General A.P. Hill at Gettysburg: A Study of Character and Command

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If not A. P. Hill, then who?

May 2, 1863, Orange Plank Road, Chancellorsville, Virginia – In the darkness of the Wilderness, victory or defeat hung in the balance. The redoubtable man himself, Stonewall Jackson, had ridden out in front of his most advanced infantry line to reconnoiter the Federal position and was now returning with his staff. Nervous North Carolinians started to fire at the noises of the approaching horses. Voices cry out from the darkness, “Cease firing, you are firing into your own men!” “Who gave that order?” a muffled voice in the distance is heard to say. “It’s a lie! Pour it into them, boys!” Like chain lightning, a sudden volley of musketry flashes through the woods and the aftermath reveals Jackson struck by three bullets.¹

Caught in the tempest also is one of Jackson’s division commanders, A. P. Hill. The two men had feuded for months but all that was forgotten as Hill rode to see about his commander’s welfare. “I have been trying to make the men cease firing,” said Hill as he dismounted. “Is the wound painful?” “Very painful, my arm is broken,” replied Jackson. Hill delicately removed Jackson’s gauntlets and then unhooked his sabre and sword belt. Hill then sat down on the ground and cradled Jackson’s head in his lap as he and an aide cut through the commander’s clothing to examine the wounds. The near presence of Union soldiers necessitated the removal of Jackson immediately. With rumors of an impending Union counterattack, Hill, on foot and pistol in hand, soon left Jackson to attempt to organize his division in the darkness. It was the last time the two men saw each other.²

On May 10, Jackson succumbed to pneumonia. In the fateful moments before death, Jackson was heard to utter: “Order A. P. Hill to prepare for action! Pass the infantry to the front immediately! Tell Major Hawkes…” It would not be the last time that a high ranking Confederate general passed away with the name of Hill on his lips.³

The loss of Jackson left Robert E. Lee with a huge dilemma: Should the structure of the army be reorganized and who could replace the fallen lieutenant? Lee had to address the former question first and on May 20, 1863 addressed the President proposing to divide the infantry from two wings into three corps:

“I have for the past year felt that the corps of this army were too large for one commander. Nothing prevented my proposing to you to reduce their size and increase their number but my inability to recommend commanders. Each corps contains, when in fighting condition, about 30,000 men. These are more than one man can properly handle and keep under his eye in battle in the country that we
have to operate in. They are always beyond the range of his vision, and frequently beyond his reach. The loss of Jackson from command of one-half the army seems to me a good opportunity to remedy this evil.”

James Longstreet would continue in command of the First Corps. But who could replace Jackson? Among the Major Generals of the Army of Northern Virginia, the names of Richard H. Anderson, Richard Ewell, Ambrose P. Hill, Daniel H. Hill, John B. Hood, Lafayette McLaws and Jeb Stuart stood out. Of the generals, Ewell ranked as the senior Major General and seemed a natural selection for the position. Although he had been incapacitated since his leg amputation after Second Manassas and had only served under the direct eye of Lee for approximately a month, the one legged general came highly recommended.

For the third corps commander position, the choice was not so clear. McLaws and D. H. Hill outranked A. P. Hill. However, McLaws generalship at Harpers Ferry in 1862 and recently at Chancellorsville had given pause for concern. For his part, D. H. Hill possessed an acrimonious and irascible temperament which combined together lent itself to an overall personality of a classic “Sweet Ol’ Bob.” Anderson and Hood were pronounced to be “capital officers” and were “improving” but Lee did not feel they were not seasoned enough for promotion. Jeb Stuart performed admirably in his brief tenure as corps commander at Chancellorsville and possibly coveted the new position. However, if the indefatigable Stuart received promotion to the infantry, who would lead the cavalry? So, if you’re in Robert E. Lee’s position, who do you choose? In the same tactful letter of May 20 to Jefferson Davis, Lee made his recommendations.

“If, therefore, you think Ewell is able to do field duty, I submit to your better judgement whether the most advantageous arrangement would not be to put him in command of three divisions of Jackson’s corps … and give the [other] corps thus formed to A. P. Hill. In this event I also submit to you whether it would not be well to promote Ewell and A. P. Hill. The former is an honest, brave soldier, who has always done his duty well. The latter, I think upon the whole, is the best soldier of his grade with me.”

The death of Jackson and the impending promotions had led to much conjecture among the Army of Northern Virginia’s officer cadre. Hill’s selection seemed to come as no surprise though. Only one day after Jackson’s death, Willie Pegram wrote his sister that “every one here looks to A. P. Hill as the man to fill his place, & after he once gets a shew, the enemy will fear him as much as they ever feared Jackson.” On May 14, Dorsey Pender wrote his wife “It is strange what a jealousy exists towards A. P. Hill and this Division and for what cause I cannot see unless it is because he and it have been so successful. I hope to stick to him, for he sticks to me.” One of the few dissenting voices came from James Longstreet. In the postwar years full of bickering, he wrote that the selection of A. P. Hill was due to another important factor:

“As the senior major-general of the army, and by reason of distinguished services and ability, General Ewell was entitled to the command of the Second Corps, but there were other major-generals of rank next below Ewell whose services were such as to give them claims next after Ewell’s, so that when they found themselves neglected there was no little discontent, and the fact that both the new lieutenant-generals were Virginians made the trouble more grievous.”
When asked about Longstreet’s comments, former President Jefferson Davis responded that he was aware of the criticism involving the promotion of Virginians. However, he argued that Hill “was clearly entitled to the place, both on account of his ability as a soldier and the meritorious services he had rendered, that General Lee did not hesitate to recommend him, and I did not hesitate to make the appointment.”

Without hindsight as a benefactor, Lee’s selection of A. P. Hill seemed the natural choice. Hill commanded the largest division in the army. He had consistently shown an aggressive nature in combat, a quality which Lee sought in his subordinates. In an October 2, 1862 letter to President Davis, Lee had extolled the roles of Longstreet and Jackson in the recent campaigns and then said: “Next to these two officers, I consider A. P. Hill the best commander with me. He fights his troops well and takes good care of them.” So, we end the promotion of Ambrose Powell Hill to corps command with the same question, if not Hill, then who?

Creating the Third Corps

On Sunday, May 24, Hill was summoned to army headquarters and informed of his promotion to Lieutenant General and command of the newly created Third Corps. Hill lost no time in trying to influence the organizational structure of his new command. On the same day he received the promotion, Hill drafted a letter to the commanding general and returned to army headquarters to present the correspondence in person. Hill faced a dilemma among his brigadier generals. His first choice to supersede him in command of the Light Division was Dorsey Pender. Hill had earlier that year recommended Pender for promotion to major general. Since that time however, Lee had assigned Harry Heth to the Light Division and Heth’s date of commission made him the senior brigadier general. In his letter to Lee, Hill laid out his argument:

“Of General Heth I have but to say that I consider him a most excellent officer and gallant soldier, and had he been with the Division through all its hardships, and acquired the confidence of the men, there is no man I had rather see promoted than he. On the other hand Gen. Pender has fought with the Division in every battle, has been four times wounded, and never left the field, … has the best drilled and disciplined Brigade in the Division and more than all, possesses the unbounded confidence of the Division. At the battle of Chancellorsville he seized the color, and on horseback led his brigade up to and into the Federal intrenchments.

“The effect of such examples of daring gallantry at critical moments is incalculable. I am very earnest in this matter, for I know that 10,000 men led by a Commander whom they know, and have fought with, may turn the tide of battle, and I do not think the Confederacy can afford to have this Army defeated. Hence, as much as I admire and respect Gen. Heth, I am conscientiously of opinion that
in the opening campaign my Division under him, will not be half as effective as under Gen. Pender.”

Hill went on to write that since a new division was being formed for his corps, he recommended Heth for this command.¹¹

For his part, Lee had some backtracking to perform. In his May 20 letter to the President, he had already recommended Heth for promotion over Pender. In this letter, Lee expressed reservations because Heth’s prior nomination “having been once declined by the senate . . . and not knowing whether it would be proper to promote him.” Lee then expressed his confidence in Pender as an “excellent officer, attentive, industrious, and brave.” In other words, if Heth could not be promoted, Pender was an acceptable alternative.¹²

On May 25, five days later, Lee wrote Davis again, while at the same time enclosing Hill’s letter. Always tactful, Lee began by stating “I may have misled you in my remarks upon Genls Heth & Pender as to my views regarding their promotion.” If Davis had already decided to promote Heth, then the decision was fine with Lee. “I have a high estimate of Genl Heth,” Lee added. Then Lee pointed out that he had always had the intention of creating two new divisions and now requested promotion for Pender also.¹³

Between May 7 and June 6, the Army of Northern Virginia underwent a major reorganization. Originally, Lee had eight divisions of infantry, four assigned to Longstreet’s command and four in Jackson’s. To maintain a proper organizational chart, Lee decided to create a ninth division in order that each corps would contain three divisions apiece, though reshuffling of the divisions as they were on May 7 was in order. Gen. Richard Anderson’s division moved from Longstreet’s Corps to Hill’s. Not too flashy, quiet, but dependable, Dick Anderson brought steady leadership to the new corps. Moxley Sorrel, Longstreet’s chief of staff, perceived Anderson to be “indolent.” “His capacity and intelligence were excellent,” wrote Sorrel, “but it was hard to get him to use them . . . . Longstreet knew him well and could get a good deal out of him, more than
anyone else.” Perhaps Sorrel was a bit harsh, but nevertheless, the task of motivating Anderson befall A. P. Hill. How would Anderson perform under the new corps commander? That remained to be seen, but his five battle-hardened brigades from Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi and Virginia would hopefully overcome any of their commander’s shortcomings.14

Dorsey Pender assumed command of the Light Division. He was 29 years of age. Prior to promotion, Pender showed an unswerving devotion to Hill and his leadership skills were highly recognized. Pender loved combat and although he kept it from his wife, he had been wounded in almost every engagement. Hill’s old command was arguably the finest division in the army. The Light Division contained six brigades but two were removed in the reorganization. Out of the remaining four brigades, two were under new brigade commanders. Alfred Scales received command of Pender’s old brigade while Abner Perrin took temporary command from the convalescing Samuel McGowan. Nevertheless, Hill had the man he wanted in charge.

