THE REBELS CONCENTRATE AT STONES RIVER

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CHAPTER I

The Confederates Abandon Kentucky

October 11, 1862, found the Confederate "Army Group" led
by General Braxton Bragg massed at Bryantsville, Kentucky. Three
days before, a portion of the Army of the Mississippi commanded
by Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk had gained a Pyrrhic victory
over Major General Don C. Buell's Army of the Ohio at Perryville.
The Southern forces were scattered, however, and they were unable
to capitalize on this success. At the time that the battle was
raging, Lieutenant General Edmund Kirby Smith's Army of Kentucky
(reinforced by Major General Jones M. Withers' division of the
Army of the Mississippi) was at Lawrenceburg, 25 long miles away.
Regardless of Polk's success, Bragg realized that, unless he
concentrated his troops, it would be unwise to renew the contest
on the 9th. Accordingly, Bragg issued instructions for the
Confederate armies to assemble at Harrodsburg. By the 10th,
Polk's and Kirby Smith's troops had rendezvoused at Harrodsburg.
Here, Bragg formed his command and waited impatiently for Buell
to attack. Instead of launching a frontal assault on Bragg's
formidable position, Buell used his superior numbers to feel for the Confederates' flank. Bragg, fearful lest the Yankees bypass his command and establish themselves astride his line of communications with Cumberland Gap, decided to abandon Harrodsburg.

After retiring across Dick's River, Bragg re-formed his armies. When deployed, the greyclad soldiers occupied the high ground covering the numerous crossings of Dick's River. If the bluecoats should attempt to force their way across the river, they would have to be prepared to withstand a violent counterattack. Bragg established his headquarters at Bryantsville several miles east of the river.

Again, as at Harrodsburg, the Confederate position was so strong that Buell felt it best not to precipitate an engagement. Instead, the Union general determined to turn Bragg's left flank. Buell sensed, correctly, that Bragg would be very sensitive about any threat to his extremely vulnerable Cumberland Gap supply line. At the same time, Buell sent out numerous raiding parties. These detachments destroyed the mills and granaries from which the greyclads drew their breadstuffs. This type of warfare hit the butternuts where it hurt. All around them the soldiers could see large fields of grain, but only at Lexington, which had been
evacuated, were there large stockpiles of meal and flour. Bragg knew that, even if the bluecoats were not waging economic warfare on him, it would be impossible to obtain an adequate supply of breadstuffs from the small country mills. Questioning his chief of subsistence, Bragg was shocked to learn that the army's magazines contained only enough flour and meal to last for four days. 1

This information left Bragg with two alternatives. As the general saw it, he could seize the initiative and launch a sudden assault on Buell's army. If he chose this dangerous course of action, the general knew he would have to rout the foe, because merely "to cripple him would not suffice". Otherwise, Bragg reasoned, he would have to give up a region in which he could no longer subsist his command. To make matters worse, the general had received reports indicating that another strong Union force was pushing southward from Cincinnati. (This report was correct. The Union Army of Kentucky led by Major General Gordon Granger was moving down the Kentucky Central Railroad toward Lexington and a junction with Buell.) If this were true, this force would be able to turn Bragg's right flank. Finally, the general knew that the "season of autumnal rains was approaching". Once these rains started, the general reported, "the rough and
uneven roads leading over the stupendous mountains of Eastern Tennessee and Kentucky to and through Cumberland Gap would then become utterly impassable to an army." Having thoroughly analyzed all the available data, Bragg concluded that if he remained at Bryantsville and suffered a reverse, his "Army Group" would be lost. 2

Before drafting the orders for the withdrawal, Bragg decided to send one of his ranking officers to the rear. This individual would be charged with the mission of collecting and stockpiling supplies along the line of retreat. In addition, he would see that clothing, shoes, tents, etc., were stored in the Knoxville and Chattanooga magazines. These items would be issued to the troops when they reached Tennessee. General Withers was given this difficult assignment. Brigadier General Johnson K. Duncan would take command of Withers' division during his absence. (Duncan, however, was ill. Consequently, Brigadier General John K. Jackson assumed charge of the division on Withers' departure.) 3

Before abandoning the Dick's River line, Bragg placed hard-hitting Colonel Joseph Wheeler in charge of all the cavalry then serving with his "Army Group". Since the Army of Kentucky was scheduled to move at a later hour than the Army of the Mississippi, Wheeler would report directly to Kirby Smith. Once
the artillery and infantry had taken up the march, the cavalry would be expected to hold the Dick's River fords "as long as possible". Furthermore, the troopers (Colonel John H. Morgan's) which were operating north of the Kentucky River would destroy the Lexington pike bridge, once they had crossed the river. 4

On the 13th the retreat commenced. All the supplies which it was impossible to carry along were burned. Provisions, muskets, merchandise of all sorts, were hauled away in wagons. There were refugees with their families, slaves, and household goods. Straining oxen dragged artillery along behind and between omnibuses, stages, and almost every other variety of vehicle. Mingled in the din was the shouting of the men of the 8th Texas (Terry's Texas Rangers) as they swore at frightened droves of bellowing cattle. 5 This is what Wheeler had to protect. His orders read, in part:

The condition of that army, with its large train, &c., being now considerably in the rear, will require that you should send your largest cavalry force for covering well its rear .... The officer commanding the force covering the rear of the column on this road must keep his position well, and not fall back on the infantry unless driven back by the enemy. 6

In accordance with Bragg's decision to retire into Tennessee, the Confederate artillery and infantry began abandoning the Dick's River line at an early hour on the 13th.
When the troops moved out, both the Army of the Mississippi and the Army of Kentucky moved on the Lancaster road. One division of Kirby Smith's army, Major General Carter L. Stevenson's, remained in position near Bryantsville. Stevenson's mission was to rush support to the cavalry patrols posted at the crossings of the Dick's River in case the Federals tried to force their way across the stream. Wheeler planned to hold the fords until he had received information that Bragg's "Army Group" had stolen a march on the bluecoats.

The other cavalry brigade assigned to the Army of the Mississippi, Colonel John A. Wharton's, screened the right flank of the retreating column. Since the Federals had not yet reached the Dick's River south of the Harrodsburg-Bryantsville pike, Wharton's troopers were able to move down the left bank of the river. As the cavalrymen rode along, Wharton threw out a number of reconnaissance patrols. These groups prowled through the countryside west of the river on the constant lookout for signs of Union activity. Near Danville, Wharton's scouts spotted a Union task force composed of infantry and artillery. Realizing that if the Yankees were able to force their way across the river, they would be able to strike the strung-out Confederate column in the flank, Wharton ordered out a combat patrol.
Accordingly, a strong detachment drawn from Wharton's command attacked the Federals. In the desultory skirmishing that ensued the butternuts were able to check this potentially dangerous thrust. 7

At Lancaster, the column split. The Army of the Mississippi took the road to Crab Orchard. The Army of Kentucky would march by way of Big Hill. After passing through Lancaster at a late hour on the 13th, the Army of the Mississippi camped for the night alongside the road a short distance southeast of town. It was after midnight when Kirby Smith's vanguard trudged into Lancaster. Before retiring for the night, Smith wrote Bragg a letter couched in pessimistic terms. The general reported that his "command, from loss of sleep for five nights, is completely exhausted". Straggling had "been unusually great", and Smith was certain it would be daybreak before his rear division (Stevenson's) reached Lancaster. Furthermore, Smith informed Bragg that he had no hope of saving his train, as he would "be obliged to double teams in going up Big Hill, and will be necessarily delayed there two or three days". In closing, Kirby Smith stated that there was "a strong position in front of Big Hill, which ... [he would] hold as long as possible." 8

Kirby Smith's dispatch reached Bragg's Crab Orchard
headquarters before daybreak. Refusing to be shaken by his ranking subordinate's fears, the aggressive Bragg dashed off a hurried message to Wheeler. The cavalry leader was informed that the armies had divided at Lancaster. Bragg observed that the Army of Kentucky (which was accompanied by most of the trains) had started to lag behind the Army of the Mississippi. Accordingly, the general wanted Wheeler to send a strong force to cover its rear. Wheeler was to collect all the stragglers and the sick and disabled. If possible, Wheeler would secure mounts for the men in the latter two categories. Wheeler was also informed that the cavalry brigades led by Colonels Henry M. Ashby, John H. Morgan and John S. Scott would report to him for orders. These three commands were currently serving with Kirby Smith's Army of Kentucky. ⁹

Folk's Army of the Mississippi, despite the rough roads encountered, made good progress on the 14th. Nightfall found the army's vanguard camped at Mount Vernon. ¹⁰ Kirby Smith's army, however, continued to lag. It was late afternoon before Stevenson's division departed from Lancaster. The head of Smith's column, Major General John P. McCown's division, halted for the night at Jones, 16 miles beyond Lancaster. ¹¹

General Buell, who had established his headquarters at
Danville, learned from his scouts on the evening of the 13th that the Rebels were evacuating their Dick's River line. After examining his maps, Buell decided that Bragg was probably falling back on Somerset. Accordingly, Buell drafted his plans for the chase. If the general had correctly interpreted the situation (which he hadn't), the pursuit would have intercepted the foe. The corps commanded by Major Generals Thomas L. Crittenden and Alexander McD. McCook would move toward Stanford. The corps led by Major General Charles C. Gilbert would advance on the Lancaster road. Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood's division, which spearheaded Crittenden's advance, tramped out of Danville at midnight.

At daybreak, Wood's vanguard reached Stanford. At this time, Wharton's cavalry brigade was holding the town. After a sharp skirmish, in which both sides employed artillery, the Rebels were forced to evacuate Stanford. Following this setback, Wharton's troopers fell back toward Crab Orchard. When Wood failed to launch a vigorous pursuit, Wharton halted his command three and one-half miles from Crab Orchard. Here, he established a roadblock. The hard-hitting Texan warned his troopers that they would have to hold this position until the rear echelon of the Army of the Mississippi had passed beyond Crab Orchard.
Wharton's task was made easier when the bluecoats failed to press their advantage following the occupation of Stanford. 13

It was mid-morning before Gilbert's advance guard reached the ford where the Lancaster pike crossed Dick's River. As the Union troopers approached the river, they were fired on. Wheeler's cavalry brigade, supported by units drawn from Stevenson's division, was charged with watching the river at this point. Instead of boldly attacking, Gilbert used his cavalry to feel for unguarded fords to the north and to the south of the pike. In the meantime, Kirby Smith, in accordance with Bragg's orders, had issued instructions for Ashby's and Morgan's commands to report to Wheeler. Ashby's arrived first. Wheeler employed Ashby's brigade as a strategic reserve. Each time the Union troopers discovered a little-frequented ford and started to cross the river, they found Ashby's grim cavalrymen waiting for them.

It was late afternoon before the Federals succeeded in establishing a bridgehead on the right bank of the river. But by this time, Kirby Smith's rear guard had passed beyond Lancaster. Wheeler then permitted his men to fall back. At Lancaster, Wheeler divided his command. Ashby's brigade marched toward the east. Its mission was to cover the left flank of Kirby Smith's army as it ascended Big Hill. Wheeler, accompanied by his own brigade,
proceeded to Crab Orchard. Reaching there early on the morning of the 14th, Wheeler rendezvoused with Wharton. 14

On the 14th, after burning the bridge which carried the Lexington pike across the Kentucky River, Morgan's troopers fell back. It was early evening before Morgan reached Lancaster. Reporting to Wheeler, Morgan received instructions regarding his future movements. He was given the task of protecting the rear of Kirby Smith's column as it passed out of the Bluegrass region. Once he had received his orders, Morgan proceeded to carry out his assignment. 15

When he reached Crab Orchard, Wheeler was shocked to learn that Colonel Scott's brigade was not there. The cavalry chieftain had been led to believe by the messages which he had received from Bragg that Scott would be at Crab Orchard. Instead, Wheeler was handed a letter from Scott. Perusing the dispatch, Wheeler discovered that Scott had called on General Bragg earlier in the day. Scott had told Bragg that his command's horses were badly jaded. Furthermore, Scott continued, his brigade had seen much hard service since its entry into Kentucky in August. At present, the colonel stated, his command mustered only about 1,000 effectives. After listening to Scott's tale of woe, Bragg had reportedly given the colonel permission to retire into Tennessee.
via Somerset. Bragg, however, attached one condition to this grant of authority. Scott was to remain at Crab Orchard until he could ascertain whether or not Wheeler required his services. Evidently, Scott failed to do this. Without waiting to secure Wheeler's sanction, Scott started for Somerset immediately. Finding no sign of Scott or his command at Crab Orchard, Wheeler sent a staff officer dashing ahead to bring the matter to Bragg's attention. When he was advised of the situation, Bragg directed Colonel Wharton to send a party in pursuit of Scott's command. Overtaking the errant unit, the leader of the detachment placed Scott in arrest and turned his brigade over to the next ranking officer -- Colonel James R. Howard. 16

After relieving Scott, Wheeler decided to allow the colonel's former brigade to continue on into Tennessee by way of Somerset. The new commander, Colonel Howard, was warned to keep a close lookout for the Union cavalry. This was fortunate, because before the Confederates had proceeded very far, their rear guard was attacked by a strong force of Federal troopers led by Colonel Frank Wolford. From the 14th through the 17th, there was a running battle between the bluecoats and the butternuts. While the Rebels were crossing the Cumberland River on the 16th, Wolford's men launched a slashing attack on the Rebel rear guard,
the 1st Louisiana and the 3d Tennessee. Unable to hold off the Northerners, the two regiments scattered.

In the meantime, Colonel Howard had heard the firing. Turning his column around, Howard hastened to the rear guard's assistance. But by the time he reached the river, the Louisianaans and Tennesseeans had dispersed, and Wolford's cavalrmen were crossing the river. Fearful lest the foe capitalize on this success and capture the wagons entrusted to his keeping, Howard again reversed his line of march. Moving off at a rapid pace, the Southerners succeeded in giving Wolford's bluecoats the slip. Before nightfall, the Rebels passed through Mountain Gap. Even though he was now in Tennessee, Howard determined not to halt his command until it had reached Jamestown, 15 miles south of the border. 17

On the 15th, Polk's Army of the Mississippi marched along a very rough road. Even so, the army made fairly good progress. By nightfall, the army's vanguard, with which the ordnance train traveled, had passed beyond London. Lieutenant General William J. Hardee's corps spent the night at London; Major General B. Franklin Cheatham's bivouacked alongside the road three miles northwest of the town at Pitman's Spring. (The only adequate
supply of water for a large body of men, between the Big Rock-Castle River and London, was at the spring.) Before retiring for the night, Bragg gave instructions for a supply depot to be established on Big Laurel Creek, where Hardee's troops were scheduled to spend the night of the 16th. 18

As anticipated, Kirby Smith's Army of Kentucky experienced considerable difficulty in getting the army's trains up Big Hill. At 8 a.m. Kirby Smith addressed a note to General Bragg. At this time, Smith informed Bragg that the army's ordnance train was "not yet up the Big Hill". Kirby Smith observed that the task of getting the wagons up the steep grade was not easy, because the road was choked with trains. Continuing, Smith complained that many of the wagons appeared to belong to the Army of the Mississippi. Next, Kirby Smith wrote of the clash at Lancaster. He reported that when Stevenson evacuated the town on the previous evening, the foe was trying to turn his position. This threat to his left flank, taken in conjunction with the trouble he was having in getting his train up Big Hill, had caused Kirby Smith to become very gloomy. Accordingly, he warned Bragg that he had "little hope" of saving the trains. To make matters worse, Smith feared much of the
artillery would be lost. In event the Yankees overtook his command, Smith planned to take up a strong position covering the approaches to Big Hill and fight a delaying action. Smith believed this would enable him to push forward the ordnance and provision wagons, which he deemed most important for the army's survival. Kirby Smith wanted to know if Bragg had posted a strong force in the Crab Orchard defile. If not, he was afraid the Yankees would attack the right flank of his army. In closing, Kirby Smith advised Bragg that he had given Brigadier General Humphrey Marshall permission to withdraw into Virginia by way of Richmond and Pound Gap. The general justified this move by pointing out that it would be impossible for Marshall to save his command, if it had to pass across Big Hill. 19

After parting company with Kirby Smith's column, Marshall's troops passed through Richmond and Mount Sterling. By the evening of the 17th, Marshall's command camped at Ticktown, seven miles beyond the latter town. Since the Federalists had focused their attention on Bragg's "Army Group", Marshall was able to withdraw his troops from the Bluegrass region with ease. Near Mount Sterling on the following day, Marshall's rear guard was attacked by the 14th Kentucky, reinforced by the Home Guard.
Beyond capturing a number of stragglers, the Yankees were unable to score any important successes in the day's skirmishing.

About dusk, the Union leader, William H. Wadsworth, learned that Morgan's raiders had captured Lexington. Furthermore, he received reports indicating that 900 Rebel horsemen, led by Colonels Orville G. Camron and Robert C. Trigg, were at Owingsville. In view of these developments, the bluecoats fell back to Paris, taking their prisoners with them. Wadsworth's command remained at Paris until the 21st. Reinforced by the 22d Michigan Infantry and a detachment of the 10th Kentucky Cavalry, Wadsworth then returned to Mount Sterling. Leaving most of his command at Mount Sterling, Wadsworth led a patrol on a sweep through the mountains of eastern Kentucky. Wadsworth's objective was to find out what Marshall's intentions were. At Winchester on the 24th, Wadsworth learned from reliable sources that "Marshall, with his train and artillery, and such of his infantry as did not desert" had escaped. Passing through Prestonburg and Pound Gap, Marshall was said to be well on his way to Abingdon, Virginia. Realizing that the Confederates had escaped, Wadsworth returned to Mount Sterling.

Fortunately for the Confederacy, there were some vigorous
officers present at Big Hill. One of Bragg's brigade commanders, Brigadier General Patrick R. Cleburne, had been wounded at Perryville. Off duty, Cleburne traveled with one of the ordnance trains. Apparently, one of Smith's subordinates lost his head and ordered the train destroyed. Coming upon the scene, Cleburne asked for and obtained unlimited authority to try to save the stalled train. Stationing guards on the road to arrest every straggler and passing officer, Cleburne soon collected a large force. These men were organized into fatigue parties which literally lifted the train over Big Hill. The train which Cleburne saved contained munitions and subsistence of the utmost value to the Confederacy. 21

As a result of the exertions of Cleburne and others, the traffic jam at the Big Hill bottleneck began to dissolve on the 15th. In a message to General Stevenson, whose division was guarding the approaches to the hill, Kirby Smith wrote, "Everything here is going on well; the wagons moving up the hill as rapidly as could be expected." After advising Stevenson that Major General Henry Heth's division had scaled the steep grade, Kirby Smith admonished Stevenson to hold his ground unless compelled to fall back. 22

Hardly had the situation at Big Hill commenced to improve
before another jam began to develop. At Pitman's Spring, the road followed by Kirby Smith converged with the one used by the Army of the Mississippi. Smith's van reached the junction before the rear of Polk's army had passed. Within a short time, a number of the units had become badly intermingled. Commenting on this situation, Bragg reported, "The union [of the two armies] will embarrass us much, but we must make the best of it." 23

Wheeler's cavalry command (the chief of cavalry's own brigade, and Wharton's) remained at Crab Orchard until noon. Before departing, Wheeler received a message from Bragg, directing him to detach two regiments. One was to take position at London and picket the approaches to the town from the direction of Somerset. The other was to follow in the wake of Polk's army "to pick up and help along all wearied and foot-sore, to spell the tired, and push forward the stragglers". Later in the day, General Polk issued instructions for Wheeler to have one of Wharton's regiments patrol the right flank of the army's line of march. This was to keep Union raiding parties from making sudden dashes on the long winding column. Following the receipt of his orders, Wheeler gave three regiments the task of carrying out these assignments. 24

General Crittenden's corps, after driving Wharton's
troopers out of Stanford, went into camp. At midnight, the pursuit was resumed. By noon, Crittenden's vanguard had reached Crab Orchard. The numerous patrols which Wheeler had thrown out gave the cavalry leader adequate warning of the bluecoats' approach. Realizing that it would be suicidal to engage Crittenden's powerful corps, Wheeler evacuated Crab Orchard. Covered by a strong rear guard, the Confederate troopers fell back to Mount Vernon. Brushing aside the Confederate vedettes, Crittenden's leading division, Brigadier General W. Sooy Smith's, pushed to within two miles of Mount Vernon. Here, the division bivouacked for the night. 25

At Crab Orchard, the character of the countryside changes radically. Leaving the fertile Bluegrass region, one enters the rugged mountainous region of eastern Kentucky. In 1862, as today, this area was rough and barren. It afforded scarcely more than enough corn to subsist the sparse population, let alone great armies. To make matters worse, the autumn of 1862 had been very dry. The springs and creeks had been turned into beds of sand and polished pebbles.

From the reports submitted by his scouts, Buell knew that the road along which the Confederates were retiring passed "through defiles, where a small force can resist with great
effect a large one; where in fact the use of a large force is impracticable." Furthermore, the general realized that the Rebels would undoubtedly use or destroy the small amount of forage that was available in this sterile region. Such a course of action would render it impossible for the Unionists "to subsist any considerable number of animals". Accordingly, Buell decided to halt Gilbert's and McCook's corps at Crab Orchard. Crittenden's troops were given the mission of pursuing the retreating Rebel legions. 26

Shortly after daybreak on the 16th, Bragg received another distressing message from Kirby Smith. Learning of the rapid advance of the Union army beyond Crab Orchard, Smith all but panicked. The commander of the Army of Kentucky was afraid the Federals would reach Pitman's Spring ahead of his infantry and artillery. If they did, Smith theorized, his troops would have to double back and try to escape in the direction of Lexington. Bragg, therefore, issued instructions for Polk "to hold the enemy in check on this route until ... [Smith] can advance, so as to avoid being headed off by ... [the fog]." To check the Yankees' advance, Bragg suggested that Polk have Cheatham's corps take up defensive positions covering the crossings of either the Big or Little Rockcastle rivers. Since food was starting to become
scarce, Cheatham would have to rely on beef for subsistence. If Smith were being pressed as hard as he indicated, Bragg wrote Polk, he would have to sacrifice his trains. The bridge across the Little Rockcastle was to be destroyed after Wheeler's cavalry had crossed. In a postscript to his dispatch, Bragg warned, "If we pass on so rapidly Smith's front will be open to the enemy and he will be surrounded. In saving our army we must help him, having imposed our trains on him, by which he is retarded; besides, I have no doubt we can whip the force behind us." 27

In accordance with Bragg's instructions, Polk had Cheatham's corps take position behind the Little Rockcastle River. During the day, Hardee's corps continued to press forward. Nightfall on the 16th found Hardee's troops camped on the Big Laurel. Meanwhile, Brigadier Generals Henry Heth's and John P. McCown's divisions of the Army of Kentucky slowly wound their way southward from Big Hill toward Pitman's Spring. The sluggish column's progress was further retarded by the long trains. By nightfall, Stevenson's division had not yet ascended Big Hill. 28

At daybreak on the 16th, Crittenden's corps resumed the pursuit. General Sooy Smith's division again took the lead. The brigade commanded by Colonel William B. Hazen spearheaded Smith's advance. Two miles beyond Mount Vernon, Hazen's scouts spotted a
roadblock manned by Wheeler's troopers. Without hesitating a minute, Hazen deployed and threw forward the 6th Kentucky. Simultaneously, the gunners of Battery F, 1st Ohio Light Artillery, unlimbered their pieces on the road. Supported by the artillerists' fire, the Kentuckians closed in on the Rebels.

Wheeler, having forced the bluecoats to halt and deploy, ordered his cavalrymen to fall back. Swinging into their saddles, the butternuts were off and away, before the panting Yankees could reach their position. Falling back, the greyclads established a second roadblock.

Made wary by this experience, Hazen decided to have the 6th Kentucky remain deployed as skirmishers. While this formation would materially slow the pace of the advance, it would keep the brigade from blundering into an ambuscade. A dismounted company belonging to the 2d Indiana Cavalry served as Hazen's point. These dispositions completed, the march was resumed along a rough road that passed "through narrow gorges, occasionally debouching into narrow valleys, and of such a character as to render" the Federals' movements very cautious. About four miles beyond where the initial contact with the Rebels had been made, the Hoosiers were fired upon. After holding their own for a few
minutes, the Indianians retired. By this time, the 6th Kentucky had arrived on the scene. Dashing forward, the Kentuckians, after a brisk 30-minute clash, sent the Confederates scurrying up the road. In this skirmish, the Unionists lost one killed and two wounded. The Confederates made no report of their losses. Colonel Hazen, however, claimed that his men killed 11 Southerners and wounded several others in this engagement.

Observing that the infantrymen of the 6th Kentucky were beginning to tire, Hazen ordered the 9th Indiana to take the lead. Once Lieutenant Colonel Isaac C. B. Suman had formed his men as skirmishers, the march was renewed. After a two-mile advance, the Hoosiers encountered another one of Wheeler's roadblocks. This time, the Southerners were supported by artillery. The guns were unlimbered in the road; the dismounted cavalrmen were posted on the hillsides opposite an open valley. While one battalion of the 9th Indiana kept the Southerners pinned in position, Colonel Suman took charge of the other. Executing a rapid forced march, Suman turned the Rebels' flank. In fact, the colonel's deft maneuver was so successful that he almost bagged the battery. The cannoneers were alerted to the Federals' rapid approach in the nick of time. Quickly limbering up their pieces, the cannoneers executed a hurried retreat. Following the withdrawal
of the artillery, the roadblock collapsed. Hazen reported that a few Confederates had been killed and wounded; and several others, including a captain, had been captured, in this clash.

