“My Presence on the Field Was Rather an Injury Than Otherwise”- George Gordon Meade and the Pursuit From Gettysburg

Dr. Jennifer M. Murray

In a letter written to his wife, Margareta, just days after Christmas in 1863, George Gordon Meade lamented over his perceived role in Union victory at Gettysburg: “Before long it will be clearly proved that my presence on the field was rather an injury than otherwise.”

In the six months following the closure of the Gettysburg Campaign, Meade found himself at the center of a firestorm of relentless criticism. Dissatisfaction and scathing analysis came from every level and multiple fronts. President Abraham Lincoln expressed disappointment with Meade in his pursuit of the Army of Northern Virginia. A myriad of northern newspapers leveled criticism at Meade’s leadership. Several of Meade’s subordinates, not without their own agendas, became the most vociferous of critics and some soldiers within the ranks expressed frustration that they did not have the opportunity to crush Lee’s army before it retreated back to Virginia. These frustrations with Meade’s leadership during the pursuit, July 4-14, 1863, centered on the expectation that the Union general could destroy General Robert E. Lee’s weakened army. By July 14th, however, the Army of Northern Virginia rested on the south side of the Potomac River; Meade’s “golden opportunity” had passed.

To be certain, the northern public and the commander-in-chief expected the impractical, the unprecedented, from General Meade. The quest for a decisive battle that wrought total destruction of the enemy in the Civil War remained elusive. Meade had proved capable of defeating the heretofore seemingly invincible Army of Northern Virginia. The pursuit offered the opportunity to destroy Lee’s forces. But the Union general acted cautiously, deliberately. On July 12th, with Lee’s back to a rain-swollen and impassable Potomac River, Meade called a council of war. While promising decisive action in his telegrams to Washington, the commanding general decided to postpone an offensive until
he gained further intelligence on Lee’s position. This decision had critical consequences, both for the immediate implication of the Gettysburg Campaign and, in the longer term, the construction and perpetuation of Meade’s reputation.  

As the curtain closed on the deadliest battle of the American Civil War, Meade considered his next strategic step. Victory at Gettysburg came at a high cost. After three days of grueling fighting, the Army of the Potomac suffered approximately 23,000 casualties. Among those included critical losses in the Union high command, including the death of 1st Corps commander Major General John Fulton Reynolds and the wounding of 2nd and 3rd Corps commanders, Major General Winfield Scott Hancock and Major General Daniel Sickles. On July 4th, as Lee’s army prepared its retreat from Seminary Ridge, Meade gathered his generals for a council of war. Here they explored the efficacy of a pursuit and the suggested route. The commanding general reiterated his strategic objective remained the protection of Washington and Baltimore, per Lincoln’s instructions given at the outset of the campaign. Several questions guided the conversation. First, the generals considered whether the army should remain in Gettysburg. Then they debated the feasibility of an offensive. Third, the generals then explored the line of pursuit, via Williamsport and Emmitsburg. With the consensus from his subordinate commanders, Meade ordered the bulk of units to remain in a defensive posture at Gettysburg. Here lay the first missed opportunity of the pursuit. In remaining idle, Meade missed the first step of a relentless pursuit, passing the strategic initiative to the Confederates.

Union pursuit began the following morning as elements of General John Sedgwick’s 6th Corps began moving west to gather intelligence on the enemy position. Meade’s decision to use the 6th Corps was sound; Sedgwick’s men had seen relatively minimal action during the three days’ battle and proved the most fresh for the occasion. General Gouverneur K. Warren, now acting as Meade’s interim chief-of-staff accompanied Sedgwick’s troops. Before dawn Sedgwick began readying his men for the ordered reconnaissance, and it was near 11 AM when the march westward began. Meade had impressed upon Sedgwick the significance of his reconnaissance, stating, “Time is of great importance, as I cannot give order for a movement without explicit information from you.”

