AN INTERVIEW WITH ROBERT M. UTLEY ON THE HISTORY OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE--1947-1980

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This interview with Robert M. Utley was conducted by Richard W. Sellars and Melody Webb in Santa Fe, New Mexico between September, 1985 and December 1985.

Mr. Utley began his career with the National Park Service as a summer seasonal employee at Custer Battlefield National Monument in 1947. He continued this work for six seasons. Following graduate studies in history and a four-year stint with the United States Army, Mr. Utley became a permanent employee of the National Park Service in 1957. He first served as Regional Historian for the Southwest Regional Office in Santa Fe, New Mexico. In 1964, he transferred to Washington, D.C., to become Chief Historian for the Park Service. He held this position until 1971, at which time he became Director, Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation. This was followed in 1973 by appointment as Assistant Director for Park Historic Preservation. In 1977, Mr. Utley left the National Park Service to become Deputy Executive Director of the President's Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, a position he held until his retirement in 1980. He now resides in Santa Fe, New Mexico, and is married to Dr. Melody Webb, who, in her present position as Regional Historian for the National Park Service in Santa Fe, holds the same position once occupied by Mr. Utley.

Mr. Utley's interest in American frontier and military history has led to his writing many books, articles and pamphlets on these topics. Quite a number of his publications relate directly to the history of individual national park units, and are of value to those seeking a better understanding of the history associated with these parks.

However, of particular interest to those involved in historic preservation is Mr. Utley's career with the National Park Service. As a historian with the Park Service, he participated on the field, regional and national levels. His tenure in Washington as Chief Historian and later as Assistant Director came at an important time for the Park Service and for the historic preservation movement. The Park Service experienced tremendous expansion in the 1960s and 70s, including the addition of many historical units to the system. Also, under Director George Hartzog, the Park Service's policies for the management of historic and prehistoric properties evolved to a more well-defined and articulated state than ever before. Mr. Utley's role in this expansion and the evolution of policy was substantial. It is believed that his observations and his recollections of these important times will be of considerable value to those who inquire into the National Park Service's history. It is for this reason that the following interview with Mr. Utley was undertaken.
This is September 24, 1985, I am Richard Sellars, Chief of the National Park Service's Southwest Cultural Resources Center in Santa Fe. I am joined by Melody Webb, Regional Historian in Santa Fe, and we are interviewing Robert M. Utley about cultural resources management, or as we will refer to it at times, historic preservation, in the National Park Service, and on various related matters. Bob is formerly Assistant Director for Park Historic Preservation with the National Park Service. Before that he was Director of the Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation. Before that he was Chief Historian of the National Park Service, and before that he was Regional Historian here in Santa Fe. I should add that Bob and Melody are husband and wife and we are at their home in El Dorado, a community southeast of Santa Fe, New Mexico. And it is a splendid sunny day!

Now, in the belief that an agency that manages and interprets so much important cultural material from our past does itself become historic, it is important to record Bob's observations and views on aspects of cultural resource management in the National Park Service, given his extensive and varied involvement in cultural resources management over the past decades.

The interview will take at times the form of an open discussion as we explore certain issues. But the primary focus will be to seek Bob's observations and his recollections of various items. The questions will be posed by me and by Melody. Some of the questions were submitted however, by the following individuals: Ed Bearss, Barry Mackintosh, Gordon Chappell, Jane Scott, Tom Lucke, and Dwight Pitcaithley.

I would also like to reference an interview with Bob Utley by Herb Evison on May 17, 1973. The transcript and original tape of this interview are in the Archives at the Harpers Ferry Center.

Okay Bob, to begin with, would you discuss in general how the management policies for historic preservation have evolved and your role in this during your tenure in Washington.

Bob: I am afraid I have to confess at this point that, although I subsequently came to be a very outspoken advocate of the management policies, and still am for that matter, my role initially was a negative one.

The first of what we might call management policies were formulated at the very first meeting, in 1936, of the newly created Secretary's Advisory Board on National Parks, Historic Sites, Buildings, and Monuments. Who stood behind that formulation--really principles more than policies--I don't know; that was much before my time. I suppose it was Vern Chattelain who had been, or maybe then was, Chief Historian. He may have had something to do with it, but my instinct is that they flowed from within the board itself. Clark Wissler, the anthropologist, was a member of the board, and there was a historian whose name I've forgotten, but the Advisory Board's statement of principles governing the historic properties that the Park Service was expected to get under the newly enacted Historic Sites Act served as guidance for Park Service professionals for the next 30 years. I am not aware that they ever underwent any revision. I am unaware that there was ever any dissatisfaction with them or any proposal that they be changed. In fact, they became virtually a cliche with the Park Service professionals.

But a few years after George Hartzog became Director of the Park Service, about 1967 or 1968, he decided that the Service needed a set of management policies, and he put the various professional staffs of the Service to work drafting management policies for the care and administration of the three kinds of parks that made up the park system as we viewed it then: natural, recreational, and (as we called it then) historical.
For a couple of years we went through a rigorous exercise of attempting to get policies that suited Hartzog. The Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation had just been formed. Ernest Connally was in charge of that, and he considered that he had a mandate from Hartzog to specify how the historic properties were going to be run. And so we had some immediate collisions with Hartzog because he didn't like the way we were stating things. It was kind of a contest between Hartzog and Connally and his staff for the better part of a year. It got pretty rough before Hartzog simply decreed how it was going to be.

Those first policies contained a great deal that we in the professional arm disagreed with and took very violent exception to. I don't remember specifically what the issues were, and in retrospect they probably weren't that important, but finally those three policy booklets came out. They were blue and green and red. The red was for historical areas. These booklets were published and circulated very widely as a statement to the world at large of how we were going to manage these three kinds of parks.

I remember that, very early on in this controversy, we told Hartzog that we didn't need any new policy because we already had the Advisory Board's statement of 1936. He erupted very violently that no advisory board made policy. The advisory board recommended, while the agency itself made policy. And he simply dismissed all of that early effort out of hand. We attempted to fold the old Advisory Board policies into the new version in places. Where they were unduly specific in George's view, where I think he believed that they might hamper him in doing what he might want to do for political reasons, he simply fogged up the language in order to provide more flexibility than the original statement.

Of course over the years those three books have been revised many times, and under Gary Everhardt they were merged into a single policy statement and have evolved every few years ever since. You have some version today which I think you can trace as lineal descendants of those 1968 policies, which for history were themselves lineal descendants of the Advisory Board's first policy statement.

Dick: Your role in the formulation of the historic preservation policies would have been fairly considerable.

Bob: Well yes, as I mentioned, it was negative to begin with, because we tried to stonewall Hartzog. You don't succeed in that or you didn't. And then we attempted to get a version we could live with, and yes, I was probably the principal drafter of them. We attempted to get a version that most reflected that original Advisory Board statement, which then, and to this very day, remains pretty consistent with national and international thought on the matter. But it had to be wording that Hartzog would accept. Whenever we would bring a version to him, he would lean back in his chair and reach for a pencil before he ever glanced at the first word, and then he would start marking them up right as you sat there, and what came out at the end was a good deal different than what went in at the beginning.

Dick: What is your view of the three sets of the management policies—natural, historical, and recreational—as opposed to one book with several chapters in it?

Bob: Well I remain dedicated to that original concept. However much I opposed it to begin with, I believe there are many virtues for proper management in a separate set of policies for the three kinds of parks. I probably should withdraw the word "park" and say resources, because the principal argument used to demolish the triad approach was that practically all parks have all three kinds of resources. Of course, that was recognized at the time, and in fact under the 1966 act we were in the process of defining zones within each park that would be the subject of each of these three kinds of policies.

And so far as historic resources are concerned, the National Register definition would also be the definition of that portion of the park that would be administered according to the red book. I still strongly believe that every park in the system can be categorized as dominantly one of those three, and that the management system ought to reflect the dominant characteristics of each one. So in that sense I believe that the red book for all of the areas principally historical was the way to go, and for managers of natural and recreational areas the red book would apply to those defined zones within their jurisdictions that were determined to be cultural and that had been entered in the National Register.
Dick: Going back a bit, Charles Hosmer has argued that during the 1930’s the Park Service decided to adopt a philosophy of preservation different from Colonial Williamsburg. Would you agree with this?

Bob: Well I interpret the Colonial Williamsburg philosophy to mean two things: freezing history at a point in time, and a rather liberal use of reconstructions where they were needed in order to fill in the gaps for that point of time. Is that what we are talking about?

Dick: I think so.

Bob: The Colonial Williamsburg philosophy of course evolved in the 20’s and early 30’s. Definitely the Park Service philosophy as reflected in the Advisory Board statement of principles in 1936, while it did not bar reconstructions altogether, discouraged them in major ways. And also, while I don’t recall whether this is explicit in that statement of principles, it is at least implicit that it is far better to preserve architectural features in buildings reflecting the history of the building rather than arbitrarily to try to take it back to some particular point in time. Those were departures from what they were doing in Williamsburg. I think that they were departures that were warranted by what was even then becoming the best thought in this country and in foreign countries about historic preservation. And so the Park Service has always in its policies reflected these two departures from the approach of Colonial Williamsburg. But as we both know the Park Service also has violated those principles time and again.

Dick: The decision to restore Appomattox Courthouse during the early 1930’s--was this an aberration or was this approach typical of the Park Service during the early 30’s.

Bob: Well I think what is typical is that you find decisions that contradict the principles from the very beginning up to the present day. I am not sure that Appomattox is the best illustration of what you are getting at. I think enough was left of Appomattox that it was feasible to put it back together. The McLean House was not the total reconstruction that we tend to think because it had been dismantled and was simply rebuilt. In my judgment there are certain historic places that are so overwhelmingly significant in terms of their consequence for American history, and so tied to one moment in time, that their restoration is justified, and Appomattox I believe is one of them. So I have no philosophical problem at all with Appomattox. In fact I pursued the same reasoning with Fort Sumter which I felt again was a moment in time of tremendous significance. But Hank Judd persuaded me that from an engineering standpoint it was totally infeasible.

Dick: There was an effort to reconstruct or heavily restore Fort Sumter?

Bob: Restore Fort Sumter to its appearance in April of 1861. There was a good deal of steam behind it locally from some very important and very wealthy Charlestonians, and I picked up on it because I happened to agree with them and because I felt that they had the influence to put it over. Of course, it never came about, and if indeed, it would have involved simply too big an engineering feat, it probably should not be done.

Dick: Ok, back to Appomattox for a minute. What is your opinion of the General Store and other kind of features like that?

Bob: Well of course that’s a loaded living history question. I have frequently used Appomattox in teaching situations as an illustration of some of the excesses of living history. When I first went there, I believe, you walked into the store and there was a great plastic shield that protected you from the shelves and the counter behind and on which were lined up samples of the goods that would have been sold there in the middle 1860’s. Of course, I suppose in April of 1865 there probably wasn’t much of anything on those shelves. But after Hartzog launched his living history initiative, the people at the park decided to make this store a functioning country store and sell corn meal and all that sort of thing, and that was done, and it turned out to be tremendously successful. So much so that the park proposed that still another building be opened up and converted to a second country store because the first one was so successful and crowded all of the time. That wasn’t done, but in my judgment this illustrates the kind of the conflict in that kind of approach between, on the one hand, something that is so well received that hardly anyone would think to question its utility, and on the other hand what to me is the almost certain impression that most visitors would take away
from Appomattox, which is one of all of those neat things we bought in the country store rather than the significance of the meeting there between Grant and Lee.

Also they have had in the past—I don’t know whether they do now—a living history interpreter who role plays as a Confederate soldier and will not allow visitors to move him out of his role as a returning Confederate veteran. First person. He dressed up as a Confederate soldier and he never allowed himself to be jolted into the 20th century. I have always regarded that sort of thing as hokey and inappropriate, and I opposed it, but again the Park Service loved it and I guess visitors loved it. I am not sure that it really interprets anything in particular, but I am pretty sure that it detracts, simply because it is kind of a spectacle, from the message that you want to get across there about more momentous events than the experience of one soldier. I am definitely in a minority of a very few in that regard, I think.

Dick: Oh, do you think so?

Bob: Well, that was back in the 70’s. I suppose some sense of sanity is returning to the ranks, maybe induced by budgetary limitations if nothing else.

Dick: Let’s go back to your own experiences and discuss the evolution of your feelings about, and your awareness of, historic preservation—more or less how you reached the age of discretion as far as historic preservation goes. And how your feelings and philosophy about historic preservation changed and evolved from the time you arrived at Custer until the time you left the Park Service. Were you, let’s say for example, aware at all of historic preservation when you went to work at Custer? Of course, you were quite young then.

Bob: I don’t think I was aware of historic preservation even in the latter stages of my tenure as Regional Historian here in Santa Fe. And I don’t think, beyond that rather short statement of principles adopted by the Advisory Board, that there were very many in the Park Service who were. I think we were much more oriented toward communicating a story to the visiting public, and much less aware than we became later of how that mission might intrude on or actually damage cultural resources. So I can definitely say I had no awareness whatever during the six summers I was at Custer Battlefield. And during the seven years, 1957 to 1964, that I was here in Santa Fe my preoccupation was with hatching new historical areas. I was doing the research necessary for Advisory Board and congressional purposes, for getting the story together that we would tell, and for the planning that would present the resources and the story to the visiting public. We weren’t very conscious in those days of how we might be interfering with the preservation of the resources. You can go no further than Fort Union to see where we put the visitor center in those days—practically right in the middle of the fort—as an indication of that. It was only after I went to Washington that I became acutely aware of this, and then it was under the influence of people much more experienced than I who at that early stage I was not impelled to question, but rather simply accept what they were saying uncritically. The first of these people were the old breed of staff historian that I inherited when Herb Kaler retired, such as Roy Appleman, whose overriding purpose in the Park Service was always the interpretation of the story to the visitor as a first priority. Charlie Porter, Rogers Young, Harold Peterson, and John Littleton were others.

But that lasted for only about a year before practically all of them retired and we had a whole new ball game with the 1966 Act, the National Historic Preservation Act. And of course, Ernest Connally brought to that job a very systematic and philosophically well-developed approach to the whole business of historic preservation. I guess I failed to mention Ronnie Lee, but he was still very much in the picture even though he was no longer in a CRM position: first as Regional Director in Philadelphia, from which he retired, and then as a special assistant to George Hartzog after George became Director. Ronnie continued to exert great influence upon the direction in which we went, so I would say the combination of Ronnie Lee representing the old line Park Service, and Ernest Connolly representing the main stream of historic preservation, together opened a whole new book in the Park Service. I happened to be there when the first page was reached, and I think I simply uncritically accepted what they were saying and became, I suppose, a not ineffective advocate of those measures and principles.
Melody: I was just going to ask Bob if there were historical architects in that period of late 50's early 60's who were directing and guiding maintenance and changes or if they were only used for the restoration process.

Bob: There were very few architects who could be considered CRM or historical architects, and they were largely associated with HABS. Or put another way, the people who tended to specialize in historic architecture handled HABS and that took a good deal of their time. During the late 50's and early 60's I worked closely with Charlie Pope, who was in the old Western Office of Design and Construction in San Francisco. He knew his business very well. He was the one who conceived the basic architectural approach to Fort Davis, which stood in contrast to Fort Union, which was simply a ruins stabilization project entrusted to the archeologists. Charlie said let's take these walls back up to the roof line put a bond beam on them, and hang roofs on them. That had two advantages--first, ruins shelters, and second, restoration of what was the dominant architectural feature of Fort Davis, those deep porch shadows. For this Region especially, that represented a tremendous departure from the way things had been done, simply because now an architect who was in the history business for the first time was in on it rather than the archeologist. Charlie Pope brought into the Park Service Louis Koie, and he worked on Fort Davis also. He too was an architect who had specialized in historic preservation. But you see these people were not a discrete organization. They were part of WODC and they functioned in other than historic preservation capacities.

Melody: Who did the actual preservation, the directing of the preservation while they were at Fort Davis? Once it was restored, how was it to be repointed, how was it to be maintained on a daily basis? Was that left to park operations staff?

Bob: Yes, it was a much later development that awareness of that kind of need came about. So far as Fort Davis goes, I think in the early years it kind of reverted to the archeologists to handle as a ruins stabilization sort of thing. Later Dick will remember when we tried to develop preservation guides that would specify what maintenance measures were to be taken. That was when we sent Dave Clary out to make Fort Davis a pilot of this sort of thing. But that came much later, and I would say at the time that your question pertains to it wasn't very well organized. To go back to your original question, in the East Hank Judd was already on the scene, but again it was simply part of the EODC organization, and while he handled the historic stuff he was not part of an organization devoted to that, and I would suppose he had to trim his sails to suit a management that had no sensitivity to historical needs or any particular interest in them because those two design and construction offices were predominantly new construction outfits.

Dick: So your involvement in building treatment and recommendations for that in Santa Fe would have been minimal.

Bob: Practically non-existent because Fort Davis is the only project I was associated with that could be considered architectural. The archeologists had their preserve staked out on all of the rest of them. Pecos was in the study works at that time and the archeologists had that sewed up. Fort Bowie was in the works at that time; that was a ruins stabilization project. Fort Union was already in the system; that was ruins stabilization. These were the years when Charlie Steen, who was the Regional Archeologist, was pioneering in chemical and engineering measures for treating adobe ruins, which I'm sure you'll recall didn't always turn out to be in the best interest of the resource. At Fort Union in particular the oil company chemist that he lined up sold the Park Service on a bill of goods that actually hastened the disintegration of the walls, which is no particular criticism of Charlie. He was trying to pioneer in a field that was practically nonexistent as recently as the 1950's.

Dick: That's quite a surprising statement to me--the minimal involvement that you had in that kind of thing in the 1950's and early 60's. It's changed a lot since then as far as Regional involvement goes.

Bob: Well that probably needs to be explained a little further in the sense that Santa Fe, Region III, was the only one that for many years, since before the war, did not have a Regional Historian. Erik Reed, Regional Archeologist and then Chief of Interpretation, was not a bad historian himself, and simply reflecting the corner that archeology had on this Region, they never hired a Regional Historian. John Littleton came out on the Arkansas-White-Red River Survey in the middle 50's and sort of functioned as a Regional
Historian when one was needed. I came out in 1957 solely on the historic site survey payroll assigned the mission of carrying out the National Survey of Historic Sites and Buildings.
Dick: This is Reel 2 of the interview with Bob Utley, September 24, 1985.

Bob: We were discussing the fact that I had come to Santa Fe with the Historic Site Survey, which had been reactivated as part of Mission 66, and it was funded for the specific purpose of conducting a historic site survey, and it was not until five years later, in 1962, that we managed to get the position set up of Regional Historian. At that time I became Regional Historian and Bill Brown came in to take over the Historic Sites Survey.

I had performed a number of proposed park studies such as Fort Bowie and Fort Davis, Golden Spike, and Hubbell Trading Post while I worked with the Historic Sites Survey. We simply justified those as Historic Site Survey studies. But after 1962 I was permitted really to get into the business of park planning. But again you have to try to recapture the management climate of those days. It was totally different from your own situation now, when you have something to say, however inadequate you may consider it, about how a park is managed and cared for. It would have been unthinkable for a Regional Historian or a Regional Archeologist to have been too aggressive in trying to tell a park superintendent how to run his park, even when they were doing so graciously. So my park-related functions had to do principally with planning and studying proposed parks and with assisting superintendents of historical areas in any matters in which they might request assistance. To conduct a systematic monitoring of how they were doing their job was simply unthought of.

Dick: For one thing, you did not have legislation such as Section 106 to back you up on that.

Bob: That's true. It's another whole subject how much that really interferes today with the same old management system of the National Park Service.

Dick: What do you consider your greatest contributions to historic preservation in and outside the Service?

Bob: I take considerable pride in major contributions to the ultimate establishment of several park areas in this region before I went to Washington, and even after I went to Washington: to Fort Bowie, to Hubbell Trading Post, to Golden Spike, to Fort Davis. I think I performed a rather important function in delineating the remains of the Santa Fe Trail in the vicinity of Fort Union. After I went to Washington I was simply a bureaucrat, and I believe in the 1970's I became a pretty good bureaucrat, although there are those who might disagree. I believe that I probably did raise the level of consciousness of the Park Service to the importance of professional care and management of historic resources, but beyond that I am not sure I did any more than simply dance a pretty good tune during an extremely vital and active period in the history of the National Park Service. I suppose someone else might have let things slip in the way that damage would have been done. I may have prevented damage, but I am not sure that beyond raising that level of consciousness I did all that much.

Melody: What about the task force that you headed on writing the criteria for the National Register. Those criteria are still intact today.

Bob: That's true. Of course, what we did was simply lift those criteria out of the ones that we were already using for the Historic Sites Survey and substitute words that brought the criteria from national significance down to local significance, and that wasn't terribly creative. I don't mean to denigrate my own role, but even that wasn't terribly creative because we already had a set of criteria that we applied right out of my office in the surplus property program. That program did not require national significance. We had not really refined the concept of local significance. Up to that time we had national significance, on the one hand, and less than national significance on the other. This avoided the pitfalls of trying to differentiate between state and local and regional significance. We still had a set of criteria that had worked quite well. And I guess I would take more satisfaction in having defended what I still regard as basically sound criteria over a period of a decade and a half against rather determined assaults to make them more specific than I would over creating those criteria in the first place. George Hartzog, in his quest for simplicity, wanted a handy-dandy set of concrete criteria that he could hand out to all members of Congress, and they could all look at it and
say, yes this meets the criteria, or no, this doesn't meet the criteria, and we wouldn't have any more disputes over it. Professional judgments fluctuate greatly, and it was his quest for the concrete, for political and bureaucratic reasons, in the Congress and then in the Bureau of the Budget later OMB, that led to one assault after another on the criteria. And that goes on I think to this day.

Dick: Bob, let me make one observation and ask you to comment on it. For a good bit of the time that you were in Washington, Ernest Connally was your supervisor, the man to whom you reported. And yet I think today, and since you left the Park Service, and during your last years in the Service, your name as far as I can tell was far more remembered or well known to the rank and file in the NPS as a person associated with historic preservation than was Connally's. And it is today as far as I can tell. Can you tell me why you think that might be?

Bob: Well, I think in large part it is because Ernest could never pretend to have ever had any green blood in him, and I probably could. The fact of the matter is that my field experience was fairly limited. I was a seasonal historical aide for six years at Custer Battlefield. That was the only park I served in. I was Regional Historian in Santa Fe and then I went to Washington, but that background was enough to make me one of them in ways that he never could be. It is unfortunate that the institutional memory of the Park Service does not credit him with the genuinely major role that he played in laying the foundations for the cultural resource management program and practices and philosophies of the National Park Service today, because he did in fact play a tremendously significant role.

But Ernest was a scholar's scholar. Ernest was a gentlemen and a sophisticate in ways that people who wore Stetson hats never were. And so he never was taken unto them and embraced as one of the gang. Because of background, because simply of the whole style and image that he projected. I think he thought that he was one of the gang when they were kind and friendly to him. He tended to exaggerate that until at last in his eyes, they had made him part of the Park Service. They never did. But at the same time, any history has to credit him with the enormously significant role that he played from about 1966 to the early 70's. After that his influence slipped like mine did, and the significance becomes less.

My role was to support Ernest Connally. It is true that many throughout the Park Service thought, or wanted to think, that I was the one who was calling the shots and he was taking the credit. That simply is not true. I was always a loyal Number two person. We worked together exceedingly well. I had strengths that compensated for his weaknesses--largely in terms in my acceptance by the rank and file in ways that he was not. And he had strengths that compensated for my weaknesses--primarily in the professional aspects of the business and in an acceptance by that big professional world outside the Park Service that never trusted the gray and the green, as they in turn never trusted that outside world. So it was a real good team. It was an effective team, and it's a shame that it was not allowed to flower to the full extent that was originally projected.

Melody: Could I follow up on that just a little bit. Just one of the things that the field remembers about you was that you visited the parks. How often did Dr. Connally visit park areas?

Bob: Well, not very often. He visited the Regions frequently, but mostly in connection with Regional Directors' meetings and that sort of thing. He and I made one big sweeping tour of parks. And he visited parks where there were crises or political problems. But he had no systematic program for doing so. And I think in some part, maybe in large part, that may have been the result of an implicit understanding between the two of us of role separation. I would sort of look to that aspect of it because even though I don't think he would admit it openly, he sensed that I had better rapport with the park professionals than he did, and he left that part of it to me while he took over the function of relating to the big scholarly professional world outside. I think he probably would have been much more effective had he visited parks. Again on that subject, as we began to work effectively together in the later years, he tended to take principal responsibility for external affairs--the new National Register, grants-in-aid, and so forth, and he tended to look to me to handle the internal affairs, which is another dimension of the question you were asking.

Dick: I think so. I think he became identified with external affairs.
Bob: Well then of course that subsequently took on an organizational definition, when we broke it down into separate organizations dealing with internal and external. He headed both, but he concerned himself mainly with the external and left me virtually unsupervised to do the internal, and I came to him only when I needed his higher-level assistance.

Dick: Looking back on your career with the Park Service, what do you consider your greatest mistakes or failures?

Bob: Anyone who has functioned on the level that I functioned will inevitably look back upon mistakes in personnel selection. And of course there is a good deal of interest all through the submissions from your various participants in this interview, why I selected this person or that. You always have to look back to the environment, or the climate, in which selections were made, but I would say that I selected and advanced the careers of people who have not lived up to what I might have expected of them at that time.

I suppose I consider my biggest failure to have been my inability to bring about an organizational alignment of the Park Service which I felt took care of the concerns of the CRM professionals over insensitivity to and mismanagement of the historic resources of the National Park System. I remain convinced that much of the institutional bias against our business, and much of the resulting mismanagement of historic resources, is in fact correctable by the proper kind of an organizational alignment. Ernest and I both labored for that for many years, but there was never any point at which we even began to approach it. The whole system vibrated with apprehension that the historians were about to take over, or were about to win more power, within the organization, and that should not be allowed. And so our efforts fell by the wayside. I think my organizational failures were the greatest.

Dick: Perhaps they were the greatest, but perhaps they were one of the greatest battles too.

Bob: Yes, it was, and it was a continuing battle. Of course, that battle was related to the battle over securing the proper application of the management policies--those policies that we first resisted and later came to embrace as a tool by which we hoped to achieve what we were also seeking through organizational measures. The two were intimately connected. And the reason to this day that the policies remain so good but so ineffective is that the organization is inadequate to ensure their application in the field.

Dick: I would like to come back to the organization later on in the interview. Bob, aside from yourself, what Service employee or employees do you regard as having made the greatest contributions to history and historic preservation inside the Service?

Bob: Well, it's awfully hard to be sure you don't leave anyone out because there were many. I guess I've already paid high tribute to Ernest Connally. Simply because of my personal association with him, I probably would put him at the head of my list. But probably a more accurate overview of the whole history of the Service would have to put Ronnie Lee at the very top. Ronnie Lee was, as it were, in on several creations. Ronnie Lee was there when the Historic Sites Act was born--or very shortly afterward. He was crucial in formulating the practices that translated the Advisory Board's principles into a management system. He played a key role in our end of the Park Service all the way up to his death.

My own associations of course, include some of the people that came in with Connally. I have to include Bill Murlaugh as one of the real architects of the National Register, in its philosophy and in its practices. I have to include Bob Garvey in that also, because the Advisory Council was then part of the Park Service.

But I don't think these are the type of people you're getting at. You're getting at the old line and the new line people who were concerned with the management of the parks and the care of historic resources within the parks, and you would simply have to include all of the principal staff historians on the Washington level because they were instrumental for so long.

Roy Appleman particularly was a tremendous influence on my thinking and upon the fortunes of my career in the early years. And I still have the highest regard for Roy Appleman because I think there was no historian of that period in the Park Service who was more professional, more careful, more insisten upon
the right kind of research, and more determined that the historic features of the parks be properly cared for and interpreted.

I give Ed Bearss large credit for being probably the most effective researcher that the Park Service has ever had in terms of his contributions to overall history, in terms of his contributions to a large number of parks.

The other staff historians, as I have already mentioned, were Rogers Young, Charlie Porter, and Harold Peterson. I worked with some top-quality regional historians. John Hussey was the scholar's scholar in San Francisco and held that job for years and years and years. Merrill Mattes did the same thing working out of Omaha. Murray Nelligan and Frank Barnes were in Philadelphia. Every Region had its regional historian who, in the sense that I mentioned a few moments ago, stood ready to help the superintendents in any way that they wanted help. Not to tell them how to do their job.

Different generations. You had some superintendents back in the early days who were influential in historic preservation. Fran Ronalds was for many years the superintendent of Morristown, but his influence was not confined to Morristown because he tended to be brought in on all of the larger conferences dealing with issues central to historic preservation. There were others of the same sort who escape me at the moment.

Dick: Although you played a different role in historic preservation than most of the people you are talking about, George Hartzog was director when a great many cultural parks were brought into the Service. Would you include him in this? Was he actively seeking these?

Bob: George was an empire builder and George would go after anything that was politically getable and that his professionals could back him on, and sometimes he had to take some things that his professionals would not back him on. Yes, I don't think that I would put George in this list that we have been working over. I would put George in a much more celestial pantheon up there, one that embraces the whole National Park Service. What he did for our business I think simply was a fallout from what he did for the Park Service. I think at one point George sensed—even explicitly recognized—that his greatest opportunity to make a distinctive name for himself as Director of the Park Service lay in the field of cultural resources. All of the big natural parks had pretty much been brought into the System by early in his career. He got Redwoods. But historical areas were always much more politically feasible. For him and for both the budget process and the Congress. The political price was not nearly so great. And I suppose it is one of the misfortunes, if not tragedies of George's directorship that something within him prevented him from doing the things that he would have to do in order to realize that objective.

Dick: Such as?

Bob: He was primarily—I would say more than any other single person—he was responsible for the 1966 Act, for getting it enacted. For pulling the political strings that finally got that hatched. He allowed himself to be sold by the Lee-Brew-Connally committee, which he had put together before that law was passed, but when it looked like it was going to be passed. He had allowed himself to be sold by them on the organization necessary really to make the Park Service a leader in the field of historic preservation. Which meant an organization that gave professional people in the field an identity, a public visibility, and an internal power, or authority and power if you will, wholly at variance with what the Service had permitted up to that time. He allowed himself to be persuaded to this over his own bureaucratic instincts and over the very vigorous objections of some of his top staff, principally Howard Baker, as I recall. And so the Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation was set up under Connally reporting to George Hartzog. That was a condition on which Connally took the job: that this would become the American equivalent of the French Monuments Service or the other monument services that were so prominent and powerful in European countries. It included all three disciplines that we then considered making up CRM. The curators were not in on it at that time, but history, archeology, and historic architecture would be brought together and concentrated in OAHP. It would be responsible for all the external historic preservation programs of the Park Service and all historic preservation projects within the National Park System from their beginning in the research stage clear up through the final construction-supervision stage. That was the original concept—that every restoration
project would start with research in OAHP with all disciplines and would end with the final product supervised by professionals from OAHP by all three disciplines.

This is what we were building for the first two or three years. But then I can only give you my suspicions of what happened. I think George saw a threat in Connally's rising visibility and rising prominence, rising power over budgetary and program matters within the National Park Service. So George made organizational changes that totally wrecked that concept. This is when the professionals concerned with research and with construction supervision were moved out of OAHP and brigaded with all of the modern construction types in the construction offices. That doomed OAHP, the original concept of OAHP, and insured that it could never be the American equivalent of a European monuments service. I remember one time Ernest in his frustration said, "You know I don't aspire to having something as good as even the Mexican monument service. I would take something as good as the Bulgarian monument service if they would only give it to me."

Dick: Well I think you are right in that Hartzog should be classified in another category. And I think the question really dealt more with historians, but actually from what you say now and what you said about your work in Santa Fe and how little you were involved in CRM in Santa Fe, Hartzog really was doing something dramatically different in setting up OAHP, at least in trying it out for several years.

Bob: He was, and he was doing something dramatically different but very closely related when he insisted upon management policies to guide the management of the park resources. The two tie right together. It is just that organizationally he could not bring himself to do what had to be done if he was going to look good in this field.

Melody: Could I just go right back to this question of Dr. Sellars' about the role of important people in historic preservation. You discussed primarily historians. Would you say only historians or were there architects, archeologists, other disciplines that also played a role?

Bob: Well, archeology was very powerful of course. It was discrete, and as we know, archeology anyway has a tendency to go off on its own and do very little with reference to the rest of the world. That was even more so then than now because organization permitted it to happen. When I came into the Park Service the three disciplines were together under an organization labelled Interpretation. So in Santa Fe there was a Chief of the Division of Interpretation, Erik Reed, and reporting to him were the Regional Historian and the Regional Archeologist, the Regional Publications Officer, the Regional Naturalist and the Regional Curator. Each of us pretty much did our own thing. On the Washington level, John Corbett was Chief Archeologist, and he tended to do his own thing. The field archeologists were not under his supervision, but they had very strong professional relationships to Corbett, so that as a whole the archeologists tended to function pretty much as a separate entity even though it was integrated into management levels all the way down to the parks.

As I mentioned earlier, there was really no such thing as historical architects in an organizational sense. Museum curators were off somewhere on their own too. This was before Harpers Ferry. We had a Regional Museum Curator, Frank Smith, and he went around and saw to the collection needs of the Region. But it was not until after the 66 Act that these disciplines got pulled together organizationally in such a way that they would function or expect to function as a multi-disciplinary group of professionals.
This is Reel 3 of the interview with Bob Utley, September 24, 1985.

Bob: We were trying to pinpoint some of the people I regarded as greats in influencing the early evolution of Park Service practices in CRM.

I believe I was speaking about the stresses between the three disciplines that afflicted the early years of OAHP and constituted almost growing pains. In particular, the archeologists had a hard time adapting to the new way things were done organizationally. Archeologists had a hard time working under Ernest Connally and mounted several rather powerful efforts to break free and have their own office of archeology apart from OAHP.

During the 1970's, I gravitated into a position of more influence. The people that were on my staff I regarded as very influential in unfolding the organizational and policy proposals and the practices that we wanted to get instituted by the National Park Service. Any list of important people has got to be headed by Hank Judd, who was Chief Historical Architect under me when I was Assistant Director. I have never known a person who understood the inner workings of a building better than Hank Judd. To visit a historic building with him and simply go around and listen to him and watch him point out the various components of a building and how you could read them and what this meant in terms of how the building had to be treated was always a very revealing experience. Hank didn't shine at articulating on paper, but Hank could articulate in words that I could put on paper what ought to be done. Those years with Hank I think were a tremendous benefit to me as well as to the National Park Service and I hated to see him retire.

Doug Scovill came in pretty late, but he turned out really to be the one who led the archeologists into a sincere and I think fruitful association with the other two disciplines organizationally in the Park Service. I don't think there is much disposition now to try to fragment the three disciplines organizationally. I think there is a recognition by the archeologists that their best interests lie with the other two disciplines and I believe that Scovill was largely responsible for bringing about that conclusion. Besides which he was a first-class--still is a first-class--programmer and budget expert in putting together the documents that get the money.

Dick: Bob, why have historians traditionally held the top CRM positions in Washington?

Bob: I think that they have simply gravitated there by default on the part of the other two disciplines. I cannot explain why, but I think it is a fact that historians tend to have more of a breadth of interest, a sharper development or potential for the bureaucratic and administrative skills necessary to run such an organization, a greater commitment to a multi-disciplinary approach than the other two disciplines do. My observation and experience is that, however professionally well developed and valuable architects and archeologists are, very few of them have had the potential to run a bureaucratic organization, and have not really wanted to either. About the only exception is Ernest Connally, a professor of the history of architecture, an architect, an art historian, and his managerial skills were pretty good. But that is the only one I can think of, and I don't think so long as archeologists are interested almost exclusively in archeology, and architects almost exclusively in architecture, that you are going to find very many in those ranks rising to the top.

Dick: Ok. Your article, "A Preservation Ideal," which appeared in Historic Preservation for April and June 1976: Do you consider this your major written statement on historic preservation?

Bob: Yes, I do, simply because I have not written much on the subject. My writing interests have always been elsewhere, and I did that initially as an oral presentation at a convention simply because I had been asked to speak on the subject, and it came out to be a very good statement of the things that we were trying to achieve at that very time. And I still adhere to everything I said there. I should not take exclusive credit for that myself. As I recall, the first draft of that was a collaborative effort between Barry Macintosh and Marcella Sherfy, and I simply refined it into a statement of my own philosophy. But the groundwork was laid by them.
Dick: Do you have a bibliography of your published writings on historic preservation?

Bob: Well that is about the only one. What else have I done? I did something on....

Dick: You've done a few things in the Courier haven't you?

Bob: Those were part of the initiative that we undertook when Ron Walker became Director to try to raise the level of consciousness of the whole Service on cultural resources management. I did something on living history for the interpreters' newsletter. I did the article you mentioned and earlier I did an article on archaeology in the National Register, which was a propaganda piece trying to get the archaeologists into the fold on the National Register program. But I don't remember much of anything else I wrote.

Melody: The article you wrote with Barry in....

Bob: In Monumentum, Barry Mackintosh actually drafted that and I worked it over. I just simply haven't much because my interests have been elsewhere.