Throughout the remainder of the day, Hazen's brigade continued to push slowly forward. Besides having to root out the Confederate snipers who fired at the Union vanguard from the hillsides, Hazen's troops had to clear the road of felled timber. Wheeler's troopers, in order to retard the Union advance, had turned into lumberjacks. Details had been put to work cutting trees and toppling them so that they would block the road. Nightfall approaching, Hazen's brigade bivouacked on Big Rockcastle Creek. Hazen reported that during the day's operations, his unit had captured between 30 and 40 prisoners. The remainder of Crittenden's Corps camped for the night alongside the road in the rear of Hazen's command. 29

On the 17th, Kirby Smith finally gained the Big Rockcastle River. Here, the general was handed a message from Wheeler. Opening the dispatch, Smith was shocked to discover that Wheeler's cavalry had been ordered to fall back to London. (It has been impossible to ascertain whether Bragg or Polk was responsible for this order.) Looking at his map, Kirby Smith saw that if Wheeler were withdrawn, the foe would be able to cut off his army.
At this time, the Army of Kentucky was strung out along the road that linked Big Hill with Pitman's Spring. The army's vanguard was at Raccoon Creek and its rear guard at Big Hill. Accordingly, the general dashed off a note to General Polk. The commander of the Army of the Mississippi was informed, "Unless the Crab Orchard roads are held for some days longer this army [the Army of Kentucky] and its trains will be sacrificed." Kirby Smith reminded Polk that it would be best if the two Confederate armies support one another "instead of separating". Otherwise, Smith commented, it would be in his interest to turn the Army of Kentucky toward Lexington, "as the way is open to me in that direction". 30

The staff officer bearing Kirby Smith's urgent dispatch found General Polk at London. At this time, Polk was on his own. General Bragg, accompanied by his staff, had left for Barbourville. Stung into action by Smith's message, Polk ordered Cheatham to post one brigade at Little Rockcastle, and another at Pitman's Spring. These two infantry units would support Wheeler's cavalry. Simultaneously, Polk countermanded the orders directing Wheeler to fall back to London. Instead, the cavalryman would continue to resist the bluecoats' advance with all the resources in his power. The remainder of Cheatham's corps was to take position at Big Laurel. Hardee's corps would continue on to
Barbourville. Cheatham's and Hardee's combat-hardened troops were to remain at Big Laurel and Barbourville until the Army of Kentucky had overtaken the Army of the Mississippi. 31

Following the receipt of Polk's instructions, Cheatham sent Colonel Arthur M. Manigault's brigade to Little Rockcastle and a second brigade to Pitman's Spring. The remainder of Cheatham's corps proceeded to Big Laurel.

It was late in the afternoon before Kirby Smith learned that Polk had initiated measures to secure the Army of Kentucky's line of retreat. Evidently, when Polk advised Smith of these steps, he had advanced the opinion that the flanks of the Army of Kentucky were "well covered". Replying to Polk's message, Kirby Smith again observed that he considered the position of his army as "extremely critical". At the moment, Smith commented, Heth's division had started to arrive at the Big Rockcastle River, while the rear of the wagon train was not far behind. Stevenson's division, according to the latest reports reaching Smith's command post, was still at Big Hill, 16 miles away. Both Heth's and Stevenson's commands had been on the road since the previous evening. Consequently, Kirby Smith reported, the troops were "scattered along the route, are broken down and exhausted, having been taxed by six days' and nights' forced marches and hard work." 32
Next, Kirby Smith turned to a discussion of the cavalry attached to his army. He informed Polk that, at the moment, the only effective mounted force serving with his command was Colonel Ashby's. Three cavalry regiments led by Brigadier General Abraham Buford also marched with the army. But these units had just been organized and were, according to Smith, of little value. The three other cavalry commands that had served with Kirby Smith's army during the recent Kentucky campaign had been detached. Morgan's had remained in the Bluegrass region; Marshall's was en route to Virginia; Scott's (now led by Howard) was attached to Wheeler's command. 33

Kirby Smith also relayed to Polk some information he had picked up pertaining to the Federals' movements. A prisoner had told the general that Crittenden's corps was near Big Hill.

Turning to his future plans, Kirby Smith informed Polk that Stevenson's division should be allowed to have a day's rest, before pushing on. In the meantime, Kirby Smith had stationed McCown's division at Pitman's Spring. Once McCown's division had reached Pitman's Spring, the brigade of Cheatham's command stationed there had rejoined its parent unit at Big Laurel. Since the hour was late, McCown decided to wait until morning before relieving Manigault's brigade at Little Rockcastle. In the meantime, General Heth had posted two of his brigades
(Colonel Alexander W. Reynolds' and one which it has been impossible
to identify) at Metzner's Cross-Roads. 34

Since leaving Lancaster, Kirby Smith had been growing more
resentful of alleged mistreatment by Bragg. He thought Bragg had
deliberately chosen the direct route for the Army of the Mississippi
and sent his the hard way. In his letter to Polk, Smith complained
bitterly:

He /Bragg/ gives up the Wild Cat Pass,
exposes my flank, and leaves the enemy only 9
miles to march to reach my front, 3 miles from
London, my column at the time being far in the
rear; General Stevenson at Gum Springs, 43 miles
distant. I have marched by a circuitous route,
while he /Bragg/ has taken the direct one. His
/Bragg's/ trains have been turned off my line,
delaying me two days, my command working day and
night pulling them up the Big Hill. I gave his
/Bragg's/ wagons the preference, when I would
have secured the safety of my columns had I not
been encumbered with them and might have done it
by moving on with my train alone. My train is
now turned off by a circuitous route and one that
is almost impassable, and on which they must be
delayed a long time, if not abandoned. Should
his /Bragg's/ army move off, as directed by his
/Bragg's/ order, the enemy will have a good and
direct route from London, by which they can
anticipate me two days with their force,
compelling me to fight superior numbers under
great disadvantage. 35

Stevenson's division made much better time than Smith
expected. At 11:30 p.m. one of the general's aides informed
him that Stevenson's vanguard was on the opposite side of the Big
Rockcastle River. In spite of having had to assist the artillery
and ordnance train up Big Hill. Stevenson's troops had marched 30 miles during the past 24 hours. Stevenson's arrival enabled Kirby Smith to alter his plans. He would now be able to move his entire command on the 18th. A staff officer was immediately sent to London to communicate this good news to Polk. 36

Accordingly, Smith proceeded to draft his orders for the next day's march. Heth's division (except for Colonel Reynolds' brigade which was to remain at Mershon's Cross-Roads) would leave the Big Rockcastle River at 4 a.m. Stevenson was directed to have his troops on the road by daybreak. These two divisions were to take the Raccoon Shoot road and pass to the east of London. All the trains, except the division's ordnance vehicles, were to proceed to London by way of Pitman's Spring. At London, the trains were to turn into the Barbourville road unless it was blocked by Polk's troops and wagons. Ashby's cavalry was to hold the crossing of the Big Rockcastle River until 10 a.m. The troopers would then fall back on Mershon's Cross-Roads. Following the cavalry's arrival, Reynolds' infantry brigade would evacuate the crossroad. Screened by Ashby's command, Reynolds' troops were to proceed to Bush's Store. Kirby Smith's third division, McCown's, was to hold Pitman's Spring until compelled to fall back. McCown's troops would then move to London. From there, McCown's unit would march to Bush's Store, where they would
rendezvous with Heth's and Stevenson's. Kirby Smith hoped to have his army united at Bush's Store by nightfall on the 18th. 37

On the morning of the 17th, General Crittenden ordered General Sooy Smith to have his division execute a forced reconnaissance toward London. In the interest of efficiency, General Smith determined to alternate his brigades. Hazen's command, which had spearheaded the advance on the 16th, would be held in reserve. Accordingly, Smith alerted Brigadier General Charles Cruft to have his brigade take the lead.

Passing through Hazen's picket line, Cruft's troops forded the Big Rockcastle River. By 9 a.m. Cruft's bluecoats, after a four-mile advance, approached Camp Wild Cat. As they passed forward, the Yankees bagged approximately 50 stragglers. These they paroled and sent to the rear. During the night, Wheeler's lumberjack troopers had felled a large number of trees across the road. Consequently, Cruft's advance was slowed by the necessity to clear the blockaded road.

In a message, couched in defeatist's terms, Smith informed Crittenden of Cruft's difficulties. Continuing in the same vein, Smith reported, "There is no forage whatever in this neighborhood, and none ahead. Our animals are now suffering, and it will
virtually sacrifice our train to move it any farther to the front. The same may be said of our artillery. Our infantry can go as far as rations will last which they can carry on their person."

In the meantime, Sooy Smith had learned from his scouts that Kirby Smith's army had camped on the Madison road, 16 miles north of Pitman's Spring. The general planned to send his supporting cavalry across a little used mountain trail in an effort to intercept and cut off the Confederate stragglers. When informed of the general's plan, Captain Ebenezer Gay, Buell's chief of cavalry, told Smith that his troopers' horses were too badly jaded to attempt such a movement. 38

By noon, Smith's division had occupied Camp Wild Cat, and Cruft's brigade had pushed a mile beyond. Since 9 o'clock, Cruft's bluecoats had been in constant contact with Wheeler's troopers. The greyclads had been steadily pushed back. But, as Smith disgustedly reported, there was skirmishing "at every turn of the road". To make matters worse, there had been no improvement in the condition of the road. Much time and effort had to be devoted to removing the felled timber. Smith felt that if he had a force of cavalry, he could check this mischief. As it was, the Confederate troopers would chop away until the Union infantry was almost upon them. Then they would swing into their
saddles, fall back rapidly, and commence to fell additional trees across the road. 39

Nightfall on the 17th found Sooy Smith's entire division encamped at Camp Wild Cat, where Crittenden had established his headquarters. The other two divisions of Crittenden's corps were bivouacked alongside the road, wherever there was an available supply of water. 40

Hardee's corps, in accordance with Polk's instructions, spent the morning of the 18th at Barbourville. At least one division, Brigadier General Patton Anderson's, welcomed this respite. On the previous afternoon, Anderson had been forced to yield the right of way to a large wagon train. Consequently, Anderson's troops had been on the road until midnight.

While at Barbourville, Hardee received instructions from Polk to have his men destroy their tent-flies and certain other pieces of equipment. Since the wagons on which these articles were loaded had passed beyond Barbourville, Hardee delayed carrying out this order. In the meantime, he sought to get Polk to change his mind. Addressing a message to Polk, Hardee observed that since his corps had reached Barbourville without hindrance, and he had a number of empty wagons to assist those "which may be overloaded", it might be wise to save the tent-
flies. If they were destroyed, Hardee felt, the Confederates might have difficulty in replacing them. Furthermore, Hardee stated, he was in favor of carrying the other enumerated articles out of Kentucky, because they were of "but little weight." In a postscript to his dispatch, Hardee commented, "There is, I believe, no doubt of my ability to take forward the articles you have ordered to be destroyed. If when we reach the difficult part of the road they be found to impede us then they ought to be destroyed. If we get them to the Gap we can leave [them], for they will be safe." Seeing the logic in Hardee's arguments, Polk suspended his order to destroy the enumerated gear.

In the meantime, Polk had learned that Stevenson's division had reached the Big Rockcastle River a number of hours ahead of schedule. This would enable Kirby Smith to resume the march on the 18th, twenty-four hours earlier than he had estimated. Polk, therefore, issued instructions for Hardee's and Cheatham's corps to hit the road. Moving out of Barboursville on the afternoon of the 18th, Hardee's troops spent the night near Benson's, 15 miles from the Gap. 42

Sunrise on the 19th found Hardee's bone-weary corps again on the road. By dark, a number of the trains (all of Hardee's, as well as Cheatham's and Smith's ordnance trains) had reached
the Gap. Major General Simon B. Buckner's and Brigadier General Patton Anderson's divisions camped for the night on Yellow Creek, several miles below the Gap. It had been a difficult struggle for the wagoners to get their vehicles up the steep grade. The infantry divisions were called upon for heavy drafts to assist the trains. Hardee and his staff supervised these groups as they toiled away. 43

On the morning of the 18th, General McCown directed Colonel Evander McNair's brigade to move forward from Pitman's Spring. McNair was to relieve Colonel Manigault's command at Little Rockcastle. The latter officer's unit was posted in support of Wheeler's cavalry. Once his command was relieved, Manigault proceeded to Big Laurel. There, he rejoined his parent unit -- Cheatham's corps. Following Manigault's return from the front, Cheatham's command took up the march. 44

After spending the night camped along the road southeast of Barbourville, Cheatham's troops again pressed forward on the 19th. By noon, Cheatham's corps had reached Cumberland Ford. Since there was a plentiful supply of water at this point, the troops went into camp. The corps would remain at Cumberland Ford, until Hardee's troops and the trains had cleared the Gap. To provide for the security of his encampment and to assist Smith's
command, Cheatham posted two of his brigades at Flat Lick. At Cumberland Ford, Cheatham found 100 barrels of flour. This flour had been previously earmarked for the use of Kirby Smith's army. This did not deter the hard-bitten Cheatham. He had his chief of subsistence seize 60 of the barrels and establish a bakery for converting the flour into bread for consumption by his hungry soldiers. 45

The Army of Kentucky was unable to maintain the march schedule which Kirby Smith had established. Smith pronounced the Raccoon Shoot road the "worst" he had ever traveled. He informed Polk that in places his troops had to cut a new road. Furthermore, Smith reported, his "command from exhaustion in drawing the wagons and artillery up the hills and not having had sleep for some nights, are very much scattered along the road." Smith observed that he had been compelled to order General Stevenson "to destroy such of the wagons as impede his march." 46

Accordingly, Heth's and Stevenson's divisions, which escorted the army's trains, failed to reach Bush's Store as contemplated on the 18th. The next day, the Army of Kentucky again clawed its way slowly forward. It was nightfall before Stevenson's division, already 24 hours behind time, camped at

35
Bush's Store. Heth's division spent the night near the intersection of the Raccoon Shoot and the old State road, 13 miles from Flat Lick. McCown's division held its position at Pitman's Spring until the afternoon of the 19th. Only after he was informed by Wheeler that the foe had crossed the Big Rockcastle River, did McCown order his division to fall back. Passing through London, McCown's greyclads, taking the same road as the Army of the Mississippi, camped for the night on Big Laurel Creek.

Throughout the 18th and the morning of the 19th, the Union pressure on the cavalry units covering the Confederate retreat slowly increased. By 1:30 p.m. on the latter day, Crittenden's vanguard was within one mile of Pitman's Spring. At the same time, Cruft's troops had forced Colonel Buford's troopers to evacuate Mershon's Cross-Roads. Learning that McCown's infantry had fallen back beyond London, Wheeler's cavalrymen withdrew. After crossing the Big Laurel, Wheeler divided his command. Wharton's brigade was sent to Bush's Store. There, the Texan reported to General Stevenson. During the remainder of the retreat, Stevenson's rear would be covered by three mounted brigades — Ashby's, Buford's, and Wharton's. Wheeler's command would continue to protect McCown's line of retreat. To slow the
Union advance, the cavalry officers kept their men busy felling timber across the road. 50

Polk transferred his headquarters from London to Cumberland Ford on the 19th. From the latter place, the general wrote a long letter to General Bragg. (The commanding general had continued to travel with the vanguard.) Polk advised his superior of all that had transpired during the past 48 hours. The general also pointed out that, so far, he had "managed to secure forage for the Army of the Mississippi, and rations, including bread, for the men." Furthermore, Polk expressed the opinion that if the magazines at the Gap contained the requisite amount of supplies, the Army of the Mississippi would reach the railroad without difficulty. Polk admitted, however, that Kirby Smith's soldiers had "suffered some inconvenience from being separated from" their trains. But, he observed, they had plenty of beef and sufficient forage for their livestock. Indeed, beef on the hoof was so plentiful that Polk felt that the army would be able to bring between 1,500 and 2,000 head of cattle through the Gap. If all went according to schedule, Polk predicted, the Army of the Mississippi would be in Knoxville on the 21st. 51

The information garnered by the Union scouts on the evening of the 17th placed strong Confederate forces at the
Little Rockcastle River and Marshon's Cross-Roads. This intelligence determined Crittenden's plan of action on the 18th. Accordingly, the general ordered Sooy Smith to have Hazen's brigade reconnoiter the London road. Hazen was expected to test the strength of the Rebel force watching the crossing of the Little Rockcastle. Crutf's brigade was to move up the Winding Glade Road and investigate the Rebel force at the crossroads. Cruft and Hazen were admonished that they were not to bring on an engagement, if the foe were present in force. But if the Confederates were not, Cruft and Hazen were to attack and seek to capture as many of the foe as possible. To hold Camp Wild Cat during the two brigades' absence, Crittenden ordered Brigadier General Horatio P. Van Cleve to send forward one of his brigades. At this time, Van Cleve's division was camped on the Big Rockcastle River. A second brigade, drawn from Van Cleve's division, was given the mission of exploring the Richmond-Madison road. 52

In accordance with Crittenden's orders, Hazen's brigade moved off promptly. To be prepared in case of emergency, Hazen covered his advance with the 9th Indiana and the 42d Ohio. Approaching the Little Rockcastle River, the bluecoats were fired on by Wheeler's sharpshooters. After a sharp skirmish, the
Yankees forced the Rebels to fall back across the river. Seeing that the foe had massed his force to oppose a crossing, Hazen prepared to return to Camp Wild Cat. Before retiring, Hazen picked up some "reliable information" regarding the Confederates' strength. It was reported that the force opposing Hazen's advance consisted of two brigades, one cavalry and one infantry. (This data was fairly accurate. At this time, Hazen's bluecoats were opposed by three, and not two brigades -- Wharton's and Wheeler's cavalry and McNair's infantry.) Reaching Camp Wild Cat, Hazen relayed this data to General Sooy Smith. In addition, Hazen stated that in the day's skirmishing his troops had killed and wounded several butternuts without suffering any loss.

Guided by a Negro, who had carried the news of the Confederate activities at Mershon's Cross-Roads to the Union brass, Cruft's brigade departed from Camp Wild Cat. After a difficult march up the rugged Winding Glade road, Cruft's troops reached Mershon's Cross-Roads about dusk. At this moment, the only Rebel force stationed at the crossroad was a small patrol drawn from Buford's untested brigade. Moving to the attack, Cruft's infantry easily scattered the cavalrmen, capturing 11 of them. Once his men had secured the area, Cruft established a
roadblock. The general felt confident that if there were any Confederate units north of the crossroad, they would have a rough time cutting their way through his combat-ready command to rejoin their comrades. Pickets were then posted and the brigade bivouacked for the night. 54

General Van Cleve entrusted the task of reconnoitering the Richmond-Madison road to Colonel Stanley Matthews' brigade. To gain their objective, Matthews' troops left their camp near Mount Vernon and moved up the old road that skirted Roundstone Creek. It was 4 p.m. before Matthews' vanguard reached the Richmond-Madison road. Here, the Yankees captured several stragglers belonging to Reynolds' infantry brigade and Colonel David W. Chenault's cavalry. The bluecoats observed that the Richmond-Madison road was covered with the tracks of hundreds of cattle and sheep. These had obliterated all others. After establishing a roadblock, Matthews sent out a number of patrols. One of these groups bagged six additional prisoners belonging to Chenault's cavalry. Questioning these individuals, Matthews learned that Morgan had left Richmond the previous evening. His objective was to raid Lexington. While some of the captives stated that Morgan planned to leave the Bluegrass region by way of Irvine, others indicated he planned to retrace his steps.
Since the hour was late, the brigade spent the night on the Richmond-Madison road. 55

On the 17th, the day before Matthews' brigade had established its roadblock on the Richmond-Madison road, Kirby Smith had detached Morgan's brigade. In accordance with his request, Morgan had been granted permission to retrace his steps, capture Lexington, and then move southward, directly across General Buell's rear, doing all the damage he could. Marching at a rapid pace, Morgan reached Lexington at dawn on the 18th. At Ashland, two miles from the city, Morgan's raiders attacked and routed the 4th Ohio Cavalry. In this engagement, Morgan's troopers captured nearly 600 bluecoats. The loss in killed and wounded on either side in this clash was slight.

Resuming his march at noon, Morgan's troopers bivouacked at Shryock's ferry on the Kentucky River. At midnight, the Confederate encampment was attacked by a Union column commanded by Brigadier General Ebeneger Dumont. Fearful lest he be surrounded and trapped in the rugged hills of the area, Morgan made a forced march to Lawrenceburg, four miles distant. The Confederates succeeded in passing through the sleeping town just as a strong Union command, sent to intercept them, entered on the Frankfort pike. Passing around Bardstown on the 19th, the
greyclads camped between that place and Elizabethtown.

From the 20th to the 25th, Morgan continued to march in a
southwesterly direction, reaching Hopkinsville on the latter date.
After a short sojourn at Hopkinsville for a much-needed rest,
Morgan moved to Gallatin, Tennessee. 56

It was the morning of the 19th before Cruft's and
Matthews' reports of their previous day's activities reached
Crittenden. After digesting these messages, Crittenden came to
the conclusion that "Cruft came on the last of them [the Rebels]
and that Matthews will not see them". Furthermore, General Sooy
Smith had been told by a man who had escaped from the Confederates
that the foe had fallen back to London. "If so", Crittenden
wrote Buell, "I have no hope of catching them." To verify this
report, Crittenden ordered Smith to have Hazen's brigade visit
the London area. 57

Following a hurried breakfast, Hazen's brigade hit the
road. With the 41st Ohio thrown forward as skirmishers, the
brigade moved along the London road. Five miles short of
Pitman's Spring, the bluecoats encountered their initial
opposition. Here, they were fired on by Confederate sharpshooters.
Dashing forward, the Buckeyes quickly flushed the snipers. The
Yankees, though, found the timber-obstructed road a far more
difficult and frustrating problem. After much hard work by the pioneers, the brigade finally penetrated to within one-half mile of Pitman's Spring. By this time, it had started to get dark. About sundown, there was a sharp clash between Hazen's point and a Confederate outpost. In this brush, both sides suffered a few casualties.

Having determined that the butternuts were supported by artillery, Hazen deployed and posted his command behind the spur of a hill. Before permitting his men to retire for the night, the colonel alerted them to be ready to attack the battery at dawn. During the night, the greyclads evacuated their position at Pitman's Spring.

The next morning (the 20th) Hazen ordered out a patrol to see how far the Rebels had retired. Visiting London, the Federals were told by the inhabitants that the Confederates had fallen back to Big Laurel. The patrol, having captured 25 stragglers, returned to Pitman's Spring with this information. Hazen immediately notified General Crittenden of this development. The corps commander in turn relayed this news to General Buell. 58

After examining all the reports flowing into his headquarters from the front, Buell became convinced that it was inexpedient to press the pursuit of Bragg's "Army Group" beyond
London. In his "After Action Report", Buell listed his reasons for this decision. They were, "partly because it was impracticable in a manner to afford any material advantage; partly because, without advantage, it took the troops out of the way when they were likely to be required elsewhere." Therefore, Buell called off the pursuit and issued orders for the Army of the Ohio to concentrate on Nashville. 59
THE REBELS CONCENTRATE AT STONES RIVER

NOTES ON CHAPTER I

The Confederates Abandon Kentucky

1 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Vol. XVI, pt. I, 1093. (Cited hereafter as O. R.) Kirby Smith had been promoted to lieutenant general, to rank from October 9. At this time, Smith did not know that he had been advanced in rank.
2 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 939-940.
5 David Urquhart, "Bragg's Advance and Retreat", Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, III, 603.
8 Ibid., 943.
9 Ibid., 941.
10 Ibid., 943.
11 Ibid., 944.
16 Ibid., 941, 948.
18 Q. R., Series I, Vol. XVI, pt. II, 948, 950-951. Hardee and Polk had been promoted to lieutenant generals to rank from October 10, 1862. At this time, the two generals did not know that they had been advanced in rank. When Polk had assumed temporary command of the Army of the Mississippi, General Cheatham had assumed command of his corps.
19 Ibid., 949.
23 Ibid., 950.
26 Ibid., 1029; Dyer, "Fightin' Joe" Wheeler, 66.
28 Ibid., 950, 952, 958-959, 963.
31 Ibid., 963.
32 Ibid., 959.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., 960.
37 Ibid., 959-960.
39 Ibid., 1140.
42 Ibid., 964.
43 Ibid., 964-965.
44 Ibid., 962-963.
45 Ibid., 963-964, 975.
46 Ibid., 967.
47 Ibid., 966.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., 966, 971.
50 Ibid., 963, 965, 971-972.
51 Ibid., 963-964.
52 Ibid., 624.
Major General John C. Breckinridge, who had been slated to command a Confederate division during the invasion of Kentucky, reached Knoxville on October 3. This was five days before the battle of Perryville. The general had been accompanied by approximately 2,500 soldiers on his roundabout journey from East Louisiana to East Tennessee. Upon his arrival in Knoxville, Breckinridge found that there were "about 4,000 miscellaneous troops" commanded by Brigadier General Samuel B. Maxey camped in and around the city. ¹

Calling upon Major General Samuel Jones, who had assumed charge of the Department of East Tennessee during Kirby Smith's absence, Breckinridge learned that about 2,000 exchanged prisoners were scheduled to reach Knoxville within the next several days. Continuing, Jones informed the former Vice President that there were "some 6,000" stand of small-arms stored in the Knoxville magazines. Breckinridge proposed to rearm the exchanged prisoners with these weapons. The remainder of these weapons would be sent into Kentucky with General Maxey's command.
In a letter to General Kirby Smith dated the 3d, Breckinridge pointed out that he hoped to start Maxey's troops for the Bluegrass region within the next two or three days. The general promised to follow with the remainder of his force as soon as feasible. Breckinridge warned that he was having trouble accumulating sufficient transportation to move his commissary, ordnance, and quartermaster supplies. When he did depart from Knoxville, Breckinridge wrote that he would "probably move via Cumberland Gap to London, thence through Richmond or Lancaster, as events may require." In any case, Breckinridge promised to contact Smith before his column reached London. Breckinridge next informed Smith that Polk's and Hardee's trains, which he was to escort on his march into Kentucky, had not reached Knoxville. In closing, Breckinridge remarked that he thought the head of his column would be in London by the 17th. 2

A shortage of transportation, however, frustrated Breckinridge's plans. Three days later, Breckinridge addressed a long letter to General Bragg. He complained that not a single wagon belonging to Hardee's or Polk's corps had yet arrived. Breckinridge observed that he "must get transportation" for his and Maxey's troops, with forage and subsistence trains, if they were "to cross a desert of 150 miles." The general pointed out
that he had collected 60 wagons at Chattanooga, which were currently on their way to Knoxville. In addition, Breckinridge reported, he had secured some transportation at Jackson, Mississippi. These vehicles had been "pushed across to Montgomery by common road". At the moment, these wagons were being shipped from Montgomery to East Tennessee by rail. All the while, the general continued, vigorous efforts were being made to collect transportation for the army's use in the Knoxville area. 3

If all went well, Breckinridge informed Bragg, he hoped to put Maxey's 4,500 men in motion by the 9th. Breckinridge planned to follow Maxey, at the earliest moment, with the remainder of his force. The general thought that he might be able to take the field on the 11th. Breckinridge thought it might be a good idea for Bragg to stockpile supplies at London. Breckinridge felt that both his and Maxey's troops would probably exhaust all their rations and forage in crossing the mountains of eastern Kentucky and Tennessee. 4

Breckinridge also discussed the strength of the force which had accompanied him from Mississippi. He reported that Major General Earl Van Dorn had refused to permit him to withdraw more than 2,500 men and two batteries from the Department of
Mississippi and East Louisiana. As yet, the general commented, the exchanged prisoners had not reached Knoxville. The latest news on their whereabouts indicated to Breckinridge that they should reach Knoxville on the 7th. The general had been disappointed to learn that General Van Dorn had held in Mississippi a regiment of exchanged prisoners slated for service with Bragg's "Army Group". If Van Dorn hadn't done this, Breckinridge informed Bragg, he would have been able to lead a force of about 5,000 soldiers into Kentucky. As it was, he would be unable to take the field with more than 4,300 officers and men.

