START OF TAPE

Herbert Evison: This is February 25, 1971. And I have with me Roy Edgar Appleman for the second of our sessions of taping. Roy, when we sat in front of this tape recorder two or three weeks ago you mentioned your service in the Army, but you didn't go into any detail about it. And I think it would be nice if you would get down some of the salient facts about your service, your start, and your experience during World War Two, and your second experience with the Army.

Roy Appleman: Well I was drafted into the Army in October 1942 when I was still living and working in Richmond, Virginia, in the old Region One office – inducted at Petersburg, sent down to Fort McClellan, Alabama, for infantry training in an infantry replacement training battalion setup they had there. And from there I had a rather checkered career for awhile, eventually went to O.C.S., came out a second lieutenant, and was assigned to Indiantown Gap as a platoon leader. I was there a month or two as a platoon leader. Then suddenly I received word that I was to report to Washington. It turned out that the IBM machines had picked me out for some assignment and I was sent to the 7th Service Command in Omaha. I was there about a year and a half, and, again suddenly, I was picked out again by the IBM machines – this time it turned out because of my historical training – to be sent overseas as a combat historian.

Roy Appleman: So I reported to Washington for 10 days of training and then was sent to Hawaii to join the 10th Army which was getting ready for certain invasions in the Central Pacific.

Roy Appleman: So I was stationed in Hawaii, first at Fort Ruger, which is at the base of Diamond Head, a very delightful spot, by the way. I went to jungle training school up along the northeast coast of Hawaii where they have constant rain when the Tradewinds hit those high bluffs – 10 days up there and then eventually shipped out. I was to go into an operation that was cancelled eventually. I went to New Caledonia and was assigned for a while to the 31st Infantry Division which had just come off an operation, and it was then attached to 10th Army. I went with it to Leyte – the Leyte operation, and then was transferred suddenly to Okinawa for the Okinawan operation. So I was in Okinawa during the operation there.

Roy Appleman: That was a terrible battle by the way, with the Japanese dug into the coral cliffs – and neither side giving any quarter whatever until the very end when the Japanese did surrender, some of them, after the battle was practically over and only a few survivors left. I went from there with the 24th Army Corps to which I was then attached and the 7th Infantry
Division to Korea, to take over the occupation of the southern part of Korea. And I happened to be one of the very first persons ashore at Inchon, stayed there overnight, went up the next day, got a ride up, and I was present at the surrender ceremonies of the Japanese to General John R. Hodge in the Government House in Seoul. I stayed in Korea then until late that fall, beginning of winter, working on the Okinawan campaign which was eventually published in 1948, and I was one of the co-authors.

Roy Appleman: I went from Seoul, Korea, back to Fort Shafter in Hawaii and stayed there about eight months, working on the draft of the Okinawan operation, and returned to Washington to the Pentagon where we finished it. And I was mustered out of service then in the fall of 1946. I went back to the old Region One office and stayed there until March 1951, when suddenly I received an order from the War Department ordering me back to active duty, to go to Korea. This would be my second time in Korea, but now we were in a war there. So I went to Korea – got there at the first of July 1951.

Roy Appleman: My job was to prepare myself for writing the combat history of the Korean war. I was in Korea for about five months and visited all divisions, some of the South Korean divisions as well, and was in on a few of the operations up at the front, interviewed a great many people – came back and by studying the records, carrying on interviews also, orally, and writing all over the world, I eventually finished the combat history of the Korean war through the first Chinese intervention, up to December 1951.

Roy Appleman: I had to choose then between staying in the Army and coming back to the Park Service. I wanted to stay in the Army and would have done so had it not been for my family. My wife, with three small children just coming of school age, didn’t want to travel overseas, which she would have had to do or else be separated from me, and I’d be separated from my family. Considering their welfare I eventually decided to come back to the Park Service. So I did come back in the fall of 1954.

Herbert Evison: Now before you go ahead I want to go back a little ways. Most of your time in the Central and Western Pacific, I guess you would call it Okinawa, you were a combat historian. Now I like to know how a combat historian operates. What special things do you do that the combatants don’t do?

Roy Appleman: A combat historian was given that title because he was assigned to and lived with combat forces. At that time I had a card from the Joint Chiefs of Staff which theoretically entitled me to go anywhere and see anything and to have access to all secret documents. However, when you get into a combat area this is nothing but a scrap of paper really. And you’re completely subject to the authority of the commanding general or the
commanding officer to whom you may be assigned. Now, in Okinawa I was with 10th Army a short time, but nearly all the time I was assigned to the 24th Army Corps and General John R. Hodge was the Corps Commander. I was able to establish excellent relations with him. I never bothered him except when I had something important. And I got along fine and I could go anywhere I wanted. I could go up to the front every day if I wanted to. At the same time you could lie in your bunk all day if you wanted to.

