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Introduction

Research Project HF-94B is a detailed narrative of military actions and operations which occurred in and about Harpers Ferry, or which had some direct or indirect relation to the area. Sources utilized are those maintained in the Park research files; however, many other sources are extant which would shed additional light on the Harpers Ferry story but which were not examined due to lack of time and funds. It is expected that additional source material will be gathered as time passes, which can then be incorporated in this report through revision.

HF-94B, the second in a series of five reports, covers the year 1862 and was written with the object of furthering the interpretive program at this Park.

Preparations

The near-deserted and war-ravaged town of Harpers Ferry was visited January 20, 1862, by Major and Aide-de-Camp, Chief of Staff, D. D. Perkins, and Captain James W. Abert, Topographical Engineers, from Major General Nathaniel P. Banks' Division, Army of the Potomac, based at Frederick, Md.[1]

The purpose of their visit was to determine the most effective means by which a large body of troops, including cavalry, artillery, baggage trains, etc., could cross the Potomac River from the Maryland shore and set foot on Virginia soil. Banks' Division was making initial preparations to carry on an offensive campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, and the bridging of the Potomac at Harpers Ferry was the first and indispensable step.[2]

On examining the river, the inspecting party discovered that recent rains had raised the depth of the water to some ten feet above its usual level. As they expected the river would rise and fall several times before the Potomac would maintain a steady level, the use of

[1]Report of Maj. Perkins and Capt. Abert to Maj. Gen. Banks, Jan. 20, 1862, The War of The Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901, Ser. I, Vol. 5, pp. 705-706. Hereafter cited as O.R., followed by the series number in Roman numerals, the volume number in arabic, the part number (if any), and the page.

[2]Ibid.

canal boats in the construction of a pontoon bridge was discounted.[3]

In lieu of canal boats, which were clumsy and which would restrict river crossings to time and place, Perkins and Abert advocated the use of bateaux. They recommended white pine, 31 feet in length, 4 feet in width, and well calked to serve as floating supports for string pieces and plank flooring.[4]

The utilization of bateaux had several advantages. They could be made away from enemy observation and brought to the river crossing complete. Bateaux were easily placed and anchored and would suffer little damage from strong currents or rising waters. Once anchored, the flooring could be easily and quickly laid.[5]

While preparing for an offensive campaign, Banks' Division, in the meantime, functioned as watchdogs of the Potomac from Hancock, Md., 36 miles above Harpers Ferry to Point-of-Rocks, Md., some 12 miles below. Nine regiments of infantry and cavalry, and twelve guns protected the fords and crossings between these two points from the Maryland side of the Potomac, in addition to providing protection for the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. At Sandy Hook, Md.,

[3] Ibid. This was in direct conflict with the recommendations of O. E. Babcock, Corps of Engineers, submitted Dec. 26, 1861. Cf. Sullivan, Arthur L., "Harpers Ferry, April 18 - December 31, 1861, A Casualty of War", Research Project No. HF-94A, Harpers Ferry National Monument: Feb. 17, 1960, pp. 98-99.

[4] O.R., S.I, V.5, pp.705-706.

[5] Ibid.

two companies of cavalry, six companies of infantry, and two guns kept a cold and lonely vigil.[6]

This disposition of Federal troops caused Brig. Gen. D. H. Hill, commanding Confederate forces at Leesburg, Va., to comment, "...I have never in my life seen such a chain of sentinels...."[7]

The reason was clear. The protection of the railroad and canal, as vital lines of communications, was absolutely necessary for successful offensive operations. Furthermore, there was some fear that Confederate troops might attempt crossing from Virginia into Maryland and initiate their own offensive.[8]

While Banks favored delaying the offensive campaign, Brig. Gen. F. W. Lander, commanding Federal troops at Patterson's Creek, proposed an immediate crossing of the Potomac. South of the river, he could effect a junction with Banks and drive the Confederates from the Valley.[9]

The repeated proposals of General Lander were strenously opposed by Banks, who submitted his many objections to Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. R. B. Marcy. Banks pointed out that any attempt to cross the river at that time in an effort to intercept the enemy could well end in another

[6]Maj. Gen. Banks to Maj. Gen. McClellan, January 18, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, pp.703ff.

[7]To Gen. G. T. Beauregard, Jan. 17, 1862, Ibid., p.1035.

[8]Maj. Gen. Banks to Maj. Gen. McClellan, Ibid., pp.703-ff.

[9]Brig. Gen. Lander to Maj. Gen. McClellan, January 16, 1862, Ibid., p.702f.

"Ball's Bluff".[10]

When Banks' views were presented before Maj. Gen. McClellan, the latter sustained him in his thinking. McClellan wired Banks January 7th, "I would not run the great risk of crossing the River unless you see certain chances of great success and perfect certainty of being able to recross at pleasure...Lander is too young a General to appreciate the difficulty of a river behind an army...."[11]

Thus, without the sanction of their Commander-In-Chief, the Union army north of the Potomac was destined for the time being to maintain the watch on the river, and remain, temporarily immobilized. The great desire of General Lander to cross the Potomac and pursue the rebels was intensified by the active and harrassing policy adopted by Major General Thomas J. Jackson, Commanding the Valley District. While the Federal troops aligned along the Potomac continued their vigilance and shielded their respective defensive positions, "Stonewall" Jackson, based at Winchester, Va., led his forces on an expedition, "...that seemed for awhile to confirm the impression that General Jackson was crazy....",[12] and which very nearly cost the Confederacy the services of one of its ablest commanders.

[10] O.R., S.I, V.5, p.694f.

[11] The Papers of George B. McClellan, cited by, Summers, Festus P., The Baltimore And Ohio In The Civil War, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939, p.111. Hereafter cited as Summers, followed by page number.

[12] Douglas, Henry Kyd, I Rode With Stonewall, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1940, p.20. Hereafter cited as Douglas followed by page number.

The Romney Expedition

General "Stonewall" Jackson, commanding the Valley District, encamped at Winchester, Va., received reinforcements until by the latter part of December, 1861, his command built up to a small army of 8,500 effective fighting men.[1]

With this force, Jackson planned to drive the Union detachments from Romney, Va., then under the command of Brigadier General Benjamin F. Kelley. But before attacking Romney, some 32 miles west of Winchester, Jackson first planned to hit the villages of Bath /Berkeley Springs/ and Hancock, directly north of Winchester. Bath is 30 miles distant from Winchester, while Hancock, on the north bank of the Potomac, is approximately 36 miles directly north of Winchester.

By driving Federal detachments from Bath and Hancock, Jackson would prevent reinforcements being sent to Romney, and by cutting the telegraph along the railroad, he would break off communications between Banks at Frederick and Rosecrans in Western Virginia. This done, Kelley would be forced to evacuate Romney, or meet Jackson with the forces he had on hand, which were inferior in number.[2]

On January 1, 1862, Jackson moved from Winchester in the direction of Bath. Garnett's brigade, with McLaughlin's, Carpenter's and Waters'

[1] Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson to Maj. Thomas G. Rhett, Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of Northern Virginia, Feb. 21, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.389.

[2] Henderson, op. cit., p.144.

batteries; Loring's command, consisting of Anderson's, Gilham's, and Taliaferro's brigades, Shumaker's and Marye's batteries; and Meem's command took up the march behind Jackson.[3]

The morning the Confederates moved out of Winchester was clear, bright, and warm, so much so, that many of the soldiers left their coats and blankets in the wagons. But as the day proceeded, a sharp drop in the temperature was followed by a severe snowstorm. The first day's march was dismal, and the bivouac that night was cheerless as the suffering men huddled around campfires in an effort to keep from shivering.[4]

Just prior to leaving Winchester, Jackson was presented with a bottle of whiskey by a local resident which, however, Jackson believed to be wine. As the General was affected by the extreme cold no less than his troops, he thought, perhaps, a drink of wine might warm him a bit.

> ...Asking for the bottle, he uncorked it, tilted it to his mouth and without stopping to taste, swallowed about as much of that old whiskey as if it had been light domestic wine. If he discovered his mistake he said nothing but handed the bottle to his staff, who, encouraged by the dimensions of the General's drink, soon disposed of all that he had left. In a short while the General complained of being very warm, although it was getting still colder, and unbuttoned his overcoat and some of the buttons on his uniform. The truth is, General Jackson was incipiently tight....[5]

[3]Jackson to Rhett, Feb. 21, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.390.

[4]Henderson, op. cit., p.144.

[5]Douglas, op. cit., p.20.

The march was resumed the following morning and that evening, Jackson's command was joined by General Carson, with part of his brigade and parts of two companies of cavalry, under Captain Harper.[6]

On the third day out, when within ten miles of Bath, the militia, under Generals Carson and Meem, veered to the left and crossed the Warm Springs Mountain where they would be able to attack Bath from the west. The main body, with General Loring's command in the lead, continued to advance along the Frederick and Morgan turnpike, and when nearly three miles from Bath, the Confederates were met by a small party of Federal troops, consisting of about thirty infantry and as many cavalry.[7]

After a token resistance, the Federals retreated, leaving behind eight men that the Confederates managed to capture. The Union troops inflicted wounds on four men from Jackson's command; one lieutenant and three privates.[8]

The militia attacking from the west also drove in the Union defenders, but with darkness coming on the attack was halted and the Confederates encamped.[9]

During the night a heavy snow fell, completely covering the sleeping Confederates, scattered on the ground. The following morning presented a weird spectacle.

[6]Jackson to Rhett, Feb. 21, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.390.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Ibid.

> ...Great logs of men were lying in all directions, covered over with snow and as quiet as graves. Now and then one would break out and look about him with amazement. Suddenly all were aroused by the strident voice of Bill Wintermeyer ...who jumping to his feet, cried out, "Great Jehosophat! The Resurrection!...."[10]

Shaking the snow from their uniforms, the Confederates, on the morning of January 4th, resumed the attack on Bath. General Loring was still in front, and continued the march until within a mile or two of the town. Here he allowed the head of his column to halt repeatedly, which greatly angered Jackson who was impatient to occupy Bath that day. Jackson directed Loring to order a regiment to advance on the Confederate left along the mountain which commanded the town. The execution of the order was delegated to Col. Maney who moved the First Tennessee Regiment in such a manner as to win the praise and admiration of Jackson.[11]

Colonel Hatton's regiment, and a section of Shumaker's battery, under Lieutenant Lanier, co-operated with the advance on the left while Col. Campbell's regiment advanced along the hill on the Confederate right.[12]

The Confederates, moving on the right and left, had not advanced far when the Union troops evacuated the town leaving their baggage and stores to be captured by Jackson's men. The rebel cavalry, under Lt. Col. William S. H. Baylor, dashed into town where it met and briefly

[10] Douglas, op. cit., p.22-23.

[11] Jackson to Rhett, Feb. 21, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.390f.

[12] Ibid., p.391

fought the Union cavalry. The Federal horsemen fled toward Hancock pursued by Baylor's troops who, however, were unable to overtake their quarry.[13]

The Confederates advanced to the outskirts of Hancock, and after the nearby woods were cleared of Union defenders by artillery, Jackson directed the guns turned on the town.

> ...As the U.S. troops had repeatedly shelled Shepherdstown, and even done so while there were no troops in the place and it was not used as a means of defense, I determined to intimate to the enemy that such outrages must not be repeated, and directed a few rounds from McLaughlin's battery to be fired at Hancock...[14]

Darkness halted further military operations and the Confederates withdrew to Bath where warm quarters were a welcome relief to the troops who had marched better than thirty miles in the face of inclement weather, and slept on the ground in the bitter cold. At Bath, Jackson's force was augmented with the arrival, on the evening of January 4th, of Lt. Col. Ashby, commanding a detachment of cavalry and infantry.[15]

The next morning, January 5th, General Loring was directed to proceed with Colonel Rust's command with orders to destroy the railroad bridge across the Big Cacapon. These troops accomplished this objective without difficulty and proceeded to destroy several railroad buildings, in addition to breaking the telegraph line at several points.[16]

[13]Jackson to Rhett, Feb. 21, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.391.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Ibid., p.392.

[16]Ibid.

While Rust and Loring were busily engaged in their errand of destruction, Jackson proceeded to Hancock where he demanded the surrender of the town, under threat of bombardment.[17] The Union commander refused to comply with Jackson's demand, and the town of Hancock was cannonaded. While the artillery barrage continued, the Confederates proceeded to build a bridge across the Potomac, at a point two miles above the town, however, this work was stopped the following day when Union reinforcements discouraged Jackson from making further attempts to capture Hancock, particularly where Romney, and not Hancock, was the chief objective of the expedition.[18]

On January 7th, the Confederate command was put in motion, but before leaving Alpine Depot, opposite Hancock, the rebels destroyed a large amount of public stores which they were unable to carry with them.[19]

The expeditionary force moved to Unger's Store, some 13 miles south of Bath, where the exhausted troops rested for several days while the horses were ice-calked. As the weather was so mild when the command left Winchester, the precaution of rough-shoeing the horses was neglected, and the unexpected snow and sleet made the roads almost impassable for loaded wagons, unless the teams were shod especially for the purpose.[20]

[17] Jackson granted the Federal commander two hours in which to remove the women and children. Cf., Henderson, op. cit., p.145.

[18] Jackson to Rhett, Feb. 21, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.392.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

The column left Unger's Store January 10th, bound for Romney. "...The sleet beat fiercely down upon the crawling column. The men stumbled and fell on the slippery tracks; many waggons were overturned, and the bloody knees and muzzles of the horses bore painful witness to the severity of the march...."[21]

On the approach of the Confederate column, the Federals evacuated Romney, abandoning a large number of tents and other public property. The town was occupied first by Sheetz's and Shand's companies of cavalry, and subsequently by the remainder of the struggling Confederate force. In the expedition, Jackson lost 32 men; 4 killed and 28 wounded.[22]

Jackson departed from Romney and arrived at Winchester January 24th, where his command went into winter quarters, while Loring's command, consisting of 4,000 infantry, three companies of cavalry, and thirteen pieces of field artillery, remained to occupy and hold Romney.[23]

Jackson had hardly arrived in Winchester when the officers from Loring's greatly demoralized command held a council and enumerated their grievances in an official report to Loring. They pointed out the privations endured by the command in the recent expedition; the sickness prevalent in the camp; deaths from exposure; the disagreeable quarters; and the difficulties involved in holding Romney which they considered

[21] Henderson, op. cit., p.146.

[22] Jackson to Rhett, Feb. 21, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.392f.

[23] Jackson to Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, Jan. 24, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.1044

to be of no strategical importance. Furthermore, these soldiers had enlisted for only twelve months, had served all but four months of their enlistment, and the Confederate Government was about to ask them to serve for the duration of the war.

> "When we left Winchester, a very large proportion of your army, with the benefit of a short furlough, would have enlisted for the war, but now, with the present prospect before them, we doubt if one single man would re-enlist. But if they are yet removed to a position where their spirits could be revived, many, we think, will go for the war...."[24]

Loring, who had experienced difficulties with Jackson and who was reprimanded by the latter several times on the expedition for his slow movements, gladly endorsed the petition and requested Jackson to forward it to the Secretary of War.[25]

In addition to this formal complaint, the officers from Loring's command, who had been granted leave at the close of the expedition, traveled to Richmond, where they "filled the ears of the Government and the columns of the newspapers with complaints."[26]

Then, on January 30, 1862, General Jackson received the following preemptory order from the Secretary of War, J. P. Benjamin:

"Our news indicates that a movement is being made to cut off General Loring's command. Order him back to Winchester immediately."[27]

[24]Col. Wm. B. Taliaferro, et al. to Brig. Gen. Loring, Jan. 25, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.1046f.

[25]Loring to Jackson, Jan. 26, 1862, Ibid., p.1048.

[26]Henderson, op. cit., p.151.

[27]O.R., S.I, V.5, p.1053.

Jackson promptly complied with the orders of the Secretary, but at the same time he requested that he be ordered to report for duty at the Virginia Military Institute, or else accept his resignation from the army. "...With such interference in my command I cannot expect to be of much service in the field...."[28]

But through the importunities of General Joseph E. Johnston,[29] and a particularly strong appeal to Jackson's patroitism from Governor John Letcher, Jackson reconsidered and authorized the Governor to withdraw his resignation.[30]

But Jackson, seeking redress, requested a court martial and preferred two charges with seven specifications against General Loring,[31] who emphatically denied each charge and specification.[32]

The court martial was never conducted, but Loring's command was divided; a portion was transferred to Tennessee, while the remainder was assigned to serve under General Joseph E. Johnston, and General Loring was assigned to duty with General Lee in Georgia.[33]

[28]Jackson to Secretary of War, J. P. Benjamin, Jan. 31, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.1053.

[29]Johnston to Jackson, Feb. 3, 1862, Ibid., p.1059f.

[30]Jackson to Letcher, Feb. 6, 1862, Ibid., p.1062f.

[31]Ibid., p.1065f.

[32]Loring to Sec. of War Benjamin, Ibid., p.1070f.

[33]Sec. of War Benjamin to Gen. Johnston, Feb. 9, 1862, Ibid., p.1066f.

Thus, the Romney Expedition ended in bitter dispute. The fruits of victory won under the most gruelling conditions were wrenched from Jackson, not by a Federal advance, which Loring believed imminent, but through the dissatisfaction and protests of Confederate officers broadcasted to authorities in Richmond.[34]

[34]For an excellent analysis of the Romney Expedition and the resultant dispute between Jackson and Loring see Henderson, op. cit., pp.148ff.

The Big Push

While McClellan was amassing, training and equipping the hugh Army of the Potomac in preparation for the coming Spring Campaign, and while Federal troops were preparing to cross the Potomac in conjunction with the Campaign, Harpers Ferry "was visited nightly by scouts from both sides and the citizens were, as the Irishman says, "between the devil and the deep blue sea."[1]

On February 6th, a party of Federal scouts spent the night in Harpers Ferry,[2] and returned to the Maryland side of the Potomac the following morning. From their position on the north bank of the Potomac, the Federal scouts sighted a man, apparently colored, waving a white flag from the Virginia shore and calling for a boat to carry him across the Potomac.[3]

The Union scouting party reboarded the skiff and headed for the Virginia bank. When nearing the shore, the Federals discovered that the man with the flag was not colored, but a white man who had blackened his face in disguise. A number of Confederates appeared and opened fire on the hapless Federals.[4]

[1] Barry, Joseph, The Strange Story Of Harper's Ferry With Legends Of The Surrounding Country, Martinsburg, W. Va.:, Thompson Brothers, 1903, p.134. Hereafter cited as Barry, followed by page number.

[2] Ibid., p.138.

[3] McL., J., Memoir Of Hector Tyndale, Philadelphia: 1882, p.10. Hereafter cited as Tyndale, followed by page number.

[4] Ibid.

One of them, a man named Rohr, was killed. Another, named Rice, plunged into the river and escaped by swimming to the Maryland shore. Rohr was the only casualty.[5]

The Confederates who fired on the Federal scouting party were from Captain Baylor's company, "who kept Harper's Ferry in a state of terror all the winter, entering the town every few nights and doing many harsh things, without the orders or approval of their captain...."[6]

Rohr was a favorite scout of Col. Geary who commanded the Federal troops at Point-of-Rocks, Sandy Hook and at other points along the Potomac. Enraged at this loss, Geary ordered Major Hector Tyndale, who was in immediate command at Sandy Hook, to cross the river and destroy that part of Harpers Ferry between the armory entrance and the ruined railroad bridge, which had become a favorite place of concealment for Confederate snipers.[7]

On receiving these orders, Major Tyndale, Lt. Greenwalt and several men from the 28th Pennsylvania Regiment, crossed the Potomac February 7th, and proceeded to burn the area which Geary had ordered demolished.[8]

The area consumed by fire consisted of the entire "point section" of Harpers Ferry which, in addition to privately owned property, included

[5]Barry, op. cit., p.138.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid.; Tyndale, p.11. Tyndale is erronously credited with burning the "John Brown Fort."

several holdings of the B&O Railroad Company. The Company's hotel, warehouse, ticket office and water station were burned along with 38 panels of woodwork, 570 feet in length, on the double track iron trestling through the Armory yard.[9]

The citizens of Harpers Ferry bemoaned this loss which they considered "a wanton destruction of property as the trestle butresses or even the ruins of the burnt buildings furnished enough of shelter for spies or sharpshooters...."[10]

But, while opposing scouts and pickets along the Potomac worried and harried each other, Gen. McClellan anxiously looked forward to the Spring Campaign. One of the necessary precursors to the coming campaign was the opening of the B&O Railroad by crossing the river in force at Harpers Ferry.[11]

With a view to crossing, McClellan ordered Banks, at Frederick, to report the condition of the troops in his Department and to forward any information he had in reference to the opposing forces in the Valley.

[9] Thirty-Sixth Annual Report Of The President And Directors To The Stockholders Of The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, For The Year Ending September 30, 1862, Baltimore: J. B. Rose & Co., n.d., p.49f. In Harpers Ferry National Monument Microfilm Collection, R.15, V.2, p.321f. See also Jackson to Johnston, Feb. 12, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.1068f.

[10] Barry, p.138.

[11] General Report of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan of the operations of the Army of the Potomac from July 27, 1861, to March 17, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.48.

In juxtaposition of the two armies, Banks pointed out that on the one hand, the recent Romney Expedition[12] had greatly weakened the Confederate troops, both morally and physically. Sickness was prevalent; exposure to severe frost and cold necessitated many amputations filling their hospitals to capacity. The quarrels and discontent among the officers and men had a tremendous demoralizing effect.[13]

In contrast to the poor condition of the Confederates, the Union troops, on the other hand, were healthy, well-fed and clothed, and eagerly looking forward to an offensive campaign. In short, "...The enemy has not been in worse condition, and our troops never in better, than at this time...."[14]

Banks was not particularly worried about the enemy. He was confident that his troops would be victorious in the event they fought a pitched battle with the Confederates. He was more concerned with the deplorable condition of the earth roads, both north and south of the Potomac. Some of them were almost impassable and would impede a forward movement, but, he added with confidence, "...The state of the roads constitutes no insuperable difficulty in our way...."[15]

A few days later, Banks elatedly reported the arrival of three full batteries of 10-pounder Parrotts which brought his artillery force to

[12] Supra, pp.6ff.

[13] Banks to McClellan, Feb. 11, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt. 1, p.529f.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

five full batteries. Outmoded muskets were being replaced with more efficient weapons, and, poor roads notwithstanding, the army was fit and ready to take up the march.[16]

Preparatory to the crossing of the main body of the army, Col. Geary, 28th Pennsylvania Regiment, was detailed to cross at Harpers Ferry with a storming party large enough to clear the town, Bolivar and Loudoun Heights, of rebel scouts and pickets.

Geary, with seven companies and two guns, boarded the cars at Point-of-Rocks the evening of Feb. 23rd, and departed for Sandy Hook. They arrived shortly before daylight where they were joined by two more guns and seven additional infantry companies.[17]

Within a few hours, on the morning of February 24th, Geary's command rigged a rope ferry across the Potomac, but the weather worked against them. Heavy rains swelled the rapids, and an extremely high gale churned and whipped the waters to a foaming frenzy. A skiff capsized and six men were thrown into the icy river, swept downstream and drowned. Work was halted, and the storm continued to rage throughout the day and all that night.[18]

Two officers and six privates, however, had managed to reach the Virginia shore before the storm forced Geary to temporarily abandon the

[16]Banks to Sec. of War E. M. Stanton, Feb. 17, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.723.

[17]Report of Col. John W. Geary, including operations of his command to May 6, 1862, dated May 14, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, pp.511ff. Hereafter cited as Geary Report.

[18]Ibid.

project. Confederate cavalry scouts had been sighted on the hills of Bolivar during the day, but the eight cold and wet men stranded on the Virginia shore received some comfort from the knowledge that artillery and infantry on the Maryland side maintained an all night vigil that afforded some protection.[19]

The storm receded the following morning, February 25th, and eight infantry companies along with a section of artillery were at once thrown across the river, before the rope to the ferry broke, compelling the remaining two companies to fight their way across the rapids in boats.[20]

Pickets were posted for several miles, extending beyond Bolivar, while five companies forded the Shenandoah and ascended Loudoun Heights, where they put to flight detachments of Confederate cavalry and administered the oath of allegiance to four civilians they found there.[21]

Two guns were emplaced, and the five companies, under Lieutenant Colonel De Korponay, were detached as garrisons in three fortifications from which the Federals had driven a body of Confederates.[22]

With the area cleared of rebels by Geary's advance guard, the way was made safe for the construction of the pontoon bridge, and the crossing of the main body of the Union Army.

[19]Geary Report, May 6, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, pp.511ff.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Ibid.

While waiting for the bridge to be constructed, cold, tired and hungry soldiers, massed at Sandy Hook, where they milled around and searched for food among the local people who "...showed some of the distress incident to war, and a strong disinclination to feed or believe in us...."[23]

At about 9 o'clock on the morning of February 26th, about one hundred soldiers came down opposite Harpers Ferry, just above the destroyed railroad bridge, and with military precision, broke into little groups:

> ...Four or five with spades and other implements improvised a wooden abutment on the shore; another party rowed against the stream, moored a scow, and let it drift down until it was opposite the wooden abutment; then a party of ten advanced, each two men carrying a claw-balk, or timbers fitted with a claw, one of which held the gunwale of the boat, the other the shore abutment. Twenty men now came down on the left with planks, one inch thick, six inches wide, and fifteen feet long, narrowed at each end; these they laid across the five joists, or balks, and returned on the right. Another party meanwhile moored another boat, which dropped down-stream opposite the one already bridged; five joists, each twenty feet long, were laid upon the gunwale by five men; these were fastened by those in the boat, by means of ropes, to cleats or hooks provided for the purpose on the side of the scows, which were shoved off from the shore until the shore end of the balk rested upon the shore boat. These were covered with planks in the same manner as before; side-rails of joists were lashed down with ropes to secure the whole. So one after another of the boats was dropped into position until a bridge several hundred feet long reached from the Maryland shore, for the passage of artillery and every description of munitions for an army. Owing to the force

[23] Goss, Warren Lee, "Campaigning To No Purpose" in Battles and Leaders Of The Civil War, New York: Thomas Yoseloff, Inc., 1956 ed., V.II, p.153ff. Hereafter cited as Goss, followed by the abbreviated form B&L and the volume in Roman numerals followed by the page number in arabic.

> of the current, a large rope-cable was stretched from shore to shore fifty feet above the bridge, and the upper end of each boat was stayed to the cable by a smaller rope. The rushing bent the bridge into a half-moon curve. The clock-like precision with which these men worked showed them to be drilled engineers and pontooniers of the regular army....[24]

Maj. Gen. McClellan, who came to Sandy Hook to personally supervise the crossing, witnessed the construction of the pontoon bridge, and was so impressed with the skill of the responsible officers, Captain Duane, Lieutenants Babcock, Reese, and Cross of the Corps of Engineers, that he immediately recommended that the Captain be made a brevet major and the Lieutenants awarded brevet captains. "...It was one of the most difficult operations of the kind ever performed...."[25]

The bridge was no sooner in place when the Federals poured across in force. Officers were forbidden to trot their horses and the troops were ordered to "Route Step," as a trotting horse or the steady tramp of marching feet could endanger the stability of the bridge.[26]

By nightfall, February 26th, 8,500 infantry, 18 guns, and two squadrons of cavalry were on the Virginia side. Those that remained on the Maryland side occupied Maryland Heights, while the troops thrown across the river were deployed on Loudoun and Bolivar Heights. The troops on the heights were in an unenviable position as it was still raining hard, but the bulk of the men were quartered in houses at Harpers Ferry which

[24]Goss, op. cit., B&L, V.II, pp.155f.

[25]McClellan to Stanton, Feb. 26, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.727.

[26]Goss, op. cit., B&L, V.II, p.156.

had been evacuated by many of the local residents.[27]

With the laying of the pontoon bridge, the big push was on. Gen. Sedgwick at Poolesville, was ordered to Harpers Ferry with two brigades and all available artillery.[28] Federal troops from other points along the Potomac were pulled from their positions and directed to Harpers Ferry.

The watchdogs of the Potomac, so long idle in winter camp, now had to leave their comfortable quarters and begin an active campaign. Letters were hastily written home, and articles which every soldier accumulated, but could not carry on a campaign, were boxed and shipped home. Those items which a man felt he could not do without, were stuffed into his knapsack. Ammunition was issued; each man received 40 rounds and the excited men, glad to be relieved of the monotonous routine of camp life, marched happily to points on the B&O where they could board the cars for Harpers Ferry.[29]

For some of the troops, it meant a two days march which necessitated sleeping on the ground when they bivouacked. For many of them, it was their first experience in camping out, "...and that in the middle of

[27] McClellan to Stanton, Feb. 26, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.727.

[28] Chief of Staff R. B. March to Gen. Sedgwick, Feb. 24, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt. I, p.538.

[29] Ward, Joseph R. C., D.D.S., History Of The One Hundred and Sixth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, 2d Brigade, 2d Division, 2d Corps, 1861-1865, Philadelphia: F. McManus, Jr. & Co., 1906, p.23, in Harpers Ferry National Monument microfilm collection, R.38, V.I, pp.4ff. Hereafter cited as Ward, followed by typed page number without reference to microfilm designation.

winter, with no tents; nothing to sleep on but the gum blanket, six feet long, three feet wide, issued to us before leaving camp, and but a single blanket to cover us, so that we suffered very much with the cold...."[30]

After boarding the cars at different points, the troops detrained at Sandy Hook, tumbling out of the cars about 6 o'clock on the morning of February 27th. The weather had changed for the better. The day was sunny, bright, and relatively warm.[31]

The column marched from Sandy Hook to the pontoon bridge, with the 106th Pennsylvania Volunteers in the lead. The crossing of the 106th was attended by a somewhat amusing incident.

> ...Part of the uniform of the Regiment consisted of high black felt hats with black feather plumes, and were worn with one side of the rim fastened up by a gilt eagle; a gilt bugle ornamented the front; these hats had never been much liked by the men and many were the attempts made to get rid of them, only to have a new one issued and the cost charged against the delinquent; but, when about the head of the column was on the bridge, a hat was mysteriously seen to drop overboard; soon another followed; that was sufficient; the signal had been given, the opportunity was just what the men wanted, and it was astonishing to see how easily the light breeze, that hardly affected the surface of the water, carried those hats overboard; their number increased as each succeeding company stepped on the bridge, until they presented the appearance of a large flock of ducks or other water fowls quietly floating down stream, or as if an army had been swept overboard and lost, with nothing left to tell the tale but their hats. Notwithstanding the positive orders of the officers and their strenuous efforts to prevent it, the number of hats increased until the last company had landed. The two

[30] Ward, op. cit., p.24.

[31] Ibid.

> days' march and the night spent in the cars but increased the men's dislike to them, and some of those who had not taken advantage of the kindness of the breeze disposed of theirs in other ways until, upon coming on the first dress parade thereafter, so many were found missing that they were ordered to be abandoned....[32]

The crossing continued on smoothly, company after company, regiment after regiment poured into the town of Harpers Ferry, amazed and shocked as they stared at the blackened skeletons of the armory buildings. For the great majority of them, this was their first encounter with the disastrous effects of war. As they marched past the "John Brown Fort," many of them sang "John Brown's Body," and later, when they had free time, some returned to the "Fort" to peek through the hole that Brown had fired through, while others chipped pieces of wood from the window sash, and sent them home as trophies of their campaigning.[33]

As the troops tramped across the pontoon bridge in a steady stream, a large, green, railroad passenger car at Sandy Hook was the scene of intense activity. Here a dozen officers conversed on strategy and tactics. Here, the French Prince de Joinville and his nephews, Louis Philip Compte de Paris and Robert rubbed elbows with the Prussian Noble, Baron Paul Von Radowtiz. This was McClellan's headquarters, and this was his staff. The "big push" was on. McClellan and Edward G. Beckwith, Chief Commissariat for the Department of the Shenandoah, intently studied

[32]Ward, op. cit., p.25.

[33]Ibid., p.25f.

maps of all the counties from the Potomac to Winchester.[34]

The crossing at Harpers Ferry was to be no mere reconnaissance-in-force, but a major drive at the Confederates based at Manassas - a grand flank advance. The movement was in conjunction with Lincoln's order of a general movement of all land and naval forces against the rebels, to commence on Washington's birthday.[35]

Lincoln further specified that the Army of the Potomac, "after providing safely for the defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction...."[36]

Sometime prior to the proposed advance, General McClellan and the Secretary of War consulted the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company as to its ability and readiness to transport 50,000 men of all arms from

[34] From the notes of Dr. Cecil Eby, Professor of English, Madison College for Women, Harrisonburg, Va., transcribed from the MS Journal of David Hunter Strother, loaned to Harpers Ferry National Monument for copying, Nov. 1959-March 1960. The typescript notes have been bound in looseleaf notebooks in two volumes and pages have been number consecutively. Hereafter cited as Strother, followed by volume number in Roman numerals and page number in arabic, e.g., f.n. 34 is Strother, V.II, p.96b. Material copied or abstracted from the transcribed notes may not be used in publications or published material without the written consent of Dr. Eby. The original MS Journal of David Hunter Strother is now in the possession of his grandson, David H. Strother, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

[35] President's General War Order No. 1, Jan. 27, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.41.

[36] President's Special War Order No. 1, Jan. 31, 1862, Ibid. A plan which McClellan disapproved. McClellan favored moving the Army of the Potomac down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana and thence march on Richmond. For McClellan's objections to Lincoln's strategy and justification of his own plan, cf. Ibid., pp.41ff.

Washington to Sandy Hook.[37]

The railroad was willing to undertake the project and was confident of its ability to accomplish the job successfully, provided 48 hours advance notice be given. This time was necessary to gather cars and engines at Washington and to obtain additional equipment from other railroads north and east of Baltimore. Also, experienced train men and extra telegraph operators would be needed, and these would have to be drawn from scattered points.[38]

No advance notice was given, however, and at midnight, February 25th, the railroad received orders to provide a special train at Washington, 6 o'clock the following morning. This train carried General McClellan, his staff, and a mounted body guard of the Sturgis rifles, complete with horses and baggage, to Sandy Hook where they arrived about noon, February 26th. These officers and men were accompanied by W. P. Smith, Chief Transportation Officer for the B&O Railroad.[39]

Smith witnessed the pontooning of the Potomac at Harpers Ferry, but, he believed the objective of the troops crossing at that point was simply to occupy and hold Harpers Ferry and Charles Town. Since the railroad was not given any advance notice to transport large bodies of

[37]Chief Transportation Officer, B&O RR, W. P. Smith to Hon. J. M. Brodhead, Comptroller U.S. Treasury, Jan. 26, 1869, in Harpers Ferry National Monument microfilm collection R.15, V.5, p.646f.

[38]Ibid., p.647.

[39]Ibid., p.647f.

troops to Sandy Hook, Smith was under the mistaken impression that the grand flank advance was called off.[40]

Supposing nothing further was to be done, Smith started to return to Baltimore at about 9 o'clock, the night of February 26th, and as he said good-by to McClellan and his staff, the Chief Transportation Officer was greatly surprised when McClellan submitted an oral requisition to move the heavy forces from Washington to Sandy Hook.[41]

The movement would begin at daylight the following day, and within 24 hours, McClellan wanted 3,000 cavalrymen and horses; 16 guns, caissons, equipage and the horses and men accompanying them; as well as 10,000 infantry, with their equipage and supplies. The day after this force left Washington, they were to be followed by 25,000 infantry with their necessary supplies.[42]

Smith was stunned. As Chief Transportation Officer for the railroad, he knew better than anyone the difficulties involved in undertaking such an extraordinary task practically without notice. He pointed out these difficulties to McClellan but the General was adamant. The railroad would do the job.

> ...I left him at about 10 o'clock, promising to do our best towards his great object; and I at once telegraphed to all quarters from Sandy Hook, and afterwards from the Point of Rock, Monocacy and other stations during the night, as I

[40] Smith to Brodhead, loc. cit., Jan. 26, 1869, R.15, V.5, p.649.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

> advanced upon a locomotive to Baltimore. The whole operating force of the Road at Baltimore, Washington, Sandy Hook and all intermediate points, was aroused and kept at work through the night, in preparing for this unexpected emergency; and all the business of the line and branches was deranged, or setaside in greater or less extent, to provide for executing such an unparalleled demand....[43]

But before the crossing of such a large force, with all its supplies, could be effected at Harpers Ferry, one further step was necessary. The pontoon bridge was fine for passing men, horses, and light artillery across the Potomac, but once across, this army would have to be supplied with food, ammunition, clothing and other equipment as well as heavy artillery. The pontoon bridge was not sturdy enough to bear the weight of heavy baggage trains, and heavy artillery, thus it could not be relied upon. Since the reconstruction of the demolished B&O bridge at Harpers Ferry could not be effected for several weeks, some other means of transporting baggage trains across the Potomac had to be innovated.

This last obstacle to the advance would be hurdled by the construction of a canal-boat bridge, scheduled to be thrown across the Potomac, February 27th.[44]

On the morning of the 27th, an attempt was made to pass the canal-boats through the lift-lock into the Potomac so that construction of the bridge could commence immediately, but Lo! and Behold!, it was discovered for the first time that the lock was too small to permit the

[43]Smith to Brodhead, loc. cit., Jan. 26, 1869, R.15, V.5, p.650f.

[44]McClellan to Sec. of War Stanton, Feb. 26, 1862 - 10:20 p.m., O.R., S.I, V.5, p.727.

passage of the boats! The lock, McClellan alleged, was built for the type of boats running on the Shenandoah Canal and was too narrow by some four to six inches to allow passage of C&O canal-boats. The army engineers had been assured that the lock was large enough, and since the difference was too small to be detected by the naked eye, no one had thought to take measurements.[45]

"I thus suddenly found myself unable to build the permanent bridge," McClellan moaned.[46]

Without the bridge, the army south of the Potomac could not be supplied, hence, the order for the heavy forces to move from Washington to Sandy Hook was countermanded,[47] and the "big push" petered out to a "feeble shove."

Furious at this unexpected turn of events, Secretary of War Stanton snapped an impatient message to McClellan: "If the lift-lock is not big enough why cannot it be made big enough? Please answer immediately."[48]

Yes, it could be enlarged, McClellan answered, but, he pointed out,

[45]General Report of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan of the operations of the Army of the Potomac from July 27, 1861, to March 17, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.49; McClellan to Sec. of War Stanton, Feb. 27, 1862 - 3:30 p.m., Ibid., p.728.

[46]General Report, Ibid., p.49.

[47]McClellan to Marcy, Feb. 27, 1862 - 1 p.m.; McClellan to Marcy, Feb. 27, 1862 - 3:30 p.m.; J. W. Garrett, President, B&O RR to Marcy, Feb. 27, 1862, Ibid., p.728f. Goss was among those who had made the round robin trip from Washington to Harpers Ferry - hence the title of his article "Campaigning To No Purpose," op. cit.

[48]Feb. 27, 1862, Ibid., p.728.

the entire masonry would have to be destroyed and rebuilt while new gates would have to be built, "...an operation impossible in the present stage of water and requiring many weeks at any time. The railroad bridge can be rebuilt many weeks before this could be done."[49]

Faced with the inability to supply a large force south of the Potomac, McClellan reported his embarrassment, "...I shall probably be obliged to fall back upon the safe and slow plan of merely covering the reconstruction of the railroad...."[50]

And to Chief of Staff Marcy, McClellan wired, "...Immediately on my return we will take the other plan, and push on vigorously."[51]

It is the contention of the writer that the "other plan" alluded to was McClellan's grand plan to invade the South by the sea and that a lift-lock too narrow by some four to six inches, or canal-boats too large by the same measurement, directly led to the famous Peninsular Campaign. This conclusion is based on the following evidence and considerations.

First of all, as was seen earlier, /cf. f.n. 36/ Lincoln favored an overland route and opposed McClellan's proposed Peninsular campaign, but the President was open to argument and willing to follow McClellan's strategy, provided the latter could give satisfactory answers to the

[49]Feb. 27, 1862 - 10:30 p.m., Ibid.

[50]McClellan to Stanton, Feb. 27, 1862 - 3:30 p.m., O.R., S.I, V.5, p.728.

[51]Feb. 27, 1862, Ibid.

GEORGE BRINTON McCLELLAN*

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-697

1826-1885. Pa. USMA 1846; Engrs. Son of George McClellan, the distinguished surgeon and teacher, he graduated second from the top in his West Point class, won three brevets in the Mexican War for gallant and meritorious conduct, and gained a further military reputation for an outstanding report submitted after spending a year in Europe observing foreign military methods. He resigned in 1857 as a Capt. and was successful in business, becoming vice-president of the Illinois Central R.R. He started the war as a Maj. Gen. of Ohio volunteers and was soon made a Maj. Gen. of the R.A. and given command of the Dept. of the Ohio. He was then 35 years old. His success in the minor victory at Rich Mountain, W. Va., just 10 days before the Federal disaster at Bull Run, put him in the public eye at a critical time. Given command of the armies around Washington (Div. of the Potomac) and later succeeding General Scott as C. in C. of the army, he undertook with marked success the complex task of organizing and training the Union armies. His failure in the Peninsular campaign led Halleck to give Pope command of the next major operation. After the latter's defeat at the 2d Battle of Bull Run, McClellan resumed his former role. The administration became increasingly dissatisfied with his reluctance to march against the enemy. After Antietam, when McClellan delayed in pursuing Lee, Lincoln finally lost patience and ordered Burnside to take command of the Army of the Potomac. McClellan was a presidential candidate in 1864. After the war he was chief engineer of the N.Y.C. Dept. of Dock (1870-72) and Gov. of N.J. (1878-81).

*Biographical data of this and subsequent personalities was extracted from: Boatner III, Mark Mayo, The Civil War Dictionary, David McKay Co., Inc., New York: 1959.

following questions:

1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine?

2d. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?

3d. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?

4th. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would?

5th. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine?[52]

McClellan accepted the challange and disputed the two conflicting plans of attack in a long and detailed reply.[53]

In referring to his answer, McClellan wrote in his General Report; "This letter must have produced some effect upon the mind of the President, since the execution of his order was not required, although it was not revoked as formally as it had been issued...."[54] But in later years when writing of the episode, McClellan's tune changed considerably: "The positive order of the President, probably issued under the pressure of the Secretary of War, forced me to undertake the opening of the railway...."[55]

[52]President Abraham Lincoln to Maj. Gen. McClellan, Feb. 3, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.41f.

