COLONIAL SARATOGA

WAR AND PEACE ON THE BORDERLANDS OF EARLY AMERICA

DAVID L. PRESTON

HISTORIC RESOURCE STUDY

PRESENTED TO SARATOGA NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK

IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN HISTORIANS/
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
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NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
2018
HISTORIC RESOURCE STUDY
David L. Preston

U.S. Department of the Interior
National Park Service/In Partnership with the Organization of American Historians
Northeast Region History Program
September 2018

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AIHA</td>
<td>Albany Institute of History and Art, Albany, N.Y.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>Archives Nationales (Paris)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRH</td>
<td><em>Bulletin des recherches historiques</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Colonial Office Papers, TNA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCB</td>
<td><em>Dictionary of Canadian Biography</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL</td>
<td>Huntington Library, San Marino, Ca.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LO</td>
<td>Lord Loudoun Papers, Huntington Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYCM</td>
<td>New York Council Minutes, 1668–1783 (A1895), NYSA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYCMSS</td>
<td>New York Colonial Manuscripts, 1638–1800 (A1894), NYSA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYHS</td>
<td>New-York Historical Society, New York City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPL</td>
<td>New York Public Library, New York City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYSA</td>
<td>New York State Archives, Albany, N.Y.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYSL</td>
<td>New York State Library, Albany, N.Y.</td>
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</table>
Abbreviations


**TNA**  The National Archives, United Kingdom

**WLCL**  William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

**WO**  War Office Papers, TNA

**WMQ**  *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd series
Timeline of Events
on the Saratoga Borderlands

c. 1450 Formation of Iroquois League (perhaps earlier).

1608 French explorer Samuel de Champlain establishes permanent French presence at Quebec.

1609 Champlain, allied to Huron, Algonquin, and Montagnais Indians, skirmishes with an Iroquois war party near Ticonderoga.

1609 Henry Hudson, exploring the Atlantic coast for the Dutch, ventures up the “North River” (later named the Hudson).

1614 Dutch traders establish a small outpost, Fort Nassau, near modern Albany.

1624 Dutch reestablish a larger fortified outpost, Fort Orange, at modern Albany.

1646 Jesuit missionary Isaac Jogues passes by “Ossaragué,” possibly Saratoga, during his journey to Mohawk country.

1663 King Louis XIV makes New France a royal colony, instituting new reforms to make the colony profitable, defensible, and orderly.

1664 English forces conquer New Netherland during the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665–1667).

1665 The Carignan-Salières Regiment arrives in New France to defend the colony from incessant Iroquois attacks.


1666 Courcelle and Marquis Alexandre de Prouville de Tracy destroy several Mohawk towns in the Mohawk Valley.

1679 René Poupar dit Lafleur, a veteran of the Carignan-Salières Regiment, is documented as hunting in Lake Champlain and venturing to Orange (Albany).

1684 Royal Governor Thomas Dongan approved a petition of Colonel Pieter Schuyler, Robert Livingston, Dirck Wessels, Jan Janse Bleecker, Johannes Schuyler, and Cornelius Van Dyck for a license to purchase a vast tract of over 100,000 acres of land at Saratoga.
Timeline of Events on the Saratoga Borderlands

1689  French traders and at least one Dutch colonist, Bartholomeus Vrooman, establish posts and houses at Saratoga for fur trading.

1689–1697  War of the League of Augsburg (King William’s War in America), ended by the Treaty of Ryswick.

1689  Iroquois warriors attack the French settlement of La Chine, in an intensification of ongoing warfare involving New France, the Five Nations, and their respective allies.

1689–1690  Fortification erected at Bartholomeus Vrooman’s house at Saratoga.

1690  French and Indian expedition attacks and burns Schenectady, killing 60 colonists and taking 30 as captives.

1690  Fitz John Winthrop of Connecticut leads the first English intercolonial expedition from Albany to Canada, northward to Saratoga and Wood Creek, before its stalls out.

1690  Johannes Schuyler attacks French settlements at La Prairie, near Montréal.

1691  Peter Schuyler attacks French settlements at La Prairie, near Montréal.

1701  The Great Peace of Montréal (and concurrent treaty at Albany with the English) brings an end to nearly a century of incessant war between the French and the Five Nations. The Iroquois foreign policy of neutrality in Anglo-French conflicts structures a new peace on the borderlands.

1702–1713  Queen Anne’s War (War of Spanish Succession). Ended by Treaty of Utrecht.

1709, 1711  Francis Nicholson’s intercolonial expedition to Canada ends in frustration.

1710  Voyage of four “Indian Kings” to London.

ca. 1722  Blockhouse established at Saratoga.

ca. 1730s  Large and prosperous settlement emerges at Saratoga, under the leadership of Col. Philip Johannes Schuyler.

1733  John Hendrick Lydius establishes a fortified trading house at the Carrying Place north of Saratoga.

1733  Philip J. Schuyler, future general in the Continental Army and proprietor of his family’s Saratoga estate, is born at Albany.

1734–1737  French begin construction of Fort Saint-Frédéric at Pointe-a-la-Chevelure (Crown Point) on Lake Champlain.
Timeline of Events on the Saratoga Borderlands

1744–1748  King George’s War (War of Austrian Succession). Ended by Treaty of Aix-la Chapelle.

1745  Lieutenant Paul Marin de La Malgue’s Expedition destroys Saratoga, killing some colonists, and taking 50 Anglo-Dutch and 60 African slaves as captives to Canada.

1746  Fort Clinton established at Saratoga.

1747  Second Battle at Saratoga, February.

1747  Third Battle at Saratoga, April.

1747  Fourth Battle at Saratoga, June.

1747  Fort Clinton abandoned in October.

1749  Swedish traveler Peter Kalm observes Saratoga following the war.

1753  Captain Paul Marin de La Malgue leads French forces to construct forts at Lake Erie (Presque Isle) and the upper Ohio Valley (Fort LeBoeuf).

1754  French expel the British from Fort Prince George, a stockade at the Forks of the Ohio River. The French build Fort Duquesne.

1754  A skirmish involving George Washington’s Virginia troops and a French party commanded by Ensign Joseph Coulon de Villiers, Sieur de Jumonville, marks the advent of open warfare between the French and British in America.

1754  Albany Congress meets in New York to discuss intercolonial union and to renew the alliance with the Six Nations in a conference.

1754  The French and the Indians attacked and defeat George Washington’s troops at the Battle of Fort Necessity.

1755  Battle of the Monongahela, or Braddock’s Defeat.

1755  Battle of Lake George results in victory for William Johnson’s British forces engaged against French regulars, Canadian militia, and Indian allies under Baron Dieskau.

1756  British Army’s 48th Regiment of Foot encamps at Saratoga, marking the origins of Fort Hardy.

1756  The British formally declare war on the French, marking the formal beginning of the Seven Years’ War, a global conflict that spreads to Europe, the West Indies, Africa, the Mediterranean, India, and the Philippines.
Timeline of Events on the Saratoga Borderlands

1756 British Lord Loudoun arrives in New York as commander in chief. His imperial behavior alienates the colonies and hinders the war effort. But Loudoun begins to establish the logistical foundation for all future British victories.

1756 The French capture the British Fort Oswego and take control of Lake Ontario.

1757 The French capture Fort William Henry, followed by the famed “massacre” of British forces by Montcalm’s Indian allies. Extensive Indian attacks commence on the Mohawk Valley and on the supply lines at Saratoga and Fort Edward.

1757 Fort Hardy constructed in earnest at Saratoga, under Chief Engineer James Montresor.

1757 William Pitt becomes the chief minister of Great Britain.

1758 Battle of Fort Ticonderoga: British General James Abercromby’s force suffers severe casualties at the hands of Montcalm’s outnumbered troops.

1758 The British capture the fortress at Louisbourg. This opens the St. Lawrence River and the water route to Canada. Generals James Wolfe and Jeffrey Amherst are prominent in the operation.

1758 The British capture Fort Frontenac under a daring attack led by John Bradstreet. The fall of Frontenac endangers all of the French posts west of it.

1759 The French surrender Fort Niagara to the British after a long fight. Sir William Johnson is the victorious British commander.

1759 General Jeffrey Amherst captures the French forts of Ticonderoga and Crown Point.

1759 Battle of the Plains of Abraham: The French surrender the city of Quebec after the British defeat them in an early morning battle just outside the city. Gen. James Wolfe and the Marquis de Montcalm are both mortally wounded.

1760 Three British armies converge on Montréal, resulting in the surrender of the French army there and marking the end of major hostilities in North America.

ca. 1763 Fort Hardy abandoned by British forces.

1763 Treaty of Paris ends the Seven Years’ War, resulting in the cession of all Canada by the French to the British.

1760s Philip J. Schuyler reestablishes a prosperous estate and plantation at Saratoga.
1765  Parliament passes the Stamp Act; riots erupt in many colonial seaports, including Charles Town, New York, Newport, and Boston.

1766  Parliament passes the Declaratory Act, asserting its supremacy over the colonies, while repealing the Stamp Act.

1767  Parliament passes the Townshend Revenue Acts, and tightens vice-admiralty courts in the colonies.

1768  British regulars sent to Boston to keep order.

1768  Kayaderosseras Patent controversy is settled with the Six Nations, symbolizing a new period of colonial expansion in the Saratoga region.

1770  Boston Massacre occurs in a dispute between British regulars and Bostonians.

1775  A civil war erupts when British regulars and Massachusetts militia spar in the battles of Lexington and Concord on April 19th.

1775  Fort Ticonderoga captured by American insurgents.

1776  New York Campaign, Trenton Campaign.

1777  Burgoyne’s Expedition from Canada.

1777  Battles of Saratoga, September–October 1777.
This Historic Resource Study (HRS) presents new archival evidence on Saratoga, New York’s role in the broad colonial era preceding the pivotal Battle of Saratoga in 1777. The study is based on research in eighteen different archives or libraries, and I hope that these new archival sources will contribute to the Saratoga NHP’s understanding of the Revolutionary War and the historical and cultural landscape related to Saratoga’s colonial past: the Schuyler Estate, the focal point of the 1745 French attack on Saratoga; the site of Fort Hardy and the Field of Grounded Arms; and the Sword Surrender site, overlooking the area of Fort Clinton and the earliest Saratoga settlements.

I highlight the following discoveries or new contributions that this HRS makes:

- **New manuscript evidence on Saratoga drawn from the George Clinton Papers at the William Clements Library; the Livingston Family Papers at the Museum of the City of New York; and the Loudoun Papers at the Huntington Library.**
- **Translation of French documentation pertaining to African-American slaves captured at Saratoga in November 1745.**
- **Expanded documentation on the identities of the Anglo-Dutch settlers who were taken captive in November 1745 and their ordeals in New France between 1745 and 1748.**
- **New perspectives on Fort Clinton during King George’s War from the George Clinton Papers and Livingston Family Papers.**
- **French archival documentation of Johannes Hendricks Lydius’s activities when he lived in Montréal and of his business associates in Albany who were implicated in the illegal fur trade.**
- **Fullest study to date of Saratoga’s crucial role as a logistical hub during the French and Indian War, and of the construction of Fort Hardy in 1756 and 1757.**
- **Discovery of new, unpublished maps of Fort Hardy at the Huntington Library in California.**
- **Extensive bibliography (twenty-one pages) of archival and manuscript collections and published sources that will contribute to future research endeavors for Saratoga NHP.**

The historiographical and methodological perspectives employed in this HRS center on the idea of Saratoga as a borderland in the colonial era. A borderlands study not only broadens the geographic frame of reference—to include the histories of the United States, Canada, and Native American nations—but also deepens our understanding of the
Preface

colonial context of Saratoga’s story in the American Revolution. The story represents the intersection of four major worlds in the colonial northeast: New France, the Iroquois Confederacy, the Algonquians (Schaghticokes and Wabanaki), and the northern British colonies of New England and New York (to include New Netherland and the earlier Dutch presence and legacy in the upper Hudson Valley). At stake in this borderlands story was nothing less than the future of North America, as each of these groups struggled for their respective independence, security, and strategic goals. British imperial triumph was not inevitable, as there were moments that the French might have consolidated a broader control of the lower Champlain and upper Hudson valleys.

This study will explore some of the key themes arising from recent borderlands scholarship, such as the tense interplay between empires and localities, and why borderlands, which had once been culturally fluid, became rigidly defined borders over time. Borderlands scholarship has helped recover the significance of places like Saratoga that were in between rival empires or Indian nations. Historians have shown just how much such localities influenced larger imperial developments rather than assuming that empires called the shots. Historians have also challenged the notion that borderlands were intrinsically disordered and violent. Borderlands were fundamentally places of diversity and creativity where intercultural relations were intense. When war came, a borderland could certainly become a violent, cruel, and Hobbesian world. But Indians and Europeans who came together on these meeting grounds often created a stable coexistence in their everyday relationships, and often in defiance of imperial authorities’ desires. Individuals could often negotiate new lives or new identities for themselves on the malleable borderlands. Indeed, British and French officials struggled mightily to assert their political authority and claims to lands that they could not control; as much as they assumed and craved to have dominion, they did not always enjoy it. For most of its colonial history, Saratoga remained a largely Indian world in which colonists came to live and trade.

This HRS is not intended to be a study of the entire borderland between Albany and Montréal. The area of the HRS is defined by the lands encompassing the Saratoga Patent and its environs (Native and colonial usages of the word Saratoga connoted a particular settlement as well as the general region surrounding it). While comparable to Theodore Corbett’s Clash of Cultures on the Warpath of Nations (2002), this HRS delves more deeply into Saratoga’s place on the borderlands. It also builds upon the Hartgen Archaeological Associates’ superb Historical Documentation Report (2015) by investigating several important archival collections that it did not consult. This HRS also reflects the evolution of the research itself, as the chapters are particularly weighted toward the new information on Saratoga’s role in King George’s War and the Seven Years’ War. When I first began this study, my ambition was to find enough information to reconstruct the early Saratoga community of the 1730s that came to a grim end in 1745. There was simply a dearth of information about how the owners of the Saratoga patent began to develop their
lands, let alone about the ordinary settlers who established farms in the region. The Schuyler Family Papers, for example, contained next to nothing on the pre-1745 development of the Schuyler estate on the Fish Kill. (Kill is the Dutch word for stream or creek.) Dutch sources did not reveal much beyond the involvement of key merchants in the fur trade with Montréal and other diplomatic relations with the Iroquois or French Canadians. While the study seeks to highlight social, economic, and cultural history whenever possible, it recognizes the inescapable fact that the frequent warfare on the borderland produced far greater documentation than peacetime activities. The rich veins of evidence that I found on Saratoga concerned its role during King George’s War and especially the Seven Years’ War. No previous study had fully mined the George Clinton Papers, the Thomas Gage Papers, or Lord Loudoun’s voluminous headquarters papers for those periods. In addition, this HRS unearthed new documentation on the French perspective during those conflicts as well as new information on the African slaves captured at Saratoga in 1745 and the new lives they forged in the city of Montréal. All previous studies of Saratoga’s history have superficially dealt with the French and Indian War in a few pages, but Lord Loudoun’s papers at the Huntington Library revealed the greatest level of information on Saratoga’s importance (for any imperial war).

Above all, the HRS aims at a readable and accessible braided narrative that can eventually be published into a small book for general audiences and become a resource for visitors to the Saratoga NHP seeking more information on the park’s colonial-era sites. Accordingly, biography and human relationships across this borderland will be a major focus throughout the HRS. Saratoga’s history is full of characters with engaging life stories. Academic histories of borderlands or frontiers too often place emphasis on abstract processes—such as land, trade, settlement, dependency, racial violence, or imperial rivalry. I want to emphasize the life stories and decisions of individuals—like René Poupart dit Lafleur, Philip J. Schuyler, John Henry Lydius, Paul Marin de la Malgue, Geertruy Vanderwerken Quackenbush, Robert Rogers, Lord Loudoun, Henry Bouquet, Rufus Putnam, an African slave woman named Étiennette, and an Abenaki-African captive named Atiatoharongwen, who became a Mohawk warrior and later, an officer in the Continental Army. Historical processes are of course important. But one can use biography to illustrate and humanize larger historical forces or dynamics. The military career of Paul Marin de la Malgue, for example, expresses how and why the French-Canadian officer corps of the troupes de la marine became so experienced in wilderness warfare and why a frontier place like Saratoga was so vulnerable in 1745.

Perhaps the most dramatic scene in Saratoga’s history before 1777 is the first French-Indian attack on the community in 1745. Chapter 1 immerses readers in that eighteenth-century world through a visceral description of the French-Indian attack. It paints a vivid portrait of Saratoga and its place in America in 1745 and charts the community’s grim fate in a micro-historical manner. The French-Indian attack powerfully brings
together all the representative groups who met on the Saratoga borderlands—the French, British, Dutch, Canadian Iroquois, Abenakis, Mahicans, and African slaves. Chapter 1 then traces the various historical paths that led French, Anglo-Dutch, and Native American peoples to that moment in November 1745; the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century borderlands were places of exchange and intermingling as neither the British nor the French could control lands that remained firmly Indian territories. Chapter 2 examines the consequences of Marin de la Malgue’s 1745 attack on Saratoga and the subsequent efforts of the French and their Indian allies to destroy Saratoga (Fort Clinton) and to paralyze the New York colony’s defenses during King George’s War. Perhaps the most important geopolitical consequence of the 1745 attack on Saratoga was how it restructured the New York colonial government’s Indian diplomacy, shifting from the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs to a sole royal superintendent, William Johnson. Finally, Chapter 3 is a lengthy and necessary study of Saratoga’s role in the French and Indian War and how that conflict inexorably changed the colonial borderlands. It particularly examines the evolution of Fort Hardy and of the British supply system that made Saratoga such an important logistical hub. Without places like Saratoga, the British could never have projected military power deep into the interior or conquered New France by 1760. The epilogue points toward 1777, and how a thorough understanding of Saratoga’s colonial history vitally informs our understanding the Battle of Saratoga. The British and American armies that converged on Saratoga in 1777 did not come to a static place. Rather, the commanders, armies, and the flow of that important campaign all reflected deeper historical patterns of Saratoga’s long colonial background.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am exceedingly grateful to the Saratoga National Historical Park (NHP), the National Park Service (NPS), and the Organization of American Historians (OAH) for the opportunity to research and write this Historic Resource Study. As a former seasonal historian in the National Park Service, I am pleased to contribute my skills as an academic historian to the ongoing interpretation and preservation of the Saratoga NHP—truly one of America’s greatest historical treasures. The OAH-NPS collaboration that has facilitated this and other research projects across the United States is a wonderful example of partnership between academic and public historians.¹ I wish to recognize the professionalism and constructive support of the National Park Service staff at both the Northeast Region (April Antonellis and Christine Arato) and the Saratoga NHP (particularly Chris Martin, Eric Schnitzer, and Christine Valosin). I would also like to express my deepest thanks to the two outsider reviewers from the Organization of American Historians, whose comments were so beneficial to me as I revised the final manuscript. The staffs at all of the libraries and archives where I researched are also to be thanked and commended. Last, and most important, I wish to remember Aidan Smith, my esteemed colleague and OAH grant facilitator, who passed away so unexpectedly while I was completing this manuscript. His support and encouragement of this project were greatly valued.

David L. Preston
Charleston, South Carolina, 2018

Everyone awaited his order. On an extraordinarily cold night, between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m., an intrepid band of French Canadians and Indian allies huddled along the banks of a tributary of the Hudson River. All had wet feet and high adrenaline, desperately trying to dry and warm themselves next to a single small fire, having just crossed a waterfall of *la riviere d’Orange* to mask the noise of their approach. They were less than one league from their intended target.

“Everyone dried himself and we awaited fairly comfortably the moment of departure,” wrote the French officer who chronicled the expedition (most likely, Lieut. Jacques Legardeur de Saint-Pierre, the second-in-command). They were two hundred miles from their point of departure in Montréal; the Nipissing, Kahnawake, Kanesatake, and Abenaki warriors who hailed from communities even more distant.\(^1\)

The officer whose command would send these 520 cold, wet, and weary Canadians and Indians hurtling forward was Lieut. Paul Marin de la Malgue of the *troupes de la marine*. Military service infused his family ever since his father had emigrated in the mid-1600s to New France from Toulon, on the Mediterranean coast of France. The surname De la Malgue hearkened the French name for Málaga, a city in Spanish Andalusia.\(^2\)

About fifty-three years old in 1745, Paul Marin de La Malgue was baptized at Montréal in

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\(^1\) “Journal de la campagne de Sarastaugué, 1745,” ff. 10, 18, reel 41, Schuyler Family Papers (New-York Historical Society, New York, NY) (translation by Sam Anderson, in Saratoga National Historical Park Research Files). The journal’s context makes clear that it was kept by a subordinate officer, and that Lieut. Paul Marin de la Malgue was not the author. For example, the November 6 entry relates, “M. the Commandant [Marin] ordered me to take charge . . . and to divide Messrs. the officers into four brigades.” Jacques Legardeur de St. Pierre initially commanded the expedition, until Lieutenant Marin was appointed as the overall commander. The journal author seems to act in the capacity of a brigade major (second-in-command), so it is likely that Legardeur de St. Pierre is the author. The first brigade was also led by St. Pierre, perhaps indicating his status in the expedition. Governor Beauharnois ordered that Legardeur de St.-Pierre “serve in the capacity of second-in-command” under Marin: See Joseph L. Peyser, ed. and trans., *Jacques Legardeur de Saint-Pierre: Officer, Gentleman, Entrepreneur* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996), 80.

\(^2\) “Malgue, the French name of Malaga, a City in Granada in Spain,” in *A Geographical Dictionary, Representing the Present and Ancient Names of All the Countries, Provinces, Remarkable Cities: And Rivers of the Whole World: Their Distances, Longitudes and Latitudes*, by Edmund Bohun (London: C. Brome, 1688).
1692. He was commissioned an ensign in the *troupes de la marine* in 1722, likely having served previously as a cadet, as did most Canadian officers.

The path that brought him to command this expedition reflected over twenty years of service for his king across New France. His first assignment was on the edge of the world—the small post of Chagouamigon, on the southwestern corner of Lake Superior. It schooled him in the art of diplomacy with the Sauk, Fox, and Sioux Indians with whom he was charged with preserving peace. The fur trade there had been so profitable that it had already given name to one of its destinations in Montréal, a small alley called *la ruelle Chagouamigon*. Marin’s years of service taught him the importance of the fur trade as the economic underpinning of New France’s alliances with Native nations and, by extension, its military power in North America. By 1741, Marin de la Malgue had been promoted to the rank of lieutenant and had gained the favor of two influential governors-general of New France, the Marquis de Vaudreuil Philippe de Rigaud and the Marquis de Beauharnois Charles de la Boische.

The advent of the War of Austrian Succession (1744–1748) between Britain and France gave Lieutenant Marin the opportunity to serve his king yet again, by striking his *anglais* enemies in Acadia, New England, and New York. Marin received orders from Governor Beauharnois in October 1745 to take command of a detachment of Canadians and Native allies to attack the frontiers of New England. The grueling two-hundred mile journey—from Montréal, up the Richelieu River, to Lake Champlain and lac Saint-Sacrament, and then overland to the upper Hudson River—displayed all of the strengths that had brought New France such imperial sway across North America: longstanding alliances with Native nations; an established set of procedures for Canadians and Indians fighting in joint expeditions; an ability to move men and supplies across colossal distances; and a corps of Canadian officers skilled in *petite guerre* with deep reservoirs of diplomatic and military experience in America.

Marin’s target—the Anglo-Dutch settlement of Saratoga on the upper Hudson River—was a reflection of how much French imperial influence was negotiated constantly with Indian allies. In this case, Marin’s Indian allies—who knew the weather and land far better than the Canadians, and even drew maps for them—advised against a strike on Connecticut so late in the season. Instead, they recommended a target of opportunity close by, one that some Canadians and Indians had previously visited. Demonstrating their geographic knowledge, the Indians showed the French, “by the map which they presented to M. Marin of this river that we could be masters of, that we seize thirty-one houses, two

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forts with several storehouses, and magazines belonging to the King of England, which they
designated exactly on this same map. Saratoga composed the northernmost settlements of
the New York colony, or as the French called it, l’Orange, hearkening back to the Dutch
origins of the colony and Fort Orange, constructed in 1624 at what became Albany. The
warriors’ motives for selecting Saratoga as their target are unclear: they were clearly famil-
 iar with the settlement’s prosperity, but some Iroquois and Abenakis may have resented the
expansion of Anglo-Dutch plantations near their hunting grounds. Whatever their reasons,
Marin acquiesced to his allies’ recommendation, knowing that if he asserted his orders as
the French expedition commander and refused, the Indians would simply go home. He
may have also come to see the target’s value, as Saratoga had long been an irritating
way-station in the illegal fur trade that French authorities had been unsuccessful in sup-
pressing. The negotiation between Marin and his Native allies reflected what historian
Peter MacLeod termed “parallel warfare,” in which “both parties to the alliance waged a
separate war against a common enemy,” for different goals and objectives.6

Their journey southward brought this borderland region between la nouvelle
France and l’Orange into greater focus. It was a place where people moved in between
those rival European colonies with ease. Only the day before, as Marin’s party made its way
overland south of lac St. Sacrament, it encountered the house and trading station of John
Henry Lydius, one of the slippery characters who thrived in the borderlands. Born in
Dutch Albany in 1704, Lydius was a young fur trader who sought refuge from creditors by
fleeing to French Canada, where he converted to Catholicism and married Geneviève
Massé, a métis woman. When French authorities soon banished him from New France for
his illegal trading with New York, he returned to his Dutch world, where he established his
profitable trading post, perhaps in conjunction with Albany merchant David
Vanderheyden, who also had a house there. A few Indians from the nearby town of
Schaghticoke were at Lydius’s post at the time of the attack and were taken as captives—a
testament to the everyday presence of Indians at Saratoga. Another Schaghticoke native
known familiarly as “Old Cohconshawit” was “kill’d in the fight.”7 Fearing that his party
would be discovered, Marin had allowed a small party to capture Lydius’s house, only to
find two occupants—Lydius’s son Martinus and an African slave—who were taken as
captives. Lydius’s house and his apple orchard were put to the torch or destroyed. Having
intercepted random Indians, Dutch scouts, and settlers during their advance, Marin’s party

6 “Journal de la campagne de Sarastaugué, 1745,” ff. 8-12, esp. f. 9 (my translation), reel 41, Schuyler Family
Papers; D. Peter MacLeod, The Canadian Iroquois and the Seven Years’ War (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1996), x.
7 J. Allen and Foster Letter, Nov. 1745, in The Law Papers: Correspondence and Documents during Jonathan
Historical Society, 1907–1914), II, 118; American Weekly Mercury, Dec. 24, 1745, p. 3, places the death of
“Cockensenet” at Lydius’s house, not at Saratoga. The Schaghticoke leader may be “Covonooseet” or
“Cononnaughteset,” both of whom signed deeds to lands in the Housatonic Valley in the 1720s. See Shirley Dunn,
The Mohican World, 1680–1750 (Fleischmanns, NY: Purple Mountain Press, 2000), 351. The testimony of
Richard, a New England Indian, states that David Vanderheyden’s house was captured by Marin’s party. See
had finally made it to the vicinity of Saratoga undetected, crossing the falls of the Hudson River there around midnight on a bitterly cold November night.8

Marin finally gave the order to advance around 3:00 a.m. as the Indian and French warriors advanced through the dark woods down what they believed a “fairly good road”—a telling indication of previous Native and colonial traffic through the area. Marin’s intent was a coordinated attack at first light after small parties had surrounded the settlements. But when a small party of four Frenchmen and ten Indians encountered the first house, the Natives began to attack it and raise their war cries.9

From that moment, the fog of war took command. The other Indians in the party took the sound of gunfire and war cries as a signal to commence the attack, and “from then on it was impossible to exert any control.” Dividing into small and large groups—most likely based on the ethnicity and organization of the Native war parties—they headed south along the road and passed over the Fish Kill, “a very rapid river for which we were unprepared,” the French writer acknowledged.10

In the blink of an eye, intense destruction befell the hapless residents of Saratoga. Before the marauders lay an unsuspecting and vulnerable settlement of Anglo-Dutch colonists who had carved out wealthy and prosperous farms and mills with numerous African slaves. A large neighborhood stretched for about two miles along the Hudson, making the most of the fertile alluvial plains as farmland. Among the first to be captured were a Dutchman and an African slave running a sawmill. A squabble ensued between two young Frenchmen, the cadet Joseph Marin de La Malgue and Ensign François-Xavier de Saint-Ours, over which of the men was going to take the black slave as prisoner. Another party swooped on a blacksmith’s house, most likely that of John Maclure and Janet Finn Maclure. A Canadian militiaman killed their fourteen-year-old son, Johannes.11 But the man whose enterprising spirit had prospered Saratoga—Philip Johannes Schuyler—was determined to defend his estate. Holed up within his brick house “pierced with crenellations” or gun loops, he hurled insults and defiance at the French. Having drafted a will in 1739 that described him as “being very sick,” perhaps he did not fear death.12

9 “Journal de la campagne de Sarastaugé, 1745,” f. 18, reel 41, Schuyler Family Papers.
10 Ibid., ff. 18–19
11 Ibid., ff. 19; Jacqueline Dinan, “John Mack Cluer and Janet Finn: Two of Saratoga’s Forgotten Captives,” 2016, unpublished manuscript (Saratoga National Historical Park Research Files).
Schuyler knew at least one of his attackers. Charles-René Legardeur de Beauvais acted as a guide for the French expedition, as he was in many respects a Canadian counterpoint of Philip Schuyler—Beauvais owned a seigneury in the Champlain Valley, above the Abenaki town of Missisquoi. Beauvais had been acquainted with Schuyler—“knew him and liked him,” according to the journal—most likely because of the clandestine fur trade between New France and New York that ran through Saratoga. Beauvais entered the house, shouted Schuyler’s name, and asked him to surrender. But Schuyler refused to give up, shouting back that Beauvais “was a dog and that he would kill him.” Gunfire erupted. Beauvais shot and killed his old acquaintance, then Canadians and Indians proceeded to

13 “Journal de la campagne de Sarastaugué, 1745,” ff. 19–20, reel 41, Schuyler Family Papers. The Beauvais mentioned in the Marin 1745 Journal is not René Legardeur de Beauvais, a Marine officer born in 1660 and who died in 1742, nor was it his son Philippe-René Legardeur de Beauvais, holder of a seigneury in the Champlain Valley who was born in 1700 and died in Saint Domingue in 1744. The most likely candidate is Charles-René Legardeur de Beauvais, fils, who appears to have inherited it from his father Philippe-René: See “Ratification d’une concession sur le Lac Champlain en faveur de Sieur Charles-René Legardeur de Beauvais fils,” Feb. 8, 1735, in Correspondance entre le gouvernement français et les gouverneurs et intendants du Canada relative a la tenure seigneuriale demandée par une adresse de l’Assemblée legislative, 1851 (Québec: E. R. Fréchette, 1853), 95; P. G. Roy, “La Famille Legardeur de Tilly,” Bulletin des recherches historiques 53, no. 4 (April 1947): 99–123.
ransack his wealthy abode before setting it ablaze. The war parties moved south, using the road or the high ground overlooking the riverside settlements. Shattering glass and screams of terrified victims marked the scene of each attack on the homes of individual settlers who, for the most part, “surrendered very peacefully.” Blazing fires, columns of smoke, and cries of death gave a hellish cast to Saratoga, as the Canadians and Indians set fire to houses, mills, barns, and stables, some with their human and animal occupants still inside. They “ring’d all the Apple-Trees” to destroy orchards. Around 109 people were taken as captives, including the extended family of Jacob Quackenbush and Geertruy Vanderwerken Quackenbush, who faced a terrible fate in Canada. About fifty captives were Anglo-Dutch, while sixty were African slaves—a measure of slavery’s importance in Saratoga’s early economy. Although the attack would be mythologized as a prime instance of French and Indian brutality, the majority of Saratoga residents survived the attack (which fits larger patterns of Indians taking more captives than they killed). The Marin journal states that 109 settlers and slaves were taken as captives and “around a dozen were killed or burned in the houses.” Contemporary British accounts provide no firm statistics on the number of killed (George Clinton suggested around thirty killed) but are more precise about the numbers of captives (fifty colonists, sixty slaves). Though there is no clear evidence of the attackers’ motives, it is possible that the French and Indians saw Saratoga as an attractive target because of its large numbers of slaves—indeed, slightly more African slaves than Anglo-Dutch colonists were taken as captives by Marin’s party. One of those slaves was a young boy who eventually received the name of Atiatoharongwen from the Kahnawake Mohawks who had adopted him.

The attack on Saratoga had been an unparalleled success for both the Canadians and the Indians. The damage they inflicted on this wealthy British outlier was estimated at two hundred marks or £15,000 sterling (a sum equivalent to hundreds of thousands of dollars today). Sawmills stacked with ten thousand boards and joists and barns overflowing with corn, wheat, and fodder were all torched, denying those resources to any future British garrison or expedition against Canada. In addition, the Indians achieved unqualified success in the goals of their warfare—captives, scalps, and captured materiel—all attained with no casualties. By 8:00 a.m., the event was over. Lieutenant Marin ordered his forces to return to Lydius’s fort, north of the destroyed settlement, where the victors

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15 The French estimated 200 marks (Marin journal); an English newspaper estimated £15,000 (New-York Evening Post, Dec. 2, 1745, p. 4).
“remained drinking & were drunk at [Lydius’s] House So that they might if diligence had been made Easily cut off & destroy’d before they were Sober & departed,” as Lydius lamented back in Albany.\(^\text{16}\) The following day, the French and nominally Catholic Indians sang the Te Deum, the ancient hymn of Christian praise.

The 1745 destruction of Saratoga is a significant historical moment, for what it tells us about the nature of early America and places like Saratoga that were situated in between different worlds: in this case, the Native, Anglo-Dutch, and French worlds in North America. Its story highlights numerous important individuals and their families who profoundly shaped the evolution of North America and eventually, the emergence of the modern United States and Canada. For many of the French officers present in 1745, their participation in the Saratoga raid enhanced already formidable military reputations or it became a proving ground for their exploits in future conflicts. Lieutenant Marin was one of many French-Canadian officers who played conspicuous parts in French efforts to secure mastery of the continent. He advanced French interests in the far west, Acadia, the Champlain-Hudson corridor as well as the upper Ohio Valley, which he was commanded to seize in the year 1753 at the commencement of what became the French and Indian War (1754–1763). Three other members of the 1745 expedition would attain greater historical significance for their respective roles in the beginning of the Seven Years’ War in America: In 1753, the young George Washington delivered a diplomatic summons to the French at Fort de la Rivière au Boeuf, where he encountered Captain Jacques Legardeur de St.-Pierre, who had “much the Air of a Soldier” in the young Washington’s estimation. Ensign Joseph Coulon de Villiers de Jumonville was the leader of the small party ambushed by George Washington in 1754 in the Ohio Country, and Lieutenant Daniel-Marie Hyacinthe Liénard de Beaujeu was the commanding officer of the French and Indian force that routed Maj. Gen. Edward Braddock’s army at the Battle of the Monongahela in 1755.\(^\text{17}\)

Perhaps the most important French Canadian officer was Luc de La Corne Saint-Luc, a wealthy Montréal merchant, slaveholder, and superb partisan fighter, whose life bridges the histories of Saratoga, New France, British Canada, and the American Revolution. La Corne Saint-Luc personified the expertise of the French Canadian officer corps in petite guerre—gained in part through his service in Marin’s expedition against Saratoga in 1745 and in another attack that he led there in 1747. Born in 1711 to two distinguished families—Jean-Louis de La Corne and Marie Pécaudy de Contrecoeur—Saint-Luc entered service in the troupes de la marine as a cadet in 1722. His military service was an astounding education in warfare, geography, economics, diplomacy, culture, and linguistics (he was fluent in numerous Indian languages). In 1729, he was assigned to the far-western post of Michilimackinac in Ottawa country, gaining involvement in the fur trade and also military experience.

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fighting in the Fox Wars of the 1730s. Saint-Luc became one of the wealthiest French Canadians and one of its most distinguished officers, rising to the rank of lieutenant in 1748 and captain in 1755. In 1759 he received the Croix de Saint-Louis, the noble military order awarded by the King of France that Canadian officers aspired to earn. Eventually, he carried forward that history and experience into his participation in the 1777 campaign from Canada. Maj. Gen. John Burgoyne hailed him as “a Canadian gentleman of honour and parts, and one of the best partizans the French had last war.”

“La Corne de Saint-Luc, enseigne des troupes du Canada, 1747” dossier, COL Série E 243, ff. 363–79, ark:/61561/up424nhlnpq (Archives National d’Outre-mer, Aix-En-Provence, France). This dossier also includes La Corne de Saint-Luc’s journal of his 1747 attack on the Saratoga garrison. Marie Pécaudy de Contrecoeur was related to one of New France’s most distinguished soldiers of the eighteenth century, Captain Claude-Pierre Pécaudy de Contrecoeur.

One of the Saratoga captives who headed northward to an uncertain future was a young slave, born at Saratoga to African and Abenaki Indian parents. He was eventually adopted by the Kahnawake Mohawks, and grew up at their town near Montréal, where he became known as Atiatoharongwen, or Louis Cook. His story illustrates the crucial ways that Native Americans defined the early American world. Borderlands communities like Saratoga were fundamentally and powerfully places of cultural blending, where one’s life and identity could be altered or reinvented altogether. John Hendricks Lydius was one such borderlands chameleon who learned to negotiate and move among French-Canadians, Indians, and the Dutch with ease. Atiatoharongwen became a distinguished warrior during the war that many Natives fought in alliance with their French father in the 1750s. Eventually, he would become an ally of the United States during the War for Independence, meeting with George Washington in 1775 at the Siege of Boston, and later, returning to Saratoga with the American army opposing John Burgoyne in 1777. In one of history’s ironic twists, Atiatoharongwen’s presence during the Saratoga Campaign brought him in opposition to La Corne St. Luc—one of the French officers who had participated in the raid that resulted in his capture in 1745.

Figure 1.3. John Trumbull, Captain Joseph Lewis or Louis, of the Oneida Indians, ca. 1785–1786, pencil sketch, Yale University Art Gallery.
Philip Johannes Schuyler, the patrician of the early Saratoga community who was shot to death by his acquaintance Monsieur Beauvais, illustrates the Anglo-Dutch world that gave birth to northernmost settlement of the New York colony. The prevalence of wealthy Dutch patentees, with deep interests in the fur trade, gave rise to a coterie of powerful families like the Schuylers who sought opportunity, influence, and large landed estates in new frontier regions. In 1684, a group of six wealthy and well-connected Dutchmen received a patent for over 150,000 acres of land in Saratoga following a purchase from Mohawk Indians. In a fundamental way, this early patent defined the trajectory of Saratoga’s history, as it represented an investment in the future of the North American frontier. Without that patent, and the access it gave to good alluvial farmland, rushing creeks to power sawmills, and the fur trade with Canada, there would have been no settlement for the French to attack in 1745. The death of Philip Johannes Schuyler that year meant that ownership of his father Johannes Schuyler’s Saratoga farm and sawmill eventually passed to Philip’s nephew and namesake. Born in 1733 to Johannes and Cornelia Van Cortlandt Schuyler, the younger Philip was heir of a prominent Dutch family distinguished by its mercantile and landed wealth and political influence. Philip would later inherit and develop the family’s Saratoga lands, serve in the French and Indian War, and eventually become a major general in the Continental Army and the first commander of its Northern Department.

The 1777 Battle of Saratoga is also brought into better focus when viewed in light of the long colonial history stretching back to Samuel de Champlain—the first European to undertake a campaign from Canada up the Champlain Valley. Saratoga’s colonial past is remarkable for the presence of so many influential characters who shaped early American history: Isaac Jogues, John Hendricks Lydius, Paul Marin de La Malgue, Peter Schuyler, Robert Rogers, Lord Loudoun, Jeffery Amherst, Philip Schuyler, and Atiatoharongwen are only a few of the significant individuals whose lives intersected with Saratoga. These life stories reveal many of the broader historical patterns of this borderland area that would continue to shape the 1777 Saratoga Campaign. Indeed, the lives of Philip Schuyler, La Corne Saint-Luc, and Atiatoharongwen personify the links between Saratoga’s colonial past and its revolutionary future.

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Native Paths to Saratoga

The presence and independence of Native American peoples profoundly shaped Saratoga’s history and that of the borderland framed by the Six Nations, New France, New York, and western New England—or the triangle formed by the upper Hudson-Lake Champlain-Richelieu corridor, running up the St. Lawrence River to Lake Ontario, and then along the Wood Creek-Mohawk River corridor back to the Hudson. The Batten Kill and Hoosic Rivers, emptying into the Hudson from the east, also offered passages to the New England colonies. Saratoga was a key resource as well as a transportation nexus of those strategic corridors for Natives and colonists, making it a point of competition for both. Its alluvial lowlands along the Hudson River, flanked on the west by hills and ridges, offered a natural overland highway as well as agricultural possibilities. West of the Hudson River, Native hunters prized a mountainous region called Kayaderosseras for its excellent hunting. Lakes in the Saratoga and Kayaderosseras regions offered possibilities for fishing, as did the junction of the Fish Kill and the Hudson where herring abounded. The Hudson was generally navigable up to its largest falls (modern Hudson Falls, New York), although there were smaller falls and riffles downriver. Small boats could navigate upriver to Saratoga and the Carrying Place beyond it—where boats were portaged or carried overland to reach Lake George or to Lake Champlain’s South Bay via Wood Creek. A short portage
was also required at the Saratoga Falls on the Hudson, which made Saratoga a logical
waypoint for travelers to halt or rest before moving on. For most of the colonial era, Native
peoples controlled the borderlands between New France and New York, despite the formal
claims of the French and Anglo-Dutch colonists to the land and its resources.

