ARCHEOLOGICAL SAMPLE SURVEY
OF THE
FLORIDA MOUNTAINS
LUNA COUNTY, NEW MEXICO

by
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ABSTRACT

In June, 2001 the New Mexico Office of Cultural Affairs awarded the County of Luna, New Mexico, a Small Projects Grant to be applied toward an archeological survey that would identify the location of an Apache War battle site in the Florida Mountains. Several Apaches lost their lives during this battle, which was fought January 24, 1877. Also, a member of the 9th Cavalry "Buffalo Soldiers," Corporal Clinton Greaves, ultimately won the Congressional Medal of Honor for his meritorious action that saved the lives of his comrades. Once the battle site is identified the County plans to establish an educational monument in its general vicinity. The monument would honor the memory of the Buffalo Soldiers, as well as educating the public that this region of the state was once part of the homeland, or Apachería, of the Chiricahua Apaches.

National Park Service (NPS) archeologist Charles Haecker, with assistance from U.S. Forest Service archeologists Chris Adams, Bob Schiowitz and Gail Firebaugh-Smith, NPS historians Larry Ludwig and Aaron Mahr, Historic Preservation Division archeologist Gwyneth Duncan, and Deming resident and avocation archeologist Bill Crawford, conducted the reconnaissance-level survey that employed metal detectors. An estimated 80 acres were selected for intensive inspection using this remote-sensing device, and the ground surface of an additional 180 acres was inspected using conventional archeological methods. Funding from the New Mexico Historic Preservation Division Small Grants, with matching support from Luna County, made this project possible. We would like to thank Luna County Manager Scott Vinson, County Deputy Manager Rheganne Foster, and former County Project Coordinator Larry Truax, as well as Phillip Butz, Luna County Land Use Director, for their invaluable support. We reserve special thanks to Mr. Tom Kelly and his wife Dorothy who graciously offered us the use of their guesthouse at their ranch in the Florida Mountains.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

THE WESTERN APACHES

The Apaches played an active part in the events of the Desert Southwest during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. They were part of a much larger body of closely related Native Americans who, by the mid-eighteenth century, inhabited a vast expanse across northern Mexico and the American Southwest. Apaches were intruders in this region and probably did not enter it much before the Spaniards. It was in New Mexico that Apaches first began their long history of raiding and trading with more sedentary peoples. In the 1600s Apaches raided settlements of Pueblo Indians and Spaniards alike, and violence between Apaches and Spaniards and Pueblos increased during the ensuing years. After 1692 Apaches began to appear farther south in the present-day states of Chihuahua (at that time combined with the state of Durango and called Nueva Vizcaya) and Sonora. They also joined with other Indian tribes in raids on Spanish settlements and ranches in northern Old Mexico. In southwest New Mexico, Spaniards called all Athabaskan-speaking peoples "Gila Apaches." By the end of the seventeenth century the Gila Apaches were using the mountain ranges of southwestern New Mexico as bases of operation for conducting raids on Spanish settlements in Chihuahua. Specifically regarding the Florida Mountains, this range was a stronghold for the Suma Apaches during the last few years of that century (Figure 1) (Spicer 1962:235).
By the early nineteenth century four separate Apache bands inhabited southwestern New Mexico. The easternmost band, the Chihene (Red Paint people) corresponds roughly to what Spanish sources labeled Mimbrenos and Mogolloneros. Anglo-Americans called at least some of these Warm Springs and Copper Mine Apaches. The later territory of the Red Paint People ran from the Gila River eastward along the Mogollon Mountains as far as the Rio Grande. The three western bands were usually lumped together by non-Apaches as Chiricahuas. These bands included the Chokonen, who lived in the Chiricahua mountains up to the Gila River; the Bedonkohe, who lived north of the Chokonen from the headwaters of the Gila River in Arizona; and the Nednehi who lived almost entirely in Mexico in the Sierra Madre (Ball 1970: xiv, 22, 45).

Each band was made up of several local groups, termed rancherías by the Spanish, composed of families of kinsmen by blood or marriage. This was the basic unit of Apache social organization. Members of a rancheria derived their status, identity, and their rights from their association with this group. Rancherías had specific relations to each other through ties of kinship since, being small, their members had to marry into other rancherias. Rancherías kept in touch with each other by reading each others' tracks, leaving trail signs for each other, or sending each other smoke signals. Each rancheria was led by a headman and was independent of all other rancherias (Ball 1980:102; Opler 1965:012-103).

The freedom of each group from interference by other Apaches reflected the freedom of individuals as well. Ideally, no one could tell another what to do although social pressure sometimes goaded a person to act. Since women managed the camp they would encourage their husbands, brothers, and sons to raid for resources. It was difficult for non-Apaches to understand the fluidity of Apache leadership, and Apaches found the power and authority of non-Apache groupings incomprehensible. In turn, Apaches did not comprehend the nature of a political state. Consequently, Apaches had great difficulty in understanding that a peace agreement made in one place was also binding in other places and that different towns and villages were not autonomous as were their own rancherias (Ball 1970: 19, 32, 168; Ball 1980:22; Barrett 1970:121).

Apache camps consisted of several structures that usually faced east. They were often placed at some distance from each other because of the avoidance taboos between in-laws, but close enough so that families could assist each other in times of need or danger. Habitation structures, called wickiups, were made of brush and poles. They were often covered with hides, which were taken when camp was moved, although the framework was left behind. Apaches camped at some distance from water but near grass, firewood, and cover for concealment. Camps were often located in hard-to-reach places and lookouts were posted. Fake camps were occasionally set up to confuse the enemy (Ball 1970:17, 26, 74; 1980:3, 32; Betzinez 1959:131; Opler 1965:22-24).

The description of a typical Apache camp provides an idea as to the amount and variety of their possessions. When an Apache band was put to flight by a party of scalpers in the Sierra Madres of Chihuahua State in 1846, the scalpers found 43 wickiups, 300 hides of both domestic and wild animals, 30 saddles, plus bridles, sarapes, hatchets, hoes, griddles, livestock bells, sugar, flour,
beans, bolts of cloth, two muskets, and seven cartridge boxes without cartridges. Other such camps were noted to contain objects similar to these, as well as storage bags and boxes containing cheese, tobacco, and corn tortillas (Griffen 1988:130).

Traditional Apache subsistence was based on gathering wild plants and hunting. They relied to a great extent on mescal obtained from the maguey, and the seasonal harvesting of this plant was intimately connected with their movements. Indeed, Spaniards and Mexicans often planned attacks where they knew rancherias would be gathering mescal. Mesquite beans, acorns, and the seeds from wild grasses were ground into meal, and piñon nuts and cactus fruits were also important plant products. Principal game animals were deer, antelope, and rabbits. Several eighteenth century sources note that Apaches did supplementary gardening. They sowed plots at the beginning of a growing season, then left, giving the plants little care, and returned when the crops, usually corn, were ready for harvest. But crop raising was a minor activity and farming for an Apache male never became a principal way of life.

Raidding became an important economic activity for Apaches as the Spanish frontier advanced with the establishment of cattle ranches. Spaniards and Mexicans considered raiding an act of war but the Apache view was different. They had no concept of war for conquest or the permanent occupation of enemy territory in the European sense. Raidding parties had two purposes, sometimes combined, sometimes not: gain and revenge. Revenge was an ethical commitment to retaliate for the deaths of murdered relatives. It required an elaborate pre-battle ceremony to prepare one for meeting the enemy. Once on the warpath a special ritual language with its own vocabulary was spoken (Ball 1980:104-105; Opler and Hoijer 1940).

The principal weapons of the Apaches were bows and arrows, slings and lances. Muskets were employed to some extent but it was not until rifles with cartridges were available that firearms could be used extensively, for obtaining sufficient loose powder and storing it properly was difficult. A bow and arrow had a shorter range than a musket but in the time it took to reload a firearm an Apache warrior could get off a good many arrows. War parties were led by a temporary war chief. Warriors left camp in small groups, took care to leave as few tracks as possible, and met together in the vicinity of the place they were to attack. Even a small war party could cause great destruction. The speed with which Apaches could travel was a source of wonder for their enemies. Warriors would split into small parties and cross the most inhospitable terrain on foot or on horseback. If necessary, they would kill their animals to make good their escape.

Apaches were expert in choosing the time and place for battle. They ambushed their assailants by trapping them in narrow canyons or other totally disadvantageous places (Ball 1970:12-15). Their Hispanic enemies, on the other hand, relied mainly on manufacturers outside the region for their firearms, balls or bullets, and powder, though lances, heavy leather jackets (cueras), horse trappings, and the like were made locally. Because of the lack of available resources, Hispanic militia and their Indian allies also used bows and arrows, and Apaches stole or traded for guns and powder, as well as knives and other utensils (Griffen 1988:130).

When surprised by their enemy Apaches kept their nerve and always displayed bravery and disregard for danger. It was noted by an eighteenth century Spanish chronicler that "they fight to
the last breath and usually prefer to die rather than to surrender” (Matson and Schroeder 1957). But the Apaches also practiced the maxim that discretion was the better part of valor. If they saw that their attack was to lead to their defeat, they disappeared from battle as fast as they had appeared. Under assault they would rapidly break camp with men and women cooperating to move babies, food, and possessions. They made forced marches on foot or horseback until they could shake their pursuers and reach safety. Women who accompanied war parties remained the field for extended periods in order to keep camp for the men; however, some women also fought and were known for their bravery and expert marksmanship (Opler 1965:336-354).

**Apache-Hispanic Relations**
The story of Apaches in northwestern Mexico and southern New Mexico in the nineteenth century is rooted in crucial events that took place during the late colonial period. Not only were both the governmental and the individual relationships between Mexicans and Apaches a continuation from the last decades of Spanish rule, but the Mexicans themselves relied on, or tried to rely on, the experiences of Spanish administrators. During the early eighteenth century, to meet the threat from nomadic Apaches, the Spanish Colonial government extended a chain of forts, or *presidios*, across a vast stretch of the frontier, some 800 miles from Tucson, Arizona, to Coahuila, south of central Texas. After 1750, contact between Spaniards and Apaches had expanded as Apaches stepped up their raiding and Spaniards responded with increased military force. At the same time, Apaches occasionally made peaceful visits to presidios, where they were given gifts of food and trinkets, sometimes including seed corn, and invariably were admonished by the Spanish authorities to be peaceful.