Dick: The quality of cultural resource management people in the National Park Service seems to fluctuate over the years. Sometimes there is a excellent cadre of folks. At other times the stature of the CRM staff is less than prominent. Several questions on this. Have you seen this fluctuation over the years? And if so, how do you explain it and what would you recommend to get quality folks to join the CRM ranks of the National Park Service?

Bob: I have to take issue with the basic premise. I have not seen the fluctuation in the terms that you raise the question. What I have seen are possibly three generations of CRM professionals, each generation composed of people who were products of the academic and bureaucratic climate of their times. The people we had in the 1930's were products of their times. They did a very fine job within the framework of what they were given to work with at that time. The same is true for the 60's, the same is true for the 70's and 80's. I don't think that we necessarily have better people than we did then or vice versa. We just have different generations of people reacting to different stimuli.

As for how to get better quality folks, I think what you have to do there--and I don't think it can be done--is to do what Hartzog said he was going to do in 1966 but couldn't bring himself to do. I think you have to have a sharper organizational identity, prominence, and influence within the overall organization before you are going to attract any higher quality people than you've got now. And you've got high quality people now, but you've got some real turkeys too. Every organization has a mix of both, of course, but you would be in a position to attract more highly qualified people if you could take care of these organizational requirements, which in my view the Park Service could never permit to be done.

Dick: This organizational influence that you are talking about, I think at all levels but certainly in Washington, would that not depend to a considerable degree on the personality and the ability of the individual or individuals to articulate and promote CRM policies?

Bob: Well, when you talk about highly qualified people I take that to embrace bureaucratic and political skills, or potential for them, as well as professional equipment. You have many people in the Park Service now who professionally are highly qualified but who are not effective people because they lack these other skills. In fact, one of the big problems the Park Service had in the beginning was finding within its professional ranks people who were both professionally well qualified and had bureaucratic potential. I think this is one place where I did pretty well. There are not very many people who can do both, who have the stature outside the bureaucracy in the academic world but who can also manipulate political and bureaucratic elements to make things happen. I guess this goes back to an earlier question. Historians are more likely to have that combination than the other two disciplines.

Dick: A number of people criticize the National Park System for being too heavily oriented toward Civil War and Western military history. Military things in general. Do you agree with these critics?
Bob: I agree with the observation, but I don't agree with the criticism. The National Park System is heavily, perhaps even predominantly, military and political and I think this is because those particular things in our history are more apt to have produced what I call a preservable entity that illustrates and conveys a significance of the thing commemorated. For many years, and I suppose still, it was an announced objective of the National Park Service to round out the System by the inclusion of areas that would illustrate all of our formal themes and subthemes that go to make up a balanced view of American History. I did then and I still do regard that as an impossible ideal and probably a mistaken ideal. I don't believe it should be a purpose of the National Park System to represent every theme of American history simply for the reason that many themes do not lend themselves to illustration by historic sites. And moreover, the visiting public is not so interested in visiting sites that illustrate some of the more esoteric themes even when you can find them. So while I am not against trying to find good illustrative sites to commemorate the various themes of American history, it doesn't bother me in the slightest that we have so many battlefields and so many forts and that sort of thing. These have been more likely to survive. These are more susceptible to preservation and interpretation of nationally significant themes of American history.

Dick: Could you elaborate on why they are more susceptible to preservation and interpretation?

Bob: I think simply the nature of the fabric or landscape setting within which they occurred. I suppose I could answer the question better by trying between us to find the illustrative sites for literary or scientific themes. Take the theme that we were so concerned with back in the 1960's of the development of nuclear power. Certainly there is scarcely a theme you can identify that is more consequential in terms of the unfolding of American and global history than that. The then chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Glen Seaborg, put tremendous pressure on the Park Service to get into this whole field of identifying nuclear sites before we otherwise would have done so. But you go around and identify the critical places where things happened in the development of nuclear energy. We made a landmark out of that stadium of the University of Chicago where they did something... pull some piles or something... There are individual laboratories. But you go to any one of these now, or you think in terms of trying to make any one of them a conventional type national historic site that interprets to the visiting public what happened there and why it was significant, and I wager that you will have a very hard time trying to come up with anything beyond the Trinity Site, here in New Mexico, that could be effectively treated with your usual park development techniques.

Dick: That is a rather esoteric theme in a way.

Bob: Ok, let's take American literature. That's not an esoteric theme. Here what you are dealing with primarily are the homes of literary figures, and a few have direct and long-standing associations with their homes. You can go to Longfellow House and I suppose get a feel for Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. You can go to Sinclair Lewis's home up in Minnesota and get a feel for Main street and Babbit and so forth. How much of the visiting public does, show effective are we at Longfellow House, or is the state or whoever at Sinclair Lewis's House, how effective are we at Eugene O'Neal in presenting something that the typical visiting public conceives of as significant and interesting in the same way that they do Fort Davis or Gettysburg Battlefield or any of the more conventional sites?

I recall the bureaucratic exercise we went through back in the early 70's under the chairmanship of Barry Mackintosh in which, for Hartzog's purposes with the Office of Management and Budget, we constructed some elaborate charts that purported to show an unbalanced National Park System and the themes in which we needed to acquire new parks in order to have a balanced representation of American history. As you pointed out, we were over-represented in military and political affairs.

But the illogical box we got ourselves into took a very concrete form with the proposed Abraham Lincoln Home in Springfield, Illinois. Here is the premier Abraham Lincoln site. There is none that comes anywhere close to that one in significance. That was not in the National Park System, but in state custody. Yet, when it became possible to get the Lincoln Home in Springfield, we ran into trouble because our own study showed we already had Abraham Lincoln covered at the Lincoln Birthplace, the Lincoln Boyhood Home, the Lincoln...
Memorial in Washington, DC, and the House Where Lincoln Died and Ford’s Theater. Who needs more Lincoln sites? So you can’t have the prime Lincoln site.

So this whole numbers game is misplaced effort in my judgment, and I do not think that ought to be the objective of the National Park System.

Dick: Ok. Are there any aspects of American history which you would like to see covered better in the Park System. Granted you don’t want to see it necessarily round that out. But what more should the System include?

Bob: I haven’t thought of this for a long time, but there are themes that I think do lend themselves to illustration by historic sites in which visitors would be genuinely interested. I think American industry is one. I guess it’s not American industry, but the Edison Laboratories in New Jersey are fascinating to the visitor as well as tremendously significant in the world of invention. And I can conceive of factory situations on a small scale that would be worthwhile. Maybe they’re doing this at Lowell, I’ve not been there. I think there is potential in that area and I am sure there are others that don’t occur to me at the moment.

Dick: Other themes?

Bob: Political affairs really aren’t all that well covered except in presidential homes. Party history, we don’t have the birthplace of the Republican party do we?

Dick: Or the Know Nothings.

Bob: That’s right.

Dick: Bob, do you believe that history and historic resources have been of less concern to top management than natural history and natural resources, and if so why?

Bob: Well definitely so. I think it simply is the ingrained institutional bias of the National Park Service in all of its history and traditions that makes that so. It has always been oriented that way. It has always seen itself as oriented in that direction. And it has always been run by people that come out of that tradition. And so I think that institutional bias is so deeply embedded that it can never be rooted out. I think it is something simply that has to be lived with, lamentable though that may be.

Dick: Who were the top managers most supportive of history and historic resources in the National Park Service?

Bob: Well, I think most who have been supportive were supportive simply because they were imperialists who saw the growth of the System is a good thing. The only one that strikes me offhand as not an imperialist was Newton Drury. He very definitely did not believe in building the System up. But as for being genuinely supportive on other than pragmatic grounds, very few of them. I wouldn’t name a single one, unless it was Arno Cammerer and, of course, Horace Albright, who were genuinely interested as a personal matter in acquiring historical areas and in building up the historical component of the National Park System. Hartzog did a lot. Connie Wirth did a lot. Not I think from genuine personal interest in it, but simply in the imperial sense of building the organization and thus the political strength to be gained by a new park area in some new district. They both said all the right words in expressing their commitment to it. But I don’t think that they were genuinely interested. And when you get down closer to modern times, I have to rate both Gary Everhardt and Bill Whalen very low on the list. I think they not only had no personal interest but they didn’t have any particular institutional interest either. And so I think our interest suffered badly from those two directorates. I don’t think Russ Dickinson is particularly interested, but like Hartzog and Wirth he gave lip service to it and he did well by it.

Dick: What about top managers other than the Directors? Would you name some of who have been the most supportive?
Bob: I probably know the ones who have been the least supportive.

Dick: That was coming up next.

Bob: Well, Ronnie Lee for a time was a Regional Director, but that's kind of an aberration. The most supportive would have to have been Elbert Cox, and of course he came out of the history ranks. Oddly enough, my observation is that most who came out of lower ranks of history into top management turned out not to be all that supportive, maybe because they felt they had to prove something to the Service at large, or they took on another persona when they took on a new responsibility. Chet Brooks was once a historian, and I never regarded him as a particular friend of us after he became a Regional Director. Ed Hummel was a historian, and he kind of lost his commitment to history when he became superintendent at Glacier and then Regional Director in San Francisco. Dave Thompson likewise. So origins in our professions didn't necessarily produce sympathetic top managers. I go back to Elbert Cox. Joe Rumburg was very supportive, surprisingly so. You worked with Joe Rumburg; would you agree with that?

Dick: Yes.

Bob: As Regional Director in Santa Fe. My first Regional Director, Hugh Miller, was. None other comes to mind at the moment. As I say, there are plenty that I would put on the opposite side. Len Volz: I don't think he was ever very supportive. He ran things in Richmond for a time and then went off to Omaha. Frank Kowski was greatly beloved throughout the Park Service and contributed enormously, but Frank was no friend of historic preservation. I still remember the shock that went through our whole organization when Frank asked on paper what difference it made what shade of color we used to paint Independence Hall. You worked for Frank too, didn't you?

Dick: Yes I did. Bob, would you discuss the degree of cynicism with which agency leaders may have approached historic preservation.

Bob: I think all of those I have named as not personally supportive, but who were institutionally supportive, have to be accused of a degree of cynicism. I think that would be inherent in postulating that they were the one and not the other. The degree to which they were personally aware of their cynicism is another thing again. I don't think any of us, no matter how pure we consider ourselves, can occupy positions of bureaucratic authority on a high level without doing things that would open us to a charge of cynicism. Certainly I would have to confess to approaching many assignments cynically or else I wouldn't be able to live with myself. It simply is part of the job of running an organization that is larger than a two-person branch.

Dick: In a way history got to the top under you and under Ernest Allen Connally. Do you think there were any costs in this?

Bob: Got to the top?

Dick: Got to the top. And if so,

Bob: You mean penalties to professionalism or to integrity? Well I have always been able to rationalize everything I have done. I know I have done a lot of things that my colleagues throughout the Service might regard as a prostitution of professional principles. I can only invite them to occupy the chair I did. I have always given George Hartzog great praise and credit as an intensely political administrator who did not ask his professional people to provide him with answers or justifications that ran counter to their professional principles. Wherever an unprofessional decision was necessitated on political grounds, he made it, and didn't throw the blame or the requirement on his top professionals. And a good bit of what I did through the years after Hartzog came to trust me, which wasn't initially, was in politically sensitive issues to find that narrow ground on which he and I could walk comfortably, where I could provide the justification for what he wanted to do or found it necessary to do. Sometimes that required a great deal of intellectual gymnastics. Sometimes we had to bury the unacceptable very deep in something acceptable. But I don't think I ever did anything that I feel today was a compromise of my principles or a prostitution of my profession.
Dick: Ok, let's look at one or two other Directors. How would you characterize Conrad Wirth, especially as regards his interest in historic preservation?

Bob: I think Connie Wirth was a good Director, for his time and place. It was a much smaller organization then, a much more personal organization, and we historians had better access to him. So I think he tended, more than later Directors, to be responsive to what the professionals were saying to him. But like Hartzog, I don't think that Connie had any personal interest in the historical component in the National Park System. I think his interest was primarily institutional and imperial, and especially during the Mission 66 period he saw it as a fine opportunity to build up the National Park System much beyond what it was when it emerged from WW II. Personally, I dealt more closely personally with Connie Wirth in later years, after he retired, when he didn't really let go of the Park Service and was always in there with one project or another. And I dealt with him as an official of National Geographic on Alaska concerns, and in fact he and I toured Alaska together putting together that joint Park Service-National Geographic Early Man Study up there. So I have an affection and a respect for Connie, but it's not nearly so great as for George Hartzog.

Dick: How would you characterize Ron Walker?

Bob: Well, of course, he was almost an aberration, totally without experience in our business or much of any other business, and totally a political creature of Richard Nixon. But because of that he came unburdened by any traditions or preconceptions or commitments of how things ought to be done. He really didn't have the intellectual equipment to have any original or creative idea of his own. But after he himself got over an initial suspicion of the career service, which he saw as hostile to his President, he proved very receptive to what the top staff was telling him, and in historic preservation he simply turned me loose. After we compiled the list of horrors that had been perpetrated by the Park Service in historic preservation, he turned me loose to go about an attempt to bring about a higher level of sensitivity and a greater commitment to proper care of historic resources. The difficulty came because he turned other people loose with agendas that conflicted with my own and then proved incapable of mediating between the two and making decisions himself. But during a year or so, in which we pretty much wrote our own program, I think that we accomplished a great deal in sensitizing the Park Service to this particular concern, and so I look back on Walker with mixed feelings, both positive and negative.

Dick: Bob do you have any other comments about any other Directors? You commented briefly on Everhardt and Whalen. Do you have any more observations on them as far as historic preservation goes?

Bob: No. Whalen I did not serve under. Gary Everhardt was my last Director, and it was because of fundamental disagreements with him that I left the Park Service. I rather strongly believe that if you can't loyally serve and carry out a chief's policies, it's time to get out, and so I left. I guess that in itself indicates what I feel about Gary's sensitivity to historic resources. I would hasten to add that I liked him personally very much, and he brought many good qualities to the Directorship. It is simply that in historic preservation he was a total bust.

Dick: You seemed to indicate pretty much that the Directors by and large have been interested in historic preservation with imperial motives rather than the day-to-day management and protection and care of the resources. Which of the Directors were most interested in day-to-day management and interested in assuring proper care of the resources?

Bob: I don't think any of them were. As I mentioned earlier, the ones who would come closest were Horace Albright and Arno Cammerer, and that goes a long way back. I don't think any of them since then have been. I think that Newton Drury, if he could have had his way, would have purged the Park System of all historical areas. I don't think he believed that the Park System ought to include historical areas. I don't think any others have been prepared to go that far.

Dick: Some countries have a dual Park System, one for natural resources and one for historic areas. To what extent has this dual system been proposed to the United States and what do you feel are the pros and cons of a dual system? One for natural and one for historic.
Bob: Well, of course, a dual system would permit the two kinds--let's deal with natural and historic--the two kinds of resources to be managed by policies that were formulated specifically to meet the needs and special conditions of those resources, so you cannot help but have a professionally more enlightened care of the two kinds of resources with a dual system. That's the advantage. The disadvantage is that you have a certain degree of bureaucratic overlapping because you've got two organizations in the same business, and so it's not cost-effective. And you lose something else, too. You lose the overall park conservation ethic that comes out of the traditions and the history of a National Park Service that's been in the single business for so long. The care of both requires basically the same ethic, and I think you might lose that with the dual. But, in my judgment there are more advantages than disadvantages to the dual system.

Dick: Was the dual system very seriously proposed during your time?

Bob: Well, the first serious proposal really goes clear back to the Schneider report of 1935, which faces right up to the differing nature of the two kinds of resources and says that most countries do it with two organizations. By the time Schneider wrote it, Ickes, the Secretary of the Interior, had already decided that we weren't going to do it that way. And Schneider made a big pitch for a more or less discrete organization within the National Park Service that would run the historical areas under the oversight of no one beneath the Director himself. That never got put into effect, because of the institutional bias that we've discussed off and on all afternoon.

Yes, it was subsequently proposed. Connally and I at one point both very strongly felt that was the only way to go. That was the only way that historical areas were going to be properly cared for. After Walker became Director, as I mentioned a few moments ago, he had no preconceptions, no loyalties to the best way of doing things, so he was receptive. Here is a subject that couldn't even have been whispered in the presence of any previous Director that now could be discussed openly with this Director.

Dick: What happened to it?

Bob: Well, at Walker's direction, Connally and I drew up a proposal on paper to separate the historical and archeological areas out altogether into a separate system administered by a bureau apart from the National Park Service which would also be concerned with all of the external programs. Walker approved it and it was discussed with Secretary Rogers Morton, who proved receptive. Again I suppose that Morton's interest was as much imperial as it was a commitment to the proper care of historic resources. As I recall, and I may have my memory all screwed up, it was torpedoed by Nat Reed, who was Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks and was between Morton and Walker. I suspect that he simply told Walker that you don't do this sort of thing. Anyway it died aborning; but it did get down on paper, it did get formally proposed simply because a fluke--a Director who was open to discussing different ways of doing things. Boy, if you had ever mentioned that to Hartzog, why he would have sent you out to Katmai right away.

Dick: There are advantages then to having a Director who is......

Bob: Well, there are more disadvantages.

Dick: Ok, so at one time you proposed this to Walker. In your interview with Evison this is discussed. And, that's in 1973, and as I recall you said you could go either way. And now you recognize more disadvantages than advantages.

Bob: I think I would say that. I would have to say, though, that basically I am still ambivalent about it. But I do believe there are more advantages than disadvantages. It really is basically an academic discussion; because politically and bureaucratically it is simply not in the cards under any foreseeable combinations, and it was a serious matter for a brief time only because of the fluke of Ron Walker.

Dick: Was there a title given to that proposed organization?
Bob: Yes, I don't remember what we were going to call it though. It may have been the National Historic Site Service. What do they call it in Canada?

Dick: I don't know Bob.

Bob: Well it's not important anyway, but it may have been National Historic Sites or National Monument Service, something like that. It would have reflected Connally's conception of the European monument service as the ideal, or the model against which we should be striving.

Dick: We've discussed the dichotomies between the natural and historical realms of the National Park Service. Let's focus down a little more closely on historic preservation or CRM in the National Park Service and discuss its being divided into two groups: an internal group involved in historic preservation and an external group involved in tax act, HABS, and so forth. You have seen times when both were in the National Park Service and times when both were in different agencies—the National Park Service and HCRS. Do you feel both belong in the National Park Service? The internal and external programs? Or not?

Bob: Well, again this is somewhat academic discussion because that's where they are and that's where they're going to be. Back to our previous topic. If we could have a National Monument Service, concerned with historic preservation, concerned with history, archeology and historic architecture, I believe the internal and external ought to be combined in a professional organization concerned with both. Now, since we've discounted that and said it's not in the cards, then I answer your present question. I believe there is an inherent conflict between the two that places the Director of the National Park Service in almost a no-win situation. He has to mediate in terms of scarce personnel and scarce dollars between his basic mission of running the parks and, what is not terribly central to his concerns, giving money to the states to take care of historic districts that have nothing to do with the National Park System. So, at the time the Carter Administration set up HCRS I supported that. I was a member of the task force that underlay that. Unhappily Carter's Interior Department torpedoed the recommendations of the task force, and they got badly corrupted, but the principle I think was right, that the external programs all belong in a separate organizational entity. This is true because they require different kind of persons, they have a different constituency and different kinds of programs. There just isn't much overlap between running an external program and running a park.

Dick: Bob, you say a separate organizational entity. You're talking about actually not a separate Associate Director, but a separate......

Bob: I am talking about either one, since it's not likely you're going to get a separate bureau. If all of the old external recreation programs, which were very major in the old BOR days, of recreational assistance and the recreational grant-in-aid program, if they were ever to come back, in the dimensions that they used to have and the Park Service were to run them, I think you could make a good argument for including both the recreational and cultural in an Associate Directorate having to do with external programs. So long as that's not going to happen, or so long as it doesn't happen, I think then that you ought to separate the two under a professional Associate Directorate but in separate columns under separate Assistant Directors. I guess what I am getting at is to try to keep external and internal as separate as possible at the highest possible organizational level that you can pull off politically.

Dick: But you would have both the internal and external cultural resource programs reporting to one top professional just below the Director?

Bob: As things stand now, I would do that. If all of the recreational programs came back in their old dimensions, with the money and the constituency and all that they used to have under BOR, I think you could make a good case, even though it may seem to contradict things I've said earlier, for putting all of the external affairs, both recreational and cultural, under an Associate Director for External Programs. There just isn't enough community of interest between running the parks and running grants-in-aid programs to the states.
Dick: Ok, on pages 67 & 68 of Evison's interview with you, you outlined an organizational chart that would establish, as you said, the kind of accountability that we would like now; that was in 1973. Is it possible to establish accountability within the present system—real hard-core accountability?

Bob: Not without reorganizing. If you mean by the present system, the present organization, no. If you mean a reorganization within the existing park system, yes.

Dick: The organization that you proposed to Mr. Evison was one where there was, as I recall, an Associate for natural resources, one for historic, and one for recreational, and that organization was mirrored in the regional offices. Do you still support that kind of organization?

Bob: Absolutely! I think that is the kind of organization most likely to establish the accountability that we are talking about. The practice of the Park Service of letting each individual Regional Director decide what kind of an organization he wants, I think is just off the wall, and I've never been able to see any rational justification for it.

Dick: Has that been going on for some time?

Bob: Yes, it has for some time. I think that may have originated under Hartzog. I believe when I came into the Park Service each region pretty much reflected the Washington Office. But it was not set up to manage separate kinds of resources such as we're talking about now. I would make each of the three Associate Directors responsible to the Director for the proper management of each of the kinds of resources. They would have a functional relationship with their opposite numbers in the regional offices whose jobs would really be to oversee and monitor the performance of the superintendents in applying the specialized policies to each of the kinds of resources.

Dick: The operational kinds of things such as maintenance, concessions, safety, and that kind of thing—will they fall under different Associate Regional Directors depending upon the kind of park they were in?

Bob: You've got administration that cuts across everything, concessions, this sort of thing, and I would put those that are big enough under an Assistant Director over here somewhere, maybe under someone who reports to the Deputy, but the key to this whole thing is a management Associate Director for each of the three kinds of resources. And a monitoring mechanism under each one of them that systematically looks at the performance of the superintendents in each of the parks to see whether the specialized policies for each of the three kinds of resources are truly being applied. This is the big fault of the Park Service today in my judgment. It's got perfectly good policies that reflect the best thought in historic preservation worldwide, which simply are not being applied on the park level because no Regional Director has the guts to ensure that the superintendent carries them out.

Dick: Would you guess that the same is true of natural resources?

Bob: That would be my guess, yes. As we began to get into this big sensitivity initiative back in the Walker directorship, it rapidly became apparent to us that the natural sciences had exactly the same complaints that we did and exactly the same problems in trying to get superintendents to apply the specialized policies for the management of natural resources.

Dick: Why do you think this problem exists?

Bob: It's because, as an institutional tradition, the Park Service has always looked upon their superintendents as the Navy looks on the captains of its ships—not to be interfered with in the captaincy of the ship. And we have policies. The superintendents are supposed to apply the policies. The Region has a capability of looking over their shoulders to see whether they do or not and as you know from your own experience some do and some don't. But do you have a mechanism for taking any kind of decisive action in those instances where superintendents are not? I have seen time and again where superintendents are called on their failure to apply policy by the Regional Office, and they simply respond with the assurance that, no, they really are
in conformity. That unsupported statement, when everybody knows it to be untruthful, is enough to call the Regional Director off.

Dick: Do you see any improvement in accountability, since say your last interview?

Bob: Not really. Well, I'm not in a position really to observe it that much, now. This region has never been one that's been conspicuously at fault in that regard. Other regions have, and I don't know what the record is in them now, although I can guess that it hasn't improved all that much. I do get some into it through my job as Chairman of the Board of Eastern National Park and Monument Association, and I can tell you from the projects that come before us for review that I have very grave suspicions that there has been any improvement since my time.

Dick: You must get some ideas from Melody.

Bob: About how it's run here. Yes, I have a good deal more confidence in you and my wife than I do in some of your counterparts elsewhere.

Dick: Thank you, Bob. It seems to me that you're saying that this is more or less a hopeless situation, that we're not really going to improve in this regard.

Bob: Well, I guess I am a natural pessimist. I would agree to that. I don't think you are.

Dick: Let's look at the Washington Office a little bit, and I'd like your idea on what the proper responsibilities are for the Chief Historian, Chief Anthropologist, the Chief Curator and the Chief Historical Architect in Washington.

Bob: What they should do first and foremost in my judgment is to formulate for approval of line management the policies and standards, from the professional standpoint, that are to be carried out on the park level in each of the respective disciplines concerned, and to relate to their counterparts on the regional level to insure that the application of those policies is monitored and failure to apply them is identified and corrective action taken. That is the first responsibility.

Another is to represent the respective disciplines to the outside professional world and to relate to it in ways that may be mutually beneficial; to communicate to professional counterparts in the universities and elsewhere the programs and objectives of that discipline in the National Park Service in an attempt to secure their support and assistance insofar as it may be needed. Then of course, there is a whole host of other things that fall to each of those officials simply by being in the Washington office and being a professional, and I think I would lump those under the general heading of providing any advice and assistance in those disciplines that the Director or Directorate might need, politically, bureaucratically, programmatically, and budgetarily.

Dick: This would then include the allocation of monies for projects Servicewide?

Bob: In an advisory sense. I think you have to have an ultimate line authority make the final decision and at least approve the distribution.

Dick: Over time, have you seen a bias in the Washington Office among the top professionals, the division chiefs, for the resources in the east or the resources in the West?

Bob: I think that bias toward the East existed when I came into the Park Service and had existed during the 30's the 40's and early 50's, simply because that's where most of the historical parks were. In the East. And so the preoccupation was very largely with the East. I am sure that still exists to an extent because still most of the resources are in the East and most of the serious problems are in the East. But it does not exist as a bias in the degree it did in those earlier decades.

Dick: Certainly the balance between East and West as far as resources go, I think, has been corrected some.
Bob: Some, but not altogether. The eastern regions are essentially historically oriented. Most of the parks in each of the three eastern regions, I believe, are historical.

Dick: The same would be true here in the Southwest Region.

Bob: That's true.

Dick: Do you see a need for a Chief Archivist in Washington.

Bob: No.

Dick: Why?

Bob: Because I do not believe that the Park Service ought to be in the archival business. You will recall that we wrote a policy at one time (and maybe it still is in the policy statement) that the Park Service would not be in the archival business. Personnel were to be encouraged to keep copies of original documents for study in the parks, but the documents themselves were to be in repositories designed for archives, cared for by professional archivists, and in locations accessible to researchers.

Dick: Not in parks.

Bob: Not in parks. And that means really nowhere else in the Park Service. There is nowhere in the Park Service that is equipped to take proper care of original documents. They should not be in the custody of the Park Service, with one or two exceptions such as Morristown, where the collection and the facility were given to the Park Service by someone, and there is no way to get out of the business there.

Unfortunately, the parks are so territorial that they resisted that policy, and I guess they resisted effectively. To my knowledge there are still parks that are in the archival business.

You know we had an agreement with the Archivist of the United States about Yellowstone Park, which has all of the records going back to the beginning. Under the law they are supposed to be in the National Archives. The superintendent wouldn't let go of them. In an agreement with the Archivist of the United States he promised to hire a professional archivist to care for them and to do so according to standards prescribed by the Archivist of the United States. I'll bet whoever takes care of them now is a naturalist.

Melody: Half-naturalist, half-historian.

Dick: Bob, if you were Chief Historian today, what responsibilities would you assign to the agency historian?

Bob: Well, I would expect him or her to be the keeper of the traditions and the keeper of the facts, to be the expert on all facets of the history and traditions of the bureau. But as an ongoing daily responsibility, I would expect him to devote himself primarily to obtaining the maximum number of studies relating to the bureau, and particularly to its ongoing management problems, that could be obtained for the least investment in resources, and I would look to accomplishing this both outside and inside the Park Service through the utilization of Park Service historians but of external historians too, under contract and simply as dissertation topics.

I think that critical to the survival of that position, whether it's in the Park Service or anywhere else in the Federal Government, is to make it constantly valuable to management, and this means turning out studies that are useful to management in handling its daily management problems. The moment that it becomes focused on the past, the distant past, then it becomes a luxury that can be done away with in the first budget crunch.

But you can't ignore the distant past either. There has to be a judicious mix that makes it constantly valuable to top management. I don't think that person ought to be doing many studies himself. I think he ought to
be getting the studies done inside and outside the Park Service. But I would expect him to be able to answer about any question I asked about the history and traditions of the Service.

Dick: What was the situation with regard to collections management during your tenure in the Washington Office of the Park Service?

Bob: Chaos, as I guess it still is. I had almost nothing to do with collections until Hartzog created a crisis one time. I guess he went down to the archeological facility at Okmulgee National Monument and saw the collections all in great disarray in the basement. There were collections that went back to the 1930's. And he created a great crisis, and he went over and told Julia Butler Hanson (chair of our House Appropriations Subcommittee) that 90% or whatever of our artifacts had never been catalogued and we didn't even know what we had. And so there was a tremendous concentration for several weeks upon drawing up budget proposals to go out and do something about all of these collections. Well, when the magnitude of the problem became apparent it all just kind of died back into its normal chaos, where I suppose it has remained ever since.

Dick: Do you support the idea of a Chief Curator?

Bob: Yes.

Dick: And yet since Hartzog's time—from approximately the mid-60's to the mid-80's—and you commented that it has been somewhat chaotic. You don't see a great deal of change.

Bob: I don't see any hope, and I wouldn't criticize anyone for it. I think given the magnitude of the problem, given the sheer quantity of collections around the Park System, that about the only thing that can be done is simply to blunder along doing the best that you can with the limited amount of money that is going to be made available for this purpose. About the only thing that can be done is to set some priorities and use the limited resources accordingly.

Dick: It has been my observation that Ann Hitchcock is truly looking to establish a systematic Servicewide program. That's my observation of her as a Chief Curator. It might still be chaotic, but I believe she is making a serious attempt to systematize it in some way or another.

Bob: Well, I think that is true from what I have heard of her also, and I didn't mean to imply you should not strive for a systematic and comprehensive approach. I think, given the magnitude of the problem, it will continue to be a chaotic one though. You'll only nibble away a little bit at a time.

Dick: So it has always been chaotic?

Bob: So far as my observation goes. I did not have much of anything to do with collections.

Dick: Who did in Washington?

Bob: Nobody in Washington. The one generally looked to was Art Allen up at Harpers Ferry, and of course his responsibility was primarily laboratory work—curation. I don't believe he ever had much to do with organizing a system for managing collections, until very recently.

Dick: Bob, would you discuss Mission 66 and its effect on cultural resource management?

Bob: Well it was a mixed bag. Of course, under Mission 66 we got the Historic Sites Survey, which underlay a lot of new additions to the Park System in the historical area category.

Dick: Why did we get the Historic Sites Survey at that time? How did it tie in with Mission 66?

Bob: Well I think they succeeded in making a case for research and study. I would attribute that primarily to the contributions to Mission 66 planning of Ronnie Lee and Roy Appleman. Roy Appleman was the
history member of the Mission 66 planning team, and I think simply the historians made a good case for reactivating the Historic Sites Survey. I believe the justification was primarily as a necessary tool for identifying qualified additions to the National Park System. It was only after it got well underway that the subsidiary purpose emerged and then became the primary purpose of public recognition through plaques and certificates and publicity and encouragement of preservation by other than the Park Service. I think it was probably initially justified in large part as proposed area studies, but it was quite healthily funded and was an important part of Mission 66.

The new parks that flowed out of Mission 66 were another positive effect. They came not alone from the studies of the Historic Sites Survey but from the more liberal funding climate in which the Park Service worked.

Interpretation was from the first considered to be a major thrust of Mission 66. And the Park Service got a lot of historical museums and other interpretive media in its existing parks that it didn't have before, which I think for history, for cultural resources, was a positive effect.

Those were the good things. Of course, the bad thing was that as a development-oriented program it created a lot of probably unnecessary structures and infra-structure and facilities--concrete and mortar and pavement and that sort of thing--that constituted in the historical areas an insensitive intrusion. We see it in retrospect as damage to the very features that the parks were established to protect and interpret to the public. And again, it was just the way of thinking back in the 50's. We put the visitor center up there at Fort Union practically on the edge of the parade ground. We put the visitor center and cyclorama at Gettysburg virtually on Pickett's objective point on the third day of the battle, which is the worst possible place it could have been put. That happened all through the Park System because of development, a lot of development that wasn't needed. It was done simply because you could get money for buildings, because the Park Service's architects and engineers, like its interpreters, always look for opportunities to glorify themselves by erecting architectural monuments rather than blending these things softly into the park setting.

Dick: I hear the term glorifying themselves a good bit.

Bob: Well I probably originated that term. It was in my article that you referenced. Yes, I think it is a natural instinct for a person to want to do things that will make him look good. And it was my personal experience dealing with DSC architects that they couldn't be persuaded to fold their architecture unobtrusively into the park's surroundings. It had to be prominent and something that could be pointed to. I remember where this sort of conflict reached an almost shrill level was in the controversies over George Rogers Clark in Indiana. That memorial was built specifically with the whole basement level intended for a visitor center. On the exterior that memorial was designed, both in architecture and landscape, as an artistic creation. Yet the Park Service had to go in there and plop a visitor center down in the midst of that artistic creation, disrupting the intent of the original artist and not using the space originally created for visitor center purposes. This is just one example of many that exemplified a Mission 66 mentality of "go out and build." And of course, we see this among the interpreters just as much as the architects.

Melody: I'd like to ask you, Bob, to comment on what we have here at Pecos. We have a visitor center that is an architectural gem and jewel in the Park Service's eyes, and yet it is set off in a way and hidden from the resource so that it does not intrude in any way on the resource. So what you have here is on the one hand an architectural gem and on the other hand it's set away from the resource in a location that neither you nor Bill Brown your successor as Regional Historian, wanted.

Bob: Well, I like very much what has been done at Pecos. Dave Battle's visitor center is a statement in itself, an architectural statement, and a very beautiful creation, and does not detract from the historic resources for the very reason that you said, which is that it cannot be seen from them. It is hidden.

Dick: Do you think it competes with the historic resources?

Bob: I don't think so because you have two distinct experiences there, you have the museum experience and then you go to another place where you experience the resources out of sight of the first experience. Now,
I don't really see any great contradiction between that with our earlier view. I think a very good case could be, and was, made for the interpretive benefits to be derived from poking that building out from slightly around the corner of the hill so that the resources could be seen from the visitor center. It would have had to be unobtrusive architecture, and that would have been effective too. I think something has been lost by not being able to see the resources from the visitor center. But what you've come up with is still a very fine solution, so I'm comfortable with either way.

Dick: In your article on Preservation Ideal you say, and I quote: "In parks the best modern works are those that compete the least with the historic attractions. It might almost be said that the more unmemorable the modern work the more successful it is as a park development." How does that square with your views of Pecos?

Bob: I still subscribe to that generality. Consistency is not necessarily one of my virtues. I happen to like what has been done at Pecos, but I still subscribe to what you just read. As a generality, I believe that the more unmemorable the better. I like what's been done in this instance.

Dick: That's the only problem I have with the Pecos Visitor Center and I haven't made up my mind on it yet--as to its competing with the resource: otherwise it's a very fine building.

Bob: I haven't had a sense of competition from being there, and I think it is because there are two distinct experiences involved, and neither seems to intrude on the other.

Dick: The comments around the Regional Office have included, among other things, that the superintendent has two resources.

Bob: That's probably true, and I think the way to get at this sort of a question is to try to ask yourself what is it, as the visitors drive down the road after visiting Pecos, that is most prominently in their mind. I suspect that at Pecos it's all that nice warm bread that they bought from the bread baking operation. But once we get beyond that, the last thing that they have experienced has been the ruins, and I would guess that the ruins are ascendent in their minds along with the bread.

Dick: One thing about that structure is that it is built not to stand out but to blend into the landscape. Its regional architecture. It can't help but stand out some, as it's a very attractive building, but it's not a superimposing building. It is low and it's down, it's not on a prominent site. Ok, we were talking about Mission 66. We jumped up to the 1980's. Let's go back to Mission 66 for a bit. How would you characterize the historic preservation philosophy and practice of Bill Everhart and Roy Appleman.

Bob: Bill Everhart and Roy Appleman. I don't think Bill Everhart ever had a preservation philosophy. He had a very well-developed interpretation or interpretive philosophy.

Dick: How did this impinge on historic preservation?

Bob: Well, I don't want to blame it all on Bill Everhart because he simply personified and expressed a trend whose time had come because of Hartzog's search for new and ever more imaginative ways to catch the public eye. I think that interpretation in its worst excesses, around 1970, was very detrimental to the interest you and I represent, which is, one, the preservation of the resource, and two, its tasteful and effective communication to the visitor. Harking back to our strictures on the architects and the engineers a few moments ago, I think the interpreters got into an attitude where they were calling attention to themselves and away from the resources of the park. The package became the great objective and the contents of distinctly secondary importance. It was 'look at what creative people we are and how imaginatively we are performing.' Rather than 'look at the resource; here's why it's significant.'

