USS Arizona Memorial

Administrative History

Review Draft 1.0

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CONTEXT

The design of the USS Arizona battleship, the powerful photographic images of her explosion after the attack, the salvage operations of the Arizona and the other ships in the Harbor still influence decisions that are made today in the Park.

Era of the Battleship

Battleships reflect the culmination of centuries of development of seagoing fighting vessels with a balance of firepower, protection and speed. It is nearly impossible for a vessel to be designed to excel in all three categories but that was the ultimate goal. The increase in one, often tipped the scale for an increase in another to provide an endless tradeoff in decisions of more power, more armament, and more protection. Each element competed with the others for a part of the precious total weight. When evaluating a ship the comparative weights gave an indication of the relative priorities in the design. The ultimate goal was to design a ship to take punishment yet deliver destructive blows at an enemy with appropriate speed.\(^1\)

The term “battleship” derives from the “line-of-battle ship” when fleets would typically engage their enemies in parallel lines at close quarters. In the early years with limited range of armament this meant battles quickly degenerated into ships pairing off and attempting to batter one another to pieces. The world's major naval powers built a series of classes of battleships, each subsequent class more powerful than the previous one. “While the early

\(^1\) Dulin, Robert, 1
attempts were mere benchmarks for further improvements, it was not until the British Admiralty completed the all-big-gun HMS Dreadnought in 1907\(^2\) that the future of the type was defined and ‘dreadnought’ became synonymous with the battleship. All existing battleships and other similar major combatant types that came before were classified as pre-dreadnoughts, reflecting that their capabilities dropped them to a second class rating.\(^3\)

By the start of World War I the United States, Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia all had dreadnought battleships in commission, each country endeavoring to establish supremacy over the others. Two epochal developments during the War significantly impacted future battleship design. Submarine development required naval architects to provide designs to protect against torpedo detonations and aircraft development caused them to consider anti-aircraft gunnery and to provide heavier deck armor to minimize bomb damage.\(^4\)

A post-World War I treaty had an even more profound impact. World nations attempted to control the continuation of the naval arms race by enacting an arms reduction treaty in 1922. The Washington Naval Reduction Treaty, and the subsequent London Naval Treaty in 1936, established two basic limitations on capital ship design. Standard displacement was limited to a maximum 35,000 tons. Standard displacement was the displacement of the completed ship, fully manned, equipped and ready for sea, including ammunition, provisions, fresh water for the crew, and miscellaneous stores, but not including fuel or reserve feed water for the boilers. The maximum size of the main battery guns was set at a 16-inch diameter bore. The

\(^2\) Dulin, Robert, Jr., v
\(^3\) http://www.battleshipnc.com/history/battleships.php August 3, 2003
1922 treaty also declared a building holiday, which lasted for more than ten years. These treaty developments had the effect of accelerating the technological development of battleship design, particularly the re-design of existing ships and ships currently under construction. Changes to the *Arizona* were a direct result of these advances. It is worthwhile to note that the Japanese, while signatory to these agreements were limited to 60% of the US and French strength, the 5-5-3 ratio bitterly being resented by the Japanese and forcing them to develop their strength in other combatant ships such as the aircraft carrier.

The United States fought and won the War in the Pacific with large carrier task forces, as a direct result of the substantial losses to the fleet of battleships at Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor and the battles that followed demonstrated the dominance of the aircraft-carrier and forced the battleship class into a supporting role.\(^5\)

During the era of battleships, the United States authorized construction of 71 capital ships of this type. While the historical impact varies greatly among battleships, a select few now serve their Country beyond their Naval service. The *Arizona*, the most visible reminder of the Japanese attack and the *Missouri*, the ship on which the Japanese surrendered in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945 are Memorials at Pearl Harbor. Now acting as memorials in their namesake states are *Texas* in LaPorte, *Massachusetts* in Fall River, *Alabama* in Mobile, *New Jersey* in Camden, and *North Carolina* in Wilmington.\(^6\) The possessive nature of state governments towards “their” ship has had an impact on the *Arizona* with competing interests for artifacts and World War II documents by the state of Arizona.

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\(^5\) Kimmett, 20

\(^6\)
Design of Arizona

Like most warships, the United States Ship Arizona was built to reflect operatives at the time of design, while later alterations reflected changes in technology and defensive strategies. Congress authorized construction of the USS Arizona in 1913 for a cost of not more than $7,425,000. The keel was laid on March 14th of the following year at the New York Navy Yard Brooklyn. Miss Ester Ross, the daughter of a prominent Arizona pioneer, Mr. W. W. Ross of Prescott broke bottles of both American champagne and water from the spillway of the Roosevelt Dam across the bow on June 19, 1915. There was some controversy in selecting Ms. Ross. The initial claim was that she was receiving a free trip at government expense. She finally paid her own expenses for this honor. The battleship was commissioned on October 17, 1916, with Capt. John D. McDonald in command. Five years later, three star Vice Admiral McDonald returned to the Arizona as her first flag officer. The final construction cost was $13,000,000.

Initially, Battleships required the name of a state chosen by the Secretary of the Navy. Named after the recently accepted forty-eighth state, and the third United States warship to bear this name, the word Arizona comes from the Spanish-Indian term "Arizone" meaning "few springs." The first Arizona was an 1859-vintage iron-hulled side-wheel steamer.

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6 http://www.battleshipnc.com/history/battleships.php August 3, 2004
7 Lenihan, Daniel J. 1990, 80
8 US Government Documents Act of 4 March 1913
9 http://www.library.arizona.edu/images/USS_Arizona/history/history.html 1-19-01
10 Slackman, Michael, 1984. 14
11 http://www.library.arizona.edu/images/USS_Arizona/history/ross.html 1-19-01
12 Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol. 1A, 379
13 Delgado, 1988, 1
14 Martinez, 1989, 24
captured by Union troops as a blockade runner and then used for operations of the civil war in Louisiana and Texas. She burned and sank south of New Orleans when on flagship duty on the Mississippi River. The second Arizona, a screw-frigate, was never in active service, bearing the name for less than three months in 1869. She was sold for scrap in 1874 when judged in such poor condition that she was not seaworthy. Many other ships destroyed at Pearl Harbor have had their names given to newer ships, but the name Arizona has not been used again.

The Naval General Board of 1910 set the battleship design parameters for new vessels including the USS Arizona, a Pennsylvania-class battleship. Naval handbooks reduce a battleship to many numbers of dimensions, displacement, and firepower. The Arizona was the second and last Pennsylvania-class battleship, a modest improvement over the previous Nevada-class. Although the length and displacement were slightly increased, the significant improvement for this class was the firepower of the ship.

At commissioning, the Arizona was 608 feet overall in length and 600 feet at the waterline. The beam was 97'-1" with a displacement of 31,400 tons with a mean draft of 28'-10".17 Her modernization in March, 1931 increased her basic dimensioning, the designer’s waterline displacement was increased to 34,823 tons standard with a full load of 35,925 tons. The beam was increased to 106 feet and 2.25 inches, an increase of over 8 feet. The increase in beam resulted from the addition of anti-torpedo bulges on each side of 4'-8" feet between

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15 Friedman, 1
16 Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Vol. 1A, p 379
17 Stillwell, 359
frames 17 and 134 and an extra bulkhead fr the length of the fire-room. At commissioning, the Arizona had four 40-pound torpedo bulkheads, with a protection of 11 feet, 9 inches. The armor was increased at the 1931 modernization by a layer of 70-pound special treatment steel-plating to the second deck and an armor grating inside the funnel of the upper deck.\textsuperscript{19}

**Armament**

For the main armament, all triple turrets were adopted, the guns remaining the same from the previous Nevada class.\textsuperscript{20} The armament of the Arizona was adjusted during her service period several times due to experience from World War I battleship engagement. Initially, she had twelve 14-inch 45-caliber guns in four triple turrets. The original secondary armament included twenty-two 5-inch 51-caliber guns designed to attack torpedo boats and small craft; four 3-inch 50-caliber AA guns, thirty nine 45-caliber machine guns and two 21-inch torpedo tubes.\textsuperscript{21} Ten of the 5-inch guns were removed in her 1931 refitment to add eight 5-inch 51-caliber single mounts, of which two were removed in 1940. Eight 5-inch 25-caliber antiaircraft guns were added in 1931 as well as four 3-pounder saluting cannons, four 1-pounder sub-caliber guns, one for each turret, and eight .50 caliber anti-aircraft machine guns. Most of this new armament was designed to sink an opposing battleship line by outranging the more typical armament of the Nevada class. The original configuration of the vessel included the typical cage mast of the period.\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{19}] Stillwell, 361
\item[\textsuperscript{20}] Whitley, 259
\item[\textsuperscript{21}] DANFS, 379.
\item[\textsuperscript{22}] Delgado, 1
\end{itemize}
In this same overhaul, the entire superstructure was replaced, including the lattice or cage masts that had been in place since commissioning that were typical of the period. The elevation of the fourteen-inch guns was changed from 15 to 30 degrees. A number of 50-caliber guns were installed including a tripod mast or “bird bath” atop the main mast. The director tower was filled with four 50-caliber guns. The ship was better prepared for war in April 1939 and January 1941 by removing a pair of 51-caliber guns so that 1.1” quadruple machine-gun mounts could be installed on the superstructure deck abreast of the conning tower. Although the foundations, ballistic shields, ammunition hoists, and ready service lockers were installed, the guns were scheduled for installation in early 1942.23

**Armor Belt**

The USS *Arizona*'s armor reflects the interplay between technology, defensive strategy and seaworthy requirements. The main armor belt was similar to the Nevada class, 13.5 inches thick at the top to 2’-4” at just below the design waterline to 8 inches at its lowest edge. This belt ran 444 feet from the bow to frame 127 where it was reduced by one deck height. After her 1931 revitment armor represented 29 percent of the standard displacement. These actual thickness became of special interest in the later corrosion studies.

Armor-piercing shells are armed when passing through armor deck plate; ordinary hull or deck plate has no effect. Medium armor plate would arm shells, and offered no protection for the added weight. Only very thick steel plate could offer full protection, hence, the "all or nothing" armor strategy. "All" meant 13.5-inches of steel plate, which was found in areas

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23 Martinez, 1989, 30
such as the turrets and an armor belt at the water line. If sufficient armor was used topside to thwart armor-piercing shells, the ship would be dangerously unstable. A 3-inch-thick deck was used to ward off most shells but not to arm those that passed through. A lower deck was installed of 1.5-inch armor, called the splinter deck, and was sufficient to contain the explosion of shells that passed through the upper deck. The combination provided lightweight, effective protection from most shells.\textsuperscript{24} Additional protection included 12,000 tons of thick armor plating including 13.5” of steel at the water line,\textsuperscript{25} with a maximum thickness of 18”.\textsuperscript{26} Steel tanks known as blisters were added at the waterline to increase torpedo protection from the turn of the bilge to the top of the armor belt.\textsuperscript{27} These torpedo bulges were fitted to the vessel’s sides increasing the displacement to 32,600 tons and extending the beam to 106’-2”,\textsuperscript{28} the maximum width allowable for traversing the Panama canal. Additional horizontal armor was added for protection from air attack. The deck armor was increased to 5” in thickness and an inch was added to the turret tops. Six new boilers and geared turbines were fitted, the torpedo tubes were removed and new heavy tripod masts replaced the typical cage masts.

Aircraft provided a means of greater defense by spotting gunfire beyond the horizon. The light fighter fly-off platforms were added to the fantail and Turret III. The \textit{Arizona’s} first planes were 1919 Sopwith Camels followed by 1919 Nieuport 28s and 1919 Harriot HD-2 fighters, 1920 Vought VE-7Hs and 1926 Vought FU-1 fighter/observation floatplanes.\textsuperscript{29}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{24} Murphy, 80
\bibitem{25} DANFS, 380
\bibitem{26} Martinez, 1989, 24
\bibitem{27} Murphy, 81
\bibitem{28} Delgado, 3
\bibitem{29} Delgado, 2
\end{thebibliography}
Machinery

The USS Arizona was oil powered, in three fire-rooms by four paired Parson turbines and 12 Babcock and Wilson boilers that developed 33,375 horse power for a speed of 21 knots. The average for the battleships during this period was 27 knots. The battleship’s engines were upgraded in 1929-1931 to allow her to maintain fleet speed and to offset the weight of the additional armor. The total oil capacity was nearly doubled in the 1931 modernization from 6,180 tons in emergency from the original 2332 tons, for a total capacity of more than 1.8 million gallons.

Many of these modernization changes to the vessel’s design were requirements demanded by the Pacific theatre where travel distances were much greater between port facilities. The “design considerations … included were speed, reliability, protection, long range guns, and the ability to carry huge supplies of fuel.”

The painting scheme was one of the changes specific to the Pacific theatre. The Arizona was painted in Measure 14, a dark blue-gray hull and superstructure to blend with the ocean, and a haze gray on the masts, yards and towers above the level of the superstructure masses to blend with the sky. This scheme was meant to breakup the general outline of the ship against the horizon at a distance. It obviously had no value to vessels in port. A majority of the Pacific Fleet was painted in Measure 14. The exact date of the order that authorized the

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30 Martinez, 25
31 Murphy, 80
32 Martinez, 1989, 30
Measure 14 scheme for the fleet is not known, however, a recent discovery of a photograph of the *Utah* showed this paint scheme being applied in October 1941.

**Crew Compliment**

Although the original design complement was 55 officers and 860 men, the re-design of the crew quarters in 1929 increased this complement to potentially 2037 men.\(^{33}\) The normal crew in 1941 was 1,731 men comprised of 92 officers and warrants and 1,639 enlisted. Of that assignment, on December 7, 1941 the total muster roll for the *Arizona* was 1,514 men\(^{34}\) assigned to the ship; 88 of that amount were members of the Marine Corps assigned to the ship.\(^{35}\) A number of the men were on leave or liberty at the time of the attack, and others were on temporary assignment to other commands. Most of those on liberty had returned to the ship by midnight December 6.

**Arizona’s Service Record**

The USS *Arizona* served an uneventful career with the Atlantic fleet. The *Arizona* departed New York on 16 November 1918 for shakedown training off the Virginia capes and Newport, proceeding to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. She returned north to Norfolk later in December to test fire her battery and to conduct torpedo-defense exercises in Tangier Sound. The battleship returned to the Brooklyn yard the day before Christmas of 1916 for post-shakedown overhaul. Completing these repairs and alterations on 3 April 1917, she cleared

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\(^{33}\) Delgado, 3

\(^{34}\) Stillwell, 350; discrepancy in Stillwell’s number 1177+337=1514 not 1511 and in Kimmett’s number 1731-377=1354

\(^{35}\) Kimmett erroneously lists the total men on the ship as 1731 which was the compliment but not the actuality, 51
the yard on that date for Norfolk, arriving there on the following day to join Battleship Division 8.36

Although she was commissioned during World War I, the USS Arizona fought no battles in this engagement. The new battleship operated out of Norfolk throughout the war, serving as a gunnery training ship and patrolling the waters of the eastern seaboard from the Virginia Capes to New York. The oil-burning Arizona was not sent to aid the Grand Fleet in European waters due to a scarcity of fuel oil in the British Isles. Later she was ordered to British waters at the end of the conflict to serve as part of the peace escort with the transport George Washington, the ship carrying President Woodrow Wilson to the Paris Peace Conference in Brest, France in December 1918.37

Over the next 14 years, Arizona alternately served as flagship for Battleship Divisions 2, 4, 7, or 9, all in the Atlantic theatre until 1921, when she moved to the Pacific Fleet where she remained for the rest of her service with occasional sojourns through the Panama canal for operational exercises in the Caribbean. Based at San Pedro during part of this period, the Arizona operated with the fleet in the areas off the coast of southern California. She participated in a succession of annual trainings in the Caribbean, the west coast of Central America, the Canal Zone, the West Indies, to the waters between Hawaii and the west coast. Her service also included protecting the American presence in Turkey during the Turkish Greek war at the fall of the Ottoman empire. After her overhaul in the Norfolk Naval Yard in 1929-31 Herbert Hoover sailed aboard the Arizona for a cruise to the West Indies. In 1931

36 DANFS, 379
37 Delgado, 6
she joined Battleship Division 3 Pacific Fleet, becoming the flagship in 1932. By the summer of 1932 she was flagship of division 2, and by 1939 flagship of Division 1. She moved to Pearl Harbor in 1940 when her homeport was changed to provide a better strategic location for the Japanese threat within East Asia and the Pacific.

Pearl Harbor Attack

The United States and Japan were in diplomatic confrontation throughout the decade preceding Pearl Harbor. There was undeclared war in China and a weakening of European control in the Asian colonies as a result of the necessary Euro-focus concern with battle on Europe’s front. Military factions in Japan were anxious to gain control in Asia as a result of this opportunity. “President Franklin Roosevelt demanded an end to Japanese aggression. To back up his demands, he stopped all sales of American oil to Japan. Oil [was] the lifeblood of the Japanese war machine.” This embargo greatly limited Japan’s abilities to carry out her imperial strategies in the South Pacific.

The population of Honolulu was 460,000 in 1941 and nearly one in three was ethnically Japanese. The Japanese had a large consulate in Honolulu of over 200 people There were several strategic targets of the Japanese attack on Oahu: Pearl Harbor was home to the US Pacific Fleet with three major task forces, one of which was usually at sea. Wheeler Field was the main Army Air Force fighter base on Oahu; north of Wheeler was Schofield Barracks, a large army installation. Ewa Marine Base was just under construction, and had 47 planes, and Hickam Air Field was the main US Army Air Force bomber base with 56

38 Delgado, 8
39 American StudiesFilm Center, 16
bombers, twelve more were to arrive after the attack. Kaneohe Naval Air Station was a seaplane patrol base with three squadrons of thirty six planes of long range reconnaissance ability. Bellows Field was the US Air Force auxiliary training base, with observation planes and fighter squadrons numbering a total of 12 P-40 fighters on December 7th.40

Admiral Isoruko Yamamoto, Commander-in-chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet visualized a surprise attack on the Pacific Fleet while it lay at anchor at Pearl Harbor.41 Commander Minoru Genda strategically developed the plan for this attack. The Japanese organized a six aircraft carrier task force with 350 planes in an aerial armada, designated the First Air Fleet. The aircraft carriers, Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku, and Zuikaku were escorted by 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 9 destroyers, 8 refueling tankers, and 3 picket submarines. These ships rendezvoused in the Kurile Islands to prepare for the attack. The carriers were loaded with 88 Mitsubishi A6M2 fighters (Allied code name Zero); this new and agile Japanese fighter had a top speed of 330 mph far superior to any US plane until the middle of 1943. Critical to the attack was the conversion by the Japanese Navy’s ordnance section of 16-inch shells into 1,760 pound armor piercing aerial bombs that would penetrate the 5-inch thick decks of the American battleships.42 Also important was the addition of wooden fins on the aerial torpedos to slow their speed and raise their depth in shallow water after launching.