On the following day (the 7th), Breckinridge drafted orders alerting Maxey to hold "his command in readiness to move" on the 9th. After passing through Cumberland Gap and reaching London, Maxey was to direct his troops "toward Danville or Lexington, as events may determine him, or as he may receive orders." "Unless diverted by controlling circumstances or by orders," Maxey was to join Kirby Smith's Army of Kentucky. Before taking the field, Maxey would see that his troops were supplied with 200 rounds of ammunition per man, and his battery traveled with "a full supply" of projectiles. Forage to last 12 days, and, if it were possible, 12 days' rations would be loaded.
on Maxey's wagon train. If there were a shortage of vehicles, rations to last for ten days were to be taken in the wagons; the troops would then be required to carry two days' cooked rations in their haversacks.

Following his departure from Knoxville, Maxey was expected to adopt a number of measures to provide for the security of his column. A strong advance guard and flank patrols were to be thrown out at all times. In the event of a threatened attack, Maxey would communicate immediately with General Breckinridge. Strict discipline would be observed at all times. Every trespass upon private property or individual rights was to be "promptly and severely punished, especially any acts of trespass or a failure to arrest the perpetrators by commissioned officers." Maxey was to report to Breckinridge the moment his command was ready to take the field.

As anticipated, the trains with the exchanged prisoners aboard reached Knoxville on the 7th. In addition to a number of casuals, personnel from two crack units, the 2d Kentucky Infantry and Graves' Kentucky Battery, clambered off the train. (The two Kentucky units had been captured at Fort Donelson.) Breckinridge immediately brigaded the newcomers with the 4th, 6th, and 9th Kentucky, and Cobb's Kentucky Battery. Colonel Roger W. Hanson
of the 2d Kentucky was placed in charge of this brigade. The
Tennessee units which Breckinridge had brought from Mississippi
(the 19th, 20th, 28th, and 45th Tennessee Infantry, and McClung's
battery) were organized into a brigade to be commanded by
Colonel Francis M. Walker. 7

At this time, the enlistments of the men of the 4th and
6th Kentucky elapsed. These two regiments had originally been
mustered into service to serve for one year. Most of the men
wanted to re-enlist; but in Colonel Morgan's cavalry, not the
infantry. Accordingly, Breckinridge had the brigade formed. He
told the men "that the needs of the country were such that the
war department could not spare ... [them] from the infantry
service". The general then urged all the Kentuckians to re-enlist
in that branch of the service. Impressed by Breckinridge's
oratory, one of the boys shouted, "Let's reenlist for thirty years
or during the war." This proposal was met with a roar "of
approval from almost every throat." The re-enlistment papers
were then "made out for three years or duration of the war." To
these, the men eagerly affixed their signatures. 8

It was impossible for the Confederates to assemble
sufficient transportation in the Knoxville area by the 9th to
enable Maxwell's command to start for Kentucky. Consequently,
Breckinridge was forced to postpone Maxey's departure. It was the evening of the 11th before the Southerners were able to accumulate enough teams and wagons in the Knoxville staging area to permit Maxey's soldiers to take with them the stipulated amount of ammunition, forage, and rations. By the next morning, the staff officers reported that all the vehicles were loaded and ready to roll. After the troops had been formed and mustered, Maxey's column (over 5,000 strong) finally started for Kentucky. 9

In the meantime, the strength of the force which Breckinridge planned to lead into the Bluegrass region had been materially reduced. The reason behind this reduction in Breckinridge's effective strength could be traced to developments in Middle Tennessee. On September 25, General Bragg had issued a special order placing Brigadier General Nathan Bedford Forrest in charge of operations in Middle Tennessee. Forrest was authorized to raise six regiments of troops, two of cavalry and four of infantry. These units were to be mustered into Confederate service. With these troops and such others as he might find already organized, Forrest would "operate against the enemy wherever found, but especially at Nashville, Clarksville, &c., cutting off supplies, capturing trains, and harassing them in all ways practicable." The hard-hitting cavalry leader was authorized
to call on General Jones for arms and ammunition. Four companies of the 3d Tennessee would accompany Forrest to the Middle Tennessee sphere of operations.

Reaching Murfreesboro, where he established his headquarters during the first week of October, Forrest called upon General Jones for arms and accoutrements. In addition, Forrest had learned from his scouts that the Federals gave every indication of trying to recover the initiative in Middle Tennessee. If they should seize Murfreesboro, Forrest would lose his base of operations. Accordingly, the cavalry leader asked Jones for help!

Replying to Forrest's telegram on the 6th, Jones observed that he had no surplus cavalry equipment. At the moment, he wrote, there were some 2,000 cavalrymen in his department for whom he had no arms. Jones informed Forrest that there were about 6,000 stand of arms stored in the Knoxville magazines. But, he continued, he was under orders to forward these weapons to Kirby Smith. If Forrest were certain that Bragg did not wish to send these arms to Smith, Jones promised to send a portion of them to him.

This question taken care of, Jones endeavored to scrape together reinforcements from his not too numerous command to bolster Forrest. Accordingly, Jones ordered the 51st Alabama
Cavalry and Gunter's Alabama Cavalry Battalion to Lavergne; the 32d Alabama Infantry and two batteries (the Jackson Georgia Artillery and Freeman's Tennessee Battery) were directed to move to Murfreesboro. At the time that these units received their marching orders, they were stationed at Tullahoma, Tennessee.

In the meantime, the Union commander at Nashville, Brigadier General James S. Negley, had learned that Forrest had occupied Lavergne. Consequently, the Union general decided to break up the Confederate force stationed there before it could seize the initiative. On the afternoon of the 6th, Negley organized two striking forces -- one commanded by Brigadier General John M. Palmer, the other by Colonel John F. Miller. These two combat teams left Nashville about dark by different routes. Palmer's forces (composed of 400 cavalry, an equal number of infantry, and four guns) moved along the Nashville-Murfreesboro pike. Colonel Miller's infantry column (1,800 strong) left the Nashville perimeter by way of the Nolensville pike. At Concord Church, Miller's command turned into a country lane. This road would bring Miller's column in on the flank of the Confederate force holding Lavergne. If all went according to schedule, Palmer's and Miller's troops were slated to be in position and ready to attack at daybreak.
Besides the two cavalry units (the 51st Alabama and Gunter's Alabama Cavalry Battalion), Lavergne was garrisoned by a number of militia and the 32d Alabama Infantry. The three Alabama units had just reached Lavergne from Tullahoma. Therefore, their officers had not had time to familiarize themselves with their surroundings.

During the night, the Confederate vedettes picked up the advance of Palmer's column. It appears that the Rebel scouts failed to spot Miller's command, which slipped through their security cordon undetected. When the ranking Southern officer at Lavergne, Colonel Henry Maury, was informed of the Union advance, he quickly turned out the garrison. Since the information reaching the colonel indicated that only one column (Palmer's) was pressing toward Lavergne, he made his dispositions accordingly. A roadblock manned by the 32d Alabama, supported by three guns, was established astride the Nashville pike, near the Hurricane Creek bridge. The Confederate cavalry was deployed to cover the infantry's flanks.

As his column drove down the Nashville-Murfreesboro pike, Palmer's vanguard easily brushed aside the butternut pickets. Near Hurricane Creek, Palmer's advance was suddenly brought up short, when the blueclads sighted a determined looking greyclad
battle line massed astride the pike. Reacting to this situation with his customary vigor, Palmer bellowed orders for his subordinates to form their men. While the Yankees were busy deploying, the butternuts' cannons roared into action. The Union gunners, however, were soon able to get their pieces into battery. Opening fire with shell, the bluecoats succeeded in scoring a direct hit on, and exploding, one of the Confederates' limbers.

In the meantime, Colonel Maury had launched an attack on Palmer's right flank. Just as the Southerners started to move forward, Miller's column came up on the double. Quickly forming his men into line of battle, Miller struck the foe from an unexpected direction. Maury suspended his attack, and prepared to cope with this new threat. Both surprised and outflanked, the Rebels were unable to hold their ground. After about 30 minutes, the Confederates "fled in the wildest disorder, leaving 175 prisoners ... and three pieces of artillery" in the Yankees' hands. Among the prisoners was the Southern commander, Colonel Maury. In addition, the bluecoats reported the capture of commissary, ordnance, and quartermaster stores, camp equipage, personal effects, a stand of colors, and three railroad cars. After putting the torch to the captured supplies and cars, the Yankees, having accomplished their mission, returned to Nashville.
On reaching Nashville, General Palmer listed the Union losses in the engagement as 5 killed, 9 wounded, and 4 missing. 

On the evening of the 7th, General Jones received a message from Forrest telling of the attack on Lavergne. Furthermore, the cavalry leader advised Jones that the foe was pressing on toward Murfreesboro. In response to this distressing news, Jones ordered the 4th Florida Infantry and the Ringgold Rangers from Chattanooga to Forrest's assistance. The commander of the 14th Georgia Light Artillery Battalion, Major J. T. Montgomery, was directed to rush one of his batteries to the point of danger. (At this time, the artillery battalion was stationed at Camp Randolph, near Calhoun, Georgia.) Since Battery G was ready for service in the field, Major Montgomery ordered the cannoneers to proceed to Murfreesboro.

The following evening, additional messages from Forrest reached General Jones’ Knoxville headquarters. Again, Forrest called for reinforcements, arms, ammunition, and accoutrements. In a dispatch dated the 9th, Jones enumerated the various units which he had ordered to the cavalryman's assistance. By this time, the general had ordered a third infantry regiment (the 60th North Carolina) to Murfreesboro. Jones warned Forrest that he would be unable to spare any additional troops. In addition,
Jones commented that he considered the units which he had ordered from his department to Middle Tennessee as still under his command. If it became necessary, he would recall them.

In the meantime, Jones had received permission to send some of the war matériel stockpiled in the Knoxville magazines to Forrest. Accordingly, Captain W. W. McCreery was placed in charge of a large shipment of arms, ammunition, and accoutrements. Once these munitions had been loaded on the waiting cars of the East Tennessee and Georgia, they were started on the roundabout, and time consuming, journey to Murfreesboro. 16

These urgent telegrams from Forrest thrust General Jones on the horns of a dilemma, because he had already promised to let Breckinridge have the 60th North Carolina. Jones, therefore, forwarded the Forrest correspondence to Breckinridge. In the covering letter, Jones stated that he was "obliged to beg off from ... [his] agreement to give" Breckinridge the 60th North Carolina, as it was the only unit available for immediate transfer to Murfreesboro. Continuing, Jones pointed out that he planned to rush the 63d Tennessee to Forrest's assistance as soon as he could "find a guard to replace it at Loudon." Turning to a discussion of the strategic situation, Jones observed, "In view of our disaster at Corinth I think it more desirable than ever
that Nashville should be taken without delay, and I believe the
most valuable service you [Breckinridge] can render just now is
to aid in taking that place." In closing, Jones inquired, "Could
not Colonel Hanson's command be detached on that service?" 17

Breckinridge, however, rejected Jones' suggestion that
Hanson's brigade be sent into Middle Tennessee. Then, to make
matters worse, Jones received another disturbing message from
Forrest on the morning of the 10th. The cavalry leader wired
that he anticipated an attack on Murfreesboro on the 11th.
Furthermore, unless he was reinforced, Forrest stated, he would
have to fall back. In the face of Breckinridge's refusal to
co-operate, and Forrest's pessimistic dispatch, Jones addressed
a letter to the War Department. Jones informed the Richmond
authorities that Forrest had called on him repeatedly for
reinforcements. The general reported that, in response to these
requests, he had sent Forrest all the troops he could spare from
his department. At the moment, Jones continued, there were
hardly enough soldiers in Chattanooga to guard the public
property. Accordingly, Jones wrote, he would be unable to rush
any additional units to Forrest's support unless he was
"authorized to detail a part of General Breckinridge's command,
now here on route to Kentucky." Jones reported that Breckinridge
had from 8,000 to 9,000 men, including exchanged prisoners, and about 3,000 convalescents, armed and organized into brigades. Since he had received no news from General Bragg for several days, Jones admitted that he did not know the general's wishes in the matter. But, he informed Richmond, Bragg had ordered the arms stored in the Knoxville depots transferred to Middle Tennessee.

In view of the fluid condition of affairs on the approaches to Nashville, the unrest in East Tennessee, in the light of the conscription act, and the recent disaster at Corinth, Jones argued that the strength of his command should be increased. Jones thought that he should at least be allowed to retain the exchanged prisoners hailing from Tennessee. If Bragg were in no danger, Jones believed that "Breckinridge's troops could render no better service than to drive the enemy from Middle Tennessee and occupy Nashville." Next, Jones asked the Richmond authorities to designate the western boundary of his department. If it did not include Nashville, Jones wished it extended temporarily so as to give him control of the troops he had sent to Middle Tennessee. Because, the general warned, it might become necessary to suddenly recall these units for the defense of Chattanooga or Knoxville. 18

At the same time, Jones addressed a telegram to General Forrest. The cavalry leader was informed that Jones had "no more
troops to send" into Middle Tennessee. If Forrest were unable to hold his ground in front of Murfreesboro, he was authorized to "fall back to Tullahoma, and farther if necessary". Jones thought that unless the Union force was larger than represented, the Confederate cavalry ought to be able to check its advance.

The general also requested information on the current tactical situation in Middle Tennessee. Reports had reached Knoxville indicating that the 32d Alabama had been surprised at Lavergne and a large number of men captured. Jones asked Forrest to comment on this news. In closing, Jones warned Forrest to keep a sharp watch for a Federal force led by Major General William S. Rosecrans in the direction of Decatur, Alabama. Jones was afraid that Rosecrans, following his victory at Corinth, would launch a drive up the Tennessee Valley. 19

The War Department replied immediately to Jones' telegram. Richmond authorized Jones "to retain all the Tennesseans who are with Breckinridge". In addition, if Jones deemed it necessary for operations in Middle Tennessee, he would be permitted "to detain a larger portion" of the former Vice President's division.

In the absence of orders from General Bragg, Jones was directed to exercise command over the country between the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers. 20
Since the message from the War Department did not reach Knoxville until late at night, it was the next morning before Jones broke the news to Breckinridge. When he advised Breckinridge of the contents of the dispatch, Jones observed that he "disliked extremely to diminish" the Kentuckian's command. But, Jones continued, he believed "the interest of the service" required that he should retain the Tennesseans. Accordingly, Jones asked Breckinridge to "have the kindness to direct the Tennessee colonel to report to" him. To ease Breckinridge's feelings on the matter, Jones commented that he presumed the Tennessee brigade would not "number as many men as Maxey's command", which he had assigned to his command. Therefore, Jones observed, he had actually added to instead of reducing Breckinridge's overall strength.

Breckinridge did not agree with Jones' logic. He immediately wired a protest to the War Department. The distressed general informed Richmond that Maxey was scheduled to start for Kentucky on the following day "with 5,000 miscellaneous troops". Furthermore, he hoped to "be ready to move in two days with 1,500 Kentuckians and 2,000 Tennesseans, some of them exchanged prisoners". Should General Jones decide to detain the Kentuckians, Breckinridge wanted to know if he could have his own division. The general wanted direct orders on this subject. As
he pointed out, Maxey's command was composed of casuals and would be disbanded when it reached the Bluegrass region, with the men rejoining their parent units. In addition, Breckinridge wanted authority to follow Maxey at once with his Kentuckians. Otherwise, he was afraid that Jones "might call for the Kentuckians to-morrow". 22

Breckinridge received a reply to his urgent communication on the 12th. He was directed by the President to join Bragg with all the Kentucky troops in his command. 23

On the previous day, General Jones had informed Forrest of the War Department's order expanding his department to include the country between the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers. At the same time, Jones pointed out that he would send the cavalry leader "two more regiments in a day or so". Forrest was directed to hold Murfreesboro if possible pending the arrival of the promised reinforcements. For the second time in two days, Jones requested Forrest to provide him with a statement of the tactical situation on the approaches to Nashville. 24

Evidently, the artillery which General Jones had ordered to Forrest's assistance had been slow in putting in an appearance. When informed of this, Jones advised Forrest to contact the officer in charge at Chattanooga, Colonel Alexander McKinstry.
Jones believed that the colonel might be able to locate the errant batteries. In answer to another request from Forrest for cavalry arms, Jones reported he had none to spare. Furthermore, Jones expressed himself as being opposed to the formation of additional cavalry regiments until the infantry had been organized, because, the general observed, "The undisciplined cavalry without arms is more than useless." 25

The next day (the 12th), General Jones wrote a long letter to General Bragg regarding the situation in Middle Tennessee. Jones observed that the information reaching his headquarters indicated that Buell had left from 3,000 to 5,000 effective troops in Nashville. In addition, reports were afloat that the Federal brass had just thrown another 6,000 men into that place. Even if this intelligence were untrue, Jones believed that the Yankees, in the wake of the Corinth disaster, would certainly augment their Nashville garrison. Next, Jones discussed his efforts to bolster Forrest. After enumerating the units ordered to Murfreesboro, the general pointed out that all of these except two of the batteries (Battery G, 14th Georgia Artillery Battalion, and the Jackson Georgia Artillery) had reached the front. Prior to the dispatch of these reinforcements, Jones commented, the only Confederate troops operating on the
Nashville approaches were "raw cavalry, or rather men on horseback ... in whom" he had "no confidence". Jones also relayed to Bragg a brief account of the fighting that had taken place at Lavergne on the 7th. 26

Turning to his future plans, Jones reported that, in accordance with the instructions he had received from the War Department, he was retaining Breckinridge's Tennessee regiments. As soon as the Tennesseans had been reorganized, they were to be sent to Murfreesboro. If the Richmond authorities would give him permission, Jones planned to take personal command of the operations in Middle Tennessee. Continuing, Jones pointed out that he considered Nashville to be of great strategic importance, and he proposed to have the city if it were at all possible. 27

Having lost his battle with Jones, Breckinridge had likewise addressed a letter to Bragg on the 12th. Besides informing Bragg of Jones' success in weaning his Tennesseans away from him, Breckinridge reported that Maxey's column had finally started for the Bluegrass region. With this business taken care of, Breckinridge wrote that he planned to leave Knoxville on the 14th, with 1,500 Kentuckians and two batteries (Cobb's and Graves'). Since his division, through the machinations of Generals Jones and Van Dorn, had all but
evaporated, the general asked Bragg to save him "a good command".

In closing, Breckinridge wrote, "I hope you are satisfied with my energy since I was allowed to leave Grand Junction. I have encountered every difficulty a man could meet, and but for some transportation I clung to and brought with me, would be wholly paralyzed." 28

Having determined to take the field on the 14th, Breckinridge issued a set of instructions for his subordinates' guidance. The troops were alerted to be ready to move "by way of Tazewell and Cumberland Gap, with two days' cooked rations in haversacks and 40 rounds of ammunition in cartridge-boxes."

Colonel Hanson's 2d Kentucky would take the lead; the baggage, ordnance, and supply trains were to follow along behind the column. Evidently, Breckinridge had secured a number of wagons, because he deemed the transportation sufficient to enable his command to take "an adequate supply of tents and camp equipage". In addition, the general warned, "The firing of small-arms on the march is strictly prohibited, and the most stringent means will be taken by the officers to prevent straggling and plundering, and to insure order and good discipline among the troops." 29

For some unexplained reason, Breckinridge's column was unable to leave Knoxville as scheduled. It was the morning of
the 15th, twenty-four hours later, before Breckinridge's troops hit the road. Taking the field, the general dashed off a telegram informing the Richmond authorities that he had moved out "with 1,700 Kentuckians, 600 miscellaneous troops, and two batteries." Breckinridge reported that all these men were well armed and supplied with ammunition. 30

Since most of the soldiers thought they were going home, their "hearts beat high with hope". The Kentuckians confidently predicted that they would join Bragg's "Army Group" and redeem their "state from the hands of the despoiler". 31

About 12 hours before Breckinridge's eager troops tramped out of their Knoxville camps, General Bragg had his chief of staff, Colonel George W. Brent, draft a set of instructions that would shatter their dreams of a victorious homecoming. During the day, the staff officer carrying Breckinridge's message of the 12th telling that reinforcements were en route to Kentucky encountered Bragg's retreating "Army Group". After perusing the dispatch, Bragg dictated a set of orders. These changed Breckinridge's and Maxey's destination. Hastening on to Barbourville, where he stopped for the night, Brent forwarded this fresh set of instructions to Breckinridge. The Kentuckian was to halt his and Maxey's units. After forwarding all the
forage and rations above their needs to Cumberland Gap, the two commands were to retrace their steps. At Knoxville, Breckenridge would see that the troops were loaded aboard troop trains. Proceeding to Chattanooga by rail, Breckenridge was "to take such measures for the defense of Middle Tennessee, or an attack on Nashville, as to ... [his] judgment shall seem best." 32

After two days on the road, Breckenridge's troops camped on the night of the 16th on the Tazewell road, three miles beyond Maynardsville. Just as the soldiers were starting to fall in on the following morning, preparatory to resuming the march, a courier galloped up to General Breckenridge's headquarters. The messenger handed the general a copy of an order which Bragg had sent from Bryantsville on the 12th. Glancing at the dispatch, the general discovered that he was to halt his column where it was. Accordingly, the troops were dismissed and allowed to return to their camps. 33

Since the courier had passed through the Gap and had seen no signs of Maxey, Breckenridge feared that his brother officer's column had "turned off through Big Creek Gap". The general, therefore, called for one of his scouts. While waiting for the scout to report, Breckenridge composed a message for the missing general. Maxey was to halt his command and endeavor to communicate
with General Bragg. If he ran short of subsistence, Maxey was to fall back toward Knoxville. A copy of Bragg's orders was attached to Breckinridge's communication. 34

As Breckinridge had suspected, Maxey's column had turned off on the Big Creek Gap road. When the courier overtook Maxey, the general halted his command. Maxey proposed to remain where he was, pending the receipt of further instructions.

In the meantime, General Withers had reached Knoxville. The general had been detached from Bragg's command on the 12th. His mission was to see that the magazines located along Bragg's line of retreat were filled with supplies. Hastening to Jones' headquarters, Withers called upon the Knoxville commander. Withers informed Jones that Bragg expected the Knoxville commissary to "place 200,000 rations of flour at London and 100,000 at Cumberland Gap". This news hit Jones like a bombshell, because it was the first inkling he had received of this request. Quickly recovering his poise, Jones dashed off a message to Breckinridge. As a stopgap measure, Jones recommended that Breckinridge send all his flour to Cumberland Gap. The Kentuckian would be able to replenish his supply from the McMillan's Station commissary depot. Breckinridge was to employ all the teams he
Before Jones' message reached Breckinridge, the courier entrusted with Colonel Brent's Barbourville message rode into Maynardsville. Examining the dispatch, Breckinridge discovered that his command was to return to Knoxville, preparatory to moving to Chattanooga. As the first item on his agenda, Breckinridge wrote to General Jones. Besides enclosing a copy of Bragg's order, Breckinridge asked his brother officer to see that sufficient rail transportation was accumulated at Knoxville by the 21st to entrain his 2,500 men; the cars slated to carry Maxey's 5,000 greyclads were to be in the Knoxville marshaling yards 48 hours later. Continuing, Breckinridge observed that forage and rations for the use of his soldiers would have to be stockpiled at Chattanooga and Knoxville. To add an air of urgency to the situation, Breckinridge wrote, "It is a neck and neck race for Murfreesborough and Nashville". In closing, Breckinridge informed Jones that he did not think the Federals would follow Bragg across the mountains. Instead, the general predicted, they would push their troops into Tennessee through the Nashville area. The Confederates, therefore, would have to be prepared to meet this thrust. 36

Breckinridge's and Brent's messages were delivered to
General Jones on the morning of the 19th. Evidently, Jones was not happy to discover that Breckinridge had been ordered to Murfreesboro. Jones probably still cherished the idea of taking command at that point and leading the attack on Nashville. In an apparent effort to weaken Breckinridge's command, Jones addressed a letter to General Bragg. After informing Bragg of Breckinridge's plans, Jones inquired, "Are you aware that some 4,000 of the men with Maxey belong to regiments of your army."

The general wondered if it would not be better if Maxey's casuals rejoined their regiments. Jones observed that he was already sending all the troops he could spare to Middle Tennessee. In addition, he had asked Richmond to transfer Brigadier General William W. Mackall to his department. Jones had planned to place Mackall, when he arrived, in charge of the troops at Murfreesboro. In view of Bragg's decision to place Breckinridge in charge of the Middle Tennessee theatre of operations, Jones wrote than when Mackall put in an appearance, he would place him in command of a brigade. 37

At the same time, Jones acknowledged Breckinridge's letter. Jones wrote that he had called on Mr. Campbell Wallace, the Superintendent of the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad, for the necessary rolling stock. Jones observed that every
effort would be made to provide Breckinridge's troops with forage and rations. This business taken care of, Jones turned to what disposition should be made of "Maxey's miscellaneous troops". Jones thought that Bragg certainly did not intend for Breckinridge to take Maxey's men "into Middle Tennessee, as they belonged to regiments in Bragg's and Kirby Smith's armies." 38

When the dispute over the disposition of Maxey's command was brought to Bragg's attention, he decided in favor of General Jones. Maxey's troops, except for the regularly constituted units (the 41st Alabama and Eldridge's Tennessee Battery) would remain at Knoxville. Once Bragg's "Army Group" had reached Knoxville, the casuals would report to their commands. The Alabama infantryman and the Tennessee artillerists would accompany Breckinridge into Middle Tennessee.

In the meantime, Breckinridge's column had moved to Knoxville. It took the troops two days to complete this leg of the journey. One of the soldiers recalled, "So we did not get to press the sacred soil of Ky under our feet. With sad hearts we turned from our cherished hopes & with stern determination to manfully do our duty returned to Knoxville ... " By the evening of the 20th, Breckinridge's Kentuckians were encamped on the same ground in Knoxville which they had left five days before. 39
Arriving in Knoxville, Breckinridge proceeded to the telegraph office. Here, he dashed off a message to Forrest. The cavalry leader was informed that Breckinridge planned to "start 2,500 troops to-morrow" for Shell Mound. This contingent would be followed by other units. To facilitate the movement into Middle Tennessee, Forrest was to "collect all the transportation and subsistence and forage" he could. These were to be sent to Bridgeport, which was on the opposite side of the Tennessee River from Shell Mound. (The railroad bridge spanning the river at Bridgeport had been burned several months before.) Forrest was warned to keep a strong lookout for "Buell or Grant", who, Breckinridge thought, might "be pushing for Nashville or Murfreesborough".

