A water wilderness: Battles over values and motorboats on Yellowstone Lake
Riding his horse along the shores of Yellowstone Lake one summer day in 1958, Yellowstone’s superintendent Lemuel Garrison had his mind full. Motorboat use on the lake had more than doubled in the past few years, in part because inexpensive fiberglass, aluminum, and plywood hulls were making boats more affordable to Americans. The rising number of boaters were associated with errant behaviors such as speeding, wildlife chasing, and creating waves that swamped canoes, all of which threatened the lake’s resources and wilderness values (Figure 1). Human waste had become an additional offensive problem because boaters were not at the time required
Figure 2. The map used by Superintendent Garrison to portray Yellowstone Lake and his zoning proposal, 1959-61. Peale Island is shown as the small dot with a proposed dock in the southern tip of the South Arm. Not shown are the Molly Islands in the southern end of the Southeast Arm (the Mollies are tiny islands), and Shoshone Lake to the southwest of Yellowstone Lake. (From "IV. Yellowstone Lake and Shoshone Lake Zoning Plan," file "Yellowstone & Shoshone—Zoning," Box 24, Office Files of Director Conrad L. Wirth, 1946-64, Record Group 79, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.)
to seal their heads. Garrison had attempted in 1957 to deal with it by compelling motorboat users to seal them, but even this minor action stirred a surprising amount of controversy. After only two months he had been forced to back off, leaving it and the other problems unaddressed.¹

As he rode that day, Garrison contemplated a more drastic solution to the boating problems: banning motorboats from the lake’s remote, southern arms (Figure 2).² While the arms constituted only 20% of the lake’s surface, they contained the wildest portions of the lake and its best wildlife habitat, including the Molly Islands, which sheltered Wyoming’s only nesting colony of American pelicans (Figure 3). Garrison was excited about the idea’s potential, but he knew that if an action as small as sealing motorboat heads caused controversy, that such zoning would cause a near riot among surrounding boating fans. Motorized boating on the lake was popular locally, especially among wealthy businessmen from nearby Billings, Montana, and Cody, Wyoming. Some virtually lived in their boats on the lake in summer; others took regular outings with their staff and clients; and virtually all loved fishing for the lake’s cutthroat trout. Consequently, boating clubs were a powerful interest group that zoning could antagonize.³ As the park’s superintendent, Garrison knew he would take the brunt of their wrath, and that zoning the lake in such a manner could cost him his job.

Continuing his ride, Garrison enjoyed views of the glittering lake and noticed an osprey following him. He later wrote that the osprey “would stoop gently to me, hover over me, wing ahead, drop back, circle, calling frequently…” Contemplating the decision before him, he “discussed my problems that day with Omar,” the name he gave the osprey. He felt it was calling to him, as it were, to protect its wilderness home. Sensing the import of that call, Garrison headed back to political reality, his mind made up. “Omar” that day gave him his answer: “I had a dream of upper Yellowstone Lake with limited access so that it became in truth a water wilderness again!”⁴ Over the next five years, he would often recall this ride as he attempted to protect Yellowstone’s water wilderness by banning motorboats from the lake’s arms.

As Garrison’s vignettes reveal, he saw Yellowstone as a place defined by its wildness, an attribute commonly seen by scholars as significant in our place creation in Yellowstone and other national parks.⁵ More specifically, Garrison’s concept of Yellowstone as non-motorized wilderness, so similar to that of the growing national wilderness preservation movement of the time, deviated significantly from that of his predecessors there (and in many other national parks), who often promoted motorized vehicle access in order to boost visitation and support for national parks. Garrison adhered to a new set of values that found nature to be sacred and threatened by— as opposed to “protected by”— motorized vehicle access. Increasingly, but slowly, others in the NPS were embracing that same new set of values, most commonly by
creating or developing new national parks which promoted wilderness preservation and minimized road construction (such as Kings Canyon and North Cascades national parks). However, few administrators in older parks with established motorized usage (those developed when motorized use was seen as promoting nature preservation) applied those newer values in their parks by attempting to curtail or eliminate existing motorized uses. Garrison took that bold step, going to great lengths to restrict motorized boat access to Yellowstone Lake’s arms over the next few years. In so doing, he became one of the earliest and most visible National Park Service (NPS) administrators to advance the newer conservationist values in established national parks. In Yellowstone, he effectively reinterpreted the NPS’s mission to place preservation above recreation; to him, parks were wilderness cathedrals more than they were human playgrounds.

As events would make clear, Garrison came up against powerful boating and business interests favoring the status quo (promoting recreation). Those interests adhered to a different set of values, finding freedom and independence in motorized (boat) travel, and so were not sympathetic to his
conservationist values. The opposition eventually stymied his proposal, forcing him to accept a weakened compromise. Such groups not only demonstrated their influence upon park policy-making, but also suggested that they had greater influence than conservationists, argued by many scholars to be the NPS’s main influence. As the zoning story will demonstrate, many interest groups influence national park policy-making, but motorized use groups (rarely examined by other authors) have often proven more influential than conservationists since World War II.9

Finally, such motorized groups are often aligned with powerful politicians, as Garrison would come to find. Sympathetic to such groups, politicians frequently - and often successfully - have defended motorized recreational access to the parks. Garrison, perhaps unwittingly then, began a long history of NPS struggles with powerful politicians over the role of recreation in parks. His efforts and failures in the zoning battle, as well as more recent controversies such as Yellowstone’s snowmobile issue, provide support for the claims by many ex-NPS Directors as well as scholars that the agency is highly (or increasingly) subject to political intervention. At least when recreational access is threatened, such intervention usually does not promote nature preservation.10

“Lon” Garrison, as he was known to his employees, was a life-long ranger, having begun his career in Sequoia National Park in California (Figure 4). Like many rangers, he moved around the system, ending up in Yellowstone in 1957. He loved wild places, and regularly got out in the park’s back-country. Contemplating the significance of his horseback ride, and finding support from a committee he had commissioned to examine the matter, Gar-

Figure 4. Yellowstone Superintendent Lon Garrison, c. 1960. Photo courtesy of Yellowstone National Park.
rison wrote Regional Director Howard Baker seeking his approval for the partial boating ban in December 1958.11

