HISTORY OF PROFESSIONS IN THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

by John Luzader
INTRODUCTION

The professionals' role in the history of the National Park Service reflects their role in the American national experience. While on the surface the professional person may seem to have enjoyed a favorable, even an enviable, position in the service and the larger society, a careful study significantly modifies that perception. For almost three centuries, American society was profoundly influenced by the existence of a wilderness frontier; and its most valued member was the self-reliant man-of-all-trades, one who could turn his hand successfully at a variety of tasks. The ideal citizen was the virtuous person who could, when the occasion demanded, cut down trees, build a house, plow a field, repair a tool, and practice a trade or profession. True, this ideal lost relevance as society increased in complexity and America became more industrial. But until the end of the nineteenth century, the banker, lawyer, merchant, clergyman, politician, teacher, and manufacturer had more than a lay knowledge of a second craft; and until late in the century often practiced both. This was especially true on the frontier and in rural areas, where traditional practices persisted long after the geographical frontier had moved westward.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the frontier no longer existed; and professions and industrial trades increasingly demanded skills that required specialized training and full-time practice. Although the frontier has passed into history, it continues to exercise an emotional influence on popular thought. While Americans, in their pragmatic moments, recognize the premium modern society places upon professional specialization, the myth of the jack-of-all-trades persists, encouraging Everyman to believe that he knows as much as the experts. A suspicion lingers that the professional is too narrow or too elitist to be fully trusted— that he should be "on tap, not on top." The frontier folk-hero has become the modern "generalist" who can reduce the complexity of contemporary life to common-sense, manageable dimensions.
Thus, the professional's relationship with the society of which he is a part, and that he is paid to serve, is ambivalent at best and mutually hostile at worst.

How is this attempt at historical analysis relevant to a study of the history of the National Park Service's utilization of professionals? Is it merely an expression of self-pity by one who believes that his talents have been underused and undervalued?

The answer to the former lies in recognizing that the National Park Service is a particularly American institution. Unlike most United States governmental agencies, no European prototype set an example for its creation on 25 August 1916. In its evolution, the service has reflected with remarkable fidelity the concerns, tensions, values, and problems of the larger society.

The answer to the latter will have to come from this study, which is the product of a belief that an objective record of professional relationships in the service can be profitable and executed without exaggerated partisanship. That record is not easily documented; and this report, which began as an attempt to chronicle the story of all of the service's professions has become more modest—hence the title Some Chapters in the History of NPS Professions. The adventures of some professions and organizations are better documented that others. Other writers are preparing studies of their fields. John Henneberger has been working for several years on the history of the rangers; Ralph McFadden on electrical engineering; and Wilfred Logan is beginning an account of the service's archaeological development. This study concentrates upon the fields represented in the Service Center. The seminal work undertaken by the major part of the professors of the natural sciences will have to be undertaken by another student with more time and talent than I can claim. I hope that others will be stimulated to build upon what is undertaken here until a candid, analytical record becomes a reality.

Some who read this study will disagree with details or interpretations. There is no claim of infallibility—only one that I have been faithful to the documented...
CHAPTER I

THE FIRST QUARTER-CENTURY: A HISTORICAL SURVEY

This chapter's purpose is to provide a summary history of the National Park Service from its origins until the United States' entry into World War II. It was during that twenty-five-year period that the service assumed the form and essential roles that have made it the institution that it is today. A general knowledge of the service's evolution is needed as a frame of reference for a detailed study of how the several professions have functioned and fare within the agency. This summary is just that; it is not a comprehensive account; and it omits many facts that one needs to obtain a thorough understanding of the long and sometimes complex story of the service's career.

This is not the place to discuss the origins of the national park idea, a subject that has been ably discussed by students of conservation. Reservations in the District of Columbia and Hot Springs in Arkansas were precedents of a sort that provide tenuous early examples of the national system. During the first half of the nineteenth century, an occasional lonely voice called out to a largely indifferent public against the heedless spoliation of natural and scenic areas. They were unheeded as Americans pursued and destroyed the retreating frontier, opened new regions for cultivation, contended with one another to the point of civil war over state sovereignty and slavery, engaged in Indian and international wars, participated in an industrial and financial revolution, absorbed millions of immigrants, and built a nation. Few of the participants in that drama saw the land's natural features as meriting preservation. If they encountered something awesome or beautiful, it was only a part of an inexhaustable supply. Only haltingly and against the dynamics of the age did the concepts of conservation and preservation enter into the public consciousness.

As the Civil War moved toward a climax in the East, a group of Californians

"of fortune, of taste, and of refinement" moved to preserve the Yosemite Valley; and Congress was persuaded to grant the valley and the Mariposa Big Tree Grove to the state upon the condition "that the premises shall be held for public use, resort, and recreation, and shall be inalienable for all time." The "elitist"


 genesis of Yosemite State Park was not peculiar to its origins; and much of the impetus for early conservation derived from similar persons "of fortune, of taste, and of refinement." In fact, the movement has never quite divorced itself completely from that association.

3. Critics of the conservation ethic have frequently cited its alleged undemocratic bias in favor of those with the leisure and money to indulge their interests in scenery, the wilderness, cultural resources, and recreation.

As increasing numbers of Americans became aware of natural wonders and as veterans of the Civil War recalled the events of that personal and national watershed, more citizens came to believe that someone should do something to preserve those features of the nation's heritage. A rich popular literature emerged that reported the exploration of the huge public domain and visits to the scenes of dramatic battles. Harper's, The New York Times, The New York Herald, and dozens of lesser publications brought the growing reading public closer to the natural and cultural monuments. The result was the development of the national park and monument and national battlefield movements that slightly more than sixty years later merged into the modern national park system.

The immediate impulse for the basic legislative history of what became the American park system was the first official exploration of the Yellowstone country, described for a sometimes incredulous public during the first six decades of the nineteenth century by such men as mountain man John Colter and trapper Jim Bridger.
whose duty it shall be . . . to make and publish such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary or proper for the care and management of the same. Such regulations shall provide for the preservation, from injury or spoilation, all timber, mineral deposits, natural curiosities, or wonders within said park, and their retention in their natural condition . . . He shall provide against the wanton destruction of the fish and game found within said park, and against their capture or destruction for the purposes of merchandise or profit . . . 6

66. United States Statutes at Large (Washington, 1873) XVII, chapter XXIV, 32-33.

Thus, the fundamental elements of the national park concept were expressed or implied, providing the philosophical frame for all subsequent national parks.

Three years later, Mackinac Island in Michigan became a national park, only to be ceded to state twenty years later. The national park idea was not still-

7. Ibid. (Washington, 1876); (1886)

born, neither was it a brawling youth. Then in 1890, three new areas were established by Congress: Sequoia, as a national park, and Yosemite and General Grant as "reserved forest lands," which subsequently became national parks by administrative order of the secretary of the interior.

8. Ibid.

At this point, the significant distinction between national parks and forests found definition in the Forest Reserve Act of 1891. That act empowered the president to create permanent forest reserves out of the public domain by proclamation.

9. Ibid.

Within sixteen years, Presidents Cleveland, McKinley, and Theodore Roosevelt reserved more than one hundred fifty million acres in 159 national forests. By the time the National Park Service was established in 1916, twenty million additional
acres had been incorporated into the national forest system. By contrast, the
creation of each national park resulted from congressional establishment legis-
slation, almost always after advocacy and adversary contention. Even in the face
of political obstacles to quick action, eleven parks came into existence between
1890 and 1916, bringing the total to fourteen parks encompassing about 4,750,000
acres.1

1. Ronald F. Lee, Family Tree of the National Park System (Phila-
delphia, 1972), 10-11. The eleven parks, their establishment dates were
Mount Rainier, 22 March 1899; Crater Lake, 22 May 1902; Wind Cave,
9 January 1903; Sully's Hill, 27 April 1904 (became a game preserve in
1931); Platt, 29 June 1906; Mesa Verde, 29 June 1906; Glacier, 1 May
1910; Rocky Mountain, 26 January 1915; Hawaii, 1 August 1916; Lassen,
August 1916.

The national forests and parks not only had different legal origins, they
responded to different values. The former were products of the movement for utili-
tarian conservation that came into its own with Theodore Roosevelt's administra-
tion. The forests' acreage tripled and utilitarian concepts, i.e., reforestation, land
reclamation, land leasing, and multiple use, were firmly embedded as management
tools.11

11. Rodger Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven,
1967), 149-53; Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency:
The Progressive Conservation Movement (Cambridge, 1959), 14-15, 122-
46; Runte, op. cit.

The latter, until the twentieth century's first decade, had their origins in what
Alfred Runte called "scenic nationalism," whose "overriding cri-
terion was proof that the territory set aside was, as claimed, worthless for all ends but preservation."12

12. Ibid., 71.

While the national forests were modifying the American concept of how to exploit
the natural environment and the national parks reflected a changing attitude toward
preserving nature, an important interest in the Nation's antiquities, especially
those with anthropological associations, gained momentum. Cliff dwellings, pueblos, and Spanish missions in the Southwest attracted both scientists and pot-hunters. Other sections of the country were not immune; and Indian mounds, graves, and even post-contact historic and archaeological sites were being raided in the East and Midwest. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the activities of vandals, curio hunters, and commercial collectors were rapidly destroying sites. Even scholars and responsible amateurs did not stand blameless. Pottery, implements, animal and human figurines, grave goods, and human remains were trafficked in Indian trade and curio shops and museums. Little if any provenience data essential to scientific knowledge were recorded. A real danger existed that much of the information necessary for sound knowledge of pre-Columbian and early historic America would be irretrievably lost. Aroused by this situation and inspired by the examples of every advanced nation that undertook to protect significant antiquities and monuments, anthropologists, archaeologists, historians, and literate laymen pressed for passage of protective legislation. The drive was uncoordinated and represented diffuse interests, but by 1904 no fewer than four bills were introduced in the House of Representatives: the Rodey Bill (H. R. 12, 111), the Hitt Bill (H. R. 12, 141), the Rodenberg Bill (H. R. 13, 349), and the Lacey Bill (H. R. 13, 478). Two were introduced in the Senate: the Cullen Bill (S. 4, 127) and the Lodge Bill (S. 5, 603), during the second session of the 58th Congress.

13. The Congressional Record

With the exception of H. R. 13, 478, introduced by Chairman of the House Lands Committee John F. Lacey of Iowa, all the bills dealt exclusively with monuments, ruins, and antiquities in general. The Lacey Bill included, in addition, places of scenic beauty and natural wonders. Most of the bills provided that objects meriting
permanent preservation would be included in "reservations" that would be established by either congressional or executive action.

The several bills were referred to the Committee on the Public Lands, where their essential similarities became apparent. The committees received letters from interested archaeologists critical of one or another of the various provisions. Questions arose in committee concerning which bill should be reported out, even whether any was fully satisfactory. The upshot was a request for the anthropologists and archaeologists to draft a bill. The Archaeological Institute of America and the American Anthropological Association responded by appointing a joint committee, which prepared a draft published in the 1905 issue of the American Anthropologist.

The draft represented the scholars' concerns in consistent, coherent terms that became the germ of sections 1, 3, and 4 of the new act. However, it omitted any provision for executive establishment of "reservations," a feature that, as has been noted, was common to the bills that had been introduced. Representative Lacey recognized the excellence of the draft's language in reflecting professional concerns and its weakness in providing a practical mechanism. He, and perhaps others, met with the joint committee of professionals; and a second draft emerged that was approved at a joint business meeting of the parent organizations during December 1905. That draft, with minor changes, became the draft bill (H. R. 11, C16) that was introduced during the first session of the 59th Congress and became law during the second session as the Antiquities Act of 1906, an act that profoundly affected

the history of the national park system.


The Antiquities Act extended the Forest Reserve Act's principle to the antiquities and scientific features located on federal public lands. Briefly defined,

15. United States Statutes at Large (Washington, 1907)
the Act empowered the president, in his discretion "to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic scientific interest" to be national monuments.

16. Ibid.

The authority for creating national monuments was not the only result of the Antiquities Act that had a lasting impact upon the national park system. Section 1 reads:

That any person who shall appropriate, excavate, injure or destroy any historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of antiquity, situated on lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States, without the permission of the Secretary of the Department of the Government having jurisdiction over the lands on which said antiquities are situated, shall upon conviction . . .

The secretaries of the departments were thus mandated to protect historic and archaeological sites and objects; and sections 3 and 4 provided legislative authority for uniform rules and regulations for executing the mandate. As shall be apparent as this study develops, the requirement to protect cultural, and by extension scientific, features had significant ramifications in the development of professional capabilities necessary to the exercise of the department's chartered responsibilities.

The Antiquities Act signified that cultural nationalism joined utilitarian and scenic nationalism to provide an ideological rationale for reserving parts of the public domain from untrammeled exploitation.

It is important to note that from the creation of the first national monument, Devil's Tower, the "scientific objects" dominated and that "objects" were not limited to man-made artifacts and scientific curiosities. By the end of 1916, seven historic and fourteen scientific national monuments had been added to the Department of the Interior's system. Other national monuments came under the administration of the departments that had jurisdiction over the land on which they were located.
Alfred Runte summed up the Antiquity Act's philosophical importance in the following terms:

The lasting significance of the Antiquity Act lay in its title and decree that the new reserves be called "national monuments." Rarely had the Act so openly revealed that its efforts to protect the uniqueness of the West had been strongly motivated by search for cultural identity. Americans now made the dwellings of prehistoric Indians suffice for the absence of Greek and Roman ruins in the New World. It followed that the more impressive monuments eventually would be considered for national park status. Prior to winning the honor, they too, simply had to be proven worthless.

By the middle of the twentieth century's second decade, the federal conservation/preservation establishment was fragmented administratively among the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and War and philosophically between the utilitarians and the preservationists. The compelling criterion for reserving lands for park purposes continued to be their commercial and industrial worthlessness. The advocates were still persons whose cultural and recreational interests classed them as elitists.

Prior to 1916 the national park system's development was a story of individual legislative or executive establishments, unformed by an integrated guiding force. Except for the Antiquities Act, there was no noteworthy federal legislation of general applicability. The Department of the Interior had no section or division formally invested with the authority and responsibility for administering the parks and monuments. Until the Department was reorganized during 1907, the Patents and Miscellaneous Division carried out the secretary's duties. The task then fell to the Miscellaneous Section under the supervision of Assistant Attorney W. B. Acker, who had the oversight of matters relating to parks, Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia eleemosynary institutions. In 1913, Secretary Lane invested Assistant to the Secretary Adolph C. Miller with general responsibility for the parks; and on June of the following year Mark Daniels, a San Francisco landscape architect,
took over the direct administration of the parks as General Superintendent and Landscape Engineer, with offices in the Manadnock Building, 681 Market Street, San Francisco. Daniels had little permanent effect on the parks' administration.


He continued his private practice and resigned his Department of the Interior post before the end of 1914.

Acker and Miller, the former as Assistant Attorney and the latter as Assistant to the Secretary, were more important. Both men took their responsibilities to the parks seriously and did what they could to provide effective leadership. The secretaries of the interior, Walter F. Fisher during President Taft's administration and Franklin K. Lane during Wilson's, also supported the national park idea, but without a legislatively created bureau exclusively concerned with parks, they labored under serious limitations. The single most important contribution made by the department was the hiring of Stephen T. Mather and Horace M. Albright. The latter arrived first. He had been a reader in economics under Miller at the University of California, and he accepted his former mentor's offer of a clerk's job in Washington in May 1913. Mather succeeded Miller as assistant to the secretary in December 1914, after the latter accepted a presidential appointment to the Federal Reserve Board. For two decades, the history of the national park system

was inextricably entwined with the public service careers of those two men.

After Mark Daniels resigned from the position of general superintendent and landscape engineer, a significant change in national park administration took place. His successor was Robert B. Marshall, who had been chief geographer with the Geological Survey, who took office on December as superintendent of the national parks. More significant, the urgent deficiency act of February 1916 (39 Stat. L., 32) gave the secretary of the interior authority to employ a general superintendent in the District of Columbia and the field, duty stationed in Washington. The civil appropriation act of July 1916 (39 Stat. L., 309) provided for the general superintendent and a staff not to exceed four persons.

20. United States Statutes at Large

Marshall thus became the first full-time administrator of the national park system. He was something more. He and his assistant, Joseph J. Cotter, organized a protobureau that anticipated congressional establishment of a national park service. Mather and Albright had at hand two competent professionals capable of organizing a system that could, once the Congress breathed independent life into it, take over the management of the national parks. Mather expected Marshall to become the director of the new agency, at which time, his goal of new bureau realized, Mather would return to private life. The expectation was wrecked by a later quarrel; and Mather


22. Ibid., 106-7.

The fragmentation of the federal conservation establishment among the three departments was not accidental. The Antiquities Act had specifically vested the
Miller, Stephen Mather, Horace Albright, and other Interior Department personnel whose experience had exposed them to problems affecting the parks unanimously supported the idea of a park bureau. Private citizens, led by J. Horace McFarland, versatile and aggressive president of the American Civic Association, worked to create a service comparable to the United States Forest Service.

The earliest legislative move to establish a separate bureau for national parks that this writer has been able to identify was a bill introduced by Congressman John Lacey of Iowa on April 26, 1900. Two years later, Congressman Frederick K. Stevens of Minnesota introduced two bills that proposed the establishment of a "Park commission." National park conferences convened during 1911 and 1912 recommended that a park agency be created. In his report for 1910, Secretary Ballinger urged the Congress to establish a park bureau within his department. He also asked McFarland, who in turn, enlisted the assistance of Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., for help in preparing legislation. Olmsted reviewed a draft bill that the secretary had prepared, found it defective in defining purpose and future development and use, and proposed appropriate changes that Ballinger accepted.

Public support for a separate bureau lacked breadth and organization; and the Forest Service opposed the move because at least some of its leadership believed that they should administer the national parks and forests. Lacking the kind of
well mobilized constituency that could overcome inertia and institutional opposition, the first movement failed.

President Taft's secretary of the interior, Walter Fisher, took up his predecessor's struggle; and the president, in an address to the American Civic Association in 1911, appealed for the creation of a park service.

31. Shankland, op. cit., 51 - 52.

At least sixteen bills that provided for the establishment of a national park service were introduced during the 61st, 62d, and 63d Congresses during the six years between 1910 and 1916. All were referred to the Committees on Public Lands, which conducted hearings on six and reported two out of committee. In the meantime,


34. S. 3463 and H. R. 15522.

President Taft, in a special message on February 1912, urged Congress to establish a Bureau of National Parks. While there was no immediate legislative response,

35.

individual solons continued to introduce bills that kept the issue alive during next four years.

The chief sponsors of the bills introduced during the 62d and 63d Congresses were Senator Reed Smoot of Utah and Representatives James H. Davidson of Wisconsin and John E. Raker and William Kent of California. Congressman Raker's bill, H. R. 15437, received support from conservationists, but the California Democrat was
anathema to House minority leader James R. Mann, Republican of Illinois. Mann did like Congressman Kent, former Republican who subsequently gained re-election as a Progressive ("Bull Moose") and then as an Independent. Congressman Mann's support was coveted in the interests of bi-partisan backing. Pro-park strategists, who included such men as Frederick Law Olmsted, Horace Albright, Stephen Mather, Congressman Raker, Enos Mills, Gilbert Grosvenor of the National Geographic Society, and J. Horace McFarland of the American Civic Association, put together a bill to be introduced by the popular William Kent. The tactic worked, and Kent's bill, H. R. 15522, passed the House of Representatives in an amended form.

While the Kent bill was acceptable to the men who had been party to its drafting, it contained some seeds of future controversies, some of which were to affect professionals' perceptions of the park system and their roles in its development. One of these was a policy statement whose principal author was Olmsted: the service's purpose was "to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and wildlife [of the national parks, monuments, and reservations] and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations," thus embalming in the organic act the issue of preservation versus use.

Another germ of future discord was the provision that authorized the secretary of the interior to grant grazing permits. The bill also left jurisdiction of some national monuments with the hostile Department of Agriculture, however, the effect of that provision was lessened by the fact that the Antiquities Act authorized the president to transfer them to Interior by executive order.

While the Kent bill met little organized opposition in the House, there were elements in that chamber that wanted to be certain that the new bureau did not become so large or powerful as to threaten their constituents' interests or do violence to their concepts of governmental economy. One of the watchdogs of
the treasury, Irvine Lenroot of Wisconsin, who had built a record of opposition to spending money on parks, worked to assure himself and like-minded congressmen that the National Park Service would be a small agency with few personnel and very limited power. He was largely responsible for reducing the director's salary from $5,000 to $4,500 and for limiting the total of all salaries to $19,500, of which $11,400 would be for the Washington office staff. Other members of Congress were opposed to the creation of any new bureaus, and Representative William H. Stafford of Wisconsin posed what was probably the major threat to passage of the bill because, unlike Lenroot, he was not amenable to any compromise. Political compromise, effective lobbying, and luck cooperated in overcoming the few obstacles that threatened delay in the lower house; and the tent bill moved to the Senate.

The bill's Senate champion was Reed Smoot who, with the skill of an accomplished parliamentarian, shepherded it to passage with minor amendments, the most important of which was one striking out the grazing provision. At this point, the bill was at its greatest jeopardy. The Senate amendments required reconciliation with the House version by a joint committee. 1916 was a general election year; and there was a compelling urge during those August days to leave Washington and return to the hustings. The chairman of the Public Lands Committee, Senator Henry Myers, and Congressman Scott Ferris, had difficulty convening their colleagues before the pre-election adjournment. Finally succeeding, a compromise that entailed retaining the grazing provision, except for Yellowstone, was approved by the committee members. Representative Stafford attempted to block House consideration, but the measure passed one afternoon in his absence. Senate passage was uneventful; and President Wilson signed the National Parks Act into law on August 25, 1916.

36. Ise, op. cit., 190; Shankland, op. cit., 102.


38. Ibid., 102-4; Ise, op. cit., 190.
The National Parks Act was obviously a landmark in conservation/preservation history, but it harbored significant weaknesses. The problem posed by Olmsted's definition of the service's purpose has been noted. The agency created by the act was too modest in size and authority to fulfill its mandate. The funding was less than modest, even for a new bureau in the second decade of the twentieth century. The $19,500 limitation for salaries and half million dollars for park operations not were calculated to launch a strong agency. A serious deficiency was the lack of effective provision for wildlife protection beyond the casual reference in the paragraph that defined agency's purpose and the clause authorizing the secretary to destroy animals detrimental to the park's use. The timing of the Act's passage left the new service in an administrative limbo. The Act was dated April 1916, but did not become law until August 25, when the president signed it. Funds for Fiscal Year 1917 had already been distributed; and there was no money for the new agency only $251,550 for park operations. Organization had to be deferred until 1917.


In the meantime, the interim agency headed by Robert Marshall continued to function; Marshall had lost favor with Stephen Mather, seriously compromising his and his office's effectiveness.

40. Detailed accounts of the drafting and passage of the National Parks Act are contained in Shankland's and Swain's books, noted above.

A deficiency bill passed on April 17, 1917, appropriated funds for the service; and Secretary Lane appointed Stephen Mather director and Horace Albright assistant director. Because Mather was incapacitated by his second nervous breakdown, Albright assumed leadership as acting director and set about organizing the new agency.

41. Shankland, op. cit., 111

42. Ibid.
The Washington Office was responsible for the service's routine administration, while the execution of the parks' program was in the hands of the superintendents, custodians, engineers, and rangers who comprised the Field Service.

Organizational matters were not the only problems that faced the service. Operational procedures, policies, administrative practices, and relationships with other federal agencies required early action. Relations with the War Department were among the last named. Cavalry troops were still employed for administration and protection at Yellowstone; and the Corps of Engineers continued to have primary responsibility for construction. While individuals often functioned effectively and conscientiously served park interests, the dual control exercised by the two departments militated against efficiency and responsibility. Interested officials were aware of the weaknesses inherent in that dual relationship; and for several years efforts were made to relieve the Army of its park duties. The efforts were not limited to civilians. Secretary of War Lindley K. Garrison considered the employment of soldiers in the parks a drain upon men and funds. Troops had been withdrawn from the three California parks after the 1913 season, replaced by civilian rangers. Two years later, Mather, while assistant to the secretary, tried to get them out of Yellowstone. To that end, he and Army Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Hugh Scott developed an agreement that would restore most of the detached troopers to their regiment, while discharging a minority to be hired as members of a special ranger force. The scheme briefly until it wrecked on the shoals of legislative interest in the person of
Representative John J. Fitzgerald, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee and ever-watchful of the machinations of bureaucrats—civil and military. Mr. Fitzgerald, in spite of assiduous wooing by Mather, viewed that consummate charmer with grave suspicion. Fortified by rectitude and and suspicion, he managed to have funds eliminated from the Fiscal Year 1918 Yellowstone appropriations; and the troops returned, and the special rangers were dismissed. So, the first year that the National Park Service operated as a bureau witnessed an apparent set-back as an independent agency.

Mather, supported by the Army, argued the case before the Appropriations Committee. The times and logic were with him. The manpower and funding needs that attended American entry into the war argued against the trivial dissipation of resources by detailing soldiers to guard a park. Good administrative practices argued with equal persuasiveness against inter-departmental park management. The Congress was convinced, the Fiscal Year 1919 appropriation provided funds for protection, on October 1918 the soldiers marched away, and the reorganized rangers took over operations. Effective July 1919, the park construction funds were vested entirely in the Interior appropriation; and on July 19 the last army engineer departed Crater Lake. The service had achieved individual responsibility for its mission.

On May 1918, Secretary Lane signed a letter to Mather that has fundamental importance to the history of the service and to the articulation of the principles that were supposed to inform both policy and action. After noting that the agency's infrastructure was in place, the secretary continued:

... an outline of the administrative policy to which the new service will adhere may now be announced. This policy is based on three broad principles: First, that the national parks must be maintained in absolutely unimpaired form for the use of future generations as well as those of our own time; se-
cond, that they are set apart for the use, observation, health, and pleasure of the people; and third, that the national interest must dictate all decisions affecting public or private enterprise in the parks.

Every activity of the Service is subordinate to the duties imposed upon it to faithfully preserve the parks for posterity in essentially their natural state. . . . 51

51. N. A., R. G. 79, 201 - 01, Secretary Lane to Director Mather, 13 May 1918.

Mr. Lane went on to apply those standards to specific activities, i.e., grazing, concessions, leases, timber removal, construction, jurisdiction, in-holdings, public use, education, inter-agency relations, cooperation with the private sector, and legislation affecting existing and proposed areas. Included was the admonition: "The national park system . . . should not be lowered in standard, dignity, and prestige by the inclusion of areas which express in less than the highest terms the particular class or kind of exhibit which they represent." The history of the National Park Service is a record of how faithful the service has been to the secretary's standards.

Almost seven years later, another secretary of the interior, Hubert Work, gave explicit, detailed confirmation to Lane's principles in his Statement of National Park Policy, which read as follows:

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

Washington

March 11, 1925.

STATEMENT OF NATIONAL PARK POLICY

Memorandum for the Director,

National Park Service.

Owing to changed conditions since the establishment in 1917 of the National Park Service as an independent bureau of the Department of the Interior, I find it advisable to restate the policy governing the administration of the national park system to which the Service will adhere.
The leader of the exploring party was Gen. Henry D. Washburn, former congressman and Montana Territory's surveyor-general, who had heard of Yellowstone's wonders from the mouth of Bridger. Accompanying him was Nathaniel P. Langford, western personality, author, and lecturer. A five-man cavalry escort commanded by Second Lieutenant Gustavus C. Doane, Second U. S. Cavalry, provided protection from the local Indians. The party's report gave official confirmation of the existence of a natural wonderland on the Yellowstone.

Gustavus C. Doane, Report of Lieutenant Gustavus C. Doane upon the Socalled Yellowstone Expedition of 1870 (11th Congress, 3d Session; Senate Executive Document 51) (Washington, 1871)

Additional information about Yellowstone and impetus for the preservation moved came from the United States Geological Survey of the Territories, popularly known as the Hayden Survey for its director, Dr. Ferdinand Vandiver Hayden. Hayden capitalized upon the public interest created by the Washburn expedition to persuade Congress to provide $40,000 for a scientific investigation of the Yellowstone country. Accompanying the nineteen-man party as a "guest" was the artist Thomas Moran, whose paintings along with photographs by William Jackson, contributed to heightening interest in the area's scenery, while the director's report documented the survey's results.