Apparently, the railroad officials were unable to accumulate sufficient rolling stock in the Knoxville yards to take care of Breckinridge's command on the 21st. Consequently, Breckinridge was compelled to postpone his scheduled forward movement. Breckinridge was forced to cool his heels in Knoxville for another 48 hours. On the morning of the 23d, Superintendent Wallace informed General Bragg, who had arrived in the city the previous day, that the trains were ready to move. Following the receipt of this news, Bragg issued instructions for
Breckinridge to "proceed immediately to Murfreesborough, Tenn., with your command, except the men belonging to the miscellaneous regiments ... ." Following his arrival in Middle Tennessee, Breckinridge was to "assume the direction of military operations in that quarter." 41

After he had been alerted to get his men aboard the trains, Breckinridge contacted Forrest. The cavalry leader was directed to send railroad transportation for 2,000 men to Bridgeport. Upon reaching the Tennessee River, the trainmen would report to Colonel Hanson, who would be in charge of the advance echelon of Breckinridge's command. 42

As a result of the destruction of the Bridgeport bridge, Breckinridge's movement into Middle Tennessee did not proceed as smoothly as anticipated. Considerable difficulty was experienced in ferrying the troops and their gear across the broad Tennessee River. Accordingly, it was the 28th before the last of Breckinridge's greyclads reached Murfreesboro. 43

During the two weeks preceding Breckinridge's arrival in Middle Tennessee, Forrest's command had been materially increased. On October 14, General Jones informed Forrest that five infantry regiments (the 18th, 20th, 28th, 32d, and 45th Tennessee) had left Knoxville en route to Murfreesboro. Two of these units (the
18th and 32d) were composed of exchanged prisoners of war captured at Fort Donelson. At the same time, Jones informed the cavalry leader that he was sending him several staff officers to help him organize his command. 

Two days later (the 16th), Jones received an encouraging message from Forrest. The cavalry leader reported that there were persistent rumors afloat indicating that the Federals were about to evacuate Nashville. To check on this news and pursue the bluecoats if it were true, Forrest ordered out 1,500 cavalrymen and a section of guns under Colonel John T. Morgan. Unfortunately for the Confederacy, the Yankees had no idea of giving up Nashville without a fight. 

After relaying this intelligence to Richmond, Jones wired Forrest. Evidently, Forrest had not been keeping Jones informed on developments at the front. When he communicated with his subordinate, Jones wanted to know: if Forrest had received and issued the small arms sent in Captain McCreery's charge, had he mustered any new cavalry units into service without arms, had the five Tennessee infantry regiments and three batteries ordered to Middle Tennessee reached Murfreesboro. In addition, Jones directed Forrest to arrest all personnel "coming from the army in Kentucky who have not written authority from proper officers to
be absent". 46

When General Jones learned on the 19th that Breckinridge had been ordered to Murfreesboro, he immediately relayed this news to Forrest. Reports had reached Knoxville from Mississippi indicating that the Federals were evacuating Corinth, Bolivar, and Jackson, and presumably going to Nashville. Jones, therefore, alerted Forrest to keep a sharp lookout to his left. 47

Apparently, Captain McCrery was having considerable trouble getting the arms shipment to Murfreesboro. On the 20th, the fiery Forrest went over Jones' head and wired Richmond. Forrest informed Secretary of War Randolph that he was "in urgent need of 5,000 stand of arms." If the government could send 1,000 carbines and sabers for his cavalry, Forrest observed, "they will be invaluable." Randolph referred the cavalryman's message to Chief of Ordnance, Colonel Josiah Gorgas. The ordnance officer reported it would be "impossible to furnish 1,000 cavalry arms, as called for by General Forrest." 48

The same day (the 20th), Jones received a letter from Forrest reporting that the reinforcements had reached Murfreesboro. Replying, Jones assured Forrest that additional troops were being rushed to his assistance. In addition, Jones wanted Forrest to send a "reliable agent to Columbia" to report...
on General Rosecrans' activities. On the following day, Jones, in acknowledging a telegram from Forrest, directed the cavalryman to, "Keep the enemy hemmed in at Nashville." Forrest was again admonished to, "Keep a sharp lookout on the left for Grant or Rosecrans and in front for Buell's forces." 50

In the month that he had been at Murfreesboro, Forrest had succeeded in raising, organizing, and mustering into Confederate service, four regiments of cavalry (Russell's 4th Alabama, and the 4th, 8th, and 9th Tennessee). This was double the number authorized by General Bragg. Since Forrest was unable to obtain the carbines which he had requisitioned, he was compelled to arm these units with inferior arms (shotguns and squirrel rifles). Forrest, however, had been unable to raise in the Murfreesboro area the four infantry regiments which General Bragg had authorized. 51

When he detrained on the 28th, Breckinridge issued a "General Order" assuming command of all the Confederate troops operating in the Murfreesboro area. 52 Next, the general proceeded to organize his infantry and artillery into three brigades. The Orphan Brigade, Colonel Hanson commanding, would constitute the reserve and camp on the Shelbyville road south of town. Colonel Joseph B. Palmer was placed in charge of a brigade
consisting of the 32d Alabama, the 8th Florida, and the 18th and 32d Tennessee Infantry regiments. Batteries B and G, 14th Georgia Light Artillery Battalion were assigned by the chief of artillery to Palmer's brigade. Palmer's unit would constitute Breckinridge's right and occupy the ground northwest of town between the Nashville and Lebanon pikes. Breckinridge's left was held by Colonel Walker's brigade. Four infantry regiments (the 60th North Carolina, and the 20th, 28th, and 45th Tennessee) and two batteries (Eldridge's Tennessee and the Jackson Georgia Artillery) constituted Walker's brigade. Walker's command was posted west of Murfreesboro, between the Nashville pike and the Franklin road, and guarded Breckinridge's left. Major J. T. Montgomery was placed in charge of the reserve artillery -- Batteries C, D, and F, 14th Georgia Light Artillery Battalion. 53

At the same time, Breckinridge placed Forrest in command of all the cavalry operating on the approaches to Nashville. Two batteries, Roberts' Arkansas and Freeman's Tennessee, were assigned to the cavalry by Breckinridge's chief of artillery, Major Rice E. Graves. Forrest was to reconnoiter thoroughly the countryside between Nashville and Murfreesboro. Strong mounted patrols would be thrown out with instructions to harass the foe at every opportunity. In addition, Forrest was to send scouting parties...
across the Cumberland. These groups were to keep a sharp lookout for "the approach of the enemy from the north to Nashville, or toward our lines from any point east or west of Nashville, or from the direction of the Tennessee River." 54

Within a week of the time that he had reached Murfreesboro, Breckinridge tested the Nashville defenses. Learning that Colonel John H. Morgan's hard-riding cavalrymen had reached Gallatin, Breckinridge carefully matured his plans for an attack on the Nashville Federals. In the meantime, the general had also learned that there were several hundred cars and a number of engines belonging to the Louisville and Nashville Railroad in the Edgefield yards. This was across the Cumberland River from Nashville. Accordingly, Breckinridge ordered Morgan to raid Edgefield and destroy this valuable rolling stock. Forrest's cavalry command, supported by infantry and artillery, was alerted to cover Morgan's dash into Edgefield by feinting an attack on Nashville. Both Forrest and Morgan were directed to have their respective commands in position and ready to attack by daybreak on November 5. Morgan was to keep his men under cover until after Forrest's guns had roared into action. Breckinridge believed that Forrest's demonstration would so engross the Federals that they would forget about the possibility of an
attack on the Edgefield marshaling yards. 55

In accordance with the master plan worked out by Breckinridge, Hanson's and Palmer's brigades and their supporting batteries left Murfreesboro on the 4th. Moving along the Nashville pike, the grey clad infantry reached Lavergne late in the afternoon. Here, the column rendezvoused with Forrest's cavalry. While the officers were perfecting their plans, the soldiers were permitted to get a few hours' sleep. 56

At 9 p. m. the soldiers were aroused and mustered. Since Breckinridge wished the troops to be in position by daybreak, the butternuts were required to make a night march. When the advance was resumed, Hanson's and Palmer's brigades continued to use the Nashville pike. Colonel Alfred A. Russell’s 4th Alabama Cavalry screened the infantry's advance. Colonel John T. Morgan's mounted command (the 51st Alabama and a battalion of the 3d Tennessee) operated on the left of the infantry, covering the ground between the pike and Stones River. Colonel James H. Starnes, with a strong force of cavalry (the 4th and 8th Tennessee, and Douglass' battalion) and Forrest's two batteries (Freeman's and Roberts'), used the Nolensville pike as the axis of his advance. 57

At daybreak, the Confederate cavalry attacked the Union
pickets. Between the Nashville pike and Stones River, Colonel John T. Morgan's troopers easily drove in the Federal vedettes, killing and wounding several. Colonel Russell's cavalrymen encountered a Union outpost at Dogtown. Dismounting his men, Russell pressed forward. The bluecoats quickly fell back on their outlying fortifications. These consisted of crude log and brush barricades covering the approaches to a commanding hill south of the pike. Here, the Northerners made a stand. After a brisk skirmish, Russell's Alabamans forced the Yankees to retire into their main defense line. As soon as his troopers had occupied the hill, Forrest had the cannoneers of Battery B, 14th Georgia Light Artillery Battalion emplace their four 3.3-inch rifles on its crest. The Georgia artillerists opened fire on the Union position on top of Jones Hill, one and one-half miles away.

Simultaneously, Starnes' column had pushed up the Nolensville pike. Unlimbering their pieces, Freeman's and Roberts' gunners began to hammer away at the Union force dug in on Saint Cloud's Hill (Fort Negley). Two of the Union guns mounted in Fort Negley returned the Confederates' fire. When the Confederate artillery went into action, Hanson and Palmer deployed their infantry into line of battle on either side of the Nashville pike. 58

About this time, Forrest's men heard firing from the
direction of Edgefield. This indicated that Colonel John H.
Morgan was carrying out his portion of the operation.
Accordingly, Forrest kept up his demonstration until 10 a. m.
Since the sound of the distant firing had died down, Breckinridge
ordered Forrest to fall back. Breaking contact with the foe,
the Confederates fell back. The two infantry brigades and John
T. Morgan's and Russell's cavalry returned to Lavergne; Starnes'
command headed for the Franklin pike. 59

Colonel John H. Morgan's cavalry left Gallatin as
scheduled on the night of the 4th. By daybreak, the raiders had
taken position on the approaches to Edgefield. When Forrest's
guns opened fire, Morgan's grim raiders moved to the attack. At
this time, Edgefield was garrisoned by the 16th Illinois,
Colonel Robert F. Smith commanding. After a sharp fight, the
Rebels succeeded in gaining control of the yards. A company of
the 16th Illinois (E) was stationed in the depot. Morgan's
troopers quickly surrounded the building. Undaunted, the
bluecoats cut their way through the Confederate lines and
rejoined their comrades.

Encouraged by this success, the Yankees counterattacked
and recovered the initiative. Company C, which had been bypassed,
launched a sudden thrust against the Confederates on the Gallatin pike. The Union commander at Nashville, General Negley, correctly deduced that the Confederate activities on the south side of the river were designed to cover Morgan's attack. Consequently, he began to pour troops across the river. These infantrymen "streamed at the double-quick over the pontoon bridge." The intervention of these fresh troops frustrated the efforts of Morgan's demolition teams to destroy the rolling stock. Following the arrival of these reinforcements, Morgan decided to break off the engagement. Accordingly, the Confederates withdrew, leaving one stand of colors, five dead, and 19 wounded in the Yankees' hands. Only a small number of cars and an old building belonging to the railroad had been burned. Morgan's raid on Edgefield had been a failure. 60

In the wake of Morgan's repulse, General Negley learned that Forrest's troopers were likewise retiring. Shortly thereafter, the general received information that the foe was still lurking beyond the picket line. Negley, therefore, determined to drive the Confederates from the Nashville approaches. Colonel George W. Roberts was placed in charge of a combat team composed of two regiments and a section of artillery. With this force, Roberts was to feel his way toward Lavergne.
General Negley (accompanied by the 69th Ohio, detachments drawn from the 78th Pennsylvania and the 14th Michigan Infantry, the 7th Pennsylvania and the 5th Tennessee Cavalry, and two sections of artillery) proposed to make a forced reconnaissance in the direction of Franklin. 61

As Negley's troops pushed down the Franklin pike, they flushed and put to flight several small Confederate patrols. At the seven mile post, Negley directed Colonel William B. Stokes to have his regiment, the 5th Tennessee (Union) Cavalry, charge the retreating foe. Thundering forward, the bluecoats pursued the butternuts to within five miles of Franklin. During the chase, the Unionists, besides overtaking and capturing several of the greyclads, bagged a drove of cattle.

In the meantime, Colonel Starnes' column, accompanied by General Forrest, approached the Franklin pike. Neither Forrest nor Negley was expecting the other to be where he was. In his "After Action Report", Forrest wrote, "The Abolitionists were in ambush with four regiments of infantry, ... [four] pieces of artillery, and a battalion of ... [the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry] ... ." General Negley recalled, "the enemy appeared in considerable force upon our left, front, and rear, with the evident intention of cutting off the cavalry [Stokes] and our retreat."
To keep Stokes from being isolated, Negley moved down the Franklin pike about a mile. By the time Stokes' cavalry had rejoined his command, Negley learned from his scouts that the Rebels were emplacing their artillery in a position from where it could "play" upon the pike. This information was correct. In accordance with Forrest's instructions, the cannoneers of Freeman's and Roberts' batteries had unlimbered their eight guns east of the road. Reacting with alacrity, Negley prepared to smash the Confederate roadblock. The Federals quickly retraced their steps. Finding a commanding position, the Northern gunners quickly placed their four pieces in battery. After a spirited contest of about an hour's duration, the bluecoated artillerists gained the upper hand. Freeman's and Roberts' gunners, in order to avoid serious damage, were compelled to shift their pieces. Negley's troops took advantage of this situation to clear the Confederate troopers from the road. With the roadblock broken, Negley's column headed for Nashville. To discourage pursuit, Negley used his cavalry, stiffened by the 14th Michigan, to cover his retreat. Even so, Forrest's troopers hounded the Yankees until they reached the security afforded by the Nashville defenses. 62

As usual, there was a wide variance in the casualty
reports submitted by the belligerents. Forrest stated that in this action he lost 1 killed and 3 wounded. At the same time, the Confederate leader listed the Union casualties as "40 killed, 20 prisoners, and 60 wounded." General Negley reported that his command suffered 38 casualties in this running fight -- 21 wounded and 17 missing. The Union general announced that during the course of the day's fighting his troops had captured 23 Confederates, including two of Morgan's officers. 63

Evidently, Colonel Roberts' combat team failed to overtake the main Confederate column as it fell back on Lavergne. It was probably fortunate for the Federals that they didn't, because Roberts' command was badly outnumbered. After advancing as far as the Insane Asylum without sighting any greycoats except a few scouts, who kept at a safe distance, Roberts' troops returned to the Nashville perimeter.

By nightfall on the 5th, General Forrest's and Colonel Morgan's troopers had returned to their respective bases at Gallatin and Lavergne. The next day, Hanson's and Palmer's infantry proceeded to Murfreesboro. Forrest, in accordance with the instructions which he had received from Breckinridge, remained at Lavergne. To harass the Federal foraging operations on the south side of the Cumberland, Forrest kept a number of
strong combat patrols operating on the approaches to Nashville. In accordance with instructions which he had received from General Breckinridge, Forrest sent several of his best scouts toward Pittsburg Landing. These individuals were to keep a sharp lookout for the strong contingents from Grant's Army of the Tennessee which were reportedly moving into Middle Tennessee from that direction. 64

When General Negley made his report of the raid on Edgefield, he informed General Rosecrans that he did "not apprehend an attack upon Nashville in force before the arrival of re-enforcements". (General Rosecrans had relieved General Buell as the commander of the Army of the Ohio on October 30. At the same time, the Army of the Ohio was redesignated the Army of the Cumberland.) Negley informed his superior that the foe was continuing "to concentrate troops at Murfreesborough and toward Nashville." The general reported that the Confederate force in Middle Tennessee "positively exceeds 25,000, of which at least 5,000 are cavalry". Furthermore, Negley observed, the Rebels had "about forty pieces of artillery." (While the information reaching Negley concerning the strength of the Confederate artillery and cavalry was accurate, he had greatly overestimated their total force. At this time, Breckinridge's had about 11,000
officers and men, supported by 44 guns.) In closing, Negley
wrote, "Their cavalry approach our lines daily, and are engaged
in driving off stock and negroes. My command is in fine spirits
and the transportation in excellent condition." 65

Following the failure of the Edgefield raid, Colonel
Morgan found his command in the path of Rosecrans' advancing army.
Taking position at Gallatin, Morgan threw out strong detachments
to harass the bluecoats, and, if possible, delay their march.
McClellan's wing, however, reached Nashville without making contact
with Morgan's raiders. Crittenden's corps, however, was not so
fortunate. On the 7th, the greyclads succeeded in ambushing
Crittenden's advance guard near Tyree Springs. A volley delivered
at 75 yards' range inflicted some loss on the Federals. Similar
harassing attacks were made on Crittenden's column on the
following day. In a determined effort to break up these attacks,
Crittenden turned part of his corps toward Gallatin. Early on
the morning of the 9th, Wood's and Van Cleve's divisions closed
in on Morgan's base of operations. The Unionists almost bagged
Morgan's raiders. But in the nick of time, the greyclads eluded
the oncoming foe and escaped across the Cumberland River. Falling
back on Murfreesboro, Morgan's raiders, in accordance with
instructions from Breckinridge, took position at Baird's Mills. 66
The vanguard of the Army of the Cumberland, McCook's wing, reached Nashville on the 8th. The Federals had won the race into Middle Tennessee. It would now be suicidal for Breckinridge, with his limited force, to attempt to take the city by coup de main. In fact, Breckinridge might even have trouble holding on to Murfreesboro, pending the arrival of Bragg's army, in case the Yankees chose to seize the initiative. Fortunately for the Confederates, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad had been so badly damaged during the recent Kentucky Campaign that it was not reopened for through traffic until November 26. By the time the railroad had been repaired and Rosecrans had concentrated his army at Nashville, Bragg's army had reached Murfreesboro.
Breckinridge Goes to Middle Tennessee

1 Q. R., Series I, Vol. XVI, pt. II, 997: Johnny Green of the Orphan Brigade -- The Journal of a Confederate Soldier. Ed. A. D. Kirwan (Lexington, 1956), 49. Breckinridge's troops had been withdrawn from the Baton Rouge area on August 19. The next month was spent in Mississippi camps, first at Brandon and then on the Coldwater River. On September 19, the troops were loaded on trains, preparatory to moving to East Tennessee. The soldiers passed through Jackson and Meridian. At York, Alabama, they detrained and marched to Demopolis. At Demopolis, the greyclads were embarked on steamboats for the next leg of their trip. At Tensas Station, Breckinridge's soldiers disembarked from the boats. Again boarding trains, the troops completed their journey to East Tennessee by rail. Johnny Green, 47-48. The following units accompanied Breckinridge to East Tennessee: the 4th, 6th and 9th Kentucky Infantry, the 19th, 20th, 28th, and 45th Tennessee Infantry, Cobb's Kentucky and McClung's Tennessee batteries. In addition to a large number of casualties, Maxey's


3 Ibid., 998.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., 997-998.

6 Ibid., 998-999.

7 Ibid., 998; Johnny Green, 49.

8 Johnny Green, 49-50.


10 Ibid., 876-877.

11 Ibid., 913.

12 Ibid., 890, 907.


14 Ibid., 1020-1021.


16 Ibid., 929.

17 Ibid. A powerful Confederate force led by General Van Dorn had been defeated at Corinth, Mississippi, on October 3-4 by the Federals under Major General William S. Rosecrans.

18 Ibid., 929-930.
19 Ibid., 931.
20 Ibid., 930.
21 Ibid., 933.
22 Ibid., 933-934.
23 Ibid., 935.
24 Ibid., 934.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., 937-938.
27 Ibid., 938.
28 Ibid., 999.
29 Ibid., 999-1000.
30 Ibid., 951.
31 Johnny Green, 50.
33 Ibid., 1001.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., 962.
36 Ibid., 1002.
37 Ibid., 967-968.
38 Ibid., 969.
39 Johnny Green, 50.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 1003; Johnny Green, 50.
46 Ibid., 952-953.
47 Ibid., 968-969.
48 Ibid., 970-971.
49 Ibid., 972.
50 Ibid., 973.
53 Ibid., 981.
54 Ibid., 980-981.
57 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 4-5; Duke, "Morgan's Cavalry During the Bragg Invasion", Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, III, 28.
62 Ibid., 4-5, 7.
63 Ibid., 5, 7.
66 Duke, "Morgan's Cavalry During the Bragg Invasion", Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, III, 28.
CHAPTER III

The Generals Are Called on the Carpet —

Bragg Sells the Authorities on His Middle Tennessee Campaign

In the meantime, the Richmond authorities were becoming alarmed. Many reports had reached the capital, indicating there was widespread dissatisfaction in Bragg's "Army Group" regarding the general's conduct of the Kentucky Campaign.

Furthermore, President Jefferson Davis wanted to know what Bragg planned to do next. On the 20th the War Department wired the general. Bragg was directed to send "an intelligent officer" from his command to Richmond. This officer was to be prepared to brief the Richmond bureaucrats on Bragg's future plan of operations, the condition of the "Army Group", and all the information which the general had been able to garner regarding the foe. At this time, the Richmond leaders dropped a gentle hint as to what direction they wanted Bragg to turn his attention. It was pointed out that "Co-operation between your command and that of [Lieutenant] Generals [Theophilus H.] Holmes and [John C.] Pemberton is indicated."
Unknown to Bragg, the War Department had also addressed a communication to General Holmes on the 20th. Besides informing Holmes of Bragg's failure to hold Kentucky, Secretary of War George Randolph sketched out a plan which he hoped would lead to the recovery of Tennessee and the Mississippi Valleys. Holmes was directed to forget about his projected invasion of Missouri. Instead, he would hold his forces ready to "co-operate with General Pemberton for the protection of the Mississippi Valley". Randolph wrote that as yet Richmond had not learned what course of action Bragg intended to pursue on his return to Tennessee. Since Bragg's army had not been "seriously weakened", the Secretary of War observed, he was undoubtedly giving up Kentucky preparatory to completing the conquest of Tennessee.

Randolph believed that if Bragg's, Holmes' and Pemberton's armies converged on a central point, it would lead to the quick recovery of the Mississippi Valley. As the initial step toward implementing this plan, Holmes was directed to get in touch with General Pemberton. At the same time, the Richmond brass, working in conjunction with General Bragg, would endeavor to hammer out the details of this vast campaign. Randolph assured Holmes that as soon as the details were arranged they
would be communicated to Pemberton, who in turn would relay them to him. Pending the receipt of further information, Holmes would prepare for offensive operations against Helena, Arkansas.

Randolph felt that the reoccupation of Helena "would seem to be the first step necessary to secure Arkansas and the Mississippi Valley and to put ... [Holmes] in position for entering Tennessee". Before turning to a discussion of the conscription act, Randolph commented, "If the fall campaign can be closed by the reoccupation of Tennessee and the restoration of our communications with the Trans-Mississippi Department we shall be well content to leave Kentucky and Missouri for another campaign." 2

Bragg established his headquarters at Morristown, Tennessee, on the 21st. Here, the general received the telegram which the War Department had sent to him on the preceding day regarding his future plans. Without wasting a minute, the vigorous general placed one of his staff officers, Colonel H. W. Walter, on the first eastbound train. Walter was instructed to inform the Richmond authorities that Bragg planned to transfer the Army of the Mississippi to Middle Tennessee. Bragg proposed to use the railroads of the area to effect this movement. The general used the telegraph to keep Richmond abreast of these developments. In addition, Bragg observed that the scheduled
shift to Middle Tennessee would be suspended if the War
Department raised any objections. 3

The following day (the 22d), Bragg moved to Knoxville.
Besides notifying Adjutant General Samuel Cooper of this, the
general reiterated his intention to "press into Middle Tennessee
and hold the country south" of the Cumberland River. Continuing,
Bragg reported, "The Army of the Mississippi is much shattered."
In an effort to strengthen his army, Bragg inquired of Cooper,
"Can I draw on Kirby Smith for any surplus troops he may have." 4

By the following morning, Bragg decided it might be a
good idea if he sent a second officer to Richmond. This man would
reinforce Colonel Walter's arguments in favor of the projected
movement into Middle Tennessee. The officer selected for this
mission was Colonel Preston Smith. Before departing for
Richmond, Smith was handed a memorandum which he was to deliver
to the President. This dispatch contained Bragg's arguments in
support of his plan to occupy the country between the Cumberland
and Tennessee rivers. In the main, Bragg based his case on the
economic wealth of the region involved. If the Confederates held
the area, he argued, they would be able to utilize the foodstuffs
and forage which the planters and farmers of this section of the
state raised. At the same time, the Yankees would be denied
supplies from this fertile region. Bragg admitted that the position he proposed to occupy was exposed and hazardous. But, he continued, he felt confident that if the Confederates pursued a cautious policy, it could be maintained. Discussing the strength of his command, Bragg commented, "Our forces are not yet sufficiently assembled to enable me to give a correct idea of what strength we may assemble there [in Middle Tennessee], but it cannot exceed 40,000 men, part raw recruits." In closing, Bragg wrote that within a short period of time the Federals would be able to concentrate a larger force in the Nashville area than he. But, the general remarked, by a rapid concentration, he might be able to encompass Buell's downfall. Provided, of course, that the Union troops in West Tennessee were pinned down. 5

Shortly after the train bearing Colonel Smith had chugged away from the Knoxville depot, an important telegram was delivered to General Bragg. This message originated with Adjutant General Cooper. Perusing the dispatch, Bragg discovered that Colonel Walter had reached Richmond. Furthermore, the President had expressed a desire to see the general, if it were feasible for him to take leave of his army for several days. 6 Acknowledging Cooper's communication, Bragg wired that he would "leave for Richmond by first train to-morrow".

5
Preparatory for his departure for the capital city, Bragg issued a special order placing General Polk in charge of the Army of the Mississippi during his absence. Since no orders had been received from the War Department forbidding the transfer of the army to Middle Tennessee, Bragg determined to leave Polk instructions on this subject. Accordingly, the bishop-general was directed to move the army to Murfreesboro. 