40 Kimmett, 21
41 Delgado, 8.
42 Kimmett, 22.
“The Naval General Staff decided to add a submarine force to guarantee success. Twenty-seven submarines with positions around the Hawaiian Islands had very specific instructions: to conduct reconnaissance around Oahu, to torpedo escaping warships from Pearl Harbor, and to intercept any attack on the Japanese carrier fleet. In addition, five midget submarines were deployed to just outside Pearl Harbor to enter the harbor after the attack and create additional confusion. These submarines had been developed by the Japanese in the 1930s and were ferried to the combat site strapped to the top of the mother submarine. Each 78.5 foot 46-ton ship carried a two-man crew, two torpedos, and was battery-driven with a top speed of 19 knots. All five midget submarine were damaged or were lost in the attack.

The first 183 planes, including torpedo bombers, horizontal bombers, and high altitude fighters, were launched from the decks of the carriers at 6:00 AM. Two planes were lost in the launching. They were ordered to attack at 7:50 AM by Lt. Commander Mitsuo Fuchida. At approximately 7:15 A.M. the second wave of aircraft was launched and 170 more aircraft were on their way to Pearl Harbor. The first wave arrived at 7:55AM over Pearl Harbor, Hickam Air Field, Wheeler Field, and Kaneohe Naval Air Station. The second wave attacked Bellows Airfield, Kaneohe Naval Air Station, Hickam Air Field, and Pearl Harbor again nearly an hour later.

The orders for this attack were quite clear:

The Carrier Striking Force will proceed to the Hawaiian Area with utmost secrecy and, at the outbreak of war, will launch a resolute surprise attack on and deal a fatal
blow to the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area. The initial air attack is scheduled at 0330 hours, X Day. Upon completion of the air attacks, the Task Force will immediately withdraw and return to Japan and, after taking on new supplies, take its position for Second Period Operations. In the event that, during this operation, an enemy fleet attempts to intercept our force or a powerful enemy force is encountered and there is a danger of attack, the Task Force will launch a counterattack.\textsuperscript{46}

While the attack was clearly dependent on the carrier fleet, doubts persisted by the Japanese about the potential success of the attack due to the large scale of the operation.

Eighty-five ships of the U.S. Navy were present that morning, consisting of battleships, destroyers, cruisers and various support ships. “The arrival of the US Pacific fleet from California in June 1940 had transformed Oahu and Pearl Harbor…to host 3 aircraft carriers, 9 battleships, 12 heavy cruisers, 9 light cruisers, and 53 destroyers.\textsuperscript{47} The USS Colorado was being overhauled at Puget Sound Navy Yard and had not yet traversed the pacific to join her command. When the battle was over, the losses included the battleships Oklahoma, Arizona, and target ship Utah. Also sunk but later returned to service were the battleships California, and West Virginia and minelayer Oglala. The battleships Nevada, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Maryland, cruisers Raleigh, Honolulu, and Helena, Destroyers Cassin, Shaw, and Downes, auxiliary ships Curtiss and Vestal were damaged, but later repaired.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{45} Slackman, 1984, frontispiece
\textsuperscript{46} Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 1 23 November 1941
\textsuperscript{47} Kimmett, 20
\textsuperscript{48} Friedman, 46
Ward Confrontation

One of the first battles involved a midget submarine at the entrance to the harbor. At 0343 on December 7th, the duty officer of the minesweeper Condor patrolling in the security zone sighted a periscope some 50 yards ahead and to port. The Quarter Master 2nd class R. C. Uttrick confirmed the sighting and relayed it to the destroyer Ward also on patrol. Lieutenant William Outerbridge- on his first night of command at sea- ordered his crew to General Quarters and conducted a sonar search but found nothing, so it was not reported to headquarters. More than two hours later another alarm was sounded by the USS Antares who also spotted a conning tower. The Ward was signaled and opened fire at 75 yards with two rounds. The second round struck at the waterline at the junction of the hull and the conning tower. Four depth charges were then dropped over the stern. The sub sank in 1200 feet of water.49

Utah Attack

One of the first vessels attacked by the Japanese was the Utah. Commanders Genda and Fuchida, planners of the attack, had ordered their pilots to ignore the training ship, which as a non-combat ship [in their "illustrious" view] was not worthy of attack, but eager pilots dropped two torpedoes on the Utah and the nearby light cruiser Raleigh. One torpedo slammed into Utah’s port side at 8:01 a.m. as the crew raised the flag on the fantail. Some minutes later a second hit the same area. This action infuriated Lt. Heita Matsamura, flight commander for the torpedo bombers from the carrier Hiryu, who had "specifically instructed

49 Van der Vat, 52-55.
his men to avoid the Utah." Nonetheless pilots from the Soryu attacked, and following the first hit, Lt. Tamotsu Nakajima, "young and inexperienced ... followed suit." 50

**Attack on the Arizona**

The *Arizona* was moored at Quay F-7 alongside Ford Island with the repair ship *Vestal* at her port side.51 The Marine Honor Guard was on deck in preparation for raising the flag and heard the first bombs fall on the seaplane station at Ford Island. The marines raised the flag and hurried to their battle stations.52 The men watched the attack of the *Oklahoma* and *West Virginia* and high-level bombers making runs from the south.53 On board the *Arizona*, the ship's air raid alarm went off at 7:55AM when several bombs and strafing occurred. Captain Franklin B. Van Valkenberg ordered General Quarters soon thereafter. The first bomb hit the *Arizona* astern near Turret IV with two more bombs exploding on the aft quarterdeck shortly thereafter. At 8:10 AM the *Arizona* received a direct hit from the high altitude bomber of Petty Officer Noburo Kanai.54 The 800-kilogram bomb hit just forward of Turret II on the starboard side penetrating deep into the battleship’s interior exploding the forward powder magazines, gutting the structural support for the gun turrets and barbettes underneath. This caused the foremast and forward superstructure to collapse and fall forward into the hole presented by this explosion. “The ship sustained [a total of] eight bomb hits; one hit on the forecastle, glancing off the face plate of Turret II, penetrating the deck to explode in the black powder magazine, which in turn set off adjacent smokeless powder magazines. A cataclysmic explosion ripped through the forward part of the ship, touching off fierce fires

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50 Prange 1981, 66  
51 Martinez, 1989, 30  
52 Kimmett, 46  
53 Kimmett, 46
that burned for two days. This blast from the Arizona blew men off the decks of surrounding ships and threw tons of debris all over the harbor. There was speculation that the Arizona was also hit by torpedo from Japanese submarines that had breeched the nets at the mouth of the harbor. Abandoned at 10:32 AM, the ship's burning superstructure and canted masts loomed through the smoke that blanketed the harbor.”

Acts of heroism on the part of the Arizona's officers and men were many, headed by those of Lt. Comdr. Samuel G. Fuqua, the ship's damage control officer, whose calmness in attempting to quell the fires and get survivors off the ship earned him the Medal of Honor. Posthumous Medal of Honor awards also went to Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, the first flag officer to be killed in the Pacific war, and to Capt. Van Valkenburgh, who had reached the bridge and was attempting to defend the ship when the bomb hit the magazines and destroyed her.

Of the 2,403 Pearl Harbor killed or missing from the attack, almost half of the dead came from the Arizona; 1177 men had perished, 48 officers and 1129 enlisted. Although over 232 bodies were removed, 945 men remained below deck. Of the 229 enlisted men's bodies recovered from the Arizona, 124 could not be identified. Thus there is no way to compile an accurate list of the names of the men actually entombed in the ship. Officially, all these men were considered buried at sea. The number of men who had survived the attack that
were assigned to the *Arizona* was 337 men. In 2001 at the sixtieth commemoration 55 were still alive and members of the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association.\(^{58}\)

The sinking of the *Arizona* became a symbol to battle, “Remember Pearl Harbor.” The battleship’s burning bridge and listing mast were photographed for the front pages of newspapers across the world forming indelible images of the attack in the Pacific. The Portland newspaper *The Oregonian* is generally credited with the first use of the phrase “Remember Pearl Harbor” in its afternoon edition on December 7, 1941. The phrase would later be used in countless books and newspaper articles to enlist the support of the American population for battle engagements. The phrase, "yesterday, December 7, 1941 - a date which will live in infamy -- the United States was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan" \(^{59}\) would later be regarded as the most famous phrase ever uttered by an American President. Roosevelt had “worked on his war message, most notably altering ‘a date which will live in world history’ to the memorable line. Nearly sixty million Americans listened to his six and one half minute address, which was the shortest war message in the nation’s history.\(^{60}\)

Visual images of the attack were just as enflaming. Life magazine published in late December pictures showing the “Attack on Hawaii: Death and Destruction at American Base.”\(^{61}\) The stark poster image of “Avenge December 7” showed the *Arizona’s* collapsing
foremast silhouetted against the explosion of the ship's magazines. As recounted by William Manchester:

"Remember Pearl Harbor" became an American shibboleth and the title of the country's most popular war song, but it was the loss of that great ship which seared the minds of navy men. Six months later, when naval Lieutenant Wilmer E. Gallaher turned the nose of his dauntless dive-bomber down toward the *Akagi* off Midway, the memory of that volcanic eruption in Pearl Harbor, which he had witnessed, flashed across his mind. As the *Akagi* blew up, he exulted: "*Arizona*, I remember you!"\(^{62}\)

The attack at Pearl Harbor was intended to wreck the US fleet and protect Japan's assault of Asia. However, the tactical error of no third assault proved to be a major miscalculation. The Japanese left untouched the most important and obvious Pearl Harbor target after the battleships, the US Navy's supply of oil for its entire Pacific operations.\(^{63}\) Had the planes hit the tanks they would have immobilized the Pacific fleet. More than 4 1/2 million barrels of oil had been vulnerable and were left untouched.

Admiral Yamamoto’s summation of the attack, that the Japanese had “awakened a sleeping giant and filled him with a terrible resolve,”\(^{64}\) was realized. Four of the six carriers used to attack Pearl Harbor were sunk at Midway six months later and Yamamoto was shot down at Bougainville in 1943. The bloody hand-to-hand fighting on the Pacific Islands, and the devastating nuclear attack finally ended the Pacific War with the surrender of Japan aboard the USS Missouri in 1945.

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\(^{62}\) Manchester, 42
\(^{63}\) Yergin, April 10, 2001

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“USS Arizona received the most serious battle damage of the ships attacked on December 1941. Survivors of the attack claimed that Arizona was hit by one or possibly two torpedoes. Several bombs were dropped on Arizona, one 1,760-lb. projectile reportedly penetrating the deck near turret 2 and detonating near the magazine. The resultant explosion of ammunition and fuel showered the harbor with debris, demolished the forward section of the vessel, which collapsed inside the hull, and killed most of the ship's complement. Six days after the attack, the senior surviving officer from Arizona forwarded the ship's action report to CINCPAC Adm. Kimmel and noted; "The USS Arizona is a total loss except the following is believed salvageable: fifty caliber machine guns in maintop, searchlights on after searchlight platform, the low catapult on quarterdeck and the guns of numbers 3 and 4 turrets." The battleship had sunk to the bottom of Pearl Harbor in approximately nine minutes, her burning superstructure and canted masts projecting from the water in perhaps the best known and most stark image of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.”

Damage Assessment

The highest ranking officer who survived the attack was the executive officer of the Arizona. Commander Ellis Geiselman had been on shore leave the morning of December 7. He made the first official assessment of the damage to the Arizona. In his report of December 17, 1941 he stated that one 500 pound bomb had passed through the starboard side and exploded after bouncing off the face plate of the number four turret. Another 500 pound bomb hit at frame 85 on the port gallery deck making a two foot diameter hole. Another 500 or 1000 pound

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64 Delgado, 9
65 Delgado, 1988 np
bomb hit at frame 96 on the portside of the quarterdeck in the area of the ship’s motor boats also producing a two foot diameter. Geiselman also proposed that a fifth bomb of 1000 pounds went down the ship’s stack. This initial report perpetuated the myth that the Arizona’s main damaged was caused by a bomb that went down the stack and exploded the ships powder magazines. The internal grill dividing the stack into six pie shaped wedges when later inspected appeared to be completely intact refuting this initial report.\textsuperscript{66} Geiselman also reported that a sixth bomb hit at frame on the port side at frame 66 and a seventh bomb hit at frame and an eighth bomb hit in the vicinity of the forward turrets. Repeating also the claim of the Vestal’s Captain, Geiselman reported that a torpedo hit on the portside at frame 35.\textsuperscript{67}

Salvage Operations

The salvage operations for the damaged ships in Pearl Harbor began almost immediately. It became one of the greatest maritime salvage operations in the history of the world.

As soon as the Arizona’s fires were extinguished and the decks cooled, salvage operations went onboard. The ship settled for days, with air pockets bubbling to the surface. By the end of December, 1941 it was known that she would not be righted, and most likely most of her crew would remain below decks.\textsuperscript{68} The Arizona was believed to be a total loss except for the “salvageable fifty-caliber machine guns in maintop, searchlights on the after searchlight

\textsuperscript{66} Stillwell, 1991, 273
\textsuperscript{67} Geiselman, 2
\textsuperscript{68} BFSM, December 23, 1941
platform, the low catapult on quarterdeck and the guns of numbers 3 and 4 turrets." Salvage operations began in earnest in May 1942, but the task proved to be difficult.

There was no thought of raising the Arizona to return her to service, but the divers and other salvors spent a lot of time investigating the wreckage, and large pieces of the Arizona were cut loose in 1942. Though consideration was given to cutting loose the ship's relatively intact after portion and re-floating it, divers' examinations of the wreck indicated that the work involved would not be worthwhile. Practically all of the survey conducted in the summer of 1942 had to be performed by divers, mostly from the inside of the ship. It was found that the bow portion was buoyant, the after portion relatively intact, but the central portion of the ship was badly damaged. Lieutenant Ankers assisted by Ensign Beauchamp-Nobbs and Carpenter Urbaniak make a thorough survey. The war demanded that only work that could reverse the tide of Japanese victor be undertaken. The Arizona did not fit that criterion.

The Ordnance Section was successful in removing from Arizona a great deal of the anti-aircraft battery with its ammunition. Much other ordnance material was recovered from the ship even as late as November 1942. Gunner Manthei recovered considerable ammunition from turrets III and IV. The ammunition was salvaged from inside the water logged ship. Some of the oil which fouled the harbor was gradually removed as it was released from the ship’s opened tanks.

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69 Martinez, 1988, 34
70 Madsen, 173
71 Stillwell, 279
In early 1942, Navy divers used a high pressure excavating nozzle to blow mud away from the ship. They followed the frame of the ship down to investigate possible torpedo damage. They did not turn up any evidence of a torpedo hole on the side of the ship.

By the end of 1942, the stern aircraft crane and the conning tower had also been removed. Salvage operations involved removing the two main gun turrets aft, their ammunition, and all of the ship’s superstructure and the guns from Turret II. “The guns, slides, deck lugs, and other equipment from Turret II were taken away, and Turret I was left where it lay near the bottom of the ship.” Large pieces were removed with blow torches and removed by crane including the foremast and mainmast. Very little of the superstructure lay above water after salvage operations. Everything above the main deck had been removed for scrap or use on other ships.

The equipment that was removed was considered to have some combat value: the two after turrets and their six 14-inch guns. Unfortunately, the Army’s expressed interest in these guns occurred after they were removed, and significant adaptation needed to occur to the guns to make them usable for part of Oahu’s coastal defensive system. The idea of another attack or worse an invasion was ever on the minds of those in command. The Army developed in 1942 coastal defensive batteries to attack approaching enemy ships; the guns from the Arizona were protected by turrets, and this type had proved useful at the attack on Manila Bay.

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72 Stillwell, 278
73 Commander, 1943, 3
74 Slackman 38
75 Friedman, 47
Two sites were selected by the Army: Battery Pennsylvania on Mokapu Peninsula in Kaneohe to cover the eastern approach to Oahu including Kaneohe Naval Air Station; and the other was Battery Arizona at Kahe Point on the western slopes of the Waianae Mountains. The design and construction of these batteries took more than three years as both the guns and the site needed substantial preparation. The salvage operations had not taken into account the reuse of the turrets in such an installation. They needed repairs from the attack, and reworking from the year under salt water. The shipboard turrets needed to be adapted for use on land. “The fire control equipment needed adequate separation from the guns to minimize problems arising from the concussion.”

Extensive underground concrete construction was required to provide stability to the recoil of the guns and new hoists were necessary as the distances were greater for the shoreside magazines. Each Battery was scheduled for completion by January 1944 but by that date the war had shifted and the United States was on the offensive, so the pace of construction on the Batteries slowed down.

The completion of the emplacement and mounting of the guns at Battery Pennsylvania was completed in August 1945. They were test fired as part of the jubilant celebrations of VJ day announcing Japan’s surrender on Oahu, becoming instantly obsolete. Battery Arizona’s construction was suspended and when after war strategies of defense changed, the turrets and other metal work were cut up for scrap. Again, in that removal, no thought was given to the later reuse as possible historic artifacts. Today, only the large concrete holes are all that remain at Battery Pennsylvania and Battery Arizona.

76 Stillwell, 281
77 Stillwell, 281
For most of the salvage operations the focus was on returning ships to the war effort. Since the *Arizona* was considered a total loss, not much care was given to the protection of her non-reusable pieces. Many were taken to the near by Waipio Peninsula ass scrap metal and dumped unceremoniously. For most of the war the *Arizona* was taking up an important berth at Harbor side, she was not yet considered a national shrine.