Baker, a cautious man more removed from the frontlines of nature preservation in Yellowstone, instead wondered if a better solution lay in improved enforcement of existing regulations, which would curtail the errant boater behaviors. Accordingly, he suggested gathering more data in summer 1959 to determine whether zoning was truly necessary.12 Sensing that such research could bolster his argument and that the summer’s delay would also provide time to gather support from the conservation community, Garrison concurred and had his staff research boating’s impacts. Park Ranger Naturalist Joseph Murphy found that nesting pelicans and cormorants on the Molly Islands moved off their nests when boaters approached the shores closer than 100 yards. Ranger Naturalist Paul Sebesta similarly found an inverse relationship between motorboat use and wildlife presence (for example, moose often moved away when powerboats arrived in the morning). Additionally, by paddling the lake’s 75-mile roadless shoreline, Chief Ranger Otto Brown and

Figure 5. Historic circumnavigation of Yellowstone Lake by canoe, 1959. To test the era’s “common knowledge” that non-motorized boating on Yellowstone Lake was unsafe due to its volatile winds and cold water, Garrison organized a canoe expedition to undertake a week-long trip along the lake’s 75-mile non-roaded shoreline. By staying close to shore, watching the weather carefully, and paddling mainly in the morning, the group demonstrated that paddling the lake by canoe was safe and enjoyable. Here, two of the group’s canoeists observe a pair of moose feeding on the shoreline. Photo by Dr. John Montagne, a trip participant.
71-year-old Olaus Murie, Director of The Wilderness Society and resident of nearby Jackson Hole, along with several others demonstrated that canoe expeditions on the lake could be both safe and enjoyable, in contrast to the era’s common knowledge that windy conditions were too severe for such small craft (Figure 5). While none of this research was peer-reviewed, it did document the wildlife impacts and demonstrated that non-motorized boating was feasible. Such findings made Garrison anxious to make his proposal public, but Baker continued to hold him back. Increasingly unable to contain his zeal for wilderness protection, Garrison bristled under his superior’s hesitancy.

Meanwhile, and perhaps due to the delay, Garrison found that the local boating community had learned of his proposal. The probable source was park employees discussing the idea off-record with Sherman Jones, manager of the Yellowstone Park Company’s Boat Division (the company was the primary hotelier and service provider in the park). Jones offered guided fishing trips on Yellowstone Lake, garnering a little more than 10% of his division’s business from trips to the lake’s arms. Upon learning of the proposal, he not only authored a report summarizing his division’s operations and the economic threat that the zoning proposal entailed for them, but he also leaked word about the idea to Curtis Lees, Commodore (Director) of the Billings Boat Club. In so doing, Jones let the cat out of the bag, and put Garrison in precisely the defensive position he had hoped to avoid. Instead of a proactive campaign to zone the lake, Garrison would from this point forward be fighting a reactive battle.

Lees, an elected state representative from the Billings area, oversaw a boating group with considerable power. While his club had only about 120 members, some had “virtually unlimited personal means,” with significant boat investments. Learning of Garrison’s proposal, the Club grew concerned it would lose access to its favorite haunts, and commissioned the printing of 2,000 oppositional brochures. In them, the Club decried the impending loss of access to favorite boating areas and criticized Garrison’s reasons for the proposal, which were the need to protect the lake’s water wilderness, to protect wildlife along the shoreline, and to diminish the shoreline erosion caused by speeding motorboat wakes. The Club felt instead that Yellowstone’s Organic Act directives (that it be managed as a “pleasuring ground” for the “benefit and enjoyment of the people”) indicated that personal access to remote portions of Yellowstone Lake was more important than what it perceived as minor wildlife disturbance. Regarding the shoreline erosion argument, the Club, knowing that winds on the lake occasionally produced six- to ten-foot waves, stated “[t]he attempt to assign the natural consequences of the elements to motorboating on the lake is nothing short of ridiculous.” Garrison would come to regret ever having made the erosion argument; as the reaction to the brochure illustrated, it became a red herring, distracting from his pri-
mary reason for promoting lake zoning - to preserve the water wilderness. Indeed, the club used this weakness to its advantage as it distributed its brochure to boaters and congressmen throughout the region. Lees himself soon claimed the support of congressional delegations and/or governors of 22 states for his club's position.

With his proposal increasingly drawing flak from the boating community and his studies complete, Garrison pushed Baker to implement the plan that September. As the autumn progressed, the two sparred via mail, with Baker now pushing improved enforcement and a 4-mph speed zone for boats in the arms. Garrison responded defensively, worrying that such a low speed limit would be difficult to enforce, and then reiterating his concern about increasing motorboat numbers. He closed by complaining that “[i]f we do not move positively during the next few months to restrict the use of power boats, we do not believe it will be possible to ever again do so. We will be outweighed by sheer numbers and could well lose the support of conservation groups which we now have....We must act while we still have such support.” Finding they could not reach agreement, Baker took Garrison’s rebuttal into consideration and deferred to Director Wirth for guidance. Garrison had had Wirth’s support from the beginning, so it was no surprise that he responded with a strong endorsement of the proposal in January 1960.

Actually, Garrison knew Wirth from his previous assignment, chairing the steering committee for the National Park Service’s “Mission 66” program in Washington. Mission 66 was Wirth’s brainchild, a ten-year program of capital improvements that Wirth and Garrison believed was essential for the NPS to cope with the rising numbers of national park visitors following World War II. Despite their faith in the program, neither Garrison nor Wirth evidently saw a contradiction between the increased visitor use it would make possible and the decreased access to portions of Yellowstone Lake that the zoning plan would entail. Instead, Garrison promoted a balance of uses on the lake: while he wanted to curtail motorized use in the arms, he simultaneously was building two new marinas on the lake (both Mission 66 projects) which would better facilitate motorized boat use elsewhere on the lake. Although those marinas stirred little controversy, his proposed boating ban would continue to do so, mainly because it brought forth a value conflict between preservation of wilderness and retention of boating freedoms.

While Garrison and his superiors had been settling their internal divisions over the matter, public debate about the proposal continued to grow, thanks in part to the Billings Boat Club and its brochure. Boaters from Wyoming and Montana pressured their congressional representatives, many of whom in turn contacted the NPS about the proposal. Some conservationists, spurred to action by Garrison over the summer, also wrote their congressional representatives. The NPS’s national office sent out dozens of responses
to the representatives between March 1959 and January 1960. In the local states, several of the Utah Congressmen seemed to support the proposal, while most from Wyoming and Montana were less supportive, perhaps reflecting the numbers of boaters among their constituents.20

Soon, Wyoming Senator Gale McGee grew interested, and began to consider a hearing on the issue. McGee was Wyoming’s freshman senator, elected in 1958. He regularly fished and hunted in his state, and as Senator liked to examine natural resource issues first-hand. He represented a unique state, large in geographic extent, but with the country’s smallest state population, only about 400,000. In such a place, it was easy for a citizen to get a Senator’s ear. Many pressured McGee about the zoning matter, so he looked into it during a visit to Yellowstone Lake in summer 1959. He was on the Senate Committee on Appropriations, and later pushed Committee Chair Carl Hayden for a hearing. By January, Hayden acquiesced, announcing that McGee would be holding the requested hearing on February 3, 1960, in Cody.21

McGee had probably chosen Cody for the hearing venue because it was the closest large Wyoming community to Yellowstone, although many of his constituents opposed to zoning also lived in that area. It was (and still is) an isolated, conservative community that was not especially easy to access in the winter (at least one person made this complaint in his testimony).22 Because more regional conservationists lived in Bozeman than in Cody, winter geography dictated that boaters would find travel to the hearing easier than conservationists.