Roy Appleman: So I would say that the duties and the activities of a combat historian would depend almost wholly on the temperament of the person, his initiative, what he wanted to do, what he dared to risk, and how he got along with the field commanders he happened to be assigned to. Theoretically and actually your job was to keep abreast as well as you could at the time of what was going on, to see enough of it to get the feel. You didn’t have to carry a rifle and go out and shoot at enemy, although I always carried weapons. And I was in positions I could have done this several times. I’ve tripped off flares and they might have been anti-personnel mines. I’ve been in artillery impact areas. And I’ve also heard a lot of bullets whizzing around. I had a person killed right next to me once at the most forward platoon position then held by American troops in South Okinawa.

Roy Appleman: I was up later on in Korea with troops that were assaulting a hill that went back and forth several times between Chinese and Americans. But this was of your own volition. I had great trouble getting in on that one, however. I had to get my way past a major who was military police and had a roadblock. Nobody was allowed to go forward because this place was two miles in front of the forward lines. But I pulled out my card, and I was at that time also a major. And he finally let me go.

Roy Appleman: But this is the general nature. You study the various reports that come in. You have to establish contact with the G-2 Offices to know what the intelligence is. The personal relations you're able to establish with the various commanders determine a great deal how much current information you're going to get so that you don't get a lot of second-guessing later. And then, of course, you always have access to all the records. And you study the terrain. I did that a great deal. After the battle at Okinawa for instance, I went myself alone down into the southern part day after day when there were still a lot of Japanese in caves. I made it a point not to stick my head into caves. And I was within 200 yards one time of a cave when two marines were killed. And they'd gone in. They were fooling around and they went in. There were Japanese in there. I heard the shooting. And I learned later that's what happened to them.
Roy Appleman: I've gone into mine fields – just purely and simply a damn fool, as I look back on it. I went up one road that was loaded with mines and I knew it was. And I counted seven picric acid stains in the dirt which revealed that there were picric acid box mines underneath. And one time I even saw a prong sticking up out of the dirt. Well these are things that you can do or not do, depending as you may decide yourself. So I would say the combat historian had a great deal of latitude, but he had to use his initiative to take advantage of it. He had the opportunity.

Herbert Evison: Did you, to any extent, interview individuals down in the lower echelons to get personal experiences or personal reactions?

Roy Appleman: Oh, yes. Later, and as you could, particularly in the Korean War, I interviewed practically everybody I could get because a large part of the period I was to cover had taken place before I got over there. This was in 1950, and I didn't get there until 1951. And I interviewed everyone I could find who had taken part in those early battles from privates on up to, well, General Ridgeway eventually, and practically everyone on MacArthur's staff. I never really got an interview with MacArthur, but I got extended written comments from him on a manuscript. But excepting MacArthur himself, I did have access to and saw just about everybody on his Far Eastern Command staff I wanted to – same in 8th Army – General Van Fleet and on down. And I found excellent cooperation everywhere.

Herbert Evison: In the course of this job you must have gradually accumulated a tremendous mass of notes or quotations, interviews, and so on. As you accumulated that what became of it?

Roy Appleman: That eventually was all turned over to the Chief, Office of Military History, and is in their files.

Herbert Evison: After this period in Korea, didn't you do your writing about that period of the war as covered by your history after you got back here?

Roy Appleman: Yes, I did. I had the personal knowledge that I'd gained on terrain, people, and the interviews I'd had, but I had to carry on interviews with people who in the meantime had been scattered all over the world in different military assignments – those who had survived. And I did this by correspondence. A lot would be reassigned back to Washington and to some of the command places here and to some of the War Colleges. I went up to the Army War College for instance and interviewed at length General Ned Almond, who was the 10th Corps Commander over in Korea. And I did this; I traveled around where it wasn’t too far. But I sent drafts, too, to lots of people and asked their extended comments. And I got back long comments in many cases. So it was a constant learning process from the records, from interviews, from letters and correspondence, and from
comments on drafts. I went through four or five different drafts on the Korean volume for instance.

Roy Appleman: And I’d like to comment here that it’s impossible to write accurate combat history from the records because the records never have the story. The records are written by a company clerk usually, in the S-3 section, down at the lowest level, and he gets just what he wants to put in and what he feels like putting in. He usually never knows the story. He’s not involved in the action. He’s back at some little headquarters. The messages are often garbled. I would say that, although you cannot write accurate combat history from the records, they help immensely in dating and timing.

Herbert Evison: You know that’s some of the most interesting stuff that I have ever gotten on tape, Roy. I suppose for every person who has heard the phrase, “combat historian,” there are a thousand who really don’t have the remotest idea just what is involved in that. You didn’t have the advantage ever of using a battery-operated tape recorder in talking with these people did you?

Roy Appleman: No, I didn't want to. I could have if I had wanted to be burdened with it. All I did was carry a carbine, a revolver, and a 35-millimeter camera. And that was it, plus pencil, and paper notebook, of course.