[53]Ante p.26, cf. f.n. 36.

[54]General Report of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U.S. Army, of the operations of the Army of the Potomac from July 27, 1861, to March 17, 1862, Ibid., p.45.

[55]McClellan, George B., "The Peninsular Campaign," B&L, V.II, p.165.

This is an obvious cover-up for his own blunder and a flagrant shifting of responsibility. In a further effort to conceal the truth, McClellan repeatedly stated in his official reports, and his later writings, that the chief objective in crossing at Harpers Ferry was to re-open the railroad and he studiously avoided all mention of the grand flank movement.

But if this were the case, why then, should McClellan, when he saw the impossibility of supplying an army south of the Potomac, have had to report that he would be "obliged to fall back upon the safe and slow plan of merely covering the reconstruction of the railroad..."?[56] Surely, if the re-opening of the railroad was his chief objective, as McClellan contended, then he certainly would not have had to "fall back" on this plan.

Furthermore, we have the testimony of W. P. Smith, Chief Transportation Officer for the B&O, given in 1869 in reference to a claim of the railroad against the United States, "for its services in the great proposed and partially executed movement of Genl. McClellan from Washington on Manassas via Harper's Ferry, in February, 1862...."[57]

> ...This movement, to my certain knowledge (obtained from the then Secretary of War /Edwin M. Stanton/, Maj. Genl. McLellan, /sic/, and his Chief of Staff, Genl. Marcy, contemplated nothing more nor less than a grand flank advance, to open the spring campaign against the enemy at Manassas Junction with 75,000 men, mainly drawn from Washington by way of Harper's

[56] Ante, p.31.

[57] Smith to Brodhead, Jan. 26, 1869, loc. cit., R.15, V.5, p.644.

> Ferry and Winchester. 25,000 of the proposed force was embraced in Banks' corps, forming the right wing of the great army of the Potomac that had wintered at Frederick, Md., and had been moved by the B. & O. R.R. between the 23d and 26th of February, in cars from Frederick and vicinity to Sandy Hook, opposite Harper's Ferry, at which point the road was yet interrupted by the original destruction of Harper's Ferry bridge....[58]

Finally, it was not until February 27th, undoubtedly after McClellan discovered he could not build a secure bridge at Harpers Ferry, that the "Secretary of War, by the authority of the President, instructed Mr. John Tucker, Assistant Secretary of War, to procure at once the necessary steamers and sailing craft to transport the Army of the Potomac to its new field of operations...."[59]

This was confirmed by Mr. Tucker, who stated in his report, dated April 5, 1862, "...On the 27th February I was informed that the proposed movement by water was decided upon...."[60]

The case of the lift-lock being too small, or the canal-boats being too large to pass through the lock into the river has given rise to conflicting testimony. It was McClellan's contention that the lift-lock at Harpers Ferry was too small to allow the passage of the canal-boats, as the lock was designed for the class of boats running on the Shenandoah Canal. "The lift-locks above and below are all large enough for the

[58]Smith to Brodhead, Jan. 26, 1869, loc. cit., R.15, V.5, p.645f.

[59]General Report of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U.S. Army, of the operations of the Army of the Potomac from July 27, 1861, to March 17, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.46.

[60]Extract contained in Ibid.

ordinary boats....," he observed.[61]

But Horace White, a Chicago Tribune correspondent based at Washington, had a different story to tell:

> I wrote an account partially imperfect, this morning to Dr. Ray, of the ridiculous & shameful blundering at Harper's Ferry. I learn now from pretty good authority...that McClellan's pontoon boats were built here expressly for the purpose of being used at Harper's Ferry, and started up the canal simultaneously with Mac's departure by railroad. Arriving at the first lock above Washington the master of pontoons found that they were all too large to go through the lock--contributing in fact a "dead lock"....[62]

This latter of the two discordant explanations is the more logical. As was seen in an earlier report, the C&O Canal was open to navigation and carrying a heavy coal traffic from above Harpers Ferry to Georgetown, during the closing weeks of 1861.[63] Undoubtedly, the type of craft transporting this cargo was the "ordinary boats," as McClellan termed them, and if they could pass through the lift-lock at Harpers Ferry in December of 1861 and not in February of 1862, as McClellan asserted, this could only mean that one of two events occurred.

Either the lift-lock at Harpers Ferry was replaced between December 1861 and February 1862, or, a different type of canal-boat was attempted. But there is absolutely no evidence of the lift-lock being replaced, indeed

[61] General Report of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U.S. Army, of the operations of the Army of the Potomac from July 27, 1861, to March 17, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.49.

[62] Horace White to Joseph Medill, March 3, 1862, Ray Papers, HM RY 220, cited by, Andrews, J. Cutler, The North Reports The Civil War: University of Pittsburg Press, 1855, p.253. Hereafter cited as Andrews, followed by page number.

[63] See Sullivan, "Harpers Ferry, April 18 - December 31, 1861, A Casualty Of War," loc. cit., p.98.

there is no mention in any of the reports submitted by the several engineers who inspected the crossing at Harpers Ferry, during the winter of 1861-62, that the lift-lock was even in need of repair. And if it were in need of repair or replacement, these professional soldiers and engineers would certainly have brought the matter to the attention of their commanding officer.

In addition to the above, we have the negative evidence of David Hunter Strother who was at Harpers Ferry and Sandy Hook, February 27th.[64] This meticulous and ever-observant, artist-writer-soldier, who became one of Harper's Weekly highest-paid contributors, famous for his written sketches, made absolutely no mention in his Journal of any canal-boats unable to pass through the lift-lock at Harpers Ferry. This observer, with his special talent for drawing word-pictures, entered in his Journal such details as the daily weather; color of hair, facial expressions, clothing, appearance, actions and re-actions of persons from all walks of life; battle scenes, manuveurs, strategy, tactics; appearance and condition of streets, buildings, towns; almost infinitestimal minutiae. With such attention to detail, Strother most certainly would not have overlooked the blundering scene of bewildered and cursing men attempting to squeeze canal-boats through a lift-lock too small to accommodate them.

From the evidence at hand, it appears manifest that the canal-boats, intended to be used in the construction of a strong and stable bridge,

[64]Strother, loc. cit., Vol. II, p.96b.

never reached Harpers Ferry, and because of this blunder, which McClellan understandably made every effort to conceal, the overland invasion of the South was cancelled. With the abandonment of the overland route, the way was made clear for McClellan to activate his beloved Peninsular plan.

With no prospect for an immediate southward advance from Harpers Ferry, Secretary of War Stanton asked McClellan the next logical question, "What do you propose to do with the troops that have crossed the Potomac?"[65]

In reply, the General stated his intentions to occupy Charles Town and Bunker Hill in order to cover the rebuilding of the railroad,[66] and to President Lincoln he wired, "...I know that I have acted wisely, and that you will cheerfully agree with me when I explain...."[67]

Far from being cheerful about the matter, Lincoln reportedly "... swore like a Phillistine /sic/ when he learned the upshot of the affair, & there was wailing & gnashing of teeth among the imperial staff.... Inextinguishable laughter has been the result of the grand demonstration on the right wing, not unmixed with fears for the safety of Banks."[68]

In conjunction with his determination to occupy and hold Charles Town, General McClellan readied himself, the morning of February 28th,

[65] Feb. 28, 1862 - 1 p.m., O.R., S.I,V.5, p.729.

[66] McClellan to Stanton, Feb. 28, 1862, Ibid., p.730.

[67] Feb. 28, 1862, (Received 9:30 p.m.), Ibid.

[68] Horace White to Joseph Medill, March 3, 1862, cited by Andrews, op. cit., p.253.

for the eight mile march to the County Seat where he desired to personally inspect and examine the town as a preliminary step to preparing a defense network.

The morning of February 28th dawned cold and clear as McClellan with Bank's Division of 14,236 men, supported by 32 pieces of field artillery, pushed on toward Charles Town. Left behind at Harpers Ferry was Sedgwick's Division of 9,471 and 18 guns, while 199 soldiers from an Engineer Battalion remained at Sandy Hook.[69]

The Division entered Charles Town with colors flying and bands playing. At the further end of town, artillery was planted to guard the old Winchester dirt road and the Smithfield Pike. McClellan next examined the Berryville Pike and ordered it defended with several guns.[70]

The Charles Town population received the Federal Army with mixed emotions; some joyful, some resentful, and others wary of the intentions secreted in the minds of the occupation troops who proceeded to quarter themselves in empty buildings and churches.

Col. Ruger's men moved into a church where they immediately began taking up the carpets, while the helpless minister, Mr. Dutton, scurried back and forth removing Pulpit furniture, Bibles and candelabras.[71]

[69] Abstract from return of the Army of the Potomac, commanded by Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U.S. Army, for the month of February, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.732

[70] Strother, loc. cit., Vol. II, p.96c.

[71] Ibid.

Preacher Dutton stopped in his tracks when:

> ...he saw a platoon of rugged looking fellows around the organ and fumbling with the music books of the choir. He looked in agony at the prospective destruction and desecration. A moment after the books were all open and fifty accordant voices rose in a thrilling anthem that filled the church with solemn music, the alarmed clergyman paused a moment. His face became calm and solemn. He turned to the officer in command. 'You need not move the furniture from the Pulpit sir. It will be safe I feel assured!...'[72]

In the afternoon of February 28th, McClellan returned to Harpers Ferry and boarded a train at Sandy Hook for Washington, leaving behind the bottleneck created by the lack of a sturdy bridge. From the ruined bridge, through Sandy Hook, up to Weverton and as far back as Knoxville was massed with rail cars and wagon mules. Boxes upon boxes of supplies and mountains of forage were strung along the track, watched and protected by groups of teamsters who sought shelter under projecting rocks and huddled over blazing campfires.[73]

An icy and extremely high wind arose in the late afternoon and continued through the night. The troops on the heights lit hundreds of campfires and fought the cold as they settled down for the night, to await the next move.[74]

[72]Strother, loc. cit., Vol. II, p.96c.

[73]Ibid., p.96d.

[74]Ibid.

The Valley Occupied

When the Divisions of Banks and Sedgwick first moved into Harpers Ferry in the latter part of February, "...there were but three or four families living here...."[1]

With the arrival of the soldiers, a large number of civilian friends and relatives followed to visit the Federal troops, and a new life was thrown into the town. "...Besides, many of the old citizens returned to their homes, now comparatively safe, and accumulated snug little fortunes in providing small luxuries for the wearied soldiers and their friends...."[2]

By March 2nd, the return of town residents was such that many soldiers who were comfortably quartered in homes, were compelled to leave them for the much less desirable Sibley tents. The already low spirits of the disgruntled evictees was aggravated by a severe north-east snowstorm that blinded and cut the unhappy soldiers as they trudged toward Bolivar Heights for their new abode. Their plight was intensified when they were forced to wait more than an hour in the mounting snow for the arrival of their tents.[3]

[1] MS letter from George H. Collins, 1st Regiment Minnesota Volunteers to Miss Carrie Bells, March 3, 1862, donated to Harpers Ferry National Monument, July 14, 1959, by his grandson, George H. Collins, Division of Recreation Resource Planning, NPS, Region Four Office, Museum Acc. 80, Cat. #416.

[2] Barry, op. cit., p.141.

[3] Ward, op. cit., p.26.

The following day, March 3d, five companies from this regiment, the 106th Penn. Vols., and two pieces of artillery, under the command of Lt. Col. William L. Curry, were ordered to take possession of Loudoun Heights.[4]

These troops left their camp on Bolivar Heights, about 8 o'clock in the morning, and marched back to Harpers Ferry where they ferried across the Shenandoah. The ferry consisted of a large rope stretched across the river. A flat-bottomed boat was attached to this rope by ropes and pulleys and was carried from one side of the river to the other by the force of the current. As this boat would hold only about 30 men, it took most of the day to transport the five companies across the Shenandoah.[5]

The climb to the crest of Loudoun Heights was difficult, as snow, mixed with rain, continued to fall, coating the trees, rocks and ground with ice. But late in the day the summit was reached by the 106th where they met and relieved a detachment of Col. Geary's 28th Pennsylvania Regiment.[6]

> ...Here we were to stay, with no shelter but a few rude huts or sheds, made of logs and brush, that had been hastily put up by the "Twenty-Eighth." We were glad, however, to seek their shelter, but in a few days sorry that we did, as to our horror and disgust, we found that our predecessors had not taken away all that belonged to them, but left some of the huts well inhabited; and it was here that many of us for the first time made the acquaintance of the "grayback," that subsequently stuck so close to us during our tramp through Virginia; neither intense heat nor bitter cold had

[4] Ward, op. cit., p.26.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

any effect to shorten their existence or drive them away from us....[7]

The privations endured by this unfortunate detachment were somewhat compensated when the weather cleared, for:

> ...we were afforded one of the finest views of the country, and those of us who saw it will never forget it. Standing on that high mountain, we saw the beautiful Potomac coming down from the north, and the Shenandoah from the south, as though cutting their way through the steep mountain; here uniting together and running off to the east and south. At the point where these two rivers join, Harper's Ferry is built on a high hill, but from our point of view looked very low; a little farther west is the town of Bolivar and, beyond that, Bolivar Heights; the Charlestown Pike, 'a good broad highway leading down,' leading through one and past the other till lost in the distance, then lined with long trains of wagons, slowly moving along; others were parked in different places, as were also the many batteries of artillery; the many camps of the large force of troops then concentrating there were dotted on plain and hillside as far as the eye could reach. Artillery, cavalry and infantry, with their rows upon rows of white tents, and large numbers of horses picketed in rows, companies and regiments, could be seen moving about in all directions as they were exercised in company and regimental drills and on dress parade, and the music of the different bands was gently wafted towards us, all indicating the great preparations for and the presence of war; the beautiful Shenandoah Valley now turned into a vast camping ground for that large army....[8]

While the Federals occupied the three heights surrounding Harpers Ferry, other Union troops continued to march into Charles Town, among them the Twelfth Massachusetts Volunteers, who passed the spot where

[7]Ward, op. cit., p.26f.

[8]Ward, op. cit., p.27. It is singularly interesting to note, that all those who passed through Harpers Ferry during this period, and wrote about it, were shocked at the war-ravaged appearance of the town, but were equally impressed with the contrasting beauty of the surrounding area.

abolitionist John Brown was executed, "...with colors flying, and the band playing its very best music...."[9]

This regiment, that sang "John Brown's Body" at Boston, New York, Harpers Ferry, and now Charles Town, did so with justifiable pride, for in the ranks marched Sergeant John Brown, former member of the "Tigers," a Massachusetts Volunteer Militia Company. It was this John Brown, and not the John Brown of abolition fame, to whom the famous song first referred, and marching side by side with Sergeant Brown were other former "Tigers" who created the song at Fort Warren in Boston Harbor, where these troops were awaiting orders to be shipped South. Later, when the song became widely popular, the words were applied to John Brown, the abolition martyr, who met his death on the gallows in Charles Town, December 2, 1859.[10]

No rebels were met enroute to Charles Town from Harpers Ferry, but the Federal troops were busily engaged in pursuing other quarry:

> ...The amount of Pig and chicken stealing was very considerable and all the way from the Ferry up I saw soldiers with slaughtered sheep & hogs, carrying their whole or quarters upon their bayonets. These doings were so extensive that it appeared hideous. There was also a good deal of fence burning but besides the seizing of food & fire there was no mischief done, no wanton acts of destruction....[11]

[9]Cook, Benjamin F., History of The Twelfth Massachusetts Volunteers, Boston: Twelfth (Webster) Regiment Association; 1882, p.39. Hereafter cited as Cook, followed by page number.

[10]Stutler, Boyd B., Glory, Glory, Hallelujah! The Story Of "John Brown's Body" and "Battle Hymn of the Republic," Cincinnati: C. J. Krehbiel Co., 1960. An excellent genesis of the famous war-song.

[11]Strother, loc. cit., Vol. II, p.96d.

Besides the invading host of men in blue, Charles Town soon became the center for another type of invasion. This was the runaway slave. Soon after the occupation of Charles Town, a wagon load of negro women and children appeared. They were stopped in front of the Provost's Marshall's office, and for quite sometime the curious soldiers and citizens speculated on what should be done with them. In the end, they were forwarded to Harpers Ferry.[12]

The women and children were soon followed by the men. Day by day they flocked into Charles Town where they were arrested and placed in jail. Their numbers increased with each passing day, until the jail was filled to capacity.[13]

The contrabands posed a problem. No one seemed to know what should be done with them until it was learned that the Quartermaster at Harpers Ferry was seeking a detail to load and unload army supplies. Someone suggested that the runaways be elected for the job, and the suggestion was followed through. As the slaves poured into Charles Town, they were gathered up and marched to Harpers Ferry in squads. After completing the work for the Quartermaster, the contrabands were employed in rebuilding the railroad.[14]

Meanwhile, preparations continued for a probable advance on Winchester, where "Stonewall" Jackson lurked with a scanty force of 4,600

[12]Strother, loc. cit., Vol. II, p.96c.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid.

fighting men. /Appendix I/

General Williams, commanding the Third Brigade of Banks' Division, reached Martinsburg, March 4th, with a force of 5,000, where he would be in a position to strike Winchester by way of Bunker Hill.[15]

On the day General Williams reached Martinsburg with his Brigade, General Sedgwick was ordered to move his Division from Harpers Ferry and place it within supporting distance of Berryville, where Banks planned to advance his Division.[16]

General Frederick W. Lander, with his Division of 11,869 men and 26 pieces of field artillery,[17] under orders to cooperate with Banks' Division, was instructed to move his force from Paw Paw to Martinsburg and unite with Williams' Third Brigade.[18]

But Lander, the former railroad surveyor, who was severly wounded at Edward's Ferry and led a charge at Blooming Gap before his wound had healed, fell critically ill. He grew progressively worse and was stricken with pneumonia. Finally, after sleeping for more than twenty-hours under the influence of morphine, the General died without suffering at 5 6'clock on the afternoon of March 2nd, at Paw Paw as a heavy snowfall

[15]Banks to Marcy, March 4, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.734.

[16]Banks to Sedgwick, March 4, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.733.

[17]Abstract from return of the Army of the Potomac, commanded by Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, for the month of Feb., 1862, Ibid., p.732.

[18]McClellan to Lander, Feb. 27, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt. III, p.543f.

set in.[19]

The following day, General James Shields was placed in command of Lander's Division.[20] An advance guard of 5,000 from this Division boarded the cars at Paw Paw the morning of March 5th, and headed for Martinsburg.[21] The troops carried tents and knapsacks and each man was equipped with a rubber shirt to protect him from the inclement weather. Ammunition was issued. The infantry received 100 rounds per man, while the artillerymen were allotted twice that amount.[22] By March 7th, the entire force of Shields' command had reached Martinsburg.[23]

With a large menacing force massing to his front, Jackson with his little army at Winchester grew concerned and planned the route he would take, in the event he was forced to evacuate.[24] Letters from officers in Jackson's command to their families were intercepted by the Federals. They spoke of the expected withdrawal; their tone was despondent,[25] no less so than Jackson's, "...The accumulation of army stores in Cumberland looks ominous...."[26] By March 6th, "Stonewall's" stores and sick had

[19]S. F. Barstow to McClellan, March 2, 1862, Ibid., p.544; S. F. Barstow to Gov. Chase, Sec. of Treasury, March 2, 1862, Ibid., p.546.

[20]McClellan to Brig. Gen. W. S. Rosecrans, March 3, 1862, Ibid., p.547.

[21]N. Kimball, Col. 14th Indiana to Gen. McClellan, March 4, 1862, Ibid., p.548.

[22]S. F. Barstow to McClellan, March 2, 1862, Ibid., p.545.

[23]Banks to Marcy, March 8, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.738.

[24]Jackson to Johnston, March 3, 1862, Ibid., p.1087f.

[25]Banks to Marcy, March 4, 1862, Ibid., p.734.

[26]Jackson to Johnston, March 6, 1862, Ibid., p.1092.

been removed from Winchester.[27]

But Jackson was determined to make a desperate stand, and the rebels prepared for the expected assault. Forests were removed and works were constructed, as the Confederate commander pleaded for reinforcements. Jackson had been instructed by General Joseph E. Johnston, Commanding the Department of Northern Virginia, to abandon Winchester in the event either he, Johnston, or D. H. Hill at Leesburg, retreated.[28]

Hill withdrew from Leesburg March 7th, but, as Johnston had also ordered Jackson to "...delay the enemy as long as you can...," Jackson felt justified in his decision to remain at Winchester. The former V.M.I. professor begged Johnston for Hill's troops, but no reinforcements were forthcoming and the miniature rebel army braced itself for the imminent onslaught of the overwhelmingly powerful Federal legions.[29]

By March 8th, the Union line extended from the Shenandoah to North Mountain, and the pickets covered that line for about 1½ miles in front. But Banks was uncertain of the next move:

> ...Beyond the point we now occupy I have received no instructions from the Commanding General-whether we are to move on as a force destined to effect a specific object by itself or to perform a part in combined operations. I shall be glad to receive more specific instructions....[30]

[27]Jackson to Johnston, March 6, 1862, OR., S.I, V.5, p.1093.

[28]Jackson to Johnston, March 8, 1862, Ibid., p.1094f.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Banks to Marcy, March 8, 1862, Ibid., p.738.

The following day, March 9th, the rebels abandoned the batteries on the Lower Potomac, and General Johnston withdrew his army from Manassas, isolating Jackson in the Valley. This information speedily reached Banks along with orders from McClellan to make a strong reconnaissance toward Winchester the morning of the 10th.[31]

At mid-night of the 9th, Banks issued orders to his commanders. General Williams was instructed to move two regiments from Martinsburg, at daybreak, along with a detachment of cavalry and two sections of artillery. General C. S. Hamilton was instructed to follow with his Brigade to Bunker Hill, in support of Williams.[32]

While this force pushed on from Martinsburg, a cooperating column would advance from Charles Town over the Berryville Pike. Generals Gorman and Abercrombie were ordered to advance their brigades over the latter line, supported by one battery of artillery and two squadrons of cavalry.[33]

While the Union columns moved out of Martinsburg and Charles Town toward Winchester, General Dana at Poolesville, Md., was ordered, March 10th, to move his troops forward to Harpers Ferry in support of these columns.[34]

[31]Marcy to Banks, March 9, 1862-9:40 p.m., O.R., S.I, V.5, p.739.

[32]Banks to Hamilton, Sunday, March 9, 1862 - 12 p.m., Ibid., p.739f.

[33]Special Orders No. 57, by command of Maj. Gen. N. P. Banks, March 9, 1862-12 p.m., Ibid., p.740.

[34]Marcy to Banks, March 10, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt. I, p.549.

At 5 o'clock, the morning of March 11th, Dana's troops were abruptly awakened by the bugle call "To Arms," "...and then all was bustle and confusion. High fires of straw were made and the woods resounded with shouts of glee at expectation of a march...."[35]

Dana's men were soon crawling over the muddy road to Harpers Ferry, arriving opposite there in the early morning hours of the following day. The exhausted force crossed the pontoon bridge into the town and each man looked for a spot where he could lie down and get two or three hours of much needed sleep. Some stretched themselves out on the brick sidewalks, while others preferred to lie on stone walls. When the sun began to rise above the Blue Ridge, Dana's troops slowly left their place of rest.

As tired as they were, many could not resist the temptation to climb to "Jefferson's Rock" for a quick glimpse of the celebrated view, and to wonder about the four pillars upon which the rock sits. The pillars, it was erroneously concluded, were to prevent snakes from making the base of the rock a harbor.[36]

[35]Excerpt from the Diary of Hervey H. Smith in Harpers Ferry National Monument Document File, HFD-70-b. The original diary is in the possession of Mr. Delf Norona, Moundsville, W. Va.

[36]Excerpt from the Diary of Horace A. Smith, in Harpers Ferry National Monument Document File, HFD-70-A. The original diary is in the possession of Mr. Delf Norona. Hervey and Horace were brothers from Rochester, N.Y., who enlisted in the 3rd N.Y. Volunteer Cavalry Regiment. The brothers "captured" a ledger book in Berryville, Va., tore it in half and each kept a record of his daily actions and observations. In juxtaposition of the two halves, it is evident that the brothers either thought and wrote very much alike or else they compared notes. Hereafter cited as Smith, Hervey and Smith, Horace.

After admiring the view, the Federals scrambled over the rock and spent some time unearthing the various names inscribed on its base.

> ...On its bed can be read the names of Ex-Gov Wise - now a leader in the Rebel army -...Floyd the thief has left his name to be spit upon by Union troops - Davis the leader of the Southern confederacy has inscribed his traitorous name by the side of Irving, Washington and others who are now battling to grasp from wicked hands of this modern fiend...the false power with which he has now invested himself....[37]

When the troops in Dana's column were rested, they pushed on toward Charles Town. As they passed General Banks' headquarters, in the home of Senator Hunter, the General came out and bowed to the column, as it hurried to Berryville in support of the movement on Winchester.[38]

Little resistance was met as the advance units of Williams, Hamilton, Gorman, and Abercrombie neared Winchester, feasting off the land. "Chickens, ducks and geese fell an easy prey to the 'advancing hosts.' Soon not one could be found; then the remaining 'porkers' were similarly disposed of, and finally the bee hives were carried to camp, their inmates smoked out, and the honey added to the bill of fare...."[39]

At the approach of the heavy Union force, the Confederates evacuated

[37]Smith, Horace. The rock and its base are covered by thousands of names that have been scratched in over the years. No attempt has yet been made to determine which noted figures in history have left their names on the rock. The Smith brothers, like others before them, were horrified at the devastated appearance of the town but were truly inspired by the adjacent scenery. They both made use of grandeloquent prose in describing the general scenery.

[38]Smith, Horace and Smith, Hervey.

[39]Ward, op. cit., p.30.

Winchester, at 5 o'clock in the evening, March 12th, and at 7 a.m., the following morning, the conquering army entered the city.[40]

But it was only through an unlucky accident that the Federals had it so easy. Jackson had no intentions of giving up without a fight. Even though he was outnumbered by more than eight to one, he had determined to attack the Union command.[41]

After dark of the 12th, when the Confederates evacuated the town, Jackson called a council of war. When the troops had finished eating, and obtained some rest, "Stonewall" proposed marching to the vicinity of the enemy, some four miles north of Winchester, and hit them before daylight.[42]

But before the council met, Jackson left to pay a call on a friend and later, when the council convened, it was learned that someone had blundered. Jackson had ordered his trains placed immediately south of Winchester, but instead, they were moved to Kernstown and Newtown, from three to eight miles distant, and the troops had been marched back to them in order to obtain their rations.[43]

Instead of being on the outskirts of Winchester, where Jackson wanted them, his troops were already five or six miles away, which would mean at least a ten mile march before they could be brought in contact

[40]Banks to Marcy, March 13, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.746.

[41]Henderson, op. cit., p.173.

[42]Ibid., p.173f.

[43]Ibid., p.174.

with the enemy. This fact, and because the council disapproved of his plan, caused Jackson to abandon the project.[44]

The Federals had hardly entered Winchester when General McClellan, who was nearly ready to embark the first troops for his Penninsula Expedition, began recalling portions of the force that figured in the advance on Winchester.[45]

Banks issued orders to General Sedgwick at 5:45 p.m., March 13th, to move to Harpers Ferry without delay, and remain in readiness to leave there on short notice, as instructed by McClellan. General Dana would meet Sedgwick at Harpers Ferry.[46]

Sedgwick's Division left Winchester the same day picking up detachments of Dana's command on the return trip to Harpers Ferry and reaching the latter place, March 15th, in the face of a severe northeast rainstorm.[47]

The less fortunate men were quartered in tents on Bolivar Heights, amidst the usual grumbling,[48] but the horses were stabled in drier and more comfortable surroundings. An old brick school house on Bolivar Heights was innovated as a stable, and the cavalrymen found deserted

[44]Henderson, op. cit., p.174.

[45]Marcy to Banks, March 13, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.748.

[46]Ibid., p.750.

[47]Ward, op. cit., p.31; Smith, Horace and Hervey, Loc. cit.

[48]Ward, op. cit., p.31.

homes, where fires were soon blazing to warm and dry the soaking horse soldiers.[49]

While these troops were enroute to Harpers Ferry, a change took place in the Army of the Potomac. On March 14th, General Banks was placed in command of the Fifth Corps.[50] /See Appendix II for organization of Banks' Division as of March 14/

The new Corps Commander was ordered to leave Shield's Division /Appendix III/ at Winchester to guard the Shenandoah Valley while he moved his own Division to Centerville to protect the reopening of the railroad from Washington to Manassas and Strasburg, in order to open communications with the Shenandoah Valley.[51]

In their brief stay at Winchester, many of the soldiers in Banks' army, amused themselves by visiting the Winchester Medical College, "being much interested in the skeletons, some of which were said to be of members of John Brown's party. One skeleton of a negro boy had evidently been left in great haste by the reb doctors, for it was partly dissected. Another, brought into camp, was sent home by an officer...."[52]

[49]Smith, Horace and Hervey, loc. cit.

[50]McClellan to Stanton, March 14, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.5, p.755.

[51]Marcy to McClellan, March 17, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.11, p.11; S. Williams to Banks, March 16, 1862, O.R., S.I, V. XII, Pt. I, p.164.

[52]Cook, op. cit., p.45. Unless skeleton collecting was common, this must have been the body of Watson Brown, who was killed in the John Brown Raid. "The body...was taken to the Medical College at Winchester; skinned, red fluid injected into the veins and fat removed to show the muscular system. Dr. Jarvis Johnson, surgeon /continued/

On March 18th, General Shields moved his Division from Winchester in pursuit of the retreating Confederates, who fled up the Valley burning bridges behind them. Shields halted his command at Woodstock, but his cavalry followed the rebels as far as Mt. Jackson, where the Confederates crossed the Shenandoah and disappeared.[53]

Shields returned to Winchester, the following day, and reported to Banks that Jackson had left the Valley.[54] It appeared evident that the Valley situation was well in hand.

On the 21st, Sedgwick, at Harpers Ferry, was ordered to be prepared to move by rail to Washington,[55] and the following day, Dana's command left Harpers Ferry[56] while Banks moved the remainder of his forces, with

of the 27th Indiana, recovered it when the town was captured in 1862 and shipped it to Martinsville, Indiana. It was not recovered by the family until 1882. At Colombus, I found all the affidavits taken by JB, Jr., at Martinsville, and in addition a letter from Allan Pinkerton to Benjamin Harrison asking for assistance for JB, Jr., in recovering the body; a letter from Governor A. G. Porter, Indiana, to a Martinsville Colonel, requesting that he interest himself in the matter. But the prize letter in the lot was one from a doctor in Maine, Brown County, N.Y., addressed to Dr. Johnson after the body had been relinquished to the family - wholly inspired by newspaper accounts. This doctor reminded Johnston that he, as a medical cadet, had been his room-mate at Winchester and that he remembered varnishing the body and preparing it for shipment back to Martinsville. 'As a reward for my labors you gave me the left ungual phalange of the big toe, which was nearly detached. I still have it in my possession...." Cf., Boyd B. Stutler to Dr. Henry T. McDonald, August 27, 1950; McDonald-Stutler Correspondence, Vol. III, p.65.

[53]Kimball, Nathan, Brevet Major General, U.S.V., "Fighting Jackson at Kernstown," B&L, op. cit., Vol. II, p.303; Banks to Marcy, March 21, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt. III, p.7.

[54]Kimball, p.303.

[55]Marcy to Sedgwick, March 21, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.XI, Pt. III, p.27.

[56]Smith, Horace, loc. cit.

the exception of Shields' Division, east of the Blue Ridge.[57]

This left Shields' Division the only forces at and around Winchester, and as everything seemed under control, Banks left Winchester the morning of March 22nd and headed for Harpers Ferry, where he planned to board a train for Washington.[58]

But Jackson had not left the Valley. On the evening of the 21st Ashby reported to Jackson that the enemy was retreating. The following day, Ashby, with 280 troopers and 3 horse-artillery guns, collided with Shields' pickets about one mile south of Winchester. A skirmish followed, during which Shields was wounded. Although Shields entire Division was in the area, the most of it was carefully concealed, which misled Ashby to report to Jackson that only four regiments of infantry, besides the guns and cavalry, remained at Winchester.[59]

On receiving this information, Jackson hurried his troops forward and on March 23d the rebels fought a pitched battle with Shields' Division at Kernstown, just south of Winchester. Too late, Jackson learned that Ashby was wrong. Instead of meeting four regiments, the small Confederate force was smashed by Shields' entire Division, consisting of more than 9,000 men. In the "Battle of Kernstown," the beaten Confederates lost 718 men, while the Union casualties amounted to 590.[60]

[57]Kimball, p.303; O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.7.

[58]Kimball, p.303.

[59]Henderson, op. cit., p.179.

[60]Henderson's account and criticism of this battle is excellent, cf. pp.179ff. For official reports of this battle see O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt. I, pp.324ff.

When Banks heard of the engagement, on his way to Washington, he halted at Harpers Ferry and returned to Winchester. Alarmed at the audacious Confederate attack, he ordered Sedgwick to hold his Division at Harpers Ferry, for a few hours as the men were even then boarding the cars which would carry them to Washington.[61]

In addition to holding Sedgwick at Harpers Ferry, Banks immediately recalled Williams' Division and that morning Shields was reinforced by two brigades from this division.[62]

With the crisis passed, Sedgwick was authorized at 1:26 p.m., the afternoon of March 24th, to proceed to Washington with his Division.[63]

Although the "Battle of Kernstown" was counted a Confederate defeat, the far-reaching effects of the engagement were damaging to the Federal cause. Banks was not the only one who pushed the panic button:

> ...The President was already contemplating the transfer of Blenker's division from McClellan to Fremont; the news of Kernstown decided the question, and at the end of March these 9,000 men were ordered to West Virginia, halting at Strasburg, in case Banks should then need them, on their way. But even this measure did not altogether allay Mr. Lincoln's apprehensions. McClellan had assured him, on April 1, that 73,000 men would be left for the defense of the capital and its approaches. But in the original arrangement, with which the President had been satisfied, Williams was to have been brought to Manassas, and Shields alone left in the Shenandoah Valley. Under the new distribution the President found that the force at Manassas would be decreased

[61]Banks to General S. Williams, March 24, 1862 (Received 9:42 a.m.), O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.16.

[62]Ibid.

[63]Marcy to Sedgwick, March 24, 1862, Ibid.

> by two brigades; and, at the same time, that while part of the troops McClellan had promised were not forthcoming, a large portion of those actually available were good for nothing. The officer left in command at Washington reported that 'nearly all his force was imperfectly disciplined; that several of the regiments were in a very disorganised condition; that efficient artillery regiments had been removed from the forts, and that he had to relieve them with very new infantry regiments, entirely unacquainted with the duties of that arm.' Lincoln submitted the question to six generals of the regular army, then present in Washington; and these officers replied that, in their opinion, 'the requirement of the President that this city shall be left entirely secure has not been fully complied with.'
>
> On receiving this report, Lincoln ordered the First Army Corps, 37,000 strong, under General McDowell, to remain at Manassas in place of embarking for the Peninsula; and thus McClellan, on the eve of his advance on Richmond, found his original force of 150,000 reduced by 46,000 officers and men. Moreover, not content with detaching McDowell for a time, Lincoln, the next day, assigned that general to an independent command, covering the approaches to Washington; Banks' also, was withdrawn from McClellan's control, and directed to defend the Valley....[64]

This is what Jackson meant when he reported on the battle at Kernstown, "...I feel justified in saying that, though the field is in the possession of the enemy, yet the most essential fruits of the battle are ours...."[65]

His bold attempt to re-capture Winchester injected the leaders of the Union with a deep fear for the safety of the Nation's Capital, and as a direct result of Jackson's initiative, McClellan was deprived of a sizeable and powerful army which most certainly would have been invaluable

[64]Henderson, op. cit., p.190.

[65]Jackson to Maj. Thomas G. Rhett, Assistant Adjutant-General, April 9, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt. I, p.383f.

in the "March on Richmond."

In the weeks following Kernstown, Jackson's manuveurs in the Valley would continue to frighten Washington; immobilize McDowell; and confuse the commands of Banks, Shields, and Fremont.

Railroad Re-Opened

The destruction of the B&O Railroad line by Jackson in 1861 was systematic and thorough. Approximately 100 miles of track between Harpers Ferry and Cumberland was rendered virtually inoperable.[1]

The most devastated section of the railroad lay between Harpers Ferry and Back Creek, where the rebels completely removed 40½ miles of track, all of high English grade, and transported them South. At the same time, all the crossties were torn up, stacked and burned.[2]

On March 4, 1862, orders were issued by the B&O to commence work at either end of the burnt district, with instructions to repair the road as rapidly as possible.[3]

A work crew, under W. W. Porter, Assistant Master of Road, went to Back Creek, March 5th, and began working eastward, while another crew, under W. C. Quincy, Acting Master of Road, with Thomas Heskett, Supervisor of Bridges, W. M. Shawen, J. P. Williams, C. H. Mayers and George Henthorn, Supervisors of Track, and Benjamin Uncles, Supervisor of Water Stations, reached Harpers Ferry, March 4th, and commenced working westward.[4]

The rebuilding of the bridge at Harpers Ferry was a particularly ticklish job. The Potomac had reached an unusual depth in early March,

[1] Thirty-Sixth Annual Report, B&O RR., loc. cit., p.24.

[2] Ibid.; Summers, op. cit., p.109.

[3] Thirty-Sixth Annual Report, B&O R.R., p.50.

[4] Ibid., p.51f.

and the waters were a raging torrent, complicating the job of spanning cables across the river.

The Supervisor of Bridges communicated his difficulties to President Garrett, who immediately telegraphed that flying a kite over the river, or shooting a rocket, could be used for the beginning cable.[5]

Within short order, large cables were stretched across the river. Utilizing the cables, the work crew was able to raft across the river all the heavy timbers to restore the line of wood work, 1,620 feet in length, upon the original iron trestling through the armory yard, and to trestle the Tilt Hammer Bridge. The iron rails, track fixtures and crossties, were also rafted across the Potomac and hoisted to their position.[6]

Several efforts were made to raise the trestles in the river by lashing boats to the cables and to the masonry. Finally, on March 5th, one was placed in position, but the excessive cold stiffened the ropes with ice, and the project was temporarily abandoned.[7]

The crew was sent back into Harpers Ferry to work on the trestle through the armory yard and on the Tilt Hammer Bridge. This bridge was completed March 6th.[8]

[5]Hungerford, Edward, The Story Of The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 1827-1927, New York - London: G. P. Putnam's Sons; The Knickerbocker Press, 1928, p.20f.

[6]Thirty-Sixth Annual Report, B&O R.R., loc. cit., p.51

[7]Ibid., p.52.

[8]Thirty-Sixth Annual Report, B&O R.R., loc. cit., p.52

When the anxious McClellan heard of the difficulties experienced by the railroad crew in rebuilding the bridge, he wired President Garrett the following eager message, March 7th:

> It is most important that the railroad bridge at Harper's Ferry should be completed with the least possible delay. John W. Murphy, 333 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, will build the bridge at once by means of suspension scaffolding. The river is said to be falling, however, and you may be able to use ordinary scaffolding. The operations of the army are dependent upon your action in this matter.[9]

On March 9th, the crews were placed on four of the river spans, but the weather hindered their efforts. Rain fell the entire following day, but some progress was made trestling in the river.[10]

The rain of the 10th caused the river to rise rapidly, and the swift currents made it impossible to accomplish much work on the main bridge during the day of March 11th, but work was resumed the following day, and pressed forward until the night of March 18th, when the first locomotive in nine months crossed over into Harpers Ferry.[11]

On the 19th, the track was completed on iron trestling through the Armory yard, and the following day, track laying was commenced near the 83d mile post, and continued rapidly until March 29th when the tracks were joined and the entire line re-opened.[12]

[9] O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.1, p.548. Whether or not Mr. Murphy did build the suspension scaffolding is uncertain.

[10] Thirty-Sixth Annual Report, B&O R.R., loc. cit., p.52.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

The day after the line was re-opened, nearly eight hundred cars passed over the bridge at Harpers Ferry. Many of these, loaded with miscellaneous supplies, had been held at New Creek, Cumberland, and Martinsburg ready to move forward when the last rail was in place.[13]

While work progressed on the B&O line, the Winchester and Potomac Railroad was pushed forward, following the capture of Winchester by Banks.

By March 18th, railroad engineers were able to report that they had completed the trestling of one bridge, and secured three others on the W&P, and the following day, that line was open to traffic.[14]

That this latter line was considered a vital communications link is evident by the following order, issued by the Secretary of War, March 24, 1862:

> 1st That the Rail Road between Harper's Ferry and Winchester and its appendages and appurtenances be and the same is hereby taken possession of and held as a Military Rail Road of the United States under the Act of Congress, and it is placed under guard of the General Commanding the Army of the Potomac.
>
> 2nd That the Baltimore and Ohio Rail Road Company be and they are hereby authorized and required to repair said road and its appurtenances and operate the same, keeping an accurate account of receipts and expenditures, to be rendered to this Department when required, for adjustment of accounts.[15]

[13]Thirty-Sixth Annual Report, B&O R.R., loc. cit., p.52.

[14]Garrett to Stanton, March 18, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.6.

[15]Order by Edwin M. Stanton, Sec. of War, March 24, 1862, in Harpers Ferry National Monument Microfilm collection, R.15, V.3, p.493.

On the day the Winchester and Potomac Railroad was converted into a military road, March 24th, General Sedgwick moved his Division from Harpers Ferry. The removal of his troops necessarily weakened the protection of a large segment of the B&O, causing the Secretary of War considerable concern for the safety of the line. Stanton promptly brought the situation to the attention of McClellan.[16]

But the confident McClellan just as promptly attempted to allay the fears of the worried Stanton: "There is ample force along the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to protect it...."[17]

Unconvinced, Stanton, three days later, again reminded McClellan of the exposed line, adding that the engineer in charge of re-building the road and President Garrett both reported, "there is no guard between Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg."[18]

After receipt of this dispatch, McClellan finally detailed five additional companies to cover the vulnerable section of the road,[19] and the following day, March 28th, after a long conversation with President Garrett, the commanding General decided to increase this guard by a full regiment.[20]

[16]Stanton to McClellan, March 24, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.17.