After six miles of marching, the lead brigade, commanded by General Alfred Torbert, engaged the rear guard of General A.P. Hill’s Corps outside of Fairfield, Pennsylvania. Located just eight miles west of Gettysburg, Fairfield held critical strategic significance because access to the passes through the South Mountain range ran through the small town. After a short skirmish, the Confederates withdrew to Fairfield. Leaving Sedgwick’s men positioned outside of Fairfield, Warren returned to Gettysburg to report
the incident to Meade. Upon receiving this information, Meade made a critical decision. Already uncertain as to the intent of Lee’s movements and forced to consider the possibility that the Confederates were retiring westward into the mountains to secure a defensive position, Meade halted the movement of his army, which had been ordered to converge upon Middletown, Maryland. The commanding general resolved, “I shall not move the army from its present position until I am better satisfied the enemy are evacuating the Cumberland Valley.”8 Another cautious decision.

In multiple communications, Meade expressed the lack of “reliable intelligence” and justified suspension of the movement of the army until intelligence confirmed that Lee’s forces had retreated from the mountains and had indeed moved toward the Potomac. Meade needed to be “positively satisfied” that was the case before he would resume operations.9 Now, by mid-afternoon on July 6th, Meade had enough intelligence from scouts with his advance cavalry units to know that Lee was indeed withdrawing to the Potomac, and soon after issued orders for his army to resume their movement toward Middletown. Meade’s dilatory actions on July 5th into the 6th proved costly, as the Federal army halted its movements for nearly thirty hours, Lee’s forces maneuvered incrementally closer to the Potomac River and relative safety in Virginia. Meade’s decision bought the Confederate army time and miles and would not be the last time such caution proved advantageous to the retreating Confederates.10

The Army of the Potomac began its move toward Middletown, Maryland on the afternoon of July 6th. Although weather severely hampered their march, the Union army converged upon Middletown by July 8th. Meade made his headquarters in Frederick and, on that evening took a moment to write his wife. Over the course of the previous ten days, he wrote, “I have not changed my clothes, have not had a regular night’s rest, and many nights not a wink of sleep, and for several days did not even wash my face and hands, no regular food, and all the time in a great state of mental anxiety.” The general anticipated a culminating battle. He telegraphed to General in Chief Henry Halleck, “Be assured I most earnestly desire to try the fortunes of war with the enemy on this side of the river.”11

As the Army of the Potomac converged upon Middletown, Meade took the opportunity to reorganize his army. The officer cadre had suffered considerably during the fighting at Gettysburg. Replacing the talented General Reynolds, as well as General Hancock, wounded on July 3rd, proved challenging. Meade assigned Brigadier General John Newton to command the 1st Corps on July 2nd, and Brigadier General William Hays, a veteran officer, took command of the 2nd Corps. Moreover, Meade also needed to replace his Chief of Staff, Daniel Butterfield, wounded during the fighting on July 3rd. Meade appointed Brigadier General Andrew A. Humphreys to this position. The same day, Major General William French took command of the 3rd Corps, replacing General Daniel Sickles, who had been wounded on July 2nd. In sum, the leadership within the Army of the Potomac looked markedly different than it had at the outset of the campaign. Of the Union army’s seven infantry corps, three had new corps commanders. The unfolding situation demanded experienced, veteran leaders. Neither French nor Newton were proven, inspired leaders. Meade noted this deficiency in his command circle, “another
great trouble with me is the want of active and energetic subordinate officers, men upon whom I can depend and reply upon taking care of themselves and commands.”

(John Heiser, Gettysburg NMP)
Meanwhile, the Army of Northern Virginia inched closer to the Potomac River having begun the retreat from Seminary Ridge overnight on July 4. Two days, later units began arriving in Hagerstown, Maryland. Lee reported that the Federals “offered no serious interruption” to their retreat. Weather, however, proved more of a hindrance. Heavy rains had swollen the Potomac River to a depth of thirteen feet. Lee’s forces would not be able to affect a crossing. Instead, when the Army of Northern Virginia reached Williamsport, Lee ordered his forces to halt and prepare for an anticipated attack. By July 11th, Lee’s men had constructed a nine-mile long defensive position between Hagerstown and Williamsport.13