As time wore on, mutual retaliations—Apache assaults and revenge expeditions and Spanish punitive campaigns—intensified. Beginning around 1777 Apaches identified as Gileños kept up depredations as far south as Chihuahua City, and preyed on the peoples of Zuñi and Acoma pueblos to the northeast, on Socorro to the southeast, and as far west as Tucson and Pima villages. The Spanish military, based out of Janos Presidio, retaliated with punitive expeditions against Apache strongholds. As examples, in July, 1777, a military force from Janos Presidio located and destroyed several rancherias located in the Mimbres and Florida Mountains (Griffen 1988:62). In November 1780, Captain Don Francisco Martínez, leading a punitive force of some 600 men, searched the main canyons of the Floridas but found no evidence of Apaches living there at that time. In 1784, a Spanish force combed the Floridas, but the resultant report does not specify whether Apaches were encountered within this specific mountain range (Thomas 1969:216-218).

Throughout the remainder of the eighteenth century and well into the nineteenth century, the Florida Mountains were identified by Spanish and later Mexican authorities as a stronghold for several hostile rancherias. Rarely, however, were the Spanish able to locate and defeat the Apaches based in this mountain range. One exception occurred in 1792. In that year the ranchería of Mimbreno Chief Ycujidillin was located within the Florida Mountains, which the chief was using as a base for conducting raids deep into Mexico. The ranchería was discovered by Janos presidiales, who killed one warrior and took 23 prisoners (Griffen 1988:76).

The Spanish ultimately realized that the Apaches could not be pacified. During the early 1790’s Spanish officials managed to persuade many Apaches to settle at the presidios, which served as
administrative units the Spaniards called peace establishments. At these establishments it was the military, not the church, that dealt with the Apaches and other Native American tribes. Within a few years administrators concluded that the peace establishments had fulfilled their purpose, given that many hundreds of Apaches were living close to the presidios. In fact, the peace establishment had become too successful: there were often inadequate personnel and resources needed to administer to the needs of the presidio Apaches. Accordingly, starting in 1794, the Spanish began to decrease the number of Apaches that could be administered at the presidios, as well as the rewards granted to those who remained. In the meantime, the military continued their patrols into the hinterland on search-and-destroy missions to handle the recalcitrant Apaches. The Spanish were counting on those Apaches that were forced to leave the presidios would nonetheless keep the peace. As it turned out, this proved be the case (Almada 1952:72-74; Stevens 1964).

Up until 1831 Apache depredations failed to increase in proportion to the decline of Spanish and Mexican military power, and Apache thefts occurred only on a minor, local scale. Raiding rose dramatically, however, after the Mexicans instituted a major change in 1831 with the cancellation of all rations for the Apaches, which drove most of them into the hinterland. Subsequent attempts by the Mexican military to coerce Apaches back to the presidios without rations merely escalated Apache hostilities. Military operations at the national level proved a failure because political intrigue and instability paralyzed the national government in faraway Mexico City. The Florida Mountains were one of several New Mexican mountain strongholds occupied by at least three hostile Gileño rancherías, whose warriors raided deep into the state of Chihuahua during the 1830’s and 1840’s.

As a result, the governments of the two states most affected, Sonora and Chihuahua, turned to the use of militia and treaties. These likewise failed, for the militia was incapable of military victory over the Apaches, and the Apaches made peace only when convenient, with the young warriors breaking the peace at will. The two states then turned to the previous Spanish method of paying bounties for Apache scalps. This program committed the states to a policy of total extermination, for bounties were offered for the hair not only of warriors but also of women and children. Enterprising Mexicans soon took the field as scalpers, to be joined quickly by Americans, runaway American slaves, and even other Indian tribes such as the Delawares from the United States and the Tarahumaras of Mexico. The bounty system had the entire border country aflame with hatreds and suspicions within a short time, for it proved impossible for examining committees to tell the difference between the hair of friendly Indians and that of hostiles. In fact, it was difficult to tell the hair of an Indian from that of a Mexican, and whole villages of unsuspecting Mexicans were exterminated for their scalps (McGraw 1972). The end of the Mexican War in 1848 and the conquest of the Southwest by the United States saw no solution to the Apache problem (Griffen 1988:150-151; 1989:55, 61).

Apache-American Relations
The first wave of American settlers arrived in the New Mexico-Arizona Territory shortly after the conclusion of the Mexican War in 1848. The Apaches, aware of the recent war between the United States and Mexico, welcomed them as allies. The leader of the Chiricahuas at this time was Cochise, born about 1823. He had succeeded his father, Nachi, as hereditary leader of the band; in addition, by his ferocity on the battlefield, Cochise had become the acknowledged war chieftain as well, and was widely trusted by both soldiers and civilians in Arizona. Charles D.
Poston, who came to the Territory in 1856, declared in 1859 that "the Apaches have not up to this time given us any trouble; but on the contrary, pass within sight of our herds, going hundreds of miles into Mexico on their forays rather than break their (friendship)...with the Americans" (Faulk 1969:8).

But this relatively peaceful coexistence soon changed. In the fall of 1860 a band of Apache warriors, returning from a raid in Mexico, were ambushed in the Santa Rita Mountains (near present-day Silver City) by American loggers who wanted the Apaches' booty of livestock. A week later the loggers' camp was attacked and destroyed by Apaches, and all of its occupants were killed. Dragoons from nearby Fort Buchanan went in pursuit of the raiders but never caught them. Other acts of violence between Americans and Apaches occurred over the following months, each act demanding that the aggrieved party exact even more terrible vengeance on the other. Ultimately, Cochise launched a decades-long war, with the intent of killing or driving out all Americans in Arizona. The outbreak of the Civil War in the spring of 1861 resulted in the abandonment of Arizona by the military, leaving the Territory totally without protection. Mining came to a standstill, ranchers abandoned their stock, and farmers fled their homesteads, all of them having moved to Tucson or leaving the Territory entirely. The arrival of the California Column in 1862 brought little respite, for most of these troops went on to New Mexico and Cochise continued to exact his revenge (Sacks 1962:277; Utley 1961: 59-68).

With the conclusion of the Civil War in the spring of 1865, a force of 2800 cavalry and infantry re-occupied the old posts in Arizona and established new ones. But little was accomplished by these troops. In 1870 the government launched the so-called "peace policy," which was based on the theory that the Indians would best respond to kindness, religious instruction and training in agrarian methods. Army officers were not to act as Indian agents; instead, these jobs went to members of the various religious denominations. Peace treaties with the Indians would remove them to reservations where they would get an annual distribution of presents, a regular issue of food and gifts of farm implements and seed so they could become farmers. The military in Arizona adhered to the peace policy by making treaties and establishing reservations with those Apaches who would accept them, and by feeding the Apaches when they did. Arizona citizens, however, were enraged at this practice, believing such reservations to be nothing more than feeding stations for Apaches who slipped away regularly to kill and loot.

On April 30, 1871 a citizen "army" from Tucson, composed of approximately 50 Americans and 100 Papago Indians, attacked a reservation for the Arivaipa Apaches near Camp Grant, killing 108 Apaches—only eight of them men—and carrying off 29 children into captivity. The perpetrators were arrested and brought to trial in Tucson, but a local jury exonerated them. The general attitude was that all Indians must be killed, regardless of age or sex. It was also considered good business for merchants in the Territory when there were Indian problems, both real or imagined. More troops would come, which meant rations would be bought locally for them and their horses. The group of merchants in Tucson who actively promoted incidents and Indian scares were labeled the "Tucson Ring." They also connived with Indian agents to furnish sub-standard rations at standard prices, splitting the profits. Very often their thievery involved furnishing no rations at all and pocketing the money (Bourke 1891:438; Weigley 1967:267).
As a result of the Camp Grant massacre, the Grant administration sent a peace commission to Arizona to establish treaties with the various Apache bands and put them on reservations. Despite strong opposition from the Tucson ring and white citizenry in general, the commission convinced some 4,000 Indians onto reservations. By the summer of 1871 the only major tribe of Apaches not on reservations was the Chiricahua, who were led by Cochise. The Camp Grant Apache agency was moved northward to the Gila River, where it was renamed San Carlos. Thereafter San Carlos would be the major reservation for the Apaches.

Shortly after its establishment, an American observer described San Carlos Reservation as “Hell’s Forty Acres.” The agency headquarters was a scattering of adobe structures that were located on a gravel terrace at the confluence of two drainages. Rain in this region was so infrequent that it was considered an event when it did occur. The reservation was dry, and the gravelly soil supported little vegetation. Summer temperatures commonly reached 110° F in the shade, and shade was a scarce commodity. Apache wickiups were scattered over the area and populated by malnourished Apaches, many of them sick and dying. Geronimo, who was not going to surrender his people to these conditions, demanded a separate reservation for the Chiricahua Apaches if there was to be peace (Davis 1929:48-50).

Eventually the peace commissioners, assisted by Cochise’s trusted friend Thomas Jeffords, coaxed the Chiricahua to accept a peace treaty. By this treaty the Chiricahua’s were given a reservation in southeastern Arizona, which was their traditional homeland. Jeffords was also to act as their agent. Until the death of Cochise in 1874 the Chiricahua’s honored the treaty, despite visits from their New Mexican allies, the Warm Springs Apaches, who wanted them to go on the warpath. Through the force of his personality, Cochise was able to keep all but the most impatient young warriors from raiding into Mexico. But with Cochise’s death in June, 1874, the tenuous hold on the warriors came to an end, and shortly thereafter Jeffords was forced out through the manipulations of the Tucson Ring. The Indian Bureau used these and other incidences as excuses to order the Chiricahua reservation closed and the Indians there—at least those that did not escape into Mexico—were moved to the San Carlos Agency in June 1876 (Bourke 1891:224-229).

The removal of the Chiricahuas to San Carlos and the closing of their separate reservation were disastrous mistakes. The various Apache groups at San Carlos hated each other, and now some 4,000 Apaches were crowded onto land that originally had been the home for only 800. Short on rations, forced to farm non-arable land, half-starved, angry and resentful, the Apaches at San Carlos all too often were willing recruits for a warrior promising loot and adventures off the reservation. This was this grim situation that led to the breakout of a band of some 40 Chiricahua Apaches from the San Carlos Reservation in early January 1877. It was this band that Lieutenant Wright and his small command encountered in the Florida Mountains on January 24 of that year.