The Navy had considered removing the bodies entombed in the *Arizona* but designs for building a cofferdam around the ship proved unworkable due to the porous coral conditions of the harbor floor.\(^79\) More than seventy bodies had been removed during the salvage operations but most were not identifiable. The Navy ceased efforts to remove the crew by the late 1940s because of the cost involved in such recovery and the unlikelihood of identifying the remains.\(^80\)

Placed “in ordinary” at Pearl Harbor on 29 December 1941, *Arizona* was stricken from the official register of US Naval vessels on 1 December 1942.\(^81\) “One of the enduring myths of the *Arizona* is that she is still a commissioned vessel. Actually, “she was not officially decommissioned, but ships that sink in action are not decommissioned; they are stricken from the register. Only ships on the register can be in commission, so the *Arizona* is not a commissioned naval vessel.\(^82\) She was awarded one battle star for her service in World War II.\(^83\) The prefix USS meaning United States Ship is used in documents while a ship is in

\(^{78}\) Friedman, 47.
\(^{79}\) Stillwell, 279
\(^{80}\) Stillwell, 281
\(^{81}\) Stillwell, 279
\(^{82}\) Lenihan, p35
\(^{83}\) DANFS, 381
commission. After decommissioning she is referred to by name in italics only with no “USS” prefix. 84

84 United States Navy Regulations 1990 Article 0406
Building a Memorial

The idea of building a memorial was an immediate reaction to the overwhelming loss of the Arizona. The funding, design, and construction were to occupy the minds and hearts of men for more than twenty years. The relationships that developed during this period were to set the stage for future management of the Park.

Idea of Memorial

The first memorial service to honor the dead of Pearl Harbor occurred on New Years day 1942¹. Within a year of the attack, there were requests to put aside December 7th as “Pearl Harbor Day.” The first request came from the Maui Rotary Club in 1942². President Roosevelt’s response was “to proclaim a day of silence in memory of the great infamy.”³ The Honolulu Advertiser also agreed that the anniversary of the attack was not a time for “any special celebration or observance…but a first milestone on the way to Tokyo.”⁴

There were at least three wartime plans to honor the dead of the Pacific War. The first idea of creating a memorial was proposed by Tony Todardo, a Pearl Harbor war worker, in 1942. Fred Kramer, an architect of the army’s Special Services section, developed Todardo’s designs. This design proposed an outdoor auditorium and museum near the Halawa cemetery at Red Hill where many of the Pearl Harbor dead were buried.⁵ The design would take the form of an inverted amphitheatre enclosed by curved form housing additional war memorials of an educational nature. The tips of the horseshoe terminated in two large buildings

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¹ Advertiser, 1/3/42 A1
² Honolulu Star Bulletin, 11/20/42
³ FDR, Honolulu Star Bulletin, 11/20/42, as quoted in Linenthal, p178
⁴ Honolulu Advertiser, 12/07/42 A1
⁵ SB, 5/28/45, A2
containing lecture halls, utility rooms, and a gathering place for students representing all nations of the world. Centered between the two end buildings would be the memorial of the unknown soldier of the Pacific, approaching 200 feet high and preceded by a reflecting water pool. The site location with the austerity of the white buildings would be visible across Pearl Harbor and out to sea.\(^6\)

The second fortunately unrealized idea was by Herbert Knowles, a worker employed at the Central Progress organization at Pearl Harbor, who proposed a Washington, DC memorial in 1944 with overbearing numerical symbolism of the attack: 12 columns, 7 steps, a 41 foot diameter to the memorial shaft, all topped off by a clock stopped at 7:55AM. While all names would be inscribed for those who died on December 7th, special honors would be accorded to the radio operator, Joseph Lockhart, whose warnings of the attack were ignored. \(^7\)

The third proposal came from a coalition of veterans and patriotic groups, the Pearl Harbor Memorial Trust in 1944.\(^8\) This proposal included XXX.

After the war a proposal for a “Temple of Peace” in 1946 was proposed by Pacific Memorial Foundation, Inc., which the territorial government had designated as the official war memorial agency.

There was a shift of focus away from the remains of the *Arizona* after the war, and a period of neglect, or at least distinct disinterest began. H. Tucker Gratz, a Honolulu businessman

\(^6\) SB 5/28/45, A2  
\(^7\) Adv. 4/26/44, p2  
\(^8\) Slackman 10/4/82, 6
first conceived of building a memorial near the *Arizona* when he went to the wreckage on December 7 in 1947 to lay a wreath in honor of the dead crewmembers. There he found the dead wreath he had left a year earlier. Gratz began to galvanized support for the *Arizona* and a War Memorial Commission. The state of Hawaii established the Pacific War Memorial Commission to raise funds for the erection of war memorials in the territory in 1949.

The Pacific War Memorial Commission (PWMC) was a politically appointed group with enabling legislation Act 288, SLH 1949 and Gratz, was appointed its first chairman. The members formed a cornucopia of Hawaiian influence and included Harry Albright, Duke Kahanamoku, George Miki, Secretary, Governor William Quinn, honorary member, fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, Honorary Chairman, Mrs. Walter Dillingham, Vice Chairman, Major General FW Makinney, Dwight Styne, and Joe James Custer, executive Secretary. The PWMC was tasked with creating and maintaining a war memorial in the state and soliciting gifts and contributions of money and property, and most importantly communicating with the Pacific War Memorial, Inc. an east-coast based non-profit private group. The Pacific War Memorial Inc. (PWM) had the potential to shift the focus away from Hawaii for a national memorial in another location. Despite the strength of the financial backing of the Rockefellers, the Pacific War Memorial never implemented a formal memorial strategy.

The Navy also had its own ideas about a memorial at the *Arizona*, and erected a flagpole on the partially submerged rear mast to display the Navy ensign, as well as a wooden boat deck.

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9 Clarke, Thurston, 2000, 138
over the *Arizona*, and memorial plaques at both the *Arizona* and the *Utah*. The bow and stern of the *Arizona* were outlined by rope strung from poles affixed to the periphery of those ship sections.\(^{10}\) On March 7, 1950 Rear Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, also ordered the USS *Arizona* to fly the American flag.\(^{11}\) Radford saw an *Arizona* memorial as a Navy obligation to what had been one of the fleet’s proudest ships.\(^{12}\) At the dedication ceremony of this flagpole, he stated, “from today on, the USS *Arizona* will again fly our country’s flag just as proudly as she did on the morning of December 7, 1941. I am sure the *Arizona*’s crew will know and appreciate what we are doing.”\(^{13}\)

The Pacific War Memorial Commission gave first consideration in 1952 to a memorial and “suitable monument at the site of the sunken battleship Arizona.”\(^{14}\) The first ideas included a museum, archives, and observation tower on Ford Island with a bridge to the *Arizona*.

Public tours by the Navy to the *Arizona* began shortly thereafter most likely to inhibit the commercial boat tours that had started in 1949. In the response to a demand to visit the resting place of Pearl Harbor’s first war dead, COMFOURTEEN’s barge began making a weekly trip to the sunken battleship. As the demand grew, a harbor tug was equipped with 150 folding chairs in 1953 and began to make a Pearl Harbor tour on Thursdays\(^{15}\) increasing shortly to twice a week. A small concrete platform built atop the *Arizona*’s superstructure, served as a visitor’s landing. A 64-foot victory launch was ultimately authorized by the CNO

\(^{10}\) NPS, Resource Management Plan 1996, 10.
\(^{11}\) Advertiser, 10/10/50
\(^{12}\) Slackman, 1982 10
\(^{13}\) Kimmett, 114
\(^{14}\) PWMC Minutes 4/16/52
as the official tour boat. This craft was obtained from Mare Island and modified to seat 120 persons and began service on February 14, 1956.

While there were many ideas on where and what to build for a memorial there was not a consensus on why. This multiplicity of intent has plagued the Memorial since the beginning. Interest in a war memorial was supported by a variety of national groups, such as the Navy Club and Survivors Associations, as well as national magazines, such as Colliers. Each of the interest groups had their own reasons for developing a memorial, including “a tribute to the men of the Arizona, and to the others who died at Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field.” Colliers showed a standing forlornly on the rusted hulk of the Arizona on its May 1950 cover, asking the question, did the Navy want to honor their dead of Pearl Harbor? Most included some use of the hulk of the Arizona in the design schemes. The Pacific War Memorial Commission proposed a series of memorials including structures at Red Hill, the Marine Parade ground, the main gate at Pearl Harbor, the wreckage of the Arizona, and a memorial boulevard between Nimitz and Kamehameha Highways. Their plans for the Arizona site included a platform over the ship and a connection to Ford Island where an archives, observation tower, and museum would be located.

There was not agreement on the motives of all groups, as Colliers felt the Navy dragged their feet due to the shame of the defeat. President Harry Truman echoing the words of Franklin Roosevelt gave a negative response to a request by the PWMC to make December 7th a day

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16 Lest We Forget, Colliers, July 22, 1950 p74, as noted in Slackman, 1982, p10 check this source dates don’t jibe.
17 Lest We Forget, Colliers, May, 1950
18 Slackman, 1982 8
19 Slackman 1982, 9
of national prayer. He stated that the anniversary of the attack should be remembered “only as a day of infamy” 20 and that the emphasis should be placed on Memorial Day not December 7th. Colliers’ editors viewed the issue as basically one of marking the graves of all American service men.21

In 1955, the first permanent memorial was erected by the Navy Club, a ten-foot high basalt stone on Ford Island. At about the same time, the Navy pushed on with its own agenda for a memorial over the hull of the Arizona recognizing the range of public opinion about the Navy’s responsibility, “Whether or not the Navy has done its best to preserve the dignity of the Arizona’s remains, it is still blamed because this burial place for 1102 [stet] men is a rusting mass of junk.”22 The PWMC also was concerned about the deteriorating condition of the Arizona and met with the Admiral Radford to discuss the condition of the ship. Within the year, the hull was rusting so badly that the initial flag raising ceremonies were no longer being held each morning.23 On August 6, 1956, the “commission accepted an invitation by the Navy to sponsor a public subscription campaign for the construction of a memorial for the USS Arizona dedicated to all those who died on December 7, 1941.”24 The PWNC received congressional authorization two years later to raise funds for a memorial.25

There were a number of obstacles in erecting a memorial at the Arizona and most of them were political. Federal funding was required by law for federal projects, no authority to build

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20 Short to Gratz. Nov 26. 1952 PWMC as noted in Slackman p11
21 Colliers, May 1950
22 COMFOURTEEN to Secretary of Navy. Nov 23, 1955, PWMC. Slackman 13
23 National Park Service, Arizona Memorial Shoreside Facility Study A1, 1973
24 State of Hawaii, Department of Budget and Finance, 1979, An Evaluation of the Pacific War Memorial System.
25 Need copy of legislation
over a sunken warship within a naval compound could be granted, and the perhaps most difficult hurdle, liaison with the politically charged American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC) was required. Congress established the ABMC in 1923 as an independent agency of the Executive Branch of the federal government. The mission of the ABMC was to establish memorials within the United States when directed by public law.\textsuperscript{26} Erecting a memorial at the Arizona would have been within their jurisdiction. They were already directly involved independent from the PWMC with the development of the National Cemetery of the Pacific at Punchbowl.

The consummate gentleman and representative to Congress from Hawaii, John Burns, resolved these problems.\textsuperscript{27} Burns was instrumental in drafting the legislation and in maneuvering the political minefield of Washington, DC. The final result was Public Law 85-344, which passed on March 15, 1958. This law authorized the Secretary of the Navy to

1) accept contributions for the construction of a memorial and museum to be located on the hulk of the United States Ship Arizona or adjacent property in Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii;

2) authorize Navy activities to furnish material to the Pacific War Memorial Commission for use in national promotion of a public subscription campaign to raise funds for a United States Ship Arizona Memorial;

3) authorize Navy activities to assist in conceiving a design and determining the construction cost for the memorial;

\textsuperscript{26} ABMC, Annual Report 2002, 6
\textsuperscript{27} US Congress, Congressional Record, Vol 103, Part 12, 15634 August 22, 1957.
4) undertake construction of the memorial and museum when sufficient funds have been subscribed for completion of the structure; and

5) provide for maintenance of the memorial and museum when completed.28

This law was amended by Public Law 87-201, effective September 6, 1961 that stated:

“Such a memorial and museum shall be maintained in honor and commemoration of the members of the Armed Forces of the United States who gave their lives to their country during the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on December 7, 1944.”29

With no explanatory preamble the Law had avoided the main issue, which might have embroiled debate in its passage:30 what was to be the main purpose of the memorial. Another key to its passage but a cause for later universal congressional support, was the requirement that no federal funds would be used in its construction.

The Pacific War Memorial Commission took on the funding task through a number of events and solicitations for raising funds for the memorial construction. Although the early campaign projected a need for $2,000,000 in funds, a hired fund-raising consultant was not able to produce the donations of such a magnitude and the estimate was reduced to $250,000.31

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28 US Congress, Public Law 58-344
29 Letter, Warshefski, Gary June 2, 1989. USAR files
30 Slackman, 1982, 19
31 Minutes, May 8, 1958 PWMC, Hawaii State Archives
Two public events brought in contributions that would have longer impacts than the dollars contributed. The first public request for money was telecast from Pearl Harbor on the December 3, 1958 “This is Your Life” hosted by Ralph Edwards. This popular TV program featured the Arizona and Admiral Samuel Fuqua, the highest-ranking survivor of the attack along with other surviving members of his crew. This was the first national public solicitation for funding for the Memorial. More than $95,370 in funds for the memorial was directly attributed to this broadcast.

The other public event was a concert on March 25, 1961 by Elvis Presley in Bloch Arena. Presley’s press agent had been alerted to the Memorials fund drive by a “My Dear Fellow Editor” letter written by George Chapin to the editors of daily newspapers across the nation. Elvis was already planning a trip to Hawaii to film the now famous, Blue Hawaii. Elvis in gold lame “quaked and shaked” another $48,301.10 in $100 ticket sales and [need number] in outright donations into the coffers of the Arizona Memorial fund. His efforts were acknowledged by Rear Admiral Robert L. Campbell, the night of the event, “the generosity and public spirited zeal with which you donate your services to the USS Arizona Memorial Fund tonight are deeply appreciated by the US Navy and will never be forgotten.”

Elvis fans are still involved with obtaining appropriate recognition for the King for his involvement in the Memorial fundraising.

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33 Minutes, December 18, 1958, PWMC, State Archives, Handwritten tally
34 Slackman, 1982 27.
The Hawaii legislature made significant contributions to funding the memorial construction. Funds of $50,000 were appropriated in 1959 and another $50,000 in 1961 after Congressman Olin Teaque of Texas pledged that Congress would cover a shortfall if the state contributed $100,000. This shortfall pledge required additional federal legislation as the original enabling legislation specifically prohibited the use of federal funds.

Other federal officials began to join the bandwagon about the neglect of the Arizona site and the need to honor the dead. Representative Olin E. Teague of Texas who was one of Burns sponsors to the legislation called it unthinkable that the memorial would not be completed by the twentieth anniversary. He stressed the need to change the wreck of the Arizona into something to honor the men who lay forever within it.\(^{37}\)

The federal funding legislation had a difficult path as early promises had been made to not add an appropriation bill. John Burns refused to submit this legislation, saying that "members of Congress are inclined to view such a memorial with a jaundiced eye."\(^{38}\) However, the next year was an election year, and a new group of Hawaii legislators was led by then Representative Daniel Inouye. The first year the legislation failed, but by the following Fall Inouye’s legislation passed both Houses of Congress and was signed in to law as Public Law 87-201 on September 6, 1961. This act was to authorize the appropriation of $150,000 for use toward the construction of a United States pacific War Memorial.\(^{39}\)

**Design of the Arizona Memorial**

\(^{37}\) PWMC Records, Correspondence July 1961. Hawaii State Archives

\(^{38}\) Burns to Gratz, May 3, 1959 as stated in Slackman, 1982, p30.

\(^{39}\) Public Law 87-201 9/6/61
Actual designs for the Memorial had started in the minds of architects much earlier than the legislation. During the war, many Hawaii architects left Hawaii or went to work for Public Works Pearl Harbor or the Territorial government. During the war, construction came to a complete standstill except for military projects. A small group re-organized the American Institute of Architects in 1942 soon after the battle of Midway. At the first meeting it was agreed that as a priority of post war projects, concentration should be made on war memorials.\(^40\) One of the leaders in this architectural group was Alfred Preis. Austrian by birth, Preis held a German passport and was detained on Sand Island with his wife Jana for questioning after the attack from December 7, 1941 until March 28, 1943. In May 1943 he opened his own office in Honolulu.

Immediately there were many ideas proposed by the architects’ group. James Morrison proposed that the memorial serve a socially useful purpose such as the Waikiki Natatorium, a memorial for World War I dead; Alfred Preis thought it should be thought invoking such as the *Arc de Triumph* in Paris. “Feelings of patriotism were very deep and sincere.\(^41\) The PWMC knowing of the interest of the architects in a war memorial, contacted the group for advice and assistance. Preis was the primary contact because he was first secretary (1942), treasurer (1949), vice president (1950), and then president (1951). No small thinker, Preis proposed seven teams of architects and other design professionals to come up with master plans for a series of memorials. These designs were to be free-of-charge as a patriotic contribution. Six sites were selected, including the National Cemetery of the Pacific (already under design by the Army Corp of Engineers); the USS *Arizona* site; Red Hill; the entrance

\(^{40}\) Preis, Alfred, 1991

\(^{41}\) Preis, Alfred 1991, 1
area to Halawa valley; the land along Kamehameha Highway at the Navy-Marine Golf course, and a transition area between downtown and the Pearl Harbor area along Dillingham Boulevard. The PWMC used these teams of architect to develop sketches of site plans and perspectives for a fund raising brochure to raise money for projects.