[17]McClellan to Stanton, March 24, 1862 - 7:30 p.m., Ibid.

[18]Stanton to McClellan, March 27, 1862, Ibid., p.21.

[19]McClellan to Stanton, March 27, 1862, Ibid., p.22.

[20]McClellan to Stanton, March 28, 1862, Ibid., p.25.

The day after McClellan's discussion with Garrett, orders were issued, assigning Col. Dixon S. Miles, Second Infantry, the duty of protecting the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway from Baltimore to the western limits of the Department of the Potomac, with headquarters at Harpers Ferry.[21]

A regiment of infantry and 400 cavalry departed from Washington, March 29th, and headed for Harpers Ferry with orders to guard that portion of the B&O line under the jurisdiction of Col. Miles.[22]

Miles was instructed to place four companies of the Tenth Maine along the Winchester and Potomac Railroad, to insure protection of that line.[23]

By May 20, Col. Miles, commanding the Railway Brigade, had under his command a total force of 5,360, and while Miles and two other officers maintained headquarters in Harpers Ferry, the remainder of the command were detailed to various points along the B&O and W&P lines. /Appendix IV/

From the arrival of Miles' Brigade in late March, until Jackson threatened Harpers Ferry in the closing part of May, the railroad was in little danger from enemy attack, but the elements conspired to wreck havoc along the line.

[21]Special Orders No. 95, March 29, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.30.

[22]Marcy to Miles, March 29, 1862, Ibid., p.28f.

[23]Ibid., p.29.

On April 9th, high water and seven inches of snow, accompanied by heavy accumulations of drift, endangered all the bridges along the line.[24]

By mid-April, the Potomac had risen so high, that it was necessary to stand loaded cars upon the bridge trestling at Harpers Ferry in an effort to prevent it from being washed out.[25]

But these efforts were in vain. At 11:30 a.m., April 22nd, the curved span adjoining the Maryland shore, and two contiguous spans, were swept away, plunging fourteen loaded railroad cars into the river. At 3:15 p.m., a canal boat jumped the tow path, smashed the next span in line, and ten more loaded cars fell in the waters. The river contined to rise and at 7:45 p.m., one-half of the wide span was washed away, taking with it an additional twelve cars.[26]

The high waters remained until April 28th, while in the meantime passengers and baggage were transported across the river by boat.

When the river dropped, the job of re-building the bridge was commenced, and continued without further mishap until completed May 4th.[27]

[24] Thirty-Sixth Annual Report, B&O R.R., loc. cit., p.53.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid., p.53f.

[27] Ibid.

Drive To The Potomac

> Whatever movement you make against Banks do it speedily, and if successful drive him back toward the Potomac, and create the impression, as far as practicable, that you design threatening that line....[1]

The salvation of the Army of Virginia and the fate of the Confederacy depended upon how well "Stonewall" Jackson would be able to execute this order. For even as Lee issued this command, McClellan's Army of some 112,000 men was but twenty miles from the gates of Richmond. McDowell, with 40,000 men, was within striking distance, and the Confederates encamped outside Richmond were menaced by three times their number.

It seemed as if McClellan's well-planned Peninsula Campaign would succeed, and if Richmond fell, the Confederacy would collapse, bringing an end to the war.

But McClellan's plan had one fatal flaw. In amassing his huge army to storm Richmond, he neglected the defenses of Washington, or so thought Lincoln and Stanton. McDowell was close by, but McClellan needed these troops. They were withheld from him after Kernstown, but McClellan again called for this army.

If the Confederates continued to exploit the fears of Lincoln and Stanton they might prevent McClellan from being reinforced and the Confederacy might be saved.

This, then, was Lee's strategy. To threaten an invasion of the north, and frighten Washington to such a degree that would force

[1]General R. E. Lee to Jackson, May 16, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt. III, p.893.

Lincoln to recall McClellan.

> ...It was at Lincoln that Lee was about to strike, at Lincoln and the Northern people, and an effective blow at the point which people and President deemed vital might arrest the progress of their armies as surely as if the Confederates had been reinforced by a hundred thousand men....[2]

To carry out Lee's strategy, Jackson's Army of the Valley was reinforced and brought to a fighting strength of 17,000.[3] The hopes of the Confederacy rested with these men.

On May 17th, Jackson's Division left Harrisonburg, marched down the Valley turnpike to New Market where it effected a junction with Ewell's Division. Their objective was Front Royal. Jackson hoped to capture or disperse the garrison there and get in rear of Banks at Strasburg, or else compel him to abandon his fortifications.[4]

Col. John R. Kenly, First Maryland Infantry, held Front Royal with nine companies from his regiment with two 10-pounder Parrott guns, manned by 38 artillerists from Knapp's Pennsylvania battery.[5]

At Strasburg, Banks commanded 4,476 infantry and 1,600 cavalry, supported by ten Parrott guns and six smooth-bore pieces. As Jackson was marching down the Valley, most of Banks' force were busily engaged

[2]Henderson, op. cit., p.233.

[3]Ibid., p.236.

[4]Report of Lieut. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson, commanding the Valley District, of operations May 14-June 17, 1862, dated April 10, 1863, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.1, p.701. Hereafter cited as Jackson Report.

[5]Report of Col. John R. Kenly of action at Front Royal, May 23, 1862, dated May 31, 1862, Ibid., p.555.

erecting fortifications and constructing lines of defense, but of Jackson's movements, Banks knew nothing. As late as May 21st, when Jackson was in the vicinity of Luray, Banks confidently reported that, "...Jackson has returned to within 8 miles of Harrisonburg, west...."[6]

But on Thursday, May 22nd, Jackson's entire command moved down the road leading from Luray to Front Royal. The advance, under General Ewell, bivouacked about 10 miles from the latter town.[7]

Then, on the afternoon of May 23d, the Confederates trampled the small Union garrison at Front Royal. Captain Saville of the Maryland Regiment managed to escape to Winchester, where he reported the massacre to Banks by the following frantic message:

> Colonel Kenly is killed. Lieutenant-colonel, adjutant, and all the rest of commanding officers First Maryland Regiment taken prisoners. Regiment cut all to pieces and prisoners; First Michigan Cavalry ditto. The enemy's forces are 15,000 or 20,000 strong, and on the march to Strasburg....[8]

Banks was incredulous. This couldn't be Jackson, since his latest intelligence placed Jackson at Harrisonburg, some sixty miles south of Strasburg and Front Royal was only twelve miles east of Banks' encampment.

The report of Captain Saville was handed to Col. Strother of Banks' staff, who was equally unbelieving: "...I told the Genl. that this fellow was some coward who had ingloriously fled & covered his ignominy by

[6]Banks to Stanton, May 21, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.I, p.523.

[7]Jackson Report, op. cit., p.702.

[8]Captain Saville to Banks, May 23, 1862 (Received 12 o'clock midnight), Ibid., p.525. Saville erred when he reported Col. Kenly killed.

NATHANIEL PRENTISS BANKS

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-703

1816-1894. Mass. Maj. Gen. USV May 16, 1861; mustered out Aug. 24, 1865. Prominent member of Congress 1853-57; Governor of Mass. 1858-61; president Illinois Central R.R. He headed Dept. of Annapolis, then Dept. of the Shenandoah. In March 1862 he took command of V Corps, which was detached from McClellan's Army of the Potomac in April for service in the Shenandoah Valley. After defeating Jackson at Kernstown, detachments from Banks' force and ill-advised reorganizations ordered from Washington helped make Banks a victim of Jackson's brilliant strategic diversion. Subsequent reorganization put him at the head of II Corps in Pope's Army of Va.; at Cedar Mountain he was outgeneraled and defeated again by Jackson. When Pope's army was abolished September 12, 1862, Banks commanded the Mil. Dist. of Washington from that date until Oct. 27, 1862. He then succeeded Butler in command of the Dept. of the Gulf. Leading the Red River Campaign of 1863 he met several bloody repulses at Port Hudson, capturing that place only after the fall of Vicksburg had rendered it untenable. For this he was given the Thanks of Congress "for the skill, courage, and endurance which compelled the surrender of Port Hudson and thus removed the last obstruction to the free navigation of the Mississippi River." After the unsuccessful Red River Campaign of 1864 he was superseded by Canby and resigned. He returned to Congress where he served, with the exception of one term, until 1877. He was reelected in 1888, but forced to retire in 1890. The next year Congress voted him an annual pension of $1,200; three years later he died at his home in Waltham, Mass.

monstrous lying...."[9] Convinced in his own mind that the attack on Front Royal was a small raid, and assured by Strother, General Banks went to bed.[10]

At 7:05 the following morning, Banks cooly reported the action at Front Royal to Sec. of War Stanton and estimated the enemy's force at 5,000 or 6,000.[11] At 7:10 he reported that the force was somewhere between 6,000 and 10,000, but still Banks was not alarmed. "It is probably Ewell's force, passing through Shenandoah Valley...."[12]

Reports continued to pour in, each worse than the dher, until at last Banks fully realized the situation. Jackson's entire command had entered Front Royal, and worse yet, his advance guard was reported to be at Middletown, just five miles north of Strasburg, on the road to Winchester. Jackson was in his rear, on his line of retreat and Banks' entire command was perilously close to being smashed or captured by a force three times its number.

Soon after 9:00 o'clock in the morning, Banks started his trains for Winchester.[13]

> ...The troops followed & with them the staff. Near Cedar Creak bridge we passed some theatre folks packing their

[9]Strother Journal, loc. cit., Vol. II, p.107.

[10]Ibid.

[11]O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt. I, p.526.

[12]Banks to Stanton, Ibid.

[13]Report of Maj. Gen. N. P. Banks, commanding Department of the Shenandoah, of operations May 14-June 16, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.I, p.547.

> trumpery. At the bridge we were met by a waggon master at full speed & apparently terrified. The General questioned him and he informed us the head of the train was attacked and the enemy in force was formed across our road. Just ahead several field officers rode by confirming the tidings. This was a shock. I had to that moment been tenaciously incredulous of an enemy in our rear. This seemed proof positive, in fact I saw a body of troops indicated as the enemy and waited to hear the opening cannon. We rode forward rapidly and in dead silence, each heart manning itself for the death struggle. We met waggons & mounted teamsters rushing furiously back while the main line of waggons stood in the road stopped & many of them deserted by their drivers. Still no firing was heard. I rode close to the General summing up our position. I had till this time stoutly denied the possibility of an enemy in our rear. I was mortified at the utter failure of my judgement. I saw little way for any of us but an honourable death for with Ewell in our front Jackson must of course be close in our rear. The desperate attempt to cut our way through was all that was left for us. Death on the field, wounds & captivity, or a long and weary escape through the woods to the mountains to be murdered perhaps by guerrillas. I hoped my fate would be the "belle mort" as the French term it, sudden & outright by ball or shell. I saw the General's countenance betokened this resolution, and having entirely recovered my equanimity, I rode beside him. He said gravely, but kindly 'it seems we were mistaken in our calculation....'[14]

Jackson deployed cavalry scouts to Front Royal, reasoning that Banks might attempt escaping to Washington by way of that city, then he personally accompanied the main body of the army to Middletown.

> ...Upon arriving there we found the Valley turnpike crowded with the retreating Federal cavalry, upon which the batteries of Poague and Chew, with Taylor's infantry, promptly opened, and in a few moments the turnpike, which had just before teemed with life, presented a most appalling spectacle of carnage and destruction. The road was literally obstructed with the mingled and confused mass of struggling and dying horses and riders. The Federal column was pierced....[15]

[14]Strother Journal, loc. cit., Vol. II, p.107f.

[15]Jackson Report, op. cit., p.703.

But Federal artillery was turned on the Confederates which drove the rebels from the Pike, and the largest part of the Federal column was saved.[16]

The wounded column raced toward Winchester, harried by Confederates who contested every inch of the route. Finally, at 5 o'clock in the evening, Banks advance guard limped into town.[17] But the Confederates were close behind.

At dawn of the 25th, the rebels stormed the heights overlooking Winchester. The men in blue briefly held, then broke and ran through the streets of the city. The victorious Jackson observed that:

> ...The Federal forces, upon falling back into the town, preserved their organization remarkably well. In passing through its streets they were thrown into confusion, and shorty after, debouching into the plain and turnpike to Martinsburg and after being fired upon by our artillery, they presented the aspect of a mass of disordered fugitives....[18]

Col. Strother had just finished a cup of coffee and a roll at the Taylor Hotel, this bright and pleasant Sunday, when he strolled onto the street just as Lieutenant Horton of the Second Massachusetts rode by at a gallop:

> ...'Mount and ride. You have not a minute to spare. They are in the town.' The rattle of small arms in close proximity reinforced his recommendation. I mounted & trotted up the street... As I rode pistol shots were fired from windows

[16]Banks Report, op. cit., p.547.

[17]Banks to President Lincoln, May 24, 1862 - 8 p.m., Ibid., p.527.

[18]Jackson Report, op. cit., p.706.

& enclosures at myself & some straggling footmen that were passing. I turned at the second corner and got to the Main Street. There I saw the smoke and flame rolling up from our burning stores and saw our troops in full route sweeping up the Main Street. There was a rapid crackling of small arms, chiefly pistol shots all along the street. I saw at least 20 shots from houses & yards, pistols & shot guns. Doubtless there were many more. As I drew up my horse within ten steps of a hydrant where several soldiers stopped to drink I saw the flash of a piece from a gateway and one of the men fell over in the gutter apparently mortally wounded. I turned about & looking down the street saw another man falling supported by his comrades. At the same time I got sight of Ruger's regiment (Third Wisconsin) marching in organized column. I joined him... As we passed out of Winchester on the Martinsburg road I saw our straggling columns pouring out by every avenue with stragglers horse & foot covering the fields. When I got about 200 yards down the road, the enemy rose the ridge on the northern end of Winchester poured in a sharp fire of musketry on our confused rear. This quickened the movements and arms, accouterments and knapsacks began to be strewed along the route. Presently the cannon boomed and the shot whistled & the shells hurtled over our heads seemed likely for a time to renew the scenes of Bulls Run. At every report the living mass started and quickened its motion as if shocked by electricity. Overcoats and knapsacks strewed the fields... One fellow rode by me with a groove ploughed in his horses rump by a shell, a ghastly wound, but the animal travelled surprisingly...the scenes along the road were pitiable & ludicrous. Droves of negroes increasing at every step thickened the column. An enormously obese negress and a mulatto woman dragging a heavy baby a foot were weeping & gesticulating - 'O Lord, They will kill us, they will kill us, if we are left behind.' ...Further on was a grotesque fellow on a mule with a negro wench behind him, here half a dozen light waggons loaded with plunder & sprawling with babies were shoved out of the road to make room for a battery, side boards broken off, gears giving way, which the negro men were hastening to repair & get themselves under way at the first opportunity. They said that Jackson had sworn he would kill them all if he ever came back to this valley.... As the cannonade in our rear would increase their bundles and stuffed pillow cases strewed the way side. Broken waggons & dead horses now occasionally stopped the trains and were dragged aside & the waggons burnt with their contents.... At Bunkers Hill some talk was made of halting but it was not attempted. I here saw a light

> waggon full of negro women & children thrust off the causeway into the mill dam... From this place until Martinsburg there was no disturbance of our retreat....[19]

The head of the Federal column reached Martinsburg at 2:40 p.m.[20] Here the exhausted troops rested for two and a half hours then re-newed the retreat to the Potomac. The river was reached, opposite Williamsport, about sundown and the crossing effected the following morning. Only then could the Federals relax and the general feeling of relief was expressed by Banks who reported:

> ...There were never more grateful hearts in the same number of men than when at midday of the 26th we stood on the opposite shore....[21]

It was a remarkable march. In two days, Banks' Division had marched nearly 60 miles, while fighting a good part of the way. And while the Federals caught their breath, Jackson halted his army near Winchester to observe the Sabbath that Monday, as the "Battle of Winchester" on Sunday made it impossible to hold religious services.[22]

The Federal Government was terrified by Jackson's rapid advance, and fearing that the Confederate commander would attempt to cross the Potomac, as many troops as could be mustered were dispatched to Harpers Ferry to reinforce Col. Miles' scattered Railroad Brigade.

[19]Strother Journal, loc. cit., Vol. II, pp.109ff.

[20]Banks to Stanton, May 25, 1862, OR., S.I, V.12, p.528.

[21]Banks Report, op. cit., p.551

[22]Jackson Report, op. cit., p.707.

On May 24th, as Banks was cutting his way toward Winchester, Brigadier General Rufus Saxton was ordered to Harpers Ferry from Washington with instructions to assume command of all troops sent there "and operate with them according to your discretion, as circumstance may require...."[23]

General Saxton arrived at Harpers Ferry, at 9:15 the morning of May 25th[24] and by 5:15 that evening, he had under his command, 2,500 men, but no artillery.[25]

Later that night, Stanton telegraphed Saxton that Assistant Secretary of War Watson and General Hamilton were enroute for Harpers Ferry, "but not to supersede you in command. By special assignment of the President you are assigned to the command of the forces and operations at Harpers Ferry, without regard to seniority of rank...."[26]

Expecting to be attacked on the 26th, Saxton took the precaution to remove all stores from Harpers Ferry to the north bank of the Potomac and extended his pickets to 3 miles beyond Charles Town, on the road to Winchester. Three companies of cavalry were deployed near Charles Town, while six companies of infantry performed outpost service on Bolivar Heights. Three regiments of infantry dug in on Camp Hill and the remainder of the force guarded the bridge and passage of the river.[27]

[23]Stanton to Saxton, May 24, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt. I, p.626.

[24]Saxton to Stanton, May 25, 1862, Ibid., p.626.

[25]Ibid., p.629.

[26]Stanton to Saxton, May 25, 1862, Ibid., p.630.

[27]Saxton to Stanton, May 25, 1862, Ibid., p.631.

RUFUS SAXTON Jr.

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-698

1824-1908. Mass. USMA 1849; Artillery. Serving in the Seminole War, and on the frontier and coastal surveying (where he improved the self-registering thermometer which now bears his name), he taught at West Point and was commander of the artillery detachment (as 1st Lt. since 1855) that broke up the secessionist assembly at Camp Jackson, Mo., May 10, 1861. Named Capt. Asst. Q.M. May 13, he was the Chief Q.M. on both Lyon's and McClellan's staffs, and also served on T. W. Sherman's staff during the Port Royal expedition of 1861-62. Named B.G. USV April 15, 1862, he commanded Harpers Ferry when Jackson threatened that point May, 1862. He then commanded US Forces Beaufort X, South (Feb. 19-June 14, 1863 and July 6, 1863-April 17, 1864); Northern District, South (Sept. 1-Oct. 3, 1864); District Beaufort (April 25-Sept. 1, 1864); and 2nd Sep. Brig., District Beaufort, South (Oct. 26, 1864-Jan. 23, 1865). Breveted for war service (Lt. Col., Col., B.G. USA Apr. 1865, and Maj. Gen. USV Jan. 12, 1865), he was awarded the Medal of Honor in 1893 for Harpers Ferry. He continued in the R.A. until retired in 1888 as Col. Asst. Q.M. Gen.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL RUFUS SAXTON

Reinforcements continued to arrive for the next two days, until the command under Saxton reached a strength of about 7,000 men. /Appendix V/ In addition to the infantry and cavalry, the much needed artillery arrived.[28]

But the edgy men, expecting an invasion of overwhelming numbers at any moment, were the more un-nerved and demoralized by the wild tales carried by several stragglers from Banks' defeated army who stumbled into the town.[29]

Saxton prepared his line of retreat. All available carpenters were put to work planking the bridge so that teams, men, and artillery, as well as cars, would be able to cross the Potomac hurriedly, if the need should arise,[30] and all town residents of Harpers Ferry, with Union sympathies, crossed over into Maryland.[31]

No attack was made on the 26th, but Union cavalry scouts returned from Charles Town with reports that Jackson said he would breakfast in Harpers Ferry the next morning.[32]

Col. Strother and Col. Clark, from Banks' command at Williamsport, came to Harpers Ferry with the report that Saxton could expect little assistance from Banks' Division. The men and horses were so fatigued by their recent gruelling retreat that they were in no condition to

[28]Saxton to Stanton, June 2, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt. 1, p.639.

[29]Watson to Stanton, May 26, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt. III, p.248f.

[30]Watson to Stanton, May 26, 1862, Ibid., p.249.

[31]Barry, Op. cit., p.141.

[32]Watson to Stanton, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt. III, p.261.

march, let alone fight.[33]

Saxton faced a shortage of officers at this crucial moment. The 102nd New York Regiment came to Harpers Ferry minus its Colonel, Lt. Col., Major, Quartermaster and Commissary Officers. These officers were all on furlough.[34]

And the men, most of whom were inexperienced, lacked entrenching tools, shelter and tents, and were forced to sleep on the bare ground.[35]

The expected attack did not materialize on the 27th, but between 9 and 10 o'clock that night, two companies of Colonel Maulsby's First Maryland Regiment made a reconnaissance of Loudoun Heights, where it was reported the Confederates had taken position.[36]

As the Marylanders climbed the heights, they were fired upon by dismounted rebel cavalry who were waiting in ambush. From their concealed positions behind the bushes on either side of the road, the Confederates were able to drive the Federals from the heights. Sergeant Mehrling, Co. I, of the Maryland Regiment, was killed.[37]

Determined to find the whereabouts of the enemy, Saxton, on the morning of the 28th, sent a large reconnaissance party toward Charles

[33]Watson to Stanton, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt. III, p.262.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Saxton to Stanton, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.I, p.639.

[37]Ibid.

Town. The reconnaissance-in-force consisted of the 111th Pennsylvania Regiment, under Col. Schlaudecker; the First Maryland Cavalry, under Major Deems; and a section of Reynolds battery.[38]

It was threatening rain when this force left Harpers Ferry, and the march to Charles Town was without incident until the troops arrived at a hill near the Charles Town toll gate. Here, rebel pickets stationed on the road at the fair ground fired on the Federal advance. "Ashby was there as usual on his white horse, circus riding up and down...."[39]

The section from Reynolds battery was placed in position and opened on the Confederate cavalry. Half a dozen shells cleared them from the town.[40]

In the meantime, as the artillery continued to fire on the rebels, the Federal cavalry flanked the town and when the Confederates retreated, the Union horsemen were mistaken for Confederates by the artillerists who turned their fire on the unfortunate First Maryland Cavalry. "Three or four tumbled off their horses which caused great rejoicing among the fools at the supposed loss of the enemy...."[41]

Col. Strother, who accompanied the reconnaissance party, discovered the error and stopped the firing. He then urged Col. Schlaudecker to advance the infantry, but, "...Instead of this, he ordered three cheers

[38]Saxton to Stanton, June 2, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.I, p.639.

[39]Strother Journal, loc.cit., Vol.II, p.115.

[40]Ibid.

[41]Ibid.

for Captn. Loder. The whole command responded. Somebody then called three cheers for somebody else and so they went on cheering like fools at a public meeting...."[42]

When there was no one left to cheer for, the Federals dashed through the main street of Charles Town, firing down every side street as they advanced. Some of the storming party halted at the Town Hall and put the torch to the building. The fire soon reached dangerous proportions and threatened the entire town. Citizens of the town, women included, and several negroes joined to fight the blaze. The engines were brought into play and within two hours the flames were under control. The Hall burned to the ground, but the adjacent buildings were saved.[43]

While the fire was being fought by local residents, several of the Federals busied themselves by looting the stores. Tobacco seemed to be the chief objective of the plunderers.[44]

The pillage was stopped by the roar of cannon. Screaming shells announced the arrival of the dreaded "Stonewall" Brigade.

The "Stonewall" Brigade of 1,337 officers and men, commanded by Brig. Gen. Charles S. Winder, had left camp, 4½ miles from Winchester, at 5 o'clock that morning. The 4th, 5th, 27th, and 33rd Regiments of Virginia Volunteers with Carpenter's battery of four pieces, and six

[42]Strother, loc. cit., Vol.II, p.115.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Ibid.

guns from Poague's battery, marched to Charles Town by way of Summit Point.[45]

The Confederates moved forward cautiously, not knowing the strength of their enemy, until they collided with the Federal pickets east of the town. After a slight skirmish, the Federals took cover in a nearby section of woods.[46]

Two companies of the Fifth Virginia Regiment followed, and after a slight exchange of shots, the Union pickets retired.[47]

The Confederate Brigade advanced to within three-quarters of a mile from Charles Town, where they halted when they discovered the Union force drawn up in line of battle.[48]

An artillery duel followed, but lasted for only some twenty minutes, when the green Union troops stampeded, throwing away arms, blankets, and haversacks, "...For the first two miles the road was strewed with plunder gotten by the rascals during their three hour sojourn in the village...."[49][50]

[45]Brig. Gen. Charles S. Winder to Maj. R. L. Dabney, Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters Valley District, June 15, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt. I, p.738.

[46]Ibid.

[47]Ibid.

[48]Ibid.

[49]Ibid.

[50]Strother, loc. cit., Vol. II, p.116.

The rout was continued to Halltown, where the fleeing Federals were reinforced by the 78th New York and the remaining sections from Reynolds' battery.[51] From here to Bolivar Heights, the retreat was more leisurely.[52]

Winder pursued the Federals as far as Halltown, and from that point he was able to see Saxton's command stretched along the crest of Bolivar Heights, from the Potomac to the Shenandoah.[53]

Content with his success of the morning, Winder posted pickets and withdrew the brigade to within one mile of Charles Townwhere the men encamped for the night. Later that night, the Brigade was joined by Ewell's Division. In addition to driving the Federals from the village, Winder's command managed to capture ten horses, one captain and eight privates from the First Maryland Cavalry, as well as stores and equipment, while suffering only one casualty.[54]

While this action was taking place in Charles Town, Lt. C. H. Daniels, U. S. Navy, and his naval battery of Dahlgren guns and boat howitzers, were busily engaged shelling Loudoun Heights, with a nine-inch Dahlgren where Confederates were sighted the night before. Daniels and his battery arrived from Washington the evening of May 26th, and placed their guns on the west slope of Maryland Heights, which commanded all the points in

[51]Saxton to Stanton, June 2, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.I, p.639.

[52]Strother, loc. cit., Vol.II, p.116.

[53]Winder to Dabney, June 15, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.I, p.738; Saxton to Stanton, June 2, 1862, Ibid., p.639.

[54]Winder to Dabney, June 15, 1862, Ibid., p.739.

this vicinity.[55]

This was the extent of the battle on May 28th, and that evening Brig. Gen. John P. Slough, "...a bold and able assistant....", was dispatched to Harpers Ferry to assist Saxton in his defense.[56]

The 29th dawned fair and warm. Early that morning, the Fifth New York Cavalry was sent in the direction of Halltown to reconnoiter. They were fired upon and driven back to Bolivar Heights where the Federal command was again formed in line of battle, expecting the assault at any moment. General Cooper's Brigade formed on the right of the Charles Town pike, while General Slough's Brigade was placed to the left of the road.[57]

Stretched across the ridge of Bolivar Heights, the Federal command waited for two or three hours, and still the enemy did not appear. Again, a squadron of cavalry was sent toward Halltown and again they were fired upon. A Confederate battery, occupying a position at the edge of a section of woods, to the left of the road near Halltown, and supported by infantry and cavalry, compelled the reconnoitering party to return to the safety of Bolivar Heights.[58]

As the squadron of cavalry raced up the slope of Bolivar Heights,

[55]Saxton to Stanton, May 28, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, p.634; Saxton to Stanton, June 2, 1862, Ibid., p.639.

[56]Stanton to Saxton, May 28, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt. I, p.641.

[57]Saxton to Stanton, June 2, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.I, p.639.

[58]Ibid., p.639f.

the Federal batteries opened on the rebels at Halltown.

> ...Artillerymen, guns, and all are quite new, and from unskillfulness or defective ammunition the firing was wretchedly bad. The shells burst midway in their flight--some immediately after leaving the muzzle of the gun; others tumbled into the fields without exploding....[59]

While this ineffective barrage continued, a huge cloud of dust, rising between Charles Town and Halltown, could be seen by the Federals from their position on Bolivar Heights. At Halltown, the dust cloud split in two; one segment floated toward the Shenandoah, while the other drifted in the direction of the Potomac. The ominous clouds were caused by the tramping feet of nearly 17,000 Confederates. Jackson's entire command had arrived.[60] /Appendix VI/

The Confederates massed their forces on either side of Halltown, while the Second Regiment Virginia Infantry crossed the Shenandoah and occupied Loudoun Heights, in hopes of being able to drive the Federals from Harpers Ferry across the Potomac.[61]

The Union defenders grimly prepared for the attack while Chaplains, standing in front of each regiment, prayed at the top of their voices to encourage the men. But the sun went down in peace, and the men slept

[59]Strother, David Hunter, Harper's New Monthly Magazine, No. 204, May, 1867, p.719.

[60]Ibid.; Watson to Stanton, May 29, 1862, O.R., S.I, Vol. 12, Pt.III, p.285f.

[61]Jackson Report, op. cit., p.707.

uneasily on their arms.[62]

That night a rebel deserter came into the Union camp. Information gained through interrogation of the turncoat misled Saxton to believe that the Confederates were planning to flank him by crossing a division over the Potomac, north of Harpers Ferry, and throwing another across the Shenandoah to take Loudoun Heights. While the remainder of the Confederate army menaced his front, these two divisions would be in a position to command his naval battery and cut his communications below Harpers Ferry. Confronted with these unhappy prospects and deeply concerned for the safety of his command, Saxton called a council of war.[63]

At the council it was determined to evacuate Bolivar Heights and withdraw to an inner line of defense on Camp Hill. The tightening up of the line had two advantages; firstly, as it was much less extended, the line could be held by a smaller force, and because of the nature of the terrain, the enemy could not bring into action a force larger than their adversaries; secondly, as the Confederates advanced down Bolivar Heights into the gully that separates it from Camp Hill, they would be exposed to heavy fire from the naval battery on Maryland Heights. These guns would be able to fire over the heads of the Federal defenders on

[62]Strother, Harper's New Monthly Magazine, No. 204, May, 1867, op. cit., p.719; Watson to Stanton, May 29, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.285f.

[63]Strother Journal, loc. cit., Vol.II, p.118; Saxton to Stanton, June 2, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.I, p.640. Strother tells us the deserter's name was Clarke. He was from a Louisiana Regiment and claimed he was from Cincinatti, and was pressed into service while at New Orleans.

Camp Hill into the ranks of the advancing rebels.[64]

The contraction of the defense line made part of Saxton's command available for other purposes. The council of war thought it wise to place these troops on the crest of the hill above the naval battery, "...to frustrate any attempt of the enemy to take this hill in the rear and turn our batteries against us...."[65]

These decisions were reached about mid-night, and orders were immediately issued to carry them into effect. General Cooper's brigade was directed to Maryland Heights, while the brigade under General Slough fell back to Camp Hill.[66]

The passing of Cooper's brigade across the Potomac consumed the rest of the night. It was a tedious project, complicated by the darkness. A rope ferry with a single scow was used, which required at least an hour to cross, discharge, and return. In addition to the ferry, the railroad bridge, which Saxton had the foresight to floor with planks, formed a passage-way. The bridge was about 1,000 feet long, seven or eight feet wide and spanned the river about forty feet above the water, but was without handrails.[67]

The infantry marched two abreast, while the cavalry dismounted and

[64]Saxton to Stanton, June 2, 1861, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.I, p.640.

[65]Ibid.

[66]Ibid.

[67]Strother, Harper's New Monthly Magazine, No. 204, May, 1867, p.719.

led their horses across in single file. Several of the horses spooked and jumped forty feet into the river. One, at least, was killed when it landed on a railroad engine lying in the river, but most of the others, hitting deep water, were able to swim to shore.[68]

No chances were taken in losing artillery or wagons by frightened horses. The nervous animals were removed from their trappings and the wheeled vehicles were pushed and drawn across the bridge by hand.[69]

But the horses were not alone in being unnerved. Colonel Maulsby's Maryland Regiment of Home Guards had been detailed by Saxton to guard the arsenal which contained about 300 tons of ammunition. They were further charged with the protection of all commissary and quartermaster's stores and were assigned picket duty on the streets of Harpers Ferry, near the rivers, to guard against any attempt by the enemy to cross the Shenandoah, and to prevent the entrance or departure of possible spies.[70]

The Marylanders were stampeded by the re-shuffling of Cooper's brigade. When the Home Guard saw these troops crossing the river, they deserted their posts and ran for the bridge where they nearly trampled Assistant Secretary of War Watson.[71]

[68]Strother, Harper's New Monthly Magazine, No. 204, May, 1867, p.719.

[69]Strother Journal, loc. cit., Vol.II, p.118.

[70]Watson to Stanton, May 30, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.296f.; Watson to Stanton, Ibid., p.303f.

[71]Watson to Stanton, May 31, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.303f.

Watson tried in vain to halt the panic, but the Maryland Regiment was convinced that "Stonewall's" army was charging down the hill and that they were about to be slaughtered. They believed that all the regulars were retreating to Maryland, leaving them alone to fight in Virginia. Furthermore, they enlisted to serve only in Maryland, and would not fight outside the State.[72]

On the Maryland shore, Col. Maulsby was collared by General Saxton and his chief of staff, Col. Dixon S. Miles. Maulsby was ordered to take his regiment back to its position, but the Colonel stated he could not make his men go back and begged Saxton to allow his regiment to remain in Maryland.[73]

Convinced that the demoralized regiment would be useless on the Virginia shore, Saxton, "after a few remarks by no means complimentary," permitted it to stay in Maryland and assigned its former post to a braver regiment.[74]

May 30th dawned fair and pleasant as General Slough's brigade dug in on Camp Hill. Here, the men hastily built breastworks and cut down trees and hedges in preparation for the expected attack. Slough's brigade was supported by two batteries, Companies K and L of the First New York Artillery.[75]

[72]Watson to Stanton, May 31, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.303f.

[73]Saxton to Stanton, May 31, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.I, p.636.

[74]Ibid.; Watson to Stanton, May 31, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.303f.

[75]Saxton to Stanton, June 2, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.I, p.640; Strother Journal, loc. cit., Vol.II, p.118.

On Maryland Heights, 300 sailors anxiously awaited, eager to put into action their Dahlgren guns and boat howitzers while Cooper's brigade watched the flank.[76]

Major Gardner, with the Fifth New York Cavalry, was sent to Bolivar Heights to feel the rebel's position and watch his movements. He was later reinforced by 200 sharpshooters and one piece of light artillery.[77]

On Bolivar Heights, the Federal reconnoitering party collided with the Confederate First Maryland Infantry, under Col. Bradley T. Johnson.[78]

Johnson's sharpshooters pushed the Union skirmishers back and Captain Cutshaw's battery drove them completely from the heights. The Maryland Infantry Regiment then advanced along with Company A of the Maryland Cavalry, took possession of the Heights; and gathered up arms and stores that the Federals had deserted.[79]

The Marylanders then advanced to the Potomac but were soon subject to heavy fire from the Federal batteries. Lacking adequate artillery support, Col. Johnson withdrew.[80]

Artillerymen, Union and Confederate, continued to exchange shots as the day progressed. In the afternoon, rain began to fall.[81]

[76]Strother, Harper's New Monthly Magazine, No.204, May, 1867, p.719.

[77]Saxton to Stanton, June 2, 1862, O.R., S.I,V.12, Pt.I, p.640.

[78]Col. Bradley T. Johnson to Maj. James Barbour, Assistant Adj. Gen., Third Division, June 11, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.I, p.817.

[79]Ibid.

[80]Johnson to Barbour, June 11, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.I, p.817.

[81]Strother Journal, loc. cit., Vol. II, p.119.

But there was no large-scale assault. Jackson learned that Fremont and Shields were moving left and right, respectively, on his rear and threatened to cut off his escape route. To avoid this catastrophe, Jackson issued orders for all troops, with the exceptions of Winder's brigade and the cavalry, to move to Winchester. Winder was directed to recall the Second Virginia Regiment from Loudoun Heights and when this regiment rejoined his command, he was to move as rapidly as possible to overtake the main army.[82]

Unknown to Saxton, the main Confederate army withdrew, and he mistook the movement of the Winder Brigade as the long-expected attack in force.

> ...About dark on Friday evening, in the storm, General Slough opened upon them from Camp Hill with Crounse's and part of Reynolds' battery, and Lieutenant Daniels from Battery Stanton, on Maryland Heights. The scene at this time was very impressive. The night was intensely dark; the hills around were alive with the signal-lights of the enemy; the rain descended in torrents; vivid flashes of lightning illumined at intervals the grand and magnificent scenery, while the crash of thunder, echoing among the mountains, drowned into comparative insignificance the roar of our artillery. After an action of about an hour's duration the enemy retired.[83]

The feint of the Winder Brigade completely deceived Saxton, for at 9:30 the following morning, May 31st, as the main Confederate army was moving south of Winchester, more than thirty miles from Harpers Ferry, Saxton dashed off a desperate message: "...All my pickets driven in

[82]Jackson Report, op. cit., p.707.

[83]Saxton to Stanton, June 2, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.I, p.640f.

last night. Enemy in force in front and I believe on both flanks. My position is strong. Shall try to hold it."[84]

When no rebels appeared, a strong Federal reconnaissance party cautiously crept as far as Halltown, but could not find a single Confederate.[85] The enemy had withdrawn.

He had not only withdrawn, but was completely successful in eluding Fremont and Shields who were closing on his rear. The trap was sprung, but Jackson's entire command slipped through.

Jackson had indeed carried out Lee's order extremely well. He had driven Banks not only toward the Potomac, but completely across the river. In the advance, "Stonewall" had captured, killed or wounded nearly 3,000 Federals. /Appendix VII/ Confederate casualties in the entire operation has been sixty-eight killed, 329 wounded and three missing, a total of 400.[86]

Moreover, Jackson's army siezed some 9,354 small arms, two pieces of artillery and their caissons, as well as Quartermaster's stores valued at $125,185 and sutler's stores amounting to $25,000.[87]

Commissary supplies, consisting upward of 100 head of cattle,

[84]Saxton to Stanton, May 31, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.I, p.640f.

[85]Col. Dixon S. Miles to Stanton, May 31, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.304.

[86]Jackson Report, op. cit., p.708.

[87]Ibid.

34,000 pounds of bacon, flour, salt, sugar, coffee, hard bread, and cheese, fell into Confederate hands.[88] /See also Appendices VIII, IX, X/

But over and above this, Jackson's bold threat of invasion, paralyzed Washington with fear. At 5 o'clock on the afternoon of May 24th, when Jackson was pursuing Banks from Middletown, Lincoln telegraphed McDowell at Fredericksburg to suspend his advance on Richmond and to send 20,000 of his troops to the Shenandoah Valley.[89] As Washington had received reports that the Confederates were advancing northward from Richmond, the Secretary of War had telegraphed all Northern Governors to prepare the whole of their armed forces for immediate call.[90]

The following day, the War Department took military possession of all railroads in the United States,[91] and sent this startling message to each Chief Executive of the Northern States: "Intelligence from various quarters leaves no doubt that the enemy in great force are advancing on Washington. You will please organize and forward immediately all the volunteer and militia force in your State."[92]

General Fremont, at Franklin in Pendleton County, West Virginia,

[88] Jackson Report, op. cit., p.708.

[89] O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.219.

[90] O.R., S.III, V.2, p.68f.

[91] Ibid., p.69.

[92] Stanton to Governors of Northern States, May 25, 1862, Ibid., p.70.

was ordered to advance immediately to Harrisonburg[93] while General Shields hurried to the Valley from the vicinity of Fredericksburg.[94]

That Jackson's little army accomplished much is evident from the testimony of Gen. McClellan presented to a Congressional Committee investigating his failure to capture Richmond. In speaking of the 40,000 troops withheld from him by Jackson's northward thrust, McClellan stated:

> "It is also my opinion that, had the command of General McDowell joined the Army of the Potomac in the month of May by way of Hanover Courthouse from Fredericksburg, we would have had Richmond within a week after the junction."[95]

But that the North considered Washington genuinely periled by Jackson's advance is evident from the congratulatory orders issued Saxton for his defense of Harpers Ferry - a defense in which one man was killed and one other wounded.[96]

> The thanks of this Department are cordially tendered to you for your late able and gallant defense of Harper's Ferry against the rebel forces under command of General Jackson. You were placed in command at that point at a moment of extreme danger and under circumstances of extraordinary difficulty.
> By your gallantry and skill great service was rendered to the country, which I feel it to be the duty of this Department to acknowledge and place on record, assuring you at the same time of my personal confidence and regard.[97]

[93]Lincoln to Fremont, May 24, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.I, p.643.

[94]McDowell to Lincoln, May 24, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.220f.

[95]Cited by, Downer, Edward T., Stonewall Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign 1862, Lexington: Stonewall Jackson Memorial Inc., 1959, p.23.

[96]Saxton to Stanton, May 27, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.I, p.634.

[97]Stanton to Saxton, June 17, 1862, Ibid., p.641f.

And for this "able and gallant defense," General Rufus Saxton was presented the nation's highest award for valor - the Congressional Medal of Honor.[98]

[98] Boatner III, Mark Mayo, The Civil War Dictionary, New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1959, p.722f.

Communications - Cut and Restored

With the crisis over, General Saxton was relieved from command of the forces at Harpers Ferry and was superceded by Major General Franz Sigel.[1]

Sigel was directed to take this force from Harpers Ferry and place it under the command of Banks, who was still at Williamsport. The combined commands of Sigel and Banks were ordered to take the offensive immediately and pursue Jackson up the Valley, "without the loss of an hour."[2]

The German General arrived at Harpers Ferry early on the morning of June 2nd,[3] and the same day he departed with two brigades toward Winchester where he expected to form a juncture with Banks' command.[4]

Col. Dixon S. Miles was left in command of the greatly depleted garrison at Harpers Ferry that had been reduced by Sigel's departure to eighteen companies of the Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Cavalry and the naval battery.[5]

Miles immediately dispatched troopers along the B&O line to determine the extent of damage inflicted by the invading rebels. The officer in charge of the investigating party reported the Opequon Bridge was injured, and the trestle-work at Martinsburg seriously damaged. But the remainder

[1]Stanton to Saxton, June 1, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.I, p.638.