Living history of course is only one of the excesses that exemplify that trend. That has not been got wholly under control yet. I think there is still a tendency to rely on gimmicks to catch the public's attention, to the distraction from the park resources, but it's not nearly so bad as it was back then. I think what you had then
was interpreters who were attempting to win the plaudits of the design community, which hands out prizes and says how artistic this is, rather than the understanding, appreciation, and approval of the visiting public. These are two wholly different constituencies.

Melody: Can you give some examples?

Bob: Sure, the basement museum at Independence that was created during the Bicentennial, the Franklin Court museum, I consider that the worst example of what I am talking about. All of that electronic gimmickry totally overwhelmed any message that they were trying to impart, and I think I have a good deal of agreement around the Park Service on that particular museum. What they did down at Yorktown is another example. What they did at Golden Spike, if you've been up there. There wasn't a single label in the whole series of displays, and the things that they were displaying didn't communicate anything, even the mood that they were trying to set by scattering pick axes and railroad ties and things around indiscriminately.

Dick: Bob, I don't hear any supporters of the Franklin Court Museum speaking out. The only comments I hear on the museum itself are very negative because of its high-tech nature and its basic confusion. Do you think there is much support for that kind of thing in the Park Service today?

Bob: Probably not for that. For one thing, the technology there rapidly became outdated. But the underlying motivation is still there. We visited the Saratoga Museum last year or the year before. That was a late-70's museum in which the old and very dated Mission 66 exhibits were replaced by gimmickry which just didn't come off and didn't interpret really anything. The movie was awful. The exhibits were awful. The only thing worth spending time over was the old dioramas that they kept from back in the 50's. So I think it is still there. I think it's an attempt to create a mood and not tax the intellect of the visitor with labels and specific interpretation.

Dick: Would you comment on Roy Appleman--characterize his historic preservation policy and practice.

Bob: Well Roy's interest was primarily in interpretation. Roy was one who believed in putting the visitor right on top of the resource, and that meant putting the visitor center right on top of the resource. He always argued that you had to be able to see virtually everything from the visitor center, and I know in this Region when I came here one of the most hotly controversial issues was Roy's insistence as a member of the Mission 66 planning team that the visitor center at Chaco had to go right on the rim dominating everything so the visitor could see everything right from there. The whole approach is outdated now.

Roy also believed passionately in the value of exhaustive research to document every last site, every last movement, everything, before planning proceeded. You've discovered that recently at Chalmette, where, had his instincts been followed back in the 50's when he was Regional Historian in Richmond, you would have long ago discovered that your whole interpretation of that battlefield was wrong. He recognized something was wrong.

Dick: Let's discuss the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 just a bit. You mentioned that Hartzog had a great deal of involvement in that. Would you elaborate on that some?

Bob: George had the political connections and the political savvy to know how things got through the Congress. There were other agencies involved, there were other constituencies involved--the National Trust, HUD, and so forth--but when it came right down to getting a version of it through the Congress he knew. The House of Representatives voted against putting it on the consent calendar, which means to consider it out of order. When that is done, even though it is a procedural vote, that kills it for that session. Hartzog, Bob Garvey I think went with him, but it was primarily Hartzog, went to old Judge Howard Smith, that reactionary congressman from northern Virginia who was chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, and simply got it rescheduled on the consent calendar. I don't know what strings he pulled to get it done. Gordon Gray was mixed up in that also. But it came up for the floor vote when there was no reason to expect that it could ever make it that session, and it was primarily because Hartzog maneuvered it, and then it passed, and that meant the Senate would take it seriously.
That was only one instance. All the way through Hartzog was maneuvering this thing behind the scenes. He was closely tied in with the staff people on the Hill. One was from Casey Ireland, who was the staff person for Widnell's housing committee. Casey Ireland had only contempt for the new Department of Housing and Urban Development even though his committee oversaw it. He maneuvered to get the legislation into the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, or to get a version into it. That helped throw it to Interior instead of HUD. So there was all of this kind of string-pulling, the details of which I have forgotten, and in which Hartzog was right in the middle.

Dick: Again Hartzog comes across as a Director very heavily involved and in his own bureaucratic way very supportive of historic preservation. Here he is supporting this major piece of legislation, and then after that was passed was willing to look into an organization that was in a radically different direction away from traditional Park Service operations. He set up Ernest Allen Connally's office, which he later sort of decapitated I gather, but nevertheless he was doing things with regard to historic preservation that perhaps no one since Albright had done.

Bob: That is true. I would agree with every word that you've said. Most of the early versions of the 66 legislation contemplated that it would be administered by HUD, the new Department of Housing and Urban Development. Hartzog went in and manipulated the whole system to capture it from HUD and make it a National Park Service program with all of the authority to go get money to administer a grant-in-aid program that would give him a constituency in every state in the union. What I am doing is showing both sides of this. I don't know whether he was personally committed as a matter of principle to this sort of thing. I don't think he was. I think his principal interest was on this other side, of bureaucratic empire building. But I am not about to look a gift horse in the mouth, because he was saying all the right things and he was doing all the right things, initially, to have a result that was beneficial and also good for the Park Service. Who knows what inner motivations propel people? We can only suspect what they are. He could put the words together that sounded sincere and made a better case for our business than you or I or anybody else in our business was ever able to do.

Dick: Well, nevertheless, no Director since Albright had done so much for historic preservation in the Service, and who is to say exactly what Albright's motivations were?

Bob: Absolutely, you're right. It was a black day for the Park Service when we lost George, although there were a lot of things we lost that we could do without.

Dick: What was your own personal involvement in the passing of the legislation?

Bob: Virtually zero. Hartzog had not come to trust me at that point. In fact he had come to distrust me at that point, and as I later discovered, although I didn't know it at the time, he didn't have any intention even of keeping me under the new organization. Ronnie Lee was still around. I think he had retired by that time, but Hartzog formed the committee of Lee and Joe Brew, for Archeology, and Ernest Connally, for architecture, and they were the ones that he turned to. In fact George even would go to one of my subordinates, John Littleton, who ran the Historic Sites Survey, to get information and staff support for this initiative on the Hill without even letting me know that he had done it. So I was completely out of it. I knew roughly what was going on.

[Since this interview, James Glass, in a doctoral dissertation at Cornell University, has documented a significant role that Utley played in the origins of the act. In 1988 an abridgment of Glass's work was being prepared for publication by the American Association for State and Local History.]

Dick: I would like to get away from the 66 Act for just a minute and ask you at what time did Hartzog begin to trust you. Do you remember any incidents?

Bob: Well it wasn't until '68 or '69 I think. You see, he had been sold a bill of goods that this new highly professional organization had to be headed up in all the crucial jobs or positions by people with Ph.D's. I didn't have a Ph.D, and I had done some things that alienated him anyway, and so he simply didn't have in mind for me to continue to be Chief Historian. Ronnie Lee, Joe Brew, and Ernest Connally, and Herb
Kahler, who took Connally's slot on the committee after Connally became Director of OAHP, convinced Hartzog that I had enough other credentials that I ought to be kept as Chief Historian. I learned all of this after the fact. I never knew I was threatened.

No it was earlier than 1968. I think when he came to trust me was in the opening months of 1967, after the 66 Act had been passed in October. Connally consented to come in and take over the organization, but he couldn't come until the summer of 67 because he had teaching commitments. So I was made Acting Director of the new OAHP with the mandate of organizing it and drawing up all of the criteria and guidelines for the operation of the new programs. Connally and I talked on the telephone frequently.
This is tape 6 of the interview with Bob Utley and this is September 26 now. Two days since the earlier interview. Go ahead Bob.

Bob: We were talking the other day about when George Hartzog may have come to trust me, and I was indicating that the process at least started in the early months of 1967, when I was named Acting Chief of the Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation for about 6 months until Connally came in to assume his new responsibilities. We had a task force that was assembled from various field units of the National Park Service as well as Washington to draw up the procedures and guidelines and criteria and so forth for all of these new programs that we had been authorized in the 66 Act. My organization had recently moved over to Roslyn in northern Virginia, and we occupied an office building that had two or three floors totally empty and undivided. So we stuck the task force down on the fourth floor, one floor below me, and simply turned them loose on this problem. I was the Chairman of the Task Force, but I did not meet with them except when there were drafts to be considered and disputes to be resolved. I believe we had Jerry Rogers in by that time--a very junior GS-7 from out in Texas. Zorro Bradley represented Archeology, and Russell Kaune, later of the National Trust, represented Architecture, and on my urging the Chairman was Murray Nelligan. He had been Regional Historian in Philadelphia. Murray was a big talker who created lots of words very emotionally, and he had got himself crosswise with the organization. I had recommended Murray because I didn't believe that we ought to lose his long experience and expertise in park history because of personal characteristics that offended people. That was probably not good grounds on which to select a Chairman. As it turned out, Murray was quite a disruptive element, and the task force rocked from one controversy to another, but finally came up with the necessary paper. That groundwork then was the platform (to mix metaphors) on which the new programs were launched. And I believe that by the time Ernest Connally came in the summer of 1967, I had perhaps rehabilitated myself enough in Hartzog's estimate that probably I was not seriously endangered after that.

Dick: This was a task force that dealt both with internal and external aspects?

Bob: No, it was strictly external. We drew up the guidelines for the operation of the grant-in-aid program. That was a first task. We rewrote the National Landmark criteria to constitute criteria for the National Register down to the level of community significance. And we conceived an administrative mechanism by which all this would be carried out. Most of this mechanism was modeled after the already existing and successful recreational programs of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. We early on decided that the programs could not be carried out by Park Service personnel, that we would have to rely on the states. So the whole system of what we now call State Historic Preservation Officers evolved out of that task force. It drafted a letter for Secretary Udall to send to all of the State governors inviting them to name someone to work with us in developing a State-Federal partnership as the basic working approach to these new programs.

I think it fair to say that OAHP as it was conceived in those first months, and I think as Ernest Connally may have conceived it, was much more concerned with the external programs than with the internal. In the perception of most of us, the internal was rocking along with fair satisfaction. But here in the external we were building something wholly new to tackle the so-called "new preservation" that came out of all of the creative thinking of the middle 60's in the preservation of historic districts and architecture to an extent that had never been done and that the Park Service was not well equipped to do.

Dick: But nevertheless the internal programs were under OAHP.

Bob: Yes. We had two previously existing professional divisions--History and Archeology. We created a third, Architecture, and each of these three had both what we then called inhouse and outhouse components. History had a park research outfit and the Historic Sites Survey--in and out. Likewise Archeology had the Interagency Archeological Services program which had been around for a long time which was external, and also had people dealing with internal. We set up historic architecture on the same model. Then the fourth division was National Register, which was totally external and responsible for the grant-in-aid and National
Register programs. But each of the professional divisions had a very significant role to play in the operation of that new external division.

Dick: Do you think that this was an effective organizational arrangement, where internal and external units were locked together?

Bob: Yes I do. I think it would have worked very well if George had left it alone and not dismantled it three years later.

Dick: Bob, we've discussed some how Hartzog came to trust you in the early months of 1967. Would you in turn discuss why he distrusted you in the first place?

Bob: Well in all of my bureaucratic innocence I succeeded in getting myself crosswise not only with him but with the whole power structure in the Interior Department. Very shortly after I went there, in 1964, the Pennsylvania Avenue plan was getting a great deal of publicity. You recall that President Kennedy lamented the shoddy appearance of Pennsylvania Avenue during his inaugural parade, and this translated into a mandate for Secretary Udall to do something about dressing up Pennsylvania Avenue. He turned to Nat Owings, the very prominent architect associated with Owings, Skidmore and Merrill who did a lot of projects for Interior back in the middle 60's. There was formed a Pennsylvania Avenue planning group, maybe even a commission that early, but it was basically Nat Owings' plan. If you've ever dealt with Nat Owings you know he was a very difficult man to deal with: mercurial, excitable, absolutely convinced of the correctness and the rectitude of what he was proposing, and very impatient of any opposition. Nat and I later became very good friends and worked closely together. But his Pennsylvania Avenue plan, which was unveiled with great ceremony shortly after I came to Washington, contemplated a totally new creation along Pennsylvania Avenue. In other words, we'd tear down everything there and build a monumental national avenue framed with totally new monumental structures. That would have been all right, except to promote it they had hung it very definitely on history, and unfortunately they said that they wanted to create a Pennsylvania Avenue National Historic Site based on the Historic Sites Act of 1935. They discovered that in order to do that they had to have some historical studies to establish the significance for consideration of the Advisory Board and the Congress of the proposed area. This is where I got dragged into it—-to come up with the historical significance. I was pulled upstairs to be interviewed by high officials--I only later came to know how high they were--and I immediately took the stand that it was wholly inappropriate to use the Historic Sites Act to justify a project that contemplated the destruction of historic properties. Well of course this kind of scrambled up the intent, and from on high down to my level there were vibrations that I was interfering with what the Secretary wanted done. What happened, as I later learned, is that Owings and Udall got down on the floor of his office with the big map spread out before them and drew boundaries around the National Historic Site to conform to what Nat Owings' plan called to be done. When it got to me I delicately suggested that it should be the other way around. The historians make the study and decide what is historic, then you draw the boundaries.

Dick: Did they?

Bob: No, no it was done their way. A memorandum came from the Solicitor down to the Assistant Secretary for Public Land Management, Stanley Cain, that said that Chief Historian Utley was resisting what Secretary Udall wanted done. When that hit Hartzog's desk, of course he just went into orbit, and that was the beginning and almost the end of me in his estimation.

One of the central controversies of this whole thing was the Willard Hotel. And I told them at that time, if you create a national historic site here, in part based upon the historicity of the Willard Hotel, and then undertake to tear it down, you are going to run into problems. I reiterated this a year later, after the 66 Act passed, because that national historic site would go on the National Register, and if you're going to tear down the Willard Hotel, you are tearing down a National Register property, and so you've got a Section 106 case on your hands. Of course, as we know, the Willard Hotel encountered exactly that scenario and constituted a 10-year battle before it was finally resolved to keep the Willard Hotel.
But as it turned out I was simply ordered to take the boundaries they had drawn, constitute a task force to study what happened within them, and saturate that area with history. Which is what we did. We saturated it with historical events and significance, nailing all kinds of important people and all kinds of important events to specific locations on the ground. But very little was left in the way of illustrative structures or settings. But it was on the basis of our study, saturating that with history, that they went forward and created the national historic site. So my only complicity in it was to give them the study they asked for. They took it from there and thenceforth until I got back into Hartzog’s good graces I was simply bypassed, as we’ve seen on the unfolding of the 66 Act.

Dick: So you were seen I suppose by Hartzog as more or less of a troublemaker?

Bob: A troublemaker, an obstructionist, one who resorted to legal technicalities, probably excessively professional. We were both learning then. I learned an awful lot out of that experience about how to comport myself in a bureaucratic sense on that level. I think he may have learned a good deal at the same time about how to comport himself with regard to his professional staff, because he began to adopt different techniques than he had demonstrated as superintendent of Jefferson National Expansion Memorial. So it was a mutual learning process.

Melody: I think in large part your reputation is based on stands that you have taken of a professional nature such as the Pennsylvania Avenue issues. There are probably others in your career that would give us insight into the formation of the policy of historic preservation as we now it.

Bob: I don’t recall any suicidal stands that I took on subsequent issues. One thing I learned from Pennsylvania Avenue is some of the ways to prevent bad things from happening and to promote good things without totally alienating those on whom you depend. For example, Congressman Charlie Bennett’s proposal for the “Southmost Battlefield of the American Revolution National Historic Site.” This was the scene of an encounter which indeed was the southmost, but as John Luzader used to say, its only other significance was that two equally incompetent commanders blundered into each other in the Florida swamps. Instead of standing up and saying this simply is unacceptable, which it was, and thereby alienating one of the most powerful members of Congress, who fancied himself a historian, and thereby also getting my boss George Hartzog into hot water, what we did was simply look for something bigger in which to bury the unacceptable. We stalled with one study after another so that the issue was never truly joined in ways that would leave blood on the floor. There were various other bureaucratic techniques like that, that were designed to avoid confronting the problem headon.

We did the same thing with Congressman Joe Skubitz when he was ranking minority member of our House legislative committee. He urged one unacceptable project after another to put substandard properties from his Kansas district into the National Park System. We did the same sort of thing with him, so that most of them never came to pass. One did, but I think it has since fallen by the wayside. Do you have in mind any particular issue that I am forgetting?

Melody: Well, of course, there is your experience with Frank Masland, Julia Butler Hansen, and what was going up at Fort Vancouver.

Bob: Frank Masland was part of the learning experience that occurred at the same time as the Pennsylvania Avenue mess and simply reinforced the conclusions Hartzog was already drawing. At my first Advisory Board meeting, at Great Smokies, this greatly venerated and highly significant member of the Secretary’s Advisory Board took vigorous exception to a proposal to put the Washita Battlefield in Oklahoma into the National Park System, and he rose to make an impassioned speech about how this was a massacre of helpless women and children by bloodthirsty soldiers. I simply got up and said that Frank Masland didn’t know what he was talking about, and Frank in great indignation stormed out, read the study, came back in, made an impassioned defense of his stand, and cast aspersions upon the person who had attacked him. When we got back to Washington, Hartzog sent down a note by way of my boss saying tell Utley to get straight with Frank Masland. So I wrote a letter of apology to Frank Masland, not for disagreeing with him but for the manner in which it was done. He responded handsomely, and to this very day we are very close friends and allies.
Dick: Bob, as an aside, why wasn't Washita Battlefield ever brought into the System. Did it have anything to do with Masland's feelings?

Bob: No, I believe the Advisory Board endorsed it. It never had the political steam behind it. It was a state historical park and the new Congressman from that district, I believe his name was Jed Johnson, a young fellow, embraced the cause. He fell casualty to the next election, and so the political support for it collapsed.

I guess there are other episodes that come to mind that I might mention. Of course, the Historic Sites Survey and the National Landmark program were under my supervision, and this always involved delicate or politically loaded questions of what should or should not be national landmarks. One of the early incidents that brought me under Hartzog's critical notice had to do with the proposed McGuffey Birthplace Landmark in Ohio. McGuffey's Readers, you know, were a very significant part of our educational history, and McGuffey was well worth commemorating in our National Landmark Program. The fact of the matter is, we already had McGuffey's home over in western Ohio, where he wrote all of these McGuffey's Readers, and it was already a National Historic Landmark, when Mike Kirwin came in with a proposal to put McGuffey's birthplace up as a National Landmark. Mike was the chairman of our appropriations subcommittee who controlled all of the money flow to the National Park Service. So Hartzog said yes, we'd take a look at it. We took a look at it. Mike Kirwin represented a district that consisted almost exclusively of Youngstown, Ohio, and not very much more. Youngstown was a pretty grim industrial intercity, and there is not much history there. We had in fact combed his district from one end to another looking for landmarks and couldn't find much of anything. So we looked at the McGuffey Birthplace, and it turned out to be simply a hunk of real estate with nothing left on it that would even suggest a connection with anything historic. It was just a farm on the outskirts of Youngstown, with no structures surviving from McGuffey's time, so the answer was, this won't get it. For one thing, we've got a criterion which discourages birthplaces. For another, we've got the place most directly associated with McGuffey on the other side of the state, unfortunately not in Mike Kirwin's district. And so George went over and conveyed the unhappy tidings to Mike and came back with the word, apocryphal or no, that Mike says if he didn't get a landmark there ain't going to be no landmark program because he will cut off the money for it.

So, George then wrote to Mike and said we had this conversation the other day about McGuffey, and this is a very important matter, so important that I am asking Assistant Director Howard Stagner to go up and personally make the study that we have promised you. Well, Stagner was my boss and he was a naturalist. He had no background whatsoever in history. So Howard Stagner went up and made the study, and it was then to be presented to the Advisory Board. We met up at Harpers Ferry. The chairman of the History Committee at that time was a very witty and erudite former president of the University of Colorado, Robert Stearns. My custom was to present each study to the History Committee, and then they would deliberate, and then I would present the next one, and so forth. When they came to McGuffey, I turned it over to Howard Stagner and he presented it to the History Committee, which was by and large one of considerable integrity. Joe Brew said, you know, we've got to do this for Mike. Hartzog's got to do it for Mike. We owe a lot to Mike, and I believe that we should suppress our professional dictates in this one instance and give Mike his landmark.

So the record clearly showed that Howard Stagner presented the study without any participation whatever, either in the study or the presentation, by me or any other professional historian. I made sure that got in the record. Mike Kirwin got his landmark. The history people remained pure and unsullied by the prostitution of their profession, and a very sticky situation was bypassed. This I think represented my first memory of Hartzog religiously--maybe not religiously--but conscientiously not requiring his professionals to prostitute themselves.

Dick: In this case he chose a professional from another discipline to go up there and I suppose essentially prostitute himself.

Bob: What he did was to choose my boss, who happened to be of another discipline, but also he went in his capacity of Assistant Director. Yes, I think he prostituted himself, but I don't know what I would have done under similar conditions. I don't think he felt very comfortable doing it. But I think it was pretty
widely recognized, when you can even get people like Joe Brew and Bob Stearns to prostitute themselves, that there was a very powerful justification for rationalizing what they were doing in this one instance for expedient purposes, because Mike Kirwin had been one of the most influential supporters of the National Park Service through a very long career in the Congress. He had done the Park Service many favors he didn't have to. And Mike Kirwin I suppose was more responsible than anyone else for insuring the continued flow of Mission 66 money. So everyone felt greatly indebted to him.

We have mentioned the reconstruction of Fort Vancouver. This is another instance involving another powerful member of Congress. In fact it was Mike Kirwin's successor as chairman of the appropriations subcommittee for the Park Service, Julia Butler Hanson. She represented a district up in the State of Washington that included Fort Vancouver National Historic Site. And whether on her initiative or what, she and Hartzog cooked up a deal to reconstruct the palisade of the old fur trading post of Fort Vancouver. Incrementally this cost over the years about 8 million dollars. It began to take shape just at the time that our thinking was beginning to harden against such reconstructions because the money was drying up for other things. We were never consulted on whether my organization approved of this or not. It was simply a fait accompli by Julia and George, with most of the staff support being done out of the park and the Western Region in San Francisco. We have since held it up as a prime example of the very sort of thing that ought to be resisted.

I think it fair to say that at that time, just to digress a bit, my own philosophy had not hardened as it did later on the whole question of reconstruction. This was around the beginning of the 70's. I had actively supported the reconstruction of Bent's Fort. I guess as a measure of the influence of Roy Appleman on me I was all for interpreting the story, with preservation a secondary consideration. So I did not oppose Fort Vancouver. But that, along with what happened to Bent's Fort, became a real study in excessive funding and in the inappropriate handling of historic fabric. You know, they just threw up these big palisade walls there, and they really didn't say much about the old Fort Vancouver, they really didn't rest on all that thorough research, and all in all it was a boondoggle that we shouldn't have done on any other grounds than political expediency.

Dick: Do you think that had you had the chance as a professional historian to discuss these directly with the Congresswoman or with the Congressman from Ohio in either case, the McGuffy case or the Fort Vancouver instance, that you as a historian could have persuaded them of the logic that went against their case or not?

Bob: That would differ from member to member. Julia Hansen was a very forthright woman. Very much determined to get her own way.
Dick: This is tape 7 of the interview with Bob Utley. September 26, 1985.

Bob: I don't think I could ever have persuaded Julia Butler Hanson of the inadvisability of the Fort Vancouver project. Perhaps with Hartzog's active participation something might have been done, but I think that was a lost cause.

Now subsequently, I got in exactly the same situation with regard to Fort Smith, Arkansas. As you will remember, Senator John McClellan wanted it reconstructed in the same way that Fort Vancouver had been reconstructed. I never dealt directly with Senator McClellan, but I dealt with his administrative assistant, who was a very powerful man. McClellan was chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and he could have got the money for it with no problem just by putting it in the budget. I did manage to convey to the administrative assistant (I can't remember his name) that this oughtn't to be done and why. He was persuaded, as were the staff people representing Senator Bumpers. But in order to make it stick, I then had to go out to Fort Smith and persuade the constituents out there that it shouldn't be done. So in a public meeting I did in fact make the case, and Fort Smith, for that as well as other reasons, never materialized as a serious proposition.

Dick: What was the reaction of the constituency at Fort Smith?

Bob: I believe they were basically persuaded. They wanted their log stockade, but I succeeded in making them feel that what they wanted would be a fraud on the public, would be a waste of the taxpayer's money, and could not be accomplished on the basis of what was known, and so therefore it would be simply a Hollywood movie set and nothing more. They resisted up to a point and then the support collapsed.

Dick: Bob, let's go back briefly to the Ohio congressman and the McGuffy Landmark.

Bob: Mike Kirwin.

Dick: Ok, I can see why Julia Butler Hanson and Senator McClellan would want reconstructions in their own districts because they had a lot of public appeal and so forth, but a National Historic Landmark, what real political difference did that make to Congressman Kirwin?

Bob: Well it made a difference. I guess we had done such a good job of selling the importance of the landmark designations in terms of something that a community could be proud of that, that was appealing to him, and of course in addition the landmark presentation is a format within which you can get together politicians and others to make public appearances before the constituency, and this was early on recognized as a big benefit of the landmark program. We just had presentation ceremonies all over the place to give exposure to members of Congress.

There was another very tricky issue that confronted me late in my career. First I should say that there were basic issues that I regarded as matters of principle that arose in connection with properties within the National Park System. How to care for them, or projects for their utilization or destruction, made for constant battles with park management, regional management, and even Washington management. We had one issue up in New England involving the Narbonne House, where the Region insisted on converting it for park quarters. Well this was a dwelling that had been built in the 17th century.

Dick: In Salem, Massachusetts.

Bob: Yes it was in Salem. And I suppose you can number on the fingers of two hands the number of 17th-century buildings still standing in the United States. Our contention was that you simply don't take a structure going back that far, of which there are so few, and adapt it to modern use. The Regional Director was adamant, and so we had a standoff between the professional division in Washington and the Region. And one of the tricky things always is to decide whether the issue, the principle, is so important that you want to accept all of the fallout in terms of subsequent dealing with a subordinate manager by going over his head. This was an instance where we felt that the principle was so valid that it was important to get the Regional
Director overruled. We went to the Director and he overruled the Regional Director. Of course, then, the Regional Director didn't have any great love for me for a long time to come because I had got him overruled by the Director. So this is the kind of decision you always had to make.

Dick: Who was the Regional Director?

Bob: I think it must have been Chet Brooks. I think this was before the North Atlantic Region was created.

Of course, my own Waterloo arose over the same sort of collision. This was with the Director himself, then Gary Everhardt. And the issue concerned a considerable district of historic buildings on the south rim of Grand Canyon. Back at that time the great goal was to try to clear all of the buildings off the south rim of Grand Canyon—all the Fred Harvey hotels and so forth and a brand new luxury motel. These last, of course, really weren't at jeopardy. Nobody was going to tear down El Tovar or force the demolition of that luxury motel or any of the others. And yet Gary was ready to wipe out a whole district of very fine residential properties and the big electric plant which the architects had said was very significant. I had said from the beginning, I can join in your effort to clear the south rim of Grand Canyon if indeed you are going to approach it indiscriminately. Tear everything down and I probably can justify this on the grounds of the dominant values of the natural area. Personally I felt that the south rim didn't suffer that much from the buildings that were there. And the railroad station, the electric plant, and other structures were fairly significant in terms of how we viewed our national parks two generations ago. But okay, if you will take everything out I probably can get the demolition of the historic structures through the Advisory Council and the 106 process. But you can't select out just the historic and demolish them. I rapidly found myself squaring off directly against the Director. We had a very severe collision one Friday evening in which I simply was, if not shouted down, at least overruled by the Director, and it was that issue, specifically exemplifying many others of a like nature dividing me and the then Director, that lead directly to my decision to leave the Park Service. If I couldn't loyally serve the Director, I didn't want to serve him at all. So I left.

Dick: Bob, this goes back to what we were talking about a few minutes ago: the learning process that began when you got to Washington and your relationship with George Hartzog. Both you and Hartzog, I gather from what you say, were learning a good bit about finesse and diplomacy within the bureaucratic framework. And I think some of these things that you've just mentioned might help answer the question that was asked day before yesterday about why you are remembered by the rank and file of the Park Service more than Ernest Allen Connally. I gather you were the one, not Dr. Connally, who was at the forefront of these battles that we have discussed here.

Bob: Insofar as they involve park resources, that's true, because as I indicated previously Ernest and I had kind of a division of responsibility. He concentrated on external and I internal. And so I was the one who knew the internal. I was the one who could articulate the issues and present the arguments pro or con. It wasn't all con, either. There were instances where George wanted something positive and I was able to provide something positive that was also justifiable from the professional standpoint.

Dick: Perhaps the fact that you were spokesman and could articulate these matters is one of the reasons why a kind of a cult developed regarding you. Which I have observed from my various stations in the Park Service. Would you comment on that?

Bob: Well, Melody and I argued about this yesterday, and I'm not persuaded that there is an Utley cult out there or ever was, but I had, I think, some enthusiastic and loyal supporters scattered throughout the professional ranks of the Park Service. In fairness, I had plenty of detractors, too, who thought I was the worst thing that ever hit the professional arm of the Park Service. So you have to balance the one with the other. But I guess I would concede a certain validity to the thought that the ability to articulate professional issues and concerns to a nonprofessional and political and bureaucratic audience may have been one reason for my supporters. Another may be that I always took pains to relate to the field, and if not make sure the field supported me at least make sure the field had its opportunity to have its say—regional historians, park historians, and all. Another explanation may be that I had sort of a dual career. I was a relatively successful bureaucrat inside, but I had enough of a publication record that I was accepted by the professional
world outside, which not very many people have done in the Park Service. I think there was, if not a lot of admiration for it, at least it was looked upon as an example that many would liked to have emulated.

Melody: Well I might also add Bob that I think that because the outside world perceives you as the spokesperson for the Park Service, those people in the Park Service also fell behind that recognition and saw you as speaking for the Park Service. For example, WHA still sees you as the spokesperson for the Park Service even though you've been out of the Park Service for 10 years.

Bob: I think that is a dimension of it. I would agree to that.

Dick: We're digressing a good bit from the 1966 Act, but I want to bring this up again. We discussed it the other day briefly. That is the matter of why more people in the National Park Service rank and file remember you than remember Dr. Connally. Perhaps if the question were asked of people who were in the National Register or external programs, would they remember Connally more than you? Do you think?

Bob: That is a hard one to call for a couple of reasons. Connally's activities may have been in part not visible to the rank and file, simply because he was out there on the firing line representing them in the bureaucracy, on the Hill, and to the outside profession. By contrast, I and Bill Murtaugh, Russ Keune, and others related more to the rank and file than he did. When you add to that the fact that I succeeded him as Director of the Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation and held that post for a couple of years, and so then was directly responsible for them, I am not sure what kind of an answer you would get. I am pretty sure that you would get a much higher name and reputation recognition of Ernest from that group than you do from the internal group, but I am not sure that they fully appreciate all that he did in their behalf.

Dick: Because as you said much of it wasn't quite......

Bob: Wasn't visible to them. But it was visible to me, because I would go with him, for example to sit down with Secretary of the Interior Rogers Morton, and I would see how effectively he got Morton behind our program. I accompanied him to Chicago for all of those very delicate and volatile negotiations with Mayor Daley's henchmen over the proposed Chicago Architectural Theme Historic Site, in which I saw him pitted against the quintessential development mentality. I saw how effectively he represented our interests. So I suppose I am in a better position than almost anyone to have an appreciation of his performance. My visibility with the rank and file was greater, and they probably thought that much of the success was due to my leadership, when in fact I was simply following behind him.

Dick: You mention detractors. Would you discuss that just a little bit who they were and so forth?

Bob: I suppose the ones I had mostly in mind I would have to concede were not within our own professional discipline, but the most vocal of them were in interpretation, and many of them were historians in planning and in the design and construction end of things.

But there were several. We all remember the celebrated case of George Svejda. Svejda was on my staff at one time and came out of that very close-knit historical organization that Tommy Pitkin put together in New York City. George Svejda, of course, tried to organize a vendetta against me that would have eliminated me altogether if he had his way.

A more constructive opposition came from Sidney Bradford, with whom I had been associated since the very beginning years of the Historic Sites Survey. Sid Bradford ran the Historic Sites Survey under me for a time and then became one of the key officials in the new National Register Program of the Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation. Sid was the person responsible for grants-in-aid. After we started getting money for grants to the states, that became a rather crucial position. There was some organizational change that Ernest and I had jointly decided upon when I was Director of OAHP that involved Sidney surrendering some of his responsibility to another unit. I don't even remember what it was. But Sidney was a very dogmatic and rigid person, totally resistant if he disagreed, and we simply confronted the situation in which the subordinate refused to carry out the orders of his superior—me. And so to finesse the whole thing with a minimum of embarrassment of everyone, including him, I was instrumental in getting him a position in the...
Philadelphia office, which subsequently became, if it wasn’t initially, an assistant regional director. Bradford, almost always with the Regional Director’s support, could be expected to take the opposing side on any issue, and there was just constant war between my office and the Philadelphia Region. Sidney was behind a lot of that, but I think beyond that this Region in the corporate sense always has been and to this day remains sort of a power unto itself that goes its own way without regard for what the rest of the Park Service is doing.

Dick: What other detractors come to mind?

Bob: When I assembled the research unit on the Washington level in 1965, I took on a lot of people. It was put together through a process of simply transferring positions, money, and incumbents identified with research on the park level onto the Washington level. I picked up more than a dozen historians who then became research historians. George Svejda was one of those who came that way, and of course he was, as I have mentioned, one of my most bitter detractors.

Another one who came in that way was George Olshevski. He had done the research (such as it was) on the Ford’s theater restoration and thought very highly of himself. And maybe it’s significant that both Svejda and Olshevski were proud possessors of a Ph.D and felt that no one who did not have one could pretend to any kind of professional attainment, and here they were reporting to two people—Roy Appleman and myself—who lacked the terminal degree.

Another who came in at that time was John Platt. He turned out not to be very successful and finally went back to where he had come from, in Philadelphia, and I have a suspicion that he was not among my admirers. There were historians, as I have indicated, who were not in the history end of the Park Service but in interpretation, and I suspect you might find that most of the historians who worked for interpretation were not among my admirers or supporters, probably because of my stand on so many interpretive issues. The names of so many of these people slip away from me.

I think I mentioned Murray Nelligan earlier. He was one of those who found it difficult to accommodate to a young unknown from out west coming in and taking over the top history position of the Park Service. I guess I should say at the same time, though, that the ones most affected, Charlie Porter and Rogers Young, for whom it must have been a very bitter pill indeed, swallowed the pill. I have no reason to believe that they or others—John Littleton, Harold Peterson—ever did other than give me the most loyal and conscientious support, even though every one of them thought he ought to be Chief Historian.

Dick: Bob, let’s go back to the 1966 Act. Did that act fail to do or inadequately provide for things that you wanted addressed, and then would you discuss the 1980 amendments, if they addressed anything that you wanted addressed?

Bob: Well, as I mentioned, I wasn’t leading the pack. I was running to catch up in the period when this was going through the Congress. It was only after the enactment that I began to have any opinions at all about it and I don’t remember that they were independent opinions. We simply accepted the given of what the experts had said had to go in that law and then tried to translate it into an administrative system that worked. Of course, I guess I came to have definite opinions as we acquired experience under it. The biggest thing that we needed was money. The law was an authorization to seek funds to do certain things, and I don’t believe it was until 1969 that we got our first money to activate the grants program, and then it was only $300,000, which had to be split up among the 50 states. So long as we didn’t have any money, the states weren’t particularly interested in building up their machinery, so funding was the concentration of everybody in those first two or three years.

I think otherwise, in creating a National Register, the classes and categories to be looked upon as worthy of preservation, and the criteria of evaluation, were all sound. The protective mechanism, Section 106, was sound and I think a sensitive product of our own particular republican form of government: it was fine-tuned to public and private responsibilities and prerogatives. It was a good thing.

The one place that we began to develop some real problems was how to apply it to properties in Federal custody. The Park Service itself had a rude awakening when all of a sudden the Superintendent of
Yellowstone found a representative of the State of Wyoming identifying properties within park boundaries that were worthy of preservation, to be put in the National Register and therefore protected by Section 106. The Superintendent then was Jack Anderson and he was not of a temperament to suffer anyone inside or outside the Park Service to encroach in the slightest on his territory. So he got on the telephone to Hartzog and Hartzog had the rude awakening. He was not about to have any state official coming into the parks to identify what was worthy of preservation. So we had a few years of delicate negotiations between our own hierarchy and our constituency out there in the states. It was essential to our survival. We were not going to get a dollar unless the state people told their congressional delegations that this was something important to the state. And yet inside we had the hierarchy telling us to keep those people out of the parks. This eventually got resolved.

The other Federal agencies were doing an even worse job. They didn’t conceive of the Register as applying to them at all. We finally worked out arrangements whereby Federal agency officials would consult with state officials, and between them they would decide what went on the National Register. But still there was tremendous stonewalling by Federal agencies against putting things in the Register, simply because they didn’t want to have to deal with Section 106.