Henry Heth—Harry to his close friends—led the last division. The 37 year-old Heth had only recently transferred to the Army of Northern Virginia to take command of Field’s old brigade in the Light Division. Two months later, at the Battle of Chancellorsville, Heth assumed temporary command of the Light Division when Hill was wounded. Now, his newly created command consisted of two brigades from the Light Division - his old brigade, commanded by Col. John M. Brockenbrough and the Tennessee and Alabama brigade under James J. Archer. Heth’s two additional brigades were new to the Army of Northern Virginia. After much haggling between Lee, Davis, and General D. H. Hill, commanding the Department of North Carolina, the brigades of James Johnson Pettigrew and Joseph R. Davis were sent to join Heth’s newly formed division. The majority of the regiments in both brigades had seen only limited combat and though Pettigrew was new to the army, his date of rank gave him seniority over the other brigadiers in Heth’s absence or disablement.15

Thus, the Third Corps entered the Gettysburg Campaign with a brand new corps commander. Of the three division commanders, two were new to the position. The three divisions were comprised of thirteen brigades of infantry. Only eight of the brigades were under commanders of suitable rank; two were led by brigadier generals with no combat experience; the remaining three brigades were led by their senior colonels.16

Hill nominated Col. R. Lindsay Walker to head the Third Corps Artillery. Walker hailed from Albemarle County and graduated from the Virginia Military Institute in 1845 at the age of eighteen. He subsequently worked as a civil engineer and though not inclined to participate in any public office, Walker served as the sergeant-at-arms at the Virginia Secession Convention. Attracting the notice of Governor Letcher, Walker began his wartime service with the Purcell Light Artillery as a captain and his battery became one of the first to depart for war. In March of 1862, he gained a promotion to the rank of major and command of all of the Light Division’s artillery. With only a brief absence during the Seven Days Campaign, Walker served without interruption for the rest of the conflict. During the investment of Harper’s Ferry, Hill commended his “indomitable resolution and energy” and his performance at
Fredericksburg also garnered praise. In February of 1863, he gained his third star as a colonel and with the subsequent reorganization in May, was promoted to command all of the Third Corps artillery. Jennings Wise in his epic study *The Long Arm of Lee* wrote about Walker:

“In manner Walker was particularly alert, and while by no means dull, his mind was not an active one. In physical hardihood, fixity of purpose, dogged determination, and dauntless courage, he was unexcelled by any officer in the Army. . . . His forte was organization, and it was generally conceded that he had throughout the war the best organized artillery in the Army, whether it were a battery, a battalion, or a corps division under his command. His character was distinguished by great integrity, resolution and devotion to duty.”  

During the Gettysburg Campaign, the 36 year-old Walker commanded twenty different batteries organized in five battalions of artillery for a total of 84 cannon.

In May, Hill also completed the organization of the Third Corps’ general staff: Lt. Col. William H. Palmer, chief of staff; Maj. W. Norborne Starke, assistant adjutant general; Capts. Murray Forbes Taylor and Francis T. Hill, aides; Maj. R. J. Wingate, inspector general; Capt. Richard H. T. Adams, chief signal officer; Maj. E. Baptist Hill, chief commissary; Capt. William S. P. Mayo, assistant commissary; Maj. James G. Field, chief quartermaster; Capt. Henry M. Field, assistant quartermaster; Dr. John W. Powell, chief surgeon; Dr. Francis L. Frost, assistant surgeon; Sgt. George W. Tucker, chief of couriers. These men would continue to serve under Hill until the war ended.

So who was the enigmatic man, Ambrose Powell Hill, which Robert E. Lee had promoted?

Taking Measure of the Man

Ambrose Powell Hill hailed from Culpeper, Virginia, the son of Thomas and Fannie Hill. Powell, as he was most familiarly called, was born on November 9, 1825. Young Powell enjoyed hunting and fishing. From an early age, his father taught him a love of horseback riding. His mother imparted a love of reading and the young lad devoured books on Napoleon while playing “war” with his friends. The Hill family’s wealth also meant that Powell enjoyed the best educational opportunities in the area including the local Black Hills Seminary. His education had advanced to such a degree that he applied to West Point Military Academy at the age of sixteen. His application also included affidavits from thirty-one citizens of Culpeper County on his behalf. One family acquaintance petitioned his local congressman on Powell’s behalf saying that he possessed “a sense of propriety and moral firmness that always must protect him from wrong doing, he has at the same time an amiability of heart and amenity of manners that endear him to all his acquaintances.” On April 26, 1842, Powell accepted a cadet position at West Point. He entered an academy stocked with fellow cadets destined for future roles in the Civil War. Some of his classmates included: Birkett Fry, Dabney H. Maury, Cadmus Wilcox, Samuel D. Sturgis, George E. Pickett, Jonathan Jackson, and David R. Jones. His roommate was a fifteen year old cadet named George McClellan. The two plebes became fast friends in the tight confines of cadet quarters. The end of the first year of the Fourth Class had Hill ranked 39th out of 83 cadets. In the ranking, Jackson stood at 53 while McClellan ranked 3rd. Hill improved his standing to 23rd by the end of the second year.
The summer of 1844 marked the first time that Hill and the rest of the cadets were allowed a furlough. Before the young men departed, Superintendent Harry Brewerton posted Special Orders No. 72 forbidding the cadets from stopping at the “harems of pleasure in Church and Mercer streets” in New York City on route home. Apparently, the previous class had engaged in “improper conduct” the prior summer. Hill made it back to Culpeper without incident but the return trip to West Point through New York proved too much temptation to the eighteen year old. On September 9, 1844, the post hospital log noted that Hill had been admitted “with Gonorrhea contracted on furlough.” Most of the time, this type of sexually transmitted disease disappears after a few weeks. Unfortunately in Hill’s case this illness did not pass. In November, the post surgeon granted Hill a twenty-day furlough to convalesce at home. His furlough was subsequently extended several times over the next coming months. In March, 1845, Hill’s Culpeper physician wrote the Academy “that the disease of the prostate gland &c. under which he labored prior to his leaving … still continues, and that in consequence thereof I conceive him to be incapable of military and academic duties.” Despite his prolonged illness, Hill still had the clarity of mind to remind the Academy to forward his stipend of sixteen dollars a month. Even at this young age, he showed doggedness in pursuing his rights under the rules and regulations, a trait that would often resurface during the Civil War.  

Hill returned to the Academy, perhaps with a slight limp, in the late spring of 1845. An academic review board subsequently found him deficient in his studies, philosophy and chemistry in particular. In plain language, Hill had missed too much time and he was now behind the rest of his classmates. The board ordered Hill to repeat his third year of study. With the war with Mexico underway, the setback must have been particularly galling to Hill but he pressed ahead and graduated in 1847, ranking 15 out of a class of 38.  

Eager for action, Hill hurried to the front. He arrived too late though for any significant action. Mexico City fell to American forces shortly after his arrival but Hill did enter the capital in fine style. Foreshadowing the Civil War, Hill first donned the ubiquitous red flannel shirt during active service in Mexico. The young soldier completed his wardrobe with sky blue trousers, a large sombrero cocked on his head, artillery saber, a brace of pistols complete with oversized leather holsters on his horse, two revolvers on his person, and one oversized butcher knife in his belt. According to his own description, Hill was a cross between a strutting bandito and a mobile arsenal.  

In November, 1847, illness struck Hill down again. This time he contracted typhoid fever in Mexico City. He battled for his life for six weeks – fever, vomiting, headaches, and complete incapacitation. The typhoid, along with the resulting loss of fluid, probably also exacerbated his prostatitis from West Point. Hill survived though and returned to America.  

