The Best Staff Officers in the Army-
James Longstreet and His Staff of the First Corps

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Lt. Gen. James Longstreet had the best staff in the Army of Northern Virginia and, arguably, the best staff on either side during the Civil War. This circumstance would help to make Longstreet the best corps commander on either side.

A bold statement indeed, but simple to justify. James Longstreet had a discriminating eye for talent, was quick to recognize the abilities of a soldier and fellow officer in whom he could trust to complete their assigned duties, no matter the risk. It was his skill, and that of the officers he gathered around him, which made his command of the First Corps- HIS corps- significantly successful.

The Confederate States Congress approved the organization of army corps in October 1862, the law approving that corps commanders were to hold the rank of lieutenant general. President Jefferson Davis requested that Gen. Robert E. Lee provide recommendations for the Confederate army’s lieutenant generals. Lee confined his remarks to his Army of Northern Virginia: “I can confidently recommend Generals Longstreet and Jackson in this army,” Lee responded, with no elaboration on Longstreet’s abilities. He did, however, add a few lines justifying his recommendation of Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson as a corps commander.¹

When the promotion list was published, Longstreet ranked as the senior lieutenant general in the Confederate army with a date of rank of October 9, 1862. Jackson, number six on the promotion list, had a date of rank of October 10, 1862. Longstreet thus outranked Jackson by one day. Lee formally appointed Longstreet command of his First Corps and Jackson received command of the Second Corps.²

Lee’s two corps commanders had their own ideas of how to manage an army corps and how to use their staff officers, and a comparison of the two is in order.
Jackson’s staff was unequal in merit and his camp was quite austere, with rare displays of humor or what could be seen as joyous behavior. Longstreet oversaw a very efficient camp but when work was done, the officers would gather in one of their tents for a nip or two—sometimes three—and inevitably stories and song would break out interspersed with practical jokes played on each other, which helped form a tight comradery. The evening’s playfulness was enjoyed by the general, who turned a blind eye to these distractions.

One staff member, Capt. Francis W. Dawson, remembered that during the winter encampment of 1862-1863, the “great American game of poker was played almost every night….There was hard drinking as well as hard playing; and it was reported that at the close of one debauch General Longstreet had played horse with one of the stronger officers of his staff, who on all-fours carried Longstreet around and around the tent until the pair of them rolled over on the ground together.” Just who was the staff officer “playing horse” with Longstreet? After all, Longstreet was six feet two inches and weighed over 200 pounds. We know that Majors John W. Fairfax and Osmun Latrobe and Lt. Andrew Dunn were each “at least six feet high, and broad in proportion,” so one of these dignified men were, perhaps, Longstreet’s “horse” during that episode.

General Jackson was notoriously stingy with rank and promotion. In comparison with Longstreet’s staff, Stonewall’s officers generally served at one grade lower in their appointed positions. One of Longstreet’s staff officers remembered that “Longstreet never failed to encourage good work; he praised freely and liberally where he thought it due, constantly recommending meritorious young officers for promotion. There was no illiberality about him, and the officers knew it and tried for his notice.” Similarly, high praise was not so liberally given by the stoic Jackson.

The respective staffs also had to adjust to the personal methods of each general, not an easy task. Longstreet was known for writing very clear and concise orders and though Jackson could also dictate clear orders, it was not his normal style. One example of Longstreet’s precise style is a dispatch sent to Col. Edward P. Alexander on November 22, 1862, three weeks prior to the battle of Fredericksburg: “Gen. Longstreet wishes you to ride on ahead and select positions at once for all of our batteries including the Washington Artillery and the Brigade Batteries. Please use dispatch. Gen. Longstreet will probably be at Gen. Lee’s H. Q. which are on the Telegraph Road 2 ½ miles from town.” This informed Alexander that he was to select positions for all the
batteries of the First Corps and to do it quickly. If Alexander needed to see Longstreet for some reason, he also knew where to find him, but typically, the general’s orders were clearly understood. In contrast, Capt. Alexander “Sandie” Pendleton of Jackson’s staff wrote to his sister on December 5, 1862, that “We, by we I mean the members of the staff, who judge from appearance and know nothing, do not consider a battle imminent.” Written eight days before the battle of Fredericksburg on December 13, 1862, Pendleton and others had not been informed on any campaign preparations or knowledge of enemy movement by their corps commander; a trait of Jackson’s was to keep everyone—even his own staff—in the dark. 6

Longstreet gave his staff a great deal of latitude in making battlefield decisions in his name. When he launched his decisive attack with four divisions on a front over a mile wide at Second Manassas on August 30, 1862, no more than forty-five minutes elapsed from the time the attack was conceived to the time it actually began. Speaking of his staff, Longstreet said they were “…full of courage, intelligence, patience, and experience, were able to give directions to the commands such as they saw proper, which were at once approved and commanded my admiration.” It’s doubtful whether the plan could have been executed so rapidly without the efficiency of his staff officers and clear instructions provided by them to brigade commanders. 7

On May 2, 1863, the second day of the battle of Chancellorsville, Jackson utilized his entire corps to launch a furious attack on the exposed flank of the Army of the Potomac, driving the Eleventh Corps from the field. There were, however, directional mistakes made in Jackson’s formation. Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Colquitt’s brigade overlapped Brig. Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur’s brigade in the second line, and Brig. Gen. Francis R. T. Nicholl’s brigade formed by mistake in the third line— A.P. Hill’s Division—instead of the second line with the other brigades of Raleigh Colston’s Division. As a result, the attack lost momentum as it proceeded when the system of command became confused in the chaos of battle. At least some of the confusion could have been avoided if Jackson’s staff had been informed of Jackson’s plan of aligning his command, which they were not. His staff could have quickly helped adjust the brigade formations in Jackson’s name prior to stepping off. 8

Another secret to Longstreet’s success was the concern he always had for the lives of his men, a concern infused into his staff officers. He would not sacrifice them needlessly. Lt. William Miller Owen, of the Washington Artillery of New Orleans, remembered that at Fredericksburg the army engineers had constructed emplacements for three of Longstreet’s batteries en barbette (where the guns fire over a parapet). Miller wrote that “we improved upon their work by raising the earth higher, and arranging embrasures to fire through. The engineers say we spoil their work, but as we, not they, have to stand here in case [Maj. Gen. Ambrose E.] Burnside comes across they will remain as we have altered them. Longstreet says, ‘If we only save the finger of a man, that’s good enough.’” 9

Longstreet also had a good grasp of his soldiers’ mentality, including how and when to enforce discipline. Former staff officer Moxley Sorrel fondly remembered a day in July or August 1862
when General Lee was riding through Longstreet’s camps “and regretted to see so much gambling among the men; they nearly all seemed absorbed in a game called ‘Chuck-a-luck’. Could anything be done to better the matter? Longstreet had served much with soldiers, and knew they would, many of them, gamble in camp in spite of all orders and watching; never yet had he found anything that would completely cure the evil. He would, however, see what could be done – but nothing came of it.” Longstreet probably assured and agreed with Lee, and possibly mentioned the “evil” to his division commanders, but neither he nor his staff officers pursued the matter further. Since there was no regulation against gambling, Lee was probably thinking in terms of General Article 99 in the Articles of War, which states: “All crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects, which officers and soldiers may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, though not mentioned in the foregoing Articles of War, are to be taken cognizance of by a general court or regimental court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offence, and be punished at their discretion.” Lee was probably not as concerned about the gambling itself, but the bad effect it had on morals and discipline. Longstreet’s attitude was intentionally lenient and never instructed his staff to enforce a ban on the games of chance in his camps. 10

After the battle of Fredericksburg in December 1862, one of the pastimes enjoyed by the men in the Army of Northern Virginia was snow-ball ing. This apparently involved not just individuals but regiments, brigades, and divisions. Longstreet was not immune to this diversion. Mrs. Longstreet was staying at a house one or two miles from the general’s headquarters and every evening her husband would faithfully ride over to see his wife to return to his headquarters in the morning. His travels took him by the camp of the Texas Brigade where he was “frequently saluted with a shower of snow-balls. For sometime he took it with his usual imperturbability, but he grew tired of the one-sided play at last, and the next time that he was riding by the Texans, and found them drawn up on the side of the road, snow-balls in hand, he reined up his horse, and said to them very quietly: ‘Throw your snow-balls men, if you want to, as much as you please; but, if one of them touches me, not a man in this brigade shall have a furlough this winter. Remember that!’ There was no more snow-ball ing for General Longstreet’s benefit. 11

Longstreet’s self-confidence filtered down to his staff officers as well as his men, who gained a grudging respect for “Old Pete”. In September 1863, Longstreet was sent to northern Georgia with two of his divisions to reinforce the Army of Tennessee under General Braxton Bragg. On September 19, Maj. Gen. John B. Hood’s Division of Longstreet’s Corps was engaged in furious fighting on the first day at Chickamauga. After a day of fighting in dense woods and along narrow roads, his division had gained ground and was holding a line of hastily thrown up log works close to Federal lines. Having been informed at midnight by General Bragg that he was in command of half of the army once the battle was renewed the following day, Longstreet rode out to inspect his line of battle and encountered Hood who had just completed rallying his division. The Texan informed his commander that they had driven back Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans
and his Army of the Cumberland that day, and would rout him before sunset on September 20. “This distinguished general instantly responded with that confidence which had so often contributed to his extraordinary success,” Hood recalled, “that we would of course whip and drive him from the field. I could but exclaim that I was rejoiced to hear him so express himself, as he was the first general I had met since my arrival who talked of victory.”

