Table of Contents

List of Maps ................................................................................................................iii
Introduction .................................................................................................................v

1. Before the Park: The Olympic Peninsula Before 1909...........................................1
2. Creating the Park ...................................................................................................39
3. Planning and Administering Olympic National Park ...........................................87
4. Natural Resource Management ...........................................................................151
5. Cultural Resource Management ..........................................................................207
6. Interpreting the Wilderness … and More ...........................................................245
7. Running the Park .................................................................................................285
8. Threats to the Park ..............................................................................................327

Appendices
   A. Olympic National Park Superintendents ............................................................367
   B. Recreational Visits .............................................................................................369
   C. Chronology of Significant Events ......................................................................371

Bibliography ...........................................................................................................379

*Photographs follow each chapter.*
An American Eden
List of Maps

1 ..............................................................................................................................................
2 ..............................................................................................................................................
3 ..............................................................................................................................................
4 ..............................................................................................................................................
5 ..............................................................................................................................................
6 ..............................................................................................................................................
7 ..............................................................................................................................................
8 ..............................................................................................................................................
9 ..............................................................................................................................................
An American Eden
An American Eden

Introduction

Olympic National Park holds a pivotal place in the history of national parks in the United States. Since its tumultuous establishment as a national park in 1938, it has served as a bellwether of the national sentiment that favored preservation. Despite initial authorizing legislation that established the area as a national monument under the scientific significance designation of the Antiquities Act of 1906, the area that became Mount Olympus National Monument was prized in no small part for its wilderness qualities at a time when Americans of the influential classes bemoaned the loss of their natural past. This emphasis continued even as the monument was reduced in size to accommodate commercial extractive endeavors. As a result, alone among early U.S. national parks, Congress established Olympic National Park specifically to preserve wilderness, and it became the singular place where the modern preservation movement established its precepts and implemented its objectives. Simultaneously, Olympic National Park has been a peculiar repository for the complicated feelings local communities hold toward national parks – the oddly simultaneous ambivalence toward a powerful entity that contains resources from which they can make a living and that adds powerful social meaning to the place where they live. In this, Olympic National Park tells the story of the evolution of national park management and of the responses of the national and local constituencies to National Park Service policies, practices, and decisions.

The park also reveals an important dimension of evolving national park management. Olympic National Park clearly shows the ways in which national parks became progressively more sensitive to their surroundings and more skilled at building coalitions to support National
Park Service objectives. In this process, Olympic served as a forerunner, not always by the agency’s choice, and its lessons translated to later park proclamation struggles and their usually complicated aftermaths. The constituencies at Olympic – national and local, extractive and preservation-oriented – gave the agency a range of choices, and over time, the National Park Service moved from reliance on powerful and influential regional and national elites to a broader embrace of the mass market tourism that followed World War II. In this, the conditions at Olympic National Park anticipated what has come to be called the “New West,” with its emphasis on quality of life, recreation, and leisure ahead of traditional extractive industries.

Olympic National Park was unique at its founding. Alone among existing U.S. national parks, Olympic’s “wilderness” was a legacy of its proclamation as a national monument. Unlike any other park area, Olympic was surrounded by a viable and functioning commercial extractive economy – timber harvesting – that coveted the very resources included inside park boundaries. The National Park Service and the local economy vied for the same timber resources; the former for preservation and aesthetic values, the latter for sustained yield extraction. In this, Olympic differed from the great nineteenth-century national parks, for which Yellowstone and Yosemite served as the prototypes – those too high in elevation and too remote for practical commercial extractive use, such as farming or timber cutting. These so-called “worthless lands” made park establishment easy, for there were few other claimants to compete for jurisdiction. It also differed from later entries in the first generation of national parks, for unlike Grand Teton National Park, founded in 1929 as a mountaintop park in an area already largely dependent on its scenery for economic sustenance, the area included in Olympic remained commercially useful. The battle for Olympic National Park’s establishment became the classic dispute between the
An American Eden

National Park Service and the U.S. Forest Service, the federal agency tasked with managing national timber lands. It set into motion the forces that created the park of today.

Despite the obvious differences between an agency devoted to preserving resources and one that saw sustained timber yield as its goal, the National Park Service and the Forest Service shared both mission and constituency. The overlap led to strife from the founding of the National Park Service in 1916, and by the 1930s, the two agencies regarded each other with intense antipathy. The Forest Service preceded the National Park Service on the Olympic Peninsula, managing a national monument it largely did not want for two decades and creating a template for management that the National Park Service followed. Forest Service management created expectations as well as patterns on the land, and the National Park Service had to address both. In the 1930s, the Forest Service and the National Park Service were at the apex of what was by then a twenty-year spat; it reached a resounding crescendo at Olympic. Even at the park’s establishment, the roiling politics of U.S. conservation and federal land management agencies already included the Olympic Peninsula.

With multiple constituencies and competitors, National Park Service management of Olympic National Park required flexibility from the outset. In many ways, the agency learned to compromise at the local level. Pulled between regional demands and its own powerful national constituency, the National Park Service quickly learned that it had to give ground to get ground. In this process, it found itself caught between its many friends and their diverse objectives. As a result, Olympic’s managers often felt pulled between constituencies that became progressively more strident over time. In a situation typical of the National Park Service at the end of the 1960s, the park’s purported friends did it more damage than its enemies. In no small part, the
story of greater public attention to National Park Service decisions began at Olympic National Park, and the agency learned how to respond to its friends in the Olympic Mountains.

In this lay the basis of Olympic’s reputation as a difficult park to manage. Every compromise the National Park Service made alienated one or another of its constituencies. Increasing visitation and wilderness preservation remained inherently incompatible, as antithetical as commercial resource extraction and agency goals. Each group had an energetic constituency, one influential locally and across the region, the other equally powerful regionally and much more so throughout the nation. Olympic National Park and the National Park Service were forever caught between them, trying to accommodate both and remain true to the agency’s complicated and overlapping missions.

Instead of alleviating this condition, changes in the regional economy after 1970 heightened the tension. As the U.S. economy shifted away from its historic base in natural resources and timber jobs disappeared along with other kinds of work, the peninsula communities resented rather than appreciated the park for its ability to provide fresh economic energy in the form of recreation and tourism. As an arm of the federal government, the National Park Service was suspect in the eyes of the region’s residents. Its history of land acquisition contributed to mistrust of the agency and its goals. As timber jobs disappeared, the wealthy bought increasingly scarce land with outstanding views; retirees sought out the peninsula, a trend likely to increase as the U.S. population ages; and people looked at the park’s acreage as lost livelihood instead of as an opportunity to create new economic options in recreation-related industries. The age-old tension between protection and extraction reprised even as the park contained the possibility of new opportunity.
At its founding, Mount Olympus National Monument was typical of national monuments established during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidential administration. The monument was hastily conceived, established under the auspices of the Antiquities Act, and in terms of the protection it provided, largely symbolic. This first generation of monuments, including places as diverse as Petrified Forest, Devil’s Tower, the Grand Canyon, and Chaco Canyon, highlighted the flexibility of the authorizing legislation. Although Mount Olympus National Monument was in no small part established to remind a recalcitrant Congress that presidential authority extended even to the last hours of a president’s term, the proclamation also established an area that shared traits with federal game reserves. The proclamation linked its boundaries to the needs of the Olympic or Roosevelt elk, the species the monument was ostensibly established to protect.

From 1908 until 1934, the Forest Service administered the monument under the terms of the Antiquities Act of 1906. This critical piece of federal legislation left the national monuments it created under the charge of the agency and department that managed them prior to establishment, and so Mount Olympus National Monument remained under Forest Service administration. The agency managed the monument as it did its other national monuments, in a manner not distinct from surrounding national forest lands. Timber cutting dominated the Forest Service agenda, especially after the federal government reduced the peninsula national monument by nearly half in 1915 to make more timber acreage available for World War I. The area received special designation as a national monument, but in general, activities that were deemed essential to the economic health of the region continued without interruption.

That changed on June 10, 1933, when Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Executive Order 6166
An American Eden

reorganized the National Park Service. The order transferred all national monuments, including Mount Olympus National Monument, to National Park Service jurisdiction. The transfer gave the National Park Service a stake in the peninsula region, and the Forest Service and the National Park Service began an extended conflict over not only the status of the reserved area, as a national monument or park, but about appropriate boundaries for both entities.

The National Park Service inherited a substantial local economic history at Olympic National Park. This was not entirely new to the agency, but it was uncommon. Until the creation of the three eastern national parks – Shenandoah, Great Smoky Mountains, and Mammoth Cave – in the 1930s, the National Park Service typically acquired new parks from public domain or the province of other federal agencies. While Olympic National Park came from Forest Service land, that acreage had been the basis of an ongoing regional economy. Elsewhere, national park lands came either from lightly populated, high elevation lands or in areas in which the economy had collapsed. In a new way, Olympic National Park required the National Park Service to devise solutions to regional issues.

This became the single most trying task for the National Park Service, the one that caused the greatest rancor and made Olympic National Park a perennial agency hotspot. The combination of wilderness and extractive industry, of national conservation movement and local and regional economic engine combined to threaten park management principles and practices and to make even the most basic decisions rancorous. From the 1940s until the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969, the National Park Service faced some of the most difficult circumstances in the agency’s history. Buffeted by national organizations with specific goals on one side and assaulted by local and regional constituencies on the other, Olympic
An American Eden

National Park faltered numerous times with a very small margin of error. NEPA created an administrative structure that added important obligations to park management throughout the entire national park system. After NEPA, environmental impact statements and other mechanisms to permit public oversight of agency functions became an integral part of the management terrain. This both helped and hindered park management. On one level, some management decisions, many now mandated by law, were more straightforward; on another, park leaders ceded some measure of autonomy as even mundane decisions often were effectively out of their hands. As Olympic National Park devoted more of its staff time and energy to the mass of federally mandated activities known under the loose rubric of “compliance,” its managers felt the burden of addressing its public shift. After NEPA and the plethora of legislation that followed, park managers sometimes found that statute justified decisions. Local communities could protest all they wanted, but in the National Park Service’s eyes, the law was the law. This shifted some management decisions from the local to the national level, but in terms of public opinion still left the responsibility squarely with the park. The change did little to diminish ongoing tension between the park and its neighbors.

By the early twenty-first century, Olympic National Park had become a leader among national parks. With more than 96 percent of the park designated as wilderness and in a transformed regional economy in which timber had significantly diminished as an economic mainstay, Olympic National Park appeared as a regional anchor, a dependable if different source of revenue for a region in desperate need of sustenance. It filled the role that federal facilities from prisons to military bases played: it provided a stable baseline for the regional economy. The park had also emerged as an important leader in environmental management, especially in the
An American Eden

effort to remove dams that threatened or disrupted native species. Despite its many issues, Olympic remains as it began – a national park that embodied the spirit of the national park system in one of the most complicated management situations the agency faced.
Chapter 1:
The Olympic Peninsula Before 1909

During the summer of 1890, James Wickersham, a county probate judge and Republican congresswoman in the newly created state of Washington, led a party that included his wife and two sisters through the eastern Olympic Mountain range. Wickersham and the party explored the interior of the Olympic Peninsula, traveling up the North Fork of the Skokomish River to its headwaters and descending the Dosewallips River. Greatly impressed by what he saw, he authored an article promoting the idea of a national park that encompassed the range. “The beauty of Switzerland’s glaciers is celebrated, yet the Olympics contain dozens of them,” Wickersham regaled his readers. He foresaw that the reservation of the snow-capped mountain range and its Olympic Peninsula headwaters would provide a “great pleasure ground for the nation” as well as protect the “finest forests” in the United States.1

Wickersham sent his recommendation, along with maps outlining possible park boundaries, to Major John Wesley Powell, concurrently director of the U.S. Geological Survey and the Bureau of Ethnology at the Smithsonian Institution. Wickersham was sure that Powell, the first Anglo-American to raft down the Grand Canyon and a champion of natural and cultural resource preservation, would be sympathetic to his proposal. The article written by Wickersham did not circulate as widely as he hoped, but it expressed an idea that garnered popular support: He wanted to add Olympic National Park to the very short list of reserved areas in the United States. “A more beautiful national park cannot be found,” insisted Wickersham.2

As did explorers, naturalists, scientists, outdoorsmen, and public officials of his time,

2 Ibid.
Wickersham voiced an increasingly popular sentiment about the wild places left on the North American continent. As the United States government administered the nation’s disappearing frontier and reorganized the federal bureaucracy to conserve dwindling natural resources, the idea of protecting wild land gained credence. On the Olympic Peninsula, ancient timber stands graced the landscape and Roosevelt Elk abounded. Yet, only in 1938, nearly one-half century after Wickersham’s note to Powell, and after more than three decades of interagency battles within the federal government, did Congress finally establish Olympic National Park.

The land that became Olympic National Park occupies the center and western edge of the Olympic Peninsula. It lies in the coterminous United States’ northwest corner. More than 922,000 acres in size and shaped by as many as four glacial advances, Olympic National Park’s topography ranges nearly 8,000 feet, from sea level to the Olympic Mountains. A north-south extension of the coastal range, the mountains intercept moisture-filled Pacific air masses. As the air moves over their western slopes, it cools and releases moisture as rain or snow. At higher elevations, snow falls on the glacial masses that continue to carve the landscape. The blocked air mass creates a rain shadow effect that creates the rain forests along the mountains’ western slopes while leaving drier areas on the peninsula’s northeast corner. This variation is dramatic. Mount Olympus, the highest peak in the Olympic range, averages 220 inches of precipitation a year, most of it snow, while only thirty miles to the east, the town of Sequim receives average annual precipitation of seventeen inches.

The geographically isolated Olympic Peninsula boasts some of the greatest ecological variety in the coterminous United States and contains every possible permutation of regional biogeography. Disparities in elevation and rainfall create diverse areas of vegetation and wildlife, including intertidal communities, bogs, temperate coniferous rain forest, montane coniferous
An American Eden

forests, subalpine forests, subalpine and alpine meadows, and alpine fellfield. Several varieties of plants and animals are unique to the peninsula, including the Olympic marmot, Flett’s violet, Piper’s bellflower, Olympic Mountain synthyris, Olympic yellow-pine chipmunk, Olympic snow mole, Olympic torrent salamander, and the Beardslee and Crescenti trout.

Heavy rain and fog produce the temperate rain forests of Sitka spruce, western red cedar, and western hemlock that dominate the low elevations along the Pacific coast and the western-facing peninsular valleys. Lowland forests – characterized by grand fir, western hemlock, and some Douglas fir – extend inland from the coast at elevations higher than the rain forests. The montane forest, even higher, resembles the lowland forest but for its wealth of silver fir. Silver fir, mountain hemlock and Alaska cedar groves dominates the subalpine zone. It starts as the elevation drastically increases, temperatures cool, moisture falls as snow, and the trees open out to alpine meadows and glacial lakes. Olympic National Park also contains a fifty-seven mile-long stretch of the Pacific coastline from Shi Shi Beach to Kalaloch, one of the last remaining undisturbed coastal ecosystems in the lower forty-eight states. Rich intertidal life, expanses of sand driftwood, eroded cliffs, and sculptured rocky islets characterize this coastal area.

Its supporters have called the park “a gift of the sea,” for the Olympic Peninsula is a decidedly maritime environment. Seawater wraps around the 4,000 square miles of the mountains’ serrated peaks and valleys. The Pacific Ocean lies to the west, the Strait of Juan de Fuca is to the north, and Admiralty Inlet and the Hood Canal are to the east. Mount Olympus, a huge dome-shaped forerunner of the spiny circle of mountains, dominates the peninsula.

Although geologists offer different theories that explain the origin of the Olympic Mountains,

3 A fellfield is the portion of an alpine or tundra slope where the combination of freeze-and-thaw cycles and wind produce a unique growing environment, with the cycle tending to push plants out of the soil. Alan Graham, Late Cretaceous and Cenozoic History of North American Vegetation: North of Mexico (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3

they generally accept that the highlands rose from the sea. Between 35 million and 70 million years ago, the present-day Olympic Peninsula lay under water. Sediments from the land accumulated on top of the sea floor, compressing into shale and sandstone. Basalt domes also formed on the sea floor. When vents and fissures opened underwater and spewed lava, large underwater mountains and ranges called seamounts formed.5

The oceanic plate began inching toward North America from the Juan de Fuca Ridge about 35 million years ago. Most of the plate descended into a subduction zone between the present Olympic Mountains and the Cascades. Convection currents and volcanic sediment slowly pushed up into the continental landmass. About 12 million years ago, the convection currents slowed near the Olympics; according to some geologists, the subduction zone shifted seaward. These processes explain the craggy appearance of the fractured, folded, and contorted sedimentary rock formations of the Olympic Mountains. Adjacent to the park’s Hurricane Ridge Road, lava hardened into the pillow-shaped masses characteristic of sea formations. As the dome slowly rose from the sea, rivers and streams formed.6

Other geologic factors left their marks on the peninsula. Striations in rock formations show evidence that during the Pleistocene Ice Age, great sheets of ice traveling south from Canada rode over the Olympic Peninsula at least four times, sculpting the Olympics into grandiose patterns, creating a peninsula, and almost completely isolating the range and its flora and fauna from nearby landmasses. The glaciers that enveloped almost one-third of the North American continent deepened the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Hood Canal and formed Puget Sound, a long arm of the sea reaching southward from the strait. Alpine glaciers shaped lakes and mountains,

and filled in and broadened the peninsula’s U-shaped valleys. Erosion, particularly during the past two million years, when North America experienced its last great ice age, also molded the Olympics. Today, eleven main rivers with tributary streams, all originating as meltwater from glaciers and snowfields, drain the peninsula park through deep valleys.\(^7\)

Thirteen thousand years ago, before the retreat of the last continental ice sheet, the warming climate melted most of the alpine glaciers. These melting icepacks dammed several valley drainages, formed large inland lakes, bogs, and open meadows, and left behind large granite boulders. The park’s sixty glaciers probably formed about 2,500 years ago, though some of the region’s largest, including the Blue and Hoh, possibly survive from the last Ice Age.\(^8\)

**Early Settlement**

The glacial retreat and warming climate created the potential for human occupation. The Olympic Peninsula’s first inhabitants, small groups of nomadic paleo-Indians, roamed the land about 12,000 years ago, when the last continental ice sheets retreated but before the vast forests developed. The Manis Mastodon site at Sequim, just outside the park’s northeast boundary, provides the peninsula’s oldest archaeological evidence of human habitation. In 1977, archaeologists discovered on the Manis family farm the butchered remains of a mastodon – colloquially known as the woolly mammoth – with what scientists think might be a spear point in one of its ribs. Such evidence suggests that the paleo-Indians hunted the bison, caribou, and mastodons that then roamed the peninsula. These first people preceded the Alcott hunters and gatherers who hunted deer and elk about 10,000 to 3,000 years ago. Researchers have found

---


worked wood, bone, and chipped points dating from 6,500 years ago in more recent strata at the Manis Mastodon site, allowing archaeologists to partially reconstruct this culture.9

Population growth led to increased settlement along the coastlines, mouths of rivers such as the Hoko River, and lakes, including Lake Ozette. Coastal archaeological sites, typically characterized by thick coastal shell middens and evidence of seal and whale hunting, provide evidence of human habitation during the late prehistoric period. At the 2,500-3,000-year-old seasonal fishing site near the mouth of the Hoko River, outside the park on the Strait of Juan de Fuca, archaeologists have uncovered more than 5,000 artifacts. Baskets, fishhooks, gillnets, and harpoons paint a rich if incomplete picture of the living patterns of these riverine collectors.10

The Ozette Village site near Cape Flattery provided a clear view into the area’s early human history. Around 1700 A.D., a mudslide buried the entire village. Mud and sand preserved the 2,000-year-old cultural site and more than 50,000 artifacts belonging to groups thought to be relations of the Makah people, allowing archaeologists to reconstruct the tribe’s cultural history. Long dugout canoes of western red cedar and elaborately carved fish clubs, chisels, and knives indicate that the people of the region fished for the plentiful salmon in the Ozette River, hunted gray and humpback whales, seals, sea lions, sea otter pelts, elk, deer, and birds, and gathered roots and berries. The abundance of natural resources allowed the Makah to develop a sophisticated, hierarchical society based on wealth and slave ownership. Communal cedar long houses with carved wood panels, hearths, cooking platforms, sleeping benches, drainage systems

---

An American Eden

built from whale bones, and vertical looms used to weave blankets of dog hair indicated the complexity of this early culture.11

Olympic National Park’s land base is associated with a considerable number of tribal groups. Eight groups – the Elwha Klallam, Jamestown S’Klallam, Port Gamble S’Klallam, Skokomish, Quinault, Hoh, Quileute and Makah – signed three treaties that ceded lands now in the park. The ancestors of these groups moved seasonally through present-day Olympic National Park, traversing the eastern edge of the Hood Canal to the southern boundary of Grays Harbor and the Chehalis River, settling in the mountains, coasts, and the mouths of rivers. Depending on the location and season, they fished for salmon and halibut, gathered mussels, clams and crabs, while hunting birds, deer and elk for additional sustenance. Every tribe possessed great knowledge of navigation and ocean resources, and traded resources such as whale oil, blubber, halibut, cedar planks, canoes, sea otters, ochre, cinnabar, and even slaves with other tribes and later, European settlers. Each tribe reflected a distinct culture, spiritual beliefs derived from the natural world, and different social organization.12

The Europeans Arrive

Native Americans lived on the Olympic Peninsula for thousands of years before European exploration began in the sixteenth century. After their arrival, the Europeans competed with one another for New World dominance until the mid-nineteenth century. The great naval powers of Western Europe first searched for the fabled Northwest Passage in the late 1500s. Such a route


reputedly offered a safer passage to the riches of the Orient than those around Cape Horn and the Cape of Good Hope. In a search that spanned nearly 300 years, first Spain and then England sent ships to find this illusive passageway, leading European explorers to the waters around the Olympic Peninsula.\textsuperscript{13}

Spain was the first and the most determined of the European powers to explore and chart the Pacific Northwest. Reputedly, the first European to sight the Olympic Peninsula was Apostostlos Valerianos, a Greek sailor commissioned by the Spanish crown to find the legendary Northwest Passage. If his stories are to be believed, in 1592, operating under the name Juan de Fuca, he sailed into the 100-mile strait between Vancouver Island and northwest Washington that now bears his name. Though he did not discover the mythical passage to Asia, reports of his adventures inspired future voyagers.

As the eighteenth century came to an end, Spain continued to lead European exploration efforts in Pacific waters. Viewing a Russian fur-trading outpost on the Aleutian Islands as a threat to its claims in the region, Spain sent additional explorers to solidify its position. In January 1774, New Spain’s viceroy gave orders for Juan Pérez Hernández, known as Juan Pérez, to explore the upper Northwest coast. Leaving the Baja Peninsula, Juan Pérez, who had sailed with the Manila galleons that led to the colonization of Alta California, traveled north to claim territory in advance of the reported Russian expeditions into the region. In August 1774, he sighted a trident-like pair of peaks, part of the Olympic Mountains, and named them Santa Rosalia and El Cerro. Juan Pérez also encountered Indians off the Queen Charlotte Islands – they paddled out to the Spanish vessel to trade – and remarked on what he perceived as their highly sophisticated civilization.

After Pérez, the Spanish government sent another expedition to the Pacific Northwest. In July 1775, the Santiago, commanded by Bruno de Heceta, and its sister schooner, the Sonora, captained by Juan Francisco de La Bodega y Quadra, anchored at Point Grensville, near the Quinault River. Intending to plant a cross and take formal possession of the land for Spain, Bodega y Quadra first sent ashore a small landing party to collect firewood and fresh water. The plan went awry as 300 Indians, possibly from the Quinault tribe, jumped out of the brush and killed them. This disaster convinced Heceta to return to Mexico, but Bodega y Quadra sailed north into Alaskan waters, claiming more of the Northwest coast for Spain.  

These late eighteenth-century voyages gave Spain a sovereign foothold in the Pacific Northwest. The establishment of the first European settlement on the Olympic Peninsula, a garrison at Puerto de Nuñez Gaona – Neah Bay – in 1792, strengthened Spain’s claims among European powers. Although the settlement lasted only a few months before Makah Indians disrupted it, in European eyes it solidified the Spanish presence on the peninsula. A short-lived military outpost at Porta de la Bodega y Quadra, named after the explorer and later renamed Discovery Bay by Englishman George Vancouver, followed the abandonment of Neah Bay.  

As the Spanish explored the Pacific coast from New Spain and the Russians navigated from the north, the English entered the race to acquire lands in the Pacific Northwest. In the late 1770s, on a cursory visit financed by Queen Elizabeth I, the English first explored the northern Olympic Peninsula, the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Puget Sound, and Vancouver Island. Sir Francis Drake’s voyage between 1577 and 1579 gave England its first tenuous claims to the Pacific 

---

Northwest. As the Elizabethan searched the Pacific Ocean for Spanish treasure ships, winds forced the *Golden Hind* north as far as Cape Argo, Oregon. Drake promptly headed south to California, where he refitted his ship and continued the first English circumnavigation of the globe. Almost 200 years later, Captain James Cook used Drake’s “New Albion” maps to search for the still elusive Northwest Passage. Cook reported sighting the Olympic Peninsula’s westernmost projection of land, Cape Flattery, in 1778, though he failed to find a southern entrance to the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Cook did visit Nootka Sound, the base from which most of the fur traders operated, even after Spanish occupation in 1789. He subsequently sailed north to Alaska and then on to China, where he sold sea otter pelts from the Northwest at great profit.  

The opening of the Pacific Northwest to the maritime fur trade with China, started by Russian explorers working in the North Pacific in the mid-1700s, propelled further exploration and sea trade. Beginning in the 1780s, commercial ships, mainly from England and its American competitors, arrived in large numbers. Unlike the Spanish vessels commanded by the government, these ships belonged to commercial ventures based in London, India, Macao, and Boston. In their desire for land and profit, England and Spain competed for dominance over the area around the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Vancouver Island, and Nootka Sound. The Spanish presence was already strong, but British exploration efforts quickly increased. In 1787, less than a decade after Cook’s visit, Charles William Barkley, a former East India Company naval captain of the fur-trading vessel *Imperial Eagle*, embarked on a trading venture for sea otter pelts in the North Pacific. Accompanied by his seventeen-year-old bride, he commanded a 400-ton vessel, armed with twenty mounted guns. It sailed near the Strait of Juan de Fuca, but the ship did not enter. When some of its crew disembarked at the mouth of the Hoh River, one of the

---

many groups of native peoples in the area killed them.

In June 1788, British Captain John Meares of the *Felice Adventurer*, on a voyage inspired by Cook’s news of the fur trade riches, followed a chart drawn by Barkley the previous year and passed the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Like Barkley, he chose not to enter. At present-day Neah Bay, Meares encountered members of the Makah tribe, whom he described as colorful, dressed in sea otter skins and armed with spears, bows, and arrows. When the Indians became distressed at the actions of the Europeans, Meares abandoned further exploration of the strait, but not before he named the dominant snowcapped mountain he sighted – Pérez’s Santa Rosalia – Mount Olympus, a name that reflected his opinion that the mountain range offered a suitable retreat for the Greek gods.17

Continued belief in the existence of the Northwest Passage, and the desire to enter the profitable fur trade and claim land lured explorers to the Pacific Northwest throughout the last part of the eighteenth century. In 1792, in one last futile attempt to find the Northwest Passage and resolve skirmishes with the Spanish over claims to Nootka Sound, English explorer George Vancouver, supported by Sir Joseph Banks, the head of the Royal Society, charted the Pacific Northwest. Vancouver sighted Meares’ Mount Olympus and referred to the entire range as the Olympics, giving the mountains the name that lasted. Vancouver conducted the first systematic mapping and exploration of the Pacific Northwest coastline. He also surveyed the intricate network of Puget Sound, Hood Canal, Admiralty Inlet, and the southern end of the Strait of Georgia. These discoveries led to the realization that the land of the Olympics was a peninsula.18


U.S. Exploration

Spurred by the same impulses as the British, U.S. exploration accelerated throughout the Pacific Northwest. In 1787, a small group of Boston merchants organized commercial voyages to the region. Captains John Kendrick of the Columbia and Robert Gray of the Washington arrived almost a year later at Nootka, initiated contact with local people, and traded for furs. Gray then explored the northern side of the entrance to the Strait of Juan de Fuca and returned to Boston. Kendrick remained on Vancouver Island. The U.S. presence was the harbinger of a distinctly different future for the region.

In 1790, Gray piloted a second voyage from Boston, this time in the Columbia, around Cape Horn, and to the Pacific Northwest. In May 1792, he discovered the harbor that bears his name. Gray also explored the mouth of the river later named for his ship, Columbia. The first American to enter the river’s estuary, Gray spent one week in the river mouth trading with the local Chinook people. Both Gray and Kendrick disappointed their Boston backers, who had hoped for greater fur profits. Yet, their discoveries proved to be useful. The U.S. government later used Gray’s discoveries to endorse its own rights to the Oregon Territory in the face of competing British claims.  19

U.S. exploration and trading persisted through the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1838, Congress, acting on a newfound interest in scientific research, sent a squadron of six Navy vessels under the command of Lieutenant Charles Wilkes to circumnavigate the globe. Congress was particularly interested in surveying the Northwest coast and Oregon territory, then jointly occupied by the United States and Great Britain. Heading the first maritime expedition sponsored by the federal government, Wilkes arrived in the waters of the Olympic Peninsula in spring.

---

An American Eden

1841. He proceeded along the peninsula, passing Hood Canal, navigating through the waters of Puget Sound, and eventually sweeping through the Strait of Juan de Fuca. By this time, many of the native peoples of the region had fallen prey to European diseases and weapons. Some of the survivors spoke English and wore European-style dress.20

Although many maritime journeys around the Northwest coast followed Wilkes’ expedition, exploration of the Olympic Peninsula’s landmass proceeded much more slowly. Almost 150 years passed between the short-lived Spanish military outposts at Discovery Bay and Neah Bay and permanent European settlement of the Olympic Peninsula. To potential settlers, the peninsula’s thick, rain-soaked forests and steep glacier-carved mountains seemed impenetrable. Fur traders and homesteaders had little incentive to settle in the region’s interior. Although many Americans followed Kendrick and Gray in exploring the coastal waters around the peninsula, few ventured ashore. Fur traders initially aimed their efforts at British Columbia. American John Jacob Astor’s company briefly operated a large fur-trading outpost at the mouth of the Columbia River in present-day Oregon. Its sale to the British North West Fur Company in November 1813, just before a British warship arrived on a mission to attack the fort, diminished U.S. claims to the region and hurt the fur industry.21

Territorial disputes significantly delayed U.S. settlement of the Olympic Peninsula. Following the War of 1812, both Great Britain and the United States claimed ownership of the Oregon territory. England asserted a claim to everything north of the Columbia River; the United States insisted that everything south of Alaska belonged to the new republic. The Olympic Peninsula lay inside the disputed territory. Americans were able to claim the lands between the

An American Eden

42\textsuperscript{nd} and 49\textsuperscript{th} parallels for reasons that even the British Crown acknowledged. Providing strong justification for the U.S. claim were Gray’s discoveries, John Jacob Astor’s fur trade, and Meriwether Lewis and William Clark’s expedition between 1804 and 1806, which provided the nation with a wealth of scientific information about the largely unexplored interior of the American West. In June 1846, during James K. Polk’s aggressively expansionist presidency, the Oregon Treaty formally settled the matter of ownership, establishing the boundary between the United States and Canada, and opening the way for creation of the Oregon Territory. The treaty gave the United States title to all lands south of the 49\textsuperscript{th} parallel and west of the Rocky Mountains, including the Olympic Peninsula.\textsuperscript{22}

The existence of a U.S.-owned Oregon Territory, achieved through geopolitical finesse, added to a host of other legal and political factors that strengthened the context for Anglo-European homesteading in the region. By the 1840s, the Oregon Trail, the main corridor through the American West, carried new waves of immigrants. In 1849, California’s Gold Rush, which attracted immigrants to the Pacific Coast from around the world, created an unquenchable market for the Olympic Peninsula’s principal resource: timber. Six citywide fires raged through San Francisco between 1849 and 1851, intensifying this need. The creation of the Washington Territory, carved from the Oregon Territory in 1853, suggested American permanence. Further settlement drove the possibility of statehood.\textsuperscript{23}

\textbf{U.S.-Indian Relations}

In addition to dealing with European powers, efforts by U.S. government officials to establish peaceful relations with Indian tribes in the region allowed for Anglo-American settlements on the Olympic Peninsula. The United States opened up to settlement public lands in

\textsuperscript{22} Williss and Schene, \textit{Historic Resource Study, Olympic National Park}, 38.
the Oregon Territory under the Donation Lands Act of 1850. Yet, before the federal government
could open these lands for settlement, it had to extinguish all Indian title legally. The
Appropriation Act of March 3, 1853 – signed on the last day of President Millard Fillmore’s
term – not only authorized the War Department to find an economical railroad route from the
Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean, it also ordered negotiations with Indian peoples.\(^\text{24}\)

By 1855, Isaac Stevens, concurrently governor of Washington Territory and superintendent
of Indian affairs in the territory, had negotiated three major treaties concerning the Olympic
Peninsula. Stevens acquired lands on the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Hood Canal by signing the
Treaty of Point No Point with members of the S’Klallam (Elwha Klallam, Port Gamble and
Jamestown), Chimacum, and Skokomish on January 25, 1855. He signed the Treaty of Neah Bay
with the Makah and Ozette tribes, who lived in the area around Cape Flattery, five days later, and
the Treaty of Olympia, signed with the Quileute, Hoh, Queets, and Quinault on July 1, 1855. The
agreements ceded several million acres and established a 10,000-acre reservation as the new
homeland for the Makah and Quinault. The S’Klallam received a reservation at Skokomish, with
which they were not pleased. In response to Indian agents’ demands, the federal government
later established reservations for the Hoh and Quileute.\(^\text{25}\)

The peninsula treaties achieved an important goal for the U.S. government. In order to settle
Washington Territory, the government needed to resolve the status of Indian peoples. In response
to settlers seeking title before the lands were ceded, the Office of Indian Affairs set up Indian
reservations along the coast for the Ozette, Makah, Quileute, Hoh, and Quinault. The peninsula
treaties legally reserved Indian rights to fish, a right recognized by the bill that established
Olympic National Park decades later, but in reality, the treaties failed to protect Indian

\(^{25}\) Clifford E. Trafzer, ed., *Indians, Superintendents, and Councils: Northwestern Indian Policy, 1850-1855* (Lanham,
livelihoods. Indian communities along the peninsula’s Pacific shores attest to that fact: a small fishing village at Neah Bay on the Makah Reservation; the Quileute Reservation at LaPush; and the Quinault, Hoh and Ozette reservations. Despite such challenges, several communities – Taholah, the seat of present day Quinault Tribal government; S’Klallam enterprises near Jamestown; and the Skokomish Reservation at Potlatch – reflect the persistence and vitality of native peoples on the peninsula’s ocean shores.\(^\text{26}\)

**Settling The Peninsula**

While U.S. immigrants flooded much of the rest of the West Coast during the 1850s, the Olympic Peninsula received only a trickle. Homesteaders did settle the eastern side, and towns cropped up around large inland lakes, the bottomlands of river valleys, and natural ports. In 1852, settlers platted Port Townsend, which became the port of entry for ships entering Puget Sound. Maine immigrant William Talbot and his partner, Andrew J. Pope, settled Port Gamble on the Kitsap Peninsula in 1853. By 1870, the town’s population approached 400. It boasted a school, the first Masonic Temple in Washington Territory, and most significantly, the Puget Mill sawmill, which transformed the port into a company town. The towns of Shelton and Port Ludlow as well as settlements on the Cape Hood Shoreline, Port Orchard, and Port Hadlock, followed. On the peninsula’s north coast, settlers filed for home sites around Port Discovery, Sequim Bay and Dungeness. Neah Bay, the site of the Spanish garrison, attracted settlers until it became reservation land. Port Angeles, on the northern coast in Clallam County, boasted a natural harbor that attracted settlement by 1857. Five years later, lobbied by land speculator and U.S. Treasury agent Victor Smith, President Abraham Lincoln issued an executive order establishing a lighthouse and a military reservation in Port Angeles. The town soon developed

---

into the Olympic Peninsula’s largest community.27

The Timber

Settlers in some of the early peninsula towns, including Neah Bay, traded in goods such as smoked salmon, whale oil, and furs, but most of the communities evolved into logging towns that exploited the Pacific Northwest’s great timber resources. The heavily forested coastal areas that stretched across the Olympic Peninsula’s western half had not escaped the notice of Spanish, English, and American mariners in the late 1700s. Many of them surveyed the ample stands of old-growth timber, and as they did around the globe, noted the potential of those trees for ship construction. Sailing through the Strait of Juan de Fuca in 1792, Captain George Vancouver was impressed with the abundance and quality of trees. The region abounded “with materials to which we could resort,” the British officer observed, “having only to make our choice from amongst thousands of the finest spars the world produces.” Overland travelers were equally impressed. Arriving at the mouth of the Columbia River in 1805, Meriwether Lewis and William Clark praised the area. “The whole neighborhood of the coast is supplied with great quantities of excellent timber,” they wrote. The trees’ size in particular captured the visitors’ attention. Fir “grows to an immense size,” they noted, “and is very commonly twenty-seven feet in circumference, six feet above the earth’s surface: they rise to the height of two hundred and twenty of that height without limb.”28

The abundance of timber quickly led to commercial development in the area. In 1827, the Hudson’s Bay Company established the first mill in the Pacific Northwest at Fort Vancouver, on

the north bank of the Columbia River; six years later, the company began lumber operations 100 miles to the north at Fort Nisqually. A small group of settlers purchased mill machinery from the Hudson’s Bay Company in the mid-1840s and built the first power mill on Puget Sound, near Olympia. After the Gold Rush of 1849, timber operations near and on the Olympic Peninsula expanded with unprecedented speed.29

The nation’s homesteading laws greatly aided settlers on the resource-rich peninsula. The 1862 Homestead Act allowed citizens of age to file for a free quarter section of surveyed public land – the famous 160 acres of American lore – contingent upon improvements such as a house and ten acres brought into cultivation during the first five years. The Timber Culture Act of 1873 also encouraged homesteading and tree planting in the West until its repeal in 1882. Many settlers exploited the terms of the law, hiring entrymen to take up land claims for them and then selling the claims to timber interests once they were perfected. In this and other ways, loose homesteading laws rewarded speculation by crafty businessmen. Such legislation seemed to suit the needs of the relatively unpopulated Washington Territory.

Development of peninsula timber resources served as a catalyst for regional economic growth. In the 1880s and 1890s, immigrants settled in the areas that later became Olympic National Park. Scandinavian communities formed on the shores of Lakes Ozette, Crescent, Quinault, and Cushman. Farmers also took up 160-acre homesteads along the Elwha, Sol Duc, Hoh, Queets, and Quinault river valleys. They cleared underbrush, built fences, cultivated fields of vegetables and hay, and allowed cattle to range the forest during summer. These settlements were small and often short-lived.30

30 Evans, Historic Resource Study, Olympic National Park, 63; Ruby El Hult, The Untamed Olympics: The Story of a Peninsula (Portland, Ore.: Binfords & Mort, 1954), 122-40; Richard White, Land Use, Environment, and Social Change in the
Clearing the land of huge timber stands and designing drainage systems for agricultural fields was expensive, and the peninsula’s temperate rain forests did not offer suitable soil for farming. Wet conditions hindered agriculture, while the narrow river bottoms flooded during the spring snowmelt. The distance of the Olympic Peninsula from major markets and inadequate transportation systems impeded the marketing and sale of agricultural products. USGS surveyors Theodore F. Rixon and Arthur Dodwell concluded that except for the Upper Elwha river section, most of the 2.188 million acre Olympic Forest Reserve that President Grover Cleveland created in 1897, was deserted. Although settlers filed 341 homestead entries in Clallam County, only eighty-three residents actually lived there when Rixon and Dodwell visited between 1897 and 1902. Timber companies eventually bought many of these homestead claims or settlers substituted them for other federal land under the lieu land provision in the Forest Management Act of 1897.31

As Rixon and Dodwell suggested, homesteading on the Olympic Peninsula ended almost as soon as it began. With the creation of the Olympic Forest Reserve – redesignated the Olympic National Forest in 1905 – homesteaders lost their legal right to carve homes in the wilderness. Although new groups of settlers claimed lands after 1901, when the federal government reopened some of the peninsula to homesteading, settlement dwindled. Even after the Forest Homestead Act of June 11, 1906, which encouraged homesteading in national forests, settlement on the Olympic Peninsula never recovered the vitality that characterized it in the 1890s.32

Exploring The Interior

Despite the existence of small settlements, towns, and logging camps in the coastal areas of

---


the Olympic Peninsula, through the end of the nineteenth century the interior remained largely a
great unknown. As settlers founded towns on the peninsula’s edges, scientists and outdoorsmen
explored the mysterious, glacial-peaked interior. In 1855, Indian agents Michael Simmons and
Benjamin Shaw, accompanied by two Indian guides, claimed they ascended Mount Olympus.33
Until 1885, when Brigadier General Nelson Miles ordered Lieutenant Joseph O’Neil to conduct
an exploration of the Olympic mountain range, no systematic exploration of the peninsula’s
interior had taken place.

The O’Neil military expedition was the first well-documented exploration to pierce the
peninsula’s interior. On July 16, 1885, O’Neil led a small party of enlisted men and civilian
engineers, accompanied by a mule train, from Vancouver Barracks on the Columbia River to
Port Townsend. The group took a steamer to Port Angeles and departed from there. Dense timber
and undergrowth slowed their progress south into the Olympic foothills. After about a month of
work, the party climbed Hurricane Ridge and divided into two groups. One explored the Elwha
Valley while O’Neil and the other group headed southeast.34 They reached almost as far south as
Mount Anderson before the Army recalled O’Neil to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

A second expedition into the Olympic interior resulted from a challenge laid down by the
Seattle Press newspaper. In 1889, when Elisha P. Ferry became the state of Washington’s first
governor, the Press issued a call for “hardy citizens of the Sound to acquire fame by unveiling
the mystery which wraps the land encircled by the snow capped Olympic range.” Outdoorsmen
James Christie and Charles A. Barnes answered the call, volunteering to organize an expedition
if the Press financed it. On December 8, 1889, six men, accompanied by four dogs, two mules,

34 Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative History, 13; Wood, Men, Mules, and Mountains, 13, 15, 18, 41-42; Evans, Historic Resource Study, Olympic National Park, Washington, 17-18; El Hult, The Untamed Olympics, 141-47; O’Neil and his party filed two separate reports.
and 1,500 pounds of supplies, departed for Port Angeles. They suffered through an unusually
harsh and snowy winter, but managed to explore the Elwha Valley in March and then traverse
the Low Divide and descend to Lake Quinault. The group reached the coast in May, becoming
the first U.S. exploration party to blaze a north-south-southwest route through the Olympic
Mountains. As a result of the Press expedition, many peaks now bear the names of prominent
newspaper publishers and editors of the late nineteenth century, including Mount Meany, named
for Edmond Meany, a Press editor and friend of naturalist John Muir; Mount Dana, honoring
Charles Dana of the New York Sun; the Bailey Range, named after William E. Bailey, publisher
of the Seattle Press; and Press Valley in the Upper Elwha Valley. Mount Christie and Mount
Barnes honor the expedition’s leaders.35

In July 1890, Lieutenant O’Neil led a second U.S. Army expedition – ten enlisted men, a
civilian packer, twelve pack animals, and three scientists from the Oregon Alpine Club – that
trekked from Hood Canal to the Pacific Coast. Several smaller parties split off to explore large
sections of the eastern and southern Olympic Mountains. In late September, the three scientists
ascended the Athena Group, four pinnacles that comprise the South Peak of Mount Olympus.
Other triumphs followed. Cutting a ninety-three mile mule trail up the North Fork of the
Skokomish River, over O’Neil Pass, down Enchanted Valley, and out the East Fork of the
Quinault, part of today’s park trail system, the party mapped headwaters and streams, and
catalogued many of the resources of the Olympic Mountains’ interior.36

Like the leaders of the Press expedition, O’Neil found no evidence of the peninsula’s

35 Seattle Press, July 16, 1890; Evans, Historic Resource Study, Olympic National Park, 19-24; El Hult, The Untamed
Olympics, 151-66; Robert L. Wood, Across the Olympic Mountains: The Press Expedition 1889-90 (Seattle: The Mountaineers
and University of Washington Press, 1967); F.W. Mathias, “The Olympic Mountains” [Historical report prepared in 1928],
OLYM 18414, Box 1 Folder 1936-1948 History, Olympic NP archives.
36 The Oregon Alpine Club is the “grandfather” of the current-day Portland-based Mazamas, and the Mazama offshoot
of the Seattle-based Mountaineers. Evans, Historic Resource Study, Olympic National Park, 25-37; Wood, Men, Mules, and
Mountains; El Hult, The Untamed Olympics, 166-70.
rumored great central valley, interior meadows, or lost Indian tribes. He discovered mountains in all directions and a wilderness majestic in its beauty and solitude, a place he said was worthy of national recognition by a country that had become preoccupied with the power of the continent it saw itself as conquering. At the dawn of the 1890s, the nation’s first stirrings of conservation began in earnest, spearheaded in California by the great naturalist John Muir and his friends at the Sierra Club. Muir first suggested the idea of a park in the Olympic Mountains after visiting the region in 1889. O’Neil followed his lead. In front of the 54th Congress, the lieutenant proposed the creation of a national park on the peninsula. “While the country on the outer slope of these mountains is valuable, the interior is useless for all practicable purposes,” he observed. He deemed the mountains unfit for grazing, agriculture, and mining, though fertile river bottoms and prairies west of the mountains held some potential. O’Neil stressed that the abundance of game, including bear, deer, and elk – “that noble animal so fast disappearing from this country” – required protection. The Olympics, he argued would “serve admirably for a national park. … The scenery, which often made us hungry, weary, and over-packed explorers forget for the moment our troubles, would surely please people traveling with comfort and for pleasure.”

**Considering A National Park**

In this, O’Neil reflected the dominant theme in early national park establishment. As the 1890s began, the push for national parks accelerated in the United States. Before 1890, only Yellowstone and Mackinac Island National Park had attained that status, although the Michigan site reverted to the state in 1895. In 1890, Congress granted national park status to the lands surrounding California’s Yosemite state park, and added Sequoia and General Grant to the

---

An American Eden

category. These early parks established a loose set of standards for national parks. Areas that received serious scrutiny typically shared a number of traits, including spectacular and usually high-elevation scenery, status as public lands, and the perception that any resource the area contained had no practical commercial value at the moment. The Olympics region fit some of that criteria. It was scenic and spectacular but its vast stands of timber whetted the appetite of loggers in the Pacific Northwest.

Judge James Wickersham, who headed the 1890 Buckley Banner newspaper party, shared sentiments similar to Muir’s and O’Neil’s. Like the Seattle Press party, Wickersham gathered scant scientific information about the interior. He did explore the peninsula’s eastern section, and his group claimed to be the first American party to explore some of the high river sources in the Olympic range. Wickersham, like O’Neil, found grandeur in the Olympic Mountains. Comparing its glaciers to those in Switzerland in classic late nineteenth-century fashion, Wickersham argued that a park would provide recreation for a growing nation and protect its fine forests.

Americans saw in nature something special about their land. Some considered wilderness the defining feature of U.S. identity, a basic ingredient of national culture. The debate between conservation and preservation that emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century – embodied by the struggle over San Francisco’s flooding of Yosemite’s Hetch Hetchy Valley as a water source with the 1923 opening of O’Shaughnessy Dam – reflected the nation’s contradictory views about nature. Conservation, represented by key Progressive politician and U.S. Chief Forester Gifford Pinchot, advocated the wise and efficient use of natural resources, the “greatest good for the greatest number in the long run.” Preservation, best articulated by Muir

---

38 The state lands were incorporated into the national park in 1906. Alfred Runte, Yosemite: The Embattled Wilderness (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 21-56.
and the Sierra Club, sought to value pristine natural places for their own sake and set them aside for time immemorial. Both of those competing ideologies found considerable support among those who sought to change the development pattern on the Olympic Peninsula.40

4 Exploiting The Resources

While O’Neil and Wickersham expressed hopes for an Olympic National Park in the early 1890s, resource extraction had become the dominant economic strategy for people on the peninsula. Some pioneers had hoped to find a region as rich in mineral wealth as California’s gold-filled Sierra Nevada. As early as the 1850s, legend held that the Olympic Mountains contained fortunes as rich, one prospector asserted, “as the richest gold fields of Australia or Cassiar,” a rich mining community in nineteenth-century British Columbia. In the early 1870s, rumors of gold nuggets in the river near Grays Harbor circulated. An 1890 report claimed the discovery of a rock assaying at $200,000 a ton. These exaggerated claims encouraged men with gold fever to stake claims along the Olympic Peninsula’s coasts, rivers, and mountains. In his 1890 report, O’Neil stressed that the country was “too youthful to have concealed about [its] person mineral wealth” and the mountains of “very recent formation” to harbor such riches, but this report was not enough to dishearten optimistic speculators. The Rixon and Dodwell report also discounted the potential of gold mining in the mountains and watersheds, but even as these discouraging reports circulated, men staked out claims in the mountains.41

On the Olympic Peninsula between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, sporadic mining activities took place, but consistent with the observations of O’Neil, Rixon and

Dodwell, such endeavors had little lasting importance. Federal legislation governing mineral
extraction, particularly the Mining Law of 1872, allowed individuals to claim public domain land
for mineral exploration, development, and production. Driven by rumors and dreams,
prospectors continued to search for gold in the Olympic Peninsula. Between the 1850s and
1890s, reports of small quantities of gold around Lake Cushman surfaced. Placer mining was
common along the coast between the 1890s and 1940 in what became the western edge of
Olympic National Park, but prospectors found no gold amid the vast quartz veins.\(^{42}\)

Prospectors had slightly better luck at the end of the nineteenth century unearthing less
coveted minerals such as silver, manganese, cinnabar, tin, coal, iron, and copper. Manganese
deposits occurred in broad belts around the Olympic Peninsula’s central core. In the Shelton
District, prospectors filed fifty-four manganese and copper mining claims that persisted through
the 1950s. Miners filed hundreds of claims in the Hoodsport, Sol Duc, and Quilcene districts;
more than 100 claims were filed between 1905 and 1909 on Iron Mountain alone, leading to the
formation of the Tubal Cain Copper and Mining Company. Independent operators and mining
companies established copper mining camps, using burros to haul machinery over the steep,
winding trails. Despite this flurry of activity, only the Black and White manganese and copper
mine on the Skokomish River had any lasting economic impact, although the Crescent Mine at
Lake Crescent, which ran between 1923 and 1926 until it was reopened in 1941, produced more
than 50,000 tons of ore containing manganese, iron, copper and zinc. It closed in 1954.\(^{43}\)

Mining never proved sufficiently lucrative to encourage the large-scale development that
shaped other parts of the U.S. West, Australia, and South Africa. However, despite the relative


paucity of minerals on the Olympic Peninsula, exaggerated booster and newspaper accounts of
the region’s wealth continued to fuel speculation through the middle of the twentieth century.
Though mining exerted relatively little influence over the course of resource development on the
Olympic Peninsula and in the national park, the lands it claimed proved obstacles to park
advocates. Individuals and mining companies formed a powerful block against the creation of the
national park, arguing that it would retard the region’s mineral development. Park opponents also
used fraudulent mining claims to cover exploitation of the heaviest and most valuable stands of
timber.44

9 **Timber Resources**

Unlike mineral extraction, timber development had a lasting impact on the history of the
peninsula and the creation of Olympic National Park. Nineteenth-century surveyors, government
officials, and scientists often were as keen to gauge the extent of the region’s timber resources –
stands of old-growth timber that stretched across the western half of the peninsula – as they were
to explore them. O’Neil noted that the timber seemed inexhaustible. With “a market for the
lumber, there is hardly a quarter section that would not almost pay for itself,” he wrote in 1890.45
He hoped that settlers would clear the timberlands to make room for farms. Yet, by the mid-
nineteenth century, historical circumstances made the Olympic Peninsula ripe for development
that had little to do with commercial agriculture.

California’s Gold Rush of 1849 upset the Olympic Peninsula’s relatively simple economy.
The new demand for building and mining material far outstripped the lumber shipments
dispatched from the eastern and southern ports of the United States. California’s forests were

45 Evans, *Historic Resource Study, Olympic National Park*, 42-47; Joseph P. O’Neil, letter to The Assistant Adjutant-
General, Department of the Columbia, Vancouver Barracks, Washington, November 16, 1890, OLYM 18414 Box 1, Folder
1936-1948 History, Olympic NP archives.
available to cut, but miners expended their energies in the gold fields, and the demand for timber for shoring up shafts was so great and the transportation by sea so inexpensive that it merited importing Washington lumber to the Golden State. As greater numbers of East Coast vessels found their way to the region and spread word of the immense stands of timber, outside investors poured capital into the Olympic Peninsula. The result was an enormous boost for local timber production.

The regional timber industry grew with amazing speed. By the 1850s, thirty-one lumber mills were scattered throughout the Puget Sound area. Together, they annually produced more than 45 million board feet of lumber, chiefly feeding California’s massive growth. The mills soon reached the peninsula’s eastern fringes. On Discovery Bay, the Discovery Bay Mill, established in 1859 with funding from San Francisco investors, became one of the largest producers of cut logs. In the early 1860s, mills around Puget Sound produced almost 71 million board feet of lumber annually, a good share of which became an underlying part of the transcontinental railroad as its construction began in the early 1860s.

Most of the mills were the properties of experienced East Coast lumbermen. In 1853, Maine resident William Sayward, who had made a fortuneSpeculating in gold dust in San Francisco, erected a large steam mill at Port Ludlow in Jefferson County, Washington. In 1855, Maine capitalists Andrew J. Pope and William C. Talbot built a mill at Port Gamble, on the Hood Canal’s east bank. By 1875, the Puget Mill Company owned 186,000 acres of forest, the largest tract in Washington Territory. It shipped 43 million board feet yearly, nearly three times more than any other Puget Sound mill. Ushering in the “Sawdust Saga” of the Pacific Northwest, it remained the oldest continually operating sawmill in North America until its closure in 1995.

“Mills running night & day, & lumber goes off just as fast as we can make it,” Pope wrote of his
thriving business. Other companies, including Port Blakely Mill Company at Puget Sound, reproduced the success of Pope & Talbot. By the 1880s, lumbermen based at major logging camps in Port Angeles and Port Crescent had tapped into the dense peninsula rain forests along the Hoh, Queets, and Quinault river valleys.46

By the end of the nineteenth century, the timber industry dominated the economic life of the Olympic Peninsula’s coastal settlements. At the eastern tip of Grays Harbor, which boasted the greatest stand of Douglas fir ever surveyed in the Pacific Northwest, logging interests established the towns of Aberdeen and Hoquiam in 1884 and 1885. The industry continued to expand its markets. In 1885, the Washington territorial governor listed timber as one of the principal industries in all of the peninsula counties. Statewide, the number of mills increased from forty-six in 1870 to 310 in 1890. By then, South African diamond mines created further demand for global timber shipments. Three leading peninsula logging companies competed in the area: Pope & Talbot in Port Gamble, Polson Brothers Logging Company in the Grays Harbor area, and Simpson Logging Company in Shelton. As explorers and prospectors further surveyed the peninsula, timber companies followed them into the interior.47

Technical innovation also spurred the timber industry’s growth. Early logging operations had been wasteful because the sticky pitch on the bottom ten feet of the Douglas fir jammed the primitive crosscut saws, making it nearly impossible for loggers to cut trees close to the ground. Similarly, handling the removal of trees larger than 200 feet tall posed untold difficulties. In 1878, loggers replaced the single-bitted ax with the long-handled, double-bitted ax and


introduced a new saw, reducing felling time by four-fifths. A specifically West Coast invention was the skid road, a path constructed of greased, small-diameter trees on which trees were cut, pulled to rivers by ox and horse teams, and floated down to tidewater mills. Other rivers transported the logs to inland mills and markets. By the mid-1880s, many loggers replaced animal power with the steam donkey engine, dramatically increasing timber production. The timber industry soon replaced the peninsula’s skid roads with railroad lines, which permitted faster, more efficient transportation. In the early 1880s, the Satsop Railroad, the Mason County Central Railroad, and “the Blakely” of the Port Blakely Mill Company ran through the peninsula’s heart. Although the average rail line extended only twelve miles in the early days of logging, more than 1,000 miles of rails, used by 323 steam locomotives, snaked through the area before 1910. Despite the thriving timber industry, the majority of early rail companies went bankrupt, though the Simpson Logging Company and the Peninsular Railroad continued to support logging in Mason and eastern Grays Harbor counties.

Despite all of this activity, the Olympic Peninsula remained on the periphery of the U.S. economy, subject to the vagaries of a national and international timber market. In 1889, companies laid rail lines that began in Portland, Oregon, and attempted to reach Port Townsend, running between the mountains and across the water through Quilcene, Brinnon, Duckabush, Lilliwaup, and Hoodsport. Expected lumber markets east of the Cascades and Rockies never appeared. Still, optimistic development plans continued. In the early 1900s, the Northern Pacific and Union Pacific surveyed a route north from Grays Harbor to Lake Ozette and Port Angeles, and the Western Pacific Railroad and Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railroad raced north.

48 Williams, Americans and their Forests, 300-2.
from Lake Ozette. The economic depression of 1907 curtailed these plans.50

Even with the haphazard nature of such development, railroads changed the face of the Olympic Peninsula. Each rail line brought new logging camps, often housing several hundred workers, to feed timber into more mills. Offshoots of the timber industry grew as well.

Shipbuilding, shipping, and ports were linked intrinsically to timber, and Port Townsend soon developed into an important port.51

In many ways, development on the Olympic Peninsula linked the previous three centuries of destruction of U.S. forests to a new concern about and experimentation with timber. The national sense of loss that stemmed from industrialization and rise of a growing wilderness consciousness among intellectuals, naturalists, outdoors clubs, and public officials offered a new cultural foundation for resource preservation. The announcement of the perceived closing of the nation’s Western frontier in 1890, the growth of rapidly industrializing and increasingly polluted cities, the highly publicized depredations of private enterprise during the Gilded Age, and concern for the nation’s disappearing natural resources led to the growth of legislation intended to address these issues. The nation’s forests were of particular concern. By 1891, reports found widespread abuse of the nation’s timber resources by private companies and fears of a timber famine abounded.52

Olympic Forest Reserve

As the timber industry extended its influence on the Olympic Peninsula, the federal laws that had so generously aided settlers, miners, and loggers came to an abrupt end. On March 3,

1891, an amendment to the General Appropriation Act known as the Forest Reserve Act of 1891 revised existing land laws, repealed the timber-culture laws and authorized the president to set apart forest lands in the public domain with only his signature. President Grover Cleveland did not initially designate any area in the new state of Washington for a reserve. A coalition that included the Mazamas, an alpine club based in Portland, members of an 1896 National Academy of Sciences Forestry Commission that included forester Gifford Pinchot, scientists from the U.S. Geological Survey and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and university professors regularly lobbied Cleveland. Action came on February 22, 1897, ten days before the end of the presidential term. On that day, Cleveland created 21 million acres of new forest reserves, which opponents derided as “midnight reserves.” Cleveland wrote “[I]t appears that the public good would be promoted by setting apart and reserving said lands as a public reservation,” He included the Olympic Forest Reserve among them.53

The creation of the Olympic Forest Reserve closed to private acquisition an area that encompassed 2,188,800 acres. The new reserve included nearly all of the Olympic Mountain range and two-thirds of the peninsula, including land in the homestead and timber counties of Clallam, Jefferson, Chehalis, and Mason. The reserve’s boundaries extended to the Strait of Juan de Fuca to the north, to the coast of the Pacific Ocean on the west and almost to Hood Canal on the east. The set-aside area included sixty miles of ocean coast. In a fit of hyperbole, a government report described the reserve, formally established in March 1898, as “the largest and most valuable body of timber belonging to the nation,” the “only part of the U.S. where the forest unmarked by fire or the axe still exists over a great area in its primeval splendor.”54

53 “By the President of the United States of America, A Proclamation, February 22, 1897,” OLYM 443 Box 1 File 1 1897-1905, Olympic NP Administrative files, Olympic NP archives; McCarthy, Hour of Trial, 46-56; Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative History, 20-22.

Cleveland’s thirteen reserve proclamations incited much opposition, with congressional resistance so strong that the president had to wield a pocket veto to block the Olympic proclamation’s outright repeal. Olympic Peninsula economic interests, led by the major timber companies, denounced Cleveland for not only endangering their livelihoods, but also threatening the entire economic base of the Pacific Northwest. Others argued that the reservation impeded agricultural development. Vociferous opposition came from Clallam County’s auditor, Thomas Aldwell, who, bowing to local interests, reported that the reserve included all but 240,000 acres of his county’s 1.47 million acres – including 450,000 acres of fertile farmland and precincts containing nearly 400 voting citizens. After inspecting Clallam County, Commissioner J.W. Cloes of the Olympic Forest Reserve aligned himself with peninsula chambers of commerce, concluding that setting aside those lands would slow the development of those communities. Officials in Jefferson County, Clallam County’s southern neighbor, also requested that the federal government reduce the size of the reserve and exclude the county’s eleven townships.55

The Olympic Forest Reserve quickly became an interagency battleground. Yielding to local and congressional pressures, the General Land Office’s Forestry Division determined that the reserve harmed settlers. The U.S. Geological Survey, consisting of scientific professionals, argued that agricultural development was not possible given the prohibitively expensive cost of clearing the land; only the timber interests stood to benefit from reducing the area of the reserve.56

With these different agencies locked in conflict, Secretary of the Interior Ethan A. Hitchcock ordered the General Land Office and the U.S. Geological Survey to reach a consensus.


An American Eden

about any boundary revisions. The agencies met March 15, 1900, and adopted the original Cloes recommendation that land south of the Bogachiel remain in the reserve, and accepted Commissioner of the General Land Office Binger Hermann’s recommended removals in Clallam, Jefferson, and Chehalis counties. On April 7, 1900, President William McKinley reduced the reserve from 2.18 million acres to 1.46 million acres. The proclamation restored fifteen townships to the public domain; the government opened them all to settlement. The area also included the great forests of western Clallam County that, politicians later pointed out, were not fit for cultivation. A year later, on July 15, 1901, McKinley again yielded to local interests and reduced the reserve by another 456,960 acres.\(^{57}\)

Many people thought that settlement patterns in the West would follow those of the eastern United States, with pioneer farmers clearing the forests and taking up land for homesteading. However, the Olympic Peninsula was a different country and McKinley’s reductions did not help area farmers. Instead, as U.S. Chief Forester Pinchot and others had predicted, the reductions helped secure more acreage for timber companies under the Timber and Stone Act of 1878, which eased private ownership of the public forests by declaring lands unfit for cultivation. By the early 1900s, a second wave of settlers had filed timber claims along the banks of the region’s major rivers. As did many earlier homesteading claims, most of these eventually fell into the hands of the timber companies. The pattern was so pronounced in the Pacific Northwest that Pinchot noted, “nearly every acre [of the removed land] passed promptly and fraudulently into the hands of lumbermen.” Speculators acquired 37 percent of the lands, and timber companies acquired 19 percent. Congressional investigations later found that among the “settlers” of the disputed and removed lands were corporations that had acquired the reserve lands, including

railroad companies, Milwaukee Land Company, Weyerhaeuser Timber Company, Simpson Logging Company, Puget Mill and Timber Company, and Merrill and Ring Company.\textsuperscript{58} 

### The U.S. Forest Service

Between 1901 and 1904, management of the new forest reserve took shape. As federal administration efforts began, fire reports, trail building, and settling disputes such as timber-cutting trespass and squatter issues took precedence. During this time, Pinchot, the key figure in the Progressive conservation movement and an advocate of the wise and efficient use of the forest reserve, garnered the support of timber corporations and slowly gained backing for the transfer of the forest reserves to the Department of Agriculture. President Theodore Roosevelt and Pinchot were close, and Pinchot incessantly lobbied the president for his own bureau. On February 1, 1905, Congress transferred responsibility for overseeing the nation’s forest reserves from the General Land Office in the Department of the Interior to the Department of Agriculture’s Bureau of Forestry, soon renamed the U.S. Forest Service.\textsuperscript{59}

This transfer ushered in important changes in the administration of the Olympic Forest Reserve. In 1907, the government changed the name of the reserve to “Olympic National Forest.” The new designation better reflected Pinchot and the Forest Service’s sense of the multiple purposes of reserved forest lands and allowed the new agency to stamp its administration as different from the previous haphazard management of the forest reserves. As Pinchot built his agency, he assembled a cadre of followers. Professional foresters rather than political appointees took control of the forests and implemented Pinchot’s philosophy. As part of


the new management attitude, a growing system of trails provided accessible routes in the national forests for foresters, firefighters and recreational users.\textsuperscript{60}

As the interagency transfer occurred, an effort to create a national park on the Olympic Peninsula gained momentum. The forest reserve system had serious limitations as a tool for preservation. A president could alter or even erase its borders at will. John Muir and his friend Edward H. Harriman, the Union Pacific Railroad magnate, wanted a national park on the peninsula that permanently fended off the timber interests. They also wished to protect from extinction by overhunting the Olympic Elk, which foraged across the reserve’s mountain meadows. Lieutenant Joseph O’Neil had expressed such concerns as early as 1890. In 1897, noted naturalist Clinton Hart Merriam, the chief of the Biological Survey, pronounced the “uniqueness” of the elk and named it after Theodore Roosevelt. By the early 1900s, overhunting had reduced the elk population to about 500.\textsuperscript{61}

Proposing A National Park

During Roosevelt’s administration, such a situation demanded government action. On January 19, 1904, Congressman Francis Cushman of Tacoma, Washington, introduced H.R. 10443 to establish “Elk National Park,” a public park with the goal of “preserving elk, game, fish, animals, timber and curiosities therein.” He argued that saving the elk required habitat protection. The idea of habitat protection did not fit the standards that Congress typically applied to national park proposals, and the bill failed to pass the 58\textsuperscript{th} Congress. In 1904, Representative William E. Humphrey failed in his attempt to create a more plausible designation, a game refuge.


of 393,000 acres on the Olympic Peninsula, with a clause that permitted logging in an attempt to mollify opponents. During the first session of the 59th Congress in 1906, Humphrey introduced another bill that advocated the creation of a park covering the same area as the proposed Elk National Park. Humphrey’s attempt again failed, as did one in 1908 that advocated saving the elk but left their habitat open to the timber industry.62 Passing national park bills was a difficult proposition even when Theodore Roosevelt sat in the White House.

Although the national park idea garnered little support, concern about the fate of the forest and its endangered elk herds spurred presidential action. In 1907, Roosevelt, supported by Pinchot, added 127,680 acres to the Olympic National Forest, returning some of the lands McKinley had eliminated. On March 2, 1909, Congressman Humphrey persuaded Roosevelt to designate a large portion of the forest as Mount Olympus National Monument under the Antiquities Act. Passed on June 8, 1906, the act gave the president the authority to designate “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic and scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the government of the U.S. to be national monuments.”63 Executive Proclamation No. 869, 35 Stat. 2247, enacted March 2, 1909, created Mount Olympus National Monument. It retained the core of Olympic National Forest and seemingly provided a refuge for the Roosevelt Elk. The kernel of a national park, offering at best symbolic protection, was in place.

The creation of Mount Olympus National Monument settled few of the many issues that created so much controversy on the Olympic Peninsula. The new national monument differed in

---

An American Eden

1 a significant way from other similarly designated areas: unlike the rest, Mount Olympus was
2 located in the middle of a viable commercial extractive economy. The creation of the monument
3 resulted from an expression of presidential prerogative. Many of those living and working on the
4 peninsula vociferously disagreed with the proclamation, as did the powerful regional timber
5 industry. In the end, a federal agency, the United States Forest Service, closely allied with local
6 economic interests, supported them. If Congress intended the proclamation of Mount Olympus
7 National Monument to be an initial step toward national park status, the process took longer and
8 was far more complicated than anyone at the time envisioned. A three-decade battle to establish
9 Olympic National Park ensued.
An American Eden

1
Figure 1-1: Hurricane Ridge and Bailey Range, including Mount Olympus and Mount Carrie. (Photographs courtesy of Olympic National Park, Accession Number OLYM-632, Box 3)

Figure 1-2: The rain forest of Olympic National Park.
Figure 1-3: The Hoh Glacier on Mount Olympus.

Figure 1-4: A portion of the Olympic National Park’s Pacific coastline.
Figure 1-5: Roosevelt Elk grazing within Olympic National Park.
Figure 1-6: The North Fork of the Quinault River.
Figure 1-7: Sol Duc Park in 1960, looking west. Seven Lakes Basin and Bogachiel Peak are in the right foreground, with the Hoh River to the left. The High Divide Trail can be seen along the ridge top.

Figure 1-8: Mount Olympus, with the Blue Glacier in the foreground. The photograph, taken in 1937, was shot 2.5 miles north-east of Mount Olympus.
Figure 1-9: The rain forest of Olympic National Park.

Figure 1-10: The rain forest along the South Fork of the Hoh River.
Figure 1-11: Round Lake, a subalpine lake in the Seven Lakes Basin, melts out in late July.
Figure 1-12: The Enchanted Valley waterfall, showing the valley’s north wall and the east fork of the Quinault River.
Chapter 2:
Creating the Park

Between 1916 and the 1938 establishment of Olympic National Park, the National Park Service and the U.S. Forest Service engaged in a titanic struggle for preeminence as the nation’s top land management agency. These two agencies, sharing similar missions and constituencies, overlapped especially in their effort to attract the public to their comparable yet different ideas about management. At its establishment in 1905, the Forest Service embraced the ethos of the Progressive Era, seeing its primary mission as the prevention of timber famine and later, the suppression of forest fires. Founded in 1916, the National Park Service quickly assumed the traits of the Jazz Age, the ebullient era that seemed to rewrite the rules of U.S. society in the years following World War I. While the Forest Service sought alliances with the timber industry and support of local constituencies, the National Park Service fashioned a national audience, excited by the economic and social prospects of the early and mid-1920s. Both agencies often aimed at the same tracts of land. Their struggles were everything observers expected out of bureaucratic disputes: venomous and petty, arcane and Byzantine. Simultaneously, they were crucial to the administration of public lands, especially in the West.¹

The establishment of Mount Olympus National Monument in 1909 triggered a chain of events that led to the most significant battle the Forest Service and National Park Service fought in the more than twenty years of intense acrimony. Mount Olympus was typical of the early national monuments. They were carved from national forest acreage, removed from the public

domain by authority of the Forest Reserve Act of 1891 and made the province of the Forest Service in 1905. Control of Mount Olympus National Monument initially fell to the Forest Service, as the Antiquities Act left national monuments in the jurisdiction of the federal department that administered the land prior to the proclamation. After the 1916 creation of the National Park Service, which inherited almost all the Department of the Interior national monuments, the Forest Service faced a competitor for Mount Olympus. The nondescript monument category, which before 1916 meant little to anyone, became an important tool for the National Park Service as it expanded. For eighteen years, until the monument’s transfer to the National Park Service in 1933, the agencies offered two different perspectives of the future of the area. The Forest Service advocated timber harvesting, mining, grazing, and to a much lesser degree recreation, while the National Park Service yearned for the opportunity to formally protect the same lands and make them available to the public.