The public interest in Yellowstone resulted in the establishment of the world's first national park in "An Act to set apart a certain Tract of Land lying near the head-waters of the Yellowstone River as a public Park," signed into law by President Grant on 1 March 1872. Section 1 defined the park's boundary; and Section 2 provided that it should be under the secretary of the interior's exclusive control.
administration of the national monuments in the departments that had jurisdiction over the lands from which they had been set aside. The situation was compounded by the fact that the acts creating Yellowstone, Sequoia, General Grant, and Yosemite authorized the secretary of the interior to promulgate rules and regulations affecting those parks, but no means of enforcing them. The act of 3 March 1898 contained a clause authorizing the secretary to request the secretary of war to detail troops to Yellowstone; and a similar clause in the act of 6 June 1900 extended the provision to the three parks in California, as well as providing that thereafter road extensions and improvements would be controlled by plans approved by the U. S. Chief of Engineers.

In the case of other parks, such as Crater Lake and Mount Rainier, funds for road construction came from War Department appropriations, instead of from Interior moneys.

In brief, the Office of the Secretary of the Interior administered the national parks, the National Capital Parks, and twenty of the thirty-four national monuments; the Department of Agriculture administered the national forests and two national monuments; and the War Department had jurisdiction over twelve national monuments and nine military parks. The United States Cavalry provided the local administration and protection of the national parks; and the Corps of Engineers handled the construction of facilities and roads.

Preservationists naturally considered this fragmented structure a seriously flawed vehicle for executing the legislative mandates of the several park bills and the Antiquities Act. Secretaries Ballinger, Fisher, and Lane, W. B. Acker, Adolph
The times were not auspicious. The United States had entered World War I on April 6, Secretary Lane was an active internationalist and national park concerns retreated in the face of those attending military and industrial mobilization, and twenty-seven-year-old Albright expected to join the colors at an early date.

Uncertain as the times were for a new civil agency and with a mandate less commanding than would have been that of his absent chief, Albright turned to giving form to the National Park Service. Daunting as the task was, no one, including Mather was better fitted for its performance. He was physically and mentally strong, knew the national park situation from both Washington and field perspectives, and had an effective knowledge of the political realities that operated in Congress and the Wilson Administration. Of comparable importance was his relationship with Stephen Mather. The available evidence limns a picture of mutual respect, trust, and friendship and a common commitment to the conservation ethic and the National Park Service. It was an edifying example of two strong personalities complementing one another. Robert Marshall, a dedicated conservationist whom Mather had originally intended to head the service, had fallen from grace and left the agency. But two of his aides, Arthur Demaray and Isabelle Story, stayed on, along with three men from the Department of the Interior: Frank Griffith, as chief clerk; George McCain, who had been Mather's secretary; and accountant Noble Wilt. A few others were hired to flesh out the new central office, which was located on the fourth floor of the recently completed Interior Building between 18th and 19th.
This policy is based on three broad, accepted principles:

First, that the national parks and national monuments must be maintained untouched by the inroads of modern civilization in order that unspoiled bits of native America may be preserved to be enjoyed by future generations as well as our own;

Second, that they are set apart for the use, education, health and pleasure of all the people;

Third, that the national interest must take precedence in all decisions affecting public or private enterprise in the parks and monuments.

The duty imposed upon the National Park Service is the organic act creating it to faithfully preserve the parks and monuments for posterity in essentially their natural state is paramount to every other activity.

The commercial use of these reservations, except as specially authorized by law, or such as may be incidental to the accommodation and entertainment of visitors, is not to be permitted.

In national parks where the grazing of cattle has been permitted in isolated regions not frequented by visitors, such grazing is to be gradually eliminated.

Lands leased for the operation of hotels, camps, transportation facilities, or other public service under strict Government control, should be confined to tracts no larger than absolutely necessary for the purposes of their enterprises.

The leasing of park and monument lands for summer homes will not be permitted. Under a policy of permitting the establishment of summer homes, these reservations might become so generally settled as to exclude the public from convenient access to their streams, lakes, or other natural features, and thus destroy the very basis upon which this national playground system is being constructed.

The cutting of trees is not to be permitted except where timber is needed in the construction of buildings or other improvements within a park or monument and only when the trees can be removed without injury to the forests or disfigurement of the landscape; where the thinning of forests or cutting of vistas will reveal the scenic features of a park or monument; or where their destruction is necessary to eliminate insect infestations or diseases common to forests and shrubs.

In the construction of roads, trails, buildings and other improvements, these should be harmonized with the landscape. This important item in our program of development requires the employment of trained engineers who either possess a knowledge of landscape architecture or have a proper appreciation of the esthetic value of parks and monuments. All improvements should be carried out in accordance with a preconceived plan developed with special reference to the preservation of the landscape. The overdevelopment of parks and monuments by the construction of roads should be zealously guarded against.
Exclusive jurisdiction over national parks and monuments is desirable as more effective measures for their protection can be taken. The Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction over the national parks in the States of Arkansas, Oklahoma, Wyoming, Montana, Washington, and Oregon, and of three of the parks in California; also in the Territories of Hawaii and Alaska. The cession of exclusive jurisdiction over the parks in the other States, and particularly in Arizona and Colorado, is urged, as over all the national monuments.

There still remain many private holdings in the national parks, although through the generosity of public-spirited citizens many of these which seriously hampered their administration have been donated to the Federal Government. All of them should be eliminated as far as it is practicable to accomplish this purpose in the course of time, either through Congressional appropriation or by acceptance of donations of these lands. Isolated tracts in important scenic areas should be given first consideration, of course, in the purchase of private property.

The public should be afforded every opportunity to enjoy the national parks and monuments in the manner that best satisfies the individual taste. Automobiles and motorcycles operated for pleasure but not for profit, except automobiles used by transportation companies operating under Government franchise, are permitted in the national parks. The parks and monuments should be kept accessible by any means practicable.

All outdoor sports within the safeguards thrown around the national parks by law, should be heartily endorsed and aided wherever possible. Mountain climbing, horseback riding, walking, motoring, swimming, boating, and fishing will ever be the favorite sports. Winter sports are being rapidly developed in the parks and this form of recreation promises to become an important recreational use. Hunting is not permitted in any national park or monument except in Mount McKinley National Park, Alaska, in accordance with the provisions of the organic act creating it.

The educational use of the national parks should be encouraged in every practicable way. University and high school classes in science will find special facilities for their vacation period studies. Museums containing specimens of wild flowers, shrubs, and trees, and mounted animals, birds, and fish native to the parks and monuments, and other exhibits of this character, should be established as funds are provided.

Low-priced camps operated under Government franchise are maintained, as well as comfortable and even luxurious hotels. Free camp grounds equipped with adequate water and sanitation facilities are provided in each reservation. These camp grounds should be extended as travel warrants and funds are available.

As franchises for the operation of public utilities in the national parks represent in most instances a large investment, and as the obligation to render service satisfactory to the Department at carefully regulated rates is imposed, these enterprises must be given a large measure of protection, and generally speaking competitive business is not authorized where an operator is meeting service requirements, which coincide as nearly as possible with the needs of the traveling public.
All franchises yield revenues to the Federal Government which, together with automobile license fees collected in the parks where a license fee is charged, are deposited to the credit of miscellaneous receipts in the Treasury of the United States. Due allowance is made by Congress for revenues collected in appropriating funds for the upkeep and improvement of the parks and monuments.

In the solution of administrative problems in the parks and monuments relating both to their protection and use, the scientific bureaus of the Government are called upon for assistance. For instance, in the protection of the public health, the Public Health Service of the Treasury Department cooperates; in the destruction of insect pests in the forests, the Bureau of Entomology of the Department of Agriculture is called upon; and in the propagation and distribution of fish, the Bureau of Fisheries of the Department of Commerce gives its hearty cooperation.

In informing the traveling public how to reach the parks and monuments comfortably, the splendid cooperation given by the railroads, automobile highway associations, chambers of commerce and tourist bureaus is acknowledged and should be furthered for the purpose of spreading information about the national parks and monuments and facilitating their use and enjoyment. Every effort should be made to keep informed of park movements and park progress, municipal, county, and State, both at home and abroad, for the purpose of adapting, whenever practicable, the world's best thought to the needs of the national park system. All movements looking to outdoor living should be encouraged. A close working relationship with the Dominion Parks Branch of the Canadian Department of the Interior should be maintained to assist in the solution of park problems of an international character.

Our existing national park system is unequaled for grandeur. Additional areas when chosen should in every respect measure up to the dignity, prestige, and standard of those already established. Proposed park projects should contain scenery of distinctive quality or some natural features so extraordinary or unique as to be of national interest and importance, such as typical forms of natural architecture as those only found in America. Areas considered for national parks should be extensive and susceptible of development so as to permit millions of visitors annually to enjoy the benefits of outdoor life and contact with nature without confusion from overcrowding.

In considering projects involving the establishment of national parks or the extension of existing park areas by transfer of lands from national forests, the effect such change of status would have on the administration of adjacent forest lands should be carefully considered. It might be well to point out the basic difference between national parks and national forests. National forests are created to administer lumbering and grazing interests for the people, the trees being cut in accordance with the principles of scientific forestry, conserving the smaller trees until they grow to a certain size, thus perpetuating
the forests. Grazing is permitted in national forests under governmental regulations, while in the national parks grazing is only permitted where not detrimental to the enjoyment and preservation of the scenery and may be entirely prohibited. Hunting is permitted in season in the national forests but never in the national parks, which are permanent game sanctuaries. In short, national parks unlike national forests, are not properties in a commercial sense, but natural preserves for the rest, recreation, and education of the people. They remain under Nature's own chosen conditions. Therefore, in an investigation of such park projects the cooperation of officers of the Forest Service should be sought in accordance with the recommendations of the President's Committee on Outdoor Recreation in order that questions of national park and national forest policy as they affect the lands involved may be thoroughly understood.

(SGD.) HUBERT WORK,
Secretary.

52. Ibid., Secretary Work to Director Mather, 11 March 1925.

Secretary Work's enunciation of policy and principles was timely because events had not stood still. Under the best of conditions, a bureau, especially a new one, is subject to tensions and pressures that can change its direction during a seven-year period. The period between 1918 and 1925 was not marked by the best of conditions for a fledgling conservation agency. Secretary Lane wrote his letter to Mather while the war in Europe was still commanding most of the Nation's attention and energies. The Armistice of 11 November 1918, while ending the fighting, left the causative international issues unresolved. The negotiations that produced the Treaty of Versailles, with the questions of reparations, disarmament of the Central Powers, and establishment of the League of Nations engaged and divided the American people. Postwar economic adjustments produced a depression in 1921 and 1922 that contributed to the decline in idealism and optimism that had become evident during 1919. The general election of 1920 swept the Republicans into office with a perceived mandate to return the Nation to what the new president, Warren Gamaliel Harding, in a moment of inspired malapropism called "normalcy."
The National Park Service was created with strong bipartisan support, but some of its opponents were Republicans from that wing of the party that produced the Harding candidacy and victory. Mather and Albright were Republicans, but they came from the progressive wing that identified with Theodore Roosevelt, Charles Evans Hughes, and Hiram Johnson. The country now seemed to have turned its back on that progressivism with its concepts of the role of government in reform of domestic and international affairs. The picture was not brightened by Harding's appointment of Senator Albert B. Fall of New Mexico as secretary of the interior. Fall, whose reputation as a hack politician was to receive confirmation in his conviction for bribery in connection with the Teapot Dome oil scandal, was a stark contrast with Lane and John Barton Payne, who had headed the Interior Department during the Wilson administrations. One specific threat to national park interests that could not be laid at the door of the Harding administration was the Federal Water-Power Act that President Wilson signed into law on June 1920, an act that Secretary Lane helped to draft. The measure, of which Mather was ignorant until the eve of its enactment, created the Federal Power Commission consisting of the secretaries of agriculture, interior, and war, with an executive secretary responsible for its administration. The commission had authority to issue licenses, for a period not to exceed fifty years, for the construction and operation of power houses, dams, reservoirs, and other developments to provide power transmission and for improving navigation. All water reserves on public lands, including those in national monuments and parks, fell within the Act's provisions. As soon as he learned about the bill, Mather protested to Secretary Payne, who took the matter to the president. He, in turn, informed the sponsors, Senators Wesley Jones and Thomas Walsh, that he would veto the bill unless they promised to work for an amendment during the next session that would exclude park and monument waters from
the Commission's jurisdiction. They grudgingly acquiesced; and an amendment passed during the next session that did exclude existing park and monument waters. Until 1935, every new area had to be immunized by specific legislation.

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Albert Fall was at best insensitive to issues of public morality and at worst a crook, and he was popular with many westerners (not necessarily for those qualities); and he worried Mather and Albright. However, he and Mather liked one another; and, while he declared that he favored opening every natural resource to unregulated exploitation, in most decisions affecting park interests he deferred to Mather.

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The result was that the service suffered less from the malfeasance and incapacity of the Harding Era than its supporters had a right to expect.

While the National Park Service was spared the cutbacks that affected other agencies during the early 1920s, it did not exist in a vacuum. That was evident when a powerful agency was directed toward managing the forest and park services within the Interior Department. The idea of a single conservation agency appealed to many conservationists and bureaucrats in both services. But there were deep divisions about organization. Former Chief Forester Gifford Pinchot, one of the giants of conservation, had opposed the establishment of a park service, arguing that his agency was equal to the task of administering the nation's natural resources without interference from a non-utilitarian rival. National parks were not high in his order of priorities; and they represented a conservation concept with which he was unsympathetic. Pinchot was not alone in his views; and successors, backed by an important school of supporters, continued to espouse his brand of conservationism. On the other hand, some of the national parks' more

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55. Ibid., 220.

56. Ise, op. cit., 188-89
doctrinaire champions wanted to see their values given the force of law by the unification of the federal conservation program into a service that reflected the park concept.

Into this thicket of ambitions, good intentions, empire building, and theory stepped an influential group of western stockmen and their henchman, Secretary Fall. Their plan provided for the take-over of the national forests by the Department of the Interior. The forests had been under Interior's jurisdiction before the Forest Service's establishment in 1905, when they came under the Department of Agriculture. The plan to restore them to Interior did not spring from a newly heightened public-spiritedness on the part of the livestock interests. Quite the reverse: the stockmen were angry about reductions in grazing in national forests that the Forest Service had ordered in an effort to restore over-grazed range. Because Pinchot had withdrawn some important power sites under his administration from appropriation for private development, the cattlemen gained important allies within the electric power industry. Another source of support came from lumber interests who opposed the creation of national forests in Alaska that would "bottle up" resources and preclude development in that great frontier expanse. Utilitarian conservation collided with significant interests when the lands at issue did not meet the worthlessness criterion that was so often invoked in establishing park preserves.

During the spring of 1922, Secretary Fall let the political world know that he intended to get the forests transferred to his department and fire those theorists and bureaucrats who stood between the natural resources and their rightful users. The time seemed critical. The president was planning his Alaska trip; and conservationists, already uneasy about him and his secretary, cried alarm. Along with farmers' organizations, they opened a press campaign that made comparisons between the Agriculture and Interior Departments that were unfavorable to the latter. The scheme unravelled almost overnight. Fall resigned with leaks about the Teapot Dome bribe making him a liability to a scandal-wracked administration and his
friends in the business community. The transfer plan collapsed. And the president sailed to Alaska, where he gave a speech outlining a policy for the territory's forests that pleased conservationists of all persuasions. It was not the

57. Ibid., 315; 67th Congress, 4th Session, Senate Document No. 302, "Reorganization of the Executive Departments. Letter from the President of the United States to Walter F. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Committee on the Reorganization of Government Departments" (GPO, 1926); 68th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives Document 356, "Reorganization of the Executive Departments, Report of the Joint Committee on Reorganization" (GPO, 1924); N. A., R. G. 79, 201, 201 - 01.


The Coolidge years were a period of internal consolidation as a body of administrative and policy experiences grew that gave form to the Park Service. A beginning was made at loosening the grip of political patronage on jobs by placing rangers under civil service coverage in 1925. The national parks became

59. Lee, op. cit., 18-19

Former Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, representative of good govern-
ment, successful mining engineer and public administrator, won the general election of 1928. In an important sense, he was the first twentieth century president, a product of a career in industry and management rather than law and politics. Mather and most conservationists, unless they were dedicated Democrats, favored his candidacy and looked forward to a business-like administration in which sound management principles would be applied to government. He was, along with Charles Evans Hughes, untainted by scandal and mendacity; and while he came into public life from business, he was, unlike Coolidge, not an uncritical exponent of its values and perceptions.

On the eve of the election, November, Mather's public service career ended abruptly when he suffered a paralytic stroke. It had been a remarkable career. When

he arrived in Washington in 1915, there were thirteen national parks with a total acreage of 4,666,261. When he died, there were twenty parks whose acreage totaled 5,890,660 acres and thirty-two national monuments, totaling 2,383,169.81 acres, a total of 8,273,835.81 acres. There was also a bureau with a reputation for effective, responsive service.

Mather tendered his resignation on January 1929, and Horace Albright succeeded him on the twelfth. No one was better qualified, Albright knew that, and he wanted the job. He had worked with Adolph C. Miller, been Mather's assistant from 1915 to mid-1919, when he became superintendent of Yellowstone, and since March 1920 he had functioned as both superintendent and field assistant to the director. No one,

including Mather had been so deeply involved at so many levels and stages of national park administration and planning. His four-and-half-year tenure as director was a
testimony to his skill as an unusual administrator and his stature as a far­sighted, thoughtful conservationist.

Albright was fortunate in that the secretary of the interior was Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur, who had been for many years president of Stanford University. The secretary relied heavily upon Albright, trusted his judgment, and shared many of his values. He was equally fortunate in his relations with the Congress. His understanding of how the Legislative Branch functioned and of the constraints within which members operated, an understanding gained during his earlier Washington experience, made him one of the most effective agency chiefs of his time. Albright knew his parks and their constituencies; and Congressmen and their staffs recognized that fact. Evidence of his success in working with Congress was the relative ease with which new areas were authorized and the expansion of the Park Service budget from $8,750,000 to more than $12,800,000 for the fiscal Year 1932 during the first years of the Great Depression.


Albright's three major achievements as director were: 1) improvement of administration 2) expansion and professionalization of the service; 3) and shepherding the service through the Depression and the first months of the New Deal, leaving it a dynamic agent for conservation and national recovery.

Stephen Mather was an imaginative and generally effective but erratic administrator. Albright was more cerebral and logical. Without exalting management, he made it more rational and orderly by the intelligent use of his staff and discriminating delegation of authority at all levels. Associate Director Arno Cammerer, Assistant Director Arthur Demaray, Assistant to the Director George Moskey, and Assistant Director Conrad Wirth exercised substantive authority; and three of them became effective directors during important periods of Park Service history.

64. Swain, op. cit., 194.
Someone is always promoting some scheme for reorganizing government services. Reputations and careers are frequently founded upon and advanced by identification with plans for restructuring agencies and working for what is hoped will prove to be increased efficiency. The Harding and Coolidge administrations spurred good-government advocates to increased activity—the former by its corruption, the latter through its indifference to reform. Among the products of the urge to improve was a move to centralize in one agency, a Department of Conservation, the administration of federal forests, parks, and wildlife reserves. We have noted an experience in the effort in 1921-2 to merge the Forest and Park Services into an Interior Department bureau. The idea revived in bill submitted on

65. Suora,

by Representative Finis James Garrett of Tennessee to establish a Department of Conservation. The bill had the active support of conservation organizations and equal, but more effective, opposition from the business community, whose desire to make the government more "businesslike" did not extend to such rationalizing of federal functions. The Garrett bill could not survive in the hostile environment of a "business man's administration."


67. Ise, op. cit., 350.

The 1928 political campaign was the occasion for raising the issue of reorganization; and Herbert Hoover's reputation as an engineer and administrator, like Jimmy Carter's nearly fifty years later, promised that the issue would have an important place on his administration's agenda. In Mr. Hoover's case, the promise was honored. In fact, he had a penchant for reorganizing bureaus that found expression in his December 1929 message to Congress. The president outlined a
broad, vague plan to merge the national resources agencies, without saying what department they would come under. The issue was clouded by his appointing a Commission on Conservation of the Public Domain with members from the public and representatives of the states with public lands, at the same time hinting that it might be appropriate to transfer the federal lands to the states for educational purposes.

The proposal that had broad conservationist support and appeared to approximate the Hoover administration's ideas was one advanced by journalist William Head. He suggested that the General Land Office, Federal Power Commission, National Park Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Fisheries, National Forest Reservation Commission, Geological Survey, and Coast and Geodetic Survey be united in the "Department of Public Domain and Public Works" within Interior. The idea was anathema to the Forest Service, which was almost always suspicious of moves to establish a new agency and unalterably opposed to being absorbed into the Department of the Interior, correctly perceiving that its mission and those of that department's bureaus were generated by differing philosophies and mandates. The Forest Service was also justly proud of its reputation for probity, while the Public Land Office and Interior Department had been plagued with scandals.

The reputations of the Interior Department and Land Office had improved significantly, but the philosophical differences remained cogent. The Forest Service function went beyond custodianship of a portion of the national public lands to a stewardship that entailed active participation in producing and harvesting forests, similar to farming and properly assigned to the Department of Agriculture. That thinking had been be-
hind the transfer of the forest reserves from Interior to Agriculture in 1905.

In brief, the utilitarian and preservation functions had valid conservation roles that would be better served by keeping them institutionally separate.

The reorganization was aborted by a conspiracy of circumstances, of which opposition by the Forest Service and its constituencies were important parties. The issue was not killed and has surfaced with some frequency during the past fifty years.

More significant reorganization actions attended the expansion and professionalization of the Park Service, in which Director Albright's role was crucial. An important step in enhancing the agency's position was its 1930 reclassification as a major bureau. A second step was taken in persuading President Hoover to issue an order that placed park superintendents and monument custodians under civil service regulations. Rangers had been covered in 1925. The service became much less vulnerable to the vagaries of party politics and more capable of recruiting career-oriented professionals.

Another step that was to affect profoundly the composition and scope of the national park system was the director's role in leading the National Park Service into the preservation field. That facet of Albright's administration is especially significant because the service became an internationally recognized leader in cultural resource preservation.

Although Stephen Mather had concentrated his energies upon the scenic parks, the national park system included one historical park, sixteen historical national monuments, and the Peterson House in which Abraham Lincoln died. The service's role in their inclusion into the system had been relatively passive. The lead agency
The National Park Service was no better equipped to be the key cultural preservation agency. Its primary concern and interest was management of great scenic areas; and it had no professional historians and historical architects. But it had in Horace Albright a leader who was prepared to commit his bureau to implementing its legislative mandate to conserve historic properties. As the director forthrightly expressed it: "My job as I see it, will be to consolidate our gains, finish up the rounding out of the Park System, go rather heavily into the historical park field, and get legislation as is necessary to guarantee the future of the system on a sound permanent basis where the power and personality of the Director may no longer have to be controlling factors in operating the Service."

73. Ibid., 475-76.

With a wisdom rarely vouchsafed to a busy bureaucrat, he realized that the service's mission must be founded upon law rather than the caprice of personalities and personal biases.

Horace Albright had pronounced pro-history bias. He enjoyed the study of history and believed that a knowledge of it was a useful civic virtue that merited cultivation. He also believed that the service he headed was the one that should be the lead agency in preserving and interpreting the total national heritage—natural and historic. He had arrived at that conviction while assistant director, when his visits to Civil War battlefields persuaded him that the War Department was failing to meet its obligations to the resources and the public. He was a voice in the wilderness during the 1920s in the presence of lack of support for historic preservation on the part of Harding's and Coolidge's secretaries of the interior. Hoover's secretary, Wilbur, was more tolerant of Albright's goals, but he and his office gave little, if any, real support. Crucial congressional backing was also lacking. Most of the historic sites were in the East, where political support for the service was weak. A bill to transfer the military areas to the Department of the In-
terior failed in the face of this conspiracy of adverse factors, in spite of some support from persons within the War Department.

Perspicacity and redourcefulness were met in Horace Albright. He saw that a key to realizing his objective was the development of an effective eastern constituency, and he set out to develop one by working for the establishment of national historical parks at Wakefield, Washington's birthplace, and Yorktown and Jamestown. In a skillful partnership with Representative Lewis C. Cramton of Michigan, Kenneth Chorley of the Rockefeller Williamsburg foundation, leaders of patriotic societies, and professionals and amateurs interested in preservation matters, Albright crafted an effective, if unstructured, coalition.

71. A study of the expansion of the National Park Service during the 1930s by historians Harlan Unruh and Frank Williss is underway at this writing that will detail in depth the events that attended what may have been the service's most creative decade.

1932 was the bicentennial year of George Washington's birth; and Albright and his colleagues took advantage of the nationalistic and historical interest that attended its observance. The birthplace site, Wakefield on Pope's Creek, in Westmoreland County, Virginia, was an obvious beneficiary of patriotic filiopietry that the Washington Bicentennial generated. It also presented the first opportunity to put the National Park Service "squarely into the field of historic preservation." The cast of characters eventually involved in the Wakefield story was as diverse and strong-willed as any that ever crowded the stage of a single historic site. It included Josephine Wheelwright Rust, one of Washington's numerous collateral descendants; Charles Moore, chairman of the U. S. Commission on Fine Arts; genealogist Charles Arthur Hoppin; architect Edward Donn; Milton B. Madary, presi-
dent of the American Institute of Architects; landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr; architectural historian Fiske Kimball; Maj. (later Gen.) Brehon Somerville; Kenneth Chorley; Congressman Cramton; and sundry state and national political figures. The Park Service contributed its share of tough-minded, opiniated personalities: historian Verne Chatelain, engineer Oliver Taylor, and landscape architect turned historical architect Charles Peterson. Out of the seething boil of competing values and voices emerged a decision to build a "memorial Mansion" on the site of one of the foundations that had been located at the traditional birthplace site. It was not a happy solution; and subsequent experience has recorded just how unhappy it was. But the mansion is still there, a landmark along the service's road to professionalism. Only the story of the Lincoln birthplace cabin can rival it as an unedifying example of good intentions gone awry. More

77. Ibid., 478-93.

details will be forthcoming on the Wakefield adventure will be forthcoming later in this study.

Wakefield was not the only iron in the fire. A larger, more important one that represented the American experience from 1607 to 1781, the Colonial period. The Rockefeller Williamsburg undertaking, the brainchild of Bruton Parish's canny rector, the Reverend W. A. P. Goodwin, was already underway. Virginia's eighteenth century capital lies between Jamestown, first permanent Anglo-American settlement, and Yorktown, capstone of Washington's military career—174 years of American history. The private sector had pointed the way to recognition of the responsibility to a site of surpassing regional significance. Would the public sector be blind to neighboring sites that had called the national into existence? Not if Director Albright had his way.

The catalyst for the creation of what became Colonial National Monument was a letter from the chairman of the Virginia State Commission on Conservation and Development, William E. Carson, to Albright. In brief, he proposed that the federal
government take over the Yorktown battlefield and that Virginia secure Jamestown
Island, where the Association for the Preservation of Virginia Antiquities had for
more than two decades owned a twenty-two-acre portion of the ancient townsite that
included the third parish church. The Rockefeller foundation would continue to re-
store Williamsburg. The three units would preserve three great historic landmarks
through a partnership of federal, state, and private cooperation.

The Antiquities Act offered an easy mechanism for proclaiming Yorktown a national
monument, but existing legislation did not provide for the acquisition of privately
owned historic property. Albright and his ally, Cramton, with the able assistance of
the former's aide, George A. Moskey, authored a bill that established a monument that
included Jamestown, the Yorktown siege lines and battlefield, and a parkway that
would run between the two via Williamsburg. Cramton managed the passage through the
House of Representatives with the finesse of the accomplished parliamentarian that
he was. It then passed the Senate, and President Hoover signed the act on Jul. 1930.

