The Civilian Conservation Corps and the Development of Glacier and Yellowstone Parks, 1933-1942

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THROUGHOUT ITS SEVENTY-TWO year history, the National Park Service has walked a fine line between the two parts of its mission. Congress dictated that the Service provide for the enjoyment of the people, yet, at the same time, preserve the nation's parks unimpaired for future generations. The fledgling Park Service's officials needed to establish a firm financial base for park system growth.

Park Service administrators knew that only by attracting more visitors to the parks could public interest in the parks develop, and, in turn, they hoped that increased appropriations would follow. Faced with the threatened cuts in funding in the depths of the Depression, the Park Service concentrated on the "use" aspect of its dichotomous mission as a way to increase visits, and therefore, appropriations.

The National Park Service (NPS) welcomed the establishment of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) as a harbinger of increased financial security. The financial resources and the manpower of the CCC enabled the National Park Service to develop the nation's parks for the tourists' comfort. As we shall see, the work of the CCC in Glacier and Yellowstone National Parks concentrated on making these parks more comfortable and more attractive for visitors. Reforestation, campground development, road and trail building, fire hazard reduction, and fire fighting were the major efforts to

realize these use-oriented ends in Glacier and Yellowstone.

Alfred Runte, in *National Parks: The American Experience*, claimed that Congress approved of setting land aside as national parks only if the proposed land was deemed barren of exploitable natural resources, and therefore, "worthless."[1] Runte continues that "even later awareness about a growing need for wilderness, wildlife, and biological conservation did not change the primary criterion of preservation—national parks must begin worthless and remain worthless to survive."[2] From various work projects that the CCC carried out in Glacier and Yellowstone, however, another conclusion can be drawn. The use of the men and money of the CCC in these parks represented an attempt of the National Park Service to transform the parks from "worthless" to "useful" lands by making them more accessible and attractive. It also created a legacy of development which makes a desirable policy shift more difficult.

On August 25, 1916, President Woodrow Wilson signed into law a bill establishing the National Park Service. This organic act stipulated that the Service was to manage the parks under its administration in such a way as to both "promote and regulate the use of...national parks," and also to "leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations."[3] Herein lies the fundamental dilemma for the Park Service administrators—to balance the seemingly contrary goals of use and preservation.

The first to wrestle with this problem was the Service's first director, Stephen Mather. On one hand, he recognized that preservationist pressure groups were instrumental in the establishment of the Service. However, he also recognized that the major railroad interests held a great stake in the parks' future survival. The Northern Pacific Railroad spearheaded the development of hotel and resort development in Yellowstone, including the massive Old Faithful Inn and the elegant National Hotel at Mammoth Hot Springs. The Great Northern Railroad spent over one million dollars building resort hotels at East Glacier and Many Glacier near Swiftcurrent Lake.[4] Mather sought to coordinate the railroads' and the Park Service's activities to draw more of the travelling public to the parks. Mather claimed that the nation's parks were "lying fallow," and that they needed only "proper development to bring them into their own."[5]

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Throughout the 1920s, Stephen Mather and his successor, Horace Albright, expanded the Park Service's interests by bringing battlefields, historic sites, and recreational areas under the Service's

auspices to provide a greater variety of park experiences. Arno B. Cammerer, who followed Albright into the directorship in 1933, built upon Mather's and Albright's developmental agenda for the parks. President Roosevelt's establishment of the Civilian Conservation Corps provided the National Park Service with the manpower and financial resources needed to execute this agenda of development—at the expense of preservation.

The subject of conservation and stewardship of the national wealth found in America's forests was one near and dear to Franklin Delano Roosevelt. In his home state of New York, as chair of the state Senate Committee on Forests, Fish and Game, he sponsored and fought to pass legislation authorizing state-supervised forestry. Moreover, he knew through personal experience that reforestation could rehabilitate poor land. At Hyde Park, the Roosevelt family estate on the banks of the Hudson had produced award-winning corn as late as 1840, but by the turn of the century, its soil was worn out and nearly useless. In 1915, FDR began reforesting the estate, and in time, most of the estate's 1,200 acres were covered with new trees. As Roosevelt rose to national prominence in the depths of the Depression, he carried with him the lessons he had learned from his experiences at Hyde Park.