In 1956 the PWMC was approached by the Navy for assistance in the selection of an architect to develop a memorial at the Arizona site; they asked the AIA for recommendations. The Executive Committee of the AIA recommended that the original designers for that site used in the PMWC fund raising brochure be selected. Preis stated later that he wanted to note that he was not at the meeting that this decision was concluded. Alfred Preis, Johnson & Perkins, and Clifford Young were the designers on the preliminary plans for the site next to the wreck of the Arizona. All had worked previously together on projects in Hawaii and the Pacific. Clifford Young withdrew from the group to join with Jack MacAuliff on a competing team. The joint venture of Johnson & Perkins and Alfred Preis was interviewed first by the design committee of the PWMC chaired by Mrs. Louise Dillingham, and then later by Rear Admiral E A Solomon. The associated architects signed a contract with the Navy in 1959 which included certain design parameters: that the memorial would be a bridge, that the bridge would contain an assembly area for 200 persons, and that the hull, in which the remains of officers and men were entombed, would be viewed as the prime target of the visitors attention. Neither the contractors crew nor the architect could set foot on Ford Island.
Preis’ original design was a rather dramatic sarcophagus like structure. He proposed that a landing platform was to be built between the two mooring quays on the Ford Island side of the hull with a grand stair descending down into a tank-like space below the water level. He was fascinated by the crusted nature of the ship, “growing layers of barnacles, coral and broken sea shells…bright red rust spots…like rubies and emeralds.”42 Preis compared these barnacles to the richly ornate coffins and sepulchers in the underground imperial crypts in his native Vienna.43 Contemplation of the sunken ship was to be made through portholes. The names of the dead would be engraved on a large marble slab between the portholes crowned by a gigantic flame at the top. Admiral Solomon disqualified this design idea with the simple comment that it did not meet the “bridge” criteria of the design parameters. However, Preis with another design in his pocket did not give up his idea of viewing the encrusted sarcophagus in his final design. He cut out a portion of the Memorial floor so that the “gigantic sarcophagus is clearly visible without portholes or glass, as no where else in the world.”44 A close view of the battleship can be seen through this floor opening, and “[a]t low tide, as the sun shines upon the hull, the barnacles which encrust it shimmer like gold jewels… a beautiful sarcophagus.”45 Preis noted that, “the hull was the true memorial to be visited, to be reflected on, and to be honored…the bridge was an auxillary to the hull, by providing visual access to the hull…the hull remains clean, pure, holy.”46

Initially, it was thought that spanning the 110 feet across the hull would be cost prohibitive. However, Alfred A. Yee, a structural engineer noted throughout his career for his innovation
structural solutions, was able to design a bridge that did not connect to the hull or mooring platforms but cantilevered from a recessed support at each end. The recessed supports give the effect of a bridge floating above the water like a “snow white seabird.”

Much of the symbolism of the design developed after the construction. Preis noted that the catenary curve that dips down two feet in the center and rises at the ends was “almost instantly coined as a symbol of the initial painful defeat at Pearl Harbor, followed by the proud ultimate surrender in Tokyo aboard the USS Missouri.” Asked if the trapezoidal windows signified a 21-gun salute, Preis stated that he selected the window pattern because it was an odd number allowing for a central opening, and that the 21-gun myth was not an appropriate theme for his design. The tree of life was Preis’ specific adaptation of the ancient symbol of the tree of life. This universal tree of life bore twelve kinds of fruit, one for each month, and the leaves were for the healing of the nation and fellowship with God, the Father. Initially Preis designed stained glass for the openings, but they were omitted in the final construction due to costs. Preis later stated that the lack of stained glass improved the design since it provided better ventilation for the shrine room. Viewed from the outside, the organic design also enriches the contrasting stark beauty of the white memorial. The overall effect was one of serenity. Overtones of sadness were omitted to “permit the individual to contemplate his own personal responses…his inner most feelings.”

47 Preis, Alfred 1991, 14
48 Preis, Alfred 1991, 12
49 Martini, John 5/31/82 to staff
50 Martinez, interview with author, 6/29/04
51 Preis, Alfred, nd brochure, 30
The functions of the Memorial were clearly divided into the requirements from the legislation: museum and memorial. The vestibule space was the transition zone after the dock, and contained ferns and palms, and restrooms and a small office. The main purpose of the vestibule was to give the visitor a time to adjust their minds and mood from what had previously preoccupied them to one more conducive and appropriate to the names of men who lost their lives in order to protect and preserve ours. From the vestibule, visitors entered the Ceremonial Bridge through a slender triangular opening with a slight break inward to increase the visitors’ receptivity and sensitivity. The Ceremonial Bridge is a sun-bathed, serene space, letting the visitors pursue their own thoughts, feelings and conclusions.\textsuperscript{52} From the very beginning the Memorial was consciously designed to function as a shrine. In the shrine room “one sees only the names, ranks, the disembodied remains of those who died there. The shrine in its simplicity and restraint, comes nearest to a spiritual character without becoming religious.\textsuperscript{53} Softening the stark impact was also initially considered by the addition of landscaping, the original drawings show tropical plants on the moorings.\textsuperscript{54} A symbolic anchor chain also linked the memorial’s dock to the ship, a portion of which remains on the \textit{Arizona’s} deck today.\textsuperscript{55}

Later, Preis described the experience which he wanted for the Memorial, “The visitor enters through a darkened and narrow foyer onto the sunlit deck with its open concrete framework unlike but somehow properly reminiscent of the ribs of a ship, which permit the breeze to freely play through the central portion of the structure.”\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{52} Preis, 1991, 15
\textsuperscript{53} Preis, 1991, 15
\textsuperscript{54} Preis, Alfred Original construction drawings 1960
\textsuperscript{55} Preis, Alfred, Honolulu Star Bulletin & advertiser, March 6, 1966 pA12

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The cost estimate for the construction of the Memorial as initially designed exceeded the funds contributed. Consequently, plans were partially redesigned to permit incremental construction of the Memorial. In the meantime, to make up the time lost in redesign and to reduce the overall cost, Rear Admiral E.C. Holtzworth, Commander, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard was requested to drive the reinforced concrete piles and temporary timber support piles. This work was accomplished under the management and direction of Captain G.H. Thompson, the Publics Works Officer. The bid on the redesigned scheme still exceed the available funds, and the Pearl Harbor Shipyard was requested by the Commandant, Rear Admiral E.A. Solomons to undertake the work on the pile caps, girders, and deck. Additional federal funding was provided when President John F. Kennedy signed House Bill 44 in September 1961 appropriating $150,000 for use toward the construction of the Memorial. This appropriation together with the remaining contributions provided sufficient funds to complete the structure. The second increment of the superstructure construction was awarded to the Walker Moody Construction Company under Contract NBY 40503 on 6 October 1961 for $213,857.00. The total cost of construction including the military contributions was $532,000.

In Public Law 8-201 on September 6, 1961 Congress clearly stated the intent of the Memorial: “Such Memorial and museum shall be maintained in honor and in commemoration of the members of the Armed Forces of the United Stats who gave their lives to their country during the attack at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941.” AMVETS installed and dedicated the first memorial wall in May 30, 1962 where the names

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56 dedication ceremony speech, no author
of the then known dead of the USS *Arizona* were engraved in imperial Danby marble, the highest grade of Vermont marble. This casualty list proved to be problematic as it was compiled in a hurry by the Navy department in Washington, DC, and several names were missing, and a few still alive were engraved as entombed.

The PWMC working with the Navy, provided for the return of the original ship’s bell from the State of Arizona. The Commission also contributed plaques, display cabinets, a public address system and a shelter for visitors to wait at the boat ramp. Of necessity, the museum function was moved to the shore side facility in 1982, as the conditions for artifact preservation were less than ideal. Termites had eaten the wooden backing of a large painting as well as several exhibit cases.

In preparation for the building of the Memorial a considerable amount of material was removed from the hulk of the *Arizona*. The upper bulkhead and the overhead sections of the deck were removed leaving the galley area exposed. All this material was stored at Waipio Point on the Pearl Harbor base. Many parts are still recognizable as bulkheads and portholes. The Navy has issued disposition instructions which make this material available to qualifying museums and veteran’s organizations.

Even twenty years after the war, many were still distancing themselves from the attack. Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz wrote to Tucker Gratz in 1961 declining involvement with the

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57 State of Hawaii, 4
Memorial and saying that he was not a Pearl Harbor Survivor and did not want to be connected in anyway with the attack.\textsuperscript{59}

**Maintenance of the Memorial Structure**

The Memorial has had several major repairs due to deterioration from the harsh harbor environment and needs to upgrade for functional considerations. The most dramatic was the replacement of the shrine room wall in 1984 when the marble attachments to the structure rusted through creating streaks of blood-like rust. Preis was quick to point out (twenty years later) that the contractor must not have followed his initial requirement for stainless steel attachments.

[Need more on Maintenance of Memorial from missing annual reports or Mary interview]

\textsuperscript{59} Nimitz, Chester W. Letter to Tucker [Gratz], 7/11/61 USAR files
Construction of the Visitor Center

Construction of appropriate shore-side facilities was necessary to meet an overwhelming visitor rate to the Memorial. In 1962 when 122,000 visited the Memorial, the makeshift boat ramp had a covered walkway to provide shade for those who waited for the Navy boat to the Memorial. It was horribly inconsistent with the character of the Memorial\footnote{Inouye, 1977, np} yet visitor growth continued to expand exponentially. Ten years later those people waiting in the hot sun had risen to 600,000.\footnote{Wisniewski, 62}

Several key pieces of legislation were introduced to provide for a better facility. At issue was who would bear the costs of the construction and how was the building to be maintained. Congressman Spark M. Matsunaga, a former member of the PWMC, agreed to sponsor and introduced legislation in the House of Representatives to provide funding for this facility. Daniel Inouye introduced Senate Bill S 139 in January 1973 to authorize the Secretary of the Navy to provide shore-side facilities for the education and convenience of visitors to the United States Ship Arizona Memorial at Pearl Harbor.\footnote{Inouye, 1973 np} For several years, neither the legislation nor agreement on who should run the facility was resolved. Although the Navy recognized the significant inadequacy of the shore-side boat ramp, their primary concern was that funding for the Visitor Center would ultimately impact other funding for more vital military operational facilities.\footnote{Willett, EH. Letter to John Stennis, July 12 1973} HR 155 introduced by
Representative Davis of Georgia recommended that the facility be transferred to the National Park Service. The National Park Service rallied back with similar complaints of financial burdens and budget restraints.

The Navy turned again to the PMWC for assistance in 1968. During the 1968 discussions Rear Admiral Richard Lynch commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District told the Commission that the National Park Service should operate the shore-side facility not the Navy.

The Navy turned to the Fleet Reserve Association, an organization of active and retired members of the Navy services. In 1974 Branch 46, the Pearl Harbor Branch of the FRA organized the Arizona Memorial Museum Foundation (AMMF) which undertook to lead a drive of $4,500,000. While this amount later proved to be too big a burden for the group, they were responsible for raising nearly $1,000,000, including $350,000 from the Hawaii State legislature. The AMMF was organized to promote the Navy’s concept for the proposed USS Arizona Memorial Museum, which would include a theatre, restrooms, observation tower, a veterans meeting hall, and souvenir stand.

Also in 1974, the Navy appointed a committee to develop a strategy for better managing the Memorial and visitor accommodations. The committee recommended that the facility be transferred to the National Park Service. The following year the Navy and the Department of the Interior took the first steps in formalizing the relationship. The

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5 Davis, xxx, HR 155
6 Slackman, 1982, 439
7 Fleet Reserve Association Branch 46, Articles of Incorporation, 1974

Page 2 of 7
arrangement was an informal interdepartmental agreement of principle, as the Navy did not have the authority to divest itself of the Memorial nor the Park Service to take on the obligation.  

Daniel K. Inouye authorized funding in additional legislation in 1977 that would provide for an auditorium, museum, exhibit area, waiting room, and boat dock. “The opportunity to present the important historical significance and atmosphere of the shrine will be lost without a proper visitor center.” In typical Inouye acumen the Visitor Center legislation was attached to the annual military construction authorization. However, the conference committee report in a counter volley said in part, “prior to the award of any construction contract for the proposed *Arizona* Memorial facilities, an agreement must be executed between the Navy and the National Park Service providing that the National Park Service will assume responsibility for operation of the Memorial upon completing of such facilities. Representatives of the Navy and the Park Service signed an understanding in 1978 and the final Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 1980.

**Design of the Visitor Center**

The design of the Visitor Center was undertaken and built by the US Navy. When the facilities were designed, visitation was projected for 700,000 per year.

The design contract for the Center was awarded to the Honolulu architecture firm Chapman, Desai, Sakata and ground was broken by October 1978. The Visitor Center
was designed to be open air and tropical in design, with fountains in a central courtyard open to the sky. This space was to be the holding area for those waiting to view the film in either of the two auditoria.\(^{10}\) A small museum room and large bookstore were [part of the original design. Covered walkways led directly to the docks with the Navy Shuttle boats to the Memorial. The eternal tree of life, a symbol also used at the Memorial, was a major focus of the entrance experience.

The initial bids for the facility exceeded the amount authorized and the PWMC, working with Senator Inouye and the Navy, secured an additional $2.9 million in August 1978.\(^{11}\) The state of Hawaii also contributed $350,000 to the Visitor Center’s construction. The contract was awarded to S & M Sakamoto.

The Reverend Abraham K. Akaka, then Pastor of Honolulu’s historic Kawaiahaø Church, blessed the site in a traditional Hawaiian green ti leaf blessing at the ground breaking of October 19, 1978. Other prominent speakers at this event included Senator Spark Matsunaga, Hawaii Governor George Ariyoshi, and Admiral Donald C. Davis USN, Commander and Chief US Pacific Fleet, who gave the keynote address.\(^{12}\) The groundbreaking shovel, forged from steel plating salvaged from the sunken hulk of the USS *Arizona*, was signed by all fifteen groundbreaking participants and later was on display in the Visitor Center. Akaka and Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., whose father was killed aboard the USS Arizona during the attack, cut the maile lei and ribbon. In a custody transfer ceremony a few minutes earlier, the US Navy had relinquished

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\(^{10}\) Magee, Donald. 1992, np
\(^{11}\) State of Hawaii, 1979 4
\(^{12}\) Wisniewski, 62
jurisdiction over the Memorial and the Visitor Center to the National Park Service. The building was completed for a cost of XXX and opened in formal ceremonies on October 10, 1980.\textsuperscript{13}

The capacity of each theatre was 135 persons, for a total of 540 persons, the same capacity as the boats to the Memorial structure. By the end of 1981, the first full year of National Park Service operation at the new facility, visitation had already exceeded 850,000, 120 percent of the Visitor Center’s design capacity. For more than a decade, yearly visitation at the US Arizona Memorial has been averaging 1.4 million, twice the capacity of the original design.\textsuperscript{14}

The USS Arizona Memorial (USAR) became a unit of the National Park Service through a Memorandum of Agreement with the United States Navy and as such is unique in the National Park Service system. This formal agreement with the Navy and the Department of the Interior distinguishes USAR from most other NPS areas, which are typically created by Congress or Executive Order.

Typically enabling legislation defines a specific mission for each park. The agreement that created the USAR deals primarily with stewardship and operation of the Visitors Center and supporting Memorial facilities. The public law that created the facilities is

\textsuperscript{13} Wisniewski, 62
\textsuperscript{14} NPS, 1999, 3
Public Law 85-344, which passed in March 1958 as part of the military construction budget. The matter of fact language of this law does not discuss the reasons for the Park.

The Arizona, the Memorial, and the Visitor Center are all officially Navy property. The Use Agreement assigns responsibility to the National Park Service for the Memorial, the boat buoys marking the ends of the Arizona and the landing but not to the Arizona tied symbolically to the Memorial.\(^{15}\) Although the Arizona is an obvious focus, it is not specifically mentioned in the Memorandum of Agreement.

**Maintenance for the Visitor Center**

The Visitor Center continues to sink and deteriorate. While the annual maintenance activities at such an exposed and extensively visited location should be projected, the actual work required is greatly exacerbated by the hyperbole of the site conditions and visitor numbers. The major maintenance issues are settling, deterioration, environmental controls, handicap accessibility, and restrooms. In addition, any major work to improve maintenance or interpretation requires the often-circular logic of official Navy approvals.

Four years after construction the building had settled the distance projected for twenty years.\(^{16}\) While leveling provisions were included in the original design, those provisions have proved grossly inadequate.\(^{17}\) The measured settlement in 1984 (average .52 feet) is approximately equal to the settlement previously anticipated for the year 2004 (average

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\(^{15}\) NPS, 1996, 2
\(^{16}\) Libby 3
\(^{17}\) Libby, 3
0.50 feet). In 1993 the maximum footing settlement was 2.28 feet, while the average footing settlement was 1.42 feet since commencement of use of the building.

**Changes to Building**

The existing Visitor Center building does not meet museum environmental and curatorial standards. This is true from the vantage point of both the visitor and the artifact. The visitor experience needs space to contemplate and interact with the exhibits. The exhibits should not be something “to do” while waiting for the film to start. The provision for environmental stability is currently provided for in conditioned exhibit cases.
Management Issues: Resources

The USS Arizona Memorial is both a sacred site of national memory and the most visited tourist attraction in Hawaii. Inherent in those two facts is controversy, as issues present in its history collide.

Historic Resources

In 1964, the entire Pearl Harbor Naval Base was included in the National Register of Historic Places and designated a National Historic Landmark. The Historic Preservation Plan makes allowances for physical changes occurring on the Naval Base; the continuing function as an active military base taking precedence over its physical facilities. This allows the US Navy to make changes in the physical facilities if they judge the changes to be necessary in the implementation of its overall mission. In 1989 the sunken hulls of the Arizona and the Utah were also declared National Historic Landmarks. In the National Historic Landmark Study the statement of Significance for the Arizona states:

The battle-scared and submerged remains of the battleship USS Arizona (BB-39) are the focal point of a shrine erected by the people of the United States to honor and commemorate all American servicemen killed on December 7, 1941, particularly Arizona's crew, many of whom lost their lives during the Japanese attack on the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Arizona's burning bridge and listing masts and superstructure, photographed in the aftermath of the attack and her sinking and emblazoned on the front pages of newspapers across the land, epitomized to the Nation the words "Pearl Harbor" and form one of the best known images of the Second World War in the Pacific. Arizona and the Arizona Memorial have become the major shrine and point of

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1 Market Trends Pacific, Inc. 7
2 Magee, Donald. 7
3 National Historic Landmark Document np
remembrance not only for the lost battleship but also for the entire attack. Indelibly impressed into the national memory, Arizona is visited by millions who quietly file through, toss flower wreaths and leis into the water, watch the iridescent slick of oil that leaks, a drop at a time, from Arizona's ruptured bunkers after more than forty years on the bottom, and read the names of Arizona's dead carved in marble on the Memorial's walls. Just as important as the shrine, as embodied in the form of the modern memorial that straddles Arizona, is the battleship herself. Intact, unsalvaged, and resting in the silt of Pearl Harbor, USS Arizona is a partially frozen moment of time, her death wounds visible and still bleeding oil, and her intact hulk holding most of the battleship's crew. Overlooked in the original designation of Pearl Harbor as a National Historic Landmark, Arizona, the greatest victim of the Pearl Harbor attack and the nation's focal point for remembering a day of infamy, is of exceptional national significance.

Collections

The purpose of the USAR museum collection is to increase the knowledge and inspiration among present and future generations through exhibits, research, and programs that are related to the park's interpretive themes (see interpretation chapter). The interpretive themes provide direction for the acquisition of objects for the museum collection.