We presented ourselves early on to the Defense Department and pointed to all of the incontestably significant properties in the jurisdiction of the Army and the Navy and the Air Force and pointed to the new law. Their housing official flatly informed me that the Defense Department had only one mission and that was national defense. I said you’ve got another mission now, it’s historic preservation. But they did not accept my interpretation. So this situation and the dissatisfaction it aroused among the state people led to the promulgation of Nixon’s Executive Order 11593, directing all of the Federal agencies to survey properties under their jurisdiction and put them in the National Register. So we then acquired Federal agency representatives, who did the same things for their agencies that the State Historic Preservation Officers did for their states. And when it came to properties under Federal jurisdiction, the two officials theoretically got together. The Executive Order also, I believe for the first time, used the language “properties in or eligible for the National Register,” which instantly created the requirement to evaluate all properties not in the National Register that might qualify for the Register before doing anything that might harm them. It created a requirement for a whole system of survey and identification on the part of every Federal agency. And as you know, that was embedded into the 1976 legislation, which also freed the Advisory Council from the Park Service, and then into the 1980 Amendments. That in my recollection is the only really rough spot in that whole external program. I think philosophically and practically, it all went together in a very symmetrical way.

Dick: You would identify the executive order by Nixon as the key turning point in the bringing around the Federal agencies.

Bob: Well it helped a lot. But it wasn’t decisive. But it laid a very substantial foundation for subsequently inserting those requirements in the law. It was only after it was enacted into law that agencies began to take them even half-way seriously.
This is tape number 8 of the interview with Bob Utley, September 26, 1985. Go ahead Bob.

Many of the agencies, not least of them the Park Service, took refuge in the sophistry that because the Executive Order specified that these surveys would be completed by a certain deadline (a year or two I have forgotten), that it no longer applied simply because the deadline had come and gone. So it took the force of the law to make them start taking it seriously, and even then it was only half seriously. Even so, it represented quite a coup to get the President to sign an Executive Order that had to do with our business. That came about primarily through the collaboration of Bob Garvey and the Advisory Council and Jack McDermott, who was his only staff member at the time, with Bill Reilly, who was a staff official over in the Council on Environmental Quality, under Russell Train. (Reilly since has become President of the Nature Conservancy or one of those other big wildernesses organizations.) Between them, though, they managed to get the Executive Order up through the CEQ hierarchy.

Melody: What does CEQ stand for?

Bob: Council on Environmental Quality.

Dick: Bob you mentioned that the National Register Criteria were sound. Were you and are you completely satisfied with the National Register criteria.

Bob: Well I don't know what the present wording of them is. They are basically the same. I think they have tinkered with them in a cosmetic sense over the years. I have always regarded them as sound, yes. They have periodically come under attack by people who wanted to make them so explicit that they could easily qualify or disqualify any given property. I think the merit of the criteria lies in the fact that they establish general guidelines, understood by trained people in our profession, that allow for the exercise of professional judgment within broad parameters. That this is the only sound way that you can get to it. The Office of Management and Budget always wants to tighten them up and in fact return it all to the level of national significance. I know there have been periodic task forces that have sought to rewrite the National Register criteria, either to make them more specific or to tighten them up so that fewer properties slip through, but Melody says they are the same, and if they aren't they are basically the same as we started with, and as I mentioned the other day, these go back clear to the criteria that were being applied in the 30's.

Melody: the interpretation of those criteria, however, have changed considerably in the last 10 years.

Bob: I guess that's true.

Dick: Bob, what is your feeling about the 50-year criterion?

Bob: Well, there is no 50-year criterion. Unfortunately, what was considered as a kind of a general guideline has been translated by either ignorant and well-meaning people, or by evil people with bad designs in mind, into a criterion. It's become almost a cliche. The thinking was that in general you need a 50-year perspective to have a good professional judgment of whether a property qualifies or not. But it was never intended to be rigidly applied, and when the National Register criteria were written the wording in the original landmark criteria was retained in which, upon a showing of "transcendent" value, the general guideline of 50 years was to be ignored. When you are dealing with properties on the level of community significance as you are in the National Register, it doesn't take much verbalization to make a case for transcendent significance in the local context. So the way that was intended to be applied was simply to use it in obvious cases where you needed to have a 50-year perspective. We used to accuse, only half jokingly, various Park Service superintendents of each spring systematically going around their parks and demolishing all 49-year old buildings. As a matter of fact, a lot of superintendents were demolishing buildings that were approaching 50 years simply to avoid having to deal with them on the basis of that spurious 50-year rule.

Dick: Bob, would you discuss the background to the 1966 Act especially as it relates to landmarks or the landmark program?
Bob: The 66 act politically began in the broad historic preservation movement that was beginning to concentrate on urban problems, on the bulldozers that were taking out great swatches of both urban and rural America. What we then called the "new preservation" focused on anonymous architecture or adaptive use in the urban context of historic districts. This was in contrast to the traditional associative type of preservation such as, for example Gettysburg or Independence Hall, which we preserve because of association with people and events of the past. The movement for a law gathered momentum within that broader constituency, and so therefore in the Congress it found its way into the housing subcommittees which dealt more with that aspect of preservation. What George Hartzog did was to grab the proposals and nail them to the existing Historic Sites Act and the existing landmark program. Thus he facilitated the capture of the legislation from the housing people and got it into the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, where it would be more of a Department of Interior thing. He was always very insistent upon the point that the National Register already had authorization in the Historic Sites Act. In all of the documents we prepared--the procedures, guidelines, standards and so forth, he changed the language from creating a National Register of Historic Places to read "expand and maintain." That language got into the law itself empowering Secretary of the Interior through the Park Service to "expand and maintain a National Register of Historic Places." That word "expand" relates back to the existing landmark program, and in all of his testimony George made the point that the National Register already existed, had existed since 1935, and had always been the responsibility of the National Park Service. All that was proposed in this new legislation, as he explained it, was to give the means to broaden it in order to take in those places of state and local significance that were now suffering so badly from want of funding and because of the actions of Federal bulldozers in the housing and highway programs. It was this ploy, this tactical move, more than anything, I think, that captured the new program for the Park Service and away from the housing people. And so we always maintained the fiction that the new National Register was simply the old landmark list broadened.

Dick: Several times in this interview you've given Hartzog a great deal of credit for various things relating to historic preservation, and you seem to be giving him a great deal of personal credit in pulling these programs away from HUD.

Bob: That is my intent, yes. Not that he understood it all that well, not that he was all that personally committed to it, but he greatly enjoyed this kind of intellectual exercise, focusing on the tactics, whether it's historic preservation or recreation or getting money for the curation of objects or what have you. It was almost a game with him, a game at which he was very good. I was thinking over our interview of Tuesday and hoping that I didn't come across as too critical of George for my perception of his not being all that personally committed to historic preservation. I thought in terms of my own responsibility for the three disciplines, and the fact that I may not have had a great personal interest in or commitment to archeology, for example. But that didn't inhibit me from trying to understand it and advance its fortunes just as much as my job called for me to do. That's comparable to what we are talking about Hartzog doing. Historic preservation was part of his responsibility and he advanced its interest whether he was personally deeply committed to it or not in the same way that I worked, I think, for archeology.

Dick: It seems that the Hartzog administration comes across as the major turning point in recent cultural resource management development in the National Park Service.

Bob: That is true because of the 66 Act, which in terms of consequences, bureaucratic as well as professional, probably was a greater legislative landmark than the Historic Sites act, important as that was. You are correct that this was the period when historic preservation flourished as it never had before and never has since, but it was also a time when the Park Service as a whole flourished as it never had before and never has since. So in one sense we were a beneficiary of a very dynamic and creative and energetic builder as Director of the National Park Service such as we had never had before and never have since.

Dick: I guess I stated this once before, the other day and again just now, what strikes me is the importance of what happened during Hartzog's era and the fact that the rank and file Park Service people have not really recognized his role in pulling historic preservation together, getting the policies written, getting the disciplines together under one roof, establishing OAHP, getting the 1966 Act passed. People usually go back to Albright, to the 1933 Executive Order, and they kind of move on through the 60's with only a nod to Hartzog. In fact, his tenure was more of a landmark in the development of CRM in the Park Service than I had realized.
Bob: That is true. There simply is no question about that. I think one reason for the lack of appreciation may be that our discipline tends to have a deeply ingrained distrust of politicians and bureaucrats, and Hartzog was the quintessential politician and bureaucrat. Those who want no part of the dirty life of Washington look back on him as a slippery operator. What they fail to appreciate is that it takes slippery operators to make a success of the leadership of a bureau. In fact, the reason that our disciplines have not exerted more influence than they have is simply because so many of them don't want to get their hands dirty with administration and politics.

Dick: What you need is a slippery operator with some degree of principle.

Bob: Absolutely, but the point I am making is that he is perceived, by those who never worked closely with him, as being without principles. I think it's worth comparing George Hartzog with Lyndon Johnson because those two had a lot in common. They were indeed both of them men of principle. Whatever you may think of Lyndon Johnson's involvement in the Vietnam War, he was a man of principle. But both were also slippery bureaucrats and politicians, very much so.

In fact, after Johnson stepped down from the Presidency, he went back to his ranch, and the rest of his life was greatly preoccupied with two things--putting together the LBJ park and the LBJ library. And so Hartzog had occasion to deal closely and on a continuing basis with ex-President Lyndon Johnson, and the two of them came very much to appreciate each other and to understand that they might well have been cut from the same block. As you know, Richard Nixon fired Hartzog after he was elected to his second term, and Hartzog had a hard time letting go of the Park Service. So periodically he used to call us from his law office and enlist us to do certain things for him. One night in January of 1973 he had Ernest Connally and me and Bill Everhart up to the Lawyers Club for dinner. Among other things, he wanted me to write him a speech on the Civil War. I've forgotten what he wanted the others to do. In the midst of dinner the television out in the lobby announced that Lyndon Johnson had died at his ranch in Texas. Hartzog was very visibly shaken by this, and it was obvious that there was a great bond between the two that had developed in the years after the presidency. Hartzog told us that evening that the last time he was down at the ranch he and the President were sitting on the front porch, and the President leaned over and he slapped George on the knee and said, "George, I wish to hell I had known you when I was President because between the two of us we could have remade the fucking world."

Dick: Would you comment on Section 106 and what you perceive to be its value to cultural resource management in the National Park Service since its implementation?

Bob: There's been a lot of criticism of Section 106 inside and outside the Park Service, most of it in my judgment invalid. The Park Service from the very beginning had to be dragged kicking and screaming into Section 106 compliance. I am sure it never dawned on anyone in the Park Service when this law was being conceived, even George Hartzog, that Section 106 was going to protect properties under the jurisdiction of the Park Service just the same as the Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service. But lo and behold that it applies probably even more to the historic resources of the Park System because these are the cream of the crop. We encountered tremendous resistance from the field in the Park Service to any kind of scrutiny under Section 106. The Park Service was the expert in historic preservation. The Park Service had been the lead Federal agency in historic preservation from the very beginning. Who presumes to tell the Park Service how it should be done? This was not just a sub-rosa attitude. It was openly articulated by park superintendents who wanted no interference with the way they ran things. Gradually over the years, the Park Service learned that it had to take Sec. 106 seriously, especially as other agencies found themselves dragged into court for procedural violations, not substantive. Procedure is how you get people in court under this law. I believe there were some threats of litigation. I don't believe there was ever any actual litigation against the Park Service, but gradually it began to pay attention to Section 106, not on any kind of a systematic basis--some regions were better than other regions--and not very sincerely either. But I have always felt that finally, especially after the Advisory Council won its independence in 1976, it was the threat of policing and punishing from the outside that forced the Park Service to be a little more serious about its policies and standards. It still isn't very serious about them, but the extent to which it has a good body of policy and standards and the extent to which it applies them, I think, is largely a result of the threat of 106
and the consequent embarrassment to the Park Service of being exposed in improper care of historic resources.

Dick: Bob, day before yesterday we discussed how you came to Washington not really knowing a great deal about historic preservation philosophy and policy because it was apparently not your job here in Santa Fe. Let me ask you where policy was debated prior to your coming to Washington. Was it debated at all in the regions or was it all in Washington or in the parks?

Bob: Policy wasn't debated. Policy wasn't considered at all. I don't think that my experience in this Region was at all unusual. We all gave lip service to those Advisory Board principles, but superintendents and Regional Directors ran their historical areas very much as they wanted, and I just don’t believe that any Region had much of a debate over policy.

The first I can remember getting involved in it was when Hartzog had received the report of the Leopold committee saying we weren't doing enough research in the Park Service and System. That was directed almost exclusively at natural science research, but history and archeology got caught in the fallout. Just before I came to Washington, Hartzog reorganized the Washington Office under an Assistant Director for Resource Studies, and he looked upon it as being exclusively research. The Division of History had never done research. The Division of History had been concerned with policy, not in the formal sense of writing down policies, but of dealing with individual issues as they arose against the background of their experience and those Advisory Board principles. Suddenly to be looked upon as dealing exclusively with research, and with none of what previously constituted 90% of the functions of the History Division, not only was very traumatic but left a huge gap in Washington Office responsibility. So very early in my tenure in Washington, we had some arguments with Hartzog over this and finally a conference in Philadelphia under the chairmanship of Ronnie Lee. He brought in Fran Ronalds from Morristown and other Superintendents who were known as experts in preservation. We went through this whole question of who was going to do this policy thing now. It was really more of a meeting on procedure than policy. I don't think anything ever came out of that except some very good paper that stated the problem and how it ought to be handled. As a matter of default, however, we didn’t do research. We went on doing management history like we had been doing for years. This issue got overtaken by the organization of that big research unit in Washington, so I was able to do research but also have the personnel to continue to take care of what I regarded as the most important function of that division. You asked me the other day what the Chief Historian should do. His first priority is management history.

Dick: i.e. policy.

Bob: Policy formulation, application, and monitoring.

Dick: Let me get this straight then. You said the Washington Office, Division of History, had prior to your coming been primarily involved in policy, so that's where policy would have been debated if anywhere.

Bob: Yes, but it wasn't called policy. So far as it was debated at all, it was debated in terms of specific issues. We've got Chalmette down here and they want to reconstruct the earth work. How should we handle this? There was a staff historian who was an expert on that particular period. Rogers Young had the early Federal and national period. So Chalmette was his park and he handled all issues relating to Chalmette, and when issues that we would now call policy arose he determined the ideal solution. The staff historians did this less on the basis of any written body of policy than on a philosophy that had developed through long experience. I think their judgments flowed from those Advisory Board principles, but the principles were not hauled out and looked at every time there was a policy question. Nobody questioned that Roy Appleman was the keeper of the ultimate wisdom on matters relating to western and frontier historic property. Or that Charlie Porter was on the colonial period.

Dick: I suppose one could look back and research that period from the mid-30’s up to the mid-60’s and by examining the decisions made determine that the Washington office had certain biases, but there was no fundamental policy document, it was just a matter of the chance of personalities and projects submitted.
Bob: That's the only way you could get at it, except by looking at the Advisory Board principles, which constitute the only charter. But it was more this personal philosophy developed through experience that determined what was and wasn't policy, and the only way you could get at it is by examining individual issues as you've indicated.

Dick: And Hartzog asked for written policies.

Bob: You bet. This was in connection with George's brilliant public relations ploy when, with great fanfare and approval by Jack Anderson and other columnists, he suddenly one day abolished the Administrative Manuals. Every park and every regional office had a big bookshelf of about 25 manuals that governed everything that was done in the Park Service, including cultural resource management, and Hartzog threw them all out. He said they stifled creativity and he didn't want that kind of crutch on which everybody relied and in which they took refuge. And he got great approval in the press. When those got tossed out, however, there was nothing. Even he was not about to turn superintendents loose with nothing but their own judgment, and so it was against that background that the policies evolved. The theory was that we did not want detailed manuals to cover every possible contingency. We wanted to establish broad limits within which individual managers could exercise their creativity and imagination and initiative and not be hampered by detailed instructions. So the exercise in policy writing was very definitely along those lines, not to list do's and don'ts but just to give superintendents some broad guidance and let them do as they wanted within that broad guidance.

Dick: Okay, perhaps we are looking for a shift in power from the parks to the regions and Washington in part through the development of written policies and the use of Section 106. Would you say that is true or not.

Bob: No, I can see how you might spot that as a trend, but Hartzog was very definitely wedded to a decentralized organization that permitted the greatest possible latitude for individual initiative on the lower levels. Now that philosophy, which indeed was implanted in the Park Service, ran counter to his own management style. Hartzog was the leader, the monarch in all the plenitude of his power, a very personal leader, and you jolly well had best not cross him however much the latitude built into the policies.
This is tape #9 of the Interview with Bob Utley, September 26, 1985.

Bob: However much the policies encouraged superintendents to act within broad guidelines, however much the system mandated it, they exercised individual initiative only if it did not contradict or depart from what Hartzog wanted done. In other words, the system did indeed rest upon decentralized authority, but you better read the top man and make sure that you don’t get crosswise with him or you’re not going to be a superintendent very long.

Dick: Let’s look at it since Hartzog’s time. It seems to me that 106 and the XXX process go against individual initiative and establish a dialogue between the park and the region to curtail individual initiative.

Bob: Well this is very true, and not only is that as it ought to be, but I think it came about in some part because of excesses of individual initiative on the park level that threatened to embarrass the Park Service, within the context of Section 106, as the lead preservation agency. I think that has come about in part, too, because of the efforts that I and members of my staff undertook back in the 70's, specifically the programmatic memorandum of agreement, which was in my mind explicitly intended to force the Park Service to live up to its own principles. We hoped to force the Park Service through this external mechanism to begin adhering to its own written policies. I conceived it more of an internal management tool for the Park Service to get its own house in order than I did as an external compliance with a provision of Federal law. At that time, I worked very closely with Bob Garvey, who was Executive Director of the Advisory Council. He and I cooked up this scheme, and I negotiated the original Programmatic Memorandum of Agreement on behalf of the Park Service. Then I went over the Advisory Council as deputy to Bob Garvey and attempted to enforce it from that side. I believe that approach may have had some impact in influencing you to where you are today. It works in your own Region at least. There are other Regions of the Park Service that just ignore 106 altogether I think.

Dick: Well it seems as if we are going from a situation where parks were virtually autonomous in the 30’s and 40’s and 50’s, perhaps with regards to cultural resource management, to where the Regions in exerting 106 authority over the parks have more priority.

Bob: This is true, but the power is unevenly applied as between Regions, and your questions are reflecting your own experience here, which is probably as close to the ideal that we conceived back in the middle 70’s as exists anywhere in the Park Service. There are some regions which don’t come anywhere near that ideal. I remember John Rutter, when he was Regional Director up in Seattle, boasted to me one day that he had no Section 106 cases. That Region didn’t have any Section 106 cases simply because they ignored the law altogether.

Dick: Do you recall any key 106 crises in the Park Service?

Bob: Well, the biggest crisis was the Gettysburg tower. That was the one that spotlighted for all the world to see the conflict of interest in the National Park Service supervising as one of its own components the Advisory Council, which in turn was charged with policing the Park Service as well as other agencies. It was a conflict of interest not only in the Park Service but in all of Interior, which has got some other pretty significant land managing agencies in the BIA, BLM, and Fish and Wildlife. So the Gettysburg Tower practically made it essential that the Advisory Council be given its independence from the Park Service and from Interior.

Dick: Did you support that separation?

Bob: Absolutely! This legislation was introduced in 1976. Gary Everhardt was Director then, and in this instance I believe that, in addition to Gary’s lack of interest, I pretty much persuaded him that this was the right way to go and that he ought not to oppose it. I have since learned that at this very time Hartzog was chiding Gary pretty sarcastically for letting a part of his empire get away from him without a fight. And Hartzog has since said that the biggest mistake Gary Everhardt ever made was to let the Advisory Council go without a fight.
Dick: You don't agree with that.

Bob: No, absolutely not.

Dick: But Hartzog, being an empire builder would naturally......

Bob: That's right, I think he looked at it as much from the imperial perspective as any other, plus the fact that the Advisory Council, after it got its independence, gave the Park Service more trouble than it did when it got its budget and personnel ceiling from the Park Service.

Dick: Okay it was to some large degree Everhardt's lack of interest in the Advisory Council that allowed it to slip away?

Bob: Well in historic preservation in general. But I fancy too that I had something to do with talking him into it.

Dick: Do you want to comment on any more bureaucratic ins and outs of separating the NPS and Advisory Council?

Bob: Not at the moment. I think it was a long overdue move that certainly needed to be done.

Dick: Okay and Hartzog would have accepted the Advisory Council as part of the Park Service despite its contradictions.

Bob: Oh yes, he would have resolved the contradictions one way or another.

Dick: You mean they were resolvable?

Bob: Oh no, they were not actually resolvable. I guess I shouldn't say he would have resolved them. He would have finessed them one way or another after the Gettysburg experience. I am sure he didn't want to get squeezed like that again, and I think he would have finessed it so that no such thing ever arose again. Again, he was a dictator, and whether it was right or wrong, this is the way you do it, and I think he could have buried the contradictions.

Dick: Bob what was your particular role in the Gettysburg controversy and your position?

Bob: I had no role except to watch from the sidelines. That was handled pretty much by Bob Garvey and Jack McDermott out of the Advisory Council. I knew what was going on. I knew what the issues were. I guess at that time I was Director of OAHP, and we had plenty of other things to do.

Dick: Was the Advisory Council under you then?

Bob: No, the Advisory Council reported pretty much to Hartzog. Later the Advisory Council and the National Park Foundation and several other oddball things like that reported to Tom Flynn as Deputy Director of the Park Service. Then Bob Garvey's relationship was very largely with Tom Flynn.

Dick: Any other observations on your point of view during the Gettysburg controversy, even though you might not have been involved?

Bob: I didn't know enough of the ins and outs. I have learned since more than I knew at the time. The legal situation was created mainly by Hartzog. I think he did it carelessly and with the best interest of the Park Service at heart. The promoter there owned an inholding. He was going to build a tower on that. There was no way we could stop him from doing it. He was going to do it. Hartzog bargained with him to build it on a chunk of Park Service land that was less objectionable than his private inholding and gave him access over park land to get him there. That was a Federal undertaking. There would have been no
Dick: The one result of the Gettysburg controversy would have been the Park Service's greater awareness that it was responsible for 106?

Bob: I think it had that effect, yes. It didn't make it any more inclined to cooperate when it could get away with it. I'd say the Park Service's record under 106 historically has been just as bad as the Corps of Engineers or any of the other baddies.

Dick: Let's move on to another topic: your views on the rapid growth of the System in the 1960's and 1970's with regard to cultural resources.

Bob: There is a tendency in the Park Service these days to look back with great regret upon the expansion of the System in the historical area category at that time. I don't, because basically I guess I picked up enough of Hartzog's imperialistic approach to things to be an expansionist too. I am not an uncritical expansionist, but I am an expansionist who probably applies a looser or broader set of judgments to what can be justified for the Park System than many of my critics who are the purists. This goes to one of your other questions of what constitutes national significance. I felt in the early years of my career that we applied the criteria of national significance too rigidly, and when I took over the responsibility for the Historic Sites Survey I deliberately and systematically broadened the application of those criteria to admit landmarks that had been rejected before or never could have aspired to the distinction. So likewise, in what can be justified for the Park System, I fought vigorously against areas I considered substandard. I emerged from the fight over the Kosciuszko House in Philadelphia with blood all over me in a total defeat. But I went down bravely singing the criteria of national significance under the onslaught of all of those Poles.

Dick: You felt it did not meet.....

Bob: Well there was no way that it could be either nationally significant or suitable for the National Park System. Kosciuszko spent several months there. It was a boarding house. Hartzog used to say that's not a monument to Kosciuszko, it's a monument to his landlady. But it became a symbol of Polish ethnic pride and it turned out that there were something like 12 million Poles in the United States, and they had some very responsive members of Congress. So we went down to crashing defeat on that, with I standing on the bridge saluting.

There were others that I fought, both in the sense of outright opposition or of the kind of bureaucratic maneuvering that I spoke of earlier, where you're either stalling or putting it in a context that you know is politically unacceptable and so it can't come about.

Dick: Would give some examples of those that you fought that nevertheless were brought into the System?

Bob: Yes, for years we had a running battle with a woman in Savannah, Georgia, to put the Savannah Battlefield into the National Park System, and we simply opposed this consistently.

Dick: On the grounds of national significance?

Bob: Well on the grounds more of integrity. There just wasn't enough to make it an acceptable park area that could be preserved and interpreted. Also, we didn't feel that the Battle of Savannah was all that critical in the American Revolution.

Dick: I guess the question really was, Bob, others where you fought against proposals and they still came about.
Bob: We tried everything in the world to give Joe Skubitz something that we could live with and that would satisfy him without taking that Cherokee strip living history museum. When I went out and visited it, I found a quonset hut in Arkansas City, Kansas—big quonset hut with corrugated roof, full of everything that the local ranchers had dragged in for the last 50 years. There were all kinds of very valuable specimens along with just plain junk, none of it organized around any particular theme or displayed with any professional sensitivity. We tried to bury that in a larger Cherokee Strip proposal and a still larger Prairie Park proposal. Everyone of them failed, and finally Skubitz simply slapped that museum into one of Phil Burton's annual omnibus bills and the Park System got it.

Dick: But it came in as an affiliated area?

Bob: I think that was negotiated subsequent to the enactment of the legislation and I think subsequently it may have been defrocked or someway so lowered in its visibility that nobody really knows it's in the Park System. But that was another defeat. I am sure there are others, but I can't bring them to mind at the moment.

Dick: If others come to mind I would like to get some good examples.

Bob: One that we did succeed in defeating is rather amusing. There was a gentleman in Washington, D.C. who bombarded us for years with proposals to put into the Park System the Aquia Creek Quarries. These were the sandstone quarries from which they took the stones that they built the U.S. Capitol from, and he had members of Congress behind him, and he got the idea that the property was never legally alienated from U.S. Government ownership.

Dick: I thought George Washington owned the place where they took the sandstone?

Bob: Well this comes from down on Acequia creek. George Washington may have owned it, but if so I'll bet he sold it to the Government. Anyway, he got it in his mind that it had never been legally alienated even though a Richmond housing subdivision was being built there. He was able to prove that the Government still owned it and forced GSA to repossess it as Federal property. A Richmond title insurance company went bankrupt over it. Having triumphed then, far from getting it into the Park System, GSA declared it surplus to Government needs and sold it.

Dick: Can you think of some other examples where you succeeded in situations where the national significance was lacking?

Bob: Well basically we headed off Charlie Bennett's Southmost Battlefield of the Revolution proposal. Another one we lost spectacularly was Fort Scott, Kansas. That was another of Skubitz's.

Dick: That you opposed?

Bob: The whole Park Service opposed. Actually it was hatched very early in my tenure so that the opposition had been mostly before my time, but I joined in it and we lost that one. That gave Skubitz a contempt for Park Service historians, especially those specializing in the West, because on the face of it anyone who thought that Fort Scott wasn't significant couldn't be a very good historian.

Dick: Was Skubitz particularly important to the Park Service?

Bob: He was the ranking minority member of our legislative subcommittee and an amateur historian.

Dick: Bob, was there any real Polish support for the Kosciuszko place?

Bob: My lordy, yes. Every Pole in the United States jumped into the fray. When we had the Senate hearings, Senator Church of Idaho was presiding, and every seat in the hearing room was taken. The walls were lined with people, all Poles, who had been bussed down on chartered busses from Philadelphia. There was no seat for me to sit in, and I walked over against one of those big deep window wells in the Senate
hearing room, and stacked up there was a bunch of file folders, and the top one was labeled "Utley's statements." They had come prepared to quote me against me, with a whole file folder full of paper. Of course, Senator Church sitting up there was not about to say anything that any Pole could object to, and so we were in a real delicate situation that morning. As we usually did before congressional hearings, we had a briefing in Hartzog's office. Hartzog was asking questions that none of us could answer, so I went down and got John Luzader.

**Dick:** Historical questions?

**Bob:** Yes. I went down and got John Luzader. If you know John Luzader, like you he is a very tall and distinguished bearded man with a bald head and speaks in sonorous and erudite language, with a most scholarly air. Hartzog was so impressed with the image that Luzader projected in that meeting that he dragged him up on the Hill, and when he got a question he couldn't answer he'd call Luzader up to the stand. Well Luzader is not known for brevity. And Luzader undertook to give for Senator Church's edification every detail in the litigation over the Kosciuszko will from 1798 until its final adjudication by the Supreme Court in 1856. It went on and on and on and on, and neither Hartzog nor Senator Church could turn off John Luzader until he had finished his recitation. That was the last time that we took John up on the Hill.

**Dick:** Okay. A question that came from Ed Bearss. There were several questions regarding national significance. Let me read it. Did you ever sense that management was willing to accept substandard historical additions to the National Park System on political grounds? I think you addressed that to some extent already.

**Bob:** That's a loaded question from Ed. What he's really saying is, didn't you kind of prostitute your conception of national significance for management's political purposes? My answer to that is that there were occasions when management wouldn't have liked to accept substandard additions. I can't think of one off hand. I know there are none that we supported that I would regard as substandard. Even the controversial Maggie Walker house in Richmond Virginia. I was involved in it to this extent. After I left the Park Service, Vince and Bob DeForest, the black brothers that we finally turned to much earlier to help us with our black landmark program, were very much interested in the Maggie Walker house. Vince was an architect, and he had been hired by the people in Richmond to do a park planning study for them. They all wanted it ultimately to come into the National Park System, and Vince used to bring his plan to me after I had moved over the Advisory Council. I made comments and he would seek advice on how he could get it into the Park System. He came over one day just as Phil Burton was on the verge of introducing an omnibus bill, and I said if he really wanted to put this in the Park System, he should get the Black Caucus on the Hill to get Phil Burton to put this in his omnibus bill and it would go right through. Well he did that, and within a matter of weeks the authorization had come about. So, yes, I had something to do with the Maggie Walker House. I would not have given that advice if I had not felt I could make a case for that particular site.

**Dick:** Regarding national significance?

**Bob:** That's right. And that's true for a lot of the so-called black landmarks that Ed and others believe were improperly inflicted on the Park Service. There are landmarks that should never have been classified and I don't believe would have had I still been there, because I related to those brothers DeForest in ways that my successors did not, and I think I could have restrained their excesses in ways that my successors did not in regard to unacceptable black landmarks. But again, I think what we're reflecting is a deliberate and I think professionally sustainable effort to broaden the application of the criteria of national significance, not to admit substandard units to the System on political grounds. The System got some substandard units in some of Phil Burton's omnibus bills, but they were put there for political purposes as between Burton and their sponsors, without very much participation, if any, from the Park Service. One was something having to do with the American Legion up in Pennsylvania. We got some we shouldn't have but not, as Ed may suspect, through caving in on the part of the Park Service.

**Dick:** Okay, what you're saying is essentially that professionals in the Park Service did not have a great deal of involvement in some of Burton's legislation.
Bob: That's true. Of course, I had gone to the Advisory Council by that time, but that is my perception.

Dick: At the same time you yourself had a more liberal definition, a broader definition of national significance, and used that in your approach.

Bob: I used it in the systematic and ongoing national landmark program and I applied it when I was brought in on proposed historical additions to the Park System.

Dick: Do you think the definition of national significance needs to be sharpened in any way?

Bob: Again, I don't know whether it still has the same definition as it did then. If it is the same as it was in my day, I found it perfectly useful. Again, as we were observing in relation to the National Register criteria, what the national significance criteria ought to do is simply set some broad guidelines within which professional judgment can be exercised. And the very fact that I could apply the same criteria more generously and broadly than my predecessors is testimony that they are indeed broadly based.

Dick: What did you do or what can be done today to insure that the Service gets only national significant historic sites?

Bob: Nothing. The Service will get what the Congress tells it to take. Now obviously this is a relationship in which there is an interaction, and we may cooperate. The Park Service may cooperate in getting substandard areas. But the question, as you phrased it, is what can be done to insure that we don't get any, and nothing can be done because, as Burton demonstrated so vividly, the Park Service can be given areas without even being consulted.

Dick: You are also saying, it seems to me, that the voice of the professional historian simply is not listened to.

Bob: I'm not saying that so much as that the voice of the United States Congress prevails and is the final word.

Dick: Did you have a lot of contact with congressional staff members and Members of Congress as Chief Historian?

Bob: After Hartzog got to trust me, I had very continuous and meaningful contact with Members and their staff—both committee and individual members. I once almost had Phil Rupee of Michigan talked into sponsoring legislation to give us Mackinaw Island back.

Dick: That is something that has diminished considerably today. Isn't that correct?

Bob: That is my perception. I don't know if it's because of organizational constraints or because simply the present people would rather be doing other things.

Dick: But nevertheless, once Hartzog got to trust you he allowed you to go directly. Okay, that's an interesting point.

Bob: Another dimension of working with congressmen, once you are trusted to do so, is that you can deflect a lot of the heat from the top man by going in his stead to deliver unpalatable messages. I could take the heat instead of Hartzog, and he could later say, well it's those goddamn professionals, you know, and if they can't justify it, well I can't fight effectively for it. I remember one particularly graphic example of this when a bunch of people up in Scranton, Pennsylvania, decided that some old abandoned coal mines ought to be put into the National Park System as the National Coal Historic Site. The congressman there was Joe MacDade, who was at that time the ranking minority member of our appropriations subcommittee under Sid Yates. A very powerful person. Delaware Water Gap is in his district also. So a bunch of his constituents came in with a slide show to present their proposal and Hartzog and his number 2, Spud Bill, and I went
over to get the presentation. The lights went off and they showed us all these very colorful pictures, mainly of the various hues of a slag heap that's still glowing, and when the lights went on, lo and behold, neither Hartzog nor Spud Bill were in that room. They had fled and left me to handle MacDade and his constituents. This shows a good deal of confidence that I could finesse the whole thing in such a way that it would not reflect adversely on Hartzog and that it would make Joe Macdade at least not unhappy. Joe MacDade surely understood that this was not a valid proposal, but he had a bunch of constituents to placate so what more natural than to throw it on the Park Service. I agreed to go to Scranton and look it all over and make the appropriate reports. This is the stall'em. I did go to Scranton and did view all of those old abandoned coal mines, and it just kind of strung out. The thing is that the constituents had been appeased. MacDade looked good because he had been able to produce three high officials of the Park Service and then produce someone on the site. Then it was just kind of my ball to carry after that, and I had many of them being juggled at any one time.

Dick: This is a very strong indication of the high degree of trust that Hartzog had developed in you by that time.

Bob: Undoubtedly that is so. And he placed his trust in anyone who was basically effective, who could read him, and who could then do what he wanted done and do it without further bothering him. This is why Bill Everhart was so powerful in that era. Because he could do that. And of course, it was Bill Everhart who wrote Hartzog's speeches till he started trusting me, and then I wrote some of his speeches also.

Melody: What about the other Directors that you served under? Did you play the same role with Congress?

Bob: I did to an extent with Gary Everhardt. I guess with Ron Walker I did too. Yes, all the way up to the point where I left the Park Service. The heaviest demands in that regard, and the most interesting, were in the Hartzog era.

Dick: So as long you were the principal spokesman for the internal programs, after you had gotten Hartzog's trust, then you became deeply involved with the congressional side of things.

Bob: That's right, but not the spokesman. It was always a very tricky thing because Members of Congress are hard to deal with without offending. And when you consider that several different units of the Washington Office were all dealing with Members of Congress, to get them all speaking with the same voice was not easy. You had the park planning people that Eldon Reyer used to be in. Proposed park areas. They prepared all of the briefing material and dealt directly with them. Then there was the congressional liaison people. Their concern was mainly that everybody be happy. And then there were the professional people and Lord knows who else. Those three were always involved, and when they all went up together and were simpatico with one another, it could be a very effective team. But when they were dealing separately, without close coordination, they could create all kinds of problems. This continued to happen with regard to programming and planning for Fort Scott. Joe Skubitz's park. We'd say one thing and they would say something else, and Joe would nail us with the contradictions.

Dick: Did Hartzog let this kind of thing go on where there were several groups going directly to Congress? Wouldn't that create problems for him?

Bob: It wasn't a question of letting it happen. It just happened. You know, if Skubitz's office called me about something, and I gave him the answer without knowing that Eldon Reyer had told him something else, it looked bad. This was our big problem. Mike Lamb headed the Division of Legislation. They dealt directly with Members of Congress in issues that we professionals were concerned, often without telling us what they had done, without even giving us copies of the letters that they had sent out. Sometimes this was simply careless oversight, other times deliberate, simply because they didn't want to get into a cat fight with us. But it caused some real problems trying to lay out the annual program for Fort Scott.

Dick: Okay, and since you left the Park Service that ability to deal directly with the congressional staff or other congressmen or senators has diminished?
Bob: That is my impression. I have the further impression simply from being married to your office that there is a greater disposition today on the part of the Washington Office simply to dump a congressional problem on the Regional Office than there was in those days. I think it would have been a rare issue indeed in which Hartzog would have let his Regional Directors deal directly with a Member of Congress. And I think you do this all the time now. Bob Kerr writes letters of explanation to Members of Congress. Before, we would have got the information from the Region, but then written ourselves and kept the dealings up on that level, so that it didn't get out of hand out here, where the people are not so sensitive on how to deal with politicians.

Melody: Well, we may draft the letters. They all go back to Washington. Even those that are for Kerr's signature are sent.

Bob: Before he sends them out?