Sensing this potential weakness, Garrison and conservationists rallied support among the regional conservation community, hoping to put in a strong showing. Although they did, verbal testimony at the hearing was still dominated by boaters opposed to the zoning proposal. Written statements were almost evenly split, however, between supporters and opponents, with a majority of Montana comments favoring Garrison’s zoning and Wyoming comments almost evenly split.23

Testimony at the hearing provides insights into the motives of both boaters and conservationists. Boaters generally believed that Americans should have the freedom, as expressed in boating, to explore their heritage; one boater, for example, wrote: “it seems to me that [zoning] would be a most short-sighted action that would deprive hundreds of American citizens from the in-born privelege [sic] of enjoying their native country.”24 By contrast, conservationists like Garrison were more motivated by feelings that nature was sacred, and that the boating ban would preserve or restore an opportunity for spiritual experience. Many conservationists, in fact, quoted an article defending such values by Murie, who was one of the country’s leading proponents of wilderness values.25

Beyond such insights, the hearing’s testimony records the arguments
advanced by the two primary camps. The most common theme echoed by zoning opponents was criticism of Garrison’s arguments, especially his shoreline erosion claim. Boaters also commonly criticized the agency’s claim that boats harmed park wildlife, raising questions about the Sebesta study. Although Sebesta’s research certainly suggested that boats frightened animals away, it was confounded by the fact that boats typically arrived at about the same time the mammals bedded down for the day. It was unclear whether the boats were frightening them away or whether they were just following their natural patterns of diurnal rest and crepuscular activity. Although it did not become the red herring of the erosion argument, this confusion further confounded Garrison’s cause. Meanwhile, conservationists, including former Yellowstone Superintendent Horace Albright, argued at the hearing for the preservation of quiet and wilderness, protection of park wildlife, prevention of a motorboat racing atmosphere, and the prevention of litter.26

Senator McGee seemed to enter the hearing with the appearance of an open mind, objectively taking testimony, questioning speakers, protecting Garrison from hostility, and relieving the atmosphere with humor. However, he had been overheard a few months earlier stating that he felt Garrison’s arguments were weak and that his staff were not familiar with the remote arms, suggesting a sympathy with the boaters’ position.27 He may have been predisposed toward a compromise, which he left the hearing definitely believing was possible. He specifically hinted that continuing a 1957 motorboat ban in the smallest arm, the Flat Mountain Arm, seemed acceptable to all parties, but that implementing a motorboat speed limit in the two larger arms, along with a boating ban around the sensitive Molly Islands, could satisfy him and the boating community. It is not known whether he got the speed limit idea from Baker, who had first suggested it months earlier.28

Garrison, manager of the country’s oldest national park, had a more national constituency than McGee, which may have blinded him somewhat to the local concerns. He left the hearing convinced that supporters had equaled opponents, and resolved to forge ahead with his zoning plan. He quickly revised his proposal to move the non-motorized zone boundary one-half mile south and further into the arms to provide the lee shore shelter that boaters claimed they needed in storms (clearly, he was not immune to boater concerns and recognized their need for zones of safety). He then recommended to Baker that the agency move forward with public review and eventual implementation of the plan. Baker, by now realizing the issue’s prominence and his boss’s support for zoning, concurred and rapidly forwarded the recommendations on to Wirth and Secretary of the Interior Fred Seaton. Two months later, Seaton published the proposed zoning plan (not the final decision) in the Federal Register, the publication that the government uses to advise Americans of any proposed or planned actions.29
Despite this support and rapid action, other players in Washington, D.C. were not as supportive. At an early March meeting, Director Wirth found that McGee’s opinion had crystallized into direct opposition, a view shared by the state’s senior senator, Joseph O’Mahoney. Moreover, Wyoming’s U.S. Representative Keith Thomson had asked for another hearing, feeling slighted that he was not party to McGee’s previous hearing and believing that the February scheduling had made it too difficult for some to attend. Eventually, Idaho Senator Henry Dworshak echoed Thomson’s request, so Secretary Seaton agreed in May 1960 to hold further hearings (there would be three) the following August.30

Garrison, worried that his agency was taking a beating over the erosion claim, had his staff revisit the issue before the summer’s hearings. Chief Park Naturalist Robert McIntyre advanced a more nuanced claim, that only those birds nesting close to the shoreline were swamped by passing motorboat wakes (not an impact of erosion, but an unacceptable one nonetheless). Accordingly, he felt that the Service should hone its focus on the arguments that misbehaving boaters harassed wildlife unacceptably and also that the increase in boating endangered wilderness preservation. Garrison and his staff continued their publicity efforts as well, explaining their proposal and its reasoning to several groups outside the park. They also derived cost estimates for the increased lake patrol that seemed necessary to enforce the prospective zoning. Although they had begun such patrols the previous summer, the agency’s old, slow boats hampered their effectiveness, and funding this activity deprived other park programs of resources.31

Also that summer, Garrison and his staff conducted a thorough clean-up of trash left by boaters on the shores of Yellowstone Lake. Camping ethics of the era directed backcountry users to bury their trash after burning the combustibles. Not all campers complied, and bears often learned to dig up remaining food scraps. Escalating motorboat use exacerbated these problems, so Garrison organized a cleanup operation for the lake’s 110-mile shoreline in 1960. All told, that summer his crew removed over 1,000 gunny sacks of garbage, weighing over 35 tons.32

The growing drumbeat of regional concern on the issue, combined with McGee’s hearing, increasingly drew national attention. For example, the Outboard Boating Club (OBC), a boating equipment manufacturer’s trade group, urged its members to oppose zoning. Specifically, the OBC solicited support from its 375 affiliate clubs and their 18,000 members, encouraging them to attend the hearings or submit testimony rebutting the Service’s wildlife protection and erosion arguments while emphasizing that “[p]ublic recreation is supposed to be the paramount consideration.”33

National conservation groups were also becoming more involved, in part because Olaus Murie published several more articles supporting the zon-
Figure 6. Motorboats on Yellowstone Lake, c. 1960. Garrison sought to balance non-motorized boating opportunities on Yellowstone Lake with improved motorized facilities, such as two more sheltered marinas to replace these exposed docking conditions. Photo courtesy of Yellowstone National Park.