Objects Collection

A significant number of objects were transferred to the NPS by the Navy upon the Memorandum of Agreement in 1980. Most of this collection was by donation from former Arizona crewmen and their families, or others on ships in Pearl Harbor on

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4 Delgado, James. 1989a np
December 7, 1941 directly to the Navy. Originally, the memorial exhibited the museum collections, including the USS *Arizona* commander’s plaque, bell, and ship model, as well as a painting, Day of Infamy, completed in 1969 by Kipp Soldwedel. The artifacts were conserved and moved ashore after showing the adverse effects of the saline environment.  

The Navy Historical Center loaned the Memorial and Visitor Center three original parts of the *Arizona*: the anchor, the ship’s bell, and the commanders’ plaque as well as, a Japanese mini-sub periscope and a desk plaque picturing the USS *Arizona*. The second bell of the *Arizona* is at the University of Arizona having been saved from meltdown at the Puget Sound Naval Yard in Bremerton, Washington in 1945 by Bill Bowers. The bell arrived at the University of Arizona in 1946 and was installed in the Student Union Memorial Building in 1951. It is rung on special occasions, particularly footballs wins. When requested by the Navy in 1956 to return the bell to the *Arizona*, the University responded that the bell was a permanent part of the student union; it was relocated to a new clock tower in August 2002, and Bill Bowers was given the honor at age 99 of ringing the bell for the first time in its new location. The bell that now resides in the Visitor Center came from the First National Bank of Arizona, in Phoenix. This bell was returned by the Arizona Historical Foundation in 1964 and was installed at the Memorial in 1966.  

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5 University of Arizona, Collections Document, 2002  
6 Bush, Kent. 3  
7 [http://www.arizona.edu/tours/traditions/traditions8.html](http://www.arizona.edu/tours/traditions/traditions8.html) 8/6/04  
8 PWMC records, USS Arizona Ship’s Bell, nd, np
After the opening of the Visitor Center the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association commissioned John Charles Roach to paint an oil-on-canvas of the USS *Arizona*.

The collection of Admiral Isaac Kidd, Jr., includes personal belongings, recovered during *Arizona* salvage operations, and other property of the US Navy. The Medal of Honor sword of Samuel Fuqua, as well as objects related to the Japanese Navy are also part of the collection. These items include flags, uniform items, and fragments of aircraft lost in the attack. Of specific note is the Shimizu Collection. Shimizu was an aviator and a casualty of the attack; his artifacts were donated by his fiancé on December 7, 1987. There was significant outrage after this donation by some Pearl Harbor Survivors that these materials would be put on display within the memorial and desecrate the honor of these who had died there.

The desire to widen the collection with addition combat artifacts from the attack has created both opportunities and XXX.

On May 2, 1991, a Japanese aerial torpedo was dredged from the silt of Pearl Harbor near where the *Oklahoma* and *Maryland* were damaged in the attack. The National Park Service expressed an interest in adding the torpedo to the USAR collections as there were few intact artifacts from the attack. The Park took many photographs of the torpedo, which were later confiscated by Navy public affairs personnel. The Visitor Center was the most obvious place to display the weapon but the Navy had other ideas. Despite assurances that the torpedo could be rendered safe, and without the knowledge of either

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9 Dickinson, William. 1987, 8
10 Dickinson, William. 1987, 22
11 Chenowith, Robert, as quoted in Burlingame, 433
the National Park Service or Navy military historians, the Navy took it out to sea the next
day and blew it up. The shredded aft end of the torpedo was displayed for the 50th
anniversary commemoration but hardly with the presence of the entire object.

The search for even larger underwater weapons has consumed others scanning the depths
of the Harbor and nearby areas. The University of Hawaii Underwater Research Lab
(HURL) while searching for Douglas flying boat hulls with the Institute of Aeronautical
Archaeology and Research discovered a portion of a Japanese midget submarine. The
rear third of the sub was neatly sheared at a bolted joint. IAAR quickly filed salvage
claims for the partial vessel, precluding much hope for acquisition of the artifact by the
NPS. The submarine pieces are technically still the property of the Japanese government
as the ship was neither surrendered nor boarded and seized during the attack. 12  James
Delgado, military historian precisely noted the issue with the claim, “This is really
troubling, and it’s not just a question of finderskeepers. … The artifacts of Pearl Harbor
are temporal touchstones, one of the rare bits of history that you can actually touch, and
should be beyond the taint of commercial exploitation. To turn this in to a privately
owned thing is a fundamental betrayal of why we preserve history.”13

There is also a small natural history collection, donated by Dr. Julie Brock of the
University of Hawaii Zoology Department. These specimens were collected during the
preservation project in 1993.14

12 Delagado, as quoted in Burlingame, 435
13 Delagado, as quoted in Burlingame, 436
14 Bush, 1999, 4
The goal of the collection is to concentrate on the acquisition of outstanding examples of objects currently not well represented by the Collection. The specific accession priorities include: original to or removed from the *Arizona* or *Utah*, relating to other ships at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941; and related to men or women present at Pearl Harbor during the attack.

**Documents Collection**

The archival documents collection consists of letters, documents, and photographs collected from former crewmen of the *Arizona* and the *Utah* and other ships at Pearl Harbor, as well as the documents preserved by the US Navy. Official Navy reports that have been unclassified that relate to the attack are also included. Fundraising documents for the Memorial have also been preserved.

Significant documents in the archival collection are the Heidt brothers letters (the correspondence of twins killed in action on the *Arizona* to their family), the papers of Paxton Carter, a casualty of the attack, the James Boyce Collection, a *Utah* musician, the *Arizona* Memorial Museum Foundation papers, the Ford Island Naval Air Station Reports, and the Pearl Harbor Signal Tower Reports.

Future collection activity for the archival collection will focus on papers relating to Admiral Kidd and Captain Van Valkenberg, both of whom were killed in action of the *Arizona*. In addition, the papers of the *Utah*’s commander should also be obtained.
In 1983 the National Archives transferred the 14th Naval District Photographic Collection of approximately 27,000 images on glass plates or acetate and nitrate negatives. The volatile nitrate and acetate negatives were sent for storage in the Western Archeological and Conservation Center in Tucson, Arizona for proper conservation. These photographs document the Navy’s involvement in Hawaii and the Pacific from 1880 through World War II with many focusing on the construction of the Pearl Harbor Navy Base. In 1994 the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard transferred an additional 10,500 photographic prints from their collection to the Park. Since there were many duplicates with the National Archives transfer, the two collections were merged, and negatives or prints made when the image set was incomplete. Substantial work has gone in to sorting out and making the photographic collection usable, yet more than half of the collection still had no numbers assigned by 2001.

There are no known museum collections associated with the Native American Graves Protection Act of 1990 and none are expected to be acquired. There are also no plans to acquire and maintain more of a natural history collection that is not examples of ship growth organism.

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15 Bush, 1999, 3
16 Martinez, 2001, 16
17 Martinez, 2001, 18
Oral History Collection

An emphasis has gone into the recording of oral history for the Pearl Harbor survivors. In 2003 there were more than 350 oral histories with 262 reviewed in FY 2001 to correct the many errors from transcription.\(^\text{18}\) [Need more information about oral histories]

Use of the Collection

An inventory of Park Staff was undertaken in 1999 to ask them how they used the collections of USAR. The highest use rate was the library collection with more than 82% responding that they had used the library an average of 40 times within the last year. Within the archival collections, the use rate was highest for the photographic collections followed by the historic archives. The usage of the photographs and archival collections is substantially hampered by the off-site location in Building 416 of the Pearl Harbor Submarine Base. The top (55%) reason given for the high library usage was to provide information to visitors. The next reason was use of the collections for project research. The greatest reason for not using the collections was a need for a more accurate listing of what was in the collections and inadequate space to work while using the collection. There was very strong support for the basic concept of museum collections and archives as instruments for the documentation of park resources.\(^\text{19}\)

Collection Management Issues

There are significant environmental, storage, and exhibition issues for the USAR collections. The original design of the Visitor Center by the Navy did not take into account...
account the storage and display needs of a museum collection. The environmental conditions in the Visitor Center are damaging to the objects particularly due to the salt-filled air, high humidity and ultraviolet light. “Currently, the Museum exhibit gallery is a visitor orientation which includes a few exhibits. Controlled traffic flow through the exhibits is purely random.”20 Many times the exhibit is filled with a large commercial tour that must wait a substantial time for the orientation film. They move slowly, and generally in a group, blocking access to cases for extended periods of time. Tour guides create their own story and use books and models in the store to create their own props.

The open-air tropical environment is the opposite of premium exhibit conditions for the type of collection for the USS Arizona Memorial. Several isolated exhibit cases have been constructed to better preserve the collections on display. Several cases are attached to a new wall designed to block a large sun-filled window, and a large case with provisions for humidity control and access protects the Aircraft Carrier Akagi displayed since 1997.21 The following year the Park built a micro-climate exhibit case to display the Paxton Carter and Admiral Isaac Kidd collections which are now on display. 22 However, even these displays are exposed to direct sunlight and minimal security controls.

Adequate storage is also unavailable on site for many accessioned objects. While the basement of the building is often used for storage, the area often floods, has minimal drainage which produces mosquitoes and high humidity, and is grossly inappropriate for

20 Bush, 27
21 Bush, 5
22 Bush, 6
Substantial emphasis has gone in to providing an improved environment for collections at Building 416 on the Navy Base. New fire protection and security was installed in FY2001 and compressed storage units were installed the same year. Access to this collection is hampered by the increased security necessitated at the DOD installation.

Planning Documents

The information in the Museum information collections should play a key role in the management of the Park. However, there is not a viable system for management and collection of management and administrative materials. Materials are spread throughout more than a few locations within the Park. The library is the most accessible but lacks a professional organizational system and there is no centralized system for retrieval.

Curator Steven Floray and Historian Daniel Martinez wrote the Scope of Collections statement in 1995 and the following year initiated a Collection Condition Assessment that made recommendations for future direction. A Housekeeping Plan was developed by Conservator Gretchen Voeks in 1997.

Natural Resources

While most National Parks have a specific focus on the protection of natural resources, the USAR has the protection of cultural resources as its primary goal. The natural processes at work on these cultural resources still have a profound effect, most of which is out of the control of the National Park Service. The Navy undertook a comprehensive...
survey of the Pearl Harbor ecosystems in 1971-74. The conclusion was that the harbor was homogenous except for West Loch.\textsuperscript{24} \textbf{[Any followup studies?]}

Oil Seeping from \textit{Arizona}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Catastrophic Oil Spill of Chevron Pipeline Oil Spill}
  \item \textbf{Water Quality from Pearl Harbor Activities}
\end{itemize}

\subsection*{Federal Policies}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Entrance Fee Policy}
  \item \textbf{Budget Close down}
  \item \textbf{Boat Tours}
\end{itemize}

\subsection*{Law Enforcement}

Law Enforcement Rangers returned to operation at the \textit{Arizona} Memorial as a result of the September 11, 2001 attacks. A law enforcement operation had been absent for nearly four years. After September 11, the Memorial and Visitor Center were immediately closed for seven days by the Navy, and when the Park reopened, substantial security restrictions were set also by the Navy. Bags that could offer concealment were prohibited from access to the Center or the Memorial.\textsuperscript{25} While there were two notices sent by mass mailing to the public and the tourism community, a public relations nightmare was created. Visitors without knowledge of this new regulation, were turned

\textsuperscript{24} NPS, 1996 20
\textsuperscript{25} Martinez, 8
away when arriving by public transportation, or were upset by having to leave their belongings when arriving in private vehicles. They became even more distraught when many of those cars were burgled in the carpark by those more aware of the new security restrictions. Video cameras were installed in the parking lots, and were monitored by military personnel. [xxx verify if military] A joint arrangement with the Missouri and the Bowfin beginning in early 2003 to provide storage for bags at a checked storage facility was operated first by the Arizona Memorial Museum Association and later by a contract hire.

The new Law Enforcement operation required detailing of five law enforcement NPS Rangers on 21 day temporary duty to the Park in 2001. Three seasonal Rangers were hired in FY 2002 to reduce the high cost of these temporary assignments. These rangers enforced both the no-bag policy at the gate, as well as first response to the auto burglaries, medical emergencies and grounds security.  

Interments

The long hand of the Law

The Senate energy Committee unanimously adopted language in September 1986 that exempted “the Arizona War Memorial [sic] at Pearl Harbor from the Park Service proposal for entrance fees.” This language passed the full Senate in a legislative package but never made it to the House.  The final fee proposal included the FY 1987

26 Martinez, 8
27 Ford, 1986, np
Continuing Resolution did not contain any *Arizona* prohibition, but eventually the provision to exclude fees at the USAR was added to the law by amendment to the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act [16 USC 460L-6(a) (9)]. The Director of the National Park Service, William Penn Mott also supported the provision against an entrance fee.\(^{28}\) He was no doubt influenced by survivors groups writing to their congressmen.\(^{29}\)

In 1995 a bill concerning the possible collection of fees for transportation purposes in the National Parks was revised as a provision of the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act [16 USC460L-6a(L)]. This act related directly to the collection of fees for services of transportation provided by the Secretary of the Interior. These provision to collect fees could have been used by the Park to offset some of the substantial costs paid to the Navy to operate the shuttle boat service.\(^{30}\) However, the Western Regional Office felt that it would not be a good idea to circumvent the obvious Congressional intent in not charging fees at the USAR by actually charging fees for the shuttle boat service.\(^{31}\)

**Budget Restrictions**

The inability to raise specific funds from use fees was not the only impact from Washington budget manipulations. In December 1995 Congressional leaders were deadlocked over the budget. Without an appropriation, this required a shutdown of all non-essential government activities including all National Parks.\(^{32}\) Debates on the hill

\(^{28}\) Mott, 1987, np
\(^{29}\) Ford, 1986, np.
\(^{30}\) Christensen, 1995 np
\(^{31}\) Christensen, USAR files.
\(^{32}\) NPS Briefing Memo. 12/21/95
became more focused away from the central issues and more political as time progressed. No immediate end to the debate was seen.

In addition to the extremely difficult loss of income for the personnel at the USAR, the facility began to break down within the first two weeks: irrigation was broken, the air conditioning compressor gave up, and rubbish covered the groups as many tourists came to the Park but could not get into the Visitor Center. Superintendent Billings brought in an essential maintenance staff to provide services to the high maintenance park.

Of even greater concern was that the Navy took the closing of the Park into its own hands. The Navy was approached by the City and County to open the Memorial using City and County funds. The Navy felt that a provision in the original Use Agreement with the Park Service allowed them to write a new agreement with the City of Honolulu to operate some of the facilities because the “park was not using them.” Without informing the Park of their negotiations\(^{33}\) the Navy began to draft a Use Agreement with the City and County of Honolulu to use the Parks facilities including the restrooms, grounds, docks, and Memorial. When Superintendent Billings told the Navy counsel that she was not in favor of a new agreement with the City and that the USAR was granted exclusive use of the facilities, he countered that the Navy could take over the operations anytime they wanted.\(^{34}\) Obviously, Superintendent Billings did not want to jeopardize the NPS position with the Navy, but it hardly looked like they were honoring their previous agreements. Her integrity and resolve did not go unnoticed by her superiors,

\(^{33}\) Billings, 1995b np
\(^{34}\) Billings, 1995c np
when comments were made that it was “one Boston whaler against the US fleet at Pearl.”

The anxiety and stress of furloughed personnel was also handled by Billings with care and concern giving out both her office and home phone numbers to all personnel.

An alternative proposal was then offered by the City to donate to the park the costs to keep a portion of it open. The City had been approached by the Hawaii Transportation Association, a group of tour operators seriously hit financially by the shutdown. A major issue was indemnification, and no agreement could be reached regarding indemnification since the City Council was not meeting until January. The Governor was approached to offer his assistance as there was already a nation wide agreement with state attorney generals regarding indemnification in national parks. An agreement was reached to open a portion of the Park with a donation made by the State that would equal the actual costs, both direct and indirect for operating that portion.

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35 Harry, 1995, np
36 Billings, 1996 np
Research Initiatives

There are two primary concerns for the resources of the USAR Park: interpretation and management. Both are heavily dependent on adequate and appropriate research initiatives. Despite the significant literature and eyewitness accounts about the Pearl Harbor attack and the Arizona, the NPS has spent considerable attention refining and correcting this information.

There is almost an insatiable demand for information about the Arizona and its role in the Pacific War, and the conditions of the ship are critical in the management program for the Park. It is the refinement of that information that has continued to keep alive the story.

Research

Until the Navy and the National Park Service began underwater mapping surveys in 1983 there had been little work done on the assessment of the Arizona since the salvage operations during 1942. Management of the resource of the Arizona was necessary yet the integrity of the resource was difficult to ascertain. There was very little management precedent for Gary Cummins, the first Park Superintendent. “It was perfectly clear what had been here before December 7, 1941 but notions regarding its present condition were riddled with contradiction and mystery.”

The first NPS research project had as its objectives specific goals to aid in the management of the underwater resources contributing to the National Historic Landmark District. The project was funded by the Arizona Museum Memorial Association with the following specific goals:

- Establish the wreck’s position and chart it in detail
- Place reference markers to aid in determining if any shifting or settling will occur in the future
- Ascertain the current conditions of the wreck
- Find the location from which fuel oil was escaping
- Learn whether any unexploded ordnance was on still board
- Search for possible torpedo damage to the ship

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1 Lenihan, scrs/scrs1.1 (html)
• Clean off an accumulation of coins, combs, cameras, and other things that tourists had thrown or dropped from the Memorial over the years.²

Permission to Survey

Permission to do underwater research at the Arizona had to be obtained from the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, as the Navy retained complete control over the Arizona underwater site. Obtaining this approval proved to be somewhat problematic.

[Gary Cummins quotes here]

Record drawings

The detailed mapping of the Arizona began in 1983 with a low-tech system of string and clothes pins. The task seemed daunting to the archaeology team as no one had ever drawn such a large vessel under water with less than a six foot visibility. Higher technology solutions such as photogrammetry were precluded because of the visibility, shallow water, and high site relief.³ The experience the archaeology team had gained from the mapping of other irregular sites such as those of the Pueblo Indians proved to be invaluable. Both the ship and the pueblo sites had curving forms and irregular three dimensional surfaces, that needed to be measured two dimensionally but represented three dimensionally.

Rows of No. 18 nylon string were laid out over the site in much the same way is done above ground for an excavation of underground archaeology. The string was marked with plastic clothes pins at ten foot intervals. This grid was drawn and established the datum points for drawing the ship. Simple trilateration established known points on the marked lines to target features on the Arizona.

