

The Queen, the Emperor, and the Republican

United States Foreign Policy in 1863

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On December 1, 1862, in his Annual Report to Congress, President Lincoln reported:

If the condition of our relations with other nations is less gratifying than it has usually been at former periods, it is certainly more satisfactory than a nation so unhappily distracted as we are, might reasonably have apprehended.¹


Lincoln, and his Secretary of State William Henry Seward, had reason to be satisfied with the administration's foreign policy to date. They had weathered the *Trent* Affair and mediation offers by both Great Britain and France. Despite the Confederacy having been granted belligerent status by Great Britain and France, no nation had as yet granted official recognition to the Confederacy. Preventing such recognition was the main objective of Lincoln's foreign policy. 1863 would present challenges to that policy.

The three countries of most concern to Lincoln were Great Britain, France, and Mexico. Each would present its own unique challenges to the administration. A fourth country would prove to be a surprising friend of the administration.

Queen Victoria had reigned as the constitutional monarch of Great Britain since 1837 (when she was 18). Her Majesty's Prime Minister was Henry John Temple, third Viscount Palmerston. At the age of 79, Lord Palmerston had served in every administration except two since 1807. He had served almost 20 years as Secretary at War and 16 years as Foreign Secretary. Palmerston considered his greatest achievement as Foreign Secretary to have been the creation of Belgium in 1832.²

Earl John Russell, age 71, served as Foreign Secretary under Palmerston. Earl Russell, like Palmerston, had a distinguished career in government service. He entered Parliament in 1820 and had served as Home Secretary and Colonial Secretary. He served as Prime Minister from 1846-1851, during which time Palmerston served as his Foreign Secretary. Russell served as Foreign Secretary in 1852 and was chosen by Palmerston as his Foreign Secretary in 1859.³

Representing the United States in Great Britain was Charles Francis Adams, one of the most outstanding diplomats in American history. The son of John Quincy Adams and the grandson of John Adams, Adams had accompanied his father on many of his diplomatic missions. Educated partially in English public schools, Adams was intelligent, urban and understood the English mind and society. Adams had served in the Massachusetts Legislature and had established the *Boston Whig*, to oppose slavery and the government's pro-Southern policy. He ran for Vice-President with Martin Van Buren on the Free Soil Ticket in 1848, had served in the U. S. Congress and had supported Seward for President. Earl Russell described Adams as "a reasonable man," high praise coming from Russell.⁴



Charles Francis Adams
National Park Service

Prior to Adams' arrival in London, on May 14, 1861, Russell had met twice, unofficially, with Confederate commissioners. At his first interview with Russell, on May 18, Adams noted that "the continued stay of the pseudo-commissioners... (and) the knowledge that they had been admitted to more or less interviews with his lordship, was calculated to excite uneasiness." Russell replied that both England and France "had long been accustomed to receive such persons unofficially." Although Russell informed Adams that "he had no expectation of seeing them anymore" he did not rule out the possibility of written communications.⁵

Palmerston's policy was to keep Great Britain out of war. He wrote Russell that our "true policy" was "to go on as we have begun, and to keep quite clear of the conflict." Russell agreed. The Confederacy believed Great Britain would be forced to recognize them in order to obtain cotton (King Cotton Diplomacy). Russell felt that to intervene "because they keep cotton from us would be ignominious beyond measure... No English Parliament could do so base a thing."⁶

The English working class and many English Liberals had been reluctant to give full support to the United States because Lincoln had not declared the abolition of slavery to be a war aim. After the Emancipation Proclamation most of the English working class supported the United States wholeheartedly. At a mass meeting in Yorkshire it was declared "that any intervention, physical or moral, on behalf of the slave power would be disgraceful."⁷

Frederick Law Olmstead, writing from Europe, stated that the Emancipation was building good will in England, the Germanies, and was helping to restrain France. Lord Althorpe felt that Emancipation made intervention preposterous and that it might have certain side effects:

There was now a chance of the entire abolition of slavery if the proclamation were fully carried out, for that proclamation had not been addressed to the Southern States only, but virtually to the Brazils and to Spain as well; for if the slaves should be emancipated in America, but two years, certainly not twenty, would elapse before the negroes of Brazil and Spain would be free also.⁸

This outpouring of support for the United States was unusual. Henry Cobden, one of the leading English Liberals, stated: “Do not forget that we have in this case, for the first time in our history, seen the masses of the British people taking the side of a foreign government against its rebellious citizens. In every other instance, whether in the case of the Poles, Italians, Hungarians, Corsicans, Greeks, or South Americans, the popular sympathy of this country has always leaped to the side of the insurgents.” Even the London *Times*, decidedly anti-Union, now rejected intervention.⁹



In this cartoon from Britain's humor magazine *Punch*, British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston considers whether he should "recognize" Jeff Davis, or snub him, the next time they pass. Library of Congress.

All of this support did not mean there would be smooth sailing in 1863. On February 25, the British steamer *Peterhoff*, while off St. Thomas, was seized by Acting Lieutenant C. H. Baldwin, U. S. Navy. Baldwin found the ship's papers to be irregular. He reported that he had also learned “from one of her crew that she has field-pieces and arms on board...there is little doubt she will prove a lawful prize; she has run the blockade before.” The *Peterhoff* was heading for the neutral port of Matamoras, Mexico.¹⁰

The *Peterhoff* had been seized under the doctrine of continuous voyage. This legalized the seizure of contraband goods from a neutral vessel going from one neutral port to another *provided* the ultimate destination for the goods was enemy territory. British courts had established the basic doctrine of continuous voyage and could not now repudiate their own precedent. The

question, having international repercussions, was how this doctrine applied to the status of a blockaded river, such as the Rio Grande, serving both a neutral and a belligerent. The United States Supreme Court freed the ship and the non-contraband articles, but it ruled that the mouth of the Rio Grande was within the Federal blockade. The Court sustained the seizure of the contraband goods on the grounds that they were destined for trans-shipment over land from Matamoras to the Confederacy. The British could have protested this ruling but they chose to take a long term view of it. During World War I, British courts applied the doctrine of continuous voyage to American ships bound for the Netherlands with goods to be shipped overland to Germany.¹¹

Minister Adams noted to Secretary Seward that the effect of the news of the *Peterhoff* “will be to prolong the delay in reorganizing the scheme of smuggling by way of the Rio Grande.”¹²

On June 30, 1863, John Arthur Roebuck, Member of Parliament (MP), proposed in the House of Commons that Her Majesty “be graciously pleased to enter into negotiations with the Great Powers of Europe, for the purpose of obtaining their co-operation in the recognition of the independence of the Confederate States of North America.” Roebuck, known as “Tear-'em” for his vehement attacks on opponents, had stated in a speech at Sheffield in 1862, that “a divided America will be a benefit to England... The North will never be our friends. Of the South you can make friends. They are Englishmen; they are not the scum and refuse of Europe.” This was a brave thing for Roebuck to state considering the many of his listeners had friends or relatives who had immigrated to the North to find jobs.¹³

Roebuck had visited Napoleon III of France on June 20 and had been authorized to state that Napoleon was willing and anxious to recognize the Confederacy with the co-operation of Great Britain. Napoleon, however, failed to make a formal proposal to Russell. Roebuck, therefore, had no proof of the French offer and this helped to weaken his motion. Palmerston informed Roebuck that “No good can come of touching again upon this matter, nor from fixing upon the Emperor a mistake which amid the multiplicity of things he has to think of he may be excused for making...”. It was believed by some that Roebuck’s motion was an effort to unseat Palmerston’s government. However, Lord Derby, the opposition leader, who had not been consulted by Roebuck, was also opposed to granting recognition.¹⁴