78. Ibid., 494-98; Swain, op. cit., 199-200.

The National Park Service was presented with a challenge that exceeded its re-
sources. Historical, archaeological, and architectural research were required, an
appropriate parkway had to be designed, land had to be acquired, cooperation with
the Virginia Commission on Conservation and Development and the federal Yorktown
Commission had to be fostered, and an interpretive program had to be de-
veloped. The challenge could be met only by enhancing the service's professional
capabilities.

Civil service reformers and the more responsible members of the federal bureau-
cracy had long recognized the need for professional staffs. The National Park Ser-
tice had been created as the national government was emerging from the entrenched
amateurism and incompetence of the spoils system. Mather and his key assistants were
aware of the problems, but the political climate of the 1920s was hostile to the
idea that trained archaeologists, architects, historians, and naturalists should
be recruited for careers in a government agency. There was, conceivably, a place for engineers—they met practical needs; but persons trained in the arts and humanities were luxuries that weren't needed by a businesslike government.

This is as a good a point as any to discuss Albright's other great contribution: the professionalization of the National Park Service. He saw the service's geographic and thematic expansion as an opportunity—and he was the best kind of opportunist: one whose decisions and actions were guided and informed by a principled intelligence. His first efforts revolved around the service's educational and interpretive program, which had its origins in the museums and nature-guide activities of the Mather era. The Carnegie Institution's John C. Merriam chaired an educational committee whose report included a recommendation that a Branch of Education be created. The director chose Dr. Harold C. Bryant, who with Loye Miller had inaugurated the Yosemite nature-guide program, and a member of Merriam's committee, to head the new branch with the title of assistant director. It was a wise choice. Bryant was a dedicated teacher in whatever position he filled; and he was an equally dedicated conservationist. And dedication was matched by intelligence. Bryant's Branch of Research and Education was a seed-bed for the development of a new multi-disciplined staff of careerists. As might be expected, the first major actions of the new office were concerned with the natural history program; and Chief Ansel Hall set up the Field Educational and Forestry Headquarters in Hilgard Hall of the University of California at Berkeley. Dr. Bryant entered onto duty in Washington on 1 July 1930.
The service's embryonic expansion into the historic preservation field, coupled with the director's personal interest in history, made the development of a capability in that discipline inevitable. The need for answers to evidentiary problems at Wakefield and Colonial was pressing. The first step specifically directed toward developing a history staff was the hiring of Dr. Verne E. Chatelain as a historian assigned to Dr. Bryant's office and his arrival in Washington on September 15, 1931. Chatelain, who had been head of the Department of History and Social Sciences at Peru College in Nebraska, was an especially fortunate choice. Strong-willed, candid, a sound historian, and vigorously ambitious for himself and his program, he had an outstanding sense of the importance of historic sites as vehicles for interpreting the national heritage. He had a keen appreciation of the obligation to serve the heirs of that heritage: the public users of the sites. There was nothing of the stereotypical cloistered scholar in his personality. Neither was he capable of compromising principles and professional standards in the interests of expediency or personal gain. No better man was available to launch the service's history program.

The service had established positions for historians to work at Colonial National Monument. They were filled during July 1931 by Floyd Flickinger, who had been on the faculty of the College of William and Mary, and Albert Cox, fresh from the University of Virginia's Graduate School. Hired to provide interpretation for the 150th anniversary celebration, they inaugurated the agency's first history interpretive service the following August.


83. Ibid., 25 August 1931
In late 1936, the service had three historians. Chatelain, in Washington, was developing a philosophy to guide the agency in addressing its obligations and opportunities and in conducting a survey of the nation’s history and identifying significant illustrative sites. Cox and Flickinger, at Colonial, were embarked on the uncharted course of executing research to meet development needs and providing interpretive services to visitors.

If Albright’s and Chatelain’s dream of a National Park Service expanded to preserve elements representative of the total national experience was to be realized, credible standards for inclusion of historic features had to be developed and applied. It is instructive to note how the need for such a canon evolved.

Even before the service recruited its first three historians, events took shape in Morris County, New Jersey, that offered an opportunity for acquiring at least a part of the site of Washington’s 1777 and 1779-80 winter encampments. Local residents, including W. Redmond Cross, Morristown’s mayor, Clyde Potts, and wealthy Washingtonia collector Lloyd Smith, were trying to prevent the core of the historic lands, Jockey Hollow, from being exploited by real estate developers. Smith bought most of the hollow in 1930; and the town received the site of Fort Nonsense at about the same time. On the last day of 1931, Smith wrote to Director Albright, warned him of the threat of development, and allowed as how he might donate his land to the state or federal government through either the Park Service or the War Department. Here was a chance to steal a march on the latter; and Albright promised to have Dr. Chatelain study the matter. The historian reported in March 1932 that the Morristown story was equal, if not greater, in significance to Valley Forge, that it possessed every qualification for a major historic area, and that nearly all the property would be donated by Smith, Morristown, and the Washington Association of New Jersey, which had been exhibiting the Ford Mansion, Washington’s 1779-80 headquarters, for half a century.
Chatelain recommended the site's inclusion in the park system as a "National Historical Preserve."

Chatelain's enthusiastic assessment of Morristown's eligibility for inclusion in the system received a mixed reaction. Traditionalists were unenthusiastic about including historic areas among the national parks. They believed that the parks should be natural scenic reserves and saw little national importance in the cultural features. Some were even indifferent to the archaeological monuments of the Southwest. Others, most significantly Assistant Director Arno Cammerer, believed that the historic sites were a state responsibility; and he suggested that federal involvement at Morristown would establish an undesirable precedent that could lead to similar undertakings in every state. He was correct. But while he deplored the federal intrusion, Albright enthusiastically embraced it.

Chatelain and Albright, with strong local support and the expert assistance of former Congressman Cramton, now a special assistant to the secretary of the interior, lobbied effectively for congressional establishment of Morristown National Historical Park. The creation of the term National Historical Park, of which Chatelain was the author, was more than a semantic novelty. In the first place, conferring national park status meant that establishment depended upon legislative, not executive, action. This had of immediate importance because the exigencies of the final months of Hoover's harassed administration. A presidential proclamation creating a historical national monument during those dark days was not in the order of things. Secondly, congressional establishment as a national park extended the park concept that placed the historic resource on a par with the scenic.
Given the crisis conditions that prevailed during the first three months of 1933, passage of the Morristown bill was remarkable. The nation was in the throes of its worst depression; Franklin D. Roosevelt had decisively defeated President Hoover; and the Congress was a lame-duck waiting for the new administration to take office on March 4. However, successful lobbying, patriotic sentiment generated by the Washington Bi-centennial, and effective management of the bill by Albright, Chatelain, and Bramton operated to get it through Congress and to the president's desk by March 3. Mr. Hoover signed it the next day, less than forty-eight hours before his term expired.

With Franklin Roosevelt's inauguration, the nation and the National Park Service entered a new era that no one who was in Washington on that cold March day in 1933 could envisage — including the new president. In retrospect, it is tempting to see a common bond of optimism uniting Roosevelt, Albright, and Chatelain. The president exuded confidence in himself and America; and his charm was notorious. Albright, at least in public, was almost completely free of pessimism; and his persuasive powers were impressive. Chatelain had an exceptionally broad vision of the service's rightful role in preserving and transmitting the national heritage and a conviction that, properly led and motivated, the service would succeed. Be that as it may, the three men exhibited a creative blend of optimism, skill, and ambition.

Wakefield, Colonial, and Morristown, with the scenic area, gave the service a national scope, but it still fell short of filling what the director believed was its real destiny. In a memorandum to the secretary of the interior, dated March 3, 1932, Albright had noted that the federal government maintained three distinct park services: 1) The National Park Service administered twenty-two national parks and thirty-six national monuments; 2) The War Department was responsible for eleven national military parks and twenty-one monuments; 3) The Office of Public Buildings and Public Parks of the National Capital administered Washington's parks, Mount Vernon Highway and "other federal lands as authorized by the Act approved 29, 1930 (46 Stat., p. 483)." In addition, the Department of Agriculture, through the Forest
Service, had jurisdiction over fifteen national monuments that were within national forests, some of the former requiring separate administrative attention.


Albright's goal was to replace the fragmented federal park system with a unitary one that would vest responsibility and authority in the National Park Service. The germ of the idea was several years old. As early as 1924 the secretaries of interior and war had agreed that the military parks should be transferred to the Interior Department. Albright was determined to accomplish the integration through the president's issuing an executive order reorganizing the executive branch. Once Mr. Hoover became convinced of the wisdom of an integrated administration of federal park lands and such an integration appealed to his innate sense of order securing the requisite order was no problem. The problem was that an executive order transferring government property has to be approved by both houses of Congress; and the president could not command sufficient congressional support. The Congress that passed the Morrill bill adjourned without approving the president's action.


President Hoover's reorganization was dead, but Director Albright's dream was not. After artfully wooing his new boss, the choleric Harold Ickes, and a masterful improvement upon an opportunity to influence Mr. Roosevelt, Albright submitted his transfer proposal Congress had authorized the president to reorganize the executive departments. On June 1933, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 6166 changing the service's name to the Office of National Parks, buildings and Reservations, and transferring to it the Arlington national Bridge Commission, the Buildings and Public Parks of the National Capitol, the National Memorial Commission, the Rock Creek and Potomac Parkway Commission, and "All functions of administration of public buildings, reservations, national parks,

Executive Order 6228, dated July 28, 1933 explicitly transferred eleven national military parks, two national parks, ten national battlefield sites, ten national monuments, four "miscellaneous memorials," and eleven national cemeteries. The effective date of the transfer was 10 August 1933, Albright's final day as director.

The integration into the national park system of the military areas altered radically its composition and scope. The great national western parks retained their hold on popular imagination and they continued to work their magic upon service traditionalists to whom they epitomized the term "national park." But the system now included among its 137 components seventy-seven historical area, one recreation area, and the multi-theme National Capital Parks. It had ceased being a predominantly western institution by comprehending cultural areas in seventeen eastern states and the District of Columbia.

The national park system was an agent and beneficiary of the New Deal programs that proliferated as Roosevelt's war on unemployment gained momentum. No one who experienced the Great Depression and the national recovery efforts could forget the personal and collective suffering, sense of helplessness, and despair that permeated the national mood. Even the minority that retained a faith in traditional economic and political formulae was not immune. Neither could those familiar with the operations of the emerging programs forget the excitement, alternating optimism and disappointment, and the tensions of expanding federal involvement in important economic and social organizations. Park Service veterans of that era shared those emotions in full.
As funds became available through the Federal Economic Recovery Administration (FERA); Public Works Administration (PWA); Works Progress Administration (WPA); and especially the Emergency Conservation Work (ECW), better known as the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), the service undertook expanded and intensified conservation and preservation roles. The CCC was one of the products of the Roosevelt administration's "first hundred days," when legislation creating emergency agencies and programs were introduced and enacted in numbers and at a speed that made supporters giddy with exhilaration and opponents vertiginous with shock. The executive departments had to respond by developing machinery to put the new programs into operation. The CCC gave the Interior, War, Agriculture, and Labor Departments a key role in the fight against industrial unemployment.

The act that established the Corps, the administration's first entry into relief work and human welfare legislation and which was to form the vanguard of comprehensive social programs, was deceptively simple. It authorized the president to operate the CCC "under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, and by utilizing such existing departments or agencies as he may designate." As Senator David I. Walsh of Massachusetts, chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, noted that the act did "practically nothing more than authorize the President to go into the public domain, carry on forestration, and employ citizens from among the unemployed."


94. Congressional Record, 73rd Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 77, 862.

The act establishing the Emergency Conservation Work agency was introduced in its original form immediately after the presidential message of 21 March 1933, that called for the creation of such a program. In spite of vocal labor, Socialist, con-
95. The official name was Emergency Conservation Work (ECW) until 28 June 1937, when congressional action changed it to its popular title, Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). See Salmond, op. cit., n. 26.

Conservative Republican, and southern Democratic opposition, the bill passed both houses and was signed by the president on 31 March.


Congress's role in creating the CCC was obviously important--without it, there would have been no Corps. However, the president's role was more fundamental. The idea was his, derived from the liberal commitment to conservation as a governmental concern and made urgent by the exigencies of the depression. The Congress had given him wider authority that he had requested: in effect, commissioning him to execute in an almost personal manner his brainchild and to do it with almost no legislated fetters.

Franklin Roosevelt loved to exercise both power and responsibility as few men have in American history---loved it with a personal commitment that found joy in all its demands. There is no record of his complaining about the burdens of office. Launching the CCC gave him a chance to indulge his favorite hobby. To begin with, he chose labor leader Robert Fechner to be director. Next, he coordinated the operation and at a White House conference on 3 April, personally drafted a chart that located the roles of each cooperating agency: Agriculture, Army, Interior, and Labor. Each box on the chart contained an outline of the task the president assigned each department. He made his own involvement graphically plain by writing at the bottom of the chart: "I want personally to check on the location and scope of the camps, assign the work to be done, etc." That personal interest was a mixed blessing.

97. Salmond, op. cit., 30; Nixon, op. cit., I, 150; Wirth, op. cit., 79.

It compromised Fechner's authority and complicated the implementation of the pro-
gram. There were so many demands on the president's time and attention that he was not able to respond to the Corps' needs in a timely manner.

The assignment of functions was basically straightforward. The Labor Department selected the men to be enrolled. The War Department enrolled, fed, clothed, housed, transported, and provided physical conditioning to the enrollees and administered the camps. Agriculture and Interior, through their component bureaus, selected projects and supervised work. An Advisory Board, consisting of one member

98. Report of the Director of the National Park Service, 1933 (Washington, 1933), 1-2; Salmond, op. cit., 30, 32, 84-87.

from of the cooperating departments, assisted the CCC Director. Secretary Ickes appointed Albriton. His successor as director of the National Park Ser-

99. Wirth, op. cit., 78.

vice replaced him and was, in turn, succeeded by Conrad Wirth in 1939. The dec-

100. Ibid., 128.

sions made during the April meeting became official with the promulgation of Executive Order No. 6101, dated April 5, 1933, which was supplemented by another dated May.

101. See Report of the Director of the National Park Service, 1933, Appendix B for a copy of E. O. 6101. For the text of the second, see Wirth, op. cit., 89-90.

Most of the Interior Department's camps were situated in national park system areas. The corpsmen built roads, trails, bridges, dams, picnic areas, campgrounds, and recreation facilities. They also provided labor for archaeological digs, building restorations, reconstructions, and assisted in the cataloguing and preservation of artifacts and specimens. Administration buildings and employee housing, reforestation and fire suppression projects, as well as water and utility lines were major under-
takings. The camp's staffs included engineers, foresters, landscape architects, historical technicians, archaeologists, and naturalists under the direction of the project supervisor, who was the civilian manager. The enrollees were assigned to sections, each led by one of the staff, and worked on tasks under his supervision.


The CCC was the National ParkService's major vehicle for the agency's expanding cultural resource preservation program. Chatelain saw in the New Deal an opportunity to obtain the money and labor that the service needed to perform the work required to meet the challenges posed by the absorption of the new historical areas. He adroitly tapped Works Progress Administration, Public Works Administration, and CCC funds to hire historians (called Junior Historical Technicians) to staff those camps located in historic areas, especially the military parks, and to build a corps of research historians in Washington. Ronald F. Lee, Branch Spalding, George Emery, Herbert Kahler, Roy Applemann, Charles W. Porter, Jr., Francis Wilshin, George Palmer, Vernon Setser, and other young men entered the service and were paid from relief agency money. The ramifications of the relief programs' effect on the development of professions in the service will be noted later in this study.

The peak of CCC participation in national park work came during fiscal year 1935, when 115 camps were located within the system and when the service employed 7,031 "appointed personnel" in the program.


In his final report on CCC operations, Conrad Wirth summarized:
The Civilian Conservation Corps advanced park development by many years. It made possible the development of many protective facilities on the areas that comprise the National Park System, and also provided, for the first time, a Federal aid program for State park systems through which the National Park Service gave technical and administrative guidance for immediate park developments and long range planning.

The National Park System benefited immeasurably by the Civilian Conservation Corps, principally through the building of many greatly needed fire trails and other forest fire-preventional facilities such as lookout towers and ranger cabins. During the life of the CCC, the areas received the best fire protection in the history of the Service.

The CCC also provided the manpower and materials to construct many administrative and public-use facilities such as utility buildings, sanitation and water systems, housing for its employees, service roads, campground improvement, and museums and exhibits; to do reforestation and work relating to insect and disease control, and sand fixation research and work; to make various travel and use studies; and to many other developmental and administrative tasks that are so important to the proper protection and use of the National Park System.

The CCC made available to the superintendents, for the first time, a certain amount of manpower that allowed them to do many important jobs when and as they arose. Many of these jobs made the difference between a well-managed park and one "just getting along."  

Although establishing the Civilian Conservation Corps set a precedent for relief and welfare legislation, it could have only limited application in dealing with the unemployment problem. Only a minority of the jobless could be housed in camps and utilized in conservation work. Other programs were needed to help the majority of out-of-work Americans.

Such a program was the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), which was a creation of the Emergency Relief Act and launched with $500,000,000 from funds of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). A part of the money went to tasks that could be performed by manual labor, but there were other projects that
provided employment for skilled and professional workers: producing museum and outdoor exhibits, research, travel and recreation guides, and publications.


The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) created the Public Works Administration (PWA) with a $33,000 appropriation. Its purpose was to promote building of public facilities. Seven million dollars in grants for recreation were made to the states and $7,997,000 were loaned to states and communities. The PWA spent $2,668,166 on federal recreation projects, $20,000 on park improvements, and $314,000 on building 249 miles of parkways and more than one thousand miles of park roads.


The benefits derived by the National Park Service from the New Deal programs were both material and intangible. Additional lands, as at Isle Royale, Mammoth Cave, and the Great Smoky Mountains, were purchased for the system. Funds for physical facilities, equipment, and salaries enhanced the service's physical and professional capabilities and made feasible its expansion in such new fields of leadership as the Historic American Buildings Survey, which developed out of Charles Peterson's proposal to employ a thousand architects and pay them from Civil Works Administration (CWA) funds.

109. Hosmer, op. cit., 549. The HAJS will be discussed in more detail later in this study.

All who witnessed the proliferation of agencies and programs that flowed out of Washington in an "alphabet soup" realized that orderliness was not the New Deal's hallmark. This does not mean that it was chaotic and that there was an absence of rational thought behind the several social and economic programs that emanated from the "brain trust" and the federal bureaucracy. The New Deal was
especially hospitable to intellectual diversity and innovation; and many of those who were active in public affairs were thoughtful, intelligent persons who believed that knowledge and reason should and could be enlisted in solving problems and in eradicating or, at least, ameliorating inequities and injustice. Among them, as among their critics, were some ideologues. However, no new overriding philosophy informed the fight to economic recovery. Even the belief that the national government was ultimately responsible had historic precedent. The goals were to get people back to work, rebuild purchasing power, and restore confidence in American capitalism—all else was incidental. America changed significantly. But the changes were not revolutionary; and compared with those wrought in other countries and other times, they were profoundly conservative.

The accretion of federal responsibility and involvement might be reactive, but it was seldom mindless. Responsible people sought ways to give a sound legislative frame to federal action.

Horace Albright and Verne Chatelain knew better than anyone that the federal role in cultural preservation rested upon foundations no more secure than a fortuitous juncture of public officials' personal interests and transient opportunity. The landmark Antiquities Act of 1906 was an inadequate legislative mandate for a national undertaking. There were ways that historic properties could enter the national park system: the president had authority to create a national monument out of the public domain; and Congress could enact legislation establishing specific parks and monuments. The latter made the historic areas the creatures more of effective lobbying than of objective standards for identifying places of truly national significance.

Aside from the mechanical limitations, there was no mandated national commitment to policy of historic preservation.

Fortunately for the preservation cause, President Roosevelt and Secretary Ickes both a concern for the cause and an appreciation of the limitations of the
utility of the Antiquities Act. Segments of the non-federal—state, local, and private preservation constituency believed that an expanded national program was needed. Experienced persons, including members of Colonial Williamsburg's staff, state agencies, and the American Council of Learned Societies, as well as spokesmen for patriotic societies, campaigned for a permanent, more active federal preservation charter.


One of the advocates was the president's Washington neighbor, Maj. Gist Blair, owner of Blair House, who contended for the establishment of a committee to administer a federal historic sites system. The president gave some encouragement to the major's ideas, but took no more decisive action than forwarding Blair's correspondence to Secretary Ickes: "To read and speak to me about some day."

111. Hosmer, op. cit., 565.

Major Blair's proposal reached Historian Chatelain's hands at an opportune moment. He and his staff had been preparing a set of standards for federal historical areas. They, like their professional successors, wished to insure that those areas would be limited to those that were nationally significant; and they had little faith in the legislative process as a guarantor. Only three kinds of historic features would qualify: 1) those where "the student of the history of the United States can sketch the large patterns of the American story" by definitely illustrating a major theme of the national experience; 2) sites significantly associated with lives of major historic persons; and (3) places that were associated with major historic events. A sound professional assessment would have to be prepared by a survey conducted by experienced historians that would be repeated decennially. The historians would provide comparative data to a National Board on Historic Sites, which would re-
port the survey's results to the secretary of the interior. The young men who

112. Ibid.

authorized that counsel of perfection believed that political considerations in selecting federal historic sites would be neutralized by invoking scholarly standards. They did not reckon with the hardihood of local interests and their political influence.

The major proposal for a separate commission to administer all federal historic properties received short shrift from the Park Service historians, who, not surprisingly, opposed the creation of a new agency that would take over the service's newly-won leadership role. Chatelain prepared correspondence to the president for the secretary's signature that compared his staff's canon of standards with Blair's proposal, noted the latter's duplicative nature, and urged upon Mr. Roosevelt the efficacy of survey under the aegis of the National Park Service.


Horace Albright had become a member of Colonial Williamsburg's board of directors after his resignation from the service; and that organization now joined Secretary Ickes in the drive for a legislatively mandated preservation policy. An immediate result of that support was the funding of the "Schneider Report." J. Thomas Schneider, a Harvard-trained attorney with no specialized knowledge of cultural resource preservation, prepared a detailed study of the state of the art as of mid-1935.

In Part I of his report, Schneider reviewed private, local, state, and federal preservation activities. In Part II, he examined the legislative history and administration of their counterparts in Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Poland and undertook a "comparative study of current problems" under the topics: administration; finances; surveys; classification; technical policies; education; and advisory boards. In the same section, he reviewed some technical methodology and unofficial organizations that were active in Europe, ending that portion.
of the report with a discussion of international collaboration through the League
of Nations' organization for Intellectual Cooperation. Part III contained an exami-
nation of the Historic Sites Act and certain recommendations for its implementa-

114. J. Thomas Schneider, Report to the Secretary of the Interior on the Preservation
of Historic Sites and Buildings (Washington, 1935)

During his study's early stages, Schneider submitted a draft Historic Sites Act
to Secretary Ickes. Its submission predated his examination of the European programs and
was, therefore, generally tentative in nature. Albright, Chatelain, and members of

115. Hosmer, op. cit., 571.

the departmental solicitor's staff co-operated in drafting a revised version of the bill,
which Senator Harry Flood Byrd, Senior, of Virginia introduced in the upper house on
February 1935. Representative Maury Maverick of Texas, chairman of the House Com-
mittee on Public Lands, introduced it in the lower house on March 116

116. Congressional Record, Senate
13 March 1935; House of Representatives,

The House Public Lands Committee conducted hearings during the first week in
April during which all the witnesses testified in support of the bill 117

117. House Committee on Public Lands, Hearings, Preservation of Historic America
1, 2, and 5 April 1935.

some congressional critics, while professing support for the bill's principles, op-
posed the invocation of the right of eminent domain to condemn private property to
establish a national historic site. Their objections were met by the changing of the
bill's language with regard to the acquisition of land by replacing "or the exercise
of eminent domain" with "or otherwise" and altering the limiting proviso to read:
"That no such property which is owned or administered for the benefit of the public
shall be so acquired without the consent of the owner." Congressional prerogatives
were honored by the additional provision that no federal expense could be incurred
by acquisition "unless or until Congress has appropriated money which is available for that purpose."

Assistant Director Demaray hosted a meeting at Williamsburg in late April, where Chatelain, Rufus Poole of the solicitor's office, and Schneider effectively argued the department's case in the most favorable ambiance. In spite of the staff's best effort, the bill became stalled in the House by the opposition of Republican leader Bertrand Snell of New York. The president removed that obstacle by phoning the congressman and advising him that Mr. Roosevelt did not oppose the construction of the Ogdenburg bridge. The bill passed and president signed it into law on August 6.

118. Hosmer, op. cit., 575-76.

It would be difficult to overestimate the Historic Sites Act's importance to the history of the National Park Service. In the first place, the Act was very much the service's creation. Working closely with the department's legal staff, the service's leadership authored, advocated, and defended the bill; and it bears the indelible imprint of their institutional and professional biases. Those men believed that the national had a cultural resource responsibility and that the National Park Service was the best medium for fulfilling that responsibility. They did not equivocate, nor were they overawed by the task they campaigned to assume. Their testimony before Maverick's committee was marked by a candid enthusiasm that is in refreshing contrast with the bureaucratic cant and jargon that make reading many congressional hearing records depressing.

Secondly, the Act is a charter that documents the national commitment to the concept that "preservation for public use of historic sites, buildings and objects of national significance" is a public responsibility and that "it is a national policy to preserve the same for the benefit and enjoyment of the people." This language was shortened to read: "That it is hereby declared that it is a national policy to preserve for public use historic sites, buildings and objects of national significance for the inspiration and benefit of the people of the United States."
Section 2 explicitly made the National Park Service the agent through which the secretary of the interior executes the national preservation policy. That designation had not been a foregone conclusion. There was sentiment in favor of permitting the secretary to administer the Act through some unnamed existing or new organization. However, Albright, Chatelain, et al. succeeded in making their service the statutory agent.

119. Schneider, op. cit., 142; Chatelain Interview, January 1982.

To enable the secretary to meet the obligations imposed by the Act, he received authority to secure and preserve documentary sources, to conduct a survey to identify nationally significant features, and carry out necessary research and investigations. The bill's original draft directed that research be conducted in the United States "or in foreign countries." However, the enacted bill omitted the reference to research in foreign sources for reasons that are not immediately apparent, unless the omission had xenophobic origins.

The authors of the draft bill included a provision for a library to house professional and technical publications and reference works that dealt with federally owned historic features. That provision did not survive in the final version. The men who prepared the draft believed that such a library was needed because a new sub-discipline would develop from the legislation, that there was no other "historical division" in the federal sector, and a requirement for a specialized repository existed.

120. Ibid.

Other provisions that bear directly upon professional concerns directed the secretary to "restore, reconstruct, rehabilitate, preserve, and maintain" nationally significant cultural resources and to develop "an educational program and service for the purpose of making available to the public facts and information" pertaining to those resources.
The Act also authorized the secretary to cooperate with other federal, state, and local agencies and with educational and scientific institutions or resource persons in meeting his legislated obligations. An interesting provision gave him discretionary authority to create expert advisory committees to provide access to scarce expert professional and technical assistance without "regard to the Civil Service requirements and restrictions of law governing the employment and compensation of employees of the United States. . . ."

Section 3 created an "Advisory Board on National Parks, Historic Sites, Buildings and Monuments," whose eleven members were selected from among distinguished representatives of the disciplines of archaeology, architecture, history, and human geography. The board's purpose is to advise and make recommendations to the secretary of the interior on matters that he referred to them for consultation.

The above discussion is not a comprehensive treatment of the Historic Sites Act on dealing, as it does, with those provisions most directly related to professional concerns.