The fight over Olympic National Park became the final battle for those involved in the first generation of the National Park Service-Forest Service rivalry. The Forest Service found itself on the Olympic Peninsula not only surrounded by a viable economic community that supported its policies, but also holding land with more than one apparent use. The peninsula was both beautiful and, in the 1930s, commercially viable. By the early 1930s, the National Park Service had gained the upper hand in the rivalry. The Forest Service sought to reverse its decade-long series of land losses, relying on local communities and the timber industry to support its position. Friends of the National Park Service who wished to preserve the nation’s remaining wilderness area fashioned a complicated nationwide consortium of people and organizations that demanded park status for Mount Olympus National Monument. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, museum curator and persistent conservationist Willard Van Name, journalist Irving Brant,
national park advocate Rosalie Edge, and many others in the conservation community made a compelling case for creation of a peninsula park. Pleased with the strategy and the influence its leaders brought to bear, the National Park Service followed their lead. Forced by local circumstances and the hold of the Forest Service to compromise in new ways with different constituencies, the National Park Service entered a controversial and bitter maelstrom that shaped the agencies’ future on the Olympic Peninsula.

The eventual establishment of Olympic National Park inaugurated the second generation of national parks. Along with three eastern parks authorized in the 1920s and established a decade later – Shenandoah, Great Smoky Mountains, and Mammoth Cave – Olympic represented a change in national park philosophy. At Olympic, conditions differed markedly from the era’s conventional national parks. Unlike the largely empty lands filled with inaccessible natural resources that became nineteenth- and early twentieth-century national parks, the peninsula was relatively well populated, and the proposed park was located amid a viable and thriving commercial resource economy. Indeed, timber played an essential role in the Washington state economy, giving timber-cutting operations on the Olympic Peninsula more than a little influence in state politics. By the late 1920s, the creation of a national park seemed a more remote possibility than it had been a decade before.2

Elsewhere in the park system, spectacular places rapidly made the transition from national monument to national park. Even the Grand Canyon, another Forest Service holding, took only eleven years to go from monument to park – with the full endorsement of the Forest Service. In contrast, Olympic’s transition took nearly thirty years, testimony to the complicated array of interests and the strength of the peninsula’s economy. Only when the Great Depression

---

hit the United States in 1929 did a national park on the Olympic Peninsula become truly viable. Its establishment required a weakened regional and national economy, a growing sense of the value of recreation, influential support of conservationists – for whom the 1930s were a glorious era – and compromises between local and national groups and agencies. It also required powerful support in Washington, D.C., at a moment that favored federal over local action. In a time of federal bureaucratic expansion – when Congress took lands back from states at their request and when regional economies were weak and federal dollars paid local bills – from a national policy perspective, a park made more sense than a forest. With the regional timber industry in disarray as a result of the dire national economic circumstances, local opposition to Olympic National Park softened. Its establishment in 1938 brought to a close the first battle to protect Olympic’s ancient forests and snow-capped peaks. It also foreshadowed later park proclamations in the continental United States.

Opposition To The Monument

In the first decade of the twentieth century, opposition to Mount Olympus National Monument continued to grow. The U.S. Forest Service’s district office in Portland, Oregon, led the protest of President Theodore Roosevelt’s proclamation and immediately sought to abolish the monument. From that agency’s perspective, the monument removed several billion potential board feet of lumber from the Olympic Peninsula’s economy, and in its view amounted to taking food from tables and jobs from anxious workers. Mining interests pressed similar arguments. On April 30, 1909, F.H. Stanard, a Seattle businessman, inquired of Secretary of the Interior Richard A. Ballinger whether he could prospect for minerals within the new monument. The Antiquities Act barred such activities, Ballinger responded. Stanard soon found other Seattle businessmen who felt the impact of a depressed timber economy. Together they initiated a campaign to abort
the monument, a strategy to which the Forest Service was sympathetic.\textsuperscript{3}

The rancor toward the national monument reflected the dubious status of areas preserved under the Antiquities Act and the limited protection afforded national park areas before the National Park Service’s creation in 1916. In 1909, no federal agency had direct administrative authority for national park areas. The categories of park areas were understood best as individual parks rather than as part of a national system, leading to peculiar appreciation of specific parks such as Yellowstone, Yosemite, and Mount Rainier, but a less comprehensive feeling for national monuments.\textsuperscript{4}

The peninsula’s business community mainly made economic arguments, and by 1911, Seattle businessmen had formed a powerful block in opposition to the new national monument. The Northwest was beginning to develop the complex natural resource-based industries that became its hallmark during the first seventy years of the twentieth century, and the Olympic Peninsula provided a significant opportunity for development. Timber interests already possessed great power in the region. In addition, the Olympic Peninsula Development League, to which Stanard belonged, claimed that the peninsula harbored the nation’s largest manganese and iron deposits. “We who have given years to pioneering in the work of developing the resources of the Olympic peninsula (sic), would be fools to let a lot of foolish sentimentalists tie up the resources of the Olympic peninsula in order to preserve its scenery,” a Seattle tax commissioner enunciated the point, with some vehemence.\textsuperscript{5}


\textsuperscript{5} “Leaguers Make Assault on Monument,” Bremerton Searchlight, October 6, 1911, quoted in Olympic National Park: An Administrative History, 38.
Seattle’s business community also organized against the monument. Stanard, who represented mining interests, Asahel Curtis of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce, and D.J. Kelly of the Seattle Commercial Club formed a committee that proposed the creation of a national park that would be open to mining. Advocates of economic growth did not see the point. A 1911 Forest Service report estimated that a sustained annual yield of 250 million board feet existed within the boundaries of Olympic National Forest, almost half consisting of mature stands of Douglas fir valued at more than $100 per acre; these reportedly were primarily within the monument. In its proposal for a national park, the committee that included Stanard, Curtis, and Kelly recommended removing the valuable timber acreage from the southern part of the monument and agricultural land from the eastern edge and authorizing the extraction of minerals within new reduced boundaries. The proposal created an initial division between park and commercial land that was consistent with the era and became the basis of nearly every subsequent national park proposal.

During these years, national park and monument boundaries were not sacrosanct. Revisions and reductions occurred with some regularity, as new information helped rectify problems that resulted from often-hasty proclamations, faulty surveying, and incomplete records. At establishment, many parks had arbitrary boundaries, often drawn in a haphazard manner. Equally many contained large swaths of territory included out of convenience rather than any real assessment of the land’s importance. As a result, the borders of many national parks remained in flux. Yosemite had the Minaret section excised from its boundaries in 1903 and

---

endured the removal of the Hetch-Hetchy Valley a decade later; Congress reduced Navajo
National Monument from an enormous 160-square mile unsurveyed tract of the Navajo
reservation to two 160-acre tracts and a third 80-acre parcel in 1909. Such adjustments were
common under the loose system of administration that persisted even as the number of national
park areas grew.

The effort led by Stanard was the first Olympic national park proposal of any
significance, but it compromised the nascent national park ethic. By this time, elements of the
public had a clear idea of what a national park was, and extractive endeavor was outside that
boundary. Around the country, many business elites embraced the idea of Progressivism and
became avid supporters of national parks. Down the Pacific Coast in San Francisco, a
combination of business and civic leaders made conservation into a bellwether ideal. Stanard
hoped to capitalize on Seattle’s civic pride and the desire for a national park on the Olympic
Peninsula to release lands for development. His committee sent its report to Congressman
William Ewert Humphrey, R-WA., who sponsored H.R. 12532 on July 15, 1911. A canny
politician, Humphrey recognized the power of the people who were behind the report and
averred that he never intended to keep mining out of the park. In the new bill, he authorized
mining, homesteading, and salvage logging. A few months later, Senator Wesley L. Jones, R-
Wa., introduced a similar bill for a Mount Olympus National Park that permitted mining, twenty-
year leases on visitors’ buildings, and summer cottages. Conservation remained a prominent
social goal throughout the Progressive Era and the public subjected park bills to close scrutiny at
the national level. Despite the support of Washington’s congressional delegation,
conservationists quickly alerted their friends in Congress that the two bills did not meet the

---

evolving standards for national parks. Both bills soon failed.8

After this setback, regional opposition to the national monument intensified. The Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Olympic Recorder, Port Angeles Times, and other newspapers printed letters from foresters in favor of abolishing the monument and from prospectors who sought to mine inside its boundaries. The Seattle Times provided powerful ammunition to opponents when it announced that the development of a recently discovered high-grade oil field would benefit the country more than the existence of a national monument. Although the discovery turned out to be insignificant, the groundwork for an ongoing comparison of economic and preservation value had been mapped out. The Tacoma Tribune even accused the monument of being a “huge joke” as a strategy to protect the Roosevelt Elk and “worthless for the purpose created.”9

Calls For A National Park

National organizations that supported conservation issued separate calls for a national park, signifying an uneasy convergence of local and national movements motivated by disparate missions. The Sierra Club, which at that time was waging a national campaign to save Yosemite’s Hetch Hetchy Valley, took an interest in the Olympic Peninsula. The club had become a leading voice in favor of the complete preservation of national parks, and its view of the growing Olympic controversy reflected that stance. The peninsula’s local economic interests, club member E.T. Parsons insisted, proposed “a strictly commercial” vision that subordinated the idea of the park “to every special corporate and individual interest anywhere about the monument.” If the park were to allow resource extraction, he continued, “it would be practically

the same as having no park at all and would unquestionably establish most vicious precedents
with relation to all of the other national parks.” A Seattle-based preservation club, the
Mountaineers, supported the Sierra Club. It focused on achieving national park status for the
peninsula area. Alone among a cacophony of local voices opposing resource extraction in the
park, the Mountaineers reflected a national perspective. Consistent with the values of
conservation in that era, both the Mountaineers and the Sierra Club imagined park status only for
the Olympic mountain range.10

Despite growing national interest in a national park on the Olympic Peninsula, local and
regional groups wielded far more immediate power than did national interests. In 1914, at the
behest of the Southwest Washington Development Association, Washington Governor Earnest
Lister pleaded with President Woodrow Wilson to rescind the monument proclamation. His letter
reached Chief Forester Henry S. Graves, who conducted a study of Mount Olympus National
Monument. The government charged Graves, Gifford Pinchot’s successor, with addressing the
concerns of different constituencies on the peninsula and recommending a solution.11

The former dean at Yale University’s forestry school and a successful administrator,
Graves regarded forestry in a different manner than had his predecessor. In 1913, Graves stressed
the importance of preserving the monument’s natural beauty for the “enjoyment of the public.”
Recreation, he averred, was a “highly important form of use of the Forests by the public, and it is
recognized and facilitated by adjusting commercial use of the Forests, when necessary.” On the
Olympic Peninsula, such plans were already in action. Following the vision of the “back to the

10 Meredith B. Ingham, Jr., “Olympic National Park: A Study of Conservation Objectives Relating to Its Establishment
and Boundary Adjustments” (U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1955, Mimeo.), 1; John Ise, Our National
Origins of Olympic National Park,” 110; E.T. Parsons, Sierra Club, to Fisher, April 10, 1912, Olympic General 1909-1914, RG
79, NPS Records Central Classified files 1907-49, Box 396, Entry 7, Olympic NP archives.

11 O.J. Kelly, Sr., to Hon. Bo Sweeney, Washington, D.C., April 24, 1915, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder
16, University of Washington Archives (hereafter UW Archives).
land” movement of the new century, the Forest Service and private entrepreneurs provided an increasingly mobile public with new ways to visit the Olympic Peninsula. In the early 1900s, they built horse trails to new recreational resorts at Elwha, Olympic Hot Springs, and Sol Duc Hot Springs. Other resorts appeared along the coast at Mora and Kalaloch, and in the backcountry in Enchanted Valley and Low Divide. More trails, roads, campgrounds, and lookout points designed for automobiles followed. In 1909, the North Pacific District of the Forest Service reported 45,000 recreational visits to its area. At least on the Olympic Peninsula, recreation seemed a coming trend for the Forest Service.12

Graves’ 1914 report reflected a more conventional perspective. By that time, the genial forester, who avoided conflict whenever possible, had moved the agency closer to the timber industry – much to the consternation of Pinchot. Pressured by the Department of Agriculture and eager to please his new friends among timber producers, Graves sought to reconcile different philosophies and interests in a forest management plan. He visited the Olympic Peninsula in September 1914, holding public meetings in Hoquiam, Port Angeles, and Seattle. He also met with different constituents – local businessmen opposed to the national monument and creation of a national park, as well as groups such as the Mountaineers that favored a park on the peninsula. Graves also examined the national monument and reported on its prospects to Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston in January 1915.13

**Multi-Use Management**

In an attempt to mediate the differences in opinion, Graves proposed multiple-use

---


management for Mount Olympus National Monument, a concession to all sides. Under certain circumstances, he favored the monument’s abolition and return of the land to the Olympic National Forest. He recommended that the monument’s heavily forested southern half, which also contained most of the mining claims, be restored to the national forest. Graves urged that the monument’s northern half, which contained rugged mountains and less timber, should retain monument status until the secretary of the interior determined whether it should become a national park. If Congress demurred on national park status, Graves recommended abolition of the remainder of the monument. Protection of the Roosevelt Elk did not figure in his assessment. Graves believed that a state ban on hunting until 1925 resolved the original justification for the monument. He emphasized that the Forest Service, working jointly with the U.S. Biological Survey, still could protect the animal’s habitat even without the existence of a national monument.14

An adept leader with strong ties to Pinchot, Graves took a forward-looking approach to forestry. Even as he brought the timber industry into federal forestry in a more prominent way, he recognized the importance of recreation to his agency. Always in search of consensus, Graves tried to find a way to please each constituency. His proposal was to remove land from the national forest for which the Forest Service had little use. His perspective foreshadowed the easy transfer of the Grand Canyon from the Forest Service to the National Park Service in 1919, arguably the last civil moment between the two agencies until the end of World War II.

Reducing The Monument

The status of lands to be removed from the national monument posed a significant issue.

Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane voiced strident opposition to Graves’ reductions if the lands returned to the public domain. If instead they reverted to Olympic National Forest, he noted, his concern diminished. Lane feared settlement of the lands; he was willing to cede them back to the managing agency, but did not want them as possible homestead sites that might halt a future national park effort. The situation proved easy to resolve. Analysis of the Antiquities Act permitted the president to reduce the size of a monument by executive fiat, and earlier court rulings restored excised lands to the condition before their designation. In the Olympics, this assured that lands removed from the national monument would revert to the national forest.¹⁵

Following the resolution of these questions, debate shifted to the size and nature of the reduction. Between December 1914 and January 1915, different groups prepared proposals that reflected their own objectives. The nascent rivalry between the Department of the Interior and Department of Agriculture stirred. Houston, the latter agency’s secretary, willingly supported legislation creating a park with little or no timber. He proposed to reduce the monument by 298,760 acres and retain the remainder as a monument until Lane could make a recommendation for a national park. Western Washingtonians persisted in their efforts to abolish the monument, this time pointing to the potential for hydroelectric power along the Sol Duc, Elwha, Skokomish, Hoh, Queets, Bogachiel, and Quinault rivers.¹⁶

The campaign to diminish the size of the monument yielded results. When Graves arrived on the Olympic Peninsula in 1914, boundary adjustment had begun. Typical of the process, the government eliminated 160 acres from the monument on April 17, 1912, in order to relieve a

¹⁵ Secretary of the Interior to Judge Preston C. West, April 8, 1915; Preston C. West, Solicitor, to the Secretary of the Interior, April 20, 1915, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 16, UW Archives; Henry S. Graves to The Solicitor, Department of Agriculture, November 12, 1914, RG 95 USFS L/LP/Land Acquisition/Boundaries, 1909-1947, Box 5, Mt. Olympus National Monument 1914-1935, NARA Seattle; Rothman, Preserving Different Pasts, 52-59.

¹⁶ Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative History, 42; Burns, The Olympic National Forest: Its Resources and Their Management, 10; R F.W. Mathias, Historical Report, 1928, Olympic NP Archives, OLYM 18414, Box 1, Folder 1936-1948 History, Olympic NP Archives.
homesteader of an entanglement resulting from the original proclamation. On May 11, 1915, President Woodrow Wilson signed an executive order that adopted Graves’ boundary changes. Mount Olympus National Monument decreased from 610,000 acres to 300,000 acres. Fifteen townships returned to the Olympic National Forest, and the order removed 85 percent of the dense forest stands from the monument. The reduction also eliminated the Roosevelt Elks’ winter range from the monument, shifting management of the animals to Washington’s county game commissions, which often allowed hunting of the species.17

Conservationists melodramatically referred to Wilson’s reductions as the “rape of 1915,” but foresters and timber companies could not have been more pleased. The return of timber lands to Olympic National Forest came at an opportune time for extractive industries. One species of tree drew considerable attention. European allies in World War I needed the strong but lightweight Sitka spruce for airplane construction, and the peninsula’s manganese ore, a component of steel, aided the nation’s armament program.18

Supporting The War

Before the 1910s, uneven and difficult terrain limited logging efforts in the peninsula’s interior. World War I accelerated demand for timber, especially the spruce prevalent on the peninsula, and created a need for a federal subsidy for transportation development. In one of many steps to increase production, the U.S. War Department established the Spruce Production Division in 1917, a major logging effort that left a lasting impact on the region. The division assisted in creating infrastructure to support the cutting of spruce. The War Department initially


assigned 10,000 soldiers to the program.\textsuperscript{19}

The Spruce Production Division initiated a major transformation of the Olympic Peninsula. During World War I, 25,000 soldiers in 234 spruce division camps throughout the Northwest assisted logging companies and nearly 100,000 lumber mill operators, loggers, and railroad construction workers in both Washington and Oregon. Soldiers and civilian workers constructed thirteen logging railroads in Oregon and Washington. On the Olympic Peninsula, the U.S. Army cooperated with Merrill & Ring and the Polson Logging Company to build the thirty-six-mile Spruce Production Division Railroad No. 1, which extended from Disque Junction west of Port Angeles to the Hoko River area near Lake Crescent. It penetrated the greatest stand of spruce forest on the Olympic Peninsula. The rail line eventually passed to Lyon, Hill, and Company.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{A Transfer Of Authority}

As the War Department intensified logging activities on the peninsula, debate over a national park in the region continued. After President Wilson reduced the monument’s size in 1915, Agriculture Secretary Houston and Interior Secretary Lane agreed to include the remaining acreage in a national park. Their agreement preceded congressional sanction. The interdepartmental tensions between Interior and Agriculture were on the rise. The idea of a national parks agency worried the Forest Service. Even under such circumstances, the two departments could agree to cooperate as long as transfers were specific and not part of a blanket transfer plan.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{19} U.S. Army and U.S. Spruce Production Corporation, \textit{History of Spruce Production Division} (n.p., ca 1919), 16.

\textsuperscript{20} Evans, \textit{Historic Resource Study, Olympic National Park}, 145-7; El Hult, \textit{The Untamed Olympics}, 215. One-third of the railroad, the largest extant system of railroad and tunnels in present-day Olympic National Park, is now a National Historic Trail and National Register site.

The National Park Service founding on August 25, 1916, ended such cooperation and began a bitter, lasting rivalry between the Forest Service and the new agency. As head of the Forest Service, Gifford Pinchot had sought to bring the national parks under the aegis of the Department of Agriculture, but with his departure, the idea fell into disfavor. Because of the lobbying of the American Civic Association and other proponents, the National Park Service landed in the Department of the Interior, which had previously managed the national parks as a general responsibility. Unlike the Forest Service, the National Park Service accepted the bifurcated mission of protection and use, a fundamental dichotomy that has challenged the agency ever since. However, even in its most aggressive interpretation, the National Park Service’s vision of use was considerably different from the Forest Service’s emphasis on timber yield. At the same time, the National Park Service’s first two directors, Stephen T. Mather and Horace M. Albright, faced difficult bureaucratic wrangles that pushed them toward the development of tourism. Under Mather, the Department of the Interior assigned the National Park Service jurisdiction of existing national parks and all national monuments then managed by the department. Other units, including Mount Olympus, had remained under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service, a result of the original terms of the Antiquities Act.22

With the most valuable timber stands removed from the diminished boundaries of Mount Olympus National Monument and the National Park Service making inroads on some of its constituencies, the Forest Service considered new ideas on the Olympic Peninsula. Much less amenable to a national park after the founding of the National Park Service, the Forest Service began a recreation program in 1916, but its development was slow in an agency devoted to the gospel of timber. The 45,000 annual visitors to the monument did provide an important

---

constituency for the Forest Service. Foresters built more trails and provided new recreational facilities, but their top management priority remained the possibilities of future timber extraction. “Trails and trails and trails all looping into one another and into roads so as to allow cross cuts,” as forest supervisor Parish Lovejoy envisioned the ideal construction program that combined fire protection and recreation in 1912.23

The Forest Service And Recreation

The Forest Service was unprepared for the National Park Service’s onslaught and the new agency’s ability to enlist public support. Its own recreational development provided one kind of answer, but the Forest Service lacked the enthusiasm and expertise that the National Park Service quickly assembled. With the peninsula monument already under Forest Service administration, foresters recognized the need to develop programs to circumvent their rivals. As a result, the Forest Service set out a dramatic recreation plan, one of the most comprehensive in the agency’s short history, within the context of a fire plan for the monument. Planning for summer home tracts, campgrounds, and resorts around Lake Crescent, Lake Quinault, Seven Lakes, and Mount Angeles took precedence. The agency also constructed more trails as part of its fire planning, with officials fully cognizant that such construction supported recreation goals as well. In 1911, Olympic National Forest had 160 miles of trail, eighteen miles of road, fifteen miles of telephone line, and eleven cabins. Four years later, the Forest Service claimed credit for four new trail projects spanning 400 miles – Sol Duc-Hoh, the Lillian Switchback on the Elwha, the North Fork Quinault, and the Upper Dosewallips trails. As in many parks and forests at the time, the trails were hastily and poorly constructed, and they were expensive. Costs ranged from $200 to

$500 per mile, nearly ten times the cost of trail building in the Rocky Mountains.24

The Forest Service’s tactics helped secure its claim to the monument. After the 1915 monument reduction, the Olympic Peninsula ceased to be a priority for the National Park Service. Limited resources, the predisposition for parks in the Southwest that both Mather and Albright shared, and the need to pick its battles carefully with the more powerful Forest Service all contributed to National Park Service reticence. At a time when National Park Service inspectors traveled widely in search of additions, none of its representatives visited the Olympic forest to determine whether it merited park status. When a high-ranking National Park Service official inquired in 1918 about the special features of Mount Olympus National Monument, Acting Forester Albert F. Potter replied that its only unique feature was the Roosevelt Elk. The monument possessed “no outstanding features,” Potter insisted, “and there is little or nothing in our files here that would be of use to you.” Nearby Mount Rainier National Park further complicated the National Park Service position. As late as 1923, Mather reported that any effort to create a park on the Olympic Peninsula would only duplicate existing holdings.25

Despite National Park Service disinterest, pressure from the conservation community for an Olympic national park grew. Conservation groups had specific interests on the peninsula that the National Park Service did not always share, and the peninsula’s threatened elk herds provided a solid rationale for a higher level of protection. Poachers killed and sold more than 300 elk each year, a practice decried by national writers and the growing local conservation community. Some criticized the Forest Service’s poor management of the herds, which led to the only effort to create a national park during the 1920s. In 1926, the Quinault Commercial Club

and Hoquiam Chamber of Commerce spurred a backdoor national park effort. Led by F.W. Mathias, the groups argued that the Olympic Chalet Company, headed by a group of people from the Hoquiam and Aberdeen areas who favored regional development, encouraged elk hunting under the guise of tourism in the Olympic Mountains. Visitors carried rifles, ostensibly for their protection, that became instruments for poaching. Mathias pressured Congressman Albert Johnson, a Hoquiam Republican who was the timber industry’s chief advocate and the Forest Service’s greatest detractor, to endorse the creation of a national park to protect the elk. Johnson supported the idea, believing that the “national park” designation would bring greater attention to the area. The bill died in committee after the secretary of agriculture testified against it.26

A National Constituency

By the mid-1920s, the peninsula’s ancient forests had attracted a national constituency that developed its own strategy. Grassroots leadership in support of the nation’s vanishing forests came from Willard Van Name, an eccentric and reclusive bachelor “whose love for wild creatures compensated for his distrust of human beings,” one chronicler wrote. Van Name served as associate curator of invertebrate zoology at the American Museum of Natural History in New York City. “Experience bred a touch of bitterness in him, along with a tendency to mistake blindness and self-interest for malevolence,” observed his friend and peer in conservation, newspaper editor Irving Brant. Arguing with characteristic zeal that the Forest Service and National Park Service were conspiring to eliminate forests from the national parks, Van Name attacked U.S. Forester William Greeley and National Park Service chief Mather. He understood the idea of national parks in a very narrow way, seeing them exclusively as agents of preservation. Van Name believed the Forest Service and National Park Service colluded to the

An American Eden

detriment of national parks, a perspective that bordered on preposterous as the two agencies battled for the position as chief land management agency. Van Name accused Mather of attempting to trade timber areas for “scenery,” usually high alpine country with little commercial economic value. In his 1926 pamphlet, *Hands Off the National Parks*, which he mailed by the thousands across the country, Van Name raised the alarm against both agencies by sharply criticizing the proposed boundary adjustments to Mount Rainier, Rocky Mountain, Sequoia, Grand Canyon, Yellowstone, Yosemite, and Crater Lake national parks.27

A quixotic and even desperate air wafted about Van Name. A quiet man in his fifties who was a loner, he jumped to life with a pen in his hand. Like many later advocates, he saw only the moral rightness of his cause and failed to appreciate the complicated steps that national park management required. Nor did Van Name correctly assess the National Park Service’s mission. The agency was never, as Van Name assumed, an organization devoted solely to preservation. Instead, it was a federal bureau with a bifurcated mission and the need for both a powerful political constituency and the support of Congress. Van Name represented one element of the agency’s constituency, the powerful elites whose position led them to assume that their desires were not only widely shared, but based in morality as well.

**The Cleator Plan**

Even as Van Name and his supporters lobbied against Forest Service policy, that agency was reconsidering its priorities. The 1923 management plan for the Olympic National Forest called for timber harvesting in every river valley and did not acknowledge the existence of the

---

national monument. Although revised in 1924, the timber harvest provisions remained.\(^\text{28}\) By the end of the 1920s, the Forest Service included National Park Service-style recreation in its plans for the peninsula monument. In 1927, Fred W. Cleator, Forest Service recreation examiner and landscape engineer for the Pacific Northwest District, developed a comprehensive management plan that established new priorities for the national forest and monument. It preserved the beauty of Mount Olympus National Monument while developing the area’s resources. Completed in 1929, the Cleator plan set aside fifteen geographic units for partial recreational use and allowed for logging in all heavily timbered areas, including the Hoh, Elwha, and rain forest remnants in every valley on the peninsula’s west side. It also provided for the creation of the Snow Peaks Recreation Area containing Mount Olympus and the shores of Lake Crescent and Lake Quinault, for which the Forest Service planned summer homes, hotels, and resorts.\(^\text{29}\) This concession to recreational interests was both economic and strategic. It allowed the Forest Service to develop a constituency usually loyal to the National Park Service while catering to local interests. Bold and tactically sophisticated, this move reasserted Forest Service primacy on the peninsula.

The most significant part of the Cleator plan revealed the Forest Service’s primary recreation strategy, the creation of wilderness through administrative means. Wilderness in the Forest Service reflected Aldo Leopold’s influence. Beginning in the early 1920s, Leopold agitated for increased wilderness protection. He pointed to the National Park Service’s emphasis on facilities for visitors as exactly what the Forest Service should avoid. U.S. Forester Greeley and his assistant, Leon F. Kneipp, understood the subtle difference from National Park Service strategy, inherent in Leopold’s proposal. The Forest Service’s 1929 decision to use


administrative regulations to create wilderness areas within national forests was the culmination of these efforts. These “L-20” regulations allowed the Forest Service to administratively designate wilderness on national forest land. This gave the Forest Service what it saw as a claim on preservation, the high ground among conservationists that foresters thought the National Park Service had abandoned in its headlong rush to please the public. Cleator’s report described the monument as a roadless area that was untrammeled, an important linchpin for the strategy of administrative wilderness. This was an audience the Forest Service could reach. In one memorable description from the era, foresters described their constituency as the “seriously-minded interested visitor,” casting National Park Service efforts as frivolous attempts to appease the masses. If the National Park Service could encroach on Forest Service turf, the foresters indicated, they could return the favor.30

Established on December 22, 1930 under the L-20 regulations, the Olympic Primitive Area contained 134,240 acres to the south and east of Snow Peaks, primarily in the sub-alpine and meadow country. Cleator recommended that the only improvements should be those absolutely necessary for resource protection, such as trails, shelters for fire crews and rangers, telephone lines, and lookout houses. Although administrative discretion rather than congressional approval established the primitive area, the Forest Service was committed to its wilderness program. The plan for the Olympic Primitive Area temporarily silenced critics and became an integral part of a key Forest Service strategy to resist the National Park Service.31

In no small part because of these intersecting strategies, the Olympic Peninsula became a cause célèbre for the nation’s preservation community. In the middle of the 1930s, it seemed to offer that constituency the best chance to implement its value system. Many well-known names and groups had challenged the direction of Forest Service policy, including Aldo Leopold, who experienced a near-conversion before he left the Forest Service in 1934; Robert Marshall, already planning the Wilderness Society; and members of the Boone and Crockett Club, still a stalwart, patrician-class conservation organization. Other organizations, including the Mountaineers, accepted that the Forest Service would cut timber, but expressed outrage that the agency designated only very small areas for recreation. Again, different definitions of the peninsula’s value led to protracted struggles.

The most strident calls came from the furthest distance. Acting largely alone, Van Name continued to call for forest preservation. His 1928 monograph, *Vanishing Forest Reserves*, rebuked the Forest Service for permitting timber cutting on the Olympic Peninsula and attacked the National Park Service, which had no standing on the Olympic Peninsula, for passively accepting this policy. The trees on the peninsula were not easily replaced, he pointed out. “The splendid Douglas fir planks (brought from the Pacific coast) grew in large part *before Columbus discovered America,*” he wrote. “It will take us till almost the year 2500 to grow more such boards.” Van Name concluded that, “There will be little left of nature in the United States if we do not do something to protect it.”

Van Name’s pamphlet contributed to spurring the larger conservation community to

---


action. He drew the National Park Service into the fray, for most of the public did not readily
differentiate between federal land management agencies or know which department housed
them. Letters poured into the Department of the Interior daily but without any standing on the
Olympic Peninsula, the National Park Service had no effective way to respond. Mather defended
the agency’s long history of efforts in the region, including bills for a national park in 1911 and
1912 that had been “unsatisfactory from the standpoint of the National Park Service,” as they
permitted mining and the leasing of summer home sites. Such activities, he insisted, remained
antithetical to National Park Service policies. Meanwhile, Acting U.S. Forester Edward E. Carter
asserted that the Forest Service maintained the monument in its “wild and rugged character,”
negating any rationale for a transfer. Mather accepted Carter’s formulation, recognizing in the
Olympics a battle the agency was not quite ready to wage. Later form letters from the National
Park Service concerning the Olympic issue began, “It is a very beautiful region, but thus far it
has not been demonstrated that it comes up to the standards set for national parks.”
This tacit
acceptance of the status quo reflected the National Park Service’s unwillingness to take on the
Forest Service in the Olympics as well as a common strategy for deflecting overzealous members
of the public. This reticence dogged national park efforts for a decade.

Area opposition to an Olympic national park persisted and proved difficult to negotiate.

Local supporters of national parks often did not understand the National Park Service’s vision of
the category. Asahel Curtis of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce had long lobbied for a park that
would maintain opportunities for commercial development. He believed that existing
recreational opportunities in Washington State eliminated the need for a national park, and he
could not see how Congress could create a national park whose boundaries did not include

34 Madison Grant to Hon. Stephen T. Mather, Washington, D.C., October 22 and October 29, 1928; E.E. Carter, Acting
Forester, U.S. Department of Agriculture, to Stephen T. Mather, October 29, 1928; Stephen T. Mather to Madison Grant, October
26, 1928, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 16, UW Archives; Lien, Olympic Battleground, 105.
valuable timber. As a one-time champion of the park, his view carried great weight, and local
timber interests were grateful for his perspective. By 1929, Grays Harbor needed timber to
supply its thirty-four sawmills and thirty-seven other plants, most hovering near bankruptcy.
Timbermen already claimed three-fourths of the volume of lumber in the Olympic Forest
Reserve under the terms of the Timber and Stone Act of 1878. They continued to seek the
remainder, believing only such an acquisition could return their mills to profitability. Their
economic need and Curtis’s vision provided formidable opposition, and deterred much National
Park Service action.

The national conservation community continued the struggle, mirroring dozens of others
that pitted local desires against national ideals. The strong preservationist tone of the outsiders
complicated things further. In 1932, Madison Grant of the Boone and Crockett Club asked Van
Name to investigate conditions on the Olympic Peninsula, expressing concerns about the
Roosevelt Elk. Van Name rushed to the task, seeking to prove the perfidy of the Forest Service’s
plans. His closely held report showed that the monument boundaries and the recently designated
Snow Peaks Recreation Area were nearly identical. Following Forest Service policy, the
recreation area allowed summer homes, hotels, and privately run resorts. Van Name was
indignant. The government selected the Primitive Area because it was commercially worthless,
but the administrative designation did not protect it from roads or other intrusions. Van Name
thought Forest Service management a sham, an attempt to trumpet the preservation he believed
monument designation demanded while encouraging recreational development and timber
cutting. The conservation community maintained its close ties to the National Park Service and it

35 Asahel Curtis to Mr. Ernest Walker Sawyer, Department of the Interior, September 30, 1929, Preston Macy Papers
3211, Box 1, Folder 16, UW Archives; Lien, Olympic Battleground, 91.
continued to press the case for an Olympic National Park. Supporting letters arrived in quantity, for interest groups had discovered letter writing as an important way to influence government policy. In May 1932, National Park Service Director Horace M. Albright, who had taken the reins from Mather in 1929, received a heartfelt plea. The shores of Hood Canal had “not a tree left, just the most unsightly stump-field,” Mrs. William Hill bemoaned, adding that Quinault, cut by the Simpson Logging Company, showed similar impact. She pleaded, “Why can not the area for miles around Mt. Olympus be made into a park preserving the natural beauty for generations to come?” The “entire chain of Olympic Mountains, jagged and wild, nested with lovely lakes, bordered by fine, age-old trees” would make a “wonderland for tourists and a marvelous rest for the large cities near.” Only the National Park Service could save the peninsula from imminent destruction, Hill exclaimed. “It is not too late to save some of the beauty surrounding the Olympic Mountains, and it will mean much to the entire country,” she wrote.37

The Idea Of A National Park

Circumstances continued to trap the National Park Service. The agency controlled no land on the Olympic Peninsula and had little opportunity to challenge directly Forest Service control without further souring already strained relations. The Forest Service had powerful allies as well, and despite the power parity between the agencies, a frontal assault would likely leave more carnage than positive results. “The question of establishing a national park on the Olympic Peninsula has [been] brought to our attention several times, and while it is truly a very beautiful region, we have felt that it did not quite come up to the standards set for national parks,” an internal memo in 1932 couched the limits of the agency’s interest. This was a typical evasion of the era, a way the National Park Service discouraged public interest in properties about which it

37 Mrs. William Hill to Superintendent Albright, May 6, 1932, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 16, UW Archives.
was reticent. The reasons for its limited interest on the Olympic Peninsula were different than in many parallel circumstances. When Brant approached the National Park Service about the widespread harvesting of virgin timber on the Pacific Coast, Albright candidly replied that he did not wish to initiate policies that would impair Forest Service activities.\(^{38}\)

Changes in the political and economic climates contributed to a strengthened effort for national park status on the Olympic Peninsula. The Great Depression that began in October 1929 deeply hurt agricultural and timber economies across the West. The federal government became involved in vast economic and social programs, tamping down anti-government feeling. In much of the country, the only economy of any consequence was federal. It became considerably easier to advocate the reservation of public land as a result, and park proponents found a staunch ally in Franklin D. Roosevelt and his administration. When Roosevelt arrived for his March 1933 inauguration in Washington, D.C., he found a nation in desperate need. An avid conservationist who claimed to have learned the movement’s principles at the feet of Gifford Pinchot, the president had a strong feeling for protecting public land. Roosevelt tasked Brant, whom he knew and respected, to study the organization of the federal government, fully aware that his interest in conservation would influence his report. Brant argued for the expansion of the national park system at the expense of the national forests, a recommendation that the president was happy to receive. During Roosevelt’s tenure, the national park system more than doubled in size.\(^{39}\)

One of Roosevelt’s efforts to streamline government brought the National Park Service directly into the fray on the Olympic Peninsula. On June 10, 1933, in Executive Order 6166, Roosevelt transferred all the national monuments, including Mount Olympus National

---

\(^{38}\) Memorandum for Dr. Bryant, May 17, 1932, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 16, UW Archives; Lien, Olympic Battleground, 111-13.

Monument, to the National Park Service. Although the National Park Service initially tried to reject seven of the fifteen transferred monuments, including Mount Olympus, pressure from Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes compelled the agency to accept all of its new responsibilities. Albright’s successor, Arno B. Cammerer, was a weak man. He rose through the National Park Service by carrying out the directives of Mather and Albright. Ickes, a powerful man who steamrolled anyone who disagreed with him, thought the Olympic Peninsula ideal for a national park. Ickes despised Cammerer and intervened to secure his objectives when he thought the National Park Service director could or would not. Under Ickes’ dictates, the National Park Service’s interest in the Olympic Peninsula grew. The agency assumed administrative responsibility for Mount Olympus National Monument in February 1934. Under Roosevelt and Ickes, a national park seemed a certainty. When and how large the new park would be were entirely different issues.40

Ickes’ appearance as head of the Department of the Interior energized conservationists, who renewed their campaign for the Olympic Peninsula park. The Emergency Conservation Committee (ECC) mobilized widespread support. Led by New York Audubon Society member Rosalie Edge, the ECC added Van Name in 1930. Irving Brant, with his direct connection to Roosevelt, later joined the effort, as did Irving Clark, secretary of the Mountaineers who became the ECC’s valuable Pacific Northwest collaborator. In 1934, after four years of attacks on the U.S. Biological Survey’s wildlife policies, the ECC published an anonymous pamphlet, The Proposed Olympic National Park, a direct response to Olympic’s gory open hunting season on elk in 1933. Authored by Van Name, the pamphlet drew a direct line between the preservation of

old-growth timber and protecting the Roosevelt Elk. It demanded a national park with boundaries that assured the elk’s ecological protection. The area sought included Mount Olympus National Monument, the entire Quinault River valley north of and including Lake Quinault, Lake Crescent, and large parts of the Queets, Hoh, and Bogachiel river valleys.41

The ECC put pressure on the National Park Service. It gave the Olympic Peninsula issue national reach and mobilized local conservation organizations such as the Mountaineers. With the insistent Ickes at the helm of the Department of the Interior, National Park Service officials soon reevaluated their position on the peninsula park. Mount Rainier National Park Superintendent Major Owen A. “Tommy” Tomlinson and Preston P. Macy, the park’s assistant chief ranger, became enthused about the possibility of a new national park. Macy even complimented Edge on the pamphlet. “Consideration of the [Olympic] area from a National standpoint,” he wrote, “will mean far more than if allowed to be marred for today’s dollars.”42

The two National Park Service officials simultaneously reflected the difficulties of the proposal. While a wonderful potential addition to the national system, to them the needs of the Olympic Peninsula’s business and timber interests also merited consideration. The National Park Service felt it could cow the Forest Service; it was less confident when it came to local interests. Tomlinson indicated that local communities estimated that they and the federal government stood to lose $150 million if the National Park Service adopted the ECC proposals. A geologist’s report confirming the existence of large manganese deposits fueled this line of reasoning. Even worse, Mount Olympus National Monument Park Ranger Fred Overly, recently arrived from Glacier National Park and formerly a logging engineer for the Crescent Logging Company,

---

42 Lien, Olympic Battleground, 109-11, 125-27; Preston P. Macy to Mrs. C.N. Edge, Chairman, Emergency Conservation Committee, June 3, 1934, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 2, UW Archives.
arranged for an exchange of government timber in an area about to be added to the monument at
the request of his former employer. The National Park Service found itself in a situation that it
knew existed: a local community had a very different kind of relationship to lands the ECC
wanted for a national park. For the National Park Service, this was a quandary in which the cost
of success could likely be too high to bear.43

The ECC’s stance compelled the National Park Service to seek park boundaries that
would satisfy both conservationists and local communities. In May 1934, a month after the ECC
pamphlet first circulated, a National Park Service team inspected the agency’s new acquisition.
Macy, who became acting custodian of the monument a year later; National Park Service
Wildlife Division Head David Madsen, who had been nominally the monument’s initial acting
custodian; and George A. Grant, the National Park Service’s chief photographer, were appalled
at what they found. They traversed 125 miles of trail on horse and foot. Most of the forest trails
had fallen into disrepair. The team recorded areas “trampled as a barn yard and smelled worse”
and illegal boundary changes by the Forest Service, and noted that poachers readily harmed the
elk herds.44

**National Park Service Support**

By the middle of 1934, the National Park Service responded to the pressure from Ickes
and the ECC. Tomlinson issued a preliminary report on July 29, 1934, that established, for the
first time, National Park Service support for a national park on the Olympic Peninsula. He
averred that Mount Olympus National Monument and parts of the Olympic National Forest met
national park standards, clearing the way for the agency to embrace an Olympic National Park.
The first tentative recommendations for park boundaries included Lake Crescent and some

---

43 Fringer, *Olympic National Park: An Administrative History*, 57-58; Sheldon L. Glover, United Report, September 4, 1934, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 2, UW Archives; Lien, *Olympic Battleground*, 257.
timber acreage on the western side. On October 5, 1934, the National Park Service unveiled its
final report on Mount Olympus National Monument. The report contained further boundary
recommendations. Tomlinson, Macy, Grant, and Madsen felt that the ECC boundary proposal
was not politically tenable because it included 300,000 acres of valuable timber without great
scenic potential. They recommended instead that Congress add 110,000 acres to the monument
in the areas of Sol Duc Hot Springs, Lake Crescent, and several miles of forest along the Hoh
River – “a veritable jungle” – totaling a 410,000-acre park. Most of the area was inaccessible,
but some of it contained small amounts of merchantable timber and reported manganese
deposits.45

The report assessed the monument’s infrastructure and management, and judged them
lacking for national park purposes. Macy and Tomlinson found only 135 miles of third-class
trails, “wholly unsuited for the purposes of a National Park or National Monument.” They noted
that the agencies charged with protecting Roosevelt Elk were not fulfilling that obligation. The
National Park Service needed to change provisions that allowed summer homes if the agency
was to attain national park-caliber management on the peninsula. The two officials voiced “a
universal opinion with those familiar with the area that it should remain free from development
of roads, hotels,” and “remain as nearly as possible in its primitive condition.” They were certain
that the existing Forest Service regulations would not suit a national park.46

After their reconnaissance, Macy and Tomlinson worked to build support for the national

45 Preston P. Macy, George A. Grant, and David H. Madsen, “Preliminary Report on Mt. Olympus National
Monument, July 28, 1934,” Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 32, UW Archives; Fringer, Olympic National Park: An
Administrative History, 59-60; Preston Macy, “Memorandum of Information on Activities in the Mount Olympus National
Monument: For the Associate Director, A.E. Demaray and Superintendent, O.A. Tomlinson, July 17, 1935,” Preston Macy
Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 18, UW Archives; Macy to Tomlinson, August 3, 1934, OLYM 18242, Box 1, Folder 1: 1934,
Olympic NP archives; Office of the Superintendent, Mount Rainier National Park, “Preliminary Report, Mt. Olympus National
Monument, October 5, 1934,” Preston Macy papers, 3211, Box 1, Folder 2 and 32, UW Archives; Lien, Olympic Battleground,
128-29.

46 Office of the Superintendent, Mount Rainier National Park, “Preliminary Report, Mt. Olympus National Monument,
October 5, 1934,” Preston Macy papers, 3211, Box 1, Folders 2 and 32, UW Archives; Lien, Olympic Battleground, 128-29.
park proposal. They met with civic clubs and chambers of commerce in Port Angeles and Grays Harbor, and found a local response that reflected the three primary attitudes toward an Olympic national park. The timber industry opposed any park that blocked access to the forests, and in fact resented the presence of the National Park Service on the peninsula in any form. Behind the industry was the Forest Service, which supported the timber interests. The second view, voiced by regional and national conservation groups and echoed in part by the National Park Service administration, was that a large park was necessary to protect both the elk and untrammeled forests. Some conservationists still thought that park boundaries proposed by Macy and Tomlinson were too small. Finally, many local businesses interested in tourism sought a small alpine park. The variety of possibilities guaranteed that the government could not satisfy everyone’s goals.

**ECC And The Park**

In early 1935, the ECC again exerted its influence. Irving Brant was an established name in conservation, a friend of Roosevelt, Henry Wallace, and other influential members of the presidential administration when he introduced Van Name to the Department of the Interior staff. Van Name knew that the National Park Service might balk at the boundaries drawn in the ECC’s 1934 *The Proposed Olympic National Park*, and he worked with Ickes and Cammerer to redraw the park. Ickes supported Van Name’s idea, and the boundaries that emerged from National Park Service headquarters were almost identical to the ones outlined in Van Name’s pamphlet. They included far more land than the Tomlinson boundaries, taking in some of the timber acreage removed from the monument during the Wilson administration, western timberlands to protect the elk’s winter range, and the Bogachiel. Under prodding from Ickes, the National Park Service

---

administration now supported a park of nearly 730,000 acres. Rosalie Edge, who visited Olympic Peninsula in August 1935, wrote to Tomlinson: “I feel we have not asked for one rod of ground or one tree too much.”

The National Park Service boundary proposal was bold. It fulfilled the objectives of the ECC and Ickes, but simultaneously served as a declaration of war on local interests. Unlike Tomlinson’s proposal, Van Name’s vision did not reflect the perspectives of either local businesses or the timber industry. The proposal seemed ideal to conservationists in Washington, D.C., but it was bound to alienate Olympic Peninsula constituencies. They too had influence; the timber industry was one of the most powerful lobbying forces in the Pacific Northwest.

Congressional representatives from the Evergreen State soon heard opposition to the proposal from their most influential constituents. A contest of political strength emerged. Ickes was among the most powerful individuals in the nation’s capital, a man well known for his willingness to use like a cudgel the power he held. It only remained to determine how much of his cachet Ickes was willing to devote to the project, and whether his influence reached all the way to the peninsula.

**Congressional Action**

On March 28, 1935, with the map drawn by Ickes and Van Name in hand, Representative Monrad C. Wallgren, a Democrat from Everett, Washington, introduced H.R. 7086, advocating the establishment of a Mount Olympus National Park of 728,360 acres. In this continuation of the long battle between the National Park Service and the Forest Service, Ickes and former National Park Service director Albright attacked the Forest Service’s multiple-use philosophy. “Sustained-yield logging, multiple use, or any of the other smooth-sounding techniques of the

---

48 Fringer, *Olympic National Park: An Administrative History*, 63-64; Rosalie Edge to Major Tomlinson, August 12, 1935, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 12, UW Archives.
An American Eden

Forest Service are no substitute for a national park, and will not save an area of national park quality. Neither will they replace trees that are centuries old after they have been cut down,” Albright told Congress. As part of his support, Ickes issued a press release touting the merits of Wallgren’s bill. Ickes added that if “the exploiters are permitted to have their way with the Olympic Peninsula area, all that will be left will be the outraged squeal of future generations.”

Many individuals and groups backed H.R. 7086. Local and national conservationists such as the Mountaineers of Seattle joined with the Department of the Interior in support of the Wallgren bill. Journalist Irving Brant, who held the respect of President Roosevelt, calculated that the area inside the proposed park constituted only 5 percent of the lands available to the timber industry on the Olympic Peninsula. “This meant, I told the president as I had [U.S. Forester Ferdinand A.] Silcox, that trees four hundred to one thousand years old, irreplaceable and the last of their kind, would be sacrificed to keep the mills running for five years and to postpone for that time the relocation of or employment shift of 172 families,” Bryant recalled in his memoir. In December 1935, the Mount Olympus National Park Association was established in Port Angeles, bringing local support for the idea of the national park. After some internal wrangling, regional groups settled on Wallgren’s proposal. Its boundaries were considerably larger and removed much more timber acreage than the business community anticipated, but the bill served their needs. This alliance with the National Park Service and regional businesses reflected the circumstances of the New Deal. Businesses found supporting government projects to be a ticket to better economic times. The coalition enlisted state Representative Francis Pearson, a Port Angeles Democrat, to introduce a memorial to support the project in the

---

Washington legislature.\textsuperscript{50}

Timber companies, although often allied with local business interests, found themselves shut out of the groundswell of Olympic Peninsula support. The proposed park was undeniably detrimental to their interests, but their local friends who had so often depended on timber as an important piece of the local economy now seemed to have abandoned them. They responded with fervor. Washington’s state forester and conservation department joined with fire-fighting associations and the University of Washington’s College of Forestry in opposition to the national park. The Washington State Planning Council jumped into action, excoriating such park advocates as the Mountaineers’ Irving Clark. Extractive resource industry interests prepared for a battle.\textsuperscript{51}

\textbf{The Forest Service In Opposition}

The Forest Service actively assisted the opposition, deepening the rift between Ickes and Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace. A titanic struggle between the two Cabinet members dominated Roosevelt’s second term. With the support of Brant’s report on efficiency in government, Ickes conceived of a Department of Conservation that included the Department of Agriculture and all of its bureaus. He envisioned himself as head of this new and powerful agency. “The real trouble with the conservation movement in this country is that it is subdivided into small cliques and factions,” he told an NBC radio audience in 1935. “Due to the resulting confusion . . . the exploiters are still largely having their wanton way with the natural resources of our America.” Wallace blanched at the comments and fought the super-department proposal with everything he could muster. In his view, the scheme smacked of exactly the kind of power

\textsuperscript{50} Brant, \textit{Adventures in Conservation with Franklin D. Roosevelt}, 74; Preston P. Macy to O. A. Tomlinson, Confidential, December 2, 1936, Preston Macy papers, 3211, Box 1, Folder 19, UW Archives.

\textsuperscript{51} “The Mount Olympus National Park: Its Relation to the Automotive Industry,” OLYM 18414, Box 1, Folder 1936-1948 History, Olympic NP archives; K. K. Tiffany to Irving Clark, December 2, 1936, Preston Macy Papers, 3211, 1, 12.
An American Eden

play for which Ickes was known. The battle that ensued nearly ripped the New Deal apart, and
the struggle for Olympic National Park was its centerpiece.\(^{52}\)

Ickes’ oft-stated objective of a Department of Conservation deepened the rift between the
National Park Service and Forest Service. It intensified every interagency conflict, granting
many smaller tussles gravity they did not merit. Any cession on the part of the Forest Service
seemed a prelude to subsuming the Department of Agriculture under Ickes. Yet, the foresters
faced a severe problem. The agency benefited from New Deal programs, but in its relationship
with the National Park Service, the bureaucratic power had shifted. As the National Park Service
became more skilled at identifying land with spectacular scenic virtue and little commercial
economic value, the Forest Service became increasingly vulnerable to its entreaties. The Forest
Service stood a better chance when it could point to viable forms of commercial production on
the lands the National Park Service sought, again highlighting the features of the dispute that
made the Olympic Peninsula different. In front of Congress, Assistant Chief Forester Leon F.
Kneipp claimed that the Wallgren bill contained seventeen billion board feet of commercial
timber that could keep nearly 17,000 people employed. Others in the agency argued that if the
forests targeted by the Wallgren bill remained in the national forest, the industry could harvest
them on a sustained yield basis. While the Forest Service also claimed that the proposed park bill
contained valuable manganese ore, it possessed U.S. Geological Survey reports claiming that the
only manganiferous material found in the proposed national park could not be used to make an
alloy for steel. The two valuable manganese mines lay outside of the boundaries of the proposed
dpark, and miners had abandoned both in 1926.\(^{53}\)

\(^{53}\) Brant, *The Olympic Forests for a National Park*, 7, 13; Rothman, “‘A Regular Ding-Dong Fight,’” 141-61; Lien, *Olympic Battleground*, 133.
The tension heightened at the local level. In October, Preston Macy, who had succeeded Madsen at Mount Olympus National Monument, discovered that the Forest Service was hindering administration of the monument in various ways. It “is common knowledge that Forest Service officials have done, and are still doing everything possible to stop or hinder the creation of a National Park,” Macy wrote Tomlinson. Foresters attempted to demonstrate that their administration could serve industry and recreational needs, obviating the need for the National Park Service. Such a stance cut to the core of the dispute over mission and constituency between the National Park Service and Forest Service, and prompted a vigorous National Park Service response. Associate Director Arthur E. Demaray even requested a confidential report from Tomlinson about situations in which the Forest Service duplicated National Park Service functions.54

With the introduction of H.R. 7086, a national park on the Olympic Peninsula became a question of relative political power. In April 1936, the U.S. House Committee on Public Lands held extensive hearings on the Wallgren bill. The public turnout was so great that the committee had to move to a larger auditorium. The battle lines were clear: Ickes and the National Park Service supported passage; Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace and the Forest Service opposed the bill. National conservationists such as Bob Marshall of the Wilderness Society, Van Name, and Edge testified in favor of the Wallgren bill. The Forest Service, represented by Kneipp, testified that the Cleator plan ended any need for National Park Service presence on the peninsula. Forest ranger Chris Morgenroth, a staunch advocate of the national park, also testified. Representatives from local business organizations argued in favor of a smaller alpine park; others from the area opposed any park plan altogether. After a nine-day hearing, the

54 Preston P. Macy, Acting Custodian, Mount Olympus National Park, to O.A. Tomlinson, Superintendent, Mount Rainier National Park, October 3, 1935; Confidential letter from A. E. Demaray to O.A. Tomlinson, October 11, 1935, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 16, UW Archives
An American Eden

committee reported the bill to the House of Representatives with a recommendation for approval. The full House did not act immediately, and debate continued through the summer.55

During summer 1936, the Forest Service attempted an important preemptive strike against the bill. Foresters thought that if they demonstrated that they could fulfill what they regarded as the National Park Service’s function – preservation of the peninsula’s alpine mountaintops – the federal government would leave them in place to monitor the timber harvest. They sought to demonstrate that the Forest Service could preserve nature as well as the National Park Service. In July 1936, Acting Secretary of Agriculture M.L. Wilson expanded the Olympic Primitive Area by nearly 100,000 acres, enlarging its borders to include virgin stands of merchantable timber in Olympic National Forest, contiguous to the eastern and southern boundaries of Mount Olympus National Monument. Following the withdrawal, an unsigned Forest Service memo argued that “there is no justification from the standpoint of the public interest for the creation of a national park in this territory.”56

The proposal for the enlarged Primitive Area did little to convince the public of the Forest Service’s position. The new boundaries failed to include Olympic’s largest and most spectacular trees, showed little of the enthusiasm the Forest Service previously demonstrated for recreation, and evinced none of the clarity of National Park Service arguments. “There can be no doubt that the National Forest Service thinks it put a fast one over on the National Park Service,” observed the Seattle Times. “The very obvious purpose of this dedication is to forestall the plan to create Mount Olympus National Park.” Newspapers around the country suggested that


“Primitive Area” spelled doom for the peninsula’s trees. Crying out for a wilderness park, conservationists attacked the Forest Service’s plan to balance timber harvests with wilderness preservation and recreation. Weakened by internal management issues and the ongoing battle between Ickes and Wallace, the Forest Service attack against the national park on the peninsula found little support.57

As the Forest Service announced its revised plan, park proponents on the Olympic Peninsula garnered further support. The Olympic Peninsula had been in an economic slump for almost a decade and many area businesses continued to suffer. Since the founding of the Mount Olympus National Park Association, the possibility of a tourist economy looked more enticing as the nation’s economic depression limited the need for timber. A National Park Service campaign further helped to sway the local community. Wallgren received the support of the Mount Olympus National Park Association and spoke to the Elks Club in Port Angeles. Macy visited peninsula communities to discuss monument administration. A national park and its economic potential looked better and better to local firms. In September, Macy observed that opposition had diminished, “so that now our strongest opponents are admitting that they would like a National Park but of course, not all are willing to concede the addition of too great an area.”58

‘A Wilderness National Park’
A generalized conception of wilderness had always been a part of park proponents’ vision. In September 1936, the Federated Western Outdoor Clubs held a meeting in Olympia, Washington, to discuss the proposed national park plan. The club representatives supported its establishment, but requested “a wilderness national park.” This was still an abstract idea without

58 Preston P. Macy to O.A. Tomlinson, February 16, 1937, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 20, UW Archives; Preston P. Macy to O.A. Tomlinson, August 18, 1936, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 19, UW Archives; Steen, The U.S. Forest Service, 209-13, 217-18; “Monthly Narrative, September 1936,” and Acting Custodian to O.A. Tomlinson, Superintendent Mount Rainer NP, December 31, 1936, OLYM 18242, Box 1: 1936, Olympic NP archives.
parameters, yet it was extremely appealing to supporters. With the support of the ECC, park associations, civic groups, outing clubs, and individuals around the nation wrote the secretary of the interior in support of an Olympic Peninsula national park. Wilderness became such a powerful part of the idea that Cammerer told area chambers of commerce that he would emphasize wilderness in any park plan. Their chagrin did not dissuade him.59

The establishment of a national park was far from complete. On February 15, 1937, Wallgren introduced a new measure, H.R. 4724, which reflected the necessity for compromise among interest groups. Wallgren hoped to reduce resistance by the timber-controlled State Planning Council and small-park advocates while at the same time isolating the Forest Service’s opposition. This new bill reduced the size of the Olympic park by 142,000 acres, eliminating areas in the Queets, Bogachiel, and Quinault drainages on the peninsula’s west side, which were almost all of the rain forest valleys that the ECC sought. Wallgren’s revised bill changed the park’s character in substantial ways, and its ramifications fractured existing coalitions.60

Wallgren’s proposition pleased local, regional, and some national park advocates. The Mount Olympus National Park Association, Northwest Conservation League, Audubon societies, garden and teachers clubs, and the Washington State Federation of Women’s Clubs favored Wallgren’s revised bill, though some expressed desire for the larger park. Even foresters recognized merit in the proposal. Graves, former U.S. forester and a close friend of Gifford Pinchot, reviewed H.R. 4724 and admitted that the 1915 recommendation of the elimination of

59 “Monthly Narrative, September 1936,” OLYM 18242, Box 1: 1936, Olympic NP archives; “Report on Mt. Olympus National Park by Committee of Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs,” Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 32, UW Archives; A.N. Demaray, Acting Director, National Park Service, to Mr. Edward Woolman, Pennsylvania Parks Association, December 5, 1937; Demaray to W. F. Mass, Chicago, December 5, 1937; Demaray to C. Parker Paul, The Dartmouth Outing Club, Hanover, New Hampshire, December 13, 1937; Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 22, UW Archives; Arno B. Cammerer, Director, National Park Service, to Alfred P. Kelley, Chairman, Recreational Resource Committee, Portland Chamber of Commerce, November 24, 1936; Kelley to Cammerer, November 17, 1936, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1 Folder 20, UW Archives.

60 Acting Custodian, Mount Olympus National Monument, to O.A. Tomlinson, confidential letter, April 16, 1937; Preston Macy to Director, National Park Service, April 20, 1937; “Summary of Changes in the Mount Olympus National Park Bill,” Preston Macy Papers, Box 1, Folder 20, UW Archives
the monument had been a mistake. A broad-based coalition supported the bill, giving it a strong change of passage.61

Vehement opposition came from Van Name, Edge, and Brant, who were outraged that the proposal removed 138,000 acres of west-side forest. When Van Name protested to Ickes “against the complete surrender of important nationwide interests and of irreplaceable scenic areas to local exploitation for relatively small private profits,” the secretary told him that the realities of the situation limited viable options. The rebuff did not deter Van Name. Within a month of the bill’s introduction, the ECC produced and circulated thousands of copies of a new pamphlet, *Double Crossing Mount Olympus National Park*, which called for letters and telegrams against Wallgren’s new bill. Hardly a grassroots endeavor, the pamphlet reflected the sentiments of an influential and extremely persistent wing of the conservation movement.

Wallgren, in a surprise move, embraced the pamphlet, requested more copies from Edge, told her that the National Park Service had designed the park boundaries – including the forest eliminations – in his second bill, and then threw his full support behind the ECC.62 The bill’s sponsor had effectively repudiated its provisions, leaving the national park movement in self-induced shambles.

Acting monument custodian Macy observed that “now an overwhelming majority of the people of the Peninsula and the State of Washington favor the establishment of the proposed Mount Olympus National Park.” Discussion of what kind of park revealed that considerable opposition to one encompassing a large area persisted. Supporters of a smaller park, including peninsula businessmen and some chambers of commerce, opposed the larger wilderness park

---

61 Arno B. Cammerer to John Baker, Executive Secretary, National Association of Audubon Societies, New York, April 26, 1937, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 20, UW Archives.
concept. Opponents of earlier national park measures, including the Port Angeles Chamber of
Commerce, favored a small park. Even the Washington State Planning Council went on record
favoring a Mount Olympus National Park, although one with different boundaries than those
proposed in the Wallgren bill. In February 1937, the planning council convinced the Washington
State Senate to pass a memorial that supported a Mount Olympus National Park with tighter
boundaries. Although the lower chamber contested its limits, a month later, the governor of
Washington wrote to Louisiana Congressmen René DeRouen, chairman of the Committee on the
Public Lands, recommending a park much smaller than that contained in Wallgren’s bill.63

9 New Forest Service Attitudes

Again put on the defensive, the Forest Service yielded more ground. In the mid-1930s,
management changed in the Forest Service, as the first generation to lead the agency gave way to
subordinates. Chief Forester Robert Y. Stuart’s 1933 death in a fall from his office window
demoralized the agency, but the appointment of Ferdinand A. Silcox as chief forester proved a
bracing antidote. Silcox, himself a veteran of the agency’s formative 1910 fires, was perhaps the
most radical person ever to lead the Forest Service, but he remained committed to resource
production.64 He viewed national forestry from an aggressively statist perspective, opposed the
Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, advocated centralized planning, and recognized a broader role for
Forest Service management. Initially, Silcox thought that transferring the peninsula monument
back to the Forest Service would best serve the public interest. If this failed, he conceded that the

63 Lien, Olympic Battleground, 154-56; “Mount Olympus National Monument, Custodian’s Annual Report for Fiscal
Year Ending June 30, 1937,” OLYM 18242, Box 1, Folder 31: 1937, Olympic NP archives; Ingham, “Olympic National Park: A
Study of Conservation Objectives,” 22-23; Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative History, 71-72; Brant, The
Olympic Forests for a National Park, 2; “Mount Olympus National Monument, Custodian’s Annual Report for Fiscal Year
Ending June 30, 1937,” OLYM 18242, Box 1, Folder 31: 1937, Olympic NP archives; Preston P. Macy to O.A. Tomlinson,
February 1937 and March 2, 1937, OLYM 18242, Box 1: 1937, Olympic NP archives; A.E. Demaray to Owen A. Tomlinson,
March 17, 1937, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 20, UW Archives.
64 The fires of August 20-21, 1910, burned across three million acres of virgin timberland in northern Idaho and
western Montana.
Department of Agriculture should support the boundaries set forth by the Washington State Planning Council.

Silcox soon changed his stance, accepting recreation as a legitimate value in national forests. Graves’ admission that the monument reduction was an error clearly influenced the new chief forester’s thinking. As a result, the Forest Service dissembled on the question of the Olympic park. The agency’s guarded public pronouncements, Irving Clark wrote Cammerer, made “it difficult to prove their opposition to the park.” Silcox appointed Robert Marshall to the position of chief of the Division of Recreation and Lands in the Forest Service, further embracing the park idea. Marshall, founder of the Wilderness Society and author of *The People’s Forests*, had been an outspoken critic of the Forest Service’s unwillingness to embrace recreation and had long advocated a wilderness park on the Olympic Peninsula. Like Graves, he challenged older Forest Service premises, promptly provoking his Forest Service colleagues with a memo titled, “Why I Feel an Area Approximately the Size of the Proposed Mt. Olympus National Park, or Larger, Should be Reserved from Cutting.” His stance rocked the Forest Service.65

At the same time, regional National Park Service officials increased pressure for an Olympic park. Throughout April and May, Tomlinson and Macy gave slideshows and discussed agency objectives before more than twenty groups, including the Sierra Club, Federated Women’s Clubs, garden clubs, and other organizations friendly to conservation. The two had a practiced routine in which they urged their audience to pressure the National Park Service to take a stronger stance. Macy often argued that the forests constituted “Nature’s greatest contribution to her natural museum.” Unless this generation acted to save them, he mourned, their descendents would lose “those esthetic values which can never be replaced after the desolation of

---

logging has passed.” The time had come, Tomlinson repeatedly insisted, for the national
leadership of the National Park Service to make a definitive statement. Only the friends of the
park could make that happen.66

The President Visits
This public pressure yielded results. Ickes had been enthusiastic about the idea of a
wilderness park, and publicity strengthened his already dominant position. Personal relationships
also played a significant role. Following journalist Irving Brant’s suggestion to visit the Olympic
Peninsula to see for himself the scene of the raging debates, on September 30, 1937, President
Franklin Roosevelt arrived in Port Angeles. The Forest Service had control of the visit, sending
park advocates and the Park Service into paroxysms of fear that USFS influence would torpedo
the park project. Adept management of the situation put Mt. Rainier Superintendent O.A.
“Tommy” Tomlinson in the position to join the traveling party.67

As of September 29, the National Park Service had been shut out of the presidential visit.
No one in the agency had been invited to participate, not Mt. Olympus National Monument
Superintendent Preston P. Macy or any higher official. National Park Service officials were
resigned to the reality that they might not get to make their case to the president. Roosevelt had
his own ideas. At 6 A.M. on September 30, Tomlinson received a phone call from Regional
Forester C.J. Buck that informed him that the president wanted him to join the party at Lake
Crescent that evening. Tomlinson must have smiled to himself; the foresters had done what they
could to segregate the president from park advocates as well as the National Park Service, but the
savvy Roosevelt knew who he wanted to see and what he wanted to talk about. With the door

66 O.A. Tomlinson to Arno B. Cammerer, Director, National Park Service, May 5, 1937; Preston P. Macy to Dr. Gill,
Mt. Rainier National Park, July 15, 1937, Preston P. Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 21, UW Archives.
67 O.A. Tomlinson, Confidential Memorandum for the Files, regarding President Roosevelt’s Visit to the Olympic
Peninsula, September 30- October 1, 1937, Papers of Preston P. Macy, Accession No. 3211, Box 1, Folder 22.
open, Tomlinson got his engineer, who brought maps, papers, and most important, Tomlinson’s crisp National Park Service green uniform.68

Tomlinson adroitly managed the situation. Running into Buck in the Port Angeles Post Office building, where park activities were headquartered, Tomlinson told Buck he intended to bring Macy to Lake Crescent. Buck was not happy, but felt comfortable with Forest Service dominance of the situation. When Tomlinson and Macy arrived at Lake Crescent, Tomlinson was astonished to see at least thirty-five Forest Service officials. Macy and Tomlinson went to the dining room for dinner; the place was crowded with the presidential party and the forest officials. As Tomlinson sat, John Boettiger, the editor of the Seattle Times and Roosevelt’s son-in-law, came over and told Tomlinson he was glad that the president would get to hear the National Park Service’s side of the story. As they ate their dinner, they were informed that the president would like to speak to them when they finished.69

Tomlinson and Macy had a frank discussion with Roosevelt. The president was well versed on the issues. He asked them about the peninsula’s wildlife and ancient timber stands, expressing concern for both the fate of the elk and Western hemlock – the latter a new issue that the president introduced. Wallgren attended the Lake Crescent meeting and explained that his proposed park boundaries excluded the monument’s eastern manganese deposits. Roosevelt admonished that no one should give the mineral any consideration. The president favored a large park, and indicated that he wanted the large timber areas included in the park boundaries, along with the high alpine area. An enthusiastic conservation advocate, Roosevelt predicted that Olympic National Park would become as popular as Yellowstone National Park.70

68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 O.A. Tomlinson, “Confidential memorandum for the files, Regarding President Roosevelt’s visit to the Olympic Peninsula, September 30-October 1, 1937”; Preston P. Macy, “Confidential memorandum for the files, re. President Roosevelt’s
Roosevelt’s visit further complicated the circumstances surrounding establishment of a national park. Although executive fiat could create other categories such as national monuments, Congress – not the president – established national parks. Recognizing this, Roosevelt sought compromise. He proposed a remedy that allowed for the larger national park he advocated. He suggested that the U.S. Biological Survey, the National Park Service, and the Forest Service share responsibility – the National Park Service handling recreation, the Forest Service forestry, and the Biological Survey facets of both. His suggestion would open selected areas in the park to logging, as was the practice in Yellowstone. Roosevelt’s support was an enormous step toward a national park, but his attempt to strike a balance between agencies befuddled federal officials who contemplated administration of the new park.

At the time immensely popular and hugely influential with Congress and the public, Roosevelt had the ability to sway the issue simply with his support. His visit, Macy wrote Cammerer, did more “to convince the people of the State of Washington of the importance of establishing a large national park than all the past three year’s efforts of those who have sponsored the project.” After the presidential visit, a number of park opponents rescinded their opposition. “Many organizations which were formerly opposed to the establishment of an Olympic park have now publicly announced their approval of the President’s proposal for an enlarged park,” Macy asserted. Satisfied that the establishing legislation would allow logging or salvage logging in the park, even the Washington State Planning Council added its support. Only the Forest Service remained recalcitrant. District Ranger Ben H. Kizer expressed concern that the

---

visit to the Olympic Peninsula,” October 5, 1937, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 22, UW Archives; Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative History, 73-74; John C. Bruckart, Memorandum, Olympia, Washington, October 6, 1937, History Files ca. 1899-1990, Box 1, John C. Bruckart ca 1936-1979, RG 95 USFS, NARA Seattle; Brant, Adventures in Conservation, 85-88; Lien, Olympic Battleground, 169-83.

---

71 Lien, Olympic Battleground, 175; O.A. Tomlinson, “Confidential memorandum for the files, Regarding President Roosevelt’s visit to the Olympic Peninsula, September 30-October 1, 1937,” Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 22, UW Archives, 6; Brant, The Olympic Forests for a National Park, 3.
Roosevelt’s interest moved the debate over the size and nature of the national park from the Olympic Peninsula to Washington, D.C., where the president and key Department of the Interior officials became directly involved in the park’s creation. Ickes long had advocated a wilderness peninsula park, but he allowed the National Park Service to influence his perspective. He acquiesced to the decision to eliminate the Bogachiel Valley from the first Wallgren bill and approved elimination of the rain forests in H.R. 4724. Although he rarely sought compromise, Ickes had ascertained the severity of opposition and tried to outmaneuver opponents. After Roosevelt’s 1937 visit, he reversed his public position, enthusiastically supported Roosevelt, and turned the park project over to Brant, who served on the staffs of both Roosevelt and Ickes.