Herbert Evison: You must have used up a lot of notebooks in your lifetime as a combat historian.

Roy Appleman: Well, I used a lot of paper. I want to add that I spent a month with a tank battalion when I was in Hawaii to learn tank operations. I went out to Scofield Barracks where a tank battalion was stationed. It had just come back from Saipan. And I knew something about the infantry operations tactics from my personal earlier training. And I had to study something about artillery and things like that. But eventually I was in on all sorts of things – amphibious operations, landings, and up front a lot. I got a pretty good feel of what went on. I always felt so sorry for the infantrymen who had to be out in the mud and were overrun nightly, or attempted to be overrun by Japanese, particularly on Okinawa. It was a hell of a life, I’ll tell you, not even counting the fighting. You can't get close to these infantrymen without having the greatest of sympathy for them and also admiration. And I would add also that probably not more than 10 percent of the infantrymen really fight.

Herbert Evison: Really?

Roy Appleman: They hit the ground the minute fire starts coming in – either mortar or rifle fire, or machine gun fire. They hit the ground. And it’s just a chosen few who make the fight and lead the way. And they often get killed.
Herbert Evison: You wrote one history in connection with the Pacific operation and you wrote another one about the first year of the Korean war. Let’s get on the record here the titles of those two reports and how copies of them can be obtained, if they can be obtained, for the Park Service archives.

Roy Appleman: I gave one copy of the Okinawan campaign to the History Division, but it was stolen, I discovered after about a year. They don’t have any copies now that I know of. Well, the titles – the first one, of which I was co-author, not the sole author, I wrote 13 chapters out of about 28 or 29 chapters. The title is Okinawa, The Last Battle. It’s Official U.S. Army History of the Ryukyus Campaign. And it was published in 1948 by the United States Government Printing Office. It was at sale initially for $10. It was reprinted two or three times, the last inquiry I made. I’ve not made an inquiry about it for 10 or more years and I don’t know whether it’s in print now or not.

Roy Appleman: The second volume is entitled, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu. I was the sole author of it. It was published in 1960. It covers the Korean war up to December 1950. It covers the first phase and the drive up to the Yalu, and the first major Chinese counterattack. It is Official U.S. Army History of the Korean War and was published by the Government Printing Office. It likewise was for sale and has gone through two or three printings that I know of, but I've not made inquiry about it either for about six years, so I don't know whether it's still available or not. The Korean volume has, I think, great value because, even though someone four times as capable as I, were now to make the effort, he could never write the thing because the sources are gone. I happened to be able to get the material at the time.

Roy Appleman: I spent five years of personal effort after I left the Army, every spare moment I could get, in continuing my searches, corresponding with people and rewriting to get what I would be satisfied with as a reasonably accurate volume. And I must pay tribute to the Army. There is a lot of controversial material in there. It called spades spades, naming people, and the Army did not censor any of it. It's all there.

Herbert Evison: If I remember correctly you took issue with the great Douglas MacArthur himself on one or two things.

Roy Appleman: Oh, yes, in the last chapter, which has to do with the situation before MacArthur ordered again the drive up to the Yalu, on which his intelligence and his trust of the Air Force turned out to be entirely erroneous. I lay all this out and indicate that the evidence was there if they hadn’t been blind to it. And he commented extensively on that chapter when he wrote back to me, sometimes filling the back sides of each page,
as well as margins. It was all self-justification, but he didn't succeed in getting a single word changed in the text. Nor did anybody else.

Herbert Evison: Now, was this comment in MacArthur’s own handwriting?

Roy Appleman: In his own handwriting, yes.

Herbert Evison: I would suppose that those papers were part of the Army archives, too.

Roy Appleman: Yes, they were all turned over to the Chief, Office of Military History, and that's where they should be now.

Herbert Evison: I bet, by golly, that you put MacArthur to more trouble than almost anybody else he ever dealt with.

Roy Appleman: Well, I set myself the goal of trying to tell the story of those Americans who went over there and died. I wanted to pay tribute to them. I wanted to be wholly honest and I was. I spared nobody. And a lot of high-ranking officers came in for pretty hard blows, MacArthur among them. And he also had plenty of fine things said about him when he deserved it. And he did deserve a lot of fine things, particularly in connection with the Inchon landing. But later on his luck deserted him and he was wrong.

Herbert Evison: Well, now, you say that for four or five years there you were continuing to correspond and get material. When did you finally complete the job of writing all this? And didn't you do quite a lot of that on your own time while you were working for the Park Service?

Roy Appleman: Yes I did. I left the Army in the fall of 1954. And I had a draft finished then which could have been published. But I knew it wasn't what it ought to be. I knew there were many unanswered questions, many puzzles that I had not been able to unravel. They couldn't be unraveled from the records. So I continued to work and write, correspond and interview. I kept that up for four years, maybe five years. I think it was about five years. And in 1958 or '59, I'm not sure which, I finally had the manuscript finished to the point that I thought I wouldn't be able to improve it appreciably no matter how much more time I spent on it, so far as factual information is concerned. And it was turned in then and published in 1960.