As the basic cultural resource preservation law, the Historic Sites Act has been a qualified success. While it did provide a charter to preserve and interpret nationally significant archaeological and historic features, it did not limit the federal involvement to sites and structures professionally judged to possess that level of significance. Response to political initiation continues to play an important role in determining what facets of the national experience would be represented and in what proportion. Service policy, responding to subsequent legislation, i.e., the Historic Preservation Act of 1966, has forced the agency to preserve structures that, while meeting an arbitrary age criterion, can not be termed historic in any meaningful sense, often at the expense of historic values. The vision that produced the Historic Sites Act is yet to be fulfilled.

The funds made available by the recovery and relief agencies provided the service with opportunities to participate in the development of a national cooperative park
network. A large percentage of the public works funds went into local and state projects. Public Works Administration (PWA), Works Projects Administration (WPA), Civil Works Administration (CWA), and Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) financed thousands of local jobs; and most CCC projects were located in state areas.

121. Ise, op. cit., 262.

The several agencies spent millions of dollars on a wide variety of activities; and a lively folklore of an unplanned federal profligacy thrived on jokes, cartoons, limericks, and horror stories. At the same time, critics of the New Deal saw sinister signs of a trend toward national planning that they believed would put an end to American freedoms. Both perceptions responded to observable fact. There was waste, poor administration, and corruption on too many levels; and Franklin Roosevelt believed in the efficacy of planning, especially land use planning. Of course, the president and his supporters contended that the programs' benefits more than outweighed incidental maladministration and that intelligent resource planning was imperative for recovery and the enhancement of traditional freedoms. The expenditure of the vast sums entering the economy through the new programs certainly required careful study and planning; and in July 1933 the Administrator of Public Works appointed the members of the new National Planning Board. National parks and forests and local and state parks and recreational facilities were beneficiaries of both planning and funding.

The National Park Service became an integral part of the national planning machinery. Like his predecessors, Director Cammerer was actively interested in the state park movement, which received a strong impetus when the president issued an Executive Order, dated June 1934, that created the National Resources Board. The new board received the assignment to study the nation's natural resource problems, including those attending national and state parks and related recreational uses. The board's recreational division was located in the Service's Washington Office with Chief of
dollars were available from the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation funds to purchase and convert to their most productive use submarginal lands. Five million of the sum were used to acquire lands for recreational purposes, with the National Park Service responsible for that part of the program. Three types of areas were studied:

1) "a few well-located regional areas" encompassing ten to fifteen thousand acres; 2) fifteen hundred to two thousand acre tracts located near large industrial centers for use by lower-income people and deprived children for family and organization camps; 3) small road-side plots that could be used for picnic areas.

Representative James W. Robinson, freshman congressman from Utah, introduced a bill during the second session of the Seventy-fourth Congress that authorized the Park Service to conduct a comprehensive study for the purpose of identifying lands that would be suitable for state parks and parkways and authorized the secretary of the interior to assist state and local governments in planning, establishing and maintaining parks. The bill further provided for the transfer to the state and local governments lands found suitable for park purposes. Subject to presidential approval, public domain lands could be leased or transferred by patent to state or local units, subject to reversion to the United States if the lands were not used for park purposes. Congress could veto the transfer within sixty days.

The House passed the bill with little opposition. In the Senate, surprisingly strong Western hostility to the provision authorizing the land transfer to the states
surfaced. This was surprising because earlier legislation, some as early as 1906, when Congress had given the Royal Gorge to Canon City, Colorado for recreational use, had provided ample precedence. Some senators, like Dennis Chavez and Carl Hatch of New Mexico, believed that establishing more parks would reduce the availability of grazing lands. They also wanted all public lands in their state turned over to New Mexico carte blanche. Some other solons were piqued by past service actions or were hostile to expansion of the park system and its influence.

125. United States Statutes at Large, Stat. 34, 238; Stat. 44, 741.


The bill that survived as the Park, Parkway, and Recreation Study Act of 1936 was limited to one very important purpose: generating data for a national plan for coordinated and adequate park development. The product, A Study of the Park and Recreation Problem of the United States (Washington, 1941) was a landmark in professional land use planning. The Act directed the National Park Service to cooperate with other federal agencies and with state and local governments and to assist them in planning parks and parkways providing the assistance was wanted, which it frequently was. The study that emerged was a careful and comprehensive one; and the state park movement received an important, long-range impetus.

Several work-relief programs had contributed to the increased federal, state, and local land planning. The Public Works Administration (PWA) established the National Planning Board during July 1933. Working with the National Resources Board and National Resources Committee, the Planning Board undertook or sponsored a number of important planning and conservation studies. Before long, conservative members of Congress realized that the reports produced by the studies could be used to justify regulating private business and succeeded in eliminating their funding, but not before the Parks, Parkways and Recreation Area Study Act passed in 1936.
An important product of the early New Deal years was the Federal Emergency Administration's land program, which came into existence in 1934. Rural poverty had marred the economic and political landscapes for a long time even during the boom years of the 1920s. A severe agricultural depression preceded the 1929 crash by at least three years. And many farmers had not recovered from the earlier post-World War recession—although neither federal nor state governments had given the rural problems much sustained attention. Those conditions helped fuel the discontents that produced Robert "Fighting Bob" La Follett's reform movement, the rise of the Farm-Labor Party, and Democratic majorities in traditionally Republican rural strongholds in 1932.

ERA's land program's purpose was to purchase submarginal land from a total appropriation of $30,000,000. In 1935, the president created the Resettlement Administration to move farmers from non-productive lands to better homestead and farm sites. His opponents lashed the program as a gross federal intrusion into social planning, a bureaucratic nightmare, and the product of the machinations of a gang of radicals who were at least do-good visionaries and probably traitors. Franklin Roosevelt usually paid his political debts, and he owed the small dirt farmers one; and he pushed his resettlement program to a point. Some of the land went into national forests, some into national parks like Shenandoah and Great Smokies, and some into "recreational demonstration areas" under Park Service administration. The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 authorized the creation of the demonstration areas. They were to be developed as parks and later transferred to states and municipalities for permanent administration. The United States Supreme Court invalidated the NIRA with its decision in Schechter v. U.S., the so-called "Sick Chicken Case," holding that the Act constituted an excessive delegation of legislative power to the executive, that there was no constitutional authority for the legislation, and that it regulated business that was wholly intrastate in character. The demonstration areas survived, however, funded by various Federal Emergency Relief Administration appropriations and in close cooperation with
An important milestone in the expansion of the Park Service's professional responsibilities was the advent of the federal parkways era. That era resulted from one of the national government's responses to the depression and began late in Hoover's administration. The president, an avid fly fisherman, had a camp on the Rapidan River in Virginia to which he retreated as often as the burdens of office permitted. On one of his visits to Hoover Camp, he hit upon the idea of a "Skyline Drive" along the crest of the Blue Ridge Mountains; and during his final year in office, he authorized the use of some relief funds for its construction.

The Roosevelt administration took up the idea with more enthusiasm and direction. The federal government built and maintained the parkways, but the states provided the rights of way. The new activity got off to an inauspicious start. In November 1933, $50,000 of public works money were allotted for a study of a Green Mountains parkway in Vermont. No one doubted that the Green Mountains were beautiful; and only patriotic Virginians argued that they were inferior to the Blue Ridge. But the predominantly Republican Vermonters, their senses perhaps dulled by familiarity with beauty, evinced no interest in embellishing their mountains' glories with New Deal-inspired parkways. So, no parkway crowns the ridges of the mountains made famous by generations of rock-ribbed Yankees and their cows. As about the same time, studies were authorized of a route for a Natchez Trace Parkway to follow that ancient trace from Nashville, Tennessee to Natchez, Mississippi. The southern highlanders did not let their much-praised independence of spirit get the better of enlightened self-interest. Federal money was accepted; and the parkway is a reality.
In the meantime, another parkway was underway along the crest of the southern Blue Ridge Mountains under the aegis of NIRA. It was to connect the Skyline Drive in Shenandoah National Park with the Great Smoky Mountains National Park, a distance of 477 miles. Because it lacked specific congressional authorization, two champions of federal support for southern projects, Senator Harry Flood Byrd, Senior, and Representative Doughton introduced bills establishing the Blue Ridge Parkway. In spite of stiff opposition from northern Republicans who thought that economic conservatism should be practiced in the South as well as elsewhere, the Doughton Act passed the House by a vote of 115 to 131 and the Senate with little argument.

Other parkway bills went into the legislative hopper over the years as the recreational values associated with the scenic roads gained in popularity. The service's engineers and landscape architects pioneered in sight planning and scenic enhancement. As the National Park Service's role as conservator of national values expanded, the refinements effected by its design and construction professionals set precedents that were followed by the more progressive state and municipal governments.

The National Park Service's first fifteen years were ones of remarkable development. No one, even its most enthusiastic sponsors, could have foreseen the directions that it took. New responsibilities and opportunities required changing capabilities. Engineers took over from the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers the planning for park roads and trails. Rangers replaced the cavalry in visitor protection and law enforcement. Landscape engineers (architects) found themselves at the center of a new discipline that entailed planning and design that carried Olmsted's concepts into practical fruition. Dr. Harold Bryant's Educational Divi-
sion was the seed-bed from which a broad spectrum of specialities grew. It was from Ansel F. Hall's office at the University of California at Berkeley that the service's natural history program developed. It gave birth to John Coffman's Forestry Division, Carl P. Russell's seminal naturalist and museum experiments set unique and important precedents in both science and interpretation. If this writer had to select a symbolic event that marked a watershed in the professionalization of the National Park Service, he would choose Chief Naturalist Ansel Hall's "Report of the Education Division" for the period September 5, 1926, to September 5, 1928, in which he recorded that the park naturalists had come under the provisions regulating the Civil Service Commission and that the first examinations for that position were administered in May 1927. The requirements included: four years of study in a science at a recognized college or university that included at least one course in general geology, zoology, and botany; passage of a written test; and an interview by an examining board made up of one Park Service representative and two Civil Service Commission interviewers. The service was entering an era of growth and matura-

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...ion that during the 1930s gave it form and function.
When the nation emerged from the "aspirin age" and entered the century's fourth decade, it had proved that it could survive the barbarities of its second Red Scare and Palmer Raids, a frenetic financial boom, the ebullient "flapper age," the Harding scandals, and Coolidge complacency. It would soon have opportunities to test its mettle against a devastating drought and a world-wide depression. The national mood was a bewildering mixture of growing private apprehension that the worst was yet to come and official optimism that present troubles were but an interlude and that recovery and new prosperity were "just around the corner." President Hoover, the Great Engineer, and Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon, the Great Financier, charted a bright future. There were nay-sayers, and their tribe was increasing; but as the decade began, the reservoir of faith was still big enough to bathe brows fevered by the dry summer and the deteriorating economy.

The Department of the Interior had been in the eye of the storm that revolved around the scandals of the Harding administration. While the National Park Service and its leadership were not implicated, they did share, to some degree, in the department's diminished reputation. Forest Service supporters had exploited that fact in opposing placing that agency within Interior and merging it with the Park Service. The department and its bureaus recovered during the tenure of Secretaries

1. Supra.,

2. Supra.,

While businesses failed and people lost jobs; while politicians and pundits argued causes and cures; the beleaguered president and his administration suffered
an almost uninterrupted series of reverses that eroded their power to govern. Before the American people had time to comprehend the nature and meaning of the previous autumn's financial crisis, the thirty-state-wide drought of 1930 delivered another body blow to national morale and Mr. Hoover's credibility. The "Great Humanitarian," who had aided the Belgians during the Great War, the Europeans after the war, and the famine-stricken Russians in 1921 and 1922, could not rescue his countrymen from financial or natural disaster. In such a political environment, governmental agencies could do little more than survive and try to compete with the overriding crises for attention and funds.

Horace Albright and the service he headed fared better during the closing months of the Hoover presidency than a casual look at the economic and political climate seemed to justify. The director shared with the president and progressive's faith in good government; and he was steadfast in his loyalty to the administration. He enjoyed Secretary Wilbur's confidence and support; and his relations with congressional leaders were excellent. The service's favorable position was evidenced by a 1932 fiscal year budget exceeding $12,800,000, an increase of forty-six percent since 1929. We have noted in the previous chapter that the service was reclassified as one of the "largest and most important bureaus," and that Albright secured the president's signature to an executive order placing custodians and superintendents under Civil Service Commission regulations. Public use of the parks' facilities rose dramatically from approximately 2,325,000 persons in 1928 to more than 3,100,000 during the 1931 season. While the number of visitors fell the following year as the


5. Supra.,
economy worsened, the figures were still substantially higher than for 1928, the year before the stock market crash. That popularity contributed to strengthening the service's hand in dealing with the hard-pressed Congress. Another factor that operated to enhance the service's relative position was the reappearance of the patriotic fervor that infects Americans on certain anniversaries—in this instance the bicentennial of George Washington's birth. Wakefield, Colonial, and Morristown, all intimately associated with the great man's life, became charges of the National Park Service. The nation's park system became very different from what it had been:

For an account of how the three Washington-related areas entered the system, see Chapter I.

it now included three nationally significant eastern historic sites, in addition to fourteen western and one Alaska national monument. And it was becoming a truly national system. The service that administered and manned the system was changing in an equally important way. The early emphasis had been a melding of custodial and developmental services—providing administration, protection (for resources and visitors), and accessibility. A few months before the great economic crisis burst upon the commercial and economic scene, the National Park Service embarked upon a course that expanded its mission and broadened its professional composition. It became an educational medium.

Horace Albright knew how to move with dispatch; and he knew how to prepare the ground for expeditious movement. The park system's educational potential had been apparent to field personnel in the natural and archaeological areas for many years—since before the service's creation in 1916. Individuals, building upon their own resources and many hours of volunteer work, put together interpretive programs for
visitors. Orientation talks, camp fire sessions, and nature walks, sometimes illustrated by exhibits and markers, provided information and inspiration. Those contributions to the system depended upon the enterprise and resourcefulness of individuals. The service did not yet provide the institutional leadership and support that was to emerge from initiatives taken during the final months of 1928 and the first three quarters of 1929. Whatever their limitations were, the media developed by those dedicated people were consistent with the language and spirit of the service’s mandate to conserve and provide for the enjoyment of the system’s natural and historic resources.

The director understood the value of constituencies and how to exploit their energies and skills. He knew that sources of knowledge and support existed among members of the public who were capable of seeing the parks as vehicles for transmitting ideas, information, and values—education’s essential role. Committees have been time-honored, and sometimes effective, instruments for accomplishing desired ends. John C. Merriam, president of the Carnegie Institution, headed a committee composed Harold C. Bryant, Hermon C. Bumpus, Vernon Kellogg, and Frank Castler, all of them articulate advocates of the parks’ role as an educational tool. The committee issued a thirty-page Reports with Recommendations from the Committee on Study of Educational Problems in National Parks (Washington, 1929), which was a consolidation of two other reports. The first, dated January 12, 1929, contained a statement of general principles for guiding the study, some specific recommendations for organizing educational work, a memorandum concerned with the necessity for further research, and suggestions for starting an educational program at Lassen Volcanic National Park.

It is difficult for right-thinking folk to be opposed to national beauty and education; and the committee’s members were right-thinking men. They had no difficulty perceiving that the “distinctive or essential characters of national Parks lie in the inspirational influence and educational value of the exceptional natural features which constitute the reason for existence of these parks.” This perception
led to the assertion that "The primary function of National Park administration concerns the use of the parks for their inspirational and educational values."
The primary objective was "to make possible the maximum of understanding and appreciation of the greater characteristic park features by the visitor, together with the stimulation of thinking," and the educational program "should include consideration of the beauty and meaning of nature in the aesthetic and spiritual sense." Naturally, the superlative qualities of the resources made it "essential that educational work be conducted on the highest attainable plane of interpretation." The committee's members asserted that the opportunity for interpretation carried with it "a large responsibility to illustrate for all education effort in America the significance of inspiration in education."

Much of the report was couched in trite hyperbole. But if the authors seemed naive and romantic, they were also men who were accustomed to influencing action, which meant that they had a practical side. The seventh and final general guiding principle noted:

It is essential that there be unity of educational program for the whole National Park Service, and leadership representing the best knowledge and educational qualifications . . . . This leadership should reside in regularly appointed officials with large responsibility and authority, and in a carefully chosen board of outstanding students of educational problems of the parks. The board should have large powers and ample means for continuing to study the problem.

Turning to specifics, the committee recommended the creation of an advisory board to assist the director "on matters pertinent to educational policy and developments in national parks," and that a division of education be established, whose chief would administer the service's pedagogical program. Those recommendations bore fruit in the creation of the Educational Advisory Board under Dr. Cerriam's chairmanship and the Branch of Education under newly appointed Assistant Director Harold C. Bryant.

9. See Chapter I.
Few more seminal events have occurred in the history of service professions than the establishment of the Branch of Research and Education, as it came to be called. It was this earnest of the National Park Service's new concern with its interpretive or educational responsibilities that provided the precedent for bringing into its ranks naturalists, archæologists, historians, sociologists, curators, economists, and graphic artists. It is also informative to note that the pioneers did not shrink from the terms research and education, words that more timid successors have expunged from their vocabulary.

The Committee on Educational Problems was not finished. During the 1929 field season, it sponsored an ambitious study program that included the following investigators and their topics:

W. W. Atwood, "Consideration of the contributions of the earth sciences (geology, geography, volcanology) to inspiration, education, and wider field of enjoyment of nature in National Parks. Special studies of Grand Teton Park, Yellowstone Park, and Glacier Park."


H. C. Bumpus, "Preparation of a report on Yellowstone National Park and Acadia Park."

Vernon Kellogg, "Study of the Rocky Mountain National Park."

John C. Merriam, "Examination of questions relating to significance of National Parks in expressing the greater truths of nature from point of view of science and human interest in nature. Study of practical administration of educational program of Grand Canyon, Sequoia, Yosemite, Crater Lake, and Rainier."

Frank R. Oastler, "Special study of educational on conservation problems of wildlife in the National Parks. Examination of Isle Royale, Rocky Mountain Park, Rainier, Bryce Canyon and Mesa Verde."

Clark Wissler, "Special study of the problem of the National Parks as they teach the greater lessons of human history."

From these studies, the investigators prepared the following reports on existing and proposed parks:

W. W. Atwood, Glacier, Grand Teton, Yellowstone

H. C. Bryant, Yosemite, Grand Canyon, Sequoia, Mount Lassen
The committee's members convened on 26 and 27 November to study the above reports in connection with their relevance to three general topics:

1) The definition of the term "education" with particular reference to a possible redefinition of educational functions in terms of the "use and enjoyment" of the parks. Although the conferees believed that the term's connotation was "disadvantageous," no came up with a more desirable one.

2) The educational program's application was limited to matters not adequately addressed by other institutions.

3) Recreation properly comprehended intellectual and "spiritual" activity.

The committee then moved to a discussion of service educational roles in three areas: history, earth science, and life science. Concerning the first, Dr. Clark Wissler reported:

In view of the importance and the great opportunity for appreciation of the nature and meaning of history as represented in our National Parks and Monuments, it is recommended that the National Parks and Monuments containing primarily, archeological and historical materials should be selected to serve as indices of periods in the sequence of human life in America. At each such monument the particular event represented should be viewed in immediate historical perspective, thus not only developing a specific narrative but presenting the event in its historic background.

Further a selection should be made of a number of existing monuments which in their totality may, as points of reference, refine the general outline of man's career on this continent.

The realization of such a program will entail the serious investigation of the sites involved, a determination of the phases of history to be presented in each case, their presentation as historical data, and finally the coordination of the units in this series to the end that the whole will at least sketch the history of man in relation to his changing political, social, and material environments. 10

10. Reports ... from the Committee on Study of Educational Problems in National Parks, 24.
Dr. W. W. Atwood's observations about responsibilities in earth sciences were summarized:

Since certain of our National Parks present conspicuous and remarkable examples of phenomena that illustrate fundamental lessons in the earth sciences, geology, volcanology, paleontology, and physiography, it is highly desirable that provision be made so that visitors to those parks may appreciate some of those phenomena.

There is no place in the world where the erosional work of running water is illustrated so well or has resulted in such beautiful and majestic forms as in the Grand Canyon of the Colorado River. There are no places where the results of Alpine glaciation are more strikingly shown that in the Yose-mite and Glacier National Parks. The phenomena of volcanism are wonderfully well displayed in Lassen Peak, Crater Lake, Rainier and Hawaii National Parks. Descending from Bryce's Canyon through Zion Canyon into the depths of Grand Canyon a visitor may examine rock formations which represent nearly every period in the geological history of the earth. In many of these formations and elsewhere . . ., there are fossil imprints that unfold a remarkable history of ancient life. Each park presents in its surface features evidence of physiographic changes which when properly interpreted make every hill and line in the landscape meaningful.

Most of these phenomena can not be properly interpreted by untrained observers. The true meaning of geologic structures, of fossil imprints, and of surface forms can not be grasped by visitors to the parks unless they have had considerable field training in the earth sciences. Certainly the deeper meanings of the phenomena displayed in the rocks and in the surface forms will be missed by most people unless they have some help.

We therefore recommend:
(1) That specialists trained in the earth sciences be engaged as members of the National Park Service. These persons should have had successful experience in explaining to others the phenomena of the earth sciences, and they must be sincerely interested in helping others to appreciate the significance in the great lessons of science.

(2) That adequate demonstration equipment be provided for this branch of the Service.

(3) That appropriate buildings be erected in the parks as science halls or demonstration laboratories where this type of work can be carried on effectively.

(4) That all staff members engaged in this kind of work be encouraged to devote some of their time each season to the pursuit of scientific research to the end that they may retain an intellectual alertness and curiosity, and by gathering fresh facts and materials, become of greater service to the public.

Dr. Harold Bryant commented on the service's responsibility to the life sciences in these terms:

Starting with the environmental background furnished by a study of geology and physiography it takes consideration of the biological and human history features to complete the picture of natural processes and attain a proper interpretation of nature.

A prime function of the National Parks is that of preserving unmodified groups of plant and animal life. Contained in them are climax types of forest as in Sequoia; superb wild gardens as in Rainier; choice collections of marine life in Acadia; disappearing species of birds like the trumpeter swan and mammals like the grizzly, elk and antelope as in Yellowstone; to say nothing of almost complete faunas and floras typical of practically every life zone and association in the United States.

Here are preserved the best and in many instances the only living materials useful to students of the life sciences. Without such materials for study science is seriously handicapped. Already, universities and scientific institutions have discovered the importance of reserved areas and are making use of the opportunities for field studies afforded by the parks. The value increases with the advance of civilization.

Basic industries like agriculture and lumbering are dependent upon the biologist for their very existence. The biologist in order to solve economic problems must have access to primitive conditions where nature has been experimenting for millions of years.

Furthermore, National Parks afford the public a chance to study and interpret their living environment and to establish useful concepts of the laws of life and the elements of human history and a chance to find a visual demonstration of the need for the care and preservation of natural resources. Biological studies such as these and even of lesser significance, made with the superlative objects found in the National Parks are not only a means of personal satisfaction but help the individual to better order his own life and increase his service to mankind. 12

**Reference:**

12. Ibid., 26 - 27.

Appreciation of nature and spiritual values, abstract terms that they were, did not daunt the committee's members. To those men, such matters were very much the concern of a useful and and meaningful education program. An exercise in the humanistic and physical sciences could be only a shallow experience if it did not enrich by enhancing aesthetic and spiritual sensibilities.

The education committee's reports have been discussed at length because they contain seeds of change that over the next decade bore fruit that altered the service's mission and structure. The members' perceptions and proposals conformed
to American progressive values. The authors shared an unabashed belief in the efficacy and pervasive nature of educational experience. They also shared a belief that providing opportunities for education was the responsibility of every level of political organization, including, in its proper, sphere, the national government. Implicit in recognizing the park system's educational responsibilities was the requirement for a corps of professionals capable of defining the system's potentials and transmitting, or interpreting, the lessons that should flow from parks' resources. It is important to note that the committee's members saw the field areas as the proper stage upon which professionals would function. This meant that the bulk of the non-development professional work in identifying, studying, and transmitting of interpretive values would be performed by field personnel. That was where the functions were located until the mid-1960s, when the study and transmission roles were divorced and the former concentrated in centralized offices.

At first blush, the committee's efforts could hardly be conceived as coming at a less opportune moment, being reported less than a month after the stock market crash that ushered in the Great Depression. The public and governmental agencies had more immediate concerns than the issues addressed by J. C. Merriam and his colleagues. The immediate political response was one of retrenchment, contracting rather than expanding government's role. It was only after conditions worsened and the business community failed to recover that demands for federal action gained a hearing. Inauspicious as its timing was, the committee's report produced early fruit in the creation of the Education Division and Dr. Bryant's appointment as assistant director, effective July 1930, and the establishment under the supervision of Chief Naturalist Ansel Hall, of the Field Educational and Forestry Headquarters on the University of California's campus at Berkeley.


Before Dr. Bryant and his new division could recover from the shock of creation,
they faced a crisis created by Director Albright's affection for history and that high-minded opportunist's occasion to indulge his interests to the advantage of the National Park Service. George Washington's memory was the most sacred in the American parthenon. The bicentennial of his birth fell in 1932; and not even a depression and an impending national election would prevent the nation from celebrating. Rather, the former made the need to observe the event more imperative for national morale—while the latter encouraged politicians of both parties to point with pride, view with alarm, call the people to greatness, challenge the future, and otherwise inspire H. L. Mencken.

We have noted briefly the story of the establishment of two Washington associated historical areas, viz. George Washington Birthplace National Monument at Wakefield and Colonial National Monument at Yorktown during January and July 1930.

14. See Chapter I above.

We have also seen that their establishment launched the service onto the unchartered waters of historic preservation. To man the crew for that voyage of discovery, Horace Albright recruited Dr. Verne E. Chatelain as the service's first staff historian and assigned him to Dr. Bryant's Education Division, where he was something of a novelty in a staff oriented toward the natural sciences. Chatelain, working in Washington to chart a course for the service's new direction, joined two field historians who had been hired to interpret the Siege of Yorktown during the 150th anniversary of that event. Those men, Floyd Flickinger and Albert Cox, were the service's first full-time professional park historians, and the functions they performed set precedents that served the system well for almost thirty-five years.
The park historians' functions were consonant with the Harriman-committee's belief that field professionals should carry out both study or research assignments and interpret the park's resources to the public. Chatelain expected versatility of the service's historians. They would have sound academic training; be thoroughly grounded in historiography; capable of conducting independent research; be capable of developing interest in related subjects, such as building styles, furnishings, implements, museum collections, and communications; be able to work with archaeologists, architects, administrators, and one another; be informed, articulate interpreters; be resourceful; and enjoy what they did. With the prevailing paucity of jobs, he could "buy a Ph. D. historian [at] a dime a dozen," but he believed that the service required historians with skills beyond those honed by formal graduate training. Chatelain did not discount academic training and credentials he valued them. He did believe that the field historians needed the other attributes if they were to be effective in the new historic preservation field.

Verbe Chatelain's first task was at once heady and delicate: to set up a historical division within the Branch of Research and Education. Director Albright hired Chatelain, but he did not discuss the new man's role with Dr. Bryant. And when Chatelain appeared in Washington on September 15, 1931, his immediate supervisor was unprepared to give any informed guidance. Dr. Bryant was keenly interested in the service's natural resources and their educational potential, but he had a limited knowledge and interest in archaeological and historical matters. At the same time, he was intelligent and open-minded and willing to permit his new colleague the freedom that he needed. Both men had a fine appreciation of the Bauhaus principle that form follows function, relegating bureaucratic issues to subordinate positions.

With no precedents to guide or restrain him, Chatelain's responsibilities included extending and organizing the service's archaeological and historical research programs, supervising the appropriate field activities, developing and ad-
ministering policies, initiating studies and policies pertaining to new areas, preservation methodology, and providing professional advice and information to the agency and its parent department. Transcending those mechanical tasks was the fundamental and difficult one of beginning to create a climate within the service that would be equally congenial to the natural sciences and the humanities. He met with limited success in that he gained personal acceptance and institutional recognition of the service's cultural resource responsibilities. But it must be recognized that many service traditionalists and line "conservationists did not welcome the inclusion of historic areas into the system and historians into the service. In spite of official pronouncements and personal disclaimers, that attitude had support almost a half century later.