Bragg left Knoxville by train on the morning of the 24th. He reached Richmond on the following day. The general remained in the capital until the 31st when he returned to Knoxville. During this time the general spent practically all his time in conferences with the President, Randolph, and lesser War Department functionaries. It appears that the busily-browed North Carolinian did not have very much trouble selling his friend, the President, on his contemplated scheme to establish the Army of the Mississippi in Middle Tennessee. Randolph's well-founded plan to effect a concentration of Bragg's, Holmes', and Pemberton's armies for the purpose of seizing the initiative and recovering the Mississippi Valley was literally tossed out the window. In a communication addressed to General Holmes, on the 27th, Randolph pointed out that General Bragg was in Richmond. Turning to Holmes' future courses of action, the Secretary of War made no
mention of his pet project of effecting the co-operation of the Trans-Mississippi troops and Bragg's and Pemberton's armies for the purpose of recovering the Mississippi Valley. Instead, Randolph was forced to content himself with a statement pointing out that co-operation between Pemberton and Holmes was "indispensable to the preservation of our connections with" the Trans-Mississippi. 8

Besides discussing his future plans with the President, Bragg utilized his Richmond visit to divest himself of the blame for the failure of the Kentucky Campaign. Bragg was not hesitant when it came to nominating a scapegoat for the bungling. The general pointed an accusing finger at one of his two subordinates, General Polk. Davis generally seemed to accept at face value anything Bragg told him. But Polk, too, was a personal friend. Accordingly, the President determined to hear Polk's side of the story. 9

Davis reserved making a final decision on Bragg's proposed plan of operations until the 1st. This was the day following the general's departure. When the President did decide, it was in favor of the movement into Middle Tennessee. In addition, Bragg was granted "authority to draw such portions of the troops from" Kirby Smith's department "as may be disposable,
and for such time as these operations may require ... " The number of troops to be detached from Smith's command was to be limited by several factors. It was the President's firm wish that a sufficient force be left in East Tennessee to provide for the defense of Cumberland Gap and the vital railroad linking southwestern Virginia with Chattanooga. Bragg was instructed to consult Kirby Smith in order to determine the number of troops needed to perform these duties.

For the time being, Kirby Smith was to remain in command of the Department of East Tennessee. It would be left up to Smith to determine whether he would accompany the troops sent from his command to accompany Bragg into Middle Tennessee or remain in personal charge of his department.

Bragg was directed to begin the movement into Middle Tennessee as early as practicable. This welcomed message was delivered to the general at Knoxville. 10

At the same time, the War Department acquainted Kirby Smith with the contents of Bragg's telegram. 11

After returning to Knoxville, Bragg held several long conferences with his staff officers. What he learned at these meetings caused the general to wince. His chief of ordnance, Lieutenant Colonel Hypolite Oladowski, informed him that there
were no ordnance depots in his department. Worse, the officer continued, there was no suitable place to establish one for either the repair or manufacture of arms and accoutrements. Furthermore, when munitions were shipped to Bragg's army, they had to pass through some other officer's department. At that time, Bragg's command, in order to supply its ordnance needs, was intruding on either General Pierre G. T. Beauregard's Georgia magazines or Kirby Smith's Chattanooga arsenal.

Lieutenant Colonel L. W. O'Bannon, the chief quartermaster, and Major J. J. Walker, the chief commissary officer, likewise informed Bragg that their depots were located in Kirby Smith's department. While General Smith had given the officers no difficulty in requisitioning supplies, the same could not be said of several members of the general's staff.

In a letter informing the Richmond authorities of these difficulties, Bragg noted, "Constant conflicts are arising, and my authority is set at defiance." Continuing, Bragg reported that, in view of this situation, he was "obliged to yield, and ask for what ... [he] ought to order." The general caustically commented, "To any one acquainted with the great importance of unity and promptness in military duty, these difficulties will appear most serious." To Bragg, they spelled the safety of his
command.

Next, Bragg reported on the strength of the Army of the Mississippi. The general was convinced that it would be unwise to carry his 30,000 effectives into Middle Tennessee. As yet, the general had been unable to see Kirby Smith. Accordingly, Bragg did not know how many troops Kirby Smith would let him have. Bragg hazarded the opinion that it was a mistake for the government to leave this vital question to the officers involved. 12

Bragg then turned to a subject which he considered "second to no other". The general pointed out that the Confederate armies were "gradually but certainly, melting away, whilst we are getting no re-enforcements, no recruits, and cannot see a source from which they are to come." To support this contention, the general observed that some of his regiments were down to 100 privates. Bragg reported that while the conscript law had been in effect for seven months, his army had not yet received its first man from this source. If none were forthcoming under the provisions of this act, Bragg inquired, "Where and how are we to obtain men?" Bragg observed that the foe by the spring of 1863 would "be able to bring against us an army vastly superior to any he has yet operated with". The general freely predicted that the Confederates would find it very difficult to
meet these hosts, "unless active measures are immediately put in
operation to collect our men and put them in shape." "For the
first time in the war", Bragg remarked, "we had to complain of a
want of men to handle our arms." 13

When Bragg's memorandum reached Richmond, it was referred
to the War Department. Before an official action could be taken
on the question raised by Bragg, Randolph had resigned as Secretary
of War. President Davis hand-picked James A. Seddon as the able
Randolph's successor. By the time Seddon was sworn in, Bragg had
been able to work out most of the problems alluded to in his
letter, except for the one relating to conscription. Taking up
this subject, Seddon recommended that "some competent officer" be
assigned to superintend the "enforcement of the conscript law".
Adjutant General Cooper suggested that Brigadier General Edward
Johnson, who was still incapacitated by the wounds which he had
received at the battle of McDowell in May, be placed in charge of
supervising the conscript law. 14

Bragg resumed command of his department on the 3d. The
next day Bragg advised Richmond that he was in the process of
reorganizing his army. He proposed to weld the Army of the
Mississippi into two corps of three divisions each. A brigade
of cavalry would be assigned to each corps. Generals Polk and
Hardee were to command the newly constituted corps. To carry out his plan, the general proposed to withdraw McCown's division from Kirby Smith's command, and reorganize and expand Breckenridge's division. Since McCown's division had belonged to the Army of the Mississippi prior to its departure from Tupelo, Mississippi, the previous June, Bragg believed he was justified in making this reassignment. In closing, Bragg recommended that the officers in charge of his cavalry brigades -- Colonels Wheeler and Wharton -- be given the rank of brigadier general. 15

Having provided for his army's reorganization, Bragg began to wrestle with some of the other weighty problems that were confronting his command. The Kentucky Campaign had been one of many hard marches. Accordingly, many of the soldiers had worn out their shoes. When the quartermaster department was unable to make available enough footwear to reshoe the army, Bragg took prompt action. A special order was issued, directing the division commanders to have their muster rolls examined. The names of all men having had previous experience as shoemakers would be forwarded to army headquarters. Individuals with a knowledge of this trade, whom the medical corps reported unfit for service in the field, would be put to work on "Operation Shoe Repair." 16
On the 5th the hot-tempered Bragg inaugurated a vigorous campaign to increase the effective strength of his army. The various staff departments (commissary, medical, ordnance, and quartermaster) were instructed to hire civilians for non-military duties. Bragg stated that after the 30th of the month, no soldier or citizen liable for military duty, whose task could be performed by hired employees, would be permitted in any staff department. Next, Bragg turned his attention to securing the return to their respective organizations of all the absentees, both officers and enlisted men. As the initial step in coping with this distressing situation, the general ordered the unit commanders to prepare lists containing the names, the present address and the duty station, the residence if on leave or without leave, and the length of time they had been away, of all army personnel. A separate list containing the names and addresses of all the soldiers who had deserted the colors during the past eight months would likewise be forwarded to army headquarters. To facilitate the return to duty of the paroled and exchanged prisoners, a camp for their reception was established at Chattanooga. The commandant of the camp, Lieutenant Samuel M. McIntosh, was directed to send to Bragg each day a roster of the persons reporting to him. 

17
Early on the morning of the 7th, the rear echelon of the Army of the Mississippi clambered aboard the waiting cars of the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad. Once he had seen the last of his troops off, on the first leg of their trying train ride to Middle Tennessee, Bragg returned to his headquarters. Before leaving Knoxville, Bragg, having received no objections from Richmond, formally announced the organization of the Army of the Mississippi into corps. Evidently, the War Department had turned thumbs down on the general’s proposal to recapture control of McCown’s division. Because, while Bragg assigned Breckinridge’s division to Polk’s corps, he failed to make any disposition of McCown’s unit. Wheeler’s cavalry brigade was attached to Polk’s corps; Wharton’s was assigned to Hardee’s. Since Polk had been summoned to Richmond, Bragg resumed command of the army. 18

During the day, Bragg received a disturbing message from General Pemberton. The Mississippi commander advised Bragg that a powerful Union column led by Major General Ulysses S. Grant had occupied La Grange, Tennessee. To make matters worse, this Federal force was now threatening Holly Springs. In an effort to take some of the pressure off Pemberton, Bragg ordered Colonel Philip D. Roddey into action. At this time, Roddey’s small cavalry command was based at Tuscumbia in northwestern Alabama.
Roddey was instructed to throw out several combat patrols in the
direction of Corinth. If the Corinth Yankees were in motion,
Roddey was to harass their rear and try to destroy their trains.

When he notified Pemberton of this, Bragg expressed
regret that he could not do more. But, the general continued,
he was engaged in transferring his entire available force into
Middle Tennessee. Once this movement had been completed, Bragg
commented, he was prepared to launch an offensive against the foe
in the Nashville area. Bragg felt that his advance into Middle
Tennessee would seriously threaten Grant's communications, thus
creating a diversion in Pemberton's favor. The general assured
Pemberton that he would prefer to strike for Corinth. Bragg
pointed out that the Tennessee River was a barrier which he could
not hope to overcome. 19

Having wound up his business in Knoxville, Bragg caught a
train for Chattanooga. The general detrained in the latter city
late on the afternoon of the 7th. Bragg remained in Chattanooga
until the 13th, when he transferred his headquarters to Tullahoma.
During the six days that he was in Chattanooga, Bragg worked with
night and main to see that his army's movement to Middle Tennessee
was expedited. On the 12th, the day before he moved to Tullahoma,
Bragg addressed a note to General Beauregard. The Charleston
commander was informed that the Army of the Mississippi was being rapidly concentrated in Middle Tennessee. The combative Bragg wrote that should the Federals move out of their Nashville entrenchments, he would give them battle. Bragg expected the Yankees to outnumber his troops in the pending campaign. But he informed Beauregard "our hopes are strong and our troops very confident." 20

On the same day that Bragg went to Chattanooga, General Polk left Knoxville for Richmond and his meeting with the President. Following his arrival in the Confederate capital, Polk was closely questioned by the President. The general gave blunt answers to his former schoolmate's searching questions. Polk generously accorded Bragg credit for being a good disciplinarian and a skillful organizer. Continuing, Polk observed that, in his candid opinion, Bragg was "wanting in the higher elements of generalship". Polk stated flatly that the Kentucky campaign had been a failure. Furthermore, he remarked, both Kirby Smith and Hardin concurred with him on this point. To make matters worse, Polk announced, Bragg no longer possessed the confidence of his principal subordinates. In response to an inquiry from the President, Polk suggested that General Joseph E. Johnston be placed in charge of the Army of the Mississippi if
Bragg were displaced. This was not a diplomatic remark on the general's part, because if Bragg were a special favorite of Davis', Johnston was already becoming an object of the chief executive's festering antipathy. 21

With this business in Richmond taken care of, Polk asked for a short leave of absence. The general's request was approved. Polk spent his furlough with his family in North Carolina.

Another of the ranking generals who had been involved in the Kentucky fiasco visited Richmond at this time. He likewise intended to tell his tale of woe to the President. Even before he reached Knoxville, Kirby Smith sent his trusted friend, Doctor Sol A. Smith, to Richmond with a confidential letter addressed to Davis. The general entered Knoxville on October 24 "a tired and discouraged man". He avoided a rousing public reception, staged by his friends, by slipping into the city after dark. When the news that the general was in town became public property, a group of his ardent admirers demanded that he sit for a full length portrait for the state gallery. After his sitting, he retired to his quiet and "elegantly furnished" rooms in the Cowan home. Here, the general meditated upon the futility of war. 22

Kirby Smith was vexed to discover on his return to East Tennessee that, without his knowledge, General Jones had been
placed in charge of his department. To clarify this unpleasant
development, Kirby Smith wired Richmond for instructions. 23
Secretary of War Randolph replied on the 26th. Kirby Smith was
informed that he had been promoted to lieutenant general. By
virtue of his rank, Smith would command in East Tennessee, but
Jones would remain in the department for the time being. 24

Several days later, a long personal letter from Davis
reached Kirby Smith. The letter delivered to the President by
Dr. Smith has disappeared. Its contents, therefore, can be
determined only by Davis' reply. The President agreed with Smith
that the Kentucky campaign had been "a bitter disappointment".
Davis, however, felt that the events should not be judged by
"knowledge acquired after they transpired". He had conversed at
length with Bragg, Davis informed Smith. Furthermore, Davis
wrote, Bragg had spoken of Smith "in the most complimentary terms,
and does not seem to imagine your dissatisfaction." The President
believed that Bragg had proven to be a keen administrator and had
demonstrated an intimate knowledge of his troops. Davis admitted
that some general of greater ability might "excite more enthusiasm",
but would in all probability not be "equally useful". 25

Having expressed his confidence in Bragg's ability, Davis
brough the subject of the possible military moves open to the Confederacy in the region between the Mississippi River and the Appalachian Mountains. Returning to Bragg, Davis told Smith, "Genl Bragg cannot move into Middle Tenn. with prospect of success without your cooperation. You are second in rank and possess to an eminent degree the confidence of the country. Your own corps could not be so useful led by another commander. How then can I withdraw you or withhold your troops?"

If he were certain that Bragg could get 30,000 recruits in Middle Tennessee, the President observed, "I would not hesitate upon your request to assign you to the duty of covering Mobile, Columbus and Vicksburg, by placing your army at Selma and Meridian to act as might be necessary." The Confederates had learned, however, to their sorrow during the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns that the promises held out by large numbers of recruits flocking to the colors could not be relied upon. "When you wrote", Davis stated, "your wounds were fresh, your lame and exhausted troops were before you, I hope time may have mollified your pain and the future operations may restore the confidence essential to cheerfulness and security in campaign." Again, the President wished to thank Kirby Smith and his brave troops for their
"patient fortitude and heroic daring" during the recent Kentucky operations. 26

Nothing more needed to be said. Kirby Smith had great confidence in Jefferson Davis. Accordingly, he would cooperate with Bragg and even follow his leadership, if the President made the request. Even so, Davis was not certain that his two trusted friends could be reconciled. He, therefore, wired Kirby Smith to come to Richmond. The general was pleased with the opportunity to converse with the President and to visit his family at Lynchburg. Evidently, Davis' appeal to Kirby Smith's patriotism was very effective. Neither Smith nor any member of his staff publicly criticized Bragg's Kentucky Campaign while the war was still in progress. 27

While en route to Lynchburg and Richmond, Kirby Smith apparently encountered Bragg. The latter officer was returning from his conference with the President at this time. Of this meeting, Smith wrote his wife, "I saw Gen. Bragg, every one prognosticated a stormy meeting -- I told him what I had written to Mr. Davis but he spoke kindly of me & in the highest terms of praise and admiration of 'my personal character and soldierly qualities' -- I was astonished but believe he is honest & means well." 28
Kirby Smith returned to Knoxville determined to render Bragg all the material assistance in his power. The general, however, confided to his wife that he saw but scant hope of victory. He and Bragg would have in Middle Tennessee not more than one-half their combined effective Kentucky strength. General Humphrey Marshall's command had returned to Virginia. An estimated one-tenth of the soldiers who had advanced into Kentucky had remained there, and one-fourth of those who had returned were on the sick list. At this moment, the general observed, "Old Doctor" Smith was grumbling and prophesying misfortune. Yet, despite this gloomy outlook, Kirby Smith resolved to accompany his troops when they moved into Middle Tennessee. Otherwise, he feared his men would mutiny if they were placed directly under Bragg. 29

Suffering from a pain in his leg and a severe head cold, Kirby Smith planned to remain in Knoxville for a few days following the departure of his troops. The general would make use of this time to put his department in order and to sit for the portrait he had agreed to have painted. It was the first week in December before Kirby Smith finished his business in East Tennessee and joined his troops in the Murfreesboro area.
Prior to his departure from Knoxville, Smith placed General Heth in temporary charge of the Department of East Tennessee.
NOTES ON CHAPTER III

The Generals Are Called on the Carpet --

Bragg Sells the Authorities on His Middle Tennessee Campaign

1 O. R., Series I, Vol. XVI, pt. II, 970. General Holmes commanded the Trans-Mississippi Department; Pemberton was in charge of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana.

2 O. R., Series I, Vol. XIII, 889-890. Although the message does not appear in the Official Records, General Pemberton, since he was directly involved in this projected plan of operations, undoubtedly was kept abreast of developments.


4 Ibid.


7 Ibid., 976-978. The position which the army was to occupy following its arrival in Murfreesboro was to be left to Polk's discretion.


9 Stanley F. Horn, The Army of Tennessee (Indianapolis, 1941), 190.

11 Ibid., 384.

12 Ibid., 386. The return for the Army of the Mississippi on November 2, 1863, listed: Present for duty, infantry 22,945, artillery 1,504, cavalry 3,111. This gave an effective total of 27,560 officers and men. Furthermore, there were 6,056 officers and men presently with the army who were unable to take the field. These were either in hospitals, on limited duty, or on detached service, etc. Currently, 24,065 soldiers were absent from the army. All of these who were not on furloughs could be classed as either stragglers or deserters. Ibid., 385.

13 Ibid., 386. Bragg also called the War Department's attention to the new regiments then being organized in East Tennessee. The general was of the opinion that if the conscript law were to be enforced in this area, the men, to discourage desertion, ought to be placed "in regiments far removed from their homes". Ibid., 386-387.

14 Ibid., 387. Randolph resigned as Secretary of War on November 18; Seddon took office six days later. Between Randolph's resignation and the advent of Seddon, Major General Gustavus W. Smith served as the interim Secretary of War.

15 Ibid., 388. On June 27 Bragg had issued instructions
detaching McCown's division from his army and sending it to East Tennessee. During the Kentucky Campaign, McCown's division had operated with Kirby Smith's army. O. R., Series I, Vol. XVI, pt. II, 720.


17 Ibid., 392.

18 Ibid., 393. Wheeler had been advanced to brigadier general; the promotion to date from October 30.

19 Ibid., 394.

20 Ibid., 400. General Beauregard was in command of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, with headquarters at Charleston.

21 Ibid., 393; Horn, The Army of Tennessee, 190; William M. Polk, Leonidas Polk, Bishop and General, 11, 158.


24 Ibid., 979.

25 Parks, General Kirby Smith, 244.

26 Ibid., 244-245.

27 Ibid., 245.

28 Ibid.

iii
29 Ibid., 246.
30 Ibid., 246-247, 249.
The vanguard of the Army of the Mississippi, with which General Bragg traveled, reached Cumberland Gap on the 19th. It was five days later when the rear echelon of Kirby Smith's Army of Kentucky passed through the historic gap. 1

Several days before his Army of Kentucky started through the gap, General Kirby Smith drafted plans for supplying his officers and men once they had re-entered Tennessee. Lieutenant Colonel H. McD. McElrath, the chief quartermaster, was directed to employ all the wheeled vehicles he could lay his hands on to rush supplies from the East Tennessee depots and magazines to the Cumberland Gap area. After they had been unloaded, all the army's ordnance, quartermaster's, and commissary wagons would be placed at McElrath's service. A supply depot would be established at McMillan's Station on the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. Since the general believed that two of his three divisions would be ordered to Blain's Cross-Roads, McMillan Station would serve as the supply base for this command. In addition, forage would
be stored at convenient points alongside the road which passed over Clinch Mountain. The chief quartermaster was also directed to secure and hold ready to issue to the destitute army all the clothing, tents, and camp equipage that he could locate in the department. The baggage which the various units had stored at London and Knoxville prior to their departure for Kentucky would be guarded and made available when called for. To facilitate the army's march, the harassed McElrath would see that boats were built and ferries established on the Clinch and Powell rivers. 2

On October 20, from his camp at Flat Lick, Kentucky, Kirby Smith issued a general order announcing that he was resuming the command of the Department of East Tennessee. At the same time, Smith indicated the staging areas he wanted his troops to occupy after they had crossed the border. Generals Stevenson's and Eth's divisions were to proceed by way of Tazewell and the Clinch River to Blain's Cross-Roads; McCown's division was to remain at Cumberland Gap for the time being. 3

Passing through Cumberland Gap on the 20th, Bragg's advance echelons reached Morristown on the 21st. Twenty-four hours later these contingents were in Knoxville. The narrow difficult roads of this mountainous area, in conjunction with the immense trains which accompanied the Army of the Mississippi, caused the column to become very attenuated. Consequently, on
the 21st when the vanguard of the Army of the Mississippi was at Morristown, Cheatham's Corps, which was bringing up the rear, had not yet cleared Cumberland Gap. Before leaving the Gap, Cheatham addressed a note to Wheeler. (At this time, Wheeler's hardy troopers were screening the rear of Smith's column.) As soon as Smith was able to dispense with the cavalry's services, Wheeler was to report to Cheatham at Knoxville. To reduce congestion on the already overcrowded roads of the region, Cheatham's Corps took a circuitous route to Knoxville by way of Jacksboro. 4

Once the rear contingents of the Army of the Mississippi had passed through the gap, Kirby Smith's Army of Kentucky prepared to move through. The night of the 21st found Heth's and Stevenson's divisions bivouacked at Flat Lick, and McCown's at Cumberland Ford. 5 On the following day, Smith's army passed through the Gap. In accordance with Smith's instructions, McCown's division remained at Cumberland Gap; Heth's and Stevenson's halted for the night near Tazewell. As soon as Colonel McElrath was able to re-victual his command, McCown planned to establish and man a strong outpost at Flat Lick. 6

From Cumberland Gap, Kirby Smith sent Eragg a message describing the condition of his army. This dispatch was couched in exceedingly pessimistic terms. Smith reported that during
the retreat his men had suffered "everything excepting actual starvation". The general estimated that there were "not less than 10,000 of them scattered through the country trying to find something upon which to live". Continuing, the distressed Smith observed that of the provisions left for his command at Cumberland Ford, all except 40 barrels of flour had been appropriated by Cheatham's troops. Smith stated that since leaving the Bluegrass region, he had received numerous reports indicating that the Army of the Mississippi had confiscated supplies earmarked for the Army of Kentucky. The bitter general informed Bragg that unless some provision was made for forwarding rations to his army, "the remaining 6,000 men now left in ranks will also have to scatter through the country to pick up something to eat." In closing, Kirby Smith reported the current location of the various units constituting his command. 7

The next day (the 23d), Kirby Smith received a dispatch from General Bragg. This message undoubtedly made the general's blood boil. Bragg, thinking of his projected advance into Middle Tennessee, ordered Smith to leave 3,000 infantry at Cumberland Gap and concentrate the remainder of his army at Kingston. At Kingston, Smith would reorganize his troops, preparatory to sending them into Middle Tennessee.
Replying to Bragg's communication, Kirby Smith commented that his command, which was down to 6,000 effectives, was in no condition to take the field. The general reported that his men were "worn down from exposure and want of food". Furthermore, he stated, they were "much in want of shoes, clothing, and blankets."

In closing, Smith reported:

Having resumed the command of my department, I am directly responsible to the Government for the condition and safety of my army. As soon as my command can be perfectly fitted out I will take the field with it. In its present condition it is impossible to move it.

Having refused to co-operate with Bragg until his troops had recuperated from their recent ordeal, Smith moved Heth's and Stevenson's divisions to Blain's Cross-Roads on the 24th. After two days, Smith's temper had cooled off somewhat. Accordingly, he determined to transfer Heth's and Stevenson's troops into staging areas which would permit a rapid concentration on Kingston. Heth was directed to move his division to Lenoir Station. His unit would remain near the railroad until it had recovered its strength. In the meantime, Heth was to requisition needed supplies from the Knoxville magazines. Once Heth was satisfied his troops were ready to return to the field, he would march to Kingston. Simultaneously, Stevenson was directed to
send his division "to some point between Elain's Cross-Roads and Knoxville." Like Heth, Stevenson would draw his supplies from Knoxville. Once these orders had been carried out, Smith's divisions were based as follows: Heth's at Lenoir Station, McCown's at Cumberland Gap, and Stevenson's near Chesterfield.

The last Confederate unit to pass through Cumberland Gap was Wheeler's cavalry. Leaving the Gap on the 24th, the hard-riding troopers proceeded to Knoxville. Reaching Knoxville the next day, Wheeler reported to General Polk. (Bragg had left for Richmond the previous morning.) With the arrival of the cavalry, the Army of the Mississippi was again united. The infantry and artillery units belonging to the army had been straggling into the Knoxville area and going into camp ever since the advance echelon had entered the city 72 hours before. The army again concentrated, Polk began drafting plans to implement Bragg's decision to send it into Middle Tennessee. According to the plans matured by Bragg before his departure, the infantry would make the scheduled movement by rail; the army's artillery and trains were to march to Middle Tennessee. Polk, therefore, called upon the superintendents of the East Tennessee and Georgia, and the Nashville and Chattanooga railroads to make the necessary rolling stock available. The latter road would carry the troops...
to Chattanooga; the former was to shuttle them into Middle
Tennessee. 11

Before Superintendent Wallace, of the East Tennessee and
Georgia, was able to concentrate the necessary transportation, a
portion of the Army of the Mississippi had started for Middle
Tennessee. At 3 p. m. on the 30th, the army's ordnance train,
the artillery of Polk's corps, and Cheatham's baggage train
rolled out of Knoxville. To prevent marauders from plundering
the baggage train, it was guarded by the 12th Tennessee Infantry.
Wheeler's Cavalry Brigade would escort the column on its long,
difficult journey. Before leaving Knoxville, Wheeler was
informed by Polk that the train was to ford the Clinch River
above Kingston. After crossing the stream, he would move down
the Tennessee River valley to Smith's Cross Roads. Here, the
column would turn into the road which crossed Walden's Ridge by
way of Foster's. Once across the ridge, the trains would move
down the Sequatchie Valley. At Jasper, Wheeler would receive
instructions as to what route he should follow in reaching
Tullahoma. 12

A second large column, probably containing Hardee's
artillery and the baggage trains belonging to various commands,
left Knoxville several days later. This train was escorted by Colonel Wharton's cavalry brigade. Since it was expected that Wheeler's convoy would consume most of the forage on the Sequatchie Valley route, Wharton's was sent to Middle Tennessee by way of Sparta. 13

On the afternoon of the 30th, Polk's chief quartermaster informed the general that there were enough cars in the Knoxville yards to entrain one division. Accordingly, the general issued instructions for General Jackson's division to march into Knoxville at an early hour on the 31st. Jackson's troops were to "camp at places to be designated by the acting division inspector-general, preparatory to moving by railroad to Tullahoma, Tenn." 14

When Bragg, following his return from Richmond, resumed command of his department on the 3d, he found that Polk had everything running according to schedule. The two gigantic wagon trains, escorted by Wheeler's and Wharton's combat-ready troopers, were en route to Middle Tennessee. Infantry contingents belonging to Cheatham's and Hardee's corps were being loaded aboard the cars of the East Tennessee and Georgia as rapidly as the limited amount of rolling stock possessed by that railroad became
available. By the 8th all of the soldiers of his Army of the Mississippi, except those confined in the hospitals, had departed from Knoxville.