Garrison proposed, including one that spring in The Living Wilderness, the magazine of The Wilderness Society. With the Wyoming Izaak Walton League and Montana Wilderness Association (a two-year-old Montana-based group dedicated to wilderness preservation) also on board, Garrison and Wirth turned their attention to garnering more national support. Their challenge in that endeavor was that conservationists nationally had been preoccupied with passage of the Wilderness Bill for the last several years. Pleading directly for support from the leaders of most national conservation organizations, the two men argued that “the outcome of this issue will establish a precedent for years to come for the highest use of wilderness waters throughout the United States.”

Sierra Club Director David Brower responded with the opinion that waiting another year and attempting to gain passage of the Wilderness Bill would be a better use of their limited time and funds. Upon passage, conservationists could use the Act to protect Yellowstone Lake. Wirth, however, reemphasized that they should not be so focused on the Wilderness Bill that they suffer the loss of existing wilderness, which was, to him, precisely the threat that increasing motorboat use posed to Yellowstone Lake (Figure 6). Repeatedly, NPS personnel made the case for Yellowstone with conservationists, arguing that saving the lake’s wilderness atmosphere could not wait for the
bill’s passage—the time to act was now.36

By the end of that summer, the NPS had successfully elevated the Yellowstone Lake zoning question to a major national conservation issue. It did not displace the Wilderness Bill debate, but rather grounded it in a specific, prominent place, at least for a time. Conservationists nationwide came to embrace Yellowstone Lake zoning as a model for wilderness preservation. For example, having been persuaded by Wirth, Sierra Club Executive Director David Brower directed his staff to solicit membership support for zoning and sent his editor, Bruce Kilgore, to Yellowstone to attend all the August hearings. Almost all national conservation groups came to support the ban, bringing the matter to their members’ attention and providing regular updates through their publications.37

Murie was perhaps the most articulate writer on the conservationist side, with one of his articles at the time providing clear evidence of the quasi-religious meaning he found in nature. Writing about his canoe trip around Yellowstone Lake the previous summer, he discussed an important experience he had enjoyed. He fell asleep in a meadow near the shore and awoke: “I turned my head, and there a few inches from my eyes was a mass of sedge leaves standing out against the blue sky. Just a bunch of sedge leaves, but at that moment they affected me strangely. Suddenly I felt a kinship, a strong friendliness with those blades before my face....I wondered: was this a realization of a kinship with all life on this planet, represented so humbly by those sedge leaves?...To me, wilderness is synonymous with values.” Clearly, Murie saw spiritual value in wilderness and therefore wanted it preserved, as did many of his supporters.38

Viewed retrospectively, Murie’s values, shared to a large extent by Garrison, were unfamiliar to many boating supporters, especially those in the political world. Motorized boat access had existed in the arms for some time, becoming institutionalized, along with the meanings and values boaters saw in their activity. Long-held values such as the freedom to explore (manifested in motorboating) were being challenged by the newer idea of preserving wilderness. This was an idea that some motorboaters and Wyoming politicians had difficulty accepting; they could not understand the kinship of sedge leaves or conversations with osprey. This difficulty was evident to some in the NPS camp, including Mr. L. F. Cook, Chief of NPS Ranger Activities in Washington, who wrote Director Wirth that Senators McGee and O’Mahoney did not understand the values of wilderness conservation. Some in Yellowstone perceived the same problem, but Garrison instead attempted to educate the public on the need to protect wilderness (evidently believing he could instill wilderness values in just one summer). With motorboat use rapidly on the rise, he felt compelled to protect the osprey Omar’s wilderness home. Still, Garrison would find that established values, and the motorized uses mani-
festing such values, were difficult to overcome.  

As the August hearings approached, Garrison encouraged his NPS colleagues to support the proposal cohesively. Having been frustrated by Baker’s delays earlier, he wrote, “We must present a united front on the proposal from the Park through the Region Two and Washington offices. There is no room for further dissension within our own ranks.” And none showed; rather, in a show of force, Director Wirth traveled to Yellowstone in part to chair the hearings, and the agency suffered no further internal delays.

The August hearings, in addition to again highlighting the respective arguments of the two main camps, also provided good evidence that powerful interest groups were active on both sides of the controversy. The first hearing, held in Cody, was again dominated by boat club representatives, with only three zoning supporters speaking. In fact, four out of the sixteen boating supporters present identified themselves as members of the Billings Boat Club. Former Wyoming governor Milward Simpson spoke against the proposal, as did former Assistant Secretary of the Interior Robert Rose of Casper, Wyoming (by then a lawyer counseling boaters). Additionally, S. J. Gardner of Cody’s Husky Oil Company provided a who’s who list of guests he had taken out on the lake in his company’s boat: “two Secretaries of the Interior, Governors of a number of States, Senators, Congressmen, executives of large oil companies and industrial and commercial firms, such people from the entertainment world as Arthur Godfrey and Esther Williams, [and] Admirals Nimitz, Radford, and Byrd.” Although some motorboaters sympathized with non-motorized users, the boating fraternity was fairly well-organized, enjoyed powerful backing, and believed public access superceded nature preservation.

The second hearing convened at Yellowstone’s Lake Hotel the next day, and, in contrast to the Cody session, was dominated by zoning supporters. Conservationists who spoke included Olaus and Margaret (“Mardy”) Murie for The Wilderness Society and National Parks Association, F. Howard Brady and Charlie Piersall for the Wyoming Izaak Walton League, Frank Craighead for the Outdoor Recreation Institute, Kenneth Baldwin for the Montana Wilderness Association, and Bruce Kilgore for the Sierra Club. Additionally, over 100 persons signed petitions in favor of zoning, while 70 Yellowstone Park Company/Lake Hotel employees submitted a petition against it (Sherman Jones’s boating operation was based at the hotel, which may have accounted for the opposing petition).