One of Longstreet’s staff officers wrote that whenever the general heard his officers or men talk of retreating or defeat, he would respond, “it is all nonsensical to have any such idea, for that in every battle somebody is bound to run, and that if they will only stand their ground long enough like men, the enemy will certainly run.” Capt. D. Augustus Dickert, 3rd South Carolina Infantry, expressed a similar sentiment: “No battle was ever considered decisive until Longstreet, with his cool, steady head, his heart of steel and troops who acknowledged no superior, or scarcely any equal, in ancient or modern times, in endurance and courage, had measured strength with the enemy. This I give not as a personal view, but as the feelings and confidence and pardonable pride of the troops of the First Corps.”

So how did Longstreet instill his attitude among the officers and men of his Corps? Apart from personal encounters, perhaps the best method was to have it spread not by word of mouth but through his staff of officers who could transmit that air of confidence in their daily duties. Longstreet’s success as a corps commander rested on the foundation of his staff. How were they chosen and just how did Longstreet use them in the field and camp?
Gilbert Moxley Sorrel served as Longstreet’s chief staff officer and was even described by two of Longstreet’s sharpest critics as “the best staff officer in the Confederate service.” However, they failed to point out what made him so effective.  

In that first summer of the war, Sorrel, the son of a wealthy family in Savannah, Georgia, journeyed to Richmond with an introduction from his father to Col. Thomas Jordan, the adjutant general of Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard’s Confederate army stationed at Manassas, Virginia. Jordan kept Sorrel waiting for at least three days before sending him to Longstreet as a volunteer aide-de-camp. It was the morning of July 21, 1861, the Battle of First Bull Run. Sorrel’s exemplary service earned him an appointment as an official aide-de-camp to Longstreet on August 12 and on September 11 he was appointed captain and assigned as assistant adjutant general on Longstreet’s staff. Sorrel was promoted to major on June 24, 1862, and to lieutenant colonel on June 3, 1863. As was somewhat typical of Sorrel’s timing to battles, he remembered receiving his official commission in the mail on July 3, 1863, on the field at Gettysburg.

As Longstreet’s assistant adjutant general, Sorrel was responsible for all the paperwork generated by the First Corps. He would handle all the correspondence coming to or originating at headquarters and all dispatches sent or received from other commands such as from Lee or the War Department in Richmond. Sorrel, who also identified himself as Longstreet’s chief of staff, later described his role:

“With the growth of Longstreet’s command my duties had become doubly important, and with weighty responsibilities. The General left much to me, both in camp and on the field. As chief of staff it was my part to respond to calls for instruction and to anticipate them. The General was kept fully advised after the event, if he was not nearby at the time; but action had to be swift and sure, without waiting to hunt him up on a different part of the field. The change of movement of a brigade or a division in battle certainly carried a grave responsibility, but it has often to be faced by the chief staff officer if the general happened to be out of reach. Nearly two years of war on a grand scale had given me experience and confidence, and Longstreet was always generous with good support when things were done apparently for the best.”

One of Sorrel’s most important duties was to carry messages to subordinate commanders on the battlefield. At the Battle of Antietam on September 17, 1862, Sorrel rode under fire to locate Colonel John R. Cooke, 27th North Carolina Infantry, with a message bearing the general’s
compliments to Cooke on the fighting his regiment had done so far, adding, “We are hard pressed and if he loses his position there is nothing left behind him; his men have made noble sacrifices, but are to do still more.” Being the good Southern gentleman that he was, Sorrel did not approve of profanity but remembered the intense encounter with a wink of approval. “There are times when it may be overlooked, and never did such words sound so sweet as when I looked into Cooke’s eyes and heard him (reply): ‘Major, thank General Longstreet for his good words, but say, by ___ almighty, he needn’t doubt me! We will stay here by J. C., if we must all go to hell together! That ___ thick line of the enemy has been fighting all day, but my regiment is still ready to lick this whole ____ outfit.”” 17

The memorable exchange as reported by Sorrel was recounted by Longstreet in his memoirs, though described as somewhat less profane for his readers. “Colonel Cooke reported his ammunition exhausted,” Longstreet wrote. “He was ordered to hold on with the bayonet, and sent in return that he would ‘hold till ice forms in regions where it was never known,’ or words to that effect.” 18

On occasion, staff officers could assume the responsibility of issuing orders on the battlefield though an incident on the second day at the battle of Chickamauga illustrates a difference in military protocol and courtesies between the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of Tennessee, commanded by General Braxton Bragg. On the second day of the battle, Longstreet’s Corps had driven the right flank of the Federal Army of the Cumberland from the field and was preparing to focus attention on the Federal left wing under Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas when Colonel Sorrel saw an opportunity to attack a Federal column marching across the front of Confederate Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart’s Division. In the Army of Tennessee, orders had to come directly from the commanding general and Stewart argued he could not deviate from them unless he received new orders from the wing commander, General Longstreet. Sorrel recalled that Stewart’s position in line was:

“admirable for the purpose. His answer was that he was there by orders and could not move until he got others. I explained that I was chief of staff to Longstreet and felt myself competent to give such an order as coming from my chief, and that this was customary in our Virginia service. General Stewart, however, courteously insisted that he could not accept them unless assured the orders came direct from Longstreet. Valuable time was being lost, but I determined to have a whack at those quick-moving blue masses. Asking General Stewart to get ready, that I hoped soon to find Longstreet, I was off, and luckily did find him after an eager chase. Longstreet’s thunderous tones need not be described when, in the first words of explanation, he sent me back with orders to Stewart to fall on the reinforcing column with all his power.” 19
Fortunately for Moxley Sorrel, Longstreet’s trust in his staff officer’s skills were not cancelled out when long standing military courtesies got in the way of opportunities on the battlefield. And there were others of a similar caliber to Sorrel on the staff such as John Walter Fairfax, who likewise had served as a volunteer aide-de-camp to Longstreet at First Manassas. Promoted to captain and assistant adjutant general on April 17, 1862, subsequently to major on May 5, 1862, Fairfax served as Longstreet’s assistant adjutant and inspector general. As inspector general, he had the responsibility of reporting on the readiness of the First Corps for active operations and helped to enforce regulations and discipline. Sorrel described Fairfax as “middle age, tall, courtly and rather impressive. He had attached himself at once to Longstreet and took charge of his mess and small wants, presented him with a superb mount, and did the best he could with his new military duties. He lacked nothing in courage; was brave and would go anywhere. But Fairfax had two distinctions – he was the most pious of churchmen and was a born bon vivant, knowing and liking good things. Whiskey… was hard to get, but he managed to have always a good supply on hand.”

Another staff member remembered that Fairfax was “Fond of his bottle, his Bible and his baths, always in front when danger pressed, very much given to show, a fine looking fellow, and nothing pleased him better when the army arrived at a new place than to be mistaken for General Longstreet, and this happened on more than one occasion.”

Fairfax may be best remembered due to an incident with Brig. Gen. John B. Hood at South Mountain in September 1862. While Hood was in the act of posting his brigade, Fairfax “came to me in haste with orders to move to the right of the pike, as our troops on that part of the field had been driven back. He accompanied me to the pike, and here turned his horse to leave, when I naturally asked if he would not guide me. He replied, ‘No, I can only say, go to the right.’” (Major Fairfax was excellent at providing orders but an obvious disappointment as a guide to General Hood, who still managed to place his brigade in the right position.)