Each day the measurements were recorded on a master set of drawings and needed points for the next dive identified. A total of four weeks was spent in underwater dives by the

² Lenihan, p12??
³ Lenihan scrs3 p1 of 7
crew. The “responsibility for the planimetric view was given to Jerry Livingston and the elevations (profiles) were given to Larry Nordby, Farley Watanabe and Mark Senning were assigned to the starboard elevation, while Larry Murphy team leader concentrated on the port elevation.”  

An infra-red theodolite was used to shoot several targets for confirmation of the accuracy of the string lines. The theodolite and the string lines confirmed that the ship had gunnels significantly altered by a blow out of several feet. A low cost video was also used to advantage to record the low light conditions with instant feedback benefits. The digital images were also used during the rendering of the drawings to fill in missing pieces between triangulated features. Later these tapes also proved to be a substantial educational tool for the public as the Honolulu TV media showed parts of the video daily on the nightly news.

Reconnaissance of Site

The specific conditions of the wreck were also surveyed to establish the site’s extent, inventory recognizable artifacts, and mark them on the base map. Several hazardous materials were encountered; these included six-inch shells, sacks of congealed gun powder, and corroded high pressure acetylene torches. and they were removed to protect the visitors and divers. The other artifacts were left in situ.

The extent of the wreckage field was also inventoried using side-scan sonars and divers. The equipment was a Klein 100KHz and was run in both 1983 and 1988 with features within 100 feet of the wreckage recorded on the base maps. Additional detail was provided by a Mesotech side-scan unit in sector-scan and polar-scan modes and 180 degree passes by divers since 1988. Questions have been raised whether the deterioration of the resource should be arrested or allowed to continue. The management strategy has been to develop a baseline of information and monitor the change without a decision being made for conservation.

Bifouling Study

4 Lenihan, scrs p2 of 7
The underwater studies were broken up into several manageable parts: In 1986 the role of befouling in the overall corrosion process was investigated. The befouling study had several very specific goals: to develop a baseline inventory of biological communities and sedimentation extant on structural remains of the ship; to obtain quantifiable measurements of the present state of deterioration of the ship’s metal structural elements at various locations; to assess the causes and rates of deterioration of the ship’s components; and to provide a scientific basis for making informed decisions regarding the *Arizona*‘s management and preservation.

In order to collect the appropriate data, several hypothesis were presented, most of which proved to be correct. There were several hypothesis formed for the vertical surfaces of the ship. The first was that a layer of hard fouling growth creates low oxygen conditions at the metal surface and reduces corrosion rate to far below what would occur on a non-fouled surface. This fouling growth (dead and alive) is stable and dense, and forms a relatively homogenous layer over nearly all vertical areas and that there is a negative correlation between the thickness and density of the fouling growth with the corrosion rate of the underlying surface. Hull components buried in silt exhibit a very low corrosion rate.

Interior hull and wall vertical surfaces were expected to have a lesser area of coverage and thickness of fouling growth, and could therefore be subjected to higher corrosion rates than exterior surfaces. This hypothesis proved to be incorrect due to a number of circumstances, the most important being a similar pH value of the water to the exterior conditions but a substantially lesser oxygen content.

There were also hypotheses developed for the horizontal (steel and wood) surfaces: A layer of sediment creates anoxic (low oxygen) conditions on horizontal surfaces and reduces corrosion and decomposition rates to far below what would occur on uncovered surfaces. The sediment layer is stable and covers nearly all horizontal areas. Corrosion and deterioration of horizontal surfaces are correlated with sediment thickness and porosity.
Two important hypotheses formulated proved to be difficult to monitor, that nutrient, pollutant and plankton levels would slowly decline in Pearl Harbor as a result of on-going pollution abatement, and that the protection provided by the bifouling communities might decrease because of their dependence on the above factors.

During the underwater testing, the fouling growth was on more than 99% of all the sixty-one vertical testing stations. Ten taxa of fauna and five tax of flora comprised the bulk of the fouling materials. Areas of higher water motion such as in the shallower water depths and areas near the bow and stern had a greater diversity and abundance of animals. Hard fouling was found to consist of entwined masses of oyster and vermetid shells. The thickness of the hard fouling was unaffected by water depth and was generally about 3/4” thick. Many of the types of organisms that were found in the befouling environment were those that depend on pollution. These filter-feeding organisms depend primarily on plankton and suspended detritus for food which in turn depend on dissolved nitrogen and phosphorus compounds. The fresh water sources and sewage provide sources for these needed ingredients. Since domestic sewage discharge has been substantially curtailed except for failures of the sewage treatment systems, it is likely that the food source for these organisms will be greatly lessened in the future.

Fifty five stations were also set up for monitoring in the horizontal surfaces study. The teak deck surfaces were greatly influenced by fish egg nests. Under the gelatinous layers of eggs, the teak had substantially more mollusk-burrow damage than teak surfaces just covered with sediment. Consequently, this nesting activity is a chronic, deleterious process to be monitored in future studies by the Park Service. In the two follow up annual studies, the fish nesting activity was greatly reduced. Other teak decks had become blackened by possible exposure to sulfide compounds formed in the anoxic environments under thick sediment. The exposed horizontal metal surfaces had largely irregular texture corrosion products. There was one area
Several stations were also selected for future steel thickness studies. The thickness at these locations was recorded and will be compared to the engineering drawings of construction as well as monitoring to occur in the future.

Additional studies were undertaken to assist in defining the chemical and biological conditions inside the ship. Access to the interior spaces was restricted by both small openings and unknown structural conditions. It was hypothesized that the interior spaces would have less water flow and therefore less biofouling and consequently, more deterioration. The water from the interior spaces was tested to be about the same temperature and pH as the exterior conditions but with substantially less oxygen. Also found in substantial quantities at the lower fluid levels was a viscous black carbon residue with a distinctive volatile hydrocarbon fuel odor which reduced the available oxygen in the water. It was hypothesized that the lack of oxygen but the presence of microbes digesting hydrocarbon products would more than compensate for the scarcity of protective biofouling cover on the interior surfaces.

A cyclical monitoring program was developed by SCRU and CPSU-UH and is implemented by USAR staff. The plan consists of photo stations on vertical elements of the ships structures and sample locations on horizontal surfaces. This monitoring has the function of establishing changes in biofouling and sedimentation levels.

Mapping and Documentation
Approximately 90% of the exterior of the Arizona has been surveyed to date.

The USS Arizona Memorial
The Visitor Center
Artifacts and Museum collections
Management Issues: Relationships

US Navy

The relationship between the National Park Service administration and their counterparts at CINCPAC has been one marked by entente and détente. This is primarily a result of the unusual arrangement that gives the Park Service responsibility for the Visitor Center and the Memorial but not ownership or control over the *Arizona* or the shuttle boat service. In the summer of 2000 visitors were asked if before visiting the memorial they were aware that the National Park service managed the facility, and only 43% said “yes.”\(^1\)

The USS *Arizona* remains, the Memorial and the Visitor Center are all officially Navy property but a Use Agreement with the US Navy allows the national Park Service to manage them. This agreement assigns responsibility to the National Park Service for the Memorial, the boat buoys marking the ends of the *Arizona* and the landing but not to the *Arizona* itself tied symbolically to the Memorial.\(^2\) Although the *Arizona* is an obvious focus, as well as all the concern of early legislation that eventually led to the creation of the USAR Park, it is not specifically mentioned in the Memorandum of Agreement with the Navy. The Park has taken as its responsibility the protection and monitoring of this finite cultural resource. The Park Service was advised by the House Armed Services Committee, in “authorizing the funds for the construction of the shore side facilities, imposed the condition that prior to the award of any construction contract, the National Park Service and the Navy must execute an

\(^{1}\) Morse, 15.  
\(^{2}\) NPS, 1996 2
agreement, which provides that the National Park Service will assume the responsibility for the operation of the memorial upon completion of construction.”

With the desire to do the underwater archeology on the Arizona, permission was requested from the Commander Naval Base Pearl Harbor and his staff. While the reception from Admiral Stanley Anderson was amenable, the staff was completely aghast that there was a desire to potentially disturb the Arizona and possibly the remains of her dead. The staff could not understand why the Park Service wanted to investigate something about which “everything was known.” At issue was the basic difference between the mission and methods of the National Park Service and the Navy. The Park Service was used to providing information to visitors. Permission to remove the coins from the surface of the ship was the first break in this confrontation but occurred after the change of command and the next Admiral was in place.

In order to undertake either construction at the Visitor Center or work on the Memorial or Arizona, permission and approval from the Navy is absolutely necessary. This has caused several log jams during the operation of the USAR. When the Maintenance Building was constructed, the design work was accomplished by the Denver Service Center, a design division of the National Park Service. Drawings were submitted to the Public Works Center Pearl harbor for the Navy’s review. It was not until after the building was constructed and in final approvals that there were any comments from on the facility from the Navy. The Mechanical Branch desired a cut off valve to be relocated, a potential cost of $30,000. Since maintenance of the building would be under Park Service jurisdiction, it was finally agreed to

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3 Nystedt, 1np
leave the valve in place. However, the discussions as to who had control and final jurisdiction over the facility at the Visitor Center raised its ugly head.

Ford Island Development

An even more tense situation developed in the review of the Concept Plan for additions to the Visitor Center. As part of the environmental review process for this addition, the Navy was asked to comment on the plan. Their terse reply was that the plan required the approval (not just review) of the Navy, and that the approval would be withheld until the Navy had completed their plans for the Visitor “attractions” contemplated in a for profit partnership planned for Ford Island. Since this navy partnership required legislation to actualize, the potential plan for Ford Island was many years off into the future.

Ford Island was listed as one of America’s eleven most endangered sites by the National Trust for Historic Preservation in 2001 as they considered the historic resources on Ford Island seriously at risk. The original airfield, air tower, World War II hangers, a collection of bungalows, officer’s housing, and landscaping of mature banyan trees remain on the island. There are competing demands for the island from the military for housing and from the profit sector for tourist experiences. In 1999 the Navy presented plans for a major housing complex, a festival market place, and recreational marina on Ford Island. Despite the concerns raised by preservation organizations, the Navy decided in early 2001 to solicit proposals for several major development initiatives at Ford Island. While there was some progress made on the incorporation of preservation concerns into the Navy’s plans with two written agreement in 2001, the future housing and commercial development has not been
completely resolved. The Navy has been in discussion with the USAR concerning bungalows along the water’s edge facing the *Arizona*.

Research Initiative Partnerships [covered in Research chapter]

**Control of the Waters in Pearl Harbor**

The Navy ran a Hydrofest with Outrigger hotels in the west Loch portion of Pearl harbor as a benefit to the Recreation and Welfare fund. This commercial alliance also impacted the park’s tour operations. The USAR was forced to cancel half of the scheduled tours to the Memorial because of demand by the Navy to have “no wake” during the Hydrofest activities. The navy launches carry visitors every 15 minutes to the Memorial but would need to travel at half the speed in order not to raise a wake. The no wake mandate was an abundance of caution to ensure that no marine traffic at Pearl Harbor created any hazard for the hydroplane racing boats. The racing boats were in the north portion of the harbor and fortunately did not cut across the memorial launch routes, but the carnival atmosphere on Ford Island by race watchers made reverence at the memorial more than difficult. While the Navy had set up the races to benefit the Seaman’s Welfare and Assistance funds they did not allow for adequate parking. Many tried to park at the USAR parking lots but were turned away. Superintendent Magee wanted to make very clear that the National Park Service was not affiliated in any way with the Hydrofest activities. ⁴ It hardly seemed necessary.

**The *Arizona* Memorial Museum Association**

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⁴ Wright, A4
The purpose of the *Arizona* Memorial Museum Association is to provide the visiting public with the best type of educational material surrounding the attack on Pearl Harbor and World War II in the Pacific.\(^5\)

The *Arizona* Memorial Museum Association (AMMA) has historically provided most of the park’s funding for special projects, including supplemental staffing and supplies. The funds provided by the Association are more flexible in use and allow various purchase alternatives. These funds afford opportunities for the park to complete projects that are not available through the soft-money competitions at the regional level.\(^6\)

AMMA’s beginnings can be traced to 1974 as the *Arizona* Memorial Museum Foundation, a private nonprofit corporation chartered to lead the fund drive for the *Arizona* Memorial Visitor Center. During that early period, the foundation raised nearly $1,000,000, which they turned over to the Navy for construction of the main building. In 1979, the group’s name was changed to *Arizona* Memorial Museum Association, and it became a nonprofit cooperating association assigned to support the National Parks in the Pacific Basin by raising money. This support takes the form of funding research, providing interpretive museum displays, outreach school programs, and activity that would prove difficult to fund through federal procurement channels. In addition to the Memorial, they fund projects at the other Parks in the Pacific. They were significantly involved in the restoration of St. Philomena, Father Damien’s Church at Kalaupapa National Historical Park, and the museum at War of the Pacific in Guam, and Saipan.

\(^5\) Baito, 10  
\(^6\) Bush, 1999, 64
The primary source of these funds is the operation of the bookstore at the Museum.

**Pearl Harbor Survivor’s Association (PHSA)**

Members of the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association have provided immeasurable time in the acquisition of museum collections, identification of artifacts and personal one-on-one relationships with visitors. The Pearl Harbor Survivors Association is a national organization that holds an annual meeting where collections are brought for the enjoyment of all members.

The mission of the individual Pearl Harbor Association chapters is to:

- To keep alive the memory of our brothers who died in the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, and for fraternal, patriotic, historical and educational purposes; to preserve and strengthen comradeship among its members; to perpetuate the memory and history of our dead; to maintain true allegiance to the government of the United States of America and fidelity to its Constitution and Laws; to foster true patriotism; to maintain and extend the institutions of American freedom and to preserve, protect and defend the United States from her enemies whomsoever.

The articles of incorporation of the national organization are:

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7 Bush, 1999, 65
8 [http://www.phsa.org](http://www.phsa.org) 8/1/04
(1) To uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States.

(2) To collate, preserve, and encourage the study of historical episodes, chronicles, mementos, and events pertaining to "The Day of Infamy, 7 December 1941," and in particular those memories and records of patriotic service performed by the heroic Pearl Harbor survivors and nonsurvivors.

(3) To shield from neglect the graves, past and future, of those who served at Pearl Harbor on such day.

(4) To stimulate communities and political subdivisions into taking more interest in the affairs and future of the United States in order to keep our nation alert.

(5) To fight unceasingly for our national security in order to protect the United States from enemies within and without our border.

(6) To preserve the American way of life and to foster the spirit and practice of Americanism.

(7) To instill love of country and flag and to promote soundness of mind and body in the youth of our nation.⁹

To be a member of the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association one must have been a member of the Armed Forces of the United States on December 7, 1941 and on the island of Oahu, or offshore, not to exceed three miles at the actual time of the attack 7:55 a.m. to 9:45 a.m. Patriotism is also a key element with only discharge under honorable conditions and no memberships in subversive organizations, particularly the communist party, advocating the overthrow of the US government.

⁹ http://www.phsa.org 8/1/04
Collections from Survivors

The Pearl Harbor Survivors are a unique resource to the Park for management. In the first twenty years of the park nearly thirty individuals in the Volunteer in the Park program logged more than 10,000 hours each year with more than a third of these hours being provided Pearl Harbor Survivors. The Pearl Harbor Survivors are dynamic, involved and eagerly share their story with young and old alike. Proof of their success and their ability to add to the overall effect are the hundreds of park comment sheets received annually expressing the visitors profound admiration of not only meeting with but having the opportunity to sit and chat with this colorful cast of characters. The Pearl Harbor Survivors provide a deep emotional context to the story at the Park which cannot be met by other avenues of interpretation.

The Pearl Harbor Survivors provide a human touch to the story told at the Arizona. They are officially Volunteers In the Park” and donated nearly 6000 hours per year in the first two decades of the Park. They are part of the interpretive scene and guide visitors with stories and explanations of the attack. Visitor surveys particularly note the emotional and human quality of this interaction and the importance of talking with a Pearl harbor Survivor was rated “extremely important” by over eighty percent of the respondents in a Visitor Survey undertaken in 2000. Now reaching the 80s and 90s in age, many have retired from active volunteerism. But they have not stopped their watchful eye on the story that is told. Many

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10 Martinez, 2001, 18
11 Martinez, 2001, 21
12 Morse, 2001, 16
still stand up at conferences to correct what is perceived to be inaccuracies, or a softening of the history of Pearl Harbor.

The Pearl Harbor Survivors have also kept the focus on proper acknowledgement of both the sacrifices and recognition of those who lost their lives on December 7th, 1941. Ray Emory, historian for the National Pearl Harbor Survivors Association has been persistent in his research concerning proper naming of those who lost their lives in the attack. He brought to the attention of the Park Service the mistakes in names and ranks for the names on the wall of the Memorial as well as the names for the Wayside Exhibits, that acknowledged the Pearl Harbor dead that were not on the Arizona. In addition, in Emory was behind adding proper identification to the attack grave markers at Punchbowl. Emory recorded the locations of graves at Punchbowl that only contained the date December 7, 1941, and in a detailed research and cross referencing to the salvage records. In the 1990s he succeeded in matching the grave numbers of all 265 unknown markers with the original burial records from the temporary cemeteries set up after the attack, making it possible to provide each with a date of death and a ship. Both the Office of Veteran Affairs, which manages Punchbowl, and the US Army the official next of kin for all unknowns, refused to make any alterations on the markers, citing their belief in the sanctity of the “unknown”. You could say I’m a real thorn in the side of the people who run this place.” Emory finally succeeded in getting a provision inserted by Representative Patsy Mink, attached to a defense appropriations budget in 2000 stipulating that the name of the ship and date should be added to the seventy-four markers of the Arizona Unknowns at Punchbowl. “These kids gave up their lives, and each of these
stones costs just sixty-eight dollars. That’s all they got, and you’re telling me we can’t do a better job of saying when and where they died? It’s a matter of simple justice.”

Interments

Blind Vendors

USS Arizona Memorial Fund

In January 2001 an additional agreement was reached between the USS Arizona Memorial and the Arizona Memorial Museum Association to raise $10,000,000 with the specific purpose of undertaking a capital campaign for constructing a new Center and donating that Center to the National Park Service on a mutually acceptable schedule. The intent of this agreement was also to involve the Park in the planning and design of a new center, unlike the planning that occurred for the existing Center built by the Navy.