THE ARMY
The end of the Civil War brought drastic changes in the United States military forces. It was now a peacetime force with little public support, so an economy-minded Congress in 1866 ordered the Army reduced to 54,301 men. A majority of these men were stationed in the conquered South to enforce reconstruction, leaving only a small number available for fighting the Indians.
Across the American West there were bloody uprisings to suppress. In 1869 the Army was reduced to 45,000 men; in 1870 to 30,000; and in 1874 to 25,000 enlisted men and officers. Not only was the Army severely understrength to fight the Indian wars, it also had poor equipment. Congress in 1866 decreed that the Army had to exhaust Civil War surpluses before ordering new materials. Thus, the soldiers were sent to do battle with obsolete weapons and equipment, as well as under-strength numbers (Weigley 1967:267).

All of the men in the Indian-fighting Army were volunteers, both officers and enlistees, for the unpopular conscription laws had ended with the Civil War. The average age for common soldiers was 23, many of whom were recent immigrants, and most of them from the bottom of the economic ladder. Some of the volunteers were attracted by the steady employment offered by the Army, with its pay of $13.00 a month for privates, its regular rations, and its side benefits, such as free medical care. Others joined to have adventures in the American West, others were rootless veterans of the Civil War: Confederates who had lost everything, ex-slaves who had nothing to start with, and former Union soldiers who could not adjust to civilian life. Military life also attracted criminals and other undesirable elements that found it necessary to travel as far west as possible from the scenes of their unlawful activities in the east.

When he enlisted for a five-year term, the new soldier was sent to one of three recruiting depots for four weeks to learn to follow orders and drill. There the enlistee received his uniform, which until about 1875 were leftovers from the Civil War and of inferior quality. From this recruit depot, the young soldier was sent west via train to join the regiment to which he was assigned. Once he joined a regiment the soldier rarely transferred out of it, no matter how long he remained in the Army. In fact, he usually did not transfer out of the company to which he was assigned. Until 1876 each company had 64 privates, after which time it was supposed to have 100, but most were understrength at any given moment. Scattered widely throughout the West, companies rarely, if ever, came together to serve as a regiment. Companies provided the familiar associations, common experiences, and distinctive characteristics and traditions with which men identified. The company, therefore, rather than the regiment, commanded loyalties and fostered solidarity (Rickey 1963; Utley 1973:10-25).

The recruit was under the complete control of his non-commissioned officers, who typically rose to their positions after long years of service and who maintained discipline through the use of their fists. The non-commissioned officer enjoyed some privileges, including higher pay and less physical labor. Competition for promotion was great, but since promotions also came within the company, none was available until a vacancy occurred through discharge, death, or disciplinary reduction in rank. The company was run by the first sergeant: an enlisted man could not even approach his company officer with a complaint without first going to the chain of command, starting with the corporal of his squad. On the other hand, if the recruit ran afoul of military regulations, official punishment was swiftly meted out through court martial proceedings. If found guilty—and that was the usual verdict of an unfortunate who challenged regulations—punishment was often brutal. In view of these circumstances it is not surprising that desertion was the most common crime in the service. In 1891 a military study reported that losses through desertion between 1867 and 1891 averaged one-third of all enlistees (Rickey 1963).
A wide gulf separated enlisted men from their officers. The cast system was rigid, imposed both by regulations and by the backgrounds of the individuals concerned. Most officers in the Indian-fighting Army were graduates of the Military Academy at West Point, and usually came from a middle- or upper middle-class background. Isolated from polite society, an officer could associate only with his fellow officers, as fraternization with the enlisted men was forbidden. His pay was small. A lieutenant drew only $40.00 a month, with which he had to pay for his mount, equipment, clothing, and support his family, if he had one. The social loneliness, privations and monotonous duty found at a military post in the West often proved too much for both officers and enlisted men, driving many to heavy drinking, gambling and other vices. This contributed to the public impression that soldiering was an unfit and ignoble profession (Weigley 1967:275)

The Buffalo Soldiers
The 9th and 10th Cavalry and 24th and 25th Infantry were distinctive regiments because they were composed of black enlisted men and white officers. The Indians labeled the 10th Cavalry troopers “buffalo soldiers,” who proudly made the buffalo the central figure of the regimental crest. Soon the term came to signify all black soldiers. Throughout the closing decades of Indian conflict, black soldiers formed a conspicuous and controversial part of the Regular Army. The black soldiers held certain strengths and weaknesses that reflected their heritage of slavery and subordination. Almost all were illiterate, adding even more paperwork to their officers. Few black recruits entered military service with mechanical skills that was essential in the maintenance of a military unit. At the same time, their white superiors commonly recognized that black soldiers excelled in discipline, morale, patience and good humor in adversity, physical endurance, and sobriety. Black units consistently enjoyed high reenlistment and low desertion rates. Above all, they performed well on campaign and in combat. Even their most severe critics testified to their exceptional record of field service. General William T. Sherman, for example, conceding his preference for white troops, declared of the blacks in 1874, that “[black soldiers] are good troops, they make first-rate sentinels, are faithful to their trust, and are as brave as the occasion calls for” (Utley 1973:26).

Despite their proven worth, the black regiments were the targets of vicious racial prejudice. Although most officers of black regiments took great pride in their units, they suffered social condescension from the rest of the officer corps. Black regiments endured discrimination in both the quantity and quality of supplies, equipment, and horses, and for 25 years they remained without relief in the most disagreeable sectors of the frontier.

THE BATTLE OF JANUARY 24, 1877
The latter half of the 1870’s was a time of increasing Apache-settler hostilities within New Mexico, specifically centering on the southwestern portion of this territory. The primary source of the strife was the Indian Bureau’s policy, beginning in 1874, of concentrating all western Apache tribes on the San Carlos reservation in Arizona. This desolate land of sand and salt flats was rightly considered to be worthless real estate by Arizona settlers and miners. It was now reserved as the permanent home for thousands of Apaches, who were accustomed to hunting, raiding, and roaming at will over a vast region. Responsible civilian and military officials knew that this unnatural concentration of warlike peoples—now subjected to a condition of gradual
starvation and diseases in a desolate place—would guarantee warfare far greater in intensity than what had occurred before. And they were proven right.

The 9th Cavalry "Buffalo Soldiers" entered this dangerous situation in 1875, when their regiment was transferred from Texas to New Mexico. By the spring of 1876 the 9th, consisting of only 456 men (out of an authorized strength of 845), was dispersed at seven posts: six in New Mexico and one in southern Colorado. In addition to constantly patrolling for small parties of raiders that had left the San Carlos reservation, the troopers built barracks and roads, hauled in firewood, and escorted the mail coaches and supply wagons. By the fall of 1876 the men of the 9th had formed a familiarity with the region and its inhabitants. They also developed an abiding respect for the Apaches' warrior and survival skills. Nonetheless, virtually ceaseless patrols by the 9th Cavalry had paid off, with only six minor brushes having occurred in their department (Leckie 1967:176).

The year 1877, however, opened on a decidedly different note when outlaw Chiricahua Apaches, reinforced by warriors from the Warm Springs and Mescalero bands that had fled the San Carlos reservation, stepped up their raids. In late January 1877 the Fort Bayard garrison learned that such a party had fought a 6th Cavalry patrol in Arizona and had headed eastward into New Mexico. Captain CD. Beyer ordered his C Troop into the field to look for the raiders. To find their trail Beyer sent a small separate detachment of only eight troopers and three Navajo scouts, under Lieutenant Henry Wright. They found the trail and followed it into the Florida Mountains. When signs indicated that the Apaches were not far off Wright, on the morning of January 24, split his small command. With two troopers guarding their mounts Wright and the others continued to follow the trail for another two miles.

They discovered a rancheria encampment of over 40 Apaches, including at least 10 warriors, near the head of a secluded canyon. An Apache woman, coming down a path into the canyon, spotted the troopers who had been hiding behind boulders. Before she could warn the band she was taken prisoner. As the troopers advanced cautiously up the canyon and toward the rancheria they encountered another woman with four children in tow; they were also made captives. The woman's cries, however, alerted the rancheria of the approach of the troopers, who were now within a few hundred feet of the Apache encampment. Her cries also alerted a group of warriors—their existence hitherto unknown to the troopers—situated along the cliff edge that overlooked the canyon.

All of the warriors had firearms, they outnumbered the troopers by at least two to one, and their placement gave them a distinct tactical advantage. Wright knew his small command would be wiped out if he attacked, but retreat would probably be just as deadly. Instead, he tried negotiation. Signaling that he wanted to talk, Wright and his men slowly advanced toward the rancheria. For the next half-hour Wright, using one of his Navajo scouts as an interpreter, tried to convince the chief that he and the band should surrender their weapons and mounts and return to the reservation. There, Wright promised, they would find protection and provisions.

The chief seemed to agree that surrender was best for his band. But during these discussions the Apache women and children had quietly slipped away. Wright also noticed that the warriors in the ranchería had gradually encircled him and his men, and those on the cliff above were
beginning to take aim. It appeared that negotiation was at a close. Wright reacted quickly, ordering his men to break through the tightening ring before it became too late. At the same time he pulled out his revolver and fired at the chief and another Apache, knocking them into a ravine. Corporal Clinton Greaves shot another Apache, as did Privates Mackadoo and Epps. Shooting from all sides and from the cliff above immediately erupted, and soon it devolved into hand-to-hand combat. Greaves, in the center of the combat, fired his carbine until it was empty and then swung it like a club, knocking aside the Apaches to bash a gap through the circle for his comrades.

The Apaches, having lost at least five of their number (including their chief) without seriously wounding any of the troopers, fell back and fired from behind boulders. The troopers, still in an untenable position, gradually backed out of the canyon while continuing to shoot at the Apaches in front of and above them. Wright led his men back to their mounts, then withdrew to Fort Cummings some 20 miles away. They took with them five of the Apaches’ rifles and some of their livestock (Schubert 1997:45). The Apaches had driven off Wright, but the rest of C Troop hit them again four days later in the Boca Grande Mountains, located about 20 miles to the southeast of the Florida Mountains and partly within Mexico. This time Captain Beyer’s men captured their entire camp, destroyed all of the Apaches’ food supplies and gear, and took the Apaches’ remaining livestock. Most of the Apaches escaped, however.