Official colonial records are replete with astonishingly frank admissions of how
little coercive power European governments possessed over their Indian neighbors. In
1684, a Wendat-Onondaga leader named Otreouti boldly informed the governor general of
New France, “We have a power to go where we please, to conduct who we will to the places
we resort to, and to buy and sell where we think fit.” Another Onondaga leader explicitly
rejected British claims to the continent: “They [the Iroquois] had not ceded to any one
their lands, which they hold only of Heaven.” 21 In the seventeenth century, as we shall see,
the French launched several military expeditions to strike at the Iroquois Confederacy, but
never succeeded in breaking their power. In 1731, Charles de La Boische, Marquis de
Beauharnois and Gilles Hocquart, the governor general and intendant of New France,
respectively, reported to their superiors in Paris, “We can easily admit the impossibility of
wholly subjugating the Indians at present.” Indeed, they could not control Canadian
Iroquois allies settled in their midst, at places like Kahnawake (also called Sault St. Louis)
and Kanesatake, just a short distance from Montréal. Beauharnois flat out admitted that
“Sault St. Louis, My Lord, has become a sort of Republic,” due to its independence.
Conversely, Indian leaders consistently emphasized their strength and independence to
their French father, Onontio and their British brother Corlaer. British leaders, for their
parts, consistently feared the alienation of the Iroquois Confederacy, which would shift
their formidable military power fully to the French alliance. Gov. George Thomas of
Pennsylvania freely confessed to fellow to governor George Clinton of New York, “If I had
any coercive power over the Indians inhabiting in or upon the Borders of Pennsylvania I
would certainly exercise it, and send all their fighting men upon this important occasion;
but it is well known, that neither you nor I have any such Power.” 22

The Haudenosaunee, or people of the longhouse, constituted the largest and most
powerful Indian confederation in eastern North America in the colonial era. They consti-
tuated a confederation of five nations formed at some point before contact with Europeans.
The metaphorical longhouse that those nations shared covered some of the most strategi-
cally important places in North America. The Senecas were the guardians of the western
door of the longhouse, facing Lake Ontario and points west. Mohawks, or
Kanien’kehá:ka—“people of the flint”—were guardians of the eastern door of the long-
house, in the Mohawk and upper Hudson valleys. The Oneidas, Cayugas, and Onondagas

21 Quoted in David L. Preston, The Texture of Contact: European and Indian Settler Communities on the
Frontiers of Iroquoia, 1667–1783 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 11, 53; Parmenter, Edge of the
22 George Thomas to Clinton, June 26, 1746, box 1, folder 35, George Clinton Papers (William L. Clements
Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor).
(the keepers of the central fire) inhabited the lands between the door keepers. Comprising originally those five nations, the Iroquois Confederacy also became known as the Six Nations after the 1720s, when an Iroquoian people called the Tuscaroras migrated northward from the Carolinas to become the sixth nation (this study uses the terms Haudenosaunee, the Iroquois Confederacy, and the Five Nations or Six Nations interchangeably).

Of all the Iroquois nations, the Mohawks had the most extensive territories and communities, stretching from the Mohawk Valley northward to the St. Lawrence River. Beginning in the mid-1600s, because of the demographic, economic, diplomatic, and religious changes wrought by European colonization, many Mohawks relocated to territories along the St. Lawrence River where they had previously hunted or settled. The communities of Kahnawake (1677), Kanesatake (1721), and Akwesasne (1755) were founded by Iroquois peoples (predominantly Mohawks but including Oneidas, Cayugas, and Onondagas) often with close ties to French Canadians and Catholic missionaries. But southern Mohawks remained in their core lands in the Mohawk Valley, more closely tied to the Protestant faith and the Anglo-Dutch world at Albany and Schenectady. The continuing relationships between St. Lawrence Iroquois and League Iroquois (those who inhabited what is now upstate New York) fundamentally defined the borderlands of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The borderlands between the St. Lawrence and Mohawk River valleys constituted key hunting territories for the Mohawks and other Native groups who shared it. Saratoga was one of the many places frequented by Native travelers and hunters over the centuries. The origins and meaning of the Iroquoian name Saratoga remain unclear. Saratoga was known as “Ocheratonque,” “Ochsechrage” by the Mohawks. An Algonquian people, the Mahicans, had once inhabited the upper Hudson River Valley, and referred to Saratoga as “Amissohaendick,” the meaning of which is unknown. During the initial negotiation of the Indian deed for the Saratoga Patent, the Mahicans were offered payment for the land along with the Mohawk claimants, “inasmuch as in old times it was their land before the Maquas won it from them.” Many variant spellings were used in the colonial era, reflecting earlier Native naming and pronunciation, Sarachtoga, Saraghtoge, Saracto, Sareghtoken, Saletoge, Sarasto, and Sarastau.23

The nature of Mohawk rights to the Saratoga region have greater visibility and definition in the historical record because of conflicting French-English claims as well as the controversy in the 1760s over the Kayaderosseras Patent, which encompassed and threatened Mohawk hunting grounds west of Saratoga. In the 1730s, the French governor general, the Marquis de Beaufharnois, was careful to respect Native claims as the French

established a fortification and a presence at Pointe à la Chevelure (also known as Crown Point, on Lake Champlain). French land claims to the south, he pledged, would be given to the Mohawks and other Indians “as a deed of Gift to make use of it for a hunting Place for them & their Posterity at ye same time assured them no French should settle there.” When Mohawks learned of a report that the French intended to settle on Wood Creek in the late 1730s, they insisted to English authorities that “the Lands at the Wood Creek, Crown Point & as far North as Ochjarego [Otter Creek] belong all to us, & all the Lands on both sides the Lake as far as Ochjarego & all the Lands on the carrying place to the Southward of Crown Point belong all to the 6 Nations.”

Additional documentation of Mohawk claims came in 1761, when the British Indian agent Sir William Johnson wrote, following a meeting with Mohawk leaders at his house: “all the Lands on the West side of Hudsons River Lake George, & Lake Champlain, as far as to a Rock called by them Rojioghne belongs to them except what was sold, that it was so settled between their Forefathers & the Indians Inhabiting the Country of Canada, which never was disputed by their Brethren or others before, that within them limits are their best Hunting Grounds.” Rojioghne refers to a rock outcropping in Lake Champlain called Rock Regio, or Tobapsqua by the Abenakis, suggesting that it functioned as a kind of territorial marker between the Mohawks and the Abenakis.

Regardless of exact territorial claims and extent of hunting lands, Natives enjoyed broad spatial mobility that fundamentally defined the borderlands of the colonial era. The Mohawks’ communities—encompassing towns in the St. Lawrence Valley as well as the Mohawk Valley—are perhaps the most instructive example of that spatial mobility. While most occupation of that vast region was more seasonal (hunting camps), small bands of Mohawks settled in the general area of Saratoga in the eighteenth century, such as the “maquase Indian from Sarachtoge” mentioned in an English record. That reference may indicate that a small band of Mohawks were, in fact, settled in the Saratoga region either permanently or seasonally. Mohawks freely moved between the St. Lawrence and Mohawk valleys, maintaining economic ties and diplomatic relationships that emphasized their kinship. As we shall see, the Mohawks’ independence made them perfectly suited to carry on a trade that was, for them, perfectly legal, but for French and English traders was illegal. Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs who frequently dealt with both groups, pointed out that the Kahnawake Mohawks have “continually been imployed to carry on the strowd Trade between the Inhabitants of this place & the French of Canada & is their chief lively

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24 Charles H. McIlwain, ed., *An Abridgment of Indian Affairs Contained in Four Folio Volumes, Transacted in the Colony of New York from the Year 1678 to the Year 1751 by Peter Wraxall* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1915), 213, 215.

hood,” adding that it “was also a motive for them to settle in Canada & then had liberty to carry on the Trade more freely.”

The Tree of Peace was a potent symbol of the Iroquois League, hearkening back to the message of Deganawida (the Peacemaker) and Hiawatha, who spread the Great Law of Peace (Gayanashagowa) among the warring Iroquois nations in the centuries before European contact. Their implements of war—hatchets, clubs, arrows—were symbolically buried underneath an ever-growing Tree of Peace, which had four white roots extending in all directions. These spiritual and diplomatic metaphors structured how the Haudenosaunee dealt with their Indian and European neighbors and why they frequently invited other peoples to settle in their territories, under the shade of the tree and as “props” of their extended longhouse.

Saratoga became a land of opportunity for the region’s natives: a hunting preserve for all; a trading paradise that maximized Indian independence; and a haven for other Algonquian and Iroquoian refugees who had been displaced by other European colonies. The Schaghticoke Indian community, located near Saratoga on the east side of the Hudson in the Hoosick River valley, was one of many refugee communities that sought security and protection by developing closer ties to Albany and to the Mohawks. The Schaghticoke Indians included Mahicans (also called River Indians in the period) as well as various Algonquian bands such as Woronocos and Pojassicks who had been displaced by the New England colonists. The Mahicans’ core territories in the seventeenth century were located in the Hudson Valley, from the Schodack Islands northward to the mouth of the Mohawk River; it also extended eastward into the Housatonic Valley. Conflict with the Mohawks in the 1620s over trade, along with the general pressures created by Dutch colonization, resulted in the gradual weakening of the Mahicans (that war was reflected in the negotiations over the Saratoga Patent, which referenced that “in old times it was their land before the Maquas won it from them”).

The turmoil and dislocation created by King Philip’s War in New England in 1675 and 1676 led many of that region’s Algonquian natives to seek refuge and trading opportunities farther west. Stockbridge in western Massachusetts was one such refugee community as well as a base for Protestant missionary work. Schaghticoke offered the opportunity to trade with Albany as well as other Native groups in the Lake Champlain Valley: Natives settled there carried on far-ranging ties with the Abenakis settled at Missisquoi, Pennacook, and Odanak. Both the New York government and the Iroquois Confederacy (particularly the Mohawks) took on a guardian role over the Schaghticoke natives. One

27 Preston, Texture of Contact, 14–15, 26–27.
measure of the independence and movement of Schaghticoke peoples is that in 1688, a raiding party against the Connecticut River valley was identified as having “Eleaven Indians that formerly lived in New England, and now in Canada,” including Wallamaqueet, a Pennacook who had “lived formerly in the Halfe Moone,” which at that time had a mixed settlement of Mahican and Schaghticoke Indians.\(^{29}\)

The Western Abenakis were another regional power whose history and culture intersect with Saratoga, a place they called nebizonbik (“place of water medicine”) after the natural mineral springs. The core Western Abenaki territories were framed by the White Mountains and Connecticut River in the east, the Richelieu and St. Francis rivers to the north, and by Lake Champlain on the west. In fact, Lake Champlain functioned as the border of Abenaki and Mohawk territories. The Abenakis had joined in resistance to English expansion in New England, first with Wampanoags in King’s Philip’s War and later in alliance with the French. Like the Mohawks, the Abenakis also found economic opportunity and security by relocating closer to the St. Lawrence River. By the early eighteenth century, the principal Abenaki settlements in the region were located at Missisquoi and along on the eastern shore of Lake Champlain, and at two Catholic mission communities along the St. Lawrence River, Bécancour (Wôlinak), and St. François (Odanak). Due to their frequent wars with New England, they were considered among the most inveterate opponents of the English.\(^{30}\)

In 1745, after over one hundred years of experience, the French had garnered the lion’s share of Indian alliances in North America. As a result, French officers like Paul Marin de La Malgue and Jacques Legardeur de Saint-Pierre were able to assemble a broad coalition of allied Indian warriors for the 1745 expedition that resulted in the attack on Saratoga. In total, there were 229 Native allies who mobilized themselves. Ninety were Abenakis drawn most likely from Bécancour and St. François. Twenty-three were Nipissings from an area north of the Ottawa River and Georgian Bay. Sixteen were Hurons, most likely from the town of Nouvelle-Lorette, where Catholic Hurons had taken refuge following an Iroquois attack on Huronia in the 1640s. Finally, there were one hundred Canadian Iroquois—drawn equally from Kahnawake and Kanesatake (Lake of the Two Mountains) near Montréal.


French Paths to Saratoga

Paul Marin de La Malgue was not the first Frenchman to lead a foray so far south from Canada, nor was he the last to experience fundamental realities that governed colonial North America: that Europeans could not achieve their larger objectives without the presence and power of allied Indian nations, and that European commanders typically had to acquiesce to Native warriors’ expertise and knowledge of the land when they went to war together. Lieutenants Marin and St. Pierre were equally diplomats and officers of la marine in that they were leading coalitions comprising French marine regulars, Canadian militia, youthful cadets, and Indian nations from multiple nations and communities. Venturing southward up the Richelieu River and Lake Champlain, Lieutenant Marin had to diplomatically condole the Iroquois warriors, listen to the Indians’ advice and suggestions, and swallow his pride on “having to do as they wished.”

Marin’s status vis-à-vis his Indian allies had hardly changed since the time of Samuel de Champlain, one hundred and thirty-six years earlier. In July 1609, Champlain and a small French party accompanied a coalition of Huron, Algonquin, and Montagnais warriors to attack the Mohawks. Their route up Lake Champlain went along much the same route as Marin’s in 1745. Champlain was a veteran explorer of the northern Atlantic coast, and his efforts to secure a French lodgment in North America came to fruition in 1608, when he established a colony at Kebec (Québec). Much of the trajectory of New France’s future was established by the early relationships formed between Indians and the French newcomers. Specifically, the Hurons, Algonquins, and Montagnais sought alliance with Champlain against their inveterate enemies to the south, the Five Nations—an example of how Natives often bent Europeans to their geopolitical ends.

Somewhere near a promontory called Ticonderoga, Champlain’s allies located a Mohawk war party. The ensuing battle, on July 30, 1609, was a pivotal moment in early American history, as it marked an essential transformation in warfare. Champlain witnessed the ways of war that had prevailed among Indian nations prior to European contact. The Mohawks, Hurons, Algonquians, and Montagnais engaged one another in set-piece fashion, after having negotiated the battle the day before. They fought in dense ranks—“a disciplined close-order forest-phalanx,” according to historian David Hackett Fischer—and wore wooden armor and carried shields to deflect stone arrows. Champlain and his men, carrying the wheellock arquebus, felled several Mohawk chiefs. The shock power of the muskets, along with the deaths of their leaders, caused the Mohawks to flee the field. In the next decades, as firearms technology spread to Native peoples across the Northeast, warriors adapted their organization and tactics. They increasingly fought in dispersed

31 “Journal de la campagne de Sarastaugué, 1745,” f. 10, reel 41, Schuyler Family Papers.
formations, ambushed their enemies, and prized marksmanship, as they adopted the total war tactics of the Europeans.\textsuperscript{33}

Unbeknown to Champlain, the English mariner Henry Hudson, in the employ of the Dutch East India Company, was undertaking a voyage of exploration that would bring him up the “North River” (the Hudson) in September 1609. It marked the beginnings of Dutch colonization in America. The founding of the New Netherland colony a few years later essentially triangulated the contest for control of the northeast and its valuable lands and fur trade. Following his fateful encounter with the Mohawks, Champlain continued southward along the La Chute River and briefly explored a finger lake known to the French as \textit{le lac Saint-Sacrament} (modern Lake George). Champlain’s exploration was the basis of French claims to the watersheds of Lakes Champlain and Saint-Sacrament, up to the height of land between the latter and the Hudson River. That, in turn, placed the future settlement of Saratoga squarely on the front lines of French imperial claims.\textsuperscript{34}

The Hurons, Algonquins, and Montagnais had drawn the French into a preexisting conflict for their purposes—and in so doing, Champlain’s battle with the Mohawks inaugurated nearly one hundred years of chronic war with the Five Nations and, by proxy, the Dutch in New Netherland. Numerous demographic, economic, and biological forces were at work in this contagion of war that swept over the colonial Northeast. Microbes inadvertently introduced by Europeans to America created one of the greatest epidemiological disasters in world history, as lethal diseases like smallpox, measles, and scarlet fever leveled the vulnerable Native populations that had never experienced them before. Some nations lost two-thirds or more of their entire population in the seventeenth century. Those losses only compounded the competition for furs, resources, and access to European trade goods and firearms. They also exacerbated the Iroquois cultural practice of “mourning wars” aimed at incorporating individual captives into Iroquois clans to replace deceased kin and to assuage family members’ grief. By the 1640s the Five Nations were attacking and incorporating neighboring tribes into their communities. The gun trade itself also spurred warfare among Native nations and enabled them to strike back at either the Dutch or the French. As one recent scholar concludes, “it was the threat of Iroquois, not colonial, gunmen that galvanized an arms race throughout the Native Northeast, involving new technologies, stratagems, and politics.” The numerous Iroquois peoples effectively brought a new and destructive war directly to the heart of New France in the mid-1600s, threatening the future existence of the French in America. Finally, Christian missionaries seeking to

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 268. 

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 266–71. On French claims up to the Lake George watershed, see McIlwain, ed., \textit{Abridgment of Indian Affairs Contained in Four Folio Volumes}, 215–16.
spread the Gospel to Native peoples also created factions aligned along Dutch Protestant or French Catholic alliances.\textsuperscript{35}

The captivity and diplomatic activities of one such missionary, Father Isaac Jogues of the Society of Jesus (Jesuits), brought the first European to Saratoga. In 1642, he was captured by Mohawks while traveling in the St. Lawrence Valley, and may have passed by Saratoga as he was led into captivity among the Mohawks. Following his release (which the Dutch helped secure), he again journeyed from Canada down to Mohawk Country in 1646, most likely passing by Saratoga. A Jesuit relation by Jerome Lallement described how he came “on the eve of the Blessed Sacrament, at the end of the lake which is joined to the great lake of Champlain. The Iroquois name it Andiatarocté, as if one should say, ‘there where the lake is shut in.’ The Father named it the lake of the Blessed Sacrament.” Jogues and his party continued on “their way by land with great fatigues, for they had to carry on their backs their bundles and their baggage”—perhaps referencing the portage after lac Saint-Sacrament—until they came to a river the Iroquois called Oiogué—the Hudson. The relation also contained what is perhaps a reference to Saratoga: “On the first day of June, their guides, overcome by their burdens and the toil, turned aside from the road which leads to their villages, in order to pass by a certain place called in their language Ossaragué; this spot (according to the Father’s report) is very remarkable as abounding in a small fish, the size of the herring.” The party had some canoes loaned to them (by either local Natives or Dutch traders) “to carry their baggage as far as the first settlement of the Dutch, distant from this fishery about eighteen or twenty leagues.” Father Jogues eventually died a martyr’s death among the Mohawks during his mission.\textsuperscript{36}

Ordinary Canadian settlers, or habitants, were dying in far greater numbers than the Jesuits from Iroquois attacks against the St. Lawrence Valley. The colony was languishing both economically and demographically, as trade and population growth stagnated. There were only about three thousand souls in New France in 1663. The situation had become so grave that in 1663 King Louis XIV made New France a royal colony. The king was guided by the counsel of his leading minister of state, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, who favored reforms to make New France a profitable enterprise. Before Colbert’s vision for the colony could be implemented, however, the Iroquois threat had to be muted. In 1665, Louis XIV sent a regular army unit, the Carignan-Salières Regiment, to New France with the mission of attacking the Five Nations and defending Canadian settlements along the St. Lawrence.\textsuperscript{37} One of the soldiers in that regiment—René Poupart dit Lafleur—would later


\textsuperscript{37} W. J. Eccles, \textit{France in America} (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1990), chap. 3; Allan Greer, \textit{The People of New France} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).
A Borderland World: French, Native, and Anglo-Dutch Paths to Saratoga, 1609–1745

have a central role in the history of early Saratoga. He was born in Rennes, Ille-et-Vilaine in Bretagne, France, sometime in or before 1655. Like many veterans of the Carignan-Salières Regiment, René permanently settled in New France, married Marie Gendron dit la Rolandièrè of Boucherville, and later began to search for economic opportunities in areas where he may have campaigned.\(^{38}\)

Two remarkable French leaders—Daniel de Rémy de Courcelle, the governor-general of New France, and the Marquis Alexandre de Prouville de Tracy, the commanding general of the king’s forces in North America—brought a new martial determination to defeat the Five Nations. In 1666, they each led punitive expeditions from Canada against the Mohawks, moving armies up the Champlain Valley and lac St. Sacrament in long-distance strikes. It is possible, but not definitive, that Courcelle’s Expedition in the winter of 1665–1666 passed through Saratoga (and also possible that the young soldier René Poupart dit Lafleur gained his first understanding of the region’s geography, assuming that he participated in the expedition with the regiment). The French stalled out without achieving their objectives in the vicinity of Schenectady, where Courcelle learned that the English had recently conquered the New Netherland colony in the Anglo-Dutch War of 1665–1667. A second expedition in the fall of 1666, led by Courcelle and the Marquis de Tracy, was modestly successful in destroying four Mohawk villages and achieving a temporary peace on the borderlands that lasted from 1667 until the 1680s. Perhaps most important, the French had demonstrated a new ability to bring war to their enemies’ doorsteps—whether they be Mohawk or Anglo-Dutch.\(^{39}\)

By the 1680s the struggle over the fur trade and alliances had shifted to the upper country in the west, or \textit{le pays d’en haut} as it was known to the French. The Glorious Revolution in England and the outbreak of the War of the League of Augsburg (1689–1697) inaugurated a century of intermittent warfare between England and France, a “Second Hundred Years’ War” for imperial supremacy. The borderland between New York, New France, and the Five Nations again became a battleground because of events in Europe—an important way that the places and peoples of the borderlands were increasingly shaped by outside forces.

Upon hearing news of the war with France from their English allies, Five Nations warriors again struck at the heart of Canada in 1689, destroying the settlement of Lachine near Montréal and killing or taking captive over one hundred settlers. Devastating raids

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once again came to the St. Lawrence Valley. But the incoming governor-general, the Comte de Frontenac, initiated numerous reprisals aimed at punishing the Mohawks, Onondagas, and the English colonists in New York who armed them. In 1690, a force of around two hundred French and Indians attacked and destroyed the town of Schenectady in the Mohawk Valley, killing around sixty Dutch citizens and taking nearly thirty as captives. In 1693 and 1696, the French sent more punitive expeditions southward to destroy League Mohawk and Onondaga towns. Even the 1697 Peace of Ryswick, ending the War of the League of Augsburg in Europe, brought no peace in North America. Decades of sustained warfare had taken a toll on the French and the Five Nations alike, but population losses from epidemics, migration, and battle had brought the Iroquois to an especially weak and vulnerable moment. As much as one-half of the Five Nations’ fighting strength had perished, along with a significant percentage of its total population.

As historians José António Brandão and William Starna observe, the Iroquois “managed to secure by diplomacy what they could not, at least for the present, secure by military might.” At Montréal in 1701, emissaries of the Five Nations met with French officials and Native nations from the far west. Approximately thirty-nine different Indian nations had journeyed to Montréal, hoping to end the chronic warfare of the seventeenth century. The Great Peace of Montréal, as it became known, was one of the most important and consequential treaties in American history. The Five Nations metaphorically planted a tree of peace at Montréal with the French and their Native allies, securing important recognition of Iroquois trading and hunting rights. At the same time, the Iroquois also renewed and strengthened their alliance with the English at Albany. Together, these treaties constituted a “triumph of Iroquois diplomacy,” according to Brandão and Starna. Perhaps most important, the Five Nations pledged to remain neutral in future wars between England and France, which gave them leverage as well as security. It was a pledge that profoundly shaped the borderlands near Saratoga, as the French refrained from any direct attacks on the Five Nations, lest they shift their still formidable power wholly to the English orbit in retaliation. Years later, the English writer Peter Wraxall observed that the Iroquois commitment to neutrality had changed America’s geopolitics, as “the Balance between us and the French is the great ruling Principle of Modern Indian Politics.”

Having secured peace with the Five Nations, and for their allies in the pays d’en haut, the French were empowered to pursue their economic and imperial ambitions against the English colonies in North America. In the decades following 1701, the French under

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King Louis XIV pursued a policy of containment of the burgeoning English colonies. They cemented numerous alliances with Indian peoples across the continent, established fortified trading stations along interior waterways, and established key posts at Detroit, Niagara, and in Louisiana. Nearly a century of chronic warfare had also given rise to Canadian proficiency in wilderness warfare. The governor general Marquis de Denonville, who served from 1685 to 1689, also established the practice of awarding commissions in the troups de la marine to worthy Canadian seigneurs or nobles. By the early 1700s, the officer corps of the troups de la marine had far excelled any of their English counterparts in the conduct of unconventional war (or petite guerre) and long-range expeditions, both of which depended on their ability to cooperate with Native allies.43

In the first half of the eighteenth century, New France significantly advanced its claims to the Champlain and Richelieu valleys with extensive fortification, seigneurial land grants, and limited pockets of settlement (one of those seigneurial grants, north of Missiquoi on Lake Champlain, was held by the Beauvais family—the same family that provided a scout for Marin’s 1745 expedition). To improve the flow of supplies from Montréal, the French constructed a supply road leading from La Prairie southeast to the Richelieu River. Along that river, the French had constructed a network of fortifications such as Fort Chambly, Fort Sainte-Thérèse, and Fort Saint-Jean. Like other outposts across New France, these were intended to anchor French claims and to strengthen alliances with Indians in the region, not dispossess them. The French military presence was such a light footprint that real control of the borderlands remained with the Indians. Nonetheless, a trickle of French settlers came into the Richelieu Valley, including René Poupart dit Lafleur and his Marie Gendron dit la Rolandière, who settled at Saint-Louis de Richelieu and later at Chambly where some of their first children were born. As early as 1679, René was noted as having “been at Orange” (Albany) and “gone to Lake Champlain to hunt for Ranontons” (raccoons). Pierre de Saurel, one of his old officers in the Carignan-Salières Regiment, had gained a seigneur in the vicinity of Sorel. According to the French governor general, Louis de Buade, Comte de Frontenac, Saurel had “5 canoes and 10 men in the woods carrying on the fur trade.” Lafleur was likely one of those men.44 As early as 1689 there was an intrepid trio of “French that live towards Sarachtoge,” where they were trading peaceably until King


William’s War erupted: René Poupar dit Lafleur, Pierre de Garmeaulx dit Villeroy, and François de Lafortune.45

Indeed, one of the most significant aspects of Saratoga’s history in the colonial era was its central role in the illicit fur trade between Canada and Albany—a trade that flourished in the borderlands conditions that prevailed during the Long Peace. The trade’s very existence reflected the great degree of independence that Natives still possessed—especially the Iroquois, who moved, hunted, settled, and traded without hinderance in their territories between the Mohawk and St. Lawrence valleys. French officials struggled mightily against this trade and the ownership of English merchandise, both of which were forbidden by law. The scale of this trade was vast. Between 1710 and 1712, more than four hundred thousand livres worth of beaver were smuggled past Fort Chambly, where English subjects were sometimes found in the woods with packs of merchandise ready to trade.46

The *traite illégale* was worth the risk to all parties involved: French merchants desperately needed a source for English woolens (called strouds), as Natives almost universally preferred English strouds for both their durability and colors. French manufacturers never produced a substitute that rivaled Indian consumers’ preference for English strouds. Indians could bring furs and pelts to Albany, where the price of exchange was generally better than in Montréal. Dutch and English merchants, in turn, could gain access to the superior quality furs hunted in the Great Lakes region or boreal forests north of the St. Lawrence. To English officials, the trade was particularly galling, as it enabled French traders, armed with the coveted English strouds, to consolidate alliances with Indians in the far west. French officials, on the other hand, feared that their Native allies would create new political alignments with the English as they traded directly with Albany or Oswego.47

The Intendant of New France, Gilles Hocquart, observed to the Minister of Marine in 1737:

You are aware, Monseigneur, of the total freedom of movement that the savages have always enjoyed, and the degree of independence that characterizes their lives. They come into Montréal, and they leave with packs which they claim to own. Similarly, they have until now customarily gone past Chambly and the fort at Pointe-a-la Chevelure without being inspected, with the exception of two or three incidents which, I am told, occurred long ago. You are surely aware of the

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difficulty of subjecting these savages to any type of law; the only rules they have are those dictated by their self-interest…\cite{48}

As Hocquart observed, the trade rewarded individual ambition and enterprise, producing a set of colorful individuals who flourished in these borderlands conditions and who flaunted imperial officials' authority. Iroquois women and sometimes Canadian women were very conspicuous agents in the trade, acting as both merchants and as porteurs (perhaps as much as 50 percent of the time).\cite{49} In 1732 the Intendant of New France, Gilles Hocquart, fined a Canadian trader named Vincent Lenoir five hundred livres for having been to trade at “Sarasto, Orange, la Menade et à Boston” without permission [la Menade or Menatte was a French term for Manhattan, or New York City].\cite{50}

The centerpiece of French efforts to control that trade, and Lake Champlain itself, was Fort Saint-Frédéric, a masonry fort constructed at a place called Pointe-à-la-Chevelure between 1734 and 1737. The French had constructed a small stockade or blockhouse at Pointe-à-la-Chevelure for purposes of trade in the early 1720s, and had even sent an officer and thirty men to the area in 1730 to intercept Anglo-Dutch traders (an unsuccessful effort, as it turned out). As we have seen, French officials were careful to recognize Native claims and uses of the land surrounding it. Both French and British commentators fully recognized that the post’s real importance was strategic. Fort Saint-Frédéric was powerful not in its engineering but in its function as a place of rendezvous for Indian fur trade (and a means by which French officers might make a profit) and as a forward base of operations for invasions of New York and New England. A survey done by a Canadian engineer in 1754 remarked that Fort Saint-Frédéric was “near the English of Fort Sarasteaux, Orange, and Corlac” (the French names for Saratoga, Albany, and Schenectady). With seigneurial grants in the Champlain Valley, and a small French civilian community coalescing at Crown Point by the 1740s, it is possible to imagine that these borderlands in the course of time might have remained permanently French. But for most of the eighteenth century, the French valued the Richelieu and Champlain valleys for their geopolitical importance—a

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49 On the roles of women, see Jan Noel,\textit{ Along a River: The First French-Canadian Women} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), chap. 3.

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Anglo-Dutch fortification, settlement, and trade in the Saratoga region before and after 1700 made French officials increasingly concerned about British expansion northward into the Champlain Valley. French maps from the early eighteenth century also testify to that growing recognition of Saratoga’s role. One French map (Figure 1.4) depicts the upper Hudson and Carrying Place circa the 1720s or early 1730s, including “Sarastogué première habitation des angloises” [Saratoga the first English settlement]. As we shall see, that inscription identifying an English settlement may, in fact, reference the Dutch patriarch Johannes Schuyler’s first efforts to develop his lands. Titled Carte du lac Champlain avec les rivières depuis le fort de Chambly dans la Nouvelle France jusques à Orange ville de la Nouvelle Angleterre [Map of Lake Champlain with the rivers from Fort Chambly in New France to Orange, city of New England], that map was almost certainly drawn before the establishment in 1734 of Fort Saint-Frédéric, which is not depicted.\footnote{Figure 1.5: Detail, Carte du lac Champlain avec les rivières depuis le fort de Chambly dans la Nouvelle France jusques à Orange ville de la Nouvelle Angleterre dressée sur divers mémoires, [ca. 1720–1730], Bibliothèque nationale de France, Département Cartes et plans, GE DD-2987, Collection d’Anville, #8682, http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb40604070n.}
Translations of Map Captions:

“Sarastogué première habitation des anglois” = “Saratoga the first settlement of the English”

“Orange” = Albany

“R. des Anies qui vient des Onejoust et passe par le village des Anies et se décharge a la mer, a la nouvelle Yorck.” = “River of the Mohawks which comes from the Oneidas and passes by the village of the Mohawks and empties into the sea, at New York.” [author translation].

“R. du Chicot ou du petit sault” = Wood Creek

“Grand Marais” = South Bay of Lake Champlain

“Fort la Reine ou les anglaise etoient retranchez en 1709” = “Queen’s Fort, where the English were entrenched in 1709”

“Pointe a la chevelure” = Crown Point

Figure 1.6. Carte du lac Champlain avec les rivières depuis le fort de Chambly dans la Nouvelle France jusques à Orange ville de la Nouvelle Angleterre dressée sur divers mémoires, [ca. 1720–1730], Bibliothèque nationale de France, Département Cartes et plans, GE DD-2987, Collection d’Anville, #8682.
In 1744, only one year before Marin’s raid, a Kahnawake Mohawk named Tecanancoassin presented intelligence to the governor general, the Marquis de Beauharnois, that “there is at Sarastau a garrisoned fort of the same size as that at La Prairie de la Madeleine, furnished with a building in each bastion for the accommodation of the inhabitants in case of necessity.” Beauharnois was left with the impression that very few defensive measures had been established by the English and that very little resistance would be had “in the projected attack on that post.” Marin may have known of Saratoga’s grave vulnerability through Tecanancoassin’s report—the veracity of which was amply proven by the events of November 17, 1745.

A second map, titled *Carte du lac Champlain*, adds yet another dimension to the historical forces and agents that ultimately shaped the background and the course of Marin’s expedition to Saratoga in 1745. That map was drawn sometime between 1732 and 1748 by the king’s surveyor Jean-Baptiste Anger and signed by engineer Gaspard-Joseph Chaussegros de Léry (1682–1756), who had designed the fortification at Fort Saint-Frédéric (Crown Point). It especially highlighted, at the far right, the “Maison de Lidius”—that of John Hendricks Lydius, whom the French had long considered a “dangerous man.” Having been expelled by French authorities for his subterfuge and collusion in the illegal fur trade, Lydius resurfaced at the Carrying Place near Saratoga around 1733, where he built a fortified trading post strategically situated to intercept furs from all his business contacts in Kahnawake and New France. The French and Native forces that surrounded and destroyed Lydius’s trading post were fully aware of who he was and what he was doing. And for the French, at least, one of the fruits of victory in this campaign was destruction of his outpost.

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53 Marquis de Beauharnois to Maurepas, Oct. 29, 1744, in *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, ed. O’Callaghan and Fernow, IX, 1109–10; “Intelligence communicated to M. be Beancours by Tecanancoassin, Chief of the Indians of the Sault St. Louis, on his return to Montréal from Orange, October 19, 1744,” ibid.

Anglo-Dutch Paths to Saratoga

The life of John Hendricks Lydius, the unfortunate trader whose house was destroyed in 1745, provides an illuminating introduction to the Dutch background of Saratoga’s history. The New Netherland colony, founded in 1614, lasted for fifty years as part of a vast Dutch global trading empire, until it was conquered by force of arms by England in 1664. John Hendricks Lydius was born into a world that remained thoroughly Dutch and only nominally English around the year 1704. His father, Rev. Johannes Lydius, was a native of Maesden in South Holland who had emigrated to New York in 1700. He had
accepted a call to become minister of the Dutch Reformed Church in Albany. The family home—a conspicuous Dutch-style brick townhouse—was located at the corner of State and Pearl streets, and there Lydias came of age.55

Lydias’s life reflects three fundamental characteristics of this Dutch world in Albany. As historian Sung Bok Kim described it, “the distinctive hallmark of New York in the colonial period was the string of great baronial estates that dominated its landscape.”56 Powerful families like the Schuylers, Livingstons, and the Van Rensselaers also dominated the political landscape. The elite class of wealthy gentry, merchants, and landowners had great entrepreneurial drive to acquire large tracts of frontier land—the key source of wealth in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century world. The ability of Albany’s merchants and elites to procure land from the Indians was aided by their deep involvements in the fur trade and Indian relations, the very foundations of New Netherland’s existence. Finally, Lydias was born into a Dutch community that had learned to navigate and to thrive in an Anglo-British world. As we shall see, John Hendricks Lydias made his mark on history in how he navigated the fluid borderlands in chameleon-like fashion—the son of a Dutch Reformed minister who eventually took refuge in New France, converting to Roman Catholicism and marrying a woman of mixed French-Indian ancestry, and then returning to the British fold, all the while carrying on a profitable trade from Saratoga and his post at the Carrying Place.57

Shortly after Samuel de Champlain’s fateful battle with Mohawk warriors at Ticonderoga in 1609, the English navigator Henry Hudson explored the river that eventually bore his name. As an agent of East India Company, Hudson advanced the interests of the United Provinces, the Dutch Republic on the cusp of growing global mastery. Over the course of the seventeenth century, the Dutch dominated the carrying trade of Europe and the Dutch East India Company displaced the Portuguese trading stations from their key trading posts in Africa, India, Malacca, and Formosa. Hudson’s voyage was part of the EIC’s search for a western route to its valuable Asian trading stations. The United Provinces, it is important to note, practiced religious toleration, as it had been necessary to unite many ethnic and religious groups in their struggle for independence from Catholic Hapsburg rule. Religious toleration was also good for business, and that principle extended to the New Netherlands, which became one of the most ethnically and religiously diverse places in the Americas.

Significantly, the first Dutch settlement established in America was near the present location of Albany, where the Dutch established Fort Nassau around 1614. But the

impermanence of the Dutch presence is suggested by the fact that the colonists abandoned that post due to flooding of the island on which Fort Nassau was located. Not until 1624 did the Dutch build a more enduring and substantial fortification at the site of Albany, named Fort Orange. From its earliest foundation, New Netherland was poised to exploit the lucrative fur trade, and as events proved, to counterbalance the influence of the French. When the Dutch established a trading post near the Keepers of the Eastern Door of the Iroquois longhouse, the Mohawks, it changed the geopolitical situation in eastern America. The fur trade with the Dutch triangulated the relationships among the French and the Five Nations, who gained firearms from the Dutch to defend themselves and advance their interests in the Beaver Wars of the seventeenth century. Dominance of the carrying trade eventually brought the Netherlands into conflict with England, which waged three separate wars in the seventeenth century to combat it. In the Second Anglo-Dutch War, in 1664, the English seized New Netherland, inheriting and renewing what became known as the Covenant Chain alliance with the Five Nations. From 1664 onward, the Albany Dutch, including Reverend Johannes Lydius and his family, inhabited a world that was slowly becoming anglicized in language, law, trade, politics, and empire.  

While the Dutch had surrendered New Amsterdam, they had not yielded their control of Indian relations. A 1686 charter incorporating the City of Albany further cemented their central role in negotiation of land sales, treaties, and the fur trade. A coterie of powerful Dutch merchants and officials, called the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, oversaw Indian relations for the colony of New York for nearly a century. In the new English administration of the colony, however, royal governors yielded great patronage in appointment of crown officials and especially in approving licenses and petitions for the land-patenting process. Land grants were often a powerful cement of political alliances. As much as British imperial officials might view the Albany Dutch as disaffected to the British interest, there was actual a complementary nature between both of those groups that had at heart the acquisition of large tracts of land.  

In 1684, Royal governor Thomas Dongan approved a petition that set in motion the basic trajectory of Saratoga’s history for the next two hundred years—toward colonial settlement and economic development. A group of wealthy Albanians—most of them commissioners of Indian affairs—petitioned Governor Dongan for a license to purchase a tract of land at Saratoga: Col. Pieter Schuyler, Robert Livingston, Dirck Wessels, Jan Janse Bleecker, Johannes Schuyler, and Cornelius Van Dyck. It was a vast tract of over 100,000 acres of land.

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According to the land-patenting process in colonial New York, it was the responsibility of the petitioners to negotiate with the Indian owners of the land and to produce a deed of purchase bearing their totemic signatures. The investors would then request a formal survey and then apply for a royal deed, or letters patent, for the parcel of land. For reasons that remain unknown, the patent was confirmed again in 1708 during the administration of Lord Cornbury. King William’s War might have delayed the land patenting process for the applicants or perhaps a disputed claim had to be worked out. But the existence of their 1684 purchase (and most likely the Indian deed) is born out in the minutes of the Albany Commissioners for Indian Affairs for August 5, 1686, which recorded a mission that a Mohawk sachem named Onnachragwaes had undertaken to Canada:

That he has been sent by the Maquase sachems to the Christian Indians in Canada with 3 belts of wampum and has made known to them the conversation our Governor has had with those sachems concerning the country of Sarachtoge that for three years has been sold to the Christians. That the Governor, as an encouragement to the Christian Indians who were in Canada to make their homes here, wanted to give them as much land as they needed in Sarachtoge and would also have a priest there to instruct them in religion. And therefore it was the wish of the Governor as well as of the sachems that they should return again to their country and should take Sarachtoge as their residence.61

This testimony by Onnachragwaes is noteworthy. It confirms a “purchase” of land at Saratoga coinciding with the license for the Saratoga Patent (though it is doubtful, given the historical pattern of Iroquois negotiations concerning land, that the Mohawks ever intended to permanently cede all claims and rights to 100,000 acres of land). And it highlights the alarming migration of League Mohawks to Canada, and efforts by Albany officials to win them back to the English alliance. Historian Daniel K. Richter argues that Dongan’s approval of the license coincided with plans to resettle Catholic Mohawks at Saratoga.62 Given that many of the original Saratoga patentees were Indian commissioners, it is significant that the original purpose of the Saratoga Patent may have been less an attempt to engross Indian lands and more to create conditions for natives to dwell among the colonists peaceably. Indeed, it is possible that the short-term objective of the Saratoga Patent was to establish the illegal trade by making it attractive for the main conduits of that

62 Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse, 167, 348n11. For Thomas Dongan’s justification of the patent—“I have prevailed with the Indians to consent to come back from Canada on condition that I procure for them a piece of Land called Serachtague lying upon Hudsons River above 40 miles above Albany and there furnish them with Preists”—see O’Callaghan and Fernow, eds. Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, III, 394.
trade—the Canadian Mohawks—to resettle there, even as its long-term objective was the patentees’ enrichment through landed wealth.\footnote{I searched in the Brieven als Buit / Letters as Loot Database, Leiden University, Netherlands, for any information regarding Saratoga in the 1670s or 1680s. See http://brievenalsbuit.inl.nl. However, several letters contain illuminating background on early Dutch settlers. See https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/geesteswetenschappen/onderzoeksprojecten/letters-as-loot/monthly-letter-may-june-2009.pdf.}

Early Saratoga indeed became a meeting ground of Dutch, French, and Indian peoples in the 1680s and 1690s. Testimony from Catholic Mohawks related their intent to resettle according to Dongan’s offer: “as soon as Jannitie [a Mohawk] told them att Canada that a priest was come to bee att Saragtoge, eight families resolved first to goe a hunting and then returne to Saragtoge.”\footnote{Examination of Kakrriel and Adandidaghko, Mohawk Christian Prisoners, Aug. 31, 1687, in The Dongan Papers, Part II: 1683–1688, ed. Peter R. Christoph (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 82.} Several Frenchman, undoubtedly traders, also moved southward and occupied lands at Saratoga as well as Schaghticoke. One of them, named Dubuisson, was mentioned in a deed of David Schuyler’s in 1687 concerning “a Flatt or Plain whereon Dubison a Frenchman now lives.” He was most likely Jean-Baptiste du Poitier Dubuisson, an interpreter who lived variously in New England and at Saratoga before he settled again in Canada.\footnote{Deed of David Schuyler and his wife to Pieter Schuyler for lands at Saratoga, March 11, 1687, in Early Records of the City and County of Albany and Colony of Rensselaerswyck, ed. Van Laer and trans. Pearson, II, 344; “Jean-Baptiste du Poitiers Dubuisson,” Généalogie Québec, http://genealogie.quebec/info/index.php?no=42305; Saratoga National Historical Park Research Files on Dubuisson. On the French at Schaghticoke, see Thomas E. Burke, Mohawk Frontier: The Dutch Community of Schenectady, 1661–1710 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 122.} As we have seen, several other Frenchmen had settled at Saratoga, including René Poupar dit Lafleur, Pierre de Garmeaulx dit Villeroy, and François de Lafortune. Their ability to integrate into the Anglo-Dutch world owed much to the legacy of religious toleration in the early New Netherland colony. Toleration was good for business.