Roy Appleman: All this time I was working for the Park Service. I spent my evenings, my weekends, my vacations, on this. I worked myself practically to death, I thought, and did not give my small children the family attention I should have, but this was a task that I wanted to get done and I considered a life work, and I was willing to do it and I did it. And I'm glad I did it. I want to add one thing here and I know it won't be appreciated by the Park Service. But the Army, with all you hear about it, at least in my experience and with me, didn't censor me at all. And the Park Service has censored
me many times. And I have to put the Park Service thumbs down in relation to the Army when it comes to censorship, when their own interest is involved.

Herbert Evison: I'm very interested in that comment and I'd like to ask you a question in connection with it. You have a reputation, and a deserved reputation, for “laying it on the line.” I mean if you believe something is right you darn well say so. I am wondering if there have been instances that you would be willing to put on the record of where that honest forthrightness of yours has got you into any trouble, or made you difficulties let's say.

Roy Appleman: Well, I say anything on this question you ask me with a lot of hesitation and reservation. It wouldn't do any good now. At the time I felt quite strongly at different points that the Park Service was self-seeking and self-serving, and it didn’t want anything exposed that might cause a ripple. And I felt that my superiors went along with that viewpoint. I don’t object to making a few comments without getting into great detail.

Roy Appleman: I’ve always felt that a professional man in the Park Service, or anywhere else, ought to be professional, and he ought to have truth and integrity in what he did. And if political interventions and political decisions have to be made paramount, that the professional people shouldn't do that themselves. They should let the administrators who have these political factors to deal with do it. But the administrators always like the professional people to give them the documents and the support so they can say, “Here’s what they say,” which is slanted for a political purpose that the administrators can use. And I have never gone along with this. And I have found that generally – won't say always – maybe generally is too strong, too – but frequently my own superiors in the professional field have gone along because they wanted to please the Director, or they wanted to please the Associate Director. They didn't want to get them into trouble. They didn't want to have to explain why. And they wanted to make it easy. They didn’t want to be difficult themselves. And if I was difficult and they supported me then they became difficult. And so it went.

Roy Appleman: So I found the biggest stumbling block were my own immediate superiors in the History Division – Ronnie F. Lee on occasion, and Herb Kahler on occasion. They both didn't want to rock the boat. I could name a number of instances, but I don't think I'll get into detail.

Roy Appleman: Now there was one case that might be mentioned involving the top NPS hierarchy. About 1958 or ‘59 when Mr. Lee was Assistant Director, then in charge of Interpretation, he had become greatly worried about the lack of any standard in interpretive qualities and services that were given throughout the Park Service. He found in his travels that it varied widely
from park to park. There was no standard whatever. Well, he viewed his job here in Washington as one in which he owed the Service, the Director, the duty of trying to establish better standards everywhere. He didn't quite know how to do it. He decided to appoint a committee to study the matter. So he appointed a committee made up of three persons. I was one. He made me chairman. Gunnar Fagerlund, who was a naturalist, was on it, and Cal Burroughs, an archeologist, was on it. Burroughs soon left and he was replaced eventually by Don Erskine.

Roy Appleman: We were given the mission of studying the entire background history of interpretive work in the Park Service going back to 1920, and even earlier, and then going out and acquainting ourselves fully with the present situation in the parks, in the regions, and in the Washington Office – the whole hierarchy – making a report which would attempt to correct abuses, or lapses, or just simply poor performance. And we were told to lay it on the line.

Roy Appleman: Mr. Lee was transferred to Philadelphia within about a year and Dan Beard then took his place. The committee worked about two or three years here in spare moments; it had to be an extra-curricular duty, and the committee acquainted itself with everything in the background. We did that as best we could. And we made field trips to all the regions, except the Southeast, I believe. We visited the regional offices, visited parks. We spent about four or five years altogether and finally came up with a 100-page report. And it was a hard-hitting report. And it was very critical of the regions. It was very critical of the Washington Office. It was very critical of many of the park superintendents.

Roy Appleman: Word got out that this report would not do the Park Service any good. It was reproduced in 250 copies, however, under Mr. Wirth's instructions. But then it was stopped and killed, and all copies burned. I could tell you quite a story about that, but that would take more time than you have. And I will stop by saying there’s one report that never saw the light of day. All copies were burned and destroyed. I think three, four, or five copies may have survived in the desks of two or three regional directors, and maybe two or three of the Assistant Directors here in Washington.

Herbert Evison: How about in the library of Roy E. Appleman?