Secretary Seward expressed “great apprehension” at the possible break-up of Palmerston’s ministry. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles wrote that there was “an intimation that should Roebuck’s motion for a recognition of the Confederacy prevail, Earl Russell would resign. I have no fears that the motion will prevail. The English, though mischievously inclined, are not demented.”¹⁵

The government was well aware of the various military campaigns being conducted in the United States. William E. Gladstone, Chancellor of the Exchequer, stated: “Certainly there has not been a single epoch during the whole period of the war at which there were pending military issues of such vast moment, both in the East and the West – interests so important with reference to...both belligerents.” When Roebuck realized that his motion would be overwhelmingly

defeated he withdrew it on July 13, before news reached London of either Gettysburg or Vicksburg.¹⁶

The Foreign Enlistment Act (passed in May 1861) forbid British subjects to “be concerned in the equipping, furnishing, fitting out, or arming, of any ship or vessel, with intent or in order that such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service...” of a belligerent. When the *Alabama* and *Sumter*, built by the Laird Shipyards in Birkenhead, were accepted into Confederate service, Minister Adams had believed it to be a violation of the Enlistment Act. Earl Russell explained that according to the Act, the government needed *proof* that the ships were intended for Confederate service and this the government had not been able to obtain.¹⁷

In June 1862, the Laird Shipyards received a contract for two double-turreted iron-clads, 1800 tons each, 230' long, 40' beam, carrying four 9" Rifles and with an iron “piercer” at the bow. T. H. Dudley, the U. S. Consul in Liverpool, believed that if “these vessels get out they will give us much trouble. I regard them as the most formidable and dangerous vessel afloat.”¹⁸

The Laird Shipyards had a long history of building iron-clad vessels. The Laird's had built one of the first iron vessels in 1829. The firm constructed the *John Randolph*, the first iron vessel in the United States and had built the first iron vessel to carry guns. Gideon Welles described the Lairds as “...those virtuous abolitionists who, as a matter of principle, would not use the product of slave labor, but who for mercenary considerations snatched at the opportunity to build ships for the slave oligarchy?”¹⁹

It was rumored that the Rams were intended for a French firm, Bravay & Company, who were acting as agents for the Viceroy of Egypt. Adams presented Russell with evidence, obtain by Consul Dudley, that the Rams were intended for Confederate service. Russell still insisted that his government needed absolute proof of intent in order to seize the Rams.²⁰

Adams sent Russell more affidavits. On September 3, Russell wrote Adams that the government had been advised that “they cannot interfere in any way with these vessels.” This prompted Adams to regard the escape of the Rams “as practically opening to the insurgents free liberty” to attack New York, Boston, and Portland and to break the blockade. Adams ended his note to Russell by stating: “It would be superfluous in me to point out to your lordship that this is war...”. Russell, unknown to Adams, had on September 3, already issued “positive instructions” to detain the Rams, place a guard on board and to have the shipyards watched by a vessel of the Royal Navy. The government seized the Rams in mid-October and the vessels were eventually purchased by the Admiralty. Adams wrote to Seward noting the “firm stand” taken by Russell and stating his belief that this was now the time for the best prospects to preserve friendly relations since his arrival.²¹

There were several reasons for this “friendly” attitude of the British government. In March 1863, the U. S. Congress passed a Privateering Act authorizing the President to issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal to privateers. This act would have allowed the President to authorize private individuals to outfit their own ships for the purpose of attacking Confederate commercial shipping. This was a measure neither the President nor Secretary Welles had requested. Earl Russell chose to view this act as a possible threat to British commerce and a possible threat of

war with the United States. Lord Lyons, the British Minister to Washington, wrote in November that the United States had become too formidable to challenge:

Three years ago Great Britain might at the commencement of a war have thrown a larger number of trained troops into the British provinces of Canada than the United States could have placed there. Now the United States could without difficulty send an army into Canada outnumbering any British force five to one.²²