With faith in the efficacy of conferences as a vehicle for progress, Chatelain convened one in late November 1931. The conference, presumably with appropriate gravity, considered several propositions expounded by the conference leader. Those propositions were important to the record of the development of historic resource philosophy to guide the service and its personnel. They certainly reflected Chatelain's response to two months experience in the Washington Office. They included the following:

1) **Historical activity is not primarily a research program, but an educational one.**

2) **Historical activity is a part of the service's educational program.**

3) **Education presupposes accurate scientific knowledge, and every "educationist" should possess the knowledge necessary to interpret his area and appreciate its relationship to the entire service.**

4) **The historian's knowledge of his area would be comprehensive.**

5) **The historian would fulfill his educational responsibility by being prepared to "disseminate accurate information in an interesting way."**

6) **As early as possible, the historian would prepare a comprehensive bibliography of sources relating to his area.** Chatelain believed that this was
so important that he provided a suggested form and specified that a copy be furnished Washington.

7) The historian would prepare a publication dealing with his area.

8) Pertinent sources on the area and professional matters should be acquired for the park's library and used by the staff.

9) The historian should deliver talks, lectures, "guide instruction" and actively solicit opportunities to provide these services.

10) Historians should prepare monthly "Historical Notes."

11) The historian should participate in assembling library and museum collections and be involved in all the area's field activities. 18

Prepared as they were after Chatelain had been on duty less than two months, the propositions were tentative and idealistic. Additional experience in Washington during worsening economic and political conditions was bound to be instructive, and Verne Chatelain was a rapid learner. One lesson that he absorbed was that the service needed an enlightened standard for determining the inclusion of historic sites into the park system. An early testimony to that effect appeared in a report to the director prepared by Chatelain and Roger W. Toll, superintendent of Yellowstone, that read in part:

Historic sites include areas of military significance. In addition, a system of acquiring historic sites should include all types of areas that are historically important in our national development. This entire subject is of greater importance at the present time due to the recommendations in the President-elect's plan of transferring to the National Park Service the military areas of the War Department. An examination of the areas that have been set aside as national military parks, battlefield sites and national monuments administered by the War Department, indicates that the selection has not been the result of a plan or policy determined in advance, but rather the acceptance of areas that have been advocated from time to time by various proponents. Some of these areas are undoubtedly of the highest importance, but others may not be. Certainly the list does not represent all the most important historical shrines of American history, even in the field of military endeavor. The pressure that has been brought in the past to bear on the War Department in the establishment of these national military areas will be transferred to the National Park Service along with the sites themselves.

The setting up of standards for national historical sites and the listing and classification of areas pertinent to the development of the Nation seems to be of utmost importance. The committee believes that it is unsound, uneconomical and detrimental to a historical system and policy to study each individual area without reference to the entire scheme of things. 19
Chatelain returned to the subject four months later in a memorandum to Assistant Director Arthur E. Demaray when he wrote:

... the historical work of the National Park Service is dependent upon the acquisition of an historical mind by those who control its administration, or at least upon their willingness to leave the problem to the historically-minded. Of course it is conceivable that those with authority and opportunity may acquire for the Service in the name of the Nation one historic site or another under one or many standards of selection. What areas are acquired, however, and how these are interpreted will in the long run show whether or not we know what we are doing. Unless there is a real philosophy of history, it will be easy enough to spend our time in academic discussions over this or that museum or antiquarian problem, and never seriously tackle the bigger task.

The historian is an expert and there are relatively few of his kind. Most of those who work in history are struggling students and should be properly alluded to as students of history, not as historians. The historian is a philosopher because his work is essentially synthetic. He is constantly studying causes and effects, processes, patterns, and cycles, in short everything connected with the development and relationship of human beings in their environment and the recording of what he sees. His professional knowledge has been acquired by the study not simply of many facts but of many processes and patterns...

No conception of the historical activity of the National Park Service is complete unless it attempts to tie the individual problem to the larger patterns of history. He must find those patterns and then relate the Wakefield or any other problem with which we are working to that scheme.

The sum total of the sites we select should make it possible to tell a more less complete story of American history. Keeping in mind the fact that our history is a series of processes marked by certain stages of development, our sites should illustrate and make possible the interpretation of these processes at certain levels of growth.

It is going to be impractical for the Federal Government to take a lot of unrelated historical sites, no matter how significant any one of them might seem at the moment. What I feel we must do is to select bases from which the underlying philosophy can be developed, and expanded to the best advantage.

Chatelain sought a mechanism for identifying, evaluating, and preserving within a national system nationally significant cultural resources that transmitted and illustrated an integrated account of the American experience.
first, preliminary step was his own survey of the country's settlement and growth
with emphasis on sites and features whose preservation would be vehicles for inter-
21
pretating the nation's history. Subsequent efforts to concentrate the service's

of copy of the survey, and Dr. Chatelain does not know its fate.

cultural preservation energies upon nationally important resources, including the
Historic Preservation Act of 1935, the Historic Sites Survey, the Park Service
Plan, and the preachments of individual chief historians, historical architects,
archaeologists, and historians have failed to compete successfully with non-pro-
fessional persons and constituencies and the procedural provisions of the National
Environmental Protection Act and the Historic Preservation Act of 1966 in delimiting
the service's preservation program to what is important as opposed to what responds
to a trend, an antiquarian interest, or is simply "old." Thus, the same system that
preserves and interprets Independence Hall, Frederickburg - Spottsylvania, and Chaco
Canyon essays to do the same for the mis-called Kosciuszko House, Sailly Homestead,
and the Holzworth Ranch. Dr. Chatelain's warning that the areas chosen for pre-
servation and how they are interpreted "will in the long run show whether we know
what we are doing" has not been heeded sufficiently to avoid the frequent dissi-
pation of money, talent, and credibility. Nor, by extension, has the national pre-
servation constituency always demonstrated that it knew what it was doing.

While Chatelain in Washington and Floyd Flickinger and Albert Cox in Yorktown
were still launching the service's historical program at their respective levels,
events occurred that fundamentally altered the climate in which they labored. Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt took office on March 4, 1933 and ushered in an epoch of unprecedented
federal activism that changed America. On June 16, he issued Executive Order 6166
that renamed the service, expanded the system it administered, and vested in it
"All functions of administration of public buildings, reservations, national parks,
national monuments, and national cemeteries."

He followed this, on 

Executive Order 6228 that transferred to the park system eleven national military parks, two national parks, ten national battlefield sites, ten national monuments, four miscellaneous memorials, and eleven national cemeteries. Within less than

four months of the inauguration, the new administration launched the national recovery program that gave birth to the "alphabet soup" of agencies that included the FERA, PWA, WPA, and the ECW, better known as the CCC. By summer, the national park system was on its way to becoming an important agent of the New Deal in its fight against unemployment. Chatelain's task assumed new dimensions with the service's expanded role in historic preservation and public works as the several recovery programs funded projects and positions that had to integrated into a manageable and responsive whole. The increasing nationalization of the country's problems and the mobilization of resources to deal with those problems thrust men like Chatelain into a pioneering mode that had no precedents. When the Emergency Conservation Work program gave the Office of National Parks, Buildings, and Reservations, the service's new and temporary titles, responsibility for directing the Civilian Conservation Corps' preservation program in both national and state parks, the service's historical and archaeological responsibilities assumed proportions far beyond its organic mandate.

Preservation policy and principles did not spring from a vacuum. While Chatelain struggled to give them rational form, theories and practices appeared and were tested at Wakefield, Colonial, Morristown, and later the military parks and battlefield sites. Somewhat like the British constitution, the early development of a service practice emerged as an organic body of precedent. Service experience was reflected in Floyd
Flickinger's account of Colonial's development.

...our first obligation in accepting custody of an historic site, is preservation. However, our program considers preservation as only a means to an end. The second phase is physical development, which seeks a rehabilitation of the site or area by means of restorations of reconstructions. The third and most important phase is interpretation, and preservation and development are valuable in proportion to their contribution to that phase.

The first and fundamental step in organizing the historical program in an area is the determination of a comprehensive and accurate history of the area, and then the selection, in order of importance, of the different parts of the whole story, so that there may be a basis for the selection of objects for physical development which will include an adequate minimum plan. Provision must also be made for a complete program of general general research ... and also for special study and research on particular objects and problems. 24

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24. Quoted in Harlan Unrau and Frank Williss, The National Park Service in the 1930s (NPS, Denver Service Center, 1982), 171.

Four years on the job found Chatelain still articulating an evolving cultural resource philosophy when he wrote:

The appropriate role of the historical and archeological areas under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service has been the subject of much study during the past four or five years. The conception that underlies the whole policy of the National Park Service in connection with these sites is that of using the uniquely graphic qualities which inhere in any area where stirring and significant events have taken place to drive home to the visitor the meaning of those events showing not only their importance but their integral relationship to the whole history of American development. In other words, the task is to breathe the breath of life into American history for those to whom it has been a dull recital of meaningless facts to recreate for the average citizen something of the color, the pageantry, and the dignity of our national past. 25

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25. Old History Division Files, WASO, "History and Our National Parks" [June 1935]

Other theoretical statements flowed from the pens of early service historians as they struggled to give form to their visions of the federal government's roles and responsibilities in preserving and interpreting the nation's historic resources. Their authors prepared them, in most instances, in response to problems that arose as the service's program expanded after the addition of the old war Department areas to the system and the implementation of the Historic
Sites Act of 1935. A synthesis that faithfully reflected professional values for the next four decades was drafted by the Advisory Board on National Parks, Historic Sites, Buildings, and Monuments and adopted by the service as policy in 1937:

A. General Restoration

The motives governing these activities are several, often conflicting: aesthetic, archeological and scientific, and educational. Each has its values and its disadvantages.

Educational motives often suggest complete reconstitution, as in their hey-day, of vanished, ruinous or remodelled buildings and remains. This has often been regarded as requiring removal of subsequent additions, and has involved incidental destruction of much archeological and historical evidence, as well as of aesthetic values arising from age and picturesqueness.

The demands of scholarship for the preservation of every vestige of architectural and archeological evidence — desirable in itself — might, if rigidly satisfied, leave the monument in conditions which give the public little idea of its major historical aspect or importance.

In aesthetic regards, the claims of unity or original form or intention, of variety of style in successive periods of building and remodelling, and of present beauty of texture and weathering may not always be wholly compatible.

In attempting to reconcile these claims and motives, the ultimate guide must be the tact and judgment of the men in charge. Certain observations may, however, be of assistance to them:

(1) No final decision should be taken as to a course of action before reasonable efforts to exhaust the archeological and documentary evidence as to the form and successive transformations of the monument.

(2) Complete record of such evidence, by drawings, notes and transcripts should be kept, and in no case should evidence offered by the monument itself be destroyed or covered up before it has been fully recorded.

(3) It is well to bear in mind the saying: "Better preserve than repair, better repair than restore, better restore than construct."
(4) It is ordinarily better to retain genuine old work of several periods, rather than arbitrarily to restore the whole, by new work, to its aspect at a single period.

(5) This applies even to work of periods later than those not admired, provided their work represents a genuine creative effort.

(6) In no case should our own artistic preferences or prejudices lead us to modify, on aesthetic grounds, work of a bygone period representing other artistic tastes. Truth is not only stranger than fiction, but more varied and more interesting, as well as more honest.

(7) Where missing features are to be replaced without sufficient evidence as to their own original form, due regard should be paid to the factors of period and region in other surviving examples of the same time and locality.

(8) Every reasonable additional care and expense are justified to approximate in new work the materials, methods and quality of old construction, but new work should not be artificially antiqued by theatrical means.

(9) Work on the preservation and restoration of old buildings requires a slower pace than would be expected in new construction.

2. Battlefield Area Restoration Policy:

Consideration of a proper restoration policy for historical areas raises many important problems. Not the least of these is the proper application of such a policy to national battlefield areas. These areas offer conditions not usually present in other historical sites and the problem is more immediate in view of the present rapid development program.

In a sense a wise policy might better be described as one of stabilization rather than restoration. Stabilization embraces necessary restoration without subordinating it to the entire physical development program.

It is convenient to discuss the problem in two parts, the elements usually presented in a battlefield area when the National Park Service takes it over, but before any development program has been initiated; and, the successive steps in a sound stabilization program.

I. When the National Park Service takes over a military area, it usually consists of the following elements:

A. What was there when the battle was fought, including evidences of the battle, such as earthworks, cleared fields, ruined foundations, etc.
B. Subsequent additions, including forest growth, modern buildings, monuments, and markers. Some of these subsequent additions, such as the intrusions of unsightly and modern structures, have been injurious to the appearance of the area. Other additions, however, have improved it. For example, forest growth of 75 years frequently is a desirable witness to the age and the dignity of a battlefield area and fortifies the impression upon those visiting the area.

II. To stabilize conditions on a battlefield area after it is taken over, the following policies are hereby approved:

A. Undesirable modern encroachments on the battlefield scene shall be eliminated as soon as practicable. Not everything that has occurred since the battle can be considered an encroachment. Obviously, modern structures and intrusions which have been due to other than natural conditions and which introduce a jarring note rather than contribute to the normal accretions of age are the elements which should be eliminated. These include modern buildings, high-speed highways, gas stations, transmission lines, and other obviously incongruous elements. Normal forest growth, the natural changes of stream channel, the operation of other natural processes which seem destined never to be controlled, should not be eliminated.

B. Having eliminated undesirable encroachments, those features of the area which hamper a clear understanding of the engagement also should be eliminated. For example, where forest growth has obstructed an important vista or where a road location conveys a mistaken notion of troop movements, that feature should be modified or eliminated for educational reasons.

C. Restoration, which seems advisable to aid understanding and to restore the natural landscape for clearing and naturally representing the battlefield area, should be made as funds therefore are obtained. Such restorations may be made for structures, earthworks, plant growth, etc. It is recognized that, in each case of restoration, there is present a danger of introducing an artificial element into what had been previously a natural scene. Natural processes should be allowed to operate and dignify with age the natural scene.

The foregoing policies should aid in developing a battlefield area to provide a combination of elements remaining from the time of the battle, plus the normal additions of age effected through the natural accretion of natural processes. When a battlefield area has been so treated as to represent this combination, it can be said to be stabilized.
For those persons with a philosophic bent — of whom the cultural resource disciplines have traditionally attracted more than their share — the theoretical documents can be informative. They shared some common characteristics. Their authors had a profound belief that a knowledge of the nation's history was essential to responsible citizenship and that the preservation and interpretation of significant artifacts of that history was an important medium for transmitting knowledge. They believed that executing that responsibility is a proper function of the federal government. Thirdly, they knew that its execution required a corps of professionals — professionals with special skills. Fourthly, they were undoctinaire. The fine philosophical issues that engage some preservationists did not attract them. Their commitments were to accuracy, competence, and the performance of a mission. They were too busy with problems, testing techniques, forging a system, preserving perishable artifacts, and building a body of knowledge and experience. They were so busy creating that they had little time to be precious.

While Chatelain and his fellow historians launched their profession along its new career, one of the preservation movement's giants made a premier contribution to its scholarship. The man was Charles Peterson and his creation was the Historic American Building Survey (HABS). No one who has worked with Peterson, however briefly, forgot the experience. Opinionated, ruthless, resourceful, and devoted to his discipline, he did not suffer fools gladly — and among the perceived fools was a substantial percentage of administrators, archaeologists, and historians, as well as at least a healthy minority of architects. His antipathy for fools was matched by one of the National Park Service's larger egos. Charles Peterson is a historical architect. His first exposure to that discipline was at the new Colonial National Monument, where he made a serious comparative study of colonial architecture and formed close relationships with the Williamsburg staff. Out of those experiences
came the inspiration for a national survey of historic architecture.

The genesis of HABS was a 13 November 1933 memorandum from Peterson, then chief of the Eastern Division of the Branch of Plans and Design, to Associate Director Arthur Demaray. In that communication, Peterson proposed that $45,000 in federal relief funds be used for the employment of about one thousand unemployed architects and draftsmen for periods of two or more months to study, measure, and record examples of early American buildings. Demaray and Director Cammerer approved the proposal in time to submit it to Secretary Ickes on 15 November. The secretary's approval came two days later, and that of Federal Relief Administrator Harry Hopkins on 1 December.

The survey evolved as an effective cooperative activity. The National Park Service was the key agency, with Thomas C. Vint, the Washington Office's chief of Plans and Design, in operational charge. The second party was the American Institute of Architects (AIA), whose executive secretary, Edward C. Kemper, and chairman of the Institute's Committee on the Preservation of Historic Buildings, Leicester B. Holland, FAIA, were active and informed resource persons. A third party was the National Advisory Board, chaired by Dr. Holland. The members were appointed by the secretary of the interior: John Gaw Meem, a New Mexico architect; William G. Perry, a Boston architect; Albert Simons, an architect practicing in Charleston, S. C.; Herbert A. Bolton, professor of history, University of California, and past president of the American Historical Association; Miss Helen James, executive secretary, American Civic Association; Waldo G. Leland, executive secretary, American Council of Learned Societies; Thomas Tallmadge, a member of the Williamsburg Advisory Committee; and I. T. Frary of the Cleveland Museum of Arts. The fourth partner was the Library of Congress, the custodian of the archives that the survey created. Funding came from the Civil Works Administration's relief appropriation.

The architectural survey got under way under Vint's supervision, assisted by
architectural historian Thomas T. Waterman and architects John P. O'Neil and Frederick D. Nichols. Six northwestern states were excluded from the initial program "because of winter climate conditions and because of the relatively few architects who might be unemployed." The rest of the country was divided into

28. Ibid., 2.

thirty-nine districts, each with a district officer who was nominated by the AIA and appointed by the secretary of the interior. The district officers recruited architects and draftsmen through the local Civil Works Administration (CWA). The Washington Office furnished instructions and supplies; and private citizens and local organizations donated office space.

29. Ibid.

In spite of the unusually severe weather that prevailed over much of the country, working parties began operating during the first week of January 1934. A CWA order stopped recruiting on 15 January, by which time a maximum of 772 men were employed. A little less than a month later, 15 February, a gradual reduction of ten percent week went into effect. The first phase of the Survey ended 1 May 1934, by which time $196,267.63 of a total appropriation of $148,900 was expended.

30. Ibid.

The work accomplished during those first four months of 1934 met with general approval. Unemployed architects and draftsmen had received temporary relief from a desperate financial situation, and a body of data was begun whose value was readily apparent to all interested constituencies. In most of the districts, the Survey received a renewed six-month lease on life.

Along with the decision to extend the Survey, there came a need to regularize its operations. That charter took the form of a memorandum of agreement that was ratified
on 23 July by the National Park Service, the American Institute of Architects, and the Library of Congress. That agreement undertook to make the Survey "a permanent plan for approval and disposition of all future graphic records of historic American architecture, whether such reports be made at the expense of the Government or upon individual initiative."


31. Ibid., 4.

The basic agreement formalized the Survey's cooperative character by chartering four "phases." One was the emergency relief phase; and during 1934 and 1935, Emergency Relief Administration projects, employing an average of 300 persons, were underway in sixteen states. A second was the public works phase. As local Survey projects multiplied, the branch of Plans and Design's administrative work load threatened to become unmanageable. The secretary of the interior made Public Works Administration (PWA) funds available for a separate administrative unit. Money from the same source was used to complete work started with PWA funds at Acoma, New Mexico.

University participation was a third phase. School administrators quickly sensed the Survey's educational value, as well as its role in providing temporary employment. Their contributions were both disciplinary and concrete. Useful collaboration between architecture departments, some of which set up theses programs, contributed to professional quality. Some institutions contributed funds, administrative support, drafting facilities, and supplies. An essential and productive source of support came from private firms and individual practitioners who contributed notes, drawings, and photographs. In fact, some projects that were not completed when the first phase of relief funding terminated were finished by individual architects and draftsmen.

and in some states in response to needs, the availability of relief funds. Charles Hosmer described its mid-1935 revival as

[coming] back to life again, on the state level. There were programs in twelve states, employing 449 people at different times during the year, mostly through the Emergency Relief Administration . . . It appears that the number of unemployed architects, the amount of federal money available, and the capability of the district officer all helped the survey to survive. Unfortunately, these factors meant that HABS did not operate on the basis of historic priorities. The number of important buildings that needed to be recorded was not the crucial point, nor was the skill of the draftsmen waiting to do the job. The coverage was uneven, and a fair number of worthwhile projects had to wait for adequate funding. 32


In spite of the Historic Sites Act of 1935, which mandated a survey of historic sites and structures, HABS languished in most of the states during the decade's latter years. As employment improved for architects and draftmen, the Survey's impetus diminished. Although a few aggressive district officers kept it alive in some areas, the program was virtually dead by the end of 1941 and American entry into World War II. By then, 6,389 structures were recorded on 23,765 sheets of drawings and 25,357 photographs—a creditable record for less than eight years of work.


Assessing HABS's contributions to National Park Service historic preservation capabilities is not a simple task because most of those contributions were subtle in their impact. The Survey's purpose was to record historic structures before they disappeared—and Peterson's original proposal assumed that most would disappear—and provide work for unemployed members of the profession. While physical preservation of old structures was not a goal, it was perhaps inevitable that the Survey's activities would stimulate interest in such buildings and in historic architecture as a discipline. At the same time, a case can not be made that it significantly enhanced the service's permanent internal preservation capability beyond the indirect prestigious affect associated with Peterson's and Vint's leadership in both the —
the NPS. As Hosmer accurately assessed HABS:

There was little direct connection between the growing historical program of the National Park Service and the Branch of Plans and Design's involvement with HABS. Perhaps the historians tended to view the whole idea of "saving" buildings on paper as a meaningless exercise. After all, their work involved repairing and interpreting actual structures, not making sets of measured drawings and photographs.

Hosmer then added an observation that provides an insight into a problem that has plagued the service's preservation experience: counterproductive personal and professional rivalries that, in turn, reflect disparate disciplinary values. He wrote: "It also cannot be denied that Peterson and Chatelain were competing for the limelight in the historical phase of Park Service work."

34. Hosmer, op. cit., I, 562.

While the Survey's impact upon the service and cultural resource preservation was limited and indirect, its contribution to scholarship was seminal. Every professional effort to preserve or recreate a historic scene that involved structures owes a major debt to the HABS drawings and photographs that were deposited in the Library of Congress and to the disciplinary standards that informed the Survey's efforts.

While Chatelain, Peterson, and their colleagues did not work cut their theories and practices in a vacuum, the events that attended and immediately followed the 1933 reorganization of the Executive Departments betrayed the absence of a legislative rationale upon which to construct a national cultural preservation and restoration strategy. Because earlier leadership had come from the private sector, where interest in local history dominated, some periods were well-represented, while others were under-represented or ignored. This leadership, in spite of its parochialism--and even because of it--was an important part of the constituency that combined to support legislation that established historic areas and the evolution of the charter legislation that became the Historic Sites Act and National Park Fund Act of 1935.
The story of that legislation is summarized in the previous chapter and in Unrau's and Williss's study of the service's expansion during the 1930s.

The National Park Service's initial venture into cultural resource preservation and interpretation began its career under the benign, if bemused, supervision of Dr. Harold Bryant as part of his pioneer Education Branch. Thomas Schneider's preliminary report to the secretary of the interior contained a brief description of a proposed branch of Historic Sites and Buildings under the supervision of an assistant director. The new independent branch would "supervise and coordinate administrative policy, educational and research matters pertaining to historic and archeological sites, including the survey, classification, and preservation of historic and archeological sites and buildings and the remains thereof; supervise and collect drawings, photographs, sketches and other data relating to prehistoric and historic American sites and buildings; and collect and preserve historical and archeological records." 36

It would be organized into three divisions, one for work east of the Mississippi River, one for west of the river, and a research division. Schneider's recommendation became a reality when the Interior Appropriation act for 1936 authorized creation within the Washington Office of the Branch of Historic Sites and Buildings, with Dr. Chatelain as acting assistant director.

Chatelain had his new, independent branch, but the staff was limited to only three additional employees. This meant that more personnel had to be funded from Emergency Conservation Work (CCC) appropriations; and the new acting assistant director initiated civil service examinations for archaeologists and historians.
as he prepared to build a permanent staff.


The story of the new branch's development during the two years between August 1935 and August 1937 is instructive in revealing how effective administrative action responded to economic and political opportunities to create a professional capability within a governmental bureaucracy—an institution traditionally seen as unresponsive. At first blush, the times were out of joint for creative management, especially management that concerned itself with archaeology, history and old buildings, which hard-headed common sense classed as luxuries. The nation needed economic and industrial recovery. People needed jobs, purchasing power, consumer goods, and confidence in an economic and political system that would provide opportunities to meet those needs. Money and energy needed to be devoted to prudent, constructive ends. Beyond providing jobs for a few unemployed college graduates and professors, what useful purpose could be served by channeling resources into financing hobbies with tax dollars? A plebiscite on the question would have answered with a thundering "None!"

The prime movers in the preservation movement seemed an unlikely lot who had never that supreme American test—meeting a payroll—nor won election, men whose appeal was to intangible, perhaps elitist, values. Where were the practical men of affairs who had competed and succeeded in the rough and tumble of the corporate and political armas? Horace Albright, Arno Cammerer, Arthur Demaray, Verne Chatelain, and Ronald Lee were at best reasonably capable public servants and at worst visionary parasites.

If in the unlikely event that a positive public good might be served by preserving artifacts of the past, was the federal government the proper agent? Private and local agencies had responded to whatever limited needs the country had. Colonial Williamsburg was certainly an example of what could be accomplished by private
wealth. It was even possible that some economic benefits might flow from that kind of investment—if it were well-managed. Suspicion of the intentions and competence of the national government are important parts of American cultural and political luggage. Politicians, lecturers, editors, and pundits have always been able to find a responsive audience by castigating the federal establishment and its bureaucracy. And the latter has often been cooperative in providing object lessons. Much of the articulate public believed as an article of faith that national needs could best be defined and met through recourse to leaders in the business community and in the local and state governments.

Yet other currents moved in the land. Some observers saw them as alien notions brought to the Republic by hordes of immigrants, or worse, by intellectuals seduced by subversive doctrines, or by "traitors to their class," like Franklin Roosevelt. The economic collapse weakened the credibility of the business community. Most municipal, county, and state governments were bankrupt or facing that condition. The problems that produced the crises were national and international ones, far beyond local and state resources. Into the center of national political life moved men and women who looked to the federal government for relief and solutions, persons who could forge new coalitions and constituencies. Labor unions and farm organizations, academics and bureaucrats, conservationists and city machines, patriotic societies and preservationists. It was a heady mix—not a love feast—competitive, sometimes doctrinaire, often idealistic, usually pragmatic, conservative and progressive. It included men like Rexford Tugwell, Harry Hopkins, Harold Ickes, anda accept Albright and important members of his staff, a diverse and often contentious lot.

Americans have an ambivalent attitude toward history. On one level it is a young peoples' indifference to or contempt for the past, and agreement with Henry Ford, Senior that "history is bunk." On another is a romantic interest that is sometimes obsessive in the popular narratives that have a mythic quality, uncritical and filiopietistic. And since the first two or three generations of Americans, we have had antiquarians.
From the beginning, there have been serious recorders and students of the past. John Smith, Edward-Maria Wingfield, and William Bradford set precedents followed to the present. Several leaders of the Revolutionary and Federal periods, i.e., John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison, drew upon historical literature for their insights and theories. Yet, history as a discipline, in spite of American contributions unmatched by few other nations, is not accorded an enviable place among professions; and a significant part of the population has been and is historically illiterate.

Occasionally, especially during a crisis or when cultural values appear to be threatened, a sufficient number of Jeremias cry aloud that something must be done to combat that illiteracy. The teaching of history and its allied disciplines must be improved, the relevance of the subject must be recognized, the scenes and artifacts of important events should be preserved and honored. The nation's roots must be watered—sometimes manured. The decade of the 1930s was such a period. In a crisis of confidence, there was a search for historic resources that could help sustain faith in American uniqueness, that the vision of the nation as a "city built upon a hill" was viable. A knowledge of history was a weapon of recovery, supplying jobs and ideas. Preserving and interpreting historic sites and objects served that knowledge. Albright, Chatelain, and Lee believed in and acted upon that faith; and encumbered people of influence agreed with them to their faith institutional reality. It bore fruit in legislation and in an expanding National Park Service with a commitment to preserving the people's heritage. A happy marriage of idealism and opportunism took place. And like many happy marriages, it was fertile; and like other large families, not all the offspring were equally successful.