Once the infantry had been cleared out of the Knoxville cantonments, the Confederates' troubles were just beginning. Two more bottlenecks had to be dealt with. At Chattanooga, the soldiers had to be shuttled from the cars of the East Tennessee and Georgia to those of the Nashville and Chattanooga. This operation was quite simple when compared with the next obstacle. During the summer campaign, a number of bridges had been burned and extensive sections of track on the right of way of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad had been turned over by the belligerents. Following the Confederates' reoccupation of Murfreesboro, repair crews had quickly rebuilt the bridges and repaired the track on the section of the Nashville and Chattanooga between Bridgeport and Murfreesboro. The giant bridge across the Tennessee River at Bridgeport, however, had not yet been replaced. Materials to be used in the reconstruction of this vital structure had to be brought from distant parts of the Confederacy. The iron had to be shipped from Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, the timber from Georgia. Accordingly, the troops had to detrain at
shellmound. After being ferried across the Tennessee, the soldiers clambered aboard the cars which had been spotted on the Bridgeport Spur. As was to be expected, this was a very time-consuming operation. To make matters worse, the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad had only a limited number of engines and cars in operation on the north side of the river. Furthermore, the railroad official refused to permit Bragg to have additional rolling stock ferried across the river until the bridge was reopened. In order to facilitate the movement into Middle Tennessee and to avoid undue congestion on the railroad, a number of the Confederate units marched from Bridgeport to Tullahoma. 15

As a result of these transportation difficulties, it was November 8 before the last of the infantry units assigned to Cheatham's corps reached Tullahoma. Taking cognizance of the shortage of rolling stock, Bragg determined to concentrate his army at Tullahoma, preparatory to moving to Murfreesboro.

Evidently, the officers, whose commands had reached Tullahoma first, were very lax in the enforcement of discipline. When hard-boiled General Cheatham reached Tullahoma, he was shocked to learn that numerous complaints had been lodged at army headquarters by the civilians. The inhabitants told of large-scale depredations committed by Cheatham's soldiers on their
property. Accordingly, the general was forced to issue a general order, "prohibiting the stragglng of troops and the entering of houses of private citizens." To curb this practice, a line of outposts would be established and no personnel would be allowed "to leave camp without the written consent of the company and regimental officers, approved by the brigade commanders."

Cheatam warned his men that private property would be protected. In the future, he promised, the guilty parties would be "severely punished."

To see if his command were prepared to take the field, Cheatham scheduled an inspection for the morning of the 9th. The regimental and battery commanders were to check the soldiers' arms, accoutrements, and ammunition. A full report on the condition of their respective units was to be forwarded to corps headquarters as soon as practicable. 16

It was the 13th, five days later, before the last of General Hardee's infantry reached the Tullahoma area. Since most of the suitable quarters were already appropriated, Hardee established his headquarters at Still Springs. 17

Two days later (the 15th), Brigadier Generals Bushrod R. Johnson and John K. Jackson's brigades were sent on detached service. General Johnson's command was ordered to Shelbyville.
The brigade's mission was to forage for supplies in Bedford County. All the stores gathered were to be sent to the depots which the army had established along the railroad. General Jackson's brigade was to return to Bridgeport. There, Jackson's troops would assume the responsibility for protecting the construction crew engaged in rebuilding the railroad bridge spanning the Tennessee River. The arrival of Jackson's unit would release the 63rd Tennessee which had been guarding the bridge. The Tennesseans would then return to East Tennessee. 18

Reaching Chattanooga on the evening of the 7th, Bragg sent a staff officer to deliver an important message to General Wheeler. Contacting Wheeler at Jasper, the aide informed the cavalry officer that his ultimate destination had been changed. After escorting the train to Tullahoma, Wheeler was to go to Murfreesboro. There he would report to General Breckinridge for further instructions. 19

Accordingly, the convoy proceeded to Tullahoma. Once the general had seen the train safely through to its destination, he headed for Murfreesboro. Wheeler's badly jaded brigade rode into Murfreesboro on the afternoon of the 13th. 20

The train which Wharton's brigade escorted did not make as good time on its march to Tennessee as Wheeler's. Taking a
more northerly route across the Cumberland Mountains. Wharton's command passed through Sparta. Leaving the artillery and wagons at Tullahoma, Wharton's troopers likewise hastened on to Murfreesboro. It was the beginning of the fourth week of November before Wharton reported to General Breckinridge. 21

With the arrival of Wharton's convoy, Bragg had completed the transfer of his army from East Tennessee to the Middle Tennessee theater of operations. From the time that Wheeler's convoy had left Knoxville on October 30 until Wharton's troopers had reached Murfreesboro on November 23, twenty-five days had elapsed. The Army of the Mississippi's movement into Middle Tennessee could certainly not be described as an operation characterized by celerity and dispatch.

Once the rear echelons of the Army of the Mississippi had departed from Chattanooga, Kirby Smith prepared to send two divisions to join Bragg. Accordingly, on November 9 Smith issued marching orders to General Stevenson's division. As soon as the division batteries could be equipped with fresh horses, they and the wagon trains were to start for Middle Tennessee.

The line of march would be by way of Sparta and McMinnville, to Winchester. In addition to a cavalry escort, an infantry brigade was slated to accompany the train. Since many of the wagons were
empty, the vehicles could be used to transport the infantry when necessary. When advised of the line of march of Stevenson's train, Bragg voiced his disapproval. The general had already received reports telling of the difficulties encountered on this route by Wharton's convoy. Instead, he issued instructions for Stevenson's trains to follow the route successfully pioneered by Wheeler. 

At the same time, the Rebel brass decided to send McCown's division to Middle Tennessee in place of Heth's. Before McCown's transfer could be effected, his command would have to be relieved of the responsibility of guarding the Cumberland Gap area. Consequently, Heth's division was withdrawn from its Lenoir Station staging area. Heth's troops then retraced their steps. Once Heth's troops had reached the Gap, McCown's moved to Knoxville. After his soldiers had drawn supplies from the Knoxville magazines, McCown concentrated them near the depot. As soon as the last of Stevenson's troops had cleared the Knoxville area, McCown started to entrain his soldiers. Unlike the other units that had preceded them to Middle Tennessee, McCown's greyclads apparently carried their artillery with them.

The poor condition of the engines and rolling stock of the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad also plagued the movement.
of Kirby Smith's troops on the Knoxville-to-Chattanooga leg of their journey. In a letter dated November 17, the president of the railroad, Campbell Wallace, informed Kirby Smith that the condition of the rolling stock belonging to his company was "such that it will be impossible for us to do the work of the Confederate States more than sixty days longer." Continuing, Wallace observed that this railroad "must have two more good engines and at least fifty box cars." Next, Wallace pointed out that his company had "bought all the engines and cars we could find for sale, and paid exorbitant prices." Wallace informed the general that his sources indicated there was sufficient rolling stock "in the South to sustain the main lines for the next three to four years." In addition, Wallace commented, there were many branch roads that had cars and engines suitable for use on the main lines. Since these roads had no strategic importance, Wallace advocated that they be forced to sell their property. In closing, Wallace warned, "My stock is now so far gone that it will be useless before winter is half over. If there is a failure here, the responsibility will not be on me." 25

By the time McCown's and Stevenson's troops reached the Tennessee River, the bridge had been partially completed. To
facilitate the crossing, the cars were eased down a ramp on which
rails had been laid, and onto flatboats. The barges were then
towed across the river by steamboats. An engine was then coupled
to the cars. Even with this improvement, the crossing of the
Tennessee River was a very time-consuming operation. Reaching
Middle Tennessee, Kirby Smith's troops were stationed at
Manchester. Here, they would form the right flank of Bragg's
army. The advance contingents of Stevenson's division had begun
to pour into the Manchester staging area by the 20th. 26

Following his arrival at Tullahoma on the 13th, Bragg,
like Cheatham, was distressed by the apparent lack of discipline
prevailing in the camps. Bragg decided that Cheatham's edict of
the 8th against straggling had not accomplished its purpose.
Accordingly, on the 15th Bragg issued a general order prohibiting
the use of grain, except under special license, for the
distillation of alcohol within the limits of his department. All
the whiskey and the grain slated for use in the distilleries were
ordered seized. Bragg gave as his reasons for this drastic
action "the great evils of drunkenness resulting from this
speculation, and also to secure the necessary subsistence for the
army, and the people, now being consumed by extortioners ... ." 27

On the same date, Bragg issued another directive
appointing hot-tempered Colonel Robert C. Tyler of the 15th Tennessee Infantry as provost marshal. 28

Two days later (the 17th) Bragg leveled a blast at the numerous personnel currently absent from the Army of the Mississippi "without leave or sanction". The general announced that henceforth all officers who continued to be carried on the rolls as absent without leave "shall be brought before an examining board authorized by an act of Congress, entitled 'An act to relieve the army of disqualified, disabled, and incompetent officers', in order that their names may be dropped from the rolls of the army whose glory they wish to reflect, but whose dangers and toils they are unwilling to encounter." All enlisted men who stayed away from the army without the benefit of furloughs would "be treated as deserters and punished as such." 29

By the 19th, the movement of Kirby Smith's corps into Middle Tennessee was in high gear. Satisfied with the way events were developing, Bragg issued instructions for Cheatham and Hardee to send for the tents belonging to their respective commands. To facilitate the advance, the tents had been stored and left in the Chattanooga area. Now, with December approaching, sleeping in the open was beginning to be an unpleasant experience. 30

The next day, Bragg alerted his soldiers to be ready to
take the field on the 21st. Preparatory to taking the offensive, Bragg organized his army into three corps -- Hardee's, Kirby Smith's, and Polk's. Pending Polk's return to duty, Cheatham would continue to be in charge of Polk's unit. Each corps would be designated by the name of its respective commander. In addition, Bragg redesignated his command as the Army of Tennessee. Bragg then assigned each corps its initial mission. Polk's corps would constitute the army's center and take position near Murfreesboro. Hardee's corps was to guard the army's left. To carry out his assignment, Hardee would deploy his troops in the Shelbyville area. Bragg's left would be covered by Kirby Smith's corps, which was scheduled to take position in front of Manchester. General Breckinridge, whose division had been at Murfreesboro since the end of October, was instructed to have his troops throw up works covering the approaches to the town.

Evidently, Bragg had very little respect for Secretary of War Randolph's ability. When he gave the former Vice President his orders, Bragg caustically added, "Our Secretary Randolph has resigned; no loss." 31

Three of the five cavalry brigades then assigned to the Army of Tennessee were to cover the army's front. General Wheeler, as chief of cavalry, was to supervise the activities of these
three mounted commands. As soon as Wharton's brigade arrived from East Tennessee, Bragg's two other cavalry brigades, Forrest's and Morgan's, were to be relieved. At this time, Forrest's and Morgan's hard-riding troopers were operating on the approaches to Nashville. The former's brigade was stationed west of Stones River; the latter's was based east of the river. After resting and reorganizing their respective commands, Forrest and Morgan would receive special assignments from the commanding general. Bragg wrote, "Much is expected by the army and its commander from the operations of these active and ever-successful leaders." 32

Bragg announced to his army that he made these dispositions "in anticipation of the great struggle which must soon settle the question of supremacy in Middle Tennessee." Continuing, the general warned his officers and men that the Yankees had concentrated a heavy force with which "to redeem the fruitful country we have wrested from him." Next, the general exhorted his soldiers to keep Richmond, Murfreesville, and Perryville fresh in their minds, and "make a name for the new Army of Tennessee as enviable as those enjoyed by the armies of Kentucky and the Mississippi." 33

Evidently, some hitch developed in Bragg's plans. Not
all the units moved as scheduled on the 21st. Wither's division of Cheatham's Corps did not leave Tullahoma until sunrise on the following day. Since a number of his men were without shoes, Wither's directed the brigade commanders to have these individuals camp in the woods near the railroad. They would then be sent to Murfreesboro by rail. All the excess baggage which could not be carried in the division wagons was left behind along with fatigue parties. When vehicles became available, these working parties were to forward this equipment to Murfreesboro.

On the 22d Bragg was informed by his adjutant that all the elements of the Army of Tennessee were in the process of occupying their designated staging areas. Accordingly, the general sent a long telegram to Richmond reporting on the progress of this campaign to clear the Yankees out of Middle Tennessee. The general was forced to admit that there had been some delays in taking the field. He, however, considered these to be unavoidable. First, after the arduous Kentucky Campaign, it had been found necessary to rest and reorganize the army. The troops had to be supplied with a number of essential items, "such as clothing, shoes, &c." Bragg also called the attention of the Richmond authorities to his difficulty with the railroad. He pointed out that, while the main line of the Nashville and
Chattanooga between Bridgeport and Murfreesboro had been repaired, none of the branch lines had. Especially frustrating had been the shortage of rolling stock on the north bank of the Tennessee River.

But, observed Bragg, the situation had improved materially since he had prevailed on the officials of the Nashville and Chattanooga to transfer all the cars the company could spare to the right bank of the river. The labor involved in this operation, the general freely admitted, had been great. At the same time, he pointed out, the risk was "not small". Bragg reported that if all went according to schedule the railroad bridge would be completed by December 15.

Turning to his projected plan of operations, Bragg informed the War Department that all of Hardee's and Polk's troops had reached the Sullivan area, while most of Smith's had crossed the Tennessee River. Bragg freely predicted that the dispositions which he had ordered on the 20th "would enable me to meet the enemy at any moment, should he come out from his intrenchments."

Furthermore, the general observed, his cavalry had been given a dual mission. While a portion of his troopers attacked the Yankees' supply line, the remainder would prevent them from drawing forage from the country side. Bragg expressed the hope that the master plan which he had adopted would force the
bluecoats "to fight or fall back". The only other course of action which passed through the aggressive general's mind was to hurl his army against the strong line of works guarding the approaches to Nashville. Since these fortifications were "garnished with the heaviest guns, and defended by number superior to" his own, Bragg believed it "would be an act of imprudence". If, however, the War Department differed with him, the general would undertake to take Nashville by storm, as he had "troops ready to dare anything their leaders may order." 36

Next, the general reported on the economic condition of the Middle Tennessee theatre of operations and the attitude of the civilians toward the Confederacy. Bragg reported that all of Middle Tennessee south of the Cumberland River was "tributary" to his command. He pointed out that his army was currently "drawing immense supplies of subsistence, [along] with considerable amounts of clothing, leather, etc., from the region just vacated by the enemy." The people, Bragg wrote, with few exceptions, "are loyal and true, having once felt the yoke of Abolition despotism, and are joining our ranks in large numbers." 37

In a second dispatch which accompanied a tabular statement of the current organization of the Army of Tennessee, Bragg brought to the attention of the War Department his shortage of general officers. Bragg reported that at the present time
one of his divisions was led by a brigadier general, and seven
brigades of infantry and two of cavalry by colonels. This
created vacancies in the army for ten general officers. 38
Furthermore, the general continued, he planned to organize
another infantry brigade in the immediate future from regiments
then en route to join the Army of Tennessee. Discussing an
attached list of general officers assigned to his army that were
not on duty, Bragg reported:

[Brigadier Generals William H. Carroll
and Lucius M. Walker are not safe men to
intrust with any command, and I much prefer
leaving their brigades with such colonels as
accident may place in position. [Brigadier
Generals William B. Tate and John A. Helm are
not likely to return to field duty for months.
[Brigadier General Alliag Preston is at present
unassigned, and [Brigadier General John C. Brown
may be expected in thirty days. 39

Accompanying his letter, Bragg enclosed a list of officers
recommended for promotion to general. He enumerated the officers
in what he considered their order of merit. Commenting on two of
the officers recommended for advancement, Bragg wrote:

Col. John H. Morgan is peculiarly suited for
the special service in which I propose to employ
him -- partisan war on the enemy's lines in
Kentucky. He has raised his own command and
nearly armed and equipped it from enemy stores.
Col. John A. Wharton's, recommended for a regular
cavalry brigade, which he commanded with equal
success in Kentucky ... 40
Since the President planned to visit the Army of Tennessee at an early date, no official action was taken at this time on Bragg's urgent request that a number of deserving officers be promoted to fill the existing vacancies among his general officers.

During the day (the 22d), Bragg issued a special order reorganizing his cavalry. Wheeler's brigade was transferred from Polk's to Hardee's corps; Wharton's was withdrawn from Hardee's and assigned to Polk's. 41

On the 24th Bragg addressed a long letter to President Davis. In this communication the general, besides reporting on conditions in Middle Tennessee, sketched for the President his projected plan of operations. After again describing the deplorable condition of the railroads used to transfer the army from East to Middle Tennessee, the general turned to the condition of his men. Bragg reported that "the deficiency in clothing, shoes, and blankets is being rapidly supplied, and even now we are in very fair condition in that respect, and are daily improving." "The health and general tone of my old Army of the Mississippi (now Polk's and Hardee's corps)", Bragg observed, "are never better." His Tennesseans, Bragg commented, were in excellent condition. They had been equipped by their
friends. Bragg also pointed out that the depleted ranks of his Tennessee regiments were being filled as many recruits, having "felt the heel of the tyrant", flocked to the colors. Reporting on the economy of the area, the general wrote that his army was "securing a rich harvest of supplies." Both subsistence and forage were abundant in Middle Tennessee. Some horses and mules were available, and material for the manufacture of tents and shoes had been discovered in "considerable quantities". The general warned the President "that we are now gleaning the county, and many of these articles, especially salt meat, will not be reproduced during the war." 42

Next, Bragg discussed the condition of Kirby Smith's corps. At this time, the general informed the President, nearly all of Smith's troops were north of the Tennessee River. Bragg, however, was distressed to learn that Smith's corps, composed principally of troops not long out of the camps of instruction, had been considerably reduced by sickness. Accordingly, Smith's corps mustered only about 11,000 infantry, instead of the 15,000 Bragg had expected. As soon as the last of Smith's troops had reached the Manchester staging area, Bragg reported, it would give him an effective force of infantry and artillery totaling about 40,000 officers and men, with 5,000 cavalry in the brigades
led by Pegram, Wharton, and Wheeler. (Following the retreat into East Tennessee, Kirby Smith had reorganized his cavalry. Colonels Ashby's and Scott's brigades were disbanded. Some of the units formerly belonging to these two commands were organized into a new brigade. Brigadier General John Pegram, Kirby Smith's chief of staff, was placed in charge of the newly constituted organization. Pegram's brigade was then ordered to Middle Tennessee.) In addition, Bragg had another 5,000 troopers under Forrest and Morgan. These he planned to let loose on the Union communication lines. 

Turning to his future plans, Bragg elaborated on the undertaking which he had presented to his subordinates four days before. As the first step in his master plan, Bragg would mass his three corps in the Murfreesboro area. Next, screened by Pegram's, Wharton's and Wheeler's cavalryme, the Army of Tennessee would take position covering the roads leading south and east out of Nashville. (At this time, General Rosecrans was busy converting Nashville into a base of operations for his powerful Army of the Cumberland.) Once his hard-riding troopers had established and manned their roadblocks, Bragg believed it would be all but impossible for the Army of the Cumberland to forage on the south side of the Cumberland River.
Simultaneously, Morgan's cavalry brigade would cross the Cumberland River east of Nashville. After reaching the north bank of the river, Morgan's "terrible men" would endeavor to break the supply lines linking Nashville with Louisville. It was over these lines that the Union brass funneled supplies to the Army of the Cumberland. To Davis, Grant expressed himself as confident that Morgan's raiders would be successful in their efforts to "prevent the enemy from using the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, which is not yet in running order, and their wagon trains will be in constant danger." 45

A second raiding force led by the redoubtable Forrest was to operate to the south and west of Nashville. Forrest's initial mission would be to attack the Union shipping plying the Cumberland River. This task accomplished, Forrest would cross the Tennessee River. Invading West Tennessee, Forrest's troopers were expected to smash the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. At this stage of the conflict, the Mobile and Ohio served as the supply line for General Grant's Army of the Tennessee. (At the moment, Grant's army was regrouping and establishing magazines in north Mississippi. When this operation was completed, the aggressive Grant planned to launch a massive offensive designed to cave in the defense line, which General Pemberton had established behind
the Tallahatchie River.) In his letter to the President, Bragg wrote, "Thus we may create a diversion in favor of Pemberton, and, if successful, force the enemy to retire from Mississippi." 46

Bragg believed that if Morgan and Forrest succeeded in their efforts to cut the communication lines of the Army of the Cumberland, while Pegram's, Wharton's, and Wheeler's troopers blockaded the roads leading south and east out of Nashville, great benefits would accrue to the Confederacy. Because, he theorized, the Union brass would find itself confronted by two unpleasant alternatives. The Army of the Cumberland would either have to evacuate Nashville and fall back toward Louisville, or leave the protection of its earthworks in an effort to drive the Confederates from the approaches to the city. In case Rosecrans should choose the second, the contemplative Bragg expressed himself as being "confident of beating [Morgan] in the field ...." 47

Bragg notified the President that Folk had reached Tullahoma, following the expiration of his furlough. If all went according to schedule, the two generals planned to proceed to Murfreesboro the next day (the 25th). Informing the President of this contemplated move, Bragg commented that he would remain at the front, "as the slightest change with either party may precipitate an engagement at any moment." 48
In an effort to increase the mobility of his cavalry, preparatory to inaugurating his projected vigorous campaign against the Union supply lines, Bragg issued a general order on the 24th. The cavalry commanders were directed "to supply themselves with pack mules, instead of wagons, for transportation." According to the table of organization worked out by the general, one mule would be allowed for every ten men. Pack saddles for the mules were to be issued by the quartermaster department. When taking the field, each trooper would carry 40 rounds of ammunition on his person. An additional 100 rounds per man would be carried in the regimental ordnance train. Each brigade would be allowed "two good four-mile wagons" for the transportation of hospital stores. In calculating the number of vehicles which the cavalry should be allowed for field transportation, Bragg came up with a figure of one wagon for each 70 men. Once this directive had been complied with, all surplus wagons were to be turned over to the quartermaster department. 49

His army having taken the field, Bragg sought to insure that there would be some uniformity in the types of arms carried by the soldiers. Therefore, on the 26th, Bragg issued orders for the infantry to turn in to the chief of ordnance all the cavalry arms in their possession, "such as cartines, Sharps rifles, &c."
In place of the surrendered arms, the foot soldiers would draw muskets. In addition, the rank and file's attention was called to a previous order forbidding them "to carry other side-arms than those issued by the Government ... ." All side-arms worn by the infantry were to be turned in to the Ordnance Department. If the side-arms were the soldier's private property, a fair price was to be paid upon their surrender. 50

As a precautionary measure, Bragg directed the corps commanders to "cause all persons within their respective commands to be vaccinated who have not previously been." The medical officers would advise army headquarters when this order had been executed. 51

Bragg and Polk reached Murfreesboro on the evening of the 25th. The following morning, Polk resumed command of his corps. Upon Polk's return to duty, Cheatham resumed his duty as a division commander. 52

With Polk's corps at Murfreesboro, the responsibility for guarding the railroad north of Tullahoma fell to Hardee's corps. Accordingly, the 32d Mississippi was given the task of protecting the bridges and stations between Normandy and Posterville. The regimental command post was established at Wartrace. 53

On the 27th, the day after Polk had returned to duty,
there was an alert at Murfreesboro. The troopers manning the line of outposts covering the approaches to Nashville thought that they detected signs indicating that the Federals were about to take the field in force. Following receipt of this intelligence, Bragg ordered Polk to hold his corps "ready for action". In compliance with Bragg's directive, Polk directed Cheatham and Withers to have their men ready to take the field on an instant's notice. Consequently, the troops prepared cooked rations to last for two days and each man drew 30 rounds of ammunition from the ordnance wagons.

On the previous day (the 26th), the Nashville Federals heard vague rumors that the Rebels were in the process of concentrating a heavy force at Lavergne. To check on this scuttlebutt, the Union brass decided to have two strong combat patrols reconnoitre the suspected area on the following day. These patrols would be drawn from the divisions commanded by Brigadier Generals Philip H. Sheridan and Joshua S. Sill. While Sill's troops felt the Lavergne Confederates, Sheridan's would occupy Nolensville, thus covering their comrades' right flank. Sill assigned the task of reconnoitering Lavergne to the brigade led by Colonel Edward N. Kirk. The Nolensville expedition
consisted of Colonel Frederick Schaefer's brigade, reinforced by the 36th and 86th Illinois and one section of Battery I, 2d Illinois Light Artillery. Schaefer's supporting force was commanded by Colonel Nicholas Greuel. 56

Before leaving the Nashville perimeter on the morning of the 27th, Kirk was admonished by Sill "not to fire at all if he could avoid it." The reason for this order was two-fold. The general had an aversion to an unnecessary expenditure of ammunition, and he didn't want to alarm the inhabitants of the city. As soon as Sill had dismissed him, Kirk put his brigade into motion. The Nashville pike served as the Federals' line of advance. Pushing rapidly forward, the Union vanguard easily brushed aside Wheeler's vedettes. Near Hurricane Creek, one mile from Laverne, the Confederate resistance suddenly stiffened. Kirk then deployed his command into line of battle. Once his regimental commanders had formed their units, Kirk waved them to the attack. Surging forward, the shouting bluecoats stormed across Hurricane Creek and entered the large field which bounded the town on the north and west. The defending cavalrymen were scattered by this powerful thrust. One group, swinging into their saddles, retreated "pell-mell" down the Jefferson pike. Another, "in tolerable order", headed toward the railroad.
Pressing onward, several of the Union regiments (the 29th and 30th Indiana, and the 77th Pennsylvania) crossed the railroad embankment. On doing so, they were exposed to the fire of a section of Confederate artillery (Wiggins' Arkansas Battery) which was emplaced south of the dump. The two guns were supported by about 300 dismounted troopers drawn from the 1st Alabama Cavalry. Letting loose a tremendous roar, the Yankees headed for the field pieces on the run. At first, the Alabamans disputed the Unionists' advance. It was quickly apparent that the Southerners were greatly outnumbered. Accordingly, the greyclads bolted for their mounts. These were being held by the horse-holders in the rear of the battery. The artillerists, observing that their supporting force was in full retreat, quickly limbered up their two pieces. Before the panting Federals could gain the guns, both the cannoniers and cavalrymen had "commenced a thundering retreat". The bluecoats followed the Confederates for about one-fourth mile. Kirk, realizing that it was futile to try to catch cavalry with infantry, then suspended the pursuit. 57

The ease with which his men had been able to drive the Confederates from Laverno convinced Kirk that there was no
...substance to the reported Confederate buildup at that point. Consequently, the brigade, having accomplished its mission, retraced its steps. By dusk, the troops were back in their camps. From the three Confederates who were captured in the engagement, the Yankees learned that the only Rebel force stationed at Largeme was wheeler's cavalry. In addition, these talkative men told their captors that the nearest Confederate infantry was based at Stewarts Creek, six miles southeast of Largeme.