[2]Stanton to Banks, June 1, 1862, Ibid., p.538.

[3]Banks to Stanton, June 2, 1862-6 a.m., Ibid., p.539.

[4]Miles to Stanton, June 2, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.323f.

[5]Ibid.

of the line was intact.[6]

Miles lost no time in repairing the damaged bridge and detailed one company of infantry to provide protection for the working party.[7]

But the railroads were about to be attacked by a much older enemy - floods. By June 4th, extremely heavy rains in the Blue Ridge and Alleghany regions had swelled the Potomac, the Shenandoah and their tributaries to such proportions that the bridges were in danger of being swept away.[8]

The B&O Master of Roads was dispatched to Harpers Ferry with a large force to make every possible effort to save the bridge.[9]

But the disaster struck the night of June 4th. The entire B&O bridge at Harpers Ferry, with the exception of the west span, was swept away. The trestlework on the Winchester line crumbled. The arsenal on Virginius Island, the storehouses and stables were all flooded, but the stores were saved.[10]

The damage to the Winchester and Potomac line paralyzed Banks at Winchester who was waiting for supplies to be forwarded from Harpers

[6]Miles to Stanton, June 2, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.323f.

[7]Miles to Stanton, June 3, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.656.

[8]Garrett to Stanton, June 4, 1862, Ibid., p.657; Miles to Stanton, June 4, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, P.338.

[9]Garrett to Stanton, June 4, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt. I, p.658.

[10]Miles to Stanton, June 5, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.342; Miles to Banks, June 5, 1862, O.R.S, S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.659.

Ferry. Miles had accumulated 60,000 rations but would not be able to ship them until the line was repaired, a project he expected would take three or four days.[11]

On June 7th, the remainder of the bridge trestling at Harpers Ferry, from shore to shore of the Potomac, was carried away by high water, but the re-trestling of the river was commenced just two days later and the job was completed by June 15th.[12]

Repair of the Winchester and Potomac Railroad was initiated June 9th, and the line from Harpers Ferry to Winchester was in operation by June 20th. The hugh stockpile of supplies, accumulated at Harpers Ferry, were piled into cars and shipped as rapidly as possible to their destination at Winchester.[13]

Thus, as June neared her last days, communications from Harpers Ferry to points west and south, were established, but the supply line east of the village was still cut by the absence of the railroad bridge. The gap in the line was filled, somewhat, by the use of a steam-tug that laboriously puffed its way from shore to shore, laden with supplies.[14]

But the B&O Railroad Company commenced raising an iron bridge at Harpers Ferry, June 24th, and by August 21st, the work crew was making

[11]Miles to Banks, June 5, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.658f.

[12]Thirty-Sixth Annual Report, B&O RR, loc. cit., p.54f.

[13]Miles to Copeland, June 8, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.665; Garrett to Stanton, June 20, 1862, Ibid., p.685.

[14]Banks to Fremont, June 6, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.I, p.32

final preparations for the erection of the last span to this "magnificant bridge."[15]

While work was in progress on the railroad bridge, a new pontoon bridge was thrown across the river to replace the one that had been removed in March. Material for the new bridge arrived at Harpers Ferry, June 29th,[16] and the structure was completed and in place by August 22nd.

[15] Thirty-Sixth Annual Report, B&O RR, loc. cit., p.55.

[16] National Archives Record Group 92-Office of the Quartermaster General, Consolidated Correspondence File, Box 377-Major R. S. Rogers to Gen. Meigs, June 11 and June 29, 1862; Rogers to Meigs, August 22, 1862.

Summer Operations

The already scanty garrison at Harpers Ferry was further reduced by the recall of Lieutenant Daniels' Naval battery, June 6th. The sailors left with their boat howitzers, but were directed to leave the large guns at Harpers Ferry.[1]

The cannon remaining in the naval battery on Maryland Heights consisted of two 9-inch "soda water bottles," one 50-pounder rifle, and one steel 100-pounder. When the sailors boarded the train bound for Washington, the operation of the battery was assigned to the Eighth New York Cavalry.[2]

These horse-soldiers without horses, armed as infantry and directed to man artillery, balked at the assignment. The cavalrymen, who knew as much about artillery as the sailors knew about cavalry, were stung, and came close to mutiny.[3]

Miles' command was compounded by the inevitable left-overs that appear in the wake of an army on the move, "...it seems impossible to know who belongs to my forces or who are stragglers...," he complained.[4]

He pleaded with Sigel to let him have the First District Regiment as a garrison so that he could send the odds and ends of regiments to the front, but the German General of "I fights mit Sigel" fame, refused

[1]Stanton to Miles, June 6, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.661.

[2]Miles to Copeland, June 8, 1862, Ibid., p.665.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

the request and told Miles to apply to Washington if he wanted reinforcements.[5]

Troubled by a near mutinous regiment and faced with garrisoning Harpers Ferry with a "pick-up" army, Miles must have received some consolation from the avowed loyalty expressed by the Tenth Maine. This regiment had been divided by diverse desires. Some wanted to take to the field, while others hoped to remain with the Railroad Brigade. A vote was held and the regiment decided, two to one, to remain with the Brigade.[6]

Apparently upset by the democratic spirit of the Tenth Maine, Stanton, on learning of the vote, immediately issued unequivocal orders that the New Englanders would remain with the Brigade to guard the railroad.[7]

On June 12th, Miles had at his disposal, 1,176 infantry, which included the dismounted 8th N.Y. Cavalry and part of Maulsby's Maryland Home Guard, 182 cavalry, but no artillerymen.[8] Seven companies of the disgruntled New York cavalry were deployed on Maryland Heights, while six companies of Maulsby's regiment were stationed at Sandy Hook. Four infantry companies were garrisoned in Harpers Ferry. The stragglers and parts of companies, Miles happily reported, had all been forwarded to Winchester.[9]

[5]Miles to Copeland, June 8, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.665.

[6]Miles to Stanton, June 8, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.361f.

[7]Stanton to Miles, June 9, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.669.

[8]Miles to Stanton, June 12, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.378.

[9]Miles to Stanton, June 13, 1862, Ibid., p.387.

The situation at Harpers Ferry must have caused Washington some concern, for on June 17th, Maj. Gen. John E. Wool, commanding the Middle Department with headquarters at Baltimore, was burdened with the following additional duty:

> Ordered, That the military protection and defense of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad east of Cumberland to the city of Baltimore and of the railroad between Harper's Ferry and Winchester is especially assigned to the command of Maj. Gen. John E. Wool. Officers on the line of that road will report to him.[10]

Miles' new commander made an inspection of Harpers Ferry and this 73-year-old veteran of the War of 1812 and the Mexican War was deplored with what he found. He was aghast at the weakness of the position and grieved by the near rebellious New York Eighth Cavalry. Wool immediately recommended that four regiments be sent to Harpers Ferry, in addition to sending men that were capable of using the large guns on Maryland Heights.[11]

In an effort to strengthen the position, General Wool issued a series of Special Orders: commanding Miles to complete the intrenchments on Camp Hill; mount additional guns; and construct a block-house on Maryland Heights; intrench Bolivar Heights; and abatis the Camp Hill line. These orders, however, were ignored by Miles.[12]

[10]Order issued by Stanton, Ibid., p.402.

[11]Wool to Stanton, June 15, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.394f.; June 16, 1862, Ibid., p.397f.

[12]Special Orders No. 7, June 15, 1862; Special Orders No. 77, August 28, 1862; testimony of Maj. Gen. John E. Wool, October 30, 1862, presented to the Harpers Ferry Military Commission, O.R., S.I, V. 19, Pt.I, pp.788ff.

JOHN E. WOOL

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-700

1789-1869. N.Y. Septuagenarian veteran of the War of 1812, Wool had raised a company at Troy, N.Y., and distinguished himself at Queenstown Heights (1812) and Plattsburg (1814). He remained in the army and became a Brig. Gen. in 1841. In the Mexican War he again distinguished himself, leading a body of men 900 miles from San Antonio, Tex., to join Gen. Zachary Taylor for the battle of Buena Vista. He commanded the Dept. of the East when the Civil War broke out. In Aug. 1861 he was transferred to Va. and succeeded in keeping Fort Monroe from falling into Confederate hands. In May 1862 he occupied Norfolk and Portsmouth, Va., after the Confederate evacuation, and was promoted to the full rank of Maj. Gen., USA, May 16. This made him the fourth ranking general in the Federal service (junior only to McClellan, Fremont, and Halleck). In June he was given command of the Middle Dept. and headed the VIII Corps when it was created the next month. In Jan. 1863 he commanded the re-created Dept. of the East, and remained until he retired in July.

John E. Wool

Although the fortifications were not built, additional troops, however, were forwarded to garrison Harpers Ferry. On June 17th, Col. S. Graham, Fifth New York Artillery, was ordered to "detail one of his best companies"[13] to man the heavy guns at Harpers Ferry.

The following day, the Twenty-Third Regiment Illinois Volunteers, under Col. Mulligan, and the Twenty-Second Regiment New York State Militia,[14] were ordered to report to Col. Miles for duty.

These regiments were joined two days later by the Twelfth Regiment New York State Militia.[15]

Wool once again visited Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg, June 21st, and grew concerned for the safety of New Creek, west of the latter city, where $1,500,000 worth of stores were located.[16]

To afford protection for New Creek, Mulligan's Regiment was withdrawn from Harpers Ferry, June 23rd, and ordered to proceed to that point where Wool feared an enemy attack.[17]

On the day Mulligan's regiment proceeded to New Creek, Wool had in his Department a total force of 10,851, stationed at Baltimore, Annapolis, Harpers Ferry, Martinsburg and New Creek. This force included

[13]Special Orders No. 9, June 17, 1862, by command of Maj. Gen. Wool, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, pp.788.

[14]Special Orders No. 10, June 18, 1862, by command of Maj. Gen. Wool, Ibid.

[15]Special Orders No. 12, June 20, 1862, by command of Maj. Gen. Wool, Ibid., p.789.

[16]Wool to Stanton, June 22, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.424f.

[17]Wool to Miles, June 22, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.689f.

7,969 infantry, 2,248 cavalry and 634 artillery, " a very small force to guard a line extending from the Eastern Shore of Virginia to Annapolis, Baltimore, Harper's Ferry, Martinsburg, New Creek, and Winchester, and several other points."[18]

This was not all that troubled the aged General. Since he first took the protection of the railroad under his wing, he was "embarrassed" by Generals Banks and Sigel, who frequently issued orders for the removal of officers and troops from the B&O line, without giving him the slightest notice.[19]

But Wool's prime concern was aimed at the protection of the large quantities of military supplies and munitions intended for the armies of Banks, Sigel and Fremont. These stores were scattered at several depots, some at by-places without any protection. The inadequate safeguards prompted Wool to report the situation to the Secretary of War. Placing the blame on the Valley Generals, the old professional soldier fairly fumed:

> ...If the Union is not bankrupt it will not be because of the enormous waste and destruction of public property by men ignorant of the profession which called them into the field. Why, sir, they have furnished the rebels with arms, ammunition and other supplies sufficient to last them through a six months' campaign.
> Permit me to ask how long do you think the Northern States will submit to the enormous expenditures of money and the great

[18]Wool to Thomas, June 23, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.428f.

[19]Wool to Stanton, July 16, 1862, Ibid., p.477f.

waste of munitions of war, to say nothing of the thousands and tens of thousands of lives unnecessarily sacrificed?...[20]

These worrisome matters had given the old General, "no rest scarcely day or night...."[21]

To add to his problems, Wool received a report from Col. Miles, July 17th, that Confederate cavalry were approaching Winchester. Miles had no doubts of their objective, which he believed to be the W&P Railroad. Destruction of that line would sever communications between the garrison at Winchester and that at Harpers Ferry.[22]

In order to contend with the developing situation, Miles shifted the location of the Eleventh New York State Militia. Two companies were deployed at the Opequon bridge, one company at Summit Point, one company at Cameron, and four companies, with headquarters of the regiment, were positioned at Charles Town. "The Eleventh New York State Militia is commanded by Colonel Maidhof, composed of Germans of the better class, and will, in my opinion, give a good account of themselves in action...."[23]

Measures to remove the stores, supplies and sick at Winchester were initiated, but Brig. Gen. A. Sanders Piatt, commanding the detail at

[20]Wool to Stanton, July 16, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.477f.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Miles to Lt. Col. W. D. Whipple, Asst. Adj. Gen., July 17, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.723f.

[23]Ibid.

Winchester, vowed he would not evacuate the city, "as long as I have a man left."[24]

Piatt was not forced to make the supreme sacrifice, for on July 26th, he was relieved of command and replaced by Brig. Gen. Julius White.[25]

The rebels did not attack during the hot month of July, and Miles' Brigade continued their picket and outpost duties, while some won the affection of the local populace:

> ...The German guard now occupying Charlestown are great favourites with the people and exercise their police duties with kindness and consideration. They sing very well and a part of them serenaded Miss Amanda Crow the other night....[26]

While the Germans amused the people of Charles Town with their resonant voices, other troops in Miles' command were busily engaged in a more laborious pursuit:

> ...The Federalists are cutting the crops off the farms of Lucas, Lewis Washington, and Bob English, intending to appropriate them. This causes intense indignation among a certain class in Jefferson County....[27]

On August 8th, Miles' command was extended to include the troops stationed at Hagerstown, Williamsport, and Frederick, Md.[28]

[24]Piatt to Miles, July 21, 1862, Ibid., p.725.

[25]Special Orders, No. 24, July 26, 1862, by command of Maj. Gen. Pope, Ibid., p.728.

[26]Strother Journal, loc. cit., Vol. II, p.154.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Special Orders No. 57, August 8, 1862, by command of Maj. Gen. Wool, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.789.

Roving bands of rebel guerrillas continued to roam the countryside, collecting men, horses, and arms, but Col. Miles had no fears for the safety of the railroad lines and bridges under his protection.[29]

Suddenly, the enemy struck. At 4 p.m., August 23rd, a squadron of rebel cavalry attacked and captured a passenger train, between Harpers Ferry and Winchester. The rebels took the agent of the Adams Express and all on board prisoner, except two who managed to escape. They then burned the train, cut the telegraph and made off with the mail.[30]

The rebels then proceeded to Smithfield, west of the W&P line and surprised 20 pickets, under Lt. Robert H. Milling, from Capt. Henry A. Cole's Maryland Cavalry Battalion. Seventeen of the 20 enlisted men were captured, but Lt. Milling, Sergeant Winters and two other men escaped.[31]

Lt. Millings account of the skirmish failed to satisfy Col. Miles, who recommended drastic action be taken:

> ...This officer was esteemed trustworthy and attentive, and he was particularly charged to be vigilant and on the alert against surprise. His report is unsatisfactory, and he deserves signal punishment. I would advise his name to be stricken from the rolls of the army....[32]

[29]Miles to Whipple, Aug. 20, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.750.

[30]Garrett to Watson, Aug. 24, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.650; Miles to Whipple, Aug. 25, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.II, p.764; White to Pope, Aug. 24 (23), 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.652.

[31]Milling to Miles, August 25, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.II, p.765.

[32]Miles to Whipple, Aug. 25, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.II, p.764.

Miles' recommendation was indorsed by Maj. Gen. Wool, and Adj. Gen. L. Thomas. Asst. Sec. of War Watson approved the indorsements and Lt. Milling was dismissed from the service in disgrace.[33]

On August 27th, the Confederates struck again. This time at Waterford in Loudoun County, Va. About 23 men from Captain Samuel C. Means Loudoun Rangers were asleep in the Church at Waterford, when they were hit, about daybreak, by the fire power from 150 rebel cavalry.[34]

The rudely awakened Rangers fought until their ammunition was exhausted. In the exchange of fire, one private was killed and one lieutenant and six privates were wounded. Fifteen surrendered and were paroled, while the rebels carried two prisoners away, along with 30 horses and all the arms of the company. The Confederates lost six men killed and nine wounded. When the smoke cleared, the rebels retreated toward Snicker's Ferry.[35]

The dispersal of the Loudoun Rangers failed to arouse the sympathy of Col. Miles, who had little ~~time~~ use for the guerrilla band:

> ...Means' company, lately raised, without discipline, has committed all kinds of depredations on the inhabitants, living on them, taking what he pleased and when it suited him, until the arrival of his men in any vicinity was a dread and terror. This company was never placed under my command or I should

[33]Indorsements and approval, Ibid., p.764f.

[34]Miles to Halleck, Aug. 27, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.705; Miles to Whipple, Aug. 27, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.764f.

[35]Miles to Halleck, Aug. 27, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.705.

have removed him from Loudoun County long since....[36]

Although Miles was not anxious about the fate of Means' company, he was deeply concerned for the safety of the B&O, fearing that the rebels might be advancing in force. To resist a large scale attack, Miles had only three companies on the line between Harpers Ferry and Point-of-Rocks.[37]

General Wool, too, was worried. He wired Miles that two strong regiments and six pieces of artillery were enroute for Harpers Ferry, and promised to send a third during the course of the day.[38]

But instead of two regiments, Col. Miles received only one during the day and:

> ...the men belonging to it never had a gun in their hands until the boxes were opened and muskets issued to them yesterday; nor does an officer of the command...know how to drill or anything about the drill....[39]

Nevertheless, 200 men, under a field officer of the Eighty-seventh Ohio State Militia, and two 12-pounder smooth-bores, with a detachment from Captain Graham's Company, were dispatched to Point-of-Rocks to strengthen that position.[40]

[36]Miles to Whipple, Aug. 27, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.764f.

[37]Ibid.

[38]Wool to Miles, Aug. 27, 1862, Ibid., p.764.

[39]Miles to Whipple, Aug. 27, 1862, Ibid., p.766.

[40]Ibid., p.765.

The following day, August 28th, the recalcitrant Eighth New York Cavalry, who were earlier withdrawn from Harpers Ferry, were ordered to return. This time, the unit was provided with the much sought-after horses.[41]

Miles directed their commander, Col. Benjamin F. Davis, to proceed with the regiment to Summit Point on the W&P line. The responsibilities assigned the Eighth New York were twofold. First and foremost, the protection of the Winchester railroad. Secondly, if possible, the destruction of the Twelfth Virginia Cavalry, the regiment credited with the capture and burning of the passenger train August 23rd, and the attack on Means' independent company, August 27th.[42]

Capt. Cole was ordered the same day to proceed to Waterford with his Maryland Cavalry and unite with Captain Means' depleted company of Rangers. The principal object of these troops was to "...watch the movements of the enemy skedaddling from Manassas...."[43] Their vigil would not be a long one.

[41]Whipple to Col. B. F. Davis, Aug. 28, 1862, Ibid., p.768.

[42]H. M. Binney, Lt. and Aide-de-Camp, Aug. 31, 1862, Ibid., p.772f.

[43]Binney to Cole, Aug. 31, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.773.

Siege and Capture

Pope's short-lived army was soundly defeated on the plains of Manassas by Lee's "invincibles" in late August, and in early September, the victorious Confederates began their first northern invasion, as the disorganized and demoralized Union army fell back to the defenses of Washington.

On September 2nd, as the ponderous Southern army plodded northward, reinforcements were sent to Harpers Ferry from Washington,[1] and Gen. Julius White was commanded to abandon his fortifications at Winchester, immediately, and withdraw his force to Harpers Ferry.[2]

The evacuation of Winchester was commenced the evening of September 2nd, and by afternoon of the following day, the entire command had reached the town of Harpers Ferry. Owing to the lack of transportation facilities, White found it impossible to move all the Government property that had accumulated at his post. Four 32-pounders were spiked, the muzzles and sights battered, the trunnions strained, and balls wedged in the bores. All of the ammunition that could be loaded on the railroad cars was carried to Harpers Ferry, but about one-third was left at Winchester. This was destroyed in addition to some 70,000 pounds of forage and about 60,000 rations. The tools used in the construction of the Winchester fortifications were burned along with the property of the several commands.

[1]Wool to Stanton, Sept. 2, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.III, p.807.

[2]Halleck to White, Sept. 2, 1862, Ibid., p.800.

JULIUS WHITE

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-694

1816-1890. N.Y. A lawyer and legislator, he was commissioned Col. 37th Ill. (Fremont Rifles) Sept. 18, 1861 and led his regiment during Fremont's southwest Mo. expedition. Commanding 2, 3d Div., Army Southwest Mo. at Pea Ridge, he was promoted B.G. USV June 9, 1862 and commanded White's brigade. In the Army of the Ohio he commanded 1, 3, XXIII (Aug. 6-21, 1863); 4th Div., XXIII (June 24 - Aug. 6, 1863) and 2d Div., XXIII (Aug. 21 - Dec. 24, 1863) at Loudon and Knoxville. Breveted Maj. Gen. USV for war service, he resigned Nov. 19, 1864 and was later U.S. Minister to Argentina.



But the other guns, ammunition, and stores were brought safely to Harpers Ferry.[3]

While White's command drifted into town, Col. Miles recalled his men on the Winchester line and placed Cole's cavalry and the Eighth New York on the alert.[4]

The following day, General White was directed to proceed to Martinsburg and take command of the troops at and near that station, but was ordered to leave his own command and supplies with Col. Miles at Harpers Ferry.[5]

On September 5th, Miles notified Captain William T. Faithful, First Maryland Potomac Brigade Infantry, commanding officer at Frederick, Md., of the approaching enemy. Faithful gathered all commissary and quartermaster stores at Frederick and shipped them by rail to Baltimore. The hospital stores and convalescents were carted away to Pennsylvania. This done, Faithful proceeded with his men to Sandy Hook, where he arrived September 6th.[6]

While Union troops concentrated at Harpers Ferry, Lee's army splashed

[3]Report of Brig. Gen. Julius White on the evacuation of Winchester, Sept. 6, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.12, Pt.II, p.765f. The Military Commission that was organized to investigate the surrender of Harpers Ferry, was directed October 10, 1862, also to investigate and report upon the evacuation of Winchester. The commission exonerated White. The proceedings of the commission may be found in Ibid., p.766 et seq.

[4]Miles to Wool, Sept. 3, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.784.

[5]Wool to Miles, Sept. 4, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.181; Wool to White, Sept. 4, 1862, Ibid.

[6]Report of Capt. W. T. Faithful on the evacuation of Frederick, Sept. 8, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.136f.

across the Potomac at White's Ford, September 4-7, and encamped near Frederick.[7]

Although not properly equipped for such an invasion, lacking much of the material of war, facing a shortage of transportation facilities, and burdened with an army destitute of proper clothing and shoes, Lee felt, however, that the transfer of operations from the interior to the frontier offered several advantages.[8]

Virginia would be freed from the presence of Federal troops; the rich and fertile districts of Maryland would be available to sustain his army; and the possibility existed that Maryland would rise and join the Confederacy.[9]

On September 8th, Lee issued a proclamation to the people of Maryland, designed to arouse sympathy for the Confederate cause by asserting that the Southerners had entered Maryland as liberators. They would free the oppressed people of Maryland from the terrible yoke imposed on them by the tyrannical Federal Government.[10] But Lee was disappointed - there was no general uprising.

Lee selected the river crossing east of the Blue Ridge to threaten Washington and Baltimore and cause the withdrawal of the enemy from the south bank of the Potomac, where the presence of Federal troops endangered

[7]Lee's General Report, Aug. 19, 1863, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.144.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Ibid.

[10]O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.601f.

his communications. Having accomplished this result, Lee proposed to move his army into Western Maryland and establish his communications with Richmond through the Shenandoah Valley. Then, by threatening Pennsylvania, he would induce the Federal army to follow, and thus draw it from its base of supplies.[11]

Lee hoped that his advance to Frederick would lead to the evacuation of Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry, thus opening his line of communication through the Valley. But then the Federals remained steadfast, Lee planned to dislodge the enemy from these positions before concentrating his army west of the mountains.[12]

This objective would be achieved through the execution of the following order:

SPECIAL ORDERS, No. 191. HDQRS. ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA September 9, 1862

...The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the advance, and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by Friday morning take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of them as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harper's Ferry.

General Longstreet's command will pursue the main road as far as Boonsborough, where it will halt, with reserve, supply, and baggage trains of the army.

General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching

[11]Lee's General Report, August 19, 1863, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.145.

[12]Ibid.

Middletown will take the route to Harper's Ferry, and by Friday morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity.

General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomace at Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudoun Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning, Keys' Ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, co-operate with Generals McLaws and Jackson, and intercept retreat of the enemy.

General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, and supply trains, &c., will precede General Hill.

General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army, bringing up all stragglers that may have been left behind.

The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown.....

By command of General R. E. Lee:[13]

The army was on the move the following morning. General McLaws with his own and Anderson's Division /see Appendix XI for organizations of Confederates/, proceeded by way of Burkittsville to Pleasant Valley as the first move to carry out Lee's order to take possession of Maryland Heights.[14] The two divisions reached the Valley September 11th.

[13] O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.603f.

[14] Report of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws of operations September 10-17, October 21, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.852. Hereafter cited as McLaws Report.

Pleasant Valley runs north and south, bounded on the East by the Blue Ridge Mountains, and on the West by Elk Ridge. The southern portion of the Elk Ridge, overlooking the junction of the Potomac and Shenandoah rivers, is known as Maryland Heights. The irregular and rolling valley had one main road running along the foot of the Blue Ridge, and another along the base of the Elk Ridge. The latter road was little used and in dire need of repair.[15]

Pleasant Valley was approached from the east, at the south end of the Blue Ridge, by the B&O Railroad, turnpike, and C&O Canal. Other eastern approaches included roads over the ridge passing Burkittsville, a small town about a mile from the foot of the Blue Ridge; over Brownsville Gap; and by another through Crampton's Gap, about a mile north of the Brownsville Gap. Passing from the Valley going west were two roads, the one already mentioned along the south end of Maryland Heights, and another through Solomon's Gap, a depression in the Elk Ridge, about five miles north of the first.[16]

At the south end of the Blue Ridge, at the beginning of the pass coming from the east, is the small town of Weverton. Half-way between Weverton and Harpers Ferry, along the turnpike, is Sandy Hook. The road from Sandy Hook ran about the middle of the valley, and joined the main road along the foot of the Blue Ridge, about two miles from the Potomac.[17]

[15]McLaws Report, Op. cit., p.852f.

[16]Ibid., p.852f.

[17]Ibid., p.853.

LAFAYETTE McLAWS

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-691

1821-1897. Ga. USMA 1842; Inf. He had attended the Univ. of Va. before graduating from West Point, and then served on the frontier, in garrison, in the Mexican War, on the Utah Expedition, and in Indian fighting before resigning May 10, 1861 as Captain. Commissioned Maj. C.S.A. at first, he was elected Col. 10th Ga. on June 17, 1861 and was appointed B.G. C.S.A. Sept. 25, 1861. He fought at Yorktown before being promoted Maj. Gen. May 23, 1862. As a division commander he went with Jackson to capture Harpers Ferry, fought at Antietam, defended Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg, and served under Longstreet at Chancellorsville. His troops fought in the Peach Orchard and Devil's Den at Gettysburg. Accompanying Longstreet to the West, he was relieved for general lack of cooperation during the Knoxville campaign. After McLaws pressed for a court-martial, Longstreet restricted his charges to improper preparations for the attack on Fort Sanders (Knoxville) Nov. 29, 1862. The findings and their subsequent disapproval by Davis added up to a vindication of McLaws. He was then given command of the Dist. of Ga. and the defense of Savannah. After the Carolinas campaign he surrendered with Johnston's army. After the war he was in the insurance business, then with the Internal Revenue and Post Office departments.



On September 12th, McLaws renewed the advance. He directed General Wright's brigade of Anderson's division, to ascend the Blue Ridge with two pieces of artillery, proceed along the crest down to the point overlooking Weverton, where he would command the approaches to the pass there, along the turnpike, railroad and canal.[18]

General Semmes was left opposite the Brownsville Gap, with orders to deploy one brigade to Solomon's Gap and to take the necessary precautions to guard the passes over the Blue Ridge.[19]

Learning that a road ran from the top of Solomon's Gap along the Elk Ridge to Maryland Heights, McLaws directed General Kershaw, with his brigade and that of General Barksdale, to proceed along that road and carry the heights. This objective would have to be accomplished by infantry alone, as the terrain forbade the use of cavalry and artillery.[20]

General Cobb's brigade was ordered to cross Pleasant Valley and march along the base of the Elk Ridge. Cobb was instructed to maintain communications with Kershaw on the ridge, and lend him support if the need should arise.[21]

[18]McLaws Report, op. cit., p.853.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Ibid.

McLaws then moved down the valley, toward the Potomac, with the rest of his command, keeping in advance of Kershaw, while signal parties kept him informed of the Confederate advance along the Elk Ridge.[22]

General Wright gained his position on the Blue Ridge without opposition, and at sundown, General Anderson pushed forward General Pryor's brigade and took possession of Weverton. These troops were positioned to effectually defend the pass.[23]

The brigades of Generals Armistead and Cobb were moved up and formed a line across the valley from the right, to command the road from Sandy Hook.[24]

In the meantime, the Federal force at Harpers Ferry prepared for the expected attack. On September 5th, Col. Miles brigaded his command as follows:

First Brigade, Col. F. G. D'Utassy, Thirty-ninth New York, commanding: Thirty-ninth New York (Garibaldi Guard) Infantry; One hundred and eleventh New York Volunteers, Colonel Segoine; One hundred and fifteenth New York, Colonel Sammon; battery Fifteenth Indiana Volunteers, Capt. Von Sehlen.

Second Brigade, Colonel Trimble, Sixtieth Ohio, commanding: Sixtieth Ohio Volunteers, Colonel Trimble; One hundred and twenty-sixth New York, Colonel Sherril; Ninth Vermont Volunteers, Colonel Stannard; Potts' battery (substituted Rigby's subsequently).

[22]McLaws Report, op. cit., p.853.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Ibid.

Third Brigade, Col. Thomas H. Ford, Thirty-second Ohio, commanding: Thirty-Second Ohio Volunteers; battalion First Maryland Potomac Home Brigade, Maj. John A. Steiner; Captain McGrath, Company F, Fifth New York Heavy Artillery; Major Corliss' battalion Rhode Island cavalry; detachment First Maryland Cavalry, Captain Russell.

Fourth Brigade, Col. W. G. Ward, Twelfth New York State Militia, commanding: Twelfth New York State Militia, Colonel Ward; Captain Graham's company (A), Fifth New York Heavy Artillery; Captain Rigby's battery (Potts' substituted afterward); Eighty-seventh Ohio Volunteers, Colonel Banning.

Independent commands: First Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Regiment, Colonel Maulsby; Eighth New York Cavalry, Col. B. F. Davis; detachments companies First Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Cavalry, Captain Cole.[25]

In setting up his defenses, Miles deployed the First Brigade to the right wing of the line of battle on Bolivar Heights. The left wing was held by the Second Brigade.[26]

Maryland Heights, the key to the defense of Harpers Ferry, was assigned to the Third Brigade, while the Fourth Brigade dug in on Camp Hill.[27]

[25]Report of Lt. Henry M. Binney, Tenth Maine Infantry, aide-de-camp, of operations at Harpers Ferry September 1-15, September 18, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.533. Hereafter cited as Binney Report.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Ibid.

The First Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Infantry Regiment, and detachments from the First Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Cavalry, were positioned at Sandy Hook, while the Eighth New York Cavalry patrolled the streets in the lower town of Harpers Ferry.[28]

On the evening of the 12th, General White and his command, forced to abandon their post at Martinsburg by "Stonewall" Jackson's advancing hosts, arrived at Harpers Ferry. White notified Miles of his arrival:

> I have the honor to state that I arrived at this post last evening with my command, consisting of the following named troops: Twelfth Illinois Cavalry; Sixty-fifth Illinois Infantry; One hundred and twenty-fifth New York Infantry; Phillips' battery (four guns), Second Illinois Artillery.
>
> ...Your familiarity with the topography of the vicinity, the fact that the troops and the guns have been placed under your direction, coupled with the additional important fact that the enemy is in heavy force in the immediate vicinity, and skirmishing with their advance already commenced, render it improper, at least for the present, to deprive you of the command for the sole reason of superior rank, believing that the interests of the service would not be subserved thereby....[29]

To this offer Miles replied:

> Brigadier-General White, with a magnanimity equal to his valor, proffers to the undersigned, commanding officer of the post, his services and those of the troops brought with him, for its defense in its present necessity. This act of high-toned chivalric generosity, of which there are but few precedents in our army, overwhelms me with the deepest gratitude.
>
> I cheerfully accept the invaluable assistance of the gallant general, and will assign his troops to important positions....[30]

[28] Binney Report, p.533.

[29] White to Miles, Sept. 13, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.525.

[30] Miles to White, Sept. 13, 1862, Ibid.

This last arrival of Union troops brought Miles' command to a fighting strength of better than 14,000. /Appendix XII/

While White and his command retreated from Martinsburg, the brigades of Kershaw and Barksdale pushed along the Elk Ridge. The Mississippians and South Carolinians skirmished with Federal pickets at Solomon's Gap and drove them back along the ridge. At 6 p.m., the Confederates approached the Union abatis on Maryland Heights, about one mile from the point of the mountain. The abatis extended across the Heights, flanked on either side by a ledge of precipitous rocks. A sharp skirmish followed, but darkness called a halt to the fighting.[31]

Kershaw then deployed his brigade in two lines: The 8th South Carolina Regiment, Colonel Henagan, formed the right of the first line while the 7th South Carolina, Colonel Aiken, formed the left. The 3rd South Carolina Regiment, Colonel Nance, was placed in rear of the 8th, and the 2nd South Carolina Regiment, Colonel Kennedy, formed in rear of the 7th.[32]

Barksdale's Mississippi Brigade, consisting of the 13th, Lt. Col. Kennon McElroy; the 17th, Lt. Col. John C. Fiser; the 18th, Lt. Col. William H. Luse; and the 21st, Col. Benjamin G. Humphreys, was placed immediately in the rear of the South Carolina Regiments.[33]

[31] Report of Brig. Gen. J. B. Kershaw, of operations September 12-18, September 25, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.862f. Hereafter cited as Kershaw Report.

[32] Ibid., p.863.

[33] Ibid., for names of officers commanding Mississippi Regiments CF. Ibid., p.803.

When these dispositions were complete, the Confederates settled down for the night, and slept on their arms within speaking distance of the Union defenders.

As Kershaw and Barksdale advanced along the ridge during the day of September 12th, Col. Ford, commanding Maryland Heights was reinforced by a battalion of the 39th New York, under Major Hildebrant; one company of the 111th New York; and the 126th New York, under Col. Sherrill.[34]

When these reinforcements arrived, Ford ordered Col. Sherrill, with his regiment, and Major Hewitt, with five companies of the 32nd Ohio Volunteer Infantry, to the summit of Maryland Heights, to reinforce Captains Hibbets and Brown.[35]

Captain Crumbecker, 32nd Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and two companies of the 126th New York were left to guard the eastern slope of the Heights. Major Hildebrandt, with a portion of his battalion and two companies of the 32nd Ohio Infantry, were placed in position to defend Captain McGrath's heavy artillery.[36]

Captain McGrath, Fifth New York Artillery, commanding the naval battery of two 9-inch Dahlgrens, one 50-pounder rifled piece and four 12-pounder light howitzers, shelled the approaching enemy. His

[34]Report of Col. Thomas H. Ford, 32nd Ohio Infantry, of action on Maryland Heights, Sept. __, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.542. Hereafter cited as Ford Report.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Ibid.

THOMAS JONATHAN JACKSON

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-375

1824-1863. Va. USMA 1846; Arty. He served with distinction in Magruder's battery in the Mexican War and won two brevets. In 1851 he resigned to teach at V.M.I. Jackson's first wife died 14 months after their marriage, and he remarried a few years later. As events led up to the Civil War, Jackson commanded a company of V.M.I. cadets at John Brown's hanging and on Apr. 21, 1861 took the battalion of cadets to Richmond, where they were wanted as drillmasters for the mobilizing troops of Va. Appointed Col. of C.S.A. Inf., he was then ordered to Harpers Ferry where he organized the "Stonewall Brigade." Appointed B.G. C.S.A. June 17, 1861, he and his brigade distinguished themselves at 1st Bull Run. He was promoted Maj. Gen. October 7, 1861 and sent back to the Valley where he conducted his brilliant Valley Campaign. Joining Lee on the Peninsula, he then exhibited an amazingly inept leadership. In the 2d Bull Run campaign his mania for secrecy led to his failure at Cedar Mountain to take advantage of a strategic opportunity. Then, however, his genius showed itself again in his lightning envelopment of Pope's army and the battle of 2d Bull Run. In the Antietam campaign he continued to excel as a commander of independent operations. He was appointed Lt. Gen. on Oct. 10, 1862 and given command of the newly-established II Corps, Army of Northern Virginia. He had a prominent part in the battle of Fredericksburg and executed the audacious plan that resulted in the masterpiece of Chancellorsville. On May 2, 1862 he was mortally wounded by his own men and died eight days later of pneumonia resulting from his wounds.



GENERAL T. J. JACKSON.

THIS PHOTOGRAPH, was made from the Original Negative taken by N. Routzahn, i
Winchester, Va. just prior to the first Battle of Manassas, where the world famous titl
STONEWALL, was conferred upon him.

FOR SALE ONLY BY W. O. TOWNS, WINCHESTER, VA.

cannonading was joined by Captain Graham's battery on Camp Hill.[37]

While this action was taking place, General "Stonewall" Jackson with his own division and those of Generals A. P. Hill and Ewell, gathered quartermaster's, commissary, and ordnance stores, abandoned by General White at Martinsburg.[38]

These three divisions had left Frederick, September 10th, passed through Middletown, Boonsborough, and Williamsport, and crossed the Potomac into Virginia at Light's Ford, on September 11th. General Hill moved with his division on the turnpike direct from Williamsport to Martinsburg, while the divisions of Jackson and Ewell proceeded toward the North Mountain Depot, on the B&O, about seven miles northwest of Martinsburg, where they bivouacked for the night.[39]

The following morning, September 12th, the cavalry entered Martinsburg, and during the course of the day, the entire command occupied the town.[40]

Brig. Gen. John G. Walker's Division was at the mouth of the Monocacy when it received Special Orders No. 191. This division had been detailed to destroy the aqueduct of the C&O Canal, Walker's command arrived at the mouth of the Monocacy at 11 p.m., September 9th, and working parties were

[37]Report of Maj. Henry B. McIlvaine, Fifth New York Heavy Artillery, of operations at Harper's Ferry August 27-September 15, September 19, 1862, Ibid., p.547. Hereafter cited as McIlvaine Report.

[38]Reports of Lieut. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson, commanding Army Corps, of operations September 5-27, April 23, 1863, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.953. Hereafter cited as Jackson Report.

[39]Ibid.

[40]Ibid.

JOHN G. WALKER

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-705

1822-1893. Mo. After college he fought in the Mexican War and joined the R.A., resigning in 1861 to be commissioned Maj. of C.S.A. Cavalry Mar. 16. Soon promoted Lt. Col. and Col,, he led his brigade in Va. in Sept. of that year and was named B.G. C.S.A. Jan. 9, 1862. He served under Holmes in the Aquia Dist. and the Dept. of N.C. and was division commander in Southside, Va., during the 2d Bull Run campaign. Joining the Army of Northern Va. for the Antietam campaign, he led his division at Harpers Ferry, seizing Loudoun Heights, and at Antietam. Promoted Maj. Gen. Nov. 8, 1862, he led the Tex. infantry division in the Trans-Miss. Dept. and fought in the Red River campaign of 1864. In June 1864, he was given command of the Dist. of Tex., N. Mex., and Ariz., staying there until Mar. 31, 1865. After the war he was Consul Gen. at Bogota.



at once detailed to drill holes in preparation for blowing up the arches. After several hours labor, Walker gave up, when he discovered that the job would take several days instead of a few hours.[41]

Walker was about to rejoin the main Confederate army at Frederick when he received the orders to cooperate with Jackson and McLaws in reducing the garrison at Harpers Ferry. Finding Federal troops and artillery at Cheek's Ford, the morning of September 10th, Walker determined to cross the Potomac at Point-of-Rocks. The crossing was effected during the night of the 10th and the morning of the 11th. As his troops were so exhausted from two days and nights of marching, the General allowed them to rest at Point-of-Rocks. The following morning, September 12th, they marched in the direction of Harpers Ferry and encamped at Hillsborough that night.[42]

At about 6:30 a.m., September 13th, the fighting on Maryland Heights was re-newed at the Federal abatis.[43] Kershaw moved his first line forward, but early in the advance, the 8th South Carolina met a ledge of rock which cut them off from further participation in the initial attack. The 7th South Carolina Regiment, however, moved forward rapidly under heavy fire, surmounted the abatis, and drove the Federals from their

[41]Report of Brig. Gen. John G. Walker, commanding division of operations September 9-19, October 7, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.912f. Hereafter cited as Walker Report.

[42]Ibid., p.913.

[43]Ford Report, op. cit., p.543.

position in about twenty minutes.[44]

The Federals fell back about 400 yards to a second abatis, behind which was a breastwork of chestnut logs, extending across the mountain and flanked by precipitous ledges of rock.[45]

In conjunction with the advance of the South Carolina Regiments, General Barksdale was directed to form his Mississippi Brigade down the face of the Heights, to the Confederate left, in order to extend the two lines on the summit and to be in a position where he could attack the Federals on the flank and rear.[46]

After the Federals abandoned their first position, and the Mississippians were in line of battle, Barksdale was ordered to advance on the flank and rear, while Kershaw pressed in front with the 7th and 8th South Carolina Regiments.[47]

Kershaw's two regiments met stiff resistance as they approached the second Federal abatis. The opposing forces were within 100 yards of each other and the heavy fire was continued for some time. During this second frontal attack, the 7th and 8th South Carolina Regiments suffered heavy losses, and the 3rd South Carolina was sent in to relieve the

[44]Kershaw Report, op. cit., p.863. Ford claims this initial action lasted for two hours, before the Federals abandoned their first position.