Maj. Gen. David R. Jones’s small division provided Longstreet with Osmun Latrobe, a native of Maryland. Latrobe had served as a volunteer aide-de-camp to Jones from September 1861 to March 11, 1862, when he was promoted to captain and appointed Jones’ assistant adjutant general. When Jones’s Division was broken up on or about October 27, 1862, Latrobe was appointed to Longstreet’s staff as assistant adjutant and inspector general. Captain Latrobe was promoted to major on February 16, 1863, subsequently lieutenant colonel on December 19, 1864. Like his fellow officers, Latrobe often ventured into danger while delivering dispatches and was not shy about giving orders as well. At the battle of Fredericksburg in December 1862,
Latrobe either directed or suggested to Capt. Victor Maurin, of the Donaldsonville Artillery, to bring forward a gun to shell three Federal regiments getting ready to charge a portion of the line held by the division of Maj. Gen. Robert Ransom. Latrobe’s suggestion was followed, and Latrobe even assisted the gun crew. The confusion lies in the fact that Maurin wrote that Latrobe “suggested” the move while Ransom wrote that Latrobe “directed” the move. 23

Not all of Longstreet’s staff officers were appointments based solely on wartime assignments as aids. During his travels from New Mexico to Richmond in early 1861, Longstreet took a small boat from Galveston to New Orleans where, on board, he first met Thomas J. Goree, “an intelligent, clever Texan, who afterwards joined me in Richmond, Va.,” Longstreet recalled in his memoirs, “and served in faithful duty as my aide-de-camp from Bull Run to Appomattox Court House.” Goree also had a talent for cooking as Longstreet asked Goree in 1875 whether he had “taught your wife to make the nice dish of Welsh-rabbit that you used to treat us with occasionally in camp?” 24

Although referred to as captain, it is not clear when Goree received this appointment. He began service as a volunteer aide-de-camp to Longstreet at First Manassas and received the formal appointment of first lieutenant and aide-de-camp on December 31, 1861. He had been referred to as a captain as early as September 1861, but his parole papers, signed at Appomattox, list him as still being a first lieutenant. Goree’s duties as an aide-de-camp were, at best, ill-defined though an aide-de-camp was and still is the most personal of all staff officers, essentially doing whatever their commander wants them to do to include helping to take care of the general’s personal needs, delivering messages, and performing other duties as assigned. Moxley Sorrel felt that Longstreet was “most fortunate in having an officer so careful, observing, and intelligent” as Goree and his “conduct on all occasions was excellent and his intrepidity during exposure in battle could always be counted on.” Longstreet later wrote that Goree was “a gentleman of high position and undoubted integrity.” 25

So much integrity that Longstreet forwarded a military intelligence suggestion from Goree in an October 9, 1864 dispatch to Lee, in which he wrote that Goree had “suggested that Sheridan would probably send his infantry to the relief of Sherman.” Longstreet took this to mean that Confederate movements or “our diversion in Missouri has drawn all of the spare troops in the West to that State, and it is not unlikely that Grant will be obliged to relieve Sherman with some of his troops. I send you the suggestion that you may advise General Early that he may look for it.” Though obviously a long shot, this illustrated how Thomas Goree thought far outside of the army’s boundaries, to strategy beyond the theater of war in Virginia. 26
Goree was also very observant of the way Longstreet managed his staff and compared his methods with others. In a letter to his mother on August 27, 1861, the young lieutenant wrote that most generals “permit their staffs to remain idle except in a fight, but Genl Longstreet tries to keep his in employment. One he has to act as quartermaster for the brigade, another as commissary, another as provost marshal, and myself as ordinance officer. Mine is about the easiest position of any.” Goree also felt that Longstreet was “one of the kindest, best hearted men I ever knew. Those not well acquainted with him think him short and crabbed, and he does appear so except in three places: 1st when in the presence of ladies, 2nd, at the table, and 3rd on the field of battle. At any of these places he has a complacent smile on his countenance, and seems to be one of the happiest men in the world.”

Four months later, Goree again described the changing moods of his commander who could be “very social and agreeable, then again for a few days he will confine himself mostly to his room, or tent, without having much to say to anyone, and is as grim as you please, though, when this is the case, he is either not well or something has not gone to suit him. When anything has gone wrong, he does not say much, but merely looks grim.” The staff had come to know Longstreet, to read his moods and in this situation “do not talk to him without we find out he is in a talkative mood.” Goree also informed his mother that Longstreet was a man “of but few words, and keeps at all times his own counsels…,” while “very reserved and distant towards his men, and very strict, but they all like him.” Longstreet was, according to Goree, the only major general “that has division drills, and he seems to manage a division of eight or ten thousand men with as much ease as he would a company of fifty men.”

Like others on the staff, Peyton T. Manning had served with Longstreet since First Manassas. Described as a “little man, not weighing over 100 pounds,” Manning was the lone officer who may have known Longstreet before the war. Assigned to the general’s staff on June 26, 1861, he was appointed lieutenant and aide-de-camp. He was promoted to major and the post of ordinance officer on May 5, 1862, subsequently to lieutenant colonel on August 12, 1862. Ordnance officers had the distinction, at least until the fall of 1862, of being the only officers who had to pass a test to gain their appointments or promotions. Manning’s main responsibility was to provide weapons and ammunition to the First Corps as well as the organization, control, movements, and operations of the corps’ ordinance trains, typically between 30 and 40 wagons full of small arms and artillery ammunition. The trains also consisted of wagons carrying extra supplies, traveling forges, and other specialized equipment.

Manning’s tastes, however, “took him more to adventures in the field.” At the battle of Williamsburg, Virginia, on May 5, 1862, Manning “bore the colors of one of the regiments in a charge and slew three of the enemy himself, receiving a slight wound and another ball through his clothes.” The courageous Manning was conspicuous at Seven Pines on June 30. Brig. Gen. Samuel Garland’s brigade charged across a field swept by fire to reach the outer line of Federal
defenses where Garland’s horse was disabled. Major Manning approached the dismounted general and loaned Garland the use of his horse “until required by him to go after ordnance.”  

On August 10, 1862, Lt. Francis Dawson, an ordnance officer, reported to Longstreet’s headquarters where he was introduced to Major Manning. Moxley Sorrel remembered that Dawson “had come to see hard service,” and assigned Dawson to Manning who “wanted some assistance.” Dawson was “thoroughly competent, and himself indispensable to Manning,” Sorrel wrote. The young assistant was later promoted to captain and “also acquitted himself well under fire.” In turn, Dawson discovered that Manning was “an exceedingly easy man to get along with. Unquestionably a gentleman in his tastes and habits, and brave as a lion, he knew comparatively little of his work as an Ordnance Officer, and was unable to write an ordinary official letter correctly. Spelling was indeed his weakest point.”

Major Thomas J. Walton also started his Civil War service as an aide-de-camp to Longstreet at First Manassas. Appointed lieutenant and aide-de-camp on December 31, 1861, his name was inexplicably withdrawn from consideration until the following May when he was appointed to the rank of captain and assistant chief of subsistence. Captain Walton dutifully worked hard until July 11, 1862, when he was promoted to major and assigned as chief of subsistence. Unfortunately, a technicality prevented the full appointment and instead of handling subsistence requirements, Walton was confined to Corps headquarters reviewing court martial records. He became the acting judge advocate for the First Corps in the Spring and Summer of 1864 and later served as the assistant adjutant general to Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell (November 4, 1864) and to Maj. Gen. Richard Taylor (March 13, 1865). Sorrel referred to Walton as “quite a friend of mine and fond of me. Gifted with uncommon intellectual attainments...he was one of the most uncertain, unexpected temper and exactions; he could be dangerous at times, and only the greatest firmness held him in check until the humor passed off and then he was all lovely.” Walton was married to Longstreet’s first cousin, a daughter of William Longstreet, a brother of the general’s father.

Raphael Jacob Moses began war time service on July 19, 1861, as major and chief of subsistence to Brig. Gen. Robert Toombs. Appointed acting chief of subsistence to Maj. Gen. D. R. Jones the following year, Major Moses became chief of subsistence on Longstreet’s staff after Jones’s division was broken up on October 12, 1862. Moses had been a lawyer in Philadelphia and Georgia and was “now a most intelligent, efficient officer. He was much older than most of us,
but ‘bon comrade,’ and had an exhaustless fund of incident and anecdote, which he told inimitably.” The educated officer was a perfect choice to manage procurement and distribution of food to the men.  

Rounding out the core group of officers was Surgeon John Syng Dorsey Cullen. Cullen was born in Richmond in 1832, graduated from the University of Virginia in 1853 and continued his medical studies in Philadelphia and abroad. At the beginning of the Civil War, he was appointed a full surgeon with the 1st Virginia Infantry but transferred to the post of medical director of Longstreet’s Division on October 26, 1861. Cullen would serve with Longstreet until the end of the war. In his report after Seven Pines (June 1862) Longstreet noted that Cullen “and the officers of his department kindly and untiringly devoted themselves to the wounded. They have none of the chances of distinction of other officers, but discharge the most important duties.”