Hill then embarked on dull and grinding routine of the peace time army. For most of 1848-49, he was stationed at Fort McHenry in Baltimore before transferring to Florida. In the swampy environment, with nothing to do, Hill kept a small diary. “My God, will these mosquitoes never satiate their vampierean appetite for blood? Buggy, Buggy, Buggy,” he wrote. “There is no peace for the wicked, saith the good book. Mosquitoes were especially sent on earth as a torment to the wicked. Wonder if Noah had any in the ark with him!”  

In 1850, Hill was incapacitated with either yellow fever or another attack of prostatitis but during this same period, he obtained a brief assignment at Key West for the next year. On September 4,
1851, Hill received a promotion to first lieutenant. Yet, the constant monotony of garrison duty prompted him to request for transfer to another post and in their infinite wisdom, the War Department ordered Hill to report to Camp Ricketts along the Texas Rio Grande. Barely a year later, Hill returned to Florida where he remained until another bout of illness forced his return home to recuperate at Culpeper in 1855. He was joined at his home by fellow army officer and convalescent John M. Schofield. The future Union general later wrote that Hill’s father prescribed a brandy mint julep every morning. “Under its benign influence,” Schofield recalled, “my recovery was rapid.”

While convalescing, Hill used his frail health as a means to request a transfer to another post as far away from Florida as possible. Secretary of War Jefferson Davis obliged and Hill reported to the United States Coast Survey in 1856, where he took part in a survey that studied the triangulation of the Hudson River. The next year he served in the Washington office as a general assistant, or number two man, to the Superintendent. During this time period also, Hill began to court and this chapter in Hill’s life led to one of the more memorable affaires du couer from the prewar era.

Her name was Ellen Mary Marcy, the daughter of Captain and Mrs. Randolph B. Marcy. “Miss Nelly,” as she was also known, was 21 years of age at the time Hill courted her. She possessed blonde hair, blue eyes and a nimble frame. At the time, Ellen was dating none other than Hill’s former roommate George McClellan who had impressed Captain Marcy while both men were stationed in the west. When McClellan began to court Ellen, the good Captain and his beheld an eligible suitor, a man about to leave the army, work for the railroad, and make something of himself. This dovetailed nicely with the parents’ high aspirations for Ellen. The United States Army had other ideas and in 1856, ordered Captain Marcy to Texas. McClellan departed shortly thereafter as an official observer for the Crimean War. It was at this time period Powell Hill came a “courting.”

Powell and Ellen’s relationship started off innocuously enough. The two attended social functions together. Powell must have proved a good talker though because love bloomed quickly and before anyone knew they were engaged. Hill had Ellen’s engagement ring engraved with the word “Je t’aime.” Needless to say, Ellen’s parents were less than enthused. Writing from his outpost in Texas, ol’ man Marcy lit into his daughter:

“In regard to Mr. Hill I know but little of him, he seemed to be a gentlemanly man, and if he was not in the army but engaged in some business that would insure you a comfortable home I should not have so much objection, but I would suppose you would have more ambition . . .

“You have been gratified in every wish except this and I think it is no more than right you should pay some little regard to the wishes of your parents. I feel too proud of you to have you throw yourself, or to marry a man who cannot place you in a prominent position in society, and I was greatly grieved when I learned that you had allowed yourself to go so directly in opposition to my wishes. You say you cannot control your feeling – that is an error…. Did my affection for you merit such a breach of confidence . . .
“I forgive you, but I shall expect that you at once abandon all communication with Mr. Hill. If you do not comply with my wishes in this respect I cannot tell what my feelings toward you would become. I fear that my ardent affection would turn to hate. Do nothing therefore my dear child without choosing between me and him.”

Ellen wavered under her parent’s pressure though a stubborn Hill wouldn’t give up without a fight. He wrote Captain Marcy assuring him that he was not from humble means and pressing his claim of marriage. Now, Mrs. Marcy somehow became aware of Hill’s contraction of gonorrhea at West Point and spoke, at the very least, to Ellen about it. His honor affronted, Hill flew into a rage and promptly wrote Captain Marcy demanding satisfaction. “I have been most deeply injured but the peculiar nature and unknown source of the calumny prevents my seeking that redress which would be most pleasing and most satisfactory,” Hill’s letter announced. “Mrs. Marcy has evidenced a decidedly hostility to my suit... I have heard from truthful lips and with delicacy, that Mrs. Marcy’s objections ... is that from certain early imprudences, (youthful indiscretions I suppose), my health and constitution had become so impaired, so weakened, that no mother could yield her daughter to me, unless to certain unhappiness – This is the substance. The ornaments may be imagined.” Further, Hill demanded to know the name of the informant. Mr. Marcy dutifully wrote his wife and stated that if Hill’s allegations were true, “I should insist upon Ellen’s marrying Mr. Hill at once as just reparation.” Regardless of who said what, Ellen and Powell’s relationship became irrevocably broken and on July 31, 1856, she informed her father the engagement had ended.

The torrid courtship did not hand Powell his prize. Nevertheless, he manfully served as a groomsman when Ellen married his former West Point roommate George McClellan in 1860. Later during the Civil War, as Hill recklessly hurled his legions against McClellan’s hosts outside Richmond, Union soldiers were heard to exclaim “My God Nelly, why didn’t you marry him!”

The following year, 1857, Hill found love at a party in Washington in the guise of Kitty Grosh Morgan McClung. “Dolly,” as she was known to the family, was a young 23 year old widow with “blue eyes & chestnut hair, a lovely talking voice,” and singing skills “like a nightingale.” She came from a prominent family in Kentucky. The two were wed on July 18, 1859. Dolly’s brother, future Confederate General John Hunt Morgan, served as best man. In only two short years, Dolly would use her wedding dress to make the 13th Virginia’s battle flag. The couple’s union was later blessed with two daughters.

The year 1861 brought the nation to a crossroads. Hill could not turn his back on his family ties and the Old Dominion so he resigned his commission. Being a professional military officer, Hill received the colonelcy of the 13th Virginia Infantry and promptly began the process of transforming these Virginia gentlemen into the one of the most well drilled units of volunteer soldiers in the Confederate army. In February 1862, Hill’s superior, General Joseph E. Johnston, nominated him for promotion to brigadier general. Hill readily accepted and took command of James Longstreet’s old brigade comprising the 1st, 7th, 11th and 17th Virginia. In April, his brigade marched to the peninsula east of Richmond as part of a newly formed division under Longstreet. As the Union Army advanced toward the capital, Hill’s first taste of combat came at Williamsburg on May 5. In the midst of a driving rainstorm, his brigade mounted a counterattack that drove the Federals out of the Confederate entrenchments. Hill was prominent
in the fighting, “erect, magnificent, the god of war himself, amid the smoke and the thunder.” The fighting marked him as a future leader and the Richmond newspapers began to herald his name.

Throughout the month of May, Richmond swelled with the arrival of additional troops. The influx of all these new units prompted the government to organize more army divisions and authorize additional major general positions and to his great surprise, Hill received one of the promotions. After three short months and one battle, A.P. Hill had risen from regimental to brigade to division command. At the time, Hill was the youngest major general in the Confederacy, leading the largest division in the army, which he christened with the name of “Light Division.”

The Battle of Seven Pines (or Fair Oaks) on May 31-June 1 outside of Richmond, resulted in the injury of General Joseph Johnston. Almost immediately, command of the Army was given to Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia was born. Lee’s immediate goal was to drive the Union army away from the outskirts of Richmond with a bold offensive and twenty days later, the commanding general assembled a council of war to formulate his plans. Like a worm dangling on the end of a hook, Fitz John Porter and his Union Fifth Corps were tantalizingly isolated from the rest of the Union army by the Chickahominy River. Lee’s plan called for Jackson’s newly arrived forces to make a sweeping movement behind Porter and once Jackson became engaged, Hill’s division, which lay in front of Porter, would cross at Meadow Bridge to add to the weight of the attack.

On June 26, Lee sprung the trap but the battle plan quickly went awry when Jackson and his tired soldiers failed to begin the turning the movement on time. Flashing the aggressiveness that became a trademark of his generalship, Hill decided to attack anyway. The ensuing assault by his 11,000 Confederates turned into a bloody debacle as massed Union artillery sliced the Rebel ranks to pieces along the banks of Beaver Dam Creek. Nevertheless, Hill persisted in renewing the charges until nightfall mercifully brought an end to the fighting. In the aftermath, Lee passed no blame on Hill for the premature attack. He prized audacity over indecisiveness and Hill had certainly demonstrated that trait. Hill did not write his after-action report until eight months after the battle and for his part, the commander of the Light Division thought his repulse was due to Jackson not arriving on time. “It was never contemplated that my division alone should have sustained the shock of this battle, but such was the case.”

The Battle of Mechanicsville cost the Light Division over 1,400 casualties but the fighting continued unabated. The very next day Hill’s division made the initial attack again at a place called Gaines Mill. The assault was unsupported and fruitlessly cost the Light Division another 2,688 men. The battle later ended as a Confederate victory, albeit pyrrhic. The next battle at Gaines Mill and the subsequent fight at Frayser’s Farm cemented Hill’s reputation as a hard fighter and once again drew the attention of Lee.