Now that the reader living in the final decades of the twentieth century understands how civil servants, people not popularly credited with heroism and vision, had the audacity to dream and create during the nation's worst depression, we need to return to our narrative.

II - 31
With the meticulousness associated with his Swiss forebears, Chatelain outlined the Branch of Historic Sites and Buildings Washington level functions. The service was preparing for regionalization, and relative roles needed defining. The functions were:

1. The preparation of final recommendations to the Director of the National Park Service for submission to the Secretary's Office on all historical and archeological personnel.

2. The final historical technical review of recommendations for camp locations, Master Plans, work programs, and individual projects for historical and archeological areas, both national and State.

3. The formulation of historical research policies and final review of all research reports.

4. The formulation of historical technical policies, including restoration policy, and dissemination to the field of technical information on problems involved in preservation, restoration or development of historical or archeological sites, and final review of historical technical recommendations on historical and archeological projects.

5. The formulation of historical-educational policies affecting the national and State park areas of historical and archeological interest, including markers, museum planning, literature and ranger-historian service.

6. The final recommendation as to the national or State importance of historical or archeological sites proposed for development through ECW, or other programs of the National Park Service.

7. The general leadership in, and guidance of, the park educational program for all historical and archeological areas.

8. The organization and direction of the Historic Sites Survey and assignment of priority in lists of proposed areas for field investigation.

9. The coordination of national park historical work on a nationwide scale, including the coordination of national park with State park work, and the respective historical programs of the four regions.

10. The coordination of the work of the regional historians with the work of the superintendent of national historical and archeological areas.
While the branch took form, an unedifying example of personnel management played itself out in a way that had the potential for jeopardizing much of the progress the service was making toward professionalization. Chatelain resigned effective 15 September 1936. Secretary Ickes, strong-willed to the point of wilfullness, had a favorite candidate for the assistant directorship in which Chatelain was acting. His choice was a University of Chicago professor, which made him especially appealing. The Old Curmudgeon, not unlike other noncareer appointees, was predisposed to bring into too level positions other noncareer men. If his man had passed the civil service examination and been included on the list of eligibles submitted by the commission, the secretary could have worked his will. However, the professor had not taken the examination. Chatelain had and scored at the top of the list of eligibles. The obdurate secretary decided to appoint his preference through irregular procedures; and former director Albright wrote to the Civil Service Commission advising it of the secretary's intentions. Albright's action blocked the professor's appointment, but Ickes refused to appoint Chatelain. Relations between the secretary and Chatelain were poisoned by back-biting and tale-bearing to which the future second Mrs Ickes, then a "re-headed secretary" was a party. Chatelain knew that his effectiveness was compromised and that the service's historical program could only suffer, and he resigned to take a position with the Carnegie Institution.

It was a disgraceful incident that found Ickes, a man whose public career had been identified with progressivism and good government, resorting to humiliating pettiness that flew in the face of the principles that he continued to espouse. Some of Chatelain's colleagues compromised themselves by timidity or covert...
disloyalty. As for the service's first staff historian, he went on to have a distinguished career with the Carnegie Institution and the University of Maryland. At this writing, he is a vigorous ninety-year-old gentleman who has maintained a benevolent and perceptive interest in the service's cultural resource program. He served the National Park Service for five creative years, coauthored the Historic Sites Act of 1935, shared Horace Albright's vision of a bureau committed to preserving a multi-facted national heritage, and set service historians a high standard of professional and personal integrity.

Chapelain's successor was Branch Spalding, who had taught English at the University of Virginia and had been a doctoral candidate at Johns Hopkins University when the former hired him in 1933 as an assistant historical technician. A serious student of the Civil War with extensive professional and personal ties in Virginia, he served competently at Fredericksburg, Petersburg, and Richmond Battlefields. Spalding occupied the position in an acting capacity until 16 May 1938, a total of twenty months, when Ronald F. Lee became assistant director.

Harper's Ferry Center, NPS Archives, Branch Spalding Self Interview, 1976.

The Branch of Historic Sites and Buildings had two subordinate divisions: Research and Survey and Coordinating, each headed by a deputy assistant director. The branch was responsible for the conduct of technical and professional matters in the field[s] of history and archeology, and for assisting the Director in the administration of historical and archeological areas.

The assistant director was responsible for all aspects of the service's cultural resource mission and coordinated that mission's requirements with other planning and development. He also had important external duties, such as relations with learned societies and academic organizations and institutions. He had the duty to ensure that the service met its responsibilities under the Historic Sites Act's mandates.

The branch's Research and Survey Division consisted of three sections, each
supervised by a section chief: historical research, archaeological research, and the Historic Sites Survey. The Historical Research Section administered the service-wide research program through a three-man organization composed of field historians supported by a small staff in Washington. They undertook three basic tasks: 1) the careful collection of source material for each area; 2) the development and maintenance of bibliographies, catalogues, and indices to guide the use of the sources; 3) interpreting the sources to provide accurate information for educational purposes.

The Archeological Section administered the service's field program. This involved planning and supervising archaeological surveys, studies, and development of a useful records system. It was responsible for the dissemination of scientific data and coordinating service activities with the Smithsonian Institution and other professional agencies.

The Historic Sites Section had responsibility for executing the survey authorized by the Historic Sites Act. This required that its chief supervise the survey historians in the regions in studying sites and buildings for the purpose of developing plans for their preservation, interpretation, and use.

The Coordinating Division's chief was responsible for the branch's administration and educational functions. His most important role was directing the service's archaeological and historical interpretive program. Two field assistant, the chiefs of the General Historical and Civil War Sections, aided him in administering the educational program.

An important part of the deputy assistant director's administrative duties was oversight of all Emergency Conservation Work projects involving historic features. An ECW coordinator was the assistant in that activity and the branch's representative in its relations with the Branch of Recreational Planning and State Cooperation.


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Without denigrating the importance of the Washington Office's decisions and actions, it is worth remembering that their effectiveness depended upon what happened in the field, where the resources and visitors were. Field personnel carried out a major part of the research and all of the interpretation. They were the Branch of Historic Sites and Buildings representatives in the regional and park offices. With rangers and naturalists, they represented the system to the public. Director Cammerer described the field historians' functions in these terms:

Their first and most important duty is interpretation of the history represented in their respective areas. It should be kept in mind that the ultimate objective of the Service in its administration of historical areas is the teaching of history to the public through the physical sites of its enactment. Research is important and essential, but it is undertaken to make possible the realization of the ultimate purpose which is interpretation. Any tendency to disparage the importance of handling park visitors as a duty of a highly trained historian should be discouraged. Park superintendents should do their utmost to place public contact work in the hands of the best personnel and to utilize all personnel resources for conducting an effective, sound interpretive service. 42

42. Ibid., 201 - 15, Cammerer to Field Historians and Superintendents of Historical areas, 24 November 1937.

Because it expressed service philosophy until the mid-1960s, Cammerer's memorandum is historically important. In a sense, it was a counsel of perfection to which regional directors, park superintendents, and historians often failed to live up. Some administrators and professionals were equally interested in competent interpretation and research; but most were predisposed toward one at the expense of the other and their work reflected that fact. A result was an uneven quality of service to the resources and the public.

The National Park Service is no stranger to reorganizations; some substantive, many frivolous, all disruptive. The summer of 1938 was one of those seasons of discontent for the Washington Office, which reorganized effective 1 August. The branch became the Branch of Historic Sites, and its chief, Ronald Lee, became Supervisor of Historic Sites. The new unit's functions were:
Coordination of administrative matters pertaining to historic and archaeological sites; supervision over and coordination of the historical and archeological research, planning, and interpretive programs pertaining to historic and archeological sites; responsibility for performing the duties prescribed in the Historic Sites Act, and the code of Procedure of February 28, 1936, including the study and investigation of historic and archeological sites and buildings throughout the United States for the purpose of developing a comprehensive long-term plan for their acquisition, preservation, and use; and coordination of the historic and archeological sites conservation program with scientific and learned institutions, state and local authorities, and semi-public organizations and associations.

The branch consisted of two divisions, one of which was the Historic Sites Division, under Assistant Chief Francis Ronalds. Its functions were:

- Coordination of administrative matters relating to historic sites; supervision over and coordination of the historical research, planning, and interpretive programs relating to historic sites; direction of the survey of historic sites; and rendition or assistance in liaison work with agencies outside the Service concerned with conservation of historic sites.

That division consisted of two sections: the Research and Survey Section under Alvin P. Stauffer's supervision and the Planning and Interpretive Section under Charles W. Porter III. The former's functions were:

- Supervision over the survey of historic sites, including the listing, description, tabulation, classification, and evaluation of such areas; historical research basic to the development of historic sites in the national Park System; and historical publications; responsibility for direct execution of special studies of specific sites and groups of sites; and rendition of assistance in liaison work with other historical research and survey agencies in the District of Columbia, including the Historic American Buildings Survey, the National Archives, and the Library of Congress.

The latter's were:

- Supervision over the historical aspects of the development of historic sites, including the preparation of data for historical sheets in the Master Plan, and the application of historical data to the developed area and project program for each historic site; review of master plans and projects; supervision over the interpretive programs carried on at each historic site; and rendition of assistance in liaison work with the Branch of Plans and Design and the Museum Division, Branch of Research and Education.

The Branch of Historic Sites' second division was the Archeological Sites Division under Assistant Chief Arthur R. Kelly. Its task was described as:
Coordination of administrative matters relating to archeologic sites; supervision over and coordination of the archeological research, planning, and interpretative programs relating to archeologic sites; direction of the survey of archeologic sites; and rendition of assistance in liaison work with agencies outside the service concerned with conservation of archeologic sites.


The above prose bore the stamp of Ronald F. Lee, both in its attention to detail and its literary quality. He was capable of lucidly simple writing, but he learned that success in handling bureaucratic matters often favored those who reduce their ideas to a numbingly repetitive and stiltishly convoluted style. He was a master at giving administrators what they wanted, getting at the same time, much of what he wanted. No one has been more important to the story of the National Park Service's professions that Lee. He was a member of the "Class of '33" historians that Verne Chatelain recruited to man the parks' historical program. He began his career at Shiloh and quickly became a star performer. Chatelain brought him to Washington to be his assistant in the fall of 1934. The relationship was not idyllic. The men shared high professional standards and a commitment to an aggressive NPS role in preservation, but not much else. Where Chatelain is a strong individualist Lee was, in the words of his assistant and successor, "an organization man." Where Chatelain was candid Lee was diplomatic. Chatelain could be brutally frank, without concern for rank. Lee could be merciless with subordinates, but he was invariably solicitous of the sensibilities of influential persons. Roy E. Appleman, whom Lee recruited from Columbia University's Graduate School and who became the service's most universally respected historian, accurately described him as devoting "great intelligence and energy" to historic preservation and as a "very persuasive person. He mixed very well with important people, he absorbed their viewpoints." Both were strong,

44. Harpers Ferry Center, NPS Archives, Interview Charles B. Hosmer with Herbert Kahler, 19 June 1970.

ambitious men; and given their personalities, they would have had to be angels to work in perfect harmony—neither was angelic.

Whatever their personal relations may have been, their office associations ended early in 1935, when Lee transferred to the Emergency Conservation Work program, where his supervisor was Assistant Director Conrad L. Wirth, with whom he developed a long and close personal and official association. The ECW activity was the part of the CCC program that concentrated upon federally supervised restoration in the state parks; and Lee was the ECW's State Park Division's historian, a position that made him responsible for a nationwide research effort. He had a staff of eighteen historians scattered among regional offices. Charles Hosmer noted how Lee's experience influenced his success as head of the Branch of Historic Sites and Buildings when he wrote:

Lee had taken on an enormous assignment that prepared him well for his future career as chief historian. His administrative responsibilities in the state park ECW permitted him to develop the three major skills that helped him to become an outstanding park executive, the hiring and training of historians for historic-sites work, traveling throughout the United States and reporting on the status of the CCC work, and continuous consultation with state and local officials. The CCC had expanded greatly in 1935, with 111 camps in national parks and 324 in state parks, averaging about two hundred men per camp. Approximately 36 of the state park projects involved restoration work that required supervision by the historians Lee had employed for each region. By March 1936 Lee's small group of historians at headquarters had begun a preliminary version of a national survey with a grand total of 68 reports on proposed national monuments and 2 on possible national historic sites. These historians had also reported on 21 active historical projects in state parks and recommended 22 new programs for other state parks. There were 188 brief reports of visits to state parks... The ECW historians also compiled other reports: on state and local historic-sites surveys that covered 22 areas, on state historic-sites administration in 9 states, and 21 reports on state marker systems or state staff historical literature. 46.

46. Hosmer, op. cit., I, 585-86.

Such was the man who assumed direction of the Service's cultural resource effort and made it a force for leadership that significantly transcended institutional boundaries.
Ronald Lee's staff had its share of originals, from the urbane Francis Ronalds, who in 1939 was replaced by a member of the class of '33, Herbert Kahler, to the patrician Charles W. Porter, III.

The appointment of Arthur R. Kelly to be head of the Archeological Sites Administration and thus de facto first chief archaeologist was an important event in the history of archaeology's professional development. National Park Service archaeology can not look back upon the same kind of carefully documented, unitary career as history. The earliest work in the discipline appeared in the Southwest, where studies of aboriginal peoples and their cultures represented a pioneer field. Under the influence of the Smithsonian's Bureau of American Ethnology, men like Jesse Nussbaum, Gorden Vivian, and Dale King made substantive contributions to their discipline and the service's administration of archaeological resources. The southwestern Monuments under the superintendency of the legendary Frank "Boss" Pinkley constituted a solid archaeological enclave with an active, informed constituency. Their accomplishments were the envy of academic and nonacademic colleagues; and they enjoyed a sense of tradition, loyalty, and pride that made them a redoubtable core of principled administrators and professionals. On the other hand, American historical archaeology scarcely existed as a profession. Rare and isolated examples at such places as Colonial Williamsburg and St. Augustine were exceptions, but they were exotics on the local professional landscape.

Jean C. "Pinky" Harrington, whose Jamestown excavations were pioneer undertakings, recalled:

One of the problems at the time was (and it went all through the '30s) that American archaeologists, working in the field of American archaeology, were not sympathetic to this [historical archaeology]. They said "This is not our business; this is the business of historians. We are here to deal with prehistory . . . ." ?

The attitudes of fellow archaeologists were not the only facet of the problem. Most historians failed to recognize the need for trained archaeological colleagues and the contributions they were qualified to make. Some of them with a bent for anticuarianism had an amateur conviction that they possessed the required skills. Others suspected the professional pretensions of professors of the discipline. Many architects were even less charitable, looking upon historical archaeology as a handmaiden of architecture whose functions could be performed by a competent investigative architect. An illustration of the comparative state of historical archaeology could be found at Morristown, where historian Vernon Setser was the professional who recognized the need for archaeological data and conducted the investigations for the Wick and Guerin yards. Park Service folklore records several written and oral accounts of work undertaken by nonarchaeologists and unflattering references to the utility of historical archaeologists. In spite of the lessons taught by Wakefield, Colonial, and Morristown, the profession had a hard time earning acceptance—and elements of the service have continued to be less than completely comfortable with it.

Chatelain, Snalding, and Lee recognized the need for an integrated archaeological capability and took steps to develop it that led to Kelly's becoming assistant chief in charge of archaeology in Lee's Branch of Historic Sites in 1938. The new man brought with him an impressive set of credentials that included a Harvard doctorate; teaching experience; and field work for Harvard, the Smithsonian Institution, and the Universities of Illinois and Texas. He also brought with him a prodigious thirst and a fine contempt for such social niceties as clean shirts. Early in his Park Service career, Br. Kelly made a field trip to the Southwest that did not augur well for service-wide archaeology. Any Harvard-bred outsider would probably have been subject to some skepticism from the old hands that lived behind the "adobe curtain." Kelly's personality, eccentricities, and lack of tact guaranteed him a hostile re-
ception. The field personnel found fault with his dress, corpulence, impracticality, manners, personal hygiene, mendacity, and professional opinions. A newfound and idiosyncratic aversion to strong drink on the part of one of his hosts made the visitor especially obnoxious. The adverse feelings were strong enough to prompt Boss Pinkley to communicate them to Director Cammerer.

Dr. Kelly's personality and bibulous nature made him, remarkably, persona non grata in the Washington Office and he became superintendent at Ocmulgee. Exile failed to work a reformation, and he was separated from the service. He subsequently set up the University of Georgia anthropology department and enjoyed a long and useful academic career, dying a few years ago full of years and honor.

Dr. Kelly's rustication to Georgia did not destroy the service's archaeological capability, but it placed it at a disadvantage vis-a-vis history, natural history, engineering, and landscape architecture in that it lacked an authoritative, full-time spokesman on a service-wide level. However, Ronald Lee did appreciate and represent the field's interests with some accuracy and effectiveness.

The prehistorians continued to function much as they had prior to the enactment of the Historic Sites Act, with emphasis upon the preservation of southwestern ruins and artifacts as exhibits. Practitioners of historical archaeology in the eastern historic areas had a more exciting and precarious existence. The Historic Sites Act mandated research "to obtain true and accurate historical and archaeological facts and information."

And Chatelain, who had co-authored the original bill, and Lee took the act too seriously to ignore the charge. They relied heavily upon Jess Nussbaum, who was department consultant for archaeology, to monitor the southwestern work and to be a liaison between the professionals and the Washington Office.
The work in the new historical areas produced the new breed of historical archaeologists, who with few precedents to follow broke ground to support the efforts of their fellow novices in historic preservation, the historians and historical architects. George Washington’s Birthplace at Wakefield was the service’s first venture into the almost unchartered field of historic preservation. The National Park Service became party to the site’s preservation at a late and dangerous point. There had been minimal professional involvement; and the archaeological role was less than minimal. Foundations that were uncritically assumed to be those of the Washington’s 18th century house were uncovered in 1896. A subsequent 1926 excavation revealed the same walls, upon which after some controversy, the Wakefield National Memorial Association determined to erect a “memorial” mansion. The site entered the national park system on January 23, 1930; and the service continued what was viewed as a reconstruction. In spite of doubts and questions raised concerning the foundations’ identity and the wisdom of rebuilding upon them, no one solicited professional advice.

The man placed in charge of the construction was a capable and resourceful engineer named Oliver Taylor. William Jay loaned some trained brickmakers; and the project moved ahead. The architectural direction and planning came from Edward Dowm, a Washington architect who had restored Woodlawn and been retained by the Memorial Association. At Dowm’s direction, Taylor opened an excavation into a mound near the putative house site. Taylor reported that “we dug a trench through the mound. Only about one foot under surface a chimney foundation was discovered. Excavating was continued so far as we had any lead until we discovered a "U" shaped building of considerable size . . . . The top of the foundations are from 4 inches to 3 feet below the surface. We excavated the bottom of the foundation in enough places to determine the depth of all the walls . . . . It would be a splendid thing if the walls could be built up to the surface of the ground and the trenches backfilled.” Dowm interpreted the feature
as being associated with an outbuilding; and the decision was taken to go along with the plan to build on the traditional site, consigning the newly discovered "Building X" to oblivion.

There followed a conspiracy of controversy, confusion thrice compounded by errors of fact, interpretation, and intent. The foundations of "Building X" were backfilled, which from a professional perception was the wisest action taken. The memorial mansion was erected upon the traditional site; and the Park Service acquired a source of embarrassment.

Once the service became committed to a preservation mission and took the fateful step of hiring professionals to carry out that mission, a denouement at Wakefield became inevitable. During the summer and autumn of 1936, archaeologist Summerfield Day, historian Oscar "Doc" Northington, and architect Stuart Barnette reopened the "Building X" excavation and concluded that they had uncovered the remains of the Washington house. The Wakefield National Memorial Association was naturally disturbed by that development—disturbed not convinced; and Ronald Lee's diplomatic skills were taxed to contain the controversy.

Four years after Summerfield's report appeared, the service assigned historian David Rodmick the task of consolidating and studying all the evidence that could be assembled. Using CCC labor and funds, Rodmick continued to excavate the "Building X" site. The press, always curious about digs, picked up the story; and Lee had further opportunity to exercise his diplomacy. David Rodmick's careful report of the evidence presented a closely reasoned argument that "Building X" was the birthplace and a damning indictment of the professional quality of the 1930-32 work.

The service's professionals were delighted that their values were vindicated. Its
administrators were less jubilant. How could they handle the adverse publicity, reinterpret the birthplace, and soothe the injured pride of the patriotic folk whose uncritical patriotism had so effectively misled a federal agency and made it a party to misleading more than 600,000 visitors? They were quick to point out that the service had heeded Chatelain's injunction to interpret the mansion as a "memorial," not a reconstruction; and Superintendent Philip Hough agonized: "We feel that criticism now of the place as an unauthentic restoration is unwarranted, ill-timed and unfortunate." Some interested parties believed that the memorial mansion should be razed, others that the interpretation be radically changed. In the end, no dramatic action transpired. Hosmer charitably summarized the experience:

Drury persuaded Icke that it would be foolhardy to move the Memorial Mansion at a time of national emergency, so a degree of calm prevailed. Although the staff of the Park Service had the satisfaction of proving that collaborative research was necessary for correct restoration work, Hough did not need to change his interpretive treatment of the birthplace. Some of the historians in the Washington office could now point with pride to the quality of the investigations that had been carried on, and they referred with even greater assurance to the lesson that was contained in the Rodnick report: that proper restoration work required a monumental amount of preliminary research before conducting any building operations. 55

55. Hosmer, op. cit., I, 610.

The Wakefield story revealed a fundamental truth—that historians and historical architects needed a partner, the historical archaeologist, in performing their functions and that the partner was still an infant.

The record of historical archaeology at Colonial during the 1930s is more complex and less harrowing. 1934 was the seminal year that found Thor Borreson, a military historian who had worked at Old Fort Niagara, beginning the reconstruction of key sections of the American, British, and French earthworks. Through a very successful use of CCC labor and funds, the service recreated an essential part of the historic scene. After more that five years of research and experience at Yorktown, Borreson
wrote a pioneering report that provided a detailed study of an important set of archaeological, historical, and restoration problems.


While historian Borreson launched his work on the siege lines, archaeologists Summerfield Day and W. J. Winter supervised another CCC project at newly acquired Jamestown Island, site of the first permanent English settlement in North America.


The excavations uncovered useful data, numerous artifacts, and a fight between the archaeologists. The first two products were creditable; the third resulted from a clash of personalities, deficient professionalism, and worse supervision. Winter


resigned and took a position with the Carnegie Foundation at St. Augustine, Florida; and Day went to Wakefield, where he found himself embroiled in its saga of confusion.

Jean C. Harrington assumed direction of the Jamestown excavation. No better assignment could have been made. He was an architect who found graduate study in archaeology more satisfying than trying to make a living practicing his profession during the depression. He was temperamentally and professionally prepared to impose sound, scholarly standards upon the Jamestown study. In addition to directing the archaeology, he set up an interpretive program and exhibits to demonstrate to the public the objectives and contributions of the excavation. His work during this, his first pro-
fessional assignment, did much to make historical archaeology a recognized discipline, a contribution that he reinforced during the next two decades with his work at Forts Raleigh and Necessity. If the infant profession had a Park Service parent, it was Pinky Harrington.

Time and space preclude providing a park-by-park narrative of the service's archaeological activities during the New Deal years. It is sufficient for the purposes of this report to note that from 1936 on Park Service professionals built a sound corpus of experience that served their discipline well in the years after World War II.

The record of the service's early experiences in historical architecture was as fraught with controversy as that of any other field. The evidence indicates that if its leadership had been able to dispense with his services, the historical architect would never have become a member of Steve Hather's family or a seasonal hired hand, perhaps, but not one of the clan. That desirable state of affairs simply could not be a reality. Horace Albright's historic preservation legacy and the Historic Sites Act's mandate to the Park Service settled that. In spite of what should have been an obvious need, the service and Civil Service Commission were slow to establish a classification for historical architects. Much of the early preservation architecture, especially in the Southwestern Monuments, was undertaken by archaeologists. Other projects, as at Wakefield, were intrusted to engineers. This dulness of perception, this refusal to see that historical architects required a different set of analytical skills in addition to a knowledge of historic styles and methodologies, was especially indefensible in the light of precedent.

The profession, through the American Institute of Architects, began to develop enough informed interest in the field to lead it to form its Committee on Preservation of Historic Monuments and Scenery in 1914. By 1927, A. Laurence Kocher, chairman of the committee and editor of the Architectural Record, could report that local
chapters had compiled a significant record of achievement in preserving important structures. During the 1930s, his successor, Leicester Holland of the Fine Arts Division of the Library of Congress, continued to provide leadership for a growing professional concern.

62. Ibid., 877.

That bellwether of preservation, the Williamsburg restoration, was an architecturally oriented undertaking precisely because the profession was history-minded and because archaeologists and historians were not ready to assume creative leadership in preservation. Most historians had little real interest in the field; and until their self-interest was enlightened by economic exigencies of depression, many were openly contemptuous. Archaeologists disdained a field that was not related to classical or Indian antiquities. Fortunately, an architectural firm existed that was capable of responding to the opportunities offered by Williamsburg. That firm was Perry, Shaw, and Hepburn. William Perry had a receptive respect for history and architecture's role in it. He genuinely understood the relationship between buildings and documents as historic records. Andrew Hepburn was a student of eighteenth-century architecture and an outstanding draftsman. Their organization was a corps of resource persons to whom every agency and individual involved in cultural resource preservation owes a major debt. Some preservationists have found much to condemn at Williamsburg, but the contributions made to preservation scholarship can not be denied. Park Service administrators and professionals can not always claim as much; and academics, for all their theoretical contributions, have had a less nearly indispensable impact.

Charles Peterson, whom we have met earlier, came into intimate contact with the Williamsburg architects and draftsmen during his early days at Colonial; and his work in the area was the Service's first venture into professional historical architecture. A landmark in the history of the service's experience is his The Moore House: The Site
of the Surrender--Yorktown, completed in October 1935, is the first historic structure report (HSR). The HSR, as defined by the Moore House study and subsequently developed by service professionals, should be an analytical consolidation of all available information recovered by documentary, architectural, and archaeological research. Peterson fixed the philosophical frame for his discipline's contribution when he wrote:

... any architect who undertakes the responsibility of working over a fine old building should feel obligated to prepare a detailed report of his findings for the information of those who will come to study it in future years. Such a volume should become a permanent part of the building—a payment by the architect for the privilege of learning and using facts which no other man may have known. 64


Peterson, who had arrived at Colonial as a landscape architect, became by the decade's end the preeminent figure in the service's architectural preservation organization. As assistant chief of the Branch of Plan and Design, he became the principal decision maker in matters pertaining to restorations and reconstructions.

Charles Peterson's professional debut and development were important to the development of historical architecture, but they did not signal an end to the service's problems in that field. Throughout the 1930s too much work on old buildings was done by men who lacked training for and an appreciation of the discipline in the absence of an informed, critically developed goal. A survey of the work done at Yorktown and Morristown can be instructive.

Peterson's career at Colonial was marked by almost as much controversy as creativity; not because he operated in a vacuum, but because he operated in an unmapped professional terrain. His relations with the superintendent, William Robinson, suffered from the fact that Peterson's boss was Thomas Vint of the Office of Plans and Design and more especially from mutual antipathy. His relations with the park's first two historians, Floyd Flickinger and Elbert Cole, were only slightly more congenial; and he disliked
and disagreed with Chatelain over fundamental issues.