The full weight of the Great Depression fell on the shoulders of the nation's youth, a group that suffered unemployment as high as a staggering twenty-five percent.[6] The national parks also suffered a crippling blow. The combined efforts of the National Park Service, railroads, oil companies, chambers of commerce, concessioners, and automobile associations failed to prevent the closing down of major facilities in Glacier and Yellowstone. In 1933, the Cut Bank and St. Mary's chalets in Glacier, and the Mammoth and Lake hotels in Yellowstone closed their doors.[7] Chronic unemployment kept people away from the parks.

During the Great Depression the national parks suffered a crippling blow.

Roosevelt's Emergency Conservation Work, more popularly known as the CCC, was designed to help the young men of the nation rebuild their health and confidence through gainful employment. Roosevelt quickly began to assemble a group of key people to realize his plans for the CCC, including the Secretaries of War, Agriculture, Interior, and Labor.[8] Roosevelt and his advisors decided that the Department of Labor would select the enrollees from their unemployment rolls; the War Department would be in charge of accepting, clothing, feeding, and housing the CCC workers. The Departments of the Interior and Agriculture, known as the "technical agencies," were in charge of the actual work projects in the nation's forests, parks, and other public lands. It was this separation of responsibilities, according to enrollee Bob Smith, which

accounted for the success and smooth operation of the CCC.[9]

The CCC helped the National Park Service become a much larger bureaucracy.

This administrative coordination enabled FDR to get more than 250,000 young men into CCC tent camps by mid-summer, 1933, as the mobilization of the nation's youth swung into high gear. In fact, in the first three months after the Congress passed the CCC act, more men were mobilized than during the first three months of the First World War and nearly as many as during the entire Spanish-American War.[10] Only thirty-seven days after the CCC act was signed, local selection boards under the Department of Labor admitted the first enrollees, and by the end of the summer of 1933, there were camps in every state in the union except for Delaware.[11] This deluge of men and financial resources provided the National Park Service with the support it so desperately needed to do what NPS administrators believed was necessary for the Service's future survival.

The CCC helped the National Park Service grow to become a much larger bureaucracy. At the beginning of the New Deal, the Service had 2,027 full-time employees. By 1940, however, employment had risen to 7,341. This 262 percent increase in the size of the Park Service typifies the swelling of many governmental bureaucracies in the New Deal.[12] Increases in regular appropriations do not fully explain this expansion.

The Park Service's total "regular" appropriations increased minimally over the decade, from $10,820,620 in 1930 to $13,557,815 in 1940.[13] However, the National Park Service, over the lifetime of the CCC, received an additional $218,000,000 for emergency conservation projects, which clearly played a major role in the expansion of the Park Service.[14]

The NPS was well-prepared to take advantage of this windfall. Under Director Albright, the service began to devise "master plans" under which park development was forecast six years in advance. These master plans were the primary reason that the CCC fit so readily into the Park Service's work projects. In fact, the CCC quickly exhausted the Park Service's standard six-year plans, making further planning necessary. Guided by the National Park Service's master plans, the CCC proved to be an effective tool for park development.

At the beginning of the CCC experiment in the national parks, National Park Service administrators doubted that the untrained youths from the streets of New York and other East Coast cities could accomplish much real work in the high forests of Glacier and Yellowstone. Moreover, the enrollees themselves had reason to doubt the government's ability to provide for their needs in the woods. Many enrollees complained of being

poorly equipped for their work. One enrollee in Glacier, Alfred Strode, claimed that his shoes were "a year an a half old & worn...." He also received a mess kit with "John J. Roach, A.E.F., 1919" scratched into the bottom. His pants, while new, were a very poor fit: size 40 waist, 32 inseam for a relatively thin, tall person.[15] Another enrollee, Burton Appleton, claimed that the Park Service winter-issue clothing was totally inadequate for sub-zero winter woods work.[16] Before long, however, as the CCC workers grew accustomed to the work and new equipment became available, the enrollees proved their mettle as they demonstrated their usefulness in a wide variety of work projects.