Despite successfully driving away the Union army from in front of Richmond, an acrimonious debate soon flourished. Hill and Longstreet were the cause of the friction this time and now Hill’s division was part of Longstreet’s “wing” of the army. Before this command change, their respective divisions had both fought at Frayser’s Farm and both commanders were proud of their men. On July 8, the Richmond Examiner published a description of Frayser’s Farm. “The battle,” the article stated, “was fought under the immediate and sole command of General A. P.
Hill, in charge of both divisions. . . . The heroic command of General Hill pressed on with unquailing vigor and a resistless courage, driving the enemy before them. . . . One fact is very certain, and that is that the battle of Monday night was fought exclusively by General A. P. Hill and forces under his command.”

John M. Daniel, editor for the *Examiner*, had served as a voluntary aide on Hill’s staff until suffering a slight wound at Gaines Mill. Despite not being at Frayser’s Farm, Daniel was not dissuaded from writing a two column article extolling Hill that understandably made Longstreet and his staff “all fighting mad.” The next day Longstreet wrote a rebuttal and had his assistant adjutant general, Moxley Sorrel, sign the letter. Longstreet asserted that “no one in the army has any objections to Major Gen’l A. P. Hill being supplied with all the notoriety that the ‘Examiner’ can furnish, provided no great injustice is done to others.” Longstreet then alleged the reported casualty figures for Hill’s division were overstated and that he, not Hill, had commanded on the field. The rebuttal was published in the rival newspaper the Richmond *Whig* on July 11. The next day the touchy Hill sent a note to Lee, through Longstreet, his immediate superior officer, stating “I have the honor to request that I may be relieved from the command of Major General Longstreet.” Upon receiving the note, Longstreet endorsed the back with the following: “Respectfully forwarded. If it is convenient to exchange the troops, or to exchange the commanders, I see no particular reason why Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill should not be gratified.” In the middle of this squabble, Hill received an order written by Sorrel regarding his division. Hill promptly returned the note with the postscript “Maj. Gen. Hill declines to hold further information with Major Sorrel.” Longstreet “was at once on fire at such disobedience,” Sorrel remembered, and Longstreet asked for the information with the specification that the request came from himself and not Sorrel. Again, Hill refused again and the angered Longstreet ordered his adjutant to dress in full dress uniform with sword, ride to Hill’s headquarters and place the general under arrest. Sorrel left on his mission feeling a “natural trepidation.” He arrived to find Hill seated at his desk and the two men formally saluted each other before Sorrel stated his mission. Hill said nothing in response but saluted and resumed his seat. Major Sorrel left the camp empty handed. Despite his apparent calm demeanor, more letters were exchanged between the two generals and soon rumors began to circulate of a duel. Lee’s excellent people skills soon emerged though and he successfully assuaged the two men through familiar intermediaries. In the end, Hill gained his wish. He and his command were transferred to Jackson’s command.

Lee tried to set the tone by writing the uber reticent Jackson to trust Hill. “A. P. Hill you will find I think a good officer with whom you can consult and by advising with your division commanders as to your movements much trouble will be saved you in arranging details as they can act more intelligently,” Lee wrote. Needless to say, Jackson did not heed Lee’s advice. The overly sensitive Hill and the recalcitrant Jackson were doomed to clash from the start.

While Lee managed his quarrelsome generals, Union forces from the Shenandoah Valley and units scattered about northern Virginia were consolidated into the Army of Virginia under the command of Gen. John Pope. As McClellan’s army withdrew from in front of Richmond, Lee
wished to “suppress” Pope’s army before the two forces could consolidate. The Confederate chief dispatched Jackson northward to strike Pope and the vanguard of both armies clashed on August 9 at Cedar Mountain outside of Hill’s boyhood home of Culpeper. Initially, the clash of arms went against Jackson as Federal troops caved in his left flank before Hill’s Light Division hurried forward from the rear, counterattacked, and saved the day. Lee next dispatched Jackson on a flanking maneuver around Pope’s army along the Rapidan River. The bold move sent Jackson on a 54-mile forced march in 36 hours and resulted in the capture of Pope’s supply base at Manassas Junction. Hill’s famished division were the first to arrive and promptly set about to plunder the Federal stores. “It was more than funny to see the ragged, rough, dirty fellows, who had been half living on roasted corn and green apples for days, now drinking Rhine wine, eating lobster salad, potted tongue, cream biscuit, pound cake, canned fruits, and the like,” recalled one Virginian, “and filling pockets and haversacks with ground coffee, toothbrushes, condensed milk, silk handkerchiefs.”

Along with the Confederate celebration came another problem—Pope knew where Jackson’s forces had concentrated. Jackson marched west and miraculously hid his 24,000 men along an unfinished railroad cut near the battlefield of First Manassas. Hill’s division took up a position on the left of Jackson’s line near Sudley Church. On August 28, Jackson attacked an isolated portion of Pope’s army and on August 29 and 30, Pope attacked him.

During the evening of August 28, Hill deployed his division with three brigades in front along the railroad line and three brigades several hundred yards to the rear. In what would become a recurring theme marking his generalship, Hill failed to reconnoiter his line. This inexplicably resulted in a 175-yard gap later exploited by a Union brigade and only hard fighting in desperate counterattacks hurled the bluecoats back from the main line of battle on the railroad cut. The fighting would swirl back and forth on August 29 and Hill reported repulsing six separate attacks that day alone. The resulting casualties were the highest yet so far for the Light Division in the war with 199 killed and 1,308 wounded. Hill had performed well for his first time on the defensive as a commander. He had adroitly shifted his troops when needed, had maintained his composure during stressful times, and managed to mount a counterattack at the end of the battle. Even Jackson praised Hill’s efforts afterwards. Hill’s only blemish occurred when he failed to reconnoiter his position and left a gap in his lines. Hopefully, Hill would learn from the mistake in the future. Nevertheless, the fighting from Richmond to Second Manassas solidified Hill’s stature among Confederate division commanders.

Lee faced a decision at this point in the war – retreat, stand fast, or move forward. To retreat meant to relinquish all the ground recovered from the invaders. To stand fast in northern Virginia was not viable because of the lack of supplies. According to one of his close confidantes, Lee stated his reasons after the war “. . . that after Chantilly he found he could do nothing more against the Yankees unless he attacked them in their fortifications around Washington, which he did not want to do, and he therefore determined to cross the river into Maryland, and thus effect two things – 1st To relieve Virginia from both armies, as he thought such a movement would force McClellan over the river – and 2nd to live for a time on the abundant supplies in Maryland.” Despite the poor overall condition of his army, Lee decided to gamble and move north.  

Trouble for Lee did not just include the Yankee army; Hill and Jackson had repeatedly clashed since the transfer of the Light Division. Twice already, Jackson had reprimanded Hill for not
beginning his march on time or marching too fast, while Hill felt Jackson was not communicative enough and his orders and expectations were unclear. All this came to a head on September 4 as Lee’s weary soldiers marched toward the Potomac.

Overnight of September 3, Jackson summoned all three division commanders to his headquarters where he verbally instructed them that the march would begin promptly at 4 o’clock the next morning. As an extra precaution, Jackson had the commanders synchronize their watches. The 4 o’clock hour came and Hill’s division, who was to lead the march, were not prepared. Jackson instantly knew that Hill had instructed his brigade commanders but had not personally followed up to ensure compliance. At this point, Hill rode up and Jackson reprimanded him for lackadaisicalness. Jackson’s chief engineer, Jedidiah Hotchkiss, later recalled “Hill took this reprimand rather sullenly, his face flushing up, but he said nothing.” The march began and Hill apparently set a quick pace at the head of the column. Jackson’s strict marching regimen included a ten minute rest out for every hour on the march though Hill ignored it and continued the march unabated. At the rear of his column, Jackson became increasingly agitated and eventually ordered the last brigade to halt without informing Hill. Eventually Hill discovered the gap in his column and quickly rode back to find the reason. “Why did you halt your command without orders?” he asked the brigade commander. Pointing to Jackson, the officer responded “I halted because General Jackson told me to do so.” The prickly Hill had reached the breaking point with Jackson. The enigmatic Jackson had failed to communicate with his subordinates, fought “battles” over the most minute of army regulations, and issued orders directly to Hill’s subordinates. Hill dismounted, walked over to Jackson, presented his sword, and abruptly stated, “If you take command of my troops in my presence, take my sword also.” “Put up your sword and consider yourself in arrest,” Jackson responded. Hill dutifully marched at the end of the division column that day but this was not the end of being placed under arrest. Less than two months later, Hill found himself under arrest again.