Brant and the ECC took the momentum and accelerated the pace. In January 1938, the organization distributed 11,000 copies of The Olympic Forests for a National Park across the nation. Close to Roosevelt, Brant did not dare challenge the unusual administrative structure the president proposed. Instead, he focused on the ways in which ECC and presidential aspirations coincided. The pamphlet attacked the Forest Service’s statistics, criticized the two Wallgren bills, and offered revised park boundaries that reflected Roosevelt’s recommendations. Brant did not directly assail the Forest Service, although he condemned its hostility toward the National Park Service, its commercial attitude toward forests, and its decentralization, which he believed

---

72 Preston Macy to Director, National Park Service, October 6, 1937, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 22, UW Archives; Macy to Tomlinson, November 3, 1937, OLYM 18242, Box 1: 1937, Olympic NP archives.

allowed the agency to avoid controversy in national political debate. 74

Brant saved his toughest salvos for the timber industry. He echoed Ickes, arguing that the sustained yield argument was nothing but a red herring designed to “conceal the trail from the 300-foot Douglas firs and Sitka spruces to the Gray’s Harbor sawmills.” Grays Harbor milled 200 tons of privately owned timber each day. National Park Service calculations revealed that nearby forests could sustain the mills for 500 years without ever cutting trees in the proposed park, even if the largest mills increased production. Cutting the trees inside the proposed park was not only unnecessary, it was wasteful, Brant maintained. The “great forest wilderness,” pristine lakes “like diamonds on a cloth of emerald,” and Roosevelt Elk were “marked for hideous destruction,” he argued, unless Americans rose to the occasion. “If the Olympic forests are to be saved, they can be saved only by putting them in a national park,” he thundered. 75

A New Park Bill

On February 8, 1938, Roosevelt brought the protagonists together and instructed them to give him a park. The president insisted the area that the secretary of agriculture designated as permanent wilderness and the valleys of the two main rivers flowing to the ocean be located inside the park boundaries. After two long meetings in which the principals worked out the details, the Department of the Interior provided a report that reached Congress on March 28. Encouraged by Roosevelt’s wish for a larger park and supported by Ickes, Wallgren introduced a new national park bill, H.R. 10024, in the third session of the Seventy-Fifth Congress. This proposal included most of the provisions in the second bill, but excluded Lake Ozette because of complaints by the Port Angeles Chamber of Commerce. The National Park Service needed no less than lukewarm relations with the chamber and other business interests and sacrificed efforts

74 Brant, The Olympic Forests for a National Park; Lien, Olympic Battleground, 186-87.
75 Brant, The Olympic Forests for a National Park, 1, 2, 7, 15.
An American Eden

to add the lake to the park in the hopes of developing better relations with the local community. The Department of the Interior and Department of Agriculture reached agreement on the bill.  

Still, the battle for an Olympic park had not yet ended. Roosevelt’s support silenced the Forest Service, but local foresters conveyed their dismay to the timber industry, already furious over the legislation. The timber men saw the bill as a betrayal of their interests, and the Forest Service did little to discourage the notion. Timber remained a powerful force in the state of Washington, and in an agitated mood, its lobbyists could sway the state’s representatives. During April, Port Angeles timber interests contested the inclusion of the Hoh and Bogachiel corridors in the park boundaries. Pressured by the Crown Zellerbach Corporation, Wallgren amended his bill to eliminate both corridors and 33,000 acres from the lower Bogachiel Valley. He added Hurricane Ridge and Deer Park to replace the lost land.  

Ickes continued to insist on the larger park and used it as a weapon against his Forest Service adversaries. On April 12, 1938, the Department of the Interior issued a memorandum in support of the Wallgren bill. In May, Ickes gave a radio address in Spokane on the subject of Olympic National Park. He praised the strong support from different clubs, including the Wilderness Society, Mountaineers, Washington State Grange, the Klahhane Club, Daughters of the American Revolution, teachers’ unions, women’s clubs, and editors of prominent New York newspapers. He predicted that the peninsula park, if “not held down in size and deprived,” would “take rank at once among the most magnificent areas set aside for the enjoyment of the American people.” The Olympic Peninsula, he stressed, contained the vestiges of the “last American

---


77 Preston P. Macy to O.A. Tomlinson, April 2, 1938, OLYM 18242, Box 1, Folder 5: 1938, Olympic NP archives; Lien, Olympic Battleground, 192.
wilderness. . . . The President does not want a small park,” he insisted. “The Department of the Interior does not want a small park, and I am sure that the people of Washington want a park that will rank with other great parks and be a credit to a great State.”

With the opposition cowed by Roosevelt’s power and Ickes’ relentless support, the House Committee on Public Lands reported the bill favorably to the floor on May 10. Its sponsors had amended H.R. 10024 to exclude the coastal strip and river corridor additions. On May 16, the bill passed the House of Representatives and went to the Senate. On June 16, the final day of the congressional session, Congress authorized creation of Olympic National Park. President Roosevelt signed the park bill on June 29, 1938. The new park contained 634,000 acres, including the 320,000 acres in the original monument and additional lands from Olympic National Forest. The act also provided that the president, by executive proclamation, could increase the park’s area to 898,220 acres.

The Olympic National Park controversy came down to power politics. As the centerpiece not only in the National Park Service-Forest Service rivalry, but in the colossal battle for Ickes’ proposed unified Department of Conservation, powerful political forces, not the obvious merits of its lands, shaped Olympic National Park. Establishment of the park required national influence. As long as the timber industry on the Olympic Peninsula was viable, a park had little chance. The Depression, the New Deal, and especially Franklin D. Roosevelt’s support, overwhelmed opposition. The Forest Service and timber industry were a powerful coalition as long as the battle could be described legitimately as part of the tension between the National Park Service and the Forest Service and the timber industry was economically healthy. When

---

78 Department of the Interior Memorandum to the Press, April 12, 1938; Department of the Interior, Memorandum for the Press, undated, OLYM 18414 Box 1, Folder 1936-1948 History. Olympic NP archives, quotes from 1, 3, 7; “Text of Address by Ickes on Park,” OLYM 427, Box 6, File 5, Clipping 1, Olympic NP archives.

Roosevelt’s vision of a large national park silenced the Forest Service, the timber industry’s only recourse was its own congressional delegation. Faced with Roosevelt’s conservation goals for the region and the skilled and combative Ickes, the Forest Service and timber interests had little chance.

The creation of Olympic National Park was not an end to the process. Park proponents might marvel at their success, but they retained unfulfilled objectives. The legislative loss badly hurt the Forest Service, but it remained a potent source of opposition to the peninsula park and to any expansion of its boundaries. Conservationists rightly questioned the Forest Service’s commitment to the region’s mammoth trees, and they continued to hold aspirations for other areas on the peninsula. Even as they celebrated the creation of the park, Brant and Van Name recognized that Olympic National Park was not complete without the west-side rain forests and the spectacular Bogachiel Valley.80 With the new national park established, completing it to their satisfaction became their primary goal.

Figure 2-1: Members of the Seattle Press expedition of 1888-1890 From left, in back, Hayes, Christie, Charlie Barnes, John Sims; in front, Crumbach and Daisy. (Photographs courtesy of Olympic National Park, Accession Number OLYM-632, Box 3)

Figure 2-2: President Franklin Roosevelt visited Port Angeles on September 30, 1937, to tour Olympic National Forest and Olympic National Monument.
Figure 2-3: A National Park Service exhibit at the Clallam County Fair in 1937.

Figure 2-4: Secretary of the Interior Julius A. Krug led the dedication ceremony for Olympic National Park, which was held June 15, 1946, at Rosemary Inn on Lake Crescent. Other participants, from left, Judge Connelley of Spokane, Mr. Skinner of the secretary’s party, Krug, Assistant Secretary Davidson, unknown, Representative Henry M. Jackson (head showing), Governor Mon C. Wallgren, Senator Hugh B. Mitchell, Superintendent Preston Macy, and Con Matske.
Figure 2-5: The administrative building (OLYM 1), Olympic National Park.

Figure 2-6: The superintendent’s residence (OLYM 2), Olympic National Park.
Figure 2-7: Olympic’s first superintendent, Preston Macy (1935-1951) is flanked on the left by his successor, Fred Overly (1951-1958), and on the right by his chief clerk, Gordon Gale.

Figure 2-8: Hikers cross Queets Basin in 1938.
Figure 2-9: A fishing party in Olympic National Park, circa 1938.
Figure 2-10: Participating in the dedication of the Hurricane Ridge Lodge were, from left, Charles Webster, publisher of the *Port Angeles Evening News*; Senator Henry Jackson; and Olympic National Park Superintendent Fred Overly.
Figure 2-11: Hurricane Ridge under snow.

Figure 2-12: The interior of Hurricane Ridge Lodge, showing the snack bar.
Figure 2-13: Above, Attorney General Robert Kennedy is fly fishing in the Hayes River, Olympic National Park, while Kathleen Kennedy adjusts her reel and Ethel Kennedy fishes from a boulder.

Figure 2-14: At left, Ethel Kennedy sits nexts to Justice William O. Douglas and his wife, during an August 1962 trip to the park.
Figure 2-15: Fifth-grade students climb a log staircase at one of the park’s Environmental Study Areas.
Figure 2-16: A visitor surveys the landscape at Olympic National Park.
Chapter 3: Planning and Administering Olympic National Park

In 1966, a battle erupted over a proposal to reduce the size of Olympic National Park. Bureau of Outdoor Recreation Regional Director Fred J. Overly, the controversial former Olympic park superintendent, had crafted a proposal that challenged existing conservation management on the Olympic Peninsula. In many ways, the conflict reprised earlier episodes of tension over the control of land, when the U.S. Forest Service and National Park Service tangled over the creation, expansion, and administration of national parks. This time, to their mutual surprise, the two agencies found themselves with perspectives more similar than different. “The Park Service and U.S. Forest Service have more in common than we have in controversy,” said Richard E. Worthington, supervisor of Olympic National Forest. “There will be no fight between our two agencies regarding the Olympics.” Worthington designed his rhetoric to please all sides, but his words revealed how the struggles for land at Olympic National Park had evolved since the 1930s.

After the park’s 1938 establishment, the National Park Service followed procedures and drafted administrative procedures and policies specific to the new unit. The bitter National Park Service-Forest Service rivalry had left a lasting mark on Olympic’s administration and planning. Although President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s proclamation handed responsibility for the park to the National Park Service, the Forest Service remained a powerful influence on the Olympic Peninsula. The foresters had

---

Initially administered the national monument, developing a vast infrastructure designed to support its policies with roads, trails, and backcountry shelters, before ceding the monument to the National Park Service with the appointment of Preston P. Macy as custodian in May 1934. The continued presence of the Forest Service in neighboring Olympic National Forest and the forest’s importance to the regional economy complicated any decision the National Park Service made on the peninsula.2

The combined sentiments of local communities, wilderness groups, policy makers, and national conservation organizations created another powerful influence on Olympic National Park administrators. No national park in the 1920s and 1930s received more direct public support for its creation than Olympic. No other park established before 1965 evinced so many of the characteristics of later 1960s environmentalism, when the public loudly and vociferously sought to substitute its desires for the expertise of professionals, setting the stage for park administration with consistent and clear public comment. After 1938, Forest Service influence on Olympic National Park declined while grassroots activity persisted, challenging new administrations in different ways. New advocates for boundary changes emerged, while fresh groups demanding a say in park practices coalesced and exerted influence.

The differences between Olympic and its national park peers in the 1930s were evident from the onset. From its inception, Olympic incorporated ideals of the wilderness movement more than any other existing national park. Visitors watched bears feed at garbage dumps in Yellowstone, enjoyed the Rock of Ages ceremony in Carlsbad Caverns, viewed the Yosemite firefall, or skied at Mount Rainier; at Olympic, with the

notable exception of a rope-tow and ski operation at Deer Park, they found few amenities and paved roads, and a stronger allegiance to the idea of pristine nature. These conditions resulted in no small part from the Forest Service management strategy. This difference affected how the park operated and how its planning took shape. In the end, the distinction was marked. Olympic National Park remained apart from much of the rest of the park system, much less accommodating than the typical American traveler had come to expect from the national parks.

**First Managers**

The first tasks the National Park Service faced at Olympic National Park in 1938 were establishing its leadership, securing boundaries, defining park policies, and obtaining needed resources. Custodian Preston Macy was the natural choice to lead the new park. Trained as a biologist, Macy raised cattle in Missouri after completing college. When the Depression hit the United States in 1929, he took a seasonal job at Mount Rainier National Park, rising to the position of assistant chief ranger with the onset of the New Deal. In 1934, Macy accompanied Mount Rainier Superintendent Owen A. Tomlinson and David Madsen, the official in charge of fish resources in the national park system, on an inspection tour of Olympic National Monument. Madsen briefly served as the monument’s acting custodian, but his responsibilities in the wildlife division made Macy a better choice for the permanent position. Macy became acting monument custodian in December 1934 and custodian ten months later. In 1938, he became Olympic National Park’s first superintendent, serving until 1951.3

In this era, the National Park Service developed its initial planning processes to

---

chart development in national parks. The National Park Service turned to newly recruited
landscape architects, often hired through the auspices of the New Deal, to guide the
process. New national parks provided a proving ground. Landscape architects could start
from the beginning, designing facilities that met the standards of their profession. At
Olympic, infrastructure development, much of which the park inherited from the Forest
Service, and planning proceeded simultaneously. National Park Service planners found
less to do immediately at Olympic; the existence of some infrastructure that remained
from the Forest Service let planners see further ahead than they could at other parks.

Macy inherited a contradictory and complicated mission that reflected the
dichotomy inherent in the National Park Service’s presence on the Olympic Peninsula.
The agency expected him simultaneously to protect the park’s resources and provide for
its public use. Acting on the advice of his superiors, Macy quickly set the tone for
Olympic’s administration. In late summer 1938, a planning group met to develop
management principles and a development plan for the new park. The group – Secretary
of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, the journalist Irving Brant, Tomlinson, Madsen, Regional
Wildlife Technician E. Lowell Sumner, Regional Landscape Architect E.A. Davidson,
and Macy – eschewed the development-heavy models of other national parks. Instead,
they took an approach to Olympic’s management that treated the park as pristine
wilderness. The influences on this process were many and varied. They included the rise
of the Wilderness Society, founded in 1935 by number of important conservationists with
ties to the Forest Service; the Forest Service’s skilled use of administrative wilderness
elsewhere; the remarkable groundwork the Forest Service laid at Olympic for a
wilderness-style park; and by the new emphasis in the Interior Department prompted by
Ickes’ adamant interest in the preservation of wilderness. The committee believed that the National Park Service should maintain and preserve Olympic’s dense, virgin rain forests, Roosevelt Elk, and spectacular mountains for the benefit of future generations. Translated into policy, this meant creating a park marked by trails instead of roads, with particular emphasis on leaving the landscape intact, a novel approach at the time.\(^4\)

**Early Boundary Issues**

Olympic National Park was born amid an active timber industry. One important consequence of this unique condition among American national parks was that the park’s boundaries were perennially unsettled. The park faced ongoing efforts to remove lands from its domain even as it battled off efforts to develop commercially protected resources. The result was an ongoing struggle over what belonged in the national park and what was fair game for local and regional extractive industries. The grappling continued for almost thirty years – from the 1938 establishment of Olympic into the 1960s. At Olympic’s inception, all park advocates agreed that it was unfinished. The initial presidential proclamation had included 634,000 acres, while allowing for more than 250,000 additional acres to be added when lands were secured. The legislation was not specific and almost immediately after the initial proclamation, momentum gathered for expansion. At the same time, park opponents continued to fear that their economic livelihood would be endangered by additional reservations of land. Many had opposed Olympic in its initial form, and were no more accepting of any expansion.

The solution was a boundary conference, brokered by Benjamin H. Kizer, chairman of the Washington State Planning Council, with the full support of Ickes, the front man for conservation in the Roosevelt administration. Ickes had been instrumental

---

\(^4\) Fringer, *Olympic National Park: An Administrative History*, 87-88, 92.
in creating Olympic National Park. A bold man with vision and the determination to
break through any resistance to his goals, he envisioned a comprehensive national park
on the Olympic Peninsula. The boundary conference took him closer to his objectives and
set the stage for the park’s expansion.

The boundary conference was designed both to fill out the national park according
to the legislative mandate and to allay the fears of the people of the Olympic Peninsula
that the park would put them out of business. In the unique circumstances of the region,
the resources of the park and those on which the surrounding communities depended
were essentially the same: the timber, water, and to a lesser degree, minerals of the
peninsula. Negotiating a middle ground that left each constituency satisfied was a
difficult endeavor even under the best of circumstances. Olympic’s creation had left
considerable acrimony in the area that made boundary issues extremely complicated.⁵

Members of the conference ultimately did not agree on the park boundaries. The
Washington State Planning Council opposed the proposed extension of Olympic’s
western boundary in the Hoh, Queets, Bogachiel, and Calawah valleys, the most
important part of the expansion from the point of view of national conservationists. The
planning council also opposed extension into the Hoh, Bogachiel, and Calawah valleys,
creating a rift in the conference’s report.⁶ The possibility of a mineral belt of manganese
around Olympic led to an important concession on the part of park advocates. The
National Park Service initially had accepted a five-year term during which mineral
exploration would be permitted within Olympic’s boundaries. The importance of

⁵ Olympic Boundary Conference of R.N. Tiffany, Executive Officer of the Washington State Planning
Council and F.A. Kittredge, Regional Director of Region Four, National Park Service, December 13, 1938, OLYM-
18414, Box 1, Folder 1939-1940, Correspondence, RE: Coastal Strip, Queets Corridor, Olympic NP Archives.
⁶ Ibid., 5.
manganese led to a further concession, and the conference agreed on a ten-year exemption for mineral exploration in an effort to develop manganese on the peninsula.\(^7\)

In the end, the differences were major in philosophy, but minor in geography. Despite the intense disagreement about the extension of Olympic’s western boundary, in reality, the conferees were discussing only 3,900 acres of a 250,000-acre extension. However, the 3,900 acres represented a great deal more. The battle over the perception of the direction of the future of the Olympic Peninsula had been engaged. Its resolution was intrinsically involved with the efforts to expand Olympic National Park.

In the late 1930s, the National Park Service was at the apex of its power. The New Deal had been extremely good for the agency and its ability to acquire land was unparalleled. Since the days of Horace Albright, the National Park Service had excelled at defining needed land and securing it. In an era of national economic depression, when federal dollars underpinned the economy almost everywhere in the country, the agency’s ability to turn that dependence into an aggressive program of land acquisition drew the ire of local communities even as it won the respect of national leaders and the conservation movement. The 1930s were an era of expanding government power; the National Park Service rode that wave to some of its most important acquisitions.

This sense of destiny angered opponents and made the National Park Service bold. Just days after the boundary conference, Fred Overly, chief ranger at the new Olympic National Park, assessed the Quinault Indian Reservation for its suitability for inclusion in the national park. Overly found a number of features that he thought belonged under National Park Service management. These included the timbered areas adjacent to Highway 101 inside the reservation, the Quinault River, and the ocean front.

\(^7\) Ibid., 8.
American Eden

on the reservation. Overly feared that continued logging would ruin the river area and the
highway would be logged over and become an eyesore for the park, while the ocean front
acreage added aesthetic value. He recommended buying land from the individual
members of the Quinault tribe as a way to achieve National Park Service goals.8

The conservation community strongly supported the addition of lands west of the
existing park boundary. Irving Clark of the Seattle Mountaineers strongly supported the
addition, writing to Ickes that it would be “a gross betrayal … to surrender the forest to
the lumbermen.” Ickes was already sympathetic to the extension. Inside the National Park
Service, the momentum for adding the timbered lands on the west side all the way down
to the ocean grew. By the end of 1939, agency officials insisted that a combination of
values made inclusion of the entire area desirable. With the support of the powerful Ickes,
the objections of the timber community were overwhelmed, and the National Park
Service proceeded with its plans to complete Olympic National Park as it had been
authorized in 1938.9

A Natural State

Founded during the New Deal, when the National Park Service enjoyed its first
great burst of capital development, Olympic National Park reflected an ethos that differed
from that era’s dominant currents. Throughout the park system, Civilian Conservation
Corps funds and labor made parks and monuments more accessible by buildings roads
and facilities. Such improvements catered to the audience that the agency’s mythic
leader, Stephen T. Mather, coveted. Tourism quickly became the park system’s lifeblood.

8 Fred Overly, Memorandum to Superintendent Tomlinson, January 9, 1939, OLYM-18414, Box 1, Folder
1939-1940, Correspondence, RE: Coastal Strip, Queets Corridor, Olympic National Park Archives.
9 Irving Clark to Harold L. Ickes, January 4, 1939; C.E. Greider, Memorandum for the Regional Director,
Region 4, November 24, 1939, OLYM-18414, Box 1, Folder 1939-1940, Correspondence, RE: Coastal Strip, Queets
Corridor, Olympic National Park Archives.
American Eden

Olympic National Park reflected different values. Its supporters lobbied long and loud to keep the park in what they termed its natural state, exerting the same influence on early park administration that they did on the establishment process. With the tacit and sometimes active approval of the National Park Service, Olympic was born and managed as a different species of national park, wild by design more than by circumstance.

The question of the type of visitor access loomed largest at Olympic National Park, and in an unusual turn of events, trails gave the National Park Service advantages over roads that they did not provide in places where no viable extractive economy existed. The National Park Service inherited Olympic’s enormous trail system from the Forest Service, and questions about its maintenance, improvement and expansion dominated early policy discussions. Although the National Park Service typically encouraged automobiles and the construction of roads in national parks, Macy sided with the Olympic planning group’s desire for preservation. In no small part, his position resulted from the National Park Service’s desire to appease powerful leaders in the Roosevelt administration such as Ickes, but it also derived from the need to protect its newest acquisition from counterattacks by the timber industry and the Forest Service. New roads were an obvious vulnerability, diminishing the sense of protection and even providing a new rationale for timber interests to argue for the right to cut trees from the park’s forests. Macy opposed road improvements within Olympic National Park and successfully fended off proposals from Washington State’s Bureau of Public Roads to construct one through the Hoh Valley.\(^{10}\)

Olympic’s early staff levels initially were low, and Macy enjoyed considerable success as he worked to expand the number of personnel. Until July 1936, when Fred

\(^{10}\) Fringer, *Olympic National Park: An Administrative History*, 93-94.
Overly, a ranger from Glacier National Park, filled a full-time ranger position, Macy occupied the only permanent National Park Service position on the peninsula. Through 1938, three rangers and more than fifty seasonal employees comprised the entire staff. By September 1940, Olympic had eleven permanent staff members, including an assistant superintendent and a chief clerk. The next year, Macy added a chief ranger and assistant chief ranger, increasing the park’s payroll to $28,920. Although World War II temporarily curtailed growth, the increase in personnel accelerated after the war’s conclusion. By 1955, Olympic had thirty-one permanent staff members and a seemingly endless number of seasonal help.  

In addition to increasing the number of personnel at Olympic, the National Park Service sought permanent facilities for park administration. Agency objectives included a headquarters with amenities for visitors, a permanent administrative building and a superintendent’s residence. The earliest National Park Service planning advocated locating the park headquarters and a visitor center at Lake Crescent. Pressure from the Forest Service led to a 1935 plan to locate the headquarters outside the monument’s boundaries. This decision reflected the continuing tension between the management objectives of the two agencies. The Forest Service typically located its offices in the communities it served as part of its decentralized approach to management and emphasis on grassroots constituencies. With the rancor over the Olympic transfer still stinging and the National Park Service susceptible to local pressure, the agency decided to imitate Forest Service practice and move into town. In 1936, Macy leased office space in downtown Port Angeles’s Federal Building. Construction of a permanent administrative building and residence in Port Angeles began in 1939 and was completed in 1941. The

---

American Eden

acreage, on land donated by prominent peninsula businessman Thomas T. Aldwell, lay outside the entrance to the park but prominently located on the primary route into Olympic National Park.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{Initial Expansions}

Enlarging the park was another early priority, for the change in status and the sense of an incomplete park at its establishment prompted efforts to secure more land while the opportunity existed. Olympic’s establishing legislation authorized its increase through executive fiat from the original 634,000 acres to 898,220 acres. This clause was tacit admission that limitations bound the political process that created the park, and acknowledged that important constituencies inside government and among its closest supporters wanted more on the Olympic Peninsula.\textsuperscript{13} Two presidential orders, one issued in 1940 by Roosevelt and a January 6, 1953, executive order signed by Harry S. Truman, completed the establishment of the large peninsula park that its proponents envisioned. The 1940 addition included the forests of the Bogachiel, Calawah, Hoh, Queets, Quinault, and Elwha valleys. The 1953 addition included the Queets Corridor, the Ocean strip, and a seven-mile exchange area of the Bogachiel Valley. Roosevelt’s 1940 proclamation resulted from complex negotiations between Ickes, the National Park Service, the Washington State Planning Commission, and local and national groups. Soon after Olympic’s establishment, Ickes asked the National Park Service and the commission to study jointly the enlargement. The State Planning Commission, reflecting the

\textsuperscript{12} Fringer, \textit{Olympic National Park: An Administrative History}, 95-96; Memorandum for Superintendent Macy, Olympic National Park, May 18, 1941, Preston Macy Papers, 3211, Box 1, Folder 24, University of Washington Archives (hereafter UW Archives); Fred J. Overly, Superintendent, Olympic, to Regional Director, Region Four, Memorandum, December 29, 1954, Fred Overly Papers, 2214, Box 2, Folder 7, UW Archives; “Memorandum for Superintendent Tomlinson, Nov. 3, 1938,” OLYM 18242, Box 1, Folder 5: 1938, Olympic NP Archives.

peninsula’s economic interests, had advocated a smaller park. Chairman Benjamin H. Kizer, who asked Ickes for the joint study, and his commission believed that any new boundaries extending westward into the Queets, Hoh, Bogachiel, and Calawah valleys would hurt local timber interests. Both the National Park Service and the state commission recommended the inclusion of glaciers and alpine areas, indigenous forest types, and the elk’s winter range. National Park Service Regional Director Frank Kittredge expressed surprise that the two groups agreed on nearly everything except for the park’s west-side boundary, but Ickes rejected the report as soon as he saw it. Ickes’ objections stemmed from his ongoing reliance on Irving Brant, who figured prominently in the Emergency Conservation Committee. Although more judicious than Willard Van Name, Brant held strong beliefs, and his effectiveness at Olympic was hampered by a view that his detractors characterized as too national and insufficiently local. After Olympic’s establishment, Ickes appointed Brant as a consultant to the western national parks. A close confidant of the Roosevelt administration, Brant could recommend additions directly to Ickes and through him, to the president. As summer 1938 ended, Brant inspected Olympic and submitted a report that endorsed adding ten areas comprising 226,656 acres. He included acreage around Lake Crescent, the administrative site next to Port Angeles, the high plateau area of Deer Park, Hurricane Hill, Obstruction Point, and the forested valleys of the Elwha, Bogachiel, Queets, and Quinault rivers. Brant conferred with Ickes, who recognized the sensitivity of the project.

and removed the Quinault area to appease timber interests.15

During preparations to change the park’s boundaries, Roosevelt intervened. With an already vigorous interest in Olympic National Park and a number of close associates advocating specific changes, he proposed adding a wilderness coast and river strip along the Bogachiel connecting Olympic to the Pacific coast. The president’s goal made considerable sense, but a combination of circumstances caused delay. The uneven division of state and private timber lands outside the park near Grays Harbor made the president’s choice along the Bogachiel impractical. Federal officials switched the targeted corridor to the Queets River and deferred its addition to a later date. Irving Clark of the Mountaineers also lobbied for inclusion of a nine-mile-long section of the “great primeval forest” of the Bogachiel, which the Forest Service planned to acquire through exchanges with landholders. During the spring of 1939, the Department of the Interior revised Brant’s proposed boundaries. Ickes directed funds from the primary federal New Deal development agency, the Public Works Administration (PWA), for Project 723, which allocated $1.75 million to acquire the river corridor and coastal strips.16

On January 2, 1940, Roosevelt proclaimed the addition of 187,411 acres of the Olympic National Forest’s Bogachiel, Calawah, Queets, Quinault, Elwha, and Hoh valleys to Olympic National Park. Only 835,411 acres in size after the addition, the park

---


did not yet complete the original legislative boundary. The legislation still allowed further expansion, a total of 62,881 acres of the Queets Corridor, Ocean Strip, and Bogachiel. Despite opposition from the timber industry, the Port Angeles Chamber of Commerce, and the Crown Zellerbach Corporation, Roosevelt’s proclamation changed Olympic from primarily a mountaintop national park to one that included forested valleys and broader ecological systems, prompting an admission by the Wilderness Society that the National Park Service did a better job of protecting wilderness than the Forest Service. The proclamation made Olympic the third-largest national park in the United States.\(^{17}\)

In May 1939, prior to the January 1940 proclamation, land acquisition for the Coastal Strip, also called the Olympic Parkway Project, began under PWA and National Industrial Recovery Act regulations and financing. Stiff local resistance seemed likely. Less than one year had passed since the park’s establishment, and opposition throughout the peninsula remained both substantial and evident. Homesteaders in particular opposed the addition, some carrying signs that read “This Isn’t Russia; Secretary Ickes has no right to take our homes away from us.” In Port Angeles, Macy recognized that he needed to circumvent the timber constituency by demonstrating Olympic’s economic benefits to the region. Tourism seemed a particularly viable alternative, made more palatable by the economic problems of the 1930s. Macy trumpeted the addition as an asset to the regional economy.

economy. In 1940, nearly 100,000 people visited Olympic National Park. The coastal
strip project brought “the unusual combination of the seacoast, glacier-laden mountains,
forests, streams, and lakes of the Olympic Peninsula within reach of the average man,”
Macy reported. “We are creating a Mecca that will draw thousands upon thousands of
people from every part of our Nation,” he told the Western Forestry and Conservation
Association.\(^{18}\) This was the beginning of a prescient strategy that became a time-honored
tradition for the National Park Service on the Olympic Peninsula.

Acquiring the land for the addition required aggressive government action, even
though the timber industry remained in the throes of the Depression, limiting its power
condemnation proceedings for 49,954 acres along the Queets River and the Pacific Coast
to Lake Ozette. Such a legal step also was a last resort, taken most gingerly even during
the New Deal, when western states objected least to federal action. Even with greater
than normal acquiescence, the process took many years and involved hundreds of
individual owners and corporations. Negotiations continued in and out of the courts. A
shortfall of PWA funds and the efforts of Newton B. Drury hindered these efforts. Drury
was director of the Save-the-Redwoods-League who took over the National Park Service
directorship from Arno B. Cammerer in August 1940 before being fired in 1951 for
opposing the Echo Park Dam. He recommended against pursuing some of the cases over
peninsula land within the Coastal Strip, believing some parcels in the Bogachiel,
Calawah, Hoh, and Quinault forests were not necessary to assure National Park Service
jurisdiction over a contiguous park. As a result, the Coastal Strip addition, leased to

\(^{18}\) Preston P. Macy, “The Olympic Parkway and National Defense,” OLYM 443, Box 1 F: 1939-1940,
Correspondence RE: Land Acquisition, Park Enlargement, Olympic NP archives, 2, 8; Lien, Olympic Battleground,
215-17.
Washington State but overseen by the agency, was not completed until the 1950s.\textsuperscript{19}

The larger goal of the coastal addition did not slow ongoing boundary adjustments at Olympic National Park. On May 29, 1943, President Roosevelt added 20,600 acres in the Morse Creek watershed at the park’s northern edge, which was also Port Angeles’ watershed. The timber industry’s loss of interest forced the Forest Service to oppose the project more openly. Not yet resigned to the national park, the foresters had hidden behind the anti-park efforts of the timber companies, only to find that some of the companies made peace with the new situation. Fearing a precedent, the Forest Service instigated a battle between Port Angeles residents and several timber companies.

Roosevelt deemed protecting Port Angeles’ municipal watershed the greatest good in the situation, and the additions withstood the Forest Service’s politically dangerous attempt to foment local revolt against the president’s objectives.\textsuperscript{20}

Pockets of opposition remained. On December 22, 1942, Senator Henry M. Jackson, D-Wa., introduced a bill that provided for the exchange of private, county, and state lands within the national park, an entirely typical measure. The bill added a more

\textsuperscript{19} National protests led to rejection in 1955 of plans to build a dam at Dinosaur National Monument. U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, \textit{Olympic National Park. The Master Plan} (1976), 12; Lawrence C. Merriam, Regional Director, to David R. Brower, Executive Director, Sierra Club, September 18, 1953, OLYM 443, Box 1, File 1952-1953 Boundaries, Correspondence, NARA, Washington, D.C.; C.E. Greider, State Supervisor, Recreation Study, Memorandum for the Regional Director, Region IV, November 24, 1939, OLYM 18414, Box 1, Folder 1939-1940 Correspondence, RE: Boundary Changes, Coastal Strip, Queets Corridor, Olympic NP Archives; Memorandum for Colonel John R. White, Acting Director, from A.E. Demaray, August 14, 1939; O.A. Tomlinson to A.E. Demaray, July 28, 1939; Memorandum for Superintendent, Mount Rainier National Park, August 11, 1939; Oscar L. Chapman, Acting Secretary of the Interior, to C.B. Sanderson, July 27, 1939; C.M. Granger, Acting Chief, Forest Service, to Arno B. Cammerer, January 23, 1940, OLYM 443, Box 1 F: 1939-1940, Correspondence, RE: Land Acquisition, Park Enlargement, Olympic NP Archives; Fringer, \textit{Olympic National Park: An Administrative History}, 80-83; Harold L. Ickes to \textit{Washington Post}, February 18, 1951, Preston Macy Papers, 3211, Box 1, Folder 17, UW Archives; Lien, \textit{Olympic Battleground}, 302, 309.

controversial clause, authorizing the Forest Service to acquire lands within Olympic National Park under the General Exchange Act of March 20, 1922, which allowed the exchange of land within national forests for federal land outside their boundaries as a way to consolidate federal control. The extension of the Forest Service’s ability to acquire land in a national park was a shocking proposal – innovative or desperate in the eyes of observers. The very idea vigorously reopened the interagency wounds of the 1930s. The powerful conservation community thwarted the bill, but it reminded the National Park Service of the rancor of the Forest Service and its friends.21

Inholdings At Olympic

The National Park Service faced an ongoing problem with inholdings at Olympic National Park and conceived of a range of possible solutions. Among the remedies was land exchange, offering property owners a trade for their lands within the park’s boundaries, but the National Park Service had no land of its own to exchange. Congress or the president had designated every acre of national park land, and it was not available for exchange. As a result, the National Park Service had to rely on other agencies. Those within the Department of the Interior were amenable in many circumstances, but the agency’s chief adversary, the Agriculture Department’s U.S. Forest Service, was not. The National Park Service was audacious in its requests; emboldened by its success during the New Deal, it went after Forest Service land with a zeal that sometimes shocked even agency insiders. Foresters certainly were astonished. Forest Service Assistant Chief C.M. Granger informed Leon F. Kneipp, who managed the agency’s land acquisition program, that the Forest Service’s position had always been that national forest lands were not

---

available for exchange to improve national parks. Forest Service policy had been that
remedies for national park problems needed to come from national park allocations.22
As it did in many of its struggles with the Forest Service during that era, the
National Park Service emerged with what it wanted in the land exchange program. Public
Law 823, signed by President Roosevelt on December 22, 1942, authorized the exchange
of lands not in federal ownership within Olympic National Park for national forest lands
in the state of Washington. Drury informed the Forest Service of this change in January
1943, writing acting Forest Service Director Earle Clapp that he hoped that the two
agencies could collaborate on land exchange issues.23

Another of Olympic National Park’s ongoing problems was the number of
individual land patents within the park boundaries. In 1943, the original 634,000 acres of
the park surrounded approximately 1,250 privately owned tracts.24 While the total
acreage was not enormous, the number of land holders was daunting. The acquisition of
each parcel would require separate negotiations; each owner would want to wait until
someone else established the base line value for lands within the park. For National Park
Service acquisition experts, Olympic National Park presented an unparalleled challenge.
The number of claims was so large because the economy on the Olympic
Peninsula remained vibrant and because the federal government had established the park
long after the peninsula had been settled. For the first time in its history, the National
Park Service faced the prospect of buying back enormous numbers of small tracts inside a

22 Ben Thompson, Memorandum for Mr. Wirth, April 17, 1941; C. M. Granger, Memorandum for Mr.
Kneipp, April 18, 1941; C.M. Granger to Conrad L. Wirth, May 1, 1942, Papers of Preston Macy, Accession 3211, Box
1, Folder 24, UW Archives.
23 Newton B. Drury to Earle H. Clapp, January 6, 1943; Lyle F. Watts to Newton B. Drury, January 13, 1943,
RG 95, L/LP Land Acquisition/Boundaries, 1909-1974, Olympic Exchange, Olympic National Park, National Archive
and Records Center, Seattle, WA.
park. That new challenge was heightened by being forced to do so during the economic hardships brought on by World War II. National Park Service officials found themselves fending off attempts to cut timber inside the park when they wanted to be finding money to buy up inholdings. It was a conundrum. Throughout the war, the National Park Service planned to acquire the lands inside the park, but the strategy had to aim for acquisition after the war’s end.

**The Park in Wartime**

World War II threatened the protection that newly attained national park status granted to Olympic’s forests. During World War I, the military harvested Sitka spruce on the peninsula, but at that time, the land was in a national forest, not in a national park. At the onset of World War II, a similar production effort began. National Park Service Director Drury warned that despite the widespread use of aluminum for aircraft production, Sitka spruce would become a target of the war effort. Although he viewed wartime needs as “the most serious threat to the integrity of the great scenic parks,” Drury found his position untenable. A study by Overly and two reports by the Forest Service convinced him of the nation’s need for Sitka spruce. Greater quantities of spruce existed in Canada and Alaska, but the proximity of the Olympic Peninsula to major industrial and manufacturing concerns on the West Coast made it a far better option at the peak of the Japanese threat during the war’s first year.25

The Lend-Lease legislation of March 1941 enhanced the War Department’s interest in Olympic’s timber. As former Chief Forester William Greeley, head of the

---

West Coast Lumberman’s Association, intensified the pressure to cut the Sitka spruce for the United States and its allies in the war effort, Drury conceded that “selective cutting” in portions of the Queets Corridor and Coastal Strip could take place in a national emergency, even though such action would constitute “a distinct sacrifice of park values.” Designated as a parkway, the Queets Corridor was not technically part of Olympic National Park. In December 1942, Ickes, relying on information from the National Park Service that recommended logging of specific parcels within Olympic, received presidential approval to sell spruce and Douglas fir. In February 1943, Ickes authorized the sale of nearly three million board feet of spruce and Douglas fir on government lands in the Queets Corridor.26

Wartime logging in the park’s forests reintroducted many of the old questions about Olympic’s boundaries. In May 1943, the Port Angeles Chamber of Commerce, which represented timber interests on the peninsula, adopted a resolution recommending the transfer of the forested portion of the Bogachiel River drainage to the national forest. With the support of Greeley, Grays Harbor logging interests sought to use the mandate Drury offered for Sitka spruce to open the entire national park to logging of all types of timber. This effort drew little response. By September 1943, as the allied advance in the Pacific gathered momentum and the threat of a Japanese invasion of the U.S. mainland diminished, Ickes recommended alternate war relief measures that left forests in national parks untouched. Hearings before a House subcommittee in Washington, D.C., in October 1943 determined that because of changes in aircraft design and increased

---

aluminum production, logging within the national park was no longer necessary. The threat to park resources ended in late 1943, when Drury announced that the War Production Board required no further logging in Olympic National Park.  

The Park In Peacetime

Land exchanges became easier for Olympic National Park after the war’s end in 1945. Not only was there more money available to facilitate the acquisition program, but the park began to address in earnest the question of downed timber within its boundaries. On the Queets River, an exchange with the Polson Lumber Company established new parameters. In 1946, the park agreed to allow the company to cut 12 million board feet of timber inside the park; the government received 10 million board feet and 700 acres of land. This manner of exchange was valuable for Olympic National Park because it yielded a net gain of land and cleared an environmental problem associated with managed forests – the buildup of combustible material that occurred when natural processes of rejuvenation were stopped by management practice. However, it also allowed cutting within a national park, crossing a psychic boundary for the conservation movement.

The efforts to acquire private lands inside the park gained momentum. In late 1946, Drury requested a complete account of the private lands in Olympic National Park and the projected total cost of acquisition. The director’s interest emboldened Superintendent Macy, who had been working to attain private lands within the park throughout his tenure. But the quantity of land and the cost was stunning. The park

American Eden

contained 8,000 acres of alienated land, valued at $3 million. This enormous sum of
money meant that Olympic’s managers would have to explore other routes than outright
purchase to attain their objectives.

Additions And Efforts At Subtraction

The parade of boundary adjustments that dominated the 1930s resumed after
World War II. On May 29, 1946, Senator Warren D. Magnuson, D-Wa., introduced a bill
to remove 6,000 acres of privately owned land from Olympic National Park, including
acreage along Lake Quinault’s north shore. In February 1947, he initiated a bill to
eliminate 18,185 acres in the Quinault watershed. Conservationists stopped both
attempts. Olympic’s advocates began to feel that the existing park was safe and that the
boundary additions promised in 1938 would come true. The prospect produced some
premature giddiness among supporters.

The battle between timber interests and the park accelerated in 1947. Quiescent
during the war, the struggle heated up as post-war America needed timber for houses.
Representative Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson led an effort to eliminate 57,000 acres from
Olympic’s west side, the very lands that park advocates coveted and fought to have
included in the park. On March 24, 1947, Jackson introduced H.R. 2751, to transfer lands
from Olympic National Park to Olympic National Forest. Jackson was in the early
stages of a career that would take him from the House of Representatives and make him
one of the most powerful men in the U.S. Senate, and he understood the politics of his
home state. In Washington in 1947, timber was king. He could lose nothing by

------------------------
those lands were located inside that most sacred of American institutions, the national
park.

In March 1947, Director Drury expressed support for Jackson’s bill, and
recommended further boundary changes and eliminations totaling 56,396 acres of timber
land from parts of Quinault, Queets, Hoh, Bogachiel, and Calawah areas. In May 1948,
Representative Russell Mack and Senator Harry Cain, both Washington Republicans,
called for a congressional committee to investigate park boundaries. The overwhelming
strength of local and national conservation groups led to the quick demise of each
proposal.31

Jackson’s 1947 House bill aroused the ire of the revitalizing conservation
movement. Although support for national parks had never waned before 1945, organized
conservation was in disarray as the war ended. Jackson’s effort aroused considerable
opposition. The national support network for national parks reacted, providing the
National Park Service with ample material to fight off the request. Local interests lost
ground against national groups in the aftermath of the war, and Jackson’s effort was no
exception. The combination of national support and the limited reach of Jackson, then
just an ambitious young congressman, combined to provide the National Park Service
with a triumph. The 57,000 acres that conservationists fought for stayed in the park.32

In the aftermath of such victories, questions about resource extraction became
subsumed by Olympic’s efforts to expand. The 1939 PWA program had secured 43,730

31 “Statement of North Shore Association (Along North Shore of Quinault Lake and the Quinault River),
Amanda Park, Washington, 1961,” OLYM 0236, Olympic NP Archives; “Statement by Fred J. Overly, Superintendent,
Olympic National Park,” OLYM 443, Box 1, File 1952-1953, Boundaries Correspondence–General, NARA
32 National Park Service Reports on Results of its Study of Olympic National Park Boundaries, March 18,
1947; Further Report of National Park Service on Proposals to Adjust the Boundaries of Olympic National Park, April
22, 1947, Papers of Preston Macy, Accession # 3211, Box 1, Folder 26, University of Washington Archive.
acres for the park while funds then were available. In January 1949, the National Park
Service completed studies of the status of lands in the corridor and along the Pacific
Ocean coast. In October of that year, Director Drury recommended that the president add
by proclamation nine sections of the Bogachiel, which the Forest Service had purchased
from the Crown Zellerbach timber company. The additions totaled slightly more than
47,000 acres, exceeding the limits set in the 1938 proclamation. In order to comply with
the establishing legislation, Drury recommended eliminating the strip between the Queets
Corridor and Coastal Strip and other small areas. This reduction aided the timber industry
and muted opposition to the land transfer. On January 6, 1953, President Harry Truman
added 47,753 acres to Olympic National Park in a lame-duck action that resembled many
earlier national monument proclamations.33

The newest addition completed the core of the big park that Franklin D. Roosevelt
first outlined in 1938. Located mostly in Jefferson and Clallam counties, the new lands
included the Coastal Strip, running from the northern boundary of the Quinault Indian
Reservation north to the boundary of the Ozette Indian Reservation; the Queets Corridor,
which connected Olympic National Park with the Coastal Strip; and a nine-mile long
section of the Bogachiel Valley. In the statement accompanying the proclamation,
Truman announced that Olympic was now “the only park in the world to extend from
snow-capped mountains to ocean beaches.”34

---

33 Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative History, 84-85; Newton B. Drury, Director, National
Park Service, to Secretary of the Interior, October 17, 1949, OLYM 443, Box 1, File 1897-1905, Copies of Forest
Reserve Proclamations & House Report, Olympic NP Administrative Files.

34 “Statement by the President, January 6, 1953,” OLYM 443, Box 1, File 1952-1953, Boundaries
Correspondence–General, NARA Washington; “Enlarging the Olympic National Park, Washington, By the President
of the United States of America, A Proclamation,” OLYM 443, Box 1, File 1951-1953, Boundaries Correspondence–
General, NARA Washington; Thomas J. Allen to Tom S. Patterson, January 12, 1953, OLYM 443, Box 1, File 1952-
1953, Boundaries Correspondence, NARA Washington; G.N. Webster, Port Angeles Evening News, to Harry Truman,
December 27, 1952, OLYM 443, Box 1, File 1952-1953, Boundaries Correspondence–General, NARA Washington;
The addition revived the dispute about Olympic’s size. Despite the authorization
for increases contained in the 1938 establishing act, the use of executive discretion
always raised the ire of western state governments. This latest boundary adjustment
incensed Washington Governor Arthur B. Langlie. He saw no justification for what he
regarded as Truman’s hasty action, but lacking legal recourse he sought a rationale to
reduce Olympic’s size. In July 1953, he appointed an Olympic National Park Review
Committee, which recommended removing 225,000 acres from the Ocean Strip and
Queets Corridor.\textsuperscript{35} The announcement of the committee’s recommendation reignited the
battles of the previous decades. The ECC and other conservation groups mounted a
nationwide newspaper campaign in support of the park’s hard-won rain forest.\textsuperscript{36} Former
U.S. Chief Forester William B. Greeley and timber companies supported Langlie’s
proposed reductions, but congressional hearings in September and October 1953
displayed little other backing. Speaker after speaker announced support for Olympic
National Park. With the Echo Park Dam controversy still roiling, protecting the sanctity
of national parks had become front-page news. Irving Clark, representing Olympic Park
Associates, which he had helped form in 1947, and other powerful conservation groups
rallied behind the addition, drawing parallels to the Bureau of Reclamation’s efforts to

\textsuperscript{35} Fringer, \textit{Olympic National Park: An Administrative History}, 84-85, 210; Superintendent, Olympic, to The
Director, November 28, 1952; Arthur B. Langlie to President Truman, December 2, 1952; Harry S. Truman to
Secretary of the Interior, November 5, 1952; Harry S. Truman to Governor Langlie, November 5, 1952; Harry S.
Truman to Hon. Charles F. Brannan, Secretary of Agriculture, undated letter; Thomas M. Pelly to Dwight D.
Eisenhower, January 8, 1953, OLYM 443, Box 1, File 1952-1953, Boundaries Correspondence, General, NARA
Washington; C. Frank Brockman to Conrad L. Wirth, October 5, 1953; Conrad L. Wirth to Willard G. Van Name,
September 3, 1953; Fred J. Overly to DeForest Grant, November 13, 1953, OLYM 443, Box 1, File 1952-1953,
Boundaries Correspondence, General, NARA Washington.

\textsuperscript{36} Emma Spiller to Conservation Department, Washington, D.C., June 30, 1953; Willard G. Van Name to
Hillory A. Tolson, July 29, 1953; Willard G. Van Name to Hon. Douglas McKay, May 25, 1953; William A.
Degenhardt, President, The Mountaineers, to Conrad L. Wirth, May 20, 1953, OLYM 443, Box 1, File 1952-1953
Boundaries, Correspondence, NARA, Washington, D.C.; Willard G. Van Name, “Despoiling Olympic National Park,”
build dams in national parks. After finally attaining the objectives of the national park movement, they were not about to let extractive interests diminish their accomplishment.

**Downed Timber And Land Acquisition**

The question of downed timber within Olympic National Park provided answers to one kind of park acquisition. In November 1943, the park received authority to exchange forty acres of blown down timber land for 1,200 acres of privately owned land that had been logged over. This provided the park with an avenue to reduce the amount of privately owned land within the park, but at a risk: the forty acres were to be logged, albeit as salvage. The exchange negotiations took the better part of 1944, reaching completion in December. The unusual request, an exchange of land for the right to harvest downed timber inside a national park, made many in the National Park Service queasy. But the prospect of adding 1,200 acres for almost no cost was too enticing.

Such maneuvers opened the way for later efforts at timber salvage that became more controversial.

The National Park Service continuously sought ways to secure inholdings within the peninsula park. Timber companies were the easiest groups with which to negotiate. They were always willing to trade cut-over lands they owned for the opportunity to cut downed timber within park boundaries. In a typical instance, in March 1948, Olympic’s managers reached an agreement to exchange downed timber in the park for the Sunrise

---

37 Fred J. Overly to Julius Olus, June 9, 1953; Fred J. Overly, Superintendent, to Dr. and Mrs. Marge Davenport, April 2, 1953; Carl B. Neal, Secretary, Olympic National Park, to Fred Overly, Superintendent, July 8, 1953; C. Frank Brockman to Conrad L. Wirth, June 1, 1953; Fred J. Overly, Superintendent, to Regional Director, Region Four, December 8, 1953; Fred J. Overly to DeForest Frant, November 13, 1953; “To the Congressional Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hearing at Port Angeles, Washington, Sept. 26, 1953”; “Olympic National Park Boundaries Defended”; Superintendent, Olympic to Regional Director, Region Four, Memorandum, October 6, 1953; Regional Director to Superintendent, Olympic National Park, October 2, 1953; A.L. Miller to Fred Overly, September 14, 1953, “Statement by Fred J. Overly, Superintendent, Olympic National Park,” OLYM 443, Box 1, File 1952-1953, Boundaries Correspondence, General, NARA Washington.

Beach Addition on Lake Crescent owned by the Standard Lumber and Manufacturing Company of Carlsborg, Washington. After the agreement, the National Park Service attained an important parcel in an extremely public part of Olympic while it had professional timbermen solve an ecological problem within park boundaries. Timber companies so liked the idea that they sought to purchase land within the park in the hope of exchanging it for downed timber.\textsuperscript{39} It seemed like a situation in which the National Park Service got everything it wanted. The model could serve well in the future, and it became the hallmark of Fred Overly’s superintendency.

\textbf{Overly As Superintendent}

Despite posting a strong line record of successes, conservation groups faced a range of internal issues. In 1951, Fred J. Overly succeeded Macy as superintendent at Olympic National Park. Overly became the most controversial superintendent in the park’s history and arguably in the history of the National Park Service. As National Park Service Director George B. Hartzog, Jr., remembered him, Overly was aggressive, arrogant, and imaginative, a complex man always remained sure of the course he charted. Overly sought to improve relations with peninsula communities by aggressively promoting salvage timber operations, and the exchange of downed timber within Olympic provided a model for one kind of park acquisition.\textsuperscript{40}

Preservation advocates and park staff vehemently challenged Overly’s decisions, often wondering if his goals might better fit the Forest Service than the National Park Service. He also supported the expanded construction of roads and concession facilities, an objective antithetical to the wilderness goals contained in Olympic’s 1938 planning.

\textsuperscript{39} Superintendent’s Monthly Report, March 1948; Superintendent’s Monthly Report, April 1948.
\textsuperscript{40} George B. Hartzog, Jr., Battling for the National Parks (Mt. Kisco, NY: Moyer Bell Limited, 1988), 34-35; Superintendent’s Monthly Report, Olympic National Park, November 1943.
document. By the time the National Park Service removed him to Great Smoky
Mountains National Park in 1958, Overly had become the center of a national maelstrom.
An outstanding forestry student at the University of Washington, Overly brought
pertinent professional experience to the superintendent’s post at Olympic. He worked for
the Crescent Logging Company, then a Seattle bank financing a peninsula timber
operation, and soon became a forest guard for the Forest Service. He joined the National
Park Service as a seasonal worker at Glacier National Park. During his career, he
believed that parks should provide both recreational opportunities for the public and
economic benefits to surrounding communities. Missing from his perspective was the
idea of preservation that had been so important to the establishment of Olympic National
Park. In July 1936, Overly returned to the Olympic Peninsula as permanent park ranger,
becoming the park’s chief ranger in 1938. He remained as a ranger until Region 4
Director Lawrence C. Merriam appointed him superintendent in 1951.41

Overly’s management goals at Olympic differed from the prevailing views in the
National Park Service about the park. He never embraced the wilderness philosophy
formulated by the original planning group, offering instead a utilitarian vision of national
parks and nature. Overly’s 1952 Master Plan abandoned the wilderness stance so
prominent in Olympic’s history and in the staff’s vision of the park. Overly was bold; he
insisted that because the 1916 National Park Service Organic Act directed the agency to
promote tourism, he could logically make “some slight sacrifice of the Wilderness theme
in order that full use and enjoyment by the public would be possible.”42

41 Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative History, 97; Fred J. Overly, Suggested Development
Plan for Olympic National Park, Washington, August 25, 1965, Fred Overly Papers, 2214, Box 5, Folder 5, UW
Archives, 1.
42 Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative History, 97.
Overly’s plan anticipated the goals of National Park Service Director Conrad L. Wirth, who began his tenure atop the agency in 1952. A landscape architect, Wirth transformed the National Park Service; he extended the Mather-Albright ethic of visitor accommodation with Mission 66, an enormous program of capital development that focused on parkways, national recreation areas, and facilities for park system visitors. Wirth favored greater access to the nation’s parks, a position consistent with Overly’s views at Olympic but simultaneously anathema to the many who regarded Olympic as the baseline measure for pristine character in national parks. Overly had many supporters on the peninsula; the timber industry in particular welcomed his point of view, although it simultaneously inspired opposition both outside and inside the park. A national struggle that reprised earlier conflicts over the Olympic Peninsula ensued.

Much of Overly’s program followed the guidelines established during the Wirth era. The superintendent wanted to develop Olympic’s concession facilities and allow private concessioners to operate in remote parts of the park. To create better visitor facilities National Park Service workers repaired the Enchanted Valley Chalet, which had fallen into disrepair after World War II, and the agency acquired the Rosemary Inn on Lake Crescent. Overly envisioned a system of one-way roads from Hurricane Ridge along the fire protection trail to Obstruction Point through Deer Park, and from Mora Park north to Cape Alava/Ozette along the coast. Such a road directly challenged Olympic’s wilderness character and ran headlong into preservationists who played such a prominent role in the park’s establishment. Other plans for outdoor recreation – 200 miles of new trails and the construction of six new campgrounds throughout the park – further accentuated accommodation. Overly also advocated the construction of a ranger station at
Ozette, as well as fourteen new shelters. A separate park division, Construction and
Maintenance, established in 1952, oversaw much of this work.43 The park’s Mission 66 Prospectus of May 11, 1956, further illustrated the
direction that Overly envisioned for Olympic National Park. Mission 66 was Wirth’s
prize accomplishment, a ten-year, one-billion-dollar operation designed to upgrade
facilities and services in time for the National Park Service’s fiftieth anniversary in 1966.
Reflecting the growing popularity of the nation’s parks, the program offered vast
opportunities for development and expansion. To the consternation of prominent
Olympic National Park supporters, Overly and Mission 66 were a perfect fit. Overly
wanted to impose a significant human presence on the wilderness park for which
advocates had fought long and hard, his opponents complained. The superintendent
countered by highlighting management needs, arguing the planning committee had not
foreseen the necessity of maintaining roads, trails, buildings, utilities, and campgrounds.
Overly advocated cooperation with the Forest Service to remove fallen trees, grade roads,
and implement fire management programs. Most significantly, Overly’s Mission 66
Prospectus highlighted a program of timber salvage that would provide a revenue stream
to acquire private inholdings in Olympic National Park.44

This program of exchanging salvage rights for land was his most controversial
practice. He began the practice quietly in 1942 and it came crashing to an end in 1956.

43 Raymond Cordes, “Enchanted Valley and Its Chalet,” undated ts., OLYM Natural History Files, Natural
Resources, OLYM 446, Box 3, File H14, History of Early Exploration of Olympic Peninsula, Olympic NP Archives,
28-29; Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative History, 97-98; Lien, Olympic Battleground, 302; Copy of
agreement between Rose N. Littleton and Preston P. Macy, July 3, 1943; “Extract from Minutes of Meeting of Board of
Directors, National Park Concessions, Inc., Mammoth Cave Hotel, April 29, 1943;” “Memorandum for the Director,
Nov. 20, 1942,” Preston P. Macy Papers, 3211, Box 1, Folder 28, UW Archives.
44 “Park Service Marks Year With New ‘Parkscape,’” untitled newspaper, August 16, 1966, Philip Zalesky
Papers, 3773, Box 1, Folder 20, UW Archives; Daniel B. Beard, Superintendent, to Director, September 3, 1958,
AD815 Subject Files 1954-1962, Box 2, A6427, Washington Office, Olympic NP Archives; Fringer, Olympic National
Park: An Administrative History, 161, 178, 194.
Salvage sales seemed natural in Olympic National Park. Every year, the park's acres of timber required management. Damage from wind, rain, snow, and a host of other natural and human impacts meant that there was always down timber in the park. In his capacity as chief ranger, Overly oversaw the disposal of this resource and developed a working system for dealing with it. As superintendent, he coveted 7,354 acres of private land inside Olympic, and sought to bring it all under park administration. He targeted money from salvage timber sales to purchase this acreage.

Overly’s forestry training allowed him to find ways to turn timber into the cash that let him buy land for Olympic National Park. Removing trees with insect infestation or other diseases or that endangered people provided a primary avenue. A section of the 1916 National Park Service Act authorized the exchange of timber on park lands for privately owned cutover lands within national parks. It also contained clauses that allowed mitigation of insect and fire hazards. Always creative, Overly devised a strategy based on these clauses, and in his formulation, they became loose legal authority for contracts to cut “hazardous” park timber. During World War II, the practice attracted little notice, but by the early 1950s, it had become controversial. When national conservation organizations heard of the activity, the intensity of scrutiny increased dramatically. Accused of breaching the most basic tenet of National Park Service management – the inviolate character of national parks – Overly became a target of the preservation movement. His policies infuriated wilderness and conservation groups, park staff, and national park advocates even as they won him the affection of local interests.45

The extent of Overly’s salvage timber operation was enormous. According to the

watchdog Olympic Park Associates, during his seven years as superintendent, workers
cut an estimated 65 million board feet of timber. With the aid of logging companies,
timber moved quietly from the park to regional mills without the sanction of the National
Park Service’s national leadership. Conservation organizations weighed in as the practice
became more widely known. In 1951, the Wilderness Society expressed concern over
exchanging salvage rights for valuable land additions to Olympic, though it found that
Overly had not initiated unauthorized cutting. The practice persisted despite assurances
from Wirth – who condoned the superintendent’s early salvage logging activities – that
Olympic’s timber salvage program would stop.46

Prominent construction projects in Olympic National Park drew more attention to
the salvage logging, bringing rancor and political repercussions. Rights-of-way for the
new road to Hurricane Ridge, whose timber was used to complete the Pioneer Memorial
Museum in 1955, required some salvage logging. In a famous and frequently traveled
area of Olympic, such endeavors attracted a greater level of scrutiny than ever before.
Philip Zalesky of Olympic Park Associates insisted that visibly healthy, mature trees
often were marked for salvage. He believed much of the timber removal constituted “pure
and simple commercial logging.”47

Park staff turned against salvage logging, only to find that the regional office
tacitly condoned it. When Olympic seasonal naturalist ranger Paul Shepard, representing
a majority of Olympic’s seasonal staff, complained that severe logging damage had

46 Sigurd F. Olson to Irving Clark, August 28, 1953, OLYM 443, Box 1, File 1952-1953, Boundaries
Correspondence, General, NARA Washington; Lien, Olympic Battleground, 268-72.
47 Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative History, 218; Preston Macy to Nels Bruce, February
18, 1958, Fred Overly Papers, 2214, Box 2, Folder 9, UW Archives; Fred J. Overly, Suggested Development Plan for
Olympic National Park, 2; Philip H. Zalesky, Hearing Committee Chairman, Olympic Park Associates, to Sirs, January
Zalesky Papers, 3773, Box 1, Folder 4, UW Archives.
occurred at Lake Crescent, Sol Duc, Bogachiel, Hoh, Quinault, and Olympic Hot Springs, Region Four Regional Director Lawrence C. Merriam reported to Wirth that Shepard had exaggerated his claims. Although Wirth wished to conserve the old-growth rain forests from “excessive losses,” he said that prompt action was essential against serious threats of fire and pests such as the Douglas fir beetle. However, Wirth did not closely scrutinize the degree to which those infestations determined what timber was salvaged.48

The salvage operations built local support for Overly and further divided park supporters and regional industry. In 1954, the superintendent and a group of Port Angeles and Seattle businessmen explored the possibility of building a road through the Queets Valley to provide easier access for salvage logging. Overly assigned logging contracts to the nonprofit Olympic Natural History Association that he headed, keeping the process closed to avoid prying eyes. In late 1956, the Olympic Development League, one of the many groups that supported Overly, asked him to organize a program by which timber companies could salvage diseased and downed timber in the park – all “without bringing down the wrath of all the woodpecker-peekers and warbler-watchers.”49 Overly’s actions empowered the timber industry and drew an even more clear line that divided it from park supporters.

The park superintendent’s approach infuriated most of the National Park Service’s friends as well as many within the agency. In an age when support organizations usually followed the National Park Service’s line, Overly’s actions drew grassroots opposition

that largely bypassed the agency’s highest echelons. In 1956, groups at the park and the
National Park Service combined with outside forces such as the Olympic Park
Associates, Irving Brant, Irving Clark, David Brower of the Sierra Club, and conservation
maven Rosalie Edge, who had originally accepted Overly’s explanations, to challenge the
superintendent’s leadership. They declared his decisions were out of line with the mid-
century public’s idea of a national park’s purpose. After a prolonged struggle, Overly
departed to what he described as “exile” at Great Smoky Mountains National Park. His
dismissal marked the end of the first generation of management at Olympic National
Park.

Whether appropriate or not, Overly’s vision of Olympic National Park and his
efforts to salvage timber within its boundaries had disastrous implications. Congress had
founded Olympic amid controversies that centered on the very issues that underpinned
salvage logging. Despite mid-century success in defeating the Echo Park Dam and other
projects, park supporters viewed Olympic as a test case – a perennially endangered prize.
Overly did not cut timber per se. He stretched the definition of “damaged timber” so
broadly as to make advocates fear for the safety of any tree in Olympic. Overly blew
open one of the primary fictions of national park management, the idea that the
convoluted mission the National Park Service received at its founding could be translated
into effective preservation. In the process, he compromised the superintendency of
Olympic National Park. At the dawn of the environmental movement, he reflected an
older vision of conservation, one that predated the National Park Service, and became
anathema to the advocates of preservation. The Port Angeles Chamber of Commerce
threw a farewell party for Overly, suggesting its sense of loss of a vaunted leader even as
national conservation organizations reviled him. At the expense of national park
principles, Overly strengthened the ties between local residents and the peninsula park.
National and local conservationists cared not a whit for such an accomplishment. Had it
“not been for the efforts of interested citizens,” Zalesky later wrote, “the National Park
Service might still be raiding the forests of Olympic National Park.”\(^{50}\)

In no small part because of Overly’s actions, Olympic National Park became a
measuring stick for the success of 1950s conservation. The emphasis on wilderness that
dated from the 1930s gave the park unusual symbolic significance, and the history of
national activism added stridence to the calls for protection. Olympic National Park
represented one of the last places that could truly be considered unique in the lower forty-
eight states. When faced with what appeared to be an assault not only on the park and the
principles of management, but on the near-sacred premise of its wilderness character, it
became the standard around which the conservation movement rallied.

**Olympic Wilderness**

After Overly’s departure, Olympic was marked within the National Park Service
as a difficult post, one where superintendents risked their aspirations. Anyone who
assumed the superintendency had to be able to negotiate national and local
constituencies, wilderness advocates and extractive industry lobbyists and state
government officials. Few in the National Park Service had the combination of aplomb
and experience to manage such complicated situations. After Overly, Dan Beard – a
seasoned professional with impeccable credentials and clear and determined vision –
returned Olympic to a more conventional management philosophy. Beard arrived from

Zalesky Papers, 3773, Box 1, Folder 4, UW Archives; Lien, *Olympic Battleground*, 289-91, 297.
Everglades National Park, where he served as its first superintendent, and negotiated many concerns similar to the ones encountered in his new post. Serving at Olympic from 1958 to 1960, he used his considerable experience and skill to mediate difficulties left over from the Overly era. A biologist by training, Beard returned Olympic National Park to a management model similar to that of Preston Macy. He reversed Overly’s plan to expand the road system and ended all major timber salvage operations. He also ordered studies of the Hoh Developed Area and visitor use at Hurricane Ridge Lodge, and completed an inventory of the park’s fishery resources. Beard was a modern park manager, following the National Park Service’s 1950s view of wilderness as an obstacle to management. While he returned the park to more conservative management, he did little to further Olympic as wilderness.\(^{51}\)

Beard and his successors disciplined wilderness supporters, finding the management demands of their era at odds with an influential and growing segment of the public. D. John Doerr, who served as Olympic superintendent from 1960 to 1964, and Bennett Gale, who arrived in 1964 and continued to 1967, followed Beard’s strategy, seeking the middle ground among the park’s different constituencies. Trained as a geologist, Doerr had served as a park naturalist in Rocky Mountain National Park and Hawaii, and felt less commitment to wilderness than Beard. Recognizing the importance of visitor access in the National Park Service during the Mission 66 era, Doerr worked with the Washington State Highway Department to acquire the right-of-way to construct a road connecting Hurricane Ridge and the visitor center complex. The construction of any new roads within the park met with opposition from the Olympic Park Associates,

which had become an influential voice in the park’s decision-making process.\textsuperscript{52}

Doerr’s conventional approach to Olympic National Park contrasted with the new emphasis on ecology that had begun to permeate national park management. In 1963, two influential and widely heralded reports challenged existing National Park Service practices. Both documents – the A. Starker Leopold Committee’s *Report on Wildlife Management in the National Parks* and the National Academy of Sciences’ *A Report by the Advisory Committee to the National Park Service on Research*, known as the Robbins Report after its lead author, Dr. William J. Robbins – powerfully argued for a stronger ecological basis for park management.\textsuperscript{53}

The two reports influenced natural resource management policies throughout the park system. Authored by a group of noted wildlife scientists, the Leopold report recommended maintaining or recreating the original ecology of a park as a “reasonable illusion of primitive America.” Believing that natural conditions should prevail in national parks, the authors suggested removing all non-native species, putting biologists rather than interpreters in charge of managing wildlife, and emphasizing the role of fire in forest regeneration, among other management practices. The National Academy of Sciences report focused on the National Park Service’s research needs. It concluded that the National Park Service should preserve national parks primarily for the aesthetic,


\textsuperscript{53} A. Starker Leopold served as an advisor to the National Park Service, beginning in 1962 with his appointment to a special advisory board on wildlife management; Dr. William J. Robbins was the associate director for international science activities for the National Science Foundation. Aldo S. Leopold, Stanley A. Cain, Clarence M. Cottam, Ira N. Gabrielson, and Thomas L. Kimball, *Wildlife Management in the National Parks: The Leopold Report* (Unpublished, 1963), 10; William J. Robbins (Chairman), Edward A. Ackerman, Marston Bates, Stanley A. Cain, F. Fraser Darling, John M. Fogg, Jr., Tom Gill, Joseph L. Gilson, E. Raymond Hall, Carl L. Hubbs, *Report by The Advisory Committee to the National Park Service on Research* (Washington, D.C.: The National Science Foundation, 1963).
spiritual, scientific, and educational values conferred on the public.\textsuperscript{54}

The Leopold and Robbins reports reflected a widening respect and concern for the condition of the U.S. environment. In September 1964, congressional passage of the Wilderness Act created the National Wilderness Preservation System. The legislation instructed the secretary of the interior to examine every roadless area greater than 5,000 contiguous acres in the federal land system, including national park acreage, and recommend suitable areas for designation as wilderness. Statutory wilderness was far different from either the administrative wilderness of the 1920s and 1930s or the conceptual wilderness of the founding of Olympic National Park. Statutory wilderness received formal protection from Congress as well as a proscribed set of governance rules and regulations. The authors of the legislation concurred with the idea that the National Park Service should reorient its research agenda toward ecological objectives. The act recommended evaluation methods and concluded that the National Park Service should hire more people trained in biological sciences.\textsuperscript{55}

That impulse supported an internal National Park Service transformation to create an ecological perspective in agency thinking. After World War II, the G.I. Bill sent thousands of veterans to college. Many of them saw careers in government as a viable extension of their military service, and a small number became biologists or wildlife specialists or selected other natural resource-oriented careers. Some of these joined the National Park Service, where they gradually replaced the foresters who had dominated early resource management. Despite such training, most National Park Service staff members served as generalists, but these new specialists brought a different perspective

\textsuperscript{54} Leopold, et al., \textit{Wildlife Management in the National Parks}, 10; Robbins, et al. \textit{Report by The Advisory Committee to the National Park Service on Research.}

\textsuperscript{55} The Wilderness Act (16 USC 1 21), September 3, 1964.
to park management. By the middle of the 1960s, they comprised an important cadre for management policy change within the agency.  

Wilderness was problematic for the National Park Service, evidence of a growing gap between the agency and its closest supporters. Agency leaders remained lukewarm toward the idea of designated wilderness, fearing that such legislation would curtail their management prerogatives. The National Park Service had long relied on its supporters to assist it in implementing its goals, but the Wilderness Act severely strained those relationships. The conservation constituency, which developed into the environmental movement in the 1960s, deeply felt the need to preserve wilderness and wondered why the National Park Service balked at such an obvious opportunity to protect lands under the law. Caught between a public that shared its values and an agency that they loved that was at best tepid, managers at national parks with strong wilderness values struggled. In that category, few parks in the lower forty-eight states could compare with Olympic.

Doerr and his immediate successor, Gale, moved cautiously in the aftermath of the Wilderness Act, hewing to a moderate path. Olympic had always been subject to strong outside influences. Almost a decade after the timber salvage controversy, it still suffered a sullied reputation. Olympic had had vocal supporters since before its inception, but no park unit presaged the difficulties the National Park Service experienced with its constituencies in the 1960s better than the peninsula park. At the core, the vision of Olympic’s advocates almost always had differed from that of the National Park Service, and the passage of the Wilderness Act exacerbated the difficulty. No superintendent

---

could afford to ignore such outside influences. At Olympic, Gale moved slowly as he
implemented scientific resource management programs and practices.58

A new management document resulted from the dilemma. In November 1965,
working closely with the Olympic Park Associates, Gale completed the first draft of a
new master plan for Olympic. The Final Master Plan, approved in December 1966,
reflected the changing climate in which park management took place. Gale’s plan
simultaneously encouraged public, research, and recreational use of Olympic’s resources
while continuing the trend toward visitor accommodation. By 1965, more than two
million visitors came to Olympic National Park each year. The plan recognized that
facilities for them were inadequate, and it advocated the expansion and redevelopment of
many campgrounds and public facilities.