Roy Appleman: No. I never got the thing. They were taken from the mail room and impounded. Of course, I had a manuscript draft. Mr. Wirth went on a field trip just at this time, after he had approved duplicating and distributing the report, and Jackson Price was Acting Director. And I couldn’t find out anything. It was the greatest bit of Russian secrecy you ever saw. Nobody would tell me anything. And I thought this was a hell of a way to treat
people who've worked for five years on an assignment. After a week had passed I was trying to find out what the heck had happened to this report. I knew it had been printed. I learned that from the Secretary’s printing room. I called Jackson Price, who was Acting Director, and asked him about it. He wouldn’t say much about it except that they had it and they weren't releasing it. I said, “Well, why not?” And he said, “Well we don’t think it should be released.” And that’s about all I could get from him.

Roy Appleman: I said, “Well, now, I have two members of this committee who have worked with me and I ought to be able to tell them what has happened. They want to know and, of course, I do too.” And I said, “We ought to have copies. Are you going to give us copies of the report?” And he said, “No. No copies are going to anybody.”

Roy Appleman: I said, “Well how about your having a little meeting with the three members of this committee and you tell the other two what you told me so they’ll know themselves from your lips what is happening. I’m in sort of an embarrassing position with them not being able to tell them anything.”

Roy Appleman: He said, “No, I won’t meet with you.”

Roy Appleman: Well I thought that was a very peculiar attitude for the Acting Director to take with a committee of his own employees who had been working five years on a project and he wouldn’t even sit down and talk for a few minutes with them. All we wanted was to hear what he had to say, but he wouldn’t meet with us. I never encountered anything like this in the Army.

Roy Appleman: Well Mr. Wirth came back from his field trip. And Dan Beard, who was my superior then, knew what the thing was. He had read it and he had got Mr. Wirth to approve its release. But there were a lot of shenanigans that went on; I never really knew the full story. I got bits and bits and bits over about six months. But by and large no one ever laid it on the line with me.

Roy Appleman: I understand Dan Beard had some pretty hot sessions with some people in the Director's presence. There was a cabal of about six or seven people, as I understood it, who were opposed to any release of this because they were afraid the Secretary's Office would think it was very damaging to the Park Service. And they were afraid some newspaper writers like the Drew Pearson type would get hold of a copy and they would write some bad columns about the Service. And there were some people whose professional work, particularly in the naturalist field, I felt was pretty badly impugned, and they didn't want it out. Well, this goes back to the question how did the people who finally stopped it know about it. There was a leak and I think the leak came from my own committee to a certain person whom I don't really need to name. And he was the one who went to Price and got the thing impounded.
Roy Appleman: Well, anyway, I resented this whole business for quite a while and I still hold it against the Park Service. I think it's an unworthy way for an institution that pats itself on the back as much as it does to act, because this committee could simply have been told, “Well we just don't think we can publish this and release it.” And we would have accepted that. Instead of that they wouldn’t even talk to us about it.

Herbert Evison: Was this report that was approved, approved from start to finish by all three members?

Roy Appleman: They all three approved it, every one of them. The other two signed it. We spent a lot of time going over it and adjusting wording that would make it acceptable to them. I had to modify my own views, which may have been extreme, perhaps, in many cases, to a softer line to adapt it to what they would be willing to agree to. Yes, they signed the draft which was reproduced.

Herbert Evison: You don't feel that they were trying to wiggle out of taking responsibility for stuff in the report?

Roy Appleman: They might have. I don't know, you see. They wouldn't tell me this. I never knew where the leak came. But it had to come from inside somehow.

Herbert Evison: But I mean your other committee members – they were not trying to weasel – do you think they were just really seeking a more accurate way of saying what you wanted to say?

Roy Appleman: Well, I think there was a little fear on their part. They didn't want to be quite so drastic and make the very damaging statements that I would be willing to make. A lot of the statements were damaging as they came out. So I don't know. I can't read people's minds too well and I wouldn't attempt to answer that flatly one way or the other.

Herbert Evison: Well, you probably shouldn’t. I perhaps shouldn’t have asked it as a matter of fact. Well, now that was one of the jobs that engaged a lot of your time and attention after you came back with the Service after your Korean experience and your history writing, and as a matter of fact, during some of the time of your history writing. I would like to get on the record something about the kind of work that you were called on generally to do in the Washington Office aside from this business of investigation and study.

Roy Appleman: As background I should tell you that in March 1951, just a matter of days after I received the Army order to report for duty, a situation developed here in Washington. Mr. Lee went from Chief Historian to an Assistant Directorship of Interpretation under Mr. Demaray. Mr. Kahler succeeded
Mr. Lee as Chief Historian. And, oh, maybe two or three weeks after that happened, I received a telegram one day asking for my approval for a staff position in Washington – to be assigned to Washington. I replied back, no, I had to go to the Army and there was no point in considering a move to Washington. The telegram at that point didn’t say what the job was. So I left it at that.

Roy Appleman: And Mr. Lee and Tom Allen, who was Regional Director in Richmond, were together on a field trip several days later. And Mr. Lee asked Tom Allen, “Why did Appleman not agree to come to Washington?” And Tom Allen said, “Well, I don't know.” Lee said, “Well, I wish you'd ask him when you go back.”