Melody: No, he signs them, but they do get copies. It's also a way of diffusing how high up the load goes. For instance, there was one woman who wrote President Reagan, but the answer went out over Kerr's signature. I would say it's a mixed bag. Many of them we draft the response, send it to Washington, and then they put it out for the Director.

Bob: And what I'm saying is that Hartzog felt this so important a part of his responsibility that he was not willing to decentralize it at all out of the Washington Office. And then of course that meant that he could hold the people right there on his staff accountable for any explosions.

Dick: But even though Mike Lamb might have been head of the legislative office, Hartzog didn't have a true point man through whom anybody who went to the congressional offices would have to go.

Bob: No, that's true. He was too much of an individual operator himself. There may have been someone in theory but not in fact. There was the requirement to coordinate, but then that didn't always get met. You better always let Ira Whitlock know what your relationship has been with a member of Congress. He's the one guy that's got to know. I don't know if he's still there or not.

Dick: Bob, you've discussed the black landmarks program just a little bit. Would you go back and tell how that began and proceeded?

Bob: Well, it all flowered out of the great black awareness movement of the late 60's and early 70's. It became very apparent to me, and we were criticized from the historical world too, that the landmark program was pretty much a conventional white history program that had no real room in it for much ethnic accomplishment. Of course, we looked on the landmark program as assessing what is significant in American history, not as singling out people or events to be memorialized in an honorific sense. The whole black history thrust was one of recognizing and memorializing achievements. But the landmark program was deficient in landmarks that could be associated with black history, and yet in all the universities black history was the big thing. So we felt very acutely the need for that, but didn't really know how to go about it. One way, of course, is to hire blacks on your staff. But there weren't all that many qualified blacks at that time, who were interested in working for the Park Service, and besides we needed some mechanism to give us respectability in the eyes of the blacks. We were all white, and even one black was going to be tokenism. They look at Horace Sheely and they hear Horace Sheely with that thick Charlestonian accent, and that's an immediate turnoff to a black from the South. I thought perhaps we could get at this respectability problem through the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History. That was headed by old Dr.(I can't call his name back). He was in his late 80's when we went over to see him. He had retired from Howard University in 1947. And he was the head of that organization. And Horace and I got in the taxi cab and went over there. It was in the portion of Washington that had been pretty badly gutted in the 1968 riots, and we both felt very much out of place in that old rowhouse that had survived while all of its neighbors had burned down. There it stood in all of its loneliness. It quickly became apparent that however sympathetic he was, he simply was from an age that was unable to relate to what landmarks were all about, to the modern world, and to the essentially political requirements that we had. So that kind of fell by the wayside, and I simply didn't know where to go from there until the DeForest brothers showed up one time. Vincent
Deforest was an architect, and he had known Hartzog in St. Louis. He came in to see Hartzog and got shuttled down to my office, and that led to getting together with his brother, who was a very savvy political activist, streetwise, off the streets of Cleveland. Vince was the starry eyed professional architect, and Bob was the savvy political activist who knew how to get things done politically. They both had a good orientation to history. What they came to see Hartzog about was to get the Park Service's support in founding something that they called the Afro-American Bicentennial Commission to bring blacks in on the celebration of the Bicentennial. That's why they got sent to me. Well I thought, here might be the possibility of getting this respectability in black circles that we had been looking for. Maybe these two guys could be our connection with the black professional world and also understand where we were coming from and be politically strong enough to go out and get us the money to finance it, especially if they profited from it. This is what happened immediately. Bob DeForest had already made the acquaintance of Julia Butler Hanson. I made the proposition that they—that is the Afro-American Bicentennial Commission—go talk to Julia Hanson and sell her on putting up the money for the Park Service to pay them to get us studies in various themes of black history that would produce black landmarks. It was as much a political charade as it was a professional enterprise, because we simply had to have the approval of the black community when all of us were whites. And so the DeForesls did that. They got us the money through Julia Hanson. She was utterly charmed by Bob DeForest. The problem then became one of trying, through these basically unprofessional people, to get, first, an understanding of what evaluation of historic sites was all about, and second, professional quality studies that identified black landmarks. It was never a totally satisfactory marriage between us. They were in the business of getting funding for their organization on just as generous a scale as they could. They were pragmatists, they were imperialists, they were very aggressive. Also, their goal was frankly to glorify and elevate any black who had ever done anything that might lend itself to the idea of achievement rather than of historical consequence. They dragged in all kinds of unacceptables. They were looking for places where blacks did things whether there was any integrity to the site or not. If there was a plaque on the side of a 50-story skyscraper in Boston that said here the one black man shot in the Boston massacre fell here, why this was suddenly a landmark. So there was a lot of tension, a lot of misunderstanding. We formed a committee of black scholars to process all of these studies. But they didn't do it all that well.

Dick: Did the DeForest brothers ever come to understand the landmark system pretty well?

Bob: I think they did, but they had their own constituency. When Bob and I sat down one on one with the doors closed, we had pretty good understanding. He knew where I was coming from and I knew where he was coming from. We recognized that we had different objectives that in some instances might be reconciled and others not. He recognized that I had a different bugler playing for me than he did for him and in public situations we might have to disagree publicly. I think we had a very good understanding. This is the reason I said I thought that had I remained the Park Service would not have been stampeded into a lot of the things that they got out of that program.

Dick: You said the committee of black scholars did not really understand the landmarks?

Bob: What landmarks were about. They too were typically black history types, which means teaching ethnic history in college. None of them had any real background in historic sites, and as you know it's very difficult to communicate an understanding of what historic sites are all about to an academic who has never worked in it. After that black committee got through, the studies went into the Park Service's consulting committee which went through all landmarks. The studies were done by various black scholars hired by the DeForesls on their Afro-American Bicentennial payroll, which of course was funded by the money that Julia Hanson was putting in the Park Service budget for that purpose.

Dick: These studies then went through the committee for their review?

Bob: They went through the black committee, then went through the Park Service's consulting committee to the Historic Sites Survey, and then through the Secretary's Advisory Board. So there were three levels of review. But at the second and third level, the ones that counted, you ran into two things. You ran into some people who were appointed by the Republican administration and weren't very sympathetic to the whole idea of black landmarks, or separating out the blacks for landmark treatment. They tended simply to resist everything. And then you had those who were frightened in the climate of the times to take any negative stance against something that had that kind of black clout behind it. You had that both in the Consulting Committee and the Advisory Board. So unless the staff could head off these things in the Consulting
Committee context, they probably were going to go on and simply get endorsed all the way up, because it was politically inexpedient not to endorse them. I don't remember who was making the presentations in those times, but they didn't have the finesse and the strength to stand up to Bob DeForest, because he was a very strong character, and so you wound up with a lot of substandard landmarks that really can't be justified.

Dick: So the upshot of all this is a number of sites come into the landmark system some of which you say could not really be justified.

Bob: Could not be justified usually in terms of integrity. I felt then and I feel now that the black experience was a major theme of American history. But it was one that did not lend itself well to illustration by historic sites, simply because sites associated with black achievements or black events were not spotlighted at the time or any thought given to their preservation until very recent times. So it was very hard to find good black sites, much less landmarks. When you do find some good ones, they represent a major theme of American history that deserves to be represented in the landmark program. Not necessarily the National Park System. But when you find a woman who was a bank president in the 1930's in Virginia, that is a pretty significant and rare achievement. In the context of black history, that is nationally significant, and I don't have any trouble admitting that I would tend to apply less severe standards.

Dick: In the interview with Herb Evison you mentioned that you felt the System did not have to be rounded out necessarily, but that you would pretty much accept sites that were truly nationally significant and also met the suitability and feasibility criteria and were not being taken care of. Do you agree with that attitude?

Bob: Yes, that is what I was trying to say when we touched on this subject earlier. I don't think the goal of the Park System ought to be a balanced, rounded-out system that represents every theme of American history. We ought to take everything that is nationally significant, suitable and feasible, politically attainable, and not being well cared for by others. No matter whether you have three times more forts in the West than now, no matter whether you take in more Civil War battlefields than now.

And as a final observation on this black landmark program, I don't look back on it with any sense of regret at all, or any sense that I would have done much different than I did. But I concede that many of my friends in the Park Service, otherwise my supporters, disagree with that evaluation and look upon the whole thing as a disaster.

Dick: When you were in the Park Service did you favor the deauthorization of some areas or do you now favor the deauthorization of some areas?

Bob: There are areas in the System I would prefer not be in the System and would not at all mind seeing deauthorized. I have never, however, supported any program of deauthorization or any individual proposed deauthorization for the reason that it tends to be just wasted time and effort that makes enemies for you. It is politically impossible, except in the most unusual of circumstances, to get an area deauthorized. Therefore, it is a profitless undertaking to go through elaborate studies every time there is a change in Administration to determine which ought to be deauthorized. For one thing, you can't get any kind of consensus within the Park Service. For another, the moment you surface any deauthorization proposal you've got Members of Congress up in arms. You've got a fight on your hands that is going to cost you blood, and you're going to lose in the end. So why even undertake it. I feel today as I felt when the subject was first broached to me 20 years ago that it's a waste of time even to talk about deauthorization.

Dick: Which sites though do you feel the Park Service might do without?

Bob: Well of course, we've talked of several today that as Louie Gastellum used to say were shoved up our throats. The Kosciuszko House. I would love to see that defrocked if for no other reason than personal vindication. I was very much against our acquiring Fort Stanwick. Even though we've sunk a lot of money in what is probably a phoney reconstruction I would not mind seeing that go down the tube. But it is not worth the effort because under ordinary circumstances you're not going to get rid of it. I've never had much use for
Fort Scott and I don't think it can be justified today even though we've soaked a lot of money into it. Nor do I have any use at all for Fort Caroline in Florida, which is a three-fourths scale conjectural reconstruction on a hunk of land that is not even the original site. But I might point out that these two illustrate what we've been talking about. Fort Scott, that's Joe Skubitz. Fort Caroline, that's Charlie Bennett. Those two are very powerful congressmen. (Skubitz is retired, but Bennett is still around very definitely.) Arkansas Post was forced on the Park Service and I don't think there is anything there that comes close to justifying it as a unit of the National Park System. I know there is not at DeSoto. The only thing at DeSoto in Florida is a long tradition of telling the story of DeSoto at a place he may or may not have even seen. And although certainly Horace Albright would differ with me, I think that George Washington Birthplace is so fake that it has little justification, except tradition, for being in the Park System. So there are some that I wouldn't mind seeing knocked out of the System.

Dick: What about Lincoln Boyhood?

Bob: Lincoln Boyhood I have never been to. I was very much opposed to it. It was a political thing that Hartzog hatched with Winfield Scott Denton, who at one time was our legislative subcommittee chief. I think there is very little there except a living farm now. I would not mind seeing that one deauthorized. We got Denton reprogrammed away from that and other proposals and that's how we got George Rogers Clark.

Dick: Bob, do you have some ideas as to what the Service can do to insure that we get only nationally significant historic sites?

Bob: There is nothing the Service can do to insure that you get only nationally significant sites, for the simple reason that the Congress is the ultimate authority on what goes into the National Park System. There will always be Members of Congress sufficiently dedicated to hatching substandard sites who are also very powerful in the Congress to make it likely that now and then that will happen. I think there are some things that can be done to influence the process. I think it was a great mistake to detach the Secretary of the Interior's Advisory Board on National Parks, Historic Sites, Buildings and Monuments from the Secretary of the Interior and nestle it down in the National Park Service. The Historic Sites Act of 1935 set up that Advisory Board primarily as a historic sites advisory group. The natural aspects were distinctly secondary. And it was set up by law as advisory to the Secretary of the Interior. Gary Everhardt got legislation enacted that made it the National Park System Advisory Board. Even though it may still be advisory to the Secretary, certainly it is now a Park Service creation. Certainly now it has nothing like the stature and influence it had back in the 1960's. Certainly now it is being loaded down with political appointees who do not combine their political credentials with a professional credential that gives them credibility. The time was when the Secretary's Advisory Board could head off many bad propositions. In the first place, by advising the Congress on the basis of genuine thought what is meritorious and what isn't. In the second place, by giving Members of Congress, the Administration, and everyone else an out for unsuitable proposals that nobody wants to back but has to for political reasons. Give them an out in that the Advisory Board has spoken against it. Members of Congress frequently sponsorship such a proposal simply because it sells back home. Not because they are convinced that it is a good thing. So this prestigious Advisory Board says it simply doesn't measure up, the Member can turn to his constituents and say here is this body of experts and they have all agreed that it doesn't measure up.

Dick: So this would be one way a stronger Advisory Board would be useful?

Bob: Well, simply to revive the stature and strength the Advisory Board once had. It has been allowed to erode. It has been deliberately cut down by Secretaries who were not particularly interested in it, and by a political superstructure that sees it as a dumping ground for people to whom obligations are owed.

Dick: What about a stronger landmarks program?

Bob: The landmark program was initially conceived in part as an alternative to putting nationally significant properties in the System. Gradually over the years it came to be seen (as it actually was) as the first hurdle toward putting nationally significant properties into the National Park System. Once it measured up to national significance, the only other test was suitability and feasibility, followed by an act of Congress. Generally, I would say that a strengthened landmark program does not tend to offer a viable alternative
because it frequently has just the opposite affect of so dramatizing the property that people believe it ought to be in the National Park System. It generates pressures looking toward that end. I think, on the other side of the coin, there are some practices in the present study program that, if eliminated, would tend to strengthen the landmark program. But you're never going to do away entirely with the pressures to put substandard units into the System.

Dick: Everhardt reduced the status of the Advisory Board by bringing it into the Park Service or attaching it to the Park Service. Why did he do that?

Bob: I'm not quite sure why he did. Part of it may have been some lack of interest on the part of the Secretary of the Interior but I think basically Gary Everhardt simply felt that this was a National Park System board and therefore it ought to be plugged into the National Park Service. He failed to understand the rationale behind the original Historic Sites Act, that you put this up next to the official in Government charged with government-wide historic preservation programs. Almost immediately we had an illustration of the defects in this approach in the National Historic Trails program, which the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation was responsible for. Those were historic trails in which national significance was the first test. The Secretary of the Interior's Advisory Board was the ultimate arbiter on national significance. But all of a sudden the Advisory Board is not up here on the Secretarial level, where it can enforce its dictums on the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. It's down in the National Park Service. BOR resisted successfully running those things through the Advisory Board. So it became strictly a National Park Service operation instead of a Government-wide operation.

Dick: You would like to see it back with the Department.

Bob: Absolutely. I think the Historic Sites Act was correct in 1935 in placing it next to the Secretary. This has the effect also of making the Secretary, if he's not so inclined, take his historical responsibilities more seriously.

Dick: You mentioned that there are some weaknesses in the study program, the landmark study program. Would you discuss those?

Bob: As I understand it, and I may not be close enough to be an authority on it, but it looks to me like the people who are doing the studies are being rewarded by the number of landmarks they produce. The tendency this is having is to de-emphasize historic districts, in which you might include large numbers of individual properties that hang together, in favor of a proliferation of individual landmarks that do nothing but add complications to the administration of the landmark program. I believe they may have done this on the recent space landmark study and they may even have done it on the recent War in the Pacific study. Anyway, there seems to be a premium all the way up the line in terms of personnel evaluation, and between the Park Service and the Department there seems to be a premium on numbers rather than quality.

Dick: A different kind of question with regard to national historic landmarks. Would you support the idea of nominating the Yosemite Valley as a national historic landmark? Or Yellowstone National Park?

Bob: No, I don't believe I would. I believe that from the standpoint of preservation of cultural values you have an adequate mechanism in the National Register to insure the proper consideration of cultural values. To name the whole park a landmark, either Yosemite or Yellowstone, is in some respects to substitute historical values for natural values as the dominant values of the park. This we can agree would not be the case. But the legalities of it might tend to get the two confused, and I would hate to see that happen. I recall when we put the Yosemite Valley in the National Register as an archeological district purely to insure that whenever they put a sewer line or what have you across the Yosemite Valley there would be archeological investigation and recovery program. That was the only rationale for it. Nothing but archeology was in the National Register. And yet do you think Gary Everhardt could understand it or even Les Arnberger, the Superintendent? They were sure that we had locked up the Yosemite Valley as a historic site and that historical considerations would henceforth prevail because of the National Historic Preservation Act. So when that simple and quite understandable approach gets so complicated, imagine what would happen if you designated them national landmarks.
Dick: I'm thinking of natural sites such as Independence Rock and Wagon Mound and Chimney Rock, which are national historic landmarks. I know that Wagon Mound and Independence Rock are, and I was thinking of Yosemite Valley as a very historic valley and one that is instantly recognizable to the American people. Of course Yellowstone as the first park unless Yosemite would be considered so. But it's from that perspective and it is more of a theoretical question.

Bob: Well, then there's no question if you are identifying the nationally significant historic place associated with the national park movement, both Yosemite and Yellowstone certainly qualify, and you've got huge gaps if they are not landmarks. Yes you would in your evaluation identify these places as significant for the natural values. Those are the values, then, that are to be preserved because the natural values become the historic values. Still, from the purely pragmatic point of view of the bureaucratic historian, I would hate to have to make Gary Everhardt understand that distinction because he resisted far simpler propositions than that.

Dick: Or any of Everhardt's successors.

Bob: Probably so, yes.

Dick: Bob, what are your views on the urban park movement, specifically Golden Gate and Gateway?

Bob: That issue was more prominent in Park Service deliberations a decade ago than it is now. It was a very hot number in the middle and late 70's. I don't think that it is nearly so insistent an issue now. My view at the time, and it has not changed, is that the National Park Service ought to be prepared to do anything that there is pretty clear evidence that the American people want them to do. In the middle 70's urban recreation was a big need, perceived by large segments of the population. The political process and its dynamics made it very clear that overwhelmingly the American people preferred to have the National Park Service run these. Not the Federal Government but the National Park Service, because it had great credibility. There were great efforts to get the states to run them. The politicians were still that the National Park Service ought to do it. In my judgment the message was loud and clear and not very arguable at that time that this was something that the people wanted the Park Service to do. I think when that situation is so persuasive the Park Service needs to respond positively and not drag its feet. Not only in the politics of the situation but the ethics. The democracy of the situation. So I favored us getting into the urban park business. We made many mistakes at these urban parks, I suppose Cuyahoga more than any of them. But the proposition that they dilute the purity of the National Park System in my judgment is not sufficient reason to resist putting them in the System.

Dick: So you see the System undergoing a redefinition.

Bob: It has. It has ever since the beginning. It certainly underwent a redefinition in the Roosevelt reorganization of 1933, when suddenly the Park System became composed of more historic properties than natural. And it underwent a redefinition in terms of these recreational areas. It may go back to more conservative times, but I think it is a living and evolving and always changing entity.

Dick: Both Lowell and San Antonio Missions are large historic parks in a totally urban setting. Have you visited both those parks?

Bob: I've not been to Lowell. Of course, I was involved in San Antonio from the beginning.

Dick: What is your opinion of San Antonio?

Bob: Well it is a proposal that I advocated when I was in the Regional Office here back in the late 50's. Down in our corner of the building, all of us--Erik Reed, Charlie Steen, myself--greatly favored San Antonio Missions as among the most nationally significant in the whole Southwest Region. But there were all kinds of complications then as there were later, many having to do with church-state. As a historic park in an urban setting, I think it's great. I think probably I would be similarly impressed with Lowell, although that's an entirely different proposition.
Dick: Bob, while we're talking about historic parks in urban areas, would you give your feelings on the development that has taken place in Independence National Historical Park?

Bob: Independence was controversial from the very beginning. Ernest Connally has called attention to the cross roads that the Park Service stood at when they took over Independence and probably without very much thought opted for what we might call a monumental or shrine like development. What the Park Service did was to go in and clean out all of the urban context of Independence and make a shrine out of it. The Park Service tore down block after block of old houses that very much resembled those that stood at the time of the Declaration of Independence. And so in effect, they destroyed the historic setting, the context in which Independence Hall and those associated monumental structures existed historically. The other approach would have been to historic district controls over that whole context and attempt to maintain the intercity urban character of downtown Philadelphia. Ernest gave that great thought, and he always came out with the conclusion that, whether we very consciously knew what we were doing, we probably did the right thing. Independence Hall and those associated structures were so overwhelmingly significant to us historically, and as symbols of a whole range of abstractions that go to the very heart of what this nation is all about, that the shrine type approach to the setting at least, the monumental setting, with malls and landscaping, probably is most responsive to the unique place that complex of buildings occupies in American affections and traditions. And I think I agree with him.

Dick: That was a very interesting response. Bob, you mentioned Cuyahoga Valley a while ago. What do you think of that kind of park in the System—we touched on that some—it's a somewhat quasi-urban park.

Bob: I'm all for it if the Congress will fund it and if the people want it. The fact that we may have really screwed things up there in the process, and made a lot of enemies and gotten a lot of bad publicity in the process of trying to make that a reality, doesn't detract in my judgment from the validity of that kind of approach. I think in these urban recreational areas the Park Service has simply got to learn that it can't draw boundaries around big chunks of landscape, disposes the people who live there, board up the buildings, and decide to save a few for utilitarian purposes and tear the rest down. You can't go into an urban area and do that without ripping out part of the heart. We made that mistake with Delaware Water Gap. We made it at Cuyahoga. We started to make it at Golden Gate. But I think certainly as exemplified by your approach right now to Hot Springs, that the lesson has been learned and that if we are ever again injected in a large way into the urban recreational scene maybe things will be done differently than they were in those prototypes.

Dick: How would you forecast the growth of the System will occur in the future?

Bob: I don't think there is going to be much growth in the future. We've always been talking about rounding out the System. I think the System probably has been rounded out in the natural category simply from the standpoint of the political complexity of taking in any more large natural parks. Redwood showed us the problem. History is going to continue to be made and, if there is any future growth on a significant scale, it is probably going to be in the historical area category, simply because history continues to be made and those are usually small, compact, and therefore cheaper and more politically realizable. Strictly from the budgetary standpoint, and what looks like an indefinite future of stringent budgetary constraints, I don't see the Park Service getting back into big recreational and urban areas in any kind of a big way. You may have an occasional political combination that brings one about, but I think even in the historical area category the budgetary constraints will be very limiting. So I don't see much future growth.

Dick: Hartzog mentioned once the possibility of the Park Service getting the wilderness areas from other agencies, or there could be some other kind of swapping among agencies, say in Alaska. Those might be possibilities for the growth in natural areas.

Webb: What about Big Sur, Tallgrass Prairie?

Bob: You may have an occasional aberration. I don't think it will be a pattern like we saw in the 60's and the 70's. I don't think you're going to get Big Sur. If I had to bet, I'd bet against Tallgrass, although at this
point it looks fairly optimistic. But those again are not part of any big expansion pattern. There are going
to be throwbacks and I doubt that there's going to be much in that regard happens. As a political thing, I
don't think that the Park Service is ever going to be let in to the wilderness areas, or into the National
Forests, simply because its ethic is one that can always be portrayed as nondevelopmental, single purpose, and
I just don't see that as having much political future.

One other thing that Hartzog did advocate with great vigor that I think has a lot more possibility is for the
Park Service to take over the operation of the overseas cemeteries dating from World War II. This makes
a lot more sense because these are American historic shrines in the sense of people coming and paying
homage. They are not battlefields like Gettysburg. I think it would make a lot more sense for the Park
Service to run those, with its ethic and capabilities, than for the Defense Department to run them, and than
it makes for the Park Service to run wilderness areas.

Dick: Apparently some effort was made to get the cemeteries from the National Battle Monument
Commission.

Bob: The overseas cemeteries are administered by the National Battle Monuments Commission. It's lodged
over in Defense somewhere, and it has been in business ever since World War I. Hartzog thought that the
Park Service ethic and our experience in maintaining and administering parks, which these are, fitted us to
administer them. There is a community of interest, certainly, between them and our battlefields here back
home. We were at that time exploring ways that we could work our historical commemoration programs up
into World War I, which of course is history now.

Dick: The battle monuments are the overseas cemeteries aren't they? The land is currently owned by the
host country?

Bob: I'm not sure about that, but I believe that the American cemeteries in France are on land that is
extra-territorial, like the land that our diplomatic facilities are on. I am not sure about that, but I am almost
certain that they are administered by American officials as American territory.

Dick: The Battle Monuments Commission is a land-managing agency?

Bob: Yes, it is. Bear in mind that these overseas cemeteries are not just burial places. They are big
monumental creations, both landscape creations and structural creations, in many ways like what you have
at Gettysburg. They are not battlefields in the sense that Gettysburg is, but they are certainly historical
memorials in the sense that we have memorials in the National Park System.

Dick: Bob, would you comment on the national cemeteries within the battlefields that we run in the System?

Bob: When we inherited battlefields from the War Department, we inherited active national
cemeteries—cemeteries that began with the interment of the casualties from the battle and have been active
ever since. It became the policy of the Park Service, quite rightly, to try to phase out those active cemeteries
as rapidly as possible, for the reason that when they filled up they had to be expanded, and in order to be
expanded they had to encroach onto historic landscape. In many of them, therefore, the Park Service faced
a political dilemma. The local people wanted to keep burying their veterans out at the battlefield, and their
Members of Congress in Washington would lean on the Park Service to make one more extension of the
cemetery. At Custer Battlefield, that went on repeatedly for all of the years that I was associated with it, as
long as Mike Mansfield was in the United States Senate. I think most of them have been either closed out
now, or everything is in place for them to be closed out once the current boundaries are filled up, which is
as it ought to be. Remember the celebrated case when Senator Bill Scott of Virginia faced that kind of
pressure at Arlington Cemetery and tried to establish Arlington West at Manassas Battlefield and had
legislation in the Congress to devote portions of Manassas Battlefield to the overflow of Arlington Cemetery.
That was a real nasty fight for a while. I acquired one staff member because the superintendent out there
was indiscreet in his public expressions of opinion of Bill Scott. They were accurate but impolitic. So one
Friday evening he recited his epic poem in the checkout line at Safeway Grocery Store reflecting upon Bill
Scott, and Monday morning he was a staff historian in my division.
Dick: The expansion of cemeteries has been the chief cultural resources management problem with regard to our management of those?

Bob: Of the battlefields?

Dick: Of the cemeteries.

Bob: Yes, I should say so. No other real management problem exists. Just keep them looking nice. I think also being aware that there is a shrine like quality to old military cemeteries. Certainly it reaches its zenith in the Gettysburg cemetery centered on Lincoln's Gettysburg Address.

Dick: So it would be treated like any other monumented historic site.

Bob: Sure, yes.
Dick: Bob, how do you feel about the exclusion of cemeteries from the National Register in the criteria?

Bob: Cemeteries are not excluded. They are included under certain circumstances along with other things like memorials and birthplaces. That list of exclusions—inclusions if you will—is an expression of the professional community that these things are not legitimately historic preservation, but also a recognition that in some instances it will be desirable to have them in the National Register. The fact is that you can qualify any cemetery you want under that exclusion criterion, which has to do with transcendent significance. In the local context, which is what the National Register is all about, transcendent significance is not hard to establish. It can simply be what happened down in the next block. I think this is one of several instances in which the maybe too-precious theories of the professionals has collided with the instincts of the people. If any messages come through to me over my 30 years in the business, it is that people have a deep and abiding affection for cemeteries and graves. They are fascinated by them. They will make long journeys to visit them, and in our parks graves always attract attention. So I believe that we need to recognize this fact and not be so resistant to cemeteries in the Register. There are plenty of them there.

Dick: If you were rewriting the National Register criteria, then you would either delete that reference to cemeteries or reword it?

Bob: I think I would reword that, yes. There are probably some other exclusions I would deal with too. I’d certainly do something about that so-called 50-year rule. There’s a whole series of things that could stand to be tinkered with.

Dick: Bob, it seems that the Richard Nixon Birthplace might come into the National Park System. You’ve visited that site. What do you think of it?

Bob: It may have undergone some changes since I visited it. Very shortly after Richard Nixon was elected, the congressman from that district, who’s name escapes me now—it’s Orange County, California—introduced legislation to put the Nixon Birthplace into the National Park System. I became involved with that congressman. I tried to make the point that it would not be very politic for a sitting President to assist in putting his own birthplace into the National Park System. But the idea did not die easily. So we went the landmark route first, preliminary to reporting on the legislation. Joe Rumburg, the Regional Director in San Francisco, and I went down there and visited the Nixon Birthplace. It is an unpretentious, working-class bungalow with small rooms. It was situated on the grassless playground of a local elementary school. So the historic setting was totally destroyed. There it sat, forlorn and unimposing, with kids running around in all directions. None of us could get very enthusiastic about Richard Nixon even that early in his administration, but because the Advisory Board, in connection with Lyndon Johnson, had committed the Park Service to identify national landmarks for every President just as soon as he took office, we had to go forward with a Nixon landmark. That seemed to be the natural place, even though the criteria are stacked against birthplaces. But as with cemeteries there seems to be an affection for birthplaces. Someday we will run out of birthplaces simply because, shortly after Nixon was born, people started getting born in hospitals. I think someday the problem may self-destruct.

Dick: Let me point out that there are some national historic landmarks that are simply rooms in buildings, such as in Chicago and in Berkeley with regard to atomic research.

Bob: That’s true. Those were bad mistakes too, for which we paid the penalty. But we prepared the material on the Nixon Birthplace, but Watergate overtook that whole proposition. I believe what happened was that a competing landmark, Nixon’s law office, came into the picture and had its promoters. It was also in California, and it might have been a better site. Birthplaces don’t tell anything but that a little baby was born here, and his birthplace was singularly uncommunicative of anything. We were taken up in the second floor, which is just a tiny, loft like room, and shown the very corner in which he first saw light of day. But Watergate overtook all of that and it died. I think no landmark plaque was ever presented, if indeed the Advisory Board ever dealt with the subject. But now we are getting a perspective on it. Now Nixon's
administration is more than a decade in the past, and while I’m not very crazy about that birthplace, I think that Richard Nixon ought to have a unit of the National Park System. I’d far rather see San Clemente or Key Biscayne because the world was moved and shaken at those places as it was not at his birthplace, but that is probably not in the cards. I think you would have trouble finding more than two or three or maybe four Presidents in the 20th century who more profoundly affected the nation and the world in a historical sense than Richard Nixon. I think it is important to preserve the approach of our historical evaluation programs that refrain from moral or ethical judgments. It has always been our stock in trade that we are identifying places of historical consequence and not places that we prefer to remember and conversely leave out places we would just as soon not remember. Richard Nixon was a tremendously significant figure, and certainly that period of history, for all of its bad memories, needs to be commemorated in the Park System.

Dick: The birthplace carries not much symbolism in my mind compared for example to the Lincoln Birthplace, but couldn’t you say that San Clemente is what he aspired to and was his during the height of his power.

Bob: San Clemente is not what he aspired to. He aspired to the White House. But San Clemente is the setting in which many White House decisions were taken and many figures significant in his administration gathered to deliberate. There may have been a lot of Deep Six plans laid in San Clemente.

Dick: Bob, you served under several Secretaries of the Interior. The most important ones I think were Udall, Hickel and Morton. Would you characterize them as to their interest in historic preservation or the National Park Service?

Bob: All three of them were deeply interested and committed to the National Park Service and the National Park System. Probably the one that we were most suspicious of was Walter Hickel, who came out of a purely development environment in Alaska and was widely expected to be very anti-environment and pro-development. Actually Hickel and Hartzog hit it off beautifully right from the beginning, and Hickel was very supportive of the National Park Service. We were less skeptical of Udall and Morton. We had worked with Rogers Morton on the Interior Committee when he was a congressman from Maryland. He was the principal driving force behind Assateague Island. So Rogers Morton had a very deep interest in the Park Service and the environment, although there was some apprehension because he was a conservative Republican. On the House committee he had frequently worked over the Park Service pretty badly and sometimes favored developmental interests when the Park Service would have preferred otherwise. Probably the purest of all of them was Stewart Udall, the one who most uncritically served the park and environmental interest. But you have to make a distinction with all three of them, between Park Service and environment on the one hand and historic preservation on the other hand. I don’t think Stewart Udall was ever more than superficially interested in historic preservation. I think he’s become more so in recent years, at least more interested in history. But he didn’t slight the historical areas because his commitment to the National Park Service inevitably had the effect of serving historic preservation as well as natural values. But I don’t think his interest really lay there. I think Hickel’s commitment really was National Park Service–doing the right thing and leaving a good legacy. When he went out in that great blaze of glory after being fired by Nixon, the Park Service was genuinely sorry to see him go. Of all the three, the one whose personal interest most reflected historic preservation was Rogers Morton. He was not only knowledgeable but very interested. Part of it was his wife, who was deep into historic preservation causes. But he had the right instincts also. And he got way out in front of us in that proposed Chicago Architectural Theme National Historical Park, which was supposed to spotlight the origins of the skyscraper through existing turn-of-the-century office buildings in Chicago. Rogers Morton wanted to move in there aggressively even though Mayor Daley and his development chief were resisting us at every turn.

Dick: Bob, Gordon Chappell has asked a question about Everhardt and Walker. He asked did we do much better with respect to historic preservation under Walker the outsider than under Everhardt the old hand, because Walker did not have preconceived antagonistic attitudes toward historic preservation within the parks while Everhardt did?

Bob: I would subscribe to Gordon’s question essentially as he’s framed it. Walker did not have preconceived notions. Walker wanted to do the right thing. Walker wanted to leave a reputation behind him. He had
plenty of liabilities that stood in the way of doing that, but after he began to relax a little, be a little less suspicious of the career service, he was not bound by preconceived notions. His main problem was that he turned all of us loose to do our thing as we thought it ought to be done, and lent his name to it, and then didn't know what to do when several of these initiatives began to collide and had to be mediated. He gave me free reign to go out and try to do the right thing by historic preservation in the Park Service. I and my staff went all around the Service to superintendents meetings and Regional Directors' meetings and portrayed our new initiative with Walker's backing. But then that backing turned to ashes when the chips were down. But for a year, or perhaps a year and a half, we were really flying high with the Director's backing. The field had not yet discovered that the Director's backing wasn't worth very much, and so they were inclined to go along with what we were advocating, however much they disagreed with the new emphasis. Then that began to fade because, first, of Walker's inability to choose among initiatives, and second, because Watergate overtook Walker as it did the whole Administration.

Gordon is correct, from my perception, on Gary Everhardt also. While his origins were not in the ranger service, certainly he personalized all of the ranger mentality that we associate with big trees and deep canyons and hostility toward cultural resources. His understanding was very limited, and his instincts were all negative. I shouldn't say all negative, but for the most part negative. He did make a big and serious effort that paid off to get Valley Forge, so you have to give him credit on some of these things. But the problem with Everhardt had less to do with promoting new areas, which he did effectively, than they did with caring for what we already had in the Park System, and there's where he fell down.

Dick: So his interest in day-to-day cultural resource management would have been fairly negligible.

Bob: It was not only nil, it was negative.

Dick: Bob, let's talk about some cultural resource management concerns here. Preservation and restoration, preservation and reconstruction. Would you give your thoughts on the policy implications stemming from the development and management of Bent's Old Fort on the one hand and Fort Bowie on the other?

Bob: The principles to govern historic preservation that the Advisory Board adopted in 1936 stacked the decks against reconstruction. They did not prohibit reconstruction, but there was that old saying—better to preserve than restore, better to restore than reconstruct, or some such thing like that. The preference was for preservation first. When I came to the Southwest Region, I don't think anybody ever thought of reconstruction. The fight was being conducted back East, most notably in connection with the Graff House at Independence. But out here in the Southwest, behind the adobe wall, when it came to Fort Bowie, when it came to Fort Union, there was never any other thought than doing it like they had been doing it for years at all of the prehistoric Indian ruins. You simply stabilize the standing walls and that's what people come and see. I didn't get plunged into reconstruction controversies until I went to Washington as Chief Historian, and there I was to some extent influenced by Roy Appleman, who believed very strongly that the first mission in historical area was effective interpretation of the story and significance to the public. So Roy was all in favor of reconstructions, and I guess I had got briefly into it in proposing Fort Gibson, Oklahoma, as a national historic landmark. The Washington staff very much opposed that because Fort Gibson was a reconstruction. My counter was that it was a good reconstruction. People could look at it and see what was there then, as they couldn't if it wasn't standing. That was still the thought in my mind when I went to Washington and Bent's Fort came up. Roy, who was my principal deputy, was all for reconstructing Bent's Fort, and so was I. When the opportunity arose to get congressional backing, we manipulated the paper in such a way that the authorization came about. So I am in some measure responsible for the reconstruction of Bent's Fort. It wasn't until six to eight years later, when we became immersed in writing policies, and when we were going out through the System under Director Walker's initiative to try to sell those policies—not as something that ought to be adopted but something that had been adopted and had to be carried out—then is when I and everybody around me became very vocal and vehement about reconstructions.

We had bad experience with reconstructions. Fort Vancouver cost lots of money and didn't add much to the scene there. Bent's Fort cost a lot of money and had turned out to be a construction disaster. Washing away in every rain. And we were coming philosophically to believe very deeply that expenditure of sums of money like that on creating something like that from the ground up, while we left existing structures such as C &


O Canal Aqueduct to fall down for want of money, simply didn't make sense. Also there was the experience that no matter how much you repeated to the visitors that this isn't the real thing, they still carried in their mind the feeling that it was the real thing.