The 1966 Final Master Plan was a realistic document that attempted to guide
Olympic through its tumultuous political environment. Unlike most major national parks,
where the National Park Service held a dominant position, at Olympic the agency had to
assuage both outside conservation organizations and local industries. In response to this
perennially difficult situation, the master plan emphasized cooperation between the
National Park Service, non-government organizations, and local industry in the
management planning process. It failed to address the ways in which National Park
Service goals of limited development conflicted with recreational tourism or the timber
industry. Gale sought a new planning equilibrium, but he still believed that the National
Park Service could achieve the most important of its goals within its own boundaries.59

Zalesky Papers, 3773, Box 1, Folder 9, UW Archives.
Interior, Olympic National Park: The Master Plan (Port Angeles, Wa.: National Park Service, 1965), 12-14, 22; “Long
At the same time, Gale offered the first comprehensive approach to wilderness at Olympic since the park’s conceptualization in the 1930s. The formal wilderness report, written in late 1966 and influenced by the Olympic Park Associates, recommended that the park designate three parts – 773,600 acres of the backcountry called the Olympic Roadless Area; 13,300 acres above Kalaloch, known as the North Coast Roadless Area; and 5,900 acres below Rialto, the South Coast Roadless Area – as wilderness. National Park Service Director George B. Hartzog, Jr., who succeeded Conrad Wirth in 1964, was a master politician with a keen sense of the national climate. He ignored the wilderness recommendations, judging them politically untenable at the time. Gale also prepared a 1966 master plan for the creation of a national seashore, which would combine coastal “park” lands with the Ozette and Makah Indian reservations. The plan made little headway for a variety of reasons, not least the implication for Native peoples of putting their land in a more restrictive federal trust.60

Overly Returns

Just as Gale’s 1966 plan debuted, Fred Overly sought revenge on the agency he believed betrayed him. With the help of U.S. Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, a strong supporter of Overly and his logging philosophy, the former park superintendent returned to the Evergreen State in 1963 as the regional director of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. Outdoor recreation had become an important issue for the prosperous but increasingly confined American public, and Stewart Udall’s Department of the Interior

---

assumed responsibility for providing citizens with recreational options. Americans wanted to have it all, and for the first time, they expected not only leisure time but also facilities in which to enjoy recreation. The National Park Service seemed to be the logical agency to manage recreation, but Udall held an older view of the value of the national park system. His preservationist tenets, expressed clearly in his 1963 bestseller, *The Quiet Crisis*, illustrated his leanings, a point of view that led him to regard national parks as places of reverence rather than recreation. Udall’s vision for the park system curtailed National Park Service prerogative. At the moment when the National Park Service was best prepared and most inclined to manage recreation, Udall supported the establishment of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation in the Department of the Interior, and he gave the recreation management responsibilities to the new agency.

Public recreation had been a long-standing sore point with the National Park Service. Recreation offered a ready-made constituency for the agency, but to purists recreational areas “diluted the stock” – in the timeworn agency phrase – of the national parks. The National Park Service had been intermittently involved in recreation management since before the New Deal, but its efforts often conflicted with Congress’ sense that the national parks meant something more than recreation. The National Park Service also encountered resistance from other federal agencies that claimed the same turf. National Park Service battles with the Forest Service over recreation were legendary, but only with the creation of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation did resistance – with the sanction of the secretary – originate within the Department of the Interior, ever more frightening for the National Park Service. Faced with a much larger agency in its own department that claimed its mission, the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation immediately

---

sought distance from the better-positioned National Park Service, exasperating Wirth and other politically supple National Park Service leaders. The department chose a Forest Service bureaucrat as the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation’s first administrator, and the new organization used its resources to support recreation in nearly every federal agency – except the National Park Service. This contest of mission and constituency compelled aggressive National Park Service action.\textsuperscript{62} Appointments such as Overly’s were typical during this interagency spat.

Always controversial, Overly immediately demonstrated the approach that preservationists feared. His detractors had always seen malice in his actions, and their contentions again appeared accurate. In 1964, Overly contacted Secretary of the Interior Udall and proposed construction of a road running along the wilderness beach of the Olympic ocean strip. The preservationist constituency had worked long and hard to secure the addition of that land to the park as wilderness. It revolted against the proposal, regarding it as a gift to the timber companies on the peninsula’s west side. Overly also wished to clear cut the Bogachiel and Calawah rain forests, eliminate 16,440 acres from the Quinault area, and construct a road through the Queets Valley that would open the area for logging. Within months of Overly’s return to Washington state, a decade of interagency cooperation came crashing to an end, as his proposals reignited the battles of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s.\textsuperscript{63}

Overly’s most disruptive scheme became known in summer 1965, when Udall


sent him to examine recommended boundary adjustments to facilitate Olympic’s
administration. Overly visited the peninsula park and studied its issues. He unveiled his
solution on January 6, 1966, at a press conference held by Senator Jackson in Seattle to
assess the possibility of creating North Cascades National Park. Overly’s proposal was
simultaneously a direct assault on Olympic National Park as it had been conceived in the
1930s, a clear effort to vindicate himself, and an effort to return the Olympic Peninsula to
greater productivity as a source of timber. Overly’s plan recommended the removal of
69,000 acres from the park, adding a mere 10,000 acres in its place. This exchange would
free 2.6 billion board feet of timber for cutting. In his effort to justify the reduction,
Overly determined that many of the boundaries along the park’s ridges and watersheds
had been drawn without proper surveying and were “not suitable for practical
administrative purposes,” a vague description that sounded to many like a rationalization
for self-interest. He proposed returning land along the Bogachiel, Calawah, and Sitkum
rivers – the hemlock and silver fir forests – back to the national forest. Such lands, he
averred, attracted few park visitors and were not “outstanding scenically” when compared
to other parts of Olympic National Park. Opening these areas would also provide better
hunting opportunities; it would introduce federal protection for the Roosevelt Elk,
superseding state gaming laws that permitted hunting in the elk’s winter habitat.
Returning park land to the surrounding national forest would, in his view, also assist the
peninsula’s economy.64

Overly’s plan drew greater attention than it merited. By offering it at Jackson’s

64 “ONF Chief Outlines Park Boundary Views,” Port Angeles Evening News, Apr. 3, 1966; Fred J. Overly,
1966 Proposal, OLYM 427, Box 6, File 7: Clippings 3, Olympic NP archives, 1, 4; William E. Brockman, Olympic
Park Associates, to Stewart L. Udall, January 14, 1966, Philip Zalesky Papers, 3773, Box 1, Folder 32, UW Archives;
Bennett T. Gale to Regional Director, Western Region, September 2, 1966, UW Archives; “Olympic National Park,
Boundary Study Committee Report,” September 2, 1966, UW Archives; Superintendent Bennett T. Gale, Olympic, to
Uniformed Employees, Memorandum, June 27, 1966, OLYM 427, Box 6, File 7: Clippings 3, Olympic NP archives.
press conference, Overly seemed to have the tacit approval of federal officials, including Udall, Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman, and Bureau of Outdoor Recreation Director Edward Crafts. The plan received instant credibility that it had not earned, posing a problem both for critics and for Overly. The conservation community was incensed, charging that the proposal sought to couple support for North Cascades National Park, a long-sought goal of Pacific Northwest conservationists, and the reduction of Olympic National Park, anathema to the very same people. They felt boxed in, with support for one goal tied to the reduction of the other. Overly claimed he did not intend to couple the two parks. He insisted that his recommendations followed from an assessment of the best conservation policy, weighing the wisest use of the lands in question, while recognizing the difficulty in administering remote areas. He attempted, he asserted, to settle long-standing controversies among different interests. With his record on the Olympic Peninsula, few conservationists believed him. Overly was a known commodity, widely regarded in conservation circles as an opponent of all they valued, and they vowed to stop his proposal.\textsuperscript{65}

In response, opponents challenged Overly at every step. In hearings for the North Cascades-Olympic plan in Seattle in early February 1966, conservationists and their supporters mobilized and enlisted state officials. Washington State Governor Dan Evans opposed Overly’s reductions at Olympic National Park, insisting additional timber cut from the park would merely flood the market. Olympic Park Associates considered Overly a “one-man committee to raid Olympic National Park of 59,000 acres.” Irving Brant, by then eighty-one years old, was outraged, as were the Mazamas, the Sierra Club, and the Conservation Law Society of America. Philip Zalesky even claimed that the

American Eden

1 proposal violated treaties that guaranteed nature protection and wildlife preservation, not
to mention wilderness ideals.66

3 Despite wide condemnation of his proposal in some quarters, Overly found
support for his claim that the Olympic lumber stands proposed for removal did not
necessarily threaten the “proper preservation of timber resources in the park.” The
Seattle, Port Townsend, and Grays Harbor chambers of commerce predicted that the
economic impact of Overly’s proposal would benefit Clallam, Jefferson, and Grays
Harbor counties, and looked forward to a time when revised policies would allow hiking,
 fishing, and hunting in the Bogachiel, a broad mischaracterization of National Park
Service policies.

10 In contrast to its earlier support, the Forest Service, threatened by loss of land
with the imminent establishment of North Cascades National Park, disliked Overly’s
plan. In the mid-1960s, the Forest Service struggled with recreation under its newly
created policy of Multiple Use-Sustained Yield, inaugurated in 1960. The policy featured
a new emphasis on recreation, providing the Forest Service a reason equal to the National
Park Service’s to dislike the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation and its officials. Overly’s
proposal drew the Forest Service back into a conflict with the National Park Service that
had been dormant for two decades; worse, it cast the U.S. Forest Service as a secondary
recreation agency. The Forest Service did everything it could to remain distant from

Knowledge on ONP, Tozier Maintains,” Port Angeles Evening News, February 15, 1966; William E. Brockman,
Conservation Law Society of America, July 13, 1966; Philip H. Zalesky, Hearing Committee Chairman, Olympic Park
Associates, to Sirs, January 24, 1966, Philip Zalesky Papers, 3773, Box 1, Folder 4, UW Archives; “Minutes of
Executive Committee of the Olympic Park Associates, March 15, 1966,” Philip Zalesky Papers, 3773, Box 1, Folder 9,
UW Archives.
Overly and his ideas. National Park Service Director Hartzog knew Overly very well and recognized the complexity of his motives. He was wary of the proposal, but was unable to reject it outright for political reasons. He decided to try to kill it with further study. During the summer, Olympic National Park Superintendent Gale headed a committee composed of Overly, park specialists, and others to assess the proposed boundary adjustments. The National Park Service majority report recommended returning the western end of the Bogachiel Valley to the Forest Service. This unusual proposal stunned the Forest Service, which had done its best to stay out of the fray, and subjected it to harsh criticism from the conservation community, always prepared to think the worst of the foresters. At the same time, Senator Jackson initiated a boundary reduction bill, again catching the conservation community off guard.

Conservationists responded with alacrity and fortitude. Led by Zalesky, Olympic Park Associates summoned major environmental organizations to action. The group stressed that the areas targeted by Overly for removal, especially the Bogachiel-Calawah complex, provided “the finest example of wilderness experience within the Northwest” and served as a “unique outdoor laboratory” for the nation. The Olympic Park Associates’ official statement concluded, “It would be nothing short of criminal to sacrifice this valley to resource extraction.” Prominent conservationist William Brockman


68 Extemporaneous Remarks of George B. Hartzog, Jr., Director of the National Park Service, Before the Annual Meeting of the Port Angeles, Washington, Chamber of Commerce, Saturday, January 6, 1968,” Philip Zalesky Papers, 3773, Box 1, Folder 28, UW Archives; Olympic National Park, Boundary Study Committee Report, September 2, 1966, UW Archives, 2; Lien, Olympic Battleground, 325-26, 334.
claimed that Overly’s proposal “amounts to nothing more than a timber raid.” 69

These efforts elicited support from local communities, whose own economic climate had changed. By the mid-1960s, timber had peaked as an industry, and the tourism associated with Olympic National Park produced an ever-growing share of the regional economy. The shift that marked the New West was under way; recreation had begun to replace extraction and many on the peninsula could see this change. “Will cutting corners off of the park really offer several hundred people more jobs?” a Port Angeles denizen asked. “If this is true, why hasn’t there ever been a job increase by utilizing the timber outside of the park?” Another woman felt certain that the timber in question “would stimulate the economy of the peninsula TEMPORARILY,” but Overly’s proposal threatened “a priceless public trust.” 70 Despite long-standing dependence on the timber industry, by the mid-1960s, many on the peninsula recognized that an important change had occurred. Protecting Olympic National Park became, in no small part, protecting their future as well.

Such opposition, combined with adroit National Park Service maneuvering and Hartzog’s many political connections, spelled the end of Overly’s proposal. The bill establishing North Cascades National Park passed without mention of reducing Olympic’s boundaries. The proposal had been an outside possibility to begin with. Very few instances of national park reductions had taken place after World War II; even fewer involved front-line national parks. Overly’s personal stake in the issue compromised his credibility, and Hartzog deftly outmaneuvered him in Washington, D.C. In the end,

Overly stirred up controversy, but seriously misread the political landscape. Reprimanded for his actions by his own superiors, who accused him of compromising the trust between levels of his department, Overly retired from the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation in 1972. He subsequently formed the Olympic Peninsula Heritage Council, a timber industry advocacy group that sought to remove areas designated as wilderness in Olympic.\footnote{Lien, \textit{Olympic Battleground}, 335-36.}

\textbf{A Regulatory Revolution}

The rejection of Overly’s plan became a pivotal moment in the history of Olympic National Park. It confirmed for park advocates that the service and recreational ethos had replaced the extractive model of the first half of the twentieth century. Overly’s attempt to remove 69,000 acres from Olympic National Park became the first salvo in the battles of the “New West,” which pitted resource extraction against recreation and leisure. The simultaneous shift from conservation to environmentalism occurred as Stewart Udall’s “Quiet Crisis” turned into the nationally recognized “Environmental Crisis.” The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 accelerated the statutory revolution, which reached its first apex with the Wilderness Act in 1964 and included the Wild Horse and Burro Act in 1971, the Endangered Species Act in 1973, and other significant pieces of conservation legislation. Other congressional actions that would influence the national parks included the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, and its amendments; the Clean Air Act of 1977, which later designated Olympic National Park as a Class I area, defined by the strictest requirements for air quality; the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978; and the Archaeological Resources
Protection Act of 1979.\textsuperscript{72}
Together, this regulatory revolution put an end to any serious attempts to
challenge Olympic National Park’s sovereignty. After 1967, the peninsula park never
again faced any genuine threat of reduction in size, and the battles between timber
interests and the park finally ended. Overly’s clumsy attempt at boundary adjustment
solidified trends that already existed. Timber interests had only been able to muster half-
hearted support for the reduction, and when people on the peninsula preferred tourism to
logging it was clear that Olympic National Park’s preservation was finally secure.
Overly’s attempt at revenge against Olympic had precisely the opposite effect; in its
aftermath, the park was no longer part of the debate about the demise of the peninsula’s
timber industry.
Partly in response to Overly – and equally reflecting the shift toward ecological
management in the National Park Service – aggressive pressure to implement the
wilderness agenda ensued. The divisions between the National Park Service and
Olympic’s most prominent supporters widened during the tenure of Superintendent Sture
Carlson, who served from 1967 to 1970. As was true of many superintendents during an
era when the average time at a national park was only three years, Carlson was not at
Olympic long enough to build a power base from which to implement change. As a
result, Carlson’s administration did little to move the park toward wilderness. During his
tenure, Olympic Park Associates took an aggressive position in an attempt to achieve its
goals. The group criticized previous superintendent administrations for indecisiveness
and developed a wilderness plan for Olympic that emphasized the park as a “natural”

\textsuperscript{72} Hal Rothman, \textit{Saving the Planet: The American Response to the Environment in the Twentieth Century}
American Eden

park devoid of ill-planned roads and in-park campgrounds.\textsuperscript{73} Park supporters and the Wilderness Act together pushed the National Park Service toward wilderness management at the agency’s premier “wilderness park.” The 1930s vision of a “wilderness park” differed greatly from a “designated wilderness” as classified by the Wilderness Act of 1964. The “wilderness park” was an idea best developed in the Forest Service’s 1929 regulations, which allowed the secretary of agriculture to designate tracts of not less than 100,000 acres in which roads, motorized transportation, vacation homes, and other amenities were forbidden. The 1930s ideal reflected the influence of noted author and New Deal impresario Bob Marshall, who along with Aldo Leopold was one of the nation’s leading proponents of wilderness. While the 1930s wilderness parks had only administrative fiat for support and no clear and manageable characteristics, federal law would eventually clearly define “designated wilderness.” In its 1964 legislation, Congress mandated that the development of final wilderness recommendations for national parks be completed by 1974.

**RARE I And II**

During his 1970-1976 tenure at Olympic, Superintendent Roger Allin, an aquatic biologist from Everglades National Park, embraced the goal of designated wilderness and undertook a final wilderness recommendation for the park.\textsuperscript{74} The Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE I and II) processes governed federal wilderness, and Allin and Olympic National Park worked to comply with the mandate. Wilderness had been a tricky topic for the National Park Service, for it necessarily pulled the agency and every


unit away from the goals of the Wirth era. The Leopold and Robbins reports provided an
excellent rationale for such studies, and the canny Hartzog understood that wilderness
reflected a shift in National Park Service values. He embraced studies such as the one at
Olympic National Park. A preliminary wilderness study in October 1972 identified three
areas within the park eligible for wilderness – a total of 834,890 acres in the central
primitive area and two small units of the Coastal Strip. The study’s recommendations
included the removal of all primitive shelters within wilderness areas “except for the
minimum number necessary for the health and safety of the wilderness traveler.” The
study advocated the control of wildfires to prevent unacceptable loss of wilderness
values, loss of life, property damage, and spread of fires outside park boundaries. It made
a priority of the removal of non-native plants by approved methods that preserved
wilderness values. Prohibited activities included mining and prospecting, timber
harvesting, grazing, water development projects, and public hunting.75

Compliance with the legal mandate for wilderness demanded enhanced
coooperative relationships between the National Park Service and other government
agencies. The National Park Service and Forest Service had largely abandoned their
animosities in the aftermath of World War II, and their relations improved significantly
throughout the 1960s. The two agencies had united against Overly’s proposal, and Allin
worked to enhance what had become a positive relationship. In 1972, representatives of
both agencies met to discuss their mutual problems on the Olympic Peninsula. For the
first time, they agreed to joint programs in trail building, road maintenance, and fire
management. They also assented to the construction of a visitor interpretation facility in
Hoodsport, Washington, which would represent both agencies. The Forest Service and

National Park Service also authorized whichever agency that could provide the service at
the lowest cost to undertake individual tasks, spurring greater cooperation.\footnote{Fringer, \textit{Olympic National Park: An Administrative History}, 179; Superintendent’s Annual Report, Olympic National Park, 1972.}

Regional cooperation continued as Olympic’s February 1973 reorganization placed parkwide maintenance and area operations under one manager, the chief of operations. This change provided better coordination and efficiency while maintaining the benefits of area management. In 1974, Allin’s master plan reflected the need for various state and federal agencies to coordinate master plans and wilderness plans. That year, Olympic and the Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission agreed to give federal park rangers standing to implement their duties on state lands within the park as well as support in interpretation, trail maintenance, patrol, and enforcement. The park and commission also worked to create a cooperative agreement covering joint management of the seacoast. Coordinated fire management continued between the park and the Forest Service, and Olympic National Park proposed greater coordination with the Washington State Department of Highways and Department of Fisheries, local schools, and other agencies.\footnote{Superintendent’s Annual Report, Olympic National Park, 1973, 1, 17; Superintendent’s Annual Report, Olympic National Park, 1974, OLYM 18242, Box 1, Folder 34: 1974, Olympic NP Archives, 1.}

The combination of the Wilderness Act and the ongoing statutory environmental revolution had a vast impact on Olympic’s management. This legislative transformation inaugurated the era of compliance. The park undertook a wilderness environmental impact statement, designing a preliminary report that recommended 834,530 acres of wilderness after removing 400 acres of obviously developed land included in the earlier version, and holding hearings in November 1973. These resulted in additions of 31,360

\footnote{Fringer, \textit{Olympic National Park: An Administrative History}, 179; Superintendent’s Annual Report, Olympic National Park, 1972.}
acres and deletions of 3,751 acres, bringing the total proposed wilderness to 862,139 acres, more than 95 percent of the park. In 1974, Superintendent Allin noted that the National Park Service had approved “the basic documents of park preservation – the wilderness and master plans.” The two plans helped finalize a new Backcountry Management Plan, completed in 1976 and revised again as a result of increased demand in 1980.78 Under its terms, Olympic continued to see future development in the backcountry as a less desirable alternative. The plan recommended removing some backcountry shelters, requiring permits that limited the number of people in certain areas, discontinuing the use of horses for supply purposes, and repairing existing trails. The wilderness plan, which used contributions from Olympic Park Associates, recommended the designation of 862,139 acres as wilderness, and a small increase from the originally proposed 93 percent of total park lands. New acreage recommended for wilderness designation included the area around Hurricane Ridge Road and Mount Angeles, and a parcel north of Lake Quinault. The timber industry opposed such measures, but public sentiment and changing economic circumstances had finally made wilderness protection as viable as timber production.79

1976 Master Plan

This evolution simultaneously reflected the need to comply with statutes and the transition from the 1930s vision of wilderness to that of the new era. Approved on October 18, 1976, Allin’s Master Plan provided a new model for wilderness and

78 A June 1992 addendum to the backcountry management plan called for the protection of historic structures in the wilderness area.
cooperative management at Olympic National Park. For the first time, the plan related public use, development, and interpretation to the park’s natural resources. Resource protection took precedence as the primary management goal. “Today’s ecological crisis is a direct result of man’s contempt for natural life processes,” its authors wrote, reflecting the tenor of environmental thinking in the mid-1970s. The plan viewed Olympic National Park as “an organic entity” in which nature was a “complex and constantly shifting equilibrium” that “must be encouraged to evolve naturally, free of man-imposed restraints.” The Master Plan espoused wilderness as a dominant value and supported integrated management – developing the concept in a new statutory context and understanding “resource management” and “visitor use” as competing and complementary missions. The plan also advocated dialogue with surrounding stakeholders, and focused on “planning equilibrium” among federal, state, and local governments, timber and other regional industries, and conservation organizations.80

Allin laid the foundation for wilderness and scientific management at the local level, and his successor, James W. Coleman, Jr., recognized the need to devote a greater portion of park resources to compliance. Coleman, a second-generation National Park Service member who arrived at Olympic after serving as superintendent of Mound City Group and at Morristown-Edison National Park Service group, served at Olympic from 1977 to 1979. Under his leadership, monitoring of backcountry management activities, including the shelter issue, and ongoing human impact studies continued, and Olympic began studies of elk ecology. His two-year stay allowed little more than the opportunity to implement existing policies, but Coleman did hew to Allin’s emphasis on ecological

management with an important investment of park resources.\textsuperscript{81}

By the early 1980s, compliance and its emphasis on wilderness demanded new forms of park supervision. Roger Contor, Olympic’s superintendent from 1979 to 1983, embraced scientific management, greatly influencing the direction of resource management. Like Allin, Contor was a biologist by training. He started in the National Park Service as a ranger at Yellowstone and served as the first superintendent at North Cascades National Park. In 1980, he created the Division of Science and Technology at Olympic National Park, a group composed of a chief and five permanent professionals.\textsuperscript{82}

Contor also accelerated planning at Olympic National Park. He initiated the revision of the 1976 Backcountry Management Plan in 1980 after visitation to the backcountry almost doubled in the four years following the original publication; the results became the guiding document for the backcountry and the proposed wilderness area. The plan also was necessary to address the shelter issue laid out in the 1978 shelter selection criteria, which called for the retention of 22 shelters. Contor also led efforts to develop a Resource Management Plan in 1982 and a Statement for Management in 1983, which furthered the 1976 Master Plan by detailing the balance between the wilderness and scientific management philosophies. The 1983 Statement for Management defined more than 870,000 acres as wilderness area, almost 95 percent of park acreage. This designation was a tremendous success for wilderness advocates, but required finesse to adhere to the Wilderness Act and other policies, including those recommended in the


\textsuperscript{82} Superintendent’s Annual Report, Olympic National Park, 1980, OLYM 18242, Box 1, Folder 37: 1989, Olympic NP Archives, 3.
Robbins and Leopold reports.\textsuperscript{83} At the same time as the planning process produced several defining documents, Olympic National Park experienced a cut in its base budget while visitation increased. In 1982, the park’s budget decreased by 4 percent and it had to absorb pay increases that amounted to another 4 percent of the budget from its existing allocation. Even worse, the end of Young Adult Conservation Corps program took another $500,000 in work value from the park, roughly 15 percent of annual expenditures. This shift provided a dramatic problem. Combined with a 7 percent increase in visitation, it assured less maintenance, fewer seasonal rangers, greater reliance on volunteers, employees working shorter hours, and a general decline in the park’s ability to meet its many obligations. Olympic officials recognized that they would have to respond rather than prevent, falling into a reactive mode that was not conducive to compliance.\textsuperscript{84}

Even under these conditions, there were moments of recognition that the park accepted with pride. On June 29, 1982, Olympic National Park received World Heritage Site designation status. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) selected the park for its unique temperate rain forest – one of only three in the world, unpolluted ecosystems, and presence of the only major elk herd in the United States living undisturbed in its natural environment. According to the heritage site citation, Olympic provided “outstanding examples of on-going evolution and superlative natural phenomena. It is unmatched in the world.” Olympic National Park joined only five other areas in the United States designated as both Biosphere Reserves

\textsuperscript{83} “Olympic National Park Wilderness Management Plan, In-Park Draft, Jan. 6, 1994,” OLYM 3007, Olympic NP Archives, 17; Fringer, \textit{Olympic National Park: An Administrative History}; 111-12; Superintendent’s Annual Report, Olympic National Park, 1982, OLYM 18242, Box 1, Folder 38; 1982, Olympic NP Archives, 1, 15.

\textsuperscript{84} Superintendent’s Annual Report, Olympic National Park, 1982, OLYM 18242, Box 1, Folder 38: 1982, Olympic NP Archives, 15.
and World Heritage Sites. The new status accentuated the importance of both wilderness and resource management. Unique and pristine were the new watchwords, and the designations implied both.85

New Park Leadership

By the mid-1980s, Olympic National Park officials could see clear advances in their administrative structure, offering greater ability to meet the agency’s mission. New park leadership made aggressive moves in that direction. A horticulturist by training who had management experience at Santa Monica Mountains National Recreation Area, Robert Chandler served as Olympic superintendent from 1983 to 1989, and refined Contor’s administrative reorganization. The role of park scientists in managing natural resources became preeminent. Chandler renamed the Division of Science and Technology the Division of Natural Science Studies (NSS). Under John Aho and Bruce Moorhead, NSS identified resource management issues in concert with the Ranger Division. This division later developed into a Natural Resource Management (NRM) division despite resistance from the Ranger Division, which wanted neither natural resource management nor, later, Cultural Resource Management (CRM) organizationally segregated from the traditional “ranger” definition. The National Park Service Regional Office in Seattle encouraged the development of freestanding resource management units at Olympic. During the 1980s, national park areas created separate resource divisions, and by the early 1990s, NRM and CRM divisions were common in parks. Implementing cultural programs, with identifiable resources laid out in federal regulations and agency standards, was easier, but NRM divisions gained in importance as the combination of statutory obligation and compliance gave them both mandate and autonomy. Olympic

85 Ibid.
lagged behind other parks in the development of these divisions.\textsuperscript{86}

Under Chandler, Olympic National Park developed an important set of plans to
and a \textit{Fire Management Plan} in 1985 all reflected the increased emphasis on compliance.

The park accelerated land acquisition, acquiring 65 percent of the Lake Quinault
inholdings (2,133 acres), and 20 percent of Lake Crescent tracts, a process begun under
the 1980 \textit{Land Acquisition Plan}.\textsuperscript{87} The administration also acquired most of the private
land at Lake Ozette, Point of Arches, and the state holdings at Shi Shi beach. Olympic
also purchased timber company tracts in the park’s interior. In November 1986,

legislation modified Olympic’s boundaries, adding 15,000 acres, including a national
forest-national park boundary adjustment and adding the intertidal area, which in 2004
became the subject of a general agreement for management of the shellfish harvest
between Olympic National Park and the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife.

Chandler’s administration contained a transformative moment in Olympic’s
history. In 1988, the park attained a long-sought goal – the designation of more than
870,000 acres as wilderness, approximately 95 percent of its total area. The creation of a
designated wilderness had vast implications for park managers, and required
comprehensive rethinking of natural resource management. \textit{Development Concept Plans}
in 1988 addressed the Sol Duc, Ozette, Kalaloch, and Quinault areas, and a 1988
\textit{Resource Management Plan} again articulated park priorities in project statements. The

\textsuperscript{86} Roger Rudolph, interview by Hal Rothman, June 11, 2002; Fringer, \textit{Olympic National Park: An

\textsuperscript{87} William T. Follis to Rex Daugherty, Lands Division, September 27, 1979, OLYM 0273, Olympic NP
Archives; Mary and Ken Schweitzer to Roger J. Contor, Superintendent, January 18, 1980; J. Anthony Hoare to Keith
Contor, February 20, 1980, Philip Zalesky Papers, 3773, Box 1, Folder 42, UW Archives; \textit{Superintendent’s Annual
formal planning process yielded dividends, as Olympic began to find itself with workable
plans for each of its primary functions.

The early 1990s saw a new era in Olympic’s administration, with fresh
management procedures in play under a new superintendent, Maureen Finnerty. Leading
the park from 1990 to 1994, Finnerty was a skilled administrator and leader with a
regional office background and a stint as assistant superintendent of Everglades National
Park. Strong on staff support and documentation, she implemented a new level of
strategic planning. Finnerty utilized a planning and compliance review committee,
formerly known as the Resource Management Committee that had started under
Superintendent Robert Chandler in 1978, to review upcoming projects, gauge the effects
of potential projects on cultural and natural resources, and coordinate logistics.88

Removing The Dams
During the early 1990s, a number of Olympic’s underlying long-term structural
issues became frontline concerns for park managers. In one instance, the relicensing of
the Glines Canyon and Elwha hydropower projects became critical issues. Federal
regulators authorized both dams decades prior to the advent of national environmental
legislation as well as before the establishment of the national park, exempting them not
only from national park regulations, but also from the larger federal compliance process.
The structures threatened native salmon populations and Indian treaty rights. The
relicensing of the Cushman Project, two hydroelectric dams built in the 1920s on the
North Fork of the Skokomish River, also became an issue. Mostly outside the park and
constructed well before the regulatory revolution occurred, the dams produced severe

88 Maureen Finnerty, Superintendent, Office Order No. 39, Planning and Compliance Procedures, September
3, 1993, CRM Administrative Files, File: Project Compliance Requests, Olympic NP Archives; Compliance Handbook,
Pacific Northwest Region, CRM Administrative Files, File: Project Compliance Requests, Olympic NP Archives.
environmental consequences. They flooded winter range for Roosevelt Elk, impeded salmon spawning, and had many other negative impacts. Yet, they were entirely legal. The National Park Service filed a motion for an environmental impact statement on cultural and natural resources affected by the Cushman dams, eventually extricating itself from the issue with a land exchange and a legislated boundary adjustment.89 The issue of possibly removing the Elwha dams instead of relicensing them commanded Finnerty’s attention during her superintendency. The process was well under way when she arrived. “When I got there in 1990, it was pretty clear that we were reaching critical stage” with the project, Finnerty remembered. “There were a lot of people interested in it, obviously Daishowa, James River, the City of Port Angeles, environmentalists, and the Elwha Klallam Tribe. It just went on and on,” she observed. “With all these people jockeying around, it was pretty clear we had to form some sort of coalition.” One of the attorneys for James River was a work associate of Finnerty’s at the Department of the Interior, and the two served as catalysts to move toward resolution. “We had the right people in the right places at that time,” she recalled, both within the region and on the Washington congressional delegation. “I think the stars were just lined up right,” she said with a smile more than decade later. The legislation to remove the dams passed Congress in 1992.90

As superintendent, Finnerty also focused on improving existing programs, including natural resource inventories and monitoring, managing and eliminating non-native mountain goats, fishery management, limited exotic plant management and

---


surveys, and air and water quality compliance. The Roosevelt Elk, Spotted Owl, Global Climate Change initiative, entrance fee program, fire management, planning and development, Olympic Hot Springs, and wilderness issues also became focuses of park initiatives. So did interagency programs. In 1993, Olympic launched an inter-park initiative that created a Mount Rainier and Olympic National Parks Fund, an endowment to support park programs similar to private support entities such as the Yosemite Fund and the Golden Gate National Parks Association. The two Washington parks later added North Cascades National Park to the program. In 1991, the National Park Service selected Olympic and North Cascades as “prototype” parks to develop strategies and policies for long-term ecological monitoring.91

Such innovations were part of the growing emphasis on comprehensive management at Olympic National Park. By early in the 21st century, Olympic National Park had become one of the most comprehensively managed units in the national park system, illustrating an evolution of the park’s response to the demands of compliance. During the 1980s, the park had begun to pay some attention to compliance; by the 1990s, compliance became a watchword of management. A new general management plan, initiated early in the new century, was expected to bring the various strands together in a document that would guide the park into the future. The more than sixty year history of administering Olympic National Park taught many lessons; all would be necessary in the new century.

91 Maureen Finnerty, Memorandum to Olympic National Park Staff, Seasonal Employees, Concessioners and Concession Employees, June 12, 1991, OLYM 490, Roger Rudolph Papers, Box 1, File 1991, Camp Kiwanis, Communication, Subject: Camp Kiwanis, Olympic NP archives; “Long Term Ecological Monitoring in Olympic and North Cascades National Parks: A Proposal for ‘Bridge Funds.'"
Figure 3-1: A hunting party after a 1914 trip to Olympic National Monument. (Photographs courtesy of Olympic National Park, Accession Number OLYM-632, Box 3)

Figure 3-2: Tourists explore Olympic National Park by horse in 1941.
Figure 3-3: Civilian Conservation Corps workers construction the Olympic Hot Springs Road in 1937, just a part of the park’s infrastructure built by the federal force.

Figure 3-4: CCC workers drill rocks during building of the Dosewallips Road.
Figure 3-5: Olympic National Park visitors use the picnic facilities at the Altaire Campground before World War II.
Figure 3-6: Some of the park’s early signage is examined by visitors.

Figure 3-7: Olympic visitors and one of the park’s trail shelters.
Figure 3-8: During World War II, a member of the U.S. Coast Guard rests his backpack on a piece of driftwood during his patrol.

Figure 3-9: Three members of the Coastal Lookout Program on an Olympic beach during a World War II patrol.
Figure 3-10: A Coast Guard unit on patrol near Ozette during World War II.
Chapter 4:

Natural Resource Management

Long before the term existed, natural resource management was a central feature of the National Park Service mandate. The agency’s establishing legislation and Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane’s 1918 letter, a missive that remains the basis of national park administration, established the significance of this dimension of management. The Redwood National Park Expansion Act of 1978 formalized it, elevating resource management to the National Park Service’s primary obligation, and the 1991 Vail Agenda codified the principle.¹ From the agency’s inception, park managers administered both natural and cultural resources, including both under the rubric of “resource management” after 1970. In large natural parks, these activities generally meant protecting the physical environment from overuse and managing flora and fauna to protect native species, excluding exotic species, and assuring the area’s long-term ecological health. Such obligations were clear and forthright, defined in the National Park Service’s overall mission and in the organic legislation of each individual unit.

As early as the 1880s, the Olympic Peninsula’s spectacular mountains, rain forests, and unique wildlife captured the attention of visitors, park advocates, and naturalists. Theodore Roosevelt established Mount Olympus National Monument to protect the Roosevelt Elk. When National Park Service Field Naturalist M.P. Skinner conducted a field survey of the herds in 1933, he exclaimed, “Everywhere I went I found both men and women interested in the Elk and their welfare.” In the Olympics, he stressed, “it is the Elk that count.” The emphasis on natural

resources and their welfare on the Olympic Peninsula long preceded the arrival of the National
Park Service. After the establishment of Mount Olympus National Monument, constituencies
with different perspectives valued and sought to protect Olympic’s natural resources from a
thriving timber economy. Additions and subtractions of land from the national monument and
later the park reflected the region’s commercial, aesthetic, and sometimes even wilderness
values. When the National Park Service assumed jurisdiction of the monument in 1933, it
embraced the set of activities that the agency later grouped together as resource management,
and made it a primary feature of Olympic National Park management.²

In an era when the definition of a national park’s attributes spoke volumes about its
significance, Olympic National Park was the quintessential natural national park. In this setting,
natural resource management was a preeminent responsibility even before this category of
management activities attained a similar importance elsewhere in the park system. Natural
resource management served as a bellwether at Olympic National Park, the single set of actions
that best articulated the goals and objectives of park management at any specific moment in its
history.

Natural resource management at Olympic National Park evolved through three phases. A
lack of systematic management characterized the initial era, which lasted from the National Park
Service’s arrival on the peninsula until 1973, when the agency approved the park’s first Natural
Resources Management Plan. During that era, the agency had few systemwide entities to support
park-level work, and natural resource management mostly proceeded in a reactive fashion, as a
part of other park functions. Resource management responsibilities initially fell to rangers and
naturalists, and they responded to problems that came to their attention. An effort to compile data

² M.P. Skinner, “Report on Roosevelt Elk, Olympic Peninsula, Washington” (1933), Preston Macy Papers, 3211, Box 1, Folder 2, University of Washington Archives (hereafter UW Archives), 25.
An American Eden

and comply with federal statutes characterized the second era, which lasted from 1973 until 1991. This shift in emphasis accompanied a new era of scientific management in the National Park Service, based on the Leopold and National Academy of Sciences reports of 1963. Beginning with the Wilderness Act and continuing with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the Endangered Species Act, and a plethora of other legislation – including cultural resource management statutes such as the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 and the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 – the National Park Service found itself subject to powerful mandates that compelled an agency response. In the third phase of natural resource management, this translated into full-blown efforts to comply with resource management standards. Parks with predominantly natural features felt the cumulative effects of these statutes. The 1980 State of the Parks report and the 1991 Vail Agenda, which crafted National Park Service objectives for the twenty-first century, reflected changing visions of resource management and new statutory responsibilities for the National Park Service. As National Park Service policy tuned agency activities to comply with new federal regulations, natural resource management became a barometer of the government’s responsibility to manage land, a signal measure of how well land management agencies did what was expected of them.

Shaping Natural Resource Management

When the National Park Service assumed responsibility for Mount Olympus National Monument, it inherited nearly three decades of strife over the uses of natural resources at the park and on the Olympic Peninsula. The growing sentiment for nature protection that permeated the early twentieth century created the monument and made its ongoing existence possible. Protection of the Roosevelt Elk provided the justification not only for the monument’s existence, but also for initial efforts to expand its land base. In a telling example, a superintendent’s 1936
monthly narrative report explained that the government had to extend monument boundaries on
the south and west “if proper protection is to be afforded the Roosevelt Elk of the Peninsula.” In
1943, Ira J. Mason of the U.S. Forest Service Recreation and Lands Division repeated the
argument. “The record shows fairly clearly that the Monument was originally established
primarily to insure protection of the Olympic elk herd,” he averred. Olympic’s founding
legislation confirmed that the park would preserve the forests and “provide suitable winter range
and permanent protection for the herds of native Roosevelt Elk and other wildlife indigenous to
the area.”3 For the National Park Service, that mission served as a springboard for its natural
resource management activities.

While monument and later park staff proposed establishing Olympic’s boundaries to
meet the needs of the elk by including the peninsula’s westside forests, the timber industry
simultaneously sought to exploit the park’s vast forest resources. Initially, the Olympic Peninsula
boasted an abundance of resources. Native American population densities in the Pacific
Northwest were among the highest north of Mexico, and the region offered a sophisticated
cultural regime. The local Indian populations balanced their use of resources with preservation.

In the eighteenth century, conditions changed. The fur trade drew Indians into a European market
system, which altered how native groups used, exploited, and conceived of their surrounding
resources. After U.S. control solidified in the mid-nineteenth century, economic interest shifted
to lumber, and the exploitation of timber resources dominated the peninsula’s commercial

---

3 Ira J. Mason to Mr. Andrews, July 8, 1943, RG 95 USFS, LP Boundaries 1931-1968, Box 7, LP – Boundaries –
Olympic Nat Park [1936-1947], National Archive and Records Administration, Pacific Alaska Region (hereafter NARA Sand
Point); Monthly Narrative Report, October 1936, November 2, 1936, OLYM 18242, Box 1: 1936, Olympic NP archives;
OLYM 0166, Olympic NP archives, 2:3.
outlook.⁴

Prior to establishment of the national park, most of the early scientific work on elk and other wildlife on the peninsula was limited to brief reconnaissance-level surveys by visiting scientists or park staff of a few days to week or two at most. In 1897, C.S. Merriam wrote the first scientific description of Roosevelt elk as a new species based on a large male specimen collected the upper Hoh River drainage in the present park; although his species designation has been dropped since most scientist that consider the coastal form of elk a sub species, *Cervus elaphus roosevelti*.

Evolution And Influence

After the 1938 establishment of the park, protecting Olympic’s forests, fish, and game animals in the middle of a functioning economy devoted to harvesting those same resources created challenges for National Park Service managers. From the start, natural resource management at Olympic showed the evolution of different strands of thinking about science, ecology, and conservation. Olympic’s natural resource management had significant influence throughout the national park system. At the outset, staff members focused on identifying and counting big game and bird species within the park. They also prioritized managing Olympic’s resources to please tourists, including controlling bear and stocking the rivers and lakes with fish. Protecting the Roosevelt Elk remained a prominent feature of early management.

As late as the beginning of the New Deal, the National Park Service lacked mechanisms for systematic management of its resources. In general, agency efforts at resource management took place in episodic fits, dependent on crisis situations or the ability of influential individuals

inside or outside the National Park Service to attract sufficient attention to the situation. The actions of the Emergency Conservation Committee at Olympic served as an exemplum. At the park level, most resource mandates fell to park rangers, who at that time were consummate generalists. Especially after 1937, planning and inspections took place at the regional office level or in specialized units, such as the National Park Service’s Division of Landscape Architecture in San Francisco or the Division of Wildlife in Salt Lake City. Only one major exception, an initial wildlife survey of the national park system in 1929 initiated by the independently wealthy George M. Wright, altered this picture. Head of the agency’s Wildlife Division until his death in an automobile accident in February 1936, Wright championed an early version of scientific management that depended on baseline data. Conditions on the Olympic Peninsula were ideal for the very kind of work Wright advocated.

Roosevelt Elk

The Roosevelt Elk, the ostensible reason for Olympic’s establishment, remained central to any assessment of the peninsula’s resources. As the rationale that underlay the monument, the species was a logical choice for study. Before 1900, the Roosevelt Elk ranged throughout western Washington and Oregon and into Northern California but their numbers had been in decline since Euro-American settlement. Logging and settlement reduced the herds’ habitat, eventually confining them to remote timbered and mountainous areas. By the early 1900s, the elk had become a subject of regional and national concern. Olympic National Forest Ranger Chris Morgenroth submitted the first Forest Service report on the elk in 1909 and subsequent ones in 1917 and 1925, but his efforts stood alone, brief episodes in otherwise scant Forest Service wildlife management. The first official census of the species began in 1933. During the same year, an open hunting season allowed by the Washington State Department of Game resulted in

---

the death of more than 125 elk. In the aftermath, the Boone and Crockett Club and the Emergency Conservation Committee arranged to send field naturalist M.P. Skinner to report on the Roosevelt Elk. He estimated that 6,000 animals lived on the peninsula, in bands ranging from twenty to 100. Observing that poaching and logging had diminished the elk population, Skinner recommended that scientists undertake an impartial investigation into their situation, and that the government allow no hunting season until the completion of further study. In Skinner’s view, the enlargement of Mount Olympus National Monument and its conversion to national park status to encompass the lowland elk range provided the most thorough protection for the species.7

The elk situation complicated the National Park Service’s plans for the area. Protecting the species required changes in monument boundaries, and that assured strife with one or another of the agency’s many constituencies. After the brutal interagency battles of the 1920s and early 1930s involving the National Park Service and Forest Service, the National Park Service moved tentatively on the peninsula. The cost of any aggressive posture far exceeded any gains that might come from it. Wright’s emphasis on species assessment had sufficient precedent that a survey did not seem a catalytic factor that might compel the National Park Service to overplay its position. In 1935, Senior Naturalist Technician Adolph Murie undertook the first systematic wildlife survey of Mount Olympus National Monument. Though incomplete, his report enumerated the monument’s plant and wildlife resources and commented on their populations, behaviors, and habitats. He found fifty-four mammal species, including the Roosevelt Elk, black-tailed deer, black bear, marmot, mountain goat, and the less commonly seen mountain lion, bobcat, coyote, beaver, marten, otter, mink, raccoon, and skunk. Two-hundred-sixty bird species also made the monument and its coastline their home, and five salmon and several trout species

populated its waters. As had previous naturalists, Murie paid particular attention to the Roosevelt Elk. Although poaching and hunting had decreased the peninsula herd to approximately 7,400, that was up from the 6,000 estimated in 1933. Murie recommended no action until the National Park Service had accumulated more information about the life cycles of the species and the impact of predators upon it. Murie believed that the Roosevelt Elk were in “no danger whatever of being exterminated in the Olympics,” a conclusion that provided evidence of the success of the original monument proclamation but one that stymied agency expansion strategies. Murie’s report belied the complicated politics that swirled around elk censuses. Although his perspective was probably accurate, it left an opening for those who wanted to reinstate hunting, a practice abhorred by the National Park Service.

Between 1935 and 1938, John Schwartz, a biologist with the U.S. Forest Service, collaborated with the U.S. Biological Survey and Washington State Department of Game on elk range studies in typical forage areas in the Hoh, Queets, and Quinault watersheds. The state Department of Game was keen to continue hunting elk within the monument, while the Biological Survey was considered a captive of gun interests. Although Schwartz sought to develop a scientific management plan for elk and other Olympic wildlife, the goals of his sponsors stymied his efforts. In the end, his census methods yielded little dependable information, but gave very good information about elk distribution patterns.

Schwartz conducted the first extensive investigation of elk on the Olympic Peninsula, including those lands now in the park. His efforts in the 1930s resulted in the only peer-reviewed

---


9 The Biological Survey was part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture until its transfer to the Interior Department in the late 1930s. It eventually became the core agency of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. John E. Schwartz, “The Olympic Elk Study” (U.S. Forest Service, 1939), 22 (NSS) Olympic NP archives, 1; Irving Brant, Adventures in Conservation with Franklin D. Roosevelt (Flagstaff, Az.: Northland Press, 1988), 75-76, 80-81; Guy Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative History (Seattle: National Park Service, 1990), 137.
scientific publication available on the distribution movements of elk in the park until research in
the 1970s and 1980s led to more accurate estimates.\textsuperscript{10}

Newman’s 1958 status report on the park elk population, based on a five-year National
Park Service study, was not published in a peer-reviewed journal, but has proven a remarkably
accurate assessment for its time, given its lack of modern technology. In the 1960s, park ranger
Rod Royce and wildlife biologist Bruce Moorhead relocated and maintained a number of fence
elk study exclosures that Schwartz and Newman established in, respectively, the 1930s and the
1950s at various locations to examine the effects of elk foraging and trampling activity in old-
growth forest over time. In 1980, two large, fenced studying exclosures totaling 2.5 acres were
also constructed and vegetation mapped by Moorhead and National Park Service research
scientist Edward Starkey in the South Fork of the Hoh River valley, as part of an ecosystem
baseline survey conducted there by an interdisciplinary U.S. Forest Service research team. In the
1990s, two important scientific publications by a team of U.S. geological survey research
scientists that included Douglas Houston, Edward Schreiner and Andrea Woodward reviewed the
current status and future prospects for elk in the park and assessed what it did learn over the past
60 years about elk habitat relationships in old-growth forests.\textsuperscript{11} In 1994, Moorhead also wrote a
book for the general public, \textit{The Forest Elk}, which summarized the history comp ecology and
conservation of elk, including an annotated bibliography of research on Roosevelt Elk within and
around the park.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{12} Bruce Moorhead, “The Forest Elk: Roosevelt Elk in Olympic National Forest” (Northwest Interpretive Association, 1994).
Wildlife Reports

Beyond the Roosevelt Elk, the National Park Service attempted to discern the populations and status of other species in Olympic National Park. Other wildlife reports, such as one by newly arrived park ranger Fred Overly in October 1936, detailed the presence and condition of the Columbia black-tailed deer, non-native Rocky Mountain mule deer, which the State Game Commission released into the monument near Hurricane Ridge, and non-native mountain goats, which had multiplied profusely since their introduction in the early 1920s. Overly predicted that the goats, a species that pleased both visitors and hunters, would “become an important part of the wildlife in the Olympics.” He also reported the existence of forty black bears, cougars, Northeastern wildcat, coyotes, Pacific fishers, martens, otter, raccoons, minks, marmots, and other small mammals and birds.13

After its 1938 establishment, Olympic National Park’s natural resource management followed the patterns of the National Park Service’s early forays in the region. In this era, it generally took a passive approach to native species management except when a crisis occurred. To the National Park Service, Olympic National Park seemed a stable situation. A 1952 report adopted the same approach to Roosevelt Elk as Murie’s 1935 study. Hired as a park biologist in 1952, Coleman Newman found that the cessation of hunting in the park had stabilized its elk population, roughly estimated at 3,000, well below the 6,000 that had been common before the National Park Service’s arrival. Newman did not find this decline troubling; he doubted the accuracy of the earlier count. His report, published by Olympic’s first park naturalist, Gunnar Fagerlund, in 1958, implied that active management of the elk herd had become unnecessary. Future master plans, including the one developed in 1964, retained this passive stance toward the

Grazing Issues

Grazing also troubled park administrators, for the very idea of grazing inside a national park compromised National Park Service ideals. At Olympic National Park, grazing was an inherited obligation. The Forest Service had permitted the practice in limited locations throughout the area during its administration. Heavy stands of timber confined grazing to river valleys and high alpine areas. Under the Forest Service, sheep grazed in the Deer Park-Obstruction Point-Lost River area until summer 1934, ravaging the shrubs that provided forage for deer and elk. That year, Preston P. Macy noted the existence of 1,600 head of sheep in a beautiful alpine valley near the Dosewallips River. The Forest Service had issued permits for only 400 to 500 sheep. In passing through the valley, he found the place “trampled as a barnyard – and smelling worse.” Clearly, sheep were a non-native species, and the National Park Service planned to reconsider their presence.

Grazing cattle inside Olympic’s boundaries raised similar concerns. Although the Forest Service ceased to issue permits when overgrazing occurred, ranchers grazed their cattle without permits along the Quinault and Queets rivers until the National Park Service took over the national monument. The agency clamped down, putting an end to grazing as soon as possible, at the cost of good relations with some of its new neighbors. The National Park Service would not routinely permit grazing, and in 1940, the agency halted the practice in other parts of the monument, including Deer Park. Many private owners equated parkland with open range and continued to let their cattle trespass through the Lake Quinault and Hoh areas. Despite efforts to

---

design trails for pack trains and horses, pack and saddle horse grazing degraded the ecology of the high alpine valleys. In 1942, 171 government and private operator-owned pack horses entered Olympic, totaling 2,465 days of use in the park and 526 grazing days. In 1948, National Park Service Regional Director Owen A. Tomlinson noted the difficulty of compelling private landowners to cease grazing within Olympic’s boundaries. Subsequent park naturalists’ reports noted a consequence of the inability to enforce regulations, consistent evidence of overgrazing in many of the high meadows.16

World War II again put pressure on the National Park Service, in this instance to accommodate grazing within national parks. In 1943, the War Food Administration requested that the national parks produce reports of probable prospects for local dairy and meat products and called upon the National Park Service to permit grazing on national park lands where feasible during the war. The situation merited extreme measures; the Queets people had a permit for a Victory Garden inside park boundaries. Olympic’s high valleys made this request mostly impractical, but the request renewed the concept of grazing at Olympic National Park, another obstacle to achieving National Park Service natural resource goals. The idea of a wilderness park and its reality often were very different.17

1965 Wildlife Management Plan

During the 1950s and 1960s, planning for natural resource management took new forms. Before that decade, the National Park Service managed most species and resources, including its elk, fisheries, and goats, in an episodic fashion. In 1965, Olympic National Park developed a four-year Long-Range Wildlife Management Plan, a different form of planning than had ever been attempted.
before been attempted at Olympic. The plan looked further into the future and considered new
and changed impacts on the peninsula park. It synthesized the natural resource information
collected by the agency, including the findings of previous studies on elk, deer, and other
wildlife, and outlined specific management objectives for the elk. Conducting spring surveys to
determine mortality rates, retaining the 1953 to 1958 elk exclosures, tagging elk for future
studies, evaluating the impact of elk hunting, and working toward its elimination became
priorities. The plan also recognized that bears had become an issue on the peninsula, taking a cue
from parks such as Yellowstone, which suffered dangerous incidents between bears and people.
The wildlife plan advocated educating visitors about bear behavior and removing dangerous
bears with live trapping. Olympic’s plan pointed to non-native goats, which the park had not yet
studied in any detail, as a coming issue. Most other species required no specific management
plans.18

The 1965 wildlife plan inaugurated the second phase of natural resource management at
Olympic National Park. In the latter half of the 1960s, science in the National Park Service
underwent a revolution following the 1963 Leopold and Robbins reports, which collectively
argued for a scientific basis for national park management and for in-house research to support
management. Beginning with the Wilderness Act of 1964 and continuing with the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the Endangered Species Act of 1973, and other federal
legislation, a regulatory environmental revolution took place. Even as it embraced science as a
managerial tool, the National Park Service simultaneously had to juggle its internal management
objectives with outside mandates. This legislation most directly affected parks with
predominantly natural features, and Olympic joined other prominent natural parks in the

Olympic NP archives, 4-6, 7.
By the mid-1960s, the National Park Service had considerable experience in planning, but the new emphasis on science and the enhanced regulatory climate directed efforts in new ways. In the late 1960s, planning broke into different dimensions. Until then, most parks had a master plan that directed growth and development. As the responsibilities of managers grew in number and demanded more specialized response, planning became a feature of each dimension and often each division in a national park. Specific plans became precursors and then components of general management plans, which were reviewed by the public and became codified as a contract between any park and its newly energized public. Public oversight and interest compelled both a reassessment of National Park Service assumptions as well as more sophisticated data collection and analysis. Especially at spectacular natural parks, the National Park Service’s public included professional scientists, conservation and environmental groups with resources and research capabilities of their own, and an interested public that very often reacted with emotion rather than knowledge to plans of all kinds. Olympic National Park was in the forefront of the development of natural resource management plans. When the park’s first natural resource management plan was approved in 1973, it set out a series of resource management objectives. At the head of the list was the need for baseline data, a goal that was a direct consequence of the new National Park Service emphasis on science and of the regulatory climate that demanded such data to underpin decisions. National Park Service research left significant scientific gaps at Olympic. An environmental impact statement (EIS) for the park was required by law, and the NRM plan
sought to create a “basic data package (biological, physical, and historical).”

The Compliance Challenge

By the completion of the 1976 Master Plan, resource management reflected a notable tension at Olympic National Park. Compliance posed many challenges to managers who viewed wilderness preservation as only one of several primary objectives of Olympic’s administration. The plan sought “to restore and perpetuate environmentally regulated ecosystems in the park.” It introduced a multi-layered management philosophy to administer natural resources, incorporating new trends such as the transformation of fire policy inside the National Park Service. “Each element in the scene interacts within a complex and constantly shifting equilibrium,” the plan read, articulating the holistic ideas about natural processes that characterized the era. Fire no longer would be routinely suppressed. Instead, a policy that Olympic’s managers would allow natural fire to run its course as long as it threatened neither structures nor people became the governing principle for fire management. The plan also recognized that park administrators could no longer consider the categories of “resource management” and “visitor use” separately. Growing numbers of visitors intertwined these two previously distinct facets of park management. The new preeminence of resource management had to limit some aspects of visitor use. The plan also stressed the continuation of wildlife research programs. High-priority tasks included creating planning tools, such as detailed vegetation and soil maps of Olympic National Park, monitoring forest conditions and plant diseases, and understanding the status of rare, endangered, and endemic plant and animal species. Although many of these tasks remained goals, the implementation of such complex tasks

---

An American Eden

often lagged.\textsuperscript{20}

Olympic National Park also looked to other parks as models of natural resource management. North Cascades National Park’s \textit{Revegetation Plan} of 1979 provided one example of how revegetating the backcountry, previously denuded by packers and camping activities, enhanced an area’s wilderness quality. Similar measures followed at Olympic. A new and more sophisticated level of natural resource management began before the park possessed a comprehensive set of baseline data. In 1980, in cooperation with five other federal resource agencies, the park established four Research Natural Areas to preserve unique vegetative types to provide a baseline from which to measure the effects of human activities in similar environments. Park managers designated 1,200 acres of silver fir, western hemlock, Douglas fir, and Sitka Spruce in the Bogachiel, Quinault, and Hoh drainages for study.\textsuperscript{21}

Other resource management programs took place within a new ecological framework. The park’s herbarium became the basis for biological research, which resulted in organizing its holdings and adding specimens to create a representative collection. Two members of the Volunteers in the Park program worked in conjunction with park staff and others to update the collection to reflect most of the plant species – 1,053 out of a known 1,452 – on the Olympic Peninsula, and to reflect changes in the botanical nomenclature. The National Park Service brought in a staff museum technician to arrange the collection scientifically. Further recommendations for the herbarium included hiring a curator, improving the museum’s physical

facilities, and updating publications.22

**Specialized Training**

As the National Park Service demanded more of its resource management staff, specialized training became an important dimension of preparation for work in the division. The National Park Service remained short of trained scientists and many inside the agency could have benefited from additional training and exposure to the new ideas sweeping the scientific community. Service-wide initiatives sought to rectify the shortcoming by adding to the skills of agency personnel. In 1982, the Natural Resource Specialist Trainee Program began. This $1 million-a-year National Park Service program selected biologists who were already in the agency and trained them in their home parks. They then were expected to carry out assignments based on the training. The program had limited success; most trainees in the first program found it difficult to receive full benefit from the program. They retained their ordinary park responsibilities, and had to engage in the training in addition to that regular workload. Even with such constraints, a number of distinguished natural resource managers and National Park Service administrators emerged from the initial class.23

A second training program sought to provide better opportunities to implement the newly acquired knowledge of participants. Once selected, trainees moved right away to a “training park,” and then were assigned to a destination park at the end of the trainee program. The new structure brought cadres of biologists to various parks and trained them in management skills that covered a wide range of issues such as coastal processes, fisheries, mining and minerals, air quality, water resources, wildlife, and vegetation. After twenty-two months and completion of a project, the agency placed trainees at their new park, typically to assume a position in resource

---

22 Mr. and Mrs. Buckingham, Volunteers in the Park, to Superintendent, Olympic National Park, January 27, 1981, Olympic National Park Herbarium, Olympic NP archives.
management that sought to improve the park’s capabilities in that area. In 1985, three trainees were chosen to work at parks in the Pacific Northwest region.24

As a reflection of its new commitment to resource management, Olympic was one of ten parks selected to complete a model resource management plan for the future planning process undertaken by the National Park Service. Acknowledging that the park was not a “pristine wilderness,” the 1991 plan self-consciously attempted to document all the “currently perceived resource problems.” Reorganization became an important part of the process. The park removed resource management from the Ranger Division, creating an independent entity. Cat Hawkins Hoffman became the first chief of the new Resource Management Division. The plan also sanctioned a park-level Resource Management Committee in 1993, and supported the creation of the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary.25

Wilderness At Olympic

Wilderness remained a priority for Olympic’s managers. The park’s wilderness had no formal basis; it had been created only by custom, although passage of the 1964 Wilderness Act allowed for creating designated wilderness areas with a park. Although the National Park Service was generally ambivalent about designated wilderness within parks, at units such as Olympic, it allowed managers to codify existing practice. With the implementation of the Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE) process in the early 1970s, which assessed federal land for suitability under wilderness designation, the National Park Service had a mechanism for designating wilderness under statute. In 1972, National Park Service personnel identified

834,890 acres inside Olympic National Park, 95 percent of the park’s acreage, as suitable for wilderness designation. After the RARE recommendations were complete, the process stalled. The park continued to manage the lands in question as de facto wilderness, preserving the option of final designation.

Olympic’s wilderness was rightly regarded as unusually pristine and spectacular, increasing the premium on the designation and encouraging an active management response even without formal designation. In the 1970s, the park viewed backcountry management as crucial to preserving Olympic’s wilderness character. The park developed its first backcountry management plan in 1971, implemented an interim Backcountry Management Plan in 1974 and finalized a plan in 1976. Instead of following the tepid agency directives about wilderness, the park used the Wilderness Act to propel its management. In order to maintain the area’s ecological integrity and minimize human impact, Olympic overlaid the goals of federal law on park policy. Olympic’s backcountry became “wilderness,” managed as much as possible to the minimum tool standard with required permits for overnight use and restricted backpacking, group size, and campfires as early as 1975. In 1980, after four years of visitor testing, park personnel updated the Backcountry Management Plan, finding that its practices continued to work well. In 1987, a Backcountry Management Task Force reviewed management standards, practices and policies. Subcommittees worked on classifying structures, trail classification and standards, visitor use limitations, sanitation, site revegetation and restoration, aircraft use, research and monitoring, commercial uses, stock use, safety and interpretation. In the Washington Park Wilderness Act of 1988, Congress affirmed the unspoiled nature of Olympic National Park by designating 95 percent of it as the Olympic Wilderness. Olympic again revised the Backcountry Management Plan in 1992 and unveiled a new draft plan in 1994, seeking to
ensure “the pristine character of the wilderness.” In 1997, the park updated the draft wilderness plan. Around the same time, the park developed the Wilderness Information Center, which issued backcountry permits and coordinated all of the various trail information and quota systems.26

Wilderness designation created several challenges for wildlife management. The principle established in the Wilderness Act – the idea of using the least intrusive tool to accomplish management goals inside designated wilderness areas – proved more difficult in practice than in theory. When scientists disagreed on wildlife management questions in the designated wilderness, the rules that governed their actions made their research more difficult. Differing management objectives sometimes proved fundamentally incompatible.27

Goats And Other Exotics

The management of exotic species such as mountain goats and natural resource practices such as fish stocking proved the most controversial wildlife management issues at Olympic National Park. Although the introduction of mountain goats preceded the National Park Service at Olympic, it was in line with the practices of an earlier era. For much of its early history, the National Park Service enthusiastically manipulated the physical environment to enhance its visitors’ experience. The introduction of exotic species was common, and fish stocking, which began in the park system at Yellowstone, continued until the environmental revolution of the late 1960s. Both presented enormous management issues for Olympic’s administrators.28

---


The introduction of mountain goats to Olympic National Park in the 1920s reflected important trends in early conservation. The Forest Service focused on timber production and satisfying the elites who supported progressivism. As a result, federal conservation practices mirrored the values of the upper classes in U.S. society. Many affluent Americans during this period enjoyed big game and trophy hunting. Members of the Washington Game Commission, Forest Service, and local organizations arranged for the introduction of goats around Storm King Mountain and Mount Constance, by most accounts in 1923. In 1925, the same groups introduced four wild mountain goats from the Canadian Selkirks into the area around Lake Crescent. In 1928, the Forest Service received another four goats from Tracy Arm in Alaska in exchange for eight elk from the Olympic Peninsula. A few years later, twelve goats from Alaska joined the small herd, which soon multiplied. The transfer of the monument to the National Park Service, along with the agency’s increased emphasis on wildlife management, led to changes in goat management. The National Park Service banned hunting in 1938, and in the aftermath, the goat population expanded into new areas in the park. By 1948, Park Naturalist Gunnar Fagerlund reported that the population of goats around Mount Constance had grown significantly. At Olympic National Park, the National Park Service found itself with an early iteration of an introduced species problem, a new, but increasingly important issue in the national park system. Mountain goats in Olympic National Park found themselves in a close to ideal habitat. They colonized most of the park’s subalpine and alpine areas and spread through Olympic, dispersing east and south from Lake Crescent at the rate of about two miles each year. They reached the east boundary of the park by 1938 and the south boundary around 1960. The goats

---

were first reported in the Mount Olympus area in the 1960s, although some observers believed this data resulted from a lack of human presence in the area rather than the absence of goats. The animal’s impact on the park increased even more rapidly than their range, for as much as half of the Olympic Peninsula’s rare plants were found in goat habitat. Over time, the number of animals and their proliferation throughout the park had an impact on flora and other fauna.

By the 1960s, Olympic’s staff had begun structured research on the goats, paying collecting data on the impacts on endemic plants and soil erosion. The first effort to remove goats came in 1970 under Superintendent Roger Allin, a fisheries scientist. Allin’s interest coincided with an evolving agency management philosophy that stemmed from the 1963 Leopold and Robbins reports. It reflected the National Park Service’s 1970 draft management policies, which stated that wildlife populations “will be controlled when necessary to maintain the health of the species, the native environment, and the scenic landscape.” Allin regarded the goats as an unwelcome addition to the native biota. He proposed reduction of the goat population through a variety of methods, including live capture and sterilization.30

This posture was consistent with National Park Service practice in the 1970s. By that time, the agency had gotten away from earlier practices such as direct reduction, a euphemism for shooting the animals. The energized public of the 1970s and its vast sympathy for what some termed the charismatic fauna such as goats and burros made National Park Service advocates of traditional removal appear as ogres. In the 1970s, transplanting goats outside of park boundaries was in its infancy at Olympic National Park; the park worked with partners to distribute the captured animals. National Park Service personnel removed goats to Pilchuck State Park, Seattle’s Woodland Park Zoo, and native goat habitats in Washington and Montana. Such methods provided limited results and presaged a return to an older style of exotic species

---

30 Maynes, “Chronology.”
Olympic National Park relied on evolving National Park Service management policies as further justification for goat removal. A 1978 policy revision decreased the agency’s emphasis on eradication as a possible solution; elsewhere in the system, the National Park Service paid in negative public sentiment for its efforts to remove exotics through traditional means. Olympic National Park had fashioned an innovative response. Holding eradication in the background as a final option, the park attempted to work with animal advocacy constituencies to find mutually acceptable solutions. In 1981, Olympic implemented a six-year experimental management program that evaluated live capture and sterilization techniques, documented soil and vegetation impacts, and tracked goat population trends. In 1983, the first official census recorded 1,175 goats in the Olympic Mountains. Under the new program, rangers removed 260 goats from several parts of the park by a variety of methods.32

As was typical of wildlife management programs, the National Park Service faced scrutiny from interested and self-interested outside organizations, and had to consider all views. Sport hunters coveted the opportunity to hunt the elusive mountain goats, and they saw in the park’s predicament an opportunity for sport activities. The Washington State Department of Game also had an interest. Its leaders advocated transferring goats to state-managed lands, where state permits controlled hunting. Animal rights groups blanched at the notion, instead supporting sterilization and live capture. Most conservationists supported National Park Service policies and

---


favored the solutions opposed by the animal rights groups. In 1988, Olympic Superintendent Robert Chandler approved a final three-year live capture plan that sought to remove all goats from the park’s interior and control the population along its eastern boundary. In its reliance on a variety of methods, Chandler’s proposal typified the National Park Service’s exotic species policy. As one of many participants in such discussions, the agency could not afford expediency at the expense of public criticism. For two years, live capture was conducted by the Interagency Goat Management Team. It disbanded in 1991, when the group agreed to limit the focus of goat management to the herds within the park. Policy differences between the agencies and the emergence of the spotted owl controversy, which diverted Forest Service attention, made the continuance of such a team too difficult. In 1989, a number of factors including human safety, increasing goat mortality, and a directive from the Department of the Interior Office of Aircraft Services that limited types of helicopter landings effectively ended the program. Despite such difficulties, the National Park Service’s 1991 Natural Resources Management Plan affirmed the commitment to goat removal, describing removal as “the highest field priority for the park.” In 1992, the National Park Service formally discontinued capturing goats.

Contradictory findings about the effect of goats on local ecology challenged the National Park Service’s rationale for removal. Scientific research showed that the goats modified the park plant communities and soils and confirmed they were not native to the area. In 1993, a technical report on vegetation determined that goats changed native ecosystems in all alpine and subalpine

---

An American Eden

plant communities. Their grazing reduced moss and lichen cover, the report charged, increased soil disturbance, and rearranged plant species composition. The 1995 Draft EIS for goat management affirmed this position, and advocated shooting goats from helicopters rather than transferring them from the park. In May 2000, the secretary of the interior’s office released an independent scientific review, which again confirmed mountain goats were not native to the Olympic Peninsula and mandated that control would be prudent. The existing data complicated Olympic’s management practices, for it did not conclusively resolve the question. “Available data are insufficient to establish that mountain goats are causing significant damage to vegetation, harming rare plant populations, or are otherwise having deleterious impacts on the natural ecosystem,” the report averred. “This does not mean that significant impacts have not occurred, only that previous studies were incapable, by design, of separating the effects of goats from other variables.” Scientists could not distinguish with certainty the impact of goats from that of wind or water erosion. Given these findings, goat management continued to present an administrative challenge.35

Reintroducing Species

Restoring native species that had been eliminated from the park provided a counterpoint to the removal of exotic species. The reintroduction of the grey wolf proved the most controversial. As the National Park Service worked to exclude goats, it sought to include the once-abundant native predator. As did Euro-American settlers everywhere, Washington’s pioneers despised and feared wolves; the animal’s undeserved reputation for vicious attacks on

humans made them an enemy of settlement in the nineteenth century and left a legacy of distaste in folklore. On the Olympic Peninsula, especially in the mountains, wolves had been plentiful.

One of the peninsula’s early inhabitants, Billy Everett, remembered the days “when wolves were numerous,” but noted wildlife biologist Olaus Murie, who the U.S. Biological Survey assigned to trap wolves in the Olympics from January 1916 to March 1917, reported that the animals were nearly extinct. Intensive hunting, poisoning, and trapping resulted in their virtual extirpation before the end of the 1920s. The last officially documented wolf in the Olympics was trapped in the Elwha Valley in 1920. Occasional reports of wolves continued, the last coming on Hurricane Ridge in 1948.36

Although National Park Service naturalists considered restoring gray wolves to the Olympic Peninsula in the 1930s, the idea was never popular beyond some quarters in the agency.

As late as 1965, a new Long-Range Wildlife Management Plan declared that the National Park Service would never reintroduce wolves at Olympic National Park. The certainty of this pronouncement belied the changes in U.S. culture that made species reintroduction a popular theme in the environmental community. Reintroducing gray wolves to their former habitat garnered increasing support in the mid-1970s. In 1975, a student-led study from Evergreen State College concluded that the peninsula had the biological capacity to support a stable population of approximately fifty wolves. In 1981, a National Park Service Advisory Board task force recommended exploring the possibility of restoring wolves to Olympic and Yellowstone national

---

parks. Wolves returned to Yellowstone National Park in 1997.37

The same year, Defenders of Wildlife hosted a conference featuring discussion of the
gray wolf at Olympic National Park. At the meeting, Representative Norm Dicks of
Washington’s Sixth Congressional District presented himself as a strong proponent of
conservation, insisting that the park take steps to restore the peninsula’s wildlife populations.

