The town of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania had little military significance in July 1863. Neither Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade, commanding the 95,000 man Union Army of the Potomac, nor Gen. Robert E. Lee, commanding the 75,000 man Confederate Army of Northern Virginia planned to fight there. It was events beyond both commanders' immediate control on June 30 and July 1 that committed their armies to the showdown battle of the campaign there.

What drew the armies to Gettysburg and gave it strategic importance was its road network. Ten roads met there, like the spokes on a wheel. On June 30, as the Army of the Potomac approached the Pennsylvania border, Meade directed Brig. Gen. John Buford's cavalry division, which was screening the advance of the army's left wing, to occupy Gettysburg and scout the surrounding countryside. Meade had reports of large Confederate forces both west and north of the town and he wanted Buford to investigate, and also to secure the road network there. One the same day, Confederate Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, commanding one of Lee's infantry divisions bivouacked near Cashtown, eight miles west of Gettysburg, sent a brigade to Gettysburg to investigate whether there were any supplies worth picking up. The infantry brigade marched to within a mile of Gettysburg when they sighted the advance of Buford's cavalry approaching the town from the south. Under orders not to engage the enemy, the Confederates withdrew and reported their observations to Heth. Heth carried this report of Northern cavalry near Gettysburg to his chief, Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill, commanding the army's Third Corps. Hill discounted the possibility that the Army of the Potomac was as far north as Gettysburg and dismissed Buford's cavalry as probably poorly trained Pennsylvania militia.

But some Union force were clearly in Gettysburg and Hill thought it prudent to evict them. He ordered two of his three infantry divisions, Heth and Maj. Gen. Dorsey Pender's, nearly 14,000 men to move against them on July 1. Although he certainly notified Lee of this intended movement, and Lee undoubtedly cautioned Hill to avoid becoming embroiled in a general engagement, neither Lee nor Hill believed that major elements of the Army of the Potomac were as far north as Gettysburg yet.

Buford accrued Meade a significant advantage by accurately determining the location of each of Lee's three army corps. Buford was also an uncommonly good cavalry officer and he sensed the road network and excellent defensive terrain south of the town might prove important. If the Confederates around Cashtown moved against Gettysburg on July 1 he intended to delay them until relieved or driven back.

Early on July 1st, Heth's Division took up the line of march along the Chambersburg Pike (Route 30). Around 7:30 a.m., one of Buford's advanced picket posts spotted Heth's advance crossing Marsh Creek and exchanged fire with the Confederates; the first shots of what would become the Battle of Gettysburg. Heth pushed on cautiously until he reached Herr Ridge, one and one half miles west of town, where he encountered Buford's advance line of troopers, fighting dismounted with breech loading carbines. Heth deployed from column into line and pressed Buford back towards McPherson's Ridge, upon which the cavalry commander had selected to make his principal stand.

Around 10:00 a.m. Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds, commander of the left wing of the Union army (First, Third, Eleventh Corps), arrived upon the field and met with Buford. Reynolds' own First Corps, numbering approximately 9,000 men, was en-route for Gettysburg but was still several miles distant. Reynolds learned from Buford that Hill's Confederate Third Corps were advancing from the west, and reports from scouts north of town indicated that Confederate Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell's Second Corps were approaching Gettysburg from that direction.

This information forced a critical decision on Reynolds; whether to pull Buford back or commit his own First Corps to delay the Confederate advance. Reynolds decided to fight, apparently deciding that the terrain south of Gettysburg would offer significant advantages to his army if they could concentrate there. But he needed to shield the road network and prevent the Confederates from reaching the high ground for such a plan to work. This meant offering the Confederates battle beyond the town. He sent couriers galloping to bring up his 1st Corps, as well as the 11th Corps, who were marching from Emmitsburg, Maryland, and to Meade, informing his commander of his decision to engage the enemy. It was a bold and aggressive decision and soon escalated the fighting from a skirmish to an engagement of more ominous proportions.

The leading elements of the First Corps arrived upon the field around 10:30 a.m. and engaged Heth's Division, which they defeated in a sharply contested one hour battle at such places as Herbst's Woods, McPherson's Ridge and the Railroad Cut. Total casualties were nearly 2,000 men, or nearly one-third of those engaged; a grisly portent of what was yet to come. One of the casualties was Reynolds who, while leading his troops into battle, was killed early in the engagement. In his place, Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday took command of the First Corps and Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, commanding the Eleventh Corps, assumed command of the Union troops on the field.