Dick: At Fort Bowie and at Fort Union you felt the ruins were adequate for interpretation.

Bob: I don't think we even carried the thinking that far. The ruins were what was left and the idea was to preserve what was left and interpret what was left. I think it's only in retrospect, and as I have talked to visitors who were greatly inspired by these two places, that I have come to see both in terms less of a literal interpretation of history and historic properties and more in terms of sort of a monumental commemoration. Those wall stubs standing, on the one hand on an open prairie, and on the other, amid desert mountains seemed to have a very powerful effect on visitors, one you would never achieve through a more literal type of presentation such as we have, for example, at Fort Davis. Fort Davis offered the opportunity to go a step further than Union and Bowie simply because the walls stood almost to roof level. Maybe it's instructive that Davis was the first of the southwestern historic sites that a genuine historical architect got involved in.

Dick: Davis?

Bob: Yes and that was Charlie Pope. Our treatment was Charlie Pope's proposal. After years of experimentation at Fort Union and Fort Bowie, we were no closer to anything that could be called a stabilization technique that would keep those walls from melting away and falling down. As an architect, Charlie Pope said the only thing that would guarantee preservation was a roof. So let us in effect erect ruins shelters over these buildings at Fort Davis. We'll make them in the form of historic representations of the old roofs, and we'll protect the walls with these roofs. That's what was done there.

Dick: So the primary urge there was preservation rather than interpretation.

Bob: At Fort Davis?

Dick: Yes.

Bob: Well that was the justification. That was 1962. I think I was probably still thinking more in terms of interpretation, trying to achieve for the visitor a visual aspect that as nearly as possible duplicated what would have been seen there in the historic period. That was never possible either at Fort Union or Fort Bowie. They were strictly ruins stabilization projects. My thinking didn't begin to undergo modification in terms of the monumental aspects of those two until much later, when I began to see how these ruins situations affected visitors differently than the literal presentation of Fort Davis.

Melody: I guess what I am beginning to pick up in these interviews is that there was a very slow evolution to what we now know as either historic preservation or cultural resources management and that up through, say '66, most of the aspects of what we now know as cultural resources management was done more for interpretation than it was for the preservation of the resource. Would you say that there is some validity for that?

Bob: I'd say absolutely so, and I hadn't thought of it in exactly those terms until this moment, but I think that is an accurate statement of the situation, and I think the explanation lies in the new blood, the new perspectives, that the 66 act brought into the National Park Service. I would say the biggest influence would have been Ernest Connally and the new way of looking at things that he brought to the Park Service. Not new in terms of the historic preservation movement at large. Not new in terms of the way Europeans and even Asians looked at it. But new in terms of the way the Park Service looked at it. The Park Service up to 1966 was hooked on interpretation, as I was, as I look back in retrospect. And the new dimensions of thought came from people like Ernest Connally and Joe Waterson. Hank Judd was being heard now where he hadn't before. Charlie Pope had never been listened to before, even though he had been saying these things. This was new thinking.
Dick: When you speak of new dimensions of thought, Bob, and of Dr. Connally, could you be more specific? What are you referring to there?

Bob: Well, I think it has to do with the architectural and art dimension of historic preservation. It has to do with a preoccupation with the resource and its preservation in all of its elements that have meaning and significance. Before Connally and his crowd came in, we were interested in going back and freezing our properties at some significant date and interpreting what they had to say. This is an oversimplification because there were nuances beyond that, but basically that is what it came down to. I think Ernest and his people, if they didn’t convert everybody, at least, got them to thinking of different ways of looking at it—that the building in all of its evolutionary details said something beyond what was said by a building frozen at a certain time. Interpretation ceased to be the overriding consideration, although the tensions then became very marked between the professional interpreters at Harper’s Ferry Center and Connally’s people down in WASO. Connally was much more obsessed with the preservation of significant architecture. It all came to a collision in the Nelson House at Yorktown, which in Connally’s view was an architectural monument of first rank. In the view of the people at Harpers Ferry it was an ideal mechanism for putting on a living history production. Obviously the two approaches have major implications for how you treat the building architecturally. Connally opted for an exact restoration because it’s an architectural monument as well as the headquarters of one of the generals. The interpreters wanted simply a series of rooms in which they could stage vignettes of Colonial life. Connally won that one, but this represents the tension and conflict that developed after 1966.

Dick: So in a sense preservation took the lead over interpretation with regard to how a site would be managed.

Bob: No I don’t think it did. I think it represented a new way of thinking that entered into the mix that was going on in the Park Service. I think that conflict probably still exists to this day. I don’t think it’s ever been resolved one way or another. But it did have the effect of diluting the supremacy of interpretation and creating another dimension that has affected the way we do things.

Dick: You said that Dr. Connally was interested in the preservation of significant architecture. Does that translate over to significant original fabric in general whether it’s of an architectural nature?

Bob: Yes, very definitely. He insisted upon the preservation of the maximum of original fabric with a minimum of intervention by today’s architects and a very clear differentiation between the original and the intervention. This was carried forward in the final stages of the Independence Hall restoration.

Dick: Bob, back to Bent’s Old Fort just a bit. During the deliberations on that site, was it ever suggested that perhaps those walls might be ghosted somewhat like what those walls are ghosted at Jamestown.

Bob: Not to my knowledge. If so I never knew about it.
Bent's Fort was in the Midwest Region. It may have been even called Region two then. All of the studying was done there. I believe the legislative process may have been handled through them before I got involved with it. I do not believe that reconstruction was seriously considered during the authorizing hearings. I think that is something that surfaced later, when Bent's Fort was already in the Park System and we were wondering what to do about it. There was sentiment in Colorado for reconstruction. What Roy Appleman and I did was simply seize upon that sentiment and its manifestation in the congressional delegation to get funds authorized to reconstruct it.

Dick: But the ghosting of the walls was never considered?

Bob: I don't believe that was ever considered. I'm not aware that it was ever proposed before Franklin Court at Independence.

That was another reconstruction proposal. The archeologist up there, John Cotter, had excavated Franklin's home and was convinced that he had found enough to reconstruct the Franklin House. Well the architects pointed out that there is an awful lot that archeology does not reveal about architectural detail, and so in Connally's office the decision was absolutely and unqualifiedly against reconstruction. John Cotter then went over Connally's head and sent a blue envelope memorandum to George Hartzog saying the architects say this can't be done but I say, because I did the excavation, that it can be done. That opened up the whole thing, and there was a knock-down fight in which Connally had to take on Cotter. Connally won. I suspect Bill Everhart might have entered into it somewhere, and his creative people up at Harpers Ferry, so that the ghosting idea then more or less resolved that question. No, I'm not going to give that credit to Harpers Ferry. I believe that ghosting proposal emerged under Ernest Connally's oversight.

Dick: What was your involvement in this?

Bob: Almost none.

Dick: Bob, what is your feeling about the Franklin Court?

Bob: Given all of the factors, probably that was a good thing to do. That framework doesn't turn me on like it seems to turn on most of the public, but I think it was the best thing that could have been done. Certainly an effort to reconstruct Franklin's House would have been disastrous. I do feel very strongly that underground museum is a total disaster.

Dick: Bob, at Jamestown they have ghosted the walls of some of the very early structures in a kind of white brick. What do you think of that?

Bob: What they are doing is simply outlining on the ground. I don't know how Jamestown affects other people, but Jamestown to me is totally sterile. I have never been able to muster the least interest in anything at Jamestown. That may reflect a lack of interest in that particular period of our history, but I would much rather go down to Yorktown Battlefield and visualize the ramparts than try to figure out what it might have looked like at Jamestown.

Dick: It seems from this interview that you and Dr. Connally came around to an accord of some sort regarding the philosophy of historic preservation.

Bob: I would put it differently. I was not in a position to come around to an accord with anyone. It was a liberal education for me. It opened vistas that had never occurred to me before, vistas that were not at all prevalent in the Park Service. Maybe my particular value was at that time to be receptive to what he was saying, to be able to articulate it with conviction, and to carry to the field a sympathy that perhaps he didn't have. I could carry his message to the field and be listened to when sometimes he wasn't.
Dick: I gather then that he had a good bit of influence on your thinking.

Bob: Oh absolutely. It was an educational process.

Dick: I would like to get your impressions of the interior restoration or reconstruction, whichever, of Ford's Theater.

Bob: That had just been begun when I went to Washington. The only thing left from the time of principal significance were the four walls. About the time I got there, that's all that was standing. Everything inside had been gutted. It had been an office building and then a museum, so those four walls were standing and that was it. There wasn't even a roof on it. The idea was a total and accurate interior reconstruction, so what the visitor would see would be exactly what Lincoln saw the night he was assassinated. Hartzog had just taken over as Director, and Stewart Udall was quite new and very much concerned with Washington through his involvement in the Pennsylvania Avenue renovation plans with Nat Owings. There were some local elements working on Udall to do something beyond simply a reconstruction people would go look at. There was a very active element that wanted to make it a living theater in which to stage drama and other productions. Udall thought that was a peachy keen idea. And so therefore Hartzog thought so too. We in the preservation end of the Park Service were appalled at the compromises that would have to be made to make that into a living theater, but I don't think there was any great debate about it. Udall and Hartzog decided what was going to be done and never gave us an opportunity to argue. It was a matter anyway that was largely handled between Udall, Hartzog, and the National Capital Region. I don't remember ever being consulted about it. But the decision was made, and as the project went forward it was just one compromise after another. The original Ford's Theater was not constructed according to the D.C. buildings code of 1965. For one thing, there were steps that went down through the viewing area. From each row of seats there was a step that went down. That is against the fire code now. You have to have an incline or ramp. In some instances the D.C. authorities compromised with history and made variances in the code, and in others the code had to be enforced. The result was an interior reconstruction that closely resembles the visible aspects of 1865 but with major exceptions that the average visitor would not be likely to notice. However, purist that I was at the time, in retrospect again I have to say that I think the Udall-Hartzog decision was right. I think that far more use, far more public appreciation of the history, has been derived from the theater aspects than would have been the case with a sterile historic house museum.

Dick: The fact that it was in use as a theater at the time of the historic event adds to the validity of the treatment.

Bob: That helped greatly to justify what they wanted to do. I doubt that they were aware of it, but it did.

Dick: Bob, you said at Harpers Ferry in May of 1985 that reconstructions by the NPS could not be done without disavowing the capabilities of Harpers Ferry Center. Would you elaborate?

Bob: I've said that for a good number of years. It's a good line. We were told all through the 60's and 70's about that wonderful group of creative, innovative, and imaginative people that had been assembled in that setting at Harpers Ferry conducive to original creativity. The policy on reconstructions states that the Regional Director must certify that only by a reconstruction can a site be interpreted, that in no other way can public understanding and appreciation be achieved. Is Harpers Ferry Center prepared to concede anywhere that it cannot find another way to convey significance to the public? In fact, reconstructions came about based on management and political considerations. I can't believe HFC would agree to it if they understood the full implications.

Dick: Bob would you discuss your feelings about HFC's approach toward cultural resources and their preference for treatment of these resources?

Bob: What follows is an oversimplification and an overstatement deliberately done for effect. But it was my perception during the 70's that the people at HFC tended to look upon historic properties in no other sense
than as stage settings on which to create interpretive presentations. They had no other particular value and they were to be manipulated to the extent necessary for that purpose. Again that is an exaggeration and, quizzed on it, they would certainly deny it, but nonetheless this was what was manifested in their approach to interpretation of historic properties. That may have been a product of the whole living history craze of the 70's and so therefore may have receded into the background today, now that living history isn't quite so overriding as it was then. And perhaps there is some justification for that mindset, because after all their business is interpretation. It's just that I feel that interpretation should be making the historic resource meaningful to the public, not constituting the show in and of itself.

Dick: It might be more challenging to interpret a site with minimal alteration to the fabric than to have, say, the sky's the limit kind of approach.

Bob: Well certainly it's more challenging. It's harder. But another factor that enters into this is that the truly successful interpretation of a historic property rivets the public's attention on the resource and not upon the interpreter or the interpretation. So the measure of success is the degree of invisibility of interpretation and it is a hard thing for any creative person to direct attention away from what he is doing.

Dick: What value do you feel should be placed on original fabric?

Bob: A great deal. The visiting public has demonstrated over and over that they are obsessed with original fabric. Is this the self-same brick that Thomas Jefferson laid up with his own hands as he was building Monticello? Monticello is a good illustration of this because all of these things that are obviously done by Jefferson himself are endlessly fascinating to the visiting public in terms of original fabric. Therefore, our policies, much more than in other countries, put great stress upon original fabric. When I visited Japan I found out they're not hung up on original fabric at all. The design, the visual aspect, is the main thing to them. And they are willing to compromise with expediency. I asked them why a particular shrine had a copper roof on it. Well, it has a copper roof because that's a much better roof than was on it six centuries ago when it was built. I asked why a particular shrine was built of reinforced concrete. They said, well you Americans bombed the other one out of existence, and as long as we had to rebuild it, we thought we'd build it in something that would last. But here, our policy spotlights original fabric, and I think rightly so. It's a reflection of American sentiment.

Dick: Okay, we've been talking a good bit here about preservation, reconstruction, interpretive demands and so forth. Let me ask you a theoretical question. If Hyde Park Estate had burned to the ground rather than the fire being limited to the attic, most of the 3rd floor, along with all of the contents, do you feel you could support reconstruction of that place?

Bob: I couldn't support it with great enthusiasm. I probably could be persuaded not to oppose it. There are probably some monuments that are so significant that in a catastrophe like that they deserve to be recreated. I'm remembering the fire that took out that Russian church in Sitka. There were complete HABS measured drawings that permitted it to be totally reconstructed right down to the last detail. Philosophically, I would oppose that. But I have to admit that Sitka without that monument is not Sitka. And I suppose in retrospect I would have to approve it. Had Roosevelt's home burned to the ground I would have a hard time trying to reconstruct it or support it in my mind, or any other. Independence Hall perhaps.

Dick: The Adams Home?

Bob: The Adams Home yes. Now I don't know, I can't explain to you how I differentiate between the Adams Home and Hyde Park. Because I would be hard put to say the Adams Home is more significant in our history than Hyde Park.

Dick: Wilhemina Harris would argue with you.

Bob: Well I'm sure she would.
Melody: Hyde Park is one of the two places in the NPS where you have a President from birth through burial.

Bob: That's right, but if it burned down you wouldn't. You would have your recreation of one of those elements. As you do with the birthplace at Lyndon Johnson.

Melody: No, because Lyndon Johnson built the birthplace.

Bob: Well that's right. So it does not represent his birth, it represents his Presidency.

Melody: His myth making.

Dick: Bob, you went to Yosemite park last fall. What's your impression of Pioneer Village at Yosemite.

Bob: We liked it.

Dick: So did I.

Bob: Again, I no longer have to be consistent. I can indulge the luxury of inconsistency because I no longer have to enforce the party line. I thought Pioneer Village came off quite successfully. Here is an instance where those buildings would have been lost. Doug Hubbard simply went out and got them all moved into this one place, where they go together to form something that never existed, but in their individual entities they convey something. They are legitimate preservation, and overall I don't have the problems philosophically that I thought I had.

Dick: Would you recommend that kind of thing if you were in the Service now and similar circumstances, do you think?

Bob: Well, it would have to be an almost identical circumstance, where the buildings were going to be lost, where they represented something of value that would disappear, and where they could be preserved and interpreted for what they are and no more than they are. I think they've succeeded in doing that at Yosemite.

Dick: Bob, there has been very little reconstruction of prehistoric sites in the NPS. There are some such as the Great Kiva at Aztec, and there is a reconstruction at Bandelier, but why do you think that is, why is there less of that than there is reconstruction of historic sites?

Bob: I suppose because until recent years the preservation of prehistoric sites has been pretty much in the hands of the archeologists, with very little intervention from the architects. In fact I had to force a situation in the middle 70's or earlier in which ruins stabilization was taken away from the archeologists and entrusted to architects much better equipped to handle it. For reasons that I don't know, the tradition with archeologists simply evolved of preserving the ruins and not trying to reconstruct them. I know of no reason. I don't think there is any more justification for reconstructing prehistoric than historic structures.

Dick: Yet it was the archeologist at Franklin Court who argued for reconstruction while the architects argued against it.

Bob: That's true, but I believe that in the East, and in association with historic preservation, the archeologists are a breed apart from those who have handled prehistoric sites. A John Cotter or a Pinkie Herrington, their whole career has been built on historic sites archeology. I mean post-Columbian history. I believe their way of looking at things is different from that of an Erik Reed or an Al Schroeder.

Dick: Were you involved in any discussions on the reconstructions of prehistoric sites?

Bob: None that I can recall. I don't think of any reconstruction of prehistoric sites in the period that I was in Washington.
Dick: With regard to the policies on furnishing. Did you have any role in the development of these policies.

Bob: I'm sure I did, but I don't remember what the role was. It wasn't something I was ever particularly interested in.

Dick: Do you think the policies are properly restrictive?

Bob: I don't even know what they are now. My impression is that they may be overly restrictive. Requiring original furniture and, where such doesn't exist, prohibiting similar pieces. Am I right?

Dick: There are about three different stages of guidelines there.
Bob, would you comment on the quality of certain interpretive media at historic and prehistoric sites, such as films and slide presentations and how they might have changed over the years.

Bob: I think two trends can be identified. One is a remarkably increased sophistication in audiovisual presentations accompanied by some impressionistic approaches that offend my desire for the literal. I think that our audiovisual presentations like all of our interpretation, have been designed more for the design arbiters in New York who hand out the kudos than for the travelling public who may lack that sophistication. But overall there has been a great enhancement of the technical perfection of audiovisual presentations accompanied by what I would question to be a good content. The other trend I see is worse. It is an increasingly exclusive reliance upon audiovisual presentations to tell the whole story. This downgrades museums, publications, and especially personal interpretation. I think the true approach for any park is multi-media, in which you have a balanced approach that spreads itself among all interpretive media. The trouble with too exclusive a reliance upon the audiovisual is that it deprives the visitor of flexibility and forces him into a straight jacket created by some interpretive planner in HFC who has decided what he should know about the park and leaves him no freedom to decide how much he wants.

Dick: Bob, recently have you been particularly favorably or unfavorably impressed by interpretive presentations?

Bob: Yes, Melody and I went to Saratoga a couple of years ago, which I had not visited since the late 60's. It was almost totally revamped in all of its interpretive approaches for the Bicentennial. Not only the visitor center with the museum, the audiovisual, but also the waysides out in the park. And the only element of the new interpretation at Saratoga that we could approve were the old dioramas. Everything else in our judgment was a disaster. The film was a disaster, in the visitor's center. The museum was a disaster. It was one of these new museum approaches where you simply scatter objects around unlabelled to create a mood. And worst of all were the very juvenile audio waysides in connection with art work. The only literal and meaningful interpretation were those old dioramas from Mission 66.

Before we get off the negative, we stopped on another trip at the Lincoln Home in Springfield, Illinois, which was similarly a negative experience. The whole visitor center we found a turnoff. Such displays as they did have were not meaningful and labelled imperfectly. The audiovisual presentation was a mood-setting thing that didn't come off at all. The treatment of the Lincoln Home, much contrary to Ernest Connally's recommendations 15 years ago, created a sterile and open setting around the Home. When I was working on it, the home was surrounded by houses that generally presented the visual aspect of residential urban setting similar to that of Lincoln's time, even though the structures themselves came from a later time. For the most part, those have all been removed and the only thing left are the buildings that had been there at the time Lincoln occupied it. So the setting was very much worse than it was when we got the place.

Dick: I believe that particular site treatment created quite a debate.

Bob: Yes it did, but it was a debate that was all stacked in favor of the interpreters.

Dick: Wasn't Washington opposed to that treatment?
Bob: Certainly Ernest Connally's office was, and Ernest had been very heavily involved in the proposal stage because he had come from Illinois and he had a good rapport with the congressman from that district, Paul Findley, who was a Lincoln scholar and principally behind getting that into the Park System. So Ernest was very much involved, and he was involved initially in the planning. I don't know where along the line that got changed, but it was a very bad move, and it was done, I'm sure, at the behest of people who were predominantly interpretation.

Dick: That would have been a case where the leasing program would have helped enormously.

Bob: Sure, and even though leasing was not really in vogue in the early 70's, this is what Connally was promoting. Let's keep these structures in place and lease them back. Well, there is a Park Service mindset against that or was then, most prevalent in superintendents who want to draw boundaries around the park and exclude all non-park uses, because it's easier to administer, and that is the way it's always been done in the Park Service. That's beginning to break down some, but it was very much in control during those years.
Bob: Well we were talking about good interpretation and bad, and lest I be labelled totally a negativist, we stopped a year or so ago at Wilson's Creek Battlefield in Missouri. We both concluded, Melody and I, that in all respects the interpretation was very good. The new visitor center there is small, but it is a fine mix of mood-setting and literal interpretation, with labels, and the whole presentation focuses on one of these new fiber optics maps, which I found very effective. The onsite interpretation was good too, with a logical tour around the battlefield and good onsite interpretation.

Dick: What is your impression of the Gettysburg electric map?

Bob: I can't remember whether I've seen the new one or not. Yes, I have, that's the fiber optics. It is great too.

Dick: Bob, would you explain how and when the Service embraced living history, and do you feel living history was an outgrowth of a desire to bring life to our historic sites?

Bob: Yes, I think maybe we have already recounted George Hartzog almost accidentally originated living history at Hubbell Trading Post by committing the Park Service, in legislative hearings, and without any prior discussion within the staff, to continuing the trading post as a living trading post. He is very proud of that. We had dinner with him just last week, and he was boasting about the origins of living history at Hubbell Trading Post, and I believe this is where it did originate. In my judgment, that is the only place where living history has been almost beyond criticism and highly effective. I was appalled at the time I could not see Navajos exhibiting themselves to the travelling public in the trading ritual. But apparently it has worked and it's imminently successful. And it did indeed originate, as he put it, in his determination not to have another dead embalmed historical area. He wanted historical areas to have life in them, and interpretation just took that sentiment and with his unqualified backing ran with the idea and inflicted living history on the Park Service to the degree where any superintendent who didn't have living history was judged adversely. Many of the living history demonstrations are harmless, and probably they did some good. But the way this whole thing fastened itself on the Park Service like an octopus was bad overall for the cause of interpretation. I think that living history became a be-all and end-all in itself, an entertainment program increasingly divorced from the resource it was supposed to illuminate, and something that was expected at every Park Service area whether it was needed or not, or whether it was effective or not, or whether it was relevant or not. I guess as much as anything my criticisms focused upon irrelevance. What possible relevance was there to the Battle of Saratoga of a woman sitting in front of one of the cabins making candles. This has nothing to do with the Battle of Saratoga. I remember criticizing in vociferous terms the sorghum making operation at Chickamauga Battlefield. They had mules pulling that grinder around and grinding sorghum. The explanation of the superintendent was that she wanted to demonstrate that Chickamauga was not always a blood-soaked battlefield. Well of course, Chickamauga is in the Park System not because it was not always a blood-soaked battlefield but precisely because it was. And so therefore you interpret the blood-soaking process and sorghum-making has nothing whatever to do with it. More and more living history came to be a demonstration of folkways, and old ways of doing things, whether they had anything to do with the park or not.

Dick: Furthermore, it is fairly evident that the park was not always blood soaked.

Bob: Sure, people need not have to be told that.

Dick: The Granite Farm at Gettysburg attempts the same thing.

Bob: The Granite Farm has been one big continuing battle ever since it was instituted. The present superintendent, who has been there for many years, is just as dedicated to it now, as I found out last week in the East, as he was in the beginning. People enjoy looking at the way things were done on Grandpa's farm. You can't see that everywhere now. Grandpa's farm no longer has all those things, and it is interesting
to see them once more. But that is inappropriate at Gettysburg. It is irrelevant to Gettysburg, where you have so much of great significance that you cannot interpret it all properly because the visitor's attention span won't permit it. They ran a survey there recently in which they discovered that the typical visitor spends something like half a day or a full day at Gettysburg, and comparing that with all the major features at Gettysburg, and how long it takes on the average to view each, it was obvious that the visitor wasn't coming anywhere close to visiting even major features. And when you spread his half day visit to Gettysburg to include Granite Farm it is not just irrelevant but a distraction too. It is an interference with, a detraction from, the major features of the battlefield.

Dick: Bob, other than Hubbell, what are some examples of good living history programs that come to mind?

Bob: None come to mind. I have no real problem with firing demonstrations at Fort Davis. For a time they went out in their calvary uniforms and fired a carbine. So long as it's kept in proper perspective, it's ok. So long as it is not permitted to overwhelm the principal resource and the principal significance that you want the visitor to take away, it's ok. As for major living history programs, I can't think of a single one other than Hubbell Trading Post that I would say is not distractive and is relevant enough to justify the expense.

Melody: At Fort Davis, what you're capturing there the life of a fort. No really significant historic event happened at Fort Davis. It is mostly a matter that the fabric was there to preserve and by some measure you can possibly justify living history there because you have a chance to capture what a frontier fort was like.

Bob: The life of the fort is a major part of the story but not the whole story. But the story and the significance of Fort Davis are not confined by the boundaries of the fort, and so what you interpret are lots of things that happened elsewhere but happened because Fort Davis was there. Same at Fort Union. When living history demonstrations overwhelm the Victorio Campaign at Fort Davis, or the Civil War story at Fort Union, then they get in the way. But I've never objected much to what they have done at Fort Davis. Generally this Region has kept things pretty well in perspective. It's the eastern Regions where they have let it run away with them.

Dick: Would you say that generally the parks whose purpose focuses on a more vernacular kind of theme, such as a trading post with the daily comings and goings of the Indians, would lend themselves to living history more than, say, a battlefield?

Bob: To some degree, but you probably have Bent's Fort in mind, and there are plenty of significant things associated with Bent's Fort that you want the visitor to take away other than how they made buffalo stew or how the mountain man primed his rifle. My favorite one is the bread-making operation at Pecos National Monument. I've never been able to understand the relevance to the missionary and Indian story of making bread and selling it. But I have to concede that bread making at Pecos is very popular with the visitor, and most visitors buy some bread and take it down the road with them. And what is it that's going on inside the automobile as they drive down the road? They're not talking about the Pueblo Revolt of 1680; they are eating warm bread. Eating warm bread is a very fine experience, but that is not the dominant impression you want the visitor to take away from Pecos National Monument.

Dick: Have you ever bought any biscochitos at Pecos?

Bob: Yes, I think so.

Melody: We bought bread.

Bob: We bought bread, okay. It was very good bread. But then I already knew what the significance of Pecos was.

Dick: Bob, would you care to comment on why, during the 60's and 70's, living history came into the Park Service? Was it tied to anything outside the Park Service that was going on?
Bob: No, on the contrary. I think what happened outside the Park Service took off from what happened in the Park Service. I think this whole living history craze spread from the Park Service into the state and local sector and out into the private sector too, and really no historic site could be considered complete during those years without it's living history program. I think that all started with George Hartzog and Hubbell Trading Post.

Melody: What about Williamsburg.

Bob: Okay, I guess I'll have to back off, but I don't think Hubbell Trading Post took any of its inspiration from Williamsburg, and I don't think the craze that swept the country took off from Williamsburg either. I think Williamsburg tended to be more of an isolated phenomenon. I may be wrong.

Dick: I think I would disagree with that.

Melody: I disagree with you too, because I remember that during the mid-60's and early 70's there was a television program called "Williamsburg," in which they recaptured the life of Williamsburg and at the same time told the history of its preservation, and it was a fascinating story.

Bob: Well I guess I have to back off with you too, because now that you mention it I remember New Salem in Illinois. They had some of that sort of thing there too. So you're right, it is connected to other things that went on.

Dick: Old Sturbridge Village would be another example of that.

Melody: And Plymouth Plantation.

Dick: In fact, I think in a lot of ways interpretation in the Park Service, and also to some degree preservation in the Park Service, when the overall history is done would have to tie in with the outdoor museum movement.

Bob: Yes, you are right. But I wanted to point out that all of the examples we've mentioned are outdoor museums, and that goes back a long way and has its origins in Europe. And I'm not sure we're talking about entirely the same thing, when we talk about living history in the Park Service, as what is done at Salem or Sturbridge Village or Williamsburg. There probably is a connection, and there probably is some inspiration coming out of these outdoor museums, but I think what the Park Service then did with it was to democratize it, to encapsulate it at all of its parks in ways that to me are less legitimate than what was done at New Salem or Sturbridge Village, because these are legitimate portrayals of a past way of life that not only are relevant to the site but are the whole message of the site.

Dick: It ties back into their being somewhat closer to the vernacular.

Bob: That's right.

Dick: Now Old Sturbridge Village, for example, is not built on the original village site.

Bob: No it's an outdoor museum whose purpose is to interpret to the public the way life was at a given time. And that whole activity takes place on a stage that has been erected for the purpose. Right? And this is something different than Petersburg, where you have a genuine battlefield, where two armies fought, and where to have an artillery firing demonstration of weapons that didn't play much of a role in the Battle of Petersburg is of doubtful relevance and certainly distracting effect.

Dick: Bob, let's talk a little about the definition of living history. It seems to have a sort of a vague definition among Park Service rank and file. Would you discuss your views of what it is?

Bob: I guess I have tended unfairly to lump all costumed living activity as living history. The interpreters do make a distinction between demonstrations, whether firing weapons or making candles or other craft
activities, on the one hand, and the so-called role-playing, on the other hand. An example of what has been counted successful role-playing is the Confederate soldier at Appomattox, who sits there as if it were April 11, 1865, this effort is never to step out of his role and by word or deed convey anything later than April 11, 1865. We recently were at Sutter's Fort in Sacramento, where the interpreters for the State of California do the same thing. They are costumed denizens of Sutter's Fort, and there is no way in your conversation with them that you can blast them out of the historic period and into the future to acknowledge, for example, the existence of automobiles and other modern conveniences. This to me is just sheer nonsense. It doesn't convey anything worth conveying in the historic sense. It is a play game in fact in which the interpreter sees if he can outwit the visitor and not be removed from his historic role. The truth of the matter is that the sensations of the past cannot be recaptured today. And this is what these people think they are doing. This is what they would have you believe they are doing. What was cold to the people at Sutter's Fort is not cold to us today, because there were differing conceptions of cold, having to do with the clothing that they wore then and we wear now, having to do with central heating (and I believe Sutter's Fort is probably now centrally heated), having to do with the electric blankets that we sleep under and that the interpreter sleeps under when he goes to bed at night. Distance is another conception. What is distance to us today driving from here to Fort Union in an automobile, in which it takes us an hour and a half, was a totally different perception to the Santa Fe Trail driver who took his ox team from here to Fort Union in about three to four days. So there is no way you can recapture these things, and it is dishonest to imply, or to state, that you can, as these role-playing living-history interpreters do. I think this is dying out somewhat. I hope in the Park Service it is, because it is basically dishonest.

Dick: What you are saying is that not only we as the people who present these sites, but the visitors as well, are locked into the 20th century.

Bob: Absolutely, and there is no way that you can get out of that lock in the most elemental of human perceptions. Where we end up is that I am making a distinction, in terms of my approval quotation, between role-playing living-history and demonstrations where they are relevant, where they are kept in proper perspective. So that they are not distractive. Where they are simply supportive of the main thrust of interpretation I have no problem. Role-playing in living history I oppose on principle.

Dick: Bob, do you feel that the Park Service is responsive to changing trends in historiography?

Bob: I think it is a mixed bag. The Park Service should reflect the latest historical study in its interpretation and its presentation. Park Service should always be able to document for the inquiring visitor every aspect of its interpretation. So if, because of new research, we view Gettysburg differently than we did ten years ago, interpretation should adjust. Your best illustration is Chalmette, where you have discovered evidence that totally changes your interpretation of the Battle of New Orleans, and you would be very remiss in your obligations if you did not adjust your interpretation at Chalmette to account for that. Where interpretation is not keeping up with research, it is a lapse on the part of the Park Service. But there is another dimension to this thing that probably ought to be folded in here, and that is changing interpretation to reflect or accommodate to changing public attitudes. You may be aware of this fellow Bob Hart down at Las Cruces, who is taking Custer Battlefield as his subject, to discover the ways in which National Park Service interpretation of that site has changed over the years, not to accommodate new findings, although that would probably be part of it, but to accommodate new perceptions of the Indian Wars and Custer and of the military on the frontier as reflected in public attitudes that grew out of the Vietnam war and the Red Power movement and so forth. And I think you might find that, subtly and in unplanned ways, Park Service interpretation has changed at other sites to accommodate public expectations. During the Vietnam War you had problems at some of your Civil War battlefields, not only with the visiting public but with some of your own interpreters. At Gettysburg there was a man who insisted upon using his Park Service position as a platform for denouncing war. In the context of the Battle of Gettysburg. So this is probably a subsurface problem related to the one you are talking about, because historiography changes with public attitudes.

Dick: A study of the changing interpretation at Custer seems to me a valuable one, and one that could be an interesting topic for any number of parks.
Bob: That's right. Any park where you have the slavery element in your story, obviously you're going to have had changing interpretation reflecting changed attitudes in this nation towards blacks, towards Jim Crow.

Dick: Or Indian elements.

Bob: Indians likewise.

Dick: On page 74 of your interview with Herb Eversen you make the point that the Demaray administration allowed direct communication between the park historian and the Washington Office. Was the administration organized differently then, or was Demaray simply more liberal in allowing such communication?

Bob: For most of his administration there was a different organization in that there were no Regional Offices. The management line went directly from the Director to the superintendent, which would have made this kind of professional communication much easier than now, when there is the intervening Regional Office. I think, too, the Park Service was much smaller, and everybody knew everybody else. The professional arm of the Park Service tended to have more respect from management than is the case today, so that what the historians said was gospel, and there was not the tendency to ignore or contest it from line management that you have today. It was just a smaller and more informal organization. This kind of direct communication would be considered today by just about everyone, including myself, as subversive to the accepted cannons of good management. In an organization of the complexity and size of the Park Service, you could not tolerate that sort of thing in any sense other than functional communication that does no violence to line management.

Dick: Bob, would you tell why you think Hartzog decided the Regions did not need Regional Historians?

Bob: There was a period of two or three years in which there was no Regional Historian in any region. Some of them got reclassified as something else. In his first years as Director, George took a very precise view of management flow and personnel allocation. He strongly believed that there ought not to be duplication of effort anywhere. He had personal experience in this as superintendent at Jefferson National Expansion Memorial. He had Bill Everhart and a whole bevy of research historians there. The last thing he figured he needed was Regional Historian Merrill Mattes up in Omaha telling him what to do in history, because he had his own historians. And he carried it out. He didn't believe that you needed a Chief Historian in Washington telling Regional Historians what to do so they could look over the shoulders of park historians. And this was precisely the terms he put it in. Most of the big parks where there was historical responsibility had park historians. He felt it was a duplication of effort, it was not cost effective, and it was confusing to have someone second-guessing the park historian as he had been second-guessed at JNEM. It didn't seem to have any impact when I countered with the argument that well, then, you don't need Howard Baker as the Regional Director in Omaha second-guessing you as the superintendent at JNEM, do you? He couldn't make that transference. Obviously what you are dealing with here is a very special person, George Hartzog at JNEM, who didn't want anybody second-guessing him. That was his park and anyone from outside was interference. But if you're going to take his experience and translate it into the general proposition that there ought not to be any Regional Historians overseeing the park historians, logically you have got to go the next step and say there ought not to be any Regional Director overseeing the superintendent in his management. But he just laughed that off. In fact, it was simply a gut reaction of George Hartzog not appreciating Merrill Mattes serving as guardian of the historic resources in George's park, JNEM. And of course, of all parks in the System, that one needed somebody from Omaha overseeing what happened because there wasn't always the best judgment exercised. Probably the last park in the System that had a historian with independent judgment and clout was JNEM. Any advice George got from his park historian that ran counter to what he wanted to do, I am sure he rejected it. But happily he came to see the error of his approach, or at least I think he did. I think he had some bad experiences that resulted from bad decisions on the park level that were not caught in the Regional Office because there was no one there to catch them.

Melody: Also how about E. O. 11593?

Bob: Yes, that all came to fruition under the unfolding program under the National Historic Preservation Act.
Bob: One further thought with reference to the abolition of the Regional Historian. Shortly after Hartzog became Director, there was big emphasis on research, and there was a committee headed by Starker Leopold that said research in the Park System was grossly inadequate and there ought to be much more. That had to do principally with the natural sciences, but the Washington Office was reorganized in response to the Leopold report. An Assistant Director for Resource Studies was created, and history and archeology were both put under that assistant directorate with natural sciences. In the perception of Hartzog, history came to be identified exclusively with research, a research need that had been born of a big emphasis on the natural sciences. Much wasn't wrong with historical research. The consequence of this was not only that history got stirred up with the natural sciences, with all of the evil results of that, but also that in Hartzog's mind history and research got equated, so that in his early years he could never understand that historians had responsibility beyond research, that historians were responsible for advising the Director and the Regional Directors on acceptable practices and techniques, that historians were supposed to look over the shoulders of management to insure that policies and standards were properly applied. In his mind, then, this whole realm of what we might call management history, which is all the Washington historical division ever did, went over the side. And it was only after a series of blunders got bad publicity and got him in trouble that historians had responsibility beyond research. Only then did we begin to come to a proper assignment of responsibilities to professional historians.