Wright and his men received immediate recognition for their bravery. Post orders cited that “the conduct of Lieut. Wright and men under him is deserving of the highest praise and furnishes an example of gallantry and soldierly conduct worthy of emulation by all” (Schubert 1997:46). Wright, in his report of the incident specifically singled out four of his six troopers—Greaves, Epps, Mackadoo, and Adams, as well as Navajo scout José Chaves for recognition. Wright had asked that Certificates of Merit be awarded to each soldier, but in his opinion Greaves deserved both a certificate and a Medal of Honor. Two years later Corporal Greaves, a former slave, received his medal; the others were not awarded certificates, as was recommended by Wright.

ENVIRONMENT OF THE FLORIDA MOUNTAINS

The Florida Mountain range is one of many relatively small mountain chains in southwestern New Mexico. This range was named as such by late seventeenth century Spanish explorers for the profuse flowers that grow on its slopes (florida=flowery). The Florida Mountains are composed of two parts. The northern portion, the Little Florida Mountains, is a small, relatively low range. To the south and west and separated from the Little Florida Mountains by a gap approximately 0.5 mi (0.8 km) wide is the main Florida Mountains, which comprises the project area. This range is approximately 10 mi (17 km) long and 5 mi (8.5 km) wide, and consists of one long, narrow primary ridge running north to south, dissected by canyons along its perimeter, and with several short side ridges. Numerous unpaved roads lead to the perimeter of the range but access to the remaining high areas is gained only by strenuous hiking. The Florida Mountains are visible for many miles and is one of the most prominent physical features of the Luna County landscape (Figure 2).
The Florida Mountains are in the Mexican Highlands section of the Basin and Range Province. Elevations of some of the high peaks include 7,448 ft (2,270 m) on Florida Peak; 7,106 ft (2,166 m) on Gym Peak; 7,104 ft (2,165 m) on an unnamed peak at the head of Box Canyon; and 7,084 ft (2,159 m) on South Peak. Elevations at the edge of the main mountains are about 4,400-4,600 ft (1,341-1,402 m), and elevations along its lower edges are about 4,100-4,200 ft (1,250-1,280 m).

The terrain of the Florida Mountains consists of four main categories (Bavin 1975:17-18):
- Steep rocky slopes containing large rock outcrops, large cliffs, and numerous steep and narrow draws and canyons;
- Gentle slopes that lack the rock outcrops and have shallow, more open canyons and much smoother terrain;
- Ridge crests that are fairly level to gently sloped areas on the top of the mountain crest or high on the ridges; and
- Level to gently sloping, which includes bottoms of the larger canyons, the areas around the base of the mountain range, and the surrounding desert.

There are no permanent streams, and only a few small springs flow most of the year. The overall drainage of the main range of the Florida Mountains is radial into the surrounding Mimbres Basin. As the ephemeral streams flow down into the basin, they incise locally parallel drainage patterns typical of arid climates. At flood stage most of the arroyos empty by a vast drainage network and sheet wash into the Mimbres Basin. Bedrock surfaces are common at the mouths of the principal canyons. The outer margins of the bare-rock pediment graduate into coalescing alluvial fans by thin veneers of sand and gravel. A gently sloping, apron-like surface, termed a bajada, surrounds the Florida Mountains (Clemons 1998:8-10).

Within Luna County as a whole, more than 50 percent of the annual precipitation may be expected during the months of July, August, and September. Practically all of this falls during brief but occasionally heavy showers and thunderstorms. The greatest annual precipitation recorded was 20.36 inches (509 mm) 1870. Lack of precipitation, however, is the norm, with years having less than a total of 5 inches occasionally occurring. Average annual snowfall varies from 1 inch (25 mm) to 4 inches (101 mm). Snow seldom remains on the ground for more than brief periods. Annual rainfall averages as well as the amount of snowfall is probably higher in the Florida Mountains than in Deming. Clear sunny weather is common, and occurs approximately 83 percent of the time for an average of nearly 3600 hours of sunshine annually (Houghton 1973). Water is relatively abundant throughout the project area, especially during wetter periods of the year. Besides the numerous windmills and stone and masonry dams constructed during the 1930s by the CCC, there are also seeps throughout the range that provide water during all but the driest periods of the year (Figure 3) (Bavin 1975:29-30).

The Florida Mountains lie within the Upper Sonoran Life Zone (Bailey 1913). Annual forbs represent the most abundant plant group on the east, south, and west exposures. Scrub oak (Quercus sp.) is the most abundant species on the north and bottom exposures, and juniper (Juniperus sp.) is second in abundance on the north exposures. Many species such as mountain mahogany (Cercocarpus breviflorus) and Wright's silk-tassel (Garrya wrightii) occur in abundance in localized areas. Sideoats gramma (Bouteloua curtipendula) and black gramma (B. cur. ...)
VEGETATION AND SPRING LOCATIONS

FIGURE # 3

LITTLE FLORIDA AND FLORIDA MOUNTAINS

LUNA COUNTY

NEW MEXICO
eripoda) are the most abundant grasses (Wood et al. 1970). Relatively dense stands of pinyon-ju

 Mixed oak and mountain mahogany is found in association with other shrubs, cactus (Opuntia sp.), ocotillo, and sotol. Dense growths of this association occur in draws, canyons, and in the rougher, rockier areas of the Florida Mountains. Creosote bush (Larrea tridentata) is found in uniform stands in the desert areas around the perimeter of the project area and in some of the larger canyons, especially around the southern end of the mountain range. Species of yucca (Yucca sp.), along with grasses, cactus, and scattered forbs occur around the perimeter of the project area in some of the canyon bottoms. A variety of grasses and forbs with scattered shrubs, sotol, sacahuista, and occasional junipers on generally gentle slopes, are commonly found on the northeastern side of the Florida Mountains. Predominant stands of black gramma and sideoats gramma with a few scattered shrubs are found in the southern end of the mountain range in the area of Box Canyon (Bavin 1975:30-334).

Some of the more characteristic fauna identified within the Florida Mountains are listed as follows (Bavin 1975:34-36):

- desert mule deer (Odocoileus hemionus crooki), present in small numbers;
- bobcat (Lynx rufus), common;
- mountain lion (Felis concolor), occasional migrant through the range;
- black bear (Ursus americanus), occasional;
- coyote (Canis latrans), common, especially in the surrounding desert area;
- javelina (Tayassu pecari sonoriensis), occasional;
- gray fox (Urocyon cinereoargenteus), common;
- desert fox (Vulpes macrotis), common in the surrounding desert;
- black-tailed jackrabbit (Lepus californicus), common around the base of the mountain;
- and in the surrounding bahada;
- desert cottontail rabbit (Sylvilagus audibonii), common in most of the project area;
- rock ground squirrel (Citellus variegatus), common;
- ringtailed cat (Bassariscus astutus), occasional; hog-nose skunk (Conopatus leuconotus), common.

Two species of quail are present within the project area: the scaled quail (Callipepla squamata) and the Gambel’s quail (Lophortyx gambelli). Both species become numerous during favorable years. The morning dove (Zenaida macroura) nest extensively throughout the area during the summer months, both on the ground and in shrubs and trees. The project area is also used by numerous species of passerine birds during all periods of the year. The Florida Mountains also supports a sizeable population of golden eagles (Aquila chrysaetos). Several species of hawks and owls are also found in the area, including the great horned owl (Bubo virginianus), the red-tailed hawk (Buteo jamaicensis), the marsh hawk (Circus cyaneus), and the prairie falcon (Falco mexicanus).
Due to the desert climate of the project area, numerous species of reptiles are present. Lizards of many species are found during the summer months. The Florida Mountains lie within the normal range of at least five species of rattlesnakes (Klauber 1972). During the warmer seasons, caution is required while traveling on foot in the project area. The green rattlesnake (*Crotalus lepidus*) is found in many of the high, rocky areas of the range, even to the very top of the mountains.

**Historic American Period Land Use of the Florida Mountains**

As a result of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 and the Gadsden Purchase in 1853, the region containing the Florida Mountains was added to the United States as part of the Territory of New Mexico, thus opening it to exploration and settlement by Anglo-Americans. In 1858 the Butterfield Stage began operations in the northern part of Luna County and, in 1863, Fort Cummings was established at the base of Cook’s Peak. During the 1870’s and until his death in 1880, the Mimbreno Apache chief Victorio conducted many raids in the area of Luna County. During this period his raiding parties frequently made use of the Florida Mountains during their raids deep into Mexico. Byer’s Spring on the eastern slope was the only year-round source of fresh water on that side of the range, and was used by both the Apaches and the soldiers that pursued them (Figure 4) (Thrapp 1974:248).

The town of Deming was created in 1881 with the arrival of the railroad. At this time, explorations of the Florida Mountain range by miners were taking place. The first recorded mining operation was that of the Carroll brothers who worked in Silver Cave mine on the southeastern corner of the range from 1881 through 1885. The lead-silver ore removed during that time was valued at $60,000. Other mines were worked in the Florida Mountains during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Numerous small mines and prospects with proven occurrences of zinc, copper, lead, silver, barite, fluor spar, and manganese were worked during this period. Little mining took place following this initial development until World War II and again in the 1950’s when manganese ore was mined on the eastern side and the southern end of the range (Griswold 1961). Currently there are no active mines in the Florida Mountain range (Clemons 1998:58).

During the 1930’s the Civilian Conservation Corps undertook several projects in the Florida Mountains. During that time, springs were developed and stone and masonry dams were constructed. A few trails were also built for the movement of livestock into the higher elevations. Due to the lack of use and maintenance, these trails have become almost completely lost. In recent years much of the area around the base of the Florida Mountains has been subdivided into small home sites. Roads have been graded across the desert terrain in a grid pattern and numerous homes have been constructed. The nearest of these subdivisions is at the northern end of the project area in the gap between the Little Florida Mountains and the Florida Mountains. Near the gap and at the base of the western side of the Little Florida Mountains is Rockhound State Park, which attracts tourists throughout the year. Located at the lower end of Spring Canyon in the Florida Mountains is a small picnic area that receives little use because of the rough access road.
Figure 4. 1879 Map of southwestern New Mexico and southeastern Arizona Territories. Note that both Black Rock Tank and Beyer Spring are named landmarks at this time.
RESEARCH ORIENTATION

Historical research, which follows lines of investigation at appropriate archival repositories, includes an examination and analysis of all available information regarding the January 24, 1877 battle. Historical documentation of hitherto unidentified battle sites falls into four categories, ranging from first-hand accounts to some that were not created until many years after the event:

1) **Sources from soldiers who participated in the battle.** These sources would include testimony presented at military hearings, military records, and the accounts, diaries, journals, and letters of soldiers who were present at the battle.