Heth's defeat had serious consequences for the Army of Northern Virginia and Lee's original plans, for it caused A. P. Hill to escalate the action by bringing up Pender's Division and reorganizing Heth for a renewed offensive. Hill also notified Ewell of the fighting at Gettysburg, and the Second Corps commander promptly turned his divisions of Maj. Gen. Robert Rodes and Maj. Gen. Jubal Early-nearly 14,000 men-onto the roads leading south to Gettysburg. Nearly 28,000 Confederate soldiers were converging on Gettysburg. Lee, en-route from Chambersburg, heard the sounds of firing to his front but remained unaware that events at Gettysburg were swiftly spinning out of control.

During the lull that followed Heth's defeat the balance of the First and Eleventh Corps arrived upon the field, raising the strength of the Union forces to approximately 18,000 men. Their mission was to delay the Confederate concentration upon Gettysburg for as long as possible. The First Corps deployed to defend the western approaches to town, while the Eleventh Corps formed north of town. Buford's cavalry covered the flanks. Howard wisely held one Eleventh Corps division in reserve upon Cemetery Hill to serve as a rallying point in the likely event his forces beyond the town were compelled to retreat.

Meanwhile, the Confederates received substantial reinforcements as Rodes' Division of nearly 8,000 men arrived around noon and occupied Oak Hill. Early's troops were pounding down the Old Harrisburg Road and began to deploy opposite the Eleventh Corps around 1:30 p.m.

Shortly after 1:30 p.m. the battle renewed when Rodes launched an uncoordinated assault upon the Union First Corps right flank. Launched before a proper reconnaissance was completed and in a piece-meal fashion, the attack suffered a bloody repulse. By this time Lee had arrived on the field and viewed the escalating action with deep concern. When Heth asked permission to advance Lee refused on the grounds that he was not prepared to being on a general engagement. Further concern for Lee was the lack of knowledge of the enemy's strength at Gettysburg, the whereabouts of the rest of the Army of the Potomac and the fact that nearly half his army was still west of South Mountain. But when it became apparent that Union troops in Heth's front were shifting to meet Rodes' attack, Lee granted Heth permission to renew his advance.

By 2:30 p.m. the entire front of the First Corps was under attack by both Heth and Rodes. Losses on both sides were frightful, but by 3:30 p.m. the Confederates compelled the First Corps to fall back to Seminary Ridge, where the battered survivors rallied and formed to make another stand. Pender's Division passed through Heth's exhausted ranks and, with Rodes, launched a furious assault upon this line. "Never have I seen such a charge," recalled one Union participant. Despite appalling losses, the Southerners carried the Union position and by 4:00 p.m. the remnants of the First Corps were streaming back through the town in retreat.

Jubal Early opened his attack upon the Eleventh Corps around 3:00 p.m. It fell like a sledgehammer, crushing the Eleventh Corps right flank and sending it reeling back towards town in a disorganized retreat. Early pressed after the fleeing Union soldiers into town where he and other Confederate pursuers scooped up over 3,000 prisoners. The remainder of the Union force withdrew to Cemetery Hill where they were rallied upon Howard's reserve, and by the commanding presence of Union Second Corps commander, Maj. Gen. Winfield Hancock, whom Meade had sent ahead to assume command after learning of Reynolds death. The exhausted and disorganized Confederates mounted no attack against Cemetery Hill and night finally blanketed the field. Whether an attack could have been launched has been long debated.

For the numbers of men engaged, the first day at Gettysburg was perhaps the costliest of the three days. Union losses totaled 9,088, while the Confederates added 6,800 more. Combined casualties exceeded 15,000, nearly a third of the approximately 46,000 troops engaged that day. It was a costly victory for the Confederates, not only for the heavy losses in men, but because Lee had been committed haphazardly to a battle on ground selected by the enemy. He would spend the next two days unsuccessfully attempting to wrest that ground from the Army of the Potomac, and would shatter the offensive power of his army in the process. In the aftermath, the first day of the battle would be largely eclipsed by the grander events of the second and third day. But for the men who felt the sting of battle on July 1, 1863 nearly all would nodded in approval with one Union officer who wrote of his men, "If I had been called upon to point out those deserving of promotion for gallantry, I would have pointed to them all, all are worthy of the highest praise."

D. Scott Hartwig
Supervisory Historian, Gettysburg National Military Park