Events on the European mainland were also having an impact on American diplomacy. In January 1863, the Poles had risen in revolt against Russian rule. Great Britain and France protested the harsh measures used by the Russians to suppress the revolt. Napoleon III, tied down in Mexico, was unable to do anything but lend moral support to the Poles. The Prussians chose to support Russia by agreeing to send back any Polish rebels who took refuge in Prussia.²³

In February, Confederate Commissioner A. Dudley Mann reported that the “public mind” was “almost exclusively preoccupied with Poland and the Poles.” Even as late as October, Mann reported that there “is an increasing feeling of uneasiness here on the Polish question...the Emperor would rather desire a war with Russia in which Prussia could not fail to be involved, but at present he can not dispense with the cooperation of England and Austria...So long as the Polish question remains in its present uncertain condition it will be a serious obstacle to our recognition.”²⁴

In March 1863, Denmark’s Frederick VII moved to incorporate the overwhelmingly German population of Schleswig-Holstein into Denmark. Frederick died in November 1863 and was succeeded by Christian IX, who claimed descent through the female line. Since the German Confederation recognized the Salic law they did not recognize Christian’s right to the throne or to the provinces. Palmerston believed that this would lead to a Franco-Prussian War. Britain stood with France and Russia in maintaining Danish independence. If Prussia attacked “it would not be with Denmark alone that they would have to contend.” On January 1, 1864 troops from the German Confederation entered Holstein. Austro-Prussian troops entered Schleswig one month later.²⁵

Henry Adams, the son of Charles Francis, summed up the European situation: “...Nothing has caused us more gentle slumbers since the seizure of the iron-clads than the delicious state of tangle Europe has now arrived at. Nothing but panic in every direction and the strongest combination of cross-purposes you can conceive. The King of Denmark has just died with a clearly perverse purpose of increasing the confusion, and any day may see a Danish war. Russia expects war and France acts as though it were unavoidable. Meanwhile, England hulks about and makes faces at all the other nations. Our affairs are quite in the back-ground, thank the Lord.”²⁶

Napoleon III, born in 1808, was a nephew of Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte. In 1836 and 1840 he attempted two military coups which failed. In 1848, while in exile, he was elected to the

French Assembly and in December was elected President of the Second Republic. In imitation of his uncle, he declared himself emperor of the Second Empire in December 1852.²⁷

On October 30, 1862, Napoleon offered a scheme of joint mediation by France, Great Britain and Russia. His plan was so favorable to the Confederates that both Great Britain and Russia refused to join. The Russians stated that in “our opinion what ought specially to be avoided (is) the appearance of any pressure whatsoever of a nature to wound public opinion in the United States and to excite susceptibilities very easily aroused at the base idea of foreign intervention.” Earl Russell wrote: “that there is no ground at the present moment to hope that the federal government would accept the proposal suggested, and a refusal from Washington at the present time would prevent any speedy renewal of the offer.”²⁸

On January 8, 1863, Napoleon made another offer of mediation by France alone. This was also politely refused.²⁹

The main point of contention between the United States and France was over the Republic of Mexico.

Benito Juarez, President of the Republic of Mexico, had studied for the priesthood before becoming a lawyer. He had served as Governor of Oaxaca, Minister of Justice, Chief Justice and Vice-President. When the constitutionally elected president was ousted by a coup of military and religious leaders in 1858, Juarez became president under the Constitution. He established a liberal government in Vera Cruz and was promptly recognized by the United States. Juarez’s government called for a series of reforms including religious toleration and confiscation of church property.³⁰

In a show of support for the United States, the Mexican Congress, on June 20, 1861, approved a measure to allow U.S. troops to land at Guaymas, on Mexico’s west coast, and march through the State of Sonora to relieve El Paso.³¹

At the end of the War of the Reform in 1861, Juarez attempted to scale-down Spanish, French, and British claims for Mexican debts and then announced his intention to stop all payments for two years. In December 1861 Spanish forces occupied Vera Cruz and were soon joined by British and French forces.³²