The final hearing was held at Idaho Falls two days later, and produced mixed testimony. For the three hearings collectively, 41 persons appeared to support zoning, and 31 to oppose it. However, written testimony, which the Secretary of the Interior accepted through the end of September, strongly favored zoning, with about 85% of over 1,100 letters (a significant number for
the day) written in support. Garrison and Wirth were buoyed by the large majority, and Wirth rapidly proceeded to urge Secretary Seaton to approve the zoning plan. Garrison thought he would make a decision on the matter sometime after the fall election as he was preoccupied with traveling with Vice President Nixon on the presidential election campaign trail.43

Senator McGee, not Seaton, took the next step, just after the election. Writing Seaton twice, he articulated his feeling that Garrison was promoting zoning to solve three problems: shoreline erosion, motorboat abuse of park regulations (such as speeding), and wildlife harassment. Addressing these, McGee felt that erosion had been dismissed as a concern. Further, he had been successful in early 1960 in convincing Congress to appropriate funds to Yellowstone for the purchase of new police boats. These new, faster boats enabled park rangers to enforce lake regulations adequately, thereby addressing the second concern. Finally, regarding the wildlife harassment concern, McGee suggested the compromise he had alluded to earlier: ban motorboats from the southernmost two miles of the South and Southeast Arms, where most of the sensitive aquatic birds nested (the Molly Islands and another sensitive island, Peale Island, were in this area). Motorboats would also be banned from the Flat Mountain Arm and Shoshone Lake. The remainder of Yellowstone Lake would remain open to motorboats.44

McGee’s letters clearly confirm the differing perspectives regarding the zoning proposal. Absent from them was any acknowledgement of Garrison’s desire to protect the wilderness experience. Instead, he focused exclusively on those things that could be proved (wildlife harassment and motorboat speeding) or disproved (the erosion claim). Although he did acknowledge that the agency wanted to protect portions of the lake “in their natural state,” he essentially disregarded the humanistic motivation to preserve wilderness values and experience, instead boiling the debate down to a concern over measurable impacts and law enforcement.45

McGee seems to have disregarded the wilderness argument for several reasons. It is clear that he favored the boaters’ concerns, cooperated closely with them, and knew them on a first-name basis (recall that Wyoming’s small population makes this easily possible). Not only did several wealthy boaters live in the Cody area, but they had also made possible a fish fry that McGee had recently hosted for his fellow Appropriations Committee members. In summer 1960, five boat owners stationed their craft on Yellowstone Lake for the purpose of amassing a collection of large Yellowstone cutthroat trout. When they had accumulated 160 such fish, they trucked them to Cody, then flew them to Washington for McGee (while shipping food by plane is commonly done today, it was uncommon at the time, especially from remote Cody). McGee then held a fish fry, using the event to convince the Committee to give Yellowstone the patrol boat allocation ($25,000). In so doing, some
of the motorboat problems would be resolved, thereby making zoning unnecessary and preserving fishing opportunities. The fish fry was successful in its purpose, and by August Garrison had already acquired his first patrol boat (with two more procured by the following winter). Although the fish fry was not in the public eye, McGee made no secret of the fact that he supported his boating constituents. For example, he claimed that due to his compromise, “substantial portions of the water in the arms would be available to the growing number of power boaters.”

McGee additionally felt that some of Garrison’s comments were “spurious,” such as the claim that 80% of the lake would be left available to boaters when most of that was open, windy, and potentially dangerous (this, despite the fact that Garrison had earlier altered his proposal to provide some sheltered areas for boaters in the arms). Finally, Garrison himself may have turned McGee away from his desire to protect wilderness through his earlier emphasis on the shoreline erosion claim; as one of McGee’s constituents said, “[h]ad they said plainly that they wanted to keep it for those who do not like to be around motor boats and are looking for solitude, I think more people would have gone along with them.” One is left to believe that McGee was one of those that Garrison’s spurious claims turned away—especially because he later supported wilderness designation outside of Yellowstone.

Garrison and his conservationist allies felt that McGee’s position was a real threat to their proposal. Soon, however, their concerns were seemingly allayed. Secretary Seaton was back from the campaign trail, was a lame duck because Americans had elected John F. Kennedy to be President, and did not fear political retribution if he approved zoning. Moreover, Kennedy and his Interior Secretary nominee Stewart Udall were both Democrats, sharing party affiliations with McGee, which made their support for Garrison’s proposed zoning uncertain. So, Seaton approved Garrison’s zoning plan on December 29, 1960. Garrison and the conservationists rejoiced at this “great conservation and wilderness victory, one with more than local meaning.” To prepare for future canoeists, Garrison and his associates went about preparing a canoe manual for the visitors he expected to come seeking out such trips on the lakes.

But as winter turned into spring, it became clear that the manual might have been premature. Rumors abounded that McGee was working to overturn zoning, and the rumors were true. In his correspondence with his constituents through June 1961, McGee detailed dogged efforts to overturn the recently-approved boating ban. He was “very greatly” disturbed by the matter, and shortly after Seaton announced the zoning regulations, he determined to “press for a realistic regulation governing the use of power boats on Yellowstone Lake.” Before Kennedy even took office on January 20, McGee had already spoken with Stewart Udall about the matter. Udall promised to
look into the issue as soon as he assumed office. In his first week, in fact, he had another conference with McGee, who discussed “at length” the zoning issue. The two also met independently with NPS Director Connie Wirth.\(^5^0\)

In March, McGee gave his compromise proposal to Udall, and then discussed it with him on an all-day plane trip to Wyoming the following month to dedicate a dam. On June 9, McGee wrote a constituent, “By the time you receive this letter, the Department of the Interior will have announced the revised regulations concerning boating on Yellowstone Lake….With the boating season starting June 15, everything should be in order.” McGee also wrote another constituent, “Believe me, it was an effort to get the Interior Department to reverse its position regarding the closure of the south and southeast arms.” Indeed, the Department of the Interior announced revised boating regulations on June 9. The areas closed to motorboats were reduced to the southernmost two miles of the South and Southeast arms (recall that this was McGee’s compromise proposal), while motorboats would be allowed in the remainder of those two arms at five miles per hour or slower. The Flat Mountain Arm and Shoshone Lake would remain closed to motorboats.\(^5^1\) Clearly, McGee felt so strongly about the issue that he went to great lengths that winter and spring to retain motorboat access to the arms. Wilderness preservation was not the primary issue to him; retaining motorized access was.