To Lee’s surprise, the Federal garrison at Harpers Ferry did not evacuate and ordered Jackson to invest the stronghold. Three separate Confederate columns began to converge on the city and aching to be a part of the upcoming battle, Hill swallowed his pride and on September 10 asked Jackson to restore him to command until the campaign concluded. Surprisingly, Jackson acquiesced and Hill resumed his post. “Donning his coat and sword he mounted his horse and dashed to the front of his troops, and looking like a young eagle in search of his prey, he took command of his division to the delight of his men,” recalled a North Carolinian.35

Jackson made the right decision. On September 15, the assault to take Harpers Ferry befell the Light Division and Hill rewarded Jackson by performing brilliantly. The Union garrison surrendered on the same day and resulted in the capture of 12,000 soldiers; the largest capture of United States forces until World War II. Hill and the Light Division were left behind to parole the garrison while Jackson marched with the other divisions to join Lee at Sharpsburg, Maryland.
Throughout September 17, the Battle of Antietam raged only twelve miles away from Harpers Ferry. In the predawn hours, Lee sent a courier to Hill ordering his division to Sharpsburg. Hill received the order at approximately 6:30 and the Light Division marched within half an hour. Dressed in a red flannel shirt, Hill urged his men, both by his word and the flat of his sword, to press forward, ever forward. Through the brutal heat, the Light Division marched for the life of the Confederacy. Hill’s men covered seventeen miles in eight hours.

The situation for the Army of Northern Virginia was dire by the time the Light Division reached the Potomac River crossing opposite Sharpsburg. Lee and his men had managed to fend off the Federal attacks so far but now the Confederates were out of fresh troops. At this moment, Union General Ambrose Burnside and his Ninth Corps were steadily driving back the Confederate right and stood on the verge of entering Sharpsburg to achieve complete victory. Into this situation, Hill and his staff rode up to confer with Lee at 2:30, “General Hill I was never so glad to see you,” a relieved Lee reportedly said, “you are badly needed, put your force in on the right as fast as they come up.”

Hill may have personally arrived but the Confederate army still faced a grave crisis. With the Light Division not on the field, Lee had no more reinforcements to stem the Federal advance. With his hands in splints, Lee asked artilleryman John Ramsay to identify an approaching infantry column. Taking his spy glass in hand, Ramsay responded “they are flying the United States flag.” Lee then asked Ramsay to identify a column approaching from the south. If the Federals were advancing from this direction, all was lost for the Army of Northern Virginia. For a few seconds that must have seemed like an eternity to Lee, Ramsay focused on the soldiers. “They are flying the Virginia and Confederate flags!” Ramsey said. “It is A. P. Hill from Harper’s Ferry,” Lee responded.36

Hill sent his brigades forward as quickly as each arrived, striking both in front and on the flank of the Federal columns. Although outnumbered, the Light Division stopped the Union advance in their tracks, and sent the blue coats reeling. Hill had saved the day and was hailed as the hero of the hour. “You have no idea what a reputation our division has,” Dorsey Pender wrote his wife. “It surpasses Jackson’s old Division both for fighting and discipline. But when I tell you that
this division has lost 9000 killed and wounded since we commenced the Richmond fight at Mechanicsville, you can see what our reputation has cost us . . . . Let me cease to write about war and killing.”

The smoke had barely cleared before Hill renewed his quarrel with Jackson and formally requested a court of inquiry to review Jackson’s charges of “neglect of duty.” The chain of command meant that Hill’s request passed through Jackson’s hands on the way to Lee and “Stonewall” did not intend to let it pass without comment. The matter was left up to Lee and the commanding general wanted nothing to do with it. The request was returned with the notation:

“His attention being now called to what appeared to be a neglect of duty by his commander, but which from an officer of his character could not be intentional and I feel assured will never be repeated, I see no advantage to the service in further investigating this matter nor could it without detriment be done at this time.”

Despite Lee’s tactful response and Jackson’s willingness to drop the matter, Hill would not allow it to die. Jackson dutifully outlined the charges against Hill and submitted them to Lee. The Army of Northern Virginia could ill afford to lose its best division commander and, arguably, the best corps commander. Therefore, Lee called a conference at Jackson’s headquarters to discuss the matter. Hours ticked by. Finally Lee reportedly said, “he who has been the most aggrieved can be the most magnanimous and make the first overtures of peace.” Even then, neither man would yield. Lee left the meeting with the issue unsettled but Hill informally dropped the matter until renewing his claims about injustice and tyranny again in early 1863. Hill and Jackson would never reconcile; a stiff formality remained between the two for the rest of their time together and Hill’s prickly pride would continue to vex Lee until Jackson’s death.

The war inexorably ground on and soon orders came to march for Fredericksburg. In an unusual move, the new commander of the Union army, Ambrose Burnside, committed to an offensive in the dead of winter. To counter the movement, Lee positioned his forces on the heights behind Fredericksburg with Jackson’s command deployed on the right. On December 13, as the Light Division extended their lines, the cool détente still existing with his immediate superior and the recent death of his first born daughter all weighed on Hill. Nevertheless, combat loomed and he needed to focus. Most of Hill’s line lay along good defensive ground. However, along his broad front there existed a low marshy area of ground marked with a heavy growth of timber jutting in front of the Confederate line. Mirroring Second Manassas, Hill failed to cover this 650 yard area with any infantry. Into this gap came the hard charging 4,500 men of George Meade’s Pennsylvania Reserves Division. Hill lost Maxcy Gregg as the brigadier tried to move forward and plug the gap. In a close call, only the stout defense of the Light Division and the timely arrival of Jubal Early’s division saved the day.

Relating personally to A. P. Hill, no one seemed to recall seeing him on December 13. His brigade commanders sorely missed his presence and leadership as they sought to straighten out a confusing melee. He apparently perceived incorrectly that Federal troops could not penetrate this low ground or perhaps he felt Gregg’s brigade, in reserve behind the gap, could handle any
potential situation. Regardless, once again, Hill had left a gap in his line because of a lack of attention to detail that had been, ironically, Jackson’s main complaint against him all along.

Taking a measure of the man, contemporary sources paint Ambrose Powell Hill as the quintessential Southern gentleman - a high bred, well-educated youth nurtured in a society heavily influenced by the English and Scotch lineage of only two or three generations past, and still strongly imbued with the teachings of Locke. This type of environment immersed Hill with the gentleman’s honor which later melded into the soldier, making him solicitous of those underneath him and questionable of those above him – especially when his perceived rights were infringed upon.

On the battlefield, Hill proved a natural leader, self-confident, brave, impetuous, always to be found at the front – the exact type of combat commander sought by Robert E. Lee. In his strengths though also lay his faults: Hill’s impetuousity made him rash – both in personal conduct toward others and on the battlefield. The record also reveals a man seemingly lackadaisical in the disposition of his forces or perhaps particularly careful not to infringe on the prerogative of his brigade commanders. Regardless, his command style had already led to some near fatal blunders on the battlefield. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the victory at Chancellorsville, this was the man chosen by Lee to lead the III Corps – a man with many contradictions in his character but possessed of the self-confidence to assume the command. Could Hill successfully make the transition from division to corps command?

“I intended to advance the next morning and discover what was in my front”

June 26, 1863, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, 9:00 a.m. A. P. Hill, the newly minted III Corps commander, rode into the square accompanied by one or two aides entered the town’s diamond and dismounted in front of a grocery store. An eyewitness described the general at this moment:

“General Hill seemed to be a man of splendid physique. Of ordinary height, his figure was slight but athletic, and his carriage erect. His dress was the ordinary Confederate gray, and was plain and without ornament, except the stars upon the collar of his coat, which designated his rank. His appearance indicated a man of robust health, and one who cared not for the tinsel of military trappings, or the honors of his high position.”

Hill entered into conversation with a local citizen about former acquaintances in the old army. Eventually the citizen inquired on the whereabouts of General Lee. “I am expecting him any moment,” replied Hill. A few minutes later Hill espied Lee and his staff entering the town. Mounting, Hill raised his hat over his head and rode slowly toward the commanding general. After a brief salutation, the two generals rode a short distance away and engaged in conversation. Another local citizen remarked “There… is perhaps the most important council in the history of the war, and the fate of the Government may depend upon it.” The two generals soon ended their council and the two rode to the center of the diamond with Hill dutifully riding behind Lee. Without fanfare, Lee drew the rein of his horse to the right and turned down the pike leading to a little town called Gettysburg.38
Victory at Chancellorsville left Lee with the initiative. He would not waste the opportunity. Strategically, Lee had always felt that the conflict should not be prolonged. The North would only grow stronger while the South could only become weaker. The war must be brought to a close and the way to achieve this goal lay through military victory on Northern soil. Besides, the conflict had ravished Virginia over the past two years while the Northern population had not felt the hard hand of war. With this forward movement, Lee’s army could resupply at the expense of the North. After all, the North had originally invaded in an attempt to subjugate the Southern people to their will – let them pay.

The month of June had seen the theatre of operations transferred from Virginia to Pennsylvania. Ewell’s Corps, comprising the remnants of Jackson’s old command, had led the advance. On June 14, Hill’s command followed in their wake and ten days later forded the Potomac River at Shepherdstown. On June 26, the III Corps crossed into Pennsylvania. “I do not suppose any army ever marched into an enemies country with greater confidence in its ability to [conquer] and with more reasonable grounds for that confidence than the army of Gen. Lee,” wrote one of Hill’s brigade commanders.39

To understand Hill’s mindset on the eve of Gettysburg and how his corps accidentally bumped into the Union army, one must understand the tactical situation. The Army of Northern Virginia’s advance had been successful so far. By the end of June, the vanguard of the army, Ewell’s Corps to be exact, were on the verge of capturing the Pennsylvania state capital of Harrisburg. Hill and Longstreet’s commands still lay to the west of the South Mountain range around the Chambersburg and Cashtown areas.