There were five major types of work projects in Glacier and Yellowstone: reforestation, campground development, trail construction, fire hazard reduction, and fire fighting. The first of these projects, reforestation, was one which FDR held near and dear to his heart. Roosevelt believed that reforestation could renew the lost value of the nation's forests, as it had at the Roosevelt family estate in Hyde Park, New York.

More than just tree planting, CCC reforestation efforts included projects from seed collecting and nursery duty to rejuvenation of fire scars in Glacier and Yellowstone. To be sure, however, tree planting was the major aspect of reforestation. One authority estimated that nationally, the CCCs planted over 2,356,000,000 trees.[17] While Roosevelt envisioned this project as a grand scheme to restore the productivity of the nation's lands, in the parks reforestation took place mostly around campground areas in accordance with the main goal of making the parks more attractive to visitors.

The second major project was the development of campground facilities which were also designed to make the parks both more accessible and more attractive to the expanding automobile camper-owning public. While railroads were unsurpassed in bringing the public to the parks in the late-nineteenth century, by the 1920s and 1930s more and more tourists visited by private automobile. The 1930s ushered in the true ascendency of the private automobile as the preferred form of transportation for national park visitors.

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Park Service planners and landscape architects intended campground development projects to advance the parks' "greater beauty and utility."[18] "Utility" seems to be the operative word for describing National Park Service work projects. Campground development involved paving the forests for parking spaces to accommodate the ever growing number of larger automobiles, paving and improving roads and trails, developing the water resources near the campgrounds,

and laying sewer lines to provide more bathing areas and comfort stations.

Park Service and CCC officials measured success in terms of increased visitor numbers. In 1934, CCC Director Robert Fechner received reports that CCC work projects had "made it possible for park authorities to accommodate virtually all of the large influx of visitors" to the parks.[19] In 1938, Fechner again noted that "national park superintendents report that twenty-five percent, fifty, one hundred, three hundred, and in some cases five hundred percent increases in visitor accommodations in their areas." All of which made it "easier and more pleasant for men, women, and children to visit and enjoy America's most scenic and historic spots."[20]

Still, these increases were insufficient in the Park Service administrators' eyes. Park officials estimated that they needed another ten to twenty years of CCC work to "complete" the parks' facilities to their full potential.[21]

The third project, trail construction, involved dual objectives. One aspect of this project dealt with hiking and horse trails which improved the recreational resources of the parks. A prime example of these recreational trails is the 157-mile Howard Eaton Horse Trail along Yellowstone's Grand Loop Road. [22] The second objective of trail construction, fire trails, was vital for fire control. CCCs spent a tremendous amount of time cutting fire trails.

While the construction and maintenance of fire trails remained a top priority of the Park Service officials, these projects did meet with some resistance. Raymond Torrey, noted botanist, author, conservationist, and former secretary of the National Conference on State Parks, claimed that such projects "invade the integrity" of wild lands and were "out of line" with the intentions behind the establishment of the national parks.[23] CCC and National Park Service officials saw the situation differently: improvement was more important than preservation.

"Fire hazard reduction," the general heading of the fourth main project, was intended to prevent and/or limit the severity of future forest fires, but also served to beautify the parks. Fire hazard reduction included two basic projects: cutting fire breaks and fire fuel load reduction.

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Fire breaks were paths cut through strategic areas of the forest, wide enough to prevent the spread of fire. Park administrators placed so much faith in the utility of fire breaks that they seriously considered proposals to widen some of the ridge-top fire trails to 1,000 feet in Glacier.