Those French traders—particularly Lafleur—were connected to one of the most important Albany Dutch trading families, the Wendells, who had deep trading and landed interests at Saratoga. One of the original Saratoga patentees was Johannes Wendell (1649–1692), the son of Evert Janse Wendell.\footnote{On Johannes Wendell and the Saratoga Patent, see Van Laer, ed. and Pearson, trans., Early Records of the City and County of Albany and Colony of Rensselaerswyck, II, 195–97. Stefan Bielinski, “Johannes Wendell,” Colonial Albany Social History Project, http://exhibitions.nysm.nysed.gov/albany/bios/wjwendell2942.html; Stefan Bielinski, “The Will of Johannes Wendell, 1691,” ibid., http://exhibitions.nysm.nysed.gov/albany/wills/willjwendell2942.html.} Johannes’s nephew, Evert Wendell (1681–1750) was an influential lawyer, merchant, and trader who was deeply engaged in the Albany-Montréal fur trade. His account book details extensive contacts among Native peoples. In 1707, for example, Wendell’s ledger lists a “female savage” engaged in trade at “Sarghtoke.” That same year, he lists a Mahican man named Nannalamit and a Mohawk man named Sohoonachqae engaged in beaver pelt trading at Saratoga. Wendell’s account book also provides direct evidence of René Poupar dit Lafleur’s trading activity there, as Evert paid a debt in 1708 to “Schoo, son of Lavluuer” [Lafleur], owed to him by a Canadian Mohawk.
named Aedekanijhaa (the payment was most likely to René Poupard Lafleur [b. 1682] or Joseph Poupard Lafleur [b. 1684]). The ledger for this Mohawk individual indicated a modest list of transactions for blue duffel, wool cloth, shirts, a gun, and a small box of paint (vermilion).

The death of Johannes Wendell in 1692, and the subsequent remarriage of his wife, Elsie Staats Wendell, connected two of the most influential Albany families. In 1695, Elsie Wendell married Johannes Schuyler. Their union produced four children, two of whom deeply shaped the subsequent history of Saratoga: their firstborn son, Philip Johannes, who became the main proprietor of the family’s Saratoga estate, the object of Marin’s attack in 1745; and their third child, Johannes Jr., the father of General Philip Schuyler, who would inherit the family’s Saratoga estate after the death of his unfortunate uncle in 1745. The patriarch of this remarkable family, Johannes, was destined to become one of Albany’s most important citizens, as his significant career involved the fur trade, Indian diplomacy, and service as an interpreter of Indian languages, militia officer, city council member, and later Mayor of Albany.

Both Johannes Schuyler and his elder brother Pieter Schuyler had salient roles in King William’s War, the American component of the War of the League of Augsburg in Europe (1689–1697). Imperial warfare throughout Saratoga’s history not only brought destruction but also hardened social relationships that had previously thrived in a more dynamic and fluid environment. The news of war with France immediately brought Saratoga’s French inhabitants under political scrutiny. The popular leader Jacob Leisler, who orchestrated a rebellion against the New York government during the turmoil of the Glorious Revolution, was among those who cast a suspicious eye towards foreigners in their midst—to include not only French Catholics but also French Huguenots (Protestants) like Anthony Lispenard or Pierre de Garmeaulx dit Villeroy who had lived and prospered in the colony. Leisler described “Scharachtoge” as the “uttermost frontiers and there are six or seaven families all or most rank french papists that have their relationes at Canada and I suppose settled there for some bad designe and are lesser to be trusted there in this conjunctione of tyme than ever before.”

Clearly, Leisler saw them as Catholic subversives and wanted them removed. And indeed, some of those French traders were hauled before

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70 Jacob Leisler to governor of Boston, Aug. 13, 1689, in Leisler Papers, 1689–1691, ed. Christoph, 261.
magistrates for questioning; many of them eventually returned to New France (like René Poupar dit Lafleur) or fully assimilated within the Anglo-Dutch colonial world they had become a part of. Pierre de Garmeanux dit Villeroy was one such French trader who weathered the storm and became a trusted member of the Albany community, known there as Pieter De Garmo.71

Some Dutch colonists also saw Saratoga as an opportunity, most likely for exchange with the French traders who were coalescing there. Bartel (or Bartholomeus) Vrooman (or Vroman) is usually credited as having been one of the first settlers at Saratoga. He was born in Leiden, Holland sometime before 1659 to Hendrik Meessen Vrooman and Jannttgen Wouters Vrooman, who died sometime before 1664, when widower Hendrik emigrated with his five children to New Netherland. A recently discovered letter written from America in October 1664 by Hendrik to his family back in the Netherlands provides insight onto a recent immigrant’s view of the Dutch colony shortly after its conquest by the English. He had established himself at Schenectady, writing that “At snechtendeel the land is more beautiful than I have ever seen in Holland.”72 His son, Bartholomeus Vrooman, approximately twenty-six or twenty-seven years old in 1686, married Cornelia Jansz Helmer of Albany.73 At some point in the 1680s Bartholomeus Vrooman established himself and his new wife at Saratoga. For when war broke out on the frontier in 1689, news that “three People should be kild at Bartel Vromans at Sarachtoge by ye Indians” led Albany officials to resolve that “there be made a fort about ye house of Bartel Vroman at Sarachtoge,” and that a small contingent of militia and Indians garrison it while acting as scouts.74 The government convention that had brought Leisler’s popular fury down upon the French Saratoga traders René Poupar dit Lafleur, Pierre de Garmeanux dit Villeroy, and others, produced a crucial detail: that one William Boyen and “Cornelia Vroman” provided depositions regarding their knowledge of and interaction with French traders at Saratoga.75 Although the depositions do not survive, the details that were recounted in the convention minutes amply show evidence of the early Albany-Montréal fur trade. The war, however, foreclosed those possibilities. Due to the heightened internal security, and the establishment of a fortification at Saratoga between 1689 and 1690, Bartholomeus and Cornelia

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Vrooman removed to Schenectady, where his father still lived—now moderately wealthy with two slaves.\textsuperscript{76}

Their choice was a fateful one. The French were the first to strike during King William’s War, attacking and destroying Schenectady and other towns in New England in the winter of 1690. Bartholomeus Vrooman and his father, Hendrik Vrooman, were among the sixty inhabitants of Schenectady who were killed during the assault on February 9, 1690, that was an early precursor to the raid against Saratoga in 1745. They are listed in “Hend Meese Vrooman & Bartholomeus Vrooman kild & burnt” in the official tally of the dead (sixty) and the prisoners (27).\textsuperscript{77} The shocking nature of the French attacks jarred two different colonial regions and cultures—Anglo-Dutch New York and Puritan New England—out of complacency and into an armed coalition. In what would become a recurrent pattern for the next one hundred years, New Englanders would marshall their extensive manpower and militias for joint expeditions to Canada along with New Yorkers and other colonial forces. Fitz-John Winthrop was the Governor of the Connecticut colony and grandson of John Winthrop, one of the founders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony who envisioned it as a “citty upon a hill.” Fitz-John Winthrop was appointed as a major general and commander of the joint expedition of New York and Connecticut colonial forces attempting to attack Canada, while a naval expedition under Sir William Phips attempted an ascent up the St. Lawrence River to attack Quebec. In what was another recurring pattern, the expedition went nowhere due to disease (smallpox) spreading among the troops and logistical inadequacies—a lack of transportation infrastructure and reliable supplies.\textsuperscript{78}

General Winthrop’s army significantly advanced as far north as Wood Creek, passing by Saratoga on August 2, 1690. Winthrop recorded in his campaign journal, “quar-tered this night at a place called Saratogo, about 50 English miles from Albany, where is a blockhouse and some of the Dutch soldiers. At this place I overtook Mr. Wessells Recorde of the City of Albany and a Company of the principal Gent\textsuperscript{e} volunteers of that City.” Dirck Wessells was not only a militia officer and Indian diplomat but also one of the original Saratoga patentees, defending his claim in person. Another volunteer there was Ens. Simon Van Ness, who had been ordered “to sett forth immediately to Sarrachtoge,” where he was to patrol for enemy movements between the “draegh Plaets [Carrying Place] and

\textsuperscript{76} Brieven als Buit Database, Leiden University, Netherlands: http://brievenalsbuit.inl.nl. “The Letters as Loot/ Brieven als Buit corpus.”

\textsuperscript{77} “List of ye People Kild and Destroyed,” Feb. 9, 1690, in O’Callaghan, Documentary History of the State of New York, I, 304.

Winthrop found the rivers “dangerous both for horse & man,” and the portages “very bad and difficult passing.” Saratoga’s role in the expedition also presaged its role in future conflicts, as a crucial staging area and logistical hub near the portage to the lakes. Already in 1690, Winthrop had sent a party of 30 horsemen under the command of Ensign Thomlinson “to Sarotogo for more provision.” It would not be enough. At Wood Creek, Winthrop realized that with “noe possibility of getting provition to support the forces here any longer, and that here was not Canooes to transport half the Christians, and that wee could not by any meanes at this port, eytheralarme or spoyle the enemy; it was thought most advisable to returne with the army.” British colonists in 1690 did not yet have the military or logistical power to maintain control of the borderlands, which remained a Native preserve for the next half century.  

Winthrop’s Expedition proved to be the first in a long train of intercolonial attempts to capture Montréal or later Crown Point that ended prematurely from lack of supplies and cooperation. But in two important respects—namely, the attacks led by brothers Johannes and Pieter Schuyler—the English had two leaders who could meet the French on their own terms. Both were experienced Indian diplomats who knew Native languages. Before retreating to Albany, General Winthrop had “first given order to Johannes Schuyler brother to the Mayor & of great vallew to the Indians to take under his command 40 Christians such as he should think fit, and 100 of the Maquaes, Skataco, and River Indians, and enter into the enemies country, and soo to Laprere De Magdelena one of the neerest places wee could expect to surprise any of the enemy.” Captain Johannes Schuyler led this force of “40 Christians” and one hundred Mohawk, Mahican, and Schaghticoke allies to the French settlement of La Prairie de la Madeleine, a major French settlement only a short distance from Montréal, on the south side of the St. Lawrence River. The attackers killed or captured two dozen French, burned numerous homes, barns, and supplies, and killed the settlers’ livestock. The following year, Maj. Pieter Schuyler—the mayor of Albany—led a similar party on a reconnaissance in force into Canada. Schuyler’s party reached La Prairie again but sustained sixty-eight casualties while inflicting 105 casualties on the French (and gave them reason to avenge themselves on the Iroquois in 1693 and 1696). It would be the last major English expedition to Canada until 1709, during yet another Anglo-French war. Together the two expeditions added luster to the Schuyler name, one contemporary hailing Johannes’s as “one of the most vigorous &
glorious attempts, that hath been known in those parts, with great slaughter on the enemies part, and losse on his own. . . .”

The Treaty of Ryswick brought an end to this war of reprisals on the northern borderlands of America, and the Five Nations, as we’ve seen, shaped a peace in 1701 that favored their interests. It did not take long for Saratoga to revert back to its earlier state—without defenses and a haven for traders. Col. Wolfgang Romer, an English engineer, provided a telling glimpse of Saratoga in the 1690s, though the roads were so horrendous that he could not visit there himself. He learned that there were only seven farms at Saratoga, in addition to the fort at Vroman’s, all of which “have been entirely ruined by the last war.” He and other observers understood that fortifications were essential to holding contested zones like Saratoga, which the French claimed as “dependent on them,” according to Romer. Lord Cornbury, the royal governor of New York in the early 1700s, advocated the construction and garrisoning of a stockade fort “at a Place called Saractoga, which is the Northernmost settlement we have. There are but few families there yet, and these will desert their habitations if they are not protected,” adding that Mahican or Schaghticoke Indians could also take refuge there. Despite these verbal efforts, nothing had happened by 1704, when another English engineer named Charles Congreve reported that the colony’s frontier defenses, including Saractoge, “are not in order” and needed repair.

Queen Anne’s War—the American theater of the broader War of Spanish Succession—raged from 1702 to 1713, primarily on the frontiers of the New England and Carolina colonies. This latest imperial conflict pitted England against the combined force of Spain and France. However, the Iroquois policy of neutrality shielded New York from the destruction the French had wrought on the colony in the 1690s; French officials also refrained from any direct attacks on the New York frontier, fearing that they would provoke the Five Nations to wage war against Canada as exclusive English allies. Instead, the brunt of French-Indian border attacks fell upon western New England, most infamously (from the English perspective) in the Deerfield raid of 1704 that resulted in so many dead and captive colonists. The Covenant Chain relationship between the Five Nations and colonial New York achieved growing prominence in the British imperial imagination as the

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linchpin of the British empire in North America. In 1710, four “Indian kings”—three leading Mohawk sachems and one Mahican sachem—journeyed to England with Col. Peter Schuyler and his brother Abraham Schuyler. They attained celebrity status in the city of London where they had an audience with Queen Anne and other dignitaries, requesting support for Protestant missionary enterprises and for an intercolonial expedition to conquer Canada.\(^8\)

The New York colony, and the Saratoga region, specifically, were drawn into two intercolonial expeditions to Canada during Queen Anne’s War. Those ventures significantly involved British regulars (Independent Companies) and provincial levies from New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. In 1709, a Scots officer, Samuel Vetch, and Francis Nicholson, once the royal governor of Virginia, orchestrated a dual assault on French Canada. Governor Nicholson was given command of the land expedition from Albany to Montréal, while Vetch organized a seaborne invasion up the St. Lawrence River.

Nicholson’s efforts out for the usual reasons: camp diseases, inadequate supplies and transportation, and lack of political support. As the foremost scholar of the expedition writes, “the inland campaign of 1709 exhausted the energy of the expedition in a ceaseless, wasting struggle to maintain an impracticable supply system. The logistical problems were well-nigh insuperable.” The inland campaign was revived in 1711 when the British government sent over a massive transoceanic expedition to seize Quebec with 7,000 British regulars under Major General John Hill and Admiral Sir Hovenden Walker. The Hill/Walker attempt ended in nautical disaster and the drowning deaths of hundreds of British soldiers. The land forces led by Nicholson again foundered upon the difficulties of the Hudson–Lake Champlain corridor. Despite ending in failure, Nicholson’s efforts highly anticipated the future patterns of war in the Saratoga region, involving fortification and improvements to the transportation capabilities of British forces. Three forts were constructed in the region—Fort Ingoldsby at Stillwater, Fort Nicholson at the Carrying Place, and Fort Anne at Wood Creek.\(^6\) Attempts were made to build military roads—“to clear the wayes to Surrotogo,” as one journalist wrote in 1711.\(^7\)

One of the most important outcomes of the War of Spanish Succession was the Treaty of Utrecht that ended it in 1713. Between 1713 and 1744, a stable peace endured between France and England. The Long Peace, as it is sometimes called, powerfully shaped imperial competition in North America. On the borderlands, it facilitated the movements of peoples and structured mutually beneficial cultural exchanges. But the Treaty of Utrecht


\(^7\) *The Journals of Madam Knight and Rev. Mr. Buckingham from the Original Manuscripts Written in 1704 & 1710* (New York: Wilder & Campbell, 1825), 113.
created new tensions of its own. Although no Native individuals were consulted or even present in the negotiations, the British controversially claimed that the French had recognized in the treaty that the Five Nations were under the dominion of Great Britain. But the French rejected that interpretation, arguing that the British claim of “sovereignty is a chimera. . . . The Iroquois are very far from acknowledging any sovereign.” The French also knew that the British wished to extend their imperial scope in North America using the territorial claims of the Five Nations as a convenient fiction for their own. In that respect, Iroquois claims to the Saratoga region and the whole swath of territory up to the St. Lawrence River could become a legal foundation for future British claims in the ongoing competition with New France. The disputed claims of the Treaty of Utrecht enhanced Iroquois sovereignty and neutrality, as the British and French competed for influence with the Five Nations. The reality on the ground remained that the Iroquois were still sovereign over their lands bounded by the St. Lawrence and Mohawk rivers and lakes Champlain and Ontario. Nowhere was Native American freedom of movement and independence more evident than in the resurrection of the Albany-Montréal fur trade in the decades following 1713.  

Some French Canadians and Kahnawake Mohawks not only traded at Saratoga but also settled there, remaining in the British orbit. Isabelle Montour became a well-known interpreter in British circles in the eighteenth century, when she became known as “Madame Montour” in Pennsylvania and Virginia in the 1740s (her son, Andrew, also became a well-known interpreter and served with George Washington in the opening days of the French and Indian War). Isabelle Montour was born around 1685 in the St. Lawrence Valley to Pierre Couc, dit Lafleur and Marie Miteouamegoukoué, a Christian Sokoki Abenaki woman. She was fluent in several languages and dialects, as she had lived among the Iroquois as well as at Michilimackinac and Detroit. Her turn to the British orbit occurred largely as a result of her brother’s murder by French agents. From her first appearance as an interpreter at Albany in 1711, she was favorably recognized by Gov. Robert Hunter and the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, who frequently employed her as a go-between. In 1721, her linguistic abilities coincided with the New York government’s efforts to fortify Saratoga.

Royal Governor William Burnet (1720 to 1728) confronted the growth of the Albany-Montréal fur trade when he came into office. He managed to persuade the assembly to pass an act in 1720 that made trading with the French illegal. But at a council meeting in September 1721 Burnet related that “he had found the late Act to prevent the Trade to Canada for Indian Goods had not been sufficient for that purpose but had been evaded.” Governor Burnet was even at loggerheads with some of the Albany Commissioners of

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88 Preston, Texture of Contact, 11.
Indian Affairs who were complicit in the Montréal trade. Johannes and Philip Schuyler and Cornelius Cuyler are listed in the commissioners’ minutes as having “Refurd” [refused?] to take an oath tendered to those suspected of having engaged in the trade. The same minutes attest that the Albany sheriff was instructed to collect a £100 penalty from each of the Schuylers, which went towards constructing and maintaining the colony’s frontiers defenses. 90 Burnet believed that it was “necessary to order an Officer with twenty Men to take Post near Saraghtogue, that the said Trade might be Effectually Stop’d for the future, that being the place by which all that Clandestine Trade has been and is like to be carry’d on if not prevented by a guard.” The governor and council approved “expences for Erecting a Convenient Blockhouse and providing it with such things as are Requisit for the Men.” They also approved “that M.s Montour have the Yearly Incouragement of ten pounds for being Interpreter for the garrison at Saraghtogue out of the five hundred pounds aforesaid.”91

By the mid-1720s, some type of blockhouse fortification had been constructed at Saratoga. New York council minutes contain references to its construction in the year 1722 under the direction of Philip Livingston. Additional disbursements were made for supplying the garrison and repairing the blockhouse in 1725 as it showed signs of deterioration. 92 The garrison may have made attempts to interdict the illegal trade. But as Peter Wraxall observed, “I find notwithstanding an Act of Assembly prohibiting the Trade to Canada, by the Commiss. Letters to Gov. Burnet that Trade was largely carried on from Saraghtoga & Woodenfort about 40 Miles from Albany in the Road to Canada & that the Officer posted there with a Detachment of the Indep' Company was expected to be concerned in the same.”93

In the decades of the Long Peace, Saratoga continued to act as a place of resort for Native peoples from across the Northeast. In 1728, a Kahnawake Mohawk named Schonondo resettled near Saratoga with a band of other families, amounting to sixty people, hoping to take advantage of closer ties. The Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, who generally favored such trading and diplomatic ties to the Canadian Iroquois, accommodated them on a tract of land between Still Water and Saratoga. 94 It was also a time of modification and movement for the Schaghticoke Indians. Most of them had

90 Minutes of the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, June 19, 1723, f. 43, reel C-1220, ser. 2, vol. 1820, RG-10 (Library and Archives Canada).
93 McIlwain, ed., Abridgment of Indian Affairs Contained in Four Folio Volumes, 141.
94 Minutes of the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Aug. 3, 1727, f. 195a, reel C-1220, ser. 2, vol. 1820, RG-10 (Library and Archives Canada); Minutes of the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Feb. 6, 1728, ibid. A Canadian Mohawk presence at Saratoga can be documented as early as 1723. See Minutes of the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Jan. 17–18, 1723, f. 7, ibid.
resettled at Missisquoi or in Canada, the result of their growing disillusionment with the British alliance and encroachments on their lands. Those who remained were accused of having committed robberies on the inhabitants of Saratoga, adding further evidence that there were settlers living there in 1723. The Schaghticoke leaders explained that they had “little Land to plant on and that it is a very barren soil so yt the Ears of Corn grow very small and the inhabitants there do anoy us in our quiet possession of yt Land.” In 1727 they noted that elderly members of the community found the journey to Albany a hardship. They requested to Albany officials that “we may be furnishd & supplyd with Necessaries at Saragtoque as cheap as there are to be had here.” Economic exchanges with the Saratoga community may explain why Schaghticoke Indians were among those found there by Marin’s forces in 1745.95

Neither the British nor French colonial governments could prevent the trade, even with the presence of garrisons at Saratoga or Crown Point. The trade proved to be unstoppable from the 1720s until the 1750s, when trading between French Canadians and German settlers in the Mohawk Valley continued despite the declared war between Britain and France. The spaces in between French Canadian settlements and Iroquoia remained firmly Native ground. Colonial governments could not fully control a class of “Sundry French Men called by the Dutch Bush Loopers and by the French Coureurs Du bois who have for several years abandon’d the French Colony of Canada and live Wholly among the Indians.”96 Nor could they control even the elites of their own colonies who chose to engage in trade. In New York, merchant Robert Sanders carried on an extensive trade with numerous merchants in Montréal. His surviving letterbook, contains his business correspondence en français with his Montréal counterparts, whom he identified with various totems and emblems. Similarly, a remarkable trio of three sisters—Marguerite, Marie-Anne, and Marie-Madeleine Desauniers (daughters of the prominent Montréal merchant Pierre Trottier Desauniers) were the primary organizers of the illicit trade at Kahnawake, where they owned and operated a storehouse for over two decades.97

That was the Saratoga world that explained and produced an individual like Johannes Hendricus/John Henry/Jean-Henri Lydius—who fashioned his identity as circumstances changed and who negotiated the borderlands and with stunning ease. The early death of Domine Johannes Lydius detached young Johannes Hendricks from a more rooted existence in the Anglo-Dutch world of Albany. He probably shared in the trade that had burgeoned at Saratoga in the early 1720s, for he shows up in Montréal in 1725, according to French records. He had fled there largely to escape creditors. Not only did Lydius

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95 On the topic of land, see Minutes of the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Nov. 21, 1723, f. 66, ibid. On the topic of resettlement at Missisquoi, see Minutes of the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Aug. 17, 1724, f. 86a, ibid. Minutes of the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Oct. 6, 1727, f. 205, ibid.
prosper at Montréal but also married a French-Canadian woman of mixed descent, Geneviève Massé. In his new life in New France, Lydius also converted to Roman Catholicism, renouncing the faith of his father—but only superficially. He ingratiated himself with the Mohawks at Kahnawake and Lake of the Two Mountains (Kanesatake), and briefly enjoyed political favor with French authorities as an interpreter. Lydius's illegal trading with his Dutch brethren, however, went counter to recent royal edicts forbidding such trade. 98

A judicial hearing in 1730 sentenced Lydius—“a very dangerous man”—to banishment from the colony. Lydius implicated the resident Catholic priest at Sault St. Louis (Kahnawake) as being involved in the smuggling trade. But the legal procès against Lydius 99 revealed even more extraordinary details—namely his contacts in Albany: Cornelius Cuyler (1697–1765)—merchant, recorder of the City of Albany, one of the commissioners of Indian affairs, and member of the colonial assembly; Dirck Ten Broeck (1686–1751)—alderman of the City of Albany, fur trader, “Inspector of Skins” in that enterprise, and related to the Cuyler family by marriage; and Jacob Roseboom (1695–1767)—an Albany apothecary and merchant who in 1716 had married Geertruy Isabella Lydius—John Hendricks’ sister. 100 Finally, the dossier also mentions a “Philippe Cuyler”—which is almost surely a direct reference to Philip Johannes Schuyler of Saratoga. 101 Lydius’s business associates reveals how deeply entrenched the Albany-Montréal trade was among Dutch circles, reaching even to the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs charged with preventing it.

Following a brief exile in France, Lydius returned to the New York colony in 1732, and parlayed his connections to the Mohawks for a “two certain tracts of land lying near Lake Champlain, on Otter Creek and Wood Creek.” 102 It was there that Lydius defied the French yet again, by setting up a fortified house at the Carrying Place on the Hudson River—right along the trade route between Albany and Montréal. There, Lydius continued to carry on his trading activities until the moment that Monsieur Marin’s expedition destroyed his house.


101 Philip Cuyler (1733–1803) was not yet born when Lydius’s inquest occurred, and no other prominent Philip Cuylers were active in 1730.

The French governor-general the Marquis de Beauharnois identified the Saratoga Patent and the activities of Lydius as twin driving forces of English expansion into the lower Champlain Valley. While Beauharnois probably did not know of the Saratoga Patent’s existence, he obliquely referenced English land claims to the area in a letter to Paris: “‘Tis known that with a view to establish himself on Lake Champlain, the King of England granted it to the children of M. Peter Schul, [Schuyler] a famous citizen of Orange, and there is every reason to fear that, if not provided against, they will seize on it, and in such case force will be necessary to oblige them to retire.” Pieter Schuyler was not only one of the original Saratoga patentees, but the famous leader of the strike on La Prairie in 1691. He had visited the French in Canada as an emissary in 1698, and it may have been through that visit that the French learned of Anglo-Dutch land claims to the region. The Marquis de Beauharnois “as a means of prevention” of English expansion in the area, proposed “to form an establishment at Crown Point, which will close on the English the road to the French settlements, and enable us to fall on them when they least expect it.”

In these ways, the Saratoga region figured prominently in imperial decision-making for French officials, who proceeded to construct a fort at Crown Point in the 1730s, much to the alarm of the English colonies.

By the 1730s, as the French were constructing Fort Saint-Frédéric only seventy miles to the north, Saratoga was growing into an exceedingly prosperous settlement—an extended neighborhood along the rich Hudson bottomlands south of the Fish Kill. Documentation on the formation of this large community and the identities of its inhabitants is exceedingly sparse. Genealogy offers the best clues on the origins and motives of the original Saratoga settlers. One Saratoga family about whom much is known is that of Jacob Quackenbush. He was baptized in Albany on November 17, 1695, the son of Johannes Quackenbush and Machteld Jans Post of Niskayuna (Johannes’s father was Pieter Quackenbush, the first generation of that family to settle in New Netherland around 1660). Johannes was one of the original patentees of the Canastagione (Niskayuna) Patent, suggesting that opportunities northward may have been appealing to this growing family. Jacob was married on September 19, 1719, to Geertruy Vanderwerken, and they had six children who were baptized at the Dutch Church in Albany: Abraham (1721), Gerrit (1724), Isaac (1728), Maria (1731), Jacob (1735), and Machtel (1737). Geertruy’s father and mother also lived with them at Saratoga—Gerrit Roelofs Vanderwerken and Maritie Janse de Vos Vanderwerken, along with their son Gerardus (see Table 2.1).

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103 “Abstract of M. de Beauharnois’ despatches relative to Crown Point, with the Proposed Establishment at Crown Point, on Lake Champlain,” 1021–22.

Quackenbush-Vanderwerken family was settled at Saratoga by 1745 and most were among the unfortunate captives taken by the French and Indians in November 1745.

One of the most intriguing possibilities about the settlement of Saratoga in the decades before 1745 concerns the earlier trading activities of René Poupar dit Lafleur and his subsequent family history. Despite the intolerance of French Catholics displayed during the time of Leisler’s rebellion, Lafleur and his family appear to have stayed in the New York colony for at least five to six more years. His wife, Marie Gendron dit la Rolandièrè, born in 1666 in New France, died in 1695—still living in the New York colony—just a few years after the birth of the couple’s fourth child, Elisabeth Isabelle Lafleur in 1690. A 1696 land transaction shows that René had purchased a tract of eighty acres in Richmond County (Staten Island) from Daniel and Elizabeth Perrin, two French Huguenot settlers there. Around that time, René married his second wife, Marie Perrin. The end of the King William’s War in 1697 may have given René and Marie Perrin the opportunity to voyage to New France, for he eventually died in Montréal in 1708. One of René’s daughters by his first marriage was Marie Poupard, born around 1686 when the family was living near Stillwater. Marie Poupard married Hendrick Henri Roeloff Van Der Werken (born ca. 1681 at Half Moon) in the early 1700s. Hendrick’s father was Roelof Gerrit Van Der Werken (1642-1728), who was also the father of Gerrit Roelofs Van Der Werken (Hendrick’s older brother, born around 1675). As we have seen, Geertruy Van Der Werken Quackenbush was the daughter of Gerrit and Maritie Janse De Vos, who settled at Saratoga. The fact that Marie Poupard and Hendrick Roeloff Van Der Werken’s daughter Charlotte was born in Montréal in 1708 suggests continuing family ties between the Lafleurs and Van Der Werkens that straddled the eighteenth century borderlands. At most, it might explain the presence of Van Der Werkens at a settlement notorious for its association with the Albany-Montréal trade. At a minimum, it demonstrates how interconnected life was in this eighteenth-century world.

In a similar way, the family history of Jean La Forte (ca 1650–1707) offers important evidence regarding life in colonial New York and the movement of families to the borderlands. Jean La Forte was a French Huguenot (Protestant), born in France around 1650, and who emigrated in 1670s via the Dutch Netherlands to New York. His new life there was summarized in one word, which he adopted as his alias: Liberté. Religious, economic, and personal freedoms abounded as he married Albany-born Margrietje Rinkhout and

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integrated into the Dutch reformed communities at Albany and Schenectady. He had owned land at Canastagione (Niskayuna) in 1681 and is referenced in a 1684 legal document as “Jean Forte alias Liberte.” Two of the couple’s sons—Johannes and Abraham—later sought opportunity on the frontier by settling at Schaghticoke. Two children of Abraham Fort and Anna Barber Clute Fort (Frederick and Jacobus) are listed as having been born in Schaghticoke—dating the family’s presence there to at least 1721. At some point thereafter, they resettled on the nearby Saratoga patent lands by 1745, when much of the extended Fort family was captured and hauled off to Canada by Marin’s party.\(^{108}\)

The presence of settlers in the Saratoga-Schagticoke region as early as 1720 is suggested by an incident of Iroquois killing colonists’ livestock at “Canastagione Saractitoge and half moon and other parts.”\(^{109}\) Another telling legal sign is that Johannes Schuyler, Abraham Schuyler, and Robert Livingston were appointed by the assembly as highway commissioners for the Saratoga district of Albany County.\(^{110}\) As early as 1727, Kahnawake leaders were sufficiently alarmed at the fortification and settlement around Saratoga. The Albany Commissioners recorded them as having told the Onondagas to resist English efforts to build a fort at Oswego; they warned that “the English had built in the Moaks Country above Saraghtoge, and that all the land in the Moaks Country was gone & that the Intention of the English was to deprive ym of all their Lands.”\(^{111}\)

Philip Schuyler, the first son of Johannes and Elsie Staats Schuyler, drove the entrepreneurial energy of the early Saratoga community. As he stood to inherit much of Johannes’s share in the Saratoga Patent, he appears to have acted as developer and proprietor of the lands around the Fish Kill. By 1742, when he wrote his will, Johannes wrote of a grist and a saw mill already in existence at Saratoga, a “farm and saw mill I value at £890.” Philip, who wrote his will in 1739 and identifies himself as “being very sick,” significantly reveals himself as “Philip Johannes Schuyler, of Saratoga,” indicating an attachment to that

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\(^{109}\) “Propositions made by the Honble Coll. Peter Schuyler,” Sept. 2, 1720, in Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, ed. O’Callaghan and Fernow, V, 566; Governor Burnet to the Lords of Trade, Oct. 14, 1726, ibid., 782. Either feral pigs or unfenced pigs were causing damage at Saratoga.


\(^{111}\) Minutes of the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Aug. 3, 1727, reel C-1220, ser. 2, vol. 1820, RG-10 (Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa).
place.\textsuperscript{112} As the leading proprietor of the area, Philip promoted the economic development of surrounding lands through settlers’ use of his sawmill and gristmill. He probably also acted as a storekeeper, supplying the local inhabitants’ needs for manufactured goods. A later traveler attested that in the 1730s and 1740s that sawmills were “very profitable to the inhabitants on account of the abundance of wood which grows here. The boards were easily brought to Albany and thence to New York in rafts every spring with the high water.”\textsuperscript{113} The wealth produced by the early Saratoga community was also greatly dependent upon a significant degree of African slaves who labored in both agriculture and industry. Hardly any historical documentation exists on Saratoga’s slaves, but as the numbers captured by the French in 1745 revealed, they may have constituted a large percentage—even a majority—of the total population of community. The slave who was captured near daybreak while working at sawmill suggests possible skills and tasks that Africans performed at the Schuyler plantation. Some slaves were undoubtedly skilled in the technology and operation of sawmills. Masters also relied upon slaves to perform the grueling labor of clearing the land; digging or constructing sluices for the sawmill; and cutting and moving enormous old-growth timbers. As recent bioarchaeology of African slave remains at the nearby Schuyler Flatts Burial Ground site attests, the labor and poor living conditions of rural slaves manifested themselves in arthritis, musculoskeletal stress, and dental caries.\textsuperscript{114} The net effect of the slaves’ labor was a prosperous and wealthy settlement.

Royal governor George Clarke (1736 to 1743), in a speech to the assembly in 1739, remarked that “the Peopling of that part of the Country to the Northward of Sarachtoga will be of great advantage to the Province, as well as in strengthening your Frontiers as in enlarging your Trade,” and encouraged efforts to settle it.\textsuperscript{115} But royal governors like Clarke were strident in their condemnation of the Dutch merchants at Albany who engaged in the illegal trade with Canada. In their perspective, the Albany Dutch endangered the future of the British Empire. After the construction of Fort Niagara by the French in 1726, the British gaze shifted markedly westward. The British constructed Fort Oswego on Lake Ontario to counterbalance the French presence at Niagara, and officials were increasingly concerned with the strategic corridor running from Albany, up the Mohawk Valley to the Great Carrying Place to Wood Creek and from thence to Lake Ontario. William Johnson, who had arrived in the New York colony from Ireland in 1737, gained his early wealth and


\textsuperscript{115} \textit{American Weekly Mercury}, April 12, 1739, p. 2.
connections in the Mohawk Valley as a trader who developed those western lines of trade. Many Dutch Albanians, however, were content with relationships formed over several decades on the northern trade to Montréal. They trusted their security to maintaining peace with the Canadian Iroquois. Political factions developed over these two different trajectories of trade and diplomatic influence. Slowly, the British authorities began to prevail. The Assembly had passed a prohibition of this trade, which enabled the French to supply “all the Farr Indians with our Goods,” especially the strouds so coveted by Native consumers. Montréal only flourished, Burnet reported to London, because of this clandestine trade. If stopped, “Montréal will sink to nothing.”

The problem, as British imperial officials realized, was that New France was becoming the dominant imperial power across North America by the 1740s. New France now extended from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the Great Lakes, and from thence down the Mississippi River to the Illinois Country and Louisiana. British America seemed not only encircled but defenseless. New York officials consistently trembled over their unpreparedness and the rottenness of their fortifications, which seemed an easy prey. But despite those fears, nothing was ever accomplished except blaming another political faction for the problem. British observers began to discern the rumblings of war in the early 1740s, as Britain engaged Spain in the War of Jenkins’s Ear, a conflict over trade and maritime rights. Philip Livingston alternated between complacency and vigilance in his correspondence with Jacob Wendell of Massachusetts. “I have no apprehensions,” he wrote in 1740, “we shall meet with any obstructions from the Indians in case of war with France.” But two years later, he was “very apprehensive we shall soon be involvd in a French war, which may be attended with very fatall Consequences to ye Inhabitants of your and this Province.”

The commencement of war with Spain had resuscitated Saratoga’s fortifications around 1739, in the event that the conflict spread to include France. Governor Clarke encouraged the assembly to vote funds to “build a new fort in the Mohawks country, and another at Sarachtoga, our most advanced settlements towards the fort which the French have built at Crown Point.” The assembly did provide some funds, as Clarke reported back to the Lords of Trade. But whatever repairs or improvements were made, by 1743 “the Fort at Saragtoga remains ungarrisoned,” according to Peter Wraxall. “The Fort at Albany out of repair. Fort William & Fort Cosby are without an ounce of Pouder.” The Indian Commissioners complained that “the Assembly dont judge proper to support some such Measures as these, they think the 6 Nations will be lost to us, & of what fatal Consequence


117 Philip Livingston to Jacob Wendell, Feb. 27, 1740, Jan. 15, 1742, folders 9, 12, box 115, series I, Livingston Family Papers (Museum of the City of New York, New York, NY).
that would be not only to this but to all the Northern Colonies, those who have experienced what Havock a few Indians can make in time of war can well judge.” In the summer of 1744, Gov. George Clinton sent a small “party of His Majesty’s Troops to the Fort at Saratoga for the defence of that place.” Not even a report by John Hendricks Lydias in June 1745 of the French organizing a force of five hundred to six hundred men was enough to produce a state of vigilance at Saratoga or Albany. A small garrison at an insignificant blockhouse in Saratoga, and it would be withdrawn shortly before November 1745.

And so it was that Lieutenant Marin’s expedition fell with such shocking weight upon the unexpecting inhabitants of Saratoga. The warning given decades earlier, when the French first constructed Crown Point, from whence Marin had departed, seemed a fulfilled prophecy:

...the French of Canada who have Last year built Fortifications at a place Called the Crown Point about one hundred miles from Saratoga which they have built for a place of Rendizvous and upon no Other view or Design than to make a more Speedy Attack upon our People the Inhabitants of This County.

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120 Minutes of the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Feb. 6, 1732, f. 362, reel C-1220, ser. 2, vol. 1820, RG-10 (Library and Archives Canada).
CHAPTER TWO

A BORDERLAND DESTROYED:
SARATOGA DURING KING GEORGE’S WAR,
1745–1748

A Schaghticoke Indian named Richard, who had been captured by Marin’s force only to make his escape during its journey back, was among the first to provide direct testimony of what had happened at Saratoga on November 17, 1745. He had been hunting with a friend east of the Carrying Place, when they were captured by Kahnawake Mohawks and a Frenchman. Hearing the possibility that he and other prisoners would be executed if Marin’s force was pursued by the English, he and three Schaghticoke captives decided to escape. In addition, at least one other family living at Saratoga somehow managed to escape the carnage and report that “he saw many of his Friends shot and cut to pieces” as the glowing fires illuminated the horrid scene. Richard came before the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs to provide testimony, and his report wound its way up to the royal governor, George Clinton, and to colonial newspapers.1

Albany merchant Robert Sanders, whose deep involvement in the illegal trade to Montréal had not brought any security to Saratoga, was nonetheless stunned by “that Unfortunate affair which happened on the 17 Instant at Saraghtogue.” He related to William Johnson that the French and Indian party “Destroyed all that Came before them Left only one Sawmill Standing, w. ch stood a Little out of their way it seems, took along with them such Booty as they thought fit, Kilt & took Captives 100 or 101 Persons Black & white,” adding that he guessed that the valuable slaves taken captive there “Exceeds the Number of the white.”2

The ordeals of the Saratoga captives were just beginning. Captivity was a traumatic experience for most,3 as many of the English and African captives had witnessed the horrific deaths of family members before their eyes. John and Janet Maclure—most likely the residents of the blacksmith’s house at Saratoga—had lost their son Johannes, killed by a Canadian militiaman.4 Their mourning was compounded by the physical trauma of a two hundred-mile trek through the woods, lakes and rivers back to Montréal—a hardship that a

4 Dinan, “John Mack Cluer and Janet Finn,” 1–8.
seventy-year-old female captive was nonetheless able to endure. An African female slave captured at Saratoga endured the trek while seven months pregnant (see Table 2.2).