Controversial Issues

The issue of racism has found its way into the Park via several avenues. Nearly 30% of the visitors to the Visitor Center are international with the majority Japanese nationals. Many have commented on the “chattering Japanese tourists…each with a camera and most bespectacled, they come in swarms to see the last remaining evidence of the ‘Attack on Pearl Harbor.’… It does give one a strange feeling to see so many there at the scene of their greatest triumph, leading to humiliation.” The same writer did not actually go through the entire program, as he gave up and returned to his hotel at the thought of waiting in line for his

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13 Clarke, 136-7
14 NPS and AMMA Agreement dated January 2001
15 Williams, np
number to be called. The blame he clearly placed on the number of what he thought were primarily Japanese tourists.

Internments
Elvis Fans
People Resources
Visitor Management
Japanese Visitor
Interpretation Themes

The call “Remember Pearl Harbor” has worked as the primary frame for postwar interpretation of the attack. These primary interpretive themes as identified through the Statement of Interpretation are:

- The causes and events leading up to and through the attack on Pearl harbor,
- The entry of the United States into the Second World War,
- The role of the USS Arizona in the attack and the battle cry “Remember Pearl Harbor.”

The secondary interpretive themes are

- The post attack salvage and recovery of the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor,
- The effects on the other military bases and attack sites on Oahu,
- The effects of the attack on both Hawaii and its citizens,
- The beginning of the Second World War in the Pacific through the Battle of Midway,
- Pearl Harbor: its pre-history, history, and its role in the Pacific theater,
- Hawaii’s role in World War II.¹

The vehicle for these themes has taken various forms including orientation films, documentaries, boat tour voice-overs, and symposium.

Film

¹Foray, Steve 1997, np
An orientation film is a key step in the interpretation process at the Visitor Center before visitors are taken by the shuttle boat to the Memorial. Since the opening of the Visitor Center, everyone who wishes to board the shuttle boat to the Memorial must see the documentary. There have been two major versions of the orientation film in 1980 and 1992, as well as a revision to each for accuracy or clarification.

1980 Orientation Film

When the Visitor Center opened in 1980, the orientation film shown was produced by the US Navy. This film had a military point of view and was both praised and criticized depending upon one’s own perspective.

There was significant footage in the first film from the Navy’s 1943 film, December 7th, the Movie, directed by John Ford. Ford commanded the allied photography information effort for the Office of Strategic Services. His camera crew arrived at Pearl Harbor just six days after the attack, and he developed an eighty-four minute film highly critical of the military’s preparedness. As one might expect, this film was quickly suppressed, and it was not until two years later that portions of it were reworked into the thirty-minute movie approved by the Navy. This film, December 7th, the Movie, won the Academy award in 1943 for documentary film. Technically this film was not a documentary as it is filled with dramatizations and reconstructions. The longer unedited version of this film was released in 1991 as a video for social and historical viewing purposes by Kit Parker films. Unfortunately, December 7th, the Movie footage has been borrowed by other filmmakers as
an accurate depiction of the attack when in actuality, actors in Hollywood were the sailors
and other wounded personnel. It was one of the first instances where the created illusion over
time had become the reality.\textsuperscript{2} The issue of illusion, memory and reality has been a pivotal
one since that date of infamy.

The 1980 orientation film echoed the wartime propaganda message, “if we forget that a
nation unprepared will sacrifice many of her finest men…that is why we must remember…Pearl Harbor.”\textsuperscript{3} It distinctly presented the point of view that it was essential to
have a military buildup, particularly in the Pacific. The first film had several historical errors
that were corrected in a revision that began showing in October 1981.\textsuperscript{4}

This film produced by the Navy became the focus of substantial controversy due primarily to
how the orientation film depicted the Japanese enemy. Written in the middle of the Cold
War when alliances between nations were of primary concern, it was important to portray
the “extenuating” circumstances behind the attack. The Japanese were no longer the enemy
but an ally. The reason behind the attack was placed in the context of the US oil embargo.
The lens through which viewers saw the movie was refracted by their own experience. The
chief historian Edwin Bearrs stated that the film got more complaints than all of the other
National Park historic sites combined.\textsuperscript{5} The desire for the film was “to accurately summarize

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{3} US Navy, \textit{Arizona} Memorial Film Script January 15, 1980. p23
\bibitem{4} Dickinson, William to Victor A Dybdal letter March 10, 1986. Superintendent’s files.
\bibitem{5} XXX original not found. Quoted in Linenthal 1992
\end{thebibliography}
the complicated negotiations, demands, sanctions, ultimatums and military buildups leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor from both the Japanese and American perspectives."^{6}

Despite the fact that the film was produced by the Navy, the Park Service took the full brunt of the attack on the film. One group complained about the favorable treatment of the Japanese enemy and the characterization of the Japanese attack as “brilliant.” Another viewer stated that he had suffered a heart attack as a result of his anger at the film.^{7} Others demanded that the Navy take over the Memorial and Visitor Center since the Park Service was “squeamish about telling the truth and apologetic about being Americans … the last people to be left in charge of a national shrine like that at Pearl Harbor.”^{8} Many claimed the film was sanitized and pro-Japanese because of the beneficial influence of the Japanese to the Hawaiian economy.^{9}

The Park felt that the aggressive military tone of the film worked against the desire for reverence at the site. Later, when interviewed by the *Honolulu Star Bulletin* newspaper about the new film, the Park historian, Daniel Martinez stated, that the previous Navy film “was very much a product of a Cold War mind-set.”^{10} When the Admiral in Command of Pearl Harbor read these words on the front page, he called the Superintendent of the Park and objected to this characterization of the Navy. The Navy still desired to filter the history of

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^{7} Sowell, Thomas, as quoted in Linenthal, Sacred Ground p237
^{8} Linenthal, p192
the war presented by the Park Service.\textsuperscript{11} The Navy still shows this 1980 film to their VIP guests who visit the Memorial directly from the Admiral’s boathouse.\textsuperscript{12}

The park historian, Daniel Martinez, and the park curator, Bob Chenowith as professional public historians, felt that the 1980 film also relied too heavily on Hollywood re-enactments of the attack and gave an inaccurate historical view. Excellent archival photographs were available and they advocated their use in the new film.

**1992 Orientation Film**

The production of a new film was not without its own set of divergent viewpoints. Although the funding for the new film came from the local non-profit, the Arizona Memorial Museum Association, review of the film content also fell under the jurisdiction of Washington, DC. Chief NPS Historian Edward Bearrs, a Marine veteran of the Pacific War, set up a national advisory committee to review the film and provide insight into its development. This group included the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association, other veterans groups, military historians, and the US Navy. All had their own desires for the film and the history that was to be presented. This wide consultation process although unwieldy at times, helped to preclude the objections voiced three years later by veterans groups in the Smithsonian’s *Enola Gay* exhibit.\textsuperscript{13}

Although initially intended to be ready for the 50th anniversary activities, the scripting of the narrative for the new film took substantially longer and was more expensive than initially

\textsuperscript{11} White, Geoff. “Moving History”, *Positions, East-Asia Cultural Review*, p718  
\textsuperscript{13} White, Geoff. “Moving History”, *Positions, East-Asia Cultural Review*, p719
intended. Fourteen drafts\textsuperscript{14} were necessary before agreement could be reached between the production company, American Studies Film Center, the advisory groups and the Park. More than thirty individuals reviewed the script or film cuts. One of the causes for this unusual number of drafts was the different product desired between the Memorial superintendent, historian, and curator, and the film production company and the advisory group. The Memorial staff wanted an accurate chronological narrative of the attack as primarily presented by archival materials, and the others wanted a more personalized and emotional story of those who had actually been there. Superintendent Magee felt that “[w]hile it has always been considered important to provide a personal perspective to the telling of the story, it has never been considered the primary viewpoint from which the story should be told….the early scripts and rough cut viewed by the AMMA and the park staff lacked a clear view in telling the story…it was our feeling that a straight forward telling of the events surrounding the attack would best serve the interpretative needs of the park. In support of this we feel that telling the story from a personal point of view has the tendency to exclude everyone else.”\textsuperscript{15}

The first draft was developed by the production company, American Studies Film Center. The American Studies Film Center already had gathered a substantial amount of oral histories for a documentary they were producing for public television to be presented during the 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary and this information shaped the writing. After the first rough cut of the film was produced, the curator and historian at the Park produced a revised narrative indicating USAR’s desired viewpoint.

\textsuperscript{14} Martinez, Daniel. Interview with author September 8, 2004
\textsuperscript{15} Magee, Donald to Western regional Director, 28 January, 1992 as quoted in White, Geoff. “Moving History”, \textit{Positions, East-Asia Cultural Review}, p719 original not found.
Both were reviewed by the “blue-ribbon” group brought together by Bearrs. Bearrs group thought the staff narrative focused too much on death and dying and not enough on the heroism of the day.\textsuperscript{16} They particularly wanted mention of the heroes that were the common fighting man and not so much emphasis on the Admirals and Generals.

Another difference between the two films was how personal reflection of the war and death was acknowledged. The 1980 film focused on the buildup to victory in the Pacific with shots of battles in the Philippines, Iwo Jima, Okinawa and Japan. The 1992 film focused on the injured from those battles and the losses inflicted by the war. The 1980 film closes with an image of military strength, “the world’s most powerful Naval force, the United States Pacific Fleet.”\textsuperscript{17} The 1992 film allows for reflection, sorrow and grief. The final words were “How shall we remember them, those who died? Mourn the dead, Remember the battle. Understand the tragedy. Honor the memory. Let our grief for the men of the Arizona, be for all those whose futures were taken from them on December 7\textsuperscript{th}, 1941. Here they will never be forgotten.”\textsuperscript{18} There is a conscious shift to universal remembrance. It is not only the Arizona fallen who are remembered but also the Japanese. Bearrs’ blue-ribbon panel was adamant that this tone was inappropriate and wanted the focus on grief and mourning deleted from the film. “We must insist on those changes …that reflect the consensus of our blue-ribbon panel and the desire of Deputy Assistant Secretary to be responsive to the comments of the veterans and veteran organizations.”\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{16} White, Geoff. “Moving History”, Positions, East-Asia Cultural Review, p722
\textsuperscript{17} US Navy, 1980 film script, 1979, p XX
\textsuperscript{18} National Park Service. 1992 Orientation Film Script, 1992 pXX
\textsuperscript{19} Bearrs, 1992 as quoted in White, Geoff, 723. Original not found.
Despite these heavy hitting words the script was not essentially changed, and the film opened on December 2, 1992 to generally favorable reviews. Superintendent Magee was pleased with the emotional tone of the new film and thought that the somber feelings were more appropriate preparation for the trip to the Memorial than the aggressive stance formally exhibited after viewing the 1980s film.\textsuperscript{20} The film achieved relative success until the film was seen by Yoshie and James Tanabe nearly seven years later. Like New Yorkers who never visit the Statue of Liberty, the Tanabes had lived their entire life in Hawaii and were \textit{nisei}, second generation Japanese Americans. It was their first visit to the Memorial.

Portions of the 1992 film were considered by the Tanabes to be objectionable specifically reverence to disloyalty of Japanese in Hawaii. These portions included visuals of Japanese American pedestrians walking busily along the downtown Honolulu sidewalk, a solitary Japanese sugar cane cutter stealing glances overlooking the battleships at rest in Pearl Harbor, and reverences to saboteurs within the Japanese population.\textsuperscript{21} While the sabotage fear was a real one, the actual fact of sabotage was not, but the film did not expand on this theme to clarify the distinction. While many Japanese Americans were placed in detention areas in Hawaii and particularly the west coast of the United States, the actual incidence of saboteurs was not proven by the FBI. It was easy for viewers to conclude from the footage that there actually was sabotage by these loyal Americans. This loyalty is well proven by the honors and medals received by the 442\textsuperscript{nd} infantry battalion and other acts of patriotism to America during the war. Yet there was no disclaimer in the footage to dispel these

\textsuperscript{20} Burl Burlingame, “New December 7\textsuperscript{th} Film debuts at Arizona,” \textit{Honolulu Star Bulletin}, December 3, 1992, A1
\textsuperscript{21} Tanable, James and Yoshie. Statement, 8/15/98, revised 5/10/00 1
associations between the visuals and the voiced narration. In a report written by the Tanabes they pointed out that the memorial is a “shrine to the fallen, where truth lights our way, honor and courage inspire us, and tolerance and peace are its goals.” The Tanabes had been distressed by the statement in the film made by General Walter C. Short that he did not fear air attack but saboteurs “hidden amid Hawaii’s large Japanese population”

When the Tanabes brought this oversight to the Park Service’s attention there was not immediate acknowledgement of the need to change the film. “In the seven years that the film has been shown at the USS Arizona Memorial, Mr. and Mrs. Tanabes’ statement is the only comment that has been raised regarding [this aspect] of the narrative.” The Tanabe had their own group of heavy hitters and enlisted the help of senior Senator Daniel Inouye, himself a World War II purple heart veteran of Japanese ancestry and the Japanese American Civil Liberty Association.

Despite the shaky start, the Tanabes worked with Superintendent Kathy Billings and Daniel Martinez to change the film to better present accurate information, and not allow extrapolation from striking visuals information and voiced over text. The correction of the film was difficult due to technical issues associated with a new voice over or the inability to cut out entire film footage. Eventually, the last six words of Short’s statement were deleted and the cane worker overlooking Pearl Harbor was digitized out of the scene.

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22 Tanable, James and Yoshie. Statement, 8/15/98, revised 5/10/00 2
23 USAR Film 1992
24 Billings, Kathy. Letter to Daniel Akaka. XXX
Hollywood Films

The emotions and visual images of the Arizona on December 7th, 1941 are emblazoned in the hearts and minds of many Americans before they even visit the Memorial. In the last sixty years, Hollywood has produced nine films dependent on dramatic attack footage either archival or created, and Japan cinema has produced at least three full-length feature films.25 The one with the most blockbuster potential was Pearl Harbor, produced by the Disney Company.

Issue of accuracy in Pearl Harbor

Involvement of Park Service and US Navy

Pearl Harbor on Television

National Geographic Films

Legacy of Attack

History Channel

Discovery Channel

Boat Tours

Voice over

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Pearl Harbor Survivors

The Pearl Harbor Survivors are a unique resource to the Park for interpretation. More than thirty individuals in the Volunteers in the Park program log more than 10,000 hours each year with more than a third of these hours being provided Pearl Harbor Survivors. The Pearl Harbor Survivors are dynamic, involved and eagerly share their story with young and old alike. Their motto is to “Remember Pearl Harbor- Keep America Alert.” Standing on the lawn along the water’s edge facing the Memorial, they provide first hand witness to the attack and stories that vary in intensity and detail. Proof of their success and their ability to add to the overall effect are the hundreds of park comment sheets received annually expressing the visitors profound admiration of not only meeting with but having the opportunity to sit and chat with this colorful cast of characters. In the 2000 Visitor Study, 95% of the respondents rated the quality of the talk from the Pearl Harbor survivor as very good. While the actual numbers of visitor groups with this experience was quite low (21 groups) which merits casustion in interpretation of the overall numbers, this is a remarkable number. The Pearl Harbor Survivors provide a deep emotional context to the story at the Park, which cannot be met by other avenues of interpretation.

However, there have been times within the park’s history when the Survivors have come out against the interpretation presentations by the Park guides. The interpretive guides are each tasked with developing individual presentations of their own interest for presentation to groups of individuals waiting for their orientation movie. In 1990 one of the Pearl Harbor

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26 Martinez, 2001, 18
27 Martinez, 2001, 21
Survivors was asked to leave the VIP program when he reduced a guide to tears, challenging her with not knowing the names of all the ships that were damaged in the attack.  

**Other Interpretive Materials**

Visitor groups were asked in 2000 how they obtained information about the USS *Arizona* Memorial prior to their visit. The most common source of information (43%) was by word of mouth from friends and relatives, then travel guides/tour books (39%). Most (83%) were satisfied by the type information they had before their visit. Only a small number (14%) received no information prior to arriving at the Memorial. The most common needs of visitors were hours of operation and length of wait time. In this same survey visitor groups were asked what kinds of information services they used while visiting the Visitor Center and Memorial. The most common answer (81%) as expected was the orientation movie on the Pearl Harbor attack, which is required for anyone wanting to visit the Memorial. Many responded positively about the recorded boat tour information (49%) as well as the Visitor Center Museum exhibits (65%).

**Kinds of books**

**How books are chosen**

**Contending Interests in Interpretation of Pearl Harbor/USS ARIZONA**

**USS Utah Memorial**

**USS Missouri**

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28 Martinez, Interview with Author. September 8, 2004  
29 Morse, 15-19  
30 Morse, 15-19
Visitors to Pearl Harbor have the unique privilege of seeing the Navy’s most famous World War II battleships in one visit to Pearl Harbor. The first time the Missouri steamed in to Pearl Harbor was Christmas Eve 1944. The final operational mission was when the battleship led a contingent of ships into Pearl Harbor as part of the commemoration to mark the 50th anniversary of the attack.

The final ship movement was via tugboat into Pearl Harbor on June 22, 1998 to become the Battleship Missouri Memorial. In 1992 the Missouri was decommissioned the second time and removed from the Navy’s ships registry in 1995, clearing the way for its donation to a non-profit group for its preservation as a Memorial in 1996. The USS Missouri Memorial Foundation is a non-profit 501©3 organization without the support of government funds. The Association was founded in March 1994 by retired Honolulu executive Edwin Carter, retired Admiral Ronald Hays, and retired Navy veteran Harold Estes. Other cities that competed to become the Missouri’s new home were Bremerton, Washington, San Francisco and Long Beach, California. Key to the selection of Pearl Harbor as the final home of the Missouri was the 7 million visitors to Hawaii every year and the more than 1.5 million that already visited the Arizona Memorial. The Missouri resides in an “attractive fleet port and serves as an additional role of reinforcing the Navy’s positive image to its own personnel and their families as well as to future recruits.”

Initially, the Missouri is berthed at F-5 looming less than 1000 feet from the site of the Arizona; it will be moved to a permanent berth near F-11. A bronze plaque mounted on the deck marks the spot where on September 2, 1945 in Tokyo Bay the documents of surrender

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31 [http://www.battleship.org/html/News/Archives/MotoPearl.html](http://www.battleship.org/html/News/Archives/MotoPearl.html) 8/6/04
by the Japanese Foreign Minister were signed. The battleship opened to visitors on January 29, 1999, fifty-five years after its original launch at the New York naval shipyard. While the restoration of the Missouri has been accomplished slowly with more than 25,000 volunteer hours, quarters and the officer’s wardroom now have been restored.