The pursuit from Gettysburg approached its climax on July 12th when Union infantry marched into Hagerstown. General Oliver Otis Howard reported that the southerners had constructed earthworks slightly southwest of the town.14 The Army of the Potomac took a position within two miles of the Confederates. Howard’s 11th Corps anchored the Union right at Funkstown while Newton’s Corps and Sedgwick’s troops extended the Federal line south of Funkstown along the Hagerstown-Sharpsburg Turnpike. To the left of Sedgwick’s 6th Corps sat Sykes’ 5th Corps with Hays’ 2nd Corps positioned to their left, running parallel to the Williamsport-Boonsboro Road. General Slocum’s 12th Corps anchored the southern flank of the Federal line near Jones’s Crossroads on the Williamsport-Boonsboro Road.15 Accounting for reinforcements that poured in from the surrounding areas, the Union army now amounted to approximately 80,000 effectives, 30,000 more than Lee. To be sure, while the combat number of 80,000 appears impressive, various reinforcement units were certainly not of a caliber equal to the veteran units of the Army of the Potomac. Some reinforcements were poorly trained and inadequately armed. That afternoon, Meade telegraphed Washington stating his intentions to assault the enemy position, noting that further delay would only strengthen Lee’s line.16

With the two armies positioned, Meade, accompanied by Generals Humphreys and Warren, surveyed Lee’s line. The generals observed a strong, well-entrenched line with no apparent points of weakness. But time proved crucial. Lieutenant Ranald MacKenzie, an aide on Warren’s staff, arrived at headquarters with news that the Potomac River had dropped eighteen inches within the last day. He anticipated that the river would soon be passable at Shepherdstown and Williamsport.17 The rapidly declining river levels would facilitate Lee’s escape and if Meade were to force the issue with Lee, he needed to act immediately and decisively. Instead, Meade acted cautiously. As the commanding general deliberated his next course of action, he issued orders to his corps commanders to hold their positions and “be prepared to meet an attack from the enemy.”18

On the evening of July 12th, Meade held the third, and what would be the final, council of war during the Gettysburg Campaign. Participants at this council of war represented a significant change in the Union high command, and as noted, this change cannot be overstated. Newton, commander of the 1st Corps, was sick and Brigadier General James Wadsworth represented the corps in his stead. Hays represented his 2nd Corps and French the 3rd Corps. The command structure of the 5th, 6th, 11th, and 12th Corps remained the same, with Generals Sykes, Sedgwick, Howard, and Slocum in command of their respective corps. Also present at the council were Major General Alfred Pleasonton,
commanding the Federal cavalry, and Generals Warren and Humphreys, respectively Meade’s engineer and chief of staff. Around 8:00 that evening the generals gathered with Meade at his headquarters, who began the conversation by expressing concern over the army’s operational environment. He defined the strength of Lee’s position, of which the command staff had “very general knowledge,” and lamented over the incessant lack of intelligence available to him. Nine months later, in his testimony to the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, Meade recalled that he advocated an attack on the enemy position, stating that he was “in favor of moving forward and attacking the enemy and taking the consequences.” Meade’s desire for an attack, however, did not determine the outcome. Instead, the commanding general allowed his subordinates to vote on the proposed course of action. In a telegraph the following day to Halleck, Meade reported that “five of six” of his generals were “unqualifiedly opposed” to an offensive. Meade’s senior corps commanders (and those in corps command at Gettysburg), including Sedgwick, Sykes, and Slocum all opposed an offensive. Cautious in his approach, lacking reliable information on Lee’s position, and unwilling to go against the advice of his subordinates, Meade chose to postpone any movement.

On a miserable July 13th, Meade and his staff reconnoitered Lee’s position, but dense fog and rain prevented a thorough assessment of the enemy line. That same day, Meade telegraphed Washington and informed Halleck that his corps commanders had cautioned against an assault. Halleck’s response was immediate and clear. “Act upon your own judgment and make your generals execute your orders. Call no council of war. It is proverbial that councils of war never fight.” That evening, Union headquarters prepared for a “reconnaissance in force” ordered to begin at 7:00 on the following morning. Meade identified four Union corps (the 12th, 2nd, 5th, and 6th) to make the “reconnaissance in force,” directed toward the right of the Confederate line, near Downsville. Corps commanders were instructed to assign one division of their respective corps to this mission. These units were to drive in the Confederate pickets and evaluate the character of the enemy position, to include the terrain, obstacles for artillery and infantry movement, and access the “advantages it affords for offensive and defensive operations.” While the four divisions engaged in the “reconnaissance in force,” the remaining units were to hold their positions, but prepare for an engagement “should the enemy offer one.” Meade’s plans proved cautionary. His “reconnaissance in force,” and not an all-out attack, engaged only a fraction of the Army of the Potomac, in what appeared only to be a test of the Confederate line and little more.