Upon returning to Montréal and Quebec, the captives were divided to different destinies. The most fortunate captives ended up in the care of elite French-Canadian families, who had the financial wherewithal to ransom them from Indian communities. James Price, for example, most likely went to live with Louis-Joseph Godefray de Tonnancour, a seigneur, merchant, and keeper of stores at Trois-Rivières. Tonnancour was married to an English captive named Mary Scammon and he may have had an uncommon sensibility of the challenges faced by captives. Most were not so fortunate, being “dispersed among the Indians, who took possession of them, and the remainder lodged in the prisons at Quebec.” One French record in 1746 notes that some Saratoga captives were “ransomed by divers individuals, particularly from the Indians of St. Francis and Becancourt; they have been brought down and lodged in the barracks at Quebec, and the price of their ransom repaid by the King”6 (the two communities mentioned were the Abenaki towns of Odanak and Wôlinak). Family units were usually divided, adding to the emotional and psychological ordeal of captivity, and the uncertainty of loved ones’ fates. On December 11, 1745, in the prison at Quebec, Captain William Pote Jr., who had been captured by Abenakis in Acadia in 1745, recorded in his journal that “a Dutch man yt was Taken at a place Called Sallatauger, who Gave us an account, yt he Expected Several more prisoners yt was Taken with him would arrive to prison In a Verey Short time.” Seventeen more captives arrived on January 20, 1746, and seven more on February 22, 1746—including the seventy-year-old woman “who had been so infirm for seven Y ears past, she had not been able to walk the Streets, yet perform’d this tedious Journey with Ease.”7 Captivity as well as conditions in the Quebec prison had weakened a male Saratoga captive, who expired at the Hôpital-Général de Québec on March 16. A fellow captive described him as “a Man of a sober and pious Conversation, his Name was Lawrence Plasser, a German born.”8

Table 2.1 presents new evidence on the identities of twenty-nine of the roughly fifty Anglo-Dutch colonists who were captured at Saratoga in 1745, their lives in New France, and their repatriation in a truce in 1747. Given the paucity of evidence on the Saratoga settlement prior to 1745, these captives provide the only way to demonstrate who had been settled there. This reconstruction of family units and identities of specific persons also enables us to understand the human experience of the 1745 Saratoga raid in far greater

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detail. Unlike colonial captives from New England, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, who authored and published narratives of their ordeals, no such captivity narratives exist from the Anglo-Dutch settlers at Saratoga during King George’s War. Through genealogy and the journals of New Englanders who were imprisoned in Quebec along with the Saratoga captives, it is now possible to document the experience of captivity for those captured in Marin’s expedition.

Perhaps the most poignant and documented story concerns the extended Quackenbush family during their captivity in New France. The family’s fate also demonstrates that captivity in squalid French prisons was an experience far worse than captivity among the Indians, even though Native Americans are typecast as more “savage.” Rev. John Norton, who was imprisoned at Quebec, related that for a short time, conditions “had generally been very healthy,” until the arrival of two French warships whose crews and captured English sailors were afflicted with a fever. The contagion soon spread to the prison. Reverend Norton relates that the captives petitioned the governor general of New France, “but he refused to send our people to the hospital, for they told us that their hospital was full of their own sick; yet he did not wholly

negleadt our petition, but ordered that one of the most convenient rooms in the prison should be assigned for the sick . . .” Confinement in the Quebec prison exacted a ghastly toll on the Quackenbush family, according to Captain Pote’s journal: Geertruy Vanderwerken Quackenbush lost nearly her entire family. After nearly a year in prison, her daughter Martha died at Quebec on December 7, 1746, after “a long and tedious sickness.” Another daughter, Maria, was a captive among the Abenakis at St. François or Bécancour; another daughter, Machtel, lived with a Quebec gentlewoman, and, as we shall see, refused to return. Another crushing blow came when her husband and son died on the same day:

May ye 26 [1747] Died Jacob Quacinbush and his Son Isaac, aged about 20 Years of age a Likely Young man who has been Sick But a few Days, ye wife of Said Jacob Quacinbush is Now Sick at ye hospital, and has Lost Since In this place, her husband and Son aforisd and a D[a]ughter [Martha] aged about 12 Years and her Brother aged about 30, and has now a Daughter of about 18 years of age with ye Indians, and her father and mother with us at this time In Prison aged about 75 Years Each.⁹

Another woman left a widow was Anna Barber Clute Fort, the wife of Abraham Fort, who died along with his older brother Johannes in the spring of 1747, only a few months before the survivors were repatriated during a truce.

⁹ Journal of Captain William Pote, Jr., 135.
### TABLE 2.1

**Anglo-Dutch Colonists Captured at Saratoga, November 1745**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Captive Name and Origin (Alphabetical by Last Name)</th>
<th>Condition and Status</th>
<th>Reference(s):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Clute (Cloete), possible relation to Anna Clute Fort, (below)</td>
<td>Returned to Boston in August 1747</td>
<td>New-York Gazette, Aug. 31, 1747, p. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Crawley</td>
<td>Returned to Boston in August 1747</td>
<td>New-York Gazette, Aug. 31, 1747, p. 4. No further information found on Richard Crawley.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob Fort (son of Abraham and Anna Fort born in 1727)</td>
<td>Returned to Boston in August 1747</td>
<td>New-York Gazette, Aug. 31, 1747, p. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John (Johannes) Fort (born in 1717, son of Johannes Fort).</td>
<td>Returned to Boston in August 1747</td>
<td>New-York Gazette, Aug. 31, 1747, p. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederick Fort (son of Abraham and Anna Fort born in 1721)</td>
<td>Returned to Boston in August 1747</td>
<td>New-York Gazette, Aug. 31, 1747, p. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Died/Married/Returned</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janet Finn McClure</td>
<td>Remained in New France</td>
<td>Dinan, “John Mack Cluer and Janet Finn”; <em>Boston Weekly Post-Boy</em>, Aug. 24, 1747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence Plasser</td>
<td>Died March 15, 1746 at Quebec hospital, “a Man of a sober and pious Conversation, his Name was Lawrence Plasser, a German born.”</td>
<td>Nehemiah How Journal, 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob Quackenbush (husband)</td>
<td>Died at Quebec on May 26, 1747</td>
<td>William Pote Journal, 135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quackenbush (wife of Jacob; daughter of Gerrit Roelofs and Maritie Vanderwerken)</td>
<td>Returned to Boston in August 1747.</td>
<td>Note: Newspapers list a “Hartwright” or “Heither” Quackenbush as having been repatriated in 1747. I would argue that this is not another person but likely an anglicized spelling of Geertruy. In the Dutch pronunciation of Geertruy, the G is pronounced with an H sound, as in “herr.” The addition of the “truy” sound explains why New Englanders heard “Hartwright” or “Heither.” The Dutch name Geertruy was sometimes spelled Geertruit, making the similarity to “Hartwright” even greater.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[#53](#)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Fate/Details</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Isaac Quackenbush (son)</td>
<td>Died at Quebec prison on May 26, 1747, “aged about 20 Years of age a Likely Young man who has been Sick But a few Days”</td>
<td>William Pote Journal, 135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Quackenbush (daughter)</td>
<td>“a Daughter of about 18 years of age with ye Indians”; captive at the Abenaki town of either St. François or Béancour; escaped to Trois Rivières in July 1747</td>
<td>William Pote Journal, 135, 147; possibly the Mary Quackenbush repatriated in August 1747 to Boston (New-York Weekly Journal, Aug. 31, 1747, p. 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martha Quackenbush (daughter)</td>
<td>Died at Quebec prison, December 7, 1746; “she had a long and tedious sickness”</td>
<td>Norton, Redeemed Captive, 41; William Pote Journal, 106. It is unclear if Martha was a daughter of Jacob and Geertruy, or a relation. No baptismal record exists in the Dutch Reformed Church at Albany, where all of the other Quackenbush children were baptized: see Joyce, Dave-Pane, ed. and transcr. Records of the Reformed Dutch Church of Albany, New York, 1683–1809, pt. III: 1725–1749, <a href="https://mathcs.clarku.edu/~djoyce/gen/albany/part3.html#baptismal">https://mathcs.clarku.edu/~djoyce/gen/albany/part3.html#baptismal</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rachel Quackenbush (daughter)</td>
<td>Another Quackenbush daughter had “Lived with a Gentlewoman In this town about 18 months”; abjured Protestant religion and remained in New France after the war.</td>
<td>William Pote Journal, 149; Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York, ed. O’Callaghan and Fernow, X, 214.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killian De Ridder (listed as “Ryder” in the newspaper)</td>
<td>Returned to Boston in August 1747</td>
<td>New-York Gazette, Aug. 31, 1747, p. 4; Brandow, Story of Old Saratoga, 242.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown, Mother of six children</td>
<td>“a woman here yt was taken at Sarotoga about 18 months past who . . . had her husband killd when Taken and 6 Children in ye hands of ye Sauvages”</td>
<td>William Pote Journal, 151–52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td>William Pote Journal, 151–52</td>
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<tr>
<td>2) Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td>William Pote Journal, 151–52</td>
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<td>3) Unknown</td>
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<td>William Pote Journal, 151–52</td>
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<td>4) Unknown</td>
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<td>William Pote Journal, 151–52</td>
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<td>5) Unknown</td>
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<td>William Pote Journal, 151–52</td>
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<tr>
<td>6) Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td>William Pote Journal, 151–52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He is possibly Dirck Vanderheyden (b. 1726), son of the merchant David Vanderheyden, who had a house located near Lydius’s.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Norton, Redeemed Captive, 40; Calder, “Journal of a Captive,” 38; Wikitree, <a href="https://www.wikitree.com/wiki/Van_Der_Werken-6">https://www.wikitree.com/wiki/Van_Der_Werken-6</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerardus Vanderwerken (b. ca. 1710) (spelled as Gratis Vanderveriske in Norton)</td>
<td>Died December 1, 1746 in Quebec prison “after a tedious sickness of six or seven weeks”; the anglicized hearing and spelling of “Gratis” in the Norton and Pote journals mirrors a german pronunciation of “Gerardus”</td>
<td>Norton, Redeemed Captive, 40; Calder, “Journal of a Captive,” 38; Wikitree, <a href="https://www.wikitree.com/wiki/Van_Der_Werken-6">https://www.wikitree.com/wiki/Van_Der_Werken-6</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritie Janse de Vos Vanderwerken (Mother of Gerardus and of Geertruy Vanderwerken Quackenbush)</td>
<td>b. 1677; referred to as “Mary” in English sources; “her father and mother with us at this time In Prison aged about 75 Years Each,” according to Pote’s Journal</td>
<td>Calder, “Journal of a Captive,” 38; William Pote Journal, 135; Wikitree, <a href="https://www.wikitree.com/wiki/Van_Der_Werken-6">https://www.wikitree.com/wiki/Van_Der_Werken-6</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Anglo-Dutch colonists experienced through captivity among the French and Indians what their African slaves experienced throughout their lives—permanent division of families, separation of parents from children, and powerlessness to do anything about it. For the African slaves of Saratoga, their captivity among the French and Indians merely echoed those realities of their enslavement among the English. Perhaps the most famous individual taken captive at Saratoga in 1745 was an African slave who, as an adopted Mohawk, became known as Atiatoharongwen or Louis Cook. Our evidence on Atiatoharongwen’s early life comes from Franklin B. Hough’s 1853 History of St. Lawrence and Franklin Counties. Hough’s information came from an oral interview with Mary Kawennitake, one of Atiatoharongwen’s daughters who lived at St. Regis, and from Eleazar Williams’s The Life of Colonel Louis Cook (1851). There is little reason or evidence to doubt the veracity of Kawennitake’s oral testimony that she shared with Hough through Father François Marcoux, acting as an interpreter. The level of historical detail in Mary’s account suggests key memories preserved as oral tradition, and some details are supported in contemporary records.  

Testimony from Mary Kawennitake and Eleazar Williams established that the young boy’s mother was an Abenaki of St. François and his father was one of the dozens of African slaves at Saratoga in the 1740s. At a time when Indians lived intermixed among European settlers, it is not a surprising occurrence that an African slave and Abenaki woman would have a child together. As we have seen, Abenakis frequented the Saratoga region. It is also possible that Atiatoharongwen’s mother was originally a Schaghticoke Indian who resettled at St. François. According to Mary’s testimony, a French officer seized the young boy during the Saratoga raid. But his Abenaki mother resisted, crying out “he is my child!” and appealing to the Canadian Iroquois war captains, who restored him to his mother. This account mirrors the 1745 journal of Marin’s expedition in one key detail: that such scuffles over control of prisoners did in fact occur during the raid. The intervention of the Kahnawake Iroquois meant that the Abenaki woman and her child would be adopted into the Mohawk community at Kahnawake. The young boy would receive the name Atiatoharongwen, and the French name of Louis Cook. Hough described that “his

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influence with the tribe was very great, and they always relied upon his council, and entrusted him with the performance of their more important business."\textsuperscript{11}

The young boy’s African father, according to Hough, went “in the service of one of the government officials at Montréal,” which is also in keeping with historical patterns of slave ownership among the French Canadian elites of that city. Although African slavery dominated the French colonies in the West Indies and was legalized in Canada in 1689, the institution had never taken deep root in New France. Instead, the French in North America enslaved thousands of American Indians taken in wars of the 1600s and early 1700s, so that “Native slavery predominated in New France throughout the colony’s final century,” according to historian Brett Rushforth. Wealthy merchants and officials might own African slaves, but Indian or panis slaves composed two-thirds of all slaves in New France. There were already a few hundred slaves in Montréal in the mid-eighteenth century, when captive African slaves were brought in from Saratoga.\textsuperscript{12}

Thanks to the careful research of eminent Canadian historian Marcel Trudel, there is much documentation on both the panis and African slaves of New France. Trudel’s \textit{Dictionnaire des esclaves et de leurs propriétaires au Canada français} [Dictionary of Slaves and Their Owners in French Canada] provides new evidence on the African slaves who were captured at Saratoga in 1745.\textsuperscript{13} Table 2.2 lists this author’s translation of Trudel’s notes concerning eleven of the sixty African slaves—some named, most anonymous—who are recorded as having been captured at Saratoga. Those African captives entered a world where both Indian (panis) and African slaveries were entrenched—where “fully half of all colonists who owned a home in 1725 also owned an Indian slave,” according to Rushforth. About one-third of all slaves in New France in 1759 were African, while the majority were panis. Most all slaves lived in urban areas, and fifty percent lived in Montréal. As a result, they became slaves of French officers who had captured them or of wealthy montréalais merchants who owned panis slaves. Many of the young black children captured at Saratoga were baptized according to Catholic rites and given French names and received Canadian godfathers and godmothers—acts that were required by ordinances governing slaves. But the legal status of Africans captured at Saratoga or from other English colonies during wartime, remained that of a slave—“every Negro being a slave wherever he is,” as the governor of New France decreed in 1750. Rushforth observes that the “governor’s

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Hough, \textit{History of St. Lawrence and Franklin Counties}, 182.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Allan Greer, \textit{The People of New France} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), chap. 5; Brett Rushforth, \textit{Bonds of Alliance: Indigenous and Atlantic Slaveries in New France} (Chapel Hill: Omohundro Institute and University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 10.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Marcel Trudel, \textit{Dictionnaire des esclaves et de leurs propriétaires au Canada français}, (Dictionary of slaves and their owners in French Canada) (Quebec: Editions Hurtubise, 1990). Reflecting contemporary records, Marcel Trudel’s dictionary often cites the French words \textit{noirs} (blacks) or \textit{nègre} (negro) for slaves. As Brett Rushforth observes, in the early 1700s “legal language regarding slaves changed, . . . de-emphasizing ‘nègre,’ with its more complex historical connotations, in favor of ‘noir’ or black” (See Rushforth, \textit{Bonds of Alliance}, 355). In view of the racial connotations of those French words, I have opted to use the less-pejorative term “African” in my translation of \textit{nègre}.
\end{itemize}
statement became the law of New France, instantly and universally categorizing all black people as slaves.” Africans taken as captives from the English colonies during King George’s War had resulted in an infusion of slaves that raised Montréal’s African slave population from around 5 percent to 15 percent of the total slave population by the 1750s. But for Saratoga’s Africans, the 1745 raid had only changed their location and condition, but not their legal status or severity of enslavement.14

### TABLE 2.2.

French Records of African Slaves Captured at Saratoga, November 1745

Translated from Marcel Trudel, *Dictionnaire des esclaves et de leurs propriétaires au Canada français* (Éditions Hurtubise, 1990), 89, 92.

[NOTE: Translations of Trudel’s notes in French by David Preston; because this table offers direct translations from Trudel’s *Dictionnaire*, I have elected to keep this table separate from Table 2.1, even though all the individuals in both tables were captives in 1745].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>p. 89</th>
<th>Anonymous African male</th>
<th>Captured at Saratoga in November 1745 and became the property of the officer Luc Lacorne de Saint-Luc. He is probably the anonymous slave of Joseph Gamelin who was buried at the age of 32 at Montréal on August 29, 1748.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>p. 89</td>
<td>Anonymous African female</td>
<td>Perhaps the wife of the preceding and captured at Saratoga in November 1745, became the property of Luc Lacorne de Saint-Luc; mother of the following.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p. 89</td>
<td>Étiennette, African female also called Marie-Estienne or Eskenne</td>
<td>Daughter of the preceding individuals who were captured at Saratoga in November 1745, she became the property of the Abenaki Pierre Nicholas who sold her for 500 livres to bourgeois merchant Joseph-Jacques Gamelin; baptized at Montréal the 7th of March 1746, at age 4 or 5; godfather: Pierre Gamelin; godmother: Marie-Joseph Gamelin (one of the other children of the owner). After the surrender of Montréal in 1760, desirous of returning to the English colonies, she presented herself before the Chambre des milices on June 6, 1761, invoking her status as a British subject: The English authorities had undertaken an investigation to release the English whom the Canadians had captured during the war. Geneviève Gamelin, the owner’s daughter, came to explain to the court in what circumstances the Gamelin family became and remained the owner of this negress, which was confirmed by the officer Luc Lacorne de Saint-Luc, who had acquired the parents. The Chambre des milices transmitted the file to Governor [Thomas] Gage government: we do not know the conclusion of this trial.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Name &amp; Gender</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Anonymous African male</td>
<td>Captured at Saratoga in November 1745 and became the property of merchant Pierre Guy; husband of the following, he was the father of Élisabeth, of Marie-Anne, and of Rosalie; he is probably the African man, age 38, living with the widow of merchant Pierre Guy, was buried on February 19, 1757, at the General Hospital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Diané, African female</td>
<td>Wife of the preceding, captured at Saratoga in November 1745 and became the property of merchant Pierre Guy; mother of the following.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Élisabeth, African female</td>
<td>Born to Diané around 1744, taken at Saratoga the following year with her parents and became the property of merchant Pierre Guy; baptized October 24, 1746 at around the age of 2 years.; godfather: Jean-Baptiste Magnan; godmother: Élisabeth Guy [wife of the owner].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Marie-Anne, African female</td>
<td>Sister of the preceding; born at Montréal on August 19, 1747 and baptized the next day; godfather: René-Michel Levasseur; godmother: Marie-Anne Alarie; buried August 29th of the same year at 10 days old.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Rosalie, African female</td>
<td>Sister of the preceding, said to be of an unknown father, baptized August 28, 1748; godfather: Jean-Baptiste Sabrevois de Bleury; godmother: Marie-Anne Amable Testard de Montigny.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Anonymous African female</td>
<td>Pregnant, she was captured at Saratoga in November 1745 and became the property of the officer Louis Marais de La Chauvignerie; mother of the following.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Michel, African male</td>
<td>Born on December 26, 1745 of the preceding and of an unknown father; baptized two days later; godfather: Pierre-Paul Raimbault de Saint-Blin; godmother: Marie-Joseph Raimbault, wife of the owner’s son.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Anonymous African female</td>
<td>Sister of the preceding, buried on August 15, 1748, age 5 months.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the Anglo-Dutch and African captives adjusted to their hard fates in Montréal, those left behind in colonial New York steeled themselves for the worst in the aftermath of the Saratoga raid. Rumors swirled of another attack following reports that “a great number of Snow Shoes are prepared at Messasippi by the French, In order to march a force with those Indians against Albany, Esopus & Minisink As also against the Frontiers of Jersey & Pennsilvania.” The council treated this report with utmost respect, fearing that perhaps Albany itself would fall to enemy attack: “if Albany should be reduced by the Enemy there would be nothing less to expect than the Revolt of the Six Nations to them.” In that event, they predicted nothing less than the collapse of British America: “all his Majestys Colonys on the Continent would be exposed to the Insults of the French and the Savages under their Influence and thereby the whole greatly endangered.” Colonial newspapers also gave this story great credibility—“considering the late Success of the Enemy at Saraghtoga.”

The story of Saratoga and its garrisons during King George’s War has been clouded by a lack of documentation, until now. The 1911 New York State capitol fire destroyed a large amount of documentation regarding Saratoga, the richness of which is conveyed in the one or two-sentence descriptions in the *Calendar of the New York Colonial Manuscripts*. Virtually all the volumes of colonial manuscripts relating to Saratoga in the 1740s were reduced to small charred fragments. However, previous studies and commissioned reports have not consulted or fully utilized the George Clinton Papers at the William L. Clements Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan. In addition, the Minute Book of the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, located at the Albany Institute of History and Art,

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covers the early winter of 1746 and provides new context for and detail on Saratoga’s situation following the disastrous 1745 Marin raid.

The attack on Saratoga was a testament to French and Indian strategy in the conduct of la guerre sauvage. The consequences of one single and highly successful Franco-Indian attack on a frontier community were vast. First, it forced the colonial government to concentrate their limited military and economic resources for defensive measures. The scorched earth and charred fortification at Saratoga also meant that colonial troops would have an infinitely more difficult time sustaining themselves at the ruined settlement. And perhaps without intending it as an outcome, the French and Indian attack on Saratoga inexorably divided the New York colonial government.

The devastating consequences of the Saratoga raid were magnified because of the impeccable timing of it. The French struck at a time when the New York colony and the British world were distracted by events elsewhere in the War of Austrian Succession (1744–1748), or King George’s War, as this declared conflict came to be called. The Battle of Fontenoy in the Austrian Netherlands had resulted in a crushing defeat of a British and allied army on the continent of Europe, and French conquests of other strong points in the Low Countries. The military resources and attention of the New York and New England governments were also fixed on the 1745 Expedition to Louisbourg, the French naval base on Île Royale near the Gulf of St. Lawrence. A Jacobite rebellion known as the Forty-Five had also broken out in the Scottish Highlands and raged into the next year, which heightened concerns for the stability of Great Britain and the Hanoverian monarchy. Finally, relations with the Iroquois Confederacy were also reaching a nadir, as the Mohawks began to fear that the New York colonists were conspiring to dispossess them of their lands. The Mohawks could easily remain neutral, resist British appeals for military action, or leverage British dependence into the building of forts to protect Mohawk communities.

Some Mohawk leaders wanted their settlements to be fortified to protect their families if warriors were away. They insisted that “it was very hard for them to enter into a War, the French Indians are the Indians of the six Nations are sprang of one blood. They have made Alliances & Marriages wth each other. . . . ” “It was not so Easy for them to go to War as for the white people the French and the English have each their Master their Kings . . . It was not so with them they had no King Every Indian was his own Master.” It was, of course, in the interest of the Canadian Iroquois for their New York brethren to remain neutral, so that there would be no fratricide. In 1746, two Kahnawake emissaries told League Iroquois (Senecas) “not to Intermeddle in the Warr for they intended to be Neuter and hop’d they would likewise they said the white people might fight for themselves.”

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18 Minutes of Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Feb. 25, April 17, 1746, MS 97a: Proceedings of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 1746 (Albany Institute of History and Art, Albany, NY)
The panic among New York officials was so great in late 1745 that Gov. George Clinton rushed two of the New York Independent Companies from New York City to Albany, “for the Defence of that City, conceiving it in Danger, of falling into the Hands of the Enemy, from the late Attempts they have made upon our Frontiers.” Governor Clinton also proposed “the immediate Rebuilding of the Fort at Saraghtoga” as well as a fort at the Carrying Place, “to be large and strong, of Stone-Work.” The assembly responded by issuing “by way of Retaliation, according to the Law of Nations and of War,” bounties on enemy Indian scalps (a typical practice in the British colonies). The assembly appropriated only £150 to rebuild a fortification at Saratoga, and both Governor Clinton and the Albany commissioners could agree that the sum was too small for the undertaking. Delays were inevitable. The Albany commissioners reported in late January that “the delay to build the Fort at Saratogue was not our fault. The Weather would not permit, [nor did] the Indians come so soon as expected; As soon as the Indians came we sent away Imeditaely, for the Work Men would not got without them.” In addition, militia were reluctant to go to Saratoga given its vulnerable status. Given the reluctance of militia and workers to go to Saratoga without Mohawk protection, the Albany commissioners redoubled their efforts to secure Mohawk support, so that the Saratoga garrison and workers would have reliable scouts. By late January of 1746, Capt. Nicholas Schuyler was commanding a small garrison of one hundred New York Independent Company regulars and approximately forty Indian allies at the rebuilt fortification. He reported that “the Fort at Saraghtoga goes on with success.” The Albany commissioners soon reported that “the fort at Saraghtoge is all finished except the Chimneys which Cannot be done this winter the Carpenters are all returned.” Another curious fixture in the new fort was “a slight Plank house built upon posts set in the Ground to be built in the middle of the fort [for] the Indians to lodge in.

Whatever initial concern or unity the New York government expressed in the aftermath of the Saratoga alarm, soon gave way to recriminations and political accusations. Capt. John Rutherford, one of the officers in the New York Independent Companies, requested a court of inquiry. He aimed, it appears, to exonerate the regulars’ actions by highlighting the horrendous condition of the Saratoga blockhouses. Lieut. Edmund Blood testified that in 1745, a sergeant, corporal, and ten privates were posted at Saratoga, “upon these express conditions”: that the fort be repaired, and that a well and an oven be constructed. Governor Clinton ordered Blood to withdraw the garrison if these conditions

20 Pennsylvania Gazette, Dec. 6, 1745, p. 2.
21 Clinton to Lords of Trade, Jan. 18, 1746, in Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, ed. O’Callaghan and Fernow, IV, 308; James Stevenson letter, Feb. 6, 1746, MS 586 (Albany Institute of History and Art); Minutes of Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Jan. 29, 1746, MS 97a: Proceedings of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 1746; New York Council Minutes, 1668–1783, vol. XXI: Jan. 14, 21, 1746, ff. 70, 73, A1895.
22 Minutes of Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Feb. 18, 1746, MS 97a: Proceedings of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 1746.
were not met, perhaps as way of applying pressure upon the Albany commissioners and the New York assembly. Other soldiers testified to how conditions at Saratoga prevented any effective defense, as the blockhouse roofs were so leaky that soldiers could not keep their muskets, ammunition, gunpowder, and clothing dry. After repeated appeals, Captain Rutherford obeyed the governor’s order and withdrew the garrison. How soon before the November 1745 attack the garrison was withdrawn is not clear, but later statements by the governor and the assembly prove that there was no garrison at the fort when the French and Indians struck.\footnote{Examinations at a Court of Inquiry in Albany, December 11, 1745,” Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, ed. O’Callaghan and Fernow, VI, 374–75; Assembly to Clinton, Oct. 9, 1747, ibid., 622. For a reference to the 1745 withdrawal and the Court of Inquiry, see Governor Clinton to Assembly, May 26, 1747, ibid., 367.}

The larger political significance of the Saratoga raid is how it transformed the New York colony’s Indian diplomacy, creating inexorable divisions between Gov. George Clinton and the assembly and the Albany Commissioners for Indian Affairs. The funding of frontier defenses—whether charged to the Crown or funded by the assembly and public monies—became a bone of contention for the governor. The commissioners certainly realized that the Saratoga raid “removed all hopes of a neutrality” in the evolving conflict. They took measures to enlist League Mohawks to defend Saratoga and to fortify the colony’s northern frontier. But they were also stymied by the Haudenosaunee Confederacy’s basic determination to remain neutral in this latest Anglo-French war. George Clinton and his allies pinned blame for the Saratoga attack upon the Albany commissioners, the illegal fur trade, and wealthy Dutch officials’ involvement in egregious land grants that the Iroquois deemed fraudulent. After 1745, as historian Jon Parmenter observes, “Clinton effectively took over provincial Indian policy in early 1746, bypassing the Albany Commissioners in favour of private agents whom he and William Shirley paid handsomely out of their own salaries.”\footnote{Jon Parmenter, “‘Onenwahatirighsi Sa Gentho Skaghnuhtudigh’: Reassessing Iroquois Relations with the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 1723–1755,” in English Atlantics Revisited, ed. Rhoden, 235–83, at 259–60.}

The private agent whom Clinton favored over the Albany commissioners was William Johnson, an Anglo-Irish trader who had only recently settled in the colony. Johnson had emigrated from County Meath, Ireland, to the colony of New York in 1737, settling in the Mohawk Valley. Initially, Johnson managed lands owned by his uncle, Sir Peter Warren, but his attention soon turned to the profitable Indian trade via Oswego. Just as John Hendricks Lydius had planted himself at Saratoga astride the Albany-Montréal trade, Johnson was able to intercept at Oswego much of the commerce and Indian customers who used to travel to Albany. Johnson’s location in the Mohawk Valley also enabled him to develop close diplomatic and familial ties to Mohawks settled at Tionontheroa and Canajoharie. Johnson burst on the scene in 1746 amid the turmoil of frontier war: “When the Indians came near the Town of Albany, on the 8th of August [1746],” Cadwallader
Colden recorded, “Mr. Johnson put himself at the Head of the Mohawks, dressed and painted after the Manner of an Indian War-Captain; and the Indians who followed him, were likewise dressed and painted, as is usual with them when they set out in War.” Johnson was a bright spot in a hopeless time, as he heralded a new involvement of the Mohawks in the defense of New York. From 1746 to 1747 Johnson either personally led or equipped several scouting expeditions of Indians and British colonists in the Lake Champlain region.25

The situation of the Saratoga garrison continued to worsen over the course of the year 1746. By May, the garrison at Saratoga was already “mutinous,” according to its commanding officer, Jacob Ten Eyck. The soldiers, he reported, were “uneasy and desire to be Relieved and that the Enemy are constantly passing & repassing in great Companys and that they have scarce Men enough to keep the Garrison.”26 Lieutenant George Ingoldsby, of the New York Independent Companies, reported the “the Ill Condition the Fort there is in and desiring his Excellency to order it to be finished …” In addition, Lieutenant Ingoldsby found himself unsupplied and underfunded, due to “the Expence he is at in Treating the Indians for which there is no Allowance.”27 Not only did Indian allies expect monetary payment and supplies, but they “declared they would not fight with the Caughnawaga Indians, if they will.”28 Moreover, there was friction between the officers of the Saratoga garrison and the Mohawks, who complained that “they ought to be consulted in all Opperations carried on there which they say is not done.”29 By the early spring of 1746, the Mohawks had returned home to defend their own communities, and “River Indians” were the only Native warriors left to support the garrison. Around the one-year anniversary of Marin’s raid, in November 1746, John Hendricks Lydius complained to his friend Col. John Stoddard that “They only have added two Blockhouses to the Fort of Saratogue, so that is a most Sorrowful Provide after all the preparations & Charge to many Governments have been at the mountain hath bro’t forth only a mouse.”30 After one year of effort, the British could not adequately fortify Saratoga, let alone mount an effective defense of the region.

Albany commissioners warned in May 1746 that “the whole County Except Albany & Schenectada is now att the mercy of the Enemy.” Even older residents could not remember “in the hottest Wars formerly to be so surrounded & so much blood shed in so short a time.”31 A letter written from Albany in mid-1746 and published in the Boston Evening-Post

27 Ibid., June 16, 1746, f. 113; Ibid., July 8, 1746, f. 123.
28 Minutes of Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Feb. 28, 1746, MS 97a: Proceedings of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 1746.
29 See April 5, 1746, in Abridgment of Indian Affairs Contained in Four Folio Volumes, ed. McLwain, 245.
30 John Henry Lydius to Col. Stoddard, Nov. 20, 24, 1746, NYHS.
31 Minutes of Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, May 4, 1746, MS 97a: Proceedings of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 1746.
summarizes how the war had evolved for the colony of New York: “We are in such continual Alarms . . . all around us is nothing but Desolation, Fire, Murder, and Captivity.” The writer also claimed to have seen six persons “killed within Sight of the City, on the other Side the River.”\(^{32}\) Native American attacks caused both demographic and psychological attrition. Three soldiers fishing in the Hudson or the Fish Kill were attacked by Indians in June 1746—one was killed, one was captured, and one escaped. These sporadic small-scale attacks constituted a serious drain on the garrison’s military strength and readiness. In September 1746, Natives beset a group of Independent Company regulars, killing four and capturing four. When Capt. Nicholas Schuyler led a force out in support, he was surrounded and nearly cut off from his retreat back to Fort Clinton.\(^{33}\) In December 1746, partly in response to the French and Indian capture of Fort Massachusetts in August, Gov. William Shirley authorized the stationing of Massachusetts troops at Saratoga. But even that promising development was cut short. The dreaded smallpox broke out in Albany and surrounding garrisons, including that of Saratoga. Shirley announced in a speech to the Massachusetts assembly that he would not send any forces to Saratoga, as it would be “extremely dangerous to the Health of the New England Troops.”\(^{34}\) As 1746 ended, nothing substantial had been accomplished by British forces to halt enemy incursions. The garrison at Saratoga was merely holding on, and things were about to get far worse.

In 1747, the French continued a relentless series of attacks against the garrison at Saratoga—a campaign of attrition against New York’s northernmost outpost and, as the French knew, a potential staging ground for an intercolonial expedition to Crown Point. These French and Indian attacks not only whittled down the garrison’s strength but also its colonial morale.

In February 1747, the French found a garrison very demoralized and weak due to chronic supply shortages. Basic materials such as firewood were not being supplied to the troops—and that became a bone of contention between Albany officials and the post commander, Capt. Henry Livingston. His father, Philip Livingston, had despaired for years over the colony’s inaction, and related to a friend, “my son drew the unfortunate prize Saraghtogue he has Comand of that Garrison.” As the new garrison of Independent Companies and new levies of New York provincials marched in to Saratoga, the French and Indians once again practiced psychological warfare as they “put Mr Livingstons upper saw mill on fire which burnt as they came along.”\(^{35}\)

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32 *Boston Evening-Post*, June 9, 1746, p. 4.
33 *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Sept. 18, 1746, p. 3.
35 For the prize reference, see Livingston to Wendell, Nov. 24, 1746, box 115, Livingston Family Papers. For the sawmill reference, see Livingston to Wendell, Nov. 3, 1746, *ibid.*
On February 22, 1747, the snow, cold, and firewood shortage had increasingly forced members of the garrison out on details to cut wood. The *Boston Gazette* and other colonial newspapers reported the incident in detail:

> From Albany we have Advice, that on the 22d of February last, a Party of twelve of our Forces from the Garrison of Saraghtoga, (at which Place there are six Companies posted) going out for Fire Wood in the Morning, and adventuring too hastily without the usual Guard appointed, one of them happened to step a little out of the Road, when an Indian met him, and told him he was his Prisoner; & the Indian going to take off his Belt to bind him, he being a Stout Fellow, shov’d the Indian down in the Snow, then took up his Hatchet, and was going to knock him in the Head, but another Indian approaching, he was obliged to take to his Heels, crying out, The Enemy is upon us: Both those Indians fired at him, one of which shot through the Skirt of his Coat, and the other his Heel while a whole Party of Indians immediately fired upon the rest of the Company, four of whom they kill’d out right, carried off four more Prisoners, wounded three more, two of whom its thought mortally, and only one got off unhurt: Parties were immediately sent in quest of them, but believed no Purpose, except to alarm the other Garrisons of the Danger.

The account is remarkable in a number of important details. The work party was unaware of the presence of enemy Indians, despite greater visibility in the snowy woods. The garrison attempted to pursue, but ineffectually. Six soldiers were killed and four were taken as prisoners in the skirmish. When Capt. Henry Livingston arrived on the scene with a relief column, he found one of his soldiers lying on the ground, still alive, but with a tomahawk sticking in his head.  

Less than two months later, the French and Indians struck Saratoga again, on April 7, 1747. The French and Indians once again demonstrated their mastery of ambush tactics and their ability to catch their enemies unaware. Captain William Trent, leading a company of Pennsylvania troops, was destined to become an agent for the Ohio Company in the 1750s and involved in the opening shots of the French and Indian War. But on this day, he was marching northward from Fort Clinton with a party led by Lieutenant Proctor. In the vicinity of the Schuyler estate and south of the Fish Kill, a force of sixty French and Indians lay waiting in ambush “behind a small rising Ground within 40 Yards of the Road.” Their initial volley was devastating, as eight men fell dead and others were wounded. What made this ambush different is that the provincial forces stood their ground—“Capt. Trent and the Lieut. behav’d like brave Officer.” In an hour-long engagement, the British provincials exchanged volleys with their enemy until they had exhausted their ammunition. Capt. Henry Livingston, meanwhile, had dispatched a relief force to come to their aid. In this costly engagement, nine provincials were killed, nine wounded, and six missing: Daniel

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Ireland, John Reade, Richard Brown, Peter Stiles, John Smith, John Lloyd, Isaac Brown George Pentaw, and one Mr. Kelly were killed in action. The French force suffered about fifteen casualties. The soldiers had a sense of martial pride in their conduct, but they knew that situation at Saratoga was not conducive to an effective defense. By the end of April, the officers at Saratoga reported to Colonel Roberts that “the Men are so dissatisfied for want of their pay that they have the greatest Reason to fear they will Desert in a Body.” In addition, the French gained valuable intelligence of the state of the garrison as well as preparations for an intercolonial expedition against Fort Saint-Frédéric (Crown Point). That intelligence encouraged them to keep up the pressure on Saratoga.

One of Canada’s most effective partisan fighters, La Corne Saint-Luc, led what became the coup de grâce for the Saratoga garrison. Saint-Luc’s life was thus intertwined with Saratoga, from 1747 to his involvement in Burgoyne’s Campaign thirty years later. In June 1747, he commanded a force of two hundred men—125 Canadian militia and the remainder Iroquois from Kahnawake, Hurons from Lorette, Abenakis, Nippissings, Algonquins, and even a handful of far western allies, the Ottawas and Menominees. His officers included seasoned veterans of previous campaigns against New York, such as Pierre-Philippe St.-Ours, and Lieutenant Langis, who would become the chief nemesis of Major Robert Rogers and his rangers in the next war.

Saint-Luc demonstrated a cunning and prowess in his attack on the Saratoga garrison. He studied his prey, looking for the right method and moment to strike. In consultation with his Indian allies, he sought to lure the English forces out of Fort Clinton and lead them straight into a fixed ambush. On June 30, that opportune moment arose when the English responded to shots fired upon two soldiers outside the fort. As the English relief force formed, St.-Luc attacked, inflicting fifteen casualties on the British and took thirty-seven more as prisoners back to Quebec.

British accounts related a story in the aftermath of a French Indian who came to Fort Clinton, and who provided intelligence to the English that magnified the French threat in their minds. The story goes that a French Indian came running toward the garrison, fired his musket in the air and laid it on the ground, asking to be admitted into the fort. He related that he had been in a party led by Luc de Chapt de La Corne St.-Luc, numbering four thousand French and Indians. La Corne had gone to their appointed place of rendezvous at the Carrying Place, “after the Engagemt with Mr Chews who with the Rest of the prisoners are Sent to Crownpt. Monsr Lacore has Left Monsr Laguel As Commg: officer of

38 For the French intelligence gained through the February and April raids, see O’Callaghan and Fernow, eds., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, X, 93, 96.
Three Hund. rd men. Who are Constantly Seen in the Woods Round the Garrison and he Says his Dissign is to Intercept All parties Coming from Albany . . . .” He was concerned that La Corne was coming to Saratoga with the rest of his force, “Until they Can have Several Guns, Provisions, &c: that they have Sent for to Crounp. t as thinking it Impossible to Reduce this place witht Them tho Hee says they have got hand Granads Cowhorns Shovels & Spades & firearrows in order to fire the Blokhouses which that party attempt.d to Do that fired Upon the Rounds from Under Bank.” This account relates the fear that the British were facing besieging tactics in the next encounter with La Corne St. Luc. Col. Peter Schuyler duly took precautions to “Render it impossible” to take Fort Clinton with small arms. But rumors of the attack magnified the numbers of the enemy force: “the Garrison of Sarhatoga was attack’d by a great Body of French and Indians, suppos’d to be 2000,” one Boston newspaper reported. By summer’s end, it was being reported that “the Fort at Saraghtoga is an a manner surrounded by the Enemy, and apprehended to be in some Danger; and that the Woods all round the Country seem to have Parties of the Enemy lurking about, and our People not able to take any of them.”

In September 1747, following nearly two years of incessant French and Indian attacks on New York’s northern frontiers, Gov. George Clinton wrote to Col. John Roberts on the importance of Fort Clinton, the colony’s northernmost outpost featuring a strong complement of artillery. He ordered Colonel Roberts to send reinforcements there, “as it is Conceived to be of the greatest importance to his Majesty’s Service, and the Intrest and welfare of this Province, to support and maintain Fort Clinton at Saraghtoga” (Figure 1).