Lee’s movements had been hampered by the temporary loss of his cavalry under Jeb Stuart. As the Confederate army moved north, Lee gave discretionary orders to Stuart to cross into Maryland either to the east or west of the Blue Ridge Mountains “but . . . to lose no time in placing his command on the right of our column as soon as he perceived the enemy moving northward.” Stuart chose to cross to the east but as his column rode northward so did the Union army also. Every time his command attempted to turn to the east, they encountered Union forces and became effectively cut off from the army. “It was expected that as soon as the Federal Army should cross the Potomac, General Stuart would give notice of its movements,” Lee wrote in his after action report, “and nothing having been heard from him since our entrance into Maryland, it was inferred that the enemy had not yet left Virginia. Orders were, therefore, issued to move upon Harrisburg.” In effect, the loss of Stuart and his cavalrmen deprived Lee of vital intelligence of the Union army’s whereabouts at a most critical junction in the campaign.40

All of that changed on the night of June 28 . . . Moxley Sorrel, Longstreet’s chief of staff, had only recently laid down when a knock came on his tent pole. Sorrel emerged to find a “filthy and ragged [man], showing some rough work and exposure.” He instantly recognized him as Henry Thomas Harrison, a trusted scout for Longstreet. Harrison report proved most disturbing. The enemy was not in Virginia, as Lee expected, but had advanced to Frederick, Maryland. Since Lee had already ordered an advance on Harrisburg, the Army of Northern Virginia stood in a perilous position. Sorrel instantly took the scout to Longstreet. After hearing the report, Longstreet was “on fire” and told his staff officer John W. Fairfax to take Harrison to army headquarters at once.41
At army headquarters, Lee would not meet personally with Harrison. Instead, he questioned Fairfax about the scout’s veracity. Fairfax responded that Longstreet had confidence in him. Faced with a momentous decision, little information, and no cavalry, Lee had to act.

In the annals of Gettysburg, the story of Harrison hath often been told. Surprisingly though, many historians have missed the import of Harrison’s report. Not only did Harrison state the Union army had crossed the Potomac, he also reported the Union army as heading west toward the South Mountain range. Lee’s initial response was to order the army to concentrate on the western side of the mountains at Chambersburg and he sent orders to that effect to Ewell. But then on the morning of June 29, Lee changed his mind. In his official report, Lee states:

“As our communications with the Potomac were thus menaced, it was resolved to prevent his farther progress in that direction by concentrating our army on the east side of the mountains. Accordingly, Longstreet and Hill were directed to proceed from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, to which point General Ewell was also instructed to march from Carlisle.”

Charles Marshall, Lee’s aide-de-camp, later recalled Lee stating his concerns:

“He inferred from the fact that the enemy had turned westward from Frederickstown that his purpose was to enter the Cumberland Valley south of our army, and obstruct our communications through Hagerstown with Virginia. General Lee said that, while he did not consider that he had complete communication with Virginia, he had all the communication that he needed, as long as the enemy had no considerable force in the Cumberland Valley. His principal need for communication with Virginia was to procure ammunition, and he thought that he could always do that with an escort, if the valley were free from a Federal force, but should the enemy have a considerable force in the valley this would be impossible. He considered it of great importance that the enemy’s army should be kept east of the mountains, and consequently he determined to move his own army to the east side of the Blue Ridge so as to threaten Washington and Baltimore, and detain the Federal force on that side of the mountains to protect those cities. He directed me to countermand the orders to General Ewell and General Hill, and to order the latter to move eastward on the road through Cashtown or Gettysburg as circumstances might direct. He ordered General Longstreet to prepare to move the next morning, following Hill.”

This is the tactical situation A. P. Hill faced on the evening of June 29. He had discretionary orders to advance to Gettysburg “as circumstances might direct.”

The absence of Stuart and his cavalry now came to haunt Hill at Cashtown. On June 30, Hill’s division commander, Henry Heth, instructed his brigade commander James J. Pettigrew to march to Gettysburg for the purpose “of collecting commissary and quartermaster stores for the use of the army.” (The fact that Jubal Early’s division had only a few days previously marched through Gettysburg and made their own requisition did not seem to be known to Heth.) Heth instructed Pettigrew that militia might hold the town and his brigade could easily drive them away.
However, if Pettigrew found “any organized body of troops capable of making resistance, or any portion of the Army of the Potomac, he should not attack it. The orders to him were peremptory, not to precipitate a fight.”

Pettigrew dutifully marched his three regiments to town. On the way, “Longstreet’s spy” rode ahead of the column and soon returned to report that the town defended by Union cavalry. Soon a Knight of the Golden Circle confirmed the report. The presence of Union cavalry might portend the arrival of the Army of the Potomac. Pettigrew stopped the column to ask Heth for further instructions. Heth simply reiterated the order not to bring on an engagement but expressed disbelief that the Union army had marched to Gettysburg. Faced with an unknown enemy force in front, Pettigrew counter-marched his brigade back to Cashtown.45

Back at headquarters, Pettigrew was in the process of making his report to Heth when Hill rode up. Pettigrew repeated the story for Hill of an enemy force with unknown strength at Gettysburg. An incredulous Heth and Hill expressed disbelief at the report. To bolster his argument, Pettigrew summoned his aide Capt. Louis G. Young and an acquaintance of Hill. Hill asked the young staff officer to describe the enemy force and Young stated they appeared to be “well-trained troops and not those of a home guard. . . .” Hill still did not believe the Army of the Potomac lay ahead and in “emphatic words, expressed the hope that it was, as this was the place he wanted it to be.”46

Turning to Heth, Hill remarked “the only force at Gettysburg is cavalry, probably a detachment of observation. I am just from General Lee, and the information he has from his scouts corroborates that I have received from mine – that is, the enemy are still at Middleburg, and have
not yet struck their tents.” “If there is no objection,” Heth responded, “I will march my division tomorrow, go to Gettysburg and secure those shoes.” “Do so,” Hill replied.

Heth’s recollection of the conversation with Hill indicates that the corps commander had just returned from a conference with Lee. Obviously, Lee informed Hill of the latest intelligence regarding the location of the Union army so Pettigrew’s report of Union cavalry at Gettysburg did not shake Hill’s perception that the main body of the Union army had not moved north from Maryland. Nevertheless, Hill forwarded Pettigrew’s report to Lee. At this point, the historical record is vague on whether Hill informed Lee of his impending advance to Gettysburg. In all likelihood, Hill did not leave out this important point because he informed Ewell a short time later of his decision and, as a result, Ewell turned his columns south toward Gettysburg. Such a major move would not be made without Lee’s approval.

Writing after the war, Walter Taylor asserted that “instructions had been sent to General Heth to ascertain what force was at Gettysburg, and, if he found infantry opposed to him, to report the fact immediately, without forcing an engagement.” Taylor is not clear though whether these orders emanated from Lee or Hill. The evidence points though to Lee being aware of Hill’s plans – “to advance the next morning and discover what was in my front.”

To add to the Confederacy’s woes, Hill did not feel well throughout the day. “General Hill now came up and told me he had been very unwell all day, and in fact he looks very delicate,” recalled British observer Arthur Fremantle. The exact cause of Hill’s illness is unknown but incapacitated him enough to warrant his remaining at Cashtown while Heth advanced to Gettysburg.

As cannon fire boomed louder and louder in the distance, Lee arrived at Cashtown. Hill informed his nervous commander of Heth’s standing orders not to bring on a general engagement if Union infantry was encountered. As cannon fire grew louder in the distance, a sheepish Hill had to admit to Lee that he didn’t know what enemy force lay in his front. Combat being the personal magic elixir, Hill soon mustered enough strength to ride to the front. From Herr’s Ridge, Hill sent back word that two Federal corps lay in his front and requested Anderson’s division as support. Lee arrived shortly thereafter, and, according to Heth, took over, at least partially, tactical control of Hill’s corps for the remainder of the day.

As the first day’s action drew to a close, Lee, Hill, and Longstreet stood on Seminary Ridge. The generals could clearly see a “considerable force” of Federals regrouping on the other side of town and soon a staff officer arrived with a report confirming their observations. Based on the information, Lee decided not to pursue the attack any further that day. Turning to Hill and Longstreet, Lee said “Gentlemen, we will attack the enemy in the morning as early as practicable.” Lee then instructed his corps commanders to “make the necessary preparations and be ready for prompt action the next day.”

Countless articles and books have been written about the Battle of Gettysburg and as many theories have been produced for Hill’s advance on July 1. The mindset of Ambrose Powell Hill is clear though: he did not believe the Union army was in his front. All of his actions were in accordance with this perception and his personal absence at the initial onset serves as additional proof. “This spirit of unbelief had taken such hold,” wrote Young, “that I doubt if any of the
commanders of brigades, except General Pettigrew, believed that we were marching to battle, a weakness on their part which rendered them unprepared for what was about to happen.”  