Simultaneously, Schaefer's column had moved out of the Nashville defenses via the Nolensville pike. Two miles beyond the line of Union outposts, Schaefer's vanguard established contact with wharton's vedettes. The Rebel troopers were easily brushed aside, and the Yankees pushed rapidly forward. Shortly after crossing Mill Creek, the Federals encountered the foe in force. In an effort to check the Yankees' advance, wharton had the cannoneers of White's Tennessee Battery unlimber two of their pieces near the pike. A strong force of cavalry was massed in support of the guns. Schaefer, however, was undaunted by this display of force. After forming his brigade, the Union colonel sent his men to the attack. Since his mission was to delay the Federal advance and not to fight a pitched battle, wharton had accomplished this task when the foe was forced to deploy.
Therefore, the Texan ordered his troopers to fall back. By the
time the bluecoated infantry had closed to within effective small-
arms range, most of the butternuts had made their getaway. Three
of the troopers, however, were not as agile as their comrades.
Hermed in by the Federals, they surrendered.

Reassembling his brigade, Schaefer resumed the advance on
Kolensville. The town was occupied without further adventure.
Mission accomplished, Schaefer's column returned to Nashville by
way of the Edmondson pike. During the return march, Greusel's
regiments served as the rear guard. Reaching his camp, Schaefer
informed Sheridan that the Confederate cavalry had not seriously
contested his advance. Furthermore, the colonel continued, he
had failed to see any signs of Confederate infantry. 59

Bragg, on the afternoon of the 27th, received an
anxiously awaited dispatch from General Wheeler. Opening the
message, the general learned that the Union columns were falling
back toward Nashville. After canceling the alert, Bragg dashed
off a message congratulating his chief of cavalry on his success
in checking the Federal advance. In closing, Bragg wrote that he
had been worried about Wheeler's safety. Reports had heretofore
filtered back to headquarters indicating that Wheeler was in the
habit of recklessly exposing himself "in affairs of this character". 60
Following the scare on the 27th, a period of relative quiet settled over the camps of the Army of Tennessee. This hiatus lasted until the morning of December 3. During this time, the only activity in the Middle Tennessee theatre of operations was along the line of outposts covering the approaches to Nashville. On the 28th, one of Morgan's combat patrols led by Colonel James D. Bennett of the 9th Tennessee crossed the Cumberland River. Two miles east of Hartsville on the Carthage road, the Rebel raiders ambushed and captured a small Union forage train consisting of ten wagons. Several of the men assigned to escort the train escaped. Making their way to Hartsville, they advised the commander of the 2d Indiana Cavalry, Major Samuel Hill, of the loss of the train.

The major quickly organized a force with which he proposed to recover the wagons. Pressing eastward along the Carthage road in the wake of the retreating Confederates, Hill's Hoosiers bagged several stragglers. Hill's hard-riding troopers reached the ford near Rome, where the foe had recrossed the Cumberland, close on the raiders' heels.

After gaining the left bank of the river, Bennett had detached a few men and left them behind to hold the crossing. Sighting the bluecoats, the Rebel rear guard opened fire.
Undaunted by these scattered shots, the Federals spurred their horses into the river. Seeing that they were unable to check the bluecoats, the Confederates "fled in dismay". Hill's troopers trailed the fleeing Southerners to Colonel Bennett's camp.

Alerted by the fugitives, Bennett hastily turned out his command. Impressed by the Confederates' strength, Hill halted his small force. Only the men mounted on the strongest horses had been able to keep pace with the major. The Union commander wanted to wait for more of his men to come up before attacking. He perceived, however, that the foe was becoming bolder. Fearing that the grayclads might seize the initiative, Hill shouted for his bugler to sound the charge. Digging their spurs into their horses' flanks, the bluecoats thundered forward. Despite their superior numbers, the Southerners were thrown into confusion by the audacity of the Indians' attack. Once the Yankees had opened fire with their pistols, the butternuts wheeled their mounts about and raced for the rear. A short distance down the road, the Confederates line of retreat passed across a narrow bridge. This proved to be quite a bottleneck. The fleeing troopers jammed up on the structure. Dismounting, the Hoosiers opened a scathing fire on the milling Rebels. Before the Tennesseans could escape from this obstacle, a number of them
were cut down, either dead or wounded. Hastily remounting, the
Federals followed the routed Confederates for another 12 miles.
Having penetrated a considerable distance into unfriendly
territory, the Federals abandoned the chase and returned to
Hartsville. During the pursuit, the bluecoats recaptured seven
of their wagons and freed eight of their comrades. 61

In the following day (the 29th), Rosecrans ordered one of
his division commanders, Brigadier General James D. Morgan, to
make a forced reconnaissance into the countryside east of Stones
River. Morgan assigned this task to the 60th Illinois and the
10th Michigan regiments. Colonel Silas C. Tolar of the former
regiment was placed in charge of the operation. The colonel's
instructions were "to proceed to Baird's Mills and Rural Hill,
and examine the roads and country, and, if ... met the
enemy, to whip them." By the time that Tolar had completed his
preparations, it was early afternoon. After the soldiers had
been mustered and inspected, the colonel gave the word, and the
column moved out. Crossing Stones River at Stewart's Ferry,
Tolar's troops turned into the Rock River pike. The bluecoats
camped for the night at the Widow Hay's spring, five miles from
Rock River. 62

At 4 p.m., several hours after the departure of Tolar's
patrol, three regiments of cavalry led by Colonel Minor Milliken passed through General Morgan's lines on the Lebanon road. The general asked the colonel to have one of his mounted battalions reconnoiter the Statesville road. If the cavalryman would agree to his suggestion, Morgan felt it would give the Federals a complete picture of the area and roads between the Cumberland and Stones rivers. Milliken, however, informed the general that his instructions prevented him from undertaking any additional assignments.

Daybreak found Toler's column again on the road. One mile east of Rural Hill, the Yankees struck the Chicken road. Between Rural Hill and Baird's Hills, where they arrived about 1:30 p.m., the Federals were shadowed by several small mounted Rebel patrols. Once the Unionists had camped, a "considerable force" of grayclads was seen to take position south of the hills, astride the Lebanon pike. Toler determined to punish these Confederates. Quickly mustering and deploying his troops, the colonel led them to the attack. After a sharp clash, the Confederates retired in the direction of Murfreesboro. Questioning the several prisoners whom his men captured in the skirmish, Toler learned that they belonged to Colonel Morgan's command. In addition, the talkative captives informed Toler that Morgan's brigade was stationed at Black's Shop. Morgan's command
was reported to number 3,000 men, mostly mounted, and three pieces
of artillery. During the afternoon, Toler's combat team was
reinforced by Colonel Milliken's troopers. Having reconnoitered
the Lebanon road, Milliken had proceeded to Baird's Mills. 64

The next day (December 1), the Federals returned to the
Nashville perimeter. Nothing of interest occurred on the return
march. 65

On the 1st, and again on the 3d, Wharton's troopers
launched harassing attacks on Union foraging parties. Near
Kolensville on the 1st, elements from Wharton's command
encountered a forage train. In this engagement, the Rebels
employed their artillery — White's Tennessee Battery. After
the Southerners had put their guns into position, the bluecoats
quickly broke contact and retired into the Nashville defenses. 66

Two days later (the 3d), a forage train from Sheridan's
division moved out of the Nashville perimeter along the Hardin
pike. Ten miles from camp, the train turned off the road, and
the soldiers began to gather supplies. Prior to the departure
of the train, Colonel George W. Roberts, one of Sheridan's
brigade commanders, had admonished Quartermaster David B. Sears
to give receipts for all the private property appropriated by the
foragers.
Observing that all the wagons were loaded, Sears, accompanied by three officers (quartermasters Bruce, S. B. Hood, and Lieutenant O. A. Clark), called at the farmer's house to give the prerequisite receipts. During the time that Quartermaster Sears was transacting his business, the farmer invited the officers to have dinner with his family. The Federals gladly accepted. While the bluecoats were dining, a combat patrol drawn from the 8th Texas Cavalry attacked the train. Hearing the shots, the officers leaped up from the table and dashed for the door. Bruce, who was first out of the house, mounted his horse and escaped with a trail through his coat and another in the hip of his horse. The three other officers, seeing that the Texans were between them and the train, remained at the house and were captured.

At the same time, the butternuts charged a Union outpost held by 17 men drawn from the 42d Illinois commanded by Sergeant Edward Huerson. Coming to the ready, the Illinoisans poured one volley into the onrushing Texans. This served to check the greyclads. Observing that the foe had faltered, Huerson shouted for his men to keep firing. When the Southerners failed to resume the attack, Huerson "dared them to come on". The bluff worked, and the Texans fell back. Following the Rebels' retreat,
the forage train returned to Nashville without further adventure. Before paroling Quartermaster Sears, the Southerners told him "that if it had not been for the 'little major', as they called the sergeant, they would have captured part of the train." 67

Evidently, several other Union foraging parties had been out on the 3d. When Wharton wrote Wheeler on the following day, he informed his superior, "The enemy foraged very heavily on the Granny White, Hillsborough, Hardin, and Charlotte pikes yesterday." To put a crimp in the activities of the Union foragers, Wharton suggested that Forrest's brigade be sent to Franklin. Since Forrest's brigade was under order to proceed to West Tennessee, Wheeler found it was impossible to honor Wharton's request. 68

The next day (the 4th), there were two brief flurries of activity on the Nashville approaches. At 7:30 a. m. the 4th Michigan Cavalry, 302 strong, commanded by Colonel Robert H. C. Minty, moved out of its encampment. Minty's orders were to make a forced reconnaissance in the direction of Franklin. Riding along the Franklin pike, Minty's vanguard encountered Wharton's pickets one mile north of Brentwood. Without hesitating a minute, Minty sent Companies I and L thundering forward. Almost as soon as they sighted the Yankees, the greyclads took to their heels. Passing through Brentwood at a high gallop, the fleeing Southerners
turned into the Wilson Creek pike. After pursuing the Rebels down this road for about two miles, the Michiganders retraced their steps.

Once his regiment had reassembled, Minty detailed one company (D) to guard the junction. The advance was then resumed. Two miles south of Brentwood, the bluecoats encountered one of Wharton's patrols. Badly outnumbered, the Southerners beat a hasty retreat down the Franklin pike, with the Yankees in hot pursuit. So precipitant was the Confederates' withdrawal that they abandoned Holly Tree Gap without a fight. After penetrating to within one mile of Franklin, the Unionists gave up the chase. Minty's troopers then retraced their steps. The bluecoats, having ridden about 45 miles since morning, reached their camp at 8 p.m. In the day's skirmishing, the Confederates had lost one man, wounded; the Federals had suffered no casualties. On his return, Minty informed General Rosecrans that "No obstruction of any kind has been placed in Holly Tree Gap, which is naturally one of the strongest positions I have ever seen."69

About midnight on the night of the 3d, a 50-man combat patrol rode quietly out of Lavergne. These troopers belonged to Holman's Tennessee Battalion, a unit in Wheeler's brigade. Major Daniel W. Holman was in charge of the patrol. The Confederates'
objective was to attack the Union pickets charged with the mission of covering the approaches to Stewart's Ford.

Making their way along little frequented roads, the raiders were able to penetrate to within a mile and one-half of the ferry without being detected. Informed by his scouts that there was a Union outpost nearby, Holman halted his command. Twenty of the butternuts led by Sergeant J. M. Critz were directed to dismount. These men would attempt to surprise and capture the Federal outpost. The rest of the troopers would remain on their horses and take position on either side of the road. Their mission was to waylay any of the Yankees who might escape from Critz's men. Working their way cautiously forward through the darkness, Critz's greyclads were able to close to within "15 steps" of the pickets before being discovered. At this time, the outpost was occupied by a sergeant and nine men of Captain Frank Powell's scout company. When they were challenged, the Rebels called upon the bluecoats to surrender. One of the Federals, ignoring this summons, threw his rifle to his shoulder, and fired. The 20 Confederates sent one volley crashing into the underbrush, as the Northerners scrambled for cover. Taking advantage of the darkness and the dense growth of cedars, all the Yankees succeeded in escaping afoot, although two of them were wounded, one severely. After collecting the
scoils (six horses with saddles and bridles, two rifles and a pistol, and several ponchos), the Confederates returned to Laverne. By sunrise, the Confederates were back in camp without having suffered any losses. 70

During the period between November 27 and December 4, while the hostilities on the approaches to Nashville were being stepped up, General Bragg found his time occupied with administrative matters. On the 28th the general, hoping to encourage the men who had deserted the colors to return, published an order granting a "full pardon to all soldiers absent without authority who shall within a reasonable time return to their commands and report for duty." The absentees were urged to avail themselves of this opportunity "before the inauguration of the new system of military courts established by law as vigorous and prompt administration of justice to all delinquents." "Hereafter", the general warned, "no excuse will be allowed those who abandon their colors and leave their comrades to perform their duties and defend their homes." Commissioned officers guilty of being absent without leave were excluded from the benefit of this amnesty. In the future, Bragg observed, vigorous steps would be adopted and all the men who failed "to respond to this last and generous appeal" were to be
arrested and jailed. Furthermore, he continued, "they must expect full justice, tempered only with the mercy they have failed to show either to their comrades or cause." 71

Two days later, Bragg struck another blow at the absentees. "The names of all officers 'absent without leave' at any muster" would be reported to headquarters immediately. Bragg's adjutant would then relay this information to the paymaster. The paymaster in turn would be permitted to suspend the absentees' pay until such time as a satisfactory explanation of the absence was made. Any quartermaster who paid the absentees in violation of Bragg's directive would "be reported for stoppage of their pay, besides being amenable to trial by court-martial". 72

Meanwhile, Bragg made several changes in the organization of his department. On the 30th General Breckinridge was relieved of his duties as the commandant of the post of Murfreesboro. Hereafter, Breckinridge would be able to devote his entire attention to his division. 73 Two days later, Bragg officially announced that he had established headquarters at Murfreesboro. 74

To be prepared for any emergency that might suddenly develop, Bragg on the 2d issued special instructions governing the amount of subsistence to be kept on hand. The unit commanders
were directed to see that their troops were "supplied at all
times with four days' rations . . . , two of which will be cooked
and [habitually kept] in haversacks." In addition, rations to
last for another eight days would be stockpiled in the magazines
located along the railroad between Murfreesboro and Bridgeport. 75

Bragg also found his attention drawn to other sections
of his department. On the 29th the general informed Richmond
that he had "ordered a strong brigade from Mobile to Meridian." Since
the Yankees had transferred their fleet from Pensacola to
New Orleans, Bragg believed that Mobile was no longer in any
immediate danger. From Meridian, which was an important rail
center, this brigade could rapidly move to either Forney's or
Pemberton's support. The general reported that he had sent a
number of recruits from Middle Tennessee to help fill up the
ranks of Forney's and Pemberton's Tennessee regiments. Of these,
1,500 had been allotted to Forney and 1,000 to Pemberton. 76

The days had dragged by and still there was no news of
General Pegram's cavalry brigade. Pegram's failure to reach the
Murfreesboro area as scheduled compelled Bragg to keep Morgan's
brigade on outpost duty. This forced Bragg to postpone the raids
which he had projected on the Army of the Cumberland's
communication lines. Growing impatient when his relief failed to
put in an appearance, Morgan called for his adjutant, Colonel G. St. Leger Grenfell. The fiery Kentuckian asked his adjutant to address a memorandum to army headquarters. After reporting on the condition of the brigade, Grenfell pointed out in a message dated the 28th, "General Morgan is anxiously expecting the arrival of his relief, as he requires from ten to fourteen days to consolidate and organize the regiments and battalions which have been assigned to his command ... previous to commencing active operations against the enemy." 77

Morgan was forced to cool his heels for several more days, while waiting for Pegram to put in an appearance. It was the afternoon of the 29th when Pegram's troops finally reached Surfreeburno. Another 48 hours elapsed before Bragg issued orders directing Pegram to relieve Morgan. General Pegram's under strength brigade then moved to Baird's Mills, where the general established his headquarters. After Pegram's troops had relieved Morgan's men on the picket line, the Kentuckian concentrated his brigade in the Baird's Mills staging area. 78

Bragg, advised that Pegram's brigade had been ordered to the front, decided the time was ripe to send Morgan's grim raiders to prey on the Union supply lines north of the Cumberland. The general (on the 1st) drafted a set of instructions for Morgan's guidance. Bragg informed Morgan that, upon being
relieved, he would proceed, "by the most practicable route and
with the least delay, to operate on the enemy's lines of
communications in rear of Nashville." Morgan was directed "to
assail his guards where your relative force will justify it;
capture and destroy his trains; burn his bridges, depots,
trestlework, etc." All told, Morgan was expected to harass the
bluecoats "in every conceivable way in ... [his] power." To
cloak his operations in a veil of secrecy, Morgan was directed,
if feasible, to send all prisoners captured by his command to the
rear. But if it should become necessary, Morgan would parole his
captives, and forward the rosters to Bragg's GHQ. The cavalry
commander was authorized to induct men into his command "to the
extent of ... [his] captured arms and horses." The recruits
would be assigned to the various regiments constituting the
brigade. Morgan was expected to exert himself in an effort to
prevent Rosecrans' army from "forsaking north of the Cumberland
River, and especially toward Clarksville." If practicable,
Morgan was to communicate and co-operate with Forrest's brigade.
(At the moment, the latter officer's unit was busy preparing for
its dash into West Tennessee.) Continuing, Bragg all but gave
Morgan a blank check, as he wrote, "You are not limited in the
extent of your operations, every confidence being reposed in your
seal, discretion, and judgment."
While his brigade was resting and regrouping, preparatory to crossing the Cumberland River, Morgan paid a visit to Bragg's Murfreesboro GHQ. The hard-hitting cavalryman had some information that he felt might prove of interest to Bragg. During the period that his brigade had been on outpost duty, Morgan had learned that the Northerners had established strong garrisons at Gallatin, Castalian Springs, and Hartsville. From these bases, the foe was in the habit of sending strong foraging parties into the fertile area lying south of the Cumberland River. Morgan, as a result of his careful observations, had decided it would be possible for a fast moving Rebel raiding force to slip through the Union outposts and destroy the Hartsville Yankees. The cavalryman expressed himself as being confident the Confederates could effect their escape before the supporting Union forces at Castalian Springs and Gallatin could intervene. Morgan felt certain that the Federal brass would not be expecting such a daring move on the Confederates' part, because any raiding force coming from the south would, of necessity, expose its flank and rear to attack by the Northern forces operating out of Nashville. Convinced that he could take the Hartsville Yankees by surprise, Morgan urged Bragg to sanction the proposed attack. 80
In the end, Bragg accepted Morgan's thesis that a fast-moving task force would be able to penetrate the Union security cordon, cross the Cumberland, and surprise the Hartsville garrison. Furthermore, Morgan convinced Bragg that once this Rebel force had bagged the Hartsville Federals, it would be able to recross the river before any Union reinforcements put in an appearance. Accordingly, Bragg on the 4th drafted a complex set of instructions. Bragg's plan of operations was designed to implement Morgan's projected attack on Hartsville.

To draw Rosecrans' attention away from the Hartsville area, Bragg believed it would be a good idea to bluff the Union general into expecting an attack on a different sector. The general determined to use his combat-wise infantry to support the attack on Hartsville. Bragg, therefore, alerted Generals Breckinridge and Cheatham to hold certain units of their respective divisions ready to take the field. Colonel Hanson's brigade of Breckinridge's division was alerted to move from Murfreesboro to Baird's Mills. Reaching Baird's Mills, Hanson's troops would go into camp. During the Orphan Brigade's scheduled 48-hour stay at the mills, Hanson would throw out strong patrols to reconnoiter the roads leading toward Nashville. In addition, Hanson was ordered to honor any request Morgan might
make for troops to accompany his brigade when it moved against Hartsville. General Cheatham, accompanied by two brigades, was to move from Murfreesboro to Lavergne. The Nashville pike would serve as the axis of Cheatham's advance. After rendezvousing with Wheeler's cavalry, Cheatham's troops would go into bivouac.

On the following day Cheatham's infantry, accompanied by Wheeler's troopers, would make a forced reconnaissance in the direction of Nashville. At nightfall, the Confederates were to retire to the Lavergne area. The next day, Cheatham, after detaching one brigade to support Wheeler, was slated to return to Murfreesboro with the other. 81

When they took the field, Cheatham's troops would carry three days' cooked rations in their haversacks, while Hanson's carried four. Each of the three infantry brigades would be permitted to take along ten wagons in addition to their ambulances. The division commanders were directed to hold their men ready to move on an hour's notice. 82

At the same time, in an effort to confuse the Union brass more and capitalize on Cheatham's and Hanson's feints, Bragg determined to move Hardee's and Smith's corps closer to the foe. Hardee was directed to transfer his corps from Shelbyville to Eagleville. Reaching Eagleville, Hardee would throw one brigade
into Triune. When he evacuated Shelbyville, Hardee was to leave one regiment behind to guard the magazines. Hardee's corps would continue to draw its supplies from Shelbyville. Smith's corps was alerted to be ready to march from Manchester to Readyville as soon as practicable. 83

Harty's forced reconnaissance on the 4th, in conjunction with Harter's message, had served to call Pragg's attention to the need to strengthen the small mounted force (one company) charged with the mission of protecting the approaches to Franklin. The general, therefore, issued instructions for Harter to station one of his battalions at that point. In accordance with Bragg's orders, the cavalry leader sent four companies of the 4th Tennessee Cavalry to Franklin. 84

On the morning of the 5th, Bragg issued a directive ordering Cheatham and Hanson to implement the instructions which they had received from army headquarters on the previous day. It was 2 p.m. before the troops finally received the word to draw 40 rounds of ammunition from the ordnance wagons. By the time the officers had formed and mustered their respective units, it had started to snow. The two columns then moved off. Hanson's brigade turned into the Lebanon pike, while Cheatham's troops tramped along the Nashville pike. 85
Departing from Baird's Hills on the 6th, Morgan's task force made a forced march of 26 miles. Shortly after daybreak on the following day, Morgan surprised the Union brigade based at Hartsville. Morgan's advance was covered by two cleverly executed diversions. Wheeler's cavalry, supported by two of Cheatham's brigades, made a feint up the Nashville pike, while several of Hanson's regiments swept through the countryside west of Baird's Hills. Both of these thrusts were designed to confuse the Yankee brass and divert their attention from Morgan's column.

Bragg's plan of operations worked to perfection. Morgan surprised the Hartsville Federals. After a sharp engagement, the butternuts compelled them to raise the white flag. Taking their prisoners with them, the raiders crossed the Cumberland River and returned to their base, before the powerful force sent to intercept them could intervene. (For the details of the battle of Hartsville, see study on "The Battle of Hartsville and Morgan's Second Kentucky Raid". This unpublished manuscript by Research Historian Pearse is on file at Stones River National Park.)

Several days later on December 11 Forrest started his raid from Columbia, Tennessee into West Tennessee. This strike was designed to check Grant's drive down the Mississippi Central Railroad. Forrest's command at this time consisted of four recently organized regiments and a four-gun battery of artillery.
These cavalrymen were armed principally with shotguns and flintlock muskets. Furthermore, Forrest's command did not have enough flints for the muskets or caps for the shotguns. The general had been promised modern weapons, but the ordnance department had been unable to equip the brigade with these. Accordingly, the hard-hitting colonel was ordered to invade the territory west of the Tennessee River armed as he was.

By the 15th the brigade had crossed the Tennessee River at Clifton. Two days later, the greyclads attacked and captured Lexington. Here, Forrest took 150 prisoners, including Colonel Robert G. Ingersoll, who was in command. The raiders also captured 300 Sharps rifles and a supply of ammunition. Included in the spoils were two 3-inch Rodman rifles, which were the pride of Forrest's artillery for the rest of the war. From Lexington, Forrest proceeded to Jackson. When they attacked, the Confederates were repulsed. Undaunted, Forrest dashed north and took Trenton, Humbolt, and Union City. The raiders tore up miles of track and burned numerous bridges. Grant's supply line, linking his army with the big Union base at Columbus, Kentucky, was effectively severed. Circling through west Tennessee, Forrest soon found himself hotly pursued by a large force of bluecoats. The Yankees felt certain that they would be able to hem in and bag the
raiders. At Parker's Cross Roads, near Huntington, Forrest made a stand and fought off his pursuers. Passing through Lexington, he recrossed the river on the 3d and re-entered Middle Tennessee. In a little more than two weeks, Forrest's command had killed or captured 2,500 of the foe, taken 10 guns, 10,000 stand of arms and 1,000,000 cartridges. More important, they had smashed the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. 86

About the same time, Pemberton had sent his Cavalry commanded by General Van Dorn to strike at Grant's advance base at Holly Springs. Van Dorn captured Holly Springs and burned the Union magazines on December 20. Between then, Forrest and Van Dorn had destroyed Grant's advance base and his communication lines. These dual disasters, as Bragg had predicted, forced Grant to abandon his drive down the Mississippi Central Railroad and fall back upon Memphis.
NOTES ON CHAPTER IV

Bragg Moves into Middle Tennessee

3 Ibid., 973.
4 Ibid., 970, 973-974. When Wheeler moved to Knoxville, he was to bring forward all the sick and the stragglers that he encountered belonging to Polk's corps.
5 Ibid., 974.
6 Ibid., 975.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 976. When Seth marched to Lenoir Station, Kirby Smith thought it would be best if he used the Emory road. It seems that the countryside adjacent to the direct road had already been stripped of provisions and forage by Bragg's column.
10 Ibid. Upon its return from Kentucky, the Army of Kentucky was disbanded.
11 Ibid., 976, 982.
belonged to Buckner's division, Eardee's corps; Jackson's brigade belonged to Buckner's division, Eardee's corps: Jackson's brigade was a part of Wither's division, Folks's corps.

At this time, the bridge had been completed from the south bank of the river to the island lying in mid-stream.
29 Ibid., 407.
30 Ibid., 410.
31 Ibid., 411.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., 411-412. On November 20 the effective strength of Hardee's and Polk's corps was 30,649; in McCown's and Stevenson's divisions, there were 12,457 officers and men present for duty.
34 Ibid., 416.
36 Ibid., 416.
37 Ibid., 416-417.
38 Ibid., 417-420.

ORGANIZATION OF THE INFANTRY UNITS ASSIGNED TO THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE, GENERAL BRAXTON BRAGG COMMANING, NOVEMBER 22, 1862.

Polk's Corps -- Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk (on leave), Major General B. Franklin Cheatham in Command.