The presence of wolves, the only mammal species to be exterminated from Olympic, might also
channel tourism and economic investment into the region, he said. “We have an opportunity to
correct a historic mistake,” Dicks told the Olympic Park Associate’s Voice. Vociferous

objections came from ranchers, who feared the loss of livestock, and from parents, who
envisioned wolves terrorizing small children at school bus stops. Defenders of Wildlife argued
that the wolf, as a “nonessential, experimental population” under the Endangered Species Act,
could be controlled upon reintroduction. The House Interior Appropriations Subcommittee

subsequently approved $350,000 to begin a feasibility study of returning gray wolves to
Olympic. Released in 1999, the study suggested the feasibility of restoring fifty-six wolves to the
park. At the same time, the many social, cultural, and management challenges associated with
the proposal posed formidable obstacles to the wolves’ reintroduction.38

Black Bears

Other native species, such as black bears, presented different management challenges to
Olympic’s administrators. Bears fit the public’s definition of charismatic megafauna, central to

---

Student Originated Study Funded by The National Science Foundation, June 9-Aug. 29, 1975, The Evergreen State College,”
Olympic NP archives; Superintendent, Olympic, to Olympic National Park Staff, May 30, 2001, 32; Durwood L. Allen, Larry
Erickson, E. Raymond Hall, Walter M. Schirra, “Report to Secretary of the Interior James G. Watt: A Review and
Recommendations on Animal Problems in Related Management Needs in Units of the National Park System: A Report to the
38 Representative Norm Dicks to Cat Hawkins Hoffman, March 7, 1997, N1427, Olympic NP archives; McNulty, “Will
Wolves Return to the Olympics?”, John T. Ratti, M. Weinstein, J.M. Scott, P. Avsharian, A. Gillesberg, C.A. Miller, and M.M.
Szepeanski, “Final Draft: Feasibility Study on the Reintroduction of Gray Wolves to the Olympic Peninsula,” (Moscow, ID:
University of Idaho, Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources, 1999); Superintendent, Olympic, to Olympic National Park
Staff, Seasonal Employees, May 30, 2001, 32.
American visions about themselves and their land. During Theodore Roosevelt’s presidential administration, public affection for bears first became evident, and the development of national parks put bears in proximity of people in myriad ways that furthered the attraction. Popular culture helped as well. Iconographic figures such as Yogi Bear, the fictional anthropomorphic ursus who befuddled Ranger Smith in Jellystone National Park, epitomized and helped shape the sentiment toward the species, as did the Forest Service’s iconic Smokey the Bear. For park managers, who had to deal with real bears in an actual setting, this romantic imagery proved an obstacle to management.

In the view of early naturalists, bears preyed on elk calves, damaged property, and endangered people. The result was an initial National Park Service management strategy that paralleled the treatment of mountain goats – this time not because bears were exotic, but because they posed a danger to visitors. As early as 1935, bears were trapped, deported, and as a last resort, shot. As more people visited Olympic National Park and more of them explored beyond the paved roads and trails, incidents between bears and people increased. In 1972, park staff killed four bears; two years later, the National Park Service reported 141 bear “incidents,” in essence any reported encounter between bears and people. This figure suggested that cultural change that put more people deeper in the wilderness with better technology brought more people in contact with bears. Further management steps were essential if bears and humans were to coexist within the park. Almost 80 percent of bear incidents occurred in the backcountry, suggesting that the onus of bear protection fell on the humans who invaded the animal’s habitat. The National Park Service’s strategy in such situations was to improve the education of potential visitors. In 1976, the park initiated an aggressive public information campaign and implemented
An American Eden

visitor safety measures even as it planned for the future of its bears.39

The 1978 Bear Management Plan, the first at Olympic National Park, set out to minimize
bear-human conflicts with the least possible disturbance, as the park sought to strike a balance
between species protection and visitor use. The plan estimated there were 200 to 300 bears
within park boundaries, and it mapped out an aggressive strategy that treated humans as
interlopers in the park’s backcountry. Among the recommendations were developing guidelines
for handling bears as well as conflict prevention measures, such as stationing more rangers in
problem areas. Under the plan, Olympic managers would relocate bears that exhibited recurring
aggressive behavior to remote sites in the park, animal farms, or zoos. When bears became
accustomed to relying on visitors for food, personnel would remove them to more remote places
inside the park. Only bear aggression justified eradication, the plan affirmed, and only in a
manner that would not promote “a circus atmosphere.”40

The Cougar Problem

Cougars, another native predator species, posed similar problems. Unlike bears, cougars
generally presented few problems for Olympic visitors. Between 1890 and 1990, only fifty-three
documented cougar attacks on humans occurred in North America. Despite that relatively small
number, these predators inspired greater response than their actions merited. When the U.S.
Biological Survey sent vaunted naturalist Olaus Murie to the Olympic Mountains in 1916 to trap
wolves, he reported seeing cougar tracks and predatory remains. Occasional sightings of cougar
tracks continued, with an October 1936 report observing some animals within fifty yards of the

39 John M. Davis, Chief Ranger, to O. A. Tomlinson, July 3, 1935, OLYM 18242, Box 1, Folder 2: 1935, Olympic NP
archives; Macy, Custodian’s Annual Report, for Year ending June 30, 1937; Superintendent’s Annual Report, Olympic National
1476, Olympic NP archives; Superintendent’s Annual Report, Olympic National Park, 1976, 12; Wright, Wildlife Research and
Management in the National Parks, 111.

40 Crawford, Olympic National Park Bear Management Plan; National Park Service. National Resource Challenge:
Mount Olympus ranger station. As the National Park Service took over Mount Olympus National Monument, Ranger Fred Overly completed a wildlife study of the new addition. Cougars were “hunted diligently” by professionals, he observed, and “the number killed is rather alarming.”

Cougar sighting occurred intermittently beginning in the 1940s, and Olympic responded to their presence with cooperative studies with the Washington State Game Department. Only one incident took place at the park, in 1996, yet between 1991 and 1999 Olympic’s rangers recorded 112 “close encounters” between cougars and people, twenty-six of which were classified as “near attacks.” The cougars’ shy nature suggested that the increase in incidents resulted from human impingement on the species. Increased use of the park and the cougar’s status as a candidate for Endangered Species Act listing in other locations drew greater attention to the animal.

Sometimes called the “pit bull of environmental law,” the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 required an analysis of any threatened species without regard to the economic impact of their recognition, demanded federal agencies take steps to assure that their actions did not damage such species, and prohibited any direct action that hurt the species. This law compelled the National Park Service as well as other federal agencies to reevaluate priorities in species management.

Northern Spotted Owl

Olympic National Park contained several endangered and threatened species, but nothing attracted greater public attention than concern for the Northern Spotted Owl. In the 1970s, a call for protection of the species developed in Oregon. The owl soon was perceived as an indicator of

---

the overall health of the Pacific Northwest’s declining old-growth forests, and interest spread across the western states. The Washington Wildlife Commission listed the spotted owl as “endangered” in 1988, and finally, after a bitter struggle, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service named the spotted owl as an ESA “threatened” species two years later. At the same time, a hard-fought battle raged between loggers, who saw the spotted owl as the source of their economic demise, and those who sought to protect the old-growth forests that sheltered the species. Much of this battle was waged outside of Olympic National Park, but the conflict’s existence meant that park officials made decisions about spotted owls under intense scrutiny.43

Most of the spotted owl population on the Olympic Peninsula lived in old-growth timber, primarily on national forest land. Among national parks, Olympic’s 324,000 old-growth acres provided the greatest contiguous area of unharvested habitat in the northern spotted owl’s range. Olympic staff first addressed the viability of the spotted owl in 1981, when an interagency benchmark Draft Pacific Regional Plan laid the groundwork for future discussion. Specific management directives for the park classified 3,000 acres as “suitable habitat,” an area exceeding that of other management areas. The Forest Service’s May 1984 Final Regional Guide and Final EIS for the Pacific Northwest Region followed. The Forest Service document sought to maintain 375 pairs of spotted owls on national forest lands in Oregon and Washington, along with sufficient old-growth habitat areas of 1,000 acres per pair of spotted owls to achieve this goal.44

In October 1984, conservation organizations, including the National Wildlife Federation, the Oregon Wildlife Federation, the Lane County Audubon Society, and the Oregon Natural Resources Council, appealed the implementation of the guide to Forest Service Chief R. Max

43 “Historical Perspective on the Northern Spotted Owl” (1989), OLYM 2516, Olympic NP archives, 51-56.
44 “Notes on Status of T&E Species (ONP)” (January 16, 1987), OLYM N1621, Olympic NP archives; Roger J. Contor to Olympic National Park Staff, Seasonal Employees, Concessioners and Concession Employees, June 14, 1982, 8; Annual Narrative Report of Superintendent, Olympic National Park, 1988, 8.
An American Eden

Peterson. The coalition believed management provisions were inadequate to achieve long-term viability for the spotted owl. Peterson rejected the environmental coalition’s approach, only to have Secretary of Agriculture John R. Block reverse his ruling. The Forest Service returned the Regional Guide and EIS to the regional forester, who formulated a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) that addressed spotted owl management concerns.45

Amid this maelstrom, Olympic National Park maintained protection for the spotted owl. A November 1985 National Park Service memorandum established guidelines for the bird. Specifications included working with other government agencies on management goals, focusing on the owl in visitor interpretive programs, and paying particular attention to the vulnerable owl population in the park. A December 1985 survey estimated thirty-seven pairs of spotted owls in the park, a number that was significant enough to merit the attention the agency provided. The Audubon Society posited a baseline benchmark of 1,500 pairs throughout Oregon, Washington, and the Sierra Nevada. Olympic National Park contributed to that number in proportion to the size of its habitat.46

The Forest Service draft SEIS, published in July 1986, noted that the reduction of old-growth forest posed the greatest risk to the spotted owl. This situation pitted the timber industry against environmentalists, who tried to block sales from old-growth areas. A group of environmental organizations filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in 1988, citing the agency’s failure to list the spotted owl as threatened or endangered. Amid criticism from the timber industry, the Fish and Wildlife Service listed the owl as threatened under the ESA in June 1990. The Forest Service subsequently revised its standards of protection and

enlarged the recommended area of owl habitat on federal land.\textsuperscript{47}

The supplemental EIS led into the Northwest Forest Plan. This remedy attempted to negotiate the declining economic condition of the timber industry in the Northwest with the needs of the spotted owl. The devastation of the timber industry by foreign competition, questions of supply, and changing technology left the presence of the spotted owl as a scapegoat for national anti-environmental antipathy. Attempts to resolve the tremendous social tension that followed began with a federal report, \textit{A Conservation Strategy for the Northern Spotted Owl: Report of the Interagency Scientific Committee to Address the Conservation of the Northern Spotted Owl}, also called the “Thomas report” after lead author Jack Ward Thomas, who later became Forest Service chief. Along with other reports such as \textit{Alternatives for Management of Late-Successional Forests of the Pacific Northwest: A Report to the U.S. House of Representatives}, assembled by the Scientific Panel on Late-Successional Forest Ecosystems, and another Thomas-led report, \textit{Viability Assessments and Management Considerations for Species Associated with Late-Successional and Old-Growth Forests of the Pacific Northwest}, the federal system generated a scientific approach to old-growth forest management in the Pacific Northwest.\textsuperscript{48}

On April 2, 1993, President Bill Clinton convened a forest conference in Portland, Oregon, to try to create a structure to resolve what had become a symbolic but not necessarily an


actual crisis. The spotted owl had come to represent the frustrations of extractive industries and blue-collar Americans, whose jobs were at stake as U.S. companies shifted their production overseas. Caught in the gears of a revolution, such workers and their advocates looked for a place to lay off their troubles. They found venality in federal regulations, especially when environmental laws curtailed what they saw as their right to livelihood. Much like the 18th-century weavers who smashed the looms that made them obsolete, such animosity focused on the symptoms rather than the causes of the demise of the American timber economy.

President Clinton supported the Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team report called the “Forest Ecosystem Management: An Ecological, Economic, and Social Assessment Report of the Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (FEMAT),” published later in 1993. The FEMAT report assessed 10 detailed options for managing federal forests within the range of the spotted owl. On July 1, 1993, President Clinton announced the government’s selected option, Alternative 9, consisting of strategies for forest management, economic development, and agency coordination as the “Forest Plan for a Sustainable Economy and a Sustainable Environment.” The forest management and implementation portion of the strategy was analyzed in a draft supplemental environmental impact statement, of which the final EIS and the Record of Decision (ROD) were published in February 1994. The ROD amended the planning documents of nineteen national forests and seven Bureau of Land Management districts. While the legislative structure did not entirely resolve the social aspects associated with the spotted owl situation, it created a viable management structure for federal land management agencies.49

The National Park Service developed new standards after the spotted owl gained ESA

status. In 1992, the agency initiated a four-year owl inventory and monitoring project. The creation of the U.S. Geological Survey Biological Resources Division in 1993 gave Olympic National Park a partner for its work whose surveys of breeding pairs on census plots in the peninsula’s interior set the standards for further spotted owl inventory monitoring in national parks in the Pacific Northwest. Still, park surveys and proactive restoration efforts were not perfect remedies. “There’s not a lot that we can do to mitigate or restore those populations,” said Hawkins Hoffman. “More telling, any activities within the park that might affect the owl’s habitat, whether maintenance or development activities, are subject to consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The park wasn’t accustomed to being required to consult with another agency on its own activities,” she observed. ESA compliance, in many respects, became “internally a very painful process for some of the park staff,” she said.50

Other Olympic Birds

As an indicator species, the spotted owl suggested that other birds at Olympic – such as the marbled murrelet, a small diving seabird – faced similarly perilous situations. In the first half of the twentieth century, the birds were considered “abundant.” They nested in old-growth trees near the coast, and as did the spotted owl, had low reproductive rates. By the 1980s, surveys estimated a breeding population of only about 5,000 marbled murrelets in Washington. A decade later, this number had fallen by one-third. The federal government listed the bird as threatened in October 1992, which mandated development of recovery plans in which the National Park Service participated. The draft plan of 1995 aimed to stabilize the murrelet population by

removing threats such as gill-net fisheries and oil spills, and maintaining or improving the birds’
habitat on land and at sea. The entire process heralded an ecosystem approach to managing late-
successional forests and their associated species within the defined range of the spotted owl.\textsuperscript{51}

A 1995 draft recovery plan for the marbled murrelet recommended establishing six
conservation zones throughout the species range, which stretches into California. Two of those
zones were inside Olympic National Park, although administrators designated no critical habitat
within the park. The plan also recommended that federal agencies such as the National Park
Service monitor populations; implement short- and long-term actions to stabilize or increase
populations such as controlling the fire threat to limit fragmentation of habitat; and create a
coordinated regional group to conduct further murrelet research. Specific recommendations for
the National Park Service included acquiring “more information on where marbled murrelets are
nesting on [NPS] lands and the effect of noise, visitor activity, fire regime, and smoke
disturbance on nesting birds and chicks.” Such information was to provide guidelines for more
comprehensive management. In 1996, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service designated
approximately 3.9 million acres of federal land as critical habitat. Between 1996 and 1999,
Olympic biologists documented the presence of murrelets on every site they surveyed in the
park, with an occupancy rate of 80 percent. Their findings supported the conclusion that the
park’s large contiguous “island” of old growth was crucial to the survival of the murrelet.\textsuperscript{52}

\textbf{Fish Management}


Native and non-native fish species have proved yet another contentious management issue at Olympic National Park. At its inception, the National Park Service encouraged fish stocking to create recreational fishing opportunities so attractive in many national parks. One of former National Park Service Director Horace M. Albright’s most prized moments was fishing in Yellowstone National Park with President Calvin Coolidge. A parade of sportsmen fished the national parks during the first two decades of the agency’s history. The National Park Service maintained hatcheries in many of the larger parks to restock the supply continually. By the mid-1930s, the agency had permanently established as many as thirty nonnative species in national park rivers, lakes and streams. Even if Albright repeatedly insisted that the parks harbored only native species, stocking the parks with non-native species for sport fishing seemed entirely consistent with the early National Park Service ethos.

The agency’s premier wilderness park also consistently underwent stocking. The practice began in the 1930s, after visitors to Mount Olympus National Monument complained of the scarcity of good fishing. Original management goals focused on maximizing fishing in the monument, usually by stocking streams and lakes with popular sport fish such as Eastern brook trout that supplanted native salmon species. In 1934, Superintendent Preston P. Macy reassured local residents that the National Park Service had adequately stocked its lakes and streams. By July 1935, the monument stocked the Hoh and many of the lakes in the Seven Lakes Basin with Eastern Brook trout, and planned to stock the Elwha River with 75,000 fish. “[U]nless we start getting our waters stocked,” Macy wrote, “I fear we shall find ourselves short on fish in a short time.” A year later, park biologists planted 268,255 trout in the monument’s lakes and streams:

164,000 Montana black spotted trout, 72,255 steelhead, 12,000 eastern brook, and 20,000

Biologist David Madsen, author of most of the early National Park Service fish management policies, articulated new dimensions to the question of non-native fish. In a 1936 agency policy statement issued by Director Cammerer and almost certainly authored by Madsen, the National Park Service advocated maintaining the integrity of the native species within the monument and increasing the supply of fish for visitors. Madsen wrote an April 1939 report for Olympic that repeated this contradictory premise. Stocking Olympic’s rivers and lakes with non-native species continued. After World War II, the park began an extensive but haphazard fish-stocking program that continued through the 1950s. In 1956 alone, rangers stocked Lake Crescent with 50,000 rainbow trout, and Lake Mills, Seven Lakes Basin, Moose Lake, and the Soleduck and Queets rivers with as many as 30,000 rainbow or steelhead migrants each. In 1957, park staff stocked Lake Crescent with 453,000 rainbow trout. A year later, U.S. Fish and Wildlife planted six truckloads of trout in the lake, each load averaging 800 pounds and containing a total of 96,000 fingerlings.55

Fish management at Olympic changed as the National Park Service shifted toward a scientific basis for species management. By 1966, the National Park Service had developed new objectives for fisheries management throughout the park system. Protecting and restoring native flora and fauna, controlling native and non-native fish populations, developing stricter sport fishing regulations, and regulating commercial fishing all achieved new status within the agency.

The National Park Service planned to restore waters inside the national parks that contained non-
native species either to a fishless condition or one consisting solely of native populations. The
agency would only stock non-native fish to support fishing in waters where elimination of those
species was impractical due to cost.\textsuperscript{56}

In essence, following the Leopold Report, concern about how to stock the national parks
for fishing slowly shifted to an effort to restore park lakes and rivers to pre-Columbian
conditions. In 1972, Olympic National Park’s staff stopped implementing the park’s ten-year
stocking plan to evaluate the effectiveness of previous fish introductions. That year,
Superintendent Roger Allin decided against stocking high-elevation lakes because of
increasingly heavy impacts from fishing. By 1975, the National Park Service had effectively
ended fish stocking programs in Olympic. Soon after, the agency took the next step. In 1977, the
park developed a five-year plan to restore salmon and steelhead runs in the Queets River.\textsuperscript{57} Not
only were introductions to cease, the park actively pursued the reintroduction of native species, a
process that was becoming common throughout the national park system.

During the early 1980s, Superintendent Contor’s newly established Division of Science
and Technology helped systematize efforts to gather information on fisheries. The Salmon and
Steelhead Conservation and Enhancement Act of 1980 created a twelve-member advisory
committee that recommended studies and policies for region-wide management of native fish. In
1983, reports by Brian Pierce and Reginald Reisenbichler implemented the new approach. Both
concluded that Lake Crescent’s trout population was genetically identical to original Beardslee

\textsuperscript{56} O.L. Wallis, “An Evaluation of the Fishery Resources of Olympic National Park and Needs for Interpretation,
Distribution and Relative Condition of the Endemic and Exotic Fishes of Several Selected Areas in Olympic National Park”
(February 1961), 54, “Objectives and Principles for the Management of Aquatic Resources and Guidelines for Fish Stocking in
Natural and Historical Areas Administered by the National Park Service,” August 19, 1966, Fisheries Documents, Olympic NP
archives, 1-5; Monthly Report (August 1934).

\textsuperscript{57} Acting Superintendent to Bruce Moorhead, November 8, 1974, Richard J. Navarre, Annual Project Report, 1971
Fishery Management Program (Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, Division of Fishery Services, 1972); Joseph B. De La
Cruz to Gordon D. Boyd, March 4, 1977; “The Restoration of Salmon and Steelhead Runs in the Queets River, Washington: A
archives.
trout, and that the anadromous salmon in Olympic’s rivers also were wild native fish. They
warned against threats to the genetic stock. In 1983, David Houston’s work was the first status
review of Pacific salmon and steelhead stocks on the peninsula. That work led to the Olympic
Wild Fish Conference, and was among the first compilations of work on salmon and steelhead on
the Olympic Peninsula.58

Assisted by changes in statute, Olympic National Park proceeded toward an ecologically
based fish policy. In 1988, the National Park Service signed on to the National Recreational
Fisheries Policy, which reinforced goals of preserving and restoring fisheries resources.
Additional data gathering and analysis led to proposals for listing additional species under the
Endangered Species Act. By 1999, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service listed the Puget Sound
Chinook, Lake Ozette sockeye, and Puget Sound/Coastal bull trout as threatened or endangered
species. The agency proposed to list the Dolly Varden as threatened under “similarity of
appearances” to bull trout in 2001. Their listings required biological assessments and recovery
plans. In 2001, Olympic continued to refine regulations to govern recreational fishing in the
park. It included catch-and-release fishing for most species, but allowed more liberal taking of
the exotic Eastern brook trout still found in most of the park’s high-elevation lakes. The
genetically distinct Beardslee Trout in Lake Crescent received continued protection. In the early
years of the new century, attempts continued to bring the sockeye back to Lake Ozette, but the
lake’s harvested eastern side and sediment inflow from logged areas hindered their continued
survival.59

Tribal Rights

58 Office of the Coordinator, Salmon and Steelhead Advisory Commission, “Public Review Draft” (September 1983),
Olympic NP archives; Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative History, 135-36.
59 “Fisheries Management in Olympic National Park: A Limited Review,” January 8, 1998, Fisheries Documents,
Olympic NP archives, 1; Superintendent, Olympic, to Olympic National Park Staff, Seasonal Employees, Concessioners and
Tribal treaty fishing rights exerted a powerful influence on the fisheries debate. The 1974 Boldt decision in *United States v. Washington* ruled that treaty Indians of western Washington were entitled to half of all steelhead and salmon that passed, or normally would pass, by their “usual and accustomed grounds and stations” and that could be caught without endangering the runs. The ruling allows park superintendents to regulate these rights for conservation purposes, but they are not permitted to modify them in any way. The court reaffirmed the right of different tribes to fish in their traditional waters, and recognized the Quinault tribe as a “self-regulating” group, making it immune to any interference in its fishing practices. Olympic officials had difficulty determining how the ruling affected the park, asking which tribes had rights to fish in the park and how might they be managed? Although cooperation between the tribes and the park characterized the relationship, National Park Service personnel had to negotiate a path between public outcry about Indian privilege and the dictates of the Boldt decision. Twenty years after the Boldt decision, Federal District Court Judge Edward Rafeedie expanded that ruling to include tribal harvesting of shellfish. He ruled that the “in common” language of the 1855 treaties signed with the peninsula’s Indians meant that the tribes have reserved harvest rights to half of all shellfish from all public and private tidelands within the case area, except those areas “staked or cultivated” by citizens or those specifically set side for non-Indian shellfish cultivation purposes.60

As the National Park Service discontinued its fish-stocking practices, the agency initiated cooperative planting programs to restore naturally spawning salmon and steelhead to Olympic National Park’s waters. Many of these efforts involved Indian tribes. By 1977, park managers and the Quinault tribe had collaborated on a research program to determine the potential for

---

developing an enhancement fisheries program on the Queets River. The park agreed to permit
the Quinault Tribe to introduce 300,000 chinook fry at Phelan Creek for Indian commercial
harvesting. In 1982, the Makah Tribe, which had declared itself a “depressed area” in a 1967
*Economic Development Plan* and had solicited funds from the Economic Development
Administration for a fish protein and oil extraction plant in Clallam County, established the
Umbrella Creek Hatchery to incubate and rear salmon for release into the Lake Ozette system.\(^{61}\)
These programs helped the local economy, built bridges between Olympic National Park and its
neighbors, and furthered regional management objectives.

Sharply defined by law, treaty rights remain murky in practice. The *Boldt* decision only
addressed off-reservation fishing rights. By the early 1980s, Olympic National Park
acknowledged that some of those rights could exist within park boundaries. In 1981, a memo on
Indian fishing rights within the park reaffirmed that the Hoh, Quileute, Quinault, Lower Elwha,
Makah, Skokomish, and Suquamish tribes had adjudicated treaty fishing rights within its
boundaries. The Jamestown S’Klallam and Port Gamble S’Klallam enjoyed off-reservation
fishing rights that might allow access to Olympic National Park, the memo acknowledged. Yet,
the National Park Service lacked a comprehensive picture of off-reservation rights. Until tribes
chose to exercise their rights, it was hard for the National Park Service to assess them.\(^{62}\)

By the 1990s, new relationships between the tribes and the park led to active fish
restoration programs. Many of the peninsula’s tribes led fish restoration activities at Olympic’s

---


An American Eden

major lakes. The 1991 *Lake Ozette Sockeye Salmon Management Plan* conducted by the Makah Tribe focused on native stock rebuilding and enhancement. The 1992 Elwha River Ecosystem and Fisheries Restoration Act articulated obligations to one Indian tribe on the Olympic Peninsula. Despite the collaborative efforts, in the new century, harvest management required flexibility. Establishing harvest goals, developing management plans, and implementing harvest regimes stretched the administrative structure of Olympic National Park and its neighbors.63

**Elwha River Dams**

Restoration of native fish habitat and spawning grounds required complicated rethinking of existing policy. Olympic National Park’s native fish had been disturbed well before the arrival of the National Park Service. In the early 1900s, the construction of hydroelectric plants on the Elwha River denied native fish access to more than seventy miles of mainstem and tributary habitat. In 1890, Canadian Thomas T. Aldwell settled in Port Angeles and soon acquired land and water rights around the Elwha River. In 1910, he and George A. Glines solicited financing from Chicago and formed the Olympic Power and Development Company to supply power to a pulp mill in Port Angeles.64

When Aldwell constructed the Elwha Dam between 1910 and 1913, the only requirement he faced was congressional approval under a 50-year operating license, easily obtained during the Progressive Era. The hydroelectric plant lay 4.9 miles from the mouth of the Elwha River, about six miles west of Port Angeles. A concrete gravity structure, approximately 105 feet tall, with a crest length of 450 feet, including a gated spillway, the Elwha Dam powerhouse contained

---


10.8 megawatts of installed capacity. Its reservoir, named Lake Aldwell, has a total storage
capacity of 8,100 acre-feet. During construction of the dam, the Washington State Fish
Commissioner emphasized that state law required the construction of passages wherever salmon
migrated upstream. By 1922, operation of a fish hatchery constructed at the dam in lieu of a fish
ladder was discontinued.65

In an age when dams were symbols of progress, it was easy to continue beyond the
Elwha Dam. A second complex, Glines Canyon, was constructed nine miles upstream from the
Elwha Dam between 1925 and 1927 to supply electrical power to the Washington Pulp and
Paper Company in Port Angeles. The plant had a 14.8-megawatt capacity, and contained a dam,
reservoir, water conduits, surge tank, powerhouse, substation, and transmission lines. The dam
created Lake Mills, with a storage capacity of 40,000 acre-feet. Annual generation averaged 118
million kilowatt-hours. Although the dam and reservoir were outside monument boundaries
when built, the complex became part of Olympic National Park after the 1940 boundary
expansion. By the 1990s, Glines Canyon had become a crucial supplier of power to Daishowa
America’s Pulp and Paper Mill in Port Angeles.66

The two dams blocked anadromous fish from more than seventy miles of the Elwha River
and tributaries. Prior to the first dam’s construction, the river – one of a few waterways outside
of Canada and Alaska that once supported all five species of Pacific salmon – was famous for its
salmon runs and 100-pound Chinook salmon. Dam construction severely diminished native
Elwha fish runs, including spring, summer, and fall Chinook, coho, pink, chum, and sockeye

65 “National Park Service Calls for Restoration of All Native Species to the Elwha River,” National Park Service News
on May 8, 1934. The license transfer to Crown Zellerbach Corporation received approval three years later. Philip Johnson,
Historic Assessment of Elwha River Fisheries (Port Angeles: Olympic National Park, 1977); 1; Historic American Engineering
Record, “Elwha River Hydroelectric System,” 3; “National Park Service Calls for Restoration of All Native Species to the Elwha
River”; “Appraisal Report: Water Resources Appraisal for Hydroelectric Licensing, Elwha River Basin, Washington” (San
salmon, winter and summer runs of steelhead, sea-run cutthroat trout and native char.\textsuperscript{67}

In 1954, the state of Washington’s Department of Fisheries expressed concern about the survival of migrant salmon passing through dam exits. Its research suggested that only between half and three-quarters of all silver yearlings and chinook fingerlings successfully traversed the spillway and turbine of both dams, with most incurring injuries along the way. The Fisheries Department and the Washington State Fisheries Commission separately suggested constructing fisheries and hatcheries above the dams in order to mitigate dam effects on fish runs.\textsuperscript{68}

By the 1970s, when relicensing of the Glines Canyon projects and an initial licensing of Elwha began, federal agencies operated in a different climate. Crown Zellerbach, then owner of both dams, operated the dams under a 50-year license, administered by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). With that period coming to an end, an attempt to relicense Elwha and Glines Canyon set off a complex chain of events that raised many questions; prominent among them was whether FERC could license a hydroelectric project that now was within a national park. Concerns over the dwindling fish populations affected the decision-making process, as the controversy over licensing revealed the inability of previous managers to design fish and wildlife mitigation measures capable of meeting federal, state, and tribal goals. Legal challenges by a coalition of powerful conservation groups, an ongoing feature of Olympic National Park, followed.\textsuperscript{69}


A combination of stakeholders played an important role in the Elwha dam question. In 1984, the Sierra Club, Olympic Park Associates, Friends of the Earth, and Seattle Audubon Society advocated restoring the watershed by removing the dams, a proposal very different from the 1950s solution of creating fish habitat above the structures. The Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe joined them in 1986, arguing that the dams violated the 1855 treaty of Point No Point, which allowed Indians to fish at all usual and accustomed grounds. By then, representatives from the Washington Department of Game, the Point No Point Treaty Council, the Elwha Tribe, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service had discussed the potential reintroduction of steelhead into the river above the hydroelectric dams to resolve harvesting management issues. The coalition argued that dam removal would lure sportsmen and boost commercial fishing, increasing tourism to Olympic National Park and Port Angeles.70

Changes in ownership of the dam complex complicated efforts to restore native fish. In 1988, Crown Zellerbach sold the dams and the paper mill to the James River Corporation, which kept the dams but sold the mill to the Daishowa Corporation of Japan. James River proposed a fish restoration plan that trucked fish around Glines Canyon Dam and built a fish ladder at Elwha Dam. After a thorough review, the National Marine Fisheries Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, Elwha Tribe, and Washington’s Department of Wildlife concluded that James River’s plan could not restore the fish populations. Seeing no easy compromise, in 1989 the conservation coalition approached Representative Al Swift, a Democrat from Washington, and offered a framework for a negotiated settlement. Swift, who first feared that dam removal would accelerate the disappearance of jobs in his congressional district, revised his thinking and

supported the coalition, but Daishowa and James River refused even to join the discussions. As a result, in 1989, more than a dozen environmental groups filed a lawsuit challenging FERC’s right to license the Elwha dams.71

Swift’s support changed the tenor of the debate. The peninsula timber industry had been in a crisis for more than two decades, overtaken by the growing tourist economy centered on Olympic National Park that had supplanted it. The stakes changed; in the 1910s and 1920s, dam construction powered a vital industry that remained potent until the 1970s. By the time the relicensing process began in the 1970s, changes in the national and world economy assured that the longer the process took, the greater the public pressure exerted in opposition to the dams. Swift’s acquiescence sealed the transformation. In June 1990, the National Park Service boldly called for the restoration of all anadromous fish stocks to the Elwha River. “Based upon results of [seven years of] cooperative research, we believe that full restoration of all fish stocks cannot occur with the Glines Canyon and Elwha Dams in place,” National Park Service Regional Director Charles H. Odegaard insisted. Almost 90 percent of Glines Canyon was within park boundaries, placing FERC’s authority to license the projects in doubt. FERC refused to give way, asserting its jurisdiction. The Department of the Interior rejected FERC’s claim and filed as an intervenor in the licensing hearing. The Justice Department supported the Department of the Interior’s position, as did the Government Accounting Office, which also averred that FERC had jurisdiction that allowed it to remove the dams. A struggle between powerful federal agencies seemed assured.72

FERC’s response to its challengers surprised forest product companies and community

72 “National Park Service Calls for Restoration of All Native Species to the Elwha River”; Collins, “A Ray of Hope”; Mountain Goat Management, Olympic National Park, OLYM 490 Roger Rudolph Papers, Box 1, File 1991 Correspondence, Subject: Camp Kiwanis, Olympic NP archives.
development leaders. When the commission released its draft EIS in February 1991, it conceded that James Rivers’s plans would not sufficiently restore the fishery. Only dam removal would result in full restoration of the Elwha River ecosystem, it said. The commission projected that the Bonneville Power Administration could supply Daishowa with electricity at similar cost. Local residents were shocked at the abandonment of their traditional economic basis, arguing that loss of cheap electricity and fresh water would cripple local mills and the area’s timber-dependent economy. The peninsula had been losing timber-based jobs for a generation, and they feared restrictions associated with protection of the Northern Spotted Owl. From their perspective, the national park was a bad investment. There are “still a lot folks around here from, especially timber interests, that view Olympic as just tying up good timber land,” Olympic Assistant Superintendent Roger Rudolph, a veteran of more than a decade at the park, noted in 2002. “They see no value whatsoever of a protected forest when their whole lives revolve around a managed forest.” In the relicensing, such traditionalists were outmanned.

Once FERC acquiesced to removing the dams, resolution quickly followed. Late in 1991, Senators Bill Bradley, D-N.J., and Brock Adams, D-Wa., introduced legislation that instructed the Department of the Interior to purchase and remove the dams. Considerable tension continued between FERC and correspondents on the various questions surrounding removal, but the legislative process trumped its administrative counterpart. On October 24, 1992, Congress enacted the Elwha River Ecosystem and Fisheries Restoration Act, which attempted to resolve conflicts between competing groups, avoid litigation, save Daishowa jobs, offer the Elwha Tribe economic development opportunities, and maintain municipal water supplies. Port Angeles,

Clallam County, local environmental groups, the tribe, James River, and Daishowa fully participated in the negotiations, which authorized the Interior Department to study the Elwha projects’ removal cost, buy the two dams the next year, and tear them down. The process “became cooperative,” observed Hawkins Hoffman, “[as] it became clear that we were going to be tied up in court.” The economic stakes were simply too high to allow the controversy to continue. The act committed the government to pay $29.5 million to Daishowa for loss of the dams’ cheap electricity. Finally, it revoked FERC’s authority to issue permanent operating licenses.74

Called the government’s first “foray into environmental dam-busting,” the Elwha River Ecosystem and Fisheries Restoration Act revised assumptions on the Olympic Peninsula and throughout the nation. Even under a Republican administration, a full decade after the so-called Reagan Revolution, consensus environmentalism and changing economics made environmental legislation viable. FERC’s aggressively pro-industry stance could not sway Congress as industries such as timber diminished in significance, and tourism and travel exponentially grew. Even more, for the National Park Service, the dam controversy highlighted the limits of agency authority, for the conflict involved a number of agencies on whose support the National Park Service depended to achieve its goals. By the 1990s, National Park Service officials had considerable experience with the volatile politics of the Olympic Peninsula. In the Elwha situation, they once again learned how much power outside forces could bring to bear.

In January 1994, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt determined that only removal of both dams would restore the river. By June 1995, Olympic National Park had issued its final EIS for the Elwha River Ecosystem Restoration plan. In the short run, dam removal might disturb

nesting owls and murrelets, salmon, steelhead, and bald eagles, the EIS reported, but eventually the proposed action will improve their habitat. Since completion of the EIS process in 1996, the Elwha River Chinook salmon and bull trout had been listed as endangered species. Some species could take as long as twenty-five years to recover fully, it predicted. In February 2000, the government purchased both dams for $29.5 million, with Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt attending a signing ceremony in recognition of the purchase. The process that would end in removal was under way, and negotiations and agreements led to a supplemental environmental impact statement in 2005. Removal of the dams was slated to begin in 2008.75

Tribal Hunting Rights

Subsistence hunting by Indians posed yet another important natural resource management question at Olympic National Park. While the National Park Service had encouraged sport fishing, hunting had always been anathema on agency properties. Much of National Park Service ideology hinged on the inviolability of national park lands, and Indian subsistence hunting rights directly challenged this stance. The issue had been discussed earlier but it did not become a legal affair until November 1983, when park rangers arrested Gregory D. Hicks and Stevens J. Shale, members of the Quinault Indian Tribe. Charged with illegally hunting elk within Olympic National Park, the U.S. District Court, Western District of Washington, found them guilty. Their defense was that they had hunted within the traditional hunting grounds ceded by the tribe to the U.S. government in the Treaty of Olympia in 1850. The tribe asserted its disagreement with the court ruling, United States v. Hicks, but did not appeal the decision. The subsequent uproar by the public over possible “special” rights for Indians raised an important question: could Indians

---

exert hunting rights within national parks? 76

At Olympic National Park, the question was even more complex. Until the 1960s, the National Park Service worked to eliminate hunting from the park. Indians and some peninsula non-Indians hunted with discretion, limiting their activities and never challenging park rangers. Only in the 1970s, with the arrival of the American Indian Movement, did the National Park Service crack down on illegal hunting. The Quinault Tribe supported an intertribal moratoria; when law officers arrested Hicks and Shale, they were violating tribal regulations as well as federal ones. Although Clay Butler, the Quinault park ranger who investigated the case, suggested that the two young men were “just stupid,” they challenged the system at the right moment. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 created the context in which ceremonial hunting activities within national parks could take place. By the early 1980, a few parks, including Bandelier National Monument in New Mexico, made accommodations for such uses.77

The situation demanded that the National Park Service define native hunting rights in its parks. In 1984, the agency developed sustained yield harvesting guidelines for subsistence hunting of elk, deer, bear, otter, beaver, marten, bobcat, grouse, and waterfowl in Alaska, under the terms of the Alaska National Interest Lands and Conservation Act (ANILCA) of 1980. In the contiguous United States, the agency retained its administrative remedies. Olympic National Park plans did not attempt to adjudicate Indian treaty rights on the Olympic Peninsula or to determine the limits of those rights. Instead, park administrators crafted a management plan that established policy if native peoples possessed treaty rights to hunt in the park and chose to

77 Keller and Turek, American Indians and National Parks, 122-23.
exercise those rights. In the fifteen years following the Hicks and Shale incident, the peninsula
tribes asserted their right to hunt although they continued to observe the moratorium, and tension
remained. “We still hear suggestions, even veiled threats of hunting within the park,” observed
Hawkins Hoffman. Most tribes officially opposed hunting within Olympic National Park, but
individual members often did not share the official sentiment.78

Cooperation of other kinds was required at Olympic as well. The establishment of the
Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary in July 1994 created a new level of administrative
interaction with another federal agency. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) administered the sanctuary, which extended 135 miles from the Canadian boundary in
the Strait of Juan de Fuca south to Copalis, Washington. Covering an area of 3,310 square miles,
including 2,500 square miles of ocean, the sanctuary provided protection for key marine species,
including the tufted penguin, bald eagle, northern sea otter, California gray whale, bull kelp, and
salmon. Management issues include vessel traffic; potential oil spills such as the one that spread
230,000 gallons of fuel oil from Grays Harbor north to Vancouver Island in December 1988;
water quality; preservation of shipwrecks; the possible introduction of exotic species from vessel
ballast water; and harmful algae blooms. The sanctuary prohibited oil and gas development.
NOAA frequently worked with other organizations, including the National Park Service, the
Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Washington Department
of Ecology, and four coastal Indian tribes, to meet management objectives.79

Native American treaty rights to this coastal area remain a prominent concern to the
tribes. In 2003, some of the sanctuary remained off limits to resource exploitation, but active fish

78 “Indian Subsistence Hunting at Olympic National Park: Information for Management” (February 3, 1984), OLYM
2033, Olympic NP archives; Keller and Turek, American Indians and National Parks, 118-24.
79 Superintendent, Olympic, to Olympic National Park Staff, May 30, 2001, 2-4; Annual Narrative Report of
Superintendent, Olympic National Park, 1988, OLYM 18242, Box 1, Folder 39: 1988, Olympic NP archives, 6; Olympic Coast
National Marine Sanctuary: Final Environmental Impact Statement/Management Plan, Volume 1 (U.S. Department of
Commerce, NOAA, November 1993), OLYM 2431, Olympic NP archives, i.
harvesting crabbing and other activities still took place. The National Park Service allowed shellfish harvesting in the intertidal area. The sanctuary specifically authorized treaty rights.80

Rain Forest Protection

Animals and fish were not the only entities in the park in need of protection. In the 1990s, Olympic National Park’s rain forest attained a level of management similar to other natural resource management concerns. Management of Olympic’s west-side forests initially mirrored the passive approach taken to the Roosevelt Elk and other wildlife. The traditional approach emphasized minimal protection from infection and infestation, but active protection against fire – a stance supported by the Leopold Report. Preston Macy, who followed the wilderness principles that the 1938 planning group established, followed these guidelines. When pine bark beetles infected pine stands, the park took little action.81 Until the 1950s, park personnel largely left the rain forest alone.

Superintendent Fred Overly took a hands-on forest management approach, enlarging timber salvage operations to reduce “dangerous” trees, fire hazards, and infestation. The park authorized the first salvage operation in 1942 following a blow-down, after the solicitor general determined that the director of the National Park Service could exchange downed timber for privately owned lands. Overly’s expansion of these operations was in direct conflict with emerging agency management practices. In his view, insect outbreaks, such as the outbreak of silver fir beetle that began in 1947 and threatened the silver fir forests of western Washington and northwestern Oregon, provided further justification for timber removal. Overly’s practices drew considerable wrath from his superiors, and eventually the National Park Service removed

80 Hawkins Hoffman interview, June 10, 2002; “Memo of Interview,” 5.
81 Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative History, 139-41; John M. Davis, Chief Ranger, to O.A. Tomlinson, July 3, 1935, OLYM 18242, Box 1, Folder 2: 1935, Olympic NP archives.
him. Dan Beard, Overly’s successor, ended this land-exchange practice as the 1960s began. The spate of new environmental legislation in the 1960s affected rain forest management, particularly with regard to fire. Throughout Olympic’s history, park superintendents from Macy through Allin followed the National Park Service’s overarching policy and made fire suppression a primary goal. By the 1970s, the agency began to embrace the concept of “let burn,” and the 1976 Olympic Master Plan stressed that the park should allow fires to run their natural course as long as they did not threaten people, buildings, or land outside the park. By 1983, Olympic staff completed a Fire Management Plan that stressed that fire was ecologically important and should be monitored rather than extinguished. Olympic National Park’s fire plan was suspended from the Yellowstone fires of 1988 until December 2005, pending further research on endangered species and completion of a new fire plan. From 1988 until 2004, the park has managed all fires under a suppression strategy. The new plan requires tighter prescriptions on wildland fire use for resources benefit, and fire suppression in order to protect endangered species habitats. Before logging occurred on the peninsula, Northern Spotted Owls and murrelets dealt with the large natural fires that occurred about every 300 years because they had other places to go. Now, “fire operating as it once did could be devastating to those species if it removes a large proportion of their remaining habitat,” Hawkins Hoffman observed.

Monitoring The Environment

Olympic National Park also initiated numerous ecological monitoring programs. In 1993, the natural resource branch compiled a Long Term Ecological Monitoring Proposal to develop a

---

82 Summary of July, 1952 Monthly Narrative Report for Olympic National Park, 5, OLYM 18242, Box 1, Folder 19: 1952, Olympic NP archives; Lawrence C. Merriam, Regional Director, Region Four, to The Director, National Park Service, April 14, 1954, Fred J. Overly to The Director, National Park Service, May 3, 1954, Reynold V. Dickhaus to Supervisor, Olympic National Park, October 9, 1956, Fred J. Overly to R.L. Furniss, Chief, Division of Forest Insect Research, June 7, 1954, R.L. Furniss to Fred J. Overly, June 23, 1954, RG 79.4.2 ONP Records of the Branch of Plans and Design (1931-1941), Box 17, File Y2215 Insect & Tree Disease Control (1954-58), NARA Sand Point; Fringer, Olympic National Park, 139-41.

prototype monitoring program for the coniferous forest biome of the Olympic Peninsula. The U.S. Geological Survey-Biological Resources Division subsequently selected Olympic as a “prototype monitoring park.” Implemented in 2001, the program sought to better understand how park ecosystems function and how human activities affect them over time. It focused on “charismatic megafauna” such as elk, ecological monitoring of plant communities, nutrient cycling, biogeochemical and watershed processes, and specific threats to the park’s ecosystems. In 1996, Olympic was one of fourteen national parks chosen to participate in the Park Research and Intensive Monitoring of Ecosystems Network (PRIMENet), a joint program with the Environmental Protection Agency. PRIMENet provided a national network of index sites for monitoring ultraviolet radiation and other environmental properties and processes. A new belowground ecosystem function study merged climate monitoring with soil, root, and foodweb dynamics. Also implemented was the General Ecosystem Model (GEM), a study to produce a model to assess and predict how climate change affects the health of park ecosystems.84

These ecological monitoring projects revealed the centrality of natural resource management at Olympic National Park. However, lack of funds assured that many questions about Olympic’s natural resources and threats to its environment remained unanswered as the new century began. Inadequate knowledge about and data on the populations, distributions, and habitats of various plants and animals in the park remain the primary internal threat.

Federal statutes demand a great deal of Olympic National Park. By the early twenty-first century, compliance occupied considerable time of natural resource management staff, as well as other park employees. This assured that the park and the National Park Service accomplished considerable natural resource management tasks in regard to compliance issues, but in many

ways, with a perennial shortage of staff, Olympic’s natural resource management remained reactive. The tension between planning the future and accomplishing mandated goals characterized natural resource management at Olympic National Park.
Figure 4-1: Sunlight streaming through the trees, Olympic National Park. (Photographs courtesy of Olympic National Park, Accession Number OLYM-632, Box 3)
Figure 4-2: Above, a black bear seen within park boundaries. Figure 4-3: Below, photograph of a cougar seen beside Lake Margaret at Low Divide.
Figure 4-4: Other animals living within the monument are mountain goats, above, and Figure 4-5: Roosevelt Elk, seen here at Humes Ranch.
**Figure 4-6:** As part of fish stocking activities on the Olympic Peninsula, workers plant rainbow fingerlings in Lake Etta, with 20,000 planted in that lake in June 1937.

**Figure 4-7:** Workers pack Eastern Brook Trout to plant in Moose Lake.
Figure 4-8: Members of the 1935 fire school held at Louella Ranger Station.

Figure 4-9: Chief Ranger Brown and Park Ranger Dickinson cross Blue Glacier in 1946 to measure glacier recession.

Figure 4-10: Park Ranger Dickinson marks the terminus of Blue Glacier in 1946.
Figure 4-11: Above, Elwha Valley in 1910, before the dam was built. Figure 4-12: Below, Building the lower Elwha dam, 1911.
Figure 4-13: The Elwha dam power house, around the time it became operational in 1913.
Among the vegetation at Olympic National Park are hemlock, maple and spruce. **Figure 4-14:** At left, the stands of hemlock are near the Colowah Ridge.

**Figure 4-15:** Below, a festooned bay leaf maple stands in front of a large Sitka spruce.
Chapter 5:

Cultural Resource Management

In 1990, Olympic National Park officials examined a number of old structures at Kamp Kiwanis, an arts and nature camp on National Park Service-owned land along Lake Quinault’s north shore. Olympic Superintendent Maureen Finnerty recorded numerous health and safety code violations when she, West District Ranger Howard Yanish and others did a walk-through with Art and Bob Picklington, the Hoquiam YMCA directors, and other interested local leaders. Everyone agreed that the fiscal resources needed to update the camp to code were beyond reach. There was some tacit understanding among the group that the camp was outdated and not suitable for hosting youngsters. After an explanatory letter to the Kiwanis Club, which owned the structures, and other efforts to resolve the situation, park crews razed two of the buildings: a dining room and counselors’ bunk house that since the 1950s had served 300 local youth annually.¹

Despite the ample notice of the buildings’ razing, a controversy ensued. The leaders of the local Kiwanis Club and YMCA used the National Park Service’s destruction of the buildings to their advantage as they vilified the agency for what they characterized as “callous behavior.” In retrospect, the removal of these buildings redounded to the political advantage of those who wanted the camp, in whatever dilapidated condition, to continue. The destruction also fueled residual peninsula resentment of federal power. The National Park Service experienced another spate of dismal public attention at the same time that private funding and U.S. Senator Slade Gorton, R-WA provided legislative direction that rebuilt the camp. In this instance,

¹ The area was also referred to “Kamp Kiwanis.” The majority of National Park Service records refer to the site as “Camp Kiwanis,” making this the preferred usage.
national interests and power clashed with local prerogatives and rights over cultural,
rather than natural, resource management.

   In the aftermath of the Camp Kiwanis incident, Olympic officials admitted their
failure to conduct the required historical review of the buildings before destroying them.
   “Contrary to Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and its
implementing regulations,” the park’s 1991 Environmental Assessment of Camp Kiwanis
noted, “as well as to Park Service policy for the removal of structures, the dining hall and
counselors’ dormitory were not evaluated for eligibility for the National Register of
Historic Places (NRHP) prior to their removal.” Park officials’ failure to comply with the
NHPA and its amendments created “this horrible public relations nightmare,” Assistant
Superintendent Roger Rudolph remembered. Under congressional pressure, the park
built a new camp and rebuilt the main building, using National Park Service funds, and
Finnerty subsequently issued a ten-year special-use permit for continued operation of the
camp.

   The Camp Kiwanis incident created a sense of urgency about cultural resource
management (CRM) at Olympic National Park. Long an afterthought at a park conceived
and operated with wilderness as its primary attribute, Olympic’s CRM lagged behind
other park programs. Passage of the amended National Historical Preservation Act in
1980 conferred a range of obligations on all federal managers, including those at Olympic
National Park. Dominated by natural resource management and energized by the
proclamation of the Olympic wilderness just two years earlier, the park had undertaken
the minimum in fulfilling its cultural resource management obligations. A change in

---

2 Environmental Assessment: Kiwanis Camp Development, Quinault Lake, Olympic National Park
(National Park Service, 1991), OLYM-0783, Olympic NP archives, 19; Roger Rudolph interview by Hal
direction was essential, and the Camp Kiwanis incident gave CRM new significance at Olympic National Park.

The new era for cultural resource management in the national park system began in 1966 with passage of the National Historic Preservation Act. The act resulted from concerns that federal activities such as highway construction and urban renovation would lead to the loss of historically significant properties. The original legislation focused on the preservation of the nation’s historic and cultural resources in response to that threat, and it represented the starting point of a complex bundle of statutes that outlined the management obligations of federal agencies for historic and cultural resources. Section 106 of the amended act required that any undertaking on federal land or that used federal funds take into account the impact of planned activities on resources eligible for the National Register of Historic Places. Section 110 mandated that federal agencies inventory their cultural resources holdings so they would know what they possessed. Adherence to preservation regulations involved state and federal agencies, Indian tribes, and other entities. Such statutes added a new dimension – compliance – to Olympic National Park’s previously existing CRM responsibilities, forcing a broader consideration of cultural resources in park policy.

The long-standing emphasis on natural resources looked past the Olympic Peninsula’s complex array of historic properties and features. Olympic National Park contained a tapestry of cultural resources, including paleo-Indian petroglyphs, nineteenth-century Anglo-European homesteads, and World War II lookout stations. Historic structures were an integral part of Olympic National Park, revealing patterns of life that preceded park establishment, including the management practices of the Forest Service.
and the early National Park Service. Integrating the management of this complex of values and resources into the dominant currents of a wilderness park became an important challenge for Olympic staff.

Before 1966, management of cultural resources at Olympic National Park was an afterthought; between the passage of NHPA in 1966 and 1991, CRM operated in a reactive mode. During much of this time, such activities fell under the aegis of Visitor Services and Resource Protection, one of the many activities of such divisions. During the remainder of the period, CRM fell under Resource Management and was located within the Ranger Division. Without a separate unit with primary responsibility for CRM, such obligations fell into the general regime of the park and rarely received attention that paralleled the efforts devoted to natural resource management. Park staff limited proactive efforts to widely recognized and highly visible historic remains. Nor did Olympic personnel invest time or energy in creating comprehensive documentation of its vast cultural resources. Some efforts produced documents that synthesized and catalogued cultural resources in specific areas and historic “contexts,” but no system guided or directed compliance or management efforts.

During this period, the Pacific Northwest Regional Office in Seattle provided much of the support and protection for Olympic’s CRM resources. The park lacked the resources to accomplish this dimension of its mission, and regional office staff filled in. A number of staff members, including Alan Comp, Stephanie Toothman, Gail Evans, Don Peeting, Hand Florance, Laurin Hoffman, Jim Thompson, Cathy Gilbert, and Randall Schalk all undertook projects at Olympic to assess and protect park cultural resources. The level of cooperation and the skilled practitioners at the regional office
compensated for the lack of resources at the park.

The 1990s focus on compliance compelled deliberate efforts to create a CRM structure at Olympic National Park. By that time, much of the national park system had responded to NHPA and its amendments, and the National Park Service had become the most important steward of the nation’s cultural resources. Paul Gleeson, who arrived at Olympic in 1992 as the first Cultural Resource Branch chief, heralded a new beginning for CRM at the park. More than two decades after cultural resource management became a mandate, the Cultural Resource Management statement for 1992 averred that “Olympic National Park was created to preserve and protect natural resources. The numerous cultural resources of the park are just as important and require preservation and protection under the Organic Act and other regulations.”

A new era in emphasis dawned.

Early CRM Activities

When the National Park Service arrived at Mount Olympus National Monument in 1936, the activities that later were grouped as “cultural resource management” were at best ancillary concerns. At the height of the New Deal, the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) provided much of the labor that underpinned national park development. Since the peninsula park was a pet project of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his secretary of the interior, Harold L. Ickes, securing resources for development did not pose a significant problem. However, the Mount Olympus National Monument and the Olympic National Park that followed were different from most national park areas. Unlike the rest of the system, the focus at the “wilderness park” was not on development.

Because of this, at Olympic National Park the National Park Service did not push

---

for the kinds of facilities that typified the national park system as a whole. Although CCC camps preceded the National Park Service on the Olympic Peninsula and continued after the establishment of the national park, the federal government confined most of the agency’s activities to projects within the national forest. Even after establishment of the national park, the government designated only a few CCC crews for work in the new unit. After a peak of four camps, Quinault, Cushman, Elwha, and Hoh, in 1941, only two camps served Olympic, in contrast to the eight at nearby Mount Rainier National Park.4

National Park Service attempts to build a base of information about Olympic National Park’s cultural past began slowly. After the park’s establishment, many officials either remained ignorant of Olympic’s cultural resources or devalued their historic worth. In 1940, a memorandum from National Park Service landscape architect Max E. Walliser determined that the “Original Log House” in Clallam County, constructed in 1888, had little architectural merit. He considered its preservation more appropriate for a county or city historical society than a national park. In 1941, Doerr Yeager, assistant chief of the park’s Museum Division, reported on an inspection of Charles W. Keller’s property at Lake Ozette. He recommended that the buildings on the property known as the Nylund Ranch “be reconditioned so as to constitute an historic house museum” and be furnished accordingly. At the time, the ranch did not lie within Olympic National Park’s formal boundaries, justifying the National Park Service’s decision not to implement the report’s recommendations. The buildings deteriorated beyond repair by 1958 and collapsed in

---

The park neither promoted cultural resource management nor saw such resources as an integral part of its future in that era.

**Ethnography At Olympic**

While park officials exhibited an overall lack of interest in historic preservation during Olympic’s early days, ethnographic research soon garnered more enthusiasm. In 1940, Charles Keller sparked Superintendent Preston Macy’s interest in collecting and preserving the Native American relics and “art treasures” he found near Lake Ozette. At the time, the National Park Service lacked the resources to classify many of the artifacts. Arthur R. Kelly, chief of the National Park Service’s Archaeology Sites Division in Washington, D.C., recommended that Keller, who spoke an Indian dialect and had observed many of the then-deceased canoe makers at work during his youth, help the agency interpret and preserve Native American culture. Macy followed with a request for personnel with archaeological training in order to give archaeology and ethnology a more important role in the interpretive history of Olympic National Park. Ethnologists at the University of Washington, who donated materials on the Makah and other tribal cultures to the park’s library, partially fulfilled this desire. Erna Gunther, author of *Klallam Ethnography* (1927) and future director of the Washington State Museum, collaborated with local Indians at Neah Bay and agreed to help Olympic with its ethnography programs. Despite such activity, no formal cultural resource program ensued.

---


6 A.R. Kelly, Chief, Archaeological Sites Division, Memorandum, June 11, 1941, Memorandum for the Director, May 27, 1941, Memorandum for Mr. Burns, June 11, 1941, OLY 1938-1950 Cultural Resources Archaeology/Ethnology, OLY 18405 Box 2, File 9, Olympic NP archives; Preston P. Macy to
From the 1930s until the 1960s, the National Park Service informally conducted the activities that the agency would eventually codify as cultural resource management. Caring for Olympic’s cultural resources – its archaeological sites, homesteads, and the remnants of mining and logging industries – typically fell within the daily responsibilities of rangers, not under the jurisdiction of an agency division or even specialized staff. When the park could invest in resource protection, most efforts targeted archaeologically significant sites that needed security or maintenance. Elsewhere in the national park system, nascent cultural resource management typically included the construction of a museum, rehabilitation of historic features such as the remnants of mining or homesteading, or the initiation of a collection of artifacts and other material culture to support interpretation. With considerable pressure from the national level not to support development, CCC efforts at Olympic National Park were confined to small-scale facilities. The lack of construction of a visitor center and museum common elsewhere in the park system left an important gap in cultural resource management. This absence had two immediate impacts: it delayed the creation of historic and cultural resources facilities and it accentuated the prevalent sentiment that Olympic was a natural park in which culture played a secondary role at best.

**Outside Research**

In the absence of a concerted agency effort to develop an internal structure for managing historical and cultural resources, the National Park Service turned to outside researchers at Olympic. By the 1940s, archaeologists and anthropologists had begun to

---

identify and classify the park’s historically significant sites. Surveys of Olympic’s coastal
resources were driven more by the agendas of the individual scholars than by any
comprehensive set of park objectives. Much of this effort focused on the peninsula’s
Native American peoples. Systematic archaeological research along the coastal strip
began in the 1940s. The Makah, Quileute, Hoh, Queets, and Quinault peoples had lived
on the Olympic Peninsula since before recorded history, and scholars came to attempt to
understand and catalogue their lifeways. In the early 1940s, local citizens and road
construction crews first uncovered evidence of Native American coastal habitation.
Keller’s examinations of cedar stumps near Lake Ozette, which provided evidence of
Native American use of stone tools, prompted interest in further archaeological research
along Lake Ozette and the coast.7

Between the early 1950s and the 1966 passage of the NHPA, the National Park
Service mainly relied on contract work to accomplish research goals at Olympic National
Park. In 1947, Dr. Richard Daugherty and a team of Washington State College students
undertook archaeological surveys along the ocean strip. In 1955, an archaeological
survey conducted by the University of Washington discovered nineteen significant sites
inside park boundaries and along the coast. In addition, researchers examined twelve
recorded prehistoric shell midden sites along the Olympic Peninsula’s rivers and coast. In
the mid-1950s, the Western Regional Office in San Francisco contracted with
Washington State University for salvage archaeology at Toleak Point, an enormous
coastal rock shelf experiencing rapid tidal erosion. Under Superintendent Fred J. Overly,
park officials identified the site – once a major Quileute Indian village with cultural strata

---

7 Charlie Keller to Preston Macy, September 30, 1940, C. W. Keller to Herbert Maier, November 4, 1940, OLY 1938-1950 Cultural Resources Archaeology/Ethnography, OLY 18405 Box 2, File 9, Olympic NP archives.
to a considerable depth – as a cultural resource, asserted its value, and initiated
management practices. The National Park Service allocated $500 to the State College of
Washington for the archaeological excavation. T. Stell Newman, a graduate student in
anthropology, led the excavation as part of his graduate work. In 1958, with $500 from
the National Parks Association’s Student Conservation Research Program grants and
another $500 from the National Park Service, Newman conducted excavations and a
review of ethnographic sites. He negotiated with the tribal council for permission to
excavate the entire site. Such projects dominated archaeological research efforts at
Olympic until the 1980s, when ethnologists, archaeologists, historians, and landscape
architects ventured inland to examine the Olympic Mountains’ historic structures and
sites.\(^8\)

Archaeological efforts continued, with some scholars building extended careers
based on their research in Olympic National Park and its environs. Between 1966 and
1981, National Park Service funds supported Daugherty and his team as they excavated

---

the Ozette Village site on Cape Alava, the most important Indian coastal site from pre-
contact era. The Ozette tribe used Cape Alava as a protected winter village and a major
fishing ground. Scholars long regarded the site as the primary intensive excavation of a
sea mammal hunting site outside of Alaska. Stretching three-quarters of a mile along the
beach and a quarter mile inland, the site, occupied by the Ozette people until the early
1900s, contained one large shell midden more than thirteen feet deep and a series of
Pleistocene and post-Pleistocene sea terraces underlying the archaeological deposits. The
site yielded bones and artifacts as old as 2,000 years, along with a number of more recent
late historical Indian long houses buried and preserved by a mudslide. Daugherty’s team
uncovered more than 50,000 artifacts at the Ozette site, including baskets, wooden
implements, iron tools, and a complete plank house, now in the Makah Cultural and
Research Center at Neah Bay.9

**NHPA**

Such ongoing efforts on a contractual basis accomplished the goals of individual
researchers and added to knowledge of Olympic’s history but did little to develop a
comprehensive cultural resource management program at the park. Only the statutory
imperative of NHPA could alter the terrain. The law required all federal agencies,
including the National Park Service, to identify and evaluate prehistoric and historic sites
and ruins, and determine their eligibility for inclusion in the National Register of Historic
Places. It also expanded the register to encompass places of local, state, and regional
significance. Supplying matching federal funds to state and local governments to conduct

---

surveys and develop preservation plans for specific projects made compliance feasible. The act simultaneously created the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation and established procedures to protect significant sites.\textsuperscript{10}

Historic preservation had been a longstanding obligation of the National Park Service. During the New Deal, the agency became responsible for preserving much of the fabric of U.S. history as it acquired the majority of the nation’s historic and archeological sites. In no small part due to the efforts of George Hartzog, Jr., who served as National Park Service director from 1964 to 1972, by the time NHPA became law, the agency already had expanded its administrative capability for historic preservation. When the National Park Service created the Office of Archaeology and Historic Preservation in 1967, historic preservation finally reached administrative parity with archaeology within the agency.\textsuperscript{11}

In 1971, Executive Order 11593 further accentuated the National Park Service emphasis on historic preservation. Labeled an order for the “Protection and Enhancement of the Cultural Environment,” this attempt to clarify NHPA charged federal agencies with the responsibility to survey all lands in their jurisdiction and nominate suitable properties to the National Register of Historic Places. It required the secretary of the interior to advise other federal agencies in matters pertaining to the identification and evaluation of historic properties. The order eliminated the vague requirement described in the 1966 legislation, and required federal agencies to assess every undertaking – any activity that


took place on federal land or used federal funds or required federal permits – and
evaluate and record its potential impact on cultural resources. Along with NHPA, the
1971 executive order gave the National Park Service a clear mandate to identify and
manage the cultural resources under its care in proscribed ways. In a frank assessment of
its impact, longtime National Park Service Western Regional Historian Gordon Chappell
described Executive Order 11593 as a “kick in the pants” for the National Park Service.12

Regional Assistance
On October 10, 1968, the National Park Service issued a memorandum that
required each park to develop a survey report on each structure inside its boundaries more
than fifty years old.13 At the time, Olympic National Park had little infrastructure to
support cultural resource management. The regional office in Seattle handled the few
eyearly compliance projects, an effort that gained considerable momentum in the early
1980s. This established a pattern at Olympic that later impeded the development of a
park-based CRM program. In this older system, the regional office handled compliance
and resource management issues. It assigned tasks to specialists and sent them to the park
to undertake studies or handle compliance. Upon completion, the documentation returned
to the regional office. In addition, the regional director rather than Olympic’s
superintendent was responsible for correspondence with the State Historic Preservation
Office (SHPO) for Section 106 compliance. The Seattle office handled the Assessment of
Effects forms, colloquially known as the “XXX forms,” for the regional director’s
signature, engaging in the negotiations with the SHPO for the completion of Section 106.

12 Gordon Chappell, interview by Hal Rothman, December 12, 2002; Executive Order 11593,
“Protection and Enhancement of the Cultural Environment,” May 13, 1971, in Dilsaver, ed. America’s
National Park System, 377-78.
13 Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative History, 143; Olympic National Park
Surveys were done at the park but paperwork was done at the regional office, a pattern that persisted for almost two decades. Olympic’s early NHPA compliance efforts began in spring 1969 with a historic structure report on Humes’ Ranch by National Park Service historian Benjamin Levy. This document represented the first professional evaluation of a historic structure in Olympic National Park. In 1972, the park nominated Humes’ Ranch to the NRHP; it was added to the list in 1977. The Ozette Indian Village Archaeological Site was listed in 1974. Park officials nominated the Wedding Rock petroglyph site and the Ahlstrom and Roose’s prairie homestead sites for the NRHP in 1973. Wedding Rocks Petroglyphs joined the National Register in 1976. The listing attested to the park’s interest in accounting for its cultural resources and locating their appropriate designation with the new regulations. Olympic later nominated what the National Park Service called the Olympic National Park Archaeological District, consisting of White Rock Village site, Toleak Point Site, and an unnamed site, to the NRHP.

**Historic Structures**

In response to Executive Order 11593 and the NHPA, Olympic National Park’s *Wilderness Environmental Impact Statement* (EIS) of 1974 recognized the need to survey the park’s holdings in order to evaluate its historic resources and develop a preservation plan. In March 1974, Associate Regional Director for Professional Services Bennett Gale, a former Olympic superintendent, forwarded a list of historic structures compiled by two Regional Office cultural resource professionals to Superintendent Roger Allin. This *List*

---

of Classified Structures (LCS) at Olympic National Park contained ninety structures of potential significance. The Rosemary Inn retained “the integrity that allows us to understand, and even participate in, an earlier form of wilderness resort experience that captures the reverence for peace and the recognition of a popular, urban need for quiet, natural places,” the document reads. As had become the pattern at Olympic, the park was slow to act on these recommendations. In 1980, the Clallam County Historical Society, not the National Park Service, nominated the inn for placement on the NRHP. Gale’s list also included the Lake Crescent Lodge complex, which contained Cottage 34, the site of President Roosevelt’s October 1937 visit; Storm King Inn (now removed); and Storm King Ranger Station. After evaluating many of the park’s structures, Allin agreed with Gale’s conclusion that only one representative structure from each historic context could adequately portray the park’s different cultural themes.\(^\text{16}\)

At Olympic National Park, the response to NHPA entailed reconsideration of priorities, as cultural resources never had been a priority at the lower forty-eight states’ premier wilderness park. Rangers tended to be generalists without specific historic preservation or cultural resources training. As was typical in the National Park Service at that time, managers deemed most of the park’s history recent – a function of the failed homestead and mining eras – and generally found it insignificant. Numerous sites and facilities dated only to Forest Service management of the area. Historic preservation, nationally and in the parks, tended to value exemplary historic structures such as mansions and federal buildings rather than more vernacular examples. As a result, Olympic’s managers did not generally regard as historic the structures, trails, and

recreational facilities developed between the early 1900s and 1930s.

Dismissal of the recent past was common in the National Park Service. When Congress created new parks, the agency spent considerable energy and resources assuring that the public recognized and appreciated its presence. Often, National Park Service engineers redesigned a park’s entry roads and reception structures to bring visitors to agency facilities rather than use pre-existing private ones. In the process, the National Park Service often demolished historic structures and changed historic settings, usually in pursuit of the elusive idea of “vignettes of primitive America” articulated in the 1963 Leopold report. The result amounted to rejection of the past at hand and even its destruction.\(^{17}\)

As a result of strong programmatic interest from National Park Service regional office CRM staff in Seattle, Olympic accomplished some significant goals in cultural resource management. The model of contracted work continued, with funding coming from the National Park Service and researchers producing both literature and subsequent scholarly research. While less comprehensive than some may have desired, the contract model had a long history in the National Park Service, served the needs of the park, and produced a consistent stream of high quality work.

**The Trail System**

The trails and shelters that the Forest Service built at Olympic posed an interesting management problem for the National Park Service. Foresters had constructed a trail system to protect forests in the former national monument from fire and to combat

---

poaching. The Forest Service left an extensive, utilitarian web of trails throughout the
national monument and surrounding national forest. In the 1920s, the Forest Service
added shelters throughout its holdings, building more than 100 small shake-sided, high-
pitched-roof trail shelters and structures for the fire guards who monitored the forests. It
also built campgrounds and picnic areas as part of its efforts to offer recreational facilities
within the forest.\textsuperscript{18} When it assumed control of Olympic, the National Park Service
recognized the shelters as a valuable asset and used them to reduce the impact of camping
on park resources. Superintendent Preston Macy advocated extending the range and
number of shelters.

The National Park Service extended the network of trails and structures as a
utilitarian measure, simultaneously diminishing any perception of historic value in the
process. As late as the 1950s, two decades after Olympic National Park’s establishment,
the National Park Service continued to follow its predecessors’ model. The agency built
small, log-sided shelters in the higher country where none previously existed. These
included the Lunch Lake, Upper Cameron, Round Lake, and Sundown Lake shelters. The
last stage of shelter building in Olympic National Park occurred in the 1960s, when the
National Park Service used an innovative hewn-log design for shelters in the lowlands,
including sites at Happy Hollow, Olympus Guard Station, and Twelvemile. Student
Conservation Association groups subsequently rehabilitated many of the older structures,
and in 1971, a Youth Conservation Corps crew constructed a large A-frame at Jackson

\textsuperscript{18} Fred W. Cleator, “Recreational Facilities of the Olympic National Forest and Forest Service
Plan of Development,” \textit{Forest Club Quarterly} 10 (1936/37): 6; L.F. Kneipp to Frank A. Waugh, April 14,
1922; L.F. Kneipp to District Forester, May 1, 1922, NA, RG 95, Entry 86, Box 71, file: U-Recreation,
Region 6, 1920-1939.
Creek near Toleak Point.19

**Backcountry Shelters**

Shelters also housed squatters in the woods who vandalized the structure, anathema to Olympic National Park managers, and supervisors settled on a building removal policy as a way to limit vagrancy inside park boundaries. Between 1970 and 1974, the National Park Service removed more than forty shelters in Olympic. Using the park’s *Backcountry Management Plan* as a guide, agency officials removed fifteen shelters in 1975 and 1976 because the park classified them as “non-conforming structures,” buildings that contravened the mission of the park but lacked historic provenance. This removal policy raised strong objections from the Friends of the Olympic Trail Shelters and other park users. As a result, the National Park Service established a moratorium on shelter removal until the issue could be resolved satisfactorily. The National Park Service applied new shelter criteria in January 1978. Because the 1964 Wilderness Act defined wilderness as “land retaining its primeval character and influence, without permanent improvements or habitation,” the National Park Service only hesitantly sanctioned the continued use of backcountry shelters. The Wilderness Act required the use of the least intrusive tool to accomplish any end, and human-constructed shelters in wilderness areas were discouraged. The 1974 *Backcountry Management Plan* assumed that the unique features of Olympic necessitated the retention of a shelter program only to provide emergency shelter for the safety of backcountry

---

From the CRM perspective, the shelter issue was as complicated a situation as Olympic National Park could face. In an age before the idea of adaptive reuse gained wide currency, “historic preservation” in most instances meant that the property to be preserved had lost some measure of its historic function. The trail shelters remained an integral part of the park. Even if the buildings were eligible under NHPA, they had an ongoing utilitarian function. Two different kinds of management obligations – the statutory requirements of NHPA and the desire for a statutory wilderness – had come into conflict.