Ernest A. Davidson, the Park Service

Regional Landscape Architect, vehemently criticized this plan. He failed to see the logic in clearing and burning a 1,000-foot swath through the forest simply to prevent a similar scar which could occur some time in the future. Moreover, he questioned whether the Park Service landscape planners should "throw overboard (even to a greater extent than we now do) the theory of preservation of natural conditions within the parks."[24]

The second aspect of fire hazard reduction, or fire fuel load reduction, was as hotly debated as was building fire breaks. Many different factors contributed to fire fuel hazards. By 1930, tree diseases, especially White Pine Blister Rust, and bark beetles attacked and killed more trees than did fire. In 1939, experts estimated that bark beetles destroyed over 5,000,000,000 board-feet of timber annually.[25] A Department of Agriculture expert claimed that these insects brought a greater "drain of commercial pine timber than has been sustained from any other destructive agency."[26]

The most controversial part of reducing fire fuel loads was the clearing of fire scars. Because of the burn scars in the two most heavily used areas of the park—the McDonald Valley and the Swiftcurrent/Many Glacier areas—fire scar clean-up work was concentrated in Glacier. This project involved felling snags (fire, insect, or disease killed timber), cutting them into logs, and either burning the wood or salvaging it.

Critics were adamant about putting an end to this work. The most vocal was Dr. Adolph Murie, Glacier's Assistant Wildlife Supervisor. He feared that removing the downed and dead wood from a burn area would significantly reduce the nutrients available for the surrounding soils and would expose soil to the drying effects of the sun and wind and to rain run-off, which would increase erosion.

The most damaging result of the work, in Murie's mind, was that clearing a burned area of dead wood would eliminate a natural habitat. He believed that "destroying a natural condition in a burn is just as sacrilegious [sic] as destroying a green forest."[27]

Dr. Murie was not alone in his condemnation of the project. Landscape architect Davidson attacked it from a fire hazard reduction standpoint. He claimed that fires spread through "growing, green, lodgepole pine and other trees just as easily, and with far more rapidity, than they burn the old snags."[28]

Proponents of the CCC's efforts were as vocal as were the critics. George C. Ruhle, Glacier's Park Naturalist from 1929 to 1941, based his support for the project on the fear of further damage to Glacier's forests. First, the naturalist claimed that only volatile nitrogenous compounds would be lost by removing dead wood from the burns. Second, while clearing all of the dead wood could increase the danger of erosion, Ruhle feared fire and beetles more. Dead trees provided not only fuel for future fires, but the standing snags were a perfect breeding ground for Douglas fir bark beetles (Dendroctonous pseudotsugae) that had destroyed Douglas fir stands in surrounding areas.

Finally, Ruhle argued that standing snags were not, in all actuality, a natural aspect of the Rocky Mountains. Fires as huge as those in the Fish Creek area of

McDonald Valley in 1926, in the Apgar area of Lower McDonald Valley in 1929, and the horrific Heaven's Peak Fires of August and September 1936, were "almost as rare an agent as man in shaping...Glacier's features 100 years ago."[29]

He used the age of the cedars in the 1929 fire as proof. A cedar-hemlock forest is a climax, or mature, forest which takes 250 to 500 years to produce. Consequently, fires the size of the 1929 burn must have been rare. In any case, Ruhle assured Dr. Murie that "there will always be opportunity...to study wild life in a 'natural habitat' of unnatural burns on the park."[30] Both Superintendent Eivind Scoyen and the National Park Service's Chief Forester, John D. Coffman, supported the work. Coffman, in fact, recommended that fire scar clean-up be "the first priority project for any and all CCC camps...to the exclusion of all other projects...."[31]

The CCC's final major project in Glacier and Yellowstone was battling forest fire.

Clearing fire scars was one instance of the National Park Service modifying its goal of unimpaired preservation of the parks for the use of future visitors, in order to make the parks more appealing to the tourists of the 1930s. CCC Director Robert Fechner considered the fire scar clean-up work in Glacier to be valuable not only to the park, but to the nation as a whole.[32] It is clear, in the words of one historian, Curtis Buchholtz, that "human demands, and human aesthetic values pre-empted the primitive or natural condition" in the parks.[33]

Of still greater importance to the nation's forests was the CCC's final major project in Glacier and Yellowstone, battling forest fire. Roosevelt's dedication to the protection of the nation's forests from the predation of fire stems from one of his last activities as a healthy man. On August 10, 1921, while he was sailing off the Bay of Fundy, young Roosevelt spotted a fire. He sailed to shore and beat the fire out with pine boughs. To clean himself of the dirt and soot of the fire, he dove into the warm waters of Lake Glen Severn, and then jumped into the icy Bay to get back to his boat. Later that evening, he retired early, complaining of chills and aches. He began to experience the paralysis of polio the following morning.[34]