It was this core of officers who served Longstreet through the summer of 1862 and in a memorable incident at the Battle of Antietam, went beyond their normal duties as Moxley Sorrel recalled. It was the afternoon of September 17, 1862, and bitter fighting throughout the morning had taken its toll on the Confederate defensive line. At the height of the Union efforts against the Confederate center, Longstreet and his staff came upon Capt. Merritt B. Miller’s Battery of the Washington Artillery, located east of the Sunken Lane. “The gunners,” Sorrel remembered, “had fallen by their pieces, which were temporarily without cannoneers. Longstreet was with us. Fairfax, Goree, Manning, [Thomas] Walton, myself, and perhaps some others took our horses’ bridles as we leaped from them to the guns. The position was most important and it would never do for those ‘barkers’ to be dumb, even for a minute; so at it we went, the improvised gunners, and were afterwards cheered by being told we did it well and could always get a gunner’s berth, when we might want it. I had the rammer, number 1, I think it is in the drill. Our fire was really strong and effective, until some reliefs from the Washington Artillery camp up…and with hearty shouts took their guns in hand.”

Longstreet’s official report of the battle emphasized the role his staff took that day, expressing his admiration for “Maj. G. M. Sorrel, assistant adjutant-general, who was wounded at Sharpsburg; Lieut. Col. P. T. Manning, chief of ordnance, Maj. J. W. Fairfax; Maj. Thomas Walton, who was also wounded at Sharpsburg; Capt. Thomas Goree and Lieut. R. W. Blackwell – I am under renewed and lasting obligations. The officers, full of courage, intelligence, patience and experience, were able to give directions to the commands such as they saw proper, which were at once approved and commanded my admiration.”
To aid the headquarters group in battlefield communication and security, “a good troop of cavalry for courier and escort service” was assigned to corps headquarters, the “Kirkwood Rangers” from South Carolina, a mounted troop formed in November 1861 as part of Holcomb’s South Carolina Legion. In June 1862, the troop had been assigned to the 6th Virginia Cavalry in 1862 but detached for duty with Longstreet’s headquarters group. Under the command of Capt. Alfred E. Doby, the Rangers had a strength of between 75 and 100 officers and men. Longstreet noted the services rendered by the Kirkwood Rangers during the Second Manassas and Antietam Campaigns: “The cavalry escort, commanded by Captain Doby, have my thanks for meritorious conduct and valuable aid. Captain Doby, Lieutenants Bouncy and Matheson, Sergeants Lee and Haile, and Corporals Whitaker and Salmond were distinguished in the active and fearless performances of their arduous duties.”

We have examined some of the leading members of Longstreet’s staff including their qualifications and duties and how they were used by Longstreet. But how does that translate to what the staff was doing at Gettysburg? One of our main witnesses to Longstreet’s actions during the Gettysburg Campaign was Lt. Col. Arthur James Lyons Fremantle of the British Coldstream Guards. Fremantle came to the United States unofficially to observe the Confederate war effort. He joined Longstreet at or about 6:30 a.m. on June 27, 1863. 

Sorrel remembered that Fremantle arrived with letters of introduction and “could not have been a finer fellow,” gifted with a “quick, observant eye and an indefatigable sightseer, apparently nothing escaped him.” Sorrel also recalled that he never saw Fremantle “use a note-book or any scrap of paper as an aid to memory, and yet his book put down things with much accuracy.”  

Fremantle noted that Longstreet was never far from Lee and that Lee “relies very much upon his judgement.” Likewise, the British colonel discovered the soldiers often spoke of Longstreet as “the best fighter in the army.” Longstreet informed the curious Fremantle that they were in Pennsylvania and as far as the army’s behavior, he explained “that although it might be fair, in just retaliation, to apply the torch, yet doing so would demoralize the army and ruin its now excellent discipline. Private property is therefore to be rigidly protected.” Longstreet’s opinion must not have been shared equally by at least one member of his staff. While discussing objectives of the campaign with an unnamed major at Longstreet’s headquarters, Captain Justus Scheibert, an observer from the Prussian army, testified the Confederate officer’s retort was “that the enemy had to be shown what war was, what it meant to

* Three Months in Southern States, published in 1864
suffer injustice – only then would he yield and abate! This utterance was earnestly rejected by all and was found to be so contradictory to the somewhat solemn spirit prevalent, at least on the staffs, that many men avoided association with the gentleman.” 40

Fremantle recalled that he found Lee’s and Longstreet’s headquarters close to one another along the Chambersburg to Gettysburg Pike (current day Route 30) about three-quarters of a mile east of Chambersburg. Moxley Sorrel remembered that Lee and Longstreet “were bivouacked near by in a beautiful grove of large trees not far from town.” Local folklore places Lee’s headquarters on the north side of the road in Shetter’s Woods and Longstreet’s headquarters was possibly on the south side of the road. It was not unusual for the two not to be near each other. Major Moses recalled that while in Virginia, Lee’s headquarters “were very near General Longstreet’s always. I think he relied very much on Longstreet, who was a great soldier, a very determined and fearless fighter.” 41

In this unique setting, Colonel Fremantle had the opportunity to mingle with the Army of Northern Virginia’s top officers and he found Longstreet’s staff officers to be “excellent good fellows, and most hospitable.” Among the more impressive officers he met was Maj. Gen. John B. Hood, who Fremantle described as a “tall, wiry-looking man, with a grave face and a light-coloured beard, thirty-three years old, and is accounted one of the best and most promising officers in the army.” Informed that he was to share a tent with Major Moses, Fremantle described the chief of subsistence as “the most jovial, amusing, and clever son of Israel I ever had the good fortune to meet.” While encamped at that site, Moses explained to Fremantle that his job was “to open the stores in Chambersburg by force, and seize all that is wanted for the army in a regular and official manner, giving in return its value in Confederate money or a receipt.” The merchants had already “sent away their most valuable goods” and much “had already been seized by [Lt. Gen. Richard S.] Ewell, who passed through nearly a week ago.” Moses was “elated at having already discovered a large supply of excellent felt hats hidden away in a cellar, which he annexed at once…” 42

Chambersburg store keeper Jacob Hoke was one of the unlucky merchants who had dealings with Major Moses. Hoke recalled that on June 29, Moses came to his store to settle accounts and wrote “in a hurried and business-like manner an itemized bill.” Hoke told Moses that he wrote like a “Philadelphia lawyer.” Moses informed Hoke that he had studied law in Philadelphia before residing in the South and after he determined what he thought each item was worth, Hoke was paid in Confederate scrip. The exasperated store keeper wanted to know what he should do with the scrip, which had no value in the North. “Well, now, that is an important question and deserves the best answer I can give,” Moses replied. “My advice to you is to invest this money in Confederate bonds. They are at least as good as the money, and if our cause succeeds, as we expect it will, the bonds will be paid. If we fail, then of course our bonds will be worthless, but so will yours, for your government will be bankrupt by that time.” 43
Storekeepers in Chambersburg and other towns near the Confederate columns had been “persuaded” to stay open in order to sell their goods to Confederate soldiers, who, in turn, paid with Confederate bills. It was not only food and dry goods that were purchased. Sorrel reported that Moses managed to secure a bolt of velveteen and some corduroy material that was sent to headquarters where some of the material was used to make a coat and trousers for Sorrel “which did good service, I think, till the end of things.” Moses was also grumbling about “the sound rating and liberal abuse he had taken from the irate females in furious rage at his work,” an indication, perhaps, of how efficient Moses was at his job.  

Another guest in the Confederate camp was reporter Francis Lawley, of The Times (London), who camped with “the three doctors on the Headquarters Staff.” These were Surgeons J. S. D. Cullen, medical director; Randolph Barksdale, medical inspector (and no relation to Brig. Gen. William Barksdale); and Thomas F. Maury. Fremantle said they “form a jolly trio, and live much more luxuriously than their generals.”  

The night of June 28, Sorrel was awakened by “a detail from the provost guard bringing up a suspicious prisoner,” he recognized by candlelight as Lt. Henry Thomas Harrison, one of Longstreet’s scouts. “Filthy and ragged, showing some rough work and exposure,” Harrison reported the Army of the Potomac was across the Potomac River and concentrating near
Frederick, Maryland, about 35 miles south of Gettysburg. Harrison brought his report “down to a day or two…” Sorrel took Harrison with him to awaken Longstreet, who “was immediately on fire at such news and sent the scout by a staff officer to General Lee’s camp near by.” The moment was remembered by Longstreet in his memoirs when “one of my scouts came in with information that the enemy had passed the Potomac, and was probably in pursuit of us. The scout was sent to general headquarters, with the suggestion that our army concentrate east of the mountains, and bear down to meet the enemy.”