The conflict over trail shelters, still unresolved at the end of the century, was not the only cultural issue of concern to park managers. By the mid-1970s, Olympic National Park had inventoried and evaluated other cultural resources in response to statutory requirements. In an effort to satisfy National Park Service policy and federal statutes, park officials treated cultural resource management with new interest. CRM goals rose on the park’s priority list, finding their way to the forefront of planning documents. In 1975, goals such as working with the regional office to identify properties worthy of NRHP nomination, assisting the regional office in completing the Historic Studies Plan of 1975, and gathering the required information to add Roose’s Prairie to the NRHP marked the park’s objectives. This explicit articulation of CRM pushed Olympic in new directions.

**Cultural Resources**

Olympic initiated a number of new studies during the late 1970s and early 1980s.

---


The park benefited from work undertaken in other agencies. Elizabeth Righter’s *Cultural Resource Overview of the Olympic National Forest* (1978) significantly advanced Olympic National Park’s methods of evaluation and classification. A Department of Agriculture document, it categorized the major cultural holdings of the Olympic National Forest, and, by extension, Olympic National Park. Righter identified an enormous complex of cultural resources on the peninsula by different themes, using prehistory, settlement, mining, logging, and Forest Service activity as categories. Significant sites included the Indian village sites of Po-iks, Pino-otcan Toita, and Pina-alal; Seal Rock Shell Mound; settler homesteads; exploratory trails such as the O’Neill and Seattle Press expedition routes; mine shafts and cabins; railroad trestles and grades; CCC structures; logging camp sites of the Spruce Division and Polson Logging Company; mill sites; old cemeteries; and ranger and guard stations. Righter recommended that the Forest Service provide protection for many of these sites, which provided rare glimpses into historic lifestyle patterns and human adaptations to the peninsula’s environment. The potential for additional archaeological sites was unknown, she observed, and required additional research. Many of the existing structures and sites, including the Seal Rock Shell Mound and Hamma Hama Guard Station, appeared to be eligible for the NRHP. This effort by the Forest Service, largely ambivalent about cultural resources, prompted the National Park Service to examine seriously its own holdings in the region.\(^22\)

In the late 1970s, National Park Service officials commissioned a group of Olympic-specific documents. Intended to create a baseline for CRM knowledge in the park, these included an *Interpretive Prospectus*, completed in 1977 and a *Historic

An American Eden

Resource Study by Frank Williss and Michael G. Schene that the National Park Service accepted in 1979. Olympic National Park officials used both preliminary documents to identify and analyze archaeological, historic, and cultural resources. The historic resource study became controversial when Pacific Northwest Regional Director Russell Dickenson rejected it for a reported failure to evaluate adequately the park’s historic resources.

Despite that critical reception, the study contributed to the Olympic planning process.

Olympic National Park also worked with the nearby Makah Tribe to develop methods to protect their homes and lifeways while respecting their culture and practices. In 1976, the Ozette Development Concept Plan recognized local cultural resources, including a campground currently used by the Makah people, coastal lookout station, resort, and the Mulholland and Nylund homesteads. In 1981, park staff completed rehabilitation and maintenance work on the Humes Ranch.

Even after extensive surveys of Olympic’s cultural resources, some questions still remained about the role of CRM in the park. The 1976 Master Plan announced that park personnel had completed archaeological survey work, but some archaeologists disagreed with this bold assertion. By 2000, less than 1 percent of the park had been inventoried for archaeological resources.

Although park officials first nominated structures for the NRHP as early as 1971, developing the List of Classified Structures, as mandated by Executive Order 11593, formed an important component of cultural resource management at Olympic. Between 1974 and 1983, park staff developed its documents for CRM compliance. Historian Gail

---

23 Russell F. Dickenson, Regional Director, Pacific Northwest Region, to Manager, Denver Service Center, June 12, 1978, OLYM H2215, Olympic NP archives; Superintendent’s Annual Report, Olympic National Park, 1980, OLYM 18242 Box 1, Folder 37: 1980, Olympic NP archives, 10.

Evans undertook a historic resource study, and archeologist George Teague from the Western Archeological and Conservation Center (WACC) surveyed structures in the park. He recommended forty-three structures for the LCS in 1982, and considered but did not recommend more than 100 others. The Wedding Rock Petroglyphs represented Coastal Indian culture; the Nylund Homestead, Ahlstrom’s Prairie, Roose Homestead, and Humes Ranch stood for the homesteading era; the Lake Crescent Lodge Group (1916-1917) represented the resort era. For the Park Administration-Ranger Stations and Visitor Use context, Teague listed the Storm King Ranger Station (Morgenroth Cabin) at Lake Crescent (1909), the Elwha Ranger Station (1932), residences, barn, equipment shed, and shop (1930-1936), and two community kitchens at the Elwha and Altair (now Altair) campgrounds (1930). Sol Duc Falls Shelter (1940) represented the Backcountry Use era. Teague considered but did not recommend other structures for inclusion in the LCS, including the Mulholland Homestead Site/Grave, cabins from the 1920s and 1930s, and the Rosemary Inn Group.25

1983 Resources Management Plan

The 1983 Resources Management Plan marked an important watershed in the park’s approach to cultural resource management. The first planning document to truly take CRM into account, it defined Olympic’s central theme as wilderness, even as it asserted the park’s obligation to comply with Executive Order 11593. As a remedy, the plan proposed numerous studies of cultural resource sites with potential for historic significance, and made a pattern of compliance with the executive order a priority. This aggressive program promised that Olympic would undertake a number of cultural studies,

---

and then complete the appropriate National Register of Historic Places nominations for
the conforming properties. Park staff believed that the completion of the archaeological
survey and historic studies called for in the RMP would bring Olympic into compliance
with statute.\(^{26}\)

The approach to CRM was multifaceted. The park planned a historic resource
study, an archaeological survey and base map, an oral history program, an ethnographic
overview and analysis of cultural artifacts, an administrative history, modifications to the
cultural resources holding vaults to provide acceptable conditions for specimens, and a
specific historic structures report for Roose’s Homestead. Additional projects included
further research on the Wedding Rock petroglyphs and a security system for the Pioneer
Memorial Visitor Center. Added to existing park CRM studies such as the 1976 *List of
Classified Structures*, Olympic National Park laid plans for a comprehensive
management system for its many and varied cultural resources.\(^{27}\)

The 1983 *Resources Management Plan* categorized Olympic National Park’s
cultural resources by theme, dividing its history into a series of topics and assessing the
status of resources for each. Researchers had documented the park’s Native American
past well, the plan averred, but baseline archaeological data required updating. Although
the document stated that Olympic contained no physical remains of the exploration era, it
recommended including the missing features of that time in a baseline map and
promoting further research in the new historic resource study. The Humes Ranch and
other similar properties reflected the homesteading era. The Humes Ranch had been
added to the National Register in 1972; other properties – the Nylund and Ahlstrom

\(^{26}\) *Olympic National Park Resources Management Plan and Environmental Assessment* (1983), 58.
\(^{27}\) Ibid., 2-13.
homestead sites – were under consideration for inclusion. The plan recommended
demolishing the Rosemary Inn and its outbuildings after removing the property from the
NRHP, and judged Lake Crescent Lodge as insufficiently significant for inclusion on the
National Register. Under the resource management plan, which was updated in 1990,
Lake Crescent Lodge would remain a resort after the park modified it to current
standards. In addition, the document judged mining as insignificant in the park, and
recommended a walking trail commemorating the Spruce Railroad and World War I.28

The oldest extant Forest Service structure in Olympic National Park, the Storm
King Ranger Station, also known as the Morgenroth Cabin, posed another set of issues. A
log structure built about 1905 on the south shore of Lake Crescent, the property was
significant, but ruled not sufficiently so for inclusion on the National Register. Its
dilapidated condition and location in the middle of the realigned Lake Crescent Highway,
where it had been hit by a truck, presented an important CRM problem. Despite its long-
standing obligations in preservation, the National Park Service had been responsible for
the destruction of some of its own historic fabric. The cabin logs were stored for later
reconstruction and, in 1986 work crews reconstructed the cabin 100 yards from its
original site. Completely renovated, it houses the ranger station and visitor contact station
at Lake Crescent in 2003.29

After the Resource Management Plan, Olympic National Park embarked on a
major effort to complete its baseline information for cultural resource management.
University of Oregon professor Don Peting’s 1986 Historic Structures Preservation
Guide provided the park staff with detailed guidelines on how to evaluate the condition of

29 Ibid., 60; “Present Resource Status: Cultural Resources, May 1990,” 3.3.
An American Eden

1. historic structures and offered appropriate strategies for their management. It also
2. expedited Section 106 and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) compliance
3. actions for projects that affected Olympic’s historic properties. The lack of park
4. personnel with expertise and the centralized National Park Service model of the era –
5. when specialized work usually was undertaken by the service centers – brought a team of
6. historians and archaeologists that consisted of project director T. Allan Comp,
7. archaeologist Eric Bergland, historian Jonathan Dembo, architectural historian Gail
8. Evans, and historian Leslie Helm to author the CRM reports and studies mandated in the
9. 1983 Resources Management Plan. The team completed a preliminary archaeological
10. overview during the summer of 1982 and a final draft in 1983. The Archaeological
11. Overview and Assessment brought Olympic into compliance with Executive Order
12. 11593. Four major documents resulted from the team’s efforts: Bergland’s Summary
13. Prehistory and Ethnography of Olympic National Park (1984); Evan’s Historic Resource
14. Study (1983), which replaced the rejected study of 1979 and provided a definitive
15. overview of Olympic’s cultural resources and human history; Evan’s Historic Building
17. latter three documents, which identified and described in detail the park’s historic
18. structures, remain essential references for managing Olympic’s historic resources twenty
19. years later.30
20. Olympic’s research efforts continued though the remainder of the century.
21. Bergland’s Archaeology and Basemap Study (1984), which was upgraded to GIS
22. (Geographic Information System) in 1999, and Randall Schalk’s The Evolution and

Diversification of Native Land Use Systems on the Olympic Peninsula: A Research Design (1988) broadened the conception of how to obtain the knowledge base to support archaeology. Schalk theorized that Native Americans had used the high country extensively, a perspective that revised existing scholarship. Remnants of projectile points, choppers, and scrapers provided evidence of hunting and gathering activity in the mountains. His work prompted further ethnographic research. Jacilee Wray’s Ethnographic Overview and Assessment (1997), which relied on ethnographic interviews with tribal members and research, confirmed the cultural significance of Olympic’s interior, where different Native peoples continue to acquire spiritual powers. Wray provided evidence that Quileute, Quinault, Skokomish, and Klallam peoples had inhabited hunting camps and built trails to other communities through the Olympic Mountains.31

CRM Studies

The National Park Service initiated a significant number of the other CRM studies called for in the Resources Management Plan. Between 1984 and 1986, National Park Service regional office staff completed historic landscape and historic structures reports on Lake Crescent Lodge, the park’s administrative headquarters, Rosemary Inn, and Humes Ranch. Personnel also completed studies of individual properties. The Historic Structures Report for Roose’s Homestead noted that although Ahlstrom’s Prairie, believed to be the westernmost homestead in the coterminous United States, was more significant historically, the buildings on that site were beyond repair. The National Park

---

Service chose to preserve Roose’s prairie homestead, comprised of a barn, house, badly
deteriorated sawmill, and root cellar, to represent that historic era, and let the Ahlstrom
homestead deteriorate from benign neglect. As in many such instances, the question of
actual significance and that of historic fabric were intertwined intrinsically.\textsuperscript{32}

The RMP also recommended completion of a series of important cultural resource
management projects. These included an oral history project, which would record
pioneering life in Olympic and pioneer and park history, and ethnological analysis of the
park’s cultural holdings. The document also identified the need for an administrative
history. This project would document the “caldron of controversy” surrounding
Olympic’s establishment and put into perspective the management decisions affecting
landowners, neighboring communities and Indian tribes, and other government agencies
on the Olympic Peninsula.\textsuperscript{33}

Curatorial Improvements

New research into Olympic’s cultural resources helped promote growth in the
park’s curatorial and museum collection. The RMP noted in a report titled “Curatorial
Collection Storage and Preservation” that Olympic National Park was not in compliance
with \textit{Interpretation and Visitor Services Guideline} (NPS-6) or the Museum Management
Act of 1955. The park’s total collection of historical, ethnological, zoological, geological,
and botanical specimens exceeded 8,700 by 1982, and the existing vault storing the
artifacts was neither adequately waterproofed nor fireproofed. A decade later, the
museum collection had expanded to more than 13,000 objects, with cultural items
numbering approximately 2,000. By 1999, Olympic’s museum collection contained

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{32} \textit{Olympic National Park Resources Management Plan and Environmental Assessment}, 67;
  \item \textsuperscript{33} \textit{Olympic National Park Resources Management Plan and Environmental Assessment}, 61-66.
\end{itemize}
20,020 catalogued museum objects, with an additional 677,087 uncatalogued objects. Park officials addressed space issues associated with the growing collection in 1998 by planning a new collections and museum facility.\textsuperscript{34}

In the late 1980s, the park added cultural anthropology and ethnography to the cultural resource management program. Under the guidance of Stephanie Toothman, chief of the Cultural Resources Division at the Pacific Northwest Regional Office, the National Park Service developed an ethnography program and hired a regional and park ethnographer. Increased recognition of and desired coordination with local Indian groups and legislation shaped Olympic National Park’s program. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 required clear management policies for ethnography, and the subsequent 1990 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) protected burial sites on federal lands, including national parks. It mandated that federal entities and those that received federal funding bring their collections of human remains and ceremonial artifacts in compliance with the new statute, one more sensitive to Native peoples. Olympic National Park speedily addressed the challenge. The park’s ethnography program began in 1990 with funding from the National Park Service Archaeology and Ethnography Program. By 1993, ethnography had become a fully integrated park base-funded program.

**Tribal Associations**

Wray’s *Ethnographic Overview and Assessment* acknowledged the importance of tribal associations to the park as a way of understanding the larger relationship between people and the environment. This seminal work outlined the relationship of peninsula

tribes to Olympic National Park and its resources, and discussed the history, settlement
patterns, resource use, social organization, and belief systems of the Makah, Lower
Elwha Klallam, Jamestown S’Klallam, Port Gamble S’Klallam, Skokomish, Chehalis,
Quinault, Quileute, and Hoh tribes. Several of their tribal reservations, which ranged
from 200 to 200,000 acres, bordered the park, and park land surrounded three of them. In
light of new National Park Service management policies and federal laws, Wray also
included a discussion of Olympic’s responsibility to government-to-government relations
and tribal treaty rights.35

Various statutes affect the management of federal lands with respect to Native
American religious sites on federal lands. These laws in part determine how national
parks and monuments manage their cultural resources. The 1978 American Indian
Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA) protected the right of Native Americans to exercise
traditional religious beliefs at sacred sites. A 1996 amendment, Executive Order 13007,
protected Indian sacred sites on federal lands. Other acts, including NEPA and the
Archaeological Resource Protection Act (ARPRA) of 1979 require federal agencies,
including the National Park Service, to consult with Indian tribes as part of their planning
processes.36

In 1992, ethnographic resources at Olympic National Park gained additional
significance. Amendments to the NHPA, which recognized the importance of traditional
religious and cultural areas, or traditional cultural properties (TCP), encouraged
coordination among tribes and federal agencies in historic preservation and planning.

36 Native American Graves and Repatriation Protection Act of 1990 (104 STAT. 3048 P. L. 101-
601, November 16, 1990); Executive Order 13007 Indian Sacred Sites, May 24, 1996; Archaeological
After the 1992 amendments, Section 106 required federal agencies to consult with Indian tribes that attached religious and cultural significance to those historic properties. Such statutes helped clarify what often threatened to become an amorphous process of preserving Indian tribes’ cultural history on federal lands.37

Working with the Olympic Peninsula Intertribal Cultural Advisory Committee, Wray oversaw NAGPRA at Olympic. In 1999, Olympic National Park began its first year as a pilot park for testing the new National Park Service Ethnographic Resource Inventory (ERI) database. “As the applied cultural anthropology program at Olympic National Park continues to develop, and the park’s relationship with tribal groups generates greater trust, we will gain clearer understanding of these [cultural] resources,” Wray noted.38

**Landscape Inventory**

In 1991, under the supervision of historical landscape architect Cathy Gilbert in the Seattle Regional Office, a park landscape team initiated a cultural landscape inventory at Olympic. Cultural landscapes include the full range of historic property types and span the range of historic contexts or themes, including CCC-rustic designed landscapes, historic trails, orchards, homesteads, recreational developments, and ethnographic sites. The recognition of cultural landscapes as a viable category of cultural resources in Olympic first appeared in the 1991 *Resources Management Plan*.39

By the mid-1980s, much of the management of cultural resources had shifted out of the regional level and to the park. A resource management committee began in 1987

---

and developed Olympic’s first “procedural system for project review and statutory compliance.” Superintendent Robert Chandler was the committee chair, with Chief Ranger Chuck Janda serving as vice chair. Janda also led an interdisciplinary steering committee, which consisted of one resource management specialist, Cat Hawkins, an Interpretation Division member, Division Chief Hank Warren, one Maintenance Division member, Trail Crew Foreman Richard Hanson, and Ed Schreiner, who represented the Natural Science Studies group. All division chiefs were expected to attend these monthly meetings, although during the busy summer months, the meetings were less regular. Regular participants included Assistant Superintendent for Operations Don Jackson; Assistant Superintendent for Professional Services Randy Jones; Assistant Superintendent for Planning and Development John Teichert; East District Ranger Woody Jones; West District Ranger Howard Yanish; a district naturalist appointed by Hank Warren; Chief of Natural Science Studies John Aho; Chief of Maintenance Pete Fielding; and the Road and Trail foremen, Gordon Grall and Richard Hanson.40

Lessons Of Camp Kiwanis

In the 1990s, cultural resource management became proactive. Spurred by the 1990 controversy at Camp Kiwanis, park officials recognized a new value in compliance efforts. Statute not only demanded park action, it also gave Olympic a way to rule out activities inside its boundaries that did not conform to Park Service goals. Camp Kiwanis fit this description. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Boy Scouts operated “Camp Baldy” on 3.4 acres of national forest land on the north shore of Lake Quinault. The camp contained a dining hall and four cabins. Such uses were not exceptional under the Forest Service, for they fit that agency’s vision of recreation. The camp persisted until the mid-1950s,

40 Cat Hawkins Hoffmann, comment, draft administrative history, December 2003.
when the Kiwanis Club of Hoquiam took over. At the time, the National Park Service did not discourage such uses, and it issued one-year permits to the Kiwanis annually until 1978. That year, the club ceased to request permit renewal, acting as if tenancy conveyed ownership. In spring 1990, National Park Service officials expressed concern about the deteriorating condition of camp facilities. Grays Harbor and federal health officials inspected the camp and cited serious health code violations. In July 1990, the National Park Service announced its intention to shut down the camp. By that time, the campsite housed ten structures, including the old dining room and counselors’ quarters. In February 1991, park officials burned the camp’s dining hall and counselor’s dormitory. Work crews then pumped the cesspool and filled it with gravel.

The razing of the two buildings raised major questions about historic preservation and cultural resource management at Olympic National Park. Contrary to both Section 106 of the NHPA and National Park Service policy for the removal of structures, Olympic park officials had not adequately evaluated the dining hall and counselors’ dormitory for eligibility for the NRHP prior to their removal. Between the razing of the camp in February 1991 and the generation of the environmental assessment in August of the same year, local interests focused on the lack of statutory compliance. Regional Park Service officials investigated and found that park personnel had failed to complete a Section 106 evaluation, an omission that Olympic National Park staff acknowledged in a subsequent environmental assessment. The admission of the oversight revealed shortcomings in the park’s structure for managing CRM.41

On June 13, 1991, after analyzing photographs of the camp, Olympic National

Park staff submitted a request to determine NRHP eligibility to the Washington State Historic Preservation Office. In hindsight, the state historic preservation officer and park authorities agreed that despite the razed buildings’ association with early recreational opportunities on the Olympic Peninsula, they probably would not have met National Register criteria for historical significance. Park personnel individually determined that the remaining eight structures at the campsite similarly lacked architectural or historic distinction and were not eligible for NRHP nomination. In the end, after U.S. Senator Slade Gorton, R-WA, attached a rider to a Department of the Interior appropriations bill that mandated the park work with the community to reconstruct the camp, the National Park Service rebuilt it.42

**Emphasizing CRM**

After the Camp Kiwanis controversy, the Pacific Northwest Regional Office pushed Olympic National Park to re-emphasize cultural resource management. The 1991 Resources Management Plan acknowledged that the park’s existing CRM programs did not adequately address important historic resources and stressed the need for regional consultation and control of an organized CRM effort. In July 1992, Olympic National Park, in conjunction with Pacific Northwest Regional Office CRM chief Stephanie Toothman, created a position for a cultural resources manager. Statutory compliance was a primary obligation of the position; the new manager would be expected to shift the burden of compliance from the regional office to the park. The resource management

---

committee, in existence since 1987, developed the park’s first procedural system for
project review and statutory compliance, called the Project Clearance Form.

When Chief Ranger Chuck Janda retired in the early 1990s, Cat Hawkins
Hoffman became the park’s management assistant. Bill Pierce inherited the resource
management committee and Project Clearance responsibility from Janda, and assigned
Paul Gleeson to facilitate it. Gleeson, an archeologist in the Alaska Regional Office,
became Olympic’s first Cultural Resource Division chief in 1992.43

At the time, CRM remained a part of Resource Protection and Visitor Services, an
arm of the Ranger Division. This historic coupling persisted long after the trend away
from the regional office handling much of the park’s CRM activity became pronounced.
Olympic’s arrangement did not reflect the significance of statutory compliance, and it
seemed an anachronistic form as National Park Service management responded to
changes. “All the cultural resources were folded under the ranger division,” assistant
Superintendent Roger Rudolph remembered, “so [CRM] was really the red-headed
stepchild twice removed.”44

As a way to begin to address the complicated question of the role of CRM,
Gleeson led the Project Compliance Review Committee (PCR) and became the park’s
Section 106 coordinator. The PCR had been developed by the resource management
committee, and Gleeson found techniques that had been common during his tenure in
Alaska also were useful. “We needed something kind of independent to evaluate projects

43 Chief, Cultural Resources Division, Pacific Northwest Region, to Regional Director, Pacific
Northwest Region, Memorandum of Agreement Covering Cultural Resources Manager Position, Olympic
National Park, July 30, 1992, Paul Gleeson Personnel Files, Olympic NP archives; Memorandum of
Agreement Between Olympic National Park and the Pacific Northwest Region Office; Resources
and determine what kind of projects needed what kind of compliance,” he remembered.

“Prior to PCR, projects were approved at the discretion of a resource [management] committee that exercised a kind of pocket veto of projects they did not like.” CRM advocates felt that the system did not serve Olympic’s ends. Necessary projects were not undertaken and what Gleeson called “selective compliance” took place. Others disagreed with Gleeson’s perspective, regarding it as an inaccurate perception of bias against cultural resources.45

A secondary goal of the PCR was to improve communication between all divisions in the park. National Park Service personnel had considered Olympic as a wilderness park for so long that many in the agency regarded its only values as natural. The designation of the wilderness area in 1988 furthered this perception, and CRM seemed to directly conflict with the stated goals of wilderness management. Some asked whether cultural resources management could take place in a designated wilderness. Did the strictures of the Wilderness Act permit such action? The Camp Kiwanis incident demanded new ways of addressing CRM.46

When Gleeson arrived at Olympic, he viewed the park as “a little behind the times in terms of compliance.” Setting out to rectify the limited approach, he created a base-funded position for Jacilee Wray, who had been doing ethnography as well as other CRM projects since 1990. He also added archaeologist Dave Conca, brought Susan Schultz, the park historian, into CRM, and later hired Gay Hunter as park curator to handle collections management and biological specimen curating duties.47 By the end of the

1990s, Olympic National Park had dramatically upgraded cultural resource practices. Section 106 drove the CRM compliance process, as did the National Register process. The clear statutory mandate underpinned ongoing competition between cultural and natural resource management. In the view of cultural resource staff, natural resource personnel felt pressure to keep its concerns in the forefront. Natural resources management had an equally substantial statutory responsibility, and the two obligations sometimes clashed.

The new General Management Plan, coming to fruition in 2007, provided the best venue to resolve such issues. CRM managers focused on the process in an effort to ascertain the role of cultural resource management in Olympic’s future. The “real question is about us not going through with the plan because of the conflict between wilderness and CRM, because the designation of the park as a wilderness park necessarily meant removal of cultural resources because their presence conflicted with that wilderness designation,” Gleeson insisted in 2002.

This question echoed an ongoing conundrum for the National Park Service. Its complicated mandate as an agency required many different approaches to management issues. Preservation had not always been the watchword of the National Park Service, but it had always been a value. Yet, preservation meant different things in different situations, and throughout the park system, different types of preservation often collided with one another. In some instances, parallel statutory mandates were incompatible; that is, achieving one kind of mandate necessarily prevented another. At Olympic, that competition was in clear and high relief.

Wilderness And CRM

The history of cultural resource management at Olympic National Park illustrated the complex issues that park officials face in preserving the region’s rich heritage in a “natural” park. Wilderness mandates have as much influence on CRM activities as NHPA and its amendments have on wilderness. Yet, since the 1970s, when Olympic first began to address formally its cultural resources, cultural resource management has become a necessary component of park administration. In 2005, the parkwide National Register nomination list included seventy-eight historic structures, with thirty in the wilderness backcountry. The parkwide List of Classified Structure included 112 properties. These numbers demonstrated a firm park commitment to cultural resource compliance.

Even through 2002, cultural resource management at Olympic National Park continued to pose genuine challenges. The 1999 Resources Management Plan noted a gap in the Historic Structure Reports and cultural resources project statements. Both are still needed to address research and evaluation of historic research as well as document the significance of the park’s historic structures to assure the preservation of their integrity. The most pressing issue concerned surveying Olympic’s cultural resources. Presented with a plethora of archaeological sites, historic structures, ethnographic resources, and cultural landscapes, Olympic officials have systematically surveyed less than 1 percent of the park for cultural resources that include prehistoric archeological sites, homesteading, mining, logging, railroading, recreational development, military development, and administrative history sites. Although some areas likely will yield little or no archaeological potential, park authorities believe that additional fieldwork will
produce many significant sites.\textsuperscript{50} However, these obligations require resources that are not always available.

As the twenty-first century began, the history of development along the Elwha River and its imminent restoration as well as the development of the park \textit{General Management Plan} provided pointed philosophical questions for CRM managers. Since the 1966 NHPA and the environmental legislation of the 1960s and 1970s, both the National Park Service and public have increasingly responded to the importance of legal mandates to protect cultural resources in “natural” national parks. In many instances, as in Olympic National Park, the complex, intertwined character of natural and cultural resource management has meant that two different kinds of missions have overlapped at the park. Cultural resource management came into its own at Olympic, but only after a long struggle and with the added hammer of the compliance mandate. Maintaining the gains of the 1980s and 1990s will demand the recognition that CRM is a valid responsibility for the National Park Service at all of its units, especially Olympic National Park.

\textsuperscript{50} Resources Management Plan (1999), 2:1-2:3.
Figure 5-1: The trail shelter at Lunch Lake, in 1974. (Photographs courtesy of Olympic National Park, Accession Number OLYM-632, Box 3)

Figure 5-2: Trail shelter, Old Bogachiel Guard Station, 1953.
Figures 5-3 and 5-4: Above and below, Humes Ranch, September 1972.
Figure 5-5: Nylund Homestead at Lake Ozette, circa 1925.

Figure 5-6: Nylund Homestead.
Figure 5-7: The two-room cabin at Roose’s Prairie, looking southeast across the cleared land. The door is on the north end of the cabin.
Figure 5-8: Roose’s Prairie homestead in 1940, looking across cleared land to sheep barn and rail fences.

Figure 5-9: Buildings at Roose’s Prairie homestead in 1940 included the sawmill building, left, old barn, center, and outbuildings, left.
Figures 5-10 and 5-11: Above and below: Views of Indian village at La Push, Washington.
Figure 5-12: Ozette Indian village, circa 1900. Wreckage from a ship lies scattered on the beach.
Figure 5-13: The Hoh Indian reservation at the mouth of the Hoh River.

Figure 5-14: Leven P. Coe, a Quilault Indian, makes a canoe south of the Queets Village.
Figure 5-15: Native Americans act as guides for tourists on Lake Quinault.

Figure 5-16: Richard Mike, a member of the S’Klallam tribe, displays some of his carvings at a cultural demonstration at the Port Angeles Visitor Center.
Chapter 6:

Interpreting the Wilderness . . . and More

As the nation’s premier wilderness park in the lower forty-eight states, Olympic National Park faced unique interpretive challenges. Ardent advocates of the park from the conservation community and later the popular environmental movement indirectly shaped the park’s focus on interpretation. Accordingly, Olympic National Park’s efforts to communicate with the public began with wilderness and natural history, expanding to a more comprehensive approach in the 1990s when several forward-looking individuals sought to offer a more comprehensive accounting of the park’s assets.

Since Olympic National Park’s 1938 establishment, interpretation has remained the critical avenue through which the public best learns about the peninsula park and the National Park Service, providing distinct messages about the park’s natural, cultural, and historic resources and its meaning in U.S. society. In 1996, Olympic’s Statement for Management stressed the importance of interpretive programs – from naturalist-led walks, talks, films, park newsletters and trail leaflets to campfire programs, museums, and wayside exhibits. “It is essential that interpretation is scientifically based, thematic and interactive,” the statement read. “The objective is to develop a sense of environmental stewardship in the visitor and increase public understanding of the park and its management policies.” This articulation reflected a long-standing focus brought up to date.

As a large natural park with spectacular features, Olympic National Park fit the

---

main current of Park Service interpretative philosophy almost perfectly from the 1930s to
the 1970s. In an age when the agency classified parks by their primary attributes,
Olympic enjoyed the benefit of a clearly articulated set of wilderness features that
matched the National Park Service’s dominant values. Park administrators reflected the
changing agency and national view of interpretation, implemented various programs that
redefined staff duties, and honed the park’s ability to meet a growing interpretive
mission. At the same time, the evolution of interpretation at Olympic revealed how the
agency learned to broaden its mission to more comprehensively serve the public.

**Emotional Responses**

At its establishment in 1916, the National Park Service was a small agency
focused on promoting its parks and intent on finding its place in the federal bureaucracy.
Agency officials did not conceive of explaining the national parks to the public, believing
that the sites they managed had an inherent emotional appeal. Many of the heavily visited
national parks such as Yosemite and Yellowstone possessed natural features – mountains,
geysers, and waterfalls – that spoke for themselves, evoking powerful emotional
responses from visitors. In an era when a national park trip was a luxury experience,
people who visited them already understood their meaning as emblems of America, the
odd combination of appreciation for the spectacular and reinforcement of the power of
the nation that so characterized the pre-World War I Progressive era. The National Park
Service initially threw itself into land acquisition and development; explaining parks to
the visiting public was far from the center of early agency objectives because visitors
shared the values of the people who proclaimed the parks and intuitively understood their
significance.²

By the early 1920s, the National Park Service realized that it could attract more
visitors and better serve them by engaging them in educational activities that elicited
intellectual as well as emotional responses to their surroundings. Interpretation in the
National Park Service began with Director Stephen T. Mather’s creation of an unofficial
“educational division” shortly after the agency’s establishment. In 1918, Interior
Secretary Franklin K. Lane’s famous letter that gave the National Park Service its charge
reinforced the concept of using parks as classrooms for the public by pointing out that the
“educational, as well as the recreational, use of the national parks should be encouraged
in every practicable way.” Lane noted the value of the national parks to high school and
university science classes, and advocated the construction of museums to present the
scientific and historic aspects of the parks’ unique features.³

Outside Assistance

Despite its growing constituency, the National Park Service initially lacked
adequate funds to implement comprehensive educational programs and museums in its
parks. Setting the pattern for the interpretation programs developed through the 1920s,
the agency turned to outside organizations to design and finance interpretive activities. In
May 1918, Charles D. Wolcott, secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, organized the
National Parks Association, designing the organization to interpret the natural features of
the national parks and monuments and circulate information to visitors. Wolcott stressed
the importance of providing travelers with the opportunity to study the history,

² Hal K. Rothman, Devil’s Bargains: Tourism in the Twentieth Century American West (Lawrence:
³ Letter of May 13, 1918, reproduced in Lary M. Dilsaver, ed. America’s National Park System: The
Park Service Assumes Responsibility,” in Interpretation in the National Park Service: A Historical Perspective
exploration, and folklore of these areas. The association became an influential force throughout the entire national park system.\(^4\)

Other outside organizations developed interpretation programs for specific parks. In 1919, the University of California extension division inaugurated a lecture series in Yosemite National Park led by notable professors that continued through 1923. The presentations, which took place around the camps and campfires, melded intellectual and emotional responses to the natural environment. Establishing both a rationale and an audience, these talks served as catalysts for further National Park Service interpretation efforts.\(^5\)

The National Park Service implemented its first large-scale internal interpretation programs in Yosemite and Yellowstone in 1920. Mather had been impressed with California-run interpretative programs at Lake Tahoe and persuaded the programs’ educators – Professor Loye Holmes Miler of the University of California and Harold C. Bryant, educational director of the California Fish and Game Commission – to initiate a similar program in Yosemite. Bryant subsequently organized the Yosemite Free Nature Guide Service, which offered lectures, campfire talks, and guided visitors on nature hikes. At Yellowstone, Superintendent Horace M. Albright appointed the agency’s first official park naturalist and two seasonal interpretive rangers. The trio led field trips, gave lectures, and prepared natural history bulletins for visitors. By the mid-1920s, the ranger naturalist had become a fixed feature at many national parks, though until the 1930s the


National Park Service did not fully integrate this position into management.\(^6\)

The National Park Service concurrently planned for the establishment of park museums, which along with visitor centers, became the principal venues of interpretation. Mather’s 1920 annual National Park Service report called for the establishment of museums in all parks at a time when there were none in the system. Like the agency’s early interpretive programs, the first museums relied on outside support. Yosemite, where the Yosemite Museum Association helped open a museum in June 1922, provided a model for park museums with its six-room structure designated for history, ethnology, geology, natural history, and botany exhibits. Yellowstone, Rocky Mountain, Mesa Verde, Lassen Volcanic, Mount Rainier, Grand Canyon, and Sequoia national parks developed museums, information stations, nature guide services, and interpretive programs during the 1920s. Many parks benefited from private philanthropy and boasted privately funded museums or visitor centers overseen by the National Park Service.\(^7\)

**Education Division**

The National Park Service formalized its interpretation activities in 1925 with the establishment of an education division. Headquartered at the Forestry School at the University of California – Berkeley, the division expanded the scope and range of interpretation activities throughout the national park system. In 1928, the secretary of the interior appointed an ad hoc committee to study the parks’ educational programs and potential for growth. It recommended the formation of an educational advisory body

---


based in Washington, D.C., that would work with the National Park Service director on educational policy and development. In response, two years later Director Horace Albright appointed Harold Bryant assistant director of the National Park Service, in charge of the newly created Branch of Research and Education. This division formalized the roles of educational specialists such as naturalists. During Bryant’s tenure, the division of education advocated the development of field trips, lectures, exhibits, and literature that would help visitors understand park features through first-hand experience. Bryant also recommended hiring highly trained personnel with field experience, and developing a research program that would fulfill the goals of the agency’s educational programs.8

Museum development closely followed interpretation at the parks. In 1935, the National Park Service established a Museum Division in its Washington, D.C., Branch of Research and Education office. By 1939, seventy-six museums dotted the national park system. Most presented the park stories through text-heavy, chronological “book on the wall” exhibits, an approach that continued until it fell out of favor in the 1960s, when the focus shifted to artifacts and hands-on exhibits.9

Olympic’s Efforts

By the establishment of Olympic National Park, the National Park Service already possessed a developed interpretive structure. All that remained was for the new park to implement it, but the question of its applicability loomed very large. On one level, as a spectacular national park, Olympic did not require a great deal of specialized

---


interpretation. Its visitors, the National Park Service assumed, selected their destination for a reason, and knew a great deal about it when they arrived. With many other obligations that seemed more pressing at the new park, interpretation became a secondary concern.

As a result, interpretation at Olympic National Park began with a single ranger naturalist. World War II demanded an even greater level of cooperation among national parks, as the United States directed available resources to the war effort and parks had to make do. In 1944, Mount Rainier National Park Naturalist Howard R. Stagner developed Olympic’s first interpretive development plan. The relationship between the two parks was close, and Preston P. Macy, who had worked as a ranger at Mount Rainier before serving at Olympic and returned there as superintendent after working on the peninsula, looked to his better-established neighbor as a source for expertise. The plan was basic, well short of the expectations developed during the New Deal. Instead of a museum, Olympic program stressed the importance of guided walks and lectures. This inauspicious beginning left Olympic with limited aspirations. In November 1947, Regional Naturalist Dorr Yeager suggested focusing available manpower toward implementing interpretive programs, especially talks and lectures for visitors. He stressed the need for more interpretive personnel at Olympic.10

The Fagerlund Era

The impetus behind a more comprehensive interpretation program came from the park’s first naturalist, Gunnar Fagerlund. He arrived at Olympic National Park in 1947, transferring from Hawaii National Park. During most of his tenure at Olympic, he served

10 “November 6, 1947, August 18, August 31, 1948 Interpretation. Interpretive Programs,” Nat. Park Serv. File No. 833-08, Olympic NP archives.
as the park’s only permanent naturalist, overseeing the daily interpretive activities inside
the park and acting as outreach coordinator. Fagerlund was the first to insist upon the
value of interpretation. “Olympic is a confusing and bewildering maze to visitors unless
interpretive contact is made,” he intoned in a monthly narrative report. During his first
years at Olympic, Fagerlund developed an interpretative strategy that characterized the
park and explained its vast natural and cultural features to growing numbers of visitors.11

In 1951, Fagerlund’s efforts culminated in the park’s first interpretive planning
document, the Interpretive Development Outline. Modeled on interpretive planning at
other parks, the plan focused on specific ways to explain Olympic’s features to the
public. Fagerlund divided the park’s interpretive subjects into different categories. His
list included Olympic’s coniferous rain forest, wildlife, mountains, climate and
hydrologic cycle, mountain wildflowers, and ocean strip. He also included the human
experience, noting that because Olympic was “an exhibit of a bit of primitive America,”
it possessed “inspirational” value to visitors. If the park properly developed educational
programs on these subjects, he noted, they would enhance visitors’ experiences. He also
made a link between human and natural history. Drawing on Aldo Leopold’s recently
published A Sand County Almanac, the most sophisticated mid-century ecological
appraisal of wilderness and its virtues, Fagerlund stressed that all educational programs
must emphasize the fundamental relationship between people and nature.12 This
foretelling of the rise of ecology prompted a new vision of interpretation at Olympic
National Park. Natural science seemed poised to replace natural history.

---
11 “April 15, May 25, 1949, 1950 Interpretation. Interpretive Programs,” Nat. Park Serv. File No. 833-08,
Olympic NP archives.
12 Gunnar Fagerlund, “Interpretive Development Outline, Olympic National Park” (1951), OLYM 18405,
Box 2, Folder 21, 1951-53 Interpretive Programs, Olympic NP archives 4; Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac
The interpretive development outline provided a comprehensive operational vision of interpretation as well. Fagerlund noted the varieties of outside research undertaken in the park and noted who was conducting them. He designed exhibits and plotted their locations, covering everything from road signs on existing and planned roads to exhibits for future museums. Fagerlund recognized that a museum prospectus had not been developed and sought to influence the process by recommending sites. He also devised a schedule of lectures and talks for locations in the park and even planned an interpretive cruise of Lake Crescent. As comprehensive and detailed an interpretive perspective as the agency had yet devised, Fagerlund’s 1951 plan offered a model vision for interpretation at Olympic.\textsuperscript{13}

Leopold’s concept of an intertwined relationship between people and their park inspired Fagerlund. The park naturalist’s communication program conveyed this complicated vision to visitors. As very little ethnography or archaeology had yet been conducted at Olympic, Fagerlund necessarily focused on the park’s natural history and features. In the early 1950s, assisted by seasonal rangers, Fagerlund led weekly scheduled talks at different locations, including Heart O’Hills, Rosemary Inn, Sol Duc Hot Springs, Staircase, and Hurricane Ridge. Natural history – “Roundtrip of a Raindrop,” “Rain Forest,” “Animals in Olympic,” “Wilderness Coast,” and “What’s Flowering Now” – dominated the topics, along with a “Where to Go” introduction to the park. These talks supplemented the nature leaflets intended for self-guiding trails, including Hurricane Ridge, Storm King, and the Hoh rain forest. Fagerlund and his seasonal staff developed and led free educational activities for visitors, which included exhibits and slide lectures at Lake Crescent and illustrated campfire talks at La Poel campground. Fagerlund also

\textsuperscript{13} Fagerlund, “Interpretive Development Outline, Olympic National Park.”
supervised field trips for school groups and associations on various topics, including tree
identification. Small information stations at Lake Crescent, Storm King, and Big
Meadows aided visitors’ orientation to the park’s features. By 1953, “Interpretation
Services” had become a formal section of Fagerlund’s monthly report to the
superintendent.14

Despite Fagerlund’s vision, in its interpretative efforts Olympic lagged far behind
other major national park areas. Museums became crucial components of Park Service
interpretation, significant indicators of the importance of specific parks and of the need to
communicate with the public. Yosemite, Yellowstone, and the Grand Canyon all
developed museums in the 1920s and the New Deal created a good many more. By 1939,
the park system contained seventy-six museums; those parks without facilities had plans
for them by the end of the decade. Mount Rainier developed its first museum plan in
1939. Olympic’s lack of a plan for a museum resulted in part from its late establishment.
By 1938, much of the momentum of New Deal development had slowed; with so many
other obligations at the new park, such as administration facilities, interpretation planning
fell by the wayside. The result left Olympic as a major national park with a level of
interpretive planning similar to national monuments such as Death Valley.15

The Post-War Public


After World War II, the traveling public expanded in number, and the expectations of its members reflected the new more prosperous national ethos. The end of the war in 1945 gave more Americans a chance at the perquisites of the good life, and the constituency for vacation travel dramatically increased. Within a few years, most Americans enjoyed greater disposable income and more vacation time. A combination of affluence, pent-up demand for leisure after more than a fifteen-year lean period during the Depression and World War II, and new fashions that stressed access to a wider intellectual and conceptual world as part of the pleasures of middle class life heightened the importance of national parks and the interpretation they offered.16

Much of this new wave of travel occurred by automobile, the personal conveyance that promised individual freedom and authentic experience. After the war, automobile ownership became a badge of middle-class status, and the annual two-week automobile vacation in the summer became first a requirement of life and then a caricature of itself. The demand for recreation in national parks and forests soared so high that neither the National Park Service nor any other federal land management agency could keep pace. Not only were available campsites as rare as the American Bald Eagle, uncollected garbage covered existing campgrounds, campers illegally cut timber for firewood, and other eyesores dotted the parks. Noted author Bernard DeVoto recommended closing the national parks if they could not be better managed. Automobile

---

ownership in the post-war period strained the limits of federal and private systems.\textsuperscript{17} Most of this automobile tourism typically took place between Memorial Day in late May and Labor Day in early September, the boundaries of the classic and idealized summer, when children were out of school, the weather was warm, and families could spend time together. Tourists went everywhere and anywhere, purchased enormous quantities of food, gasoline, and other staples, filled motels and hotels, and generally kept moving, staying only an insignificant length of time in all but one or two of their stops. A chaos of road travel existed, in which tourists traveled the mythic landscapes of the West, staying only where they landed at the end of a day. Two days before Memorial Day weekend, tourist camps and motels were vacant; two days after Labor Day, the cacophony subsided and those businesses returned to silence.

\textbf{Park Pamphlets}

Post-war U.S. society craved both mobility and national pride, and travel to national parks amply filled that niche. The middle class embraced travel as a reflection of itself and expected the National Park Service to provide information that made its journeys worthwhile. Without a museum, Olympic relied on printed materials to accomplish this complicated task. Fagerlund, other park staff, and outside writers published guides, booklets, and leaflets to enhance visitors’ understanding of Olympic’s resources. During the 1950s, the retention of outside specialists to write about national parks became more typical. In this era, the National Park Service provided pamphlets about each park; these typically eight- to twelve-page booklets contained black and white photographs, travel information, and interpretation. Many visitors sought more depth,

\textsuperscript{17} DeVoto, “Let's Close the National Parks,” 49-52; David A. Clary, \textit{Timber and the Forest Service} (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 160-62; Jakle, \textit{The Tourist}, 193-95
spawning a cottage industry in writing and photographing parks such as Olympic.

The publications primarily focused on a park’s natural history and natural resources. In the early 1950s, Olympic staff members prepared charts of flowering plants of the high country at Hurricane Ridge and Deer Park, a leaflet on mountain flowers, and booklets on flowering shrubs and lowland flowers and trees. In 1951, geologist Wilbert R. Danner published *A Brief Guide to Geology of the Olympic National Park*. This was followed a year later by Fagerlund’s *Olympic Handbook* and, in 1954, by his *Olympic National Park*. The latter, the initial official park publication, was the first of a planned Natural History Handbook Series to be developed by park naturalists throughout the National Park Service. Fagerlund’s volume provided an account of Olympic’s natural resources and geologic history, serving as a valuable reference tool for visitors. The National Park Service published nine natural history handbooks throughout the system before 1959, when the agency reprinted the most popular titles, including *Olympic Handbook*. As part of this series, Fagerlund also wrote *The Geology of Olympic National Park* in 1955.¹⁸

Without resources to support interpretation from staff personnel, Olympic National Park was confined to pamphlet and paper production. This was a less than adequate approach, especially as visitation grew after World War II. Between 1931 and 1948, visits to the national parks soared from 3.5 million to 30 million. National park facilities – many constructed by New Deal programs such as the Civilian Conservation Corps – remained largely the same. The problem this created was system-wide rather than specific to any individual park, and remedies had to come from the national level.

Need For A Museum

These new visitors longed for more tangible guides to the parks they so loved.

Since its establishment, Olympic National Park had prepared for the eventual construction of a museum. Staff members collected numerous artifacts, specimens, and articles that related to the area’s natural history. People outside the park also pushed for some permanent arrangement. As early as 1941, letters to park supervisors urged the inclusion of ethnology and archeology exhibits in any future museum – specifically, artifacts from tribal groups that inhabited Neah Bay on the peninsula’s coastal strip. By the 1950s, the park had a collection of donated Indian artifacts from middens on the Olympic Peninsula, tribal Indian baskets, bone artifacts, and a vast literature on the peninsula’s exploration and settlement history. It had so many items in its growing archival and library collection that by 1966, park collections of natural history specimens and historic artifacts were limited “to those intended for display and those essential to study for authentic presentation of the interpretive theme.”

Park officials initiated plans for the construction of a formal visitor center and museum at Olympic but until resources were available, ad hoc structures sufficed as information and museum facilities. In 1948, park maintenance crews rehabilitated the administration building and this became Olympic’s first museum-like facility. Although it served as an initial focal point for visitors, a sort of proto-visitor center, the structure was inadequate to serve the needs of the increasing numbers of park visitors. Nor did it facilitate the display or storage of Olympic’s growing collection of artifacts and

---

specimens. Formally planning for Olympic’s museums began in 1951. Fagerlund’s “Notes on the Museum Planning for Olympic National Park” conformed to principles that designated the design and purpose of park museums in the 1950s. The plan threw out the “old style ‘musty accumulation of curiosa’” that characterized so many mid-century museums, Fagerlund wrote, advocating instead centrally located facilities that provided park visitors with effective information and interpretive services. In conjunction with larger objectives, Fagerlund planned Olympic National Park’s museum not as a freestanding institution, but as one unit in a larger interpretive program of naturalist programs, field trips, lectures, publications, and trailside markers and exhibits. The museum would focus on viewing original objects, as advocated by the National Park Service’s interpretive wizard Freeman Tilden. It would contain an information booth, exhibit rooms, auditorium, reading room, naturalist staff office and space for cooperating scientists, museum workshop, photographic processing rooms, library stacks, and storage rooms.

The first formal proposal for a museum at Olympic debuted in the 1952 Master Plan. The plan envisioned a museum occupying a thirty-seven acre site donated to the National Park Service by Thomas Aldwell near park headquarters in Port Angeles. On the road to Heart O’ the Hills, the museum would serve as an orientation for park visitors, constitute the center of operations for interpretive programs, and provide safe storage for scientific, archeological, and historical collections. Its construction seemed to solve many of the dilemmas that faced park interpretation, but in 1952, there were no funds to build

---

20 Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative History, 170.
Following the pattern of outside involvement that typified museum development in the national park system throughout its history, the park and the Clallam County Historical Society, which was established in Port Angeles in 1948, formed a partnership. In March 1952, representatives of the Historical Society met with Fagerlund and Olympic Superintendent Fred J. Overly. They proposed to help the park build the museum, to be called the Olympic Pioneer Memorial Museum and Visitor Center, with one room set aside to honor the county’s early pioneers. Despite the reticence of Western Regional Director Lawrence Merriam, on April 30, 1953, Overly signed a memorandum of agreement with John Winters, president of the Clallam County Historical Society. A memorandum on June 23, 1952, had designated the Clallam County Historical Society as a “cooperating society in connection with the planning and development” of the museum. The National Park Service granted the historical society one room in the museum for an exhibit on the peninsula’s pioneer history. In exchange, the society promised to raise most of the funds for the museum’s construction. The historical society brought in significant amounts of funding, and combined with Fred Overly’s efforts, the project was soon under way. The groundbreaking ceremony for the Olympic Pioneer Memorial Museum took place on June 13, 1953, and construction began that September. The building trades class of the Port Angeles High

School donated labor. Overly’s original plan involved recruiting local loggers to clear a small section of the land so the park could use the felled timber for building. Although this measure would have saved money for materials, Merriam opposed Overly’s proposal for it seemed to blur the line between the National Park Service and other federal agencies that facilitated timber cutting.24

As the prospect of a park museum became a reality, Fagerlund expanded the preliminary museum prospectus into a full-fledged Olympic National Park Museum Prospectus, approved by Merriam on April 30, 1954. The prospectus defined Olympic’s physical interpretive needs, expressing the desire “to integrate the many park stories” and “convert diversity into wholeness,” again adhering to Park Service interpretation leader Freeman Tilden’s idea that interpretation should present a whole rather than any one part of a story. Olympic lacked distinctiveness from its surrounding environment, Fagerlund recognized, leaving the “average traveler in a perplexing situation.” The national park and the lands outside it seemed the same. Visitors needed interpretation to understand what they experienced on National Park Service properties. A well-planned museum would not only “help the visitor to ‘get his bearings,’” Fagerlund wrote, but also “greatly enhance his understanding, appreciation, and enjoyment of the park.” The museum would orient visitors to Olympic’s significant features and “provide a simple, concise, graphic interpretation of the whole park story.”25

To present that story, Fagerlund suggested that museum exhibits introduce visitors to Olympic’s natural history as well as offer suggestions for enjoying the park.

24 Fred Overly, Superintendent, Olympic, to Director, May 22, 1957, OLYM 18405, Box 2, Folder 20 1955-1958 Museums [Exhibit Plans], Olympic NP archives.
He outlined three major exhibits for the purpose. “The Living Wilderness” would tell the natural story, including explanations of Olympic’s geology, hydrology, glaciers, vegetation, wildlife, and aboriginal history – an exhibit modeled on the work of Erna Gunther, director of the Washington State Museum at the University of Washington and an expert on native peoples. “The Last Frontier” would portray the area’s discovery by Europeans, exploration, and settlement. Finally, “Where to Go and What to See” would offer relief models, literature, and maps for ease of visitation.

Fagerlund’s plan provided for eighteen exhibits in the museum’s main room and additional material in the lobby, in addition to the historical exhibits that the National Park Service and the Clallam County Historical Society would plan cooperatively. The museum branch of the National Park Service in Washington, D.C., would design most of Fagerlund’s planned exhibits. In line with the museum exhibits popular throughout the park system at the time, most of the Pioneer Memorial Museum’s exhibits would be flat wall panels with maps, photographs, photographic montages, and large printed text – all illuminated by fluorescent lighting. The exhibits covered all aspects of Olympic’s history. Exhibit 2 illustrated the creation of the Olympic Mountains; Exhibit 3 showed Pleistocene glaciation and its effect on the Olympic landscape. Exhibit 13 introduced Olympic’s animal life, “calling attention to relationship between animals and habitats, variety of animal life, peculiar features of Olympic wildlife, and National Park Service policy.” Short text blocks about bald eagles’ habitat in the park accompanied vivid watercolor paintings. Cumulatively the exhibits portrayed almost all of Olympic’s known

---

An American Eden

natural and cultural history.\textsuperscript{27}

Fagerlund’s 1954 prospectus also called for the construction of smaller museums in addition to the main Pioneer Memorial Museum. These “wayside” museums included an observation museum and fire lookout at Hurricane Ridge, and a small building at Lake Crescent and Kalaloch. The prospectus planned other exterior exhibits for the Hoh area, Staircase, Graves Creek, Ozette, and Dosewallips. Most of these would focus on natural history and wilderness, further emphasizing the park’s orientation in that direction.

Revising The Museum Plan

Olympic staff updated the museum exhibit plan in 1955 and 1956. The new museum document’s missions remained the same as those articulated in the 1954 prospectus: to provide orientation for visitors; to serve as the center of operation for the Olympic interpretive program; and to provide safe storage for various collections. The revised plan also offered detailed information about the eighteen exhibits, providing a comprehensive list of necessary photographs, specimens, sketches, lighting diagrams, wall openings, and case installations. Only the concept for the wayside museums changed significantly in this updated plan.

The 1955-1956 revision altered the existing recommendation for the three wayside museums. The Lake Crescent Wayside Museum would be a comparatively small structure to serve as summer headquarters for interpretive activities at Lake Crescent, a popular visitor destination site. It would contain an information desk, exhibit room, and office space for seasonal naturalists. Exhibits in a panel titled “The Story of Lake

Crescent” would portray the aboriginal history, character, and biology of Lake Crescent. “The Forest Story” would introduce a self-guided nature trail, and the final exhibit, “Where to Go and What to See Around Lake Crescent” would introduce the area to visitors. The prospectus envisioned the second planned wayside museum, the Hurricane Ridge Observation Museum, for Big Meadow or Obstruction Peak. Fagerlund justified the structure by arguing that “Hurricane will in all probability become the most important day use area in the Park. It offers excellent interpretive opportunities requiring personal services of naturalists and modest museum facilities.” The museum would contain an information desk and 360-degree observation platform. Its exhibit room would describe the area through exhibits of “The Geological History of the Olympics,” “Glaciers and Glaciation,” “History of Exploration,” and “Mountain Flowers,” which would encourage visitors to embark on a self-guided flower trail. Finally, the Rain Forest Museum, planned for a site at the end of the Hoh River Road, was to be a modest building “of design harmonious with the rain forest.” Exhibits there would include “Climate and Vegetation,” “The Round Trip of the Rain Drop,” “The Story of the Rain Forest,” and “Animals of the Forest.”

New Funds

Mission 66, a ten-year capital development program designed to refurbish the national park system by 1966, in time for the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the National Park Service, served as the catalyst for such development. Spearheaded by Park Service Director Conrad L. Wirth, the most development-oriented director since Mather, Mission 66 provided the national park system an even bigger boost than had the New Deal. Between 1956 and 1966, Mission 66 channeled funds into repairing and building

---

roads, hiring additional park employees, constructing new facilities, and acquiring land for future parks. Intended to improve deteriorated conditions in the national park system, Mission 66 resulted from the post-war visitor boom, which, according to former Director Newton Drury, made the parks “victims of war.” Mission 66 poured more than $1 billion into infrastructure development in the national parks for improvements that included the construction of large numbers of visitor centers and museums. Under the program, the National Park Service usually received whatever it requested from Congress, solving a range of issues at parks such as Olympic.29

The Pioneer Memorial Museum and Visitor Center, as well as the visitor center at Hurricane Ridge, which initially operated mainly as a ski lodge and concessions facility, greeted their first visitors in 1957. Although built before Mission 66, the pioneer museum benefited from the building program. Naturalist Glenn Gallison helped organize exhibits and acquired many of the items for the museum in Port Angeles, including representative samples of Olympic’s animals that taxidermists at the Western Museum Laboratory in San Francisco prepared. Later, museum staff added other artifacts to the museum, including Indian whaling tools, “touch” objects for children, and a pioneer cabin owned by the Clallam County Historical Society that sat behind the building, the first step in implementing more comprehensive park interpretation. Society members installed temporary exhibits on pioneer history in its portion of the museum in 1959, the first time the park interpreted any dimension of the peninsula’s Anglo-American past. At Hurricane Ridge, the exhibits focused on the high mountain environment, even as skiers whizzed down nearby slopes. The Hoh Visitor Center began operations in August 1963, logging

an average of 370 visitors daily for that month.30

Emphasizing Interpretation

These visitor centers and exhibits, the Pioneer Memorial Museum in particular, constituted the main visitor contact sites at Olympic National Park, but they formed only one component in a larger interpretive scheme. In his 1957 *Master Plan Development Outline* for interpretation, Fagerlund, in collaboration with regional staff, expanded Olympic’s interpretation programs. “The major objective of every activity and the purpose of every device employed in the interpretive program must be to facilitate an enjoyable and appropriate park experience through: first, increasing intellectual and esthetic perception of the Olympic wilderness scene; and second, increasing understanding of, and appreciation for, National Park preservation,” he wrote. No one had ever more clearly articulated the idea of Olympic as a wilderness park. The more visitor contacts, the better this vision could be fulfilled. The rise in park visitation, which had increased from 182,164 in 1947 to 864,600 in 1956, required more interpretive programs.31

At the time, approximately 10 percent of all Olympic visitors received some kind of interpretive service, but Fagerlund wished to reach a larger number. To attain that goal, he outlined a plan that would allow visitors to better understand Olympic’s wilderness features. Most visitors would never venture far into the actual wilderness, but


interpretation could educate them about the park in a range of ways, he proposed. Visitors who wished to learn about geology, such as valley glaciation, would benefit from the establishment of more programs and exhibits at Hurricane Hill and Hurricane Ridge.

Cape Alava would offer an appropriate spot for visitors to study intertidal vegetation. Lake Ozette, Quinault, Elwha, Hoh, and Queets’ pioneer homesteads, by contrast, could educate visitors about pioneer history. Ozette Village at Cape Alava amply illustrated Indian archaeology, incorporating some dimensions of cultural history in an interpretation dominated by natural history. Fagerlund also recommended placing interpretive markers at different locations throughout the park to explain the geology, vegetation, and human stories to visitors who did not wish to attend a more formal interpretive program.32

Fagerlund’s successor, Glenn D. Gallison, who became chief naturalist in March 1960, changed the plans for the wayside exhibits to match patterns of visitation and visitor flow within Olympic National Park. He placed the Coastal Strip museum at Ozette instead of Kalaloch, and abandoned the planned Hurricane Ridge Fire Watch Tower in favor of establishing more exterior exhibits throughout Olympic. In so doing, Gallison not only furthered Fagerlund’s interpretive plans and policies, but also redefined the nature and location of many of the park’s interpretive facilities.33

A vast array of publications, initiated by Fagerlund’s 1954 *Olympic National Park* Outline,” Fagerlund noted that the publications regularly sold at contact stations within

---

the park included his *Natural History Handbook*, Ruth Underhill’s *Indians of the Pacific Northwest* (1953), Grant Sharpe’s *101 Wildflowers of Olympic National Park* (1954), Wilbert Danner’s *Geology of Olympic National Park*, Ruby El Hult’s *Untamed Olympics* (1954), Edward A. Kitchin’s *Birds of the Olympic Peninsula* (1949), and William Graf’s *The Roosevelt Elk* (1955). These publications, all written during Fagerlund’s tenure as chief naturalist, encouraged the publication of further materials about Olympic. Later titles included Ruth Kirk’s *The Olympic Seashore* (1962) and *The Olympic Rainforest* (1966), Frederick Leissler’s *The Roads and Trails of Olympic National Park* (1965), Coleman Newman’s *The Olympic Elk* (1958), and books and pamphlets on the rainforest, trees, coastal strip, and park geography. Internal training publications, such as a handbook for seasonal ranger-naturalists issued in 1964, helped standardize ranger-led interpretive programs such as nature walks and campfire talks.34

By the early 1960s, Olympic’s interpretation programs had become very popular. Multi-faceted and varied, with many ways to reach the public, they had become an important part of the park’s offerings. The numbers of visitor contacts could be astonishing. In July 1961, park staff recorded 11,000 visitors at Heart O’ the Hills roadside exhibits and 68,248 interpretive “contacts,” up from 57,099 the previous year. In August 1961, total interpretive contacts numbered 96,112, up from 56,468 the previous year. By 1965, more than two million people visited Olympic National Park, most in the summer months, a significant percentage of whom relied on park interpretive programs. With the emphasis on accommodating visitors in the 1950s, the park made great strides in

---

its interpretation programs.\textsuperscript{35}

Although park visitors increasingly utilized interpretive services, Olympic’s budget for interpretation programs did not increase proportionally. Between 1965 and 1969, Olympic’s budget increased by almost 40 percent, but the interpretation allocation increased less than 18 percent. In part, changing priorities influenced the process. The end of Mission 66 hurt the resource-intensive programs and the success of the previous decade was illustrated by changing priorities. The 1966 \textit{Master Plan} highlighted wilderness, returning interpretation to a lesser position.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{New Priorities}

Changes in agency philosophy also affected interpretation. The 1963 Leopold report provided the National Park Service with stronger rationale for preserving Olympic’s vast natural resources. A few months later, the Robbins report expressed the need to utilize a scientific basis for managing the nation’s resources. These two documents challenged the traditional role of interpretation in national parks. When the National Park Service had established interpretive programs in the early 1920s, it assumed that visitors wanted – indeed, needed – explanation about their surroundings in order to appreciate them fully. Both reports averred that a park’s natural resources spoke for themselves, and that scientific management should take precedence over interpretation. As the two documents influenced agency policy in the subsequent years, backcountry use and research, acquisitions of inholdings, and renovations of campgrounds emerged as Olympic’s major priorities. Conventional visitor service was


diminished, with officials presuming that Mission 66 had amply provided for needs in the area.\textsuperscript{37}

The change precipitated a minor crisis, shifting interpretation across the National Park Service toward cultural resources just as momentum gathered that legislative forces converted into the National Historic Preservation Act in 1966. At Olympic, the distinction was less significant. The park had yet to develop a vision of cultural resource management or interpretation, and the new ethos left little room for interpreters. They were supposed to explain nature and wilderness, but the mandate they received pushed them away from this forte. It was a perplexing time for park interpreters.

**The Park Naturalists**

Olympic’s interpretative strength had always come from the position of park naturalist. A succession of strong visionary leaders had occupied the post, and their efforts created strong ties between Olympic and different groups. The naturalist represented the national park to visitors and outside communities. As did staff members throughout the national park system, Fagerlund and his successor, Glenn Gallison, regularly led visiting luminaries on naturalist trips. In a typical instance, in 1963, Gallison led the director of the Provincial Museum in Victoria, British Columbia, on a trip to La Push to observe the gray whales. Gallison also scheduled talks on Olympic’s unique features, including its elk population and current elk research, for organizations, including the Izaak Walton League, the Sequim Rotary Club, and the Kiwanis Club. This practice, common in the park system, helped to build ties with peninsula groups.

Gallison used these connections to bolster the park’s interpretive program. He

\textsuperscript{37} Sellars, *Preserving Nature in the National Parks*, 266-95; Mackintosh, *Interpretation in the National Park System*, 5-17.
learned about exhibit construction and interpretive methods from the Provincial Parks Branch of the Department of Recreation and Conservation in Victoria, observing interpretive programs at Miracle Beach and Manning provincial parks. “Many exhibit ideas were gained in observing [these] nature houses,” he wrote in August 1963. He also led training workshops for naturalist rangers throughout Washington’s state park system and attended regional museum conferences and the Stephen T. Mather Interpretive Training and Research Center training program at Harpers Ferry, West Virginia. Gallison’s attendance at these educational seminars translated into higher quality interpretation at the Pioneer Memorial Museum and other interpretive facilities at Olympic. 38

Olympic’s interpretive staffing increased in size in large part because of Mission 66, but its numbers fell as the development program came to an end. Under Gallison, who served as chief naturalist until 1966, when John Douglass succeeded him, the naturalist staff grew to six permanent personnel and more than twenty seasonal naturalists. In part a response to the same increased demand that prompted the creation of Mission 66, the halcyon days of the ranger-naturalist did not last through the 1960s. At the end of the decade, a National Park Service-wide initiative, the Field Office Study Team Program (FOST), offered recommendations that restructured interpretive activities at Olympic. The program established the position of the ranger-generalist in June 1969, which combined the prior positions of ranger, naturalist, and a general clerical series. The

---

agency’s introduction of the GS-025 Ranger series reflected the growing demand for law
enforcement that stemmed from the American Cultural Revolution, the constellation of
value changes that accompanied the rights revolution of the 1960s. Visitors behaved in
new and threatening ways, and with limited resources, the National Park Service
responded by restructuring job descriptions. With all these new responsibilities, ranger-
naturalists became a different breed than their strictly naturalist predecessors. In the end,
FOST abolished the much beloved position of park naturalist as an autonomous entity,
folding a role crucial in the history of Olympic National Park into a composite position
with other responsibilities.39

The demise of such a critical position in the park’s program suggested new
realities for interpretation. New responsibilities hamstrung the National Park Service,
exacerbated by the riot in Stoneman Meadows at Yosemite National Park on July 4,
1970, that precipitated the shift toward law enforcement. No longer did older assumptions
about the public and its feelings for the national parks hold. Conversely, interpretation
remained a bright spot in the complex relationship between visitors and their parks. Even
as some visitors challenged rangers and their efforts to maintain order, many more
embraced the rangers who told them about the places they visited. Yet from the
perspective of many in the National Park Service, rangers who interpreted part of the
time were hardly the equal of the vaunted park naturalist. At Olympic National Park, this
sentiment was particularly acute.

The shift had an impact on the quality of interpretive activities at Olympic
National Park in the early 1970s. The park’s 1972 Annual Report attributed the decline of
interpretation to “a reduced training at the beginning of the season, a loss of experienced

seasonals and lack of time on the part of some of the Area Managers in auditing and
supervising seasonal interpreters.” During the 1972 summer season, the park only had
one permanent ranger-naturalist on staff and thirteen seasonal employees. As a result,
while on-site interpretive programs attracted 78,151 participants in 1971, this number
dropped to 70,389 in 1972. Ranger-led trips exhibited a similar trend, decreasing from
19,193 participants in 1971 to 18,525 in 1972.40
The decrease in interpretive programs and staffing contrasted sharply with the rise
in visitors’ enthusiasm for existing interpretive programs. Despite the overall decline in
interpretive services, during 1973, visitor use of attended stations increased by about 15
percent. In 1974, interpretive contacts at Port Angeles, Staircase, and Hoh increased
noticeably. “This increase appears to support the fact that Olympic National Park is
within the effect of metropolitan Seattle-Tacoma area and that visitors are doing a more
complete job of seeing the parks in their regions,” noted the park’s 1974 Annual Report.
Confronted with these increasing demands, Olympic’s interpretive offerings could not
keep pace. By the time Chief Naturalist Henry “Hank” Warren arrived at Olympic in
1979, permanent interpretive personnel numbered five, including clerical support.
Seasonal staff dropped from a high of thirty-one a few years before to nineteen even as
visitation to the park dramatically increased as a result of the 1976 U.S. Bicentennial and
its aftermath. More than any other single situation, the decline in interpretation reflected
the limits of the park’s ability to serve its publics. Olympic National Park faced limited
resources and increasing demand. Something had to give; in the late 1970s, interpretation

---
40 Superintendent’s Annual Report, Olympic National Park (1972), OLYM 18242, Box 1, Folder
32: 1972, Olympic NP archives, 7; Superintendent’s Annual Report, Olympic National Park (1973),
OLYM 18242, Box 1, Folder 33: 1973, Olympic NP archives, 1, 5.
Despite the limitations of the era, Warren made great strides. He stressed “scientific and fact based interpretation,” starting the Science Notebook Series, a collection of material to support the park’s interpretation efforts. He encouraged his staff to write up their talks and walks so that future interpreters would have baseline knowledge. He also brought in experts in subject matter as part of training new interpreters. Warren also was the person most responsible for the establishment of the Olympic Park Institute. He sought a full service program, complete with college courses, children’s school programs and field seminars and elder hostel programs. In the end, Warren started a field seminar program out of his own budget. Warren kept after the idea, but circumstances worked against him. The Yosemite Institute was the primary entity for such endeavors in the West and Olympic National Park sought to develop a closer partnership. At one point, Yosemite Institute dropped Olympic, and Superintendent Robert Chandler was furious. Warren picked up the pieces of the shattered relationship, bringing the proposal forward. Chandler grudgingly allowed Warren to continue to explore the relationship, with the caveat that the superintendent not be at all involved. Warren conveyed the park’s distress, and if they wanted an institute, they needed to bring a proposal to the table. When they did, it included $800,000 and Warren’s condition that they absorb his field seminar program. The Olympic Park Institute was born and flourished.

---

43 Ibid.
Despite the compromising situation, Olympic National Park found ways to respond. A lack of personnel led to greater reliance on visual interpretation. At the Pioneer Memorial Museum and Visitor Center in Port Angeles, the park’s primary location for visitor contact, new media exhibits, combined with hands-on demonstrations, helped mitigate the absence of staff. In 1972, the National Park Service acquired new 16-millimeter films, Eastman Kodak’s *Olympic Legacy* and the revised orientation film, *Incredible Wilderness*. The park also commissioned the National Park Service’s Harpers Ferry Center to produce a thirty-minute interpretive film that displayed the outstanding features of Olympic National Park. S’Klallam and Quileute people served as cultural demonstrators in the museum, illustrating traditional basket weaving and wood carving to visitors.44 As some park personnel lamented the end of the intimate ranger-led experience, others heralded the beginning of a more sophisticated age of communication.

**Native American Involvement**

The park remained reticent about interpreting cultural history. By the mid-1970s, the nation’s cultural climate made it difficult for the National Park Service to interpret the experience of Native American communities in proximity to national parks. At Olympic, with eight tribal communities near its boundaries, Chief Naturalist Warren shied away from interpreting Indian people. While the Makah people succeeded with a museum that told their story as they saw it, the remainder of the peninsula’s tribal populations were not in a position to communicate adequately to the interested public.45 While the park’s decision to allow Native Americans to present their own past without federal involvement made considerable sense, it also meant that regional cultural history did not receive the

---

44 Superintendent’s Annual Report, Olympic National Park (1972), 7; Superintendent’s Annual Report, Olympic National Park (1973), 5.
level of interpretive attention it merited.