**Day Two**

On July 2, Hill awoke early and, despite his ailment, prepared for an eventful day. His first action was to shift his divisions along the line. Hill ordered Richard Anderson’s division to relieve Heth’s battered troops and extend the line to the south. Pender’s division remained at the Seminary, where they had fought the day before, and extended to the right to join with Anderson’s left. Hill then joined Lee, Longstreet, and Heth near the Seminary for consultation on the day’s battle plan.  

The conference among the high ranking Confederate generals has proven a bone of contention among participants and historians ever since. To this day, the exact order of events is hard to determine. James L. Black, a South Carolina cavalry commander detached to Lee’s headquarters, arrived during the early morning to find Lee already in conversation with Hill. A short time later Longstreet arrived and Black estimated “the conference lasted 20 minutes or more. They were standing in an old graveyard, not enclosed, a few trees near by and in plain view of the city ….” Black recalled that Lee stood with his back to him but still appeared as “the best looking man in universe … . Longstreet was fat & full. A. P. Hill rather slender.”  

According to Longstreet, the conference’s principal eyewitness, the tenor of the conversations (there were multiple conferences that morning) revolved around whether the army should attack or remain on the defensive. After Lee made the decision to attack, the conference turned to the subjects of “where” and “how.” Many people that day noted Hill’s presence but no one seemed to record any input from the new corps commander. This does not mean that Hill did not speak, but perhaps his role “to cooperate with him [Longstreet] with such of my brigades from the right as could join with his troops in the attack” did not require him to voice his opinion as much. Or perhaps in the postwar years, Hill’s role became overshadowed in the controversy over the tardiness of Longstreet’s attack. We will probably never know.  

Regarding Hill’s role on the second day’s battle, one certainty is the Third Corps attack was predicated on Longstreet and the First Corps. Hill’s brigades were to “cooperate” once Longstreet had launched his attack. The sun passed through the meridian and began to decline by the time Longstreet’s men went forward at four o’clock. Once launched, the attack took place en echelon from the Confederate right to the left and therefore rolled north into Hill’s section of the line. Hill’s attack was further delayed when Longstreet withheld McLaw’s division from going forward in order to allow Hood’s division to envelop the end of the Union line. Hill’s far right brigade under Cadmus Wilcox probably did not advance until approximately six o’clock.  

Richard H. Anderson commanded Hill’s right division. His division was one of only two divisions containing five brigades in the Confederate army. Before the attack, Anderson gave clear instructions to at least four of his five brigade commanders that the attack would commence from the right to the left. In the actual execution of the orders, Anderson botched the assault and only managed to send three of these five brigades into action. (Wilcox, Lang, Wright) His fourth brigade under Carnot Posey was not deployed correctly to advance and his fifth brigade
commander, William Mahone, flat refused orders to move forward. Therefore, Ambrose Wright’s brigade succeeded in temporarily piercing the Union center at the Copse of Trees but being unsupported had to fall back.\textsuperscript{56}

Southern newspaper correspondent Peter Wellington Alexander later recorded an interesting rumor related to Anderson division’s performance that day:

“Wright went boldly forward . . . . But Posey, who was to move next in order, was unwilling, it is reported, to advance, contending that his left flank would be uncovered, and that Mahone should move first. Mahone, on the other hand, declined to proceed unless Posey and Pender’s division on his left should do so at the same time. Upon this fact being made known to Pender he rode forward to examine the ground, when he received a wound and was disabled. The question then arose among his Brigadiers as to who was the senior officer, and this point was not settled until about sunset.” \textsuperscript{57}

Hill lost arguably his best division commander when Pender fell. Dorsey Pender was always ready for a fight! The swell of cannon fire had reached a tempest as the en echelon attack rolled down the line. Turning to his Assistant-Adjutant-General Joseph Englehard, Pender said “Major, this indicates an assault, and we will ride down the line.” Shortly thereafter tragedy struck as a shell fragment, which included the fuse, hit Pender in the left leg tearing a ghastly two inch wound in his thigh. Surgeons could never completely stop the hemorrhaging and sixteen days later Pender died in a hospital at Staunton, Virginia. “No man fell during this bloody battle of Gettysburg more regretted than he, nor around whose youthful brow were clustered brighter rays of glory,” recorded Hill in his post-action report. Senior brigade commander James H. Lane took command of the division.\textsuperscript{58}

Darkness had started to descend when Lane received a message from Ewell stating that Rodes division was about to attack Cemetery Hill from the west. For the sake of time, Ewell bypassed Hill in the chain of command and wrote Lane directly requesting support for Rodes’ right flank in the attack. To his credit, Lane responded that he would support Rodes even though he lacked direct orders from Hill. Although Hill shortly confirmed Lane’s judgement, the time passed and neither division entered the fray.\textsuperscript{59}

On July 2, the overriding question surrounding the Third Corps performance is: where in the midst of all this breakdown was A. P. Hill? And that perhaps is toughest question to answer. Reading between the lines of various accounts one can catch a glimpse of the illusive commander though. Hill, as already stated, was present during the morning while Lee held council near the Lutheran Seminary. Hill made an impression on Fitzgerald Ross, an Austrian observer at the battle. He noted that Hill requested some water and his aides produced “some dirty stuff in a pail with an apology that no good water was to be had within a mile and an inquiry whether he would wait. ‘Oh no, that will do very well,’ said the General.” At that point, Ross came to the realization that he was “actually campaigning.”\textsuperscript{60}

As Longstreet commenced his assault at approximately 4 o’clock, British observer Arthur Fremantle climbed into an oak tree to observe the fighting. Below Fremantle stood Lee who
“generally . . . sat quite alone on the stump of a tree.” However, Fremantle noted Lee “sometimes talking to Hill.” As the time came for the Third Corps to enter the fray, Hill must have ridden down the length of his line from north to south. To reiterate, Hill’s left brigade under Wilcox probably became engaged around six o’clock. Capt. William W. Chamberlaine noted that “While this battle was progressing General Hill and his staff rode along a part of his front and in rear of McLaws’ Division, which by that time had passed beyond the peach orchard and was pursuing the enemy toward the prolongation of Cemetery Heights.” “General Hills’ staff were occupied in rallying some of the Confederates,” Chamberlaine added, “who were falling back in groups of two or three.”

Chamberlaine’s account places Hill on his corps’ right flank at the time Anderson’s division entered the fray; probably in the vicinity of the Warfield house and Peach Orchard areas. From this region, Hill could obtain a better overall view of his corps’ en echelon attack as it unfolded to the north. How long he stayed here is not known. Yet, Hill’s presence along the Emmitsburg Road does offer an explanation of where and why he was not present to oversee Anderson and Pender’s divisions as their assaults fell apart. His absence, however, does not mean his subordinates were unaware of his location. Any corps commander worth his salt would inform his division commanders of his location in case they needed to communicate. Brigadier General James Lane later wrote that he sent a staff officer to inform Hill of Pender’s wounding and “to receive instructions.” The staff officer must have known where to find Hill because he returned shortly with orders for Lane.

The question still remains though: Under the fluid circumstances of July 2, why did Hill not exercise more authority over his division commanders? The answer lies in the rhetorical questions of: What did Hill know? And when did he know it? In other words, if Hill was still in the Peach Orchard area, when did he find out about Anderson’s management problems and Pender’s wounding? Without more previously unknown primary sources coming to the fore, the ability to pass judgement on Hill’s July 2 is hard to quantify. (and perhaps unfair) Nevertheless, the overall performance on July 2 of the Third Corps was atrocious. Of the nine brigades comprising Anderson and Pender’s divisions, only three brigades entered the fray.

Perhaps the lack of performance was tied to Hill’s command style. As a division commander, Hill insisted on independence and a strict chain of command. He became quite sensitive when strict military protocol was not followed. This type of leadership philosophy worked well when a division commander proved capable of independent work. However, Hill’s style did not mesh well with a division commander such as Richard Anderson. Anderson apparently needed more “hands-on” supervision in order to reach a maximum performance level and Hill, in his first performance as corps commander, failed to make the adjustment. On the other hand, Dorsey Pender did not require as much supervision. Unfortunately for Hill and the Confederacy, Pender was knocked out of action at this crucial moment.

As the fighting ebbed and darkness covered the battlefield, various Confederate generals began to congregate at Lee’s headquarters. “About 11 o’clock all faces were made cheerful and all hearts made glad by the arrival at headquarters of General J. E. B. Stuart and General Fitzhugh Lee,” recalled one veteran. Hill soon arrived also at headquarters and began “shaking hands with friends . . . .” Hearing Hill’s voice, Lee emerged from his tent and making his way through the
crowd took Hill by the hand saying “It is all well, General, everything is all well.” The two generals then spoke privately for fifteen minutes.\(^{63}\)

“The Assault was then gallantly made . . . .”