65. Harpers Ferry Center, NPS Archives, Charles Peterson Interview, 9 February 1970.

After Peterson left Colonial, the cause of historic architecture in the Park Service experienced a series of problems that reached crisis proportions. One of sources of those problems was the early uncertainty about the service's objectives at Yorktown. As Charles Hosmer observed, the service's challenge was "one of selecting the restoration policy that would most contribute to an understanding of the social, economic, and military history of the little seaport." Some service personnel, especially Floyd Flickinger, were predisposed toward duplicating for Yorktown the kind of restoration that was underway at Williamsburg. Others favored a more conservatively selective goal. As long as the issue was unresolved, the architects and historians were vulnerable to the temptation to devote too much time to arguing about it. As things turned out, it was not settled until 1941, when almost everyone, by a kind of unconscious consensus, understood that Yorktown would not be totally restored—if for no better reason than because it was too near Williamsburg. A more selectively eclectic, and incidentally less expensive, goal emerged.

A second source of trouble was that no one could replace Peterson as the architectural theorist and director. For a time, Williamsburg architects and draftsmen tried to provide the technological direction, but their effectiveness was compromised by the new superintendent's failure to utilize their services. Flickinger, who had succeeded to the superintendency, and Chatelain were skeptical about the quality of the architects' research; and Peterson had even less respect for the historians' ability to understand structural evidence. While the skepticism displayed was a


67. Peterson Interview.
potentially healthy sign, it was sometimes as much the product of rivalry as of intellectual conviction. In any case, it was well taken in both instances. The

68. Hosmer, op. cit., I, 540.

quality of the architectural research was often superficial and inadequately based on archaeological and documentary evidence. Few historians asked themselves the right structural questions or made the appropriate demands upon their sources.

Kenneth Chorley, president of Colonial Williamsburg, a huge, blunt, and authoritative man, kept a keen and critical eye on the work at Yorktown and did not hesitate to tell Secretary Ickes and Director Cammerer when he saw something he did not like. He had influenced the decision to remove William Robinson; and he was openly unimpressed by Flickinger. In the first place, Flickinger was a historian, and Chorley viewed that profession as possessing limited usefulness. Secondly, he was unsympathetic

69. Ibid., II, 903-5.

to Flickinger's desire to restore Yorktown to its eighteenth-century appearance in the same way that Williamsburg was being restored— that would dilute the latter's impact. Thirdly, he decided that the work being done at Yorktown was inferior to the standards established at Williamsburg; and he communicated that conviction to Cammerer. The director reacted by asking Chorley to nominate five experts to study the quality of the service's work. The prosecutor was asked to choose the jury. The nominations were made; and the service settled upon University of Virginia's Edmund Campbell, an architect who had served on the Williamsburg Advisory Board and the Virginia Commission of Fine Arts, and engaged him to evaluate all Park Service restorations. Professor Campbell reported that the Moore House was a "thoroughly excellent restoration" and that the reconstruction of the Swan Tavern was a good one.

This was not a surprising verdict— Peterson had performed the Moore House research, and Williamsburg alumnus Clyde Trudell was in charge of the Yorktown projects.

70. N. A., R. G. 79, Campbell to Cammerer, 20 August 1935; Cammerer to Ickes, 27 December 1935.
Flickinger remained at Colonial for four more eventful years—years of important achievement. They were also controversial years; and by 1938 an impressive array of administrators, professionals, Williamsburg officials, and local residents was angry at Floyd Flickinger; and he returned their hostility with interest.

Chief Archaeologist A. R. Kelly—he of the embarrassing thirst—and Roy E. Appleman, regional supervisor of historic sites, conducted a detailed investigation of allegations made against the superintendent during June and July 1938. They concluded that Flickinger would have to leave. He refused a transfer to Wind Cave and resigned from the service. Elbert Cox, who with Flickinger had been one

71. NPS Archives, Charles Hosmer interview with Roy E. Appleman, 10 February 1971; Albright Papers, Box 18h, Flickinger to Ickes, 20 January 1939.

The two first historians hired by the service and later superintendent at Morristown, became Colonial's new superintendent. The situation at Yorktown and James-town became less exciting; and everyone congratulated himself that in Cox the service had a highly successful administrator of an historic area of which it could be proud.

While pots containing a variety of ingredients boiled at Colonial, events followed a less noisy, but instructive, course at Morristown in New Jersey. The principal architectural figure was, again, Charles Peterson, seconded Williamsburg alumnus Thomas Waterman as field architect. Three projects engaged the Branch of Plans and Design's architects and the park historian: the Guerin and Wick Houses and the American Hospital. An account of the last two provide an instructive insight into the professional state of historic preservation during the early 1930s.

The Wick House, home of Henry Wick, New Jersey militiaman, and headquarters of Maj. Gen. Arthur St. Clair during the 1779-1780 encampment, is one of three historic structures in Morristown National Historical Park. When the service took title to it, the house bore little resemblance to its eighteenth-century appearance. Apparently,
documentary research was not considered a necessary part of determining what their appearance was. At least none was recorded; and the architects were ignorant of, or ignored, two published descriptions of the historic house. One to them, Daniel Jensen, did know of an 1859 woodcut, but ignored it until after the restoration was completed and the serendipitous resemblance between the woodcut and the restored house was obvious. It was only after the work was completed and subject to local criticism that any value was attached to interviews with persons who had lived in the house or were otherwise familiar with it.


In an eloquent testimony to the state of professionalism, Historical Assistant Russell Baker directed a CCC crew in a limited archaeological investigation of the area around the building.


Architects Jensen and Waterman, under Peterson's general supervision, undertook a thorough examination of the building's fabric and published the results of their study in Waterman's Report On the Restoration of the Wick House. When Peterson reviewed the unpublished data provided by the Morristown staff, he believed that it justified a comprehensive restoration of the exteriors of the Querin and Wick Houses. He was less comfortable with the evidence relating to the interiors and urged that they be adaptively restored for residences because they lacked the architectural refinements of some other buildings in the vicinity. His advice was followed concerning the Querin house, but tradition recorded that Temperance "Tempe" Wick's horse had been sheltered in the "West Kitchen Chamber" during the
January 1781 mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line. Morristonians wanted visitors to see where the resourceful maiden had hidden her horse. The service, for less than com-

75. Ibid., Grace J. Vogt to Cammerer, 5 February 1934.

calling professional reasons, decided upon a comprehensive restoration based upon the architects' analysis of the structure's fabric and using WPA funds.

A number of interested and vocal local persons observed the work and found it wanting. One critic in particular, Mrs. Edgar Garfield Fisher of nearby Mendham, faulted almost every detail of the interior restoration, especially the omission of the oven that had been located to the right of the kitchen fireplace and which Waterman believed had been added about 1848 on the basis of door bearing that date. She communicated her criticism to Director Cammerer. Superintendent Cox tried

76. Ibid., Telegram, Mrs. Edgar G. Fisher to Cammerer, 30 April 1935.

unsuccessfully to placate Mrs. Fisher by assuring her that all the changes being made were supported by the best available evidence. Unimpressed by the superintendent, she wrote a letter to President Roosevelt, with a copy to the local newspapers. Nothing


was done to reconstruct an oven during the restoration. Chief of the Branch of Plans and Design Thomas Vint was ambivalent about the matter. He appeared to believe that the original fireplace had an oven, but that research had not supported its existence. HABS drawing received after the work was completed showed a universal use of ovens in houses of the Kick type.

Mrs. Styles, a former occupant who was not interviewed until 1935, recalled that she had baked twice a week, that the fireplace was built of stone and extended to the ceiling, with a shelf and no overmantel, and that the oven was on the right with a wooden door lined with sheet iron, not the door found by Waterman and the one upon
he grounded his interpretation of the physical evidence. She also recalled that
fireplaces in the East and West Parlors were closer the front of the house. Her
testimony corroborated Joseph T. Tuttle's 1859 and 1871 descriptions. Waterman's

1938 report complicated the issue because in describing the 1934-5 work on the
chimney he wrote:

... This is true also of the location of the oven in the rear wall. These ovens were heated by filling them with hot coals, and then raking
the coals out into the fireplace when the oven was heated. When the
ovened into the room an ash chute had to be built at the side into the
fireplace, but when it opened into the fireplace it was not necessary.
The domical form of the oven is characteristic. 79

78. Joseph T. Tuttle, "Washington at Morristown during the winters of 1776 - 77
and 1779 - 80," Harpers Monthly Magazine, No CV, February 1859, XVIII, 298;
"The Second Encampment at and Near Morristown, 1779 - 80," The New Jersey
Historical Magazine (June 1871); Torres-Reyes, op. cit., 64-65.

79. Quoted in Torres-Reyes, op. cit., 68.

Did this mean that Waterman intended to include a "domical" oven and that it was
overlooked when the work was done? No one ever addressed that question.

If Tuttle's and Mr. Styles' descriptions were accurate, as several persons privately
suspected they were, the research had been superficial. Waterman's assumptions, based
upon that research, were mistaken; and the Tuttle-Styles accounts could very well have
described the original chimney, fireplaces, and oven. Vint wanted an oven installed
behind the kitchen fireplace; and in 1937 Jensen prepared a sketch providing for one.
But to make it conform to the earlier descriptions, the entire chimney and three
fireplaces would have to be reconstructed. That was not done; and the Wick House

80. Ibid., 43 - 45.

interior is less historic than it was before Park Service professionals worked on it.

In spite of these problems, Professor Campbell pronounced the Wick House project
"a thoroughly excellent restoration." Peterson wasn't certain and described it as a
reconditioning whose details were "consistent with other New Jersey Colonial work and, therefore probably within shooting distance of what originally existed there." He knew better.

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82. Ibid., Peterson to Chatelain, 25 January 1934.

About a mile north of the Wick House, within the Pennsylvania encampment, is a site traditionally identified as the hospital field and burial ground. The latter had been marked early in the nineteenth century with a locust grove planted by John B. Wick. Seduced by the traditions, the Park Service decided that a good way to interpret the site would be to reconstruct the hospital. Two questions needed answering: Did the hospital exist? and what did a hospital look like? To answer the first, an archaeological investigation under the direction of Alonzo W. Pond covered the entire Pennsylvania Line encampment site. Among the many artifacts recovered were a pair of forceps and the piece de resistance, a musket ball marked by what were declared to be teeth marks made by a soldier during surgery. The burial ground was too hallowed to be profaned by the excavator's spade. A happy affirmative was the answer to question number one.

Historian Vernon Setser's research took him to the New York Public Library, where he found his answer to question number two in Dr. James Tilton's *Economical Observation on Military Hospitals; and the Prevention and Cure of Diseases Incident to an Army, In Three Parts: Addressed I To Ministers of State and Legislatures. II To Command Officers. II To the Medical Staff*, published in 1813. On page 50, Setser found a sketch and description of a hospital, with the following notation: "This was the ex-

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pedient D employed in the hard winter of 79, 80, when the army was huddled near Morris Town, and I was well satisfied with the experiment." To the men looking for information that would justify reconstructing the hospital, that statement meshed neatly with another source that recorded that when the American army marched out of Jockey Hollow in June 1780, the sick and wounded were, as was customary, left behind in the huts of the Pennsylvania Line. Patients continued to be quartered


in what remained of the huts until June 1781. While the source was explicit in referring to the Pennsylvania Line hospital as being in huts, the Morristown staff eagerly assumed that Dr. Tilton's large log structure was the Morristown hospital. To reach that happy conclusion, the service's professionals had to be ignorant of or ignore the primary and secondary sources that dealt with revolutionary period military medicine.

There were three types of military hospitals: flying, regimental, and general. The first two were located within the camp and occupied regular tents or huts. Their number depended upon the demand. At Valley Forge, where the pattern for winter hospitals was established, the practice was to have one or two huts for each brigade, located from 100 to 200 yards in the rear. The huts measured fifteen feet wide, twenty-five feet long, by nine feet high. Eleven such flying hospitals existed at Valley Forge, while each regiment had one or more hospital huts. While the original


medical plan for the Continental Army prepared by Doctors William Shippen and John Cochran anticipated that flying [carr] and general hospitals would provide most of
services, in practice, the regimental facilities took care of the greatest number of cases.


General hospitals were intended to house patients whose condition required attention beyond that offered by the regimental surgeons, excepting "putrid and infectious disorders." During the 1779 - 80 winter encampment at Morristown, there was


general hospitals at Sunbury, Yellow Springs, Philadelphia, Trenton, Pluckemin, Basking Ridge, Fishkill, and Albany. Basking Ridge and Pluckemin were the nearest,

89. N. A., R. G. 93, Microfilm 246, Monthly hospital returns of the sick and wounded, 1 February - 1 May 1780.

and fatigue and guard details reported to them from Jockey Hollow. As was noted,


another general hospital was established in an unspecified number of Pennsylvania line huts when the army broke camp in June 1780. One of the surgeons stationed at Basking Ridge, seven miles south of Jockey Hollow, was Dr. James Tilton; and it was at Basking Ridge that the experimental hospital described on page 50 of his book was built. A daughter of the surgeon's landlord remembered Dr. Tilton and his hospital, "a long, low, log building, situated on a rising ground in a meadow" on Mr. Morton's estate; and artificers were detailed from Jockey Hollow to build a hospital for "Doc Tilton." So far as is known, no other Tilton-type hospital was

built during the war. The doctor sent his plan and observations on hospital care to the president of the Continental Congress, but they did not act upon them. His ideas found acceptance after the war, and Tilton became Surgeon General during the war of 1812.


The Park Service's first two reconstructions, Swan Tavern and Tilton's Hospital, were flawed by serious professional deficiencies. In the former's case, the work was based primarily upon comparative architectural study without sound documentary research. In the second, all parties contented themselves with superficial research as soon as it provided a justification for doing what they wanted to do.

The work undertaken at Colonial and Morristown demonstrated some important facts and offered some lessons. One lesson was that the architectural profession was better prepared to assume its role in preservation than were the archaeologists and historians. The AIA and Colonial Williamsburg, as well as other less prominent agencies, had provided the architects with opportunities to develop a body of technical experience and knowledge while the other two disciplines were still indifferent or contemptuous of preservation. A product of that early dominance was the architects' belief that preservation was an architectural undertaking in which archaeologists and historians were minor, even dispensable, participants. On an institutional level, that attitude was accurately represented by Charles Peterson's concept of what the Park Service's national role was. He was, and is, as Charles Hosmer observed, a staunch "believer in the preservation of the national architectural heritage. He was less impressed with the historical inspiration that could be gained. . . . Where Chatelain hoped to have the federal government undertake a massive educational program that would insure a chain of historic sites illustrating important themes in American history,
Peterson began to hope that the public could grow to appreciate the rich variety of architectural traditions that had helped to create a new American landscape."

94. Ibid., I, 547.

That ideal informed the creation of the Historic American Building Survey. It also flew in the face of at least a significant part of the spirit of the Historic Sites Act and the Park Service’s implementation of that act. Unless the park system’s inclusion of cultural resources were based more upon those resources’ compelling architectural significance than their association with historic events, Peterson’s ideal was anachronistic. An important by-product was his consistent opposition to enhancing the role of the Branch of Historic Sites and Buildings. The philosophical conflict and the service’s ambivalent attitude toward the issue were organizationally reflected in the exclusion of historical architecture from the Branch of Historic Sites and Buildings and its inclusion in the Branch of Plans and Design, a division of the service’s cultural resources capability that persisted for more than three decades, and, in spite of the lessons of institutional history, reappeared in 1983.

Verne Chatelain came to Washington convinced that a national survey of historic sites was a requisite first step toward a rational historic preservation program. The Historic Sites Act translated that conviction into national policy by mandating the Historic Sites Survey by the National Park Service. The service responded with commendable alacrity and issued a "Statement of Policy" to guide the conduct of a survey. The statement declared that the survey’s purpose was to develop an "adequate system of sites, without encumbering the system, and without assuming more maintenance responsibility than can be met." Adhering to the "principle whereby the criterion for determining the acquisition of a site is the unquestioned major significance of the site in national history" would assure realizing that happy objective.

A memorandum prepared by Branch Spalding in October and approved by Director Cammerer on December set forth the survey’s procedures and emphasized its importance.
Of transcendent importance is the fact that upon the basis of this survey, the National Park Service will select the historical and archeological areas recommended for Federal protection. The number of such areas, their character, their geographic location, their relation to the park system, and the financial responsibilities involved, will all constitute major problems of the survey. Since sites recommended for Federal protection will presumably be protected for all time to come, they must be selected with the utmost care and only after all pertinent facts are available.

The records of the survey, if properly conducted, should also constitute a body of data of considerable value . . .

The Survey's investigators would follow four steps. They would: 1) prepare an inventory of important archeological and historic sites; 2) conduct field investigations and research studies for the more promising sites; 3) classify sites according to the degree of their national significance; and 4) develop a national plan for the preservation of important sites in cooperation with national and state agencies.


The Advisory Board approved the service's policies during its 1937 annual meeting. It recommended that the Survey follow a scheme of themes covering the main periods of American prehistory and post-Columbian history. Comparisons of the sites identified would result in selecting the best examples for preservation with the national park system unless they were already adequately protected by other systems. Less significant sites and those of local or regional importance would be recommended for preservation by state or local agencies. It was hoped that the Emergency Conservation Work state park program would handle those sites in a manner that would integrate them into the national themes. The twenty-three historic themes were:
A. Colonial Period of American History

I. European Background and Discovery
II. Spanish Exploration and Settlement
III. Russian Colonization
IV. The Establishment of the French Colonies
V. The Dutch and Swedish Settlements
VI. English Exploration and Colonization
VII. The Development of the English Colonies to 1763

B. Period from 1783-1830

VIII. The Preliminaries of the Revolution
IX. The War for American Independence
X. Domestic Affairs from 1789-1830
XI. Foreign Affairs from 1789-1830
XII. The Advance of the Frontier
XIII. Commerce, Industry and Agriculture
XIV. Architecture and Literature

C. Pattern of American History, 1830-1936

XV. Relations of the White Man with the Indians
XVI. Westward Expansion and the Extension of National Boundaries
XVII. Means of Travel and Communication
XVIII. Exploitation of Natural Resources
XIX. Industrial Development
XX. Political Events and Leaders
XXI. Military Events and Leaders
XXII. Human Relations
XXIII. The Arts and Sciences

After the Survey got underway, the number of themes was reduced to fifteen. By 1941, when military preparedness resulted in budget reductions that curtailed work, reports were prepared on five themes: 17th century English sites; colonial Dutch and Swedish sites; 17th and 18th century French and Spanish sites; western expansion to 1830; western expansion, 1830-1900. Two studies: 19th century sites and American Revolutionary War sites were in progress.

Twelve archaeological cultural themes were selected. They were:

I. Southwestern National Monuments
II. Upper Mississippi Valley Cultures
III. Lower Mississippi Valley Cultures
IV. Middle Mississippi Valley Cultures
V. Southeastern Cultures
VI. Tennessee Valley Cultures
VII. Ohio Valley Cultures
VIII. Northeastern Cultures
IX. Northern Plains Cultures
X. Arctic Cultures
XI. Gulf Coast and Peninsula Cultures
XII. Sites not included in preceding groups
The archaeological survey was a cooperative effort that involved Harvard, Michigan, Alabama, Louisiana State, Tennessee, and Georgia Universities. By the end of 1941, three thematic studies: Early Man in North America; Prehistoric Sedentary Agriculture Groups; and Historic Sedentary Groups were completed.

Before United States entry into World War II aborted the Survey, its staff inventoried 564 historic sites and 334 archaeological ones, of which sixteen were recommended for inclusion in the national park system. The Survey did not revive until 1957, when the service again embarked upon a systematic nationwide inventory of its cultural resources.

The Historic Sites Act reflected Chatelain's influence when it provided for research "to obtain a true and accurate historical and archaeological facts and information." Armed with that legislative charter, the Act's co-author launched an aggressive research program that was the opening salvo in the continuing battle over historical research's role in the National Park Service. Secretary Ickes,

whose antipathy for Chatelain eventually drove the latter of the service, told Director Cammerer, whom he personally disliked, that the service's research program exceeded what was justified by its requirements. The conscientious director had Chatelain prepare a description of the scope of the service's research operations. On July 1936, "Statement Regarding the Activities in Historical Research of the Branch of Historic Sites and Buildings" went to the secretary.

Chatelain faced an uncomfortable task when he wrote the "Statement." He had to defend a research program whose utility was widely questioned or denied. Men who harbored no doubts about the usefulness of biological investigations or engineering studies failed to understand why comparable studies in human history
were needed. Being on the defensive was alien to his nature; and the document he prepared for the secretary's edification reflected that fact. It was an unabashed statement of professional values that with appropriate changes in the text could apply to all the service's disciplines. Research was an "extremely important" part of the National Park Service's work. In carrying out its share of that work, his staff acted responsibly. During the past eighteen months, between January 1935 and June 1936, they had prepared more than 300 reports, fifty-seven percent in response to congressional inquiries; thirty-eight percent to service inquiries; and five percent answered requests from state and private organizations.

Chatelain must have felt that he was elucidating the obvious when he observed that studies were necessary to the administration of the nation's cultural areas.

The "true justification" for a comprehensive investigation of historic places lies in the fact that only by studying and reporting on them is it possible to secure the complete picture that is an essential preliminary to classifying sites according to their importance. And not until this classification is made will it be possible to carry out fully the purposes for which the Branch of Historic Sites and Buildings was created. Survey and classification is a fundamental responsibility placed upon the National Park Service by the recent historic sites legislation.

The reports made as a result of inquiries from the field and other branches of the Park Service are indispensable to the authentic development of the sites under Federal Administration. Accurate restoration of historic buildings is often made possible only by data uncovered in the Library of Congress and other governmental agencies.

Chatelain concluded his dissertation:

... To maintain true professional standards, to handle the work involved promptly, efficiently and at as low a cost as possible, and through that means to cultivate true historical standards and a genuine and widespread interest in preserving the important remains of our national past is the fundamental justification of the work of the Research Division.

98. N. A., R. G., Ickes to Cammerer, 11 January 1936; Cammerer to Ickes, 7 July 1936, with enclosed "Statement Regarding the Activities in Historical Research of the Branch of Historic Sites and Buildings."
Mr. Ickes was not the last administrator to raise questions about the service's historical research functions; and Verne Chatelain's "Statement" did not banish all doubts nor answer all the questions. Service historians have posed some of the most searching questions and answered themselves with varying degrees of relevance and certitude. An early and, because it was free of cant and philosophical vaporings, a contribution to a theory of applied history came out of the 1938 Regional Historians Conference. The conferees drafted a research and development policy for historic sites that Director Cammerer approved on June 20, 1938.

After asserting that preserving and interpreting historic sites is a "basic function of the National Park Service," the regional historians observed that the relationship of archaeological and historical research to historic sites' development needed to be "clearly understood." The service needed a policy that would serve that end. The one they prepared and director approved read:

It is a fundamental principle that research should precede actual developmental work. When it accompanies the execution of a project the demands of the moment are likely to force hasty and inadequate investigation and thus enhance the liability to error. Furthermore, planning itself can be intelligently undertaken only in the light of all the data revealed by research.

... To secure complete and accurate information and interpret it correctly, requires trained and experienced personnel. Reliance should not be placed on data compiled by untrained or inexperienced persons, nor should historical or archeological research be assigned to any nonprofessional personnel except with the approval of the Branch of Historic Sites. . . .

The Service should be capable of instantly proving the authenticity of its work. Accordingly, the policy is adopted of fully documenting the plans for each interpretative or developmental feature involving historic or prehistoric remains with a view to placing the Service in such a position of security that it can fully justify, at any time, any preservation, reconstruction or restoration project on areas under its jurisdiction. The research data shall, at the time of park development, be inserted on the project application as project justification or as a technical report justifying and fully documenting the work that is to be performed. . . .
... In addition to such documented studies for specific restoration or development projects, similar data files and similar documented studies should be made on such allied subjects as ordnance, ceramics and furnishings, when they are involved in park development.

Collaboration of all technicians engaged in research on the character, features, and history of a given site, is essential if the best results are to be obtained. Not only should archeologists and historians studying the same site work closely together, but the data compiled by them should be regularly checked with the results of historical-architectural studies and museum research.

The use of modern and standardized methods of gathering and recording historical and archeological data for use in planning is a basic requisite for effectuating any sound program of development for a historic site. Unless the best methods known are adhered to and a sufficient trained personnel is available to permit their thorough application, developmental plans should be halted or postponed.

99. Old History Division Files, WASO, Cammerer to Washington and All Field Offices, June 1938, with inclosed "Research and Development Policies for Historic Sites - Recommended by the Regional Historians' Conference, June 6 - 10, 1935."

While the service's professionals struggled to define scholarship's role, they took steps to develop a coherent policy for preserving and restoring cultural features. Between 1935 and 1937, the Branch of Historic Sites and Buildings conducted consultative sessions with the Advisory Board and professionals from other Washington Office branches that produced the following policy statement, which was approved by the Board during its 25 - 26 March 1937 meeting and promulgated by Director Cammerer on 19 May of that year:
General Restoration Policy:

The motives governing these activities are several, often conflicting: aesthetic, archeological and scientific, and educational. Each has its values and its disadvantages.

Educational motives often suggest complete reconstitution, as in their hey-day, of vanished, ruinous or remodelled buildings and remains. This has often been regarded as requiring removal of subsequent additions, and has involved incidental destruction of much archeological and historical evidence, as well as of aesthetic values arising from age and picturesqueness.

The demands of scholarship for the preservation of every vestige of architectural and archeological evidence -- desirable in itself -- might, if rigidly satisfied, leave the monument in conditions which give the public little idea of its major historical aspect or importance.

In aesthetic regards, the claims of unity or original form or intention, of variety of style in successive periods of building and remodelling, and of present beauty of texture and weathering may not always be wholly compatible.

In attempting to reconcile these claims and motives, the ultimate guide must be the tact and judgment of the men in charge. Certain observations may, however, be of assistance to them:

1. No final decision should be taken as to a course of action before reasonable efforts to exhaust the archeological and documentary evidence as to the form and successive transformations of the monument.

2. Complete record of such evidence, by drawings, notes and transcripts should be kept, and in no case should evidence offered by the monument itself be destroyed or covered up before it has been fully recorded.

3. It is well to bear in mind the saying: 'Better preserve than repair, better repair than restore, better restore than construct.'

4. It is ordinarily better to retain genuine old work of several periods, rather than arbitrarily to 'restore' the whole, by new work, to its aspect at a single period.

5. This applies even to work of periods later than those now admired, provided their work represents a genuine creative effort.

6. In no case should our own artistic preferences or prejudices lead us to modify, on aesthetic grounds, work of a bygone period representing other artistic tastes. Truth is not only stranger than fiction, but more varied and more interesting, as well as more honest.

7. Where missing features are to be replaced without sufficient evidence as to their own original form, due regard should be paid to the factors of period and region in other surviving examples of the same time and locality.
Every reasonable additional care and expense are justified to approximate in new work the materials, methods and quality of old construction, but new work should not be artificially 'antiqued' by theatrical means.

Work on the preservation and restoration of old buildings requires a slower pace than would be expected in new construction.

**Battlefield Area Restoration Policy:**

Consideration of a proper restoration policy for historical areas raises many important problems. Not the least of these is the proper application of such a policy to national battlefield areas. Those areas offer conditions not usually present in other historical sites and the problem is more immediate in view of the present rapid development program.

In a sense a wise policy might better be described as one of stabilization rather than restoration. Stabilization embraces necessary restoration without subordinating to it the entire physical development program.

It is convenient to discuss the problem in two parts, the elements usually presented in a battlefield area when the National Park Service takes it over, but before any development program has been initiated; and, the successive steps in a sound stabilization program.

I. When the National Park Service takes over a military area, it usually consists of the following elements:

A. What was there when the battle was fought, including evidences of the battle, such as earthenworks, cleared fields, ruined foundations, etc.

B. Subsequent additions, including forest growth, modern buildings, monuments, and markers. Some of these subsequent additions, such as the intrusions of unsightly and modern structures, have been injurious to the appearance of the area. Other additions, however, have improved it. For example, forest growth of 75 years frequently is a desirable witness to the age and the dignity of a battlefield area and fortifies the impression upon those visiting the area.