The Spanish, British, and French landed about 10,000 troops in Mexico with the understanding that they were there to collect on past debts. By May 1862 Great Britain and Spain had concluded separate agreements with Juarez and prepared to withdraw their forces. Napoleon had other plans. A U.S. Naval officer wrote: “The French forces will hold what they have, and, . . . will muster about 12,000 men of all arms. . . Great unanimity is known to prevail, . . . throughout Mexico, and a stout resistance may be looked for. . .”³³

The French forces started to move towards Mexico City in April of 1862. They suffered a severe loss at Puebla on May 5 (Cinco de Mayo). They were not able to enter Mexico City until June 1863. The United States continued to recognize the Juarez government. Minister Mateos Romero was made welcome in Washington and when the French entered Mexico City, U. S. Minister Thomas Corwin refused to close the embassy but he was granted a leave of absence.³⁴

The Confederacy, in contrast to the United States, offered to support Napoleon in Mexico. In July 1862, they offered several thousand bales of cotton and an alliance against Juarez in return for French recognition. They formed alliances with anti-Juarez forces to conduct a contraband trade from Matamoros to Brownsville, Texas. When Napoleon announced a plan to place Maximilian of Austria on the throne of Mexico, the Confederates offered to recognize Maximilian if he would help them. Jefferson Davis stated that “If the Emperor will free me from the blockade and he will be able to do that with a stroke of the pen, I guarantee him possession of Mexico.”³⁵

The South, especially Texas, had long dreamed of expanding into Mexico. As one Confederate officer wrote it “is a rich and glorious neighbor, and would improve by being under the Confederate flag. There are no such mines in the world as are within sight of Chihuahua City, but not developed for want of a stable government... We must have Chihuahua and Sonora.”³⁶

United States officials uncovered Confederate plans to establish headquarters at the border town of Calabazas, invade Mexico and occupy the port of Guaymas. In response the USS *St. Mary's* was dispatched to Guaymas “until further orders”. General George Wright, commander of the Department of the Pacific, assured the American Consul at Guaymas that he “need be under no apprehension that the Rebels will gain a foothold in Sonora.” Wright had written to the Governor of Sonora and had assured him that he had “10,000 men ready to pass the frontier and pursue our enemies should they enter the State of Sonora.”³⁷

The United States could do very little to directly aid the Mexican Republic during the Civil War. In July 1863 Welles wrote: “The Mexican Republic has been extinguished and an empire has risen on its ruins. But for this wicked rebellion in this country this calamity would not have occurred.”³⁸

At the conclusion of the Vicksburg Campaign, Seward wrote to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton expressing the hope that a military force could be “detached for the purpose of occupying and holding at least the lower part of the Rio Grande frontier.” Even the President asked Stanton if they could not “renew the effort to organize a force to go to Western Texas?... I believe no local object is now more desirable.” Major General Nathaniel P. Banks was ordered to retake part of Texas. Banks was informed by Major General Henry W. Halleck that there were “important reasons why our flag should be restored in some part of Texas with the least possible delay.” Halleck later clarified this order by stating that it was “of a diplomatic rather than of a military character, and resulted from some European complications, or, more properly speaking, was intended to prevent such complication.”³⁹

Banks' first attempt at entering Texas, in September 1863, was the failed Sabine Pass Expedition. The Rio Grande Expedition, starting October 27, 1863, was more successful. Banks entered Brownsville on November 5 and began reporting on a very confused situation across the river in Matamoros. General Jose Maria Cobos had occupied Matamoros on October 5 and imprisoned Don Manuel Ruiz, the governor of Tamamlipas. Banks believed this was a show of support to France as the Governor was “unquestionably a friend of the United States.” Cobos, in

turn, was ousted and executed by General Juan Cortinas on November 7. Ruiz, who had been released, felt threatened by Cortinas and sought safety in Brownsville.⁴⁰