The Bicentennial greatly enhanced the interest in history and heritage, and Olympic National Park retooled in its aftermath. In 1977, staff at the Denver Service Center, the National Park Service’s centralized planning, design, and construction project management office, developed a new interpretive prospectus for Olympic. The team found severe problems in the park’s existing interpretive structure. The facilities developed with Mission 66 funds still comprised Olympic’s major interpretive structures, but they no longer served visitors’ needs. The poor quality and scant number of wayside exhibits offered a glaring example. The 1977 plan recommended major changes. Under the proposal, the second floor of Hurricane Ridge Lodge, which then served as concession space, was to be converted to interpretive use. When the lease for the concessionaire at Hurricane Ridge expired in 1981, the National Park Service used Park Restoration and Improvement Program funds to implement this change.\(^{46}\)

**Interpretation In the 1980s**

Despite a regional sociologist’s report that the National Park Service still suffered from “shrinking budgets and accelerated demands for services,” the structure of interpretation improved during the 1980s. In 1980, Olympic National Park allocated more staff positions to permanent interpretive personnel. Rehabilitating the Pioneer Memorial Museum and Visitor Center and constructing new wayside exhibits also received high priority. In 1980, the National Park Service started to construct a museum theater and renovate the building lobby in order to improve visitor flow. The Clallam County Historical Society added a new exhibit room that addressed pioneer and logging history, and the Harpers Ferry Center revised the museum’s outdated exhibits. The National Park

---

\(^{46}\) Fringer, *Olympic National Park: An Administrative History*, 172.
Service completed the museum rehabilitation in June 1982. The agency also installed the first dozen of 153 programmed wayside exhibits designed by the Harpers Ferry Center, the largest single wayside exhibit plan completed in the National Park Service’s history. Personnel also installed new exhibits at Hurricane Ridge Lodge and built a primitive amphitheater at Kalaloch campground.\textsuperscript{47}

The park’s publication program continued to be a mainstay of its interpretation efforts. By the mid-1970s, the Olympic Branch of the Pacific Northwest National Parks and Forests Association listed twelve titles developed by the park’s interpretive staff, including \textit{Geologic Guide to Hurricane Ridge}, \textit{Guide to the Hoh Rain Forest}, and \textit{Olympic Seashore}. Warren wrote \textit{Olympic: The Story Behind the Scenery} in 1982. This short book, like Fagerlund’s classic \textit{Olympic National Park}, provided the visitor with descriptions of the nature and significance of the park’s resources along with attractive color photographs and sophisticated maps. Including a chapter on “The Teeming Seashore,” it also updated Fagerlund’s text. In 1988, desktop computer publishing made it easier for park personnel to self-publish brochures. That year, Olympic Park staff produced three new trail brochures: \textit{The Spruce Railroad Trail Leaflet} (through the National Parks and Forests Association), \textit{Madison Creek}, a trail leaflet for visitors with disabilities, and \textit{Maple Glades Rainforest Trail}, produced with desktop publishing software and then photocopied. A number of other publications came out in 1988, including a revised \textit{The Geology of the Olympic}, Eric Bergland’s \textit{Prehistoric Life on the Olympic Peninsula} and \textit{Island of Rivers}, a complete anthology of the park’s natural

By 1988, the National Park Service recorded 2.7 million interpretive contacts at Olympic through park staff and exhibits, an increase of more than 50 percent over the decade. With support from Washington’s congressional delegation, Congress authorized, but initially did not fund, the buyout of the Clallam County Historical Society’s “possessory interest” in the Port Angeles Visitor Center and Museum. The buyout was later funded, and language in the legislation recognized this as compensation for Olympic’s “taking” of the museum. The park seemed poised to develop a comprehensive approach to interpretation.

Wilderness And Interpretation

The question of themes for interpretation underwent new scrutiny. The park had always presented natural history as its primary interpretive theme, and despite the National Park Service’s increasing emphasis on cultural resources, Olympic continued to accentuate its natural features. The impetus for designated wilderness contributed to maintaining that focus, as did a battle over the spotted owl. Shortly after Interpretation Specialist Michael Smithson arrived at Olympic in 1988, the spotted owl controversy erupted across the Pacific Northwest. Although the National Park Service had not pressed for the endangered species classification of the owl, Olympic National Park contained the largest concentration of the species. The park was “branded with [the issue] even though it rightly belonged to another agency,” Smithson recalled. The regional public expressed

---


An American Eden

its outrage in some shocking ways. Dead owls were nailed to park entrance signs. At the
same time, entrance stations at Sol Duc and Lake Crescent were burned, although most
believed this stemmed from the introduction of entrance fees rather than the owl question.
It occurred at a time when some members of the public believed that the government was
hindering their ability to make a living; the idea that they would have to pay to enter the
park sparked ire. The situation left bad feelings all around and park managers moved
carefully. Olympic had “little desire to interpret homestead or logging history at the
time,” Smithson recalled. “It just didn’t seem right.”

As a result, the park continued to focus on wilderness in its interpretation
program. Since the 1976 Master Plan, the interpretive program emphasized development
at the outskirts of the park that would not infringe on the pristine interior wilderness.
Using entry points into the acreage expected to be included in the designated wilderness,
park planners ringed the wilderness with interpretive contact points. Hoh, Lake Crescent,
Hurricane Ridge, Kalaloch Beach, and Mora-Rialto Beach served as focal points for on-
site interpretation. The interpretive themes remained largely the same.

At the Hoh site, Grant Sharpe played an instrumental role in first preserving the
Hoh Rainforest and then developing the Hall of Mosses interpretative trail. Ruth Kirk
helped create the Hoh Visitor Center, where rangers offered programs on vegetation, with
emphasis on the rain forest. At Lake Crescent, Olympic personnel expounded upon the
lake’s geological history and Aldo Leopold’s land ethic in a talk entitled “Man and the
Park.” Interpreters discussed geology, glaciology, wildlife, subalpine vegetation, and
human history at Hurricane Ridge, and marine ecology, Indian history, and coastal
geology and vegetation at Kalaloch and Mora-Rialto beaches. By this time, the scope of

Olympic’s interpretation had grown from natural history to include humanity in the environment. Campfire circles completed with Mission 66 funding dotted the park, providing visitors with informal lecture and discussion opportunities at different stations. Rangers continued to lead three talks per week at Lake Crescent, seven at LaPoel Campground, two at Hoh Valley, and one at Elwha. Finally, the Pioneer Memorial Museum introduced visitors to the park’s natural history, Indian culture, and pioneer history. Several Indian cultural demonstrators, including Richard Mike, a Klallam Indian, worked at the museum to demonstrate wood carving, basketry, beading, and Northwest Indian lore.51

**Financial Challenges To Interpretation**

In the late 1980s, interpretation issues mirrored the concerns held by other administrative departments at Olympic National Park. Visitation in 1989 dropped 4.5 percent, to 3,360,555 visits, roughly the number that arrived in 1986. Visitor contacts fell even more precipitously, from just under 700,000 in 1988 to less than 574,000. At the same time, contacts with the park’s visual materials increased by 500,000, to 2.5 million. A smaller interpretive staff contributed to the growing emphasis on contact through visual materials and other multimedia forms. In essence, more visitors received interpretive information but fewer of them left Olympic having experienced personal contact from agency personnel. The statistics reflected a watershed that had been coming for a long time – interpretation at Olympic increasingly took place in fixed locations with prepared materials.52

This trend reflected one of the realities of the National Park Service in the 1980s.

---

and early 1990s. Flat or declining budgets had hamstrung the agency, and with the increase in emphasis on statutory compliance, the activities that bore the brunt of diminished resources were those that did not have a statutory function. When forced to choose among activities to finance with shrinking amounts of funding, Olympic channeled its resources into meeting statutory mandates. The trend in the National Park Service also pointed in this direction. Beginning with the Redwood Expansion Act in 1978 and codified in the 1991 Vail Agenda, resource management became the primary agency emphasis. Visitor services, including interpretation, suffered in comparison. In Olympic’s list of issues and goals for 1990 and 1991, interpretation did not receive even a mention. Only in 1992 did interpretation issues return to the list of park goals for the year.53

At the same time, the peninsula park planned to broaden the themes presented in interpretation. The 1991 *Resources Management Plan* added cultural resource interpretation to Olympic’s program, a revolutionary proposition that stemmed in part from the Camp Kiwanis incident and was motivated by the new attention to cultural resources. The addition of a cultural resource management manager in the park added another impetus for the interpretation of cultural resources. Although Smithson initially resisted the idea of devoting less attention to wilderness issues, Gleeson was persuasive.

The two eventually reached accommodation, and Olympic National Park began to bring

---

the peninsula’s Euro-American history into its program.54

Olympic’s Collections

Museum collections also received new focus from park managers. By 1991, Olympic’s museum collections contained approximately 3,400 objects. Most were housed in the basement of the Visitor Center in Port Angeles, which park personnel had renovated for use as a collection storage room and park library in 1984. Cataloguing the museum collection backlog and maintenance of museum records became Olympic’s leading priority. Between 1988 and 1991, the hiring of a museum technician who catalogued the holdings of the herbarium and natural history collections helped the situation, though more work still needed to be done. The 1991 Resources Management Plan also recommended the conservation treatment of valuable ethnological artifacts and objects.55

By the mid-1990s, interpretation efforts began to undergo significant changes. Not only did the themes broaden, but changes in personnel led to new configurations.

Long-time Chief Naturalist Hank Warren retired in January 1995, leading to the promotion of Michael Smithson and the elimination of the post of assistant chief. East District Interpreter Barb Maynes became the park’s public information officer. In addition, Olympic reorganized the interpretation division, with the Quinault and Staircase subdistricts adding personnel. The Hoh and Hurricane Ridge facilities were open longer to visitors, and a cooperative agreement with the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary funded additional interpreters at Mora and Kalaloch. This led to the inclusion


By the early twenty-first century, interpretation had reached maturity at Olympic National Park. The program discussed the complete range of park themes including cultural history, served visitors efficiently, and had been recognized for its qualities in the park system. In 1993, East District Interpreter Barb Maynes received a regional Freeman Tilden Award, which recognizes outstanding National Park Service interpreters, reflecting the success of interpretation at Olympic and acknowledging its accomplishments. Superintendent Maureen Finnerty received a parallel sponsorship award for supporting interpretation. In 2004, Michael Smithson received a Sequoia Award, which recognizes individuals for significant, contributions to interpretation and education. In addition, the park invested in education efforts at Elwha. The National Park Service saw success from its efforts to commit resources to explaining Olympic to the public, a process that had created a picture of the area that the public coveted and appreciated. Such successes reflected park-based commitment even as the agency’s obligations became ever more complex and stretched park staff thin.

---

An American Eden

1
Figure 6-1: J.B. Flett examines *Viola Flettii* on Mount Angeles in July 1926. (Photographs courtesy of Olympic National Park, Accession Number OLYM-632, Box 3)

Figure 6-2: An early responsibility of park management was signage, such as this sign showing the road to Deer Park
Figure 6-3: Beginning one of the park’s most important interpretative facilities, Thomas T. Aldwell, left, and Frank Donovan start the groundbreaking for the Olympic Pioneer Memorial Museum and Visitor Center on June 15, 1953.
Figure 6-4: Park Ranger Glen D. Gallison staffs the information desk at the Pioneer Museum in 1958. Two years later, he would be named the park’s chief naturalist.
Figure 6-5: The Hoh Visitor Center, which began operations in August 1963.
Figure 6-6: The Registration and Information Booth at Ozette, as seen in 1976.
Figure 6-7 and 6-8:
Above and right, an Olympic National Park naturalist conducts a walk on Big Meadow Nature Trail in 1976.
Chapter 7:

Park Operations

The day-to-day operation of Olympic National Park has presented its managers with an ongoing and significant operational challenge. A 922,651-acre park with more than 95 percent of its acreage designated as wilderness required careful planning, the deployment of adequate resources, and the ongoing commitment of a professional staff to meet the multi-faceted demands of its various publics. With a de facto wilderness status in place long before official designation, and almost always short of staff and fiscal resources, the peninsula park struggled to devise strategies that provided protection and service. In most circumstances, the park succeeded; staff members could be forgiven their frustration at programs and projects that never quite achieved what they considered optimal results.

Olympic National Park had its management structure set by a series of reports, some of which predated the park but left facts on the ground. U.S. Forest Service documents written in 1912 and 1929 laid the foundation for Olympic’s system of trails and shelters. Later, the construction of the Hurricane Ridge Road, the federal largess of Mission 66, and the effects of the park’s Wilderness Environmental Impact Statement set a course more in line with the rest of the park system. Developing a national park on land where the Forest Service had previously created a fire-fighting structure pulled the National Park Service away from its typical models of management, and forced it to integrate another intellectual series of premises. This created two conflicting visions of park management – an earlier one that encouraged visitor access and the later wilderness-oriented one that made access more difficult.
Wilderness, one of Olympic’s most cherished attributes, posed a complicated set of circumstances for park administrators. Not only did the designated wilderness limit any action inside its boundaries to the minimum tools for the purpose, but the network of trails inherited from the Forest Service forced a higher level of National Park Service management because of the comparative ease of access. Visitors continued to wander the backcountry, compelling ongoing efforts to protect natural and cultural resources from degradation. Such day-to-day management often seemed mundane, but it was crucial to Olympic’s functioning. In an average week, visitors created tons of garbage and waste in areas often remote from established infrastructure. Other visitors walked off trails and lost their way, and initiated other activities that demanded the attention of park staff. At the same time, Olympic’s buildings, roads, trails, and overlooks required consistent maintenance, and construction projects demanded National Park Service resources. The park was deeply involved in assuring that visitors received the services they desired. At Olympic, operations revealed how park managers kept pace with increased visitation, statutory changes, new management mandates, and agency and park goals and objectives.

Concessions – the contracts that grant the right to operate a business within national park boundaries – add another dimension to the daily management of Olympic National Park. As is common throughout the national park system, Olympic’s administrators oversaw concessions operations for visitors to the park. Relationships with concessioners provided a measure of how the National Park Service handles a dimension of its mission that can, on occasion, conflict with agency goals.

National park operations depend on the people who conceive park plans, implement them, and improve upon them after monitoring activities. Olympic National
Park has long possessed a staff committed to the park and its values that strove to implement the best of national park management, wilderness philosophy, visitor services, resource management, and facilities maintenance. When objectives conflicted and differences became heated, all involved understood that the tension stemmed from the passion managers felt for Olympic.

**Park Rangers**

As at every national park area, the ranger division was the backbone of Olympic National Park from its 1938 establishment. Fred Overly became the Olympic National Monument’s first and only ranger in 1936, the second permanent staff member after Superintendent Preston Macy. As did the typical ranger of his day, Overly served as a generalist who was responsible for nearly every facet of Olympic’s operations. His management and patrol functions followed the model established by the Forest Service. Macy’s only staff member for almost a year, Overly learned Olympic’s lessons in an intimate way. The National Park Service added two more permanent staff members in 1938, and the staff grew even more quickly after Olympic attained national park status later that same year. With a permanent staff of eleven in 1940, Olympic National Park’s workforce began to function as did its counterparts in other national parks. Everyone did as they were asked, without regard for job description or civil service status. In this era, rangers reacted to everything in an informal manner. Without statute to govern their actions, they relied on experience, common sense, and an intimate understanding of the circumstances they faced. Particularly in areas under their jurisdiction, but not yet part of the park, such as the Coastal Strip and Queets Corridor, their roles remained vague. Without a staff equal to the Olympic’s requirements, rangers simply responded to
problems as best they could, functioning as a general staff, assisting in maintenance and
supervising the Civilian Conservation Corps force then assigned to the park.\(^1\)

Superintendent Macy recognized the limits of Olympic National Park’s capability. His staff could barely manage the lands in the initial proclamation, much less the extended acreage included in the 1940 addition. Wartime restrictions after 1941 made their tasks even more difficult. Yet despite directives from the regional office to confine activities to lands inside park boundaries, Macy insisted that Olympic remain an active participant in regional affairs. He recognized that the park’s dependence on the network of roads throughout the peninsula made cooperation essential. In 1942, thirty-five miles of park shoreline was “unprotected,” Macy thought, and part-time personnel seasonally staffed the contact stations in the park, especially in the newest areas. The small number of park employees continued to mean Olympic’s ability to respond to crises depended on outside cooperation.\(^2\)

In reaction to the dire shortage of personnel, Macy supplemented the small ranger cadre with cooperative agreements that gave state law enforcement rangers power within national park boundaries. The long-standing tension between the National Park Service and the Forest Service precluded relying on Forest Service rangers. Olympic National Park personnel lacked law enforcement capabilities, not generally a major consideration in national parks during the era, but a necessary component for a park with state highways along its perimeter. Macy deputized State Highway Patrol officers as deputy park rangers, ceding to them jurisdiction along Olympic National Park’s Coastal Strip,


\(^{2}\) Preston P. Macy, Memo for the Regional Director, June 11, 1942, Preston P. Macy Papers, 3211, Box 1, Folder 24, University of Washington Archives (hereafter UW Archives).
An American Eden

Queets Corridor, and on roads running into the park, particularly State Highway No. 9, which paralleled the south side of Lake Crescent. “We believe that with the State of Washington and National Park Service working in complete harmony and unity,” Macy wrote, “police matters affecting both will be very advantageously taken care of.” National Park Service Director Newton P. Drury approved the concept, and in February 1947, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes appointed Washington State Highway patrolmen as deputy national park rangers to serve without pay for the purpose of enforcing National Park Service laws and regulations in these areas as well as on Indian reservations. While uncommon, such a decision was hardly unique. It reflected the agency’s lack of personnel or resources in specific situations.3

After World War II, the established pattern of rangers as generalists began to change. Olympic’s small staff had been marginally sufficient until the end of the war, but with the increase in visitation and the rejuvenation of the timber industry after 1945, park responsibilities became so complex that more structure became essential. No longer could the ranger division provide every service in a general way; nor could its resources be deployed for every park activity. Olympic National Park needed more specialized operations. The demand continued even as staffing levels increased. In May 1949, Superintendent Macy added new personnel – a chief ranger, assistant chief rangers, district rangers, and rangers – to provide law enforcement and to implement fire

---

regulations on parklands.\textsuperscript{4}

Trail maintenance proved to be the activity that most directly prompted that dedicated management. The National Park Service inherited a vast system of trails, trail shelters, and primitive campgrounds from the U.S. Forest Service when the latter transferred Mount Olympus National Monument to the agency. At the park’s establishment, the 1938 planning group shied away from older National Park Service practices, which generally focused on making parks as accessible to visitors as possible. Because the planning group believed that Olympic should be managed as a “trail” rather than as a “road” park, it stressed trail construction and maintenance, a conception that was designed to mitigate visitor impact on the backcountry.

Macy, Olympic’s first superintendent, placed a high priority on trails, making them the dominant function of park maintenance until the late 1940s. His small staff chiefly maintained the Forest Service’s extensive trails, originally developed after the fires of 1910 to allow detection and suppression of subsequent blazes. Olympic crews constructed only a few miles of new trails in the years before World War II. Seasonal rangers conducted most of the park’s trail maintenance before 1941, with the CCC and Public Works Administration programs funding the majority of their operations. When these programs disbanded after Pearl Harbor, trail construction and maintenance returned to the hands of the National Park Service. Throughout World War II, resources were scarce, and trail maintenance suffered. Until well after the war’s end, Olympic allocated few funds toward trail maintenance, leading to the deterioration of trails and structures.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{4} Deputy Supervisor of Forestry, Olympia, to Preston P. Macy, July 12, 1949, OLYM 18405, Box 2, Folder 14, 1937-1950 Resource and Visitor Protection – Law Enforcement, Olympic NP archives.

\textsuperscript{5} Guy Fringer, \textit{Olympic National Park: An Administrative History} (Seattle: National Park Service, Pacific Northwest Region, 1990), 87-88, 92, 159-161; “The Forest Before the Park: The Historic Context of 290
By 1949, park maintenance unofficially had evolved into its own division, a development that signaled the beginning of modern park management at Olympic. In 1949, the trail foreman shifted from reporting from the chief ranger to the park engineer, suggesting a different vision of the unit’s obligations. Soon, administrators realized that the park engineer position was insufficient, and Olympic created a fully staffed division. Because of the split in responsibilities, maintenance in 1952 became Construction and Maintenance, a separate entity with twenty-six permanent personnel. A civil engineer headed the division, which also utilized thirty seasonal employees. As late as the spring of 1952, the park let outside contracts for the cleanup and opening of trail and road and salvage timber contracts. With the implementation of the master plan of that year, the new division assumed that trail and road responsibility. To reflect the new distribution of responsibilities, Olympic then formed the Protection Division, with the chief ranger serving as division head.6

By 1952, the burden of maintenance at Olympic had become considerable. Workers were responsible for 600 buildings, 122 shelters, twenty-three water systems, twenty sewage disposal systems, fifty-one acres of campground divided among thirteen locations, 122 miles of road, 557 miles of trail, and more than 100 pieces of motorized equipment. To expand the capabilities of the new division, the 1952 Olympic Master Plan proposed nine new permanent maintenance positions and four additional seasonal

---

laborers. Independent status for the division made sense, for its activities were independent of daily ranger functions and demanded an enormous part of the park’s budget.

The emphasis on construction in the new division’s name reflected Fred Overly’s development strategy. Overly, superintendent since 1951, sought to make Olympic National Park more accessible, and the construction of facilities, especially roads and trails, helped him to pursue that goal. Trails also facilitated the controversial timber cutting Overly endorsed. As he shifted the park’s emphasis away from wilderness to development, he established an administrative structure that served his purposes, and an independent construction division almost perfectly mirrored his objectives.

Maintenance of the park’s roads and trails became a primary mission of the park. From its inception, the park had maintenance workers who were responsible for keeping roads and trails cleared and repaired. Between 1938 and 1946, a lack of funding limited trail maintenance, but beginning in 1946, new funds allowed the resumption of basic work. In 1950, Olympic started to receive an average of $60,000 per year to fund maintenance activities. With still-limited resources, trail and road crews solved the most pressing problems first, and then if time and resources remained, they continued on to smaller ones. Personnel issues dogged the effort throughout the era. There were simply not enough people to fill the crews, and some of the personnel that Olympic hired were not up to the work. In September 1947, circumstances reduced the trail crews to two permanent laborer-leadmen and one laborer. Macy noted that the laborer was “AWOL

---

After Macy, superintendents shifted away from the emphasis on trails. Overly made road construction a priority in his Master Plan Development Outline’s Operation Prospectus. Overly’s vision of Olympic National Park differed from the perspective of the people who founded the park. He wanted to see visitors there, and he believed paved roads were the fastest way to achieve this end. Not coincidentally, more paved roads facilitated the controversial salvage program that would eventually end his term in the superintendent’s office. Overly established two separate divisions in road maintenance, and planned and built the road to Hurricane Ridge.

Throughout the 1950s, the ranger division remained the center of the park’s operations. Maintenance and construction were significant but they were specific functions, apart from law enforcement and the sometimes bewildering array of duties confronting the ranger division. Throughout the 1950s, the need for a larger work force dominated the park’s horizons. In 1952, the ranger staff reached thirteen permanent positions, fifteen seasonal rangers, and eighteen seasonal fire control aides. The 1952 master plan requested ten additional permanent rangers, a number so large that it suggested an inundation of visitors of the sort that author Bernard DeVoto described in his famous 1954 essay, “Let’s Close the National Parks.” Despite the request, the park gained no more ranger positions in the subsequent four years. The park’s Mission 66 prospectus scaled back the request, asking for an increase of only two permanent

---

8 Memorandum for the Director, October 10, 1947, OLYM 18405, Box 2, Folder 14, 1937-1950 Resource and Visitor Protection – Law Enforcement, Olympic NP archives.
positions over the life of the capital development program.\textsuperscript{10}

As congressional support for Mission 66 ended, the National Park Service began a two-pronged evolution that affected the responsibilities of the ranger division at Olympic. Two 1963 publications – the Leopold Report and the National Academy of Sciences Advisory Committee on Research in the National Parks’ Research in the National Parks, colloquially known as the Robbins Report after Dr. William J. Robbins, its lead author – solidified the position of scientific management in the agency, giving the discipline of ecology a much greater position in policy. By the mid-1960s, the National Park Service committed itself to professional management of natural and cultural resources. By the following decade, the national park system felt the impact of social changes in the United States as a whole. As use of park areas increased, incidents of crime of all kinds also multiplied. After the Stoneman Meadows riot, the National Park Service found itself policing the public in ways it had never anticipated. The change led to significantly greater emphasis on law enforcement in the agency.\textsuperscript{11}

Law enforcement was not a new responsibility at Olympic. As early as 1938, law enforcement agents trained Olympic National Park rangers on how to secure fingerprint impressions left on objects. As levels of criminal activity increased during the following decades, the park responded by developing better research tools. Between 1968 and 1972, park personnel compiled a master name index of all violators, victims, witnesses, and suspects, which in 1972 became part of a National Park Service-wide case records filing system.


294
system that provided a usable record of crime within the national parks. The increase in  
crime prompted other measures. In summer 1973, the National Park Service assigned a  
U.S. Park Police sergeant to Olympic to assist in investigations and prosecutions,  
becoming in effect the park’s criminal investigator. Only a few other parks, most notably  
the Washington, D.C., parks and Golden Gate National Recreation Area in the San  
Francisco Bay area, had any formal relationship with the U.S. Park Police. On July 23,  
1980, the first reported homicide in Olympic National Park occurred. At Cape Alava,  
Dale Harrison killed Jane E. Constantino. With the help of park rangers and the testimony  
of one of the Ozette archeologists, Harrison was convicted of murder and sentenced to  
life imprisonment. He had stalked one of the archeologists, Stephanie Ludwig, on the  
beach and she eluded him by walking into the wet intertidal area. He chose not to follow  
because he was wearing cowboy boots. Her testimony served to establish motive.  

As more visitors left Olympic National Park’s main roads for the backcountry,  
propelled by the technological revolutions that made camping easier and more popular,  
their safety became a growing concern for agency personnel. In 1976, Olympic began to  
emphasize a parkwide safety program for both its staff and visitors. “As with other  
parks,” the 1976 annual report noted, “Olympic’s primary problem is developing an  
awareness in our first line supervisors and foremen as to the importance of a safe  
operation.” When a blizzard during the 1977 Washington’s Birthday weekend stranded or  
injured fifty visitors, the park’s ability to respond eased the crisis. The park recorded five  
fatalities in the backcountry in 1980, a record year for both the cost and number of search

---

and rescue (SAR) missions – sixty-eight. In 1982, rangers completed seventy-one SAR missions, twenty-nine for lost visitors, three of which involved climbers. In that year, a climbing accident on the east side of the park killed two visitors, and a beach accident killed another. Despite the seeming pandemonium that year, the total number of incidents decreased 12 percent from the previous year. In 1988, fifty-six SAR missions conducted during that year consumed 1,985 hours of personnel time and cost the park $21,726.¹³

Fire Hazards

Fire management required constant ranger presence and response. At its establishment, Olympic National Park inherited the Forest Service’s backcountry fire management structure, but lacked a labor force sufficient for fire suppression, the only mode of fire management authorized at the time. More than a decade passed before the park developed a significant fire-fighting response. In May 1949, a memo from Macy requested the approval of the appointment of park staff as deputy state forest rangers for the state of Washington. This move permitted rangers and others in the park to enforce fire regulations on the Olympic Coastal Strip and in the Queets Corridor. In July, the state deputy supervisor of forestry appointed eleven state forest ranger employees to Olympic National Park, and in August, the park and state signed a cooperative fire control agreement. This preliminary arrangement established an operational structure from which subsequent fire response developed.

Long after 1968, when outright suppression ceased to be agency policy, rangers continued to suppress all wildland fires within Olympic National Park. This lag was typical in the National Park Service for parks that were not frontline fire parks, facing

major fires on a regular basis. Trends in Alaska, Glacier, Yosemite, Yellowstone, and the Everglades shaped the National Park Service, leaving fire management as a latent issue for Olympic. Following agency guidelines, the park’s 1985 *Fire Management Plan* provided alternatives, allowing for a full spectrum of fire management activities, including fire suppression, prescribed burning, hazard fuels management, and prescribed natural fire. Its application was short lived. Following the Yellowstone National Park fires of 1988, the National Park Service issued new standards for fire management. Since then, firefighters have returned to suppressing all wildland fires within Olympic National Park. *National Park Service Management Policies 2001* specified that all parks with vegetation that could carry a fire develop a comprehensive fire management plan that complied with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and other environmental statutes. Olympic’s plan emphasized assuring firefighter and public safety, restoring and maintaining natural fire regimes to an extent that did not impair natural ecosystems, and protecting cultural resources. In 2005, a new fire plan was approved.  

**Managing Hunting**

Hunting posed another challenge for Olympic’s park rangers. The national monument had allowed hunting, an activity that required ranger presence and oversight. In 1936, for the first elk hunting season that had occurred since a slaughter of animals in 1933, the Washington State Game Department appointed ten state game protectors – Overly, five trail men, three temporary rangers, and the acting custodian – to monitor elk hunting.
hunting within monument boundaries. Mount Rainier Superintendent Owen A. Tomlinson described this as the “elk slaughter situation,” writing that he hoped it would deter future hunters. He initially found little to persuade him that this might transpire. In March 1936, a peninsula club held a contest to see who could shoot the most animals and birds within the national monument. Preston Macy glumly noted, “The greatest extension to the Monument is too little to insure the perpetuation of some of our wildlife.” Under federal regulations, the national monument did not provide wildlife the protection that national parks offered.15

The 1938 establishment of the national park put an end to hunting on parklands, but could not prevent the practice on inholdings. That situation became a significant point of contention between the state and the park. In 1946, the state of Washington allowed a special three-month hunting season on private lands within Olympic National Park. Superintendent Macy reacted with hostility, labeling the state as a “non-cooperating” agency in his annual report. He petitioned the state attorney general for redress, but was rebuffed. The state demanded that if the national park arrested any hunter, it must then open private lands within Olympic to hunting until the resolution of the case. Macy refused, instead detailing a ranger to prevent hunting on the North Fork Quinault area during the nine-day elk hunting season. Without a formal legal basis, the ranger successfully stopped hunting even on private land in the area, a courageous stand that Macy regarded as a significant triumph.16

A legal remedy was soon forthcoming. The battle with the state of Washington continued, for it reflected important objections that local residents held not only about

---

15 O.A. Tomlinson to Preston Macy, November 7, 1937, Box 1, Folder 22, Preston Macy papers, UW Archives.
16 Superintendent’s Narrative Report for September 1946, 4, 8.
An American Eden

hunting, but about the national park itself. When Olympic Chief Ranger Otto Brown
arrested M. M. Fruit, the chief game protector of the state Game Department, for illegally
hunting and possessing firearms within the national park in November 1946, the
transition to a formalized ban took shape. In *U.S. v. M.M. Fruit*, decided in 1947, the
court so overwhelmingly sided with the National Park Service that the state decided an
appeal would be a waste of time and resources, and that their case was hopeless. But state
ways could not change folkways, and hunters continued to be a problem for the park.

For the next two decades, hunting remained a flashpoint between the national
park and its neighbors, an issue sure to inspire tensions. Park rangers patrolled Olympic’s
boundaries during hunting season on adjacent lands, their presence serving as a deterrent
to hunters. Those apprehended by rangers for hunting in the national park were tried in
federal court, another source of conflict between Olympic and the peninsula community,
which saw federal authority as oppressive. The state continued to allow elk season on
adjacent lands; some years, the season stretched as long as four months, requiring
exceptional vigilance by Olympic’s ranger corps. The state allowed the park
superintendent to designate hunting camps outside of Olympic for the state’s use. This
allowed the superintendent to influence hunting outside park boundaries, presumably
lessening the pressure on the park and limiting the possibilities of poaching. Arrests
appeared to deter hunters. After prosecution of offenders, Olympic received an increase
in requests for delineation of acceptable hunting areas.\(^{17}\)

The problems persisted for the better part of two decades. Olympic National Park

---

\(^{17}\) Superintendent’s Narrative Report for October 1948, 1, 3; Superintendent’s Narrative Report for
November 1948, 1, 4.
law. Those who the park apprehended faced federal charges, but typically, sanctions were minimal. Only in the mid-1960s, when the environmental revolution began to take shape, did the courts begin to respect National Park Service jurisdiction over hunting in Olympic National Park. In 1968, Superintendent Bennett T. Gale issued another blanket prohibition against hunting and the possession of weapons in the park, one more effort to remind the public of national park regulations. Regardless, the state maintained special hunting camps and an open hunting season for deer and elk in the Queets and Pacific Coastal area. While no legal hunting occurred inside the park, poaching posed major challenges for rangers and law enforcement.18

**Campgrounds And Backcountry Shelters**

As the American public embraced automobile travel and, especially, the family summer vacation, visitor services such as campgrounds became critical sources of constituency for the National Park Service. New Deal funding had provided the public campgrounds of Olympic National Park with “complete camping facilities” at La Poel, Olympic Hot Springs, Altair, Elwha, Sol Duc Hot Springs, Lincoln Ranger Station, and Graves Creek. Visitors could find “simple accommodations” at Muncaster and July Creek near Lake Quinault. As was common at the time, concessioners managed many of these campgrounds.19

Fifteen years later, Mission 66 fueled a new round of campground development at Olympic National Park. Beginning in the mid-1950s, the park pursued more aggressive campground expansion. Overly’s draft *Mission 66 Prospectus* called for the enlargement

---


of all existing campgrounds and the creation of fourteen new ones. During Overly’s
tenure, work crews constructed campground sites at Heart O’ the Hills, Lake Crescent,
Mora, and the Hoh River. Park staff also upgraded facilities at Sol Duc Valley and
Elwha, and planned sixty new campsites at Kalaloch. Mission 66 also poured funds into
renovating and expanding campgrounds in the Lake Quinault area, including Graves
Creek, North Fork, and July Creek, in the Queets Corridor, Hoh River-Rain Forest area,
Sol Duc Hot Springs, Lake Crescent, in the Elwha River area at Elwha, Altair, Olympic
Hot Springs, and Waterhole, on the road to Obstruction Point, Muscott Flats, and
Staircase. Providing a comfortable experience for visitors, many of these campgrounds
contained piped-in water, toilets, and cooking, picnic, and garbage disposal facilities.20

Olympic’s philosophy underlying campground operations remained consistent
until the 1960s, when the new emphasis on ecology and passage of the Wilderness Act
compelled questions about park management. Superintendent Roger Allin maintained the
existing campground upgrade program, but sought to reduce the need for frequent
maintenance by capping visitor use. The park also sought to make campgrounds self-
sustaining. Instead of collecting fees only during the peak season, the park extended fee
collection throughout the year. By 1974, rangers stationed at eleven Olympic
campgrounds with 835 campsites collected user fees. By 1998, the park boasted sixteen
campgrounds with 910 campsites; Olympic regulations limited camping to fourteen

20 “Park Service Marks Year With New ‘Parkscape’,” untitled newspaper, August 16, 1966, Philip Zalesky
Papers, 3773, Box 1, Folder 20, UW Archives; Daniel B. Beard to Director, Sept. 3, 1958, AD815 Subject Files 1954-
1962, Box 2, A6427, Washington Office, Olympic NP Archives; Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative
History, 161, 178, 194; “Camping Facilities, Olympic National Park,” A3815, Subject Files 1954-1962, Box 2,
Olympic NP archives; Superintendent’s Monthly Narrative Report for Olympic National Park, Jan. 1960, OLYM
18242, Box 1, Folder 26: 1960, Olympic NP archives, 7; Superintendent’s Monthly Narrative Report for Olympic
National Park, Feb. 1960, OLYM 18242, Box 1, Folder 26: 1960, Olympic NP archives, 8; “Proposed Rule Making”.

301
consecutive days on a first-come, first-served basis. The management of trail shelters in the backcountry offered another illustration of the National Park Service’s ongoing struggle with the implications of wilderness. As early as 1910, foresters began construction of shelters to house crews and rangers working in the forest. Forest Service crews initially constructed shake-sided, high-pitched shelters in the 1920s, building approximately ninety shelters within the boundaries of what would become Olympic National Park and more on national forest land. After park establishment, this pattern persisted. In 1938, Macy advocated shelters as a means of resource protection. He saw the shelters as a way of managing the impact of camping in the park. Overly’s emphasis on development and accessibility included new backcountry shelters in his larger plan for outdoor recreation, a scheme comprised of nearly 200 miles of new trails, six new campgrounds, a ranger station at Ozette, and fourteen shelters. During his administration, park crews completed backcountry shelters near Lunch Lake, Round Lake, Upper Cameron, and Sundown Lake. Mission 66 funds provided for the construction of additional modern shelters in more easily accessible areas.

Olympic’s 1960 Backcountry Plan asserted that backcountry shelters drew people

and their presence strained the delicate ecology of the region. By the mid-1970s, a revolution in behavior, and in equipment brought even more visitors to the shelters. Many of the buildings had been located in prime areas, making them likely candidates for the brunt of increased use. Superintendent Allin had described the shelters as “heavily used” areas in his 1974 annual report and observed the resultant considerable damage to trails, campgrounds, and shelters. This report provided a stronger rationale for the backcountry plan, itself part of the drive for designated wilderness.

The subsequent Backcountry Management Plan began with the premise that development had compromised many of Olympic’s wilderness ideals, and it recommended ways to halt additional ecological devastation. The truth was more complicated. Popular areas showed continued damage even after shelters were removed. Others showed little damage to the surrounding environment. The plan advocated removing shelters, requiring visitor quotas and permits for visitors in certain areas such as the Sol Duc and Hoh drainages, discontinuing the use of horses for supply purposes, limiting the use of open fires at certain elevations, and reconstructing trails. These concerns contributed to the removal of thirty-three backcountry shelters between 1974 and 1976. The shelter removal program continued, offering tacit acceptance of the idea that ecological considerations would play an increasingly profound role in determining the number and location of shelters permitted in the park.23

Even after the removal of some shelters, the pressure on locations such as Hoh Lake continued. Increased use spurred by the growing outdoor inclinations of the generation that came to maturity during the 1960s and 1970s put tremendous pressure on resources. The numbers of backcountry visitors continued to grow despite the shelter

removals. Better technology, particularly in camping and hiking equipment, made access
more possible and desirable, and marketing of the outdoors spurred even greater use.
Shelters had been constructed at prime visiting locations; their removal did little to deter
an energetic and enthusiastic public.

Olympic’s shelter removal policy elicited hostility from hiking and outdoors
groups, including Friends of the Olympic Trail Shelters. The 1976 Backcountry
Management Plan called for the retention of only twelve of the original ninety shelters.
The problem was compounded by the fact that Olympic’s administrators had not defined
rationale for which shelters to keep and which to remove, and decisions appeared to be
based on the whims of the staff. The National Park Service’s removal of what many
visitor groups deemed a valuable visitor resource led to public protests and a series of
public meetings about the fate of the park’s backcountry shelters. In 1978, after
commissioning studies, Olympic reached a middle ground with its constituents.
Superintendent James Coleman allowed for the continued existence of backcountry
shelters, but recommended reducing the overall number of shelters and removing the
ones located on or near heavily used alpine lakeshores. The shelters were incompatible
with the park's vision of its backcountry as wilderness, but Coleman’s policies conceived
of a process to gradually remove the shelters at the same time Olympic persuaded the
public that in the backcountry, individuals should provide for themselves. Coleman also
issued the Shelter Establishment Criteria, which provided basic guidelines regarding
resource management, visitor safety, and future maintenance of the existing backcountry
structures.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{24}Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative History, 156-57; Roger W. Allin,
Superintendent’s Annual Report, Olympic National Park, 1974, OLYM 18242, Box 1, Folder 34: 1974,
Coleman’s policies for Olympic’s shelters did not produce consensus for long, and in 1980, Superintendent Roger Contor announced his intention to remove the shelters at Three Lakes. This decision renewed local and regional opposition. Several groups, including Friends of the Olympic Trail Shelters, the National Park Users Defense Fund, and the Mount Rainier Defense Fund, sought changes in the shelter removal policies at both Olympic and Mount Rainier national parks. Opponents of the move at Olympic subsequently filed a lawsuit intended to force the National Park Service to remove the backcountry population restrictions of both parks in effect since 1982. The lawsuit also sought to halt future shelter removals. By the 1980s, the National Park Service again had found middle ground. The 1982 Superintendent’s Annual Report addressed the issue, arguing that maintaining some of the backcountry shelters fell within “a total management approach.” In 1986, the courts dismissed the Olympic lawsuit and prohibited the groups from bringing further lawsuits against the national parks on the same issues. The shelters the parks had allowed to remain intact stayed – a valuable aid to people in the backcountry and a cultural resource for the park to some, and an obstacle to ideal wilderness management in the eyes of others.

By the new century, the National Park Service had switched its position on the shelters. Two shelters – the Home Sweet Home at the headwaters of the Duckabush River and Low Divide at Quinault Pass – had been protected by the wilderness EIS as

---

25 Superintendent, Olympic National Park, to Olympic National Park Staff, Seasonal Employees, Concessioners and Concession Employees, June 14, 1982, 6; Superintendent, Olympic National Park, 1982, OLYM 18242, Box 1, Folder 38: 1982, Olympic NP archives, 6.
necessary for health and safety. They had not been reviewed for historic value prior to 2000. The National Park Service kept the shelters under these terms, but a snowstorm collapsed them in 1998. At that point, the park determined to reconstruct them and replace them in their original locations by carrying their component parts by helicopter. Because the two shelters were located in the wilderness, this decision inspired the ire of environmental groups. Olympic Park Associates, Wilderness Watch, and Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility sued, arguing that Olympic did not take the terms of the Wilderness Act into account in its decision to restore the shelters to their original location by helicopter. A judge agreed, granting summary judgment on August 1, 2005, that prohibited the National Park Service from using helicopters to restore the shelters.\(^2^6\)

As much as any other issue at Olympic National Park, shelters proved a focal point for public discontent. The National Park Service could not win. When the agency wanted to take shelters out, opposition developed a strong position against any such plans. When the agency tried to restore shelters, it ran the risk of violating federal statutes and engendering a different category of opposition.

Concessions

Like most national parks, Olympic National Park contained several concession facilities that predated park establishment, including businesses at Rosemary Inn, Ovington, Lake Crescent (Singer’s Tavern), Storm King, and Graves Creek. The presence of these operations provided an inherent paradox. Defined as wilderness,

Olympic National Park embraced commercial activities directed at serving visitors since its establishment. Because concessions predated national parks in almost every attractive locale, wilderness or not, addressing that endemic condition became a source of serious concern throughout the park system, and Olympic National Park mirrored the pattern.

Since Stephen T. Mather’s days as the agency’s first director, the National Park Service had been acutely conscious of the way it served visitors. The agency was especially vigilant about concession operators. In the first decades of National Park Service history, concessions served as a focal point; dependable and professional concessions operations were seen as essential to the agency’s goals of satisfying an increasing number of visitors. Perceiving standardized, high-quality service as an advantage for the National Park Service, Mather favored near-monopoly conditions among concessioners, replacing local businesses with national ones wherever necessary, and sometimes simply because it was possible.\(^\text{27}\) A spectacular park such as Olympic, one for which the conservation community fought so long and so hard, simply could not have inappropriate or poorly functioning concessions.

Forest Service administration had not been vigilant about concessions, and a sloppy array of mostly seasonal operators plied their trade within and outside the area. National park creation brought new expectations and higher standards. In order to enhance the wilderness park, the 1938 National Park Service planning group decided that Olympic should eventually acquire and demolish all of the existing concession facilities within its boundaries. The group’s concessions agenda turned out to be too much for the situation at Olympic. The agency lacked the resources and could not withstand the public

outcry that would certainly follow an attempt to remove all the concessioners. Instead, the National Park Service dealt separately with operators who could not meet its higher standards. As a result, the agency began a program to purchase or condemn private facilities within Olympic National Park. The first of these were acquired because of the Public Works Administration (PWA) condemnation of the Queets Corridor and Coastal Strip. Olympic condemned the Becker Resort at Kalaloch, Kelly’s Ranch in the Queets Corridor, and Fletcher Resort at Ruby Beach with PWA funds. The National Park Service also purchased the Rosemary Inn in 1943, which Macy then assigned to the management of the park’s largest concessioner, National Park Concessions, Inc.28

National Park Concessions had been founded during Newton P. Drury’s tenure as National Park Service director in the 1940s. With the help of Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, Drury arranged for the creation of this not-for-profit distributing membership corporation that operated in a number of national parks, with only the public’s best interest in mind. The company ran facilities at Isle Royale, Everglades, and Big Bend national parks and on the Blue Ridge Parkway as well as at other national park units. Its presence at Olympic gave the park a concession operation that seemed to parallel that of the Rainier National Park Company at nearby Mount Rainier National Park.29

As the park developed procedures for its operators, the National Park Service established system-wide rules for concession management. The agency could not provide millions of visitors with food, lodging, and other visitor services, and concessioners acted

---

to fill that void. Long-term leases to commercial contractors often allowed concessioners wide latitude in their use of National Park Service property. The agency limited the length of a concession contract to twenty years. The government typically provided compensation to the concessioner in the form of reimbursement for actual operating costs and 6 percent profit. Operating agreements split any profit beyond 6 percent between the government and the concessioner. The government received 50 percent of the excess profit if it owned the facility, but 25 percent if it belonged to the concessioner. National Park Service policy also encouraged concessioners to provide a variety of facilities at different price ranges. The decision to enact such leases could create controversy if concessioners overstepped their limits or failed to maintain agency standards. Managing concessions required ongoing National Park Service vigilance.

The presence of National Park Concessions at Olympic offered a positive start, but park managers still had to deal with a number of smaller and less well-heeled concessioners. For peninsula operators, a lack of capital and an inability to accommodate the ever-increasing levels of visitation were the most prevalent concerns. In 1948, the agency introduced new concession management policies intended to increase the concessioner’s capital commitment. Two years later, the National Park Service standardized contracts with concessioners throughout the western national parks. Yet, standardization did little to alleviate the problems Olympic experienced with its concession-run visitor facilities. Government purchase of the concessions seemed a better option. After World War II, the National Park Service acquired some privately owned

---

cabin facilities such as the Ovington Resort on Lake Crescent, which the agency subsequently turned into a picnic area. However, many other family operators unwilling to sell to the government lacked the capital to improve their properties and as a result, their facilities deteriorated. In 1950, Macy noted, “most of our concessioners have done a creditable performance insofar as actual services rendered and pleasing of the people was concerned.” Some, he reported, such as C.W. Becker at Kalaloch, even wished to expand operations. A lack of funding prevented him from repairing his water system, gas station, and store, which the National Park Service considered “a disgrace to him and to the National Park Service.” Other concessions, including those at Ruby Beach, Kelly’s Ranch, Ashenbrenners, and the former Ovington Resort at Beardslee Bay, which after 1947 was owned by the National Park Service and run by National Park Concessions, experienced financial and maintenance problems. The facilities were generally less than impressive and people did not flock to them. “If we can continue to keep our concession facilities in operation,” the superintendent quipped, “and thus prevent complete collapse of three or four, we will be doing well.”

When Fred Overly became Olympic’s superintendent in 1951, he used funds from his controversial salvage logging program to purchase many privately owned visitor facilities within park boundaries. His acquisitions included the Fairholme property on Lake Crescent’s western side, Lake Crescent Lodge, Storm King Inn, Log Cabin Resort, and 100 acres of shorefront. Wishing to provide comfortable and accessible accommodations for as many visitors as possible, Overly disregarded the planning group’s policy of acquiring properties for destruction only; his vision favored access, the

---

31 Superintendent, Olympic, to Regional Director, Region Four, November 5, 1950, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 27, UW Archives; Regional Director to Region Four Field Offices (having concessions), November 30, 1950, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 27, UW Archives.
antithesis of the planning group. At the same time, Overly insisted on quality concession
facilities. His successors, Dan Beard and John Doerr, followed this approach. Bennett
Gale, who succeeded Doerr, extended Overly’s “activist” approach to concession
oversight even further. His 1965 *Master Plan Brief* listed as his three main goals the
acquisition and upgrade of Sol Duc Hot Springs, the obliteration of Olympic Hot Springs,
and the replacement of the Storm King Visitor Center and Lake Crescent Lodge with a
combined visitor services complex. He succeeded in accomplishing the first two.\(^\text{32}\)

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the emphasis on wilderness at Olympic
National Park had little impact on concession management policy or practices. The
National Park Service had no way to compel any kind of behavior from private
landowners who ran concessions inside park boundaries. Most were located in Olympic’s
heavily trafficked areas, adding to the islands of human activity that divided the park into
two distinctly different kinds of space — one “natural,” the other “commercial.” If the
park faced great difficulty in persuading concessioners to comply with its management
policies, it had greater success with licensees, who were more closely subject to National
Park Service regulations.

Olympic’s relationship with concessioners began to change in the 1970s. Before
1973, concession operators worked directly with the park superintendent, who
transmitted concession issues to the regional office. In 1973, the National Park Service’s
restructuring of administrative responsibilities shifted concessions to Olympic’s assistant
superintendent, Reed Jarvis. He assumed this new obligation during a time of great
change. Jarvis saw a clear distinction between park visitors, those who stayed on the
paved roads and used park facilities, and those he termed “park users,” who “would go

out and actually use the park.” The increase in users demanded most of Jarvis’ time, for
their numbers and impact grew at an exponential rate, increasing stresses on Olympic’s
natural features. As a result, concessions took a secondary position for Jarvis, with the
effort to standardize operations taking precedence. In 1973, in an attempt to solve the
problem of deficient facilities the National Park Service finalized maintenance
agreements for all concessions except those run by National Park Concessions. By 1976,
the agency evaluated concessions in a systematic way. Olympic National Park established
a concessions evaluation program, and held what became an annual concessions training
and parkwide concessionaires meeting. A shift in management responsibility also took
place. The park received a GS-11 position of concession management specialist to
oversee the program, freeing the assistant superintendent to concentrate on wilderness
and backcountry issues.\(^\text{33}\)

One of the park’s earliest concession operations was the Enchanted Valley Chalet. Now listed on the National Register of Historic Places, the structure was in the interior
Enchanted Valley, also known as the “Valley of a Thousand Waterfalls,” a rain forest
river valley along the Quinault River’s East Fork. In 1928, the Olympic Recreation
Company, an outgrowth of the Hoquiam Chamber of Commerce, received a special use
permit from the Forest Service to build a summer resort along the Quinault River. The
company never built the accompanying road it anticipated constructing along the river,
but the three-story chalet took shape as men packed in materials – including a bathtub –
from Hoquiam. The resort opened in August 1931 and catered to hikers and horseback
parties. It was one of only two private resorts built in the Olympic Mountains during this

\(^{33}\) Superintendent’s Annual Report, 1973, 3; Superintendent’s Annual Report, 1976, OLYM
18242, Box 1, Folder 35: 1976, Olympic NP archives, 5; Reed Jarvis, interview by Paul Gleeson, March
28, 2003, transcript provided by Paul Gleeson.
era. In 1939, after floundering during the Depression, the Olympic Recreation Company and Olympic Chalet Company decided to sell its holdings to the National Park Service. A series of delays that stemmed from World War II delayed the purchase until 1951. In 1953, as part of his plan to make the park more accessible, Overly had the inn repaired and re-opened to the public. Over the next thirty years, backcountry hikers and backpackers used it as a shelter. Age, weather, and vandalism took their toll, and by the early 1980s, park rangers had sealed off the second floor. In 1983, the National Park Service and the Olympians, a local hiking club, jointly renovated the chalet. In 2003, it served as an emergency shelter and trail crew housing, with a seasonal ranger stationed at the building.34

The Low Divide Chalet, on the Low Divide pass between the Quinault and the Elwha, offered another example of a concessioner-based chalet in the interior peninsula mountains. The Olympic Chalet Company constructed and operated the chalet beginning in the mid-1920s. Popular with hikers and horseback parties, the chalet stayed intact until the mid-1940s, when an avalanche destroyed the main lodge building. Without the structure, operation as a private concession became impossible. The National Park Service did not encourage renovation, preferring to keep the property as a seasonal ranger station. Since 1983, the Enchanted Valley Chalet served as a reminder of the lost age of resorts in the interior Olympic Mountains.35

Two concessions along the Pacific Coast illustrated the travails that small operators experienced. La Push Ocean Park Resort, a popular resort near the small beachfront town of La Push, home of the Quileute Reservation, predated the

---

establishment of Olympic National Park. The National Park Service first oversaw the resort in the 1940s, when it acquired the coastal strip. Operators renovated the units in the late 1950s. An eight-unit motel opened for the 1962 season; another twelve-unit, two-story building greeted visitors in 1973. In 1976, the management of the resort changed hands. The new managers constructed a modern water system and developed a sewage treatment plan, but they were soon in difficult straits. The Boundary Adjustment Act, signed in October 1976, transferred the land on which the resort sat to the Quileute Indian Reservation. In 2003, Quileute Tribal Enterprises managed the property, building first class cabins on the beach.36

Becker’s Ocean Resort, previously called Becker’s Inn and Resort Cabins, south of La Push, also preceded National Park Service acquisition of the Coastal Strip. Charles W. Becker acquired about forty acres just south of Kalaloch Creek in 1925. He erected a main house lodge containing a dining room and several wood frame cabins in the late 1920s on a bluff overlooking the Pacific Ocean. After the completion of the Olympic Loop Highway in 1931, the Beckers constructed additional guest cabins. During World War II, the U.S. Coast Guard established a beach patrol station at Becker’s Ocean Resort. After the war, when the resort reverted to recreational use, the Beckers improved the existing buildings and constructed new cabins. After the lodge burned to the ground in 1946, it was rebuilt and renovated with well-equipped visitor cabins. Between 1950 and 1954, the Beckers built a new main lodge and house. Following National Park Service takeover with the Coastal Strip acquisition in 1953, a 1973 long-range plan provided for enlarged visitor services, improved facilities, and employee quarters. Five years later, the

36 Superintendent, Olympic, to Regional Director, Region Four, November 5, 1950, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 27, UW Archives; Superintendent’s Annual Report, 1973, 6; Evans, Historic Resource Study, 313.
National Park Service turned the property over to concessionaires Marge and Larry Leslie for operation. They renamed it the Kalaloch Lodge. In 1981 and 1982, the National Park Service replaced several smaller and older wood frame cabins with twenty-two closely spaced log cabins arranged in a crescent-shaped configuration and re-landscaped the grounds. In 1989, ARA Leisure Services Inc. (now ARAMARK Corporation) purchased Kalaloch Lodge from the Leslies. Kalaloch remained the largest concession and the only year-round lodging in Olympic National Park.37

Lake Crescent, one of Olympic’s most popular tourist destinations, mirrored the pattern of pre-National Park Service development found elsewhere within the park. Lake Crescent Lodge, built in 1916 as Singer’s Tavern, preceded the National Park Service by twenty years. Located on the south shore of Lake Crescent, the property consisted of a main lodge, the lakeside Roosevelt Cottages, Singer Tavern Cottages, Pyramid Motor Lodge, and Storm King Motor Lodge. In 1976, the property contained 224 rooms. Olympic’s 1980 Development Plan for the lodge modified earlier plans, calling for the removal of all existing cabins and their replacement with more modern cabins. The plan also recommended renovating the lodge by moving the restaurant to the lakeside and redesigning the kitchen and bar area. In 1982, a new twenty-year contract with National Park Concessions, which intended to invest $2.3 million in the lodge over the next three years, was approved. By 1988, the concessioner lagged behind schedule. The park completed construction of the new entrance roads to the area and extended and improved...

37 Charles W. Becker, Jr., to Director, National Park Service, June 8, 1949, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 16, UW Archives; Superintendent’s Annual Report, Olympic National Park, 1972, 1; Superintendent’s Annual Report, 1980, 16; Superintendent’s Annual Report, 1982, 12; Annual Narrative Report of Superintendent, 1988, OLYM 18242, Box 1, Folder 29: 1988, Olympic NP archives, 16; Superintendent’s Annual Report, 1973, 6; Evans, Historic Resource Study, 307, 313.
An American Eden

The Fairholme Visitor Service Area, at the west end of Lake Crescent, grew out of the long history of commercial endeavor in the region. Fairholme began as a ferry landing in the 1890s. By 1911, the Hotel Fairholme was described as “a modern house, with large rooms, handsomely furnished.” Among the properties at Lake Crescent, this well-appointed and stately hotel alone remained open throughout the year. Even as roads became more prevalent in the area, Fairholme retained its centrality. During the 1920s, the property changed hands, and soon other smaller properties capitalized on its momentum. National Park Service development began in the early 1960s, when the park commissioned the construction of Fairholme Campground along with three comfort stations and a campfire circle. In 1976, the park purchased Fairholme Resort and awarded Elizabeth Ketchum a five-year permit to operate the resort. Limited funds prevented the immediate construction and rehabilitation of facilities. The National Park Service renewed Ketchum’s permit in 1980. That year, Ketchum installed a boat dock. A structural analysis of the site showed that the main resort had foundation problems. The park allocated funds toward demolishing the building. In 1982, a small, efficient roadside restaurant replaced the old roadside structure. In 1987, the park awarded a new concession contract to Karen Johnson, and three years later, Crescent West, Inc., purchased the contract. In 2004, Forever/NPC Resorts, LLC, purchased the contract from Crescent West and changed the name from Fairholm General Store to Fairholme Store.39

39 Superintendent, Olympic National Park, to Olympic National Park Staff, Seasonal Employees, Concessioners and Concession Employees, June 14, 1982, 5; Annual Narrative Report of Superintendent, Olympic National Park, 1988, 16-17; Superintendent’s Annual Report, Olympic National Park, 1982, 12; Monthly Narrative Report, Dec. 1962, OLYM 18242, Box 1, Folder 28: 1962, Olympic NP archives, 6; Superintendent’s Annual Report,
Originally built as Log Cabin Hotel in 1895, the Log Cabin Lodge burned to the ground in 1932. Carl and Isabel Hansen rebuilt Log Cabin Resort at the same site, offering lakeside chalets, lodge rooms, rustic cabins, RV sites, and a modest marina facility to visitors. In 1972, the Log Cabin Lodge received a two-year extension on its contract, and over the next two years, the National Park Service removed and began to upgrade the facility’s structures. In 1974, Helga and Robert Fuller purchased the lease from the Hansens, ending their thirty-one year ownership. The Fullers elected to remain open all year and opened a dining room. By 1976, the number of beds reached 119. In 1980, the National Park Service acquired the resort and soon after installed a complete sewer and water system and rebuilt the RV park. The lodge also included a general store and kayak, paddleboat, rowboat, and water cycle rentals. In 1980, work crews built a boat dock. By 1983, Log Cabin Lodge was among the few remaining public concession facilities run by resort concessioners on the lake. Log Cabin Resort, Inc., was formed in 1986. A new contract awarded in 1989, which was transferred to Rebecca and Steve Rice in 1996.40

Charlie and Ida Keller established Lake Ozette Resort in 1935, when a road was built through the area. Although their resort initially consisted of twelve cabins, a store, and a service station, only two of the cabins remained in the park. The 1976 Boundary Adjustment Act gave the National Park Service resources to purchase the entire complex. Congress appropriated $9.7 million to complete the acquisition and exchange of property, the highest priority land acquisition in Olympic. Along with the resort’s structures, the

---

National Park Service acquired forty acres of land and one-quarter mile of lakeshore suitable for parking, picnicking, and camping. In 1981, the Ozette Resort store and café closed. A year later, the National Park Service removed the cabins and café structure. In 2003, the National Park Service operated the campground and picnic areas as a non-fee facility with minimum improvements. No recreational resorts in the Lake Ozette area of the park exist, although a small operation stands just outside park boundaries.41

Resort facilities also cropped up around Olympic National Park’s hot springs, which occur on and near the presently inactive Calawah fault zone. Olympic Hot Springs, in Boulder Creek, a bank on a tributary of the Elwha River, consists of twenty-one natural occurrences of hot sulfur water ranging in temperature from lukewarm to 138 degrees Fahrenheit. Private entrepreneurs first developed the hot springs soon after the turn of the twentieth century. In 1909, Billy Everett and Carl Schboeffel secured the mineral rights at Olympic Hot Springs, and then began leasing the land from the Forest Service in 1913. By the early 1920s, Olympic Hot Springs Resort boasted furnished cabins, a main lodge, and a large swimming pool – vast improvements, visitors noted, over the tent cabins that had cropped up in the 1910s. Until 1930, when a road reached to the resort, visitors could only access the resort by foot or horseback. Although the resort grew in popularity, it started to decline when Sol Duc Hot Springs reopened in 1921. In 1940, Olympic Hot Springs’s main hotel building succumbed to fire. That same year, Olympic National Park expanded its boundaries to encompass the Elwha/Boulder Creek area, and the Olympic Hot Springs owners leased the lodge to the park. By 1950, Olympic reported that the concessionaires were maintaining the resort adequately,

41 Superintendent, Olympic National Park, to Olympic National Park Staff, Seasonal Employees, Concessioners and Concession Employees, June 14, 1982, 4; Evans, Historic Resource Study, 313; Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative History, 149, 153-55.
although their attempt to chlorinate the water at the hot springs caused a subsequent decline in business.

A decade later, the resort’s heyday had passed. Superintendent Bennett Gale’s 1965 *Master Plan Brief* noted a desire to obliterate the Olympic Hot Springs Resort altogether, following Overly’s line of thought that the park should offer quality concessions or none at all. Heavy snowfalls in the 1960s collapsed the roofs of many of the structures at the hot springs, and in 1966, the park closed Olympic Hot Springs to the public. In 1967, Gale refused to renew the permit required to operate the concession. Roger Allin oversaw the razing of the facilities. By the mid-1970s, the National Park Service graded the area and planted it with native grass, tree seeds, and tree seedlings.42

Olympic Hot Springs’ counterpart, Sol Duc Hot Springs Resort, had its genesis earlier in the century. In 1906, Forest Ranger Chris Morgenroth built a horse trail to Sol Duc Hot Springs to accommodate the increasing numbers of visitors. In 1909, Michael Earles, the owner of the Puget Sound Mills and Timber Company, built a $75,000 road to the springs. In 1912, he opened an elegant hotel, sanatorium, and resort grounds with golf links, tennis courts, a bowling alley, and a theater – “a spa for the rich and famous,” commented one local resident. Four years later, the resort burned to the ground, but it reopened to high acclaim in the original sanatorium building in 1921. “The powerful energies of water,” a brochure advertised, “have long been known to amazingly work wonders in the restoration of health … Rheumatism … and all forms of blood and skin diseases, succumbs with amazing rapidity to the powerful energies of the water.” A new

42 “Heart O’Hills … ;” Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 33, UW Archives, 3; Superintendent, Olympic, to Regional Director, Region Four, November 5, 1950, Preston Macy Papers 3211, Box 1, Folder 27, UW Archives; Fringer, *Olympic National Park: An Administrative History*, 152; Superintendent’s Annual Report, 1974, 8; Evans, *Historic Resource Study*, 283, 285, 289.
automobile-accessible camp offered rustic lodging for those with their own camping equipment.\(^{43}\) That heyday reflected the trends of the times, and when it ended with the building’s fiery destruction just before the Great Depression, a long slow decline ensued. Despite efforts to maintain the property, the deterioration continued. In 1962, the resort built a sixteen-unit trailer court west of the National Park Service campground at the hot springs. The 1965 *Master Plan Brief* noted that Olympic wished to acquire the hot springs and upgrade the facilities, and in 1966, the acquisition process began. The National Park Service purchased Sol Duc Hot Springs Resort in 1967, along with 320 acres of cutover land. The property included fifty-nine high- and low-standard rental cabins and motel units, a lodge, a mineral hot spring bathing pool, and a swimming pool. The pool required extensive rehabilitation to meet public health and safety standards.\(^{44}\)

Sol Duc remained a trouble spot for the National Park Service, a place where the agency’s aspirations and the realities of the facilities clashed. After the 1969 implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act, the National Park Service became more concerned about the health of the springs. The park’s 1976 environmental statement, a document that served the role of an environmental impact statement and provided the legal justification for the goals of the master plan, advocated phasing out overnight accommodations and considered removing all the facilities at Sol Duc and allowing the area to revert to forest. Olympic’s final master plan modified the environmental statement, recommending only the removal of overnight facilities if the operators could not secure the capital to support a renovation and some modifications of


the hot springs. A group of seasonal concession employees formed an organization called the “Save the Sol Duc Committee,” to challenge the park. Media attention made Olympic National Park look as if it arbitrarily deprived the workers of their livelihood. To ground its decision in a way the public understood, the National Park Service drew upon scientific research as a rationale for its position on the use of the hot springs. At the core of the issue was the objective of wilderness for the national park and the inadequate facilities and level of service. To stabilize the situation, National Park Concessions, Inc., assumed management of the resort, with its contract running until December 1978. The company stipulated that the National Park Service agree to a slight reduction in services to cut the company’s losses. By 1982, a new concessioner, Bill Bell of Enumclaw, who succeeded National Park Concessions, had rehabilitated the swimming pool and private hot tubs, and had built six cabins. The resort was renovated in 1988, but by the early twenty-first century, the park was forced to close the operation for nearly a year because of sanitary deficiencies. “It was a very difficult and controversial action at the time,” former superintendent David Morris remembered.

Another concession, Hurricane Ridge Lodge, run by National Park Concessions, developed as a result of actions by the 1938 planning group. The original park planners agreed that a new road leading to a new facility on Hurricane Ridge was essential to Olympic’s success. Hurricane Ridge Lodge was begun in 1952 and completed in 1954, three years before the new road brought visitors to the area. Until the early 1980s, the lodge functioned primarily as a concession facility that offered a coffee shop, curio shop, and, during the winter, ski equipment rentals. During the early 1980s, the National Park Service increased the amount of space devoted to interpretation. In 1985, the second level
of the lodge became an interpretative facility. The lodge also catered to summer visitors to Hurricane Ridge. Seasonal rangers offered interpretive talks and lead nature walks. Substantial increases in visitation throughout Olympic made Hurricane Ridge Lodge a popular year-round destination.45

Skiing At Olympic

Outdoor winter recreation provided another activity at Hurricane Ridge Lodge. Skiing had been a popular activity before the park’s establishment, and until the 1950s National Park Service policy favored the development of winter sports. With the aid of Depression-era Civilian Conservation Corps workers, Deer Park opened for recreational skiers during the 1936-1937 winter season in what was then Olympic National Forest. It operated as a local ski resort, grandfathered in after the national park expanded to include the area. Deer Park Lodge, a rustic former CCC barracks with a dormitory and kitchen, housed weekend skiers. The area did not attract enough visitors to make its operation viable. “Although skiing conditions are generally as good or better than those in other areas of the far Northwest,” Superintendent Overly noted in 1953, “the limited facilities and difficult approach have localised the patronage to nearby peninsula towns.”46

The park was caught in another dilemma. Although the agency still favored skiing and other winter pastimes, the facilities available in Olympic did not match the agency’s vision of the level of service in national parks. The park sought to upgrade the facilities and bring them under National Park Service control. In 1957, the skiing operation moved

from Deer Park to Hurricane Ridge. The agency optimistically hoped that the proposed
ski area at Hurricane Ridge, with a summit elevation of 5,240 feet and average annual
snowfall of 400 inches, would offer more and longer ski runs, attracting skiers from
outside of the Olympic Peninsula and channeling tourist dollars into the region’s
economy. The National Park Service invested in a road, utilities, chairlifts, and a day
lodge, and then hand over operations to a concessioner, Olympic Ski Lifts Inc.47

Within a few years, agency policy toward outdoor recreation in the parks shifted.
The Leopold report of 1963 found skiing and other recreational activities “incongruous”
with the ideal of national parks. Simultaneously, technological innovation made skiing
more attractive to a growing number of the public. With better equipment, more leisure
time and income to devote to it, and heightened consciousness about the desirability of
skiing and experience in the outdoors, the American public flocked to the slopes. Skiing
grew in popularity through the 1960s, posing a difficult question for the National Park
Service. At Yosemite, Mount Rainer, and other parks, the agency contended with a public
that differed from the constituency the agency found most desirable. Once again, its
publics and its goals clashed.48

Olympic presented a special problem. The National Park Service was concerned
with the impact of skiing on park experience, but on the Olympic Peninsula, skiing
remained largely a local, small-time phenomenon. By the early 1970s, the ski resort
endured financial difficulties that resulted from the limited facilities it provided. In 1976,
the National Park Service issued another five-year concession permit to Hurricane Ridge

47 Superintendent to Region 4 Director, November 30, 1959; Region 4 Director to Director,
December 16, 1959, NA, RG 79, Accession 63A231, D18, Olympic National Park, NARA Seattle.
48 Lary Dilsaver, ed. America’s National Park System: The Critical Documents (Lanham, MD:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1994), 50, 63, 146, 242; Rothman, Devil’s Bargains, 168-89, 252-53; Catton,
Wonderland, 413-35.
Ski School and Olympic Ski Lifts, despite continued insolvency and reliance on community participation in annual fundraisers. The environmental statement for the 1976 proposed *Master Plan* recommended the elimination of skiing, a stance popular in the National Park Service but much less so with the regional public. A year later, Olympic issued a waiver of its fee to the ski school as a result of light snowfall. Questions about safety, liability insurance, and lawsuits over operations at the ski school led to new strategies. In 2001, the Hurricane Ridge Public Development Authority, a non-profit foundation, was formed to operate the existing ski and snowboarding area on the ridge, with one Poma lift, two rope tows and a ski school.49

Skiing served as another metaphor for the difficulty of managing Olympic National Park. It illustrated the ways in which different kinds of objectives pushed and pulled the park, how inherited mandates became liabilities over time, and how park managers negotiated between different constituencies. Compared to the desire to cut timber or hunt and fish in Olympic, skiing was insignificant. It did attract visitors, but especially after the intellectual redefinition of the park after formal wilderness designation, its very existence at Olympic made powerful constituencies bristle. Yet it persisted in a diminished way, testimony to the complications of running a national park in an area with people who thought of its resources as their own – in many different ways.

It also foresaw a more complicated future, in which recreation had begun to supplant conventional environmentalism. The demographics of changing American society, especially with the new technologies that let people do more in more remote

---

places, spoke of a different future. In it, recreationalists took on the role that had been
mostly the province of conservationists and environmentalists: they sought to protect the
places in which they played with the same vigor as environmentalists had for the
wilderness.

In another way, skiing became a harbinger of the future, of a national park more
significant in the regional economy. Strangely, it solved the problem of the role of the
park in the regional economy. Part of what made management of Olympic National Park
so difficult was its establishment as a park at a time when the extractive industry around
it still sustained the peninsula. As the options of the timber industry diminished, the
region cast about for other sources of economic sustenance. Visitation to the park became
increasingly important, but there was an amorphous quality to its economic impact.
Hurricane Ridge seemed unlikely to play a major role in bringing visitors to the Olympic
Peninsula, but visitors came in greater numbers to the peninsula in each successive year.
Beginning in the 1980s, the heart of the nation’s economic engine moved from
manufacturing and extractive industries to service and leisure, precisely the sector that
the park anchored on the peninsula. As a result, Olympic National Park’s role in the
region increased in significance as its presence became an increasingly greater influence
on the lives of the people of the Olympic Peninsula. Negotiating this changing climate
became one of the greatest challenges of management at Olympic National Park.
Figure 7-1: Tourists on their way to the main group of buildings at the Olympic Hot Springs Resort in June 1926. (Photographs courtesy of Olympic National Park, Accession Number OLYM-632, Box 3)

Figure 7-2: A family prepares a meal at the Graves Creek Resort Camp in August 1927. The camp operated under a commercial permit from Olympic Recreation Company.
Figure 7-3: The Rosemary Inn on the shore of Lake Crescent. The main lodge, which held the lobby, dining room and recreation room, was flanked by sixteen cabins.
Figure 7-4: Becker’s Ocean Resort under construction in May 1954.
Figure 7-5: The Low Divide Chalet, on the Elwha-Quinault Divide. The Olympic Chalet Company, a group of Grays Harbor businessmen, built the chalet in 1927-28. It operated under a U.S. Forest Service commercial permit until the 1935 creation of Olympic National Monument.