[45]Ford Report, p.543; Kershaw Report, p.863; Report of Col. James D. Nance, Third South Carolina Infantry, of action on Maryland Heights, September 22, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.867. Hereafter cited as Nance Report.

[46]Kershaw Report, op. cit., p.863.

[47]Ibid.

bleeding 7th and 8th.[48]

The 3rd South Carolina leapfrogged the 7th regiment in an effort to carry the breastworks, but, on reaching the edge of the abatis they were stopped by the deadly fire spouting from behind the breastworks. Only seven companies from Col. Nance's 3rd regiment were in the thick of the fight, as Companies B and F, on the right, were precluded from the engagement by the terrain, and Company E had been detached earlier in the day on picket duty.[49]

Col. Nance thought it unwise to storm the breastworks with the bayonet, until he had engaged the enemy by fire for awhile, in order to learn more of the Federal strength and position.[50]

In the meantime, Barksdale's Mississippi Brigade gained the flank and rear of the breastwork, but could not take the crest of the Heights without being caught by the fire from the South Carolinians. Barksdale sent word of his situation to Kershaw, who immediately ordered the South Carolina Regiments to cease fire.[51]

This done, the right company of the 17th Mississippi Regiment, fired into a body of Federal sharpshooters lodged in the rock above them, and the entire Union line broke in panic and ran. This second

[48]Kershaw Report, op. cit., p.863.

[49]Nance Report, op. cit., p.867.

[50]Ibid.

[51]Kershaw Report, op. cit., p.863.

retreat occurred between 10:30 and 11:00 am.[52]

The panic was caused by the wounding of Col. Sherrill, 126th N.Y., who commanded the troops at the breatwork. When he fell, his regiment ran. The fear was contagious. As the 126th fled, the remainder of the troops retreated in disorder down the mountain.[53]

At this critical moment, Col. Miles and his staff arrived on Maryland Heights and the officers made every effort to reorganize the terrified troops and induce them to return to the field, "but as fast as we forced them up one mountain path they returned by another...."[54]

The men were partially rallied through the efforts of several officers, but again they broke and ran. In desperation, Col. Miles' aide-de-camp ordered the Garibaldians to bayonet the panic-stricken men if they attempted to break through the Garibaldians' lines.[55]

Skirmishing continued for sometime when Col. Ford, believing the Confederates to be advancing in heavy force, both on his front and left flank, gave the order to abandon the Heights.[56]

About 4,600 Federals then scrambled down the mountain, crossed the pontoon bridge, and marched to Bolivar Heights, while the guns from the naval battery were spiked. The time of evacuation was about 3:30 p.m.[57]

[52]Kershaw Report, op. cit., p.863; Ford Report, op. cit., p.543.

[53]Ford Report, p.543.

[54]Ibid.

[55]Binney Report, op. cit., p.536.

[56]Ford Report, op. cit., p.544.

[57]Ibid.; Binney Report, p.537.

Having complete possession of Maryland Heights, General McLaws then advanced his force in Pleasant Valley. General Cobb's brigade pushed forward and occupied Sandy Hook.[58]

Col. Maulsby, who had been defending Sandy Hook with four pieces, fell back. One section was placed at the pontoon bridge, while the other crossed the Potomac and was placed by the railroad bridge. These guns covered the retreat of the troops from Maryland Heights and held Cobb's brigade in check.[59]

In the meantime, General Jackson's three Divisions had been advancing toward Harpers Ferry. At about 11 a.m., September 13th, the head of his column came in view of Bolivar Heights. General Hill encamped near Halltown, while the other two divisions encamped nearby. Jackson, unable to establish communications with either McLaws or Walker, remained stationary for the remainder of the day.[60]

Walker's Division had reached the foot of the Blue Ridge, opposite Loudoun Heights, that morning. The 27th North Carolina and the 13th Virginia Volunteers were detached to Loudoun Heights, while the remainder of the Division was placed in a position to prevent the Federals from escaping down the south bank of the Potomac. Walker's Division retained this position for the rest of that day and night.[61]

[58]McLaws Report, op. cit., p.854.

[59]McIlvaine Report, op. cit., p.547.

[60]Jackson Report, op. cit., p.953.

[61]Walker Report, op. cit., p.913.

Thus, by late afternoon, September 13th, the Confederates were in complete possession of Maryland and Loudoun Heights, commanding Harpers Ferry, and Jackson was poised with three Divisions in front of Bolivar Heights, ready to strike.

The Federal position was desperate. That evening Col. Miles sent for Captain Russell, First Maryland Cavalry, and asked the Captain to "...pass the enemy's lines, and try to reach somebody that had ever heard of the United States Army, or any general of the United States Army, or anybody that knew anything about the United States Army, and report the condition of Harper's Ferry...."[62]

Russell agreed to try. He selected Captain Cole and nine men to attempt the breakthrough. They moved out later that night, keeping close to the bank of the Potomac until they neared Shepherdstown, where they crossed the Potomac near the mouth of the Antietam. Here they met Confederate pickets, put the spurs to their horses, dashed by the rebels, and followed some by-roads to South Mountain.[63]

At South Mountain, Captain Russell and his men, ran into 71 Confederate infantry. They got around these rebels by taking a road through the woods, then went directly over the center of South Mountain until they reached Middletown.[64]

[62]Testimony of Major Charles H. Russell presented to the Harpers Ferry Military Commission investigating the surrender of Harpers Ferry, O.R., S.I, V.19, PT.I, P.720. Russell was promoted after the surrender of Harpers Ferry.

[63]Ibid.

[64]Ibid.

At Middletown, Captain Russell reported to General Reno, who gave him a fresh horse and directed him to report to General McClellan, who was then at Frederick.[64]

Russell hopped in the saddle, rode to Frederick, reported to McClellan about 9 a.m., September 14th, and informed the General of the situation at Harpers Ferry.[65]

But McClellan already had some idea of the situation at Harpers Ferry, for on the previous day a copy of Lee's Special Orders No. 191, fell into his hands. Thus, McClellan was aware of the position of every Division under the command of Lee.[66]

At 6:20 p.m., September 13th, McClellan had ordered Gen. Franklin's VI Corps to Storm Crampton's Gap, cut off, destroy, or capture McLaws command and relieve Col. Miles,[67] but Franklin's Corps did not move until the morning of the 14th.[68]

Back at Harpers Ferry, as Franklin's VI Corps moved to relieve the surrounded post, the Federals prepared their defensive positions. The bridges were defended by eight companies of the First Maryland Potomac

[64]Testimony of Russell, op. cit., p.720.

[65]Ibid.

[66]Reports of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, commanding the Army of the Potomac, of operations August 14-November 9, October 15, 1862, Ibid., p.42.

[67]McClellan to Franklin, September 13, 1862, Ibid., p.45.

[68]Report of Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, commanding Sixth Army Corps, of the battle of Crampton's Pass, September 30, 1862, Ibid., p.374.

Home Brigade, the 87th Ohio Regiment, and a section of Captain Potts' battery.[69] These were placed under the command of Colonel Maulsby.

Camp Hill was occupied by Captain Graham's battery; four guns of Captain Potts' battery, two 24-pounder howitzers and two 20-pounder Parrott guns; and supported by the 12th Regiment New York State Militia, under the command of Colonel Ward.[70]

The right of Bolivar Heights was held by the brigade under command of Col. D'Utassy, 29th N.Y., consisting of the 29th, 111th and 115th N.Y., the 65th Illinois, and Captains Phillips and Von Sehlen's batteries. A slight earthwork was constructed on the right to protect the men of the batteries.[71]

The left of Bolivar Heights was held by the brigade under command of Col. Trimble, 60th Ohio, consisting of the 60th Ohio, 9th Vermont, and the 126th N.Y. with Captain Rigby's battery. A slight earthwork was also constructed on the left to protect the men operating the battery.[72]

The ground to the southeast of the Charles Town turnpike, and between it and the Shenandoah, was held by the Third Maryland Potomac Home Brigade, under Lt. Col. Downey. The remainder of the troops were placed upon the plateau adjacent to Bolivar Heights, and left under

[69] Report of Brig. Gen. Julius White of the siege of Harpers Ferry, Sept. 22, 1862, Ibid., p.526. Hereafter cited as White Report.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid., p.527.

[72] Ibid.

cover of ravines as much as possible.[73]

About noon, two companies of the 29th N.Y. and two from the 65th Illinois, recrossed the Potomac, climbed Maryland Heights to the Naval Battery and returned safely with the four brass pieces that had been spiked the day before when the Federals evacuated the mountain.[74]

During the morning of the 14th, the Confederates were engaged in cutting a road from Pleasant Valley to the summit of Maryland Heights, so they could carry artillery to the mountain top. By 2 p.m., Captain Read and Captain Carlton, under the direction of Major Hamilton, chief of artillery, McLaws Division, had two pieces from each of their batteries in position overlooking Bolivar Heights and the town of Harpers Ferry.[75]

General Walker, at daylight that morning, sent Captain French, with three Parrott guns and two rifle pieces of Branch's battery, under Lt. Martin, to the top of Loudoun Heights. Walker climbed the Heights and personally directed the placing of the guns.[76]

During the course of the day, a hot and heavy artillery duel developed: "...The cannonade is now terrific; the enemy's shell and shot fall in every direction; houses are demolished and detonation among

[73]White Report, op. cit., p.526f.

[74]Ibid., p.527.

[75]McLaws Report, op. cit., p.854.

[76]Walker Report, op. cit., p.913.

the hills is terrible...."[77]

In the afternoon, General A. P. Hill was ordered to move along the left bank of the Shenandoah, turn the Federal left, and enter Harpers Ferry. General Lawton, commanding Ewell's Division, was directed to move along the turnpike, in support of Hill, and otherwise to operate against the Federal left.[78]

General J. R. Jones, commanding Jackson's Division, was directed to demonstrate against the Federal right with one of his brigades and a battery of artillery, while the remainder of the division proceeded along the Charles Town turnpike, as a reserve.[79]

Major Massie, 12th Virginia Cavalry, commanding the cavalry, was ordered to keep on the Confederate left flank, in order to prevent the Federals escaping by that route.[80]

The demonstration on the left, against the Federal right, was executed by Winder's Brigade, Col. Grigsby commanding. The brigade was ordered to secure a commanding hill to the left of Bolivar Heights, near the Potomac. Grigsby dispersed some cavalry and gained the hill without any difficulty. Here, the batteries of Poague and Carpenter were emplaced and opened on the Federal right. That night, the Division

[77]Binney Report, op. cit., p.538.

[78]Jackson Report, op. cit., p.954.

[79]Ibid.

[80]Ibid.

was moved closer to the river with Starke's brigade resting on the river road to prevent any attempt at escape.[81]

Lawton moved along the turnpike, as directed, in three columns, one on the road and another on each side of it. The General continued the advance until he reached Halltown. Here he formed a line of battle and moved forward to the woods on School-House Hill. The brigades of Lawton and Trimble formed on the right of the road, while Hays' brigade formed on the left. General Jubal A. Early's brigade formed immediately to the rear. The batteries from this division were placed on either side of the road on School-House Hill. The division commanded by Lawton occupied these positions for the remainder of the day.[82]

General A. P. Hill, prior to executing his movement, shelled the woods over which his route lay, then moved obliquely to his right until he hit the Shenandoah. Moving down the river, Hill discovered some high ground, crowning the extreme left of the Federal line, bare of all earthwork and fortified only by an abatis of fallen timber. This hill was occupied by Federal infantry, but no artillery was in sight. Taking full advantage of the weak link in the Federal line, Hill directed Pender, Archer, and Brockenbrough to take the hill. The execution of this movement was intrusted to Pender, his own brigade being commanded by Col.

[81] Jackson Report, op. cit., p.954; Report of Brig. Gen. John R. Jones, of operations September 7-17, Jan. 21, 1863, Ibid., p.1007.

[82] Jackson Report, op. cit., p.954.

[83] Ibid.; Report of Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill of operations September 2-November 3, February 25, 1863, Ibid., p.980. Hereafter cited as Hill Report.

AMBROSE POWELL HILL

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-693

1825-1865. Va. USMA 1847; Artillery. He served in the Mexican War, in garrison, and in the Seminole wars and on the frontier before resigning Mar. 1, 1861 as 1st Lt. Commissioned Col. 13th Va., he served in W. Va. and was in the reserve at 1st Bull Run. Stationed in northern Virginia during the winter of 1861-62, he was appointed B.G., C.S.A. Feb. 26, 1862 and given a brigade. He fought at Williamsburg before being promoted Maj. Gen. May 26, 1862, and leading his division at Mechanicsville, Gaines' Mill and Frayser's Farm. Called "Hill's Light Division" for its speed in marching, this unit was sent to Jackson after Hill quarreled with Longstreet, and served at Cedar Mountain, 2nd Bull Run, Harpers Ferry, Antietam and Fredericksburg. At Chancellorsville he marched with Jackson and succeeded him until wounded himself. Named Lt. Gen. May 23, 1863, he took command of the newly-created III Corps, leading it through the Gettysburg and Wilderness campaigns. Absent on sick leave during the period May 8-21, 1864, he rejoined his corps for North Anna, Cold Harbor, and the Petersburg campaign. In the latter he rose to his greatest heights as a corps commander. In late March, 1865 he was again away on sick leave but returned for the final defense of Petersburg, in which he was killed. His wife was the sister of John H. Morgan of "Morgan's Raiders."

Brewer. The three brigades took the objective with little resistance, while Thomas' brigade followed as a reserve.[83]

While Pender fought to take the hill, the brigades of Branch and Gregg continued the march along the Shenandoah. During the night they took advantage of the ravines cutting the precipitous banks of the river, and established themselves on the plain to the left and rear of the Federal works.[84]

Pender's new position was strengthened materially when Lt. Col. Walker, Hill's chief of artillery, brought up the batteries of Captains Pegram, McIntosh, Davidson, Braxton, and Crenshaw, during the night.[85]

While these batteries were being emplaced, Col. Crutchfield, Jackson's chief of artillery, moved ten guns from the batteries of Dement, Brown, Garber, and Latimer, Lawton's division, up the Shenandoah to Kelly's Ford. Crossing the river at this point, the guns were moved down the other bank until opposite the left of the Federal line of intrenchments. Some difficulty was experienced in placing the guns, as a road had to be cut before they could be set in position.[86]

At about midnight, Gen. McLaws learned that the Federals were attempting to push through Crampton's Gap. Immediately, the brigades of Cobb and Semmes were dispatched to contest the Federal advance. Later,

[84]Hill Report, op. cit., p.980.

[85]Ibid.; Jackson Report, op. cit., p.954.

[86]Reports of Col. S. Crutchfield, Chief of Artillery, of operations September 13-19, April 16, 1863, Ibid., p.962.

Cobb asked for reinforcements, and Wilcox's brigade was at once ordered up. The brigades of Kershaw and Barksdale, with the exceptions of one regiment from the latter brigade and two pieces of artillery, were withdrawn from Maryland Heights, and were formed in line of battle across Pleasant Valley, about 1½ miles below Crampton's Gap. Generals Wright and Pryor were kept in position guarding the Weverton Pass, while Armstead and Featherston covered Sandy Hook.[87]

While the Confederates were executing these movements, 1,500 Federal cavalry composed of the 8th N.Y., 7th Squadron Rhode Island, 12th Illinois, and two companies of the First Maryland Cavalry, escaped under the noses of the Confederates. Led by Col. Benjamin F. Davis, 8th N.Y., and guided by Lt. Green, First Maryland Cavalry and Tom Noakes, a civilian scout, the horse soldiers started crossing the pontoon bridge about 8:30 that night. Turning left on the Maryland side, the cavalry galloped over the "John Brown Road" to Sharpsburg. Following back roads, the troops proceeded northward and when about two miles from Williamsport, on the Hagerstown-Williamsport Pike, Col. Davis and his men met and captured General Longstreet's ammunition train. The prize was driven to Greencastle, where the elated cavalry arrived about the 10 a.m., September 15th, amidst the cheers and applauds of an excited populace.[88]

[87] McLaws Report, op. cit., p.854f.

[88] Binney Report, op. cit., p.538; Luff, William M., "March Of The Cavalry From Harper's Ferry, September 14, 1862," Military Essays And Recollection, Papers Read Before The Commandery Of The State of Illinois, Military Order Of The Loyal Legion Of The United States, Vol. II, Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Co., 1894; Mies, John W., "Breakout at Harper's Ferry," Civil War History., published quarterly by the State University of Iowa, Vol. II, No. II, June, 1956.

As the cavalry approached Greencastle, the remainder of the troops at Harpers Ferry endured the bombardment of the Confederate gunners that commenced at daybreak. Federal artillerists returned the fire until about 8:00 a.m. when the long-range ammunition was exhausted. Col. Miles called a council of officers commanding brigades and conferred with them on the propriety of surrendering. It was the unanimous opinion of all officers present that it would be useless to resist any further, and at about 9 a.m., the white flag was displayed.[89]

Some Confederate gunners, however, failed to see the flag and continued the cannonade. After the surrender, Col. Miles started down the eastern slope of Bolivar Heights when a shell exploded immediately behind him, tearing the flesh completely from his left calf and slashing his right calf. The mortally wounded officer lingered on until 4:30 p.m. the following day, then died without a struggle.[90] /See Appendix XIII for conflicting account of Miles' death/

In this four-day battle, the Confederates suffered 283 casualties while 217 Federals were killed or wounded. Jackson's troops collected 47 pieces of artillery /Appendix XIV/ and some 13,000 small arms, in addition to other stores.[91]

[89] White Report, op. cit., p.526; Binney Report, op. cit., p.539. The time of surrender is variously given anywhere between 7:30 a.m. and 9:30 a.m., O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, et passim.

[90] Binney Report, op. cit., p.539f. The body was brought to Frederick, thence to Baltimore and on Friday, September 19, was buried at Sweet Air.

[91] Jackson Report, op. cit., p.955.

COL. DIXON S. MILES

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-32

September, 1862: "Col. Dixon S. Miles, Commanding Officer at Harpers Ferry, September, 1862." Photograph taken before the Civil War.

But the Confederates had no time to lose. General Lee was even then looking to his defenses in the vicinity of Sharpsburg, as McClellan's mammoth army pressed steadily onward. In obedience to Lee's orders, Jackson pulled his divisions from Harpers Ferry and proceeded to rejoin Lee in Maryland. Following a severe night's march, Jackson's troops reached the vicinity of Sharpsburg, the morning of September 16th.[92]

A. P. Hill was left at Harpers Ferry to gather the captured stores and arms, and to complete the terms of capitulation with General White, which stipulated that all officers and men captured were to be paroled, not to serve against the Confederate States until regularly exchanged.[93]

Hill's Division departed Harpers Ferry 6:30 a.m., September 17th to take part in the bloody battle raging along Antietam Creek;[94] a battle simply but graphically described by one of the participants who noted in his diary - "...today I saw some very hard fighting...there was great slaughter on both sides...."[95]

The paroled Federals marched from Harpers Ferry September 16th, and arrived at Frederick the same day. From Frederick, they marched to Annapolis, arriving there on the 22nd.[96]

[92] Jackson Report, op. cit., p.955.

[93] Terms of capitulation, Sept. 15, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.529f.

[94] Hill Report, op. cit., p.981.

[95] Johnson Civil War Diary, Harpers Ferry National Monument Microfilm Collection, R.40, V.9, p.852.

[96] White Report, op. cit., p.528.

With the departure of all troops, citizens from Sandy Hook, climbed Maryland Heights and performed the thankless task of burying the Union dead, while the bridges, destroyed by the Confederates, still smouldered.[97]

97 William C. Hall, operator, to Captain Eckert, September 18, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.325.

Harpers Ferry Re-Occupied

After Lee's withdrawal across the Potomac, following the carnage at Antietam, a Union reconnaissance force entered Harpers Ferry, the night of September 19th, to ascertain whether or not any Confederates still remained in the town. No enemy was discovered. The only troops found were some 300 sick and wounded Federals. Although no Confederates were located in Harpers Ferry, their mark was visible everywhere. "...Everything is destroyed...."[1]

On learning that the area was free from rebels, McClellan ordered Williams' Twelfth Army Corps to proceed from Sharpsburg, by way of Rohrersville and Brownsville, and occupy Maryland Heights.[2] The Twelfth Corps moved out and reached the Heights at 1 p.m., September 20th.[3]

Williams' Corps had hardly reached the vicinity of Harpers Ferry when McClellan telegraphed Washington with the request that the President of the C&O Canal be asked to repair the canal at once, a project which the General evaluated as "...indispensably necessary for ulterior military operations...." When this job should be completed, McClellan also requested that all the small steamers operating on the canal be sent to Harpers Ferry.[4]

[1]Brig. Gen. George Stoneman to Gen. Banks, September 20, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.335f.

[2]R. B. Marcy, Chief of Staff to Maj. Gen. Sumner, September 19, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.850.

[3]Marcy to Maj. Gen. Burnside, September 20, 1862, Ibid., p.855f.

[4]McClellan to Halleck, September 20, 1862, 3 p.m., Ibid., p.854.

The day after the Twelfth Corps occupied Maryland Heights, General Meade's First Army Corps and General Sumner's Second Army Corps were ordered to proceed to a point opposite Harpers Ferry where they were to wait until a new pontoon bridge could be thrown across the Potomac.[5]

Sumner was directed to cover the construction of the pontoon bridge, and as soon as it was completed, one division from Williams' Twelfth Corps was directed to occupy Loudoun Heights, while one division from the same corps was left on the Maryland Heights.[6]

The Second Corps was directed to occupy Bolivar Heights while General Burnside was instructed to forward boat howitzers to Harpers Ferry, where they would be emplaced on Loudoun Heights. Burnside was also ordered to move his Ninth Corps to Harpers Ferry at daylight, September 23rd, but he was delayed and did not march until October 7th.[7]

The pontoon bridge arrived at Harpers Ferry the evening of September 23d,[8] and was in place by the following day,[9] thus allowing the four army corps to fulfill their orders and occupy the points indicated. /See Appendix XV for organization of 1st, 2nd, 9th, and 12th Army Corps/

[5]Marcy to Meade and Sumner, September 21, 1862; O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.856.

[6]Marcy to Sumner, September 22, 1862, Ibid., p.858.

[7]Ibid.; McClellan to Halleck, Oct. 8, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.394.

[8]McClellan to Halleck, Sept. 24, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.353.

[9]McClellan to Halleck, September 25, Ibid., p.358.

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-348

October, 1862: "War in Virginia: General Geary's Division Crossing the Shenandoah from Harper's Ferry to take Possession of Loudoun Heights," from Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, November 15, 1862, page 117.



-GENERAL GEARY'S DIVISION CROSSING THE SHENANDOAH FROM HARPER'S FERRY TO TAKE POSSESSION OF LOUDON HEIGHTS —FROM A SKETCH BY OUR SPECIAL ARTI

The object in repairing the canal, constructing the pontoon bridge and concentrating the larger part of the Army of the Potomac at Harpers Ferry was clear. McClellan planned to make Harpers Ferry his supply base when he followed up his victory at Antietam by pursuing Lee's shattered remnants down the Valley. But McClellan was in no hurry.

In the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, the Army of the Potomac lost ten general officers, as well as several regimental and company officers. The loss in the ranks was appalling. The survivors were so exhausted from overwork, long marches and hard fighting that they were, in the opinion of the commanding general, unfit for an immediate active campaign. Not until he could rest, refit, re-organize and re-fill the depleted ranks would McClellan feel prepared to re-new the offensive.[10]

Furthermore, McClellan had intercepted a message from Gen. Lee to Col. Munford, instructing the latter to gather the large number of cooking utensils which were reportedly lying about Harpers Ferry, and bring them to Winchester.[11] This misled McClellan to believe that Lee was receiving large reinforcements, and, as he already believed that Lee possessed an overwhelmingly superior force, it is not difficult to understand McClellan's reluctance to move his army immediately.

While McClellan licked his wounds, Lee, down but not out, lurked in the Valley and toyed with the idea of re-invading Maryland by crossing

[10]McClellan to Halleck, Sept. 22, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.342f.

[11]McClellan to Halleck, September 23, 1862, Ibid., p.346.

the Potomac at Williamsport and marching on Hagerstown.[12] But his army was in no condition for such a move. The staggering loss at Antietam was insignificant compared with Lee's losses by an old killer of armies - straggling. "...many have wandered to a distance, feigning sickness, wounds, &c., deceiving the guards and evading the scouts. Many of them will not stop until they reach their distant homes...."[13]

Forage was scarce and many of the horses were so overworked and underfed that death was a certainty. The men in the ranks faced a critical shortage of clothes, blankets, and particularly shoes. "...The number of barefooted men is daily increasing, and it pains me to see them limping over the rocky roads...."[14] Taking all these factors into consideration, Lee discarded his plans to re-enter Maryland and hoped that he would be able to draw the Federals into the Valley, where he believed he could operate at an advantage.[15]

Meanwhile, McClellan set about the work of re-building his army. On September 24th he submitted a request for twenty new regiments to be sent him for distribution among the various corps.[16] A few days later the

[12]Lee to President Davis, September 25, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.626f.

[13]Ibid., p.627.

[14]Lee to Davis, September 28, 1862, Ibid., p.633.

[15]Lee to Davis, September 24, 1862, Ibid., p.625 .

[16]McClellan to Halleck, September 24, 1862, Ibid., p.354.

request was fulfilled when the twenty regiments boarded the cars at Washington and de-trained at Frederick.[17] /Appendix XVI/ In addition to these regiments, two companies of heavy artillery were forwarded to Harpers Ferry to man the heavy guns on Maryland Heights.[18]

In a further effort to gain additional troops, McClellan suggested that hospital and staff offices be inspected, "...to ferret out the old soldiers hidden away therein. Such an inspection would produce more fruit in one week than the recruiting service can in three months...."[19]

Measures to round up stragglers were initiated. General Sumner was ordered to scour the countryside about Harpers Ferry, "...for the purpose of arresting all marauders and stragglers that may be found on the highway, in the fields, in the woods, or in or about the dwellings of the inhabitants. It is feared that many of our men have absented themselves from their regiments, and are actually living upon the people of the country...."[20]

Having done everything possible to enlarge his army, McClellan directed his attention to other matters. If he was going to advance in force, utilizing Harpers Ferry as his supply base, it was essential that the destroyed communications be restored. McClellan recommended that a

[17]Banks to McClellan, Sept. 29, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.368.

[18]McClellan to Banks, Sept. 24, 1862, Ibid., p.356; Banks to McClellan, Sept. 25, 1862, Ibid., p.359.

[19]McClellan to Brig. Gen. Lorenzo Thomas, Adj. Gen., Sept. 28, 1862, Ibid., p.365.

[20]S. Williams, Asst. Adj. Gen. to Gen. Sumner, Sept. 29, 1862, Ibid., p.370.

permanent double-track wagon bridge be thrown across the Potomac, and another be built over the Shenandoah. "...I cannot too strongly urge the importance of expedition in this matter. Until this or the railroad bridge is finished, it is scarcely possible to advance from Harper's Ferry, in force, and as that is clearly our true line of operations, I need not urge upon you the necessity of completing our communications there."[21]

On September 26th, McClellan visited Maryland Heights and "...determined to fortify them, as well as the heights on the opposite side of the river, in order to avoid a similar catastrophe to the one which happened to Colonel Miles...."[22] McClellan requisitioned 2,000 contrabands to perform the labor on the proposed fortifications,[23] and General Sumner was requested to furnish such assistance as was necessary to the engineer in charge of erecting the works.[24]

In late September, Halleck questioned the advisability of expending large sums of money for a permanent type wagon bridge, and expressed doubts as to the wisdom of converting Harpers Ferry into a supply base. He had hoped that McClellan would cross the river lower down the Potomac, thus providing protection for Washington and eliminating the need for

[21]McClellan to Halleck, Sept. 24, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.354f.

[22]McClellan to Halleck, Sept. 26, 1862, Ibid., p.360.

[23]McClellan to Halleck, Sept. 27, 1862, Ibid., p.362.

[24]Marcy to Sumner, Sept. 26, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.863.

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-209

November, 1862: "Signal Station on Maryland Heights," original drawing by A. R. Waud, from Library of Congress, published in Harper's Weekly, November 15, 1862, page 733.

retaining a large force in the city. "...It seems to me," he opined, "that Washington is the real base of operations, and that it should not under any circumstances be exposed...."[25]

To these objections, McClellan retorted that whatever line of operation was adopted, he took it for granted that Harpers Ferry would be a permanent post, and for that reason, a permanent and reliable bridge, both over the Potomac and Shenandoah, was needed.[26]

But Halleck was adament. He vetoed McClellan's plans to build the wagon bridges, arguing that it would delay his army for sometime and the Government was anxious for McClellan to move. "...why not cross at once and give battle to the enemy?"[27]

Although wagon bridges were not provided, work commenced in reconstructing the B&O railroad bridge. The reconstruction train had arrived at Harpers Ferry, September 24th. Here, the work crew found that iron spans Nos. 3 and 4, and the Winchester iron span had been blown up and were laying in confused masses in the river. The trestling in the other spans had all been destroyed, but the piers, at least, were in good condition.[28] The rebels had tried five times to blow up the piers, but were frustrated with each attempt.[29]

[25]Halleck to McClellan, Sept. 27, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.360.

[26]McClellan to Halleck, Oct. 1, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.10.

[27]Halleck to McClellan, Oct. 1, 1862, Ibid.

[28]Thirty-Sixth Annual Report, B&O RR, loc. cit., p.56.

[29]Hall to Eckert, Sept. 18, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.325.

Several railroad cars had been burned along with Engines Nos. 166 and 30. The latter engine was hanging in the trestlework at the west end of the bridge, while many of the destroyed cars had been run into the river and the C&O Canal.[30]

On the 25th, workmen began the job of removing the wrecked cars and engines and the iron bridge from the river and canal. At the same time, the job of repairing the iron trestling was initiated.[31] By October 2nd, the trestling in the Potomac was complete and the curved spans were finished on the 8th. On October 29th, some loose hay under the iron trestling in Harpers Ferry caught fire through the carelessness of soldiers cooking their meals. The fire quickly spread to a train of twenty-three cars loaded with hay, and burned 550 feet of the wood work on the iron trestling. To prevent further damage, the train was run over to the Maryland side of the Potomac where it continued to burn until the cars were completely destroyed.[32]

As work on the railroad was in progress, Harpers Ferry received an unexpected visitor. At 1:30 p.m., October 1st, the President of the United States stepped off a special train provided by the B&O Railroad. McClellan had been forewarned of the visit, and at the moment Lincoln

[30] Thirty-Sixth Annual Report, B&O RR, loc. cit., p.56f.

[31] Ibid., p.57.

[32] Thirty-Seventh Annual Report, B&O RR, pp.41ff. From Nov. 1862 to April, 1863, the B&O replaced the temporary bridge at Harpers Ferry with iron spans, Cf., Ibid., p.43 et seq.

arrived,[33] he appeared at General Sumner's headquarters.

Lincoln and his party were loaded in an ambulance, and, as it proceeded to Sumner's headquarters, Captain John A. Tompkins' Battery A, First Rhode Island Light Artillery, drawn up on the crest of Bolivar Heights, fired the presidential salute of twenty-one guns.[34]

A brief conference was held at Sumner's Headquarters, in the residence of the Armory Superintendent, then, at 4 p.m., the President and party, accompanied by a host of general officers, were in motion reviewing Sumner's Second Corps.[35]

The entire Corps was drawn up for review along the summit of Bolivar Heights. Lincoln mounted a horse and rode along the front and into the ranks of the massed soldiers, accompanied by McClellan, Sumner, and the Divisional Commanders of the Second Corps.

> ...The drums were beating, the colors were dipped and the troops presented arms as the President passed each regimental unit. Sad and taciturn, the President moved along the front of the thinned ranks, responding to each salute by raising his hat. He made no speech, but on several occasions made some kindly comment to officers and enlisted men. Thunderous cheers were given for Old Abe, and, according to a war correspondent who was attached to Sumner's Corps, the morale of the whole Corps was measurably heightened by the visit of the President....[36]

[33]Stutler, Boyd B., "Mr Lincoln at Harpers Perry," The West Virginia Review, February, 1944, p.6f. Hereafter cited as Stutler, followed by page number.

[34]Stutler, loc. cit., p.7.

[35]Ibid., p.8.

[36]Ibid.

After the review, Lincoln visited each artillery outpost, then returned to the town where he inspected the pontoon bridge and reviewed the progress reached in reconstructing the railroad bridge. Much of his time was devoted to looking over the fire engine house, where John Brown made his stand.[37]

At the Potomac, McClellan separated from the President and returned to his headquarters at Sharpsburg. Lincoln returned to Sumner's headquarters where he spent the night. But before turning in, he was serenaded by the band of the Second Cavalry.[38]

The following morning, the President visited Loudoun Heights where he reviewed and inspected the troops, then climbed Maryland Heights for the same purpose. But the officer commanding Maryland Heights was not notified of the expected visit, consequently no preparations had been made to receive the President.

> ...The men were called up hurriedly from their tents and cooking shed and formed a ragged line to salute the Commander in Chief as he rode by. But there was no lack of enthusiasm - the men cheered just as lustily as at any other place in the Harper's Ferry sector....[39]

In the afternoon, Lincoln departed for Sharpsburg to review the troops in that vicinity and to inspect the battlefield. The trip was made in an army ambulance, keeping to the Maryland side of the river -

[37]Stutler, loc. cit., p.8.

[38]Ibid., p.9.

[39]Ibid.

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-31

C. October or November, 1862: "The Federal Camp on Bolivar Heights /sic-actually Camp Hill/, 1862."

the same road over which John Brown and his raiders marched on Harpers Ferry.[40]

McClellan was deeply suspicious of Lincoln's surprise visit and confided his misgivings in a private letter dated October 2nd: "...His ostensible purpose is to see the troops and the battle-field; I incline to think that the real purpose of his visit is to push me into a premature advance into Virginia. I may be mistaken, but think not...."[41]

McClellan's analysis of Lincoln's intentions was accurate, for when the President returned to Washington, a telegram was sent to the General of the Army of the Potomac, which he received October 7th; and which left no doubt in his mind as to the President's wishes.

> ...The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your line of operations, you can be re-enforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the Valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent you. The President advises the interior line, between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what line you adopt and when you intend to cross the river....[42]

In reply, McClellan stated his intentions to adopt the line of the Shenandoah for his operations against Lee's army at Winchester, and informed the General-in-Chief that it would be at least three days

[40]Stutler, loc. cit., p.9.

[41]McClellan, George B., McClellan's Own Story, New York: Charles L. Webster & Company, 1887, p.654.

[42]Halleck to McClellan, Oct. 6, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.10f.

before his army would be ready to move. "...I beg to assure you that not an hour shall be lost in carrying your instructions into effect...," McClellan promised.[43]

Three days came and went, still the Grand Army lingered; but on the 8th McClellan moved his headquarters from Sharpsburg to the vicinity of Harpers Ferry.[44] Again the President prodded McClellan. On October 13th, he wrote, somewhat condescendingly:

> My Dear Sir: You remember my speaking to you of what I called your overcautiousness. Are you not overcautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim? As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do, without the railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpeper Court-House, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you, and in fact ignores the question of time, which cannot and must not be ignored....[45]

Lincoln continued in some length, almost as teacher to pupil, giving McClellan his views and ideas on how he should conduct the operation. But this lengthy dissertation on strategy failed to move McClellan, however, four days later he answered the President's letter and promised Lincoln

[43]McClellan to Halleck, Oct. 7, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.11

[44]McClellan to Halleck, Oct. 8, 1862, Ibid., Pt.II, pp.402-403.

[45]Lincoln to McClellan, Oct. 13, 1862, Ibid., Pt.I, p.13f.

he would give his views "...the fullest and most unprejudiced consideration...."[46]

McClellan placed the blame for the delay in moving the army, not on himself, but on the Quartermaster Department. He complained bitterly that he was not receiving the clothing, shoes, blankets, horses and other supplies which he needed to carry on an offensive campaign. The breakdown in supply, he complained, was the sole factor that detained him and unless his requisitions were filled, he would not be able to move.[47]

M. C. Meigs, Quartermaster-General, investigated the complaints, and found, according to his records, that "everything called for in the way of clothing from this department, except blankets, had gone forward...."[48] In addition to supplying the Army of the Potomac with a large quantity of mules for transportation purposes, Meigs discovered that McClellan's command had been supplied with 9,254 horses since the Antietam Campaign. "...Is there an instance on record of such a drain and destruction of horses in a country not a desert?" he bemoaned.[49]

McClellan lashed back that this was not the case. He asserted that he never received anywhere near the number of horses Meigs claimed to

[46]McClellan to Lincoln, Oct. 17, 1862, Ibid., p.16.

[47]McClellan to Halleck, Oct. 11, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.12; McClellan to Halleck, Oct. 12, 1862, Ibid., p.13.

[48]Meigs to Halleck, Oct. 12, 1862, Ibid., p.12f.

[49]Meigs to Halleck, Oct. 14, 1862, Ibid., p.15.

have forwarded. Although he conceded that the Quartermaster-General may have ordered the clothing and other articles to be shipped, they did not reach McClellan's depots. "...The soldiers of this army have for some time past been suffering for clothing, and I am constrained to believe it in a great degree owing to the want of proper action on the part of the Quartermaster's Department...."[50]

Stung to the quick by this slanderous attack on his Department, Meigs refuted McClellan's charges in a lengthy report to General-in-Chief Halleck.[51] The heated debate had reached a boiling point, and worse yet, the assertion that McClellan's army could not move during the fine weather of the fall, because of lack of supplies, had reached the public. At this point, Secretary of War Stanton entered the picture and demanded a full investigation.[52]

The investigation was conducted by Halleck who concluded:

> ...that no armies in the world while in campaign have been more promptly or better supplied than ours.... In my opinion there has been no such want of supplies in the army under General McClellan as to prevent his compliance with the orders to advance against the enemy. Had he moved to the south side of the Potomac, he could have received his supplies almost as readily as by remaining inactive on the north side....

In the course of the investigation Halleck learned that the number of animals with McClellan's army on the Upper Potomac was more than

[50]McClellan to Halleck, Oct. 18, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.16f.

[51]Meigs to Halleck, Oct. 21, 1862, Ibid., pp.17ff.

[52]Stanton to Halleck, Oct. 27, 1862, Ibid., p.7.

31,000. It was further uncovered that on October 21st, 20,000 pairs of boots and shoes were at the Harpers Ferry depot; 10,000 more were on their way; and 15,000 more were ordered. By the 25th, 48,000 pairs had been received by the quartermaster of McClellan's army at Harpers Ferry, Frederick and Hagerstown. In reference to the shortage of clothing, Colonel Ingalls, aide-de-camp and chief quartermaster to General McClellan testified that the reports were exaggerated. The clothing arrived and was issued, but still more was wanted. "...Our department," he concluded, "is not at fault. It provides as soon as due notice is given. I foresee no time when any army of over 100,000 men will not call for clothing and other articles."[53] /See Appendix XVII for items sent to McClellan during this period/

While accusations and counter-accusations were flung right and left, McClellan was fighting a losing battle to erect permanent fortifications in the Harpers Ferry complex. Lieutenant C. B. Comstock, Corps of Engineers, was entrusted with the project of arranging and superintending the defenses of Harpers Ferry.[54] Completing his examination of the ground, Lt. Comstock submitted his recommendation. Bolivar Heights, he contended, should have a nearly continuous infantry parapet from river to river, supported by four redoubts, containing a total of thirty guns. The crests

[53]Halleck to Stanton, Oct. 27, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, pp.7ff. Ingalls quoted by Halleck. See also Ingalls to Meigs, Oct. 26, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, pp.491ff.

[54]McClellan to Halleck, Oct. 6, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.387.

of Maryland and Loudoun Heights should each be occupied by a line of stone block-houses or redoubts. A part of each of these lines was to serve as one side of an intrenched camp for 3,000 men, while the other sides of the camp were to be strengthened by log block-houses. These could be utilized partly as quarters for the troops. Each of these camps, which were to be located on the slopes facing Harpers Ferry, was to be armed with six or eight light guns. Comstock suggested that twelve 20-pounder Parrotts be put in embrasure on the Heights of Harpers Ferry to command the slopes not visible from the proposed camps. The naval battery on Maryland Heights was to be covered by a redoubt. The fortifications as proposed could be held by a garrison of 12,000 men. Total cost of the project - $50,000.[55]

Halleck must have shuddered when this proposal was submitted, perhaps visualizing McClellan's army working on fortifications for the next several weeks or months, while Lee's legions roamed at will. In any event, he rejected the plan of extensive fortifications and suggested, as an alternative, that McClellan confine the fortifying of Harpers Ferry to field defenses. Halleck's proposal was speedily approved by the Secretary of War.[56]

Still McClellan persisted, insisting that the erecting of fortifications had nothing to do with active operations concerned with the Army

[55]Comstock to Capt. J. C. Duane, Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.441f.

[56]Halleck to Stanton, Oct. 19, 1862, Ibid., p.442f; Approved by Secretary of War, Oct. 20, 1862, Ibid., p.443.

of the Potomac, but stood as a separate and distinct project.[57] But Halleck was unyielding. He agreed that the heights at Harpers Ferry should be fortified, but was adamant in the opinion that field batteries and temporary block-houses would suffice. Stone works and permanent fortifications were definitely not approved.[58]

While McClellan was feuding with his superiors, the re-organization of the Army of the Potomac continued. New regiments were distributed among the Corps or were brigaded and assigned a division; divisions were shifted and commanding officers were re-shuffled. On October 7th, Maj. Gen. D. N. Couch, U. S. Volunteers, succeeded Sumner in command of the Second Corps.[59] On the 13th, Burnside, commanding the Ninth Corps, was assigned to the general charge of the defenses at Harpers Ferry, and the Second and Twelfth Corps were placed under his orders.[60] The Twelfth Corps received a new commander October 15th, when Maj. Gen. H. W. Slocum, U. S. Volunteers was assigned the command.[61]

Military routine was uninterrupted. The men still drilled; performed guard and picket duties; scouted daily; and went out on occasional reconnaissance. On the 1st of October, Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball's

[57] McClellan to Halleck, Oct. 23, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.469; McClellan to Halleck, Oct. 23, 1862, Ibid., p.470f.