Dick: Do you feel that in Hartzog's later years as Director, he understood the role of historians?

Bob: I think he understood it very clearly because I personally saved him a lot of grief. I pointed out things that ought not to be done and things that ought to be done from the standpoint of professional history. He could see the direct application in both the management and political sense. Yes, he became very aware of this.

Dick: Bob you mentioned the evil results of mixing historical research with natural science research. What do you mean by that?

Bob: These are two separate kettles of fish. The natural scientists define their research in terms of problem resolution. They have a problem, which they then devise a research project to solve. Historical research is a wholly different thing. You set out to find all you can about a given subject, for interpretation or other purposes. We have some problem-oriented research, but it isn't all that way. When you attempt to administer historical research the same as natural research, you get into that problem. Another problem you get into is the tendency of management to want to throw the two sources of funding together into a single pot and administer it according to one set of priorities. When that happens, the natural scientists almost always occupy the upper end of the priority list and history the lower end. A third evil consequence is that, given the nature of the National Park Service, a natural scientist usually controls or heavily influences the program. All of these factors indicate to my mind that it is a fatal mistake to try to mix, in a management, administrative, and budgetary sense, the two kinds of research.

Dick: Okay you said there was an Assistant Director for Research.

Bob: Assistant Director for Resource Studies. This was a time, in 1965 and 1966, when research was a bad word. Resource study was the euphemism. Ben Thompson, who had been the golden boy of the Wirth administration, was now made the scapegoat for many things in the Udall-Hartzog administration. So Ben, who had at one time virtually dictated the directions of the Park Service, now was squirreled away as Assistant Director for Resource Studies. He shortly retired and Howard Stagner, a natural scientist, took his place.

Dick: Was there one pot of money for natural science and history research.

Bob: There really wasn't any money for history. Historical research was done on the park level and absorbed in the park base. So all the projects were in the natural sciences. One result, though, was that history's management responsibilities and power were eroded very rapidly while we had little to do with research except create a lot of paper.
Dick: How do you mean?

Bob: Hartzog tended to look at the Division of History as concerned only with research when we had been doing all these other things. We managed to hang on to those other things almost subrosa mainly because Ronnie Lee understood the need and from his base as Regional Director in Philadelphia managed help us to hold on to those things.

Dick: Was Lee influential with Hartzog?

Bob: Lee was very influential with Hartzog. In the realm of history and historic preservation, Lee's word was gospel, and if it was not embraced and put into place it was for political reasons.

Dick: When Ernest Allen Connally came on board, did he and Lee see eye to eye?

Bob: They got along very well. In fact, if it had not been for Ronnie Lee, Ernest Connally would not have been brought in. There was the famous Lee-Brew-Connally Committee, which Ronnie Lee set up at the behest of George Hartzog in 1965 to advise him on how to gear up to handle this new law, the 1966 Act that Hartzog saw coming down the pike. Ronnie and Joe Brew brought in Ernest Connally, who was unknown to Hartzog and most everybody else in the Park Service except through some early HABS projects. So we got the law and the committee remained in place, it was apparent to everyone that, given the emphasis on architecture in the new law, and in anonymous kinds of resources, Connally was the man to run the program. And Lee said so. After Ronnie retired as Regional Director, Hartzog appointed him a special assistant to the Director based in Philadelphia, and so Ronnie continued to have great influence with Hartzog right up to the day of his death--great influence incidentally, that often constituted a short circuit around me, the official and formal head of the history program.

Dick: What problems did he cause you?

Bob: The principal problem was that I remained in ignorance of major issues, of the direction they were taking, until the decision was made, and then it was handed over to me, the formal chief, to implement.

Dick: Two questions. Did you generally agree with Lee's policies and did you and Lee work together well?

Bob: Yes, I was not all of that informed and assured a person. Ronnie Lee was the exalted veteran that nobody thought to challenge.

Dick: He was the Bob Utley of the......

Bob: Well, I suppose you could put it that way. Ronnie's judgments were generally sound when it came to preservation policy and technique. Ronnie's problem was that he was an idea man. He spun off ideas at such a rate that nobody could keep up with him, and he was not of a temperament to follow up on them himself. When I was appointed Chief Historian, I think Ronnie had grave reservations about me. He was very cool to me for several years-- formally courteous but not much more. Enjoying a direct pipeline to Hartzog, the two just simply froze me out for a long time on major issues. But by the time we got the 66 act, Ronnie had come to believe that I probably could follow in his footsteps. He and Herb Kahler insisted that I be the one to carry out the responsibilities under the Act in history. I learned subsequently that Hartzog had no intention of appointing me Chief Historian in the new organization. I did not know this at the time. I did not realize my position was imperiled at all.

Dick: Excuse me, even before you came on board you're saying, your position was imperiled......

Bob: No I was appointed Chief Historian in 1964. We got the '66 act two years later. Hartzog had in mind a high-powered management team with academic credentials that nobody could quarrel with. Of the three--Ernest Connally, John Corbett, and myself--I was the only one who did not have a Ph.D and Hartzog regarded a Ph.D as essential in all three of those top positions. He felt a tremendous competition with
Dillon Ripley and the Smithsonian Institution, and all of those people over there had Ph.D's. Ronnie Lee, backed by Herb Kahler, Joe Brew, and Ernest Connally, went to Hartzog and said that while I might not have a Ph.D, I had a stature in the professional world that was as good as a Ph.D and that therefore I ought to get the job that I already held. And so I am sure that by 1967 Ronnie Lee had come around. But there were many straws in the wind both at the time and later that left no question in my mind that I was not originally his candidate. I don't think he had a candidate. There weren't very many.

Dick: No one ever hears anything about Hartzog's Deputy Director. Did you have much of a relationship with these people, and were they interested in cultural resources?

Bob: Let's see, the first Deputy Director (he was called Associate Director when I came on board) was Clark Stratton. His background was design and construction and he was an old line Park Service builder and a really first-class person. Everybody loved Clark Stratton. His place was taken by Spud Bill, whom I had worked with here in Southwest Region when he was the No. 2 man. Then he was followed by Tom Flynn, who held the post for many years. Tom was originally a political appointee in the Department under the Eisenhower Administration who took refuge in a career job in the Park Service when the Democrats came in 1961. All three of these men were really very good Deputy Directors. But I think one would have to say that all three functioned more as technicians, as doers and gofers, than as people with philosophical approaches that might be different from George Hartzog's. I am sure Spud Bill had different ideas than George, but it would never have occurred to him to dispute George. I am sure Tom Flynn didn't because he was a mechanic, a political mechanic from on high, and so he probably was the one who served Hartzog most effectively simply because he had no judgments, other than tactical, independent from Hartzog. I worked very well with all three of these men and respected and was friendly with them. Howard Baker was up there on the corridor for a time too, and while he and I differed philosophically and in many other ways, Howard was an old veteran that another veteran could appreciate. But he may not have been Deputy Director, he may have been only Assistant Director for Operations. Then of course Russ Dickensen served as Deputy Director after Flynn and Hartzog left. He was a good one, and I got along well with him. As for philosophical beliefs. I don't believe that any of them had any real empathy or sensitivity to cultural resources. Their interest in it, as I have indicated, was a tactical interest and derived from whatever interest George Hartzog had at the time.

Dick: Bob, in your career in Washington at what point was there the strongest interest in cultural resources by the Directorate?

Bob: Unquestionably the period after the enactment of the 1966 law, roughly from 1967 through 1969. Interest was at an all-time high. Ernest Connally was flying high and had been brought in with the mandate to give the United States a program fully as good as that of France or other European countries. After that, probably beginning about the time that Hartzog sent all of our research personnel from Connally's office up to the new service center on Wisconsin Avenue, there tended to be a countervailing trend of mixing it back up again. I think this began as a deliberate move to prevent Ernest Connally from becoming too independently powerful of the Director. This was the first move not only toward heading off the growth of the organization Connally had been promised but actually a retrogression from the levels we had achieved by 1969.

Dick: Bob, Hartzog was a difficult person to take on if he opposed you. Do you recall any particular incidents where you and he were at loggerheads on issues?

Bob: Not after the first collision that we mentioned over the Pennsylvania Avenue Plan of Nat Owings and most particularly the Willard Hotel. That represented a headon collision that could and should have been avoided if I had had a little better sense of how one operates on the Washington level. After that I had many disagreements with Hartzog but never a collision in which I came away all bashed up like I did in that first one. Subsequently, where there were differences of approach, of course he was the Director, and if I or we couldn't persuade him to do otherwise, we did what he said to do. Frequently you find compromises, and in fact this was a principal role I played the last few years-- finding that narrow pathway on which he and I could walk comfortably.
Dick: Did Hartzog want to hear your opinion on most issues?

Bob: Yes. When you say me, I think we need to think about that more generically as the professionals in history, architecture, and archeology. Yes. He wanted to know the professional evaluation before he went and did whatever he had to do. If consistent with his political responsibilities and his managerial instincts, he could do what the professionals said he ought to do, and that was great. If not, he had no compunctions at all about going forth in direct contradiction to what the professionals said, and of course, this is what management is all about.

Dick: Bob, can you say when or where the positions of Regional Historian, Regional Archeologist, Regional Historical Architect and Regional Curator were first established?

Bob: Regional Historian and Regional Archeologist go back to the Historic Sites Act and were well-established parts of the organization from the very beginning of the Regional structure in 1939. Regional Historical Architect dates from after the 1966 Act. The idea under Connally's leadership was that we had three principal disciplines--history, architecture, and archeology--each of which needed to be represented by a Regional professional. Regional Architect had been a position from the beginning, but it was not concerned, except marginally, with historic preservation. Regional Curator does not come into the picture until much later, probably the middle 70's. No, I take that back there were Regional Curators in the Division of Interpretation concerned with museum objects. Frank Smith was Regional Curator here when I was Regional Historian, but that was a position in the Division of Interpretation and it was not tied in to cultural resource management as we know it today. Organizationally, that came only in the mid-70's, with the creation of the post of Chief Curator in Washington. I'll have to back up again, because Harold Peterson was Chief Curator for many years, but again it was in the Division of Interpretation. What we know today dates from the middle 70's with a Chief Curator under the Associate Director for Cultural Resource Management and Regional Curators in the same sort of organization.

Dick: The Regional Archeologists were not removed by Hartzog as were the Regional Historians.

Bob: I don't believe they were. And the Regional Historians weren't just demolished all of a sudden. It happened through attrition. When John Hussey retired in San Francisco, I don't believe they replaced him. When Frank Barnes retired in Philadelphia, Jim Holland, and so forth, they were not replaced. Merrill Mattes was demolished. He was taken out of Omaha and sent to San Francisco in the Design and Construction Office. In Hartzog's mind, Regional Archeologists may have been ticketed for extinction also, but John Cotter certainly remained until his retirement in Philadelphia. So did Pinkie Herrington in Richmond, and so forth. Southwest, Charlie Steen remained. So they did not disappear before the Regional Historians came back. I suspect it was principally Historians who were under Hartzog's skin. They were the ones who suffered.

Dick: Did Mattes and Hartzog not get along?

Bob: Not at all.

Dick: What were the problems?

Bob: Merrill Mattes simply took seriously his responsibility of making sure that proper care was taken of the historic resources of the parks and he didn't hesitate to express his opinion to the superintendent and to come back and to put it down in a memorandum to the Regional Director. Whether the recommendation was accepted or not, a record existed against future consequences. I think that George simply did not like this interference in his park when he had his own historian. So it was very definitely a matter of personality conflict, among other things.

Dick: Bob, it's been said that Ernest Connally and the Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation were considered a breed apart the old line organization. To what extent do you think this is true?
Bob: It's absolutely true. Most of the buildup of that organization came from right off the street, from academia—the buildup, that is, to take care of the new external historic preservation programs authorized by the 66 Act. Many of these people tended to be pedantic and perhaps excessively imbued with their academic credentials, and in any case temperamentally separated from the old line ranger tradition. It worked both ways, because these people tended to look condescendingly on the old line rangers. Some of this was personalized in Ernest Connally vis-a-vis, say, Frank Kowski. That personalized the issue you are talking about right there. They come from wholly different traditions, and while they could josh and exchange banter it was an uncomfortable sort of thing, and when it came to professional concerns, neither meshed with the other at all. This sort of thing existed all the way down the two chains of command—the chain descending from Connally and that descending from Hartzog. It was not a problem I ever had because I came out of the grey-and-the-green, but I was still accepted by the people who came in when Connally came in. So I was sort of a bridge between the two. John Corbett and Zorro Bradley could have been a similar bridge, but they weren't because they could not adjust to the new dispensation under Connally and persisted in working against him and exclusively for the cause of archeology. So I was about the only high-ranking bridge between the two organizations. And I may add that the problem existed up to this very day, and I consider it still a very serious problem for the Park Service. It is now more serious because you are mingling in the same organization the external and internal programs, and you have people who came out of the external tradition, who've had very little park experience, in positions of high responsibility for park cultural resources. It is not working well.

Dick: Bob to what extent did Connally and his staff foster and/or seek to dispel this dichotomy, if it existed?

Bob: The dichotomy existed. Ernest never did anything about it, deliberately and consciously, to my knowledge, because I think he simply closed his eyes to its existence. Ernest would go to the Regional Directors' meetings and come away with a different perception than I as to his acceptance by the Regional Directors. He believed that simply by sitting around and drinking and bantering in the evening, this signified acceptance. It did not. But I don't think he ever realized that, because he would come back and tell me how well he got along with good old Frank Kowski and Len Volz. My sources of information from elsewhere had them making fun of him behind his back, because he was a man of cultured ways and affected gestures and a vocabulary and manner of speech that made them all feel inferior. Nothing was ever done, but so far as it was done I guess you'd have to say I did it. And in the later years, when I was Assistant Director for the inpark stuff, he left all of that pretty much to me, so that I was the one visible and appearing out with the Regional Directors and the superintendents while he pretty much concerned himself with the external programs.
Dick: Bob let's discuss the archeologists in the Park Service just a bit. They seem to have been kind of a breed apart from the historians. Not in power, as far as Washington goes, and yet independent and sort of carrying on their own programs. Would you discuss archeology in the Service?

Bob: You have pretty accurately defined the status that they occupied for a good number of years. I suspect really you have two separate archeological traditions growing up in the Park Service. The one that we all think of is the big southwestern Anasazi ruins complexes which fostered a whole generation of National Park Service archeologists. This is the group that we mostly think of. There was a second tradition, though, that grew up in the East. The historic sites archeologists are exemplified by people like Pinkie Herrington and John Cotter. They were much more closely identified with the historians and aren't subject to the generalization that you just made, which I think applies largely to that southwestern tradition. They've joked over the years about the adobe wall behind which Southwest Region has always done its own thing no matter what the leadership in Washington. And that adobe wall is principally a creation of the archeologists. John Corbett, who was for many years the Chief Archeologist of the Park Service, came out of that southwestern tradition, and his alliances were mainly with those people-- people like Erik Reed and Charlie Steen and Al Schroeder and so forth. I believe that the archeological profession, in this prehistoric complexion, has been almost entirely uninterested in anything but their own archeological concerns, so they have not tended to rise to any positions of responsibility beyond the discipline of archeology simply because they have not cared for what was going on elsewhere in the Park Service if it did not affect them. What Connally was trying to do when he came in 1967 was to build a truly interdisciplinary monument service in which history, architecture, and archeology would all combine to do their separate things together so that they produced a unified program in which all three were represented. When you have a historic structures project, whether it is prehistory or history, whether it is inside the Park System or outside the Park System, you need all three disciplines. You need the historians to mine the documents, you need the archeologists to dig under the ground, and you need the architects to take apart the structure and put it back together. It was Connally's dream to fold all three of those together. This ran counter to the habits of the archeologists, and they did not loyally cooperate with his purpose. That led to a good deal of stress on the Washington level, where John Corbett was by seniority supposed to be Connally's chief deputy. But Corbett could not comfortably or loyally or sincerely cooperate in what Connally had been brought in to do. Zorro Bradley, who was Corbett's deputy, could not do so either. And they kept the field archeologists stirred up in opposition, if not hostility, to Connally. So defacto, if not dejure, I was Connally's deputy. Hartzog insisted on the organization chart showing Corbett as the deputy, but acquiesced in my functioning that way. It was subsequently ratified as Corbett fell by the wayside. Finally, after a number of years of considerable stress, Corbett was retired. Zorro, because he couldn't participate loyally, was sent off to Alaska, where he made a great name for himself. Rex Wilson was brought in because he was a person with the requisite grade who unquestionably was loyal to Connally and his goals.

Dick: Why couldn't Bradley and Corbett participate loyally? What was the real problem there?

Bob: I don't think it was anything diabolical or sinister. I think it was simply a product of their upbringing in the Park Service, a product of the traditions that archeology had enjoyed in the Park Service of doing their own thing without major interference from management or anyone else. In fact, about 1971 or 72, at the time that Corbett was being retired, Charles McGimsey of the University of Arkansas, who was a big name in the archeological profession, launched a major effort in the archeological fraternity to break archeology off from the Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation and set it up as a parallel office on the same level as Connally, with, you guessed it, McGimsey as the chief of the office. Because of all of the fuss and hassle that Hartzog had to endure from archeologists, he was at least intrigued by this proposition, because bear in mind that whatever you might say about the archeologists, for many years they had been organized in a politically effective way and could mount a significant voice in the Congress when it came time to pass out the money. Joe Brew had connections with the committee chiefs and knew how to testify. The man in Seattle, Dick Daugherty, he was even a member of the Advisory Council, he was tied closely to Scoop Jackson. And so the archeologists could deliver the money and the political influence, and that appealed greatly to Hartzog. The architects couldn't. No one could have been more innocent than architectural
historians and historical architects when it came to manipulating the forces on Capitol Hill. And historians, of course, were not much ahead of the architects. So the archeologists could deliver on the Hill. And they therefore constituted a force within the Park Service far beyond what they should have. The motivations of the archeologists did not have predominately to do with the cultural resources of the National Park System. The origins of their political influence were external to the Park System. They went back to the formation of the Committee for the Recovery of Archeological Remains in the late 1940's, when the Missouri Basin Dam building program got underway, and proliferated with the Reservoir Salvage Act of 1961, and then of course you had the highway program and all these pipelines that were multiplying across the country, and what the archeologists were primarily concerned with was what was then called salvage--getting the Feds to put up the money to salvage the archeology before they built the dams and highways. These were big bucks, and since the Park Service was the agency primarily concerned with administering these programs, even though they were for the Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation, the archeological lobby had a very close connection with the National Park Service, because it was through the Park Service that they worked on the Hill to realize their aims. But this activity led logically, when we began to undergo the tensions attendant on the Historic Preservation Act of 66, to a concern with what happened inside the Park System as well as outside.

Dick: Okay, the archeologists or archeology in the Park Service today seems to me to be more integrated with cultural resource management activities. Do you think it is?

Bob: Yes, I think it is. I think this had come about in the last 15 years after the principal naysayers were sent their way on the Washington level and archeology became truly integrated on the Washington level. I think that has carried down the chain of command through the Regions and the parks. I wouldn't say the integration is complete or ideal. I wouldn't say it is nearly so effective as the unity between architects and history because it still seems to be a feature of the archeological mindset that they are not even today particularly interested in things going on outside their profession. So more than architects and historians they tend, if one can generalize, to be parochial, professionally parochial. But organizationally they are integrated, and to a large extent they work together well in pursuing projects where all three are concerned.

Bob: On page 26 of your interview with Herb Evison you say that research had been a pretty much catch-as-catch can proposition on the park level and the Washington Office had never been concerned with the research program. This was up to about the Hartzog era. Would you comment on the implications of this regarding the resource management up to that time?

Bob: It would be a mixed bag. In those parks where the park historian was a good researcher as well as a good interpreter and resource manager (although that term was not coined at that time), and where the superintendent permitted the historian to engage in this research, the implication for resource management was very positive, because you had a good park historian doing all of the things that park historians should do. In parks that had less competent historians, less competent superintendents, or did not have historians at all because of their size, they suffered. What happened with the Hartzog era was systematization of research in the Park Service. It was taken away almost altogether from the park level, so that you instantly lost the benefit in those parks where it was having a benefit. But now the research was spread around the Park System wherever it was needed, and performed by professional research historians. For resource management, beginning with the Hartzog era, you tended to have a more even distribution of the benefits of research than previously and so therefore a more even distribution of resource management capabilities, which is to say that all parks were getting about the same thing.

Dick: Historical research was taken from the Washington Office, Division of History in 1970 and placed in what ultimately became the Denver Service Center. Did you support or oppose this move and why?

Bob: Well, we discussed this before. All of us in Connally's office opposed it as vigorously as we knew how. That had no effect. The decision had been made. Ernest may have had the opportunity to argue against it, but I am sure that it had no effect whatever on the decision. I think Hartzog had made up his mind, and as I think I have indicated, it was primarily because Hartzog saw Connally as getting too much power, and this was one way in cutting it down. But in my judgment it was a major breaking of faith with Connally from what he had been promised when he was brought into this job, and it was a severe setback for Hartzog's own
goals of building up a monument service that he could point to with pride from anywhere in the world. Once he began that erosion it was no longer possible to realize the goal that he had set for himself in 1966. There is a certain tragedy in that because I believe that historic preservation was probably Hartzog's biggest opportunity to leave his distinctive stamp on the National Park Service and Park System. Had he been able to go the full distance that he originally intended, he would be remembered today as an even greater Director than we do remember him.

Dick: In a sense perhaps his goals changed as he saw Connally's office becoming more powerful and perhaps more independent and perhaps he had personal goals that simply wouldn't allow these organizational goals to come to fruition.

Bob: I don't think goals is the right word. I think it simply was his management style and instincts that dictated never to let any of your subordinates get too powerful or too visible to the outside world in ways that might detract from you. This is something that he was well accomplished in himself, of appearing before the world prominently and visibly, and to have any of his people competing was simply unacceptable. I am sure Ernest was not consciously competing, but that was the effect. The competition was there because he was having more and more visibility in the professional world. At the same time, some of the old-line ranger types in the directorate were probably leaning on Hartzog to cut Connally down to size, and whatever Hartzog's instincts at the moment, I think he had to balance the competing demands and influences of his directorate to keep everybody as happy as possible.

Dick: Bob, we talked about the external people during Connally's time being a kind of a breed apart. Do you feel that this is the case today?

Bob: For one thing, today you don't have the compartmentalized organization between inhouse and outhouse that we had then. They are mixed up and concerned both with the external and internal programs. I think the problem still exists today. It exists because you have people who came out of that external tradition placed in high-level jobs with internal affairs responsibilities, and I don't think you will ever have acceptance by the rank and file of people who have never served in a park or a Region. Jerry Rogers served as a seasonal at Fort Davis, but his whole experience has been external. This will always be a strike against him. Larry Aten is having a lot to do with internal directions these days. He may have once been on the park level. If so, he's lost it pretty much. I think that tensions still exist, but I don't think it's as bad as it was when you had two large organizations.

Dick: You know, cultural resource people often feel excluded from power and the external people are not fully accepted by the old line management. So if you are cultural resources and external, which all the external programs are, you sort of have two strikes against you.

Bob: It works both ways, I don't blame the external people solely. I think the internal people, the green-blooded people, can be just as exclusive and just as patronizing as these people from academia that they hold in such contempt. This is what John Carver was laying onto the National Park Service back in 1963 when Connie Wirth got fired. You guys in the Park Service think you are a breed apart, and you're not willing to be responsive to anybody's concerns but your own.

Dick: Do you see the Park Service as a very special agency governmentwide?

Bob: Yes, and maybe that is an index of my association with the grey and the green more than with the external people, because the external people don't tend to see the Park Service that way. It's only the people who come out of the park tradition that see themselves as a very special family: Steve Mather's family of professionals engaged in a very idealistic undertaking for the benefit of the world. This is all to the good up to a point. But there was a certain validity to what John Carver was saying in his Yosemite speech. All of this tradition, just as with the Marine Corps and the FBI, is very fine up to a point, but you have to learn to be responsive to the public, be responsive to your political oversight, and of course this is why Wirth went out and Hartzog came in. Hartzog was sensitive and responsive to Stewart Udall and the Congress and the President and the administration's agenda, which wasn't the same as the Eisenhower agenda.
Dick: Wirth is fairly defensive in his book about his relationship with Udall. Have you read that?

Bob: Yes. In a review of his book I criticized Wirth for not telling the whole story, and he got very indignant, and in fact angry. It was a very minor criticism and the only one in the review, but he professed to have told the whole story, and that simply is not true.

Dick: While the Connally people might have been a breed apart, the effects of the 1966 Act included bringing more women into the Service as historians. Is this correct?

Bob: That's absolutely true, and I think that might have been the beginning in the Park Service of the emergence of women to a place in the sun. The professional buildup that Connally presided over drew heavily upon architectural and art history, and these are fields in which women, by the middle 60's, had begun to make their numbers felt. There were a lot of candidates in those fields who were women. We never practiced any sexual discrimination in that office, so they were hired simply on their merits. Many offices, especially the National Register, may have had more women than men on the professional level. Connally's office may have come to have a pretty much of a 50-50 split. And not considering clericals, but on the professional level. There was a big infusion of women over a very short period of time that probably is an element in this equation we were discussing of a breed apart, because it had to be unsettling to an organization that had been traditionally dominated by males, macho males who wore ranger hats. They didn't carry guns at that time, but nonetheless this was an outdoor profession that was exclusively men, and we still remember the great debates that occurred when they put Stetson hats on women. It wasn't the 66 Act that did it. It was Ernest Connally's creation of the Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation. Very shortly thereafter, the emphasis grew on women doing what they could do, I mean women coming to function the same as men. Hartzog encouraged this, whether from a genuine conviction or because he saw it as a sign of the times I don't know. But he was always very favorable to bringing in women in an affirmative action sense. It was around the early 70's that you started getting women rangers. But the women in OAHP led the way and penetrated this previously all-male bastion.

Dick: You speak of the women in OAHP. Before all this came to pass, can you think of any women who were in historic preservation in the Service?

Bob: The one that comes immediately to mind is Boss Pinkley's daughter, who did a lot of archeological work at Mesa Verda. She also discovered the church at Pecos that was covered up. Pinkie Herrington's wife, Virginia, was also an archeologist. There have to have been others, but I guess the fact that I cannot remember them is some index of how very few there were.

Dick: What about Penney Bachelor?

Bob: I guess she was in before Connally came but can't have been very long. She did not occupy all that significant position. She was associated with the Independence Hall project with Lee Nelson.

Me: Who was she?

Bob: She was an architect, a historical architect.

Dick: At Independence?

Bob: Yes.

Dick: Was Coxy Toogood the first female research historian, do you know?

Bob: Yes, in my office she was, but on a very low level. I don't think she had a graduate degree. We must have hired her at a GS-5. She came with two other women who were architectural historians. The three of them roomed together over in Georgetown and Russell Keune hired both of them in HABS and married one of them. The other one, Adele Chatfield-Taylor, subsequently became director of the New York City Landmarks Commission.
Dick: In the 1970's the historic preservation unit in the Denver Service Center was dissolved and those professionals were scattered to the various teams. Would you comment on this. What were consequences?

Bob: It was one more step in the organizational descent of the Denver Service Center to the very pits of organization, or disorganization. Over the years I fought step after step to prevent this dispersion of the professionals into the teams, and I still regard it as absolutely the wrong way to go. The Denver Service Center was set up to be a bureaucratic counterpart of the traditional private A/E firm, architectural and engineering firm. Most of those are organized along disciplinary lines. The engineers are all in one pot, and the landscape architects are all in another pot, and the historians and the architects and so forth. The professionals all report to a professional head. When you've got a task you form a task force from these various organizations shaped to carry out the particular purpose of the task. It seems to me to this very day that's the way the Denver Service Center ought to be organized. For a little task you can have a little task force with the appropriate mix of disciplines. For a big task you can have a big task force with the appropriate mix of disciplines. Instead, they keep tying the whole operation to these teams, which under the latest organization are reporting to about three or four Regional Directors each. That seems to me a management nightmare. There is no way that it can be made to work effectively. So far as historic preservation goes, it simply has bad consequences because it does not focus the professional competence of people in our disciplines in the way that would be most effective. Unfortunately, we in our disciplines tend to play into the hands of these so-called management experts by considering ourselves exclusively researchers, and we resist soiling our hands with policy and other management matters. The historians in the Service Center ought to be not solely researchers but also to bring their historical backgrounds to bear upon planning.

Dick: Do you think that was a problem with historians in the Denver Service Center?

Bob: Absolutely, from the very beginning they didn't want to mess around with planning.
This is Tape 17

Bob: Of course, back in the 70's we were in an expansionist era. We were adding a lot of new parks, so there was a lot of park planning going on out of the Denver Service Center. In my judgment, historians have a great role to play bringing their particular backgrounds to bear upon park planning. But do you think we could get that stable of historians interested in actively participating in the planning process and ensuring that the resources that led to the establishment of the park were properly protected in planning and development?

No. All they wanted to do was research and write history. As a result, we abdicated to landscape architects and interpreters the basic planning decisions on the preservation and care of cultural resources. It was an abdication. I used to go out there and hold pep sessions with those people periodically. Nobody ever disagreed with me, but in practice it just didn't happen.

Dick: Why?

Bob: I think, Number 1, the historians wanted to do their own thing, which was research and writing, and they weren't interested in park planning. Number 2, the landscape architects, who constituted the bulk of the planners, were just as happy to do it all themselves and not have to bother with the historians. The historians didn't want to put the road where, from the landscape architecture point of view, it ought to go. It was just easier to deal the historians out. Well they dealt themselves out. And the planners accepted it.

Dick: What was Merrill Mattes' role in this.

Bob: You can't put Merrill in that category. I don't think that Merrill and his successor, John Luzader, did their job by forcing the historians to play the role they should have played. Merrill knew perfectly well what the role of the historian was supposed to be because he had played it in Omaha as Regional Historian. He was very management- and planning-oriented as well as research. But he should have forced the research historians to take a much greater role in park planning.

Dick: Bob, why were there never as many archeologists in the Denver Service Center? Also, they seem to have played a different role than historians.

Bob: I suppose part of it is the parochialism of archeology. But the Denver Service Center did have archeologists. In my time I don't remember anyone other than Will Logan. Will did play principally a management and planning role similar to what I have been saying the historians should have played. I think the explanation is to be found in the rise, contemporaneously, of the archeological centers. Archeological research and the related professional services to management came out of the archeological centers. I always felt very strongly that the park planning services ought to come from archeologists in the Denver Service Center, but that was a hard case to make when archeological centers already existed. They existed because this got to be sort of a political thing with Hartzog. He saw political advantages in having archeological centers tied in with universities. This was a Connally ideal also. I think he may have sold it to Hartzog. Archeological centers in the universities not only achieved certain benefits for academia, they gave the universities a vested interest in the National Park Service. In turn this had a fallout in Washington with the Members of Congress in whose districts these centers existed. So we formed a center at the University of Arizona that gave Emil Haury and Ray Thompson a vested interest in Park Service appropriations. We formed one at the University of Nebraska. Hartzog conspired with the widow of Senator Bartlett of Alaska to set up one at the University of Alaska. That was the pretext under which Zorro Bradley was sent to Fairbanks. So the rise of the archeological centers prevented archeology from being folded in to the Denver Service Center in an interdisciplinary way. There was time when we said, okay, the archeological centers do in fact have a lot of payoff to the Park Service, not only professionally but politically. Let's take all of the professional disciplines in cultural resource management out of DSC and make these archeological centers cultural resource management centers by giving them historians and architects. That would have made a lot of sense, but of course it ran into the territoriality of DSC, which did not want to lose historians. And it ran into the parochialism of the archeologists, who didn't want them in the archeological centers because almost certainly some other discipline would have wound up providing managers of the Service Centers. So it never got of the ground.
Dick: Ideally where do you think research historians should be located?

Bob: Right now?

Dick: Yes.

Bob: Right now there is little justification for the Denver Service Center beyond the unsettling consequences of trying to dismantle it. There is need for such a center in a time of expansion and budgetary optimism. Now is a time of gear down for the indefinite future. You will not have very many new parks. You will not have much new development in existing parks. Therefore, you have fewer and fewer projects, which is where the money comes from for the Denver Center, resulting in higher and higher overhead. That makes the Denver Service Center unaffordable to the clients, which are the parks and the Regions. So I think in a climate such as this, a budgetary prospect such as this, the thing to do is dismantle the Denver Service Center and scatter it among the regions. Let the Regions take care of their parks and provide all the services that Denver is now.

Dick: Including historical research?

Bob: Absolutely! It couldn’t be any more inefficient than now, when you have a team trying to satisfy the research needs of three Regional Directors and mediate among them as to who gets what services when.

Dick: When you were in Washington did you promote the idea of pulling the historians out of Denver and into cultural resource centers?

Bob: Absolutely!

Dick: Do you want to elaborate on that?

Bob: Well, it just never got off the ground for the reason that I mentioned—the resistance of the archeologists and the resistance of the Denver Service Center.

Melody: Why did it get started in the Southwest Region as the Southwest Cultural Resources Center?

Bob: I think that just kind of slipped in when everybody was looking the other way. This goes back to the early 70’s. My memory may be wrong, but it may have been in large part a product of the aggressiveness of Cal Cummings.

Melody: But he was an archeologist.

Bob: That’s right, he was, but he was running the show too. He’s one of the very few archeologists who seems to be comfortable in an interdisciplinary setting. It started from pretty slim pickings, too, so that it was not a great new institution unveiled with fanfare, like Tucson and Lincoln.

Dick: It also had the support of Bob Lister, who spoke with a great deal of authority.

Bob: That’s true.

Dick: And it had the support of Joe Rumberg, who was the Regional Director. What do you feel about such centers? Do you think they are a good idea?

Bob: Oh absolutely. But as we’ve discussed, I still think that the Park Service needs an organization in which the Regions mirror the Washington Office. If this is the direction to go, every Region ought to have a cultural resource center. This ties in with what I said a moment ago about abolishing the Denver Service Center. Probably you could not make a good justification for such a center in every Region so long as the Denver Service Center is in existence. I am not sure that you can justify it in this Region now. It has grown,
and of course nobody is suggesting that it be dismantled. But if you were starting from scratch, I doubt sure that you could put together a prospectus that could convince everyone that this Region needed what you've got now.

Dick: Do you think cultural resources centers would be effective as bi-regional centers?

Bob: I am opposed to bi-regional anything. I don't think that a professional service center, no matter what it is, ought to serve more than one master, and that is what you have now.

Dick: On the whole, do you think archeological centers are a good idea and have been effective?

Bob: It is a mixed bag. I would much prefer to wipe the slate clean and merge them into cultural resource centers in each Region. No matter what the testimonials of the respective Regional Directors, you have an untenable situation in Lincoln, where the Midwest Archeological Center tries to satisfy two Regional Directors. In the Southwest, I am not aware that the center at the University of Arizona supplies any of the needs of the Southwest Region. It is an arm of the Western Regional Office.

Dick: A little storage.

Bob: Storage doesn't complicate matters.

Dick: On the whole, how successful and how effective do you think our ties with the universities have been with these archeological centers?

Bob: Initially they held great promise. It was a principal goal of Ernest Connally. He foresaw great benefits flowing from the marriage of the Park Service with academia. Hartzog saw great benefits politically flowing from his institutions in another congressional jurisdiction. So they seemed to promise a lot. With the removal of the thrust that Hartzog and Connally provided, they have been a disappointment. The Park Service has not come up with the money that would have made the universities interested. The personnel in the universities may have tended to look down upon their Park Service brothers and to see the whole thing primarily in terms of prospective dollars. So I don't think the marriage has been happy and effective. Even more serious, the divorce of these Park Service professionals from the rest of the Park Service has been detrimental. These people are off in a university setting where they cannot interact on a daily basis with Park Service management. That probably is the biggest liability. Again, I would like to do away with Denver Service Center, do away with all the archeological centers, and put everything into Regional cultural resource centers. This is an important point to make. It has to be organized as an interdisciplinary office on the regional level. You can't scatter it out, which is what Park Service management always wants to do. They want to split them up so they can't be too powerful.

Dick: You said that Connally felt there were great benefits to be derived from the contacts with the universities. The connections to be established. What do you think these great benefits were in his mind?

Bob: He saw it as an opportunity for Park Service people to imbide the academic atmosphere and perhaps work toward advanced degrees, to impart Park Service philosophies through teaching assignments. He saw it as an opportunity for storage of these huge collections of Park Service artifacts and for their utilization by the academic community as study collections. He saw it as an opportunity to get free research from graduate students on topics that the Park Service needed to have researched. He saw it as lending prestige and academic respectability to Park Service professionals who did not in the past enjoy it.

Dick: Did you agree with Connally at that time?

Bob: It never occurred to me to question him. It was just another of those innovations that Connally was promoting that I uncritically accepted and furthered.

Dick: You thought it might work.
Bob: I don’t know that I thought of it in any other terms than a Connally initiative that, as his deputy, it was up to me to promote.

Dick: What do you think of the cooperative park studies units, CPSU’s?