Just as boaters had done when Seaton approved zoning, conservationists reacted vigorously when they learned of Interior’s action. Promptly, Howard Zahniser, author of the Wilderness Bill drafts, and Anthony Wayne Smith, Executive Secretary of the National Parks Association, requested a repeal of Udall’s decision and yet another public hearing on the matter. Acting Secretary of the Interior John A. Carver, Jr. consented, scheduling the hearing in Salt Lake City for July 17, 1961 (this would be the fifth hearing).\(^5^2\) Throughout June and July, letters contesting Udall’s decision poured into his office, and conservationists once again rallied their members to attend or send statements to the Salt Lake hearing. Even *The New York Times* weighed in, encouraging a return to the motorboat ban.\(^5^3\)

Interior Solicitor Frank J. Barry presided over the July hearing as examiner. About ten persons spoke to contest Udall’s decision, and six persons supported it. Boaters claimed that boats, unlike cars, left no trace of their passage. They desired use of the whole lake, requested a 20 mph speed limit in the arms instead of 5 mph (which would be hard to maintain), and protested the inclusion of Shoshone Lake in the boating ban. Conservationists viewed Udall’s decision as a capitulation to boating interests and as having been influenced by Senator McGee and seven of his constituents (who were not specifically named). William Riaski of the Izaak Walton League particularly deplored Udall’s and McGee’s actions, arguing that they stripped the NPS of “its entire power to regulate national parks.” Barry also accepted written tes-
Garrison attended the hearing, and gave a comprehensive history of events. He touched upon the erosion issue, but noted that it was only a concern at the Molly Islands, where boater’s wakes—from as much as a half-mile distant—inundated sensitive shoreline nests (certainly, by this time, he had learned to downplay the red herring and emphasize a valid concern). Of more concern to him was enforcement of the 5 mph speed limit. This slow a speed, over water instead of land, was basically impossible to measure at the time. Land-based radar would not work over water, and inquiries around the country were unsuccessful at finding any effective over-water speed-measuring devices. Already he had been frustrated in court, his staff unable to give a judge exact speeds of violating boats. Certainly one could expect some reluctance from the agency to embrace watered-down regulations forced upon it, but it is clear that the 5 mph speed limit was essentially unenforceable. By November, Garrison boldly stated Udall’s regulations were a failure: “Our experience failed to show that the new regulations achieved the wilderness use objective we had hoped they would have….The present regulations do not achieve the preservation of wilderness, they do not satisfy the boating fraternity, and they are extremely difficult to enforce.”

The rest of 1961 passed without further action by Barry, Udall, or McGee. A “deathly silence” reigned on the matter; Udall’s office made no announcements one way or another about it. Solicitor Barry took the time to contemplate the hearing testimony, Garrison’s letter, the science of the day, and some experiences he had had in Yellowstone just before the hearing. With Garrison, he had traveled to Yellowstone Lake’s arms, camping off the shore of Frank Island, Yellowstone Lake’s largest. The next day, the two men landed and walked ashore, where they enjoyed (in Garrison’s words), “a completely hushed and primitive environment. There was nothing to indicate that man had ever stood here before—no ax marks, no footprints, just a quiet, deep spongy moss on the forest floor. We sat on a moss-draped log and conversed in whispers….It was humbling. We could hear the silence.”

The two men returned to their boat, where their wilderness experience continued with an osprey (Omar?) flying overhead from its nearby nest. The bird caught a fish, then fought off both an eagle and a raven attempting to steal its catch. This “raw wilderness battle,” however, soon ended dramatically, as Garrison wrote: “Just before we departed, a fast-planing cruiser rounded the west end of Frank Island. It suddenly began to circle wildly and criss-cross its own wake. Our binoculars revealed that the boat operator was using a $25,000, twenty-five-foot cruiser with a heavy motor to pursue a pod of molting and flightless ducks. We could not observe his results, but we could easily see his boat number. As our own cruiser began its journey to the lake
dock, I could not help reflecting on the tragedy of this hapless boatman. We had his number, and Solicitor Barry had a new view of the problem.”

Indeed he did; the two experiences amply illustrated what Garrison was trying to protect—and protect against. After his Yellowstone visit, and given the testimony from the hearing, it was probably no surprise that the following spring Barry recommended returning to the motorboat ban in the arms. He also denied that the National Park Service was in any way obligated to allow motorboat use in the park. By zoning the lake as Garrison desired, “[t]hose willing to expend the effort will still be able to visit the area in its natural state. The wilderness will be preserved.”

Assistant Interior Secretary Carver concurred with Barry, and urged Udall to “face the music as early as possible” by briefing the Congressional delegations of the four most affected states. Udall’s staff then drafted a press release announcing that only hand-propelled craft would be allowed in Yellowstone Lake’s arms. But the press release was never issued. Rather, McGee, once again disagreeing with the restriction on motorboat use, played his last hand: he took the matter to President Kennedy for relief. The historic record is silent on Kennedy’s response, but it is clear that Udall backed off on reinstating the boating ban. Although he initially assured conservationists who complained about his earlier retreat from the boating ban that it was “quite likely that some changes will be made” to the park’s boating regulations, by late fall, 1962, he was no longer predicting any change. When asked several months later what he was going to do about the matter, Udall said he would not do anything, because boaters would “kill him if he tried.” Udall lived, and although several persons called for investigations into McGee’s actions, none were ever performed. The ban on motorboats in the Flat Mountain Arm and on Shoshone Lake, however, remained in place.

The matter of wilderness designation on the arms came up again in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when Yellowstone authorities developed their formal wilderness proposal pursuant to the Wilderness Act. Although they did not at first include the Yellowstone Lake arms in the proposal, they changed their minds after the formal hearings on the proposal in 1972, at which members of the public expressed widespread support for such inclusion. The agency then forwarded the wilderness recommendation on to the Secretary of the Interior, President, and Congress, all in 1972. There it has sat ever since, never receiving Congressional consideration. Although the reason for this lapse is unclear, including the arms in the proposal probably doomed it. To pass a wilderness designation, proponents must have support from their state’s Senators. Gale McGee was in office until 1977, most likely killing support for the proposal then and thereafter.