The CCC provided the National Park Service with a source of manpower and financial resources that enabled the Park Service to implement fire protection plans shelved because of a lack of resources. Stephen Pyne, perhaps the premier historian of fire in America, maintains that "the largess of the New Deal (principally the Civilian Conservation Corps) led to a major expansion [of fire control] during the 1930s.... It seemed possible in one great push to eliminate the fire menace across the continental U.S."[35] In 1929, the total Park Service fire organization consisted of one national fire officer, one special

fire crew at Glacier Park, and a fire guard at Sequoia National Park. After the establishment of the CCC, however, the National Park Service hired 7,000 new employees for the Park Service fire organization.[36]

Early in its history, the National Park Service depended on the United States Forest Service for fire protection. As the Park Service's fire fighting organization grew, it depended less on the Forest Service. Fundamental philosophical differences in fire control remained between the two agencies, which reflected the directors' backgrounds. Gifford Pinchot of the Forest Service prided himself on being a professional forester, while Stephen Mather gained early repute in business advertising and promotion. These differences are manifested in the different approaches each took to fire control in the lands entrusted to them. Pyne claims that "the Forest Service often regulated access to its lands as a means of controlling fire; the Park Service tended to promote access, even at the risk of fire."[37]

On August 17, 1933, CCC Director Fechner authorized the use of CCC enrollees on fire lines for the first time on a fire in west central Montana near the small town of Craig. However, it was the huge August 1933 Tillamook Burn in western Oregon that inaugurated the first commitment of a large-scale contingent of CCC men on the fire lines—"collectively their real baptism by fire."[38] Entire crews fought fire as an orchestrated whole, instead of the previous practice of a mass of disorganized men working individually on the lines. Pyne considers this a revolution in fire control, and believes that it was the basis for "practically all of the organized crews so essential to modern fire control."[39]

Army General Bedford Forrest's advice for success on the battlefield typified the methods that the CCC used in fighting fires: "Git thar fustest with the mostest men."[40] After the four waves of enrollees moved across a fire line, "there was left as clean a trail as any hiker could ask for."[41] The CCCs across the nation received formal fire fighting training in early 1936. Glacier and Yellowstone officials' unique commitment to fire control is reflected in the fact that every enrollee in these parks received specialized training, instead of only special squads as in other parks. When properly trained and led, CCC workers proved to be able fire fighters.

Entire crews fought fire as an orchestrated whole.

In spite of the CCCs' training, two fires in particular posed insurmountable challenges to their fire fighting abilities. The 1936 Heaven's Peak Fire was the most devastating in Glacier in the CCCs' years there. It denuded one of the park's most scenic valleys (the Swiftcurrent) and partially destroyed another (the McDonald Valley). A park museum, a campground, a ranger station, ninety cabins, and nearly 9,000 acres of forest fell before the rolling wall of flame. The fire fighting

force, including 700 of the park's enrollees, succeeded in saving the Many Glacier Hotel only with the help of favorable winds and a fortuitous rain storm.[42]

The most tragic fire in the history of the CCC was the Blackwater Creek Fire on Yellowstone's eastern border in the Shoshone National Forest. On August 20, 1938, lightning started a small fire near the headwaters of Blackwater Creek, thirty-five miles west of Cody, Wyoming. Later that evening, a crew of fifty enrollees, one superintendent and a foreman arrived at the fire scene from a Yellowstone Park camp, to join Federal Bureau of Public Roads workers already on the scene. Upon their arrival, they discovered that the fire had jumped across the ridge into the next drainage. Later, two more CCC crews cut a fire break below that ridge. While they worked, the wind blew some sparks that started a spot fire below the CCCs.