[58] Halleck to McClellan, October 23, 1862, Ibid., p.470.

[59] Special Orders No. 274, Oct. 7, 1862, Ibid., p.400.

[60] Special Orders No. 280, Oct. 13, 1862, Ibid., p.420.

[61] Special Orders No. 282, Oct. 15, 1862, Ibid., p.431.

AMBROSE EVERETT BURNSIDE

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-702

1824-1881, Ind. USMA 1847; Artillery. After service in Mexican and Indian wars, he resigned in 1853 to manufacture firearms in Bristol, R.I.; invented breech-loading rifle (1856); Maj. Gen. R.I. Mil. (1855-1857); treasurer of Illinois Central R.R. in 1861. Entered Civil War as Col. of 1st R.I. Volunteers; commanded brigade at 1st Bull Run and promoted B.G.; led successful expedition against coastal installations in N.C., gaining promotion to Maj. Gen. and reputation for independent command. Twice refused offer to command Army of Potomac. Again offered command of Army of Potomac, he accepted only on the urging of other generals who did not want Hooker to have the position. Relieved of command after Fredericksburg, he consented to remain in the army in subordinate positions. As commander of the Army of the Ohio (Mar. 25 - Dec. 12, 1863) he succeeded in the capture of Morgan's Raiders and the siege of Knoxville. Returning to the East as commander of the IX Corps, he fought in the Battle of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna, Totopotomoy, Bethesda Church. He was again relieved of command for mishandling troops in the Petersburg mine assault. After the war he was successful in engineering and managerial work with several railroads; Governor of R.I. in 1866 and twice re-elected; then served as U.S. Senator from that state until his death.

Brigade, 3rd Division, 2nd Corps, left Bolivar Heights in the early morning hours to reconnoiter Leesburg. The brigade consisted of the 4th and 8th Ohio, 14th Indiana, 7th Virginia, 132nd Pennsylvania and the 6th U. S. Cavalry, supported by four 3-inch rifled pieces of horse artillery and Frank's battery (1st N.Y. Light, Battery G) of light 12-pounders. Crossing the Shenandoah over a pontoon bridge, the brigade marched, "by an exceedingly rough and difficult road," along the south-west bank of the Potomac to Dutchman's Creek. This creek is a mountain brook that empties into the Potomac at the easterly base of Short Mountain, about five miles from Harpers Ferry. Following the road which led up the gorge, through which the brook ran, the brigade passed into the Catoctin Valley, by way of Lovettsville.[62]

Rebel cavalry, under command of Captain White, had been marauding and pillaging in Lovettsville and the adjacent countryside. A Mr. Stone-burner, merchant and Union sympathizer from that village, complained that the rebels raided his store, robbed him of everything he had and destroyed what they could not carry with them.[63]

In pursuit of the raiders, Kimball advanced his brigade along the road toward Waterford. His advance guard surprised six rebel pickets at the village, and quickly made them prisoner. From what the villagers could tell him, Kimball gathered that the rebel cavalry were at Leesburg.

[62]Kimball to Lt. Col. J. H. Taylor, Chief of Staff and Asst. Adj. Gen., Oct. 3, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.14.

[63]Ibid.

In hopes of capturing the Confederate cavalry, the brigade pushed on as rapidly as possible, reaching the summit of the Catoctin Mountains, about 1½ miles from Leesburg, at 8 p.m. that evening. But they were too late. Earlier that day, 2,000 rebels left Leesburg, in the direction of Aldie. Darkness prevented further pursuit. Kimball posted three squadrons of cavalry and three guns on the summit of the mountain, while the main body encamped at the intersection of the Waterford road with the Leesburg and Winchester turnpike. Pickets were posted in every direction, and here the men slept on their arms.[64]

At dawn, the brigade entered Leesburg where they discovered a handful of rebel sick and convalescent. These were made prisoners and paroled. At 9 a.m., the line of march was taken up. The brigade moved along a road leading through Wheatland and Hillsborough into the valley between the Blue Ridge and Short Hills, to a point about ten miles from Harpers Ferry. Here the brigade encamped, at about 3 p.m. Later that same evening, Kimball's scouts notified him that rebels were active in the vicinity of their camp. Fearing a night attack, Kimball broke camp and marched into Harpers Ferry, reaching Bolivar Heights about 2 a.m., the morning of October 3rd, after his command had marched some 43 miles in as many hours through enemy territory - a feat which Kimball deemed worthy of praise:

> ...My old command fully sustained its reputation for fortitude and endurance. Many of them, in a most commendable spirit,

[64]Kimball to Taylor, Oct. 3, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.14f.

left camp, for this march, who were not physically able to endure it, as the day was very hot, the country rough, and the march very fatiguing, and some of these fell out, from sheer exhaustion, and returned slowly to camp; but the motive that actuated them is an honor. General, I am proud of my brigade....[65]

The following day, a much smaller reconnaissance party ventured out, this under command of Lt. Wesley McGregor, 78th New York Infantry, 3rd brigade, 2nd division, 12th Corps. McGregor selected twenty men from his company, who left their camp on Loudoun Heights and followed their Lieutenant as far as Neersville. Here they learned that a squad of rebel cavalry had been sighted about two miles north of the village. Afraid to proceed with such a small force, McGregor sent for reinforcements. These arrived about 6 p.m. Now, with 70 men under his command, the Lieutenant considered himself safe from "...any force of cavalry that could be brought against me...."[66]

Informed that a rebel soldier was secreted in a nearby house, McGregor led a detachment of eighteen men across the mountains to capture the desperado. At the summit, the Union troops were surprised to find a body of thirty men. These had been notified to report to a Confederate Lieutenant at Snickersville, who was the conscript officer of Loudoun County. Failing to do so, rebel cavalry had been detailed to round up the reluctant volunteers, and, to escape conscription, the draft-dodgers fled to the mountain and remained hidden. Taking leave

[65]Kimball to Taylor, Oct. 3, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.15.

[66]McGregor to Gen. Greene, Commanding, Third Brigade, Second Division, Twelfth Army Corps, Oct. 8, 1862, Ibid., p.25.

of the fugitives, McGregor and his detail continued on their mission.. They proceeded to the home of Steward Dorr, surrounded the house and captured his son James, a rebel soldier. James was made prisoner and taken back to Harpers Ferry.[67]

The following morning, October 5th, the reconnaissance party marched to within one mile of Hillsborough, where the company was divided into two parties. The split company advanced into town from different directions, hoping to trap a few rebels, but to their disappointment, or perhaps relief, none could be found.[68]

Posting a number of men in Hillsborough, McGregor marched the remainder to a hill in back of the town where they met a group of citizens and several refugees from the mountains, who looked upon the Union troops as liberators, "and many of the families wept for joy...." McGregor promised the forlorn group his protection, but dared "not inform them of my strength, for fear that other than loyal ears might find it out...."[69]

At 4 p.m., McGregor was informed that a large body of Confederate cavalry intended to attack his company that night. At dark, the Lieutenant drew in his pickets and formed his men along a stone fence that commanded the road over which McGregor expected the rebels to approach.

[67]McGregor to Greene, Oct. 3, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.25.

[68]Ibid., p.25f.

[69]Ibid., p.26.

Several hours passed, and still the rebels failed to make an appearance. As a deceptive manuveur, McGregor detailed a sergeant and three men to construct about twenty camp-fires on the mountain, but still the enemy did not attack. The Federals maintained their vigil behind the stone wall until 10:30 that night when McGregor formed his company in open order. With fixed bayonets, they marched through the town at quick time, to a point a mile beyond Hillsborough where the gallant men of the 78th New York "captured" a barn. Here, they rested until shortly before daylight when they returned to the hill they had occupied the night before.[70]

At the moment McGregor's command commenced the return march to Loudoun Heights, a squad of rebel cavalry galloped up and fired on the Federal pickets. The Confederates then, "...wheeled and ran, but were not quick enough to escape a bullet from one of the picket's guns, which took effect in a rebel's leg...." With this victory under their belt, the 78th returned to their camp on Loudoun Heights.[71]

Again, on the 15th, reconnaissance was called for. Federal signal parties had informed McClellan they had reason to believe that the Confederates had withdrawn from Bunker Hill and Winchester. To verify or contradict these reports, the commanding general ordered the reconnaissance-in-force. Selected for the job was General Winfield Scott Hancock's

[70] McGregor to Greene, Oct. 3, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.26.

[71] Ibid.

first division from Couch's 2nd Corps. This division was to be supported by a provisional division of 1,500 men and all the cavalry force that could be spared. Two days' rations were issued, and each man was supplied with bountiful ammunition. Time for the shove-off was set at daylight, the morning of October 16th - the third anniversary of the John Brown raid.[72] The night before the show of force was an anxious one, particularly for the men in those regiments not yet blooded by a Manassas, an Antietam or a South Mountain.

> ...Men sat around the camp fires later than usual and talked of the morrow; or rolled up in their blankets, dozed and dreamed of the anticipated fight, for all knew that there would be a meeting of some kind, as a Confederate force was within a few miles. Candles flickered all over the camp where others were writing letters home, thinking maybe that that would be their last night on earth. Some packed their knapsacks and were ready to march hours before the dawn. No doubt many never slept at all but sat by the smouldering embers of the camp fire in quiet thought, gazing at the dark mountains or listening to the wash of the Shenandoah's waters One can hardly imagine a moment so full of subdued excitement, anticipative hope, fear, sadness, pleasure and all the emotions that human nature is subject to as the eve of a young soldier's first battle, and as the stars looked down on the calm, still night at Harper's Ferry they shone on many a beating though brave young heart; and on the morning of that eventful day when the new soldiers were to hear the whistle of the first hostile bullet, no reveille was necessary to call them to arms. Every man was ready long before the time to move....[73]

[72]Marcy to Couch, Oct. 15, 1862, Ibid., p.430.

[73]Mulholland, St. Clair A., Bev. Maj. Gen., The Story Of The 116th Regiment, Pennsylvania Infantry. War Of Secession, 1862-1865, n.p., n.d., Harpers Ferry National Monument Microfilm Collection, R.39, V.5, p.484f. Hereafter cited as Mulholland, followed by microfilm designation.

At daylight the advance moved out, led by Maj. C. J. Whiting, Second Regiment Cavalry, and consisting of portions of the First, Second, Fifth and Sixth Regular Cavalry, supported by the horse artillery battery of four guns, under command of Lt. George Dickenson, Fourth U. S. Artillery. The advance was immediately followed by the rest of the command.[74]

It was a bright and beautiful day as the Federal force marched toward Charles Town. Summer had lingered late that year. Stacks of hay, not yet gathered into the barns, were still in the fields. The meadows were yellow with goldenrod, and the grass had not yet turned brown.[75]

At Halltown, the head of the column collided with Confederate pickets who fired on the Federals as they retreated toward Charles Town. The pursuit continued to within short artillery range of the high ground in front of Charles Town, where Hancock's command found the rebels posted.[76] The Confederate force consisted of a brigade of cavalry, under command of Col. Thomas T. Munford and composed of the 12th, 7th, 6th and part of the 2nd Virginia Cavalry. The cavalry was supported by three 10-pounder Parrotts, under command of Capt. B. H. Smith, Jr., Third Company Richmond

[74] General Winfield S. Hancock to Maj. Francis A. Walker, Asst. Adj. Gen., 2nd Army Corps, Oct. 20, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.91f; Report of Maj. Charles J. Whiting, 2nd U. S. Cavalry, Oct. 19, 1862, Ibid., p.96.

[75] Mulholland, loc. cit., R.39, V.5, p.485.

[76] Hancock to Walker, Oct. 22, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.92.

Howitzers, and one 3-inch rifle directed by Lt. J. W. Carter, of R. P. Chew's battery.[77]

The Federal horse artillery battery was immediately brought into play, as was Capt. William W. Tompkins' battery, 3rd Regiment Artillery. The batteries were supported by Capt. M. A. Reno's 1st Cavalry, who were dismounted and deployed as skirmishers along the Confederate front and flanks.[78] The remainder of the cavalry passed to the rear.[79]

An artillery duel followed, which lasted for some four hours, when the Confederates exhausted their supply of ammunition.[80]

At this crucial point, the Federal infantry was moved forward. The advance guard moved on the left of the road, led by Col. J. R. Brooke and consisting of the 61st and 64th N.Y. regiments, detached from the Second Brigade;[81] the 53rd Pennsylvania and 57th N.Y. regiments, detached from the Third Brigade;[82] and the 1st Minnesota Regiment, detached

[77]Report of Col. Thomas T. Munford, Second Virginia Cavalry, commanding brigade, of skirmish at Charlestown, April 2, 1864, Ibid., p.97. Hereafter cited as Munford Report.

[79]Mulholland, loc. cit., R.39, V.5, p.485.

[78]Hancock to Walker, Oct. 22, 1862, Ibid., p.92.

[80]Munford Report, op. cit., p.97.

[81]Report of Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell, commanding Second Brigade, Oct. 20, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.93. Hereafter cited as Caldwell Report.

[82]Report of Col. Samuel K. Zook, command Third Brigade, Oct. 21, 1862, Ibid., p.94. Hereafter cited as Zook Report.

from the Provisional Brigade.[83]

The advance guard was followed by Brig. Gen. Thomas Francis Meagher's famous and colorful Irish Brigade, which was composed of the 63rd, 69th and 88th N.Y. regiments, the 29th Massachusetts, and the newly arrived 116th Pennsylvania Volunteers.[84]

The remaining regiments from the Second Brigade moved along the right of the road. The 5th New Hampshire and 7th New York were drawn up in line of battle, while the 81st Pennsylvania was deployed behind the center of the line.[85]

The third brigade advanced through the woods to the right of the road. The 2nd Delaware Volunteers were detailed to support Tompkins battery, on their left, while the 52nd and 66th New York regiments pushed on to the farther edge of the timber. When reaching this point, Col. Zook, commanding the brigade, asked for another regiment. The 20th Massachusetts Infantry was immediately sent him from Col. Lee's Provisional Brigade.[86]

The Provisional Brigade formed the rear on the left of the road. The 42nd New York, the 7th Michigan, and the 71st Pennsylvania were drawn up in line of battle. The 59th New York, and 72nd Pennsylvania

[83]Report of Col. William R. Lee, commanding Provisional Brigade, Oct. 23, 1862, Ibid., p.95. Hereafter cited as Lee Report.

[84]Zook Report, op. cit., p.94; Mulholland, loc. cit., R.39, V.5,

[85]Caldwell Report, op. cit., p.93.

[86]Zook Report, op. cit., p.94.

were deployed in column, in rear of the right and left flanks respectively.

The formidable array of infantry, thus aligned, pushed on to Charles Town. Hopelessly outnumbered and crippled by a depleted supply of artillery ammunition, the Confederates reluctantly yielded the field. At 1 p.m., the victorious Federals entered and occupied the town, and the troops were immediately disposed to defensive positions.[88] Regiment upon regiment poured into town, and for the men who had fought in the epic battle along Antietam Creek, this reconnoitre detail was easy pickings, but for the raw recruits, it was something else:

> ...When passing the spot where the batteries stood the men had a chance to see a little of the horrors as well as the glories of a fight. Men were already digging shallow graves in which to bury bleeding masses of human flesh and bones that a few moments before had been men full of life and vigor, standing by their guns and in turn hurling death and defiance - the wounded were being carried to the rear on stretchers from which warm blood was dripping. Mammoth trees had been pierced through by the shells; and the earth was rent and torn in all directions....[89]

Captain Smith, who directed the fire of the Richmond Howitzers, was found lying by the road with his leg blown off, but rejoicing that his guns got safely away.[90] About 100 Confederate officers and soldiers were found in the town, consisting of surgeons, hospital attendants, convalescents, and sick. Twenty-six were sent to the provost-marshal

[87]Lee Report, op. cit., p.95f.

[88]Zook Report, op. cit., p.94.

[89]Mulholland, loc. cit., R.39, V.5, p.486.

[90]Ibid., R.39, V.5, P.487; Munford Report, op. cit., p.97.

at Harpers Ferry, while thirty-eight, who were so severely wounded that they could not be removed, were paroled.[91]

When the first sounds of the artillery duel reached Harpers Ferry, the cautious and worried McClellan determined to ride to the front to see what was going on.[92] He arrived at Charles Town shortly after the Union troops occupied the place and directed the completion of the reconnaissance movements.[93]

Toward evening the infantry advanced and occupied all the heights, within artillery range, surrounding the town. These regiments were later withdrawn, and the roads were guarded by cavalry. A reconnaissance was then made for several miles, in the direction of Bunker Hill, by the cavalry, under Capt. Reno, supported by Maj. Whiting's command.[94]

Hancock's command encamped that night in Charles Town, and after dark the rain came down in torrents, soaking everyore. Some of the soldiers bivouacked in the field where John Brown was hanged, "...and great interest was manifested when the men learned of the fact...."[95] Pickets were posted in all directions, and Lt. Frank T. Quinlan complained next morning that his picket line was attacked during the night

[91]Hancock to Walker, Oct. 22, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.92.

[92]McClellan to Lincoln, Oct. 16 & 17, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.16.

[93]Hancock to Walker, Oct. 22, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.92.

[94]Ibid.

[95]Mulholland, loc. cit., R.39, V.5, p.487.

by a flock of sheep with "...a serious loss of life on behalf of the latter...."[96]

Other than the clash with sheep, the stay at Charles Town was without incident. At about 1 p.m., the following afternoon, October 17th, Hancock's command headed back toward Harpers Ferry, but encamped that night in the vicinity of Halltown. The whole command remained in this position until about one hour after sunrise on the 18th, when it marched back to camp on Bolivar Heights.[97]

The reconnaissance had accomplished its objective. The reports that Lee had withdrawn were manifestly false. His army was still very much around.

Later in the month, reports of rebel foraging parties rampaging in Lovettsville, led to still another reconnaissance.[98] A little after midnight, on the morning of October 21st, Brig. Gen. Jown W. Geary, commanding the Second Division of the Twelfth Corps, was ordered by Burnside to proceed toward Lovettsville. Geary's column consisted of portions of the First and Second Brigades, Knap's Pennsylvania battery, and about 300 of the 6th New York Cavalry. At about 2:30 am., the column left camp on Loudoun Heights and proceeded up the valley lying between the Blue Ridge and Short Hills over the Hillsborough and Harpers Ferry

[96] Mulholland, loc. cit., R.39, V.5, p.487.

[97] Hancock to Walker, Oct. 22, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.92; Zook Report, op. cit., p.95.

[98] McClellan to Halleck, Oct. 21, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.98.

turnpike. The column passed a little beyond Hillsborough where it met and captured several rebel cavalry scouts.[99]

At Hillsborough, Geary received word that a portion of the Confederate cavalry was reportedly in the neighborhood of Morrisonville. Detailing about 200 infantry and 100 cavalry on a road leading directly to Morrisonville, Geary pushed the main body to Wheatland, where he extended his line eastwardly, toward Waterford, thereby cutting off all communications on the roads running south.[100]

The main body of Geary's cavalry dashed toward Lovettsville and clashed with a portion of White's cavalry battalion, under Capt. R. B. Grubb. The rebel cavalry were drawn up in line of battle at the edge of a wood on the Glenmore farm, about 1½ miles north of Wheatland. Confederate sharpshooters perched on top of haystacks and sniped away at the approaching Federals. About 200 of the Union cavalry, led by Lieutenant-Colonel McVicar, charged the enemy who resisted for a short time, then broke and fled. McVicar pursued the retreating rebels for some miles in a running fight, until the enemy had finally scattered in all directions.[101]

In this skirmish, the Federal loss was one killed and two wounded. Two confederates were slain and twelve wounded, while twenty-two were

[99] Report of Brig. Gen. John W. Geary, Oct. 22, 1862, Ibid., p.99. Hereafter cited as Geary Report.

[100] Ibid.

[101] Geary Report, op. cit., p.99.

taken prisoner.[102]

At the conclusion of the fight, the column marched to Lovettsville where the Federals encamped for the night. The march was resumed the following morning, October 22nd, and the camp on Loudoun Heights was reached shortly after noon.[103]

Aside from the few reconnaissance expeditions, the four Army Corps encamped in the vicinity of Harpers Ferry, remained comparatively inactive for several weeks after the battle of Sharpsburg. But their sojourn there left an indelible impression on the minds of the local residents from Harpers Ferry, Bolivar and the surrounding countryside:

> ...The whole peninsula...as well as the surrounding heights, soon became dotted with tents, and at night the two villages and the neighboring hills were aglow with hundreds of watch-fires. From Camp Hill...the spectacle was magnificent, especially at night.... A hum of voices like that of an immense city or the hoarse murmur of the great deep arose from the valleys on either side and filled the air with a confusion of sounds.... The bands of the various regiments frequently discoursed their martial strains, and nothing that sight or sound could do to stir the imagination was wanted. Of course, innumerable instances occurred of drunken rioting among the soldiers and of outrage on the citizens. A list of these would fill many volumes each much larger than this little book, and imagination can picture but faintly the sufferings of a people exposed helpless to the mercy of an undiscipline armed rabble, for candor obliges us to thus designate both the armies engaged in this war....[104]

[102]Geary Report, op. cit., p.99.

[103]Ibid.

[104]Barry, op. cit., p.145f.

In addition to the tremendous influx of soldiery to Harpers Ferry, the town "then began to be temporarily filled by that throng of vultures which follow in the trail of the paymaster..."[105] who sold whatever a soldier needed, or thought he needed. Their chief ware was a product which was strictly forbidden, but for which many a soldier would take any risk or pay any price to obtain - whiskey. Although several precautions were taken to prevent the sale of whiskey, the means of smuggling it into the camps were legion, and the illegal traffic abounded.[106]

> ...Some of the dealers had barrels constructed to draw either cider or whiskey; others used, as disguises, boxes of tobacco and other substances not at all suggestive of their real contents. In some places the boards of the floor were removed, and 'the stuff' hidden between the joists; and in others, concealed in parts of furniture....[107]

For many of the regiments, the weeks spent at Harpers Ferry were full of enjoyment and would long be remembered with pleasure by the men who took full advantage of the respite:

> ...Plenty of drills and work, to be sure, but still time enough for visiting through the camps, and rambles through the old, historic town. The ruins of the Engine House where old John Brown made his last stand was a point of geat /sic/ interest to all. The magnificent scenery, the bright, sunshiny days, and the visit to the army of many ladies all lent a charm to the new life. That truly lovely woman, Mrs. General Thomas Francis Meagher, spent a week or two in camp, and many other wives of officers took advantage of the peaceful days to visit the army. Then there was the frequent target practice down by the river bank where the

[105] Ward, loc. cit., p.118.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Ibid., p.119.

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-2

October, 1862: "Maryland Heights /sic-Camp Hill/, at Harper's Ferry, Capt. Otis, Camp 22nd New York Infantry." Brady photograph from National Archives Still Picture Section, Order No. B-158.

B-158

> boys fired away at imaginary Confederates and filled trees full of buck and ball, with an implied understanding that the trunks were Confederate Generals; the quiet picket line, three miles out towards Halltown; the evening camp fire, reviews, martial music, and all the pomp and display of war rendered the days pleasing indeed....[108]

But there were those who carried away painful memories, notably some members of a Maine regiment. This was a new regiment that was sent to Bolivar Heights where it joined the Second Corps. When the troops reached the Heights, they spread out, sat down, and began to prepare their breakfast. The Maine boys found plenty of 30-pound parrot shells lying around which they proceeded to use in constructing a fire-place, forming four or five of the oblong bolts in a ring with the points up. This wasfound to be an excellent resting place for the coffee pot.

> ...But when the fire in the centre began to roar and crackle and the coffee to boil, the shells began to explode, much to the amazement of the boys from the Pine Tree State. Half a dozen of the cooks were wounded, the coffee spilled, the whole corps had a good laugh, and the men of Maine had learned something....[109]

And there were the old complaints of food not being quite up to par. "...While, of course, we enjoyed crackers and meat, we preferred to draw them separately and not have the meat cased up in crackers in the shape of live worms...."[110]

[108]Mulholland, loc. cit., R.39, V.5, p.482.

[109]Ibid., p.480.

[110]Hicks, Hon. J. D., Company K., 125th Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers, Antietam to Chancellorsville, np., n.d., Harpers Ferry National Monument Microfilm Collection, R.39, V.6, p.597. Hereafter cited as Hicks, followed by microfilm designation.

For those too squeamish to adapt to a diet of worms, the surrounding countryside afforded an abundance of apples, and, indeed, the propensity for apple dumplings in the camp reached epidemic proportions. "...Flour was obtained from a mill close by, white sugar was purchased from the commissary at eleven cents per pound, on an order from the officers, and condensed milk was procured from the sutler, which, highly diluted with water, were the essentials for making these camp dumplings...."[111]

Foraging was not limited to the apple crops. In fact, pillaging had become so general that cavalry patrols were established in every direction, and any soldier caught outside camp without a pass was put to work on the fortifications as punishment.[112]

Daily inspections, reviews, and constant drill continued. Leisure time was spent in reading and re-reading letters from home, or writing to family, friends, relatives and sweethearts. Days dragged into weeks, and some of the troops, not knowing how long their stay at Harpers Ferry would last, prepared substantial shelters which would stand up to the expected rough weather. Heavy tarpaulins that had been used the previous winter to cover gun-carriages and harness, were now utilized as roofs. Twelve Pennsylvania Bucks County men boarded up the ends and sides of their tent, which measured twelve feet in length, ten

[111] Cuffel, Charles A., Durell's Battery In The Civil War, Typescript extract in Harpers Ferry National Monument R.51, V.1, p.2. Hereafter cited as Cuffel, followed by HFNM designation.

[112] Ibid.; General Orders No. 159, By command of Maj. Gen. McClellan, Oct. 1, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.376.

feet in width, and eight feet in height. "...It was the most imposing and elaborately appointed structure in the camp...."[113] A more creative group exhibited originality in the construction of a "cornstalk palace" that was completely rain proof.[114]

The army has yet to exist that was not pained by the thorn of disease, and the Grand Army of the Potomac was no exception. Several were afflicted with chronic diarrhea, some so severely stricken that they sickened and died.[115] Fever and funerals in some of the Pennsylvania regiments, composed chiefly of men from the country, were common. Oddly enough, the New York regiments seemed to thrive on camp life:

> ...It seemed strange that the men...chiefly from the city, from the factory and workshop, should stand the exposure of the camp better than the men who came from the country. The farmer boys fell quickly under the new conditions of life, and the citizen proved to have more stamina and better able to endure the vicissitudes of a campaign, and this rule seemed to hold good during the entire war....[116]

The camp of the Second Division, Twelfth Corps, on Loudoun Heights left something to be desired. The camp was unpoliced, the men were dirty, and drill and discipline were lacking. The unkempt condition of these troops was attributable to the fact that they were encamped on rocky ground, and were some distance from a source of water. The greatly reduced number of officers, caused by the recent hard campaign, accounted

[113] Cuffel, op. cit., R.51, V.1, p.1.

[114] Hicks, loc. cit., R.39, V.6, p.596.

[115] Ibid.

[116] Mulholland, loc. cit., R.39, V.5, p.483f.

for the lack of discipline.[117]

For many of the troops, the stay at Harpers Ferry was a nightmare, and for others it was a pleasant interlude, but whether for good or bad, it all came to an end in late October and early November. Gen. McClellan at long last put his army in motion, discarding his earlier intention to adopt the Shenandoah Valley as his line of communications, and chose instead the line running east of the Blue Ridge, "...feeling convinced that it would secure me the largest accession of force and the most cordial support of the President, whose views from the beginning were in favor of that line...."[118]

By October 25th, a pontoon bridge had been constructed over the Potomac at Berlin and the following day, Pleasonton's Brigade of Cavalry and two divisions of the Ninth Corps crossed at that point into Virginia.[119] The remaining divisions of this Corps followed the next day.

The second Corps broke camp on Bolivar Heights, October 29th, marched down the hill, tramped across the pontoon bridge spanning the Shenandoah,[120] and the following day, the First Corps crossed at Berlin.

On the last day of October, the Fifth Corps marched from the vicinity of Sharpsburg to Harpers Ferry, where it crossed the Shenandoah

[117] Williams to Marcy, Oct. 16, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, pp.434ff.

[118] General Report of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan of operations August 14 - November 9, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.83. Hereafter cited as McClellan Report.

[119] Ibid., p.86f.

[120] Ibid., p.87.

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-350

October, 1862: "Campaign in Virginia, A Street in Harper's Ferry during the passage of the Potomac by the National Troops from Maryland, October 24, 1862, - Sketched by our Special Artist," from Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, November 15, 1862, front page.

CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA—A STREET IN HARPER'S FERRY DURING THE PASSAGE OF THE POTOMAC BY THE NATIONAL TROOPS FROM MARYLAND, OCT. 24, 1862.—SKETCHED BY OUR SPECIAL ARTIST.

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-67

October 16, 1862: "The Main Street /Shenandoah Street/, Harper's Ferry, Va. - Zouaves on Mules - Contrabands Hauling Guns - Officers Lounging, &c. October 16, /1862/ Sketched by our Special Artist, Mrd. Edwin Forbes," from Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, November 8, 1862, page 109.



THE MAIN STREET, HARPER'S FERRY, VA.—ZOUAVES ON MULES—CONTRABANDS HAULING GUNS—OFFICERS LOUNGING, &C., OCTOBER 16.—SKETCHED BY OUR SPECIAL ARTIST, MR. EDWIN FORBES

and followed the route of the Second Corps. By November 2nd, the last of the Sixth Corps crossed at Berlin.[121] After six weeks of inactivity, the Army of the Potomac was in pursuit of Lee's Confederates, but McClellan paid the price for the delay - for it cost him his command. By the direction of the President, issued November 5th, he was superceded by Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside.[122]

[121]McClellan Report, op. cit., p.87.

[122]President's Directive, Nov. 5, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.545.

Those Left Behind

As the Army of the Potomac traveled south, keeping east of the Blue Ridge Mountains, Lee ordered Longstreet to Culpeper Court House, while Jackson, posted between Berryville and Charles Town, was to remain in the Valley.[1]

Left behind to garrison Harpers Ferry, temporarily, was Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum's Twelfth Army Corps, who were deployed on Maryland, Loudoun and Bolivar Heights.[2]

The reportedly large concentration of Confederate troops so near to Harpers Ferry, posed a serious threat and called for reconnaissance. Slocum selected Brig. Gen. Geary's Second Division to probe in the direction of Berryville. In the pre-dawn hours of November 9th, Geary left his camp on Bolivar Heights with 2,500 infantry, and two sections each from Knap's, Hampton's, and McGilvery's batteries. At daylight, the Division reached Halltown where the Federals met about fifty rebel cavalry pickets, who retreated in the face of the overwhelming force. Midway between Halltown and Charles Town, the Twelfth Virginia Cavalry was routed by Geary's troops. To the rear of the Confederate cavalry was a small force of infantry, who scattered in the woods and took defensive positions behind the trees, but who were soon forced to fall back by the Federal artillery and superior infantry. Geary's Division pursued the rebels

[1]Henderson, op. cit., p.564.

[2]Marcy to Couch, Oct. 29, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.506.

T85

HENRY W. SLOCUM

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-695

1827-1894. N.Y. USMA 1852; Arty. One of Sheridan's roommates at West Point, he served in Fla. and resigned in 1856 to practice law. Named Col. 27th N.Y. May 21, 1861, he was severely wounded at 1st Bull Run and was on sick leave until Sept. Appointed B.G. USV Aug. 9, 1861, he commanded, in the Army of the Potomac; 2d Brig., Franklin's division (Oct. 3, 1861 - Mar. 13, 1862) and 2d Brig., 1st Div., I Corps (Mar. 13 - Apr. 4, 1862). At Yorktown and West Point he led 2d Brig., 1st Div., Rappahannock (Apr. 4 - May 18, 1862). He commanded 1st Div., VI, Potomac (May 18 - Oct. 15, 1862) at Gaines' Mill, Glendale, Malvern Hill, 2d Bull Run, South Mountain, and Antietam. As Maj. Gen. USV July 4, 1862, he led XII Corps (Sept. 25, 1862 - Apr. 18, 1864) at Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and the right wing at Gettysburg. When sent with Howard to serve under Hooker in Tenn., Slocum handed in his resignation. Relations between Slocum and Hooker had been strained since Chancellorsville. The problem was solved by giving Slocum command of the post of Vicksburg (April 20 - Aug. 14, 1864). He commanded the XX Corps (Aug. 27 - Nov. 11, 1864) when he took over the Army of Ga. for the March to the Sea and through the Carolinas, participating in Savannah, Averasboro, Bentonville, Goldsboro, Raleigh, and J. E. Johnston's surrender. Resigning Sept. 28, 1865, he served in Congress for three terms and was active in exonerating Fitz-John Porter. He was later on the Board of the Gettysburg Monument Commissioners.

to their camp at Rippon, some five miles north of Berryville. The Federals attacked the encampment and poured in a destructive fire from several points, which soon dispersed the rebels who fled toward Berryville, "...leaving their fires burning, bread baking, several unsaddled horses, and a number of beef cattle...."[3] Lacking cavalry, Geary gave up the idea of further pursuit. The command was turned around and the Federals reached their camp on Bolivar Heights that same evening, where Geary reported the results of the reconnaissance.[4]

His investigations led him to believe that not more than 3,000 or 4,000 Confederates remained in the Valley, north of Front Royal. Geary learned that the two Hills had left the Valley and that Jackson had departed from the vicinity of Berryville about the last of October. But this was not all. In the course of the reconnoitre, Geary observed:

> ...that nearly all the corn within a large circuit had been consumed by the rebels, and they are still engaged in hauling wheat and flour up the valley toward Staunton. The country wears a deplorable aspect, being devastated almost to the last degree. The inhabitants are impoverished, and most of them have not the resources to carry them through the winter....[5]

On November 14th, Maj. Gen. George W. Morell, was placed in command of all troops left by McClellan on the Upper Potomac, and was charged with defense of that line. Halleck particularly admonished Morell not

[3]Geary to Lt. Col. H. C. Rodgers, Asst. Adj. Gen., 12th Army Corps, Nov. 10, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.160f.

[4]Ibid., p.161

[5]Ibid.

JOHN WHITE GEARY

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-701

1819-1873. Pa. A surveyor and railroad engineer, he fought in the Mexican War and was chosen by Pres. Polk in 1849 to set up Calif.'s postal system. He was then first alcalde of San Francisco and, declining the governorship of Utah, accepted that of Kans. in 1856 where he brought peace out of the anarchy of Bleeding Kansas. Named Col. 28th Pa. June 28, 1861, he was wounded at Harpers Ferry October 16, 1861 and captured at Leesburg in March, 1862. As B.G. USV Apr. 25, 1862, he commanded Sep. Brig., Rappahannock (May-June, 1862); 2, 1, II (June 26-July 16, 1862), and 1, 2, II (July 16 - Aug. 9, 1862) at Cedar Mountain, where he was seriously wounded. At Chancellorsville and Gettysburg he led 2d Div., XII (Oct. 15, 1862 - Sept. 25, 1863). In the Army of the Cumberland he commanded 2d Div., XII at Wauhatchie, Lookout Mountain, and Missionary Ridge (Sept. 25, 1863 - Jan. 27, 1864) and (Feb. 18 - Apr. 14, 1864). His son was killed at Wauhatchie. He also led the 2d Div., XX (Apr. 14, 1864 - June 1, 1865) on the March to the Seas and through the Carolinas. Breveted Maj. Gen. USV Jan. 15, 1865 for "fitness to command and promptness to execute," he was Mil. Gov. of Savannah and mustered out in 1866. From 1867 to 1873 he was Republican Gov. of Pa.



Jno W Geary

to be entrapped in Harpers Ferry. "...Maryland Heights is the true point of defense,"[6] he warned. "If there by any danger of an attack upon Harper's Ferry, the troops should be withdrawn to Maryland Heights, and the ends of the bridge, on the Virginia side, removed. On no condition must the garrison be again captured."[7] The bitter lesson of Col. Miles was not easily forgotten.

In setting up his defenses at Harpers Ferry, Slocum placed the entire Second Division on Bolivar Heights, consisting of 6,000 men and eighteen pieces of artillery. The First Division was scattered: General Kane's brigade of 2,900 men occupied Loudoun Valley, near Loudoun Heights; Colonel Knipe's brigade, 1,900 strong, was deployed on Maryland Heights with eighteen pieces of field artillery, fourteen pieces of heavy artillery, and seven boat howitzers; General Gordon's brigade of 2,500 men was largely at Sharpsburg, but one regiment was detailed to guard the fords at Berlin, while two other regiments were placed on guard duty at Frederick.[8]

As the armies of Burnside and Lee neared a collision at Fredericksburg, Jackson, who had been occupying Winchester, was requested by his superior to withdraw his Corps from the Valley.[9] To determine whether

[6]Halleck to Morell, November 14, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.II, p.581; Halleck to Morell, Nov. 17, 1862, Ibid., V.21, p.764.

[7]Halleck to Morell, Nov. 18, 1862, Ibid., p.769.

[8]Slocum to Halleck, Dec. 4, 1862, Ibid., p.828. The Third Division of this Corps was with Burnside.

[9]Lee to Jackson, Nov. 23, 1862, Ibid., p.1027.

GEORGE WEBB MORELL

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-692

1815-1883. N.Y. USMA 1835; Engrs. His first army duties were on the Great Lakes and Atlantic seacoast harbor projects. Resigning in 1837, he was a railroad engineer and lawyer. He was commissioned in the N.Y. Volunteers during the Mexican War, but his regiment never was in federal service. Named Col. Q.M. on Gen. Sanford's staff N.Y. Vols. (May 16 - July 25, 1861), and B.G. USV Aug. 9, 1861, he commanded 1, Fitz-John Porter's division, Army of the Potomac (Oct. 3, 1861 - Mar. 13, 1862) in guarding the approaches to Washington. He also led the 2, 1, III, Potomac (Mar. 13 - May 18, 1862) and 1st Div., V, Potomac (May 18 - Oct. 30, 1862). He participated in battles of Howard's Bridge, Yorktown, Hanover C.H., Mechanicsville, Gaines' Mill, Malvern Hill, 2d Bull Run, and Antietam. He was named Maj. Gen. USV July 4, 1862, but his appointment expired Mar. 4, 1863. He then guarded the upper Potomac and spent 1863 in Washington "awaiting orders." He was commanding the Draft Rendezvous in Indianapolis when he was mustered out Dec. 15, 1864.



or not Jackson had actually evacuated Winchester, General Geary was again called upon for reconnaissance.

At 6:30 a.m., the morning of December 2nd, Geary started for Winchester with 3,200 infantry from his three brigades; four guns each from Knap's, Hampton's and McGilvery's batteries; and about 50 of the First Battalion Maryland Cavalry. The men left their camp on Bolivar Heights with one day's rations in their haversacks, while an additional five days' ration was carried in wagons.[10]

By 8:30 a.m., the Federals had reached Charles Town, where they met two companies of the Twelfth Virginia Cavalry. The rebels took position in vacant houses and in the woods. Geary's advance guard skirmished with the Confederates for some fifteen minutes, when the latter abandoned their positions and retreated. The entire Federal column was then pushed through Charles Town, and advanced along the Berryville Pike. On the Pike, the Union troops met and repulsed another squadron of rebel cavalry, driving them to within a mile of Berryville, where theFederals discovered the Seventh and Twelfth Virginia Cavalry regiments aligned on a hill about one mile west of town.[11]

Knap's Pennsylvania battery was immediately brought into play as

[10]Report of Brig. Gen. Geary of Reconnaissance from Bolivar Heights to Winchester, Va., December 6, 1862, Ibid., p.31f. Hereafter cited as Geary Report.

[11]Ibid., p.32.

Geary advanced his entire infantry. The enemy was quickly dislodged, who then retreated in the direction of Winchester. Geary then ordered his cavalry to follow up the retreat. The 50 Marylanders galloped in pursuit for about one mile, when they overtook the entire Twelfth Virginia Regiment, about 700 strong. The Virginians turned around and chased the Federal cavalry back toward Berryville, advancing in three parallel columns, "...cheering vociferously at every step...." The rebels continued the charge until they came to within about 100 yards of the advance guns of Knap's battery. This battery, and the 7th Ohio Infantry opened fire together, killing four of the Virginians, wounding some twenty others, and mortally wounding seven or eight of their horses. The destructive fire of the Federals caused the rebels to disperse, "...in the greatest confusion and demoralization...."[12]

As dusk had now set in, Geary ordered a halt, and the troops bivouacked in line of battle on the site of the skirmish, felling trees as temporary barricades.[13]

On the following morning, December 3rd, rumors reached the Federal camp that A. P. Hill was still in the Valley and that Confederate troops entered and occupied Millwood and Newtown, south of Winchester, during the night. This information led Geary to reconnoitre the country. Detaching about 1,000 infantry and four pieces of artillery, Geary pushed

[12]Geary Report, op. cit., p.32.

[13]Ibid.

on to Opequon Creek where he found the camp of A. P. Hill, which the latter had recently evacuated. The rest of the Federal command was called forward, and the whole force again bivouacked in line of battle, taking advantage of Hill's recent camp ground.[14]

Early the next morning, the entire command proceeded cautiously toward Winchester, through Ash Hollow. The Federals soon occupied the high ground, immediately east of the city. Here, Geary parked his wagons and ambulances, and formed his infantry and artillery in line of battle.[15]

At this point, a number of citizens from Winchester came into the Federal lines and assured Geary that the Confederates had evacuated. Geary was disbelieving. The citizens were held hostage, and Geary sent an unconditional surrender demand to the Mayor of Winchester, under a flag of truce.[16]

The Federal flag bearers were met by several officers of the Seventh Virginia Cavalry, under Major Samuel B. Myers, who assured Geary that the military would evacuate within one hour and requested that non-combatants who wanted to leave the town be given the same amount of time.[17]

Geary refused to give non-combatants an hour's time. Immediately

[14]Geary Report, op. cit., p.32.

[15]Ibid., p.33.

[16]Ibid., p.33.