Paradoxically, Governor Clinton’s statement on Fort Clinton’s strategic importance was conditional, for in the same letter he also established the conditions for the wholesale abandonment of the post. He authorized Colonel Roberts that if “you shall find it impracticable to maintain and support the said Fort at Saraghtoga,” that he could abandon it altogether. Political chicanery was palpable in the exchange of letters between Clinton and Roberts, as they both indicated as a foreordained conclusion that the fort at Saratoga would be abandoned. It is likely that Clinton was maneuvering to cast blame upon the assembly for Saratoga’s abandonment. The next day, after receiving Clinton’s orders, Roberts wrote to Capt. Henry Livingston at Saratoga that it was impracticable to maintain the post, and that there would be “no want of willing workmen, who will be very Industrious in demolishing a place they so much detest and Dread.” On Tuesday morning, October 6, 1747, the garrison abandoned Fort Clinton altogether, burned the fort and provisions, buried some of the cannon ammunition, and withdrew the eighteen-pounder artillery pieces to Stillwater.

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41 Clinton to Col. John Roberts, Sept. 26, 1747, folder 32, box 2, Clinton Papers; Roberts to Livingston, Sept. 27, 1747, ibid.; Roberts to Clinton, Oct. 13, 1747, folder 37, ibid. A letter from Colonel Roberts to Clinton, dated Oct. 27, 1747 briefly mentions that “Cap.t Livingston buried some of the shot of the 18 [pounders] at Saraghtoga, and some at Stillwatter.” See Roberts to Clinton, Oct. 27, 1747, folder 40, ibid.
Why did a royal governor, whose viceregal duty was to defend “his Majesty’s Service, and the Intrest and welfare of this Province,” authorize the destruction of this key fortification? Why did a royal governor order the abandonment of settlers and their plantations still under threat of French and Indian attacks? Why did the British find it so difficult to defend its own frontiers, or even agree on basic defensive measures? To understand Saratoga’s significance during King George’s War, it is necessary to understand how this outpost dovetailed with the broader political, constitutional, and imperial struggles taking place within the colony of New York and in British North America.

The years following Marin’s attack on Saratoga in 1745 represented perhaps the most perilous moments in colonial New York’s existence. French and allied Indian assaults on New York settlements continued with relentless fury, extending even southward of Albany. The area of Kinderhook, twenty miles south of Albany, was “now a frontier,” according to Philip Livingston in a 1746 letter. Peter Wraxall, a colonial official, wrote that for “upwards of 70 miles along Hudsons River I was a Witness of an almost total Desertion from all the Settlements.” “Nay the Grain within 4 miles of Albany,” he continued, “was left unreaped & the Lands uncultivated.” Internal dissension also compromised the New York colonial government’s political and military responses to the dire French threat. To many at the time of events, it seemed that the lives of British subjects were sacrificed on the altar of political gamesmanship between the assembly and the governor. Troops were not paid and were poorly supplied as they languished and died in squalid encampments; fortifications rotted; and large areas of settlement were entirely abandoned. Philip Livingston laid the blood of the slain squarely upon the New York assembly: “Most of y’s Gentry here are nor more Concernd about ye murders Committed above Albany than I am to kill’d a fatt pigg they seem to have no Charity or Compassion.”

The ashes of Saratoga and the scores of slain colonists had ultimately demonstrated that Britain’s imperial control in North America was indeed hollow and brittle in the mid-1740s. Despite the colony’s longstanding claims of an exclusive Covenant Chain alliance with the Six Nations, New York’s relationship with the powerful Iroquois Confederacy was also at a nadir. British settlement expansion and outright land fraud had greatly undermined the colony’s alliance with the Six Nations. Except for some pro-British Mohawk factions, most Iroquois were extremely reluctant to abandon their policy of neutrality and fight on Britain’s behalf—especially when that might mean combat against fellow Iroquois who lived in the St. Lawrence Valley.

The Long Peace that facilitated the Albany-Montréal fur trade also created a significant wave of British colonial expansion in the Schoharie and Mohawk valleys. Movements

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42 Livingston to Wendell, June 2, 1746, box 115, Livingston Papers; April 22, 1746, in Abridgment of Indian Affairs Contained in Four Folio Volumes, ed. McIlwain, 246.
of colonists westward resulted in dislocation for Mohawk communities at Schoharie, Tiononderoge (Fort Hunter), and Canajoharie. Although cooperative social and economic relationships were formed between European and Iroquois communities, numerous land disputes occurred that threatened that coexistence. In January 1745, for example, a rumor spread through the lower Mohawk town of Tiononderoge that the people of Albany were marching up to utterly destroy them. The credence that Mohawks gave to this false report reflected their deep fears of being dispossessed by shady land deals and surreptitious deeds that stretched their small initial grants into cessions of thousands of acres. In the case of the Mohawk Flatts land controversy, the Corporation of Albany and a rival colonial claimant tried to obtain up to twelve thousand acres of land that encompassed the Mohawks’ town at Tiononderoge. Intense diplomacy with the New York colonial government followed this alarm in Mohawk Country, as leaders on both sides tried to reach an understanding. A major conference between Six Nations, New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania delegates took place at Albany in October 1745. The conference powerfully reveals the geopolitical context of Marin’s devastating raid on Saratoga only a month later. First, it was clear that the Mohawks held deep grievances against the English alliance. The Mohawk leader Hendrick Theyanoguin emphasized that “they were become the property of Albany people; They were their Dogs.” Second, the conference also set the stage for a rupture between the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs and Governor George Clinton over Indian policy, and for the emergence of an Anglo-Irish trader named William Johnson, of whom Hendrick Theyanoguin was a close ally.44

The horrendous state of New York’s relationship with the Six Nations explains why so few Iroquois responded to the colony’s appeals for warriors. That absence of Iroquois help also explains why New York colonists from political officials to ordinary farmers were struck with panic as French and Indian attacks mounted and they became despondent over the future of British America. British officials had long assumed that the French intended to encircle the thirteen colonies, to strategically prevent British expansion into the continent’s interior. In 1742, Speaker of the Assembly Adolph Philipse presented the newly appointed Governor Clinton with a bleak picture of the colony’s defenses, raising the possibility that the French might even militarily conquer and possess New York:

If through this Defect [lack of powder and defenses] the Ennemy should become possessed of the Colony, I dread to think of the Fatale Consequences it would naturally produce. How miserable would the inhabitants be? What effect might it not have on the Neighbouring Colonies? How far might it Distress the Sugar Colonies? What Disreputation would it not be to the Nation, and what expence of men and money would it not Require to Reduce & Regain the same?45

45 Adolph Philipse to Clinton, Dec. 8, 1742, p. 10, folder 7, box 1, Clinton Papers.
Shortly after Marin’s attack, Governor Clinton’s council discussed those very consequences of a French takeover. They feared that if the Six Nations turned from their historic neutrality to an exclusive French alliance, that all would be lost. The French would then “put their Grand design in Execution of setting all the Indian nations in North America upon us, and Harrasing the Frontiers of the English Colonies on all sides from Annapolis Royal to Georgia.” That design would undercut any possible British offensives against Canada, as all their military forces would be engaged in self-defense.

Wartime rumors carried those fears and doubts to enormous heights. One rumor that flew in the winter of 1745–1746 was “that a great number of Snow shoes are prepared at Messasippi by the French.” The snowshoes were supposedly intended for a French and Indian winter offensive aimed squarely at Albany and the New York frontiers. This rumor gained credence in part from British colonists’ grounded fears of attack as well as their ignorance of continental geography and of French-Native alliances: they presumed that the French could marshal Indian allies in the Mississippi Valley to make snowshoes and then coordinate an attack on Albany. But that rumor evokes the basic pessimism of British colonists who doubted whether British imperial control could ever be sustained, given the dominance of the French, their extensive fortifications, and unbreakable hold on Indian alliances. The perspectives of New York colonists—who understood that America’s future was not guaranteed to be British—show the lack of inevitability about the thirteen colonies’ triumph over New France and their westward expansion.

Saratoga illustrates many broader themes about eighteenth-century North America. The future of British America truly hung in the balance during King George’s War. The colonies of New York and New England were geographically the best poised to challenge the frontiers of New France via the Champlain or Mohawk valley corridors. Yet their efforts to launch an expedition against New France became a futile embarrassment (with the important exception of the New Englanders’ amphibious attack on Louisbourg in 1745). The French and Indian coalition maintained a strategic offensive that collapsed British settlement in the northern Hudson Valley and in western New England and magnified British colonial disunity. Saratoga remained the most important British outpost north of Albany, at a time when settlers had abandoned most of their plantations. Fort Clinton, which struggled mightily for its own existence in 1746 and 1747, was a symbol of Britain’s tenuous hold on North America’s imperial frontiers.

Saratoga’s story also illustrates an important principle about eighteenth-century warfare in North America: it was still largely dominated by Native American patterns. To the extent that the French achieved strategic dominance of North America by the 1740s, it was

46 August 25, 1746, New York Council Minutes, folder 1, box 2, ibid.
due to their successful collaboration with their broad Native American coalition, and adaptation of indigenous patterns of warfare. The attacks on Saratoga in 1745 and 1747 picture how the French and Indians—operating with smaller forces—enjoyed greater strategic mobility as they penetrated deep into British territories. By contrast, the northern British colonies struggled to build a large conventional army and siege artillery to attack Crown Point in 1746 and 1747.\(^{49}\) And in the end, such an undertaking strained the logistical capacities of the British colonies and their political unity to the breaking point. By late 1747, Fort Clinton itself was abandoned and the British expedition to Crown Point disintegrated.

Finally, the history of Fort Clinton illustrates one of the most important developments in the history of British America: the political evolution of the thirteen colonies that led, in the long term, to independence from Great Britain. By the mid-eighteenth century, the elected colonial assemblies had become the real power brokers in colonial governments, at the expense of the royal or proprietary governors and their appointed councils. In the short term, this political imbalance in colonial constitutions often rendered British military efforts an exercise in futility. The basic struggle for power between the governor and the elected assemblies was exponentially increased due to wartime strains on governments. Along with constitutional conflict, shortages of both money and resources made it increasingly difficult for the colonial governments to supply posts like Fort Clinton and pay to its garrisons. Military service in the eighteenth century was, of course, closely tied to political power. Soldiers—especially those in New England—viewed military service in a contractual manner. When colonial governments could not meet their basic obligations to feed, house, equip, and pay their soldiers, mutiny or desertion followed.\(^{50}\) Those logistical and economic deficiencies ultimately produced a mutiny in Saratoga’s garrison and prompted Governor Clinton to abandon a post that was important to the colony’s defense.

Marin’s devastating attack on Saratoga not only destroyed a settlement but exacerbated the already contentious politics within the New York colonial government. Indeed, British political paralysis was one of the brilliant, even if unintended, strategic side-effects of French-Indian offensives. The political recrimination began immediately. The assembly blamed Governor Clinton for withdrawing the small garrison from Saratoga in the fall of 1745, leaving the community virtually defenseless, and accused the king’s colonial viceroy of failing to protect His Majesty’s subjects.\(^{51}\) A few weeks prior to Marin’s raid, the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs had, in fact, recommended to the governor that an additional fort be constructed at the Carrying Place, and that the Saratoga garrison be


\(^{51}\) Assembly to Governor Clinton, Oct. 9, 1747, in *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York*, ed. O’Callaghan and Fernow, VI, 618–19.
strengthened with a small force of provincial troops and Indian scouts lest “the Enemy should destroy It.” Clinton countered that the assembly’s appropriations were “inconsiderable” and that he had taken steps to buttress Albany’s defenses by sending forward six eighteen-pounders and independent companies.

The conflict among New York’s political elites ultimately reflected their different strategic visions and the economic choices undergirding them. Governor Clinton, William Johnson, and their faction tended to see the Mohawk Valley, the Oneida Carrying Place, and Fort Oswego as the most important strategic corridor for the colony’s future. Their policies aligned with those of previous governors who were determined to shut down the Montréal-Albany trade, and to challenge French trade and alliances on the Great Lakes. They condemned as traitors the Albany merchants who dealt with their Canadian counterparts. Clinton, however, was opposed by what he called a “malicious faction headed by a man of violent passions & unforgiving principles.” That man was Chief Justice James De Lancey, who held sway in the assembly, which Clinton castigated as “a low and ignorant set of mankind.” De Lancey’s faction—especially those with mercantile interests in Albany—essentially favored the fluid relationships that had prevailed for decades along the northern borderlands. They were lukewarm in their support of a large British expedition against Crown Point and thought that security could best be obtained by a more neutral stance toward the Canadian Iroquois. They were also concerned with their physical safety on an exposed borderland, the impact of wartime taxes, and their economic wherewithal.

Governor Clinton, by all accounts, was not the most politically astute chief executive. Indeed, he viewed his governorship of New York as a professional and financial death sentence, and he yearned for release. As a Royal Navy officer, he also realized that he was missing out on the great naval theaters of action on the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. “Whilst I am fatiguing & fretting myself to [pieces] about a stubborn Dutch Assembly, who cant get to do any one thing they should either for themselves or to assist their neighbours,” he complained to a friend, his fellow Naval officers like Commodore George Anson were “making immense fortunes” through the capture of enemy vessels and treasure. Clinton even wrote “A Scheme how to get home” in late 1745. He dreamed of taking command of a Royal Navy squadron in an attack on Quebec—which would get him out of New York and might make him rich.

52 Copy of Sundry Articles which the Commissioners for Indian Aff:rs think Necessary should be done for the Security of this Country and humbly Offer to his Excellencies Consideration, Oct. 24, 1745, folder 27, box 1, Clinton Papers.

53 Clinton to the Lords of Trade, Nov. 30, 1745, in Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York, ed. O’Callaghan and Fernow, VI, 287–88.


55 George Clinton Letter, Aug. 27, 1745, folder 24, box 1, Clinton Papers; “A Scheme how to get home,” ca. 1745, folder 28, ibid.
The animosity between governor and assembly importantly carried over into questions of wartime finance. They often could not agree on basic defense expenditures as they heaped blame upon the other for the inaction and the consequences. To observers from within and without, it appeared as though the colony’s actions were suicidal. French and Indian attacks threatened the colony from the north and the west, yet the government seemed incapable of taking any meaningful defensive or offensive measures. One observer, probably from the New England colonies, wrote to a friend in New York that:

The violent Party that appears in all the Votes &c of your Assembly, seems to me extremely unseasonable as well as unjust, & to threaten Mischief not only to yourselves but to your Neighbours. It begins to be plain, that the French may reap great Advantages from your Divisions: God grant that they may be as blind to their own Interest & as negligent of it, as the English are of Theirs.  

Governor Clinton condemned the assembly’s “declining every expence that seems necessary for the security of the British Colonies in North America.” He also complained that the assembly had played favorites with supply contracts—distributing them to their cronies, while they “neglected or cut short every man that was employ’d by me & paid others which I never recommended & allow’d for.”  

His charge had legitimacy, considering that William Johnson—employed by Clinton as the colony’s primary Indian agent—was never fully reimbursed by the assembly for his many expenditures for the colony’s defense. Assemblymen would have countered, however, that Clinton had elevated Johnson at the expense of other duly appointed officials, namely the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs that had managed diplomacy on the northern borderlands for decades.  

Despite the dysfunction in New York’s Covenant Chain alliance with the Six Nations, both Clinton and Johnson aggressively pursued the military support of the Six Nations in several important conferences. They had limited success in achieving military cooperation between Iroquois warriors and British colonists during the war. Yet they knew that asking for the military aid of the Six Nations had its own difficulties—from the obligations of “gift giving” at Indian conferences to the costs of equipping Indian warriors all of which entailed battles with the assembly. Mobilized Iroquois warriors would also see British military ineptitude. And the longer the British dallied and delayed their military efforts, the more pusillanimous they appeared in the eyes of the Natives, who could see plainly that the French were the ascendant power. David Livingston expressed that sentiment in a letter to James De Lancey, which was read in the Governor’s Council in August 1746:

56 “Extract of a Letter from a Gentleman in one of the Neighbouring Colonies to his Friend in New York dated Nov.r 27, 1747,” folder 4, box 3, ibid.
57 Clinton to Assembly, April 24, 1747, folder 21, box 2, ibid.; Clinton, “Present State of the Province of New York,” 1746, folder 10, box 1, ibid.
58 O’Toole, White Savage.
That unless we go very soon upon Action & in some measure answer the expectations which the Indians have receiv’d of some vigorous attempt upon Canada we will certainly loose all the six Nations & the French thereby obtain so great an Influence over them that there is the greatest danger of their becoming our enemies.⁵⁹

Saratoga and Fort Clinton thus held immense significance for New York officials. Its purpose was detecting any threat or major French or Indian movement coming down from the French fortress Saint-Frédéric, which loomed like Gibraltar in the minds of the English. But it was more than just an outpost defending the colony from enemy threats. It was also a tangible rallying point where joint scouting parties of Iroquois warriors and New York colonial troops were sent. Mohawks and other Indian warriors were a common presence in Saratoga and its vicinity, mingling with provincial troops as they acted as scouts and as hunters. Finally, Fort Clinton was the crucial forward base of operations in 1746 and 1747 as the northern colonies tried to organize a joint expedition against Crown Point. Yet for all of those efforts to militarize the Saratoga region in the 1740s, what King George’s War ultimately revealed was the inability of the British to maintain any meaningful control over a contentious borderland that they had claimed. French military domination of the British redounded to the benefit of Native Americans in the area, as the long borderland between Canada and New York primarily remained an Indian realm.

In September 1746 Governor Clinton and his council discussed the colony’s overall defenses as well as preparations for the Crown Point Expedition. The council agreed that “the present Fort at Saraghtoga, by reason of its Scituation and otherwise, is not Tenable, nor large enough to contain a sufficient Number of Men.” Instead, the council recommended that “a Fort be Built on the most proper Scituation at or near the Great Carrying Place above Saraghtoga, and Capable of containing at least five hundred Men, and that a Communication between this Fort and Albany be secured by small Forts or block Houses, to be placed at such distances, as shall be thought necessary for that purpose.”⁶⁰ Had the expedition gone forward, Saratoga would have become an important part of the logistical lifeline stretching from Albany to the Carrying Place (modern Fort Edward, New York)—a role that it eventually assumed during the Seven Years’ War.

The 1746 expedition to Canada impressively brought together an intercolonial army composed of troops from Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia.⁶¹ A fervent British patriotism and desire to advance the British empire’s interests had motivated many of these British Americans to military service. There was also a strong sense of rivalry with the New England colonies, which had gained a reputation as the most martial of the thirteen, one that was cemented by the New

⁵⁹ August 25, 1746 council minute, folder 1, box 2, Clinton Papers.
⁶⁰ September 16, 1746 council minute, ibid.
⁶¹ Paltsits, *Scheme for the Conquest of Canada in 1746*; Buffinton, “Canada Expedition of 1746.”
Englanders’ conquest of the French fortress of Louisbourg on Île Royale in 1745. There was pressure on both New York and Governor Clinton (as the Duke of Newcastle’s protégé) to achieve a similar victory against Crown Point.62

As “Colonel of the Six Nations,” William Johnson had achieved limited success in his requests for military support from the Iroquois. He had burst onto the scene in August 1746 in New York, dressed as a Mohawk warrior and leading a party of Iroquois warriors. From that moment on, Clinton directed his political ally Johnson to “send out as many Indians & Christians as he can, some to Sarahtoga to scout abt there.” In March 1747, for example, Clinton had personally loaned his surrogate approximately £430 New York currency (worth nearly $100,000 in today’s currency) to recruit and equip “Regiment of Christians & Indians” as scouts.63

Saratoga was often the destination of these joint scouting parties of Iroquois and New York colonists. Yet there is little evidence of their overall effectiveness. Certainly, the few scouts who operated to the north of Albany did not stave off any major French or Native attacks. At best, they provided useful intelligence and security, as when they “went to Saratogue for 3 days to guard the Command and ye Waggons” in June 1746.64 At worst, Iroquois scouts might pick up the worst habits of colonial troops, such as their propensity to demand higher wages for more dangerous service, and to expect gifts and provisions from fort commanders that strained the garrison’s supplies.65

One of the most fascinating glimpses of intercultural exchange at Saratoga comes from the Minute Book of the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, now preserved at the Albany Institute of History and Art. In early 1746, the commissioners reported that “there are generally about forty Indians at Saratogue,” comprising mainly Mohawks and Mahicans (known as “River Indians”). The Mohawks expressed an unwillingness to fight against fellow Mohawks settled in Canada, which raised questions in the colonists’ minds about their fidelity. Nonetheless, in February 1746 there was a “Plank house built upon posts set in the Ground to be built in the middle of the fort for the Indians to lodge in.” This establishes that these British-allied Indians were quartered inside of Fort Clinton. The soldiers and warriors undoubtedly interacted with each other daily as they worked, scouted, and lived in the fort’s vicinity. They shared a similar sense of military service, for both

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63 George Clinton, memoranda, March 1747, folder 17, box 1, Clinton Papers; William Johnson Receipt, March 1, 1747, folder 17, box 2, ibid.; Preston, Texture of Contact, 96. For currency approximations, see Eric Nye, “Pounds Sterling to Dollars: Historical Conversion of Currency, http://www.uwyo.edu/numimage/currency.htm.
64 On the actions of a ranger captain who scouted near Half Moon, Canastigione, Saratoga, and the Hudson River, see Memorandum on the Services of Rangers, July 1746, folder 37, box 1, Clinton Papers. But no significant encounters with the enemy were recorded in the nearly two months recorded in the memorandum, except for a single Indian who was scalped.
65 For the letter from Lieut. George Ingoldsby on the “ill Condition of the Fort there and the want of many Necessarys for the Garrison also the Expence he is at in Treating the Indians for which there is no Allowance,” see July 8, 1746, New York Colonial Manuscripts, vol. XXI, f. 123, A1894.
colonial troops and Indian warriors demanded higher wages for their dangerous and arduous tasks as rangers or scouts. Mohawks in 1746 took a page from colonial troops who demanded no less than “three shillings a day and provisions” for their service as rangers. Or, was it the other way around? Upon their return to their villages, the Mohawk warriors protested to the Albany commissioners. They had responded faithfully following Marin’s 1745 raid and journeyed to Saratoga and served for many weeks there. Yet, “the Warriours observed that before the Destruction of that place their Usual Wages was three Shillings a Day But as the Danger was now encreased they thought their Wages ought to be encreased in proportion.” In general, the warriors returned from Saratoga “very discontented and complained that they were very Indifferently rewarded that their Wages were very small and Goods they were paid in very Dear.”

In the end, Clinton and Johnson had little to show for their strenuous efforts to gain the alliance and military support of the Six Nations, except for their own financial and political losses and disappointment among the Mohawks most likely to render support. According to historian Stanley Katz, “Clinton secured New York’s participation in the war against France only at the cost of such severe financial concessions” that surrendered some of the governor’s prerogatives. He further relied upon bills of credit that he hoped the British government would back him for, and expenditures from his own fortune.

Financial and logistical challenges had doomed the proposed Crown Point expedition—which was postponed until 1747 and then cancelled entirely. Like other ventures in previous Anglo-French wars, the expedition was doomed by a combination of British logistical, diplomatic, and political liabilities. Clinton could move neither his own government, nor the Six Nations, nor the army assembled at Albany to cooperate. Ultimately, Clinton blamed the assembly and his arch-rival James De Lancy, who “strongly opposed me in all the measures I took in his [Majesty’s] service in the late expedition against Canada for the sake of an abominable neutrality the people of this Province preserve with the Six Nations of Indians & the French in Canada.” Even Governor Clinton objected when some suggested a foolhardy offensive in the winter of 1746–1747. He cited the weather, a lack of clothing, supplies, and Indian allies, and the need to construct a chain of blockhouses between Saratoga and the Carrying Place as reasons to abort the mission.

While the 1746 expedition failed to emerge, the fate of Fort Clinton was still to be determined. With great suffering, the New York government maintained and garrisoned the fort from March 1746 to October 1747. The first troops there were New York provincials, commanded at first by Capt. Nicholas Schuyler, Capt. Jacob Ten Eyck, and then Capt.

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66 Minute Book of the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Feb. 18, March 22, 1746, MS 97a: Proceedings of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 1746; For the troops’ pay, see “Abstract of the Evidence in the Books of the Lords of Trade relating to New-York,” in Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York, ed. O’Callaghan and Fernow, VI, 660.

67 Katz, Newcastle’s New York, 184.

Henry Livingston. Pennsylvania and New Jersey provincials were later garrisoned there from June to October 1747 under the command of Col. Peter Schuyler. Their troop strength ranged from a few dozen to a few hundred at times.\footnote{Brandow, \textit{The Story of Old Saratoga} (Albany, NY: Fort Orange Press, 1919), chap. 7. Stevenson Letter, Feb. 6, 1746, MS 586.}

French and Indian attacks on surrounding settlements and on Fort Clinton itself constituted the principal threat to the garrison. But even keeping Fort Clinton adequately manned and supplied was extremely problematic, let alone building and maintaining a chain of blockhouses. Logistics is an underappreciated aspect of eighteenth-century warfare, but one of the most important. The New York colonial government was economically strained during King George’s War, having to contribute public funds to the Louisbourg Expedition in 1745, the proposed Crown Point Expedition in 1746, diplomatic conferences with the Six Nations, as well as more routine expenditures like soldiers’ pay, equipment, provisions, and fortifications. In addition, the Mohawks demanded that the New York government construct defensive fortifications in Mohawk Country as a condition of their military participation. The wartime demands on New York’s economy only inflamed the existing political divide between governor and assembly, creating shortages of both money and inflated prices on goods. As Clinton charged, “the building of forts at the Carrying Place, are so apparently necessary for the defence of this and the neighbouring Colonies, that the Assembly can not avoid confessing it, they only endeavour to excuse themselves by the great expence, that maintaining Garrisons in them for all times to come must occasion.”\footnote{Clinton to Assembly, \textit{Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York}, ed. O’Callaghan and Fernow, VI, 367–68.}

Construction of new forts, let alone supplying existing ones like Fort Clinton, was difficult due to a regional shortage of lumber following the November 1745 raid on Saratoga. In the decade prior to the attack, Philip Schuyler’s prosperous plantation and sawmill at Saratoga had apparently cornered the market on lumber. In 1747, Cadwallader Colden asked Governor Clinton to support two colonists’ requests for land grants below Albany, adding as justification that they intended to establish a sawmill—“boards being scarce since Saratoga was deserted & it has been dangerous to go into the woods any where above Albany” [to harvest lumber].\footnote{Cadwallader Colden to Clinton, Dec.r 20, 1747, folder 5, box 3, Clinton Papers.} From all accounts, the condition of Fort Clinton was extremely poor, despite efforts to make improvements to the post.

Documentation in George Clinton’s papers attests to the incredible financial and logistical efforts to maintain Fort Clinton. The cost of the fort’s construction in the winter of 1746 alone, as the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs admitted, “will far exceed the Sum allowed by the Assembly for that purpose.”\footnote{Minute Book of the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Jan. 29, 1746, MS 97a: Proceedings of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 1746.} A sampling of the various accounts not only reveals details about life at the garrison, but also how small expenses amassed over
time. From December 1746 to March 1747, 1,089 loads of firewood were delivered to Fort Clinton, at a total charge of £163, 7s—and that was only four months.\textsuperscript{73} Carpenters under Jacob Long (of Langdon’s Company) did work at Fort Clinton in November 1746 and February 1747, ranging from “Building Block Houses,” “Flouring the Guard House,” and “building Barracks for Cap:’ Trent’s detachment” of Pennsylvania troops.\textsuperscript{74} There were costs associated with the arduous work of transporting supplies all across the frontiers of New York—reflected in the £1,583 paid to wagoners, batteauxmen, and sledmen in 1747.\textsuperscript{75} Col. John Roberts received £81, 15s, 7d for various expenses at Saratoga, from the “money paid the new Levies that were employed as Carpenters, Masons, & Labourers in Building & enlarging Fort Clinton at Saraghtoga in October 1746.” Armorer William Page was paid £5 for “mending & keeping the Arms in Order, all the time that the New Levies were Garrisoned at Fort Clinton.” John Welch, a cooper, was paid £4 for his barrel-making skill at Saratoga.\textsuperscript{76} There was also the amount and cost of food for 370 men, delivered to Saratoga by Henry Holland, and received by Colonel Schuyler in the summer and fall of 1747: 13,075 pounds of beef; 10,360 pounds of pork; 7,030 pounds of bread; 751.5 gallons of rum; 138 pounds of candles; and 3 barrels of vinegar.\textsuperscript{77} Those and other supplies amounted to the sum of £648, 4s, 5d, for a three-month period.\textsuperscript{78}

With these expenses in view, Governor Clinton claimed that Fort Clinton “occasioned a heavy Expence to the Crown, in the Reliefs that became too frequently necessary.” In addition, “nothing has caused so much Dissatisfaction among the Soldiers, as their being sent to that Garrison; and more lives have been lost by its disadvantageous Situation, than by any other Cause since the Commencement of the War.”\textsuperscript{79} As the accounts make clear, life in Fort Clinton’s garrison entailed heavy labor and a pestilential environment that produced sickness among the soldiers. Smallpox was present during the war, both in Iroquois country as well as Albany and Saratoga. The danger, disease, and drudgery associated with Saratoga made it difficult to maintain an effective garrison. Even getting soldiers to escort provisions from Albany to Saratoga was an ordeal. The escort parties feared that they would end up be stationed at Fort Clinton. When one party marched northward, escorting supplies for Saratoga, many deserted. Colonel Roberts suggested that it had been

\textsuperscript{73} “Capt Livingston demand for furnishing Firewood &c at Saraghtoga, February 1748,” folder 39, box 5, Clinton Papers.
\textsuperscript{74} Henry Livingston, “An Acco: of Carpenters Work done by Jacob Long at Fort Clinton since Col:’ Roberts deliver’d in his Account to his Excellency.” May 21, 1747, folder 39, \textit{ibid}.
\textsuperscript{75} “Account of Wagoners, batto & sledd Men,” 1747, folder 37, box 5, \textit{ibid}.
\textsuperscript{76} “Lieut. Col:’ Roberts Acct for Sundries Paid to Workmen & Expresses &c: on Account of the Expedition,” April 1, 1748, folder 40, \textit{ibid}.
\textsuperscript{77} “A Certificate of Provisions deliver’d by order of His Excellency the Honbl George Clinton &c&c&c to the Levys raisd in the Province of New Jersey and Posted in Fort Clinton under the Command of Col. Peter Schuyler, Oct. 15, 1747, folder 39, \textit{ibid}.
\textsuperscript{78} “Provisions Sent to Fort Clinton for the Jersey Levies, 1747, folder 36, \textit{ibid}.
“industriously reported” to the soldiers by people in Albany that they would not return and would actually be stationed at Saratoga. Colonel Roberts condemned the “many malicious reports” spread by citizens of Albany to distress the new levies. In March 1746, the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs warned Governor Clinton, “It is impossible for Inhabitants of this City and County to furnish Men to Garrison the Frontiers. We are really not able to hold out Continual Watching much less to supply Men for out Garrisons.”

In short, it was a small miracle that supplies arrived at Saratoga. By mid-1747, French activity around Saratoga was unabated. Indeed, Colonel Schuyler informed William Johnson that the French “are Constantly Seen in the Woods Round the Garrison,” and that they designed to “Intercept All parties Coming from Albany.” French and Indian warriors harassed Fort Clinton but interdicted its supply and communication to Albany with great frequency. The fate of one British party in a battoe was typical. In 1747, two soldiers had journeyed upriver and were waylaid by a French and Indian party of unknown strength. The garrison heard shots fired, and watched the battoe float back to the fort, only to find one soldier missing and the other “Shot through the body, a hatchet Drove in his back & Scalped.” Such incidents only added to the demoralization and anomie of the garrison.

In April 1747, Lieut. Frédéric-Louis Herbin, an officer in the troupes de la marine, led a party that took three British captives near Saratoga. He gained intelligence that confirmed the truthfulness of the British accounts. One of the prisoners reported that “there are not above 300 men in that fort, but many are sick; that the garrison is greatly dissatisfied, not having been paid, and being almost entirely out of provisions.” Lieutenant Herbin also captured documents from a British officer killed near Saratoga—and the French renditions of these letters accurately reflect the now-lost correspondence of Captain Henry Livingston. Herbin’s attack apparently concerned Captain William Trent—a company commander of Pennslyvania levies—and a party of forty men who had

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80 Colonel Roberts to Clinton, Sept. 18, 1747, Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York, ed. O’Callaghan and Fernow, VI, 397; Speech of His Excellency William Shirley to the General Assembly of Massachusetts, December 30, 1746 (Saratoga National Historical Park Research Files); Alexander Colhoun to Clinton, March 16, 1747, folder 1, box 2, Clinton Papers; “List of medicines for the immediate use of the two Battalions of the Regiment under His Majesty’s command the four Independent Companys exclusive, March ye 22 1746/7,” ibid. Hinderaker, Two Hendricks, 181.
81 Minute Book of the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs, March 22, 1746, MS 97a: Proceedings of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 1746.
82 Commanding Officer at Saratoga to Johnson, June 20, 1747, in Papers of Sir William Johnson, ed. James Sullivan et al., I, 101–2.
83 Peter Schuyler to John Roberts, Aug. 8, 1747, folder 27, box 2, Clinton Papers.
escorted provisions to Saratoga. Nine of his men were killed, nine were wounded, and six were captured, along with some of Trent’s letters and baggage.85

Captain Livingston’s letters expressed despair over the state of his garrison and the stalled expedition to Canada. They reported that “all his soldiers are ill; that the garrison is in a miserable condition; that about 100 men only are fit for duty; that he is in want of every succor.”

Livingston lamented that “we were killed in this expedition against Canada ‘twould have been an honor for us.” Livingston was sarcastic about the expedition in his letter to Captain Trent, saying that “the old story is always afloat”—perhaps meaning that everyone talked about the expedition, but it would never get underway. He also “pities the man who is to come to relieve him”—and that man was Colonel Peter Schuyler of the New Jersey provincials.86

The final twin blows to all British military efforts in 1747 came with a humiliating mutiny of New Jersey troops at Saratoga and the Duke of Newcastle’s decision to call off the expedition to Canada.87 By then, that intercolonial enterprise had become the object of derision among Clinton’s opponents like Philip Livingston, who termed it that “Infamous Scandalous Expedition.”88 Meanwhile, a “mutinous disposition” had settled among the provincial troops still encamped around Albany and at Saratoga.89 They suffered from camp diseases, were underpaid, and demanded relief—or else. In April 1747, elements of the Saratoga garrison mutinied over their lack of pay and poor conditions (though documents do not indicate what the mutiny entailed).90 As usual, the governor and assembly were at loggerheads, so that New York government would not pay troops from another colony. Colonel Schuyler took action by paying his troops from his own pocket. He was later extolled for this act by none other than Benjamin Franklin, as an example of British Americans’ patriotism and devotion to the King’s service. But Governor Clinton was irate. He had drawn on bills of credit to pay provincial soldiers 40 shillings—less than what they

85 “Journal of Occurrences in Canada,” in Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, ed. O’Callaghan and Fernow, X, 95–96; Slick, William Trent and the West, 4–6. William Trent later became an important Pennsylvania trader, and one of the most important players in the origins of the French and Indian War in the Ohio Valley in the early 1750s. The first British fortification at the Forks of the Ohio River in 1754 was named “Trent’s Fort.”
87 Shirley to Clinton, Aug. 15, 1747, Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, ed. O’Callaghan and Fernow, VI, 384. Apparently, William Shirley was the first to receive the Duke of Newcastle’s packet, and then passed along the information to George Clinton.
88 Bonomi, Factious People, 156.
89 Roberts to Clinton, June 4, 1747, folder 26, box 2, Clinton Papers.
were due but hopefully enough to placate them. Seeing the New Jersey troops receiving full pay, however, made the other provincial troops became discontented and they refused “to receive less than their whole pay.”

While Schuyler’s patriotism and generosity assuaged the men for a short time, the temper of the New Jersey troops had again reached a boiling point in the summer. Colonel Schuyler reported in August 1747 that “our men are Daly taken with the bloody flux several of them are Very Ill.” Given the activity of French and Indian parties, he expressed concern about his messages getting through, and asked Colonel Roberts to “Let me know the [Receipt] of it by some Indians you can confide in, that I may not hazard more of the men they not being acquainted with the woods.” Finally, in September 1747, some of the New Jersey provincials deserted Saratoga: “they went off Fifty in a Body with the utmost insolence in sight of their officers that were there,” according to Colonel Roberts. Despite the shipment of literally tens of thousands of pounds of beef, pork, and bread in the previous months, Colonel Roberts alleged that “the Jersey Forces deserted Saraghtoga for want of Provisions.”

On August 8, Schuyler had reported “we have but meat for 10 days now in store.” Apparently, the meat ran out by early September and no shipments of provisions were sent.

The damage was done. The desertion of New Jersey troops precipitated Governor Clinton’s decision regarding the future of Saratoga, in which he announced to the assembly that it “is Conceived to be of the greatest importance to his Majesty’s Service, and the Intrest and welfare of this Province, to support and maintain Fort Clinton at Saraghtoga.” Yet with the collapse of the Crown Point Expedition and rumors of a peace between France and Britain, he increasingly entertained the possibility of abandoning Saratoga and Fort Clinton altogether. In addition, Colonel Roberts claimed that there were not enough able-bodied men left in the Albany encampment to send northward for relief, which seemed to seal the governor’s decision to withdraw the garrison and its valuable complement of artillery.

In April 1747, Clinton wrote to the New York Assembly what, in essence, became Fort Clinton’s epitaph:

...by all the Informations which I had of that place, it is the most disadvanta-geously scituated than any thing of the kind can be, as it cannot serve for any of the purposes which I had in view by the fortified Camp at the Carrying Place &

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92 Peter Schuyler to Roberts, Aug. 8, 1747, folder 27, box 2, Clinton Papers.


94 Peter Schuyler to Roberts, Aug. 8, 1747, folder 27, box 2, Clinton Papers.

95 Roberts to Clinton, Sept. 29, 1747, folder 35, _ibid._ “By the returns enclosed your Excellency will see we have not more men well in the whole than would be requisite to garrison Fort Clinton, had I sent a relief, and therefore did not, at this time, judging your Excellency would not have this city left destitute of defence.”
is so over looked by hills cover’d by woods that the Ennemy’s sculking parties can discover every motion in the Fort. By the lowness of the ground & watery swamps round it it has allwise been unhealthy & has brought on a continued sickness in every garrison that has been placed in it. The event has on too many occasions proved the truth of these things.  

The governor’s evaluation underscored the fort’s poor defensive situation, the problems that the damp lowland environment had created for the garrisons, and the economic costs of maintaining the post. Yet whether those challenges required the abandonment of the fort and its environs to enemy control was precisely the subject of debate among British officials. Divisions among the colonists continued to fester. A group of Connecticut gentlemen shared their view of the Albany Dutch as having contrived with the French to stymie British efforts during the war:

We Fear The Dutch aim at a Base Neutrality Why Else have They demolish d Saratoga Frustrated The plan laid Against Crown Point neglecting To Send Their Comisssrs & Using all means to retard & put a stop To any Undertakings against The French and Carrying on The pernicious practice of Sending Their Flaggs of Truce Laden with Flour &c & Corresponding with Them by Land as we Apprehend and If They designed Honestly we Can t but Think They would have Guarded Their Own Frontiers with forces of Their own Levying with out Asking Your Honour’s Aid & Assistance by Sending Companies from us for That service Indeed They Seem unwilling To push any Thing against Canada and Crown Point and Should they Carry Their point To gain a Treacherous & Injurious Neutrality with The French This Colony & The Province of The Massachusetts must bear The whole force of our Northern Enemies who will There have a place of Retreat & Comfort when They have been Imbruing Their Hands in The Blood of our people.

Everyone celebrated the return of British prisoners during a truce in August 1747—or at least as many as could be found or redeemed. Newspapers published the names of captives who returned to Boston, including many of the 1745 Saratoga captives; from those lists we know of some of the survivors’ fates. Only a month before the truce, eighteen-year-old Maria Quackenbush escaped her captors. She had been living among the Abenakis of St François or Bécancour for nearly two years after she had been captured in 1745 at Saratoga. In July 1747, however, she “made her Escape from ye Indians in whose hands she have been these 20 months.” She absconded with a canoe, rowing across the mighty St Lawrence River over to the city of Trois-Rivières. There, she found refuge with a gentleman of the city, who gave her new clothes and brought her to visit her surviving family at Quebec.

96 Clinton to the Assembly, April 24, 1747, folder 21, ibid.
Jacob and Geertruy Vanderwerken Quackenbush had already grieved the death of their daughter Martha. They faced an additional trial in the alienation of their youngest daughter Machtel (Rachel), who had been living with a genteel French family in Quebec. Machtel was brought to the Quebec prison by the French family to visit her family in March 1747. She “would not Speak a word Neither In Dutch nor English,” despite the entreaties of her parents and grandparents (Gerrit Roelofs and Maritie Vanderwerken) and her French family. Pote’s account speaks of Machtel living with a “Gentlewoman In this town” and of how her surrogate mother had replaced her natural mother as a result of the trauma Machtel had suffered. Geertruy and other English officers sought to redeem Machtel, but they could not persuade the French to do. Pote added that the “Child was So taken up ye french yt She would not Come nigh her mother but Seemed as much afraid of her as though She had been and Indian.”

Geertruy’s grief only increased when on May 26, 1747, her husband Jacob and son Isaac both died. She returned to Boston, broken, in August 1747 (newspaper accounts anglicized her name, pronounced in Dutch like “herr-too-ee,” as Hartwright or Heiter). Machtel abjured her Protestant faith and remained in New France presumably for the remainder of her days—a path taken earlier (and more famously) by Eunice Williams, one of the captives from Deerfield, Massachusetts, in 1704. Geertruy had lost her entire family, save her parents and her daughter Maria, as a result of November 17, 1745. She was not alone, as we have seen. Anna Barber Clute Fort returned without her husband Abraham, but with her three sons. One woman (name unknown) told Captain Pote that her husband was killed at Saratoga, and that her six children were all in the hands of Indians. Pote remarked, “I believe [she] will Content her Self to Live hear all ye Days,” in her efforts to locate her children. They were also casualties of November 17, 1745. Some captives, like Killian De Ridder, returned to their old homes at Saratoga. But others chose to never risk the dangers of frontier life again. Jacobus Fort, who witnessed his father Abraham’s illness and death at Quebec during their captivity, resettled at Kingston, New York, following the war. He married Marretje Osterhout on February 17, 1749. His brother and repatriated captive, Fredericus Fort, also married at the Dutch Reformed Church in Kingston, to Debora Ostrander on November 4, 1750. These Anglo-Dutch families at least had the liberty to return to New York and restore their...