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The fire trapped both crews, and one crew sought the refuge of a nearby rock outcropping, a thirty-foot wide area.[43] One man from this crew panicked and fled to his death in the flames. The second crew had no such refuge, and chose to try to fight the spot fire. Ten enrollees, three foremen and a Bureau of Public Roads employee, died as the flames overcame the second crew. All of those who sought the shelter of the rocks survived, but many had the clothes burned off their backs and sustained burns. Eighteen were burned critically.[44]

As the news of these deaths spread throughout the CCC, people began to see themselves as "cannon fodder" for the National Park Service's fire fighting plans.[45] In the face of dropping enlistments and increasing desertions, Fechner decided that all enrollees were to be better trained, and were to be used only as a last resort. This change was not evident in Glacier and Yellowstone, however, as enrollees remained the primary weapon in these parks' arsenals against forest fire.[46]

Officials of both the CCC and the Park Service recognized the contributions the enrollees made as fire fighters. The CCC worker was an excellent firefighter, because, as Fechner claimed, "what he lacks in experience is made up by his willingness, adaptability, availability, and numbers. His youth and good physical condition have enabled him to strike hard during the initial and vital stages" of a fire.[47]

Glacier Superintendent Scoyen claimed that "the Corps' primary purpose [was that] of pre-suppressing and fighting forest fires...."[48] The young men of the CCC spent a total of 6,459,000 man-days fighting fires,[49] thereby reducing the acreage lost to fire up to ninety percent of that lost before the days of the CCC.[50]

The decision of CCC and National Park

Service administrators to use the enrollees to battle fire demonstrated a clear disavowal of the Park Service's mission to preserve the parks in their natural condition for the future. Still today, the National Park Service is struggling with its fire policy. In light of the devastating fires in Yellowstone Park of 1988, the "let natural fires burn" policy has become the subject of intense debate. An indication of the debate developed during the Yellowstone fires when several fire officials sought to bulldoze the forest "right and left" to halt the fires' advance.[51] Fire in the parks is sure to remain a major point of contention between preservationist—who favor natural conditions including fires—and those favoring pretty vacation lands.

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From the perspective of Glacier and Yellowstone visitors, the CCC changed the faces of the parks. In all, nearly 10,000 young men worked under the CCC in Yellowstone, and nearly 11,500 worked in Glacier.[52] They completed a wide variety of work projects, from planting seedlings to fighting forest fires. Visitors witnessed the transformation of vast areas of burned timber into newly-planted forest. Tourists camped in new campgrounds hewn out of the forest. Expanded campgrounds made other improvements necessary. Enrollees built and furnished comfort stations and bath houses throughout these parks for the comfort and convenience of the motor tourist. CCC workers helped visitors enjoy these parks by safeguarding their forests from disease, insects, and fires.

In spite of their work in the parks, the CCC workers were not greeted with universal approval. Communities' initial attitudes toward the CCCs stemmed from fear and intimidation. Many locals worried over their daughters' virtue—sometimes with good reason.

Missoula, Montana endured robberies, vandalism, and thuggish activity by a few undesirable enrollees. While none of these activities were the fault of Glacier or Yellowstone enrollees, the CCCs' reputations were tarnished by unfounded stories circulating about a gang of Yellowstone enrollees from New York who broke into a ranger's cabin, stole his horses, and raped his wife.[53] While the community of West Yellowstone and a few others throughout the West posted signs which read "No Dogs or CCC men allowed," the communities around Glacier exhibited little animosity once the benefits of having a camp nearby became evident.[54]

Shortly after the CCC camps began their work in the parks, communities near Glacier and Yellowstone began reaping the benefits of the camps' proximity.

Local men became project foremen, and local carpenters built the camps. At the CCC mess halls, local farmers found a

ready market for their produce. Local food purchases alone added up to more than $1,500 per month. Total monthly expenditures for each camp, including individual enrollees' spending was nearly $5,000.00. This source of income was significant--one community, Plains, Montana, was completely removed from depression standards because of the trade stimulated by Glacier Park enrollees.[55]

The CCCs affected both Glacier and Yellowstone parks by enabling more and more visitors to experience the national parks. From the National Park Service's perspective at the time, this was clearly a positive result of CCC efforts. Administrators believed that an active, interested public held the promise of stable appropriations. Officials sought to attract visitors by making the parks more comfortable and accessible, thus transforming "worthless" lands into useful tourist areas.