Harrison’s escort to the interview with Lee was apparently Maj. John W. Fairfax, of whom Lee asked his opinion of the scout’s disturbing report. Fairfax expressed no opinion either way. Col. Charles Marshall, Lee’s aide de camp and personal secretary, found Lee “sitting in his tent with a man in citizen’s dress, whom I did not know to be a soldier, but who, General Lee informed me, was a scout of General Longstreet’s, who had just been brought to him.” At some point, Longstreet sent a note to Lee “suggesting a change of direction of the head of our column east,” and visited the general “early the next morning” to discuss a change in plans. Lee canceled his planned move against Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, given “it was impossible to ascertain his [the Federal] intentions” without further information from his wayward cavalry commander, JEB Stuart. In order to deter the Federal forces “from advancing farther west, and intercepting our communication with Virginia,” Lee “determined to concentrate the army east of the mountains.”

The next day, June 29, Fremantle was introduced to Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton, chief of artillery for the Army of Northern Virginia, noting that Pendleton had graduated from West Point but had served as an Episcopal minister in Lexington, Virginia. Fremantle felt that Pendleton united “the military and clerical professions together, and continues to preach whenever he gets a chance. On these occasions he wears a surplice over his uniform.” It was also on this day that Fremantle met another of Longstreet’s memorable division commanders, Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett, who wore “his hair in long ringlets and is altogether a desperate looking character.” He did note that Pickett, as a captain, was the same Pickett who “figured in the difficulty between the British and United States in the San Juan Island affair, under General Harney, four or five years ago.”

The observant Sorrel recalled that “Pickett became very friendly, was a good fellow, a good brigadier.” The close ties with his Corps commander dated long before the war as Pickett “had been in Longstreet’s old Army regiment, and the latter was exceedingly fond of him. Taking Longstreet’s orders in emergencies, I could always see how he looked after Pickett, and made us give him things very fully; indeed, sometimes stay with him to make sure he did not get astray.”
Colonel Fremantle’s introduction to the Army of Northern Virginia and its strictly American customs had to come as somewhat of a shock to one so steeped in proper military protocol of the British army. During the evening of June 29, he had the opportunity for a long talk with Longstreet who told Fremantle “about Texas, where he had been quartered a long time. He remembered many people whom I had met quite well, and was much amused by the description of my travels through that country. I complimented him upon the manner in which the Confederate sentries do their duty, and said they were quite as strict as, and ten times more polite, than regular soldiers. He replied, laughingly, that a sentry, after refusing you leave to enter a camp, might very likely, if properly asked, show you another way in, by which you might avoid meeting a sentry at all.”

The following day, June 30, Longstreet received orders “to move part of my command, and to encamp it at Greenwood,” a small village approximately ten miles east of Chambersburg. As preparations were underway, Longstreet escorted Fremantle to army headquarters and an introduction to General Robert E. Lee. Lee was “the handsomest man of his age I ever saw,” the colonel remembered, and noted that he “never saw either Lee or Longstreet carry arms.” He also observed relations between Lee and Longstreet “are quite touching – they are almost always together….It is impossible to please Longstreet more than by praising Lee. I believe these two Generals to be as little ambitious and as thoroughly unselfish as any men in the world. Both long for a successful termination of the war, in order that they may retire into obscurity.”

Leaving Pickett’s Division “to guard our rear at Chambersburg,” Major Generals Lafayette McLaws’ and John B. Hood’s divisions, accompanied by the Reserve Artillery under Colonel John B. Walton, arrived in the vicinity of Greenwood around 2 p.m. Once in camp, the brigade of Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law was sent to New Guilford (now Duffield), Pennsylvania, “on the road leading to Emmitsburg.” This would place Law somewhere between present-day Route 997 and the Mont Alto Road. Around the campfire that evening, Fremantle was informed by Longstreet that “he had just received intelligence that [Maj. Gen. Joseph] Hooker had been discharged,(discharged from duty) and that [Maj. Gen. George G.] Meade was appointed in his place. Of course he knew both of them in the old army, and he says that Meade is an honourable and respectable man, though not, perhaps, so bold as Hooker.” It’s unclear whether any of Longstreet’s staff shared the same view of Meade as their commander, but most were busily seeing to security of the trains and subsistence of the troops as Hood, McLaws, and Walton were directed to “have three days’ rations cooked…to-morrow as early in the day as possible,” a sure sign of an extended march.

Longstreet’s men were ready to resume the march toward Cashtown and Gettysburg at sunrise the next morning. Unfortunately, the “march was greatly delayed on this day by [Maj. Gen. Edward] Johnson’s division, of the Second Corps, which came into the road from Shippensburg, and the long wagon trains that followed him.” Sorrel later complained that Longstreet’s column
“was much impeded by too many troops and trains on one road and [Lt. Gen. Richard S.] Ewell’s men breaking in on the route next day to get to their position,” a nightmare for staff officers of both commands who strained to keep order on the single road, soon jammed with wagons, escorts and plodding infantrymen. 53

Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws’ Division was formed “in lines on the road,” when Major Fairfax delivered an order from Longstreet for McLaws “not to move until Gen. Ewell’s trains had passed.” McLaws requested that Fairfax inform Longstreet that “there was room for my division to march along with Ewell’s train, the road being a very broad one.” Fairfax soon returned with orders to wait until the trains had passed, and all McLaws could do was observe as “the time of passing and the rate of travel, and it was estimated that the train was fifteen miles long.” It was not until 10:00 a.m. when new orders arrived from Longstreet informing McLaws that Lee “desires you to move your command across the mountain, following the division of General Ewell’s corps which is now passing. Giving that division and its wagon train about an hour to get out of the way, you may move out and camp on the other side of the mountain as near to the division leading you as you conveniently can.” Longstreet added it would “be necessary to station some one on the road to ascertain when Ewell’s troops have passed.” Hood was instructed to follow McLaws and “camp near him on the other side of the mountain. The brigade that you have at New Guilford will be relieved by General Pickett when he comes up, and sent to rejoin you.” Colonel Walton’s orders placed his artillery at the tail end of the column, “that it would be some hours before you will have to move out,” which gave the artillerymen and horses, strapped in harnesses to limbers and caissons, a few additional hours to rest. From the side of the road, Walton’s men watched the column of wagons and troops trudge by, halting every few minutes in frustration as some delay occurred up ahead, staff officers and couriers racing back and forth with dispatches and additional orders. The afternoon dragged on until after 5 o’clock when the last of Hood’s Division cleared the road and Walton got his batteries on their way. Minutes later a courier arrived with a message from the corps commander informing Walton that Lee “desires you to come on to-night as far as you can without distressing your men and animals. Ewell and Hill have sharply engaged the enemy to-day and you will be wanted for to-morrow’s battle.” It was the first word the colonel or any of his men had heard about the opening of the battle and he renewed his efforts to have his batteries close up with the infantry. Back in Chambersburg, Pickett’s troops were relieved by Brig. Gen. John D. Imboden’s cavalry and preparations to march began. If Pickett could not start until the morning of July 2, he was authorized to pass through Greenwood and to continue over the mountains. Pickett’s men marched to Greenwood, with orders from there “to follow on after the remainder of the command across the mountains to-morrow morning.” Adding to the confusion and frustration of the day, Law’s brigade did not receive marching orders until 3 a.m. on July 2, so were late in getting their start to rejoin their division on that fateful road to Gettysburg. 54
Longstreet accompanied General Lee that morning until Lee decided to ride ahead and investigate distant booming of artillery. After issuing the necessary orders to his corps, Longstreet also left his column and rode on, his trusty staff and observers trailing behind. His ride over the mountain brought him up to Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson’s Division, the part of the column manned by the famous “Stonewall Brigade” under Brig. Gen. James Walker. Colonel Fremantle noted that when Longstreet passed the dusty Virginians, “few of them knew General Longstreet, except by reputation. Numbers of them asked me whether the General in front was Longstreet; and when I answered in the affirmative, many would run on a hundred yards in order to have a good look at him. This I take to be an immense compliment from any soldier on a long march.” Shortly afterwards, Longstreet’s party passed Brig. Gen. Edward A. Perry’s Brigade, in Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson’s Division. As part of the army’s reorganization just prior to the Gettysburg Campaign, Anderson’s Division was transferred from Longstreet’s to the newly-formed Third Corps under Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill. Perry’s Floridians knew Longstreet well and after the general passed, some of them “called out to their comrades, ‘Look out for work now, boys, for here’s the old bull-dog again.’”

Longstreet and his party joined Lee between 4:30 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. on the outskirts of Gettysburg, the fields freshly scarred by the afternoon’s fighting. Though Fremantle did not specify where the generals met, it is presumed this occurred on Seminary Ridge near the Lutheran Theological Seminary, where the British colonel saw Federal troops “retreating up one of the opposite ridges, pursued by the Confederates with loud yells.” Exactly what was said between Lee and Longstreet at this point is open to debate, but clearly Longstreet did not appreciate the situation and did not agree with Lee’s plan to attack the growing Federal position the next day. Longstreet eventually left the army commander “quite late,” convinced that Lee would launch an attack sometime the following day.