[17]Ibid.

after receiving Myers' request, he deployed his infantry, and the whole line advanced along with the artillery, encircled the city on the north and east, and occupied the forts to the north of Winchester, which had been constructed by General Julius White. After occupying the fortifications, the Federals cannonaded the rebel cavalry, who quickly retreated.[18]

With the withdrawal of the Confederates, the mayor of Winchester, J. B. T. Reed, surrendered his city. Geary then detached a party to search the city, and in their exploration, the searching party flushed out and captured some 118 rebel soldiers, including four commissioned officers. The entire command then advanced and occupied the city, and were pleasantly surprised by the reception they received:

> ...Our reception by the women and childred was satisfactorily demonstrative. The out-pouring of Union feeling was assisted with flags and other Union emblems. Most of the men being absent, a partial indication of the feeling prevailing was furnished by some 400 or 500 youths, whose acclamations of pleasure, beyond doubt unfeigned, were freely given. This change of feeling is similar through the country, and is strongly indicative of the growing entertainment of Union sympathies....[19]

The Federals remained in Winchester until 3 p.m., when Geary, considering his mission accomplished, ordered the return march. The command moved out on the Martinsburg turnpike and encamped about six miles from Winchester. On the 5th, the column passed through Bunker Hill and Smithfield to Oakland, where the Federals brushed with rebel cavalry pickets.

[18]Geary Report, op. cit., p.33.

[19]Ibid., p.34.

After bivouacking two more nights in the woods, while a severe snow-storm raged, the column reached the camp on Bolivar Heights without a single casualty. General Geary then submitted his report that Jackson no longer occupied Winchester, and was even then reported to be in the vicinity of Fredericksburg.[20]

On December 11th, General Slocum, in compliance with orders from Burnside, pulled the entire Twelfth Corps out of Harpers Ferry and headed for Fredericksburg. Only one regiment, the 5th Maryland, remained to garrison the fortifications.[21]

Concerned with the safety of Harpers Ferry, General Morell, commanding the Upper Potomac, sent General John R. Kenly with two regiments to the village, where he arrived December 16th and took command of the defenses. Kenly placed the 1st, 4th, and 5th Maryland Regiments in the fortifications on Maryland Heights, along with three companies of the 14th Massachusetts Artillery and a section of Captain Alexander's Maryland Battery. On Bolivar Heights were deployed the 4th Maine Battery; the 6th Regiment of Maryland Volunteers; and some 90 men of the 1st Maryland Cavalry, under Major Cole.[22]

On December 16th, Morell was relieved of command and Brig. Gen. Benjamin F. Kelley, with headquarters at Cumberland, Md., was directed

[20]Geary Report, op. cit., p.34.

[21]Slocum to Halleck, Dec. 11, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.21, p.847.

[22]Morell to Cullum, Dec. 11, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.21, p.847; Col. Wm. Schley, 5th Maryland Regiment, to Stanton, Dec. 17, 1862, Ibid., p.864.

JOHN REESE KENLY

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-699

1822-1891. Md. A lawyer, he served in the Mexican War and was commissioned Col. 1st Md., June 11, 1861. After Front Royal (May 1862), where he was severely wounded and captured, he was promoted B.G. USV August 22, 1862. He commanded Harpers Ferry, Md. Div., VIII, Middle Department (Sept. 17, 1862 - Jan. 5, 1863); Md. Defenses, Upper Potomac, VIII, Middle Department (Jan. 5 - Feb. 1863); 1st Brig., 1st Div., VIII, Middle Department (Mar. 27 - June 26, 1863); and 3d Div., I, Potomac (June 11-18, 1863, July 11, 1863 - Mar. 24, 1864). He also led in the Middle Department: Dist. Delaware, VIII (Apr. 2 - May 5, 1864); 3d Sep. Brig., VIII (May 16 - July 20, 1864, Nov. 18, 1864 - Dec. 20, 1864 and June 5 - July 31, 1865); and Dist. Eastern Shore, VIII (Dec. 13, 1864 - June 1, 1865). He was breveted Maj. Gen. USV for war service and mustered out Aug. 25, 1865.

to assume command of all forces on the Upper Potomac and was charged with the defense of the B&O Railroad in his district.[23] Kelley received a new chief when Maj. Gen. Robert C. Schenck superceded Maj. Gen. Wool, December 22nd, in command of the Middle Department[24] - the Department whose primary function was the protection and reconstruction of the B&O Railroad from Baltimore to the western terminus of the line at Ohio.[25]

Kelley strengthened the Harpers Ferry position somewhat when he ordered the 7th and 8th Maryland Regiments to leave their post at Williamsport and report to General Kenly.[26] But in a few days, Harpers Ferry would be screaming for reinforcements.

With the repulse of Burnside at Fredericksburg, December 13th, followed by Stuart's audacious northward advance, rumors were rife that the Confederates were advancing in force down the Shenandoah Valley.

Kelley reported, December 26th, that the rebels were in large force in the vicinity of Strasburg and Front Royal. General-in-Chief Halleck was stunned. Fearing another attack on Harpers Ferry he immediately notified Burnside of the situation, pointing out that reinforcements could not be sent to Harpers Ferry from Washington without stripping the city and leaving it near defenseless. "...I am almost at a loss

[23]Halleck to Wright, Morell, and Kelley, Dec. 16, 1862, Ibid., p.860.

[24]Schenck to Brig. Gen. L. Thomas, Adj. Gen., Washington, D.C., Dec. 22, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.961f.

[25]Stanton to Schenck, Dec. 22, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.21, p.874.

[26]Kelley to Halleck, Dec. 20, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.21, p.870.

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN KELLEY

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-704

1807-1891. N.H. He was a merchant and railroad agent when appointed Col. 1st W. Va. May 22, 1861. He was promoted B.G. USV May 17, 1861 and severely wounded at Philippi (W. Va.) June 3. He commanded Kelley's brigade, Army of Occupation, W. Va. (May - Aug., 1861) and Railroad Dist., W. Va. (Oct. 11, 1861 - Mar. 11, 1862) when he captured Romney and Blue's Gap. He also commanded the Railroad Dist., Mtn. Dept. (Mar. 11 - June 26, 1862); Railroad Dist., Mid. Dept. (July 22 - Sept. 20, 1862) and Defenses Upper Potomac, VIII, Mid. Dept. (Jan. 5 - Feb., 1863). He was later in government service.



what to say or do....," he moaned.[27]

Burnside offered to send the whole of Slocum's Corps,[28] and Schenck forwarded from Baltimore all the force he could spare - six companies of the 6th New York Artillery, two large siege guns, the 17th Indiana Battery with six rifled guns and about 100 men. "...There is so little infantry here," he apologized, "that none can be sent away...."[29] In addition to these troops, the 14th Pennsylvania regiment of cavalry was ordered to Harpers Ferry from Hagerstown.[30]

As the reinforcements arrived at Harpers Ferry, General Kenly deployed his troops. On the Virginia side of the Potomac he positioned 1,000 infantry, one battery of artillery, and 60 cavalry to defend Bolivar Heights and the town of Harpers Ferry. On Maryland Heights, 500 artillerists, 1,500 infantry, and 100 cavalry were "...disposed of to the best of my judgment, but utterly insufficient to defend the lines I am attempting to defend...."[31]

This last dispatch worried Schenck. "...I do not like the tone... there seems trepidation in it." Consequently, Schenck ordered Kelley to leave Cumberland and proceed immediately to Harpers Ferry to take

[27]Halleck to Burnside, Dec. 26, 1862, Ibid., p.886.

[28]Burnside to Halleck, Dec. 26, 1862, Ibid.

[29]Schenck to Kenly, Dec. 26, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.21, p.888.

[30]Schenck to Halleck, Dec. 26, 1862, Ibid., p.890; Schenck to Col. Schoonmaker, Dec. 26, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.964.

[31]Kenly to Whipple, Asst. Adj. Gen., Balti., Dec. 26, 1862, OR., S.I, V.21, p.891.

ROBERT C. SCHENCK

Harpers Ferry Negative No. HF-696

1809-1890. Ohio. After graduating from Miami (Ohio) Univ., he taught French and Latin and was later a lawyer and politician. He was U.S. Congressman until sent to Brazil in 1851 as Minister, returning in two years to be a railroad president. Appointed B.G. Ohio state troops, he commanded the state troops in eastern Va. and fought at Vienna June 17, 1861. He was with Rosecrans in W. Va. and succeeded Lander in the spring of 1862 in command at Cumberland, Md. During Jackson's Valley campaign he commanded the right flank of Fremont's army at Cross Keys and was in temporary command of the I Corps (Army of Va.) between the departure of Fremont and the arrival of Sigel. He was wounded at 2d Bull Run and appointed Maj. Gen. USV for that battle (Aug. 30, 1862). While on sick leave he was re-elected to Congress and became chairman of the committee on military affairs. Resigning from the army Dec. 5, 1863, he served in Washington until 1870 and was named U.S. Minister to England. He delayed his departure for this post to sit on the joint high commission that brought about the treaty of Washington, the General arbitration, and the settlement of the Alabama Claims. Accused of complicity in the Emma Mine Fraud, he returned to the U.S. and was completely exonerated but never again entered public life.

command in person.[32]

But no one need have worried, for the rumors were nothing more than that. Rebels, to be sure, were in the vicinity, as they had been since hostilities commenced, but their numbers were greatly exaggerated. On the last day of the year, General Kelley summed up the situation at Harpers Ferry, in a matter-of fact, almost bored dispatch - "Nothing new this morning...."[33]

Arthur L. Sullivan
Park Historian

[32]Schenck to Kelley, Dec. 26, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.51, Pt.I, p.964.

[33]Kelley to Whipple, Dec. 31, 1862, O.R., S.I, V.21, p.924.

Henderson, op. cit., p.167

APPENDIX I

First Brigade ('Stonewall') Brigadier General Garnett	2nd Virginia Regiment 4th Virginia Regiment 5th Virginia Regiment 27th Virginia Regiment 33rd Virginia Regiment
Second Brigade: Col. Burks	21st Virginia Regiment 42nd Virginia Regiment 48th Virginia Regiment 1st Regular Battalion (Irish)
Third Brigade: Col. Fulkerson	23rd Virginia Regiment 27th Virginia Regiment

McLaughlin's Battery.....8 guns
Waters' Battery.....4 guns
Carpenter's Battery.....4 guns
Marye's Battery.....4 guns
Shumaker's Battery.....4 guns
Ashby's Regiment of Cavalry
Chew's Horse-Artillery Battery.....3 guns

APPENDIX II

Organization of brigades in Banks' Division, Winchester, Va., March 14, 1862

First Brigade
Brig. Gen. A. S. Williams, commanding.

Fifth Connecticut Infantry.
First Maryland Infantry.
Twenty-eighth New York Infantry.
Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Infantry.
Forty-sixth Pennsylvania Infantry.

Second Brigade
Brig. Gen. J. J. Abercrombie, commanding

Twelfth Indiana Infantry.
Sixteenth Indiana Infantry.
Twelfth Massachusetts Infantry.
Thirteenth Massachusetts Infantry.
Eighty-third New York Infantry.

Third Brigade

Col. George H. Gordon, commanding

Twenty-Seventh Indiana Infantry.
Second Massachusetts Infantry.
Twenty-Ninth Pennsylvania Infantry.
Third Wisconsin Infantry.

APPENDIX III

HEADQUARTERS SHIELDS' BRIGADE
March 17 - 4:30 p.m.

Brig. Gen. S. Williams,
Assistant Adjutant-General

I have the honor to report the following as the present strength and condition of my command:

	Available	Aggregate
14th Indiana Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Harrow	744	908
4th Ohio Volunteers, Col. John S. Mason	397	992
8th Ohio Volunteers, Col. S. S. Carroll	476	852
7th Virginia Volunteers, Colonel Evans		861
67th Ohio Volunteers, Colonel Bustenbinder	587	896
84th Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Murray	503	1,023
Total	2,707	5,532
Second Brigade, Col. J. C. Sullivan commanding:		
5th Ohio Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick	821	918
62d Ohio Volunteers, Col. F. B. Pond	854	948
66th Ohio Volunteers, Col. Charles Candy	730	892
13th Indiana Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Foster	632	848
39th Illinois Volunteers, Col. T. O. Osborn	550	788
Total	3,587	4,394
Third Brigade, Col. E. B. Tyler commanding:		
7th Ohio Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Creighton	659	886
29th Ohio Volunteers, Colonel Buckley	696	893
7th Indiana Volunteers, Colonel Gavin	716	961
1st Virginia Volunteers, Colonel Thoburn	674	891
110th Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Lewis	462	670
Andrew Sharpshooters	48	96
Total	3,255	4,397

Artillery Corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Daum commanding. - Company E, Fourth Artillery, U. S. Army, Captain Clark; 109 available, 121 aggregate; six guns, 10-pounder Parrotts. Company H, First Ohio Volunteer Artillery, Captain Huntington; 124 available, 144 aggregate; six guns, 6-pounder rifled. Company L, First Ohio Volunteer Artillery, Captain Robinson; 128 available, 150 aggregate; six guns, four 6-pounder smooth-bore, two 12-pounder howitzers. Company A, First Virginia Volunteer Artillery, Lieut. J. Jenks; 119 available, 132 aggregate; six guns, four 10-pounder Parrotts, two 6-pounder brass smoothbore. Company B, First Virginia Volunteer Artillery, Captain Davey; 128 available, 148 aggregate; two guns, 10-pounder Parrotts. Captain Wallace, Fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, one gun, 12-pounder brass smooth-bore. Total, 608 available, 695 aggregate; twenty-seven guns.

Cavalry Corps. - First Battalion Pennsylvania Cavalry and squadron Ohio cavalry, Capt. J. Keys; 214 available, 469 aggregate. First Virginia Cavalry, Major Chamberlain; 484 available, 636 aggregate. Total, 698 available, 1,105 aggregate. The whole available force of cavalry is now detached from my command, and placed under Colonel Brodhead, chief of cavalry. For disposable force on hand: Infantry 9,549; artillery, 608; twenty-seven pieces of ~~ordnance~~ artillery. Cavalry, 698. Total, 10,855.

Full and accurate reports have been made to division headquarters.

Jas. Shields,
Brigadier-General

APPENDIX IV

Abstract from Return of the Railroad Brigade, Middle Department, Col. Dixon S. Miles, Second U. S. Infantry, commanding, for May 20, 1862.

	Present for duty		Aggregate	Aggregate Present
	Offiders	Men	Present	And Absent
Harpers Ferry, W. Va.	3		3	3
Winchester, Va.	35	843	921	939
Charlestown, Va.	30	672	755	833
Sir John's Run, W. Va.	35	853	908	927
Opposite Williamsport	7	194	218	268
Relay House, Md.	34	852	925	938
Beltsville, Md.	28	384	454	502
Ellicott's Mills, Md.	3	97	103	103
Monocacy Bridge, Md.	32	648	706	847
Total	207	4,543	4,993	5,360

COMPOSITION OF RAILROAD BRIGADE, MAY 20, 1862.

1st District Columbia, Col. J. A. Tait.
10th Maine, Col. G. L. Beal.
1st Maryland, Potomac Home Brigade, Col. W. P. Maulsby.
4th Maryland, Potomac Home Brigade, (three companies), Capt. C. A. Walsh.
1st Maryland Cavalry, Potomac Home Brigade, (one company), Capt. H. A. Cole.
Patapsco (Md.) Guards, Capt. T. S. McGowan.
60th New York, Col. W. B. Goodrich.
8th New York Cavalry, Lieut. Col. C. R. Babbitt.
54th Pennsylvania, Col. J. M. Campbell.

APPENDIX V

The Federal Force at Harpers Ferry, May 24-May 31, 1862, Commanded by Brigadier General Rufus Saxton, U.S. Vols.

Col. Dixon S. Miles, 2nd U.S. Inf., Chief of Staff.

First Brigade: Led by Brig. Gen. James Cooper, arrived 9 a.m., May 25.

1st District of Columbia Regt., Col. J. A. Tait, 6 companies, arrived a.m., May 24.
3rd Maryland, Col. D. P. DeWitt, arrived 2:15 p.m., May 25.
102nd New York, Lieut. Col. W. Hayward, arrived a.m., May 27.
109th Pennsylvania, Col. H. J. Stainrock, arrived 9 a.m., May 25.
111th Pennsylvania, Col. M. Schlaudecker.
8th and 12th U.S. (batt'n), Capt. T. L. Pitcher, 471 men, arrived p.m., May 26.
1st New York Artillery, Battery L, Capt. John A. Reynolds, 6 guns, arrived 9 a.m., May 26.
5th New York Cavalry, 4 companies, Maj. G. H. Gardner, arrived from Winchester, p.m., May 25.

Total present in brigade June 8, 1862: 3,599 officers and men.

Second Brigade: Led by Brig. Gen. John P. Slough, arrived evening, May 29.

3rd Delaware, Col. W. O. Redden, 750 men, arrived 5:30 a.m., May 26.
Purnell Legion, Col. W. J. Leonard, 500 men, arrived 9 a.m., May 26.
11th New York Militia, Col. Maidhoff, probably arrived May 27.
60th New York, Col. W. B. Goodrich, 600 men, arrived 10 a.m., May 25.
78th New York, Col. D. Ulman, probably arrived May 27.
1st New York Artillery, Battery K, Capt. L. Crounse, 6 guns, arrived p.m., May 26.
1st Maryland Cavalry, (Battalion), Maj. C. H. Deems, arrived 9 a.m., May 25.

Total present in Brigade June 8, 1862: 2,689 officers and men.

Other troops present

Naval Detachment and battery, Lieut. C. H. Daniels, U.S. Navy, 300 sailors, with naval guns, arrived May 27.
1st Maryland (Potomac Hone Brigade), Col. W. P. Maulsby, about 790 men, arrived May 24-25.
8th New York Cavalry, dismounted, Lt. Col. C. R. Babitt, 600 men, probably arrived May 26-27.

About 180 other soldiers, probably from units list on May 20, 1862, return.
Total: about 1,870 officers and men.

Total of forces present

10 p.m., May 25: 2,500 men.

9 a.m., May 26: 6,700 men.

9:30 p.m., May 27: 8,150 men.

APPENDIX VI

The Organization of the Confederate Forces Commanded by Lieutenant-General T. J. Jackson in his Attack on Harpers Ferry, May 28-31, 1862

Jackson's Division

First Brigade

Brig. Gen. Charles S. Winder

2nd Virginia Regt.-750 men, Col. J. W. Allen.
4th Virginia Regt.-840 men, Col. C. A. Ronald.
5th Virginia Regt.-902 men, Col. W. S. H. Baylor.
27th Virginia Regt.-418 men, Col. A. J. Grigsby.
33rd Virginia Regt.-763 men, Col. John F. Neff.
April 18, 1862 3,081 men

Second Brigade

Col. J. A. Campbell (of 48th Va. Regt.)

1st Virginia Battalion, P.A.C.S., 366 men, Capt. B. W. Leigh.
21st Virginia Regiment, 600 men, Col. John M. Patton.
42nd Virginia Regiment, 750 men, Maj. Henry Lane.
48th Virginia Regiment, 800 men, Lt. Col. Thomas S. Garnett.
April 18, 1862 2,516 men

Third Brigade

Col. Samuel V. Fulkerson (37th Va. Regt.)

10th Virginia Regt., 700 men, Col. E. T. H. Warren.
23rd Virginia Regt., 600 men, Col. A. G. Taliaferro.
37th Virginia Regt., 900 men, Maj. T. V. Williams.
April 18, 1862 2,200 men

Total infantry in Division April 18, 1862: 7,797 men.

Cavalry, under Col. Turner Ashby, 20 companies at 60 men per company, total, 1,200 men.

Artillery

Capt. Joseph Carpenter's Va. battery, four guns.
Capt. William H. Caskie's Va. (Hampden) battery, four guns.
Capt. Carrington's battery, four guns.
Capt. W. E. Cutshaw's battery, four guns.
Capt. William T. Poague's Va. (Rockbridge) Battery, six guns.
Capt. George W. Wooding's Va. (Danville) battery, four guns.
Total, 26 field guns.

Jackson's C.S.Army, May 28-31, 1862

Major-General Richard S. Ewell's Third Division

Second Brigade

Brigadier General George H. Steuart.

1st Maryland Regiment, Col. Bradley T. Johnson.
44th Virginia Regiment, Col. W. C. Scott.
52nd Virginia Regt., Lt. Col. James H. Skinner.
58th Virginia Regt.

Seventh Brigade

Brig. Gen. Isaac R. Trimble.

15th Alabama, Col. James Cantey.
21st Georgia, Col. John T. Mercer.
16th Mississippi, Col. Carnot Posey.
21st North Carolina, Col. W. W. Kirkland.

Artillery (Batteries)

Capt. J. B. Brockenbrough's battery-4 pieces
Capt. A. R. Courtney's Battery-6 pieces
Capt. John M. Lusk's battery-4 pieces
Capt. Charles I. Raine's Battery-4 pieces
Capt. William H. Rice's battery-4 pieces
22 field guns

Fourth Brigade

Brig. Gen. Arnold Elzey.

12th Georgia, Col. Z. T. Conner.
13th Virginia, Col. J. A. Walker.
25th Virginia, Lt. Col. Patrick B. Duffy.
31st Virginia, Col. John S. Hoffman.

Eighth Brigade

Brig. Gen. Richard Taylor.

6th Louisiana, Col. Isaac G. Semour.
7th Louisiana, Col. H. T. Hays.
8th Louisiana, Col. H. B. Kelly.
9th Louisiana, Col. Leroy A. Stafford.
Wheat's Battalion, Major C. R. Wheat.

Cavalry (about 500 men)

2nd Virginia, Col. Thomas T. Muford.
6th Virginia, Col. Thomas S. Flournoy.
Chew's Battery.

APPENDIX VII

CASUALTIES IN THE UNION FORCES AT FRONT ROYAL AND WINCHESTER, &C.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
First Division.							
Brig. Gen. A. S. Williams.							
First Brigade.							
Col. Dudley Donnelly.							
5th Connecticut		1		12	3	68	84
28th New York				2		62	64
46th Pennsylvania		2		41	2	65	110
1st Maryland	1	13	5	38	21	514	592
Total First Brigade	1	16	5	93	26	709	850
Third Brigade.							
Col. George H. Gordon.							
2d Massachusetts		13	2	45	3	77	140
29th Pennsylvania		2		5	7	230	244
27th Indiana		3	3	14	3	101	124
3d Wisconsin		4	2	9	1	85	101
Total Third Brigade		22	7	73	14	493	609
Cavalry.							
1st Michigan (five companies)		10		9	1	34	54
Total Cavalry		10		9	1	34	54

CASUALTIES IN THE UNION FORCES AT FRONT ROYAL AND WINCHESTER, &C.
Continued.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Artillery.							
1st New York Light Artillery, Battery M.	...	2	2	2	...	5	11
Pennsylvania Light Artillery, Battery F.	...	...	...	7	...	4	11
4th U.S. Artillery, Battery F	...	...	...	3	1	2	6
Total artillery	...	2	2	12	1	11	28
Total First Division	1	50	14	187	42	1,247	1,541
Cavalry Brigade.							
Brig. Gen. John P. Hatch.							
1st Maine, Companies A, B, E, H, and M.	...	...	1	...	3	125	129
Lst Vermont	...	1	1	8	2	103	115
5th New York	1	3	...	15	3	53	75
1st Maryland (five companies)	...	...	...	...	...	5	5
Total Cavalry Brigade	1	4	2	23	8	286	324
Unattached.							
10th Maine Infantry	...	3	...	6	...	54	63
8th New York Cavalry	...	2	...	5	1	23	31
Zouaves d'Afrique	...	1	...	1	...	2	4
Pioneer Corps	...	...	...	...	...	28	28
Pennsylvania Light Artillery, section Battery E.	...	...	...	5	...	23	28
Total unattached	...	6	...	17	1	130	154
Total Department Shenandoah.	2	60	16	227	51	1,663	2,019

No. 12.

Report of public animals, wagons, harness, and other means of transportation captured, lost, destroyed, and abandoned in the retreat from Strasburg, Va., to Williamsport, Md., May 24-25.

In whose possession.	Horses.	Mules.	Spring wagons.	Wagons.	Two-wheeled ambulances.	Four-wheeled ambulances.	Wheel harness, single sets of.	Lead harness, single sets of.	Wagon saddles.	Saddle blankets.	Riding saddles.	Riding bridles.	Two-horse wagons.	Four-horse wagons.	Remarks.
Capt. S. B. Holabird, assistant quartermaster.	204	87	1	24	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	17	...	160 horses and 20 mules condemned and worthless; 4 mules drowned and 2 stolen; 2 beds washed away. Mr. C. K. Marks, chief wagon-master, rendered the greatest service in managing the train.
Capt. G. A. Flagg, assistant quartermaster.	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	Not known. Not over two or three wagons.
Capt. H. M. Whittelsey, assistant quartermaster.	4	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	Captured.
Lieut. R. G. Rutherford, brigade quartermaster, Third Brigade.	4	14	...	3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	Captured or burned. Lieutenant Rutherford was very attentive and kept with his train, doing good service.
Lieut. C. L. Skeels, brigade quartermaster, First Brigade.	11	25	...	10	...	...	12	17	7	10	2	1	...	...	Lost or captured by the enemy. Lieutenant Skeels was particularly efficient in every way.

Lieut. J. I. David, brigade quartermaster, Cavalry Brigade.	40	...	...	10	...	...	10	10	10	...	...	...	...	...	Captured by the enemy near Strasburg, Va. Lieutenant David rendered most efficient aid in crossing the river.
Lieut. J. M. Jameson, regimental quartermaster, Twenty-seventh Indiana.	5	1	...	...	5	...	8	8	4	...	...	...	...	...	Captured or burnt at Front Royal.
Lieut. G. B. Cadwalader, regimental quartermaster, Forty-sixth Pennsylvania.	2	1	...	2	1	...	...	...	1	8	1	1	...	...	Captured, lost, broken, and abandoned. Lieutenant Cadwalader was attentive and efficient.
Lieut. J. Francis, regimental quartermaster, Second Massachusetts.	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	1	...	...	Lost in crossing the Potomac.
Lieut. M. P. Whitney, regimental quartermaster, Fifth Connecticut.	...	2	...	...	...	...	2	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	Captured by the enemy.
Lieut. J. C. Terry, regimental quartermaster, Twenty-eighth New York.	...	5	...	...	...	1	...	1	1	...	...	4	...	...	Mules died; ambulance broken and abandoned. Harness lost in the Potomac.
Lieut. A. S. Dewey, Regimental quartermaster, First Vermont Cavalry.	63	...	...	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	19	Horses were killed or captured by the enemy. The ambulances were abandoned or destroyed.
Lieut. J. G. Knight, regimental quartermaster, Third Wisconsin.	...	6	...	2	...	...	4	4	2	2	...	...	...	...	Lost crossing the river. Lieutenant Knight attended well to his train.
Capt. R. B. Hampton, commanding battery.	7	4	...	1	...	...	2	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	Captured by the enemy.
Lieut. H. C. Cushing, acting assistant quartermaster, Fourth Artillery.	1	...	...	...	1	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	Captured or destroyed.
Lieut. D. B. Hamilton, acting assistant quartermaster.	...	...	...	3	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	Broke down and abandoned or burnt. Lieutenant Hamilton rendered good service in managing the 31 wagons saved by way of Hancock, Md.
	341	145	1	55	9	2	40	45	25	20	3	7	17	19	

APPENDIX IX

No. 63.

Reports of Maj. W. J. Hawks, Commissary of Subsistence, C. S. Army, of stores captured.

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT, SECOND ARMY CORPS,
Guiney's Station, Va., February 8, 1863.

GENERAL: The following statement of property captured by your command is as nearly complete as I can make it:

At Front Royal:

Flour	barrels	85

At Winchester and Martinsburg:

103 head of cattle	pounds gross	92,700
Bacon	pounds	14,637
Hard bread	do	6,000
Sugar	do	2,400
Salt	bushels	350

At Harper's Ferry:

Salt pork	pounds	1,315
Salt beef	do	1,545
Bacon	do	19,267
Hard bread	do	155,954
Rice	do	628
Coffee	do	4,930
Sugar	do	209
Candles	do	67
Soap	do	280
Beans	bushels	9
Salt	do	154
Vinegar	gallons	180
Molasses	do	80

At McDowell nothing was captured except hard bread, which was issued to troops passing through--an extra ration.

At Winchester, Martinsburg, and Harper's Ferry large amounts of supplies were carried off by division wagons, of which no report was made to me. Full rations were issued to 13,000 of the enemy for two days at Harper's Ferry. The issue was made before an inventory was taken.

Very respectfully,

W. J. HAWKS,
Major and Com. of Sub., Second Army Corps, Army N. Va.

Lieutenant-General Jackson,
Commanding Second Army Corps.

Supplies captured by General Jackson at Winchester and Martinsburg in May, 1862.

103 head of cattle (gross weight 92,700 pounds), at 7 cents	$6,489 00
14,637 pounds of bacon, at 35 cents	5,122 95
6,000 pounds of hard bread, at 8 cents	480 00
2,400 pounds of sugar, at 35 cents	840 00
350 bushels of salt, at $5	1,750 00
85 barrels of flour, at $8	680 00

A large amount of supplies was taken by the troops of General Ewell's and Colonel Ashby's commands from Martinsburg, hauled to their camps, and issued without being receipted for or reported to me. Captain Lock's certificate accompanies this report, showing probable amount received. The contents of four sutlers' stores, filled with a variety of goods, valued at $25,000, for want of transportation, were abandoned to our troops.

W. J. HAWKS,
Major and Commissionary of Subsistance.

APPENDIX X

List of articles captured and turned in to the chief quartermaster of the Valley District during the second and third quarters 1862, viz:

Saddles		12
Wagons		19
Artillery saddles		27
Artillery valises		6
Bridles		21
Leg guards		2
Artillery harness	pairs.	19
Artillery collars		61
Artillery traces	pairs.	100½
Breast straps		5
Breeching		5
Feed pockets		16
Wheel harness	sets.	2
Lead harness	do..	9
Horses		233
Mules		21
Envelopes		3,425
Cap paper	quires.	64½
Letter paper	do...	94
Note paper	do...	10
Steel pens		172
Black ink	bottles.	95
Red ink	do....	1
Mucilage	do....	1
Cards	packs.	12
Wagon bolts		25
Wagon harness		350
Tar buckets		10
Halter chains		47
Nails	pounds.	50
Leather	do...	5,300
Wheelbarrows		8
Jack-screw		1
Iron maul		1
Rasps		575
Files		12
Hats		2
Blankets		14

Oil-cloth blankets		30
Shoes	pairs.	305
Shoes, ladies'	do...	2
Shoes, misses'	do...	2
Shoes, children's	do...	3
Socks	do...	90
Cotton cloth	yards.	545¼
Peg-cutter		1
Hammers		10
Anvils		14
Crowbars		33
Smith's vises		7
Blacksmith's tools	set.	1
Carpenter's tools	sets.	3
Auger		1
Crosscut-saws		15
Axes		13
Hatchets		31
Helves		127
Picks		272
Shovels		212
Spades		82
Camp kettles		71
Telegraph wire	bundles.	29
Platform scales		3
White lead	keg.	1
Horseshoes	pounds.	13,061
Horseshoes	do...	3,816
Horseshoe nails	do...	9,411
Iron	do...	275
Spikes	do...	20
Rope	do...	303½
Tar	barrel.	1
Can of oil		1
Artillery grease	kegs.	2
Artillery grease	do..	2
Picket rope	feet.	200
Picket pins		28
Chests		5
Pulley-block		1
Buckles		144
Insulators		190
Tents		134
Camp stools		65
Mess pans		60
Skillet lid		1

Cooking stoves	2
Tin plates	292
Spoons	52
Tin cups	20
Table knives	80
Table forks	31
Neck-ties....dozens.	2¼
Paper collars....boxes.	7
Suspenders....pairs.	7
Handkerchiefs	6

The above are the articles captured in the quartermaster's department and turned in to me. Besides these, much property was captured and reported direct to the Quartermaster-General by various quartermasters of the command without being report to me.

Respectfully submitted.

JOHN A. HARMAN,
Major and Chief Q.M., Second Corps, Army of N. Virginia.

APPENDIX XI

No. 204.

Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee, commanding, during the Maryland Campaign.

LONGSTREET'S CORPS.--Maj. Gen. James Longstreet.

McLaws' Division.

Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws.

Kershaw's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. J. B. Kershaw.

2d South Carolina, Col. John D. Kennedy.
3d South Carolina, Col. James D. Nance.
7th South Carolina, Col. D. Wyatt Aiken and Capt. John S. Hard.
8th South Carolina, Lieut. Col. A. J. Hoole.

Cobb's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb.
Lieut. Col. C. C. Sanders.
Lieut. Col. William MacRae

16th Georgia.
24th Georgia.
Cobb's (Georgia) Legion.
15th North Carolina.

Semmes' Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Paul J. Semmes.

10th Georgia, Capt. P. H. Loud.
53d Georgia, Lieut. Col. Thomas Sloan and Capt. S. W. Marshborne.
15th Virginia, Col. E. B. Montague.

Barksdale's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. William Barksdale.

13th Mississippi, Lieut. Col. Kennon McElroy.
17th Mississippi, Lieut. Col. John C. Fiser.
18th Mississippi, Maj. J. C. Campbell and Lieut. Col. William H. Luse.
21st Mississippi, Capt. John Sims and Col. Benjamin G. Humphreys.

Artillery.

Maj. S. P. Hamilton.
Col. H. C. Cabell.

Manly's (North Carolina) battery, Capt. B. C. Manly.
Pulaski (Georgia) Artillery, Capt. J. P. W. Read.
Richmond (Fayette) Artillery, Capt. M. C. Macon.
Richmond Howitzers, (1st Company), Capt. E. S. McCarthy.
Troup (Georgia) Artillery, Capt. H. H. Carlton.

Anderson's Division.

Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson.

Wilcox's Brigade.

Col. Alfred Cumming.

8th Alabama.
9th Alabama.
10th Alabama.
11th Alabama.

Mahone's Brigade.

Col. William A. Parham.

6th Virginia.
12th Virginia.
16th Virginia.
41st Virginia.
61st Virginia.

Featherston's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Featherston.
Col. Carnot Posey.

12th Mississippi.
16th Mississippi, Capt. A. M. Feltus.
19th Mississippi.
2d Mississippi Battalion.

Armistead's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Lewis A. Armistead.
Col. J. G. Hodges.

9th Virginia.
14th Virginia.
38th Virginia.
53d Virginia.
57th Virginia.

Pryor's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Roger A. Pryor.

14th Alabama.
2d Florida.
8th Florida.
3d Virginia.

Wright's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. A. R. Wright.

44th Alabama.
3d Georgia.
22d Georgia.
48th Georgia.

Artillery.

Maj. John S. Saunders.

Donaldsonville (Louisiana) Artillery (Maurin's battery).
Huger's (Virginia) battery.
Moorman's (Virginia) battery.
Thompson's (Grimes') (Virginia) battery.

Jones' Division.

Brig. Gen. David R. Jones.

Toombs' Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Robert Toombs.
Col. Henry L. Benning.

2d Georgia, Lieut. Col. William R. Holmes and Maj. Skidmore Harris.
15th Georgia, Col. W. T. Millican.
17th Georgia, Capt. J. A. McGregor.
20th Georgia, Col. J. B. Cumming.

Pickett's Brigade.

Col. Eppa Hunton.
Brig. Gen. R. B. Garnett.

8th Virginia, Col. Eppa Hunton.
18th Virginia, Maj. George C. Cabell.
19th Virginia, Col. J. B. Strange, Lieut. W. N. Wood, and Capt. J. L. Couchran.
28th Virginia, Captain Wingfield.
56th Virginia, Col. William D. Stuart and Captain McPhail.

Kemper's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. J. L. Kemper.

1st Virginia.
7th Virginia.
11th Virginia.
17th Virginia.
24th Virginia.

Drayton's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Drayton.

50th Georgia, Lieut. Col. F. Kearse.
51st Georgia.
15th South Carolina, Col. W. D. De Saussure.

Jenkins' Brigade.

Col. Joseph Walker.

1st South Carolina (Volunteers), Lieut. Col. D. Livingston.
2d South Carolina Rifles.
5th South Carolina, Capt. T. C. Beckham.
6th South Carolina, Lieut. Col. J. M. Steedman and Capt. E. B. Cantey.
4th South Carolina Battalion.
Palmetto (South Carolina) Sharpshooters.

Anderson's Brigade.

Col. George T. Anderson.
1st Georgia (Regulars), Col. W. J. Magill.
7th Georgia.
8th Georgia.
9th Georgia.
11th Georgia, Maj. F. H. Little.

Artillery.

Fauquier(Virginia) Artillery (Stribling's battery).*
Loudoun (Virginia) Artillery (Rogers' battery).*
Turner (Virginia) Artillery (Leake's battery).*
Wise (Virginia) Artillery (J. S. Brown's battery).

*Left at Leesburg.

Walker's Division.

Brig. Gen. John G. Walker.

Walker's Brigade.

Col. Van H. Manning.
Col. E. D. Hall.

3d Arkansas, Capt. John W. Reedy.
27th North Carolina, Col. J. R. Cooke.
46th North Carolina, Col. E. D. Hall.
48th North Carolina, Col. R. C. Hill.
30th Virginia.
French's (Virginia) battery, Capt. Thomas B. French.

Ransom's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Robert Ransom, Jr.

24th North Carolina, Lieut. Col. John L. Harris.
25th North Carolina, Col. H. M. Rutledge.
35th North Carolina, Col. M. W. Ransom.
49th North Carolina, Lieut. Col. Lee M. McAfee.
Branch's Field Artillery (Virginia), Captain Branch.

Hood's Division.

Brig. Gen. John B. Hood.

Hood's Brigade.

Col. W. T. Wooford.

18th Georgia, Lieut. Col. S. Z. Ruff.
Hampton (South Carolina) Legion, Lieut. Col. M. W. Gary.
1st Texas, Lieut. Col. P. A. Work.
4th Texas, Lieut. Col. B. F. Carter.
5th Texas, Capt. I. N. M. Turner.

Law's Brigade.

Col. E. M. Law.

4th Alabama, Lieut Col. O. K. McLemore.
2d Mississippi, Col. J. M. Stone.
11th Mississippi, Col. P. F. Liddell.
6th North Carolina, Maj. Robert F. Webb.

Artillery.

Maj. B. W. Frobel.

German Artillery (South Carolina), Capt. W. K. Bachman.
Palmetto Artillery (South Carolina), Capt. H. R. Garden.
Rowan Artillery (North Carolina), Capt. James Reilly.

Evans' Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Nathan G. Evans.
Col. P. F. Stevens.*

17th South Carolina, Col. E. W. McMaster.
18th South Carolina, Col. W. H. Wallace.
22d South Carolina, Lieut. Col. T. C. Watkins and Maj. M. Hilton.
23d South Carolina, Capt. S. A. Durham and Lieut. E. R. White.
Holcombe (South Carolina) Legion, Col. P. F. Stevens.
Macbeth (South Carolina) Artillery, Capt. R. Boyce.

Artillery.

Washington (Louisiana) Artillery.

Col. J. B. Walton.

1st Company, Capt. C. W. Squires.
2d Company, Capt. J. B. Richardson.
3d Company, Capt. M. B. Miller.
4th Company, Capt. B. F. Eshleman.

Lee's Battalion.

Col. S. D. Lee.

Ashland (Virginia) Artillery, Capt. P. Woolfolk, jr.
Bedford (Virginia) Artillery, Capt. T. C. Jordan.
Brooks (South Carolina) Artillery, Lieut. William Elliott.
Eubank's (Virginia) battery, Capt. J. L. Eubank.
Madison (Louisiana) Light Artillery, Capt. G. V. Moody.
Parker's (Virginia) battery, Capt. W. W. Parker.

Jackson's Corps.--Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson.

Ewell's Division.

Brig. Gen. A. R. Lawton.
Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early.

Lawton's Brigade.

Col. M. Douglass.
Maj. J. H. Lowe.
Col. John H. Lamar.

13th Georgia.
26th Georgia.
31st Georgia, Lieut. Col. J. T. Crowder.
38th Georgia.
60th Georgia.
61st Georgia.

Trimble's Brigade.

Col. James A. Walker.

15th Alabama, Capt. I. B. Feagin.
12th Georgia, Captain Rodgers.
21st Georgia, Maj. Thomas C. Glover.
21st North Carolina, Captain Miller.
1st North Carolina Battalion.**

*Commanding brigade while General Evans commanded provisional division.
**Attached to Twenty-first North Carolina Regiment.

Early's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early.
Col. William Smith.

13th Virginia, Capt. F. V. Winston.
25th Virginia.
31st Virginia.
44th Virginia.
49th Virginia, Col. William Smith.
52d Virginia, Col. M. G. Harman.
58th Virginia.

Hays' Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays.
5th Louisiana.
6th Louisians, Col. H. B. Strong.
7th Louisiana.
8th Louisiana.
14th Louisiana.

Artillery.*

Maj. A. R. Courtney.

Charlottesville (Virginia) Artillery (Carrington's battery).
Chesapeake (Maryland) Artillery (Brown's battery).
Courtney (Virginia) Artillery (Latimer's battery).
Johnson's (Virginia) battery.
Louisiana Guard Artillery (D'Aquin's battery).
First Maryland Battery (Dement's battery).
Staunton (Virginia) Artillery (Balthis' battery).

Hill's Light Division.

Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill.

Branch's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. L. O'B. Branch.
Col. James H. Lane.

7th North Carolina.
18th North Carolina, Lieutenant- Colonel Purdie.
28th North Carolina.
33d North Carolina.
37th North Carolina.

Archer's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. J. J. Archer.
Col. Peter Turney.

5th Alabama Battalion, Captain Hooper.
19th Georgia, Maj. J. H. Neal and Capt. F. M. Johnston.
1st Tennessee (Provisional Army), Col. Peter Turney.
7th Tennessee, Maj. S. G. Shepard and Lieut. G. A. Howard.
14th Tennessee, Lieut. Col. J. W. Lockert.

*The Charlottesville Artillery, left at Richmond in August, did not rejoin the Army till after the battle of Sharpsburg. John R. Johnson's and D'Aquin's batteries were the only ones present with this division at Sharpsburg, the others having been left at Harper's Ferry and Shepherdstown.