Bob: Except in Alaska, these are primarily natural science institutions. They probably offer greater flexibility, and greater opportunity for achieving Park Service goals with minimal expenditure of funds that wouldn’t be spent anyway, than the archeological centers, which were big, heavy-handed things. The only CPSU unit that I had experience with was the one in Alaska, when we were putting into effect the cultural resource aspects of the Alaska Native Claim Settlement Act. That was run by a Park Service official, Zorro Bradley and his deputy Melody Webb, and in my judgment it was very effective. It accomplished a lot with a very minimum of Park Service personnel, and principally through academic people. I suspect that in other universities, where it is not presided over by someone out of the Park Service, it would tend to serve private research interest more than Park Service interest.

Dick: Would you discuss the interest that developed in CCC buildings in the National Park Service?

Bob: This is the rustic architecture study. That was an initiative that came out of the Western Region. It was advanced and promoted by Gordon Chappell and happened to come along at an appropriate time. Half a century had passed since this form of architecture had been introduced to the parks, and in our perception it was suddenly taking on historical and architectural value. Gordon and the people who worked with him defined the initiative and carried on. My role was confined to saying, “Gee that’s a good idea, let’s go with it,” and giving the Western Region all the support it needed to go with it. With our blessing, the Western Region went with it and I think the outcome has been beneficial. It’s greatly to Gordon’s credit that he came up with this kind of creativity.

Dick: I think that I recall very clearly your memorandum to the field regarding CCC structures, that we should take a look at them. With the passing of time, their significance is becoming more clear.

Bob: That’s true. Nobody in Washington thought of this. That memorandum was drafted by somebody on my staff, but the thought came from San Francisco.

Dick: Gordon makes a point that the rustic architecture interest is parallel to the CCC interest. In some cases you have rustic buildings that are not CCC, but they are part of that rustic trend. And in other cases you have buildings that have dual significance in the sense of they are good examples of rustic architecture and also CCC.

Bob: I guess that’s true. The rustic architecture as we know it goes back to the 20’s, before the CCC. But it was the CCC that democratized it and spread it all over the Park System.

Dick: What was the original concept and purpose of the List of Classified Structures?

Bob: It was strictly a budgetary tool. It was a tool for demonstrating to the Congress that we knew what resources we had and that we knew what ought to be done to them, that we knew how much it would cost to do what ought to be done, and that we had a priority ranking that would utilize whatever funds we could make a case for each year. It had no other purpose. It was not an honors list like the National Register. It never had any purpose beyond the budgetary.

Dick: In your opinion should the LCS be identical with the National Register?

Bob: The definition of the National Register was everything in this country worthy of preservation—not that is going to be preserved, but worthy of preservation according to the National Register criteria. Therefore, if the Park Service was requesting funds for preservation of any structure, that in itself testified to its worthiness for preservation. Therefore, it didn’t make sense for it not to be in the National Register, individually or as part of a historic district. So I insisted that nothing be in the List of Classified Structures that we weren’t prepared to put in the National Register. I ran into all kinds of flack from my own staff and from the field of the National Park Service and I simply lost the battle. I conceded that there were some
things, such as cemeteries, that would not get into the National Register even though for one reason or another the Park Service would wish to preserve. Therefore, we would put them into the List of Classified Structures but not the National Register. I believe there were some archeological remains that the archeologists didn’t know enough about to put in the National Register, but wanted money to find out more. There were a few little esoteric categories like that I conceded on. That’s about the time I left the Park Service and I believe they just opened the flood gates and now you’ve got all kinds of things in the List of Classified Structures that aren’t in the National Register. I suppose part of that is that the people who are applying the National Register criteria have become very precious and prissy about what they accept. While I suppose that they wouldn’t disagree with my generality that the definition of the Register is what’s worthy of preservation, their definition of what’s worthy of preservation would be quite different than mine.

Dick: So the LCS has become something other than what you thought it would be?

Bob: That’s my impression. Maybe that’s been forced by the people administering the National Register narrowing what they will allow into the Register and increasing the bureaucratic requirements. People just throw up their hands and don’t want to execute the paperwork. So more and more these two instruments are diverging because a lot of what probably is eligible for the National Register in the List of Classified Structures can’t make it through these obstacles that the National Register staff is erecting.

Dick: The archeologists have always felt left out of the LCS. Were they involved in the planning for the LCS?

Bob: Oh they definitely were. Doug Scovill as Chief Archeologist was in on everything because, of all of the top professional people there, he was the best bureaucrat. He was the one who had the best handle on budgeting and programming and the political aspects. So the List of Classified Structures was to include all archeology for which the Park Service intended to request funding. Subsurface archeology not fully identified presented problems for entry into the List of Classified Structures that standing structures or ruins did not present. At the time this instrument was conceived, the pressing problems, professionally and on the Hill, were historic structures. We were beginning to count the number of historic structures that we had in the Park System. We were beginning to admit to the Congress that we didn’t even know what structures we were responsible for, much less how much it would cost to take care of them. Politically, the whole thrust of the List of Classified Structures was upon standing structures. The intent, when we finally got on top of structures, was to fold archeology in. But all of the principles were defined right at the beginning.

Dick: The rank and file archeologists, though, seem to have felt that the LCS is mostly an architectural document or listing. They somehow or another feel left out of that.

Bob: Well this is their own fault. It comes from the feeling of archeologists that historic preservation is a historical and architectural thing. It is the same mindset that produced the bureaucratic battles in the creation of the Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation. They would rather go and do their own thing, uncomplicated by history and architecture. But if we conceive of this as principally a budgetary instrument, and if we define historic structures as all fabric made by human hands, then obviously archeology is part of it and ought to be. My sense is that over the years archeology fell behind and really hasn’t been incorporated into the List of Classified Structures. So they are probably correct in saying that it is simply an architectural and historical document. But probably they would just as soon that it was and that they had their own instrument to serve the same purpose.


Bob: It’s probably too fat for one thing. As these documents get bigger and bigger, fewer and fewer people master them. So far as I am familiar with the content, I think it represents the natural and logical and admirable evolution from the basic policies that we first laid out in the late 60’s, which in turn grew out of the Advisory Board’s principles of 1936. But again, as I’ve said so often, your policies are great, it’s the implementation that stinks.
Dick: Would you comment on any improvements that you might see in historic preservation management between the earlier years, let's say before and after World War II and the present?

Bob: I think there hasn't been much change in what is regarded as good policy. There has been an elaboration of various elements of the policy. So it's clearer what is acceptable and what isn't. We have had an increasing emphasis upon architecture that was not present in the 30's. I think the principal improvement lies in the growing sensitivity in Park Service management ranks to the concerns of professional cultural resource management. There is still a distressing inclination to disregard the policies when it is convenient, but there is a growing sensitivity to these policies and to the concerns of the professional cadre of the Park Service.

Dick: You think that has improved?

Bob: I think that has improved. It has been slow and gradual.
Tape 18

Bob: There seems to be a contradiction between my saying implementation of policy stinks while there is an improving sensitivity on the part of park management to cultural resource management concerns. I think what you have is the rise in the Park Service of younger people who have been brought up in a climate of repeated stress on cultural resources and repeated implications to consult the specialists in the Regional Office before moving. That is a trend that I see. On the other hand, I continue to believe that the management--the formal organization for the management of the resources of the Park System--is such that those managers who don't want to conform are not confronted with any particular penalty. Especially among the older superintendents, I still see the tendency to do whatever they jolly well please in their parks regardless of policies that are just as clear as day, and about which there could be no logical dispute. Your management system does not pinpoint those deviations and does not assess any penalties for the deviation. In this region you've got half or less of the superintendents who come from the old school, and they do whatever they please, and if their deviance is spotlighted there is no reprimand for it. You folks in the Southwest Cultural Resource Center may get upset, but I doubt that the Regional Director descends very hard on such a superintendent. You may not have half of them that come out of that tradition. More than half of them may come from the younger tradition. But I know you have a few who certainly fit into that category, and I have the strong feeling that other Regions have more.

Dick: Bob, when you were in Washington, which Regions in the Service did you feel were the strongest in historic preservation management?

Bob: That would be hard to say. We always had trouble with the Philadelphia Office, which has the most historic resources. More than any other Region, they tended to go their own way in belligerent defiance of anything said in Washington. Southeast Region has a lot of historic resources, and they tended also to go their own way. Maybe it is simply partiality that leads me to say that Southwest Region was the most responsive to Washington Office leadership and the most conscientious about following good practice and the policies. I attribute that to the strong professional cadre here, first with Bill Brown and Dave Battle, and then you came in. Cal Cummings was here in archeology. And finally Melody Webb. This professionalism asserted itself despite a regional management that didn't tend to be sympathetic, with the exception of the period when Joe Rumburg was Regional Director. Frank Kowski was not sympathetic. Monte Fitch, his hatchet man, was most certainly not sympathetic. John Cook was very supportive except when it suited his convenience not to be.

Dick: We were having serious problems with John and usually he'd listen to us directly.

Bob: I would hate to single out any other Region as second because I tend to consider all of them as almost equally reprehensible in their handling of cultural resource management. Maybe that is because the function of my office was to look over the performance, and what we tended to see was what was being done badly rather than well. And so what we tend to remember is the bad performance.

Dick: Recalling the circumstances of the Park Service's acquisition of Castle Clinton and Ellis Island in New York, what really happened to bring the Service into control of these two properties?

Bob: Castle Clinton goes back to before my time. That was Ronnie Lee's operation and I don't know any of the circumstances regarding that. Ellis Island was tied in with the American Museum of Immigration at the Statue of Liberty. It was a highly political thing in which all of the immigrant groups in this country, working through their vocal representatives in the Congress, went to work on the Park Service. I was not at the center of these things. I can only confirm that it was highly political, that the Park Service had nightmares over what it would do if it had Ellis Island thrust upon it, but in which the political returns for cooperating in the acquisition of Ellis Island were very great, simply because of all of those immigrants or immigrants' heirs out there in the country. Of course, Ellis Island has turned out to be a tremendous nightmare. I don't know that the Park Service, despite all of the progress, is yet on top of what is going to be done there and how much it will cost. The American Museum of Immigration was an unmitigated disaster. It was highly political, and it was coming to fruition at the very time that we were changing our
attitudes from the melting pot to the plural society. The exhibits that had been planned to emphasize the melting pot offended people who wanted to retain and display the cultural identity of their homeland, and that was simply no win. This was during the Udall years. I have some memories of these problems, but they are not clear enough or specific enough to say much more.

**Dick:** What do you think of the historic leasing program in the National Park Service?

**Bob:** Something long overdue that offers the only real hope for the utilization of historic buildings where they exist in such numbers as prohibit the Park Service funding their preservation or restoration from traditional budgetary sources. It's something that I think was floated into the Park Service with the advent of Ernest Connally and the whole mindset that he brought with him. It was bitterly resisted by traditional National Park Service managers who did not want any foreign elements within their boundaries, and of course you can't lease a building unless you have someone in your boundaries. The issue came to a kind of climax at Delaware Water Gap, where the Park Service acquired dozens of historic farmsteads from the 18th and early 19th century, dispossessed the owners who were preserving and using them, and boarded them up. They became subject to vandalism and deterioration and became a scandal that the Park Service couldn't get on top of, because now the price tag was too great. We attempted to inaugurate leasing then, or sell-back or lease-back, but not only was there the resistance from the traditional park manager, there were some legal questions. The latter probably could have been overcome if there had been a disposition to overcome them. George Hartzog was very much in favor of any of these devices that would allow for continued use because that allowed him options other than fee acquisition. He promoted the lease-back, sell-back device at Minute Man, where we were trying to recreate the historic scene along the retreat route of the British from Lexington and Concord. It worked to some extent there but I think was never really realized. When we were promoting the same thing at Golden Gate a decade and a half later, we were still running into resistance from park superintendents. When we tried to plan the Charlestown Navy Yard in Boston, the obvious thing to do with those big warehouses was some kind of a lease program. The superintendent, however, was not going to have any foreign traffic in his park. So I guess it's only with Hot Springs that it has really been accepted.

**Melody:** Fort Mason at Golden Gate.

**Bob:** They finally did cave in up there, but it was as late as 1975 that the Superintendent was not going to have any part of it.

**Dick:** So Hartzog was in support of this?

**Bob:** Absolutely!

**Dick:** Old line management resisted and Hartzog really in many ways was ahead of his time in that regard.

**Bob:** I think so, but old line management was able to point to some provisions of law that seem to support their position. I guess George didn't want to fight it until he got more legislation, although I've heard him say many a time that you don't need a new law, you need new lawyers to interpret the law you've got. He was a lawyer himself, and he could take any law and interpret it to do anything he wanted to. You remember he used the Historic Sites Act to justify the Natural Landmark Program, and of course the Historic Sites Act had nothing to do with natural areas.

**Dick:** Did Connally propose or support a Servicewide program of historic building leasing?

**Bob:** I don't know. I know that he felt very strongly, in contradiction to Regional Director Frank Kowski, that those bathhouses at Hot Springs had to be saved, that their demolition would subject us to worldwide criticism. He felt strongly on this, and my recollection is that a leasing program was his solution. Kowski wouldn't buy that. Kowski was an old line park manager and he didn't want anybody in his park. There was kind of a standoff then, because Kowski wanted to tear them down. So it has got to have been after Connally's time that leasing came to its own. I don't recall any major proposal of his for Servicewide leasing. There may have been.
Dick: Would you discuss your opinion of tax incentives for historic preservation and the effects of this in the Service and outside the Service?

Bob: In the middle 70's we all enthusiastically favored tax incentives as a major aid to historic preservation, and such they have proved in terms of preservation payoff. It's amounted to many times the payoff that you get from a matching grant-in-aid program. We have a tradition in this country of promoting social purposes through the manipulation of the tax code. So long as we do this, then I think tax incentives and disincentives are a legitimate and desirable tool for historic preservation. If we are now entering a time of tax reform, in which any significant number of social causes are to be sacrificed, I am prepared to sacrifice historic preservation as one of them. I would like to see tax simplification and tax reform. Historic preservation is one complicating factor of many in the present tax code. Nor am I sure that the tax incentive program is being administered as professionally as it should be.

Dick: So far as preservation itself goes?

Bob: Yes, there have been many compromises with preservation in the interest of financial and economic development rather than the resource. High-powered developers have done a lot of things that could not be professionally justified.

Dick: But in the long run, the alternatives were a lot worse when alternatives meant abandoned buildings that were eventually torn down.

Bob: Yes, but I have seen instances of tax incentive projects in which what was there before had been so totally buried that it for all practical purposes was altogether lost.

Dick: And yet, this would supposedly conform to the Secretary's Standards?

Bob: That's right. The Secretary's Standards depend upon interpretation just as the National Register Criteria do, and it all depends on who's doing the interpreting.

Melody: What do you think about facade preservation?

Bob: Facade preservation is fine up to a point, but if it becomes simply a scrap thrown to the preservationists in order to get a hugh tax benefit, I don't think it is justifiable. When I was in Washington two weeks ago I saw a whole street that my office used to look out on from the 801 Building, where George Washington University has built new buildings behind the street front. They preserved the facade of that whole block, along with the first room or two, and it really looks quite good. I think it retains the historic scale and visual aspect of that part of Washington, which otherwise would have been overwhelmed by more glass boxes. I suppose that was a tax incentive proposition. All I know is that particular project appealed to me.

Dick: Bob at one time you compiled a list of horror stories in the National Park Service. Would you elaborate on this please?

Bob: When Ron Walker became Director and we persuaded him that there was insufficient sensitivity in the Park Service ranks to the proper care of cultural resources, he turned us loose to go around and attempt to develop that sensitivity. In order to dramatize the point to the field, we collected a list of horrors that had been perpetrated on cultural resources in violation of policy and good practice. We put together a list of five or six pages of true horror stories, such as the Park Service deliberately bulldozing buildings that were of National Register quality and all kinds of other horrors that lent themselves to making the point. Under previous regimes of the Park Service, we could not have compiled such a list, except surreptitiously, and most certainly could not have made public use of it. But we took this list around and publicized it quite broadly, and used it as the basis for attempting to get Park Service management sensitive to policy and their responsibility to apply the policy. After Walker went under, Gary Everhardt embraced this too, and in fact he took it over and placed it in the record of the Congressional oversight committee as a basis for his point that we needed to upgrade our cultural resources management. Of course, he didn't deliver on it then. But
the Park Service really has been guilty of an incredible number of horrors and we should put that list into the record of these interviews.

Melody: Attach the transcript.

Dick: The list is entitled "Examples of NPS deficiencies in Historic Preservation," and dates from about 1974.

Bob: For example, demolishing ruins at Fort Laramie for ripraping in the Laramie River. Many of the historic buildings at Big Bend National Park were systematically bulldozed because it is a natural park. Here's one on the C&O Canal, where there was a towpath routed around a sheer cliff and cut right out of the cliff, and the Park Service went in and blasted it out so it would accommodate two-way vehicular traffic.

Dick: We talked earlier about possible improvements in cultural resources management over the years. Do you know of current examples or examples from the mid-70's or later?

Bob: The C&O Canal would not be possible today. At Castillo de San Marcos, during my tenure in Washington, the leaking terraplane was covered over with a chemical mixture that produced a glaring white quite in contrast to the historic appearance. I remember the argument we had with the Mid-Atlantic Region over the painting of Thomas Edison's home, which the superintendent wanted to paint grey even though it had been maroon throughout its historic period. And the superintendent painted it grey. That in my judgment is a horror. I don't think you have so many of that sort of thing now.

Dick: Bob, do you think that this list of horror stories that you prepared had any effect?

Bob: Yes, I think it did. I think we took it around to every superintendents' and Regional Directors' conference that we could get billing on. Some of the horrors were just so outrageous that it did make park management think about the record of the Park Service and the need, in this day of great visibility, to have a little better record.

Dick: Bob, have you ever been involved with carrying capacity concerns for historic property?

Bob: We discussed it at great length, at the same time that the carrying capacity for natural areas was under discussion, without ever reaching any definitive conclusion. I believe that the naturalists were able to come up with criteria and standards, but the best we could ever do was say that we must be prepared to limit use of the resource when in the judgment of the professional staff it was producing irrevocable damage.

Dick: What about effects on the visitors, in a sense of crowding and the rendering them unable to enjoy?

Bob: I don't recall that we ever discussed it from that point of view. What I remember most clearly is the Lincoln Home in Springfield, Illinois, as an example. The mobs going through there each year are wearing away the fabric, and if the day ever comes when the structure is imperiled, then the resource comes first. This was in relation to the message we were trying to put over during the Walker initiative, that preservation must always come first. Therefore, if the Lincoln Home is imperiled by too many people, you close the Lincoln Home and let people look at it from the outside, or take whatever limiting measure in the judgment of the professionals is necessary, in order to insure that the resource will be passed on unimpaired for future generations. But in the scientific sense of carrying capacity we never approached that kind of sophistication.

Dick: It seems as though in historical areas the Park Service is inconsistent. For example, at Adams House in Quincy there is a very strict limit. At the Hubbell Home and at Scotty's Castle there is. But at a place like Independence Hall they flood through there. It does not appear to me there is any consistent policy.

Bob: No, and it probably has never even been approached with a view to adopting a consistent policy. I suspect it is all a product of local park management or regional consideration.

Dick: This kind of thing has never come into the compliance process has it?
Bob: No, I cannot recall of any instance where it has, other than in the context of Section 106. As an illustration, that could conceivably become a 106 case. By its actions the Park Service was adversely affecting a National Register property. By its failure to take limiting action it was affecting a National Register property.

Dick: Have you ever been involved in discussions over fees at historical areas, and if so what were the issues that surfaced, and philosophically and professionally how do you view increasing fees at historic areas of the National Park Service?

Bob: I have never been involved in any discussion over fees. That would have been considered a management matter that the historians were never consulted on, so I can't remember a single session in which I was involved. As for the second part of your question, philosophically and professionally, I have always bitterly opposed charging any fees for entry into any national park area anywhere. I believe that this is a responsibility of the national government and that parks ought to be totally funded by the national government.

Dick: Bob, there are a number of efforts these days to have the homes of presidents and former presidents commemorated in one fashion or another. What do you feel the Park Service's role should be in all of this?

Bob: Back in the middle 60's the Congress developed a tremendous interest in presidential homes and historic properties to illustrate and commemorate presidents. There arose, both in the Congress and responsively in the Park Service, the feeling that every president ought to be commemorated in the National Park System, or that every president not otherwise well commemorated ought to be commemorated in the National Park System. This tied into the Landmark program and the orders from the Advisory Board to study every president as soon as he was elected. I think all presidents, save maybe one, are commemorated either in the Park System or by a pretty good National Historic Landmark. I think the only one we couldn't find something good for was Franklin Pierce or Millard Filmore, one of the two. But in general I agree that every president ought to have a unit of the National Park System if there is a good property by which to interpret him. I don't think we ought to drag the bottom of the barrel for it. I'd rather see San Clemente illustrate Richard Nixon than his birthplace. And I am not crazy about John F. Kennedy's birthplace, although that seems to be pretty popular. But we know that every president is going to constitute a very significant portion of our history, every president. And a good presidential site offers a good window for viewing. I would not feel as strongly about a Presidential Library for every President because I generally oppose dispersing archival treasures all over the country. But that is something different than a presidential historic property.

Dick: When should the Park Service make the evaluation of these sites? While the President is still alive, or after 25-50 years?

Bob: I think it is a good thing to make the studies while the president is still alive, and I don't really have any problem making landmarks while presidents are still alive. But I don't agree with putting them into the Park Service until the presidents are dead.
Tape 19, December 27, 1985

Dick: We talked about homes of presidents and recent presidents. Would you comment on the Georgia O'Keefe National Historic Site that was authorized and then later deauthorized. What is your opinion on this and should it have been in the System? And did we have enough perspective to make that kind of decision?

Bob: That is a hard one to call. It illustrates the perils of trying to commemorate a living person. You had your area and then in the whims of her old age you lost your area. This was an instance where, because of the tremendous longevity of this woman, you probably didn't need any more perspective to assess her as a nationally significant artist. I don't think there is any question about that. I think it would have been wise to defer the commemorative move until after her death. And I think there were measures that could have been taken to sew it up so that it happened more or less automatically after her death, and so that the property and the resources were not compromised before her death. In effect this is what happened at the Truman Home in Independence, Missouri, through the cooperation of Truman's daughter. Things were kept as the Park Service wanted so long as Bess Truman lived there, and then everything was in place and had all been worked out in advance to explode once she died. That might have been possible in the case of Georgia O'Keefe too. But it certainly shows the perils of embarking upon the commemoration of living people. On the other hand, this tradition started when Franklin D. Roosevelt put his own home into the National Park System while he was President, which was an egregious lapse of good taste, but we are eternally grateful to him today that he did.

Dick: That is correct. With regard to the O'Keefe property and others like it, by waiting for a period of time, unless we have some sort of covenant with the family, we run a strong risk of losing furnishings and losing integrity.

Bob: That is true, and that is why I say I am not convinced we could not have worked with the family to do that. I guess covenant is a good word, and that is what I was talking about. I don't know enough of the situation to know if that was possible, but you are right back to where you would have been anyway, and I don't think you have a covenant. One thing you can do with the family's cooperation is go in there and photograph every square foot of the place, so you know how it was at the time she was living there.

Dick: Bob, in several cases, unsuccessful park superintendents were reassigned to the Division of History. Did you support or resist these moves and what was the affect of this on the division?

Bob: I supported any move where the position and the money came with the incumbent. No matter who the incumbent, such a move always held the prospect, realized as often as not, of one day losing the incumbent but retaining the position and the money. That happened many times. The money and position got built into your base. So I never resisted any move, whether it was a superintendent or any personnel problem, where the money and the position came along with it. These moves rarely had an adverse affect on the organization. The personnel actions that had a bad affect were the political ones forced from the outside. Usually when our own came in they fit pretty well and there wasn't any big problem.

Dick: You selected Russell Mortensen to succeed Roy Appleman as Chief, Branch of Park History, and then yourself as Chief Historian. Dr. Mortensen was not universally admired in the ranks. How did you select him and in retrospect was he a wise choice?

Bob: It's always easy, in retrospect, for anyone to say what ought to have been done. In assessing such appointments, one needs to go back to the climate that existed at the time. I suppose you could say that almost any incumbent of a high position--Mortenson, Utley, Judd, or whoever--was not universally admired in the ranks. You will always have people in the top officialdom who are disliked. Mortenson was selected for several reasons. For one, I knew him and had worked with him and knew his record in many fields of history, including historic site administration. Another was that he was a candidate I could sell at that particular time. When Appleman retired, we were at the peak of Hartzog's insistence upon outside blood and academic credentials. Mortenson represented outside blood. He had a Ph.D. He was therefore someone that I could sell to Hartzog. I don't know that I had any others at the time acceptable to me, whom I could
have sold to Hartzog. And so that is how Mortenson came into the Park Service. I suspect that the same considerations prevailed when he became Chief Historian. I don’t remember that as well as I do bringing him in.

Dick: In retrospect, was he a wise choice?

Bob: At the time he was a wise choice, and so therefore, in retrospect, I have to say he was a wise choice. As time went on, I became less approving, but if I had it to do over again at the time and the place, the setting, the climate, the environment, I’d do it, yes.

Dick: Bob you selected Horace Sheeley to succeed Sidney Bradford as Chief of the Historic Sites Survey. And you later supported Bradford’s appointment as Associate Regional Director, Professional Services, in Philadelphia. Each of these appointments also proved controversial. Were they wise choices?

Bob: The wording of your question implies almost total freedom of choice. That does not always exist. Horace Sheeley had worked himself up to the place where he was a GS-14. If I had not selected him, I would have had to find some other place for him. Horace served long and faithfully and deserved sympathetic consideration. Horace, Lord knows, had liabilities, and he knew them as well as anyone. Had I the freedom of choice implied by your question, of course, I would have not have selected Horace Sheeley. But if I had the freedom of choice I would have made certain that Horace Sheeley got a job that in no way demeaned him personally or professionally or detracted from his long years of faithful service to the Park Service.

Sydney Bradford was another expedient situation in which Ernest Connally and I had decided to transfer historic preservation planning from the grants division to the National Register Division. We felt it made more sense over there. This was the state plans that underlay eligibility for grants. Bradford was the chief of the Grants Division, and for reasons he considered quite sufficient refused to accept that. The only thing to do, therefore, since he simply would not accept what his two immediate superiors had ordained, was to get him out of there, and Associate Regional Director in Philadelphia seemed to make sense. Sidney Bradford was a GS-15. You don’t just move GS-15s around willy nilly. Here in Philadelphia was a GS-15 that was open. Here was a Regional Director who would take him in that position. It was a case of going back to a Region where he had once served before. And while Sidney and I rarely saw anything in the same way, he was qualified by grade and background for that position, and it relieved an impossible situation. It created another impossible situation, but you know you frequently do that.

Dick: Bob, how much did cultural resources management in the Service best be strengthened?

Bob: I am not going to give my usual speech on how the Park Service ought to organize itself because nobody ever agrees with me anyway. That would be my sole answer—that this is almost exclusively a question of organization, a question of arranging the Regional offices so that they reflect the Washington Office and, to the extent possible, arranging the parks, where they are big enough, in the same way. We touched a few moments ago on the new budgetary and political prospects of the Park Service. I think part of the answer to your question is to concentrate all of the professional services now done by the Denver Service Center and the archeological centers in the Regional Office and charge all of those functions to the Regional Director. Then on top of this I would create an organization in the Region with the responsibility of monitoring on the park level the application of policy. This would be an effective monitoring organization backed by an overall Park Service organization that insists upon accountability, that holds every park manager accountable for the application of the policies, which I think are fine. If the Park Service could make those organizational reforms, so that accountability is enforced and the policies are applied, then I think you would have an improvement of CRM in the Park Service that would leave little to be desired.

Dick: Did you promote this kind of reorganization at the time you were in the Service?

Bob: Yes sir. Connally and I both did.

Dick: Do you think it ever came close to being.........
Bob: No! It never came anywhere close. The Park Service has a tradition of decentralization. But in management theory and practice, decentralization is not effective unless there is accountability, unless there is a system that allows the exercise of creativity and individuality within the framework of universally understood and accepted policies. The Park Service has the policies, but the Park Service never has had a system of accountability. The Park Service has a strong tradition, then, of independent baronies, which operate according to their own desires no matter what the policies say, and a tradition of management weakness and cowardice in enforcing the policies when their lapse is identified.

Dick: Do you think that this weakness that you speak of is true in the management of natural resources as well?

Bob: Just as much. It’s true in the National Park Service. This is not a problem of cultural resource management. It goes across the board. When we carried out Director Walker’s initiative of sensitizing the Park Service to cultural resources management, we started with the premise that we cultural resources management people were somehow different than the rest of the Park Service and were being discriminated against. But once this initiative got fully floated, we found that the natural scientists agreed with everything we were saying, and it quickly became apparent that the problem was one that is inherent in the National Park Service from top to bottom.

Dick: Did you think the natural resource people at the time you were in the Service wanted the same kind of organization that you are talking about?

Bob: Everybody has his own organization that he wants. I don’t remember that we ever sold anyone on the organization that I felt was necessary, but we certainly had the natural scientists with us 100% in the identification of the problem.

Dick: When you say natural scientists, you are speaking of professional natural scientists, not necessarily the managers of the natural areas?

Bob: That is right.

Dick: Now on a beautiful late December afternoon this concludes the initial set of interviews with Robert Utley by Richard Sellars and Melody Webb. We anticipate that this will be transcribed and then edited and then reviewed and perhaps more questions will follow. Bob, I would like to thank you very much for your time and your patience in answering these questions and I think this will be a contribution to the National Park Service Archives and the writing of the history of the National Park Service in the future. Thanks!
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APPENDIX A

EXAMPLES OF NPS DEFICIENCIES IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION

Antietam

Visitor center constructed intrusively on prominent hilltop in the midst of the battlefield.

Piper Farm, center of Confederate position, acquired in 1960s, allowed to deteriorate to uninhabitable condition requiring major rehabilitation. Farm outbuildings verge on collapse.

Appomattox

Store fixtures of Meeks Store painted, covering an original 1850 finish, in order to make them look better.

Arlington House

Painting contract let without inspection of building fabric. Now a new roof has to be installed, and newly painted gutters, conductors, and other building parts will have to be renewed and repainted.

Big Bend

Systematic program of demolishing all old buildings in the park nearly completed before local citizen protest intervened.

Cape Cod

Two historic homes are vacant and not being maintained because they are surplus to park needs.

Castillo de San Marcos

NPS paved leaking terreplein with "Laycold," a glaring white asphalitic coating not historic in texture, color, or appearance. Now it looks like a tennis court, and the leaks continue.

C & O Canal

Towpath at Little Slackwater was carved from solid rock rising steeply from the river. It was eight to ten feet wide. NPS decided that it should be widened to accommodate automobiles. Cliff was blasted out and towpath widened to thirty or more feet, then paved with concrete.
Structures on upper section of canal have not been maintained because “they are going to be restored sometime.” Many lock houses that were mothballed in the middle 1960s are now all but lost because of lack of maintenance.

Storm-weakened Catoctin Aqueduct collapsed because of failure over a period of a year and a half after the storm to apply recommended emergency measures, especially clearance of debris pressing against the foundations. Other aqueducts and culverts along the canal suffer similar dangerous pressures from debris.

Chaco Canyon

Richard Wetherill buildings demolished because they were an eyesore, unsafe, and not central to the park story.

Cumberland Gap

Segments of historic Cumberland Road paved.

Custer Battlefield

Parking lot placed on Reno Hill battle lines.

Edison

Although early portions of the house were gray, red was its color in its final form as completed by Edison. Management decision returned the color to gray despite emphatic professional opposition.

El Morro

NPS decided to remove all “modern” inscriptions from historic Inscription Rock. Laborer entrusted with the assignment removed the name of Kit Carson.

Fort Jefferson

Because of maintenance expense, the brick barracks buildings were demolished and the refuse dumped in the ocean. They were so solidly built that demolition cost more than preservation would have, and in addition the dynamite explosions sent damaging shocks through the masonry of the rest of the fort.
Fort Laramie

Experiments with new type foam fire extinguisher in a furnished historic buildings ruined all fabric materials.

Ruins of old hospital used for riprapping along the Laramie River, with explanation that the ruins were a hazard to the visitor.

Fort McHenry

Master plan proposal for removal of all additions after War of 1812, which would have resulted in the destruction of more than half the original fabric.

Gettysburg

Visitor center constructed intrusively on main Union battle line.

McLean House, important battlefield feature, acquired in 1960s, allowed to deteriorate to uninhabitable condition.

Remains of historic Rose Barn, prominent battlefield landmark, allowed to fall down.

Grand Teton

Systematic destruction, without professional evaluation and over professional protest, of dozens of historic structures associated with ranching, homestead, and early tourist periods. Menor's Ferry and Cunningham Cabin survived only because of expressed interest of Rockefellers.

Harpers Ferry

Trees and shrubs planted on sites of vanished buildings, thus destroying archeological evidence as well as introducing exotics where buildings once stood.

Herbert Hoover

Color of Dr. Leach House changed from white to gray-green even though it has always been white.
Independence

Reconstructions have become a way of life, one tending to justify the next: New Hall, Pemberton House, Graff House, City Tavern, Walnut Street Houses, Market Street facades. In its initial planning, however, NPS demolished many historically and architecturally important buildings to open up the park and thus give it a visual aspect it never had.

First Bank of the United States cleaned with a product containing acid, a violation of an elementary principle of historic preservation. Ten years later the brick walls are still flaking.

Isle Royale

Demolition by neglect of John Linklater Cabin, Island Mine Powderhouse ruin, Minong Blacksmith cabin ruins, and Minong Stamp Mill. These were regarded as worthy of preservation by the park and featured in interpretive literature. They were allowed to become so deteriorated as to be beyond repair and authority was granted to remove them.

JNEM

Adaptive restoration of Old Courthouse without historic structures report.

Disappearance of remains of Manual Lisa Warehouse, dismantled during construction of arch., but planned to be rebuilt.

Lincoln Memorial

Despite repeated and vigorous professional objections, the contractor for cleaning the Lincoln Memorial was permitted to use sandblasting of 7,000 square feet of the marble columns, a process that detracted at least 20 years from the life of the structure.

Mesa Verde

Two non-masonry sites excavated on Wetherill Mesa in 1962-63 were covered with temporary shelters pending erection of permanent shelters to protect the resource and provide interpretation. The temporary coverings still have not been replaced, and ten years of weathering have all but destroyed the fragile remains.
Moores Creek

Earthworks reconstructed without historical and archeological research and without professional supervision.

Morristown

Bulldozing of remains of Fort Nonsense.

Kings Mountain

Decision to let the 1803 Hauser House melt away because not part of the park story. It is now being restored, although much of the interior and structural integrity has been lost.

Ozarks

Systematic demolition of old buildings without professional consultation. Some 800 such buildings were destroyed. Now there is a proposal to reconstruct a typical Ozark village similar to one elsewhere that was destroyed.

Rocky Mountain

Loss of historic Harbison Ranch complex. Request for authority to demolish the last three buildings cited loss of remaining eighteen (which NPS allowed to collapse) and intrusion on historic scene of a maintenance yard (which NPS put there).

Salem Maritime

Proposal to adapt unique 1670 Narbonne House to residential purposes in violation of legislative history and sound planning (i.e. it is not readily adaptable).

Demolition of Central and Derby Wharf warehouses, former by the Navy with NPS permission, latter by NPS. Now NPS wants to reconstruct the Central Wharf warehouse for interpretation even though the Bonded Warehouse, across the street, is not used at all and is in good condition.

San Juan

Passage opened between two casements to provide a door that was never there, thus destroying historic walls and also the only surviving gun cabinet in the fort. A similar project, not involving a gun cabinet, destroyed walls in San Carlos Bastion.
Removal of a 19th-century earthfill from a parapet to solve a drainage problem which could have been more readily corrected by other means.

Saratoga

Reconstruction of British redoubts without research.

Siding under the eaves of the 1785 Schuyler House was never painted, but local management painted it "to finish the restoration."

Saucus

Master plan calls for accommodating a phony 17th-century structure now used as a museum but not the genuine Mansfield House, dating from c. 1810, one of the few original historic structures on the site.

Scotts Bluff

Residence built adjacent to Oregon Trail remains in Mitchell Pass and in location of obscure pass from museum.

St. Gaudens

The three major buildings have structural weaknesses. The Memorial Trustees, despairing of NPS action, used their own funds to repair the house, porch, and roof, using their own architect and contractor. The results do not meet NPS standards.

Theodore Roosevelt (N.D.)

Master plan proposes: reconstruction of Elkhorn Ranch that will violate criteria for reconstructions, no effort to preserve an existing ranch complex of the same period, a campground that will endanger a major historical-archeological site.

William Howard Taft

Demolition of Cross building, adjacent to Taft House and contemporary with it, in order to provide visitor parking, thus leaving Taft building almost free standing whereas historically it was part of a continuous row of large homes. Parking could have been provided behind the Cross building, which itself could have been used for park facilities. Now preservation of Taft home is made difficult because parts of it must be used for offices, maintenance facilities, and community meeting rooms.
Vanderbilt Mansion

Demolition of historic greenhouse because too difficult and expensive to maintain.

Yorktown:

Superintendent's residence built to command scenic view but on American line fortifications. Now, as part of Bicentennial program, NPS is requesting money to remove it from this site.