99 Ibid., 113–14, 149, 151–52.
100 On Rachel’s abjuration, see Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, ed. O’Callaghan and Fernow, X, 214. Mary (Maria) Quackenbush repatriated in August 1747 to Boston. See New-York Weekly Journal, Aug. 31, 1747, p. 3. Pote, Journal of Captain William Pote, Jr., 151–52. New-York Gazette, Aug. 31, 1747, p. 4; and Boston Post-Boy, Aug. 24, 1747, p. 2. Both papers list a “Hartwright” or “Heither” Quackenbush. I argue, in Table 2.1 above, that this is an anglicized hearing and spelling of the Dutch “Geertruy.” For Eunice Williams’s comparable story, see Demos, Unredeemed Captive.

101 Roswell Randall Hoes, ed. and transcr., Baptismal and Marriage Registers of the Old Dutch Church of Kingston, Ulster County, New York: (formerly named Wiltwyck, and often familiarly called Esopus or ’Sopus), for One Hundred and Fifty Years from Their Commencement in 1660 (New York: De Vinne Press, 1891), 598 (#1124), 602 (#1175).
families. There is no evidence that any African slaves taken at Saratoga were ever returned by the French to their original owners: they remained permanently enslaved in Canada.

The advent of peace talks between Britain and France, and the end of the War of Austrian Succession with the 1748 Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, only intensified the political conflict between Governor Clinton and the assembly. Both parties wanted to present their side in the best possible light in the eyes of British officials in London. And they minced no words. Clinton wrote lengthy missives to his superiors in Britain that condemned the assembly for its unpatriotic conduct during the war. He was continually dismayed that he his efforts on behalf of his king were “under such difficultyes and obstructions as no Governour ever underwent from a most malicious opposition.”

For governors like Clinton and Shirley, the root problem was systemic: the very political constitution of British America, with its powerful assemblies that had gained ascendancy over the governors and their royal prerogatives. The assembly, however, condemned Governor Clinton as the obstructionist, and for his “contempt” for the people of New York and the assembly. They charged that the governor “returned no answer” to the assembly's repeated offers to provision any New York troops who would be sent northward to relieve the New Jersey garrison at Saratoga, “lest your Excellency should withdraw that Garrison a second Time”—hearkening back to their charge that Clinton was partly to blame for the destruction of Saratoga in 1745.

Such chronic and systemic political disunity in New York and the thirteen colonies became the object of imperial reform in the years between 1748 and 1754. And the same political dynamics would again become manifest in the Seven Years’ War.

While the outcome of the War of Austrian Succession is generally seen as a return to status quo ante bellum, there can be little doubt that the French had largely won the war in America. New France’s domination of British North America was nearing its zenith, and Britain’s alliances with Indian nations were rapidly waning. By 1753, the leading Mohawk sachem, Hendrick, shockingly announced that the Covenant Chain between New York and the Six Nations was dissolved. In the following year, as the clouds of another imperial war gathered in the Ohio Valley, Hendrick excoriated his British allies in the 1754 Albany conference. His speech was intended to demonstrate just how far British fortunes had fallen since the end of King George’s War. And he used the ordeal of Saratoga and the failed Crown Point Expedition as his prime examples as he spoke to assembled colonial delegates from New England, New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland:

Tis your fault Brethren that we are not strengthened by conquest, for we would have gone and taken Crown Point, but you hindered us; we had concluded to go and take it, but we were told it was too late, and that the Ice would not bear us; instead of this, you burnt your own Forts at Seraghtoga and run away from it, which was a shame & a scandal to you. Look about your Country & see, you

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103 Assembly to Governor Clinton, Oct. 9, 1747, ibid., 618–19, 628.
have no Fortifications about you, no, not even to this City, tis but one Step from Canada hither, and the French may easily come and turn you out of your doors.

Hendrick admonished the colonial officials present to “look at the French, they are Men, they are fortifying everywhere—but, we are ashamed to say it, you are all like women bare and open without any fortifications.” Even as Hendrick spoke those words on July 2, 1754, French, Indian, and British forces were colliding in the Ohio Valley, sparking the fires of the next imperial war. In May and July 1754, the young Col. George Washington engaged Ens. Joseph Coulon de Villiers de Jumonville’s French force, followed in quick succession by the Battle of Fort Necessity where he confronted a larger French and Indian force led by Captain Louis Coulon de Villiers. They were but two of the French Canadian officers who carried forward into the next war their veteran experiences gained on the Saratoga frontiers in the 1740s.

In 1749, however, the Saratoga region was still recovering from the devastation inflicted by King George’s War. A Swedish botanist, Peter Kalm, traveled through the Hudson and Champlain valleys that year, providing a visceral portrait of the Saratoga landscape that still bore the scars of war. It was a desolate landscape of charred cabins, burned sawmills, and decayed wealth. “Ordinarly,” Kalm recorded in his journal, “it is possible to drive from Saratoga to Albany in one day, but because so many of the bridges had fallen into decay on account of the war, we were of necessity greatly delayed on the road.” That “wretched road” was indeed one of the principal reasons why British expeditions had never been successful in advancing up the Champlain Valley to attack Montréal. Kalm was struck by how thoroughly Saratoga was ethnically Dutch: “whole region about the Hudson River above Albany is inhabited by the Dutch: this is true of Saratoga as well as other places.” Ordinary settlers who returned to the area lived in great poverty, as Kalm passed settlers who “lived in huts of boards, the houses having been destroyed during the war.” During his visits to Saratoga, he viewed the “place where Fort Saratoga had formerly been located,” including some of the remains of the palisade “still in the ground.” Local inhabitants shared the grim tale of how “in the last war the French through an artful trick had taken a couple of hundred Englishmen prisoners right in view of the garrison.” Further north, Kalm encountered the moldering ruins of Lydius’s fort, “all overgrown with a thicket.” It had been five years since the Marin’s expedition had destroyed the old Dutchman’s fortified home. Lydius had reoccupied it by 1749 and aimed to rebuild, as Kalm reported that he “intends to have it done next winter.” Kalm’s powers of observation were acute, both in botany and history. Despite his brief affiliation with Saratoga, he quickly discerned that the reason why the English, or rather the Dutch who live in Albany, build and live here [Saratoga] is because of the trade with the natives. The English as well as the French also settle here. The natives bring their fur products to this place and in return receive

104 Ibid., 6, 870.
almost all the wares from the English at a better price than from the French, . . .”105 As Saratoga’s residents went about resettling and rebuilding at war’s end, old patterns and customs were once again resumed. While some contemporaries rightly suspected that the 1748 peace was merely a cease-fire, no one anticipated that this next war would utterly transform the world as well as North America—including Saratoga.

105 Adolph B. Benson, ed., Peter Kalm’s Travels in North America: The English Version of 1770 (2 vols.; New York: Dover Publications, 1966), 604 (ordinarily); 600 (wretched road); 602 (Dutch); 357 (huts); 603 and 358 (Fort Clinton); 603 (trick), 360 and 600 (Lydius), 598 and 600 (smuggling).
CHAPTER THREE

A BORDERLAND CONQUERED:
SARATOGA DURING THE
FRENCH & INDIAN WAR, 1754–1763

Saratogaw, sur la même riviere, est un asses bon poste à 16 Miles de la; on y a
construit un petit fort avec des casernes, pour 100 hommes c’est un magazine assez
considerable; les environs sont agreeables; le pays est ouvert, il etoit habité il y a
quelques années, mais les habitants furent obligés de l’abandonner pendant la
derniere guerre ainsi que Schorticoke.¹

— COLONEL COMMANDANT JAMES PREVOST
60TH (OR ROYAL AMERICAN) REGIMENT OF FOOT, 1758

In the summer of 1756, Lieut. William Hervey, a British officer in the 44th Regiment
of Foot, set out from Albany for Saratoga.² Born in 1732, Hervey arrived in America in 1755
and after gaining a commission in the 44th Regiment of Foot served throughout the war in
America until 1763. He later became a Member of Parliament for Bury St. Edmunds and
rose to the rank of general. This young army officer was one of around twenty thousand
British regulars who were sent to America during the French and Indian War, or the Seven
Years’ War, as it became known on its global dimensions. What Lieutenant Hervey wit-
nessed on his journey to Saratoga was the unprecedented and massive scale of this latest
contagion of war in North America. Indeed, the French and Indian War is distinct from any
previous Anglo-French conflict in its incredible proportion. No previous war had drawn so
many thousands of French, British, and Native combatants into the cauldron of war; nor
had North America ever seen such a vast mobilization of labor and resources.

¹ “Saratogaw, on the same river, is a pretty good post at 16 Miles from [Stillwater]; a small fort with barracks for
100 men has been constructed there, it is a sizable enough magazine; the surroundings are pleasant; the country-
side is open, it was inhabited some years ago, but the inhabitants were obliged to abandon it during the last war
as well as Schaghticoke” (author translation). [Col. James Prevost], “Description militaire des pays entre Albany,
Montréal et Quebec, 1760,” in Military Affairs in North America, 1748–1765: Selected Documents from the
Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle, ed. Stanley Pargellis (New York: Archeon Books, 1969), 446. This
document was apparently written by Col. James Prevost and included in a letter to the Duke of Cumberland dated
July 6, 1758, as the Ticonderoga Expedition was underway.

² Hervey’s portrait and a brief biographical sketch can be found at “General, The Hon. William Hervey (1732–
1815),” accessed May 9, 2018, National Trust Collections, http://www.nationaltrustcollections.org.uk/ob-
ject/851784.
During his journey overland from Albany on an “intolerably bad” road, Lieutenant Hervey passed by the Cohoes Falls, praising its “very fine romantick view,” and passed by a string of fortifications at Half Moon and Stillwater, all garrisoned by provincial troops. At the placid waters near that latter garrison, Hervey set out on the Hudson River in a craft he described as a “gondola going thither [to Saratoga] with provisions.” Such bateaux brought the lifeblood of supplies to the British Army in North America, and waterways like the Hudson were becoming its arteries. Hervey described his bateaux as a flat-bottomed, shallow-draft vessel approximately thirty feet long and nine at the beam, with an impressive carrying capacity of sixty or seventy barrels of provisions.\(^3\)

As Hervey neared Saratoga, he approvingly noted “fine soil” on the broad plains on the Hudson’s east and west sides. Vestiges of the last war were still plainly visible to him, such as “fine wild horses, which have been bred from some who were left in the woods when the plantations were deserted the last war.” As he came into sight of the new fort, named Fort Hardy, he could also see the remains of old Fort Clinton “destroyed last war.” After a difficult final passage through shallow water and riffs, requiring the bateauxmen to use poles and oars to get through the water, Lieutenant Hervey finally arrived at Fort Hardy, where a force of provincials and Indians were once again manning the fort. In 1756 a battalion-sized element of provincial troops garrisoned the fort, along with an “Indian Company” led by a Stockbridge Mohican named Captain Jacobs. In this latest Anglo-French war, Saratoga’s position had radically changed from the dismal situation it had occupied in the early eighteenth century. Along his journey from Albany to Saratoga and on to forts Edward and William Henry, Lieutenant Hervey had witnessed fundamental transformations taking place in American warfare.\(^4\)

Saratoga during the Seven Years’ War perfectly summarizes those transformations and themes, making its history central to the larger conflict’s history. It is not the case, as John Brandow asserted, that “Saratoga figured so little in the war of 1754–‘60.”\(^5\) First, the British constructed an expansive logistical foundation with monumental labor—including military roads, bridges, bateaux, and fortifications—that allowed the British to project military power in ways that had been literally impossible in previous wars. During the 1750s, Saratoga as a borderlands was irrevocably changed as a result of new British priorities, investment, and support. Saratoga became a militarized borderland, as the British made it a logistical base that would enable their armies to advance deep into the continent’s interior (and to sustain a permanent presence on those borderlands). The closest targets in range of British forces were initially the daunting French forts at Ticonderoga and Crown Point. But the ultimate objective was one that all previous British expeditions had failed to attain: the city of Montréal in the heart of New France. Those previous British expeditions,


\(^4\) Ibid.

as we have seen, had failed from a fatal combination of British political and logistical weaknesses and the military superiority of the French and Native allies. Above all, extremely poor British logistics would have proven fatal to any British enterprise, even if it possessed the necessary political and military foundation for victory.

Second, one of Saratoga’s key functions was as an encampment and staging area for diverse units of British regulars, American provincials, and Native American allies. Saratoga, in fact, was arguably one of the most important logistical and staging areas anywhere in the northern colonies. It was further distinguished during the war by the presence of numerous characters of great significance in the larger French and Indian War: Lord Loudoun, Sir Jeffrey Amherst, Thomas Gage, Henry Bouquet, Robert Rogers, Sir William Johnson, Captain Jacobs, John Montresor, and Richard Gridley. The lines of supply and communication running from New York to Albany, Halfmoon, Stillwater, Saratoga, Fort Miller, Fort Edward, and on to Fort William Henry became a powerful weapon aimed at New France. British armies could now maintain a forward presence on New York’s northernmost outposts, whereas the colonies could not even sustain a significant force at Saratoga and had to abandon it during King George’s War. To a degree greater than ever before, the frontiers of New York and New England became militarized by the constant presence of armies and increased network of fortifications. As a result, it became much more difficult for the French and Indian coalition to collapse the New York frontiers, as they had done with such stunning ease from 1745 to 1747.

Third, the presence of Robert Rogers, his rangers, as well as Native American allies all connect Saratoga to another momentous development of the French and Indian War. For decades, the strategic and tactical dominance of French Canadian and allied Indian war parties was painfully evident to British Americans. In destructive attacks on settlements like Schenectady (1690) or Saratoga (1745) as well as horrific battlefield losses like Grand Pré (1746) or Braddock’s Defeat (1755), combined Franco-Indian forces had demonstrated their superiority over British regulars and colonial militias. The British colonists’ political disunity in the face of the growing French threat motivated the Albany Congress of 1754, in which Benjamin Franklin urged the colonies to “unite or die.” Braddock’s defeat at the Monongahela in July 1755 underscored the British military’s need to adapt or die. On July 9, 1755, Capt. Daniel-Marie-Hyacinthe Liénard de Beaujeu—a veteran of Marin’s raid on Saratoga in 1745—assembled a coalition of around 250 French Canadian marines and militia, and 600-700 Indian allies drawn from twenty different nations or communities. Flanking the British column in the woods, they orchestrated a stunning defeat of a larger British and American army as it approached its destination of Fort Duquesne. The destruction of Braddock’s conventional army by unconventional foes prompted the British high command to form both ranger companies and light infantry

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*Author Note:* I am reminded of the plaque in the sally port at Fort Ticonderoga listing all the famous figures in history who have entered. Saratoga can claim much the same pride of place in its cast of characters.
companies that could fight irregular opponents on their terms. In addition, British officials redoubled their efforts to secure the alliance and military support of key Indian nations such as the Cherokees in the southern colonies and the Six Nations. Those were some of the reasons that brought Robert Rogers and Captain Jacob to Saratoga, and their stories relate in microcosm the larger military transformations that were taking place.

The result of those assorted developments was a watershed moment in the history of North America. Great Britain’s massive infusion of regular troops and naval forces, along with vast improvements in logistics, transportation, fortification, and infantry tactics, enabled the British to realize their long-hoped for conquest of New France. Britain’s humiliating series of disasters early in the war—Monongahela, Oswego, and William Henry in particular—led the British to pursue a strategy of total conquest of their Canadian Carthage, as many contemporaries referenced the French colony in America. British armies successfully captured French forts in the Champlain Valley in 1759, along with Quebec and Montréal in 1759 and 1760. New York’s frontier settlements were instantly transformed from defensive barriers into springboards for settlement expansion. The Seven Years’ War in America, then, fundamentally changed the geopolitics of the continent, and of Saratoga in particular. Following the war, the Saratoga region became a focal point for British settlement expansion. As the area ceased to be a borderland between New France and New York, tensions in the area revolved around land disputes between Native peoples and colonial settlers and the continent’s future in a British-dominated world.

The Destruction of Hoosick, 1754

When fighting broke out in North America in 1754, however, all that future triumph was unknown to British Americans. In that year, in fact, it seemed as if New France’s strategic dominance of the continent would become total if not checked. Despite clear evidences of French military movements into Lake Erie and the Ohio Valley in 1753 and 1754, Saratoga remained unfortified, even as French officials sought to replicate their earlier successes against New York settlements. British observers fretted over the loyalties of both the Six Nations as well as smaller communities living along New York’s frontier. In August 1754, the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs confronted a group of Abenaki sachems, who were accused of having visited Schaghticoke and Rondax (Algonquin) Indians, scheming “to cut off our People at Saratogue.” That same month, British newspapers reported that French officials had encouraged the Ottawa Indians to strike Saratoga once again. Those rumors came to fruition in a devastating assault on the settlement of Hoosick, marking another advent of war on this contested borderland.7

7 Commissioners of Indian Affairs at Albany Minutes, Aug. 15, 1754, MS 680: Great Britain Indian Department Collection (Clements Library). The Natives in this council were identified as “Annagagne,” a contemporary term for Abenakis. Pennsylvania Gazette, Aug. 29, 1754, p. 2. Ibid., Sept. 5, 1754, p. 2.
On August 28, 1754, a party of Abenaki warriors from Bécancourt (Wôlinak), Nipissings, and Algonquins struck the Anglo-Dutch settlements at Hoosick as the fall harvest approached. Terrified deponents trickled in to Albany to deliver their grim accounts. Peter Hogg, a resident of Hoosick, appeared before the mayor of Albany, describing his sight of “the greatest part in a Light fire or Blaze, the Houses, Barns & Barricks that stood on the east side of the Hoosick Kill . . . .” The Natives had destroyed grain and killed numerous horses and cattle, leaving the survivors destitute. In the panic that followed, the Commissioners of Indian Affairs related to the governor “it is very shocking to see the Country People come in from all Quarters, with their families and effects.” One British newspaper reported, “Upon this Alarm, most, if not all the Inhabitants of Saraghtogue, Half-moon, Schaachkook, Tamhemick, and Hosack, left their Habitations; many of them came into Albany . . . .” Despite French officials’ protests that they were not involved in the Abenakis’ assault, Governor DeLancey believed that the Natives were “being encouraged to this barbarity” by the French governor the Marquis Duquesne. William Johnson regarded the French as having “now committed hostilities within this County in open Violation of the Treaty subsisting between that Crown & Us.” To make matters infinitely worse, the Abenakis also carried off most of the Schaghticoke Indian community—about 60 men, women, and children who remained there (perhaps hoping to incorporate them into Abenaki communities that numerous Schaghticokees had previously joined). Although the Albany authorities had not always dealt with the Schaghticoke Indians with justice, the loss of this small Native community made the frontiers even more vulnerable. 8

Hoosick’s destruction prompted the New York colonial government to begin fortification in the Saratoga region. In early September, Governor DeLancey “required the advice of the Council whether it might not be proper in the present situation of affairs, to order a Fort to be built immediately either at Saraghtoga, or a little further up the River, on the Spot where the Fort Built by Governor Burnet stood without waiting for an Answer from the Owners of the Land there,” to which the council assented (DeLancey referenced the blockhouse built at Governor Burnet’s direction somewhere in the vicinity of Saratoga in the 1720s, discussed earlier in chapter 1). William Johnson wrote to Jacob Glen on September 19, 1754 that “the Lieut. Governour, with the advice of his Majestys Council of this province has thought fitt to order the building a Fort at the Little carrying place above Saratoga, and has sent me his orders, to send as many men there out of the Regiment of Militia under my command, as may be sufficient to cover the work, & protect the workmen

while finishing of it.\(^9\) Even this worthy endeavor, however, fell prey to the same weaknesses that had paralyzed the New York colony in the 1740s. When the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs tried to mobilize carpenters to construct the fort at the Little Carrying Place, the workers balked. They refused to go out and find the materials and insisted upon higher wages. Based upon previous experience, they claimed that the Assembly had “cut off considerably” their wages and accounts when they were submitted. By the end of 1754, Saratoga had reverted to its status in 1747: a defenseless and largely abandoned settlement no longer under meaningful British control.

**The Crown Point Expedition of 1755 and the Origins of Fort Hardy**

As war clouds gathered elsewhere in North America, the British government in London took the fateful step of direct intervention. The political and strategic decisions in London and Paris increasingly drew the peoples of North America and places like Saratoga into a broader war. But local events in the Ohio Valley were also driving affairs. In 1753 and 1754 the French had militarily invaded the Lake Erie and Ohio Valley watersheds, driving out English traders, forts, and allies, and establishing a network of French fortifications. That effort had been spearheaded by none other than Capt. Paul Marin de La Malgue, the leader of the 1745 expedition to Saratoga. (La Malgue’s efforts in the Ohio Valley were successful but came at the cost of his own health and his life, as he died in October of 1753.) Shortly after Marin’s death, in December 1753, twenty-one-year-old George Washington delivered a diplomatic message to one of those forts, named Fort de la Rivière au Boeuf, commanded by Capt. Jacques Legardeur de Saint-Pierre, another veteran of the 1745 Saratoga raid. In their dominant position, however, the French refused to obey the summons of the governor of Virginia to withdraw from British-claimed territory. In May 1754 George Washington and a mixed force of Virginia provincials and Ohio Iroquois returned to the region, attacking a small French party led by Ens. Joseph Coulon de Villiers de Jumonville in what most historians view as the opening shots of the Seven Years’ War in America (Jumonville had also seen action at Saratoga in 1745 or 1747. In July 1754, French and Indian forces under the command of Capt. Louis Coulon de Villiers (brother of the deceased ensign) achieved victory over Col. George Washington’s provincial forces at Fort Necessity, in the disputed Ohio Country. When news of Washington’s defeat reached London in August, the British government immediately decided to send an expedition to America to achieve what the apparently incompetent provincials could not. Major General Edward Braddock would be sent to Virginia with two regular regiments, the 44th and 48th,

with a strong complement of royal artillery, to demolish Fort Duquesne. Within a few weeks, in September 1754, the British ministry had projected not only Braddock’s Expedition, but three others aimed at French encroachments in North America: Fort Beauséjour in Acadia, Fort Niagara on Lake Ontario; and Fort Crown Point in the Champlain Valley. In essence, the British government had resolved to strike New France first, with overwhelming might, and assumed the risk of an open declaration of war by France.\(^\text{10}\)

General Braddock was appointed the commander in chief of all British forces in North America, as well as the commander of the expedition to Fort Duquesne. Upon his arrival in Virginia in February 1755, he held a conference with royal governors of leading provinces at Alexandria. At the house of John Carlyle, Braddock and the governors coordinated operations and timing of the four expeditions. William Johnson had accompanied the governor of New York, James DeLancey. Johnson’s reputation as the foremost British Indian diplomat earned him a commission from General Braddock as superintendent of Indian affairs for the Six Nations—an office that eventually evolved into a broader charge for managing Indian relations for all the northern colonies. William Shirley, the royal governor of Massachusetts, was given command of the expedition to Fort Niagara. Braddock also commissioned Johnson to lead the expedition against Crown Point, and he received a provincial commission as a major general.

Johnson’s mission and challenges were identical to previous (and failed) British ventures against the French fort at Crown Point. They were compounded by the fact that his expedition was in direct competition with Shirley’s Niagara expedition. Following Braddock’s death, Maj. Gen. William Shirley founded his authority vastly strengthened as he acted as the commander in chief in America until news of Loudoun’s appointment arrived. Both Johnson and Shirley had the same base of operations (Albany) and both were rivals for supplies as well as the military support of the Six Nations. To make matters worse, General Shirley employed John Hendricks Lydius as his chief agent in recruiting Iroquois warriors. Although they had once cooperated, Johnson and Lydius were now bitter rivals, and Johnson resented Lydius’s meddling and many Iroquois had come to resent Lydius’s scheming for land. (Lydius, in fact, never regained the trust of most British colonial officials, and his influence faded rapidly during the French and Indian War—he left America in 1764 to defend some of his dubious land titles, but never returned, and died in 1791 in Britain.) William Johnson’s star, conversely, continued to rise during the war as he established a partnership with the Mohawk leader Hendrick Theyanoguin, who led a force of Mohawk warriors with Johnson’s army. As a result of that partnership, Johnson’s Crown Point Expedition would advance farther and achieve more success than all previous attempts, but not in ways that the British expected.\(^\text{11}\)

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\(^{10}\) Preston, *Braddock’s Defeat*, chap. 1; Peyser, ed. and trans., *Jacques Legardeur de Saint-Pierre*, chap. 7.

In September 1755, the French commander of the *troupes de la terre*, Baron Dieskau, led a force of French army grenadiers, Canadian militia, and Indian allies from Crown Point down the South Bay to interdict Johnson’s supply lines. The entire campaign, for both sides, again reflected the pattern of “parallel warfare” in which the Indian allies of the Europeans had their own goals and objectives in their military participation. The consensus of most Iroquois leaders and people in 1755—to remain neutral in this present conflict—did not prevent individual warriors from going to war in support of allies. Hence, the 1755 campaign brought the Canadian Mohawks and League Mohawks into a potential fratricidal war, one that both groups had historically avoided. Dieskau’s initial target was Fort Edward and the military road leading northward from Saratoga. Dieskau’s Indian allies, however, balked at the possibility of assaulting a fortification, for high casualties was never an acceptable outcome of Native American warfare. The French officer acquiesced to an attack on Johnson’s unfortified base camp at Lake George. On September 8, 1755, at what became known as the Battle of Lake George, Johnson’s forces (along with Hendrick and the Mohawks) blindly walked into a set-piece ambush that Dieskau staged. However, the Canadian Mohawks shouted a warning, hoping to avoid shedding their kindred warriors’ blood, and the British and Mohawks were able to extract themselves from the ambush (though not without cost—Hendrick Theyanoguin was killed in the melee along with Jacques Legardeur de Saint-Pierre). Dieskau pursued the retreating British back to their base camp at Lake George and launched a frontal attack on Johnson’s hastily erected defenses. The French baron was grievously wounded and captured, and his choice grenadiers suffered heavy casualties. To many British Americans, this victory highlighted the contributions that colonial troops and Indian allies could make in the war. Peter Livingston of New York related with pride that General Phineas Lyman “fought like a Lion in his shirt” during the battle. He also related what Baron Dieskau had told Johnson afterward: over the course of the battle, “he thought he had to do with Boys, but at 12 o’clock with men, and at night with Devils.”

The Saratoga region was once more brought into the fray of imperial warfare as Johnson’s forces began to move northward from Albany in the late summer of 1755. It has been asserted that Major General Phineas Lyman began Fort Hardy during the 1755 campaign as a makeshift outpost. However, there is no evidence whatsoever, in William Johnson’s correspondence and detailed council of war minutes, that any fortification occurred at Saratoga during the 1755 campaign. An English soldier captured near Fort Edward in August 1755 testified to his French captors that “there is neither fort nor

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12 Peter Livingston Letter, Sept. 20, 1755, folder 1, box 115, Livingston Family Papers. MacLeod, *Canadian Iroquois and the Seven Years’ War*, chap. 4.

intrenchment at Sarastau.” The officer often credited with the construction of a fort is Phineas Lyman, born in 1716, a native of Durham, Connecticut, a Yale graduate, and a member of the Connecticut legislature. He was appointed as second-in-command of the expedition. As of July 16, 1755, Lyman’s regiment was still encamped at Albany. The following day, Lyman received orders from Johnson to fortify the Carrying Place and open a military road from Albany. Lyman was to “preceed with your Command to the House of Col. Lydius near the Carrying Place where you are to erect Log Magazines covered with Bark Sufficient to contain & <secure fr>om the Weather, the Amunition Provisions &c belonging <to the> Army under my Command.” By July 30, Lyman’s forces were at Saratoga, and were expected to reach the Carrying Place a day or two later.15

The army’s shortages extended to ammunition. In fact, the army was so desperate for cannon shot, that during its encampment at Saratoga, soldiers were detailed to dig up buried ordnance from the decaying site of Fort Clinton. Lt. Col. Seth Pomeroy of Elisha Williams’s regiment, recorded in his journal the labor of his men on July 31, 1755:

31st

a fair Day 300 men Sent up to wards ye Carring Place to mend the Rhods & about 50 Down ye Rhods towards Still water to Compleet ye Bridges yt ware defective yt way which ware all finnish’d a number to ye fort at Saratoga to Sarch for Cannon Ball & Dug up about 1100 Shot Brought them to our Camp which was about a Mile above ye old fort---Saratogo is a rich fertile Soil full of feed tho will Stock with Cattle & horses yet Loaded with grass more then ye Cattle Can Eat.”16

The focus of British labor revolved around three critical projects: improvements to the military supply road from Albany to points northward, and the fortification of the Carrying Place, which became known as Fort Edward as early as September 175517; and construction of a fort at the southern tip of Lake George (first referred to as “Fort William

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15 Ibid., 723; Johnson to Phineas Lyman, July 17, 1755, ibid., 730-31; Johnson to James DeLancey, July 30, 1755, ibid., 796: “That Genl. Lyman who I hope will be in a day or two at the Carrying place be reinforced with some Artillery & the Engineer go up & Fortify that Pass in the Strongest Manner.” A Boston Gazette article of August 18, 1755 (p.1) references two companies “posted at Saraghtoga.” It is unclear if these forces were permanently stationed there, or if they were merely part of Lyman’s force still in the process of marching toward the Carrying Place. At any rate, the article goes on to relate that the soldiers’ cartridge boxes had no bullets in them.
16 Louis Effingham De Forest, ed., The Journals and Papers of Seth Pomeroy, Sometime General in the Colonial Service (New York: Society of Colonial Wars in the State of New York, 1926), 105. This is also verified in the diary of John Burk, a Greenfield, Massachusetts soldier, quoted in Russell P. Bellico, Empires in the Mountains: French and Indian War Campaigns and Forts in the Lake Champlain, Lake George, and Hudson River Corridor (Fleischmanns, NY: Purple Mountain Press, 2010), 43.
17 Johnson to Shirley, Sept. 22, 1755, Papers of Sir William Johnson, ed. Sullivan, II, 74: Johnson mentioned “Fort Edward at the Great Carrying Place (wth I have so named in honour to our young Prince of that name)."
Lyman was also instructed to consider building a road towards South Bay, a project that was begun but not completed in 1755. Physician Thomas Williams of Deerfield, Massachusetts, wrote in August 1755 that “we had about eight days ago 300 men at work cutting the road to Fort Ann, supposing that we should go by Wood Creek,” before the Lake George route was agreed upon. The construction of forts at the Carrying Place and Lake George, along with the burden of keeping roads to Albany repaired, had consumed British workers and supplies, leaving little time or labor for any fortification at Saratoga. A “Map of the Forts and Settlements on the Hudson, Mohawk and Hoosick River in New York and Massachusetts” drawn most likely in 1756 indicates no fortification or blockhouses at Saratoga, while those at the Carrying Place and Lake George are well advanced.

In the late summer and early fall of 1755, John Henry Lydius’s house at the Carrying Place—which had symbolized the cultural mixing that occurred on a borderland—was transformed into a large imperial outpost called Fort Edward. Capt. William Eyre of the 44th Regiment, who had been sent by Braddock to accompany Johnson’s force as chief engineer, was responsible for the design of those fortifications. Initially, the fort was merely a crude stockade, as Johnson reported: “Capn Eyre has laid out a [piece] of fortification here round Lydius’s Log House, which if finished, would be very Serviceable in case of a retreat.” That crude stockade would eventually become the mammoth Fort Edward.

Road building, however, was the most critical work taking place in the Albany–Lake George corridor, and Phineas Lyman was heavily occupied with that responsibility. Johnson’s ability to sustain any military force at either Fort Edward or Fort William Henry was utterly dependent upon the transportation of goods and supplies from Albany. General Lyman described the road’s construction and appearance in a letter to Johnson in early July. He argued that the “good wagon Road” should “Clear abt 30 feet wide for ye Men to Travel.” He was concerned, however, that cutting down all of the trees and small bushes along the road would create piles of debris that enemy Indians could use as cover. Instead, he suggested some of the smaller trees and bushes along the road be left standing.

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18 Johnson to Shirley, Nov. 9, 1755, ibid., II, 283.
20 “Map of the Forts and Settlements on the Hudson, Mohawk and Hoosick River in New York and Massachusetts,” 2.4, M29 (New-York Historical Society). I date this map to no earlier than 1756, given that the fort icons used to denote Fort Edward and Fort William Henry are well delineated and that the road networks are in a state of development (e.g., no military road from Saratoga to Fort Edward on the west side of the Hudson is shown on the map). In addition, the home of William Johnson was labeled as “Sr: Will: Johnson,” reflecting his baronetcy that was awarded in 1756, not before.
23 Ibid.
challenge of maintaining the road was painfully evident to the army commanders by the
early fall of 1755. Peter Wraxall wrote to Johnson on October 3 that “between Fort Edward &
Seraightoga roads very bad—Many almost impassible places....”24 Working parties were
constantly detached, given that “the Roads and Bridges between this Camp and Albany are
in great want of Repair,” as Johnson observed to Lyman on October 925 (the bridges men-
tioned here refer to the practice of corduroying roads through wet or swampy ground, but
could refer to wooden bridges as well). One such working party was a detachment of Col.
Timothy Ruggles’s Massachusetts provincials, sent out in October to repair the road from
Fort Edward down to Saratoga on the east side of the Hudson. Another detachment of 200
Connecticut provincials mended the road from Albany to Saratoga on the Hudson’s west
shore.26

The dual struggles of transporting supplies and building roads brought Saratoga’s
importance to the fore and made a fortification there eminently logical. Wagons heading
north on the Hudson’s western shore road would cross the river at the falls at Saratoga,
continuing on the eastern shore until Fort Edward. Johnson took note that cargoes were
sometimes damaged by high waters when wagons crossed at the “usual ford” of the
Hudson at Saratoga. He suggested cutting a new wagon passage into the west bank of the
Hudson slightly above the usual ford, and near the house of Killian de Ridder, a Saratoga
resident who had been captured in 1745 and returned in 1747. There, the wagons could
cross the Hudson knee-deep.27 The long march from Albany also necessitated posts where
soldiers could rest and find shelter. Rev. Samuel Chandler of Gloucester, Massachusetts,
recalled crossing the Hudson at Saratoga and having lodged “in the Loft of an old forsaken
House on the floor without fire and without Supper, the lower room being filled with
Soldiers & waggoners.”28 A council of war at Fort William Henry on October 20 observed
that the soldiers were exhausted and weakened by the “Long Encampment here by reason
of our Transports not arriving at Albany & the Difficulty of Transporting ye Provisions here
from thence.” The march from Albany was also difficult, as the troops were “Subjected to
Cold & Wet without any Lodging but the Ground but one blanket to Lye on & to cover &
many none at all.” As a result, sickness and disease had rendered unfit for duty about one
third of Johnson’s army—“their Spirits Exhausted their Strength & Vigor Enervated.”29

Transporting provisions by water was not feasible, as Johnson’s forces lacked
adequate bateaux and other craft. Johnson believed that “a large Scow [a large flat-boto-
tomed cargo boat] is very much wanted to ferry the Waggons & Horses across the River at

25 Johnson to Lyman, Oct. 9, 1755, ibid., 157.
26 Johnson to Sir Charles Hardy, Oct. 7, 1755, ibid., 149, 151 (Ruggles); Wraxall to Commanding Officers of
28 George Chandler, ed., “Extracts from the Diary of Rev. Samuel Chandler,” New England Historical and
Seraghtoga.” Even smaller bateaux were lacking in the 1755 expedition. “There was not one flat Bottomed Boat finished,” Johnson complained from Fort Edward in late September 1755. Moreover, the region apparently suffered from drought-like conditions that had lowered water levels in the Northeast. Writing from Stillwater on July 25, 1755, General Lyman observed to Johnson that “you must undoubtedly depend upon Wagons to Transport your Artillery and Baggage.” At Stillwater, the water was “so Low & Rapid” that it apparently exhausted any men who were wading into it to move boats. The army’s reliance upon convoys meant that troops as well as supplies were subject to both the elements and enemy attacks. From Half Moon northward to Fort Edward, there were no storehouses. Armed escorts were often dispatched to guard the slow-moving convoys. As the volume of convoys increased, more outposts were required. By late November 1755, the council of war had received intelligence suggesting that the French and Indians’ scheme of “intercepting our Provisions coming from Albany might probably be put to trial & that by a Considerable Body.”

Although it remains unlikely that any actual fortification at Saratoga occurred in 1755, the seeds of a garrison and a future fortification had definitely been planted as a result of the Crown Point Expedition. Writing from his Lake George encampment in October 1755, Johnson instructed Richard Gridley, a Massachusetts officer and engineer, to march a detachment to Saratoga, where he was to “[m]eet & Expedite such Waggons Horses or other [carr]iages w.ch may be dispatched from Albany.” Gridley, who had participated in the 1745 Louisbourg Expedition and would go on to design the American defenses at Breed’s Hill and Dorchester Heights in the Revolutionary War, was also instructed to send out scouts to prevent enemy attacks. By mid-November, Gridley reported to Johnson that he had left a small garrison at Saratoga, as he referenced having “given Y our Orders to the Commanding Officer there.” That officer may have been Col. Joseph Thatcher of Massachusetts, who had received orders from Johnson on November 5th to wait upon Governor Hardy “about a Company to be posted on the East or West side of the River at Saraghtoga & take his directions in that affair.” Yet it remains doubtful if any forces were garrisoned there over the winter. A November 24–26 council of war discussed the garrisoning of Johnson’s forces with great precision, but there was no mention of any forces stationed at Saratoga.

30 Johnson to Hardy, Oct. 24, 1755, ibid., 237.
32 Johnson to Richard Gridley, Oct. 31, 1755, ibid., IX, 291; Gridley to Johnson, Nov. 17, 1755 ibid., 313–14; Johnson to Col. [Joseph] Thatcher, Nov. 5, 1755, ibid., II, 276; Minutes of a Council of War, Nov. 24–26, 1755, ibid., 335–36. In a similar way, Goldsbrow Banyar discussed fortifications beyond Fort Edward and Fort William Henry, in a letter to Johnson dated September 29, 1755. He proposed a fort near Wood Creek to block that passage to the French, but no mention was made of any other actual or proposed fortifications in the vicinity of Saratoga. Ibid., 114–16.
While it was common for colonial forts to take the names of prominent governors, Sir Charles Hardy’s leadership and direction may explain why a fortification at Saratoga would ultimately bear his name. In September 1755 Goldsbrow Banyar informed Johnson that Governor Hardy was “extremely anxious about the building of Forts,” suggesting that the governor might initiate their construction personally.\textsuperscript{33} Johnson acquainted his council of war that Governor Hardy “had in his Letters to him from Albany expressed his Opinion that a more respectable Fort than a picketed One should be built there [the Carrying Place] & so constructed as to be able to receive a proper Garrison for its Security this Winter, together with proper Magazines & Stores, all which he judges necessary to facilitate the Expedition…”\textsuperscript{34} Although Hardy’s vision for what became Fort Edward would not bear his name, Saratoga in the years to come would occupy a key location and role as a logistical hub facilitate all future British expeditions to the northward.

The 1755 campaign came to an end not from superior enemy strength or activity, but from exhaustion and shortages. Johnson had emerged victorious in the Battle of Lake George, and in the context of 1755 even a defensive victory that stopped short of its objective (Crown Point) was more than enough to celebrate. In its aftermath had been no intense, concerted French or Indian effort to interdict Johnson’s supplies moving northward from Albany. What brought Johnson’s expedition to a standstill was the lack of any logistical infrastructure. By early November, Johnson reported that “we have not above 5 days allowance of Bread” at Fort Edward, which “occasions a great deal of Murmuring and Uneasiness.”\textsuperscript{35} Johnson’s council ultimately decided that the expedition simply could not be sustained due to the combination of lack of supplies, disease, and grinding labor that exhausted soldiers and animals. Beginning in 1756, however, Lord Loudoun—the new British commander in chief in America—would revolutionize Britain’s logistical capacities. His efforts would not only transform Saratoga but also enable the future British campaigns against Canada.

**Lord Loudoun and the Transformation of Saratoga**

John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudoun (1705–1782) was the Scottish aristocrat selected by the Duke of Cumberland and the Crown to become the commander in chief of His Majesty’s forces in America, following the demise of Edward Braddock. Loudoun had fought in the highlands of his native Scotland during the 1745 Jacobite rising, taking part in the Duke of Cumberland’s efforts to subdue the Jacobites. During his tenure as commander in chief in America from 1756 to 1758, Lord Loudoun shifted major British operations towards the vital centers of French power in America: Louisbourg, Ticonderoga, Quebec,

\textsuperscript{33} Goldsbrow Banyar to Johnson, Sept. 23, 1755, \textit{ibid.}, 82.

\textsuperscript{34} Minutes of a Council of War, Sept. 29, 1755, \textit{ibid.}, 117.