Roy Appleman: Mr. Allen did ask me and I just told him the same thing I'd put in the telegram – there’s no point in it. And furthermore I didn't know what the job was. I said I had to go into the Army and I didn't know when, if ever, I’d be back. Well in a few more days a telegram came to Mr. Allen from Mr. Demaray. It said, “Have Appleman report to Washington to see me.”

Roy Appleman: So I reported to see Mr. Demaray. Mr. Lee was present – only the two. And Mr. Demaray said he wanted me to take this job. I said, “Well what is the job?” He said, “It's to be the second in the History Division.” I said, “Well Mr. Demaray, I'm not going to be able to take the job. I'm going into the Army, as you know, and I don't know when I’ll be back, and you want somebody here to do the work.” He said, “That doesn't matter. We don't have promotions very often. We want you in this job. And when you come back from the Army, no matter when it is, it’ll be there for you.” I said, “Well I don't think it's the sensible thing to do.”

Roy Appleman: Mr. Lee was sitting there, too. I explained that it was so long in advance and so uncertain that I didn't think it was the reasonable thing to make the transfer. They insisted on it. I said, “Well if you want to do this in the circumstances, why I can't object.” So the paperwork transferred me in March 1951 to the Washington Office to take Mr. Kahler's place after he succeeded to Mr. Lee's job.

Roy Appleman: Well, I didn't come back until 1954. In the meantime there had been the Departmental reorganization and the setup that had existed when I was transferred in March 1951 on paper no longer existed. The History Division had been reorganized and there were three or four staff sections set up – like the State Department has it you know – desks to deal with certain periods. Charlie Porter was the Colonial expert, and he was undoubtedly the best man available for that. Rogers Young was then in the Office and he was interested in the Federal period. And they were the only two that had been appointed. That left the Civil War and everything after
the Civil War – the recent 19th century and 20th century, and Western Expansion. I said, “Fine, that's all right. I'll take all of that – the rest.”

Roy Appleman: So that's the job I entered into when I came back. That work required correspondence; plan review; master plan review of all the areas in these fields; writing reports on bills for Congress. At that time the reports went through the Director's office to the Secretary's Office. And there was very little change, if any, in the reports that finally went over to the committees from the way they were written in the History Division. This was on bills relating to historic sites. That persisted until about 1960. And if the History Division had ample reasons to take a negative stand on a proposed bill it was always supported in the Director's office, nearly always, and also in the Secretary's Office.

Roy Appleman: This changed drastically in 1960 with Mr. Kennedy's election. And I'd say from 1960 on in the next decade I could tell and I could see day by day that politics was playing a greater and greater role in what the reports said. We were told what we had to write in many cases. And if we didn't write it, somebody else would write it. In other words, get a favorable report. Nineteen-Sixty was the turning point. Now this continued under the Democratic Presidents, Kennedy and Johnson. It became extremely pronounced under Johnson. And I feel pretty certain it's continued also under President Nixon, the Republican President.

Roy Appleman: This was a bad thing, but it became very obvious. And the Director maybe had no choice, but the Director did go along with it. Often he got orders from the White House staff itself. But I wrote a lot of reports on bills to establish areas. I wrote a lot of correspondence for the Director, the White House, the senators, pro and con, on things they were interested in. They wrote in behalf of constituents. I did a lot of map work, plan review, did some visiting, some reports on various interpretive and historical matters, and did a lot of work for a time on park literature. But this gradually was lifted out of History and put more and more into the Information Division.

Roy Appleman: So our role in that diminished also, and our role gradually diminished in the museum field. We reviewed all museum plans. But I found when Mr. Lee became an Assistant Director he began breaking up the solidarity and the rather strong position the History Division had had under him as Chief Historian. And pretty soon functions that the History Division had been performing were scattered here and there in three or four other divisions that he was trying to build up as part of his new Assistant Directorship of Interpretation. I date the decline of the History Division as a body of influence from about that time.
Roy Appleman: I might mention another thing. When I came back in 1954 this Departmental reorganization had just been ordered. And Mr. Lee told me before I came back that he wasn't sure whether there’d be any Division of History, or Interpretation, because Mr. Wirth wanted to put all the historical and archeological work into a branch in Operation. And I learned shortly thereafter that Phil King, who had been sent down from the Secretary’s Office to be sort of an overseer within the bureau to watch what went on, didn’t agree with this. He felt it was downgrading the cultural responsibilities too much. And he himself influenced the Secretary’s Office to change it, not to allow Mr. Wirth’s reorganization idea to reduce history and interpretive functions to a branch to go through. So Phil King stopped it at that time. And this shows you some of the uncertainties that prevailed in 1954 and the years that followed.

Herbert Evison: Roy, I remember several years ago one of your specific tasks was tied in with the Golden Spike National Historic Site. I think you had to make some special studies that I remember rather hazily. But it seemed to me as I remember them they were unusual and interesting. Can you put something on the record about that particular assignment of yours?