Presence of the Missouri while important as an educational vehicle, has negatively impacted the historic scene of the Arizona. The Missouri was not even constructed when the Arizona went down, and there is still confusion by the average tourist concerning the beginning and the end of the War occurring in the same place. The addition of the Missouri and the Bowfin to the sites adjacent to the Visitor Center has also made the average stay at the Visitor Center’s parking lot more than twice as long, delaying the necessary turnover of parking stalls. This requires some tourists to park in a spillover lot where APCOA and the future developer of Ford Island collect the daily fees, some days earning more than $1000.\textsuperscript{32} The Park receives the resultant criticism that the parking is too expensive.

\textbf{Plaques}

\textbf{Special exhibits}

\textbf{Remembrance Exhibits}

\textsuperscript{32} Lentz, Douglas. Interview with author, August 28, 2004.
Commemoration

From the very beginning, there has been some conflict as to when to honor the dead at the USS Arizona Memorial. Following the dedication of the Memorial, Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral C. A. Buchanan noted that “formal ceremonies … should be confined to Memorial Day observances…. and that it is suggested that the proposed shift in emphasis be promulgated by an announcement from Washington.”¹ There was still a residual military disconnect with the events surrounding the attack and a desire to not accentuate December 7th 1941 as any different from any battle in which Americans lost their lives.

Fiftieth Anniversary of the Attack

Superintendent William K. Dickinson wrote the Washington office of the National Park Service in April 1988, that planning needed to begin for the 50th Anniversary of Pearl Harbor. “The importance of this event to Hawaii, the United States, and the world cannot be overstated.”² Included in this letter was a long list of special requests for improvements to the Visitor Center and the Memorial as well as staffing for planning the commemoration. Washington agreed that planning should begin, but added no money to the budget. They did make note with commendable foresight, that the “event should be an internal American memorial experience, solemn in character and without conspicuous foreign participations.”³ None of the official invitees included any of the World War II allies. Any official invitation

¹ Buchanan, C A to Chief of Information June 18, 1962
² Dickenson, William K. 1988, np
³ Harpster1992, 1
to the Japanese was thought to be inappropriate and incalculable …and just not a good idea.\textsuperscript{4}

Notwithstanding this written clarity, the involvement of official participation of the Japanese in this event was not resolved by the State Department until just a few months before the event itself.

Bearss suggested that a Western Regional Advisory Committee be formed to take responsibility for planning of the 50\textsuperscript{th} Commemoration. Superintendent Dickinson organized the Committee to be composed of the Superintendent, the Pacific Area Director, Bryan Harry, Jim Charleton of the NPS Washington Office’s History Division and Lynn Nakata, representing the Western Regional Office. While Dickinson was the first chair of this committee, his departure as Superintendent for Big South fork National River and Recreation area in Tennessee precluded much immediate action. Under the leadership of Chief Ranger Gary Warshefski as acting Superintendent, the Committee produced an action plan and a briefing paper for the event. The Committee estimated a cost of over four million dollars for the event most of it in refurbishment to the now shabby Memorial and Visitor Center. The wish list included $500,000 for additional staff, $2,982,000 for capital improvements including a new film, and $550,000 for new programs, activities, and exhibits. While this funding more than shocked Washington, there was a clear recommendation for the goals of the Commemoration:

- Commemorate the sacrifice of the persons involved, both living and dead.

\textsuperscript{4} Bearss, Edward, NPS Director’s Office as quoted in Harpster, 1
• Preserve the human experience of the attack with oral histories from survivors and others, thereby fulfilling the goal to preserve and protect for future generations.

• Preserve artifacts and other material remains.

• Improve the visibility of the National park Service in the management of the USS Arizona Memorial.

• Promote cooperative efforts among agencies groups and individuals involved, and prepare the ark by improving or creating programs and facilities that will last well beyond the event.

• Insure that the park presents the highest quality visual appearance for the Commemoration.

A Briefing Paper at this same time collided headlong into the stated wishes of the Chief Historian from Washington, DC. This paper was authored by acting Superintendent Wareshefski expressed a desire to bring Japanese participants of the attack to Oahu for the 50th Anniversary Observance. “Such an initiative will obviously require extensive and careful planning. There are extremely sensitive, emotional, and political issues which will need to be addressed… This initiative is important in terms of our present relations with Japan and US interests in the Pacific. Political sensitivities, ethnic prejudices and war/wounds memories will need to be overcome. Such a coming together, if properly planned, could help put the past behind the participants and move them into the present as we look towards the future- as allies, as people.”

5 These words were an important view, just written ten years too soon.

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5 Harpster, 3, original document not found.
There was considerable confusion and disagreement as to the role of the National Park Service as late as 1990 in the event due to budgetary constraints and political repercussions concerning an important political ally.

Superintendent Magee, in the first month of his tenure, June 1989, met with Navy representatives to initiate the process for the 50th commemoration. “One of my first decisions,” he recalls, “was that in anticipation that President Bush would be here, there would be only one December 7 (morning) program unlike other years where the NPS had a program at the Visitor Center concurrent with the Navy’s program at the Memorial. As custodians of the Memorial I wanted to assure that we would be involved in all aspects of planning.” This shared involvement was not to happen in any semblance of partnership. The reception from the Navy was even more decidedly unenthusiastic when Magee met with the top-ranking officials of the Commander in Chief Pacific, CINCPAC. “Their attitude was that ‘planning could wait’ [since] none of them planned to be here for the anniversary.” Magee also met with John Waihee, the Governor to discuss planning for the anniversary and to invite his cooperation and involvement, “I remember he was surprised that the event was so near at hand. He obviously hadn’t given it much thought at the time.” A year later when the next Superintendent met again with the Governor, Larry Lee, Director of the Office of Veteran Affairs had been appointed as the state’s representative but they “hadn’t gotten anything together just yet.”

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6 Harpster, 8  
7 Harpster, 8  
8 Harpster, 8  
9 Harpster, 9
The Western Regional Advisory Committee recommended the hiring of a staff person with special event planning experience; however, there were no funds released for this position. A volunteer coordinator was found in a retired NPS Public Affairs Officer from the Rocky Mountain Region. James Harpster arrived in May 1990 to carry out the tasks of this position. Harpster, following in Magee’s footsteps returned to meet with CINCPAC. Their response was that some kind of plans were afoot in Washington to establish a National Commission that would develop parameters not only for the Pearl Harbor Commemoration but others marking significant events of World War II. It was certainly a “folly to await some as-yet-unconstituted Washington-level-Commission.”

They encountered sympathetic allies in two others who had attended the CINCPAC orientation meeting, Navy Cdr, Joel Keefer, and his civilian deputy, Dick Brady from the Pearl Harbor Naval base Office of Public Affairs.

The Park was significantly understaffed at this time, three ranger positions were vacant, a new Superintendent and administrative officer had less than a year under their belts, and the Chief Ranger had just been transferred. Despite these vacancies, the staff present were on top of each other in cramped quarters, and Harpster was given a desk in the ranger workroom, but no phone, typewriter, or clerical assistance. The day was more than brightened by the return from maternity leave of the Parks Public Affairs Officer, Blanka Stransky. The responsibility for planning the event shifted from the Western Regional Advisory Committee to the volunteer coordinator. Later the able assistance of Kam Napier, a young student, and now editor of Honolulu magazine was added to the team. However, the

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10 Harpster, 9
chain of command for the planning from the multiple jurisdictions of state and defense agencies was not so clear.

What was apparent to the NPS team of Harpster and Stransky was that there were some specific audiences for the event. Immediately organizations were identified, the USS Arizona Reunion Association with about 100 members and the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association with close to 13,000 members and an impressive array of veterans’ and service organizations ranging from the American Legion and Veterans of foreign Wars to the Congressional medal of Honor Society. Other potential groups included civilian employees of the military, as well as other civilians from the community. While these large groups gave breadth to the fabric of the obvious field, there were also heart touching individuals that gave the richness to the threads: E. Stuart Lang had served as a cook in 1917 aboard the Arizona, and now 93 years old he wanted assurances that his wheelchair could be accommodated on the Arizona; a letter filled with crisp ichi mai yen, all in Japanese Kanji, “I am a 78 year old Japanese man living in Tokyo. Fifty years ago, I was a signalman in the Japanese Navy…I will never, ever forget that the war has brought so much grief and death… I feel I have lived to mourn for the fallen soldiers… Please accept this small donation so that you may purchase flowers for the fallen sailors of the USS Arizona.”

The NPS events planned for the commemoration were spread over four days with a specific focus for each day. The first day was intended to honor the civilian victims and the people of Hawaii, with another day for the survivors themselves, a day for reflections by prominent
speakers, and the final day as the Commemoration. While the other agencies and groups were still waiting for “word from Washington”, the USAR team proceeded with their planning, buoyed by enthusiasm, purpose, and a complete lack of knowledge of the tremendous amount of work ahead. “Whether the planners were abysmally gullible or merely optimistic, the international character of the event – its memories, its color, its passion- swept away their every doubt about the measure of support that would be forthcoming.”

As if the simple logistics of four days were not enough, the detail of each day began to take on mammoth proportions. Harpster planned for a concert by the Honolulu Symphony for day two, in itself a monumental challenge to coordinate a 80-member orchestra at a strange venue with innumerable union required benefits such as sun shade. The music became even more complex, not satisfied with just the expected patriotic American music, Harpster commissioned a major work for the Pearl Harbor concert from John Duffy of New York City, a noted composer and friend of the Honolulu Symphony Maestro, Donald Johanos. Duffy had undertaken commissioned work for other events, such as the Fall of the Berlin Wall, and for the Sierra Club’s interest in the resources of southern Utah. Composers of note earn $2000 per minute of completed score, and although Duffy reduced this normal fee by 50%, the cost of this music was still a significant line item in the budget. The cost of this commissioned work was borne by the vendors of the USAR bookstore spearheaded by Lynne

12 Harpster, 27
Madden of Island Heritage Books.\textsuperscript{13} They contributed a percentage of their gross sales during the Commemoration period to cover the cost of this work.

A musical concert with children was also added into the program. Initially a child from each state and each Japanese prefecture was proposed, but the idea of Japanese children at the December 7\textsuperscript{th} event completely horrified the local Pearl Harbor Survivors Association members, “you’d better not have a program like that on the seventh”\textsuperscript{14} one Navy man advised. With the fear of potential boycott of survivors’ organizations and the potential for some very ugly publicity, the idea was modified to include only children from Hawaii, and became known in the program as the Promise of Aloha. The participants were the Honolulu Boys Choir and 25 young ladies recruited by Loretta Yajima of the Honolulu Children’s Museum.

Marshalling the appropriate speakers for each day was also a formidable task. For the Hawaii Remembrance Day, the keynote was a grand and radiant Hawaiian lady, Gladys Aiona Brandt who spoke about “always being more willing to live for our ideals than to die for them.”\textsuperscript{15} Declared a Living Treasure and Outstanding Hawaiian by the State, a respected educator, she had been a witness to the attack. Additional speakers included Mayor Frank Fasi of Honolulu who spoke “that the same American people were willing to go to war…to sacrifice…to die; and Senator Daniel Inouye.

\textsuperscript{13} Harpster, 50
\textsuperscript{14} Harpster, 42
\textsuperscript{15} Brandt, Gladys Remembrance Day Speech, December 4, 1991
For the Survivors’ Day program planners asked Governor John Waihee, Lenore Rickert, a former Navy nurse to speak as well as three remarkable men with equally remarkable stories. They were Medal of Honor recipient Donald K. Ross, his shipmate form the USS Nevada, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Joseph K. Taussig Jr. of Annapolis, and Franklin Van Valkenburgh, son of the commanding officer of the *Arizona*.

The speakers for the day of Reflections of Pearl Harbor had the most non-combative bonds with Pearl Harbor. They were author James Michener, Architect Alfred Preis, 442nd Regimental Combat Team member Edward Ichiyama, and a Texas minister, the reverend Mr. Conrad; former Kansas lawman, Carl Christiansen, and Helen and Sara Entrikin, two sisters.

**Japanese point of view**

Informal interviews of both American and Japanese tourists were undertaken before the commemoration ceremonies in January 1991 using a rather Terkelian\(^\text{16}\) approach. The results of these interviews were in no way statistical or representative, but they do indicate points regarding memory and its making. The questions asked were approved by the National Park Service in Washington, Dc and as certain initial questions judged to be too sensitive, such as comparisons to Nagasaki and Hiroshima, were eliminated. The interviewer was a seasonal hire, wore a park service uniform to provide some authenticity to the interaction and was fluent in Japanese. The interviewer was assisted by two Japanese nationals, a woman from Kyoto and a man from Wakayama.

\(^\text{16}\) Masters. 3.
In 1991 there had been a conscious campaign among tour operators to dissuade Japanese tourists from visiting Pearl Harbor. However, according to the monthly visitor reports there were more Japanese tourists in 1991 than the corresponding months of 1990. Ms. Masters interviewed nearly 1000 visitors in a nine-month period in an attempt to understand why they were visiting the memorial and what meaning it had for them. The responses of the tourists were quite variable depending more on age than the nationality of the respondent. The thirty-something Japanese spoke critically of their government and business leaders, with an often said phrase, “makete, yokatta.” This roughly translated means, “we lost and it was a good thing.”

For those of the war generation, the site was visited more commonly to make peace with their pasts, and a nostalgia for a time and their places in it. The interviewer was struck by the vividness and immediacy with which some of the respondent recalled their wartime experiences. “There are many who have rewritten the memories to their liking, and there are some who choose to let their memories dictate their present way of thinking.”

Attention to the accurate detail was also important by many of the interviewees. When Commander Yoshioka detailed quite graphically how the ships were arranged and how the torpedos were lined up he was clearly associating his orders during war with his experiences.

50th Symposium

Swat Team from NPS

60th Commemoration

60th Symposia

Japanese and American reconciliation handshakes and photographs

17 Masters, 11
18 Masters, 18
Future Issues

Who does history belong to? Pearl Harbor was an intensely personal event for the people who were involved, but it has transcended that and become an important part of the world’s cultural history of remembrance and reconciliation. The passing of the World War II generation will have an effect on the how we remember Pearl Harbor. Only time will tell whether a critical examination of the War is possible when it is not in the immediate living memory. How that history is understood and responded to in the future will be a significant issue for the National Park Service.

Resource Management Issues

The primary preservation issue for USAR is the Arizona itself. If the Arizona continues to deteriorate, there will at some point be a catastrophic loss. This should not be done without proper decision-making. While the current research initiatives are monitoring the deterioration of the wreck, the decision of intervention in the deterioration has not been made. This discussion should include a comprehensive look at the preservation alternatives including leaving the site alone (benign neglect) to sustaining the existing condition and integrity (preservation). A third choice is partial restoration ... removal of the post December 7, 1941 mooring quays, flagstaff, and mooring chains. In preservation parlance, the period of significance for the Arizona is a single day, December 7th 1941, but it could also include the salvage period when decisions were made not to raise her and she was left as a tomb for her sailors. The historic structures of the Arizona context include the mooring quays of Battleship Row. Some of the quays are from later salvage operations but are not distinguished from those that were for the Battleships.

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As a tomb, the physical condition of the ship is important, as there is a need to protect the physical integrity of the ship and the buried remains. Some might find disrespectful deterioration and eventual failure. There are others who feel that dust-to-dust and the natural processes of time would be the most non-invasive, and therefore most appropriate process. Whatever the decisions are in the future, they should be made after a thoughtful and considered preservation plan for the Arizona and the Memorial.

There are some but not others who feel that the importance of the ship also is in the memorial process. As a symbol, the Memorial structure over the ship also bears significance, as it is symbolically linked to the ship below. Bill Dickinson, USAR Superintendent in 1990 felt that the Memorial should not be considered as part of the Arizona’s significance. “It is a unique design, but would seem of little actual historical significance in any other context.” However, context is the exact issue of the Arizona, so such logic seems to be focused only on one point of time rather than the necessary continuum of the site. The listing of the Memorial as part of the National Historic Landmark district would seem to dispel this point of view.

The historic view shed of the Arizona must also be examined. The historic scene of the Arizona and Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack have been negatively impacted by military and political decisions. The view planes from the Arizona now include the Battleship Missouri and the large concrete span of the Admiral Nimitz Bridge. There may also be substantial changes to Ford Island when the Navy’s developer implements their plans. These plans will increase the density of housing, commercial and retail space. Further development

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within the historic context by adding new buildings including concessions, festival market halls, and restrooms would take away from the historic ground.\textsuperscript{3} The scale and height of these facilities along the shoreline of Battleship Row must be carefully considered.

Superintendent Lentz has been in discussion with the Navy to restore and reuse the historic single family quarters that are along the shore on the east side of the Ford Island. How these facilities are used and for what purpose could expand the National Park Service’s reach into the historic areas of Pearl Harbor.

Other decisions about the ship will need to be made. There are parts of the ship that were removed both the Memorial’s construction. These pieces are buried in a special area controlled by the Navy on the Waipio peninsula. Any recognizable pieces should be accessioned into the collection. It was suggested that these pieces be taken to the \textit{Arizona} site and deposited next to the ship. An appropriate place was found during one of the research dives. These pieces have also been offered to any legitimate museum operation without any takers. Disposition of these pieces should occur.

Whatever, the ultimate preservation decision for the \textit{Arizona}, there needs to be a cyclical maintenance program and regular monitoring of the ship and the Memorial. The potential long term effects on the \textit{Arizona} should be projected despite any preservation decision particularly as implosion of the oil holding tanks could cause a negative impact on the natural resources of the harbor.

\textsuperscript{3} Martinez, Daniel. Email to author. 9/14/04.
Visitor Center

[Expansion of the Visitor Center is critical to fulfill the needs of the Park. Need lots more information here.]

**Relationship Management Issues**

The relationships with federal organizations such as the Navy, the Department of Defense and the Department of the Interior must be carefully maintained. These relationships have continued for 24 years with a Use Agreement that does not adequately resolve conflicting missions. These relationships could be more carefully defined by appropriate enabling legislation. The US Navy considers the National Park Service a tenant on their land and any activity proposed either by the Park Service or the Navy has the final say by the Navy.

Commemoration

As the Pearl Harbor Survivors pass-on the focus of the commemoration ceremonies will change. In the past a significant portion of the ceremony has been to honor the Pearl harbor Survivors and civilian individuals who experienced the attack. The emotional content could be maintained by shifting to the next generation, or a greater emphasis could be put on the gathering and exchange of research information about the attack and a critical examination of World War II.
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