Republic of Mexico: Alfonso Gomez Arguelles, Sociedad Tamaulipeca de Historia, Geografía, y Estadística de H. Matamoros

3:15 p.m.: Tour of Palo Alto Battlefield, Charles Haecker, Archeologist, Southwest Regional Office, National Park Service,to discuss findings of 1992 and 1993 archeological reconnaissance of battlefield. [2:15]

5:00 p.m.: Tour of Resaca de la Palma Battlefield, led by Bruce Aiken, Paredes Line Road and Resaca de la Palma. [4:00]

Immaculate Conception Cathedral, Brownsville

6:30 p.m.: Co-celebrant Park Dedication Worship, 1218 East Jefferson [5:30]

-Bishop Enrique San Pedro, Diocese of Brownsville

-Monseigneur Martin Guerrero Reyna, Diocese of Matamoros

Student Center, University of Texas at Brownsville

8:00 p.m.: Park Dedication Ceremony [7:00]

-Music provided by the Community Band from the Brownsville Independent School District and the Banda Municipal de Matamoros

-Porter High School Jr. ROTC Color Guard

-Emcee Nick Marks Reyna, President, Brownsville Convention and Visitors Bureau

-National Anthems of the United States and the Republic of Mexico

-Invocation

-Welcome

-Honorable Patricio M. Ahumada, Mayor, City of Brownsville, Texas

-Honorable Tomas Yarrington Ruvalcaba, Presidente Municipal, City of H. Matamoros, Tamaulipas

-Comments

-Juliet V. Garcia, Ph.D., President, University of Texas at Brownsville

-Dianne Mendoza Freeman, Ph.D., Texas Department of Commerce, Director of Tourism, State of Texas

-Walter E. Plitt, III, Chairman, Palo Alto National Park Committee

-Mary R. Bradford, Deputy Regional Director, National Park Service, Southwest Region

-Keynote Speaker: U.S. Congressman Solomon P. Ortiz, U.S. House of Representatives

-Award Presentation: Mary R. Bradford

-Awards Presentation: Walter E. Plitt, III, and John E. Chosy

-Benediction: Pastor Pete Schaelchlin, Word of God Church Brownsville

May 9, Sunday

Historic Brownsville Museum's Mary Yturria Education Center

9:00 a.m.-12:00: Noon Presentations [8:00-11:00]
Emcee Dr. Anthony K. Knopp, Professor of History, University of Texas at Brownsville
-Jenkins Garrett and Gerald Saxon, Director of Special Collections, University of Texas at Arlington
"Overview of Mexican-American War Holdings in the Special Collections at the University of Texas at Arlington"
-Anthony N. Zavaleta, University of Texas at Brownsville
"Resacas and Bancos as Military Obstacles"
-Thomas B. Carroll, Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site
"Research Potential at Palo Alto" and "The Fortifications of H. Matamoros"
-Carlos Gustavo Leal Velazco, Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo Leon
"Santiago Vidaurri y la Republica de la Sierra Madre"
-Mark Lund, Heritage Officer, City of Brownsville
"Ft. Brown Earthworks (ca. 1846): Preservation and Planning Issues"

BREAK

-George Esber, National Park Service, Southwest Region
"Ethnography at Palo Alto"
-Joseph P. Linck, Historian
"Brazos Santiago Harbor"
-Carlos Rugerio, Historical Architect, ICOMOS intern, National Park Service
"Recursos Patrimonales en el Corredor 'Los Caminos del Río'"
-Michael Creasey, Southwest Region, National Park Service
"Los Caminos del Rio Heritage Project: A Binational Effort"

End first Palo Alto Conference with a short business meeting to plan future conferences.

POST-CONFERENCE BUS TOUR IN MEXICO (MAY 9 - 10)

Begins May 9, 1:00 p.m. [12:00] Two-Day Bus Tour of Mexican-American War Sites in Mexico organized by the Historic Brownsville Museum. Bus leaves at 1:00 p.m. [12:15] for Saltillo from the Historic Brownsville Museum. On Monday morning the group will be escorted to the Buena Vista (Angostura) Battlefield for an on-site inspection. The tour will next stop at the Bishop's Palace and other historically significant locations in Monterrey. Other stops include: the church in the village of Marín; the springs at Cerralvo; and the plaza in Camargo. The group will return to

the Museum in Brownsville by early evening on Monday, May 10. Cost $95.00 for room, transportation, and tour guide from Mexico. Bruce Aiken is the contact, Tel. 210-548-1313.

-Simultaneous translation services at the Palo Alto Conference are provided by E & F Audio Visuals and Simultaneous Wireless Interpretation Systems Rental Services. The translator is Yolizma Zayas.

-Exhibit of historic maps and newspapers courtesy of Robert V. Anderson.
-Exhibit of Mexican-American War uniforms courtesy of Hidalgo County Museum.
-Exhibit of Mexican Army battalion flags courtesy of San Antonio IMAX.

CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

Bruce Aiken; Historic Brownsville Museum
Alejandra A. Aldred; Bent's Old Fort National Historic Site, NPS
Robert V. Anderson; Harlingen, Texas
Robert L. Arnberger; Big Bend National Park, NPS
Karen Ballard; Brownsville, Texas
Lynne Beeching; Hidalgo County Historical Museum
Norman Binder; University of Texas at Brownsville
Gloria Bliss-Moore; Edinburg, Texas
Julius G. Brambill
Mrs. Julius G. Brambill
Mary R. Bradford; Southwest Regional Office, NPS
Phillis Burke; Dallas, Texas
Robert J. Burke; Descendants of Mexican War Veterans
Steven R. Butler; Descendants of Mexican War Veterans
Angela Campagna; KERA-TV, Dallas, Texas
Robert Camina; Brownsville, Texas
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Jenkins Garrett; Fort Worth, Texas
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Robert Hugins; U.S. Consulate, Monterrey, Nuevo León

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A.G.M. Martin; La Feria, Texas
Sam Martin; Brownsville, Texas
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Dr. Jeffrey G. Mauck; Indiana University
Gene McNair; McNair & Co., Brownsville, Texas
Gloria Gene Moore; Austin, Texas
Kent Millard; National Trust for Historic Preservation
Mylene Moreno; KERA-TV, Dallas, Texas
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Charles Robinson; San Benito, Texas
Carlos Rugerio; ICOMOS, Southwst Regional Office, NPS
Emiliano Saenz de los Reyes; Matamoros, Tamaulipas
Javier Sánchez-García; Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia
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