Roy Appleman: The Golden Spike National Historic Site in Utah was one of those in the West that came up almost annually, with pressure from the states and in Congress to do something about them. I made, along with Bob Utley, who was then in the Santa Fe office, the initial study. Bob made the first historical study and together we made the terrain study for the recommendation of boundaries. We submitted a boundary report which eventually was accepted and became the boundary of the present National Historic Site.

Roy Appleman: Well let me say one other thing. The developmental plans that we envisioned were scuttled, as I thought they might be, by engineers and others who always seem to be frightened by rather remote problems of safety. We had a plan that we thought was foolproof – of having visitors enter on the old UP grade – Central Pacific grade – at the eastern end and follow it as a one-way road. You see the rails had been lifted in 1942 and sold for iron during the iron scrap drive of World War Two. But this road had been used by ranchers all around there all the time, and you could drive an automobile over it as we did, excepting for one culvert, for miles and miles and miles – for 30 miles there, north of Salt Lake.

Roy Appleman: We thought this was ideal as a one-way tour to see the grade and see all the sites. And there was a very choice visitor center site available there, not at the summit where it is now. And then we had another road that was in a county road system that could be used in exit. But the engineers soon scuttled it because they said this one-way road wasn’t safe, because there
were two or three places where there was a fill. But that’s neither here nor there. You can have an almost perfect setup and you can find somebody in the Park Service to defeat you.

Roy Appleman: The thing you may have in mind, Herb, and I’m not sure about this, is the research work I did later in connection with the bill establishing the area, to manufacture replicas of the two locomotives, Union Pacific 119 and the Central Pacific Jupiter Number 60. I took this on as a side issue after I found that nobody in the Park Service knew a blessed thing about it. What they had put in as estimates in the bill was nothing more than an extremely bareback horse estimate. They didn’t even know who made the locomotives. They didn’t know whether plans existed. They really knew nothing about them.

Roy Appleman: I should say in the meantime Mr. Hartzog had become Director and he’d set up a new division under Mr. Everhart. And one day I received a telephone call which told me I’d been transferred from History to Mr. Everhart’s new Division of Interpretation. I wasn’t consulted about it.

Roy Appleman: Well, I found as time went on that I didn’t have too much to do in interpretation because I didn’t fit into Mr. Everhart’s plans too well, I think. So I said, well, I’ll undertake this research which did have a relationship to interpretation. So I did it. I was allowed to do this and got a little travel money. I went to New York and to other places where I had to go. And I produced a pretty voluminous research document on these two locomotives, including assembly drawings. There was $250,000 in the bill for building the replicas, but I’ll give you a little piece of information now that you can use as you may see fit. It was very confidential at the time.

Roy Appleman: The thing was going through and this work had just about been finished when all of a sudden I learned through one of Mr. Hartzog’s close associates that the whole thing was going to be called off. Why? Well it was very confidential why. But I learned pretty soon that Mrs. Julia Hanson, who had just come into Congress and was a member of the House Appropriations Committee for parks, had developed a great phobia against – I don't know which – either the Southern Pacific, which superseded the Central Pacific, or the Union Pacific – when she was in the State Legislature in Washington. And she told Mr. Hartzog, so I was told, that she would not stand still to have him do anything out there which would perpetuate the glory of either of those railroads. And she struck out that item.

Roy Appleman: They wouldn't even let us proceed to get the working drawings drawn which were then in process. That had to be stopped. All right, that killed making the replicas. At the same time Mrs. Julia Hanson can call up and
say, “Why don’t you do something about the restoration of Fort
Vancouver?” Well, we couldn’t because we have only one side of the fort
really. The rest is under an airport navigation easement. Well she said,
“Start on that one side.” And out of nowhere they got $200,000 just like
that to start it.

Roy Appleman: Well that's what happened to Golden Spike. And Golden Spike without
those two locomotives is sort of a handicapped area because that would be
the centerpiece and the thing that people really are interested in seeing.
This was demonstrated when the area was opened two years ago because
two vintage-type locomotives were brought there for that occasion. And
they were also brought back last year from Paramount Studios.

Herbert Evison: The people found those the most interesting part of what they saw there.
Right?

Roy Appleman: Yes. And now there’s a project under way to get them sent there and kept
by the Park Service, but we aren’t prepared for it. There would have to be
shelters built. There are no shelters built. These really aren’t replicas.
They’re just old locomotives that look something like the originals.
Maybe that’s all most people want.

Herbert Evison: Still it would be nice to think that what the Park Service offered there was
genuinely authentic, wouldn’t it?

Roy Appleman: That’s the way we felt about it. And that’s what we wanted to do.

Herbert Evison: Well, I’m curious as to how Mrs. Julia Hanson would feel about even
putting two locomotives of any kind in there that might conceivably
glorify either the Union Pacific or the Southern Pacific.