While Meade debated and delayed, Lee capitalized on the declining river level of the Potomac and prepared to move his forces into Virginia. At 6:35 AM, thirty minutes before the planned Federal reconnaissance, Howard reported that the Confederates had abandoned their position outside of Hagerstown. Two Confederate corps crossed at Falling Waters and another at Williamsport. By mid-morning, the majority of the Army of Northern Virginia sat safely on the south side of the Potomac River. As intelligence confirmed Lee’s withdraw, Meade, now in a reactionary position, rushed to organize a pursuit. The four corps earmarked for the reconnaissance were ordered to spearhead the pursuit, but it was too late.
Meade’s failure to exercise decisive leadership, including his decision to acquiesce to his subordinates at the July 12th council of war, resulted in critical strategic implications. Lincoln and Halleck immediately expressed displeasure with Meade’s caution. That afternoon, Halleck telegraphed Meade ordering the general to initiate an “energetic pursuit” and noting Lincoln’s “dissatisfaction” with Meade’s strategic situation. In turn, Meade, frustrated with the seemingly unrealistic objectives of Halleck and the Lincoln administration, caustically responded ninety minutes later by asking to be relieved of command. Halleck denied the general’s request and again prodded Meade into an “active pursuit.” Two days following the events at Williamsport, and still seething from the telegrams out of Washington, Meade shared the burdens of command with his wife. “No man who does his duty,” Meade wrote, “and all that he can do, as I maintain I have done, needs spurring.” Constrained by the weakened condition of his army, Meade articulated annoyance with being “urged, pushed and spurred to attempting to pursue and destroy an enemy nearly equal to my own.”

The Army of Northern Virginia had crossed into Virginia; Lee’s forces had “escaped.” Though Meade’s Federals pursued Lee into Virginia, for all practical purposes the Gettysburg Campaign had come to a close on the banks of the Potomac River.

These hours along the Potomac River forced Meade to address his decisions at Williamsport for months to come. In the spring of 1864, the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War investigated Meade’s leadership during the Gettysburg Campaign. The committee heard testimony from numerous individuals—some who supported Meade’s actions and those who challenged his decisions. Over the course of three days of testimony, Meade defended his leadership, particularly his delay at Williamsport. Meade justified the Council of War at Falling Waters due to his “having been in command of the army not more than twelve or fourteen days,” he felt it prudent to rely on his subordinates for the strategic directive. This explanation is unsatisfying. By the time the two armies met at Williamsport, Meade had been in command of the Army of the Potomac for two weeks so that by July 12, he was no longer new to command. Moreover, Meade deferred his leadership, as autonomous commander of the army, to his subordinates, three of whom were new to corps command and posed no distinguished service record. In his testimony, Meade reinforced his determination to attack but couched such seemingly decisive, authoritarian decision-making with a statement of
deferential authority. “But that I left to their judgment,” Meade testified, “and would not do it unless it met with their approval.”

Additionally, General Meade reasoned that a failed offensive at Williamsport would have exposed Washington, thereby risking “all the fruits” of the Federal victory at Gettysburg. This justification is partially satisfying; Meade’s claim that a failed offensive unduly exposed Baltimore and Washington was an exaggeration. Certainly, a failed offensive would not have jeopardized the entirety of the Federal position, nor afforded Lee the opportunity for a decisive counterattack. General Humphreys, among others, later testified against this argument. He maintained that had the Federal army been repulsed, they could have maintained their position and forestalled a potential Confederate counterattack.

Ultimately, the Joint Committee on the Conduct of War resulted in little more than political grandstanding. Meade remained in command of the Army of the Potomac and as the 1864 spring offensive began- the Overland Campaign- the nation turned its attention to the horrific bloodletting in Virginia that began in May and lasted through the summer months.