Moxley Sorrel had remarkably little to say about the details of the battle of Gettysburg. Years later, he did write: “Lee has made his report. Longstreet has written a book and said his say. The staff has little or nothing to add. Communications were in the main between Lee and Longstreet, verbally, or occasionally by note direct.” Sorrel also added that Longstreet, “did not want to fight on the ground or on the plan adopted by the General-in-Chief. As Longstreet was not to be made willing and Lee refused to change or could not change, the former failed to conceal some anger. There was apparent apathy in his movements. They lacked the fire and point of his usual bearing on the battlefield. His plans may have been better than Lee’s, but it was too late to alter them with the troops ready to open fire on each other.”

In a footnote in his book, Fremantle stated that he had “the best reason for supposing that the fight [of July 1] came off prematurely, and that neither Lee nor Longstreet intended that it should have begun that day. I also think that their plans were deranged by the events of the first.”
Longstreet retraced his route to Cashtown, nearly nine miles from Gettysburg, where he established his headquarters that evening. Along the way he encountered McLaws’ Division, still in marching column, and ordered McLaws to camp for the night along Marsh Creek, about two miles west of Herr’s Ridge. Hood’s Division, strung out behind McLaws, also encamped in the area of Marsh Creek. Capt. Fitzgerald Ross, an observer from the Austrian army, remembered that after reaching Cashtown it “soon became pitch dark, and we could not move about, but had to wait patiently till some one should come in from the front. We lighted fires, tents were pitched, and presently the doctors Cullen, Maury, and Barksdale…rode in and brought us the glorious news….Presently General Longstreet and his Staff came in and confirmed the news.”

Though the news of the day was “glorious” to Ross, Longstreet was not as optimistic. Over supper that night, the general “spoke of the enemy’s position as being ‘very formidable.’ He also said that they [the Federals] would doubtless intrench themselves strongly during the night. The Staff officers spoke of the battle as a certainty, and the universal feeling in the army was one of profound contempt for an enemy whom they had beaten so constantly, and under so many disadvantages.”

Everyone got an early start on July 2. Fremantle reported that he awoke at 3:00 a.m., “breakfasted before daylight,” and provided a horse by Maj. John J. Graham Clark, (Longstreet’s chief engineer), set out for the battlefield in company with Captains Ross, Scheibert, and other staff officers. The group arrived at 5:00 a.m. “at the same commanding position we were on yesterday,” where the colonel decided to climb a tree to get a better view of the Union line. Beneath him were generals Lee, Longstreet, Hood, and Hill “in consultation,” Longstreet and Hood “assisting their deliberations by the truly American custom of whittling sticks.”

Prior to Longstreet’s arrival, it appears that his chief engineer, Maj. John J. Graham Clark, had ridden ahead to conduct a reconnaissance with Capt. Samuel R. Johnston, an engineer officer serving on Lee’s staff. Johnston is our only source for Clark’s presence on this particular reconnaissance as Clark apparently did not put pen to paper regarding their co-operative scouting mission. Johnston indicated that he followed the same basic route that Longstreet’s Corps followed later in the afternoon of July 2, and the general himself reported that “Engineers, sent out by the commanding general and myself, guided us by a road which would have completely disclosed the move.”
Disposition of the armies at 4 p.m., July 2 at Gettysburg. (NPS)

Uncharacteristically, Longstreet did not fully utilize his staff’s skills in the morning hours of July 2. They do not appear to have been sent out to help reconnoiter the land or the route the troops were expected to take. Where, for example, were the Kirkwood Rangers and what were they doing? Why was the Johnston and Clark reconnaissance of the early morning not brought up to
date? Why does Longstreet, or anyone else, not seem to know his column would be spotted by the Federal signal corps station on Little Round Top before the march began? These are questions that cannot now be answered satisfactorily.

Per Lee’s directions, Longstreet’s men had about a five mile march to get into position along Warfield Ridge, the southern extension of Seminary Ridge, to form for the attack that afternoon. Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw’s Brigade of McLaws’ Division led the column and after the troubling halts and countermarch, arrived on the Millerstown Road where the men turned left toward their designated line along the ridge. Kershaw’s troops began to deploy at or about 3:00 o’clock. Approximately one-half mile to the east adjacent to the Emmitsburg Road stood the Peach Orchard where the Confederates expected to find, at most, two regiments of Federal infantry and one battery of artillery. Instead, they observed massed regiments of blue-clad soldiers from the Army of the Potomac’s Third Corps and additional batteries of artillery extending the Federal line southeast from the orchard. McLaws continued to prepare his troops and sent one of his own staff to find Longstreet, and report the change in Federal strength. 63

Within minutes, Capt. Osmun Latrobe approached McLaws to inquire why he had not already charged “as there was no one in my front but a regiment of infantry and a battery of artillery.” McLaws pointed out the altered situation to Latrobe, who took the information and rode away only to shortly return and repeat the previous order. Remaining calm under the circumstances, McLaws replied his attack would require careful preparation and asked Latrobe to request Longstreet come forward to see the situation for himself. Latrobe rode away and returned, this time delivering a preemptory order to attack. McLaws understood that Lee was with Longstreet and either agreed with the order or gave it himself. Latrobe was told that the division would advance in five minutes. Before the five minutes was up, another courier arrived with orders not to advance until Maj. Gen. John B. Hood’s division was in position. Sorrel remembered that when Hood was across the Emmitsburg Road “under orders to attack, he begged me to look at it, report its extreme difficulty, and implore Longstreet to make the attack another way. This was done, but the answer I took to Hood was that the attack must instantly be made, that General Lee had so directed…” 64

Writing to Longstreet after the war, Major Fairfax remembered giving an attack order to Hood when the general “was standing within a step or two of his line of battle. I asked him to please delay his attack until I could communicate with General Longstreet that he can turn the enemy…. When Fairfax reported to Longstreet, his response was “It is General Lee’s order, the
time is up, attack at once,” and the major “lost no time in repeating the same to General Hood.” Hood had just given orders to advance when Longstreet himself arrived and despite the Texan’s plea to delay and allow him to attack the Federal position from a different direction, Longstreet’s somewhat cold response was: “We must obey the orders of General Lee.”

Remaining close to their chief, Longstreet’s staff did little more than wait to carry dispatches or encourage others to adhere to the timetable set forth by Lee. Captain Goree rode along the line of the Texas Brigade and pointing to Little Round Top yelled to the Texans to take it, to which some responded, “We’ll do it.” Surgeon John S. D. Cullen was also on the field that afternoon and in an 1875 letter to Longstreet, reminded the general how they were gathered in a group around him “in front of the Peach Orchard when Hood began to move toward Round Top. General Hood was soon wounded, and I removed him from the field to a house near by.”

As some his staff knew he could be, Longstreet had become withdrawn in his own thoughts and communication with his officers was slight or non-existent. It was during these times when the general seemed detached of the danger around him. Captain Decimus et Ultimus Barziza, 4th Texas Infantry, spotted Longstreet behind the batteries “sitting on his horse like an iron man with his spyglass to his eye, coolly watching the effect of our shots. Limbs of trees fell and crashed around him, yet he sat as unmoved as a statue.” It did not stop there as the general, followed by his observant staff, roamed the line of battle while his troops surged forward. A startled Fremantle wrote that everyone “deplores that Longstreet will expose himself in such a reckless manner. To-day he led a Georgian regiment in a charge against a battery, hat in hand, and in front of everybody.” The Times (London) reported that Longstreet did throw “himself at the head of Wofford’s brigade, and led them under such a fire as has rarely been witnessed right up the slope…Repressing the disposition of his men to cheer him as he took his place at their head by the brief exclamation of ‘Cheer less, men, and fight more.’ General Longstreet, mounted upon the same charger which he has ridden on a score of battle-fields, without either horse or rider, both recklessly and constantly exposed, encountering not even a scratch, plunged into the thickest of the fight.”

Fremantle and Francis Lawley, the reporter for The Times, stumbled upon Longstreet’s headquarters camp, located at or near the Pitzer School House near the intersection of Millerstown Road and Black Horse Tavern Road, probably where the rest of the staff had pitched the headquarters tents. Longstreet “with most of his Staff, bivouacked on the field,” Fremantle recalled, choosing to remain an observer rather than get too involved in the staff’s operations. And there was plenty to observe; Major Fairfax “arrived at about 10 P.M. in a very bad humor. He had under his charge about 1,000 or 1,500 Yankee prisoners who had been taken to-day; among them a general, whom I heard one of his men accusing of having been ‘so G_d D_d drunk that he had turned his guns upon his own men.’” The day before his promotion to lieutenant colonel, Major Sorrel “had been slightly wounded” by a shell fragment while serving his chief
“but still did duty,” and Major Walton’s “horse was killed, but there were no other casualties amongst my particular friends.”