Garrison left Yellowstone in 1964, and wrote a postscript to the controversy ten years later. He couched it within a fishing trip on Yellowstone
Lake, regaling in its splendors (Figure 7). With the passage of time, his opinion of the compromise had changed; his bitterness had softened. By 1974, he felt that the 5 mph compromise was an “85% victory on zoning and a compromise with which the park has been able to operate harmoniously.” Certainly the compromise preserved some motorized access and protected most wildlife in the area, and the agency learned to live with it (in part because boater behavior improved). However, retrospection and the passage of time suggest that Garrison’s assessment may no longer be accurate.63

First, while the compromise may have worked in the 1970s, it is more strained today, in part because the agency has formally recognized the need to protect natural quiet. While the NPS had no official policy in Garrison’s era to protect natural quiet (perhaps reflecting the fact that conservationist values, which endorsed such protection, were not yet mainstream), it approved directives protecting natural soundscapes (agency parlance for natural quiet) in 2001. The agency is not alone in valuing natural silence today; increasingly, businesses in the Yellowstone area promote the region’s quiet atmosphere. Unfortunately, canoeists today find that motorboat noise often travels into

Figure 7. Southeast Arm of Yellowstone Lake, Yellowstone National Park. The lake is the largest lake at its elevation (mean lake level 7,733 feet above sea level) in North America, with 110 miles of shoreline and 135 square miles of surface area. Photo courtesy of John Montagne.
the non-motorized zones from outside them (the nearby 5 mph zones), negatively affecting the natural soundscapes there. For managers today, then, McGee’s compromise does not adequately protect natural quiet, and arguably needs to be revisited.\textsuperscript{64}

More broadly, in boldly promoting a new interpretation of the NPS mission, Garrison brought to the surface a value conflict that continues to be played out in national park recreation controversies. Conservationists promoted a vision of national parks as sacred nature temples, while motorboat groups defended a form of access imbued with meanings of freedom and independence. Overall, the latter values were more familiar than the wilderness preservation values in Garrison’s era, meaning that the eventual compromise preserved some motorboat access.\textsuperscript{65} Today, in a similar controversy, snowmobilers go to great lengths to defend access to Yellowstone. In this case (and others like it), conservationists plead their case, believing that such motorized use derogates the wilderness values of the park. Just as with the zoning controversy, snowmobile use remains, suggesting that its defenders still draw upon more powerful values and that they are more successful at influencing national park policies than are conservationists. Certainly, some of that success derives from the sympathetic view toward motorized use commonly taken by pro-business and pro-access politicians.\textsuperscript{66} In sum, while the details and kinds of motorized use have changed over time, the core value conflicts and prevailing strength of motorized use group defenders have changed little. Garrison would recognize many common threads in these modern park controversies.

In many ways, modern park managers find resolution of such basic value conflicts difficult or impossible. Some have found success by negotiating collaborative settlements, but other controversies persist (such as the snowmobile issue). While the inherent, fundamental value conflicts will make a permanent resolution of some conflicts unlikely, empowering the public more could help to address them. In both the zoning and snowmobile issues, substantial majorities of the public spoke in favor of eliminating motorized uses, suggesting that conservationist values are more mainstream in the general public than they are in the political realm. But, the public’s will has generally been ignored, often because powerful political actors compel the agency to retain the motorized use in question (ostensibly to preserve business opportunity or motorized access).\textsuperscript{67} Were the public empowered more, or the agency empowered to listen to and act upon public opinion more, such problems could be easier to resolve, especially in cases where a clear majority is evident. For now, though, the agency has little choice but to accept whatever forms of watered-down preservation it is offered.

Despite the challenges, Garrison and his successors have been generally successful at making nature protection prevail in the parks. However,
these successes require continual and taxing efforts, and prospects for future preservation efforts remain uncertain. We are left wondering whether 85% compromises are adequate for national park protection in perpetuity. It would seem that alternative ways to express American freedom and individualism must be articulated and promoted in the parks, such as the freedom to enjoy natural quiet, breathe clean air, and explore our nation’s sacred heritage in traditional ways. By linking such activities, which promote and depend upon park preservation more than motorized uses do, to such well-established American values, more effective and durable protection may be easier to attain.

Notes

Unless otherwise noted, all archival sources are at the Yellowstone National Park Archives, a division of the National Archives, Gardiner, Montana.


2. The zoning idea had actually originated with a committee suggested by National Park Service (NPS) Director Conrad Wirth on a visit to Yellowstone a few weeks earlier (Luis Gastellum, “Chronology of Events Leading to the Zoning of Yellowstone Lake,” unpublished report, file “Chronology of Events Leading to Hearing and Miscellaneous Correspondence,” and Lemuel A. Garrison to Regional Director, 12 December 1958, file “[untitled],” both in Box W-156).


6. David Louter, in Windshield Wilderness: Cars, Roads, and Nature in Washington’s National Parks (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 2006), uses the historical geography of the three national parks in Washington to demonstrate the changing NPS understanding of the relationship of roads and cars to wilderness preservation in the parks. Louter also discusses Mission 66, the agency’s construction program in the late 1950s and 60s, which was intended to cope with rising visitor numbers in the post-war era but which spawned conservationist criticism of increasing development at the expense of wilderness preservation.

7. Several scholars have examined conservationist wilderness values, commonly finding meanings of sacredness in nature. See Stephen Fox, The American Conservation Movement: John Muir and His Legacy (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1981); Catherine L. Albanese, Nature Religion in America: From the
8. One of the most common themes in NPS discussions and histories is the balance between preservation and visitor accommodation which the agency is directed to negotiate in its Organic Act, which states that the agency shall “conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations” (An Act to Establish a National Park Service, and for Other Purposes, 39 Stat. 535, approved 25 August 1916). Some good discussions of this tension can be found in Lary M. Dilsaver, *CamuMBERLAND ISLAND NATIONAL SEASHEOR: A History of Conservation Conflict* (Charlottesville: Univ. of Virginia Press, 2004); Richard West Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks: A History* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1997), Lary M. Dilsaver and William C. Tweed, *Challenge of the Big Trees: A Resource History of Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks* (Three Rivers, Cal.: Sequoia Natural History Association, 1990); Runte, *National Parks: The American Experience*, 1979; and Ronald A. Foresta, *America’s National Parks and Their Keepers* (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, Inc., 1984).


14. Garrison to Regional Director, 12 December 1958, file “[Untitled],” Box W-156 (note that Garrison refers to the “Outboard Boating Club” of Billings in this letter; all future correspondence referred to the “Billings Boat Club” instead); Superintendent to Gastellum, Sylvester, McIntyre, and Beal (first names not provided on original), 16 January 1960, file “W4624-Boating (Lake Zoning) January-February 1960,” Box W-158; John Q. Nichols to Sherman Jones, 29 January 1959, Thomas J. Hallin to


18. Lemuel A. Garrison to Regional Director, 17 September 1959, Howard W. Baker to Superintendent, 13 October 1959, Lemuel A. Garrison to Regional Director, 21 November 1959, and Howard W. Baker to The Director, 18 December 1959, all in file “W4624 Book #2, July 1959-Jan. 1960, 1 of 2,” Box W-254; and E.T. Scoyen to Regional Director, 16 or 18 January 1960 (date is indistinguishable on original), file “W4624 #3 Jan.-Mar. 1960, 2 of 3,” both in Box W-254.