Yet, Meade’s reputation remains perpetually linked with Gettysburg. After taking command of the Army of the Potomac just three days before the battle of Gettysburg began, Meade led his Union forces to its most significant victory to date. However, in the days following the battle, the general’s leadership proved cautious and deliberate. When Union high command would have benefited from decisive leadership and direction, the “Victor of Gettysburg” acted deferentially, specifically after the council of war at Falling Waters. Obscured in the disappointment at Williamsport remains one clear fact, however; by the afternoon of July 3, 1863, Meade had done what no other commander of the Army of the Potomac had proved capable of doing: defeating Robert E. Lee. Unfortunately, it required an additional two years and tens of thousands of Union casualties to fulfill Lincoln’s aspirations in the summer of 1863, to destroy Lee’s army.

About the Author:

Dr. Jennifer M. Murray is an Assistant Professor of History at the University of Virginia’s College at Wise, where she teaches a wide variety of courses in 19th and 20th century American history. Dr. Murray’s most recent publication is On A Great Battlefield: The Making, Management, and Memory of Gettysburg National Military Park, 1933-2013, published by the University of Tennessee Press in 2014. Dr. Murray is also the author of The Civil War Begins, published by the U.S. Army’s Center of Military History in 2012. She is currently working on a biography of George Gordon Meade, tentatively titled Meade at War. In addition, Dr. Murray worked as a seasonal interpretive park ranger at Gettysburg National Military Park for nine summers, from 2002 to 2010.
Footnotes


8 Seth Williams, Circular, July 5, 1863, OR, vol. 27, part III, pp. 532-533; Meade to Sedgwick, July 6, 1863, OR, vol. 27, part III, p. 554.


10 Brown, *Retreat From Gettysburg*, p. 262.

11 Itinerary of the Army of the Potomac and co-operating forces, June 5-July 31, 1863, OR, vol. 27, part I, p. 146; GGM to MM, July 8, 1863, L&L, p. 132; Meade to Halleck, July 8, 1863, OR, vol. 27, part I, p. 84.


14 Howard to Meade, July 12, 1863, OR, vol. 27, part III, p. 658.


Papers of the 2017 Gettysburg National Military Park Seminar

18 Seth Williams, Circular, July 12, 1863, OR, vol. 27, part III, p.670.
19 Testimony of George Gordon Meade, March 5, 1864, JCCW, p. 336; Testimony of Andrew Atkinson Humphreys, March 21, 1864. JCCW, p. 396; Andrew A. Humphreys, “Journal of Movements of the HdQrs Army of the Potomac From July 8, 1863-June 23, 1864,” July 8, 1863, AAH Papers, HSP, Philadelphia, PA; Andrew Humphreys, From Gettysburg To The Rapidan, p. 6.
20 Testimony of George Gordon Meade, March 5, 1864, JCCW, p. 336; Testimony of John Sedgwick, April 8, 1864, JCCW, p. 463; Meade to Halleck, OR, vol. 27, part I, p. 91. There are some discrepancies in how many of the generals opposed or favored the proposed offensive. Meade reported to Halleck on July 13th that five of his six generals opposed the assault, a clear majority. In his testimony to the JCCW, however, Meade recalled that two of his generals favored the attack, Wadsworth and Howard. While not considered members of the council, Generals Pleasonton and Humphreys favored an offensive. In Gettysburg: The Last Invasion, Allen Guelzo argues that this Council of War is “portrayed as the moment when a suddenly offensive-minded Meade was restrained by his timid corps commanders” and suggests that Meade did not want to hazard an offensive, see Guelzo, Gettysburg, pp. 439-440.
22 Seth Williams, Circular, July 13, 1864, OR, vol. 27, part III, p.675.
23 Oliver Otis Howard to Andrew Humphreys, July 14, 1863, OR, vol. 27, part III, p. 683.
26 Testimony of George Gordon Meade, March 5, 1864, JCCW, p. 336.
27 Testimony of George Gordon Meade, March 5, 1864, JCCW, p. 336.
28 Testimony of Andrew Humphreys, March 21, 1864, JCCW, pp. 396-397.