The bruised Sorrel had a vivid memory of his injury, writing “the staff had been hard at work day and night, and my exhausted frame found rest that night [July 2] in the snuggest fence corner in sight….Riding with Dearing’s artillery late in the afternoon, while exchanging some shots, a shrapnel burst directly over us, one of the large projectiles striking me on the right arm near the shoulder. It was not broken or pierced, but paralyzed for use for at least ten days, and quite black down to the wrist.” An exhausted Captain Ross, the Austrian observer, remembered that some of them did not return to a camp that night but “lay down in a meadow near the battle-field, tying up our horses to a fence, and using our saddles as pillows. Some of the officers had blankets, but, as I had none, Major [Osmun] Latrobe shared his with me, and we slept soundly after the fatigues of the day.”

Colonels Fremantle and Manning were up early the following morning, mounted their horses at 6:00 a.m. “and went over the ground which, after a fierce contest, had been won from the enemy yesterday evening.” Sometime later, the two joined an impressive gathering of Lee’s and Longstreet’s staffs, the generals in close conversation a few feet away, “reconnoitering and making preparations for renewing the attack,” as an unrelenting roar of musketry echoed from the direction of Culp’s Hill. It was this conference where Lee made the fateful decision to launch twelve thousand troops against the center of the Federal line on Cemetery Ridge. The attacking forces consisted of the division of Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett; the division of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, under the field command of Brig. Gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew; and two brigades from the division commanded by Maj. Gen. Isaac Trimble. The whole force was to be under the command of Longstreet.

The rest of that morning was spent in hasty preparation- the placement of artillery, instructions to commanders, and ensuring the infantry was in position. While Pickett’s Virginia division was moving into position along Seminary Ridge, Pickett’s chief of staff, Maj. Walter Harrison, noticed that Brig. Gen. Richard S. Garnett’s brigade overlapped Pettigrew’s line, which prevented Brig. Gen. Lewis A. Armistead’s brigade from continuing the division front. Armistead asked Harrison to see Pickett for further instructions; should he push his line out or hold his position. Harrison did not see Pickett but, “anxious to satisfy Gen. Armistead, I rode up to Gen. Longstreet, who I saw with Gen. Lee, on top of the ridge in front of us, making a close reconnaissance of the enemy’s position, and addressed Gen. Armistead’s question to him. The great “war-horse” of the army, or as he was more familiarly called, ‘Old Peter,’ seemed to be in anything but a pleasant humor at the prospect of ‘over the hill;’ for he snorted out, rather sharply, I thought: ‘Gen. Pickett will attend to that, sir.’ Then, as I was going off – thinking perhaps, in his usual kind-heartedness, that he had unnecessarily snubbed a poor sub. – he said:
'Never mind, colonel, you can tell Gen. Armistead to remain where he is for the present, and he can make up his distance when the advance is made.'” 71

Major Sorrel wrote that while Longstreet did not personally approve of the attack, “his soldierly eye watched every feature of it. He neglected nothing that could help it and his anxiety for Pickett and the men was very apparent.” Brig. Gen. James Kemper remembered that during the cannonade preceding the charge, he witnessed Longstreet sitting on “his large charger with a magnificent grace and composure I never before beheld. – This was to me the grandest moral spectacle of the war. Still he moved on, slowly and majestically, with an inspiring confidence, composure, self-possession and repressed power, in every movement and look that fascinated me.” Like many others before him, Kemper grew concerned about Longstreet’s safety and remarked, “this is a terrible place”, believing the commander would take hint for a safer place. Greatly distressed by the shelling of Pickett’s men, Longstreet nodded and unshaken, replied, “we are hurting the enemy badly, and will charge him presently.” After taking a few moments longer in the exposed position, Longstreet galloped away to another part of the line “as grand as Arthur to Guinevere, when he led his hosts ‘far down to that great battle in the west.” 72

Longstreet spoke aloud of his concern the Federals would launch flank attacks if the charge succeeded. He selected Latrobe to ride to Pettigrew and Trimble to warn “against its possibility,” (Latrobe’s horse was killed on this mission) and quickly dictated similar warnings for the other staff officers to carry up to the commanders. Moxley Sorrel, his arm hanging limp from the previous day’s injury, rode to find General Pickett to “watch his right and if necessary move some troops in for meeting such an attempt. I did not meet with Pickett and was soon up with Garnett and Armistead,” as the brigadiers neared the Emmitsburg Road. Just as Sorrel delivered his message, a shell took off the hind legs of his horse and “down she came.” The battered Sorrel was able to get another horse from a “mounted man near by, who rather ruefully gave up his horse and saved my saddle for me.” 73

The charge having failed, Longstreet, who was expecting the Federals to launch a counterattack, alone “rode to the front of our batteries, to reconnoiter and superintend their operations.” Deeply impressed, Colonel Fremantle wrote that no “person could have been more calm or self-possessed than General Longstreet under these trying circumstances, aggravated as they now were by the movements of the enemy, who began to show a strong disposition to advance. I could now thoroughly appreciate the term ‘Bulldog,’ which I had heard applied to him by the soldiers. Difficulties seem to make no other impression on him than to make him a little more savage.” Fremantle also mentioned that Major Walton was the only staff officer remaining with Longstreet, the others having been put into the charge. He did remember Latrobe arriving on foot and carrying his saddle, Sorrel losing his horse, and Goree’s horse being wounded in the mouth. Longstreet, meanwhile, “was making the best arrangements in his power to resist the threatened advance, by advancing some artillery, rallying the stragglers, &.” 74
Longstreet “sent my staff officers to the rear to assist in rallying the troops, and hurried to our line of batteries, as the only support that I could give them, knowing that my presence would impress upon every one of them the necessity of holding the ground to the last extremity.” Though his efforts were admirable, Capt. Henry T. Owen, 18th Virginia Infantry, remembered an “attempt was made on the brow of Cemetery Hill, in front of the Confederate batteries, by a couple of officers to rally the fugitives, but the effort (under a heavy cross fire from both sides now) failed, and then commenced a route that soon increased to a stampede and almost demoralization of all the survivors of this noted charge without distinction of regiments or commands.” Neither Longstreet nor any of his wounded, horseless staff could stem the tide.75

While working to rally the survivors of the charge, Longstreet directed his forward lines to pull back to their original positions of July 2. On a borrowed mount, Major Sorrel delivered orders to General McLaws to pull his division back from the Wheatfield area and the Peach Orchard to Warfield Ridge. McLaws felt his forward positions had been won at great cost and saw no necessity to withdraw, but Sorrel informed the general that “there is no discretion allowed, the order is for you to retire at once.” The order was passed and McLaws’ regiments withdrew, coming under fire from Federal batteries on Little Round Top, “but by quickening the pace the aim was so disturbed that no damage was done.” It was not long before “clouds of skirmishers” appeared, advancing from Cemetery Ridge in close but careful persistence though extra skirmishers in front of the newly established Warfield Ridge line prevented the Federals from getting too close. In what has to be one of the strangest and most confusing episodes that day, Sorrel appeared in front of McLaws with the request “if I could retake the position I had just abandoned.” The stunned McLaws wanted to know why, to which Sorrel replied, “General Longstreet had forgotten that he had ordered it, and now disapproved the withdrawal.” In what became a testy exchange, McLaws reminded Sorrel that he had delivered the order to withdraw in the first place to which Sorrel replied, “General Longstreet gave it to me.” 76

At about 7:30 p.m. that evening, Fremantle headed back to Longstreet’s headquarters site and along the way was approached by a “great many wounded men, most anxious to inquire after Longstreet, who was reported killed; when I assured them he was quite well, they seemed to forget their own pain in the evident pleasure they felt in the safety of their chief.” The mood in the headquarters that night was sullen, the exhausted officers quietly going to their tents for a fitful night of sleep. Fremantle was startled awake at 5:00 a.m., July 4, in the tent he shared with Major Moses who was “complaining that his valuable trunk, containing much public money, had been stolen from our tent whilst we slept. After a search it was found in a wood hard by, broken open and minus the money. Dr. Barksdale had been robbed in the same manner exactly. This is evidently the work of those rascally stragglers, who shirk going under fire, plunder the natives, and will hereafter swagger as the heroes of Gettysburg.” Captain Fitzgerald Ross confirmed Dr. Barksdale’s “disgust seemed only increased when his trunk was found in the course of the
morning in a neighbouring field, open, robbed of its most valuable contents, and the rest satu-
rated with rain. Major Moses’ trunk was also found in the same state.” Both Moses and Fre-
mantle swore out affidavits testifying to the facts in the case. 77