19. Many authors mention Mission 66, and all argue that it was the consuming focus of the NPS and Director Wirth in the late 1950s. See Sellars, Preserving Nature in the National Parks, 1997, 180-212; Runte, National Parks, 1997, 173; Foresta, America’s National Parks and Their Keepers, 1984, 52-57; and Garrison, The Making of a Ranger, 1983, 254-265. As Yellowstone’s superintendent, Garrison oversaw one of the single largest Mission 66 developments nationally, the park’s Canyon Village.


22. Secretary of the Wyoming Federation of Sportsmen’s Clubs John C. Borzea, testimony at Senate Committee, Proposed Boating Regulations, 42.

23. Senate Committee, Proposed Boating Regulations.

24. Phil Empey to Gale McGee, 9 February 1960 (source of quote), Folder 3, Box 570, AHC. Yi-Fu Tuan, in Space and Place (1977), argues that machines confer a sense of freedom: “Being free has several levels of meaning. Fundamental is the ability to transcend the present condition, and this transcendence is most simply manifest as the elementary power to move…. Tools and machines enlarge man’s sense of space and spaciousness” (52-53).

25. Senate Committee, Proposed Boating Regulations; and Olaus J. Murie, “Wilderness on Yellowstone Lake,” National Parks Magazine, December 1959, 2, which was commonly quoted in 1960, such as in “FLASH: Yellowstone Boating Hearing, February 3, Cody, Wyoming,” 19 January 1960, file “W4624—Boat-
26. Senate Committee, *Proposed Boating Regulations*, Horace M. Albright to Gale W. McGee, 22 January 1960, file “W4624—Boating (Lake Zoning), January-February 1960,” Box W-158; and see the letters in Folder 4, Box 570, AHC for examples of letters to McGee in support of zoning from his constituents.


37. Bruce M. Kilgore to Lon Garrison, 12 August 1960, file “W4624—Boating (Lake Zoning), August 1960, Box W-157; Sierra Club, “Motorboats Have Been Given a Place, BUT Canoes, Wildlife and Wilderness Deserve Room on Yellowstone Lake, Too!” Outdoor Newsletter, 10 August 1960, in file “Chronology of Events Leading to Hearing and Miscellaneous Correspondence,” Box W-156. See the numerous articles and updates on the topic in 1960 issues of National Parks Magazine, The Living Wilderness, Outdoor America, and The Sierra Club Bulletin. Most conservation groups, and the General Federation of Women's Clubs, sent letters supporting zoning to the August hearings.


39. L. F. Cook to The Director, 3 March 1960, file “W4624—Boating (Lake Zoning), March-June 1960,” Box W-157, and Luis A. Gastellum to Superintendent, 6 February 1960, file “W4624 #3, Jan.-Mar. 1960, 2 of 3,” Box W-254. Garrison and Murie were certainly not the first conservationists to struggle with this difficulty; as Robert Righter records in The Battle over Hetch Hetchy: America's Most Controversial Dam and the Birth of Modern Environmentalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 206-208, John Muir and the defenders of the famous valley in Yosemite faced the same challenge several decades earlier, and also lost their cause. The situation had changed little in nearly fifty years, perhaps hinting that values of freedom (and in the Hetch Hetchy case, utilitarianism) are stronger in America than conservationist values.


44. Gale W. McGee to Fred A. Seaton, 15 November 1960, Press Release from the Office of Senator Gale W. McGee, 15 November 1960, and Gale W. McGee to Fred A. Seaton, 18 November 1960, all in Folder 4, Box 38, AHC; McGee to Associated Press and United Press International, telegram, 17 November 1960, in Folder 2, Box 38, AHC; and Gale W. McGee, “A Compromise Proposal Pertaining to the Status of the South and Southeast Arms of Yellowstone Lake in Yellowstone National Park,” in Folder 6, Box 593, AHC. Note that McGee's proposal made no mention of a restricted 4- or 5-mph speed limit in the South and Southeast Arms.

45. McGee, “A Compromise Proposal,” (source of quote), and McGee to Seaton, 15 November 1960, Folder 4, Box 38, AHC.

46. Crysdale, “An Analysis of Lake Zoning Factors...,” 62-63; Gale W. McGee to Robert Rose, 18 August 1960, in Folder 7, Box 570, AHC; McGee to Associated Press and UPI, telegram, 17 November 1960, Folder 2, Box 38, AHC (source of power boater quote; his November 15 letter and press release also promoted his compromise's benefits for the increasing number of power boaters); and

47. “Spurious” from McGee, “A Compromise Proposal,” and constituent quote from Floy Tonkin to Gale McGee, 18 September 1960, in Folder 7, Box 570, AHC.


53. Some letters contesting the decision are Kenneth B. Pomeroy to Stewart L. Udall, 28 June 1961, file “W4624a Salt Lake City Hearings Lake Zoning,” Box W-157 (there are others in the same file); and Ira N. Gabrielson to John A. Carver, Jr., 14 July 1961, and Carl W. Buchheister to Frank Barry, 12 July 1961, both in file “Boat Regulations on Yellowstone Lake,” Box 7:4, IWL. Conservationist letters relating to the hearing include Michael Nadel to Members and Friends of The Wilderness Society, 7 July 1961, file “W4624a Salt Lake City Hearings Lake Zoning,” Box W-157; Anthony Wayne Smith to All Organizations Cooperating with National Parks Association, file “Boat Regulations on Yellowstone Lake,” Box 7:4, IWL; and Bruce M. Kilgore to Burton W. Marston, 3 July 1961, file “Yell. & Grand Teton National Park,” Box 62, Izaak Walton League Papers, Accession #301, American Heritage Center, Univ. of Wyoming-Laramie. NYT opinion, “Motorboats vs. the Parks,” 13 July 1961.


65. Although conservationists arguably derive the most value from the spiritual meanings, they also enjoy its recreation potential, although often in ways different than motorized users. Similarly, motorized users also appreciate the special nature of Yellowstone and other preserves. However, each group seems to find primary value in the meanings with which they are commonly identified, such as in this story. See also Judith Layzer, *The Environmental Case: Translating Values into Policy* (Washington, DC, CQ Press, 2006), who argues that this is the primary value conflict underlying many contemporary federal land management controversies.
(see also the chapter on the Fishing Bridge controversy in the same work, pp. 94-152, for another recreational controversy illustrating the same value conflict); and Michael J. Yochim, “Victims or Victors: Yellowstone and the Snowmobile Capital of the World,” *Historical Geography* 34 (2006): 159-184.