\textsuperscript{35} Johnson to Gridley, Nov. 2, 1755, \textit{ibid.}, 190–91.
Montréal, Niagara, and Duquesne. Loudoun’s command also stirred fierce political contention between the thirteen colonies and the crown. Disputes erupted over financing the war, quartering and supplying British troops, disciplining of American provincials, and policies favoring royal officers’ commissions over provincial ones. All those issues exposed key political fault lines between the British empire and the growing political independence of the American colonies, whose inhabitants increasingly embraced a provincial identity as Americans.36

Loudoun’s political controversies, however, have obscured his fundamental contribution to British victory in North America: Loudoun essentially created the logistical and tactical foundations that allowed the British to project their power into the American interior and to conquer New France by force of arms. In five vital aspects, Loudoun successfully adapted the British Army to war in North America. First, he dramatically improved the military roads surrounding Albany, especially those leading to the northern posts of Stillwater, Saratoga, Fort Miller, Fort Edward, and Fort William Henry. Loudoun’s background in the 1745 Jacobite uprising may have given him an appreciation of the importance of roads. Following the defeat of the Jacobites, Gen. George Wade constructed a network of military roads and outposts in the Scottish highlands so that British armies could establish control and better subdue any future rebellions. Second, Loudoun overcame the challenge presented by navigation of the Hudson and Mohawk rivers, building and organizing a vast number of bateaux and other small craft to ply supplies in those waterways. Third, Loudoun established a network of new fortifications and storehouses capable of sustaining British armies on the frontiers and holding that ground with sizable garrisons of regulars and provincials. Finally, Loudoun comprehended the lesson of Braddock’s Defeat—the vulnerability of regular forces operating against irregular Canadian and Indian forces in the woods of America—and took measures to adapt the British Army’s capabilities and tactics. Loudoun organized independent ranger companies—most famously known as Rogers’ Rangers—whose mission was to conduct reconnaissance, collect captives and military intelligence, screen the movements of conventional forces, and conduct raids deep in enemy territory.

Saratoga is itself a perfect symbol of Loudoun’s reforms, manifesting all of them in its French and Indian War history. As we have seen, Britain’s previous military capabilities had been limited to the navigable Atlantic coastline or Gulf of St. Lawrence. Supplies could be delivered from New York City to Albany via the Hudson River, but every overland expedition using Albany as a base of operations had stalled out: moving armies and supplies far inland from Albany had been a difficult if not impossible task. Loudoun’s efforts transformed the strategic location of Albany, enabling British armies to advance westward

up the Mohawk Valley corridor towards Lake Ontario, and northward towards Lake Champlain. As Loudoun concentrated vast forces at Albany, the surrounding landscape would be irrevocably transformed into a militarized borderland bristling with fortifications, garrisons, and transportation of supplies. A British military map from 1757, titled “Hudson River from Albany to Fort Edward, shewing the situation of the several Posts between those places, 1757,” provides a basic orientation to this strategic corridor. Beginning at Albany and moving northward, the chain of fortifications and posts included Half Moon, Stillwater, Saratoga, Fort Miller, Fort Edward, then Fort William Henry at Lake George. Linking most these posts was the Hudson River, along with new military roads. This map unfolds the militarization of the region that took place by 1757.

**Figure 3.1.** “Hudson River from Albany to Fort Edward, shewing the situation of the several Posts between those places, 1757,” Huntington Library, HM 15409.

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This network of posts was highly necessary, for Britain and France began to introduce larger numbers of regular army regiments in 1755 and 1756 as the strategic situation in North America became more volatile. As commander in chief in America, General Shirley was determined was to use regulars to strike at Fort Frontenac in 1756—cutting French supply lines to their western posts—and to send a provincial army once more against Crown Point. French forces, as usual, struck first. The French were carried along by the momentum of the Battle of the Monongahela. Their victory had afforded them three advantages: (1) soaring commitment by Native nations to fight in alliance with their French father, (2) the capture of Braddock’s entire artillery train), and (3) the capture of Braddock’s headquarters papers, a trove of military intelligence. The French and the Natives unleashed an offensive against the British in 1756 that began to collapse New York’s frontiers. In March of that year, a French and Indian raid successfully destroyed Fort Bull, the British post that helped to anchor the tenuous lines of communication and supply to Fort Oswego, which itself fell to a French siege in August. In late July 1756, Lord Loudoun arrived in New York City from Britain, at the very same time that his French counterpart, the Marquis de Montcalm, was organizing an expedition to attack Fort Oswego. An expedition of seven thousand men and artillery under General John Winslow had advanced as far north as Fort Edward by July 20, 1756. Indeed, Winslow’s New York and New England provincial forces had encamped at Saratoga during their northward marches.38 When

38 Ian K. Steele, Betrayals: Fort William Henry & the “Massacre” (Oxford, Eng.: Oxford University Press, 1990), 68. New-York Mercury, July 19, 1756, p. 3. “All our provincial Forces are advanced. The main Body of them are encamped at Half-Moon, about 12 miles from hence [Albany]; the Rest incamped, or in garrison, at Saraghtoga, Fort-Hardy, Stillwater, Fort-Miller, Fort-Edward, and Fort William Henry.”
Loudoun learned of the French offensive against Oswego, however, he dispatched Major General Daniel Webb to lead a reinforcement up the Mohawk Valley. Webb, along with Lt. Col. Thomas Gage and the 44th Regiment, were at Saratoga when they began their march on August 12, 1756. When Fort Oswego fell to Montcalm’s siege artillery in August, the British focused their efforts for the remainder of that year upon the defenses of the New York frontier.

In July 1756, Sir John St. Clair, the Deputy Quarter Master General in America, completed a survey of the route from Albany to Fort William Henry and sent in a lengthy description to the Earl of Loudoun:

From Stillwater to Saratoga, the Road as above [very Narrow and the Bridges over small Runs of water, in bad repair], but the water Carriage is exceeding good. Here is a bad picquetted Fort, where the Fisk Kill runs into the Hudson’s River, and a large Magazine full of Provisions without it. The 48th Regt is encamped here in an Open plain having cleared the ground round them, and are now entrenching themselves. This is a good Post, and may be defended by 900 men, but it will contain four times the number. Water and Air good.

From Saratoga to Fort Miller, 6 Miles, the Road good but narrow, thro a stiff Clay, which will require constant Repair; the Bridges good. The navigation by Water is impracticable. Fort Miller is a small Stockade, open to the River, Situate in a low unwholesome Ground, and the Water bad, nor is the thick Woods cleared, which must Occasion great Sickness. It does not Appear to me to have this Fort garrisoned, as so little is gained by so small portages; for as much time is lost loading and unloading, as the waggons might proceed to Fort Edward with their Loads.

From Fort Miller to Fort Edward, 8 Miles, the Road good but Narrow, the Bridges good and high, the Navigation practicable, the River is to be crossed at Fort Edward, the two Foards occasioned by an Island, have good bottoms, the first is very deep. The engineers are at work on the Repairs of Fort Edward.

From Fort Edward to Fort William Henry 14 miles, I heard the Road Reported good to General Winslow.

St. Clair’s memo vividly describes the transportation challenges of repairing roads, maintaining bridges, moving supplies by wagon and boat, and building adequate store-houses and magazines to protect and shelter both the garrisons and the provisions.

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39 Pennsylvania Gazette, Aug. 19, 1756, p. 3: “This Day Major General Webb, Col. Gage, and sundry other Officers, set off from Saratoga to go to Oswego. …”

Repairing roads was always a yearly endeavor, “from the vast Quantity of Snow, which together with the heavy Rains that have succeeded it, have overflowed the Country, carried off the Bridges, & broke up the Roads.”⁴¹ Often, there were simply not enough horses and wagons to move the supplies. It proved to be a perennial challenge to the British Army throughout the war in America. “I am distressed to last degree, for Waggons,” Lord Loudoun confessed to Governor Hardy, “without them I can neither Supply Mr. Webb nor your people on the Mohawk River, nor can I take possession of the Forts, at Lake George and Fort Edward to Cover the Frontier of your Province.”⁴² When there were enough horses and wagons, the amount of wagon traffic that passed Saratoga in just a short period in 1756 was astounding, as Table 1 attests. In his journals written during his stay at Fort Edward in September and October 1756, Lieutenant Hervey recorded the large volume of traffic coming by the post that had come up from Saratoga via the military roads on the east and west side of the Hudson River. Lord Loudoun’s efforts ultimately lowered the costs of transporting goods, according to an estimate done by Captain John Bradstreet, of the 51⁴ th Regiment, then the 60⁶⁰ (or Royal American) Regiment: in 1756 he estimated that it cost the army 6 pence per mile to transport a two-hundred weight barrel of salt beef from Albany to Lake George; due to Loudoun’s improvements, the rate was 2 pence a mile by year’s end in 1757.⁴³ Bradstreet made himself a master of such transportation improvements, that Lord Loudoun relied upon him as his principal logistics officer. In 1758, Bradstreet received an appointment as Deputy Quarter Master General. Captain Philip Schuyler, of the New York provincials, served under Bradstreet in 1755 and 1756, and again from 1758 to war’s end, thereby gaining a thorough understanding of logistics and the movements of armies.⁴⁴

### Table 3.1

**Volume of Wagon Traffic From Saratoga, 1756**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Volume/Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 4, 1756</td>
<td>“seventy of the King’s waggons with provisions arrived here with a Captain’s party from Saratoga”</td>
<td>p. 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 8, 1756</td>
<td>“… a subaltern’s party from Saratoga, with 56 King’s waggons with provisions.”</td>
<td>p. 39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


⁴² Lord Loudoun to Governor Hardy, Sept. 1, 1756, LO 1669, Loudoun Papers.

⁴³ Anderson, Crucible of War, 180.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 11, 1756</td>
<td>“...a subaltern’s party and 50 waggons with provisions and fodder for cattle arrived at this Fort” [Edward]</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 15, 1756</td>
<td>“...41 waggons arrived with a party from Saratoga laden with provisions for the King’s troops.”</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 17, 1756</td>
<td>“...18 more waggons came with a party from Saratoga, as did Collonel Burton.”</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 19, 1756</td>
<td>“...another party of waggons 18 in number arrived here loaded with provisions.”</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 21, 1756</td>
<td>“Captain Mercer with fifty of the 48th Regiment arrived here [Fort Edward]. They brought with [them] four 9 pounders under the command of Lieut. Macullogh of the artillery, 14 waggons with artillery stores, and 27 with provisions.”</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 27, 1756</td>
<td>“37 waggons from Saratoga.”</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2, 1756</td>
<td>“...a party of an 100 belonging to the 44th Regiment arrived here with 58 waggons loaded with provisions, tools and stores.”</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 4, 1756</td>
<td>“An officer and 30 of the Americans arrived here with 44 waggons with provisions...”</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 9, 1756</td>
<td>“60 waggons with provisions arrived here with a party.”</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 10, 1756</td>
<td>“30 carts arrived with provisions.”</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 13, 1756</td>
<td>“83 waggons with stores and provisions arrived from Saratoga with an escort of Americans.”</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 15, 1756</td>
<td>“This morning 53 waggons arrived with provisions etc. from Saratoga.”</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 16, 1756</td>
<td>“This evening 56 waggons arrived from Saratoga.”</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 17, 1756</td>
<td>“This evening seventy five waggons arrived from Saratoga with provisions,...”</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 21, 1756</td>
<td>“[I] brought over five and twenty waggons loaded with stores for the garrison of these Forts and forage, that arrived on the other side of the river the evening before from Saratoga...”</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The “water carriage” from Albany to Lake George was equally difficult as the wagon roads, due to lack of bateaux, bateauxmen, and the navigational obstacles on the Hudson River. Lord Loudoun in 1757 commissioned the construction of “great Numbers of boats” and began to recruit bateauxmen under Bradstreet.45 Loudoun’s armada of supply boats, however, could only ease—not eliminate—the difficulties of moving supplies inland towards lakes George and Champlain. A typical bateau, fully laden, would have to portage three times—even “at the highest water” between Albany and Fort Edward. The first obstacle the crew encountered, requiring portage, was riffles between Half Moon and Stillwater. Once at Stillwater, the Hudson’s tranquility offered bateaux an easier passage. At the falls above Saratoga, however, another portage was required, and yet another at Fort

45 Abercromby to Pitt, May 22, 1758, in Correspondence of William Pitt when Secretary of State, ed. Kimball, I, 251–52.
Miller. Captain Salah Barnard of Deerfield, Massachusetts described that portage at Saratoga in his 1759 journal: “We drew the Boats up the Falls one mile Load them and proceed to Fort Miller unloade & carry by the Falls load again and go toward arrive at Fort Edward by 11 or 12 o’clock at night.”46 The navigation above Fort Miller and on to Fort Edward was “tolerable good.”47 But in dry seasons, those water routes became virtually impassable: in August 1756, there was “not water enough at present in the River” for a fully laden bateau to go from Fort Miller to Fort Edward on the Hudson.48 The grueling nature of the bateaux service was captured in the journal of a Massachusetts provincial named James Gilbert, of Morton: “Through very much Difficulty and hard Labor through Swift water and extreme falls,” he wrote. It took “Seven or Eight men To Git an Empty Batoue up The falls” on the upper Hudson.49 Oliver Spaulding of the 3rd Connecticut Regiment also recorded typical procedures that bateauxmen followed:

Salentoe Wensday 6th June 1759

Every Company to bale out their battoos Emediately, and all the oars seting poles and padels are to be taken and laid in several heaps on y’ Bank of y: River.

In the end, “from the Accidents Batteaus are subject to,” as Gen. James Abercromby put it, bateaux were especially risky for the transportation of ordnance, ammunition, and supplies that were subject to spoilage from damp conditions. At portages, the bateaux need wagons and horses to move heavier loads, taxing the already finite numbers of them.50 A map in the Huntington Library by Patrick Mackellar, a British engineer who had survived Braddock’s Defeat in 1755, shows the Saratoga falls and ferry where wagons and goods were crossed to the Hudson’s east side.51 Of particular note is a small blockhouse covering the falls and the ferry, and a small ferry house where goods or small parties of soldiers could stay. The map also shows the wagon road to Fort Edward, with two small bridges over creeks flowing into the Hudson.

46 Journal of Captain Salah Barnard, June 5. 1759 (Thompson-Pell Research Center, Fort Ticonderoga, NY).
47 Ibid.
48 Ralph Burton to Lord Loudoun, Aug. 27, 1756, LO 1599, Loudoun Papers.
50 Abercromby to Pitt, May 22, 1758, in Correspondence of William Pitt when Secretary of State, ed. Kimball, I, 251–52.
51 Patrick Mackellar, “A Sketch of the lower Falls and Ferry of Saratoga, thirty six miles above Albany and nine miles below Fort Edward,” 1756, HM 15458 (Huntington Library).
Figure 3.3. Patrick Mackellar, “A Sketch of the lower Falls and Ferry of Saratoga, thirty six miles above Albany and nine miles below Fort Edward,” 1756, Huntington Manuscripts 15458, Huntington Library, San Marino, California.
If bateaux depended upon human labor to row and portage, the wagon service relied upon horses and oxen, and that in turn produced a heavy demand for livestock fodder from the civilian inhabitants of the Saratoga region. New England provincials in 1757, for example, were “Provided a hundred Carts with four Oxen each, and Fifty Waggons with two Horses each, for moving them at the Stages, where they go by land.” Four hundred oxen and one hundred horses needed fodder desperately as they entered a wooded landscape. In their overland marches from New England, provincials were typically cantoned at places like Kinderhook, Claverack, Schaghticoke, Half Moon, and Saratoga, where they sought supplies from local inhabitants. One of the most common duties of soldiers stationed at the lower Hudson posts of Saratoga, Stillwater, and Half Moon was guarding cattle as they foraged in the countryside. Connecticut officer Rufus Putnam recorded how his troops were sent to Schaghticoke “to mend up the fences at Scokook, in order to cut hay for the king’s Baggage Horses.” They had “1,500 acres within fence, all of the best of mowing.” In early 1758 he “went on command to Saratoga, to guard cattle.”

The British Army occasionally pressed land, inhabitants, goods, and supplies into service, creating additional strain and civil-military friction. The Thomas Gage Papers contains an “Account of the Farms taken at the Half Moon, for his Majesty’s Use in April 1758 untill November following.” An astonishing 940 acres were used by the British Army, and a total compensation of £258 (around forty-seven thousand dollars in modern terms) was distributed to the various owners. In April 1759, Maj. Thomas Ord of the Royal Artillery received a press warrant “to Impress Materials for Building, Artificers, Work men, Labourers, Drivers of Waggons or other Carriages, also Horses Waggons Carts or other Carriages” as the campaign began that year. The resistance that colonists gave British commanders led Lord Loudoun to exclaim, “The backwardness of the People in this Country, to give any Assistance to the Service, is incredible.” But Loudoun saw even deeper, more troubling, issues at stake in the colonists’ lack of cooperation, namely the dual issues of taxation and independence that ignited the American Revolution twenty years’ hence: “The taxes which the People pay in the Country, are really so trifling, that they do not deserve the Name: So that if some Method is not found out of laying on a Tax, for the support of a War in America, by a Brittish Act of Parliament, it

52 Loudoun to Pitt, April 23, 1757, Correspondence of William Pitt when Secretary of State, ed. Kimball, I, 38–40.
54 “Account of the Farms taken at the Half Moon, for his Majesty’s Use in April 1758,” Thomas Gage Papers, AS 1 (Clements Library); Eric Nye, “Pounds Sterling to Dollars: Historical Conversion of Currency,” http://www.uwyo.edu/numimage/currency%20conversion.htm.
appears to me, that you will continue to have no Assistance from them in Money, and will have very little Assistance in Men, if they are wanted.”

The Construction of Fort Hardy, 1756–1757

When Lieut. William Hervey arrived at Saratoga in July 1756, he viewed a new “Fort Hardy” under construction (contemporary newspapers from that year also refer to “Fort Hardy” by name). That initial fortification of Saratoga was a crude stockade or palisade to protect the troops that encamped there while en route to Fort Edward. It was specifically intended for the 48th Regiment of Foot, which was stationed at Saratoga in the summer of 1756. Along with Sir John St. Clair, Hervey went to Saratoga on July 23, 1756, “to intrench the 48th Regiment, who had followed General Winslow from post to post.” “We arrived there in the evening,” Hervey recorded, “and I laid a plan for the intrenchments which I traced out the next morning, Saturday 24th, and in the evening had 50 men employed and broke ground.” Hervey’s entry is significant, as it clearly states that there had been no previous entrenchment made at Saratoga. A 1757 map entitled “Plan of Saratogha” (author unknown) also marks that the Vaubanian outline of Fort Hardy as a “Line made in the Summer 1756.” By October of 1756, Lord Loudoun reported that “at Saratoga, they are intrenched, with a small Stockaded Fort within it all. . . .” The work of Hervey and St. Clair constituted the beginnings of Fort Hardy in its most mature, Vaubanian form (an adjective derived from the achievements of Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, the French military engineer who had defined much of the art and science of fortification in the seventeenth century).

From July to mid-September of 1756, the 48th Regiment was encamped at Saratoga. This regiment had been one of the two unfortunate units sent from Cork, Ireland to Virginia as part of General Braddock’s Expedition. Following the Monongahela disaster, the 44th and 48th Regiments had journeyed to Philadelphia and then to Albany in late 1755, primarily to buttress the expeditions of Shirley and Johnson. The 44th Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. Thomas Gage, had also encamped briefly at Saratoga on September 28–29, 1756, following the unit’s failed effort to relieve Fort Oswego that August. We can imagine that when the 44th marched into Saratoga, that the soldiers commingled with fellow survivors of the Monongahela from the 48th Regiment. Later that fall, both

57 Loudoun to Pitt, April 25, 1757, in Correspondence of William Pitt when Secretary of State, ed. Kimball, I, 44.
58 Hervey, Journals of the Hon. William Hervey, 26–27. A letter in the Boston Evening-Post dated July 17, 1756, mentions that the provincial forces had reached Saratoga, or the “Camp at Fort Hardy.”Boston Evening-Post, July 26, 1756, p. 2.
One humorous anecdote of the 48th Regiment’s encampment at Saratoga concerns two young ensigns, John Vickers and Henry Elves, “who were missing, and tho’t to be carry’d off by the Enemy,” as the Boston News-Letter reported. The article surely amused colonial readers, who learned that the novice Redcoats “are return’d safe to the Regiment, they having only lost their Way” in the woods.

The reason that Lord Loudoun had dispatched the 48th regiment to Saratoga was for road work. He had written in early September that the road between Albany and Saratoga and to Fort Edward had been “very much spoil’d with the Carriages which will greatly impede” the transport of supplies. “I have therefore order’d parties from the 48th Regiment at Saratoga to mend the Roads” northward, while Phineas Lyman’s provincials worked their way south from Fort Edward. It was likely in the context of road repairs that ensigns Vickers and Elves became disoriented in the woods. Lt. Col Ralph Burton of the 48th reported to Loudoun that from Saratoga to Fort Miller, “the Road broken and bad.” Burton condemned the ramshackle nature of fortification he saw, characterizing Fort Miller’s “miserable affairs, a few Pickets stuck into the Ground, at the mercy of eighty to a hundred of the Enemy,” while Fort Edward “stinks enough to cause an infection” with its five hundred to sick hundred sick soldiers.

Following the departure of the 48th Regiment—which reached Fort Edward by September 23—the Saratoga post was garrisoned by elements of the 42nd (or Royal Highland) Regiment and then by a battalion of the 60th (or Royal American) Regiment, led by one of the most effective officers of the entire war, Lt. Col. Henry Bouquet. The recently formed Royal Americans had little time for drill or training. Most of their time at Saratoga was spent in escorting convoys, repairing roads, and improving defenses.

The presence of the 48th and 60th regiments significantly advanced the fortification of Saratoga, which received Lord Loudoun’s hearty endorsement. Loudoun’s determination to fortify the corridor between Albany and Fort William Henry sprung from his understanding of the military threat to Albany itself, which he considered virtually defenseless. He expected any enemy attack to come by way of Lake George, or by South Bay and Wood Creek, against Fort Edward or the supply lines in that area. “It looks odd on the Map,” he observed to Cumberland, “to see the Provincials advanced before the Troops” (by which he meant the provincials holding Fort William Henry were farther advanced

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61 Hervey, Journals of the Hon. William Hervey, 40; Loudoun to Cumberland, Oct. 3, 1756, in MANA, 239.
62 Boston News-Letter, Sept. 2, 1756, p. 3; Army List, 1757, p. 170, WO 65/4, War Office Papers (National Archives, London, England). The Army List of 1757 shows that Ensign Henry Elwes’s commission was dated June 25, 1755, and that of John Vickers was June 30, 1755, while both officers participated in the ill-fated Braddock Expedition.
63 Loudoun to Phineas Lyman, Sept. 4, 1756, LO 1705, Loudoun Papers.
64 Ralph Burton to Lord Loudoun, Aug. 27, 1756, ibid., LO 1599.
than British regulars at Fort Edward). “But I look on Fort Edward,” he explained, “as the likeliest Post to be attacked; and if that is taken, Fort William Henry, with all the People there falls of Coarse.” The emerging fortification at Saratoga, he noted, was “to prevent the Enemy cutting in, behind us,” to interdict the British supply and communication lines. Forces at Saratoga were also “within the reach of Joining us in a few hours, if wanted at Fort Edward.”

Lt. Col. Henry Bouquet was born in 1719 in Rolle, Switzerland. A career officer, he had entered military service as a seventeen-year-old cadet in the Swiss Regiment of Constant of the States General of the Netherlands. He also saw service with Sardinia during the War of Austrian Succession (1744-1748). In January 1756, he accepted a commission as a lieutenant colonel in the British Army’s 60th (or Royal American) Regiment of Foot, a unit that was recruited among both foreign Protestants as well as American colonists in New York, Pennsylvania, and the Carolinas. Bouquet’s 1st Battalion of the Royal Americans, upon reaching Saratoga, found no shelter or security. Their commander emphasized the lack of barracks in a letter to Lord Loudoun dated October 11, 1756: “The cold and the damp are causing much sickness among our younger soldiers, who are not accustomed to camping and sleeping upon the ground. The doctors believe that the water is not very good and that if they were given a little rum in the morning, that would prevent dysentery.” According to a map that he later submitted to Loudoun, Bouquet indicated that the only structure at Saratoga was a set of “poor barracks” that could accommodate only sixty men, lacked chimneys, and were usually flooded: “The cold is killing our sick men,” he wrote in November, “and we have no means of protecting them from it.”

Loudoun had the opportunity to witness the travails of the Saratoga garrison in late October when he passed through the region. In a letter to Maj. Gen. James Abercromby, the Commander in Chief related how he initiated a new fortification project for Saratoga:

I came next to Saratoga, the Plan I met with there was to fix the Posts that old Fort which is a Little mile lower down River, but that would not do all the Matterials to move, every one thing to be done from the very beginning, and wood close in upon them, so I have order’d it to be in that corner of the present Camp where the Magazine is, and Colonel Fitch thinks that they can secure themselves there.

Loudoun’s letter strongly indicates that there was no fort constructed in 1755 or for most of 1756, as there was still a recommendation (presumably coming from Colonel

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66 Loudoun to Cumberland, Oct. 3, 1756, in Military Affairs in North America, ed. Pargellis, 240; Loudoun to Cumberland, Aug. 20, 1756, ibid., 229.
68 Loudoun to Abercromby, Nov. 4, 1756, Loudon Papers, LO 2151.
Thomas Fitch of Connecticut) that the British reoccupy the site of Fort Clinton. Only a magazine of unknown size existed at the camp.

A plan was drafted by two officers for the small fortification that Loudoun proposed, one that would later encompass the triangulated southwest corner of Fort Hardy’s curtain wall. It had been drafted by Bouquet and Lt. Col. Frederick Haldimand, another Swiss officer commanding the 2nd battalion of the Royal Americans (who would later have a significant career in the War for American Independence as governor of Quebec). Loudoun franked the drawing as “Lt Col Bouquet & Lt Col Hardimans plan for a small work at Saratoga for the Security of the Detachment of Troops, Nov’r 4th 1756.” While there is no record of Lord Loudoun’s direct reply, he apparently took action on Bouquet’s plan in the summer of 1757, dispatching a royal engineer to oversee the fort’s construction.

James Gabriel Montresor (b. 1704), had been appointed as the Chief Engineer of Braddock’s Expedition in 1754. An engineer with deep reservoirs of experience, he had been the Chief Engineer at Gibraltar from 1747 to 1753. Due to illness, he was unable to join Braddock’s Expedition in time and missed it entirely. But Montresor’s vast engineering expertise was applied elsewhere in North America, particularly in fortifications north of Albany. The fullest picture of the construction of Fort Hardy and its infrastructure in 1757 comes from the journal kept by this remarkable engineer. Chief Engineer James Montresor first arrived at Saratoga on June 24th, 1757, where he examined a French prisoner and studied the existing works before moving on to Fort Edward. The incomplete nature of the works at Saratoga is suggested by his assessment that “the storehouse must be built on the Point, raised 3 or 4 feet from the Ground.”

Before Fort Hardy could be constructed in earnest, however, the northern frontier weathered one of the greatest French-Indian offensives of the entire war. In the spring and summer of 1757, Lord Loudoun had been instructed by London to launch an amphibious expedition to capture the French naval base and fortress of Louisbourg. The movement of regulars from Albany to New York left much of the northern frontier exposed and vulnerable. In addition, Loudoun had left Major General Daniel Webb in charge of the troops in upper New York—the same officer who had behaved with such timidity when Montcalm attacked Oswego in 1756. Loudoun’s Louisbourg expedition also meant that there was no meaningful possibility of offensive movements by the mainly provincial troops in upper New York. They would be locked into a defensive posture.

As usual, the French struck first and with demoralizing effect. François-Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil (1703–1779), the officer who had sacked Fort Massachusetts and the Hoosic Valley in the War of Austrian Succession, led a force of approximately 1,500 French,

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70 Preston, Braddock’s Defeat, 68.
Canadians, and Native allies in a devastating raid on Fort William Henry in March 1757. Devastating, as the raiders burned several outbuildings, precious supplies, and even more precious bateaux that could have supported any future advance against Ticonderoga. Then, in July 1757, a British amphibious reconnaissance force going down Lake George, composed of around 350 New Jersey provincials and led by Col. John Parker, was nearly destroyed at Sabbath Day Point by French-Canadian and Indian irregulars, led by Ensign Corbière, who had fought at the Monongahela in 1755. The destruction of so many bateaux as well as the prevalent Indian attacks along British supply lines rendered British commanders nearly blind, depriving them of intelligence of the next French onslaught.73

On August 3, 1757, British and provincial soldiers at Fort William Henry were awestruck by the sight of around 250 French bateaux and hundreds of Indian war canoes. The Governor General of New France, the Marquis de Vaudreuil, made the reduction of Fort William Henry and Fort Edward his primary goals. He allocated a combined force of around 9,000 French regulars, Canadian marines and militia, and Indian allies to the Marquis de Montcalm. The campaign was intended to deflect any British advance up the Champlain Valley, and to strengthen the French forts at Crown Point and Ticonderoga. Montcalm was instructed to “preserve the munitions of war, artillery and arms to be found in these two forts, and to have them all removed to Carillon, after the total destruction of both forts and all their dependencies.” Most important, after the successful conquest of both forts, Vaudreuil planned “to disband all the Indian Nations and to form them into detachments for the purpose of laying waste the settlements of Orange and Corlac.”74 By forcing the British back to the gates of Albany, Vaudreuil hoped to replicate French strategy of the 1740s that had crippled the New York colony.

The Marquis de Montcalm’s successful siege and capture of Fort William Henry in August 1757 was magnified by the French and Indian attacks along the Albany-Lake George corridor, and news of the “massacre” at Fort William Henry following the surrender. Fearing that Fort Edward would be attacked next and that Albany itself might fall, Captain Gabriel Christie of the 48th Regiment wrote to Governor Hardy, begging for “men properly provided, with arms and ammunition,” “to prevent the downfall of the British government upon this Continent.”75 Thankfully for Governor Hardy and Captain Christie, thousands of New England militia poured in to the Saratoga region in late August and September in response to the French attack (a pattern similar to the militia’s response to Burgoyne’s campaign in 1777). Loudoun’s reorganization of British logistics had worked, sustaining troops at their advance posts at Fort Edward despite the threat of enemy attacks.

74 Marquis de Vaudreuil to Comte de Moras, July 12, 1757, Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, ed. O’Callaghan and Fernow, X, 585; Steele, Betrayals, chaps. 3–4.
75 Gabriel Christie to Governor Hardy, Aug. 11, 1757, Loudon Papers, LO 4204.
The French had reached their high water mark, unable to press their advantages due to logistical difficulties unknown to the British.

The Fort William Henry Campaign and its aftermath added great impetus to the fortification project at Saratoga that had essentially remained stagnant since late 1756. Fort Hardy would assume its mature form in 1757 and 1758 under the capable direction of engineer James Montresor. On August 17, 1757, Montresor “Rec’d orders to send the State of Saratoga, what is necessary to done therefor to lodge a post for a Garrison.” He left Fort Edward at 8:00 a.m., arriving at Saratoga at 1:00 p.m. with a party of three carpenters—Robert Dickson, Henry Gilliams, and Bart Taws—to “begin this day on the work at Saratoga.”

One key detail from Montresor’s journal concerns the remnants of the Schuyler estate that had been destroyed in 1745. On August 21st, Montresor “Visited the Sawmill & found it all torn to pieces, the trough & wheels all destroyed to make fire by the Provincials under Coll. Fry & finished by the Militia coming up to Fort Edward. A party of 24 men went to fetch the Slabs which covered the militias Camp.” That sawmill may very well have been the deteriorating remnant of Schuyler sawmill that the French had left standing in 1745. Due to the lack of tents, soldiers were using the milled boards to construct makeshift shelters and as fuel for campfires (an orderly book kept by Leonard Spaulding of Frye’s Massachusetts provincial regiment recorded that “no person take any more bords from the saw mill”). Although Montresor blamed American provincial troops, it was likely that British regulars who had been garrisoning the area since late 1756 had also resorted to that practice. Montresor’s crews salvaged “the Saws from the Mill and Some loose pieces of Timber.” Another revealing entry relates how Montresor “Measured & Surveyed part of the Ground of the old Block house.” It is unclear what that old blockhouse structure was and where it was located. It may have been the blockhouse shown on Mackellar’s map overlooking the lower falls, or a makeshift fortification constructed in 1755 or 1756 at the Fish Kill, or perhaps a remnant of one of Fort Clinton’s blockhouses.

In late August and early September, Montresor had crews of sawyers and carpenters coming and going between Saratoga and Fort Edward, and parties of soldiers to cover the crews while they worked. Most carpenters were paid seven shillings per day. Robert Dickson, one of the carpenters, worked for 34 days. The crews’ first task was collecting timber and stone from the area. On August 25, for example, a work party “cut 18 [timber], but Could not bring 11 for want of Teams.” On another occasion, a party “brought fourteen logs in a Raft.” A team of masons —“20 Men in Stone, 6 in the foundations”—was at work as well. Meanwhile, Montresor was designing a formal Vaubanian fortification in the woods.

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76 Scull, Journals of James Montresor, 30.
77 Ibid.; Leonard Spaulding Orderly Book, 1755–1782, June 3, 1757, p. 19, BV Spaulding (New-York Historical Society). Sanders to Johnson, November 28, 1745, Papers of Sir William Johnson, ed. Sullivan, I, 42–43 (Sanders relates that the French and Indians “Destroyed all that Came before them Left only one Sawmill Standing, w.ch stood a Little out of their way it seems”).
of America: he “Traced part of the Fort, and took a profile through it,” on August 29th. Montresor’s major objective in the fall was the establishment of “a Cover of Provisions & all the Works.” The lack of protection for supplies was telling, as he and other officers surveyed the flour, and “found the whole bad except for a few Casks.” Col. Beamsley Glasier of the New York Provincial Regiment and Capt. George Fletcher of the 35th Regiment inspected 1276 barrels of flour at Saratoga, and found 1018 of them unfit for use.78

On September 1st, his teams began “pulling down the old Fort,” perhaps a reference to the picketed stockade that the 48th Regiment had put up in 1756. On September 3rd, they “Continued raising the Cover of Provisions & all the Works &c &c.” Soon, carpenters and bricklayers from Albany had arrived. Having begun the works at Saratoga, Montresor was ordered by General Abercromby to review all the posts at Saratoga, Still Water, and Fort Edward. The materials and improvements necessary to bring these fortifications up to British standards led Col. Nathaniel Mesarve of New Hampshire to suggest that Schuyler’s sawmill at Saratoga be brought back into service, but Montresor decided to postpone that discussion until the spring of 1758 (sawn boards were apparently being brought from Schaghticoke to Stillwater).79

New Discoveries: The Fort Hardy Maps, 1757

One of the most important contributions of this report is the discovery of four new drawings of Fort Hardy and its buildings, reflecting the period of Montresor’s work in 1757. While the author was researching at the Huntington Library in California, he noted a series of maps in the card catalog that were labeled as “Fort George” on the Hudson River. Unfamiliar with any Fort George on the Hudson, and upon closer inspection, he realized that they were in fact maps of Fort Hardy, as the topography and waterways clearly match Saratoga and the junction of Fish Kill and the Hudson. The name “Fort George” is written on the original maps, which raises the question of why the post became widely known as Fort Hardy and not Fort George. Many of these maps may have been done by Montresor himself, as they bear a resemblance to his earlier maps and he referenced in his journal having “Traced part of the Fort, and took a Profile through it,” but authorship cannot be definitively proven, even after comparison to known maps by Montresor.80

The first map (Figure 3.3), entitled “Plan, and Sections of Fort-George. Built upon Hudson’s River: A.D. 1757,” shows a small 200-foot-square fortification dominating the junction of “Fish-kill River” and the Hudson. It is similar to another map located in the U.K. National Archives (Figure 3.4.). Both show detail on the fort’s profile as well as a

80 Scull, Journals of James Montresor, 31.
drawing of the gate. The northwest bastion contained a platform for one artillery piece. The profile shows a glacis leading to a ditch or moat, and a fraise of sharpened logs protruding from the ramparts of the fort. The profile indicates the traditional use of timbers forming the inner and outer walls of the ramparts, filled with earth in between. An entirely different map (Figure 3.5), entitled “A Rough Sketch of the Lines at Saratoga,” labels that square fort as a “Provincial Fort,” perhaps indicating that American troops were garrisoned there to separate them from British regulars occupying the largest area of Fort Hardy. The “Rough Sketch” was done by British Captain George Bartman of the 44th Regiment, an aide-de-camp to General Daniel Webb in 1757. Bartman’s map also indicates two different landing sites for bateaux coming up the Hudson. The first was located literally at the north tip of land where the Fish Kill empties into the Hudson. A road from that landing led straight into the Provincial Fort for easy unloading of supplies or disembarkation of soldiers, exiting the main gate of the fort and continuing northward to Fort Miller. A second landing was situated outside the Provincial Fort’s walls, next to the northernmost rampart. It was a landing cut through the embankment next to the river, and similarly connected to the main wagon road leading northward to Fort Miller. The second landing allowed easier access to the “Kings Store houses” located within Fort Hardy’s walls and running parallel to the Hudson River.81

**Figure 3.4.** “Plan, and Sections of Fort-George. Built upon Hudson’s River: A.D. 1757,” Huntington Manuscripts 15454, Huntington Library, San Marino, California.

**Figure 3.5.** “Plan of the Post at Saratoga in 1757,” MPH 1/5/6, The National Archives (U.K.), Kew.
A Borderland Conquered: Saratoga during the French & Indian War, 1754–1763

Figure 3.6. George Bartman, “A Rough Sketch of the Lines at Saratoga [ca. 1757],” Huntington Manuscripts 15438, Huntington Library, San Marino, California.
The second map in the series (Figure 3.7), titled “Plan, Elevation, and Section of the Barracks at Fort-George, which contains 140 Men,” shows a barracks building of squared timbers and brick hearths, with interior partitions for the soldiers’ berths. Each barracks structure was approximately 100 feet long and 19 feet wide. With two barracks buildings inside, Fort Hardy’s interior fortification could house 280 men. Commissary officer Robert Leake wrote in late October 1757 that “Our Barracks goes on pretty briskly at present and will be fit to receive the Troops in a Fortnight, as I am informed.”

![Figure 3.7. Detail, George Bartman, “A Rough Sketch of the Lines at Saratoga [ca. 1757],” Huntington Manuscripts 15438, Huntington Library, San Marino, California.](image)

![Figure 3.8. “Plan, Elevation, and Section of the Barracks at Fort-George, which contains 140 Men,” ca. 1757, Huntington Manuscripts 15457, Huntington Library, San Marino, California.](image)

82 “Plan, Elevation, and Section of the Barracks at Fort-George, which contains 140 Men,” ca. 1757, Huntington Manuscripts 15457 (Huntington Library).
A third map (Figure 3.8), titled “Elevation of the Store-house built at Fort-George: which contains 2500 barrels of Flower,” shows one of Fort Hardy’s most unique structural features.

Measuring sixty feet long by twenty-four feet wide and nineteen feet in elevation, this storehouse was elevated on posts and protruded out from the fort, overhanging the eastern rampart and ditch (this storehouse is also marked on the first map as “Storehouse, which will contain 2500 Flower-barrels” and the profile shows how it was elevated upon posts above the ramparts and ditch). With only two central passageways forming a cross through the building, the entire structure was stacked seven barrels high with thirty-six rows of flour barrels, ten rows deep.  

Whether or not this unique appendage to the fort was ever constructed is unclear. Engineer Montresor referenced the construction in September 1757 of “two Covers for Provisions will Contain 2596 Barrells of Flour.” His team had “the Crutches and Small timber for the Posts of the Storehouse” and the “Crutches for the Cover of the Provision Shed” constructed. The crutches can best be seen in the “Plan and Sections” map, with its detail of the framework upholding the elevated store house. On the other hand, commissary officer Robert Leake warned in late October 1757 that “We have three Shades [sheds] in which we have stowed all the provisions (except that which was condemned). But as these Stores are all open at the Sides and ends, the Rain drives in very much and in course it will be much worse in time of Snow. Unless there are better Stores for Flour, Rice, & Peas there will be a great loss of those Articles this Winter.” Montresor also records that in early November “Lord Loudoun was excessively angry at Saratoga in not finding as he said a Store house ready built.”