Later that morning, Fremantle, Francis Lawley, and Capt. Justus Scheibert, walked up to the
front and met General Longstreet “who was in a high state of amusement and good humor.” A
flag of truce had come through the lines stating that Longstreet had been wounded and cap-
tured and “would be taken care of.” Longstreet sent the note back saying he was “extremely grateful,
but that, being neither wounded nor a prisoner, he was quite able to take care of himself.” If
anything, the incident gave the general and his staff a brief moment of comic relief. Fremantle
had quickly appreciated Longstreet’s iron endurance, “most extraordinary: he seems to require
neither food nor sleep. Most of his Staff now fall fast asleep directly they get off their horses,
they are so exhausted from the last three days work.” What the British officer did not know
before joining the campaign was that Longstreet’s endurance was legendary among his staff
officers. Captain Moses recalled that one night in mid-April 1864, “Longstreet rode into
headquarters about 11 o’clock. He had been riding all day through Paris Gap and reconnoiter-
ing other passes of the Blue Ridge. I remarked to him that he must be very tired. He replied, ‘No, I
never felt fatigue in my life.’” 78

The Army of Northern Virginia withdrew from the battlefield of Gettysburg and by July 8 was
concentrated in and around Hagerstown, Maryland, its back to the rain-swollen Potomac River. It
was not until July 13 when the river could be bridged and the retreat to Virginia commence,
Longstreet’s Corps to utilize the pontoon bridges at Falling Waters. “The caissons of the
batteries,” Longstreet wrote, “were started back about 5 o’clock in the afternoon. The troops
marched as soon as it was dark, my command leading. Having but a single road to travel upon,
our trains soon came to a halt. I rode on to the bridge, to hasten the movements as much as
possible, and sent my staff officers to different points along the line to keep everything in
motion. Details were made to keep up fires to light the road at the worst points, and Captain
Jacob H. Manning [signal officer], with his signal torches, lighted us across the bridge.” 79

Moxley Sorrel, now officially a lieutenant colonel, recalled that it took all night for Longstreet’s
Corps to complete the river crossing. By dawn, he was able “to approach General Lee on the
south bank ‘tete de point,’ with a report to that effect, adding that now everything was clear for
General [A. P.] Hill’s infantry. The General’s anxiety was intense….He desired me to recross the
bridge for him, see General Hill in person, and urge him to the utmost haste in getting his men
over, stopping only when imperatively necessary.” 80 Sorrel completed his assignment, passing
the word to Hill and assisting wayward troops with directions and encouragement.

It had been a long and costly campaign. Longstreet was generous in thanking his overworked
staff for their “valuable and meritorious services” adding that he was under “renewed obligations
to the officers of my staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Sorrel, Lieutenant-Colonel Manning, Majors Fairfax, Latrobe, Clarke, and Walton, and Captains Goree, Riely, and Rogers.” In stark contrast, Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill did not even mention his staff officers’ contribution in his report. Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell thanked his staff, with no further details. 81

General Longstreet was endowed with the ability to recognize the finest qualities of an individual and assembled his staff from the best pool of talent provided him, each man having common sense, intelligence, and military experience. Thomas J. Walton was the lone staff officer related to Longstreet through marriage. Similarly, Peyton Manning was the lone soldier who may have known Longstreet before the war. It would be something of a stretch to compare Longstreet with his near contemporary Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke of Prussia. Moltke had the advantage of the Prussian system for training staff officers but there was no American staff college or formal staff training prior to the Civil War. Longstreet’s close knit group had to learn their duties from the general’s expectations, manuals, regulations, and lots of on the job training. Proper delegation of authority enabled his staff officers to suggest movements to subordinate commanders, including those with higher rank, due to the fact that Longstreet generally kept his staff aware of his overall plans with the authority to modify those plans on the field as the situation dictated. Moltke and Longstreet were both hard-headed practical soldiers, gifted with a sense of fair play and sound judgment. 82

For his courageous gallantry at the Battle of the Wilderness in 1864, Moxley Sorrel was promoted to brigadier general and assigned command of a brigade in Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill’s Corps. Sorrel believed that “such efficiency on the field as I may have displayed came from association with him [Longstreet] and the example of that undismayed warrior.” Major Moses ended the war in Georgia, largely by accident. But the core of his staff- Latrobe, Fairfax, Goree, and Manning, remained with Longstreet until the end of the war; perhaps the best testament to Longstreet and his style of command. The former officers also maintained contact with Longstreet in the turbulent post-war years amid the controversies surrounding their former commander. On May 17, 1875, for example, T. J. Goree wrote to Longstreet:

“With my heart full of gratitude, I often think of you and of the many acts of kindness shown me, and the innumerable marks of esteem and confidence bestowed upon me by you during the four long and trying years that we were together. Although we may differ in our political opinions, yet I have always given you credit for honesty and sincerity of purpose, and it has made no difference in my kindly feelings towards you personally, and I trust that it never will.” 83

The loyalties of wartime service lasted long after the war and Longstreet remained proud of his staff, their accomplishments and the risks they took. In one of his reviews of the Gettysburg
Campaign, he stated that “there may have been confusion of orders on the field during the second and third days, I am not prepared to deny; but there was nothing of the kind about the headquarters of the First Corps.”

About the Author:

Karlton Smith attended Shepherdstown University in historic Shepherdstown, West Virginia, and graduated with a BA degree in Park Administration. Having begun his National Park Service career at Independence National Historic Park in 1986, Karlton moved to Gettysburg four years later as a ranger interpreter and while here has researched and presented programs on a variety of subjects and personalities relative to Gettysburg and the Civil War. He is the park’s recognized expert on Civil War books, navies and General James Longstreet.

Footnotes


11 Dawson, p. 87.

19 Sorrel, p. 192.
22 Hood, p. 40.
23 Krick, p. 198; Sorrel, p. 118; OR, Series I, Volume 21, pp. 620- 621, 625-628.
24 Longstreet, p. 32; Goree, p. 160.
28 Ibid., p. 60.
31 Dawson, p. 63; Sorrel, p. 171.
32 Krick, pp. 295-296; Bartholomees, pp. 66-70, 129-134; Sorrel, p. 30. Richard Taylor was the son of former general and president Zachary Taylor.
33 Krick, p. 227; Bartholomees, pp. 66-70; Sorrel, p. 118.
35 Sorrel, p. 105; Owen, pp. 147-148.
41 Fremantle, p. 240; Sorrel, p. 169; Moses, p. 115.
42 Fremantle, pp. 240-242.

44 Sorrel, p. 169.

45 Freemantle, p. 242.


48 Freemantle, p. 247.

49 Sorrel, p. 48. Pickett was, indeed, a major general, merely an oversight on Sorrel’s part when he authored his memoirs. Longstreet was carrying the regimental flag when wounded at the battle of Chapultepec, Mexico. Pickett picked up the flag and planted it at the top of the citadel.

50 Freemantle, pp. 246-247.

51 OR, Series I, Vol. 27, Part 2, p. 358; Freemantle, pp. 248-249.


53 OR, Series I, Vol. 27, Part 2, p. 358; Sorrel, p. 156.


57 Sorrel, pp. 157-158.

58 Freemantle, p. 256.

59 McLaws, pp. 67-68; OR, Series I, Vol. 27, Pt. 2, p. 358; Ross, p. 47.

60 Freemantle, p. 256.

61 Ibid., pp. 256-257; Ross, p. 49. While many historians have located this meeting at or near the Lutheran Theological Seminary, there is evidence to indicate the meeting quite possibly occurred on or near the south end of Herr’s Ridge, near the Adam Butt farm. This location was closer to the bivouac of Longstreet’s troops and provided an expansive view of Cemetery Hill and Ridge, the slight ridge upon which the Emmitsburg Road set, the Peach Orchard and Round Tops. See Jay Luvaas, Harold W. Nelson & Leonard J. Fulfenkamp, eds. *Guide to the Battle of Gettysburg. Second Edition, Revised and Expanded*. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2012), pp. 96–103.


64 Pfanz, pp. 153 – 154; Sorrel, p. 160.

65 Fairfax to Longstreet, November 12, 1877 in From Manassas to Appomattox, pp. 380 – 381; Pfanz, p. 165.


68 Freemantle, pp. 261-262. The Union general was Brig. Gen. Charles K. Graham, commander of the First Brigade, First Division, Third Army Corps. See also OR, Series I, Vol. 27, Part 1, p. 484.

69 Sorrel, p. 160; Ross, p. 56.
Fremantle, p. 262.


73 Sorrel, p. 164.


77 Fremantle, pp. 271-272; Moses, p. 211; Ross, p. 61.

78 Fremantle, p. 273; Ross, p. 61; Moses, p. 211


80 Sorrel, pp. 165–166.


83 Sorrel, p. 26; Goree, p. 158.