The Civilian Conservation Corps appeared as the perfect vehicle to implement such developmental plans. Roosevelt's "Tree Army" brought with it not only tens of thousands of young men to Glacier and Yellowstone, but millions of dollars as well. The National Park Service took full advantage of this seemingly endless wellspring of manpower and funds to execute its plans for full development of the parks.

The attitudes and infrastructure developed during the years of CCC work in the parks has created a legacy which makes current attempts to shift policy toward environmental non-intervention much more difficult.

From its earliest days the Park Service has walked a tightrope between use and preservation. Today's policies reflect a renewed interest in preserving the parks in their natural condition. White Pine Blister Rust, pine beetle infestations, and wildfires are left to run their courses as natural phenomena. The Park Service is currently attempting to restore Yellowstone's popular Fishing Bridge campground, in prime grizzly bear habitat, to its natural condition for the benefit of the bears. Such developments are clear departures from the National Park Service's attempt to develop the nation's parks through the men and the money of the Civilian Conservation Corps.

ENDNOTES

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12. Donald C. Swain, "The National Park Service and the New Deal, 1933-1940," *Pacific Historical Review* 41 (1972), 323-324.

13. Ise, *Our National Park Policy*, 359.

14. Swain, "National Park Service and the New Deal," 324-324.

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16. Interview with Appleton, April, 1988, Glacier Park, Redinger Collection.

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39. *Ibid.*, 326.

40. CCC, "Forests Protected...," 5.

41. Letter, Martin J. Romero to Father, as quoted in McEntee, 24.

42. *Great Falls Tribune*, August 31-September 2, 1936. See also Arthur Youwer to author, personal correspondence, October 31, 1987, Redinger Collection; and Donald H. Robinson, *Through the Years in Glacier National Park* (West Glacier, Montana: Glacier Natural History Association, 1960), 85.

43. B. Van Arsdale, "Fire Fighters Tell of Graphic Experience," *The Cody Enterprise*, August 23, 1937, 1.

44. See Hanson, 272-274; Yellowstone National Park, Superintendent's

Monthly Report, August, 1937, 20; and Pyne, 367-369; see also "Forest Fire Tragedy Stuns Cody," The *Cody Enterprise*, August 25, 1937.

45. During the lifespan of the CCC, forty-seven enrollees died on fire lines, Pyne, 383.

46. Pyne, 369-370.

47. CCC, "Forests Protected...," 5.

48. Glacier National Park, Superintendent's Annual Report, fiscal year 1937, Glacier National Park Historical Collections, Box 7, file 5, 18.

49. Merrill, 196.

50. *New York Times*, October 26, 1937, 46, and John C. Paige, *The Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Park Service, 1933-1942* (Washington, DC: United States Department of the Interior, 1985), 100.

51. Peter Mathiessen, "A Case for Burning," The *New York Times Magazine*, December 11, 1988, 121-122. For continuing debate, see also Stephen Pyne, "Letting Wild Fire Loose: The Fires of 1988," *Montana, The Magazine of Western History* 39 (Summer, 1989), 76-79; Pyne, "The Summer We Let Wild Fires Loose," *Natural History* 98 (August, 1989), 44-49; Richard Monastersky, "Lessons from the Flames," *Science News* 134 (November 12, 1988), 314-317; and Paul Schullery, "The Fires and Fire Policy," *BioScience* 39 (November, 1989), 686-694. Schullery's article appears in *BioScience* in a special issue devoted to the Yellowstone fires.

52. Numbers of enrollees in these parks is derived from Superintendent's Annual Reports and Superintendent's Monthly Reports from Glacier and Yellowstone. These reports provide an average number of enrollees per camp (Glacier: 187; Yellowstone: 186). The author multiplied these figures by the total number of camps in each of these parks. The figures given include the total number of enrollments in these parks; no account is made for re-enrollments.

53. Robert Ohls, personal correspondence with Bill Sharp, July 8, 1975, Redinger Collection.

54. Letter, Kenneth O. Williamson to author, personal correspondence, February 26, 1988, Redinger Collection.

55. Salmond, 90.