Figure 7-6: The Low Divide ranger station in the summer of 1938.
**Figure 7-7:** The interior of the Storm King Ranger Station.

**Figure 7-8:** The Eagle Ranger Station on the Sol Duc in Olympic National Park, in 1941.
Figure 7-9: The Kilea Ranger Station, in the summer of 1940.

Figure 7-10: The Marmot Lake Ranger Station, in the summer of 1939.
Figure 7-11: The Jackson Ranger Station in 1943.

Figure 7-12: The ranger station at Hoh in 1941.
Figure 7-13: Skiing at the 5,000-foot elevation at Deer Park.

Figure 7-14: Skiing at the Big Meadows area at Hurricane Ridge.
Chapter 8:

Threats to the Park

On June 27, 1980, a Seattle Post-Intelligencer editorial opined that “overuse, over-commercialization, the potential for offshore oil drilling, and the never-ending effort to log the forests surrounding its boundary” threatened Olympic National Park, the “crown jewel of the nation’s vast park system.” Making a bad situation worse, the essay averred, hordes of recreational vehicle-borne travelers often blocked the park’s roads in summer, causing major congestion around popular visitor destinations. Hikers eroded the delicate trails while goats ravaged the mountains’ native grasses. Private inholdings along Lake Crescent threatened the park’s pristine qualities. “At the heart of most disputes,” the piece concluded, “is the issue of who should use the park – if anyone.”

The Post-Intelligencer reflected sentiments long common in the greater Seattle-Tacoma area and in the nation at large, but recently arrived on the peninsula itself. Since Olympic’s 1938 establishment, the National Park Service had battled a latent and sometimes overt local and regional hostility toward the park. Such sentiment took many forms and had many manifestations, but was at its core, a constant. After more than a half century, a segment of the peninsula population barely tolerated Olympic National Park in its midst, seeing in the reserved federal acreage an obstacle to the extractive industries that they perceived still sustained the region. This distaste for the institution of the national park presented the National Park Service with a conundrum. Even as commercial extraction diminished in economic significance, many residents still held an older vision of the importance of timber and similar industries. On the

---

1 Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 27, 1980.
peninsula, the National Park Service spent much time and energy justifying its contribution to the region.

Regional Importance

Like all major national parks, Olympic National Park remained a catalytic economic, social, cultural, and political force in regional affairs. The park’s importance to the peninsula grew as the nation’s economy changed. Beginning in 1974, the United States entered a twenty-three year period that for most of the country represented a regression to an earlier American mean of lesser prosperity. The culprit was the annual decrease – for each of those years – in the real value of hourly wages. The great aberration of prosperity between 1945 and 1974 was precisely that, an era in which one typical income went farther than at any other point in U.S. history. By the mid-1970s, people worked longer hours to stay where they were on the socio-economic ladder. One-income families declined; it took more hours to survive economically in each successive year, and middle-class women entered the workforce in greater numbers.

The consequences of these shifts and the burgeoning global market economy were enormous. One clear result was the decline of the natural resource-based economy in the Pacific Northwest; among the hardest-hit industries was timber. A combination of factors, including the increasing efficiency of logging machines, which made more of the work force extraneous, protests over the potential cutting of old-growth forests in California, Oregon, and Washington, the buyout of timber companies by multinationals and corporate raiders, and the northern spotted

---

An American Eden

owl controversy throughout the West, contributed to the difficulties of traditional timber extraction. U.S. timber, once the source of billions of board feet of lumber and thousands of well-paying, dependable jobs, lost a significant measure of its viability in an increasingly international marketplace as less expensive foreign sources supplanted domestic timber. The Forest Service, squeezed in a changing culture, faced challenges to its traditional behavior from both outside and inside the agency. In a changing economy, the Forest Service, arguably the least nimble of federal agencies as a result of what former USFS Chief Historian David Clary called its near-religious devotion to the sustained-yield principles of its founder, Gifford Pinchot, was forced to rethink its strategies.3 The result for the peninsula timber industry was devastating.

Tourism grew in importance to the region as the seeds of a new, connected future were taking shape. This transformation was driven by a minuscule piece of silicon, the microchip. This little chunk of information-processing material caused the radical, inexorable, fundamental, and overnight transformation of the basis of the world economy; it created a transformation every bit as great as the Industrial Revolution, a divide across which people peered with great trepidation. The Microchip Revolution, the constellation of changes associated with the rise of this little piece of equipment, changed life as Americans knew it. Microchips created the so-called Information Age, in which knowledge and the ability to manipulate its digital bits genuinely became power, and it dramatically increased the range and significance of the service economy.4 On the Olympic Peninsula, this process accelerated into a gradual and powerful

---


329
change in the economic basis of the region. Service economies, in the form of tourism, became a crucial element in the peninsula’s economy.

As a result, the importance of the national park and the decisions its managers made increased. Business leaders and residents on the Olympic Peninsula recognized the park as an important component of regional economic sustenance. This new appreciation of an old and consistent role added a new level of complexity to park management. The people of the region scrutinized Olympic’s decisions more carefully as a result of the changes in the regional economy, the growing reliance on the park as a source of economic sustenance, and growing recognition of the long-standing positive economic and cultural impact of Olympic National Park and the National Park Service.

At the same time, a generation of park superintendents had practiced a form of integrated management that best can be described as a “good neighbor” policy. Especially in the aftermath of the 1990 Camp Kiwanis incident, Olympic Superintendents Maureen Finnerty, David Morris, and Bill Laitner invested considerable energy in working closely with neighboring communities. Recognizing that Olympic’s actions could easily inspire negative responses, superintendents articulated their goals and objectives with a new clarity and attention to detail as they actively sought consensus with their neighbors. They embarked on a long road. As they had more than a half-century before, national activists supported policies that local residents perceived as threatening. The park remained as it has been since its inception, a bulwark against rapid change and simultaneously an institution that brought change in its wake. Olympic’s new economic role

---

became a crucial dimension of park management, for decisions once perceived as internal have joined an increasingly widely circulated debate over the region’s future.

A traditional national park, Olympic faced challenges as the new century began. National parks and the agency that managed them had been in a transition for almost twenty years by 2000, with two major efforts under way to intellectually rejuvenate the National Park Service and change management procedures in a manner to alter the way staff members felt about their jobs and the agency. Though public affection for the national parks remained strong, growing segments of U.S. society questioned the necessity of remote national parks and especially wilderness parks. The influx of immigrants and the growth of minority populations in the United States who had little experience with the national park ideal placed a higher premium on the communication of the values of national parks to a diverse society. The agency was positioned poorly to achieve this task at most of its units, leading to the prospect of a park system that spoke only to specific segments of the nation. At Olympic, the challenge was even more clearly defined. In the twenty-first century, the National Park Service had to respond to a far different public than the people who worked to establish the park.

Its position on the Olympic Peninsula has made Olympic National Park pivotal for all its neighbors. In 2000, the U.S. Forest Service administered the 650,945 acres of Olympic National Forest adjacent to the park. Olympic National Park also worked closely with eight Native American tribes and with five reservations bordered by park lands. Fourteen state parks with 4,172 acres of land lay nearby, and the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)


An American Eden

administered 3,300 square miles of marine sanctuary. The more than two million people of the Seattle-Tacoma area provided an important local constituency, while the approximately 207,000 people in the surrounding four peninsula counties held an economic interest. With a 1999 average per capita income of $22,457, well below the Washington state average of $31,232, these four counties depended on the park as a source of sustenance in a changing economy.7

Even in 2000, the Olympic Peninsula relied heavily on the timber economy. Forestry and wood products sectors formed the principal economic base, accounting for 23 percent of region’s output, 10 percent of employment opportunities, and 16 percent of value added. Despite this continuing preeminence, the timber economy has played a shrinking role in each successive year.

Still the largest part of the peninsula economy, timber had been diminished by the globalization of the U.S. economy and this change enhanced the importance of Olympic National Park. The park had long constituted an alternative to the timber industry by acting as a major source of outside revenue through its role as the primary travel destination on the Olympic Peninsula. Seventy-eight percent of visitors to the peninsula in 2000 cited the park as their primary destination, leading to 3.3 million recreation visits that year. This represented a significant economic impact in a region that struggled to maintain its standard of living.

Olympic’s visitation patterns suggested that its reach had become predominantly regional, supplemented with a significant percentage of extra-regional visitors. Unlike national parks such as Yellowstone and the Grand Canyon, which drew the overwhelming majority of visitors from outside their immediate region, Olympic matched the pattern of national parks

---

areas that were proximate to urban centers. As was true of Mount Rainier and Yosemite national parks, much of Olympic’s visitation was intra-regional. Forty-seven percent of visitors originated in Washington State, another 8 percent came from California, and 4 percent came from the smaller but closer Oregon. Almost 40 percent of visitation came from outside these three states, bringing more than 1.3 million visitors from outside the region to the peninsula. This suggested that the park not only helped in a regional redistribution of income, but it also brought in significant visitor dollars. Olympic’s role as an income generator on the peninsula was growing, and every indicator early in the new century suggested it would continue to grow.

The impact was important and telling. In 2000, visitation to Olympic National Park accounted for 7-10 percent of jobs on the peninsula and 3-5 percent of overall economic output. Park visitors comprised 62 percent of spending by tourists in Clallam and Jefferson counties and 28 percent in the wider four-county region that included Gray’s Harbor and Mason counties. In 2000, park visitors spent $90 million in the area, generating $29 million in wages and salaries for local residents and supporting 1,900 jobs in area tourism businesses. Secondary economic effects generated an additional $27 million in sales. With one of the highest overnight use rates of all of the national parks, Olympic generated $11 million in personal income in the hotel sector and supported 620 area hotel jobs. Concessioners inside the park reported 70,758 person nights in lodges and 8,855 camping nights. Park-operated campgrounds produced 210,201 person nights and 115,464 backcountry stays. Park visitors accounted for 65 percent of hotel sales in Clallam

---

An American Eden

and Jefferson counties, and 29 percent in all four counties. This role as an economic engine helped the region, but presented problems both in the management of wilderness and other park resources and for native peoples.

Native American Relationships

For some peninsula constituencies, the park served as anchor, a powerful presence that respected tradition and tamped down rapid change. Many Native American groups regard Olympic National Park as their traditional homeland. Other tribes with ties to the Olympic Peninsula maintain an ongoing connection to the park. The Hoh, Quileute, Quinault, Makah, Lower Elwha Klallam, Jamestown S'Klallam, Port Gamble S'Klallam, and Skokomish signed treaties that ceded the lands now within Olympic National Park. The Hoh, Quileute, Makah, and Quinault reservations, ranging from 200 to more than 200,000 acres, abut the park. Native American rights, enshrined in law and respected by custom, influenced park policy.

In general, the National Park Service’s history with Native Americans has not done it credit. Until the 1970s, disregard for Native peoples and even Anglo-American groups inside proposed park boundaries was a typical flaw in national park establishment and management. The agency created landscapes without people, best described in the Leopold Report of 1963 as “vignettes of primitive America.” In an effort to reflect the values of nineteenth-century Romanticism, a perspective that allowed the United States to become “nature’s nation” as it escaped the oppressive legacy of European culture, national parks became landscapes from which the government had removed the humans. This primeval America, a vestige of a world before the European entry, erased Indians from that landscape of meaning. This formulation of

the role of national parks began with the founding of Yellowstone National Park in 1872 and continued for at least the next 100 years.10

Envisioned as devoid of even their first inhabitants, the national parks emphasized the distance between nature and humanity. Indians were absent only in a figurative sense; often, as at Olympic, they remained in or near national park areas, treated as symbolic representations of a past and divested of all but mythic status.11 From its inception, the agency almost perfectly mirrored the desires and values of middle- and upper-middle class America. Mainstream America made no place for native peoples except as a manifestation of the past. Where federal land received special designation, someone – often Native American but also Anglo-American – was likely to be displaced. The national parks were designed to fulfill a combination of educational and nationalistic functions that the early- and mid-twentieth century demanded. The stories of Native Americans and other longtime residents did not fit that template, so the federal government effectively wrote them out. In the national park system, instances of callous treatment and removal of Native peoples were so common that in retrospect, some scholars have come to regard the National Park Service’s treatment of native peoples within its boundaries as the agency’s original sin.12

---

Olympic National Park provided an exception to the pattern of disregard so common in the park system. Though Native people and the parks were at loggerheads elsewhere, at Olympic, they worked together closely in the aftermath of the 1974 Boldt decision. Although Boldt defined the relationship between the tribes and the state, it set a new frame for all land management. “Our [relationships] seemed to be smoother,” observed Park Ethnographer Jacilee Wray. From the Indian perspective, the National Park Service was not the villain. The agency “came late in the game, and everything had already been taken away,” Wray noted. “We did not take the land.” Peninsula Native peoples did hold the National Park Service accountable for prohibiting use of natural resources. “The [prohibition of] fishing is still remembered a lot on the coastal rivers, the nets that were confiscated by the park rangers,” Wray recalled. As it complied with law and attempted to assuage its neighbors, the park implemented a fee waiver for peninsula peoples. Indian people merely have to show their identification to enter the park without a charge. “We weren’t to ask them their purpose, because whether it was recreational or traditional, it did not matter,” Wray remarked. “Recreation is a traditional use here.” The park also invested in research about tribal history and culture. Wray’s Olympic National Park Ethnographic Overview and Assessment (1997) examined treaty rights and legislation as well as government policies and attitudes towards sacred and traditional sites within the park, providing Olympic managers with a foundation to understand the park’s historical and contemporary relationship with different tribes and work with the tribes to publish their own books.¹³

When tension arose, it typically resulted from questions about resource use. Olympic

¹³ Jacilee Wray, interview by Hal Rothman, November 13, 2003; Jacilee Wray, Olympic National Park Ethnographic Overview and Assessment (Port Angeles, Wa.: National Park Service, 1997), 5.
An American Eden

National Park’s complex mandate pitted mandatory obligations against one another, and park managers often were left to craft solutions that respected contradictory statutes. By the mid-1970s, federal statute protected Indian rights to traditional lands. The 1978 American Indian Religious Freedom Act established a policy of religious freedom and access to sacred areas under federal jurisdiction. Signed by President Bill Clinton, the 1996 Indian Sacred Sites Act accommodated ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites on federal lands. Other federal statues, including the National Historic Preservation Act, the Archaeological Resources Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) also called for tribal consultation, with treaty rights acknowledged in the enabling legislation. The park was simultaneously subject to competing mandates, and wilderness was preeminent among them. NEPA and the 1973 Endangered Species Act also specified treatment of species and resources. Access to sacred sites, sacred animals, or traditional fishing and hunting sites seemed to contravene their terms. The park typically tried to please disparate constituencies, each of which believed that their rights came first under the law. Resolution often seemed far off.

Boundary issues also caused tensions between the National Park Service and the tribes. The founding of the park left many areas that advocates coveted outside its boundaries, and land acquisition dominated agency objectives. Some of the lands in question belonged to peninsula tribes. In 1939, Acting Superintendent Fred Overly attempted to purchase portions of the Quinault Reservation; his efforts were rebuffed because of the objections of Commissioner of Wray, Ethnographic Overview and Assessment, 5; Shannon Peterson, Acting for Endangered Species: The Statutory Ark (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 81-133; Brian Czech and Paul R. Krausman, The Endangered Species Act: History, Conservation, Biology, and Public Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 15-27; Hal K. Rothman, Saving the Planet: The American Response to the Environment in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000), 158-83.
An American Eden

Indian Affairs John Collier. In 1941, Superintendent Preston Macy suggested that the National Park Service try to acquire the largely deserted Ozette Indian Reservation even though Indians still fished in the Ozette River. Macy hoped to include the reservation in Olympic’s boundaries; more importantly, he wished to forestall resource management issues that would emerge if a tribe exerted its prior rights to the salmon run. Such concern contributed to the desire for the addition of the Coastal Strip, consummated in 1953. Four years later, the Makah Tribe requested ownership of the Ozette Reservation despite recalcitrance by Olympic National Park.15

Questions about traditional resource use highlighted the relationship between the Quileute and the park. In 1954, the aggressive Overly sought a definition of the Quileute’s rights to hunt and fish within Olympic’s boundaries. His query led to a complicated effort to ascertain the tribe’s rights. Again, questions of overlapping jurisdiction illuminated the dilemma of Native peoples in the park. The National Park Service, the state of Washington and the Indian peoples all had different views of the status of land and resources. In U.S. law, Indian rights to the peninsula stemmed from the 1855 treaties of Point No Point, Neah Bay, and Olympia. These provided the tribes with formal standing and promised the continuation of rights to fishing, shellfish gathering, and other natural resources. In a 1955 case, *Tulee v. State of Washington*, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the state could not impose a charge for a fishing license for Indians who fished in their traditional places, but it could impose limits on fishing in pursuit of conservation goals.16 U.S. law had once again failed to resolve Indian claims to natural resources. Only the *Boldt* decision in 1974 clarified fishing rights.

---

The northern boundary of the Quileute Reservation, which bordered Olympic’s western edge, remained contested. The 1953 executive order that enlarged the park stipulated that no part of the Quileute Reservation was to be added to the park, yet the addition included a part of the reservation. In 1993, the Quileute asserted that they possessed a legitimate claim to three parcels of land in the Mora subdistrict, one in the Rialto Beach area and two on the south side of the Quillayute River. The park claimed the same lands. A boundary change in favor of the Indian reservation demanded the removal of nearly 300 acres from the park. In January 2003, Superintendent David Morris affirmed Olympic’s commitment to an equitable solution. “We have worked in good faith with the tribe,” he averred. “We need to find closure in a manner that's fair to both sides.” Park officials continued negotiations without litigation and in 2005, resolution remained a prominent objective of park policy. In the fall of 2005, the Quileute closed access to Second Beach until land issues were resolved. A major issue was to provide the tribe with higher elevation lands that were safe from tsunamis.17

Tribal Sovereignty

Until the late 1950s, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) played a significant role in the relationship between Native peoples of the peninsula and Olympic National Park. Indian autonomy gradually diminished the BIA role, bringing the tribes and the park closer together. Olympic and the tribes developed common interests, and when disputes occurred, they found ways to resolve their differences. Tribes increasingly challenged National Park Service authority and asserted their own sovereignty, especially concerning fishing rights. Park projects

increasingly required tribal consultation. In 1995, the Quileute tribe requested that the Olympic anthropologist assist them with a watershed analysis that the Forest Service conducted on the Sol Duc River. The work considered tribal cultural factors that would not have been understood without tribal input. Entities such as the Olympic Peninsula Intertribal Cultural Advisory Committee helped maintain contact between the park and the tribes. The groups had become “true partners,” Anthropologist Jacilee Wray maintained. “I don’t think that we can do our jobs without looking to them as partners in much that we do.”

Interagency Cooperation

Olympic’s other neighbors influence the direction of park management as well, with the U.S. Forest Service playing the most significant role. That agency once bitterly opposed the park’s establishment, but after 1938, the two agencies began to cooperate at the local level despite differences that continued to divide national policymakers. Superintendent Fred Overly’s 1952 Master Plan included a cooperative firefighting agreement between the National Park Service, Forest Service, and State Division of Forestry, an early example of cooperation that centered on an issue that dwarfed any agency’s possible scope of response. The resources available through Mission 66 helped continue this collaboration. The park’s 1964 Master Plan predicted an expanded relationship between the agencies, though Roger Allin was the first Olympic superintendent to implement further collaborative efforts in firefighting. Allin also initiated an interagency agreement and annual meetings that extended the cooperative effort to include routine maintenance activity, which included building the North Shore Road at Lake Quinault. Later superintendents worked to strengthen these relationships. “I think the

---

18 Jacilee Wray and Marie Herbert, “Stewards of the Human Landscape,” in Common Ground (Spring 2001); Wray, Ethnographic Overview and Assessment, 171-91; Jacilee Wray interview, Nov. 13, 2003.
relationships are good,” observed Natural Resource Management Chief Cat Hawkins Hoffman in 2002. “We need to do more with the Forest Service than we are doing, but we work very well with them.” With missions that both diverge and overlap, many predictable areas of disagreement between the National Park Service and Forest Service remain.19

The park’s relationship with state and local governments followed the pattern established between the National Park Service and Forest Service. Initially, the state of Washington and a majority of local governments opposed Olympic National Park’s establishment and fought to keep the peninsula’s valuable stands of timber out of the National Park Service’s hands. The Washington State Planning Council and State Game Commission led attacks against the National Park Service, with local governments, including the Port Angeles Chamber of Commerce, joining in. Clashes between local government and the National Park Service over hunting and timber rights remained a constant during the early years of the national monument and park, and the state and local entities fought constantly to remove land from the park altogether.

The 1953 addition of the Queets Corridor and the Coastal Strip further outraged state and local government agencies. It seemed to continue a pattern that removed lands from local use, a concern of peninsula residents since the establishment of the national monument. While conflicts over timber and hunting persisted, public attention shifted to ownership and use of beachlands. Washington’s ownership of the tidelands and the activities the state allowed threatened the values the National Park Service sought to uphold. As a result, jurisdictional disagreements between the state and National Park Service over tidelands persisted. Superintendent Roger Allin devoted considerable time and energy to fostering a positive working relationship with state

agencies. In 1973, he announced a cooperative agreement with the Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission that provided for joint management of the seacoast. Allin also solicited the aid of the Washington State Department of Game in the removal of the park’s mountain goat population. By 1983, Superintendent Roger Contor had reached an agreement for the cooperative management of the state beachlands along the Coastal Strip from Cape Alava to Kalaloch. In 1986, Congress extended the park’s boundaries to the low water mark and to small islands formerly under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). Despite these cooperative efforts, other conflicts over jurisdiction and fishery management goals persisted, reflecting the different agencies’ values and goals and conversely their desire to work together.20

Other federal agencies including the U.S. Coast Guard, Public Health Service, and U.S. Army had a significant role at Olympic National Park. Such agencies typically engaged the park in a specific activity. The Coast Guard assisted the National Park Service with maritime search and rescue operations, and the Army supported other emergency situations. The USFWS provided another partner, offering the park its expertise on resource management questions. After Olympic’s establishment, USFWS provided fish stocking programs in the park’s lakes except during World War II, when the program was halted. In 1975, Superintendent Roger Allin formalized the relationship by developing a joint interpretation and assistance program. In the intervening years, such relationships have grown in importance.21

Park Planning

Planning became the National Park Service’s solution to management questions, and the development of a General Management Plan (GMP) as the new century began pointed to long-

20 Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative History, 206-14.
21 Fringer, Olympic National Park: An Administrative History, 192-93.
term solutions to management issues. In 2000, Olympic functioned under a plan completed in 1977. The establishment of the designated wilderness in 1988 added new management obligations, but a revised GMP had not been contemplated. In winter 2000, Olympic Superintendent David Morris initiated a new GMP process, combining it with an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that analyzed the impact of alternatives. The GMP was an eight-stage process that progressed through project startup, identification of the planning context, the development of alternatives, publication of those alternatives in a newsletter that took place in summer 2003, preparation and publication of the draft GMP/EIS, publication of the final GMP/EIS and the record of decision, and implementing the plan.\textsuperscript{22}

The GMP process initiated in 2000 addressed the major questions at the heart of Olympic National Park’s future: how to protect its diverse natural and cultural resources while providing visitors with the opportunity to enjoy those resources. At its core, the GMP sought definitive ways to fulfill Olympic’s mission statement: “to preserve and protect, unimpaired, the park’s diverse natural and cultural resources and provide for the enjoyment, education and inspiration of present and future generations.” In summer 2001, a public newsletter raised four broad conceptual issues. Protection led the list, followed by the question of whether to develop a strategy for determining the number and kinds of visitor use activities within Olympic National Park. The park’s partners were also to be scrutinized, and increased support for the park and its activities closed the list.\textsuperscript{23}

The GMP process became both a format for resolution of park issues and a means to


communicate with a wider public. The National Park Service relied on newsletters to make the public aware of the GMP process. Conceptual and concrete issues such as natural resources, cultural resources, education and interpretation, visitor experience, visitor use, safety, access and roads, visitor facilities, and relationships with tribes and local communities dominated the process. The newsletters articulated the problems associated with each issue. The future of the park’s wilderness typified the issues the GMP process was meant to resolve. In spring 2003, a full fifteen years after the wilderness designation, the agency had yet to approve a *Wilderness Management Plan*. The park had “been struggling with a wilderness management plan for a number of years,” Cat Hawkins Hoffman observed, “and finally we are going to get there.” Superintendent Bill Laitner concurred. “We can’t afford to wait for a perfect plan,” he recognized late in 2003. According to Laitner, “a lot of wiggle room” existed in prescribed activities for management of the wilderness. The planning process also reconsidered whether adequate management policies existed to ensure the protection and restoration of the park’s fishery resources. Olympic’s eleven major river systems had national significance for anadromous fish, and the plan sought to develop a strategy to achieve goals in this area. Visitation had increased 32 percent between 1986 and 1996, requiring new attention to visitor services. The plan also considered Olympic’s cultural resources, long threatened by vandalism and neglect.24

In January 2002, the National Park Service held public workshops to develop alternative visions for Olympic National Park. The park received hundreds of ideas and comments during GMP public meetings in September and October 2002. Yet, large questions remained.

tension between cultural and natural resource management in a park with enabling legislation that stressed natural resource protection provoked major debate. Staff members also disagreed on whether to focus on outreach or interpretation programs. Increased visitation, and the types and levels of educational and recreational activities that the park could accommodate, also raised questions. Access to Olympic – private versus public transit, other transportation possibilities, road and trail access to visitor destinations – also remained unsolved. So did partnerships with public and private entities, particularly Native American tribes.25

In May 2003, Olympic National Park presented three preliminary alternatives for the GMP. The first, a current management approach also known as “no action” continues current management and services and serves as a baseline for evaluating the other options. The second emphasized resource protection, while the third focused on visitor opportunities. The 2006 Draft General Management Plan/Environmental Impact Statement will indicate a preferred alternative, which could be one of the alternatives or any combination of the three. The National Park Service will then subject the draft to public review.26 The three alternatives presented by the National Park Service revealed the difficult nature of the issues facing Olympic. The National Park Service considered alternatives for all areas of Olympic National Park, including the wilderness/backcountry, Sol Duc, Hoh, Ozette, Kalaloch, Queets, Quinault, Hurricane Ridge, Staircase, Dosewallips, and Deer Park. The locations varied considerably, but the character of the issues remained relatively constant. The future of the park’s wilderness areas and Sol Duc, two areas of concern, had become issues of appropriate use and management decisions.

An American Eden

**Olympic’s Wilderness**

Wilderness had been the raison d’etre of the park, but it posed significant management challenges. The wilderness included as much land as possible, bringing it so close to roads in the park that it eliminated Olympic’s ability to reroute and sometimes even repair roads. If the National Park Service followed the status quo, wilderness boundaries would not be adjusted to maintain road access, existing trails would be maintained, some facilities would be allowed to degrade, and wilderness shelters would be available only for emergency use. The second alternative, emphasizing resource protection, called for the National Park Service to leave wilderness boundaries intact, allowing roads to deteriorate if necessary, and possibly expand park wilderness for resource protection in the Ozette and Queets areas. Under this scenario, Olympic work crews would convert wider trails to narrower ones, maintain facilities, and, as in the “no action” option, use wilderness shelters only for emergencies. The proposed third alternative emphasized visitor opportunity, altering the nature of parts of Olympic’s wilderness areas. It would allow the National Park Service to modify wilderness boundaries to permit the relocation of roads out of flood plains and maintain road and/or transit access. Unlike the resource protection alternative, the visitor opportunity alternative focused on widening trails throughout the park, restoring a few abandoned ones, and developing new trail segments. Under this alternative, Olympic would not only maintain, but also possibly improve and expand, visitor facilities.\(^{27}\)

The three alternatives developed for Sol Duc offered another striking example of possible futures. Under the current management alternative, the National Park Service would maintain the...
existing hot springs resort facilities as well as the seasonal road and trail access to the springs. The resource protection option would mandate the closure of the hot springs and subsequent restoration of the area to its natural condition. The National Park Service would maintain seasonal road access until river movement threatened it, at which time the agency would explore alternative access to the hot springs. Campground size and functions would be reduced while maintaining trail access. Finally, the visitor opportunity alternative would allow Olympic to expand and improve the hot springs resort facilities, and, if economically feasible, improve road access to enable year-round operation. The park would also redesign, enlarge, and improve the trail network.28

As its personnel drafted the GMP, Olympic National Park also had to address internal and external threats. The concept of threats entered the National Park Service’s lexicon in the 1970s, and the agency spent considerable energy assessing damage at national parks and historic sites. In 1980, the National Park Service conducted its first comprehensive assessment of internal threats facing the park system. Investigators examined eight sites: Saguaro National Monument, Arches National Park, Crater Lake National Park, Gettysburg National Military Park, Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, Lake Meredith National Recreation Area, Minute Man National Historic Park, and Olympic National Park. The problems at the parks showed that damage took place at an alarming rate. The report concluded that the National Park Service needed to determine each park’s natural and cultural resources and ascertain the threats to each resource.29

At the eight sites studied, park managers identified five broad categories of threats: the

impact of private holdings and commercial development; the results of encroachment by nonnative wildlife and plants; the damage caused by illegal activities; the adverse affects of visitation; and the unintended adverse effects of the agency or managers’ actions. As a direct result of budget and workforce shortfalls, all eight parks showed little progress in minimizing or reversing the effects of internal threats. Most such threats had worsened since the 1970s, and about 25 percent of threats that managers identified caused irreversible damage to park resources.

Although Olympic had fewer problems than the seven other parks studied, nine major threats, including the presence of inholdings, provided its managers with a host of issues. Many of the 473 privately owned tracts in Olympic, particularly around Lake Crescent, interfered with scenic views, threatened lake water supplies, or degraded Olympic’s “pristine” qualities. Non-native mountain goats threatened the survival of rare plant species, eliminated other plants, and altered the habitat of native wildlife. The illegal harvesting of mushrooms for commercial sale damaged forest ecosystems. Concession operations, commercial development, non-native plants and vertebrates, vandalism, poaching, noise, traffic congestion, trail erosion, wildlife harassment, and fire suppression, which caused underbrush to offer more fuel for devastating fires, posed major threats as well.

National Park Service Changes

Changes in the National Park Service at the national level also had a negative impact on Olympic’s ability to maintain its obligations. In 1995, to meet the objectives of Vice President Al Gore's call to reinvent government, a major component of which was to reduce the size of the
An American Eden

federal government, National Park Service Director Roger Kennedy led the push to change the
agency’s hierarchy. He froze all positions in the parks, forced the central offices to absorb the
cuts in staffing and funding, and then moved surplus people into the park-level positions.
Kennedy designed this strategy in order to reduce staffing by 30 percent and save $30 million.31
Kennedy’s decision had a number of consequences that redistributed authority, power,
and resources throughout the National Park Service. It purposely eviscerated the regional offices,
long the mainstay of management, oversight, and specialized expertise, leaving few managers
who could hold park-level management accountable. The changes left each regional director
with a minimal staff in cultural and natural resources: one individual representing the rangers,
one in administration, and very few others. The National Park Service moved interpretation,
maintenance, and all other professionals into park support offices. This change created two
regional offices where the agency previously had only one, but the two offered less support and
assistance than did their predecessor, and the oversight authority long vested in the regional
offices evaporated. Clusters of parks, based loosely on geographical similarities, determined
regional priorities for research, preventive and rehabilitative maintenance, and most other budget
functions previously handled by regional office staff. Parks were supposed to work closely
together and share expertise.32

By most accounts, the reorganization upended the standard practices of the National Park
Service, but did not replace them with a viable operating system. When the regional offices

31 Rep. Sidney Yates to Bruce Babbitt, Jan. 20, 1995; Bob Krumenaker, “Are We Flourishing Yet?” in
Natural Resources Year in Review (Washington, D.C.: National Park Service, 1997), D-1182; Department of the
32 Peter E. Thorsett, “Reorganizing the U.S. National Park Service,” (unpublished paper, University of
Tennessee, Knoxville), 3-16; Department of the Interior, Order No. 3189, May 25, 1995, “Reorganizing the National
Park Service.”
disappeared, people moved into leadership positions in parks for which they had no expertise or
previous experience. Some parks found themselves with assistant superintendents, the operations
chief of the park, who had never served in a park and had little understanding of how parks
worked. Many experienced people took “early-out” retirement options, sometimes with incentive
packages. Often the ones who left had precisely the expertise that the agency needed, leaving not
only a gap in institutional memory but also diminished capacity. “The 1995 reorganization was a
waste of money, people, and lives,” observed long-time National Park Service historian and
superintendent Melody Webb in one of the most strident attacks on the entire process that began
a long-term decline in morale in the National Park Service.33

The reorganization shifted direction of compliance efforts from regional offices to park
superintendents. The complicated legal nature of most compliance mandates demanded a
considerable share of scarce park resources. The specialists reassigned from the regional offices
to the parks were supposed to pick up such obligations, but they also had to learn the day-to-day
obligations of their new postings. In the end, Kennedy’s reorganization, designed to streamline
agency functions, saddled the parks with new obligations without providing adequate resources
to manage them. Few obvious solutions presented themselves. Even governmental review
agencies saw the paradox of the transformation. In 1995, a General Accounting Office (GAO)
report on the national park system suggested that doing more with less had never yielded optimal
results for the park system. The National Park Service, the report recommended, should reduce
services or seek more comprehensive partnerships with private entities.

33 Melody Webb to Hal Rothman, June 20, 2003, possession of the author; Krumenaker, “Are We
Flourishing Yet?”
An American Eden

Classifying Threats

These administrative changes hindered the parks’ ability to respond to threats. Incomplete resource management planning made classification of threats a difficult process. In 1994, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) recommended that each park in the system not only identify, inventory, and prioritize threats to individual resources, but also take actions to alleviate those threats. The National Park Service itself mandated that parks assemble baseline inventory data about natural resources in order to “detect or predict changes” that might require intervention. The chaos that followed in the aftermath of the reorganization, a lack of funding, and the resulting hiring freezes prevented it from doing so. Although the National Park Service mandated that individual parks develop resource management plans, it did not require specific information detailing the number and types of threats. Therefore, the agency lacked a master list of threats that would have aided in allocating the limited funds available.\(^\text{34}\)

In 1996, Natural Resource Management Chief Cat Hawkins Hoffman and Paul Crawford, the park’s resource management specialist, met to discuss the internal threats to natural resources at Olympic. They determined that inadequate knowledge of the types, population, distribution, and habitat of natural resources in the park represented the highest priority threat. Insufficient staff and shifting funding priorities only compounded this problem. Olympic long had faced a critical issue. In most years, base funding did not match the park’s needs. This resulted in a pattern that was repeated in parks throughout the country: new dollars and positions that were vacated often were cannibalized for park operations, which meant that developing new programs proceeded without the full benefit of appropriations. In 1993, the National Park Service had

\(^{34}\) "Statement of Facts,” 1-3, 8, 11.
allocated an additional $500,000 as a base increase to Olympic National Park for natural
resource management programs. When the money arrived, park managers reallocated 25 percent
to park overhead and divided the rest between resource protection and enforcement and natural
resource management programs. Later in the 1990s, the Cultural Resources Management and
Resource Education divisions received a significant base increase; again a sizable percentage, 50
percent of the funding, was reallocated to park overhead. This prevented the addition of CRM
staff to monitor sites and pursue stabilization of buildings in desperate need of deferred
maintenance. Nor could CRM provide the oversight to manage funded projects such as
petroglyph protection programs. The lack of funding constrained all dimensions of Olympic’s
management.35

With considerable effort, Olympic National Park compiled a natural resource inventory.
In 2001, the park conducted a draft inventory, based on previous statements of management,
strategic plans, and resource management plans. It produced a two-page list of resources within
Olympic’s boundaries, including the number of different species of wildlife, rivers, natural
features, roads, trails, buildings, campsites, and cultural resources including landscapes and
historic structures. While the effort was laudable, the magnitude of the task required ongoing
effort.36

Air quality remained a possible internal and external threat to the quality of Olympic’s
ecosystems. Congress enacted the Clean Air Act in 1963, which provided for the prevention,

36 David L. Peterson, David G. Silsbee, and Daniel L. Schmoldt, Guidelines for Developing Inventory and
Monitoring Plans in National Parks (Seattle: National Park Service and College of Forest Resources, University of
Washington, undated), 1-5; “Olympic National Park Inventory” (draft August 2001), unlabeled folder, 1-2, Olympic
NP archives.
monitoring, and control of air pollution. Amendments in 1970 and 1977 addressed other goals,
including the preservation of air quality over federal lands according to different “classes” of
protection. Congress designated Olympic National Park as a mandatory Class I area, a status that
provided maximum protection by preventing the degradation of air quality and associated values,
such as visibility. Most of Olympic boasted air that was among the cleanest found anywhere in
the world, comparing favorably to the high Andes in Bolivia and the Antarctic. Some localized
air pollution and impacts on visibility occurred at the park though, leading to concerns about the
future of air quality in the region.

Olympic became an integral part of the National Park Service network for monitoring
ambient air pollution. In 1980, the park began to monitor acid precipitation at a station in the
Hoh Valley. Since the early 1980s, Olympic also has measured visibility, ozone and sulfur
dioxide levels using continuous samplers. In 1998, Olympic staff began to measure dry
deposition and ultraviolet radiation. The visibility-monitoring program included daily
photographic documentation of visibility of fixed targets from two sites at Lake Crescent’s
Barnes Point and the Port Angeles Visitor Center. Park staff and outside scientists conducted
additional research and monitoring related to atmospheric deposition on Olympic’s west side.
The primary air quality monitoring station along Hurricane Ridge Road, just southeast of the
Visitor Center, continuously sampled ozone, sulfur dioxide, meteorological parameters, and dry
particle deposition.

Ozone monitoring became an important component of the park’s air quality tests. Since
1995, Olympic conducted more limited programs of ozone monitoring, including stations at the
Staircase, Dosewallips, Sol Duc, Deer Park, Hoh, Queets, and Hurricane Ridge areas. In 2001,
the park initiated “passive” ozone sampling at three sites along Hurricane Ridge, in areas that
documented higher levels of ozone because they stood at higher elevations than west-side testing
sites. As of 2001, the park recorded low ozone and sulfur dioxide levels at the monitoring sites.
Olympic National Park participated in other federal and agency air quality monitoring
programs. A partner in the National Atmospheric Deposition Program for acid precipitation
monitoring as well as the National Dry Deposition Network, the park demonstrated a
commitment to the Clean Air Act. The Environmental Protection Agency operated a site at
Ozette to measure airborne dioxins, and the Washington State Department of Ecology installed a
nephelometer at Hurricane Ridge to monitor summer visibility. In June 2001, on Blyn Mountain,
in the northeast corner of the Olympic Peninsula east of Sequim on a site owned by the
Washington Department of Natural Resources, the park installed the Interagency Monitoring of
Protected Visual Environments (IMPROVE) sampler, which collected data on particulates that
impair the visibility at Olympic and in the surrounding region.
Olympic also was part of the National Atmospheric Precipitation Assessment Program, a
major, multiphase small watershed research study that began in 1984 with the collaboration of
Rocky Mountain, Sequoia-Kings Canyon, Isle Royale National Park, and Olympic national
parks. These parks study the ecological effects of atmospheric deposition and develop specific
park studies, such as monitoring plant and wildlife populations for effects of acid deposition. At
Olympic, the Twin Creek Research Natural Area in the Hoh Valley became the major study area.
A study of lichen populations on the north side of the park indicates that emissions from cars and
industry might deprive those communities of certain sulfur-sensitive species.\textsuperscript{37}

\section*{Protecting The Park’s Waters}

Poor water quality also potentially endangers Olympic National Park’s ecosystems. The park boasts many bodies of water, including deep lowland lakes, mineral springs, freshwater springs, coastal bogs, glacial rivers, the three large glacial lakes (Lake Crescent, Lake Ozette, and Lake Quinault) and two manmade lakes (Lake Cushman and Lake Mills). With the exception of the Coastal Strip, most of Olympic’s rivers and streams originate inside the park and flow out of its boundaries. External practices often influenced water quality. Herbicides used on cutover lands upstream of coastal rivers flowed into park waters. Downstream water use also affected park waters. Anadromous fish contributed large quantities of nutrients to the waters, but practices outside of the park, including dams and harvesting, reduced fish populations. The effects of this loss of energy to Olympic’s ecosystems remain unknown.

As the new century began, the National Park Service recognized that it had gathered very little information about water quality in Olympic National Park. A few studies have documented possible threats and changes to water resources. Snow surveys within the park since the 1960s at Hurricane Ridge, Cox Valley, and at Deer Park offered some preliminary information. The most noticeably damaged water resources remained the Elwha and North Fork Skokomish rivers, each of which was blocked by two dams. In 1981, the National Park Service surveyed several high lakes to determine their susceptibility to acidification, an indication of the buffering ability of the environment. Studies showed that Olympic’s high lakes were better buffered than other water

bodies in the Pacific Northwest. Such studies notwithstanding, the park had yet to undertake comprehensive investigations to determine the future management of water resources.

Among the park’s bodies of water, the National Park Service has directed the most attention to Lake Crescent. In 1984, prompted by concern over the effects of private development and septic systems located along the lakeshore, park personnel began a monitoring program to ascertain a chemical and limnological database for the lake. Two years later, productivity studies assessed its trophic status. In 1989, the data revealed no evidence of human-caused changes in the quality of the lake’s water.38

Other factors also threaten Olympic National Park. Noise, from sources including generators, traffic, campgrounds, and park operations, affect wildlife, including threatened and endangered species such as marbled murrelet, and impair visitors’ experiences. Traffic congestion caused by increasingly high rates of visitation, particularly at the Hoh Rain Forest Visitor Center and the Hurricane Ridge area, the two most commonly visited sites within the park, plague the summer months. When parking lots filled, rangers barricaded certain areas, causing jams and exhaust pollution.39

Inholdings

The presence of inholdings within Olympic’s boundaries continued to endanger contiguous land holdings and threatened to degrade park values. Relations between the National Park Service and private owners have not always been cordial. The agency’s responses to inholdings have ranged from attempts to establish positive relations with owners to an aggressive

---

defense of Olympic’s values. The 1976 *Master Plan* followed standard policy in recommending that Olympic acquire privately owned lands within its boundaries from willing sellers. The National Park Service would use eminent domain procedures only when inappropriate uses of the land, including subdivision or logging, threatened park values. The 1980 *Land Acquisition Plan* offered major concessions to the park’s inholders along Lake Crescent, but the 1983 *Land Protection Plan*, while adhering to a moratorium on the addition of new land to the park system issued by Secretary of the Interior James Watt in February 1981, again tightened restrictions on the uses of private property. The 1984 *Land Protection Plan* set priorities for acquisition, giving priority to owners willing to sell undeveloped land. That strategy remained in effect two decades later.40

Resource development of inholdings created a constant threat from private owners unwilling to sell and looking to profit from their resources. The possibility of timber extraction in or around Olympic was anathema to park administrators. Private timbered tracts within the park grew in value and became a target for harvest by private companies. A number of the families who owned property in Olympic faced economic hardship made worse by the depressed area economy. At the same time, many of the privately owned tracts either in or directly adjacent to the park experienced substantial visitation, posing problems for park managers.

Land acquisition since the mid-1980s reduced the level and number of threats of incompatible activities on private lands within Olympic National Park. A $2 million congressional appropriation in 1991 resulted in the National Park Service acquiring thirty-four tracts totaling 125 acres in the Lake Quinault area, and three tracts comprising eleven acres near

---


Lake Crescent. An appropriation of $750,000 was available for fiscal year 1993. “Both private and park benefits,” noted Superintendent Maureen Finnerty, “can be achieved if there is continuous funding for purchase of willing seller properties.” Different organizations, including the federal government and nonprofit associations, allocated funds to purchase inholdings from “willing” sellers.41

The contradictory implications of statute often threaten effective management of Olympic National Park. Federal and state regulations created a muddled regulatory climate that insisted upon incompatible and incommensurable objectives. Regulations often did not adequately address management goals. In 1996, Hawkins Hoffman and Crawford noted that a conflict existed between legislation that allowed for the harvesting of shellfish in Olympic’s coastal and intertidal areas, and National Park Service goals to preserve natural landscapes and processes. The legislation permitted harvests until – or unless – research reveals diminishing shellfish stocks. Hawkins Hoffman and Crawford believed that sufficient research should take place before allowing harvesting in order to prevent problems with the fish supply, a stance that made fishing a “politically hot issue” with the state, the park, and Native Americans. Different policies, including the designation of some sport fishing locations as “catch and release” only and a newly created Olympic staff position of fisheries biologist, improved fisheries policy. Another conflict between statute and practice involved salmon, many of which entered the park from non-national parklands. Those seeking to use this resource were subjected to regulation from a variety of sources, including Native American tribes, the National Park Service, the Forest Service, and state and other federal agencies. The fate of the fishes rested on sorting out the different

objectives of each stakeholder and finding common ground.42

Finding A Balance

Balancing visitor experience with resource preservation and management remained one of the most important questions that will define Olympic National Park’s future. The park based the draft purpose statement for the new GMP on the language in the 1938 U.S. House of Representatives report that preceded the park’s establishment, and it reflected the inherent contradiction between visitor use and resource protection. The natural conflict in the mission – the demand that Olympic both provide for visitors and protect park resources – dogged the agency as a whole as well as the park. By 2000, no one had solved the dilemma in any long-term fashion. The different parts of the mission often seemed incompatible, especially when wilderness became part of the equation. With more than 95 percent of the park in designated wilderness, divining a balance between the competing missions at Olympic required careful crafting of policies.43

As visitation increased, Olympic’s managers increased the attention paid to the issue of public use and how to control it. By the early twenty-first century, it became clear that visitors threatened to love Olympic to death, a fate that had been predicted for the national parks almost fifty years before, but a variety of circumstances had forestalled this from happening on the Olympic Peninsula. Eighty-eight percent of visitors in 2000 cited sightseeing and scenic drives as their main activity, and 77 percent wanted to walk on nature trails. Although only 10 percent of visitors spent the night in the backcountry, the sheer numbers of day hikers caused massive trail and soil erosion, a condition that worsened measurably after 1985. Visitors, horses, and

42 Memo of Interview, 4-5.
other pack animals also contributed to the invasion of non-native plants. The National Park
Service reacted slowly to the onslaught of visitors, largely from the limits of the resources at
their disposal. In the 1990s, rangers initiated active revegetation programs in the backcountry
and at popular visitation sites to repair some of the overuse and human-invoked damage.44
The National Park Service recognized the inherent tension between visitor use and
wilderness ideals, a conflict that repeatedly arose in GMP meetings and park publications. The
1993 National Park Service Wilderness Task Force Report insisted that the National Park
Service “needs to provide strong wilderness leadership that embraces diversity of the Service and
the Nation.” A year later, Olympic National Park took part in the National Wilderness Steering
Committee along with the Forest Service and Department of the Interior agencies, including the
Bureau of Land Management. The committee pulled together different park specialists from
resource management, interpretation, support centers, resource protection and facilities offices,
and the superintendent’s office, with members serving three-year terms. The committee assessed
progress in National Park Service park wilderness programs and helped set management
priorities for field units throughout the park system. Yet in a world of inadequate resources,
sustaining such programming over time proved difficult.45
The conflict between wilderness ideals and visitor experiences also was manifested in
frequent conflicts between natural and cultural resource management issues. The question of
which set of statutory obligations should prevail in different circumstances raised difficult
questions for Olympic National Park. Paul Gleeson, chief of Olympic’s Cultural Resource

45 Director, to Regional Directors, Memorandum, Dec. 15, 1994, OLYM N16, Olympic NP archives.
An American Eden

Division, eschewed the idea of “conflicts” in the two value systems when he observed that when wilderness values such as minimizing human presence conflicted with cultural values such as the protection of backcountry shelters, wilderness values always should prevail. Rarely was the situation so clear-cut. In one instance, a carpenter ant control problem at the Enchanted Valley Chalet led to a request for pesticide use in the wilderness; in another, archaeological digging occurred at some sites with little concern for rare plants at the sites. As a meeting between natural resource managers recorded, the National Park Service needed “to go back to enabling legislation of the park. The park wasn’t created to save log cabins or oil fields. The park was created as a natural area first. If there is a conflict between natural and cultural values, we should go back to the primary purposes of the park. Congress said that this is to be preserved as a natural area. We need to determine what is a cultural resource; which ones should be protected, and which ones warrant manipulating natural processes to maintain them,” Gleeson said.46

Tensions persisted between Olympic’s resource management and research efforts. A June 1991 analysis of resource management and ranger activities noted the “gray area” between the two in many areas, including managing goats, fisheries, and vegetation. Many park rangers felt that their “on the ground” duties had become complex planning assignments that confounded the boundaries between natural and cultural resource management and research. Again, the lack of direction and support for field-level actions that could implement “high-priority” projects complicated any possible resolution. Resource management in Olympic’s subdistricts operated as nine separate units, and priorities and activities differed. Among the subdistricts, Seven Lakes emphasized backcountry management, Mora exotic vegetation, and the Queets stressed elk

An American Eden

protection. Rangers expressed a strong desire to conduct resource management activities in the
districts, but training and availability of personnel to assist with programs remained limited.47

The political and economic realities associated with operating Olympic National Park
continued to place large demands on park and agency staff, as well as requiring outside
resources. The National Park Service’s overall morale declined with the 1995 reorganization; by
2005, it was still declining. When Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton attempted to “outsource”
Park Service employment to for-profit private contractors starting in 2001, employee morale fell
even further. Her proposal planned to eliminate approximately 800,000 federal jobs, including
10,000 in the National Park Service. A loss of institutional knowledge, reduced visitor services,
and the inability to perform essential park maintenance services would continue and grow worse.
"What we are talking about is an attempt to dismantle the National Park Service as we know it
today. It turns its back on 100 years, and a national park system that is the envy of the world,"
Bruce Babbitt, who served as interior secretary between 1993 and 2001, said in 2003. The plan
still exists in 2005, but the war in Iraq and other concerns have removed it from the central
position it held early in the George W. Bush administration.48

Budget Woes

As the new century began, Olympic National Park had emerged as a leading national
park, “the best in the park system” in the estimation of Superintendent Bill Laitner. Yet the park
faced many challenges, the most serious of which was budget. Olympic’s total appropriated

47 Memorandum to Superintendent, reply to Division Chiefs, NSS and RM and VP, Analysis of NSS, RM
48 “In the Northwest: ‘Outsourcing’ a sweeping attack on national parks,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July
30, 2003; Kerry Tremain, “Pink Slips in the Parks,” Sierra Magazine (September/October 2003),
operating budget for FY 2003 topped $10,349,000. In addition to these appropriated funds, Olympic retained an estimated $1,707,000 in net fee revenue for projects funded through the Recreation Fee Demonstration Program. Funds carried over from previous years made available an additional $860,000, a direct result of the decrease of 20 FTE at the park since 1996. Olympic appropriated $4,234,100 for facility operations and maintenance, including maintenance of trails, roads, electrical, water, and wastewater services. Visitor services and resource protection, including search and rescue and fire and emergency response programs, received $2,726,100, while $1,020,500 went to resource education, including operation of visitor centers, publications, and education programs. Olympic allocated $1,574,400 – with a third of that slotted for maintenance activities – to natural resource management, and $296,300 to cultural resource management. Park management, including the office of the superintendent, received $335,000 and $162,600 was appropriated for concessions management. In addition, the park allotted $21,639,000 to the Elwha River restoration project from the money it had been collecting for that purpose since 1992.49

This budget revealed the inherent problems of Olympic National Park, and indeed, much of the park system. The park’s budget, as large as it seemed, simply did not provide the resources necessary to meet all Olympic’s obligations. The allocation of dollars did not necessarily mean that programs were funded. Instead, they were largely based on the need to cover permanent salaries, as much as 95 percent of the fixed budget, and meet mandated programs and fixed costs.

---

The park was caught in a trap that ensnared many of its peers, with national parks slowly being devoured from within as allocations were inadequate for the obligations of the park system.

Olympic National Park operated in an increasingly complex environment. Once home to thriving extractive industries, Olympic Peninsula’s population has increasingly depended on the national park for a growing portion of its economic survival. As a result, agency obligations grew beyond simple management of the park and its resources. Managing Olympic National Park required balancing a range of conflicting interests: natural and cultural resource management, local constituencies, Native American concerns, and countless internal and external threats. Park administration has proceeded on clear and sustainable assumptions. If existing plans are implemented in the predicted fashion, in 2008, Olympic National Park will be the scene of a remarkable transformation. The removal of the two Elwha River dams will realize tacit assumptions that have underpinned the transformation of the peninsula’s economy and the rest of the American West. In the “New West,” service pursuits such as leisure and recreation have overtaken traditional extractive endeavors such as timber and mining. No action could symbolize that transition more than removal of dams, themselves powerful symbols of extractive endeavor and the idea of conquering nature. That action will further highlight Olympic National Park’s importance to the region even as it reaffirms the commitment to resource preservation that remains a significant component of the park’s mission. As it represented wilderness, Olympic National Park now foreshadows a new future for the region. The burden of its management and the obligations of its position demand much of park managers.
Figure 8-1: A mountain climber surveys the head of the Hoh Glacier in this 1955 photograph. (Photographs courtesy of Olympic National Park, Accession Number OLYM-632, Box 3)
Tourists continue searching for grand vistas such as Hurricane Ridge and Big Meadows, above. In 2000, visitation to Olympic National Park accounted for 7-10 percent of jobs on the Olympic Peninsula and 3-5 percent of overall economic output. The park is likely to remain a regional economic engine for the foreseeable future.
Management concerns at Olympic range from the heights of its mountains to its coastal areas, such as Point of Arches.

The coastal areas, including the sea stacks in the North Wilderness Beach, left, bring their own management issues, including the need to work with agencies such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service and the U.S. Coast Guard.
Figure 8-5: While not as significant a problem as this early example of uncontrolled inholding development inside the park, a number of the 473 tract privately owned tracts in Olympic in 2005 interfere with scenic views, threaten water supplies, and degrade the park’s “pristine” qualities.

Figure 8-6: The original road to Hurricane Ridge. Finding funds for the continued maintenance of Olympic’s infrastructure, including the paved road to the ridge, remains a significant park concern.
Figure 8-7: The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization recognized Olympic National Park’s unique status on June 29, 1982, when it awarded the park designation as a World Heritage Site designation status. UNESCO selected the park for its unique temperate rain forest, unpolluted ecosystems, and presence of the only major elk herd in the United States living undisturbed in its natural environment.
Figure 8-8: From its 1938 founding, wilderness has been the raison d’être of Olympic National Park. New legislative and regulatory impacts only add to that management challenge.
Appendices
### Olympic National Park Superintendents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Preston P. Macy¹</td>
<td>May 24, 1935 – October 30, 1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Preston P. Macy</td>
<td>October 31, 1935 – February 30, 1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Preston P. Macy</td>
<td>January 1, 1939 – September 14, 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Fred J. Overly</td>
<td>September 15, 1951 – May 31, 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Daniel B. Beard</td>
<td>June 1, 1958 – September 9, 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>John E. Doerr</td>
<td>January 10, 1960 – December 6, 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Bennett T. Gale²</td>
<td>March 14, 1965 – June 28, 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Sture T. Carlson (Acting)</td>
<td>June 29, 1969 – August 21, 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Sture T. Carlson</td>
<td>August 22, 1969 – January 9, 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Roger W. Allin</td>
<td>January 24, 1971 – March 26, 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Roger J. Contor</td>
<td>July 29, 1979 – April 4, 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Sue McGill (Acting)</td>
<td>January 2003 – May 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>William Laitner</td>
<td>May 2003 –</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Served as acting custodian of national monument.
² Administered San Juan Island National Historic Park from September 9, 1966 to November 19, 1967.
An American Eden
### Recreational Visits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Visitors</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Visitors</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Visitors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1,181,500</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>2,478,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>24,600</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1,077,400</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2,410,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>75,310</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,519,500</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2,532,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>42,125</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>2,044,400</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2,940,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>91,863</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1,576,200</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2,822,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>92,667</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1,343,600</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>2,959,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>72,349</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2,058,000</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2,737,611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>56,681</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1,752,000</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2,794,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>56,076</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1,905,300</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2,759,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>180,617</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2,283,100</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3,381,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>191,578</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,621,400</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3,658,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>404,125</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2,384,800</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>3,846,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>414,916</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>2,094,100</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3,577,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>449,117</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2,289,200</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3,364,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>625,703</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2,327,400</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3,327,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>663,100</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>2,293,900</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3,416,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>864,600</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2,078,843</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3,001,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2,306,032</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An American Eden
Chronology of Significant Events

1577-79
English explorer Sir Francis Drake travels along Pacific coastline.

1592
Aspostlos Valerianos, a Greek sailor sailing for Spain under the name Juan de Fuca, sails into the strait between Vancouver Island and northwest Washington that now bears his name.

1744
August: Juan Pérez Hernández, sailing for Spain as Juan Pérez, records seeing part of the Olympic Mountains. Report part of Spain’s claims for sovereignty.

1778
Captain James Cook reports sighting the Olympic Peninsula’s westernmost projection of land, Cape Flattery.

1788
June: British Captain John Meares names the dominant mountain he sighted – Pérez’s Santa Rosalia – Mount Olympus.


1792
May: Captain Robert Gray discovers the Olympic Peninsula harbor that bears his name, and explores the mouth of the river later named for his ship, Columbia.

British George Vancouver explores of the Pacific Northwest coastline, including Puget Sound, Hood Canal, Admiralty Inlet, and the southern end of the Strait of Georgia.

1841
Spring: Lieutenant Charles Wilkes’ expedition explores the waters of the Olympic Peninsula for the United States.

1855
Jan. 26: Washington Territorial Governor Isaac Stevens signs the Treaty of Point No Point with members of the S’Klallam, Elwha Klallam, Port Gamble, Jamestown, Chimacum, and Skokomish tribes.

Jan. 31: Stevens signs Treaty of Neah Bay with the Makah and Ozette tribes.

July 1: Stevens signs Treaty of Olympia with the Quileute, Hoh, Queets, and Quinault tribes.

1885

1889
Judge James Wickersham leads first of two hiking expeditions into peninsula’s interior.

Dec. 8: Seattle Press expedition leaves Seattle for Olympic Peninsula.
1890
July: Lt. O’Neil led a second expedition to peninsula.

1897
Feb. 22: President Grover Cleveland creates Olympic Forest Preserve (2,188,800 acres) through Proclamation 27 (29 Stat 901).

1900
April 7: President William McKinley reduces the forest reserve by 264,960 acres.

1901
July 15: McKinley reduces the forest reserve by 456,900 acres.

1904

1905
Feb. 1: Congress transfers responsibility for overseeing national forest reserves from the General Land Office in the Department of the Interior to the Department of Agriculture’s U.S. Forest Service.

1907
U.S. Forest Service changes name of unit from forest preserve to Olympic National Forest.

1909
March 2: President Theodore Roosevelt creates Mount Olympus National Monument (Proclamation 869). Monument holds 610,560 acres in the central part of the national forest.

1910
Construction begins on Elwha Dam.

1912
Olympic Forest Supervisor Parish Lovejoy proposes a system of roads, trails, ranger stations, shelters and lookout posts to protect the Olympic National Forest from fire.

1913
Elwha dam becomes operational.

1915
May 11: President Woodrow Wilson reduces monument acreage by half

1926
Rep. Johnson introduces HR 13069, to create Olympic Nat’l Park. Purpose was to protect game, with boundaries same as monument’s.

1927
Glines Canyon dam becomes operational.

1929
U.S. Forest Service Recreation Engineer Fred Cleator completes a recreation management plan for Olympic National Forest. The plan calls for primitive roadless areas that would leave the area “untrammeled.”

1933
June 10: Executive order shifts control of all national monuments to the National Park Service.
1934
December: Preston Macy becomes acting custodian of Olympic National Monument.

1935
October: National Park Service names Macy as custodian of monument.

1936
July: Fred Overly, a Glacier National Park ranger, becomes Olympic’s first full-time ranger.

1938
Summer: Irving Brant inspects area, recommends adding land to park.

Rep. Monrad Wallgren introduces HR 10024 (a revision of the bill introduced in 1935 and 1937). The bill establishes Olympic National Park, amended from 860,000 acres to 682,000. It also provides the president the option to expand the park’s boundaries up to 892,000 acres. (PL 778, 52 Stat 1241).


June 29: President Roosevelt signs HR 10024.

1939
Jan. 1: Preston Macy becomes Olympic National Park’s first superintendent.

Park begins construction of permanent administrative building and residence.

1940
Jan. 2: Roosevelt adds 187,411 acres to park through Proclamation 2380 January 2 (54 Stat 2678), including Forest Service land and acreage around Glines Canyon dam.

1942

December: President authorizes logging of spruce and Douglas fir within park boundaries.

1943
May 29: Roosevelt adds 20,600 acres (Morse Creek addition) by Proclamation 2587 (57 Stat 741).

1944
Mount Rainier National Park Naturalist Howard R. Stagner develops Olympic National Park’s first interpretive development plan.

1946
Senator Magnuson introduces S. 2266 to exclude approximately 6,000 acres.

1947
Rep. Norman introduces HJRes 84, calling for commission to study park boundaries. S. 711 (Magnuson), HR 2750 (Norman), HR 2751 (Jackson), all propose exclusion of approximately 56,000 acres.

Park’s first naturalist, Gunnar Fagerlund, arrives at Olympic.

1948
Park remodels administrative building for use as visitor center.

1949
October: National Park Service recommends addition of nine sections of the Bogachiel purchased by the Forest Service from the Crown Zellerbach timber company, and also
eliminating strip between the Queets Corridor and Coastal Strip.

1951
Fagerlund writes *Interpretive Development Outline*.

Park releases *A Brief Guide to Geology of the Olympic National Park*.

1952
Park releases *Olympic Master Plan*.
Park issues *Olympic Handbook*.
Park establishes separate Construction and Maintenance division.

1953
Jan. 6: Through Proclamation 3003 (67 Stat C27), Truman adds Queets Corridor, Ocean Strip, and Bogachiel Valley.
June 13: Park holds groundbreaking ceremony for Olympic Pioneer Memorial Museum.

1954
Park releases *Olympic National Park*.
April 30: National Park Service approves *Olympic National Park Museum Prospectus*.

1955
Park releases *The Geology of Olympic National Park*.

1956
Park releases Mission 66 Prospectus.

1958
May 31: Outside pressure leads to removal of Fred Overly as park superintendent.

1963
August: Hoh Visitor Center opens.

1964
September: Congress creates National Wilderness Preservation System under the Wilderness Act.

1965
Park develops *Long-Range Wildlife Management Plan*.

1966
Congress passes the National Historic Preservation Act.
December: Park releases *Final Master Plan*.

1969
Park publishes *Historic Structure Report* on Humes’ Ranch, written by Benjamin Levy.

1971
Park lists Point of Arches on the National Natural Landmarks registry.

1972
Park’s stops implementing ten-year fish stocking program.

1973
February: Park reorganization moves maintenance and area operations into one division.
National Park Service approves Olympic’s *Natural Resources Management Plan*.

1974
Park publishes *Wilderness Environmental Impact Statement*.
Park publishes interim *Backcountry Management Plan*. 
1 National Register of Historic Places adds Ozette Indian Village Archaeological Site.
2 March: Park releases List of Classified Structures (LCS).
3 April: Park releases Wilderness Recommendation, Olympic National Park.
4 1976
5 National Register of Historic Places adds Wedding Rocks Petroglyphs.
6 Olympic National Park named an International Biosphere Reserve.
7 Park releases Ozette Development Concept Plan.
8 Park releases final Backcountry Management Plan.
9 Oct. 18: Park releases Master Plan.
10 1977
11 National Register of Historic Places adds Humes’ Ranch.
12 Park publishes Olympic National Park Interpretive Prospectus.
13 Denver Service Center releases new interpretive prospectus for Olympic.
14 Park develops five-year plan to restore salmon and steelhead runs in the Queets River.
15 1978
16 U.S. Forest Service issues Elizabeth Righter’s Cultural Resource Overview of the Olympic National Forest.
17 Park issues Bear Management Plan.
18 1979
19 Park releases Historic Resource Study by Frank Williss and Michael G. Schene.
20 1980
21 Park remolds Visitor Center.
22 Park issues a revised Backcountry Management Plan and Land Acquisition Plan.
23 1981
24 Olympic begins six-year experimental goat management program.
25 Park reaffirms that Hoh, Quileute, Quinault, Lower Elwha, Makah, Skokomish, and Suquamish tribes had adjudicated treaty fishing rights within park boundaries.
26 1982
27 June 29: UNESCO designates Olympic National Park a World Heritage Site.
28 1983
30 1984
31 Park releases Land Protection Plan, Summary Prehistory and Ethnography of Olympic National Park, draft Parkwide National Register Nomination, and Historic Building Inventory.
32 1985
33 Park releases Fire Management Plan.
34 1986
36 November: Congress revises park boundaries, adding 15,000 acres.
1987
Park establishes a resource management committee.

1988
Congress designates 95 percent of Olympic acreage as wilderness.
Olympic begins three-year live goat capture plan.
Park releases Randall Schalk’s *The Evolution and Diversification of Native Land Use Systems on the Olympic Peninsula: A Research Design*.
Park issues *Resource Management Plan and Development Concept Plans* for Soleduck, Ozette, Kalaloch, and Quinault areas.

1990
Park begins ethnography program.
February: The General Accounting Office rules that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission does not have authority to license the Glines Canyon Project because it is within Olympic National Park boundaries.
July: Park announces intention to remove Kamp Kiwanis structures.

1991
Park begins cultural landscape inventory.
Park releases *Resources Management Plan, Olympic National Park*.
February: Park destroys Kamp Kiwanis structures.
February: FERC releases Draft Environmental Impact Statement concluding that removal of Glines Canyon dams is feasible and that only dam removal will fully restore the Elwha River ecosystem and anadromous fish.

1992
July: Park establishes Cultural Resource Branch.

1993
Olympic helps create Mount Rainier and Olympic National Parks Fund.
Park develops *Long Term Ecological Monitoring Proposal*.

1994
Cat Hawkins Hoffman becomes first chief of Olympic’s Resource Management Division.
July: Secretary of Commerce establishes Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary.

1995
June: Park issues final EIS for the Elwha River ecosystem restoration plan.

1996
Park releases *Statement for Management*.
Park chosen to participate in Park Research and Intensive Monitoring of Ecosystems Network (PRIMENet).

1997
Park releases Jacilee Wray’s *Ethnographic Overview and Assessment*.

1999
Olympic National Park began as a pilot park for testing the new National Park Service Ethnographic Resource Inventory (ERI) database.
Park releases *Resources Management Plan*.
January 20: First meeting between National Park Service, Fort James, and Daishowa America to...
discuss federal acquisition of Elwha and Glines Canyon hydroelectric projects.


2000

February 29: Federal government completes acquisition of the Elwha and Glines Canyon hydroelectric projects.

2001

Park issues new regulations to govern recreational fishing.

May: Park releases *Olympic National Park Visitor Study*.

Summer: Olympic National Park begins development of *General Management Plan*.

Fall: National Park Service holds public workshops on *General Management Plan* on Olympic Peninsula and Puget Sound area.

2002

Winter: National Park Service holds public workshops on *General Management Plan* in seven communities on Olympic Peninsula and Puget Sound area.

Park releases *Olympic National Park Business Plan: Fiscal Year 2001*

2004

Aug. 24: National Park Service signs Memorandum of Understanding with city of Port Angeles and Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe that identifies the agreed-to industrial, fish hatchery, and municipal water quality mitigation measures and responsibilities of the parties.

2005


2006

Bibliography

Articles


“Pink Slips in the Parks.” *Sierra Magazine* (September/October 2003).


Wray, Jacilee and Marie Herbert. “Stewards of the Human Landscape.” *Common Ground* (Spring 2001).

Government Documents


Commission on Old Growth Alternatives for Washington's Forest Trust. *Commission on Old...*
Growth Alternatives for Washington's Forest Trust Lands: Final report: submitted to
Commissioner of Public Lands, Washington State. Olympia, Wa.: The Commissioner,
1989.


Dodwell, Arthur and Theodore Rixon. Forest Conditions in the Olympic Forest Reserve,

Edmonds, Robert L. Vegetation Patterns, Hydrology, and Water Chemistry in Small Watersheds

Service, 1983.


Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team. Forest Ecosystem Management: An
Ecological, Economic, and Social Assessment. Portland, Or.: U.S. Departments of


Henderson, J. Guide to Research Natural Area Needs for Planning Area 1. U.S. Forest Service,
Pacific Northwest Region, 1981.

Houston, Douglas B., Edward G. S. Schreiner, and Bruce B. Moorhead. 1994. Mountain Goats
in Olympic National Park: Biology and Management of an Introduced Species.

to Its Establishment and Boundary Adjustments.” U.S. Department of the Interior,


Louter, David. Contested Terrain: North Cascades National Park Service Complex An

Mackintosh, Barry. Interpretation in the National Park Service: A Historical Perspective.


DRAFT ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY – DECEMBER 2003

Port Angeles, Wa.: National Park Service, Olympic National Park.


**Books**


Committee, 1938.


Kitchin, E. A. *Birds of the Olympic Peninsula; A Scientific and Popular Description of 261 Species of Birds Recorded on the Olympic Peninsula, Either as Resident, Summer Resident or in Migration, Together with Description of Their Nests and Eggs*. Port Angeles, Wa.: Olympic Stationers, 1949.


McCarthy, G. Michael. *Hour of Trial: The Conservation Conflict in Colorado and the West,*


Van Name, Willard G. Vanishing Forest Reserves: Problems of the National Forests and
Unpublished Material


Thorsett, Peter E. “Reorganizing the U.S. National Park Service.” (unpublished paper, University of Tennessee, Knoxville).


Newspapers

Bremerton Searchlight, 1911
Longview Daily News, 1966
Beachcomber, 1966
Columbia Basin Bulletin, 2001
The Daily Chronicle (Centralia-Chehalis, Wa.), 1966
Daily News, 1985
Daily World (Aberdeen, Wash.), 1990
Everett Herald, 1966
High Country News, 1991
New York Herald Tribune, 1937
Port Angeles Evening News, 1954, 1966
Port Angeles Times, 1912
Port Townsend Leader, 1966
Seattle Press, 1890
Seattle Times, 1956
Tacoma Tribune, 1912
Wall Street Journal, August 5, 1993

Interviews

Chappell, Gordon, by Hal Rothman, December 12, 2002
Finnerty, Maureen, by Hal Rothman, November 16, 2003
Gleeson, Paul, by David Sproul, July 25, 2002
———, by Hal Rothman, November 13, 2003
Hawkins Hoffman, Cat, by Hal Rothman, June 10, 2002
Laitner, Bill, by Hal Rothman, November 25, 2003
Jarvis, Reed, by Paul Gleeson, March 28, 2003
DRAFT ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY – DECEMBER 2003

1 Rudolph, Roger, by Hal Rothman, June 11, 2002
2 Smithson, Michael, by Hal Rothman, November 14, 2003
3 Wray, Jacilee, by Hal Rothman, November 13, 2003

5

395