Roy Appleman: I don’t know how she would feel about that.

Herbert Evison: Roy, you told me some months ago that you were continuing to do some
work on, I guess, a publication. Your work on it wasn’t finished when you
retired. Would you tell me something about that?

Roy Appleman: Yes. I think you have reference to one of the volumes in the series being
published by the Park Service through the History Division on the Historic
Sites and Buildings Survey. Ten years ago we got out the initial report on
the Lewis and Clark Expedition. It was a very small thing, but it served the
purpose at that time. Even then the plan was eventually to publish volumes
on these studies. I was interested somewhat in the thing and I thought,
well nobody else is going to do it so, as time permits, I will carry on the
work and expand this study, and try to get it in shape for eventual
publication.

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Roy Appleman: So I did do that. I spent a lot of time and even invested quite a lot of money in buying a set of the original journals of Lewis and Clark that would cost me $130 in a reprint. And I kept buying other things that I could have at home and work with. I have now just about all the original material that's available, at home.

Roy Appleman: But that's something aside. I did continue this work and went to study sites when I could. And after about six years of this I got a manuscript together. I finished it about 1966. And I thought my work was finished. Then, when I broke my hip three years ago I drew the maps at home, the overlays, and they were then sent off to a cartographer. They have been finished. I selected about a hundred historical photographs that I looked for wherever I could find them. And I thought I'd finished the thing by the time I retired.

Roy Appleman: By the way, the publication was deferred two or three different times, once to make way for the Alaska volume that they thought they could get out on the centennial, but it isn't out yet. Then Mr. Hartzog wanted the first volume, Soldier and Brave, reprinted and brought up to date. But now the schedule is that this volume, The Lewis and Clark Expedition, is to go to the printer this year. Well, the editor looked over the material. Concepts have changed in 10 years and they wanted two or three chapters added which I agreed would be desirable. And in going over the manuscript after the editor read it I found so many questions the editor had asked, I thought, well if I'm to satisfy him I've got to rewrite the thing. So I have spent three months now in rewriting the first section, getting the whole story up to the takeoff at the Missouri River. I have the two or three chapters at the end still to write. I have most of the research done. And I have, of course, a lot of work still to do on the great middle section and the site section, which the editor hasn't sent back to me yet with his 1,001 questions.

Herbert Evison: Now who is the editor in this case?

Roy Appleman: Robert Ferris in the History Division is the editor of this book series.

Herbert Evison: I see.

Roy Appleman: You know, it's been a full-time task almost ever since I got back from Europe last October and it will be until at least July and maybe later. If I can improve the work I'm willing to do it. But then I hope I am retired when I get through with this.

Herbert Evison: You think you will retire when your pseudo – or semi-retirement ends?

Roy Appleman: Well, yes. It takes my own money to do this work gratis. I spent my own money in going to Louisville, Kentucky, and working in the Filson Club. And I've spent my own money in transportation going down to the Library
of Congress and buying things and spending my time in transportation. I had a lot of things I wanted to do with my retirement. But as I say, I’m very much interested in helping to get out a decent volume here, and I’m doing this. Of course, I get nothing for it, and I don’t expect anything.

Herbert Evison: Well I think it's wonderful that you're willing to do that Roy. I don't know very many people in Park Service history who've been willing to give as much as their free time and thought, effort and money, to accomplish worthwhile things. There are not very many people who can match your record.

Roy Appleman: Well I don't feel proud of it at all. I don’t feel that I've gotten very far in the Park Service and I consider my career in the Park Service as a failure. That's due in part, I suppose, to my own temperament. I built up the reputation, I think, quite early that superiors felt: “You can't trust him because he won't go along your way. He'll get you into trouble. He'll embarrass you if you give him too much authority because he will stick up for what he thinks is the right thing and it might not be the politic thing.” I've always had the feeling that this attitude has prevailed about me among the higher echelon of managers in the Park Service. So I've accepted this, and I wouldn't have changed it in any event. What I do I do from a personal sense that I want to do the best I can. But I want to assure you it's not for any real love of the Park Service, because I am not a devoted Park Service fan who thinks the Park Service can do no wrong. And I don't go around patting people on the back, “Oh you belong to the greatest organization in the world!” because I do not believe that.

Herbert Evison: Roy, that's a pretty good cutoff point isn't it?

Roy Appleman: Yes.

Herbert Evison: I want to put my final words on, which are to thank you for not only being willing to come clear in here twice for this purpose, but for being willing to take down your back hair and put on the record the things that you really think. I can assure you, as I told you a while ago, my admiration hasn't diminished. It's gone up. I feel that I've been very fortunate that I was associated with you down in Richmond in those days in the old Region One, my best years incidentally, in the National Park Service.

Roy Appleman: Mine, too.

Herbert Evison: I'm thankful that you were a part of that organization that we had down there then.

Roy Appleman: Well, thank you, Herb.