Banks ordered his troops “to be ready for movement at any moment during the night” and placed artillery along the river aimed at Matamoros to protect the American consul. John Hay wrote that this move greatly concerned Lincoln and Seward. Seward stated that he had written to Banks “that that would be war. That if our consul wanted protection he must come to Brownsville for it. Firing upon the town would involve us in a war with the Lord knows who.’ The President responded with ‘Or rather, the Lord knows who not.’”⁴¹

Seward wrote Banks to clarify the Administration’s position toward Mexico:

We are on terms of amity and friendship and maintaining diplomatic relations with the Republic of Mexico. We regard that country as the theater of a foreign war, mingled with civil strife. In this conflict we take no part, and, on the contrary, we practice absolute non-intervention and non-interference.⁴²

The issue with France over Mexico would not be resolved until after the Civil War.


Perhaps the best friend the United States had in Europe during the Civil War was the “Tsar-Liberator”, Alexander II of Russia. Alexander had instituted a series of reforms in Russia including emancipation of all serfs and state peasants, creating a series of elective bodies at the local level, replacing trial by tribunal with trial by jury, and making Russia’s judges independent of any outside influence, including his.⁴³

It may seem strange that the United States and Russia should be the best of friends, even in the nineteenth century. However, they did not share a common boundary and neither had overseas possessions, except for Russian America (Alaska), which some Americans had offered to buy in the 1850s. Russia also granted the United States the right to carry prizes into Russian ports during the Civil War. Russia did desire American support in Europe during the Polish crises. No Russian intervention in U. S. internal affairs on behalf of the Confederates meant no U.S. intervention in Russian internal affairs on behalf of the Poles.⁴⁴

Seward understood this relationship very clearly. “The case”, he said, “is a plain one. She has our friendship, in every case, in preference to any other European power, simply because she always wishes us well, and leaves us to conduct our affairs as we think best.”⁴⁵

Seemingly, the most dramatic example of Russian support was the arrival of the Russian Atlantic and Pacific fleets at New York and San Francisco in September and October, 1863. Welles noted that in “sending them to this country there is something significant. What will be its effect in France and the French policy we shall learn in due time. It may be moderate; it may exasperate. God bless the Russians.”⁴⁶

The Americans, on both coasts, wined and dined the Russian officers. *Harper’s Weekly* reported that this was done to show our “gratitude for the friendly manner in which Russia has stood by us in our present struggle, while the Western powers have done not a little to work our ruin.” The Russians returned the favors. Before leaving New York, the Russian officers raised



*The Russian crew of the **Osliba** pose aboard ship in Alexandria, Virginia. Library of Congress.*

over \$4,000 for the poor of the city. In San Francisco, Admiral Popov had ordered his men to help put out a fire in the city and stated that the fleet was ready “simply in the name of humanity, but not of politics, to exercise...influence for the prevention of harm.” When rumors spread of a possible attack on the city by the *Alabama* and *Sumter*, Popov said he was ready to order the fleet “to put on steam and clear for action.” Popov was rebuked by Moscow and was reminded that Russia had no right in interfere in the internal affairs of the United States.⁴⁷

Recent history and affairs in Europe, not a show of support, had prompted the Czar to send his fleets to America in the winter of 1863-1864. During the Crimean War the Russian fleets had been bottled-up in home waters. With the possibility of war over the Polish crises, Alexander did

not want to repeat that mistake. If war with France, for example, had broken out, the Atlantic Fleet was in position to attack French shipping in the Gulf of Mexico.

In his Annual Report of December 8, 1863, the President presented an outline of the current diplomatic issues. Great Britain had acted to “prevent the departure of new hostile expeditions” and had signed a new, more effective treaty to suppress the slave trade. Napoleon III, tied down in Mexico and with affairs in Europe, had “vindicated the neutrality which he proclaimed at the beginning of the contest.” The President’s goal in foreign affairs had been to prevent European, especially British, recognition of the Confederacy and to keep the United States out of a foreign conflict. Despite the crises arising out of the Larid Rams, the Roebuck Motion and the French occupation of Mexico, that goal had been achieved. The President could thus assure Congress that “We remain in peace and friendship with foreign powers.”⁴⁸

Notes

¹ Roy P. Basler, editor. *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, 8 vols and Index. (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ, 1953), vol. 5, p. 518.