2) **Sources from soldiers who visited the location of the battle after it was fought.** These sources would include the reports of military personnel who may have visited the area. Such visits sometimes occurred if serious questions resulted from a post-battle report review or military hearing.

3) **Sources from Native Americans who participated in the battle.** Such accounts are in the nature of oral tradition, therefore, normally not available in archival repositories. However, it sometimes occurs that ethnographers have transcribed oral accounts of Indian Wars battles, and these transcriptions may be published or unpublished documents within various repositories.

4) **Post-event sources about the battle site and/or general background information.** These sources include records at courthouses, unpublished and/or published county histories and interviews with local residents and artifact collectors.

Given the limited funding for this project, conducting a comprehensive documents search at pertinent repositories, for example, the National Archives, is beyond the scope of this project at present. Fortunately, some primary documents research has already been conducted by historians regarding this battle as a result of investigating the 9th and 10th Cavalry units (the “Buffalo Soldiers”) and their various actions in the Southwest (cf. F.D. Downey 1941; F.N. Schubert 1997; W.H. Leckie 1967; D.L. Thrapp 1974).

To date, a primary documents search has produced only one detailed account of the battle. This account, published in *The Grant County Herald*, dated February 3, 1877 (Appendix A) provides useful details as to the various incidents that occurred prior to and during the fight. The author of the newspaper article notes that he obtained his information “from official and other sources.” Presumably, the primary source of information for this article would have been the action report produced by Lieutenant Wright, with perhaps additional information derived from one or more enlisted men that participated in the battle. Unfortunately, a records search at the National Archives failed to locate this action report.

The newspaper article lacks specificity as to the exact geographic location of the battle. This is not surprising given that, as late as 1877, the Florida Mountains was virtually *terra incognita* to all but the Apache bands that periodically roamed them. Thus, there were no extant topographic maps available to the soldiers for their pinpointing the battle site. They could provide only general information pertaining to its location within the mountains. Nonetheless, one can still extrapolate some clues from this article, as follows:
• The battle occurred in the general vicinity of "some water holes," the latter located approximately nine miles south of Black Rock Tank. Black Rock is a presently known formation situated near the southeastern slopes of the Little Florida Mountains just north of the gap that separates the main range of the Florida Mountains and Little Florida Mountains. Black Rock Tank is not to be confused with Black Rock Canyon, located approximately two miles to the north and also on the eastern slopes of the Little Florida Mountains.

• From the above information one can posit the above-described water source was Byer Spring, that is, assuming that the battle took place somewhere on the east-facing slopes of the Floridas. Byer Spring, which actually consists of multiple minor springs (presumably the "water holes" mentioned in the newspaper article), and is the only known permanent water source on the east face of the Florida Mountains (Thrapp 1974:248). Byer Spring is named, albeit misspelled, after Captain Beyer, Lieutenant Wright's commanding officer, and who noted their existence during a previous patrol within these mountains in October 1876.

• The fight took place at or near the head of a canyon, which is somewhere in the general vicinity of Byer Spring. There are three named major drainages within four miles of the spring: Lobo Draw, Victorio Canyon, and Copper Kettle Canyon. There are also several minor, unnamed canyons and numerous nondescript secondary drainages that empty into the above-named canyons.

• The soldiers were located "on top of a mound between two small ravines" and several of warriors were positioned "on some cliffs above." This information suggests the battle took place at the head of a canyon, where two ravines/arroyos join to form a low ridge or mound. This kind of topographic relief is fairly common at the heads of major drainages emanating from the eastern face of the Florida Mountains.

These data help to narrow the search area. Instead of dealing with some 100 mi² (256 km²) of mountainous terrain, one now has a search area that is narrowed down to several thousand acres of canyons and ridges. This is still a daunting task when one realizes that much of the fighting probably took place within just a fraction of one acre.

**ARCHEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION**

**EXPECTED ARTIFACTS**

An underlying assumption of this study is that the battle site will contain archeological remains sufficient to identify it. Indeed, battlefield archeology has been very successful in discovering the locations of Indian Wars battle sites of varying size and complexity (cf; Adams et al. 2000; Cruse et al. 2001; Haecker 1998; Johnson 2000; Scott 2001.). A basic tenet in archeology is that all human behavior is patterned; therefore, artifacts left as a result of human activity will display a pattern that reflects specific activities. Human conflict is simply one form of human behavior: battles leave patterns that are distinguishable from more peaceful pursuits. Thus, the activities that occurred during a battle hold the potential for being identified and correctly interpreted.

We hypothesize that the January 24, 1877 battle left the following artifacts:

• The Apaches were described in the newspaper article as being "fully armed with muskets, carbines and Sharp's [sic] rifles" (The Grant County Herald, Appendix A). The Sharps
was patented in 1852 and, when introduced, fired a .52 caliber bullet in a paper- or linen-wrapped cartridge that required a percussion cap. After the Civil War, Sharps rifles used metallic cartridges. A .50 caliber Sharps model introduced in 1875 used a metallic cartridge that was 2½ inch-long and center-fired. Specific to the 1875 model, we would expect to find metallic cartridge cases that lacked headstamps. If the Apaches had Civil War-era Sharps, then fired percussion caps would have been deposited. It is also possible the Apaches possessed both models.

- The word “muskets” suggests the then-obsolete .58 caliber rifled musket, the most common shoulder arm used during the Civil War era. This muzzle-loading, percussion firearm did not employ metallic cartridges; instead, it fired the distinctive Minié bullet that required loose black powder and a percussion cap. The Apaches may also have been armed with .52 caliber muzzle-loading black powder rifles, such as the Model 1841 “Mississippi” rifle, and various types of Indian trade rifles. Although considered obsolete after the Civil War, for Apaches such firearms held the advantage of not requiring sometimes hard-to-find metallic cartridges.

- If the Apaches possessed carbines, then one might expect to find metallic cartridge cases reflecting one or more carbine models, for example, Civil War-era Sharps, Burnside, Spencer, and/or the Model 1873 Trapdoor Springfield.

- Although not mentioned in the newspaper article, the Apaches during this period of conflict often possessed pistols, such as the .44 and .45 caliber Colt and Remington revolvers. These particular models used metallic cartridges; some then-obsolete pistol models of the Civil War-era required percussion caps and loose black powder. Metal arrow points might also be present, since it is likely at least some of the Apaches were armed with bows and arrows.

- It is also possible that the Apaches possessed flintlock muskets and/or rifles, firearms that had been considered obsolete since the 1840s. Around 1893 Clinton Greaves gave an interview for the Columbus, Ohio Press, regarding his exploits during the January 24, 1877 battle. In the resultant article Greaves stated that “…out of the captured stuff I received an old Flintlock gun…” (Appendix B). This statement may be true; however, other statements in this article suggests that Greaves was confusing and/or exaggerating his exploits during this battle with other, subsequent actions during his military career.

- The soldiers would have been armed with Model 1873 .45-70 Springfield Trapdoor carbines, and Model 1873 .45 caliber Colt revolvers. Headstamps are not found on cartridges made at the Frankford Arsenal before March of 1877, with the exception of the carbine cartridge made from March to July of 1874. The headstamp “US CARBINE” in raised letters is found on these latter cartridges (Reuland 1993:17).

We hypothesize the following artifact patterns for the above-described objects:

- The Apaches that surrounded the soldiers at the initiation of the battle would have deposited cartridge cases, fired percussion caps, dropped/unfired cartridges, dropped/unfired black powder round balls, and unfired percussion caps in the immediate area of their rancheria. Other, similar objects would be found near rock outcrops located along the edge of the rancheria on the sides of the outcrops that are opposite to where the soldiers stood. The Apaches stationed along the cliff escarpment would have left a roughly linear pattern of similar battle-related objects. Personal items of the Apaches may also be found, as exemplified by cone tinklers, brass wire bracelets, and skinning knives.

- The soldiers’ artifact pattern at the initiation of the battle would be a concentration of Springfield carbine and Colt pistol cartridge cases located “on top of a mound between two
small ravines.” There would probably be some intermixing of Apache- and soldier-related artifacts; however, it is possible the cartridge cases deposited by the soldiers would be grouped in several discrete concentrations, reflecting the soldiers’ typical firing habits, superior firepower, and abundant ammunition relative to the Apaches. It is also possible that other cartridge concentrations would form a roughly linear pattern reflecting the soldiers’ skirmish line(s) as they withdrew from the battle site. Evidence of the soldiers’ uniforms and personal items may also be found, as exemplified by buttons, coins, and pocketknives.

SURVEY METHODS

A critical aspect of these field investigations is the utilization of metal detectors. Archeologists have largely ignored this type of remote sensing equipment, some of them viewing it as the unrespectable instrument of the relic collector. But just like the shovel, screen, and wheelbarrow, a metal detector is simply a tool: it is neither benign nor malign, ethical or unethical. Military sites archeologists have been utilizing metal detectors with great success since 1984 (e.g., Ludwig and Stute 1993; Adams et al. 2000; Adams et al. 2001; Haecker and Mauck 1997; Haecker 2001; Harwood 2001; Laumbach 2001; Ludwig and Stute). Simply stated, it maximizes the potential for the identification of metallic cultural material associated with battle sites of the Modern Era. Use of metal detectors minimizes disturbance to the land, as well as minimizing the potential for disturbing human remains. When used by professional archeologists metal detectors are cost effective, especially when funding, time, and personnel are limited.

Previous surveys conducted by project personnel indicate Apache bands chose secluded places that provided a commanding view for a sentinel’s lookout station, the latter often indicated by a low stacking of rocks to form a simple breastwork. The rancheria may have contained several grass-and-frame wickiups, which were situated below the lookout station and preferably placed amongst trees for added screening. An essential aspect of rancheria placement was an exit route that ensured a fast escape for women, children and livestock if those on lookout provided a timely warning of an impending attack. (The warriors always exited last, while fighting off and slowing the attackers’ advance). The exit route typically was one or more steep ravines or ridges that led up the mountain slope. Close access to a water source was not an important consideration for rancheria placement: seclusion and an escape route were paramount.