Gregg's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Maxcy Gregg.

1st South Carolina (Provisional Army), Maj. E. McCrady jr., Col. D. H. Hamilton.
1st South Carolina Rifles, Lieut. Col. James M. Perrin.
12th South Carolina, Col. Dixon Barnes, Lieut. Col. C. Jones, and Maj. W. H. McCorkle.
13th South Carolina, Col. O. E. Edwards.
14th South Carolina, Lieut. Col. W. D. Simpson.

Field's Brigade.

Colonel Brockenbrough.

40th Virginia.
47th Virginia.
55th Virginia.
22d Virginia Battalion.

Pender's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. William D. Pender.
Col. R. H. Brewer.

16th North Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Stowe.
22d North Carolina, Maj. C. C. Cole.
34th North Carolina.
38th North Carolina.

Thomas' Brigade.

Col. Edward L. Thomas.

14th Georgia, Col. R. W. Folsom.
35th Georgia.
45th Georgia, Maj. W. L. Grice.
49th Georgia, Lieut. Col. S. M. Manning.

Artillery.*

Maj. R. L. Walker.

Branch (North Carolina) Artillery (A. C. Latham's battery).
Crenshaw's (Virginia) battery.
Fredericksburg (Virginia) Artillery (Braxton's battery).
Letcher (Virginia) Artillery (Davidson's battery).
Middlesex (Virginia) Artillery (Fleet's battery).
Pee Dee (South Carolina) Artillery (McIntosh's battery).
Purcell (Virginia) Artillery (Pegram's battery).

Jackson's Division

Brig. Gen. John R. Jones.
Brig. Gen. W. E. Starke.
Col. A. J. Grigsby.

*Braxton's, Crenshaw's, McInthosh's and Pegram's batteries engaged at Sharpsburg. Davidson's battery had been left at Harper's Ferry, and Fleet's and Latham's batteries at Leesburg.

Winder's Brigade.

Col. A. J. Grigsby.
Lieut. Col. R. D. Gardner (Fourth Virginia).
Maj. H. J. Williams.

2d Virginia, Capt. R. T. Colston.
4th Virginia, Lieut. Col. R. D. Gardner.
5th Virginia, Maj. H. J. Williams.
27th Virginia, Capt. F. C. Wilson.
33d Virginia, Captain Golladay and Lieutenant Walton.

Taliaferro's Brigade.

Col. E. T. H. Warren.
Col. J. W. Jackson.
Col. J. L. Sheffield.

47th Alabama.
48th Alabama.
10th Virginia.
23d Virginia.
37th Virginia.

Jones' Brigade.

Col. B. T. Johnson.
Brig. Gen. J. R. Jones.
Capt. J. E. Penn.
Capt. A. C. Page.
Capt. R. W. Withers.

21st Virginia, Capt. A. C. Page.
42d Virginia, Capt. R. W. Withers.
48th Virginia, Captain Candler.
1st Virginia Battalion, Lieut. C. A. Davidson.

Starke's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. William E. Starke.
Col. L. A. Stafford.
Col. E. Pendleton.

1st Louisiana, Lieut. Col. M. Nolan.
2d Louisiana, Col. J. M. Williams.
9th Louisiana.
10th Louisiana, Capt. H. D. Monier.
15th Louisiana.
Coppens' (Louisiana) battalion.

Artillery.

Maj. L. M. Shumaker.

Alleghany (Virginia) Artillery (Carpenter's battery).
Brockenbrough's (Maryland) battery.
Canville (Virginia) Artillery (Wooding's battery).
Hampden (Virginia) Artillery (Caskie's battery).
Lee (Virginia) Battery (Raine's battery).
Rockbridge (Virginia) Artillery (Poague's battery).

Hill's Division.*

Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill.

*On "field return," Army of Nothern Virginia, for September 22, this division appears as of Jackson's Corps.

Ripley's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Roswell S. Ripley.
Col. George Doles.

4th Georgia, Col. George Doles.
44th Georgia, Captain Key.
1st North Carolina, Lieut. Col. H. A. Brown.
3d North Carolina, Col. William L. DeRosset.

Rodes' Brigade.

Brig. Gen. R. E. Rodes.

3d Alabama, Col. C. A. Battle.
5th Alabama, Maj. E. L. Hobson.
6th Alabama, Col. J. B. Gordon.
12th Alabama, Col. B. B. Gayle and Lieut. Col. S. B. Pickens.
26th Alabama, Col. E. A. O'Neal.

Garland's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Samuel Garland, jr.
Col. D. K. McRae.

5th North Carolina, Col. D. K. McRae and Capt. T. M. Garrett.
12th North Carolina, Capt. S. Snow.
13th North Carolina, Lieut. Col. Thomas Ruffin, jr.
20th North Carolina, Col. Alfred Iverson.
23d North Carolina, Col. D. H. Christie.

Anderson's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. George B. Anderson.
Col. R. T. Bennett.

2d North Carolina, Col. C. C. Tew and Capt. G. M. Roberts.
4th North Carolina, Col. Bryan Grimes and Capts. W. T. Marsh and D. P. Latham.
14th North Carolina, Col. R. T. Bennett.
30th North Carolina, Col. F. M. Parker and Maj. W. W. Sillers.

Colquitt's Brigade.

Col. A. H. Colquitt.

13th Alabama, Col. B. D. Fry.
6th Georgia, Lieut. Col. J. M. Newton.
23d Georgia, Col. W. P. Barclay.
27th Georgia, Col. L. B. Smith.
28th Georgia, Maj. T. Graybill and Capt. N. J. Garrison.

Artillery.*

Major Pierson.

Hardaway's (Alabama) battery, Capt. R. A. Hardaway.
Jeff. Davis (Alabama) Artillery, Capt. J. W. Bondurant.
Jones' (Virginia) battery, Capt. William B. Jones.
King William (Virginia) Artillery, Capt. T. H. Carter.

*Cutts' and Jones' battalions also under D. H. Hill's command at Sharpsburg.

Reserve Artillery.*

Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton.

Brown's Battalion.+

Col. J. Thompson Brown.

Powhatan Artillery (Dance's battery).
Richmond Howitzers, 2d company (Watson's battery).
Richmond Howitzers, 3d company, (Smith's battery).
Salem Artillery (Hupp's battery).
Williamsburg Artillery (Coke's battery).

Cutts' Battalion.@

Lieut. Col. A. S. Cutts.

Blackshears' (Georgia) battery.
Irwin (Georgia) Artillery (Lane's battery).
Lloyd's (North Carolina) battery.
Patterson's (Georgia) battery.
Ross' (Georgia) battery.

Jones' Battalion.@

Maj. H. P. Jones.

Morris (Virginia) Artillery, R. C. M. Page's battery).
Orange (Virginia) Artillery (Peyton's battery).
Turner's (Virginia) battery.
Wimbish's (Virginia) battery.

Nelson's Battalion.

Amherst (Virginia) Artillery (Kirkpatrick's battery).
Fluvanna (Virginia) Artillery (Ancell's battery).
Huckstep's (Virginia) battery.
Johnson's (Virginia) battery.*
Milledge (Georgia) Artillery (Milledge's battery).

Miscellaneous.

Cutshaw's (Virginia) battery.
Dixie (Virginia) Artillery (Chapman's battery).
Magruder (Virginia) Artillery (T. J. Page, jr.'s battery).
Rice's (Virginia) battery, Capt. W. H. Rice.#
Thomas (Virginia) Artillery (E. J. Anderson's battery).**

*Including all batteries mentioned in the reports, or in the reorganization of October 4, and not elsewhere accounted for. Brooke's, Dearing's, and Nelson's Virginia batteries joined after the campaign had terminated.
+First Virginia Artillery.
@With D. H. Hill's division at Sharpsburg.
*Marmaduke Johnson's battery.
#Not mentioned between September 1-22, but probably with the arnmy, in reserve.
**Left at Leesburg.

Cavalry.

Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart.

Hampton's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton.

1st North Carolina, Col. L. S. Baker.
2d South Carolina, Col. M. C. Butler,
10th Virginia.
Cobb's (Georgia) Legion, Lieut. Col. P. M. B. Young.
Jeff. Davis Legion, Lieut. Col. W. T. Martin.

Lee's Brigade,

Brig. Gen. Fitz. Lee.

1st Virginia, Lieut. Col. L. Tiernan Brien.
3d Virginia, Lieut. Col. John T. Thornton.
4th Virginia, Col. Williams C. Wickham.
5th Virginia, Col. T. L. Rosser.
9th Virginia.

Robertson's Brigade.

Brig. Gen. B. H. Robertson.
Col. Thomas T. Munford.

2d Virginia, Col. T. T. Munford and Lieutenant-Colonel Burks.
6th Virginia.
7th Virginia, Capt. S. B. Myers.
12th Virginia, Col. A. W. Harman.
17th Virginia Battalion.

Horse Artillery.

Capt. John Pelham.

Chew's (Virginia) battery.
Hart's (South Carolina) battery.
Pelham's (Virginia) battery.

APPENDIX XII

Return of casualties in the Union forces at Maryland Heights and Harper's Ferry.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Aggregate.
General Staff	...	...	1	...	6	...	7
12th Illinois Cavalry	...	...	...	2	4	153	159
2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery M.	...	...	...	...	3	97	100
65th Illinois Infantry	...	...	1	6	32	778	817
15th Indiana Battery	...	...	...	3	4	114	121
Rigby's (Wilder) Indiana Battery	...	...	...	...	4	109	113
1st Maryland Cavalry (detachment)	...	...	1	2	1	19	23
Cole's Battalion Maryland Cavalry	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1st Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Infantry	...	6	...	6	32	747	791
3d Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Infantry	1	2	1	8	24	510	546
8th New York Cavalry	...	...	...	...	5	87	92
5th New York Heavy Artillery, Batteries A and F	...	2	...	...	9	256	267
12th New York Infantry (militia)	...	...	...	...	30	530	560
39th New York Infantry	...	...	...	15	10	520	545
111th New York Infantry	...	5	...	6	36	934	981
115th New York Infantry	...	...	1	10	28	950	989
125th New York Infantry	...	2	...	1	38	881	922
126th New York Infantry	1	12	4	38	30	946	1031
Potts' Ohio Battery (F, 82d Ohio Infantry)	...	...	...	...	2	82	84
32d Ohio Infantry	1	9	3	55	31	643	742
60th Ohio Infantry	...	2	1	5	38	867	913
87th Ohio Infantry	...	1	...	...	38	976	1015
7th Squadron Rhode Island Cavalry	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
9th Vermont Infantry	...	...	...	3	30	714	747
Unattached, in hospitals, &c	...	...	...	...	...	1172	1172
Total	3	41	13	160	435	12085	12737

OFFICERS KILLED.--Capt. Jacob Sarbaugh, Third Maryland Potomac Home Brigade Infantry, Samuel R. Breese, Thirty-second Ohio Infantry, and Lieut. Alfred R. Clapp, One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Infantry.

DIED OF WOUNDS.--Col. Dixon S. Miles, Second U.S. Infantry, and Lieut. Daniel C. Hiteshew, First Maryland Cavalry.

ESCAPED.--Captain Russell and 9 men, 8th New York, 7th Squadron Rhode Island, 12th Illinois, two companies of First Maryland Cavalry escaped P.M., September 14. Total, 1,500.

APPENDIX XIII

Copy of a letter written by Celeste B. Newcomer to her parents in Harpers Perry, W. Va., from Michigan, on Mary 28, 1906.

Dear Folks:

Yesterday afternoon Curt and I went to see Mr. Parks who witnessed the shooting of Miles following the surrender at H.F. He is a tall, fine looking, rather cultivated appearing farmer, having one of the best homes west of the town. He is a great sufferer, however, and a trifle difficult to follow in conversation, owing to a terrible rose cancer in the check, with which he is doomed to die.

He says that after the white flags had been hoisted an Illinois battery of light artillery, stationed across the road to the right (as you face Charles Town) continued a lively fire. Colonel Miles rode up to the captain and ordered him to stop firing, adding angrily, "Can't you see the signals - we've surrendered." Captain Phillips was an immensely tall man who looked like an Indian, with eyes like steel traps. It had been remarked that he had been drinking. He turned to the Colonel and damned him in terrific language, at which the Colonel repeated his order and turned away, riding straight along the crest of the Heights toward Jackson's forces massed at the Shenandoah end. Captain Phillips watched him, cursing, and after a moments pause shouted the order "Gun number three! - half-a-second fuse shell!" - then "Gunner number three! See that man?" pointing at Miles whose back was directly toward them - "That man on the horse? You fix that man! Miss your mark and you die in your boots!" The gunner fired and the shot exploded under Miles' horse, killing the horse and wounding Miles in the leg - terribly mangling the calf, he heard. The Colonel was carried to a brick building which Parks thought had been a seminary, and which was a Union Hospital. A Confederate surgeon was detailed to attend him - "Not a Union surgeon would go near him." He said the indignation of Union men and officers at the surrender was terrible - some sobbed like children, some swore, some were angry beyond words. He considered it the crime of the war, "For Harpers Ferry was the key to the situation." "If Miles had done his duty the war would have ended then and there," he declared. He stood within ten feet of Captain Phillips when he gave this order, and when the shot was fired - he heard every word and saw every motion.

Comrade (sp?) Parks also states that he was on picket duty on the Charlestown pike about a hundred yards down the hill beyond the Heights on the two days immediately preceeding the surrender (which he gives as Sep't 15 - I have not looked it up). "On each of these days" he says, "I passed

General Jackson through the lines. Or, I won't say I passed Stonewall Jackson through the lines, but I will say that I passed the man that received the honors of the surrender the next day!" "If the one was Stonewall Jackson, the other was. He rode the same horse, and was dressed the same both days when I passed him through, as on the day of the surrender, and he went straight to Colonel Miles' headquarters. I've heard they had been friends before. Jackson did not wear uniform either time. He wore long Wellington boots, way up over his trousers, and a blouse, and a wide planter's hat. The only insignia he wore was his star. The other men, under him, were all dressed up, especially his aide - he wore a uniform that they said cost $1500.00 - hat and gilt and all, but Jackson wasn't dressed up a bit."

NOTE: If Phillips did actually murder Col. Miles, the latter was unaware of the fact, for, on his deathbed, Col. Miles praised Phillips, among others, for the courage he displayed in the futile defense of Harpers Ferry. (Cf. O.R., S.I, V.19, Pt.I, p.540) Furthermore, from his testimony given to the Harpers Ferry Military Commission, it is evident that Phillips, too, was of the opinion that the surrender was inevitable. His long-range ammunition was exhausted, and at the time of surrender he had only 40 rounds of cannister. Furthermore, two of his four guns had been disabled. (Cf. Ibid., pp.684ff.) Taking these factors into consideration, it is difficult to see why Phillips would have been so enraged at the surrender, as reported in the above letter. All other contemporary accounts of the death of Miles state that he was killed by a shell fired from the guns of Confederate artillerists on Loudoun Heights who failed to see the surrender flag. It is inconcievable that had Phillips killed Miles, as stated above, in the presence of thousands of witnesses that the deed go undetected and unrecorded.

APPENDIX XIV

Number of guns used in the defense of Harper's Ferry, and turned over to the enemy.

24-pounder howitzers	6
20-pounder Parrotts	4
12-pounder guns	6
6-pounder smooth guns	6
12-pounder light howitzers	2
3-inch rifled pieces	10
3-inch rifled, James	6

These guns are spiked:

10-inch Dahlgrens	2
50-pounder Parrott	1
12-pounder light howitzers	2
12-pounder guns	2
	47

APPENDIX XV

FIRST ARMY CORPS.*

(1.) Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker.#
(2.) Brig. Gen. George G. Meade.

Escort.

2d New York Cavalry, Companies A, B, I, and K, Capt. John E. Naylor.

First Division.

(1.) Brig. Gen. Rufus King.+
(2.) Brig. Gen. John P. Hatch.=
(3.) Brig. Gen. Abner Doubleday.

First Brigade.

Col. Walter Phelps, jr.

22d New York, Lieut. Col. John McKie, Jr.
24th New York, Capt. John D. O'Sbian.
30th New York, Col. William M. Searing.
84th New York (14th Militia), Maj. William H. de Bevoise.
2d U.S. Sharpshooters, Col. Henry A. V. Post.

Second Brigade.

(1.) Brig. Gen. Abner Doubleday.
(2.) Col. William P. Wainwright.#
(3.) Lieut. Col. J. William Hofmann.

7th Indiana, Maj. Ira G. Grover.
76th New York:
Col. William P. Wainwright.
Capt. John W. Young.
95th New York, Maj. Edward Pye.
56th Pennsylvania:
Lieut. Col. J. William Hofmann.
Capt. Frederick Williams.

Third Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Marsena R. Patrick.

21st New York, Col. William F. Rogers.
23d New York, Col. Henry C. Hoffman.
35th New York, Col. Newton B. Lord.
80th New York (20th Militia), Lieut. Col. Theodore B. Gates.

Fourth Brigade.

Brig. Gen. John Gibbon.

19th Indiana:
Col. Solomon Meredith.
Lieut. Col. Alois O. Bachman.
Capt. William W. Dudley.
2d Wisconsin:
Col. Lucius Fairchild.
Lieut. Col. Thomas S. Allen.
6th Wisconsin:
Lieut. Col. Edward S. Bragg.
Maj. Rufus R. Dawes.
7th Wisconsin, Capt. John B. Callis.

*Designation changed from Third Corps, Army of Virginia, to First Army Corps by General Orders, No. 129, Adjutant-General's Office, September 12, 1862.
#Wounded September 17 +Relieved September 14 =Wounded September 14

Artillery.

Capt. J. Albert Monroe.

New Hampshire Light, First Battery, Lieut. Frederick M. Edgell.
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery D, Capt. J. Albert Monroe.
1st New York Light, Battery L, Capt. John A. Reynolds.
4th United States, Battery B:
Capt. Joseph B. Campbell.
Lieut. James Stewart.

Second Division.

Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Abram Duryea.

97th New York, Maj. Charles Northrup.
104th New York, Maj. Lewis C. Skinner.
105th New York, Col. Howard Carroll.
107th Pennsylvania, Capt. James Mac Thomson.

Second Brigade.

(1.) Col. William A. Christian
(2.) Col. Peter Lyle.

26th New York, Lieut. Col. Richard H. Richardson.
94th New York, Lieut. Col. Calvin Littlefield.
88th Pennsylvania:
Lieut. Col. George W. Gile.
Capt. Henry R. Myers.
90th Pennsylvania:
Col. Peter Lyle.
Lieut. Col. William Leech.

Third Brigade.

(1.) Brig. Gen. George L. Hartsuff.*
(2.) Col. Richard Coulter.

16th Maine,+ Col. Asa W. Wildes.
12th Massachusetts:
Maj. Elisha Burbank.
Capt. Benjamin F. Cook.
13th Massachusetts, Maj. J. Parker Gould.
83d New York (9th Militia), Lieut. Col. William Atterbury.
11th Pennsylvania:
Col. Richard Coulter.
Capt. David M. Cook.

*Wounded September 17.
+Joined September 9, and detached September 13 as railroad guard.

Artillery.

1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery F, Capt. Ezra W. Matthews.
Pennsylvania Light, Battery C, Capt. James Thompson.

Third Division.

(1.) Brig. Gen. George G. Meade.
(2.) Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour.

First Brigade.

(1.) Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour.
(2.) Col. R. Biddle Roberts.

1st Pennsylvania Reserves:
Col. R. Biddle Roberts.
Capt. William C. Talley.
2d Pennsylvania Reserves, Capt. James N. Byrnes.
5th Pennsylvania Reserves, Col. Joseph W. Fisher.
6th Pennsylvania Reserves, Col. William Sinclair.
13th Pennsylvania Reserves (1st Rifles):
Col. Hugh W. McNeil.
Capt. Dennis McGee.

Second Brigade.

Col. Albert L. Magilton.

3d Pennsylvania Reserves, Lieut. Col John Clark.
4th Pennsylvania Reserves, Maj. John Nyce.
7th Pennsylvania Reserves:
Col. Henry C. Bolinger.
Maj. Chauncey A. Lyman.
8th Pennsylvania Reserves, Maj. Silas M. Baily.

Third Brigade.

(1.) Col. Thomas F. Gallagher.*
(2.) Lieut. Col. Robert Anderson.

9th Pennsylvania Reserves:
Lieut. Col. Robert Anderson.
Capt. Samuel B. Dick.
10th Pennsylvania Reserves:
Lieut. Col. Adoniram J. Warner.
Capt. Jonathan P. Smith.
11th Pennsylvania Reserves, Lieut. Col. Samuel M. Jackson.
12th Pennsylvania Reserves, Capt. Richard Gustin.

Artillery.

1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery A, Lieut. John G. Simpson.
1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B, Capt. James H. Cooper.
1st Pennsylvania Light Battery G,+ Lieut. Frank P. Amsden.
5th United States, Battery C, Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom.

*Wounded September 14.
+Detached at Washington, D.C., since September 6.

SECOND ARMY CORPS.

Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner.

Escort.

6th New York Cavalry, Company D, Capt. Henry W. Lyon.
6th New York Cavalry, Company K, Capt. Riley Johnson.

First Division.*

(1.) Maj. Gen. Israel B. Richardson.*
(2.) Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell.
(3.) Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell.
5th New Hampshire, Col. Edward E. Cross.
7th New York, Capt. Charles Brestel.
61st New York, (Col. Francis C. Barlow.
64th New York, (Lieut. Col. Nelson A. Miles.
81st Pennsylvania, Maj. H. Boyd McKeen.

Second Brigade.

(1.) Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Meagher.
(2.) Col. John Burke.

29th Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. Joseph H. Barnes.
63d New York:
Col. John Burke.
Lieut. Col. Henry Fowler.
Maj. Richard C. Bentley.
Capt. Joseph O'Neill.
69th New York:
Lieut. Col. James Kelly.
Maj. James Cavanagh.
88th New York, Lieut. Col. Patrick Kelly.

Third Brigade.

Col. John R. Brooke.

2d Delaware, Capt. David L. Stricker.
52d New York, Col. Paul Frank.
57th New York:
Lieut. Col. Philip J. Parisen.
Maj. Alford B. Chapman.
66th New York:
Capt. Julius Wehle.
Lieut. Col. James H. Bull.
53d Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Richards McMichael.

*Wounded September 17.

Artillery.

1st New York Light, Battery B, Capt. Rufus D. Pettit.
4th U. S., Batteries A and C, Lieut. Evan Thomas.

Second Division.

(1.) Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick.*
(2.) Brig. Gen. Oliver O. Howard.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Willis A. Gorman.

15th Massachusetts, Lieut. Col. John W. Kimball.
1st Minnesota, Col. Alfred Sully.
34th New York, Col. James A. Suiter.
82d New York (2d Militia), Col. Henry W. Hudson.
Massachusetts Sharpshooter, First Company, Capt. John Saunders.
Minnesota Sharpshooters, Second Company, Capt. William F. Russell.

Second Brigade.

(1.) Brig. Gen. Oliver O. Howard.
(2.) Col. Joshua T. Owen.
(3.) Col. De Witt C. Baxter.

69th Pennsylvania, Col. Joshua T. Owen.
71st Pennsylvania:
Col. Isaac J. Wistar.
Lieut. Richard P. Smith (adjutant).
Capt. Enoch E. Lewis.
72d Pennsylvania, Col. De Witt C. Baxter.
106th Pennsylvania, Col. Turner G. Morhead.

Third Brigade.

(1.) Brig. Gen. Napoleon J. T. Dana.**
(2.) Col. Norman J. Hall.

19th Massachusetts:
Col. Edward W. Hinks.
Lieut. Col. Arthur F. Devereaux.
20th Massachusetts, Col. William R. Lee.
7th Michigan:
Col. Norman J. Hall.
Capt. Charles J. Hunt.
42d New York:
Lieut. Col. George N. Bomford.
Maj. James E. Mallon.
59th New York, Col. William L. Tidball.

*Wounded September 17.

Artillery.

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery A, Capt. John A. Tompkins.
1st United States, Battery I, Lieut. George A. Woodruff.

Third Division.

Brig. Gen. William H. French.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball.

14th Indiana, Col. William Harrow.
8th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Franklin Sawyer.
132d Pennsylvania:
Col. Richard A. Oakford
Lieut. Col. Vincent M. Wilcox.
7th West Virginia, Col. Joseph Snider.

Second Brigade.

Col. Dwight Morris.

14th Connecticut, Lieut. Col. Sanford H. Perkins.
108th New York, Col. Oliver H. Palmer.
130th Pennsylvania, Col. Henry I, Zinn.

Third Brigade.

(1.) Brig. Gen. Max Weber.*
(2.) Col. John W. Andrews.

1st Delaware:
Col. John W. Andrews.
Lieut. Col. Oliver Hopkinson.
5th Maryland:
Maj. Leopold Blumenberg.
Capt. E. F. M. Faehtz.
4th New York, Lieut. Col. John D. McGregor.

Unattached Artillery.

1st New York Light, Battery G, Capt. John D. Frank.
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery B, Capt. John G. Hazard.
1st Rhode Island Light, Battery G, Capt. Charles D. Owen.

NINTH ARMY CORPS.

Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside.*
Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno.#
Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox.

Escort.

1st Maine Cavalry, Company G, Capt. Zebulon B. Blethen.

First Division.

Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Willcox.

First Brigade.

Col. Benjamin C. Christ.

28th Massachusetts, Capt. Andrew P. Caraher.
17th Michigan, Col. William H. Withington.
79th New York, Lieut. Col. David Morrison.
50th Pennsylvania:
Maj. Edward Overton.
Capt. William H. Diehl.

Second Brigade.

Col. Thomas Welsh.

8th Michigan:+
Lieut. Col. Frank Graves.
Maj. Ralph Ely.
46th New York, Lieut. Col. Joseph Gerhardt.
45th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. John I. Curtin.
100th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. David A. Leckey.

Artillery.

Massachusetts Light, Eighth Battery, Capt. Asa M. Cook.
2d United States, Battery E, Lieut. Samuel N. Benjamin.

*On the 16th and 17th Major-General Burnside exercised general command on the left, and Brigadier-General Cox was in immediate command of the corps.
#Killed September 1t.
+Transferred from First Brigade September 16.

Second Division.

Brig. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. James Nagle.

2d Maryland, Lieut. Col. J. Eugene Duryea.
6th New Hampshire, Col. Simon G. Griffin.
9th New Hampshire, Col. Enoch Q. Fellows.
48th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Joshua K. Sigfried.

Second Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero.

21st Massachusetts, Col. William S. Clark.
35th Massachusetts:
Col. Edward A. Wild.
Lieut. Col. Summer Carruth.
51st New York, Col. Robert B. Potter.
51st Pennsylvania, Col. John F. Hartranft.

Artillery.

Pennsylvania Light, Battery D, Capt. George W. Durell.
4th United States, Battery E, Capt. Joseph C. Clark, jr.

Third Division.

Brig. Gen. Isaac P. Rodman.*

First Brigade.

Col. Harrison S. Fairchild.

9th New York, Lieut. Col. Edgar A. Kimball.
89th New York, Maj. Edward Jardine.
103d New York, Maj. Benjamin Ringold.

Second Brigade.

Col. Edward Harland.

8th Connecticut:
Lieut. Col. Hiram Appelman.
Maj. John E. Ward.
11th Connecticut, Col. Henry W. Kingsbury.
16th Connecticut,# Col. Francis Beach.
4th Rhode Island:
Col. William H. P. Steere.
Lieut. Col. Joseph B. Curtis.

*Wounded September 17.
#Assigned September 16.

Artillery.

5th United States, Battery A, Lieut. Charles P. Muhlenberg.

Kanawha Division.

(1.) Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox.
(2.) Col. Eliakim P. Scammon.

First Brigade.

(1.) Col. Eliakim P. Scammon.
(2.) Col. Hugh Ewing.

12th Ohio, Col. Carr B. White.
23d Ohio:
Lieut. Col. Rutherford B. Hayes.
Maj. James M. Comly.
30th Ohio:
Col. Hugh Ewing.
Lieut. Col. Theodore Jones.
Maj. George H. Hildt.
Ohio Light Artillery, First Battery, Capt. James R. McMullin.
Gilmore's company West Virginia Cavalry, Lieut. James Abraham.
Harrison's company West Virginia Cavalry, Lieut. Dennis Delaney.

Second Brigade.

Col. George Crook.

11th Ohio:
Lieut. Col. Augustus H. Coleman.
Maj. Lyman J. Jackson.
28th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Gottfried Becker.
36th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Melvin Clarke.
Schambeck's company Chicago Dragoons, Capt. Frederick Schambeck.
Kentucky Light Artillery, Simmonds' battery, Capt. Seith J. Simmonds.

Unattached.

6th New York Cavalry (eight companies), Col. Thomas C. Devin.
Ohio Cavalry, Third Independant Company, Lieut. Jonas Seamen.
3d U. S. Artillery, Batteries L and M, Capt. John Edwards, jr.

TWELFTH ARMY CORPS.*

(1.) Maj. Gen. Joseph K. F. Mansfield.+
(2.) Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams.

Escort.

1st Michigan Cavalry, Company L, Capt. Melvin Brewer.

First Division.

(1.) Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams.
(2.) Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.#
(3.) Brig. Gen. George H. Gordon.

First Brigade.

(1.) Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.
(2.) Col. Joseph F. Knipe.

5th Connecticut,@ Capt. Henry W. Daboll.
10th Maine, Col. George L. Beal.
28th New York, Capt. William H. H. Mapes.
46th Pennsylvania:
Col. Joseph F. Knipe.
Lieut. Col. James L. Selfridge.
124th Pennsylvania:
Col. Joseph W. Hawley.
Maj. Isaac L. Haldeman.
125th Pennsylvania, Col. Jacob Higgins.
128th Pennsylvania:
Col. Samuel Croasdale.
Lieut. Col. William W. Hammersly.
Maj. Joel B. Wanner.

Third Brigade.

(1.) Brig. Gen. George H. Gordon.
(2.) Col. Thomas H. Ruger.

27th Indiana, Col. Silas Colgrove.
2d Massachusetts, Col. George L. Andrews.
13th New Jersey, Col. Ezra A. Carman.
107th New York, Col. R. B. Van Valkenburgh.
Zouaves d'Afrique,**Pennsylvania.
3d Wisconsin, Col. Thomas H. Ruger.

*Designation changed from Second Corps, Army of Virginia, to Twelfth Army Corps, by General Orders, No. 129, Adjutant-General's Office, September 12, 1862.
+Mortally wounded September 17.
#Wounded September 17.
@Detached at Frederick, Md., since September 15.
**No officers present; enlisted men of company attached to Second Massachusetts.

Second Division.

Brig. Gen. George S. Greene.

First Brigade.

(1.) Lieut. Col. Hector Tyndale.*
(2.) Maj. Orrin J. Crane.

5th Ohio, Maj. John Collins.
7th Ohio:
Maj. Orrin J. Crane.
Capt. Frederick A. Seymour.
29th Ohio,+ Lieut. Theron S. Winship.
66th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Eugene Powell.
28th Pennsylvania, Maj. Ario Pardee, jr.

Second Brigade.

Col. Henry J. Stainrook.

3d Maryland, Lieut. Col. Joseph M. Sudsburg.
102d New York, Lieut. Col. James C. Lane.
109th Pennsylvania,# Capt. George E. Seymour.
111th Pennsylvania, Maj. Thomas M. Walker.

Third Brigade.

(1.) Col. William B. Goodrich.@
(2.) Lieut. Col. Jonathan Austin.

3d Delaware, Maj. Arthur Maginnis.
Purnell Legion, Maryland, Lieut. Col. Benjamin L. Simpson.
60th New York, Lieut. Col. Charles R. Brundage.
78th New York:
Lieut. Col. Jonathan Austin.
Capt. Henry R. Stagg.

Artillery.

Capt. Clermont L. Best.

Maine Light, 4th Battery, Capt. O'Neil W. Robinson.
Maine Light, 6th Battery, Capt. Freeman McGilvery.
1st New York Light, Battery M, Capt. George W. Cothran.
New York Light, 10th Battery, Capt. John T. Bruen.
Pennsylvania Light, Battery E, Capt. Joseph M. Knap.
Pennsylvania Light, Battery F, Capt. Robert B. Hampton.
4th United States, Battery F, Lieut. Edward D. Muhlenberg.

*Wounded September 17.
+Detached September 9.
#Detached September 13.
@Killed September 17.

CAVALRY DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton.

First Brigade.

Maj. Charles J. Whiting.

5th United States, Capt. Joseph H. McArthur.
6th United States, Capt. William P. Sanders.

Second Brigade.

Col. John F. Farnsworth.

8th Illinois, Maj. William H. Medill.
3d Indiana, Maj. George H. Chapman.
1st Massachusetts, Capt. Casper Crowninshield.
8th Pennsylvania, Capt. Peter Keenan /?/.

Third Brigade.

Col. Richard H. Rush.

4th Pennsylvania:
Col. James H. Childs.
Lieut. Col. James K. Kerr.

Fourth Brigade.

Col. Andrew T. McReynolds.

1st New York, Maj. Alonzo W. Adams.
12th Pennsylvania, Maj. James A. Congdon.

Fifth Brigade.

Col. Benjamin F. Davis.

8th New York, Col. Benjamin F. Davis.
3d Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Samuel W. Owen.

Artillery.

2d United States, Battery A, Capt. John C. Tidball.
2d United States, Batteries B and L, Capt. James M. Robertson.
2d United States, Battery M, Lieut. Peter C. Hains.
3d United States, Batteries C and G, Capt. Horatio G. Gibson.

Unattached.

1st Main Cavalry,* Col. Samuel H. Allen.
15th Pennsylvania Cavalry (detachment), Col. William J. Palmer.

*Detached at Frederick, Md.

APPENDIX XVI

HEADQUARTERS DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON,

September 29, 1862.

Regiments ordered to Frederick, under command of Brig. Gen. Henry S. Briggs, U. S. Army.

Regiments.	Colonels.	Strength.	To whom assigned.*
20th Connecticut.....	Samuel Ross.....	1,017	Williams.
21st Connecticut.....	Arthur H. Dutton.....	960	Burnside.
19th Maine.....	Frederick D. Sewall.....	916	Sumner.
37th Massachusetts.....	Oliver Edwards.....	971	Couch.
24th Michigan.....	Henry A. Morrow.....	898	Reynolds.
10th New Hampshire.....	Michael T. Donohoe.....	960	Burnside.
11th New Hampshire.....	Walter Harriman.....	1,030	Burnside.
15th New Jersey.....	Samuel Fowler.....	885	Franklin.
21st New Jersey.....	Gilliam Van Houten.....	895	Franklin.
23d New Jersey.....	John S. Cox.....	1,013	Franklin.
26th New Jersey.....	Andrew J. Morrison.....	996	Franklin.
123d New York.....	Archibald L. McDougall...	983	Williams.
137th New York.....	/David Ireland/.....	946	Williams.
140th New York.....	Louis Ernst+.....	947	Williams.
145th New York.....	.....	886	Williams.
149th New York.....	John M. Strong+.....	904	Williams.
121st Pennsylvania.....	Chapman Biddle.....	770	Reynolds.
136th Pennsylvania.....	Thomas M. Bayne.....	859	Reynolds.
142d Pennsylvania.....	Robert P. Cummins.....	868	Reynolds.
7th Rhode Island.....	Zenas R. Bliss.....	963	Burnside.
Total.....	.....	18,667	

RICH'D B. IRWIN.
Captain, Aide-de-Camp, and Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen.

*But see Special Orders, No. 30, Headquarters Army of the Potomac, September 30, 1862.
+Lieutenant-colonel.

APPENDIX XVII

Abstract from list of clothing, camp and garrison equipage, shipped to Frederick, Hagerstown, and Harper's Ferry, from September 12, 1862, to October 25, 1862, inclusive, by Capt. D. G. Thomas, military storekeeper, U. S. Army.

Date.	To whom issued.	Knit jackets.	Drawers.	Ponchos.	Forage caps.	Stockings, pairs.	Sack coats.	Cavalry jackets (privates').	Canteens.
1862.									
Sept. 12	Captain Crane, assistant quartermaster.	.....	4,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
27	Captain Crane, Frederick, Md.	2,000	4,000	.....	2,000	4,000	2,000	1,000	.....
29	Captain Crane, Frederick, Md.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	2,000
Oct. 25	Captain Crane, Frederick, Md.	1,609	5,000	.....	.....	5,000	.....	.....	.....
		3,609	13,500	.....	2,000	9,000	2,000	1,000	2,000
Sept. 27	Captain Weeks, Hagerstown, Md.	.....	200	.....	.....	200	200	.....	.....
29	Captain Weeks, Hagerstown, Md.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	2,000
Oct. 7	Captain Weeks, Hagerstown, Md.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
8	Captain Weeks, Hagerstown, Md.	2,000	7,000	.....	6,000	12,000	.....	500	5,184
		2,000	7,200	.....	6,000	12,200	200	500	7,184
Sept. 27	Capt. P. P. Pitkin, assistant quartermaster, Harper's Ferry.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
29	Capt. P. P. Pitkin, assistant quartermaster, Harper's Ferry.	.....	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,990	2,000	2,000
Oct. 1	Capt. P. P. Pitkin, assistant quartermaster, Harper's Ferry.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
10	Capt. P. P. Pitkin, assistant quartermaster, Harper's Ferry.	.....	10,000	.....	5,000	10,025	.....	.....	5,037
16	Capt. Alex. Bliss, assistant quartermaster, Harper's Ferry.	2,500	2,500	.....	2,500	5,000	.....	1,250	1,250
18	Capt. Alex. Bliss, assistant quartermaster, Harper's Ferry.	5,005	7,500	.....	.....	25,200	.....	.....	.....
22	Capt. Alex. Bliss, assistant quartermaster, Harper's Ferry.	.....	10,000	5,000	5,000	15,000	.....	.....	5,000
22	Lieutenant-Colonel Ingalls, quartermaster, Harper's Ferry.	.....	15,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
24	Capt. Alex. Bliss, assistant quartermaster, Harper's Ferry.	.....	.....	.....	12,000	15,000	.....	.....	.....

Flannel shirts.	Haversacks.	Trowsers (mounted).	Boots, pairs.	D'Abi tents.	Great coats (foot).	Blankets.	Great coats (mounted).	Infantry coats (privates').	Infantry coats (musicians').	Trowsers (foot).*	Bootees (privates').	Knit shirts.
.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	20	.....	.....	..	.....	.....	.....
4,000	.....	2,000	2,000	.....	2,000	.....	1,000	2,000	..	2,000	2,000	.....
.....	2,000	.....	.....	3,620	500	.....	.....	.....	..	.....	.....	.....
2,576	.....	.....	.....	4,000	2,000	3,000	.....	.....	..	3,000	3,000	2,424
6,576	2,000	2,000	2,000	7,620	4,500	3,020	1,000	2,000	..	5,000	5,000	2,424
200	.....	200	200	.....	.....	.....	200	.....	..	.....	.....	.....
.....	2,000	.....	.....	3,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	..	.....	.....	.....
.....	.....	.....	.....	3,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	..	.....	.....	.....
11,000	7,939	1,000	1,000	.....	7,000	.....	875	7,000	..	9,000	6,500	.....
11,200	9,939	1,200	1,200	6,500	7,000	.....	1,075	7,000	..	9,000	6,500	.....
.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	..	.....	.....	.....
2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	3,480	1,000	.....	.....	.....	..	.....	.....	.....
.....	.....	.....	.....	500	.....	.....	.....	.....	..	.....	.....	.....
7,325	5,050	.....	5,000	.....	5,000	.....	.....	5,060	75	500	5,000	2,655
.....	.....	2,500	550	.....	.....	.....	3,500	.....	..	.....	13,200	.....
6,000	.....	.....	.....	.....	10,500	.....	.....	7,500	..	11,550	7,500	.....
10,000	5,000	.....	1,050	5,000	.....	.....	.....	15,000	..	10,000	10,000	.....
.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	..	.....	9,200	.....
.....	.....	.....	2,000	.....	2,270	.....	.....	.....	..	.....	.....	.....

Date.	To whom issued.	Knit jackets.	Drawers.	Ponchos.	Forage caps.	Stockings, pairs.	Sack coats.	Cavalry jackets (privates').	Canteens.
1862.									
Oct. 25	Capt. Alex. Bliss, assistant quartermaster, Harper's Ferry.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
		7,505	47,000	7,000	26,500	72,225	1,990	3,250	16,037
	Total, October 25, 1862.....	13,114	67,700	7,000	34,500	93,425	4,190	4,750	25,221
28	Capt. Alex. Bliss, assistant quartermaster, Harper's Ferry.	.....	15,000	.....	.....	15,000	.....	1,500	.....
29	Capt. Alex. Bliss, assistant quartermaster, Harper's Ferry.	.....	15,000	10,000	.....	15,000	.....	.....	3,008
		.....	30,080	10,000	.....	30,000	.....	1,500	3,008
	Total, October 29, 1862.....	13,114	97,700	17,000	34,500	123,425	4,190	6,250	28,229

Flannel shirts.	Haversacks.	Trowsers (mounted).	Boots, pairs.	D'Abri tents.	Great coats (foot).	Blankets.	Great coats (mounted).	Infantry coats (privates').	Infantry coats (musicians').	Trowsers (foot).*	Bootees (privates').	Knit shirts.
.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	3,500	.....	.....	..	15,070	10,000	.....
25,325	12,050	4,500	10,600	8,980	18,770	3,500	3,500	27,560	75	41,620	54,900	2,655
43,101	23,989	7,700	13,800	23,100	30,270	6,520	5,575	36,560	75	55,620	66,400	5,079
.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	7,500	..	15,000	10,010	.....
2,200	9,900	5,000	.....	.....	.....	4,384	2,015	.....	..	10,000	10,030	11,595
200	9,900	5,000	.....	.....	.....	4,384	2,015	7,500	..	25,000	20,040	11,595
45,301	33,889	12,700	13,800	23,100	30,270	10,904	7,590	44,060	75	80,620	86,440	16,674

*The items in this column foot up 37,120 instead of 41,620, as given in the original.