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83 “Elevation of the Store-house built at Fort-George: which contains 2500 barrels of Flower,” ca. 1757, Huntington Manuscripts 15456 (Huntington Library).
84 Scull, Journals of James Montresor, 42–43, 48.
The well-known 1757 sketch entitled “Prospect of Saratogha” in the Library of Congress provides a summary view of Montresor’s work in 1757. It captures a substantial garrison within the walls of Fort Hardy, with officers’ huts and enlisted tents in the largest area. The Provincial Fort with its two large barracks buildings and the king’s store houses along the river reflect the work of Montresor. The provision sheds that Leake complained of may be the three parallel structures to the left of the Provincial Fort and to the right of the northern sally port. By late 1757, Fort Hardy had matured into a powerful supply depot with a substantial garrison. As such, it projected British forces to the northward, and sustained the lines of supply and communication stretching back to Albany and New York City. The construction of posts, roads, boats, and storehouses would continue to require mammoth amounts of labor and resources just to maintain that infrastructure and support an expedition each year. Lord Loudoun’s leadership had made it possible for the British to overcome the logistical challenges of campaigning in America. But Loudoun would not savor the fruits of victory derived from his labors, as he was recalled in December 1757 and replaced as commander in chief by Major General James Abercromby, who would lead the principal British expedition in 1758 against Fort Ticonderoga.86

The 1758 and 1759 Campaigns and the Conquest of New France

In February 1758, Captain Thomas Baugh, a company commander in the 55th Regiment of Foot, submitted a return for his garrison of 108 officers and men encamped at Saratoga. The 55th Regiment had embarked for America from Cork, Ireland in 1757—part of the force that Lord Loudoun had projected to attack Louisbourg. The failure of that expedition diverted the regiment to New York, where it spent the winter encamped near Albany and points north.\(^{87}\)

The British peer who commanded the 55th Regiment—George Augustus, Viscount Howe—embodied a new esprit de corps in the British Army of 1758. Lord Howe was an officer and leader who infused a spirit of adapting and overcoming to the soldiers. As commander of the 55\(^{th}\) Regiment, he transformed it into a force of light infantry outfitted

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\(^{87}\) Captain Thomas Baugh [55th Regiment], “Monthly Return of the State and Strength of the Garrison of Saratoga,” Feb. 3, 1758, AS 1, Gage Papers; George Noakes, *A Historical Account of the Services of the 34th & 55th Regiments* (Carlisle, PA: C. Thurnam and Sons, 1875), 12.
and trained for service in America. Howe had the gift of condescension, which in the eighteenth century meant an ability to converse and deal with one’s social inferiors more as equals. This British aristocrat accompanied Rogers’ Rangers on one occasion, placing himself under their tutelage as he learned their tactics and earned their respect. Howe acted as the operational commander of the 1758 expedition to capture Fort Ticonderoga even as General Abercromby accompanied the army as the overall commander in chief.88

The 1758 Expedition to Ticonderoga—which most historians view as one of the greatest disasters of the war—actually witnessed one of the greatest logistical achievements of the entire Seven Years’ War. The British had assembled the largest concentration of military force ever seen in North America, numbering 17,600 British Regulars, provincial troops, and Iroquois allies to float down Lake George to attack Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga). It was the equivalent of the third largest city in the thirteen colonies floating on bateaux, barges, and radeaux (a large floating artillery battery). Supplies for seventeen thousand men, their ammunition, artillery, horses, and wagons were all moved by boat.89 The supply system that Lord Loudoun had pioneered in 1756 and 1757 enabled and sustained this incredible movement and projection of force. And the level of supplies needed to sustain this vast military city in the wilderness was staggering. A document in the Loudoun Papers attests to the sheer volume of supplies that the British had stockpiled in the fortifications and garrisons in and around Albany. Recorded by commissary officer Robert Leake, it details “A General Account of Provisions in Store” in October 1757, shortly before the largest campaign of the war, led by Abercromby and Howe, got underway.90 Including Albany, it lists posts on the upper Hudson such as Half Moon, Still Water, Saratoga, and Fort Edward; the Mohawk Valley was also heavily militarized, with posts at Schenectady, Fort Johnson, Fort Hunter (Tiononderoge), Fort Hendrick (Canajoharie), and Fort Herkimer (near German Flatts).

Along with the nine forts or garrisons listed, the garrison of “Sarachtego,” with its 922 barrels of flour, 58 bushels of peas, 19 tierces and 9 barrels of rice, 102 firkins of butter, and 508 barrels of salt pork, fulfilled a vital role in Britain’s ability to sustain thousands of men. Most likely even more mountains of supplies arrived in the spring of 1758 as the army prepared to advance.

Before departing for Albany, General Abercromby had dispatched the able Lord Howe to oversee the movements of supplies northward from Albany to Lake George. Howe’s presence was so striking that a spot along the military road about three miles north of Saratoga became known as “Lord Howe’s Encampment.” He infused everything with energy, as in his instruction to Frederick Haldimand that “you have judged quite right in adding 50 men to work upon the Saratoga road, the more you can spare for that purpose, the better.”91 By the middle of May 1758, “ten weeks Provisions for 20,000 Men” had been sent northward and more was on the way, amounting to tens of thousands of barrels of provisions. Abercromby had also “engaged 300 Oxteams, and all the Wagons that can be procured in the three Upper Counties of this Province, all which will be wanted to carry the Batteaus, as well as every other Requisite from Fort Edward to Lake George.” Construction of bateaux to transport an army of 17,000 and its supplies had consumed

91 Lord Howe to Frederick Haldimand, June 8, 1758, (microfilm reel A-665), vol. B68, f. 10, Frederick Haldimand Papers (Library and Archives Canada).
British carpenters and boatmakers in 1757 and 1758. But according to General Abercromby, Lt. Col. John Bradstreet had “proceeded with all Dispatch, in building & expediting a Proper Number of Bateaus, of which I have the Satisfaction to acquaint you, that there are now 1500.” While there were enough boats, there was such a “Deficiency of Batteau-Men” that British commanders turned to American provincial troops to do the job. A British physician with Abercromby’s army, Doctor Richard Huck-Saunders, wrote numerous letters during the 1758 expedition that captured its dramatic moments. He wrote from Albany on May 29, 1758 that

> Every Thing on his Part is forwarded with great Vigour for opening the Campaign. Lord How is betwixt Saratoga and Fort Edward, repairing the Roads, and protecting the Battoes transporting of Provisions. Bradstreet has built fifteen Hundred and twenty large Battoes, and we have about five Hundred and twenty large Battoes, and we have about five Hundred Whale Boats, but he has not provided that Number of Battoemen your Lordship had ordered. Some say he has not five Hundred. A Part of the New York Provincials, the only Provincials that are yet arrived at Albany, are employ’d as Battoemen and Waggoners ….”

Abercromby’s armada finally departed from southern tip of Lake George, at the site of Fort William Henry, on July 5, 1758. It was a city floating northward towards Fort Carillon. Spirits were high as the army landed without opposition only two miles from its target on July 6th. That same day, British columns marching parallel to the La Chute River encountered on their left a French patrol returning back to Ticonderoga. In the ensuing firefight, the indispensable Lord Howe was killed instantly by a musket shot to the chest. From that moment, the army’s morale and momentum never recovered. The Marquis de Montcalm, meanwhile, had moved most of his 4,200 French regulars, Canadian militia, and handful of Native allies to a stronger position on the Heights of Carillon outside the fort’s walls. There, French engineers laid out a powerful complex of field fortifications. General Abercromby, in the absence of his able subordinate Lord Howe, proved to be an unimaginative commander. On July 8, 1758, he ordered wave after wave of direct assaults against French positions that he believed could be taken by storm. The results were ghastly, resulting in the bloodiest day in American history until the Battle of Antietam in September 1862. Astonishingly, a British army with the capacity to encircle the French or besiege the Heights of Carillon, was paralyzed by panic and indecision from the enlisted ranks to the commanding general. Abercromby could still have attempted to bring forward his siege artillery and convince the French (already short on supplies) that they could not outlast a lengthy

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93 Richard Huck-Saunders to Loudoun, May 29, 1758, LO 5837, Loudoun Papers.
British siege. Instead, he squandered perhaps his greatest advantage—logistical superiority gained through posts like Saratoga—even as his enemy could barely sustain their presence at Ticonderoga. It was perhaps fitting that on the anniversary of Braddock’s Defeat three years earlier, Abercromby’s army retreated in precipitate flight back up Lake George. Another attempt on Ticonderoga was abandoned until 1759.  

As news spread of “the Battle, or rather Slaughter that has happen’d to our Army near Carilong,” the defeated army dispersed into encampments in the fortifications north of Albany. The British troops returned to their typical duties of “repairing the Roads as usual,” repairing roads, hauling bateaux, improving fortifications, and guarding convoys and cattle. Following the failed attempt on Ticonderoga, Col. Timothy Ruggles’ Massachusetts provincial regiment “Marched down within about three miles of Saratoga to a place called Lord Howe’s Encampment. Received news that yesterday there was a party of Indians fell on some teams that were going to Fort Edward to Half-way Brook, where they killed 25 men and thirty-eight Teams.”

Raiders and Rangers

The militarization of the borderlands around Saratoga, as we have seen, resulted in Britain’s ability to garrison and sustain large numbers of troops far inland. Abercromby’s army did not dissolve as a result of its disastrous defeat at Ticonderoga. In the same manner, the large and sustained presence of British and provincial troops muted one of New France’s greatest historic advantages: la guerre sauvage against vulnerable British colonial frontiers. In the last war, French and Indian attacks had paralyzed the New York government and British military forces in the region. But the militarization of the Mohawk and upper Hudson Valleys altered that historic dynamic.

The French and Indian attack on Hoosick in 1754 seemed to presage a repetition of their earlier successes. By maintaining large concentrations of forces at Schenectady, the Mohawk Valley, Still Water, Saratoga, Fort Miller, Fort Edward, and Fort William Henry, British forces made it difficult for French and Indian raiders to sack or destroy settlements in a manner that would lead to the abandonment of the frontier altogether. British forces could not completely prevent raids on the frontier, but their presence made it less possible for the French to achieve a stunning surprise. As the French officer Louis-Antoine de Bougainville observed in 1756, “it would appear to me to seem impossible to undertake anything of consequence against troops three times greater in number, well established

94 René Chartrand, Ticonderoga 1758: Montcalm’s Victory Against All Odds (Oxford, Eng.: Osprey Publishing, 2000); “Return of the Names of the Officers of the Several Regiments, who were killed or wounded near Tienderoga, July 8, 1758,” WO 1/1, ff. 202 (National Archives England); “Return of Killed Missing & Wounded of His Majesty’s Troops & Provincials in the Action near Tienderoge, July 8th, 1758,” ibid., 225.

everywhere, and having the support of very good forts.” Instead, French authorities recognized that the best strategy to pursue was interdiction of British supply and communication lines, as Bougainville observed: “The great usefulness of these Indians to us should be to overwhelm small parties on the Lydius road and neighboring woods, to intercept all couriers and convoys not of great size and to warn us of major movements. . . .” And that put Saratoga squarely in French and Indian crosshairs.

During the campaigns from 1755 to 1760, French and Indian parties maintained nearly incessant pressure on the communication between Albany and Lake George. Occasionally they destroyed supply convoys and killed or captured dozens of soldiers. The historical record is marked with a steady stream of unfortunate wagoners, teamsters, and isolated travelers who were killed or scalped along the roads. Given the aims of Native American warfare—minimal casualties, taking captives and scalps, and securing valuable material—attacks on places surrounding Saratoga were ideal targets for Indian war parties. The French also wanted to target British communication lines, so that they could gain intelligence from British prisoners.

In early 1756, it was already being reported in British newspapers that “the French and Indians are pretty often of late between Saratoga and Fort-Edward.” One unfortunate fellow who was killed in March 1756 was found with “thirteen Balls lodged in different Parts of his Body.” French and Native perspectives can be perceived in a French account that relates how in March 1758, the French officer “M. de Langy had been with the Indians on the Sarasteau road; that the Iroquois, having taken an onion pedlar, wanted to return home; that four Outaouis had attacked a convoy which they dispersed, killed four men, took one prisoner and plundered several sleighs.” This particular attack on sleighs may correspond to an account published in the Boston Evening-Post and other British newspapers shortly thereafter: “as some Sleighs were coming from Fort Edward, to this place [Albany], they were attacked by some Indians upon the North River, above Saraghtoga, about 10 o’Clock in the Morning. At their first Fire they killed a Slay-man and a Soldier, who was one of an Escort from the Enniskilling Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant John Belcher.” The British detail from the 27th Regiment returned fire until Major Robert Rogers and some of his rangers came up to pursue the enemy.

The presence of the famed Robert Rogers and his rangers at Saratoga is another reason why British forces successfully stood their ground against enemy attacks and were

97 For examples from French sources of attacks on British supply lines, see *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, ed. O’Callaghan and Fernow, X, 569, 593, 596, 664, 668, 697, 703, 759, 785, 803–4, 816, 848–49. For examples of British newspaper reports on attacks on the Saratoga-Fort Edward area, see *New-York Gazette*, May 1, 1758; *Boston Gazette*, March 26, 1759, p. 1; and *Boston Post-Boy*, May 26, 1760, p. 2.
98 *Boston Evening-Post*, March 1, 1756, p. 2; *New-York Mercury*, April 5, 1756, p. 3
100 *Boston Evening-Post*, April 3, 1758, p. 4.
ultimately able to conquer New France. Prior to the Seven Years’ War, French-Canadians and Native American warriors had proven to be the dominant irregular or unconventional fighters in America. The British colonies in general had no equivalent to the Canadian officers of the *troupes de la marine* who excelled in Indian diplomacy and forest warfare (Sir William Johnson is the exception that proves the rule for the British colonies). In 1755 and 1756, as the British absorbed the lesson of Braddock’s Defeat—that conventional British armies could not contest a large force of Canadian and Native irregulars—Lord Loudoun created Independent Ranger Companies that were commanded by Major Robert Rogers. In addition, the British Army in America began to develop light infantry units and training, institutionalizing the patterns of war in America into the regular army ranks. Col. Thomas Gage, for example, formed the first light infantry regiment in the British Army, the 80th Regiment of Foot. Lord Howe, as commander of the 55th Regiment, also adapted his regulars for service in woods using many of Rogers’ techniques. By late May 1758, as Richard Huck-Saunders observed, The Art of War is much changed and improved here. I suppose by the End of Summer it will be have undergone a total Revolution.102

French Canadians and Indian irregulars would be effectively counterpoised by British rangers and light infantry. These specialized British forces trained in woodland combat; they emphasized marksmanship; equipment and weaponry adapted to their tactics; and imbibed the tactics and ways of their enemies. Rogers’ Rangers also included contingents of British-allied Mohicans from Stockbridge, Massachusetts. Part of Capt. Jacob Cheeksunkun’s Indian company was sent to Saratoga in the summer of 1756 to act under the command of Colonel Burton of the 48th Regiment during their encampment at Fort Hardy. In his journal, Lieutenant William Hervey recorded several Stockbridge Mohican scouting missions originating from Saratoga and Fort Edward, including one aimed at Ticonderoga that resulted in two Frenchmen being killed and scalped. That and other successful raids and scouts by Rogers’ Rangers during the war were prime examples of how British irregulars were bringing the fight to the enemy’s doorstep.103

Robert Rogers was personally present at Saratoga many times during the war. In August and September 1756, for example, Rogers interacted with Colonel Burton of the 48th Regiment and returned to Saratoga following a scouting mission:

Upon my return to the fort, I received orders from my Lord Loudoun to wait upon Col. Burton, of the 48th regiment, for instructions, he being then posted at Saratoga. By him I was ordered to return to my company at Fort William-Henry, and march them to the South Bay, thence east to the Wood Creek, then to cross it southerly, opposite to Saratoga, and return and make my report to him. There I met my brother Capt. Richard Rogers with his company, he being ordered back from Mohock River, to join me with the remainder of the Stockbridge Indians.104

Rogers also encountered Atiatoharongwen, the African-Abenaki resident of Saratoga who had been taken as a captive in 1745. Louis Cook was now a Kahnawake Mohawk warrior, who had first tasted battle against General Edward Braddock in 1755. He was one of around two hundred Canadian Iroquois who fought under Captain Daniel-Marie Hyacinthe Liénard de Beaujeu—a veteran of the Saratoga raid that had captured the young African-Abenaki boy and transformed his life forever. In the spring of 1756 or 1757 Atiatoharongwen was part of a French and Indian scouting party operating in the vicinity of Ticonderoga, where it encountered a force of Rogers’ Rangers. During the ensuing skirmish, he was wounded—"long a source of annoyance, but his conduct had gained him character for courage as a warrior."105

French attacks along the Albany–Lake George corridor spiked following the spectacular French successes at Fort William Henry in 1757 and at Carillon in 1758. The French governor general, the Marquis de Vaudreuil, fully understood the threat that logistical centers like Fort Edward and Saratoga posed to New France, as he urged the Marquis de Montcalm to exert maximum pressure on the British in July 1758:

You are, in fact, now in a position to have constantly considerable detachments of Regulars, Canadians and Indians along the lake and head of the bay, to harass our enemies with vigor, to cut off their communication with Lydias [Fort Edward], to intercept their convoys, to force them to retire and perhaps even to abandon their artillery, field train, bateaux, provisions, ammunition, &c. These movements are worthy your attention; they must be decisive for this Colony, since thereby we can deprive our enemies forever of the power of renewing a similar enterprise.106

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104 Todish, ed. Annotated and Illustrated Journals of Major Robert Rogers, 54.
105 Hough, History of St. Lawrence and Franklin Counties, 183.
Two Saratoga veterans from the War of Austrian Succession—Captain La Corne Saint-Luc and Lieutenant Joseph Marin de la Malgue—led some of the most spectacular raids on British supply lines following the Ticonderoga debacle. As young officers in the 1740s, they had been conspicuous in the French attacks on Saratoga in 1745 and 1747 and were familiar with the region. In late July 1758, La Corne led a strong detachment of 400 French and Indians to attack the “Lidius road.” Between Fort Edward and the Halfway Camp, La Corne’s party mauled a large British supply convoy and “captured 53 wagons loaded with provisions, 230 oxen, took 80 scalps and 60 prisoners, including men, women and children.” Only one Iroquois warrior was killed and one wounded.\(^\text{107}\) In early August 1758, Lieutenant Joseph Marin de La Malgue departed Fort Carillon with a detachment of over 400 Canadians and Indians, also aiming at the supply road between Saratoga and Fort Edward. Robert Rogers had been ordered on a reconnaissance toward South Bay with a force of one hundred regulars, 150 light infantry (mainly of Gage’s 80th Regiment of Foot), and four hundred rangers. Near the site of Fort Anne, Lieutenant Marin detected the British presence and waited in a set-piece ambush. The two-hour mêlée was a ferocious firefight, which produced two hundred total casualties and many scalps taken. But Rogers’s men had held. Marin withdrew towards South Bay, while Rogers reconnoitered towards Saratoga. Louis-Antoine de Bougainville’s assessment of Marin’s expedition—“the game was not even”—was a telling tribute to the British rangers and light infantry who had checked the historic dominance of Canadian and Indian raiders.\(^\text{108}\) One British officer later observed, “the French Indians are not so forward in scouting as they us’d to be, before Major Rogers had the last skirmish with them. . . .”\(^\text{109}\)

## Conclusion: A Borderland Conquered

In late 1758, Brig. Gen. Jeffry Amherst was appointed as commander in chief of His Majesty’s forces in North America, following London’s recall of the discredited General Abercromby. Amherst was a general bent on conquest. His aggressive spirit matched the growing fighting prowess of his soldiers, and his determination seeped into the hearts of men like Captain Salah Barnard, who knew that “we ar put undr marching orders for the Reduction of all Canada.”\(^\text{110}\) David Fiske of Massachusetts recorded in his journal (perhaps copying information from a newspaper) that over 42,000 regulars and

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\(^{109}\) Todish, *Annotated and Illustrated Journals of Major Robert Rogers*, 146.

\(^{110}\) Journal of Captain Salah Barnard, Aug. 2, 1759.
provincials had been mobilized in 1758. Some of those provincial soldiers were young recruits who had been born and raised at Saratoga: James Spring, and William McHorney were teenagers and laborers who enlisted in New York provincial companies in 1758 and 1759. Despite the French triumph at Carillon, that incredible weight of manpower had given British armies in America incredible victories in 1758: Amherst’s army had conquered the French naval base at Louisbourg, opening the way to the Gulf of St. Lawrence and Quebec; Col. John Bradstreet had raided and destroyed the vital French supply base at Fort Frontenac; and Gen. John Forbes had driven the French from Fort Duquesne in the Ohio Valley. The Marquis de Montcalm knew that time was against New France. Poor harvests in Canada had created a crisis in food supplies in the colony, even as the British were poised to strike deep into Canada in 1759 with three separate armies. Meanwhile, the bulwark of New France’s defenses—Native American alliances—was also beginning to crumble as Indian peoples realistically assessed the political and military circumstances. The Six Nations contributed nearly one thousand warriors support the British army operating against Fort Niagara in 1759, and fielded the same number again to support Amherst’s drive on Montréal via upper St. Lawrence River.

Saratoga’s key contribution in the war came in 1759 with General Amherst’s campaign against Ticonderoga and Crown Point. It was again a logistical contribution. During his journey to and from Albany and Fort Edward to inspect posts, General Amherst visited Saratoga on October 4 and 8, 1758, where he found “the woods are not very thick and the Road all making good” Over 12,000 British troops were encamped in Albany, Schenectady, and their surrounding posts. Captain Thomas Baugh’s company of the 55th Regiment, encamped at Saratoga during the winter of 1758, was but one unit of a still-potent army that would renew its advance on Ticonderoga in 1759 under Amherst’s direct command. Amherst conducted a methodical campaign, one that did not repeat the mistakes of his predecessor. By early June 1759, he had marshalled his army at Lake George, and by July 22 the British had repeated the logistical miracle of the previous year: floating the equivalent of a large city on boats, with all its equipment and supplies.

There would be no miracle for the French this time, while the events of 1759 for the British produced an annus mirabilis (year of miracles). Amherst’s army quickly advanced on Ticonderoga on July 23, and found the entrenchments on Carillon Heights abandoned, the enemy having withdrawn to the fort. Amherst broke ground to begin a formal siege with soldiers who were highly confident of victory, and who “no longer think that the lake

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111 “The Regulars Troops in North America,” 1758, in Diary of David Fiske (Thompson-Pell Research Center).
113 MacLeod, Canadian Iroquois and the Seven Years’ War, chaps. 8–9.
115 “List of Quarters, October 17, 1758,” AS 1, Gage Papers; Thomas Baugh, 55th Regt to Thomas Gage, Feb. 3, 1759, ibid.
is enchanted.” On July 26, the French boarded their bateaux and left “a match to the magazine, which would blow up the whole fort.” Facing the same fate at Crown Point, the French also decided to scuttle that outpost and withdraw northward closer to Montréal. On August 4, Amherst’s army occupied Crown Point, a fort that had symbolized the French threat to New York and New England for decades.116 British forces elsewhere in America and the world had also achieved phenomenal victories—Generals John Prideaux and Sir William Johnson had captured Fort Niagara in July 1759, while Maj. Gen. James Wolfe and Vice Adm. Charles Saunders would take Quebec in September 1759. At the naval battle of Quiberon Bay off the French coast, the Royal Navy decisively crushed the main French fleet, while the combined British, Hanoverian, and German armies under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick achieved a stunning victory over the French army at the Battle of Minden in 1759.

For the rest of the war, Saratoga continued to function in its role as a supply center, enabling Amherst to advance even deeper into Canada in 1760. By December of 1759, Fort Hardy had been stripped of virtually all its artillery and small arms as the British army’s operations closed in on Quebec and Montréal. A paltry number of small arms were left, capable of equipping no more than a company of soldiers. Captain Thomas Sterling and 60 men of the 42nd (or Royal Highland) Regiment were garrisoned at Saratoga that winter. On Christmas Eve 1759, Sterling wrote a “Return of Artillery and Ammunition at Saratoga,” showing a much-diminished list of ordnance and supplies: two swivel guns, three barrels of gunpowder, twenty-five powder cartridges for the swivels, and sixty rounds of grape shot. Saratoga still possessed the ability to send forward additional supplies, in the form of barrels of salt pork (43), flour (52), peas (84), and butter (53).117 The Saratoga garrison continued its usual labor of repairing roads, interrupted by occasional Indian attacks that continued even into 1760.118

Three British armies were now poised to deliver the final crushing blow to New France. Amherst led the westernmost army down the St. Lawrence River towards Montréal; Col. William Haviland continued to advance northward down Lake Champlain; and General James Murray advanced up the St. Lawrence from Quebec, with the remains of Wolfe’s army. These three forces converged on Montréal in September 1760, forcing the surrender of the last French troops under the Chevalier de Lévis.119 The militarization of

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118 John Reid to TG, April 15, 1760, AS 6, Gage Papers. On Indian attacks near Saratoga in 1759 and 1760, see Boston Gazette, March 26, 1759, p. 1; and Boston Post-Boy, May 26, 1760, p. 2.
the long borderland between the Iroquois and Abenaki nations and the colonies of New France, New York, and New England had enabled British arms to triumph over the French by 1760. The French had been conquered, and had ceded New France and their imperial claims in North America to the British at the Treaty of Paris in 1763. The borderland between Canada and New York was all a British claim but the Six Nations and Canadian Iroquois still asserted their independence and rights to that land. The removal of French Canada as a barrier to British expansion fueled a surge of colonial land grants and settlements in the postwar period. But while the British may have conquered the French, they had hardly vanquished Native American nations across the continent who suffered the brunt of the British colonies’ postwar growth. Peace returned to Saratoga in the 1760s, but the consequences of that conquest for the region’s native and colonial inhabitants would shape the conditions for yet another devastating war. For the British would find that the costs of asserting control over a vast new American empire would sow the conditions of that empire’s dissolution.
In 1767, a Scottish traveler named Francis Grant, of Aberdeenshire, made a journey through North America that would have been impossible for a British traveler in the previous one hundred years. Beginning at New York City in April, he journeyed up the Hudson to Albany, then west to Schenectady, up the Mohawk Valley to Lake Ontario. From Fort Niagara, he went northeast back across Lake Ontario, and down the St. Lawrence River to Montréal and Quebec, before returning to Albany by way of Lake Champlain and Saratoga in July 1767. This borderland was now a nominally British world, following the Treaty of Paris that concluded the Seven Years’ War in 1763. With the “scratch of a pen,” as Francis Parkman famously put it, New France had ceased to exist. France ceded its imperial claims east of the Mississippi River to Great Britain, leaving Native nations in alliance with their French father in a precarious status.

All along his route, but especially in Canada and the Champlain and Hudson valleys, Grant witnessed the physical manifestations of British conquest—the past remains of battlefields and fortifications as well as present garrisons of regular troops. Coming up Lake Champlain, he viewed the massive pentagonal British Fort Crown Point, “now going fast to decay,” he wrote. At Ticonderoga he viewed the remains of the French fort, as well as Montcalm’s entrenchments on the Heights of Carillon, which he added “still remain entire, and are very strong.” As he neared Albany, there was more evidence of settlement and economic activity. He noted the new settlement of Skenesborough on South Bay, begun by Maj. Philip Skene, a British officer who had served in the region during the late war. Along the old military road from Lake George to Fort Edward, Grant encountered “some Settlements on the road.” At Fort Edward, he found “numbers of new Settlements about this place, and as far as Saratoga on the banks of the river: these Settlements increase daily.”

Grant was struck by Saratoga’s prospect, “pleasantly situated in a fine valley.” He noted “many fine farms, and the soil appears to be exceedingly good.” The remains Fort Clinton caught his eye, as he described “the ruins of an old Fort, which in the war before last was the Frontier of the Province of New York.” Most likely he met Philip Schuyler during his journey (either at Schuyler’s Albany or Saratoga estates), as he learned of how in 1745 “this Settlement was cut off by the French and Indians.” He described Schuyler’s estate as “a fine Settlement here through which runs a creek, on which he has a fine herring fishery where immense quantities of herring are caught on which in bad years the poor people all around subsist.” Grant and other travelers in the 1760s perceived that profound things were at work in the land. The detritus of war became markers of how French

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dominance had ended, and of how an expansive British world was rushing in. Lord Adam Gordon, a British aristocrat who journeyed through Saratoga in 1765, noted that the region was “all peopling and Clearing very fast, in so much, that tho in the beginning of last War, all was abandon’d from Fort Edward, to within three Miles of Albany, and cut off by the Indians in the French Interest, I will venture to say, that will never again happen.”

The renaissance of Philip Schuyler’s estate at Saratoga was but one reason why this borderland area was becoming a thoroughly British zone of settlement and occupation. Like his uncle’s estate twenty years earlier, Philip Schuyler’s estate in the 1760s functioned as a powerful engine fueling settlement and economic development. Schuyler had rebuilt his estate to a remarkable degree after the war, again with reliance upon African labor. In 1775, Schuyler published an advertisement in the New-York Gazette for the sale of four different tracts within his Saratoga holdings. One tract of 322 acres he described “in the neighbourhood to two good grist-mills, and several saw-mills, in a well settled part of the country.” “All the above lands,” he continued, “are exceeding good, well timbered and watered, and in a very growing part of the country; the inhabitants already settled there are reputable, peaceable and orderly, and consist chiefly of people from the New-England colonies.”

Travelers who came through the region, like Lord Gordon, affirmed Schuyler’s flattering descriptions. Lord Gordon marveled at the “fertile Vale” of Saratoga, where “Philip Schuyler Esqr. of Albany, has two good Saw Mills and a very pretty little house. On this Land he produces Hemp, from Six to Ten Feet high, and for two Crops running.” At the beginning of the American Revolution, one of Schuyler’s sawmills boasted fourteen saws. According to Charles Carroll of Maryland, Schuyler “saws up great quantities of plank at his mills, which before this war, was disposed of in the neighborhood, but the greater part sent to Albany.”

Philip Schuyler’s Saratoga Day Book, dated 1764 to 1770, and located in the New-York Historical Society, reflects the great degree of economic activity in his bustling estate. Having rebuilt his sawmill facilities, most of the profits reflected in his ledger concern logging and boards. Herring, wheat, and corn meal were also common items of trade noted in his book. In addition, every conceivable consumer item common in the British world was purchased for his family or sold through his store at Saratoga: Nails, padlocks, rum, molasses, tea, tea pots, sugar, scythes, pork, pins, thread, scissors, ink, mill saws, powder and shot, jack knives, combs, paper, and all varieties of cloth ranging from strouds, osnaburg, check, to more expensive fabrics. Schuyler made large profits from his sawmill. In just one month

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in May 1765, for example, Schuyler’s mills sawed nearly one thousand logs for various settlers in the area, and shipped logs and planks to Albany and New York City.

New York merchant James Abeel advertised various consumer goods such as “Choice muscovado & loaf sugar,” “Jamaica spirits and West-India rum,” “Teneriffe wine,” “a parcel of choice beaver,” and “herrings by the quantity, or single barrel, cured at Saratoga, allowed by very good judges to be preferable to any Scotch or Dutch herrings.” Fishing at Saratoga was a profitable economic enterprise, and “Barrels of choice Saraghtoga Herring” were offered for sale by merchants in New York and Albany. Lot 23 in the Saratoga patent, a 932-acre tract offered for sale in 1765, was located “near the Fish-Kill, well known for the vast Quantity of Fish usually taken there every Summer—Many hundred Barrels have been pickled and sent off as Merchandize.”

The sale and development of lands at Saratoga proceeded with breakneck speed following the war. Numerous advertisements appeared in New York newspapers regarding the sale or division of lands in Saratoga Patent. New land grants, such as Skenesborough, and older grants that had lain dormant for decades, such as the Kayaderosseras Patent, were settled and developed in earnest. Thousands of emigrants from Britain arrived in New York in the 1760s and early 1770s. They, along with New York and New England colonists, formed the principal emigration streams into the upper Hudson and Champlain valleys. Many New Englanders followed the military road leading from Fort No. 4 in southern New Hampshire to its terminus at Crown Point. Their settlement in the New Hampshire Grants—an area disputed between New York, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts—only added to the region’s growing volatility. With so many New Englanders going there, Maj. Gen. Phineas Lyman, who had helped build the roads around Saratoga in 1755, elected to take his chances elsewhere. In 1763, he and other Connecticut soldiers formed a “Company of Military Adventurers” to seek land and opportunity “sufficient for a government, in some of the conquer’d lands in America,” namely the Mississippi Valley in the new province of West Florida. He died there in 1774.

Small garrisons of British soldiers continued to occupy the region’s strongholds well into the 1760s. Regulars of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 60th (or Royal American) Regiment remained as garrisons at Fort Stanwix, Albany, Fort Edward, Fort George, Crown Point, and Ticonderoga in 1765. As it did elsewhere in North America, the British Army’s

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7 New York Mercury, May 7, 1764, p. 4 (Abeel); ibid., June 16, 1766, p. 4 (Saraghtoga Herring); New-York Gazette, April 15, 1765, p. 4 (Fish-Kill).
8 New-York Gazette, May 24, 1762, p. 4; ibid., March 25, 1765, p. 4; ibid., April 15, 1765, p. 4.
garrisons only fueled the growth of settlement as civilian teamsters, contractors, and artisans came into the region to supply the regulars. The well-engineered military roads that British and American forces had cut through the region enabled the rapid growth and settlement of the region. In 1760, for example, General Amherst pronounced the “new road” from Fort Miller to Saratoga “a very good one,” as he traveled over it.\textsuperscript{12} New York as well as New England colonists accessed the Saratoga region via the same military roads that many of them had worked or marched on during the war. Abandoned British fortifications like the barracks at Fort Hardy and later at Crown Point were also utilized by civilian settlers in the area, who either reappropriated the buildings or used the materials for their own structures.

Soldiers who had once been stationed in the posts above Albany were among the first to gain land. Soldiers of the 55th Regiment and the 42nd and 77th Highland regiments were granted land by the New York assembly, though some of those grants fell in the contested Hampshire Grants.\textsuperscript{13} British officers were also at the forefront of efforts to gain land grants, and they were joined by New England and New York provincials who were attracted to the lands they had campaigned in during the war. Capt. Daniel McAlpin of the Royal Americans secured one thousand acres on Saratoga Lake by the early 1770s. For some, the land hunting had begun even before the war had ceased. In November 1759, Gen. Jeffery Amherst “received a memorial from the Massachusett & Connecticut Colonels, desiring to settle, by way of Township, the new made road to N°- 4, if His Majesty would be graciously pleased, to make them grants of the said Lands. I likewise received a Memorial from Major of Brigade [Philip] Skeene, desiring a patent for a tract of Land between South bay, East bay & the garrison land of Fort Edward. . . .”\textsuperscript{14} Philip Skene’s development of his Skenesborough lands mirrored the energy witnessed at Philip Schuyler’s estate to the southward. Skene’s holdings took in tens of thousands of acres of prime lands; slaves (he later claimed 20 slaves valued at £680, or over $100,000); numerous saw mills and grist mills; a bloomery (iron forge); and a large manor house with multiple outbuildings. By 1775, Skene’s stature was reflected in his royal position as Lieutenant Governor of the Forts of Crown Point and Ticonderoga, granted on January 28 by King George III with an annual salary of 200£ (around 30,000$ dollars). Had the American Revolution not altered his life’s trajectory, Skene’s wealth and standing would have rendered him a major figure in New York politics and society.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12} Webster, \textit{Journal of Jeffery Amherst}, 262.

\textsuperscript{13} Matthew P. Dziennik, \textit{The Fatal Land: War, Empire, and the Highland Soldier in British America} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 134.

\textsuperscript{14} Corbett, \textit{No Turning Point}, 30 (McAlpin); “Amherst’s Journals,” in \textit{Appendix to an Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North America for the Years 1757, 1758, 1759, and 1760 by Captain John Knox}, ed. Arthur G. Doughty (3 vols.; Toronto: Champlain Society, 1916), III, 73.

\textsuperscript{15} Philip Skene Papers (Thompson-Pell Research Center); Doris Begor Morton, \textit{Philip Skene of Skenesborough} (Granville, NY: Grastorf Press, 1959), 38, 64–65. It should be noted that Philip Skene’s title of “major” references his former position as major of brigade; although he retained the title of major, his actual rank remained that of captain, first in the 27th Regiment, then in the 10th Regiment. I thank Eric Schnitzer for this insight.
Along with soldiers and settlers, African slaves returned to Saratoga, resuming the prominent role they had occupied in the community’s economy since the 1740s. An advertisement appeared in 1762 in the *New-York Mercury* and other papers regarding the sale of a male slave, about 40 years old, “who understands Farming”; the sale of a “Negro Woman, who understands House-Work, about 35 Years old,” and a “Negro Child, about 4 Years old.” The male and female slave may have been the parents of the child, as the advertisement stressed that “one or both of them may be sold with or without the Child.” The presence of slaves is also reflected in Schuyler’s Day Book: a slave named Jupiter (owned most likely by Killian de Ridder) received a payment of one shilling for 1.5 scipples of potatoes sold to Schuyler.¹⁶

One African slave who desired to return to the British colonies was a woman named Étiennette, also known as Marie-Éstienne. She had been born a slave at Saratoga and was only 4 or 5 years old when Abenakis took her as a captive in November 1745. She was eventually purchased from the Abenakis by a Montréal merchant named Joseph-Jacques Gamelin, and was baptized on March 7, 1746. Following the British capture of Montréal in 1760, she appeared before a body called the Chambre des milices on June 6, 1761. She wished to return to the British colonies (perhaps to relations at Saratoga?), and invoked her status as a British subject, hoping thereby to gain her freedom. The Gamelin family explained her circumstances, hoping to keep her as a slave. Her case was sent to Gov. Thomas Gage, but the fate of Étiennette is unknown. Perhaps she finished her days as a slave in Montréal.¹⁷

The rapid expansion of settlers and slaves into the Saratoga region reflected just how much the lives and fortunes of Native Americans were changing after the war. The area bounded by the St. Lawrence, Champlain, Hudson, and Mohawk valleys still remained a predominantly Indian space. Mohawks and other Haudenosaunee peoples continued to move, trade, hunt, and settle within that area as they had before. But Six Nations leaders in the 1760s clearly recognized the changing geopolitical circumstances they confronted. In 1765, for example, Mohawk sachem Little Abraham complained to William Johnson that Mohawk hunters had viewed with alarm “a great number of new Settlements” on their hunting grounds near Saratoga and had warned the settlers off. Schuyler’s sawmills had resulted in “a considerable number of men from different parts, cutting down, and Carrying away Saw loggs, and the best of Timber from off their land.”¹⁸

The Kayaderosseras Patent controversy was an explosive issue that threatened to rend asunder the Six Nations-British alliance. Like other land disputes in the eighteenth

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¹⁷ Marcel Trudel, *Dictionnaire des esclaves et de leurs propriétaires au Canada français* (Éditions Hurtubise, 1990), 89.

century, it brought to the surface deeper Indian concerns about their relationships with the British world. Based upon an Indian deed from 1701, it was “fraudulently obtained in [Queen] Anne’s time,” and the grant that was “intended to be only 2 or 3 Farms near Saratoga” now engrossed some 250,000 acres of prime Mohawk hunting territory.\(^\text{19}\) Mohawk leaders vehemently protested the Kayaderosseras Patent at the Albany Conference in 1754. The issue lay dormant until the 1760s, at least in British imperial circles, due to the global war against France. Postwar expansion led British colonists to resuscitate such older land deeds, which the Iroquois viewed as fraudulent attempts to dispossess them of their lands. Between 1764 and 1771, the issue wound its way through the British government, with William Johnson advocating that the patent be annulled. In 1768, Governor Henry Moore was able to negotiate a compromise between the patentees and the Mohawks. The Kayaderosseras grant was reduced in size from its original lofty bounds of four hundred thousand acres, but it nonetheless diminished Mohawk hunting lands and opened the way for more British settlers.\(^\text{20}\) And it left the Haudenosaunee leaders like Little Abraham with a gnawing sense that “it is only since you [the British] have got the better of the French that you have made Settlements thereon, imagining as we suppose that you think you could now do as you please.”\(^\text{21}\)

When major generals John Burgoyne and Horatio Gates entered the Saratoga region in the 1777 campaign, they and their respective armies became inheritors of Saratoga’s long history. Indeed, when viewed through the prism of that colonial past, the Saratoga Campaign of takes on additional meaning and context. The armies of 1777 were also powerfully influenced by memories of the colonial past. For American rebel forces, the death of Jane Macrae hearkened the long history of French and Indian attacks on frontier settlements. Burgoyne’s capturing of Fort Ticonderoga was magnified in the British imagination because of the strategic value it had been assigned in the last war, as well as the high price in blood and treasure it had exacted in 1758 and 1759.

For all of the transformations that had unfolded in the previous decades, there were still essential continuities in borderlands warfare that informed the events of 1777. Burgoyne entered an operational environment not unlike that of French commanders like Montcalm who had tried to sustain operations below Lake George, with supply lines back to Canada stretched to the breaking point. In his overland advance from Skanesboro to Fort Edward, Burgoyne tried to accomplish in a matter of weeks what the British and provincial armies had only accomplished over several years in the late war—namely, the construction of a viable military road capable of supporting an army’s advance. Burgoyne’s


\(^{21}\) Quoted in MacLeitch, *Imperial Entanglements*, 182.
dealings with his Indian allies and the presence of skilled Canadian fighters and diplomats like La Corne Saint-Luc also added an essential continuity that existed between the wars of the 1740s and 1770s. His campaign ultimately bore a strong resemblance to previous French campaigns led by Montcalm, Dieskau, or Marin.

Conversely, the armies of Philip Schuyler and Horatio Gates bore a strong resemblance to earlier intercolonial and British expeditions led by Winthrop, Nicholson, Johnson, or Loudoun. Indeed, Gates’s ability to sustain an army as large as General Abercromby’s in 1758, was utterly dependent on the logistical infrastructure of the Albany-Lake George corridor and the agricultural resources of the region (far richer and more developed than in the 1740s). The American rebels’ success in achieving a concentration of force in September and October 1777 reflected that older pattern of New York and New England provincials’ service in intercolonial expeditions as well as the region’s explosive population growth. Traveler Francis Grant, for example, was “informed that during the last war, the Militia Roll of this district [at Saratoga] did not much exceed 300 men, at present it is above 1200.” At Bennington, Burgoyne’s detachment was destroyed by surging militia, reminiscent of the ways that New England provincial troops had quickly marched into the Hudson Valley in previous wars. Indeed, the New England regiments in Gates’s army included officers like Ebenezer Learned, Enoch Poor, and Rufus Putnam as well as enlisted soldiers who had made the same campaigns to Saratoga or beyond in the last war.

In all of those ways, Saratoga beckoned a long and storied colonial past, and symbolized how the struggle among the French, British, and Native Americans for control of North America’s future had unfolded on its borderlands—a struggle that continued during the Revolutionary War. It was symbolic, if ironic, that Burgoyne’s campaign—and perhaps the fate of the American Revolution—came to an end at Saratoga. With its particular contributions in the Seven Years’ War, Saratoga had once made possible the victory that had made Canada a British colony and Burgoyne’s point of departure. On October 17, 1777, the British, German, loyalist, and Canadian soldiers of Burgoyne’s army marched out their camp to lay down their arms “where the old fort stood,” near the junction of Fish Kill and the Hudson River. In its state of ruin and deterioration, the remains of Fort Hardy—an outpost that had once helped to make possible British imperial supremacy in North America—now symbolized the beginning of its dissolution.

22 [Grant], “Journal from New York to Canada, 1767,” 322.
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