Cheatham's Division - Major General B. Franklin Cheatham

1st Brigade - Brigadier General Daniel J. Jonelson
   8th Tennessee Infantry
   15th Tennessee Infantry
   16th Tennessee Infantry
   38th Tennessee Infantry
   51st Tennessee Infantry

2d Brigade - Brigadier General Alexander P. Stewart
   4th Tennessee Infantry
   5th Tennessee Infantry (Vanable's)
   24th Tennessee Infantry
   31st Tennessee Infantry
   33d Tennessee Infantry
3d Brigade - Brigadier General George Maney
41st Georgia Infantry
1st Tennessee Infantry
6th Tennessee Infantry
9th Tennessee Infantry
17th Tennessee Infantry

4th Brigade - Brigadier General Preston Smith
11th Tennessee Infantry
13th Tennessee Infantry
47th Tennessee Infantry
194th Tennessee Infantry
9th Texas Infantry
Allin's Tennessee Sharpshooters

Witmer's Division - Brigadier General Jones N. Witmer
1st Brigade - Brigadier General Franklin Gardner
19th Alabama Infantry
22d Alabama Infantry
23d Alabama Infantry
26th Alabama Infantry
39th Alabama Infantry
1st Louisiana Regulars

2d Brigade - Brigadier General James A. Chalmers
9th Mississippi Infantry
10th Mississippi Infantry
29th Mississippi Infantry
44th Mississippi Infantry
9th Battalion Mississippi Sharpshooters

3d Brigade - Brigadier General John H. Jackson
24th Alabama Infantry
5th Georgia Infantry
5th Mississippi Infantry
7th Mississippi Infantry
9th Mississippi Infantry

4th Brigade - Colonel Arthur H. Manigault
28th Alabama Infantry
34th Alabama Infantry
10th South Carolina Infantry
19th South Carolina Infantry
Breckinridge's Division - Major General John C. Breckinridge

1st Brigade - Colonel Reager J. Hanson
   41st Alabama Infantry
   2d Kentucky Infantry
   4th Kentucky Infantry
   6th Kentucky Infantry
   9th Kentucky Infantry

2d Brigade - Colonel Joseph B. Palmer
   32d Alabama Infantry
   4th Florida Infantry
   18th Tennessee Infantry
   32d Tennessee Infantry

3d Brigade - Colonel F. X. Walker
   60th North Carolina Infantry
   20th Tennessee Infantry
   28th Tennessee Infantry
   45th Tennessee Infantry

Hardee's Corps - Lieutenant General William J. Hardee

Buckner's Division - Major General Simon B. Buckner

1st Brigade - Brigadier General St. John R. Liddell
   2d Arkansas Infantry
   5th Arkansas Infantry
   6th Arkansas Infantry
   7th Arkansas Infantry
   8th Arkansas Infantry

2d Brigade - Brigadier General Patrick R. Cleburne
   13th Arkansas Infantry
   15th Arkansas Infantry
   5th Confederate Infantry
   2d Tennessee Infantry
   5th Tennessee Infantry (Hill's)

3d Brigade - Brigadier General Bushrod R. Johnson
   17th Tennessee Infantry
   23d Tennessee Infantry
   27th Tennessee Infantry
   44th Tennessee Infantry
4th Brigade - Brigadier General Sterling A. M. Wood
16th Alabama Infantry
33d Alabama Infantry
3d Confederate Infantry
32d Mississippi Infantry
33d Mississippi Infantry

Anderson's Division - Brigadier General Patton Anderson

1st Brigade - Colonel J. S. Dilworth
1st Florida Infantry
3d Florida Infantry
41st Mississippi Infantry

2d Brigade - Brigadier General Daniel J. Adams
13th Louisiana Infantry
16th Louisiana Infantry
20th Louisiana Infantry
25th Louisiana Infantry

3d Brigade - Colonel Samuel Powell
45th Alabama Infantry
1st Arkansas Infantry
24th Mississippi Infantry
29th Mississippi Infantry

4th Brigade - Colonel Thomas M. Jones
27th Mississippi Infantry
30th Mississippi Infantry
34th Mississippi Infantry

39 Ibid., 417, 508. Bragg reported that the following general officers were either absent or on detached service:


Brig. Gen. L. M. Walker. - Absent on sick leave. Imputations now rest on this officer, which will cause his case to be placed before the examining board. Application for transfer to Arkansas approved.
Brigadier-General Brown. - Absent. Wounded at Perryville.

Brigadier-General Duncan. - Assigned as chief of staff to commanding general.

Brig. Gen. E. H. Halt. - Disabled, and assigned to duty as post commander at Chattanooga, Tenn.

Brig. Gen. W. B. Bate. - Disabled and unfit for field duty. Assigned to duty at Huntsville, Ala.

Brigadier-General Carroll. - Unfit for service. Now before examining board.

40 Ibid., 417-418, 508-509. Bragg submitted the names of the following men to the President for possible promotion:

For major-general:
   D. S. Donelson, brigadier-general, Tennessee.
   P. R. Cleburne, brigadier-general, Arkansas.

Donelson is the senior, a graduate of West Point, and much the older man. He is ever devoted to duty, and conspicuously gallant. Cleburne is young, ardent, exceedingly gallant, but sufficiently prudent, a fine drill officer, and like Donelson, the admiration of his command as a soldier and a gentleman.

For brigadier-general of infantry:
   1. R. W. Hanson, colonel, Kentucky.
   2. E. C. Walthall, colonel, Mississippi.
   3. Z. C. Deas, colonel, Alabama.
   4. A. M. Manigault, colonel, South Carolina.
   5. Thomas M. Hunt, colonel, Kentucky.

For brigadier-general cavalry:
   1. J. A. Wharton, colonel, Texas.
   2. John H. Morgan, colonel, Kentucky.
41 *Ibid.* 420–421. On the 23rd Bragg issued a general order authorizing all the units in the Army of the Tennessee that had participated in the battle of Perryville, to "inscribe the name of that field on their colors". In addition, Cheatham's regiments, in commendation of their role in charging and capturing three Union batteries, were authorized to place inverted cross cannons on theirs. *Ibid.* 421.


48 *Ibid.* Besides Middle and West Tennessee, Bragg's department included Alabama and the section of Florida west of the Apalachicola River. Accordingly, Bragg had to devote a portion of his time to military problems arising in these areas. The general informed Davis that two newly organized East Tennessee infantry regiments and one battery had been sent to Brigadier General John H. Forney at Mobile. Bragg feared that, with the approach of winter, the Federals might send an amphibious
expedition against the Mobile Confederates. Furthermore, Pragg
eXpresssed the opinion that General Pemberton would soon be
pressed from two directions — north Mississippi and the
Mississippi River. To help fill up Pemberton's under strength
Tennessee regiments, Pragg ordered 1,000 recruits sent to
Mississippi from Middle Tennessee. Ibid., 429.
49 Ibid., 424-425.
50 Ibid., 426.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., 428.
55 Ibid., 428-429.
57 Ibid., 16-19.
58 Ibid., 16.
59 Ibid., 22-23.
60 Ibid., 19.
61 Ibid., 23-26.
62 Ibid., 26-27.
63 Ibid., 27.
64 Ibid., 27-28.
During the forced reconnaissance, Toler's patrol captured 12 prisoners, 1 mule, 5 horses, 1 buggy, 4 saddles and bridles, 3 double and 1 single barrel shotguns, 1 Yager rifle, and 5 revolvers.

Pegram's brigade consisted of the following units: the 1st Georgia Cavalry, the 1st Louisiana Cavalry, the 1st Tennessee Cavalry, the 16th Tennessee Cavalry Battalion, and Hanold's Tennessee Battery.
81 Q. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. II, 439. Before the departure of Hanson's brigade for Faird's Mills, Breckinridge recalled the two infantry regiments which were stationed as Stewarts Creek in support of Wheeler's Cavalry.

82 Ibid., 435, 438.
83 Ibid., 439.
84 Ibid.
85 Johnny Green, 54.
86 Horn, Army of Tennessee, 194-195.
THE REBELS CONCENTRATE AT STONES RIVER

CHAPTER V

President Davis Visits the Army of Tennessee

Following Kirby Smith's and Polk's visits to Richmond, Davis determined to make some changes in the Confederate command in the Western Theater of Operations. The President would not replace his friend Bragg. Davis refused to believe that Bragg was as incompetent as the general's critics claimed. Davis, therefore, adopted a halfway remedial measure. He decided to appoint General Joseph E. Johnston commander of the Departments of Tennessee and Mississippi.

When Johnston reported for duty at the war office in Richmond on November 13, he received the news of his new assignment to the command in the West. At the same time, Secretary of War Randolph conferred with the general on the problems involved. Johnston proposed that General Holmes transfer troops to Pemberton, to enable the latter officer to oppose the Federals on more nearly equal terms, in the Mississippi theater of operations. Randolph replied that he had already sent such orders to Holmes on October 20. He then proceeded to read these instructions to his visitor. 1
As Randolph finished reading the orders which he had sent to Holmes, he turned to a letter from Davis. This he also read aloud. The President had apparently not seen the message which Randolph had sent to Holmes before November 12. But, as soon as he read it, Davis wrote to the Secretary. He observed mildly:

I regret to notice that in your letter to General Holmes of October 27th ... you suggest the propriety of his crossing the Mississippi and assuming command on the east side of the river. His presence on the west side is not less necessary now than heretofore, and will probably soon be more so.

The co-operation desired by me was in co-intelligent action on both sides of the river of such detachments of troops as circumstances might require and warrant. The withdrawal of the commander from the Trans-Mississippi Department for temporary duty elsewhere would have a disastrous effect, and was not contemplated by me. 2

Two days later, Randolph submitted his resignation, which Davis promptly accepted. It was six days before the President appointed the studious Seddon, an able politician, totally without any experience in military affairs, to the position. In the meantime, Major General Gustavus W. Smith served as interim Secretary of War. According to War Clerk J. B. Jones, Randolph's hasty decision, of which Jones disapproved, produced a "profound sensation" in Richmond. 3
Undoubtedly, the rapid changes in the War Department between the time Johnston reported for duty on the 13th and his receipt of orders on the 24th were responsible for the delay. The general's new command was the vast geographic expanse that lay between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River, and was designated as the Departments of Tennessee and Mississippi. He was directed to establish his headquarters at Chattanooga unless, for reasons of communication, he preferred another location. The orders pertinently read that Johnston should "repair in person to any part of said command whenever his presence may, for the time, be necessary or desirable." 4

In Davis' interpretation:

"This arrangement made of several departments... was intended to secure the fullest co-operation of the troops in those departments (Department No. 2 and the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana), and at the same time to avoid delay by putting each commander in direct correspondence with the War Office."

It was a strange military procedure. Orders and reports could pass back and forth between Richmond and subordinates without the knowledge of Johnston, who bore responsibility for over-all supervision. Johnston apparently was not informed of this phase of his assignment, from which confusion would seem inevitable. The careful delineation of the territory placed under Johnston
was evidence that Richmond expected a strict observance of its boundaries, but by using such indefinite markings as natural features instead of the established state lines, the authorities left room for additional misunderstanding. More than once, Johnston had to ask for clarification to be sure that he did not overstep and bring upon himself the ever-ready reproaches of the legalistic High Command. 5

As soon as Seddon took office, Johnston called upon him. The general suggested, as he had to Randolph, the use of troops from the Trans-Mississippi Department to assist at Vicksburg. But to Johnston’s surprise, the orders which he received on the 24th contained nothing about that threatened spot on the Mississippi or the needed co-operation of the troops on both sides of the river. Instead, the orders were very general and did not give him field command. 6

Johnston acknowledged the orders immediately and reiterated his recommendation to unite the troops east and west of the Mississippi against the foe. Again, as he remarked, the “suggestion was not adopted, not noticed.” Despite misgivings about the practicability of his new assignment, he made his plans for an early departure. He organized his staff with Colonel Benjamin J. Ewell as adjutant general. This scholarly soldier,
who, after graduation from West Point, gave up the military for a life of college teaching and administration, relieved Johnston of the task of keeping records and writing official letters.

The Johnstons left Richmond on Saturday, November 29. At the stations which they passed, people gathered and greeted the general with "hearty good will". After a tiresome five-day journey (three railroad accidents had served to delay the general's trip.), the Johnstons reached Chattanooga which was to be the general's headquarters early on the morning of December 4. After resting briefly, the general issued a general order announcing that he had assumed command of his department.

Johnston found little time to observe the facets of Chattanooga life, but he missed his Virginia associates. From the beginning, the general was apprehensive about the strategic situation in the West. "Nobody ever assumed a command under more unfavorable circumstances", he wrote Senator Lewis T. Wigfall. "If ... [Rosecrans] had disposed our troops himself, their disposition could not have been more unfavorable to us."

But if Johnston were despondent, his coming gave a lift to others. "I am indeed rejoiced that Joe Johnston is to take command in the West.", Kirby Smith wrote his wife on November 20. "I can serve under and with him in earnestness of purpose and devotion of
The problems the general had foreseen when he received the orders assigning him to a geographical command immediately confronted him. Arriving in Chattanooga, he found a telegram from General Cooper awaiting him. The Adjutant General reported that Pemberton's army was falling back in the face of a powerful Union advance. Cooper stated that he had "peremptorily" ordered Holmes to reinforce Pemberton. Furthermore, Cooper continued, the President urged Johnston to draw troops from Bragg's army to reinforce Pemberton, because those from the Trans-Mississippi might arrive too late. Cooper's explanation of the situation hardly made sense. Johnston pointed out as quickly as he could that if Pemberton had retired toward Vicksburg (as he supposed), then the Mississippi commander had moved closer to Holmes and away from Bragg. To be sure that his supposition was correct, Johnston requested Pemberton to forward information about the disposition of his troops. Furthermore, Pemberton was to urge Holmes to rush troops to his assistance.

His official duties attended to, Johnston wrote a glossy letter to Senator Wigfall. After describing the strategic situation, he appealed to the Texan to help him secure prompt action by Holmes. To do this, the Senator was requested to see
Secretary Seddon and explain the necessity for this move. Wigfall 
complied by writing Seddon as soon as he received Johnston's 
letter. The Texan conveyed the general's analysis of the 
situation. In addition, he added his support to the request for 
Holmes' celerity by insisting that the government should ignore 
political desires in moving the troops. He reminded Seddon that 
he had earlier advocated bringing all the Confederate soldiers 
from Arkansas and Texas to assist Bragg against Buell.

Wigfall stated that he had never met a Texan who 
disagreed with him on this subject. "I mention this," he told 
Seddon, "to show that those who oppose the concentration of our 
troops ... on political grounds, are mistaken as to public 
opinion. Our people are full of good sense and patriotism, and 
they will not refuse the means necessary to secure success." The 
Senator then stated his earnest hope, "that the last battle has 
been fought by us with inferior numbers. Whenever the enemy 
divides, concentrate and crush ... ." 14

On the day after his arrival in Chattanooga, Johnston 
hastened by rail to Murfreesboro. Here, the general planned to 
aquaint himself with the conditions and problems confronting 
Bragg's army. Johnston questioned the officers closely about the 
combat efficiency of the Army of Tennessee, its morale, and in
particular about their feeling toward General Bragg. The general was somewhat handicapped in making his rounds of the army's camps by an attack of illness, a consequence of the wound which he had received at Seven Pines. This incapacitated him at times. Before Johnston could complete his inspection, he received an unexpected summons to return to Chattanooga. 15

In the meantime, President Davis had decided to get an on-the-spot picture of military operations in the West. This would be the President's first extensive journey out of Richmond since the beginning of the war, a fact which had led to some feeling among the soldiers and civilians that the government did not appreciate properly the importance of the area beyond the Appalachian front. Accompanied by his aide, Colonel George W. C. Lee, Davis reached Chattanooga on December 10. 16

Conferring with the President, Johnston found that Davis seemed determined to detach a strong body of troops from Bragg's army and send them to Mississippi. Johnston strongly opposed the Chief Executive's suggestion. He repeated the arguments cited in his message of December 6 to Adjutant General Cooper.

In this dispatch, Johnston had pointed out that the Federals had concentrated an army of about 65,000 men in the Nashville area, with another 35,000 guarding their line of supply —
the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. The Army of Tennessee which confronted this powerful host mustered only about 42,000 rank and file plus some irregular cavalry units. Johnston observed that if Bragg attempted to reinforce Pemberton by crossing the Tennessee River, it would be a very slow process. In addition, Johnston felt certain that Rosecrans would make every effort to interrupt the crossing. Johnston, therefore, concluded that it would require at least a month for troops from Bragg's army to reach Pemberton in any strength. It would be impossible, Johnston believed, to reinforce the Mississippi Confederates as speedily as the President desired. Johnston concluded his arguments by noting:

To send a strong force /to Mississippi/ would be to give up Tennessee, and would, the principal officers think here, disorganize this army. Rosecrans could then move into Virginia, or join Grant before our troops could reach Pemberton's position, for the Tennessee is no obstacle to him. The passage of the Tennessee is so difficult and slow /for us/ that we shall be unable to use the same troops on both sides of the river until next summer. Two thousand cavalry /led by General Morgan/ will be sent to break up the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, and 4,000 /under Forrest and Van Dorn/ will be employed in the same way in West Tennessee and Northern Mississippi.

Davis was not convinced by Johnston's logic. He decided to visit Bragg's headquarters at Murfreesboro.
The next morning (the 11th) the Presidential party boarded a train for the trip to Bragg's GHQ. Reaching Murfreesboro that evening, the Chief Executive remained at the front until the morning of the 14th. During his stay at Murfreesboro, Davis reviewed the soldiers and talked with the brass. In addition to Bragg, Hardee, and Polk, Kirby Smith was present at these staff meetings. (Kirby Smith, having left General Heth in charge of the Department of East Tennessee, had joined his troops at Readyville early in December.) What the President saw at the parades caused his spirits to soar. In a letter to Seddon, Davis pronounced Bragg's army "in good condition and fine spirits". Furthermore, he observed that the Federals were digging in at Nashville and seemed intent on remaining on the defensive. Bragg had taken this opportunity to again brief the President on his plan to use his twin-thunderbolts, Forrest and Morgan, to break up the railroads used to support the Armies of the Cumberland and of the Tennessee.

In his discussions with Bragg, Davis broached his plan to reinforce Pemberton from the Army of the Tennessee. Bragg, like Johnston, strenuously opposed the President's scheme. The general told Davis that General Grant's drive down the Mississippi Central Railroad would be broken up by Forrest's raid into West...
Tennessee before the division which the President proposed to
detach could possibly reach the Mississippi theatre of operations.

Davis' mind, however, was already made up. The soldiers
stationed in the Trans-Mississippi would remain where they were,
while reinforcements for Pemberton were drawn from Middle
Tennessee. The President, in Bragg's words, was "inexorable and
reduced me to the defensive, or as he expressed it, 'Fight if you
can, and fall back beyond the Tennessee'."

During the President's stay at Murfreesboro, Bragg again
informed him that no official action had been taken to fill the
vacancies then existing among the general officers assigned to
the Army of Tennessee. Accordingly, Davis directed Colonel Lee
to draw up the necessary orders. Brigadier Generals Patrick R.
Cleburne and Franklin Gardner were advanced to the rank of major
general on the 13th. Only one of the two, Cleburne, would
remain with the army. Gardner, along with General Maury, was
transferred to Pemberton's department. At the same time, five
colonels (Zachariah C. Deas, Roger A. Hanson, John H. Morgan,
Lucius E. Polk, and Edward G. Walthall) currently serving with
the army were made brigadier generals. Hanson and Polk were
assigned to Hardee's corps; Deas and Walthall, to Polk's. Morgan
would remain in command of his hard-riding cavalry brigade. A
sixth colonel, Marcus J. Wright, was also promoted to brigadier general. Since Wright was on furlough, for the time being he was not given an assignment. When these promotions in due time were presented to the Senate, they were readily confirmed. 20

At the same time, President Davis determined to place another officer in charge of the District of the Gulf. The reason for this change was General Forney's protracted illness. Davis deemed it best to have an active individual in command at Mobile in the event of a Union attack. Consequently, on the 14th the Chief Executive detached General Buckner from Bragg's army and ordered him to Mobile. General Cleburne would take command of Buckner's division. 21

Two days before, Bragg had reorganized his army. The division commanded by Patton Anderson had been disbanded. All the infantry units and two of the attached batteries which had constituted Anderson's division were allotted to Hardee's and Polk's corps. The corps commanders were charged with the responsibility of assigning the organizations to brigades and divisions. The two other batteries, Lumsden's Alabama and Palmer's Tennessee, were assigned to the Artillery Reserve; the cavalry escort was ordered to report to Wheeler. Hardee's corps was left with only one infantry division when Anderson's command
was broken up. To equalise the strength of his army again, Bragg transferred Breckinridge's division from Polk's to Hardee's corps.

Following this reorganization, the army was grouped as follows:

Polk's corps consisted of Cheatham's and Wither's divisions;

Hardee's corps contained Breckinridge's and Cleburne's divisions;

Kirby Smith's corps was made up of McCown's and Stevenson's divisions. 22

Davis returned to Chattanooga from Murfreesboro on the evening of the 14th. Detaining, Davis informed Johnston that he had found the troops in good condition and fine spirits. All the reports reaching Bragg's GQ, Davis observed, indicated that the Army of the Cumberland was staying close to Nashville. Since the Yankees were exhibiting a passive attitude and throwing up earthworks, Davis felt that the time was ripe to reinforce Pemberton with troops from Tennessee. The next morning, the President directed Johnston to prepare the necessary orders. These instructions were designed to implement Davis' desire to bolster the sagging Mississippi defenses with 9,000 men drawn from Bragg's army. 23

Accordingly, orders went out from Johnston's headquarters directing that four of the brigades belonging to General Kirby Smith's corps be detached. These troops were to be held ready to
move by rail to the Mississippi theatre of operations, as soon as the necessary transportation became available. General Stevenson was to command the troops slated for transfer. The brigades' horses and field transportation would follow at a later date, utilizing a route to be designated by General Bragg. 24

Bragg was understandably dismayed by the President's order. Calling on Kirby Smith, Bragg urged that only Stevenson's three-brigade division be sent to Mississippi from his army. He thought that it would be possible to comply with the spirit, if not the letter, of the order by sending one East Tennessee brigade in place of one of McCown's. Bragg argued that such a move would leave "McCown's division intact", and transfer the East Tennesseans, "which, though good troops, are better away from the Union influences by which they are surrounded." Kirby Smith was able to see the logic in Bragg's arguments. He, therefore, issued instructions for Colonel A. M. Reynolds' brigade, which was stationed near Kingston, to go to Pemberton's support. Thus, through Kirby Smith's co-operation, Bragg was able to keep his army from being reduced to the full extent Davis had ordered. Even so, he saw his effective infantry force cut from more than 39,000 officers and men to about 22,000. 25

On the 18th Bragg issued instructions for Stevenson to
begin moving his division from Readyville to Murfreesboro. At the former town, the general would find the trains that were scheduled to shuttle his division to Mississippi. 29

Simultaneously, Kirby Smith wired Reynolds to begin moving his East Tennessean to the same destination. The transfer of Stevenson's division to the Mississippi theatre of operations was to cost the Confederates dearly on the last day of the year. On December 31, General Bragg launched a tremendous assault on the Right Wing of the Army of the Cumberland. Two Union divisions were quickly knocked out. Perhaps, if Stevenson's 7,000 men had been present on the field, Bragg could have converted this success into total victory. To make matters even more frustrating for the Southerners, only one of Stevenson's brigades (Brigadier General Seth M. Barton's) reached Mississippi in time to be of any assistance in turning back Major General William T. Sherman's amphibious thrust down the Mississippi River. By this time, Grant's drive down the Mississippi Central, which was being made in co-operation with Sherman's expedition, had been checked. As Bragg had predicted, Grant's army had been stopped when Forrest's and Van Dorn's cavalmen had raided and wreaked havoc on the Union supply lines and depots.
The matter of reinforcing Pemberton taken care of, the
President and General Johnston left Chattanooga on the 16th.
After a hard three-day journey by rail and boat, the weary
travelers reached Jackson, Mississippi, on the morning of the
19th. 27

Following the departure of Stevenson's division, Kirby
Smith returned to Knoxville and resumed command of his department
on December 23. There was no need for Kirby Smith to remain in
Middle Tennessee, for under the new plan of operations forced
upon Bragg by the President, only one division of his troops,
McCown's, would be left in that theatre. 28

The Army of Tennessee was in "fine fighting condition",
Kirby Smith thought. There would be no doubt of a Confederate
victory when Bragg and Rosecrans should meet. The only thing
that worried Smith was that Bragg's right did not "extend up
toward McMinnville, securing his own retreat by Sparta, and
covering East Tennessee from any move of the enemy operating on"
the Army of Tennessee's right flank.

Smith was even more enthusiastic over possible
developments in Mississippi, where Johnston had gone in person.
"Should you determine upon operations in person," he wrote
Johnston, "I trust you will send for McCown's division, and let
me join you. 29
THE REBELS CONCENTRATE AT STONES RIVER

NOTES ON CHAPTER V

President Davis Visits the Army of Tennessee


3 Govan and Livingood, A Different Valor, 163; J. B. Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, Vol. I (Philadelphia, 1866), 188.

4 Govan and Livingood, A Different Valor, 163-164; G. B., Series I, Vol. IX, pt. II, 423-424, 432. Johnston's newly constituted department was delineated as follows:

Commencing with the Blue Ridge range of mountains, running through the western part of North Carolina, and, following the line of said mountains, through the northern part of Georgia to the railroad, south from Chattanooga; thence by that road to West Point, and down the west or right bank of the Chattahoochee River to the boundary of Alabama and Florida; following that boundary west to the Choctawhatchee River, and down that river to Choctawhatchee Bay (including the waters of that bay) to the Gulf of Mexico. All that portion of the country west of said line

7 Govan and Livingood, A Different Valor, 164-165.
9 Ltr., Johnston to Wigfall, Dec. 4, 1862; Govan and Livingood, A Different Valor, 166.
10 Parks, General Kirby Smith, 248.
12 Ibid. 436.
13 Ibid. 437.
14 Govan and Livingood, A Different Valor, 167-168; Ltrs., Johnston to Wigfall, Dec. 4, 1862; Wigfall to James Seddon, Dec. 6, 1862.
15 Govan and Livingood, A Different Valor, 168.
16 Ibid.; Horr., Army of Tennessee, 192.
19 Govan and Livingood, A Different Valor, 169; Horn, Army of Tennessee, 192.
22 Ibid., 447-448. Anderson's troops were assigned as follows: the 24th, 27th, 30th, 37th, and 41st Mississippi, the 45th Alabama, the 19th and 33rd Tennessee, and Farret's Missouri Battery, to Polk's corps. The 13th, 16th, 23th, and 25th Louisiana, the 1st and 2d Florida, the 1st Arkansas, the 26th Tennessee Infantry Regiments, the 14th Louisiana Battalion, and the 5th Battery, Washington Artillery, to Hardee's corps.
23 Ibid., 449-450.

29 Ibíd., 462-463; Parks, General Kirby Smith, 249-250.