² Brison D. Gooch, *Europe in the Nineteenth Century: A History*. (Macmillan Company, New York, 1970), pp. 297-299; Sir Leslie Stephen and Sir Sidney Lee, editors, *The Dictionary of National Biography*, 22 vols. (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1917; Reprint, Oxford, 1959-1960), vol. 19, pp. 496-512. (Hereinafter cited as *DNB*.)

³ *DNB*, 17, pp. 454-463.

⁴ Allen Johnson, editor. *Dictionary of American Biography*, 20 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1946), vol. 1, pp. 40-48.

⁵ Ephraim D. Adams, *Great Britain and the American Civil War*, 2 vols. (Peter Smith, Gloucester, MA, 1957; Originally printed 1925), vol. 1, pp. 85, 96 to 98, 105-106. For Confederate diplomacy see: Charles M. Hubbard, *The Burden of Confederacy Diplomacy*. (University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville, TN, 1998)

⁶ James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*. (Oxford University Press, New York, 1988), pp. 384-385.

⁷ John Ford Rhodes, *History of the United States*, 8 vols. (Harper & Brothers, New York, 1893 - 1917), vol. 4, p. 352.

⁸ Allan Nevins, *The War for the Union: War Becomes Revolution, 1862-1863* (Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1960), pp. 479-481.

⁹ Nevins, *War Becomes Revolution*, pp. 250 & 247.

¹⁰ U. S. Department of the Navy. *The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion*. 30 Vols. and Index. (Washington, 1894-1927), Series I, Vol. 2, p. 98. For more correspondence on the *Peterhoff* see pp. 97-104, 112, 138, 149-155, and 569-571. Hereinafter cited as *ORN*.

¹¹ James T. Adams, ed. *Dictionary of American History*, 5 vols. plus Index. (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1946), vol. 2, p. 142; 6, p. 255; McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, p. 387.

¹² U. S. War Department. *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*. 128 Vols. & Index. (Washington, 1880-1901), Series III, Volume 3, p. 213. Hereinafter cited as *OR*

¹³ *DNB*, 17, pp. 95-97; J. G. Randall, *Lincoln the President: Midstream*. (Dodd, Meade & Co., New York, 1952), p. 350.

¹⁴ Adams, II, p. 168-169, 171; Randall, p. 351.

¹⁵ Gideon Welles, *Diary of Gideon Welles*, 3 vols. (Houghton Mifflin Co., New York, 1911), Vol. 1, p. 374

¹⁶ Adams, *Great Britain*, 2, pp. 176-177; Nevins, *War Becomes Revolution*, pp. 491-492.

¹⁷ Adams, *Great Britain*, 2, p. 116.