The primary foci of the survey were those landforms that hold the above-described optimum rancheria characteristics. Such landforms are, in fact, noted in the newspaper article that describes the battle site (see Appendix A): the Apache band was situated at the head of a secluded canyon, where minor drainages form a ridge (that is, an escape route up the mountain); and some of the warriors were situated along the canyon escarpment (that is, a place that provided a wide vista for sentinels). The archeological survey is considered a reconnaissance in that it was impractical to conduct a 100 percent inventory given that, typically, only three archeologists experienced in the use of metal detectors were available during the periods of survey. The reconnaissance-level survey focused on the major canyons and the ridge tops and slopes that form these canyons. The survey was also limited to BLM-administered lands located along the eastern face of the main mountain range.
The metal detector operators worked in close proximity to each other or singly, depending on the nature of specific topographic features that are encountered. Typically, the metal detector operator swept the ground where vegetation cover and rocks were not an impediment. Given the rough terrain and vegetation association of the project area, probably no more than 10 percent of a given sample area was actually examined with the metal detector. Based on our previous experience in surveying Apache habitation and battle sites, however, we are confident that if metallic artifacts were present the operators would have located at least some of them. Once an artifact was discovered, the operators then surveyed closely spaced transects in order to increase the artifact count. All artifacts were digitally photographed using a centimeter scale, the global positions of cultural features and representative artifacts determined, artifact depths recorded, diagnostic artifacts collected, and all other discovered artifacts re-buried.

SURVEY RESULTS

A estimated total of 80 acres was intensively surveyed using metal detectors, and the ground surfaces of an additional estimated 180 acres were surveyed using conventional survey techniques. The survey resulted in the discovery of two, eighteenth-nineteenth centuries Apache camp sites, LA 135276 and LA 135277, as well as the recording of seven isolated cultural occurrences. These cultural resources are described as follows:

SITE DESCRIPTIONS

LA 135276
This site is an Apache ranchería encampment that dates to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The site is situated along the crest and saddle of a steep-sided ridge and upslope from Byer Spring (Figures 5 and 6). Associated features consist of the remains of at least two wickiups, several culturally modified junipers, and a dry-laid stone breastwork. Artifacts are widely scattered along the ridge crest for approximately 762 by 91 ft (250 by 30 m), with the majority occurring within and adjacent to a grove of mature junipers (Figure 7). Two artifacts presumed associated with this site, a portion of a wrought iron lance head and a cone tinkler, were found at the northern base of the ridge. Approximately 305 ft (100 m) downslope and to the west of the breastwork is the ridge saddle, on which is situated a grove of mature junipers.

A bough of one of these junipers has been deeply notched with a metal axe, the bough then bent down to form one side of a wickiup (Figure 8). Another wickiup location is identified, based on a concentrated scattering of baling wire fragments within a 4m² area. Baling wire has been
Figure 6  Byer Spring Area

Gym Peak Quadrangle Detail
New Mexico–Luna County
7.5 Minute Series

Scale 1:24000
Contour Interval 40 Feet

24
found at two ca. 1869 Mescalero Apache rancherias within canyons of the Guadalupe Mountains of New Mexico (Adams et al. 1999, 2000). We believe the baling wire was used to tie together and secure the wickiup frame and branches. There are also at least nine mature junipers that have had several of their limbs removed with a metal axe or hatchet (Figure 12). The bit cuts vary between 1.5 and 3 inches (38 and 75 mm) in width. Since the early nineteenth century, American-style axes and hatchets typically left bit cuts that are approximately 3 inches (75 mm) in width. In contrast, a Spanish Colonial-era ax left bit cuts that measure approximately 2 inches (50 mm) in width. It is possible, therefore, that the ax cuts found at this site reflect the use of both Spanish Colonial and American axes by the site’s occupants. Many of the ax bit cuts are covered by thick growths of lichen, which suggests relative antiquity as to when the cutting activity took place. On a bough of one of the ax-cut trees rests a stone pestle (Figure 13), presumably placed there by an Apache.

Figure 8. LA 135276, wickiup incorporating bough of juniper. Looking west.

Other artifacts found within the ridge saddle portion of the site include: an offset iron awl, a brass lock of the type used to secure a jewelry box or journal, a possible segment of a musket barrel that had been hammered, a brass tack head, chiseled pieces of iron barrel hoop—presumably the detritus from making an arrow point—and over 40 Apache micaceous sherds from one pot drop.

The breastwork (Figure 9) consists of large, angular pieces of native stone stacked on the top of an outcropping located at the highest point on the ridge. The unimpeded view from of the breastwork, which is located at the highest point on the ridge, is that of the Mimbres Basin to the east and southeast of the ridge.

Figure 9. LA 135276, stacked-rock breastwork. Looking northeast.

One brass or copper concho having a Spanish Colonial period, grapevine-and-feather design (Figure 10) was discovered on the surface and approximately 152 ft (50 m) east of the breastwork. Also, a portion of a forged iron lance was found at the base of the ridge (Figure 11). Three wire nails were found within a 3.2 ft-diameter by 2.0 ft-deep (0.98 by 0.61 m) depression on the east side of the breastwork. The function of the depression is not readily evident since it is too small to have been utilized as a habitation feature. The wire nails suggest a post-1885 date of use.
Figure 10. LA 135276, concho.

Figure 11. LA 135276, lance fragment.

Figure 12. LA 135276, ax-cut tree.

Figure 13. LA 135276, pestle resting on limb.
Site Summary

The concho and lance date to the eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries. These objects were almost certainly manufactured in northern Mexico and were acquired by the Apaches as booty and/or through trade. Baling wire was introduced in the 1850's, and wire nails were introduced in the mid-1880's. These objects are likely Anglo-American, not Mexican, in manufacture and date to the Territorial Period (1846-1912). The other, above-mentioned artifacts span the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. We believe Apaches used this encampment on an occasional basis during an estimated 130-year period, beginning around 1750 and ending at around the time of Victorio around 1880. The encampment location afforded its occupants seclusion from intruders, a commanding view of the Mimbres Basin to the east and southeast, an abundant source of firewood and wickiup material, and a nearby water source, that is, Byer Spring. Most important, the ridge provided an escape route that would have entailed exiting up the slope to the west of the ridge saddle and/or down the slopes on either side of the ridge.

LA 135277

This is a multi-component site consisting of an eighteenth century Apache rancheria and a probable Anglo-American encampment dating to the late nineteenth century. The Apache component of the site is located on a saddle ridge that forms the south side of the entrance to Copper Kettle Canyon (Figures 14,16,17). A 14 ft (4.27 m)-diameter rock ring is associated with the Apache component (Figure 15). The diameter suggests this was the location of a tipi and not a brush wickiup, the latter typically having a diameter that ranges between 6-9 ft (2-3 m) (Adams et al. 2000:70, Fig. 34).

Figure 14. LA 135277, Apache site on saddle ridge, Copper Kettle Canyon. Looking southeast.

Collected artifacts include a small, decorative iron button that is silver plated (Figure 19), and a Spanish Colonial Period bridle jingle, or coscojo, made of forged iron (Figure 20), and a wrought iron buckle (Figure 21).

Figure 15. LA 135277, Bob Schiowitz in center of tipi ring. Looking northwest.
I. COSCOJO
2. BUCKLE
3. BUTTON
4. IRON FRAGMENTS
5. KETTLE FRAGMENTS
6. (2) .45 CAL. CARTRIDGE CASES
7. (2) .30 CAL. CARTRIDGE CASES
8. SUSPENDER BUCKLE
9. PANTS RIVET
10. LEAD Drips (FROM CASTING BULLETS)

LEGEND

- 19th C. CAN SCATTER
- BEDROCK MORTARS
- BREASTWORK
- TIPI RING
- JUNIPER

FIGURE # 17
NOT TO SCALE
Other, non-collected artifacts that presumably date to the same period include: fragments of chiseled forged iron (Figure 22), which are probably the waste material from manufacturing arrow points; fragments of a cast iron pot; a flat-headed, forged iron tack; and melted lead waste, the latter likely resulting from casting a bullet(s). One fired, .38 Long bullet was also found within the Apache encampment. This type of bullet, which was manufactured for use in non-military rifles and pistols, was introduced in the early 1870’s (Suydam 1960:85), thus not associated with the eighteenth century Apache component of the site. Another feature that is presumed associated with the Apache component is a cluster of eight bedrock mortars (Figure 18), located ca. 1005 ft (330 m) from the Apache encampment and at the southern base of the saddle ridge.

The probable Anglo-American component is located approximately 670 ft (220 m) east of the Apache component and near the eastern edge of the ridge and is completely surrounded by granitic bedrock outcrops. Artifacts discovered here consist of a nickel-plated suspender or trouser buckle, an iron clothing rivet, lead dripping, two .30 cal. cartridge cases and two .45 cal. cartridge cases. Near the artifact scatter are three stones: two are placed on-edge, the other has fallen over. The box-like configuration that is formed by these stones suggests this is a storage cyst.

![Figure 18. LA 135277, bedrock mortars at base of saddle ridge. Looking northwest.](image)

**Site Summary**

The artifact array found within the Apache component site suggests a period of occupation that is coeval with LA 135276, the artifacts likewise acquired as booty from raids into Mexico and/or by trade. The presence of an apparent tipi ring is significant in that it suggests the site occupants originated from the more grassy regions to the east, where tipis were typically used by the Faraón, Mescalero and Lipan Apaches (Moorehead 1976:4-6). Although located some distance away from the Apache encampment, the bedrock mortars are presumably associated with it. If this is the case, then the site must have been periodically re-occupied over a considerable period in order for bedrock mortars to be created.

The Anglo-American component dates to ca. 1860-1900. The occupants were likely engaged in mining or ranching activities that began to occur within the Floridas toward the end of Apache occupation of these mountains after 1880. The stone-lined cyst, however, is typical of Apachean encampments. Similar storage cysts have been found on Mescalero Apache encampments in the Guadalupe Mountains of southeastern New Mexico (Chris Adams, personal communication, 2002).
Figure 19. LA 135277, button.

Figure 20. LA 135277, coscojo.

Figure 21. LA 135277, buckle.