July 3 - Lee awoke with his mind set on another attack on the Union army. At early dawn, the commanding general rode to Longstreet’s headquarters to confer with senior corps commander. Longstreet met Lee with a stiff verbal argument against renewing the offensive and urged maneuver instead. After listening, Lee reiterated his desire to retain the initiative through an attack.

Later that morning, Lee and Longstreet rode to the Peach Orchard area in order to reconnoiter the Union position where the two were joined by Charles Venable, Walter Taylor, A. L. Long, Henry Heth, and eventually Hill. The initial conference produced the decision to renew the assault again with Hood and McLaws’ divisions augmented by Pickett’s fresh command. Hill with Pettigrew’s division was to serve as support to Pickett. As the morning progressed, the assault plan continued to evolve. Lee would later write that:

“General Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the high, rocky hills on the enemy’s extreme left, from which his troops could be attacked in reverse as they advanced. His operations had been embarrassed the day previous by the same cause, and he now deemed it necessary to defend his flank and rear with the divisions of Hood and McLaws. He was, therefore, re-enforced by Heth’s [Pettigrew] division and two brigades from Pender’s, to the command of which Major-General Trimble was assigned. General Hill was directed to hold his line with the rest of his command, afford General Longstreet further assistance if required, and avail himself of any success that might be gained.” \(^{64}\)

The final assault plan shifted Hill’s troops from a support role to a portion of the main attack column. Lee also shifted direct command of Pettigrew’s (Heth) division and two brigades of Pender’s division to Longstreet. In effect, Lee turned over control of half of the Third Corps to his senior corps commander. Hill’s reaction to this decision is not recorded nor did Lee, in the battle’s aftermath, explain his decision.\(^{65}\)
After a year’s time, the amount of friction remaining from the feud between Longstreet and Hill is hard to gauge. Beyond a doubt the two generals were civil on a professional level. But did the prior disagreement factor into Lee’s decision on July 3? Probably not. Did Hill’s performance on the two prior days of battle factor into Lee’s decision? If Lee had any concerns or objections to Hill’s performance, those comments are not recorded. For the rest of the war though, Lee continued to rely on Hill and Longstreet.

The overriding factor for Lee’s choice of Longstreet to head the assault was simply the First Corps commander’s experience factor. Longstreet was a known quantity as a corps commander. (But in the irony of ironies, Longstreet did not believe in nor want to make the attack.) The overriding concern for Lee was that the assault should have unity of command. This is not to say that Lee’s decision did not arouse Hill’s sensitivity. Hill was a proud man. Upon Pettigrew’s division being ordered to report to Longstreet, Hill seems to have “washed his hands” of the affair. If Hill warned his fellow corps commander of the precarious state of Pettigrew’s division, the conversation was not recorded.

Hill’s role in forwarding supports (what has recently been referred to as a “second wave”) for the main assault requires scrutiny. Lee recorded that “General Hill was directed to hold his line with the rest of his command, afford General Longstreet further assistance if required, and avail himself of any success that might be gained.” Hill echoes this statement in his official report though his exact duty for the rest of the day, especially in the role of commanding the rest of his troops, becomes confusing. On the surface, Hill apparently retained command of Wilcox’s and Lang’s brigades but it was Longstreet who personally ordered them to move forward. This scenario played out with the remaining brigades of Anderson’s division. As Wright and Posey were forming to march into the fray, Longstreet personally ordered them to halt. Therefore, the evidence contradicts the after-action report made by Lee that Hill retained control of any of his remaining troops as eyewitness accounts indicate that Longstreet also controlled reinforcements designated to participate in the charge.66

Hill’s whereabouts on July 3 and Pickett’s Charge is as mysterious as the rest of the battle. For at least a portion of the day, Hill occupied himself with overseeing various artillery batteries along his front. William T. Poague noted that Hill personally ordered Wyatt’s Battery to open on Cemetery Ridge between 7 and 8 o’clock in the morning. That same morning, Hill also ordered the two Whitworth cannon moved “to a commanding point north of the railroad cut, to enable them to enfilade the enemy’s position.” Edward P. Alexander, Longstreet’s artillery commander, noted that the Third Corps artillery batteries opened “a little before noon” for approximately thirty minutes “it was said, by his [Hill] order.” Impetuous as always, Hill could have given the orders in response to Union skirmishers occupying the Bliss Farm in his front or in anticipation of the main assault taking place at 10 o’clock. Needless to say, Alexander lamented the wasted ammunition.67
Hill observed the charge near Watson’s Battery from the Second Corps’ Artillery Reserve, positioned just to the south of the present day National Guard Armory on Seminary Ridge. Hill possibly chose this location in order to see more clearly through the cannonade’s smoke. George L. Christian recalled later:

“Whilst we were watching this most thrilling scene, Gen. A. P. Hill came and stood within my battery not ten feet from the location of my gun and was watching with us from that position the charge of Pickett’s and Pender’s men. I shall never forget his appearance on that occasion as long as I live. When he saw Pender’s division falter in its advance, and afterwards break and retire, and as he watched with the most intense interest the struggling gallantry and continued advance of Pickett’s men, although their lines were decimated as they went on, Gen. Hill looked to me as if he were dazed, if not confounded at the scene before him.” 68

**Reminiscor**

For more than 150 years, Ambrose Powell Hill has been the bone of contention among Gettysburg scholars. Hill, however, did not single handily cause the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg. True, his corps drastically underperformed and his leadership did not rise to the occasion, but this could also be said of Lee’s other corps commanders. After the war, Lee confided to William Allan, a faculty member of Washington University, that:

“He did not know the Federal army was at Gettysburg, could not believe it, as Stuart had been specially ordered to his (Lee’s) movement & keep him informed of the position of the enemy, & he (Stuart) had sent no word. He found himself engaged in with the Federal army therefore, unexpectedly, and had to fight. This being determined on, victory would have been won if he could have gotten one decided simultaneous attack on the whole line. This he tried and his utmost to effect for three days and failed. Ewell he could not get to act with decision . . . Then Longstreet & Hill &c. could not be gotten to act in concert. Thus the Federal troops were enabled to be opposed to each of our corps, or even divisions in succession.” 69

Hill continues to this day to be one of those enigmatic figures from history - a man of quick temperament, loyal friendship, overriding confidence, fidelity to “The Cause,” and unflinching courage, one of the few men in the entire war with the capacity to handle large bodies of troops. Perhaps Hill could not meet the challenge under the shadow of Jackson . . . perhaps he, nor anyone else, could ever measure up? And perhaps, in the end, Gettysburg taught Lee that Jackson was really dead.
About the Author:

A native of Houston, Mississippi, Matt Atkinson began his National Park Service career at Natchez Trace National Historic Park after graduation from Ole Miss University. His career has taken him to Petersburg National Battlefield, Manassas National Battlefield, Vicksburg National Military Park, and Gettysburg where he settled in as a ranger in the Interpretive Division in 2008. In 2009, Matt edited and published, Lieutenant Drennan’s Letter: A Confederate Officer’s Account of the Battle of Champion Hill and the Siege of Vicksburg. One of the park’s most popular rangers, Matt hosts numerous programs throughout the year and speaks regularly at Civil War Roundtables. He just recently completed his Master’s Degree in American History. The author wishes to thank Mr. Tom Greaney, a volunteer at the park, for all his help in researching this paper. Tom is a true resource on the battle and a valued friend.

Footnotes

3 Robertson, General A. P. Hill, pp. 191 – 192.
12 OR., Series I, XXV, Pt. 2, p. 811.
16 Ibid., p. 712.
19 Robertson, *General A. P. Hill*, p. 197.
20 Ibid., pp. 5-9; Hassler, p.11.
21 Hassler, p.11; Robertson, *General A. P. Hill*, pp. 11-12.
23 Robertson, *General A. P. Hill*, p. 15.
24 Ibid., p. 17.
26 Ibid., pp. 22-26.
27 Hassler, pp. 16-17.
28 Robertson, *General A. P. Hill*, p. 27.
29 Hassler, pp. 16-17.
30 Ibid., pp. 21-21; Robertson, *General A. P. Hill*, p. 29.
31 Hassler, p. 22; Robertson, *General A. P. Hill*, p.33.
32 Hassler, p. 24; Robertson, *General A. P. Hill*, pp. 30-3 2.
37 Wills, *Pender*, p. 176.
42 John W. Fairfax, November 12, 1877 letter, Virginia Historical Society; O.R., Series I, Vol. XXVII, Pt. 3, pp. 943-944. The order to Ewell is dated June 28 but the correct date is probably the morning of June 29.
51 Long, p. 277.
52 Clark, “Pettigrew’s Brigade at Gettysburg,”, p. 117.


55 Lee’s *Lieutenants*, vol. 3, pp. 124-128.


65 Matt Atkinson, “More May Have Been Required of Them Than They Were Able to Perform: Seminary Ridge on July 3” in *The Third Day: The Fate of a Nation – July 3, 1863* (Gettysburg, PA: Gettysburg National Military Park, 2010), pp. 105-143. Author’s note: I’ve always wanted to cite myself and by God I’ve done it!


68 George L. Christian account, date unknown, John W. Daniel Papers, University of Virginia Special Collections.