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- ¹⁸ Adams, *Great Britain*, 2, p. 122; James Russell Soley, "The Confederate Cruisers" in Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel, eds. *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, 4 vols. (New York, 1884-89), vol. 4, pp. 597-598; *OR I*, 26(1), pp. 658-659.
- ¹⁹ *DNB*, 11, pp. 406-407; Welles, *Diary*, 1, p. 394. On April 5, 1863, the *Alexandria*, being built by the Larid's as a commerce destroyer, was seized as a violation of the Enlistment Act.
- ²⁰ Adams, *Great Britain*, 2, pp. 136, 144, 146; Soley, "Cruisers", pp. 597-598.
- ²¹ Adams, *Great Britain*, 2, pp. 144-147; Soley, "Cruisers", pp. 597-598; Rhodes, *History*, p. 380
- ²² Adams, *Great Britain*, 2, p. 138; Nevins, *War Becomes Revolution*, p. 506. (See also *ORN*, I, 5, pp. 796 for Proclamation by Jefferson Davis authorizing letters of marque and Edward McPherson, *The History of the Great Rebellion*. (Washington: Solomons & Chapman, 1876), pp. 377.) Lincoln never issued letters of marque. Jefferson Davis did.
- ²³ Nevins, *War Becomes Revolution*, p. 474; Edward Crankshaw, *Bismarck* (Viking Press, 1981; Penquin Books, 1983; Reprint 1984, New York), pp. 150-151. On 8 February 1863 Prussia and Russia signed the Alvensleben Convention.
- ²⁴ *ORN*, II, 3, p. 703, p. 937.
- ²⁵ *Ibid*; Gooch, *Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 415; Crankshaw, *Bismarck*, pp. 163-171
- ²⁶ Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1970), p. 345.
- ²⁷ Gooch, *Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 271-273, 292.
- ²⁸ Rhodes, *History*, pp. 346-347. For a more complete review of Napoleon's offer see: Lynn M. Case & Warren T. Spencer, *The United States and France: Civil War Diplomacy* (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1970), pp. 347-373.
- ²⁹ Rhodes, *History*, p. 348.
- ³⁰ John Edwin Fagg, *Latin America: A General History* (Collier-Macmillan Limited, London, 1969), pp. 509, 511; J. G. Randall, *Lincoln the President: Last Full Measure* (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, IL, 2000), pp. 64-65.
- ³¹ *ORN*, I, 1, pp. 379-380; Alvin M. Josephy, Jr. *The Civil War in the American West*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), p. 56.
- ³² Fagg, *Latin America*, pp. 512-513.
- ³³ *ORN*, I, 1, p. 380; Randall, *Last Full Measure*, pp. 64-65.
- ³⁴ McPherson, *Battle Cry*, pp. 553-554, 583.
- ³⁵ Fagg, *Latin America*, p. 514; Randall, *Last Full Measure*, pp. 67-68; *OR I*, 9, pp. 628-629; Justus Scheibert, *Seven Months in the Rebel States During the North American War, 1863*. (Confederate Publishing Co., Inc. Tuscaloosa, AL, 1958), p.12
- ³⁶ Frazier, *Blood and Treasure*, p. 102; *OR I*, 50(1), p. 1051; (See pp. 1047-1048 for Wright's letter to the Governor); *ORN I*, 1, pp. 383-384
- ³⁷ Josephy, *The Civil War in the American West*, pp. 13-17; See also Donald G. Frazier, *Blood and Treasure: Confederate Empire in the Southwest*. (Texas A&M University Press, College Station, TX, 1995); *OR*, I, 50(1), pp. 826.
- ³⁸ Welles, *Diary*, p. 385.
- ³⁹ *OR I*, 24(3), p. 578; I, 26(1), p. 673; Basler, *Collected Works*, 6, pp. 354-355; *OR I*, 24(3), p. 578; *OR*, I, 26(1), p. 673
- ⁴⁰ *OR I*, 26(1), pp. 399-402.
- ⁴¹ *OR I*, 26(1), p. 403; Michael Burlingame and John R. Turner Ettliger, editors, *Inside Lincoln's White House: The Complete War Diary of John Hay* (Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale & Edwardsville, IL, 1997), p. 116.
- ⁴² *OR*, I, 26(1), p. 815.
- ⁴³ Gooch, *Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 326-327; W. Bruce Lincoln, *The Romanovs: Autocrats of All the Russias* (Doubleday, New York, 1981), p.436.
- ⁴⁴ Albert A. Woldman, *Lincoln and the Russians* (The World Publishing Company, Cleveland & New York, 1952), pp. 125, 127, 156-166; Hector Chevigny, *Russian America: The Great Alaskan Venture, 1741-1867*. (Binford and Mort Publishing, Portland, OR, 1998), p. 229.
- ⁴⁵ Randall, *Last Full Measure*, p. 58.

⁴⁶ Woldman, *Lincoln and the Russians*, pp. 140, 144

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 148, 149; Randall, *Last Full Measure*, p. 61.

⁴⁸ Basler, *Collected Works*, 7, p. 36.