Figure 22. LA 135277, chiseled iron scraps.
APACHEAN ISOLATED CULTURAL OCCURRENCES

The survey resulted in the recording of nine Isolated Cultural Occurrences (IO's) that reflect the Apachean occupation of the Florida Mountains. The IO's are described as follows:

**IO 1**—Located near the head of Victorio Canyon, on the southern edge of a deeply entrenched drainage (Figure 23). IO 1 consists of a cut fragment of a tin picture frame, a small piece of pounded silver, a fragment of a square nail that may have been used as an awl or punch, a fragment of a brass fitting of unknown function, and a wood screw fragment. Nearby, there are two stacked rocks on a small boulder overlooking the drainage, and may be a breastwork. Not collected.

**IO 2**—Located on the crest of a narrow ridge that overlooks Victorio Canyon to the south and an unnamed minor drainage to the north (Figure 23). IO 2 consists of a cut, rectangular strip of rolled tinned steel that originated from a food can. Similar strips of cut can have been found on Apache sites and are believed to have been used to make cone tinklers. Not collected.

**IO 3**—Located on the saddle of a ridge approximately 610 ft (200 m) southeast of LA 135276 (Figure 23). IO 3 consists of a cone tinkler, a cut nail that may have been used as an awl, and a small piece of pounded lead. Not collected.

**IO 4**—Located on a saddle of a ridge approximately 0.5 mi (0.8 km) north of LA 135276 (Figure 4). IO 4 consists of an iron arrow point 52 mm long, 20 mm wide, and with a 5 mm-long square stem. The arrow point was made either from a segment of barrel hoop or other piece of flat, rolled iron of similar thickness. Not collected.

**IO 5**—Located at the base of a ridge top outcropping that has formed a natural breastwork, approximately 1 mi (1.6 km) southeast of LA 135277 (Figure 16). The aspect of the outcropping is the entrance to Copper Kettle Canyon to the southeast, and the entrance to an unnamed, minor canyon to the northeast. IO 5 consists of five parts of a flintlock pistol: a lock plate, two lock plate screws, a portion of the main spring, and a fragment of what is tentatively identified as a fragment of the trigger guard plate. All of the parts are made of iron. The lock plate measurements and overall design match almost exactly a type of high quality, civilian-style flintlock pistol that was manufactured in Mexico City during the late eighteenth-early nineteenth centuries (Brinkerhoff and Chamberlain 1972:59, Plate 98). All five objects were collected.

**IO 6**—Located on the edge of a second terrace that borders a feeder drainage of Copper Kettle Canyon approximately 0.8 mi (1.3 km) southeast of LA 135277 (Figure 16). IO 6 is the trunk of a juniper that possesses the physical features typical of a bow tree. A bow tree was a living tree that possessed the qualities needed for a bow: the grain of the outer wood needed to be sufficiently long, relatively straight, free of knots or other imperfections that would weaken the bow, and flexible. In order to remove the desired strip of outer wood, one first ax-notched the top and bottom of the wood selected for removal. Then a lever, such as a stout wooden pole, was inserted under the wood via the notches. A knife or ax was also used to facilitate the wood removal. The entire process left telltale marks on the tree: deep notching above and below tree blaze and a series of horizontal knife or axe cuts along the length of the blaze. IO 6 has the
Figure 23  Victorio Canyon Area

Gym Peak Quadrangle Detail
New Mexico—Luna County
7.5 Minute Series

Scale 1:24000
Contour Interval 40 Feet
Figure 24  Box Canyon Area

Scale 1:24000
Contour Interval 40 Feet
lower ax-cut notch; however, the upper notch is absent as a result of later truncation of the tree. A series of horizontal knife or axe cuts extend along most of the length of the blaze.

**IO 7**—Located at the base of a massive granitic outcrop, which is situated on the east side of the entrance into Box Canyon (Figure 24). It consists of three stacked rocks that are wedged between a 2 ft (0.7 m)-wide cleft in the outcrop. The stacked rocks create a simple breastwork and/or hunt blind: one individual could crouch behind this feature, and have an excellent field of fire toward the canyon bottom located less than 100 ft (30 m) away.

**IO 8**—Located on the edge of the drainage that emanates from Copper Kettle Canyon, and approximately 0.5 mi (0.8 km) from LA 135277 (Figure 16). IO 8 is a badly rusted and bent fragment of filed and drilled iron, possibly a part of the internal mechanism of a flintlock firearm. Not collected

**IO 9**—Located within a minor drainage that emanates from Blue Water Spring. LA 135276 is located approximately 0.70 mi (1.25 km) to the west (Figure 6). IO 9 consists of two bedrock mortars spaced approximately 6 ft (2 m) apart, and both are approximately 40 cm deep.

**CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The reconnaissance survey resulted in the discovery of two Apache encampments that both date to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and nine isolated cultural occurrences that likewise reflect Apachean occupation of the Florida Mountains during this turbulent period in New Mexico history. Unfortunately, the reconnaissance survey did not result in the discovery of the January 24, 1877 fight location. Possible reasons for this negative finding are proffered as follows:

*The sample size was too small.* Undoubtedly, within the Florida Mountains, there are many unsurveyed areas that meet our landform criteria as to where the battle took place. Thus, it is possible that the fight location may have been found if additional acreage was subjected to metal detecting. A corollary to this possibility would be that the landforms criteria we used to select areas for survey are simply incorrect. The criteria were based on a period newspaper article (Appendix A), which was written by an individual who was not an eyewitness to the fight. It is possible that, if Lieutenant Wright’s original account is ever found, then significant revisions to these criteria are in order.

*The fight actually occurred somewhere on the western slope of the Florida Mountains.* This is a possibility if only because there is no known document that explicitly states what side of the mountain the fight took place. We presumed the fight occurred within a canyon along the eastern slope, based on two facts: 1) Wright’s command made camp at Black Rock Tank the night before the fight, and this tank is on the eastern slope of the Little Florida Mountains; and 2) Wright’s command stopped at “some water holes” located about nine miles south of Black Rock Tank. Byer Spring consists of a group of several permanent springs that are located on the eastern slope of the Florida Mountains, and about nine miles south of Black Rock Tank. It is conceivable, however, that Wright’s command left Black Rock Tank and headed west through
the Florida Gap, then southwards along the western slopes of the Floridas. In fact, several intermittent springs are present on the western slopes of the mountain range, and one of these springs is about nine miles from Black Rock Tank if one were to follow the natural contours of these slopes.

*The archeologists actually metal detected the battle location but simply missed the artifacts.* This is a possibility if 1) the battle location contains very few artifacts and these artifacts are spread over a broad area; and/or 2) the artifacts are deeply buried and thus beyond the depth range of the metal detectors; or 3) collectors simply have removed all of the artifacts. Based on our previous successful experiences in locating and identifying small-scale fight locations, we are reasonably confident that, if we had surveyed the fight location and artifacts are present in relative concentration—on average, one metallic artifact per 100m²—then we would have found the site. It is unlikely that the rate of soil deposition within the surveyed colluvial zones of the Florida Mountains would have buried circa 1877 artifacts to a depth of about one foot (0.3 meters), which is the maximum depth range of the metal detectors that were used during this survey. Artifacts dating to the eighteenth century were found on or close to the surface, so artifact depth should be ruled out.

Finally, there are apocryphal accounts of collectors having found the site and removing enough cartridge cases to fill "a gallon-sized can." Even if this were true (and we doubt it), collectors, even when using metal detectors, cannot collect all the artifacts simply because their methods of collecting are haphazard, and they are not comprehensive in covering the area in question. Also, collectors usually focus on certain categories of artifacts, such as cartridge cases and those objects possessing some intrinsic value, such as coins. Other, less interesting or seemingly worthless objects (for example, bullets or iron scrap detritus resulting from making arrow points) are usually rejected by collectors, but from an archeologist’s perspective are integral to understanding the site. Therefore, it is our experience in conducting metal detector surveys of this type that, no matter how intensely a site has been impacted by collectors, it is almost certain that there will be a sufficient number of artifacts to at least identify site location, if not to determine an artifact pattern.

Although our primary survey goal was not met, the survey was successful in that we found archeological evidence of eighteenth century Apache occupation in the Florida Mountains. This is no small achievement. Only within the last few years have Apachian sites been archeologically identified and, until now, these sites have all been dated to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. We believe that LA 135276 and LA 135277 contain a wealth of information regarding Apachian lifeways during this turbulent period of the American Southwest. Furthermore, we believe that the Florida Mountains hold yet even more Apachian sites and isolated cultural occurrences.

Given the research possibilities, we recommend a continuance of reconnaissance-level surveys within the Florida Mountains. The primary goals should be twofold and of equal importance: the determination of the site of the January 24, 1877 battle and the discovery and recordation of all Apache sites. Future investigations should include:

- Consultations with tribal representatives of San Carlos and Mescalero Apache Reservations, to ensure that concerns of the descendants of those Apaches who occupied the Florida
Mountains are taken into account. If possible, Apache oral histories regarding their ancestral occupation of the Florida Mountains should be collected, and active participation of the Apaches during such surveys should be encouraged;

- If Apache support is obtained for further survey, both the Little Floridas and the western slopes and canyons of the main range of Florida Mountains should be evaluated;
- The criteria for selecting sample areas should be expanded to allow for locating all Apache sites; and
- The resultant information should be published both in professional articles and for a popular audience provided that the information is reviewed first by Apache tribal representatives.

Finally, on a more ambitious level of research, we believe that the other high desert mountain ranges of Luna County should eventually be archeologically investigated as well. In conducting research for this project we came across several Spanish military accounts that make reference to Apache rancherías, for example, in the southern end of the “Picacho de Mimbres.” This would be in the vicinity of Cooke’s Peak in the Black Range. Through a comprehensive program of documents research combined with archeological investigations, we can obtain a much better understanding of the lifeways within *Apacheria* than we have at present.

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APPENDIX A

*The Grant County Herald* article, February 3, 1877
ACCOUNT OF LIEUT. WRIGHT'S RECENT INDIAN FIGHT

From official and other sources we compile the following narrative of the above gallant officer's fight with the Apaches. At Fort Cummings on the night of January 21st the Lieutenant received an order from Capt. Beyers to pursue a party of Indians who were striking for the Florida Mountains. He was instructed to take some Navajos who were with him as scouts. In pursuance of this order the Lieutenant devoted the 22nd to preparing rations and shoeing his animals and that same evening with eleven of the 9th Cavalry, and three Navajos he marched from Cummings to Black Rock tank, a dry camp in the Floridas. On the morning following the command marched 9 miles further to some water holes. Here the Lieutenant left a party of six of his men and sent the remainder in two parties to scout. Both of latter parties, however, came back in the evening without having discovered the Indians. On Wednesday morning the command broke camp and marched to a deserted rancheria which had been found by Capt. Beyers in October last. Still no signs. Lt. Wright then started with his Navajos, Corporal Greaves and privates Mackaden and Turner—all afoot, sending the rest of the men with the horses to the west slope of the mountains. The Lieutenant and his detachment then ascended a canyon 1 ½ miles long, climbing a ridge, which looked down into another canon. Here the party discovered several Indian ponies and following the canon saw a large herd of from 40 to 50 horses and several of the 'gentle savages'. From here Private Turner was instructed to re-call the men with the cavalry horses. Then the detachment placed themselves in the rocks to await the arrival of the stock. While waiting an Indian girl about 18 or 20 years of age passed the party on the trail below. The "fair creature" was immediately taken prisoner and she being questioned, said there were but 7 men in the rancheria near there, who had come from Arizona where they had been fighting Coyoteros. In a half hour Lieut. Wright was joined by Sergt. Perry with Privates Adams, Coats and Epps, who reported that they were unable to bring up the horses. Lt. W. had now 6 men and three Navajos and the girl. He then ascended the canon and made another addition to his party in the shape of a squaw, three small children and a papoose. The command was then placed on the top of a mound between two small ravines. Here nine Indians (attracted by the cries of the women) appeared on some cliffs above. Lt. Wright parleyed with them and required them to give up their guns and horses and assured them of protection if they would do so. They came down to the foot of the mound when the Lieutenant through a Navajo ordered them to halt. Whether the message was delivered Lieut. W. does not know but in a few seconds he found himself confronted with 18 Apaches fully armed with muskets, carbines and Sharp's rifles and "plotted to kill." They then brought the Lieutenant one of their men with a bullet wound in the thigh which he dressed for them. Meanwhile the captive women and children seized the opportunity to escape to a cliff 150 yards off—and here we almost weep to be obliged to state that the Indian girl in running off took away with her the Lieutenant's over coat, which he had chivalrously wrapped around her. The chief of the party then pointed out two warriors who had come from the Hot Springs reservation bringing with them Col. Bennett's two horses. Then the chief offered to disarm and give up. It was, however, clearly apparent to the officer that the party had no intention whatever of surrendering their arms and he now warned his men to keep a sharp look out. Another demand was then made upon them to surrender their weapons but the braves instead, began...
to move off, several attempting to get between the command and their means of retreat, and
laughing at the idea of his taking their guns. Lieut. W. saw that at emergency had arisen
which required prompt action—so he drew his revolver and placing it against the breast of a
one-eyed Indian fired it, then as quickly turning to the right he fired at another—both Indians
dropped and rolled down the ravine below. Corporal Greaves at the same instant killed one,
and Private Mackaden killed the chief and wounded another in the back. The instantaneous
fall of so many paralyzed the remainder who skedaddled in all directions. They soon opened
a lively fusillade upon the gallant band who spiritedly returned it. The fire of the Indians was
reinforced by fire from the cliff above by others of the same band. The command was now
exposed on a mound without shelter. Deeming their position too perilous the Lieutenant with
his men and six captured horses (the Bennett stallion among them) started for the plain about
1 1/2 miles distant up a very rough ascent. Here the party struck the trail of the animals and
men who had been left behind which they followed until they reached Cummings at about
half an hour before midnight. The result of this affair was as follows: five Indians were
certainly killed outright—and a number of others were as certainly wounded. They captured
5 carbines, two mules and five horses and a colt. Bennett’s stallion died while en route to
Fort Cummings. The rest of the Indian herd stampeded at the commencement of the firing
which accounts for the fact that the Lieutenant did not get more stock.

Captains Beyers and Cooney and Lieutenant Wright subsequently went to the scene of this
interesting fight from which place they followed the Indian trail (a large one) toward the Tres
Hermanos—for 22 miles. Here it led southward between the Boca Grande and Tabacca
Mountains into old Mexico. Capts. Beyers and Cooney are still out. Lieut. Wright returned
to Cummings.
APPENDIX B
Columbus, Ohio Press article, dated ca. 1893
Perhaps no regular soldier whose name appears on the United States roster has a more remarkable record than Clinton Greaves who is now on detailed service as post blacksmith at the Columbus barracks. Greaves is a colored man, but bears a mark of honor which has been extended to a very few of Uncle Sam's agents. His career would make several volumes of interesting matter. Having heard something of his history a Press representative visited the post blacksmith and asked for an account of the action where he gained his (here the text is illegible for several lines) gained and an account in his own words of the notable engagement with the Apache is given.

CLINTON GREAVES was born in MADISONVILLE, VA. He is a blacksmith by trade and has been a soldier for twenty years. He first served in Capt. C.D. Beyer's Troop C, Ninth cavalry, joining the troops at Fort Duncan, Texas in March, 1873. He served at Duncan and Brownsville, Texas, until July 1875. When we were ordered to New Mexico. In 1876 he entered the campaign against hostile Hot Springs Apaches, whose head chief was Victorio. In January, 1877, he was on detached service as scout and forwarding supplies as needed. On the 24th of January, 1877 he gained the medal and was continuously in the field up to November, 1877, when he discharged on expiration of service. He enlisted again within a month and was assigned to H troop of the Ninth. In August 78 was on scouting expedition through the Guadalupe and White Mountains. Lt. Smith was commanding troop H of the Ninth Cavalry and Lt. Wright in charge of Indian scouts. The battalion commander was Captain Carroll. In one engagement killed two Indians and captured five. Corporal Dale was killed and Greaves was one of the number to recover his body and carry it from the fields. In January, 1880, was an expedition with the Apaches in the Black Range. In April, same year, had another engagement at San Andreas mountains.

In the field continuously all summer of '80. Returned to Ft. Cummings, N.M. and was there only a short time when ordered to the field again. This was in January, 1881. Was under Colonel N.A.M. Dudley and were ordered to pursue hostilies through New Mexico to Old Mexico. This expedition only lasted a month; but yet we were ion the field all that year. In August, 1881, we had an engagement at Gobelia (GAVILAN) Canyon. The Apaches killed Lt. Smith, who was in command, and Greaves was one of the number to regain
his body and convey it along with the wounded to Brockmans ranch. His last engagement was (ILLEGIBLE WORD) Dragoon into Arizona. Greaves was repeatedly called from 1876 to the tail of '81 as the most reliable man to carry dispatches and take charge of supply trains through the hostile region.

Following is an account of the remarkable battle with the Indians, told in Greaves own words: In the fall of '76 and winter of '77 I was detailed in charge of thirteen men while Lt. Wright was in charge of six Navajo scouts and my men also. (ILLEGIBLE WORD) duty was to take supplies wherever they were needed and the duty was one against one as we were continually traveling through hostile country. We received all our supplies from Ft. Armstrong, New Mexico which was the most available point near the railroad. On January 23, '77 our pack train started to deliver a load of supplies.

We made good head way and that night camped at (SEVERAL LINES ILLEGIBLE) days march would take us to MINERAL SPRINGS which would make the two days march 38 miles. When we arrived at the vase of the Florida Mountains I thought it would be a good idea to send my pack train around the mountains through a pass while Lt. Wright and his scouts with my remaining party would take a blind trail over the mountains. Everything was moving splendidly until we arrived on the top between two bald knobs which seemed to be covered with sage brush and cactus. We proceeded down the mountains picking our way among the rocks and crevices. We had not gone far when we perceived something moving among this brush and rocks. We concealed ourselves while I took a good position on a rock to make observations. I saw what I had taken for sage brush to be brush tupees, and could see what I supposed to be papooses and squaws moving about. We were not long in that position when I noticed a squaw advancing along, coming not more than 300 yards from us. I was requested to fire at her, as I was considered one of the best shots in the troop. I could have brought her down, but I knew that if we were quiet she would come up very close. When she arrived so that retreat was impossible I rolled off of my perch and told her to throw up her hands and dismount. She made an effort to get a weapon, but I let her understand by speaking Mexican, (which all those Apaches understood) that I'd kill her. When we examined her she was armed with a bow and thirteen arrows, a tomahawk and dagger. We wanted her to divulge the strength of the village we had run into, but she pretended not to understand. We got the Indian scout Pedro at her, but nothing was gained. At last I told Lt. Wright that I would make her speak, I pulled my revolver and told her I'd kill her, doing the "greaser" talk, when she said that there were sixty five all told and that they were commanded by Chief Black Leg and Saucy Man. By this
time the village was all astir and the bucks were surrounding us and the squaws and papooses were hidden out of the way. The Indians proposed after hoisting the white flag, and we did the same, that if we would place our arms on the ground unloading them first, that they would place their guns on top, that Lt. Wright should let the squaw have his overcoat to collect them in. Lt. Wright who was green in warfare with the reds, was willing to comply, but I maintained my right to hold out to the last and said that before anyone would get my arms there would be blood running. We parlied there for a long time. At last we received word that the squaw should get the overcoat to collect the arms. Now I knew what that meant. They would give us a volley just as soon as the squaw had got out of range or danger, and I told our party for each man to pick out his man and to be sure and drop him and as many more as he could; but not before they had heard my gun speak. I kept my eye on old Chief Black Leg. As he held the flag. I made up my mind to drop him when the flag dropped. It was as I surmised. When the squaw got out of the way the flag dropped and it was not a second before I'd dropped Black Leg. The fighting was furious and I don't,(ILLEGIBLE LINES) man did his work nobly. We stood them off from 2:30 P.M. until dark. We captured 13 guns and 16 horses. We retreated on to Mineral Springs, where I had sent my pack train. We started for Ft. Cummings at a jump. We rode a race for life. We made the 38 miles by __:30 A.M. and the 38 miles by __:30 A.M. and we killed two horses on that ride but not a man was wounded. At day break we started on the back trail. We found that we had killed 26 and I an certain that I got my share of them and out of the captured stuff I receiver an old Flintlock gun and the medal which congress voted me for bravery and skill in getting the party out of what was one of the tightest places 18 men were ambushed into. Capt. Bennett's family was massacred previous to this, his daughter being mutilated beyond recognition. His horses were regained in this fight.