II. To stabilize conditions on a battlefield area after it is taken over, the following policies are hereby approved:

A. Undesirable modern encroachments on the battlefield scene shall be eliminated as soon as practicable. Not everything that has occurred since the battle can be considered an encroachment. Obviously, modern structures and intrusions which have been due to other than natural conditions and which introduce a jarring note rather than contribute to the normal accretions of age are the elements which should be eliminated. These include modern buildings, high-speed highways, gas stations, transmission lines, and other obviously incongruous elements. Normal forest growth, the natural changes of stream channel, the operation of other natural processes which seem destined never to be
B. Having eliminated undesirable encroachments, those features of the area which hamper a clear understanding of the engagement also should be eliminated. For example, where forest growth has obstructed an important vista or where a road location conveys a mistaken notion of troop movements, that feature should be modified or eliminated for educational reasons.

C. Restoration, which seems advisable to aid understanding and to restore the natural landscape for clearing and naturally representing the battlefield area, should be made as funds therefore are obtained. Such restorations may be made for structures, earthworks, plant growth, etc. It is recognized that, in each case of restoration, there is present a danger of introducing an artificial element into what had been previously a natural scene. Natural processes should be allowed to operate and dignify with age the natural scene.

The foregoing policies should aid in developing a battlefield area to provide a combination of elements remaining from the time of the battle, plus the normal additions of age affected through the natural accretion of natural processes. When a battlefield area has been so treated as to represent this combination, it can be said to be 'stabilized.'

Sample Restoration Policy:

The Advisory Board approves the guiding policy of the treatment of the Morristown camp site, in accordance with which the restoration of only a very small number of representative structures is attempted, and expresses its opposition to any attempt at complete or large-scale restoration of such sites, especially where the building of structures is involved.

100. Old History Division Files, WASO, Spalding to Cammerer, 11 February 1937; Minutes and Resolutions, Advisory Boards and Commissions, "Reconstruction and Restoration Procedures Adopted by the Advisory Board on National Parks, Historic Sites, Buildings, and Monuments, Fourth Meeting, 25 - 26 March 1937"; Cammerer to all Washington Officers and Field Officers, 19 May 1937
nness Battle; Wakefield; Fredericksburg; Fort Pulaski; Kennesaw Mountain; Castle Clinton; and Goliad Mission Most of those investigations reflected competent scholarship and set sound canons for new types of applied research for which there were few precedents.

Like every American national organization, the National Park Service’s history has been attended by the tension between centralization and regionalization. Founded as a small bureau within the Department of the Interior, the service was from the beginning subject to those forces. In fact, its functional origins derived from a product of decentralisation, the San Francisco - based office of the General Superintendent and Landscape Engineer. That did not equate with regionalization, but the administration was system-wide, but it did reflect a regional bias derived from the fact that the parks and monuments were located in the West.

Within a few years of its creation, the service’s administrators knew that coordinating and administering the diverse and geographically diffuse system from Washington required subordinate centers. They found a solution for the immediate problems in field offices established in Yellowstone National Park and the cities of Berkeley, Denver, Los Angeles, Portland, and San Francisco. It would be a mistake to see those centers as precursors to regions because they were functional units of the design and service centers. The real forerunner of the regions was the field organization developed to administer the Park Service’s involvement in the Emergency Conservation Work (CCC). During the initial phase, that organization consisted of four park districts, each headed by a district officer, overseeing the work in 100 camps. By March 1935, the number of camps increased to 475, and districts, now redesignated regions, numbered eight. Because the CCC programs and funds involved a large number of its employees, the service was,
in Arno Cammerer's words, seventy per cent regionalized in 1936.

103. N. A., R. G. 79, o - 201 12, Cammerer, Memorandum for the Secretart, 1 April 1936.

Some vocal and prominent administrators in Washington and the field opined that communication within the expanding Park Service was a critical problem that could be solved by regionalization. At their November 1934 superintendent's conference a proposal that the service adopt a regional organization similar to the Forest Service's was made. That proposal provided for establishing up to five regions composed of areas whose assignment to the regions would be determined by their classification. Three regions would consist of natural and scenic parks and monuments. Cultural areas would comprise two regions; the Southwestern monuments would form one and the other would include the military parks and monuments.

104. Harpers Ferry Center, NPS Archives, Proceedings of the Park Superintendent's Conference, 21 November 1934.

Superintendent of the Southwest Monuments Frank Pinkley, a major spokesman for park administrators and who supervised a proto-region, reacted favorably. He declared that he and "at least twenty" other superintendents were concerned about the "separation of the field from the Washington Office" and hailed the proposal as "an ideal solution of one of the heaviest problems that now confronted the Park Service . . . ." Superintendent Floyd Flickinger of Colonial, who lacked neither self-confidence nor ambition, believed that regionalization would be especially beneficial for historic areas and that "the program just cries out for this sort of thing."

105. Ibid., Exhibit "D".

106. Ibid., Exhibit "I".

Chief of the Wildlife Division George M. Wright and Superintendent C. G. Thomson
were equally enthusiastic; and no one actively opposed the idea. However, Superintendent John R. White of Sequoia had some reservations about so radical an organic change.

107. Ibid., Exhibits "E", "F", and "G".

The superintendents of the larger parks dominated the conference and most of them saw themselves becoming regional directors. The superintendents had spoken, but the sense of urgency that some of them professed to feel was not reflected in immediate action. More than a year passed before the director, on 25 January 1936, appointed a committee to study the question of applying the Emergency Conservation Work organization to the entire service. Assistant Director Hilory Tolson was chairman and the members were Roger Toll, George Wright, Charles G. Thomas, Verne Chatelain, Thomas Vint, Oliver G. Taylor, and Benjamin Thompson, secretary. With remarkable alacrity, Tolson convened his committee at 2:30 p.m. of the day of its creation. After a four-hour session during which ECW matters were discussed, the committee passed the following motion by a vote of seven to three:

"The Committee recommends to the Director that ECW in national parks be administered through the same channels which have been maintained during the last several years, except that the administration thereof rests in the Branch of Planning and State Cooperation; furthermore, that no temporary regionalization of ECW, as an expedient for the national parks, be made until such time as a regional plan is designed specifically to meet the requirements of the National Park Service."


The committee then announced that, in accordance with the director's instructions, it was ready to prepare a plan for regionalization.

The committee's members worked throughout the first two weeks of February to prepare and justify a regionalization plan. The results of their consultations appeared in five documents: three memoranda for the director dated 9, 10, and 27 February; a "Proposed Regional Organization," submitted 17 February; and a
creation, the committee asserted that the proposed system would "bring the Director and his assistants back into more intimate touch with the field," but they did not explain how interposing another administrative layer would promote such intimacy, or even that increased intimacy was desirable. Another curious argument was that the parks' autonomy would be increased at the same time that supervising the system would be facilitated. The proposed system was "further designed to maintain and strengthen the influence of the professional, scientific, and technical branches; administrative decisions will be based on technical advice extended first within the park, then the region, and finally by the branch heads serving the Director at Washington." While the cause of geographic individuality would be served, the "natural and obvious purposes of the regional office are to coordinate and expedite minutia in the field, and to assure application of policies and procedures dictated by the Director." The committee promised that regionalization would provide "free channels of promotion from small parks to large; from parks to regions; and from regions to Washington. These opportunities for promotion are provided within each branch, so that the ambitious specialized man goes up within his profession and is not diverted into administration." Such an application of social Darwinism would not fail to have a salutary effect upon the service's professionalism.

The director wanted a regional structure that would lighten his administrative duties. The committee's recommendation provided what he wanted, but it was not a triumph of logic. It contained a catalogue of desired objectives with a promise that regionalization would assure their realization.

The committee next employed their logic to propose a regional organization based upon a combination of geography and classification similar to the one suggested during the 1934 superintendent's conference.
Region I would include all historical and military parks, monuments, battlefields, and memorials east of the Mississippi River. Its director would be Verne Chatelain, with the proviso that if a new Branch of Historic Sites and Buildings became a reality, that branch's assistant director would become Region I's director. He would also serve as a historical consultant to the other regional directors.

Region II would be the other cultural resource region and would include the Southwestern Monuments, Mesa Verde, Carlsbad Caverns, Great Sand Dunes, Wheeler, and Petrified Forest. Frank Pinkley would be its director.

The other three regions would be headed by superintendents of large natural parks. Region III, Charles G. Thompson of Yosemite; Region IV, Owen A. Tomlinson of Mount Rainier; and Region V, Roger Toll of Yellowstone.

110. Ibid., Organization Regionalization, 27 February 1936.

Region III's areas would be:

Parks
Yosemite, Sequoia, General Grant, Lassen Volcanic, and Hawaii

Monuments
Lava Beds, Muir Woods, Pinnacles, Devil's Postpile, Cabrillo, and Death Valley

Region IV

Parks
Mount Rainier, Crater Lake, Glacier, and Mount McKinley

Monuments
Mount Olympus, Oregon Caves, Craters of the Moon, Glacier Bay, Katmai, Old Kasaan, and Sitka

Region V

Parks
Yellowstone, Grant Teton, Grand Canyon, Rocky Mountain, Bryce Canyon, Wind Cave, and Zion

Monuments
Cedar Breaks, Big Hole, Lewis and Clark, Verandye, Devil's Tower, Jewel Cave, Shoshone Cavern, Fossil Caves, Scotts Bluff, Timpanogos Cave, Dinosaur, Lehman Caves, Holy Cross, Colorado, and Black Canyon of the Gunnison

Four parks; Acadia, Great Smoky Mountains, Hot Springs, and Platt, and three
Park Service Regional Offices, July 1, 1937. From Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People, p. 134.
projects: Everglades, Isle Royale, and Mammoth Cave, would be excluded until Everglades and Mammoth Cave were established, when they, along with Great Smoky Mountains and Platt, would form Region VI. Acadia and Isle Royale remained in limbo. The change-over was scheduled to occur on 1 April.

The proposed reorganization went to Secretary Ickes for approval; and that old foe of proliferating agencies did not think highly of it. He did not believe that the problems of administering the parks would be eased by creating regions that would dilute the authority of the Washington Office. His solution was to appoint district supervisors within that office; and he instructed the director to revise the proposal accordingly.

The secretary was not alone in his skepticism about the virtues of regionalization. Letters from conservationists and critical opinions from within the service reflected a broad-based opinion that the proposed reorganization did not represent an improvement. The secretary did eventually approve a regionalization on 2 January 1937, to become effective after the beginning of the next fiscal year.

On 7 August, Director Cammerer issued an order establishing four geographic regions. Region I included all the Eastern States; Region II, the Mid-west; Michigan, Wisconsin, Indiana, Illinois, Montana, Missouri, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, Nebraska, Wyoming, Montana (excluding Glacier), and Colorado.
(excluding Mesa Verde National Park and Colorado, Black Canyon of the Gunnison, Yucca House, and Hovenweep National Monuments). The Southwest was represented in Region III, which included Arizona (except Boulder Dam), Arkansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Texas, the national monuments in Colorado, and Rainbow Bridge National Bridges, and Arches National Monuments. Region IV included California, Idaho, Oregon, Nevada, Utah (excluding the Utah national monuments), Glacier National Park in Montana, Boulder Dam Recreational Area, and the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii.

115. Ibid.

A kind of tentativeness attended regionalization as the service experimented with its new infrastructure; and for most of a decade a flow of memoranda refined the regional offices' functions. However, those refinements did not alter the fundamental design; and the system that has dominated the service's administration for almost half a century was firmly in place by the time the country and the National Park Service found themselves entering the war years.

Not surprisingly, the service's leaders concluded that regionalizing was a wise act. In a prose that was even less elegant than most documents of that genre, Director Cammerer's 1938 annual report recorded that he had looked upon the handiwork and saw that it was good:

Establishment of clear relationships with executives charged with various administrative units of the Federal park system and acceptance of a greater degree of responsibility for regular and emergency programs in those areas were the most marked results of the transition from the previously existing emergency regionalization to the present national park organization. 116


The director's satisfaction with the new structure elicited an equally felicitous echo from the superintendents in a fifty-eight word sentence (compared with Mr. Cammerer's fifty-three word one):
As a means of establishing closer relationship with the various administrative units of the National Park Service and providing better coordination of field and Washington Office activities, it is agreed that the general principle and practice of regionalization effected by the Director's memorandum of August 6, 1937, and amendments, have already proved their worth and are heartily endorsed. 117


The superintendents were so imbued with the spirit of the moment that they called upon their leaders to create yet another region.

Regionalization was as inevitable as any bureaucratic change can be, given the burgeoning federal conservation program and the service's intimate association with the Civilian Conservation Corps. But the relevant documents tempt one to suspect that a part of that inevitability was the fact that the service's leaders wanted to regionalize and that the arguments advanced for doing so were less compelling than the need to justify something they wanted to.

The creation of the regions affected the service's professional capability by providing a corps of specialists to the regional offices who could serve as resource persons for both those offices and the parks. Engineers, architects, landscape architects, archaeologists, and historians moved into the regional headquarters and functioned as consultants and supervisors in their respective fields. From 1937 until the mid-1960s, when the regional offices lost most of their professionals to the service centers and the Washington Office, those regional specialists were their disciplines' key operational representatives.

This could be conveniently illustrated by the example of the regional historian, who recruited the park historians, supervised the parks' professional program, provided disciplinary guidance, supported professionals in conflicts with superintendents whose backgrounds and values often made them ignorant of or hostile to professional concerns, contributed to park planning, and according to Charles Hosmer "became a most important means of assuring the accuracy and quality of
the work done by the historians and rangers who interpreted the newly acquired historic sites to the public."


The 1930s was a heady, dynamic epoch. The National Park Service entered it a small agency with a very limited range of responsibility and interest. It emerged with a nation-wide, multi-faceted system of parks and a corresponding expansion of interests and responsibilities. In 1930, the service's professional staff was limited to a ranger force supported by a small cadre of engineers, landscape architects, naturalists, and foresters. By 1940, the cadre's numbers had multiplied; and they were joined by archaeologists, historical architects, historians, curators, artists, cartographers, editors, and economists.

Service spokesmen, in a manner natural to their kind, consistently projected a euphoric sense of satisfaction with the way the nation's premier conservation agency matured during the decade. National Park Service administrators have, at least for the record, rarely permitted themselves to question their organization's philosophical assumptions. That has not been the avenue of advancement. Agonizing over those issues is reserved for the agency's professionals and outside constituencies.

Some of the constituencies' members were not at all certain that the service and the national park system were what the nation needed— in fact, some firmly believed that they were not. Their numbers included "purists" who believed that the pristine values of the parks were cheapened, if not destroyed, by excessive construction and pandering to tourism and recreation. Their concerns dated from


Stephen Mather's days; and New Deal enthusiasms for producing facilities that at
once produced jobs and increased public use did not inspire their confidence. Many
of them believed that including Eastern areas, especially historic sites and buildings,
in the system diluted its quality. James A. Foote expressed that sentiment more
moderately than some in an "open letter" to Secretary Ickes when he wrote:

The National Park Service has been expanding in recent years—so
rapidly that the original precepts and ideals upon which the Service
was founded appear to have become lost or forgotten. State parks,
recreational areas, national parks and primeval natural parks have
been shuffled and jumbled until today a confused American public
scarcely knows which is which. 120

(December 1937), 7. See also Robert S. Yard, "Losing Our Primeval System in
Vast Expansion," Ibid., 13 (February 1936), 1-4.

Critics included activists who were not content to criticize. They wanted some­
thing done. In mid-1936, the Audobon Society, National Parks Association, Sierra
Club, and Wilderness Society united in calling for a "National Primeval Park
System," declaring that:

The National Park System, once the expression of the highest ideals
and uses to which primeval wilderness of exalted beauty could be applied,
has been required in recent years to embrace areas which do not justify
the adjective primeval. The original system is now virtually lost sight
of among innumerable recreational activities, regional and national, as­
signed to the National Park Service.

The present day popular conception of National Parks as open-air re­
servations of different kinds owned by the nation and maintained largely
for playground use make no distinction between the primeval kind of
national parks and other kinds administered by the National Park Service.
To save the primeval national parks and all they once meant to the nation,
we must find a special title for them which will exclude all others from
the system by definition.

Such title is National Primeval Park System. 121

121. "Report on the Place of Primeval Parks in the Reorganized National Park
System," National Parks New Service, Number 4 (8 June 1936)

Service leaders responded by defending the changes that had occurred and asked
their traditional supporters to trust them to preserve the system's integrity by
assuring that substandard areas would be excluded and that development would not
degrade park values. Associate Director Demeray assured the American Planning and Civic Association in 1938 that his agency was equal to the task of preserving the parks's purity while making them more accessible. To be sure, the service's mandate contained contradictions, but increased efficiency, more sophisticated planning, improved design, and, naturally, enlightened management converted threats into opportunities. He concluded with the non sequitur that the National Park Service was "one of the most forceful and honest agencies of conservation in the Federal Government," which was comparable to declaring that the U. S. Army was one of finest national defence agencies.

122. Harpers Ferry Center, NPS Archives, File K - 5410, Policy and Philosophy to 1949.

The service had little to fear from its critical friends. Their concerns did not command a high priority as the Depression stubbornly refused to yield to public and private sector recovery programs and as the nation began to find reasons to worry about events in the Far East and Europe. Most conservationists believed that the purists' alarms were overdrawn—that the national park system that emerged from the New Deal expansion was a better one than it had been at the close of the 1920s. The National Park Service and most of its leadership enjoyed a large measure of congressional confidence; and most public opinion shapers were favorably disposed toward the service and its efforts.

123. There were important exceptions to this generalization. Industry organs and local critics frequently attacked service policies regarding land acquisition, hunting, timber cutting, and opposed the establishment of given parks.

Interestingly, some of the most perceptive and fundamental criticisms of the service came from informed and dedicated employees. The eastern expansion and inclusion of historical areas disturbed traditionalists who believed that the system should not include cultural properties. On the other hand, cultural preservation professionals claimed that service administrators failed to integrate the historical
program. Edward Hummel, who began his career as a historian in the Emergency Conservation Work (ECW) activity, became a superintendent, assistant regional director, and an associate director, remembered that the service's leadership had little interest in history, considered the necessary research and preservation a burden, and looked upon historic areas as step-children. Roy Appleman, whose candor and reliable memory are legendary, echoed that assessment. Non-historian Regional Director Minor Tillotson remarked in 1940 that the service "has, thus far, to a great degree, failed in its task relating to the historic areas under its administration, not so much in their selection and development as in the interpretation of them to the public."

The criticisms of the service as it existed immediately before World War II were often valid enough—many of them still are. But the agency that emerged from the foment of a remarkable decade in a form that, with its strengths and weaknesses, is substantially in place as this is written is the same one that adjusted to varying forces and fortunes to remain, at least until the 1970s, a pioneer in preserving and interpreting a complex national heritage.
CHAPTER V

THE DENVER SERVICE CENTER: The Early Years

The merging of the two service centers in Denver was so abrupt that a majority of the personnel affected experienced degrees of distress that varied from simple inconvenience to hardship. And there was a substantial body of opinion that questioned the motives and wisdom of the moves and was even more critical of what was perceived as the service's cavalier attitude toward the interests of a significant number of its professionals. That people experienced important personal problems,

1. The most important public notice taken appeared in the Washington Post's November 8, 1973 issue, where the National Park Service was characterized as the worst federal employer.

that productivity declined, and that the move was expensive could not be denied.

2. Just how expensive is not easy to determine. If the costs of transferring some 350 persons and the closing of the two centers and leasing space for the combined operation in the Villa Italia are included, direct expenses exceeded $1,000,000. Indirect costs to production probably exceeded that figure. The surviving records simply make any assessment suspect until a careful collection of all the data completes the record.

However, most employees took the move with a good grace that testified to a remarkably healthy morale. The more effete cosmopolitans and high-livers were grieved to trade San Francisco's and Washington's cultural advantages and fleshpots for Colorado's wholesome clime, but others looked forward to starting anew in the land where everyone skied, called everyone by his first name, lived in the sun, and smoked Marlboros—the American susceptibility to the frontier's lure was not dead among the National Park Service's urbanized elite.

Once the decision to locate the merged service center in the Denver area was taken, a second, equally significant, decision emerged: what kind of an organization would give it form? The eastern and western centers had followed the functional orientation of the parent Eastern and Western Offices of Design and Construction, and an organization that reflected the professional values and roles of
their component disciplines. The application of those roles and values depended upon the disciplines' service-wide utility with regional interests playing a limited role. Peculiar geographic problems contributed variety and complexity to professing a discipline that might create the need for specialists, but they were secondary to the canons that made applying or practicing a discipline a profession. They made the kind of organization that Vint and other professionals who had established service creditability bequeathed to their successors: a functional order constructed upon professional lines—a application of Louis H. Sullivan's dictum that form follows function.

The type of organization described above generally succeeded in providing professional services that conformed to disciplinary standards, but it left unsatisfied some of the interests of practitioners of a function that was becoming more aggressive and and dominant—management. That term assumed new meaning during the 1960s. In a sense, that new meaning was as superficial as the adoption of a new jargon for an old, but gussied up, activity. More substantively, administration, initially in industry and then in the public sector, became the subject of new assumptions and theories that produced a growing body of literature and practice. The older ideal, not universally honored in practice, made the most competent craftsmen and professionals the leaders of their fellows and rewarded them with administrative and supervisory responsibility and authority. It was not universally applied because the imperfection of human nature made it possible that the most expert might not get to be boss. Then too, the time-honored American distrust of the expert as one who should be on tap—not on top—played its part. That traditional attitude helped create a hospitable climate for developing a new homo erectus, the person who is considered an expert—or at least a specialist—in managing. Under the new covenant, professional expertise became less important than the possession of skills useful in performing budgetary, programming, and public relations or communication tasks—the organization man...
who, once he had mastered the management skills, could manage a wide variety of activities, without being expert in any. The American faith in Everyman had found effective institutional expression. It is worth noting that this theory of public and private administrative practice has found its fullest expression in the United States. European and Japanese leadership in government and business bureaucracies is almost always filled by persons with established professional expertise. Some observers have seen this as a significant reason why America, in spite of its resources, has experienced a decline in relative diplomatic, political, and industrial leadership.

The National Park Service, under the influence of a compulsion to keep in step with current practice and the inspiration of varying degrees of exposure to the doctrines flowing from the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, embraced at least the trappings of the new school; and managers appeared where formerly there had been superintendents, directors, and supervisors. The Director of the National Park Service and his surrogates in the Washington Office were, of course, cast into an increasingly managerial mold. But the manager nonpariel was the regional director. The cyclical shift of power between central and regional loci moved in favor of the latter; and the new regional directors were a different breed from the Carl Russells, Elbert Cows, and Lemuel Garrisons.

This lengthy and simplistic aside is not a digression because it is important to the story of the Denver Service Center's organization and because that organization has been an arena in which the tensions between centralization and fragmentation and between managerial and professional values have operated.

We have noted that, like the nation of which it has been so representative, the Park Service has harbored centralizing and regional forces; and the balance has shifted with changing leadership models and political trends. The problem has been complicated on the operational level by varying shortages of fully
qualified professionals, which have conspired to favor creation of centralized professional offices, such as the Eastern and Western Offices of Design and Construction, the Eastern and Western Service Centers, the Archeological Centers, and the Harpers Ferry Center. Like the last named, the Denver Service Center undertook to supply expertise on a service-wide basis, which placed it in an especially sensitive position vis-à-vis the national, regional, and park offices.

While the Service Center's ultimate institutional clients are the field areas, its most critical operational relationships are with the regional offices, the loci of the preponderant managerial power. The Center's leadership had to tailor its organization to provide agency-wide services within an infrastructure composed of largely autonomous geographic entities. The solution that developed was the so-called "team manager" organization agreed upon during a seminal meeting at a Dulles International Airport hostelery.

The organization's theoretical base was the management study prepared by James M. Kittleman and Associates of Chicago, whose findings and recommendations were recorded in the succinctly named Kittleman Report, published in 1972. The new center's purpose was to provide "high-quality planning and design services" through a centralization of "a majority of the Park Service's professional personnel. Functioning somewhat apart from day-to-day park management, the Denver Service Center attacks problems objectively and conceptually with teams specifically selected for each job." The teams would produce:

3. Denver Service Center's Manager's Files, Book I, emphasis added; Director, Denver Service Center to All Management Team Members and Resource Personnel, 21 January 1972.
graphic designs
historic research and preservation documentation
master plans
wilderness plans
interpretive prospecti
development concept plans
construction drawings and specifications
surveys
archeological investigations
urban plans and designs

They, with support from private consultants, would provide specialists in the following fields:

architecture
landscape architecture
planning
engineering
resource management
surveying
graphics
transportation
writing/editing
interior design
ecology
sociology
historic architecture
history
archaeology
construction management
interpretation

The Service Center was to be the vehicle for developing and maintaining a strong and viable internal professional capability that would carry out the following crucial assignments:

1) new area studies
2) master plans
3) historic preservation and restoration
4) negotiation, administration, and supervision of architecture and engineering (A & E), agency, and construction contracts
5) planning, design, and supervision for facility development
6) quality control of park, regional, and concession planning and design
7) provide the capacity to respond to emergency requests for planning, design, and construction assistance
8) conduct research and development in fields relating to practices, equipment, and systems appropriate to park design and development.

The justification for the Service Center's autonomous existence outside the service's standard geographically-oriented structure depended upon its peculiar attributes that required it to respond to needs that transcended
regional bounds. One of those was to be a flexibility in numbers and skills to cope with the requirements of multi-faceted programs, fill emergency needs and solve polytechnical problems. A second was to provide a climate favoring professional growth through intra- and inter-professional associations. A third justification was to be an emphasis upon quality and the freedom to take long-range views of problems and opportunities. Another was that the Center would provide "enhanced recruitment capabilities" for young professionals. A higher degree of consistency would be realized in meeting legal and administrative requirements. The economical utilization of technical skills would be a reality. There would be more "uniformity, accuracy, and professionalism" in supplying important services. The Center would be the "focal point for the service's professional relations with foreign governments, other agencies, academia, and professional organizations." It would also provide for a "greater impact of general consultants and extraordinarily talented professionals," and would give an increased opportunity for employees' accreditation and licensing by state professional boards. No finer counsel of perfection ever flowed from a Park

1. DSC Manager's files, Book 1, "Why a Denver Service Center?"

Service justification for creating a new organization.

For the first time in its history, the National Park Service deliberately undertook to establish an integrated professional research and development office whose purpose was to serve the entire system. Its success in this undertaking would require the creation of a very sophisticated organization. While the service's history provided a variety of precedents and theoretical literature contained some guidelines and inspiration, there is not much evidence that anyone gave them serious consideration. At the same time, given the territorial interests involved and the speed with which the transfer to Colorado and the reorganization moved, it is doubtful that doing so would have been feasible.

The organization that emerged was a heady and complex one. At its top was
the assistant director, service center operations, a Washington Office position filled by Johannes E. N. Jensen, who had left Eero Saarinen Associates in June 1963 to become the service's chief of the Division of Design and Construction. He subsequently became the assistant director, design and construction in 1964, deputy associate director in 1967, and associate director, planning and development in 1968. His knowledge of the national park system was limited, and his impact upon the service's professional capabilities is difficult to assess upon the basis of the documentary evidence. His name appears frequently on charts and correspondence, but he is a shadowy figure in contrast to old hands like Thomas Wint and Charles Krueger. He was duty stationed in Denver and was line supervisor of the directors, Denver Service Center and Harpers Ferry Center. In that capacity, he had final responsibility and authority for adherence to professional standards. He and the appropriate regional directors agreed mutually to the assignments of programmed projects. The assignments were "approved by the Deputy Associate Director, Operation (WASO), and the Associate Director, Professional Service (WASO)." He had "supportive and consultive responsibility" to the regional directors and the director of the National Capital Parks and a functional relationship with the associate director, professional services (WASO) and the regional associate directors for professional support.

5. DSC Manager's files, "Role and Functional Statement, Assistant Director, Service Center Operations.

The Denver Service Center's chief was its director, Glenn Hendrix, a veteran Park Service employee who had headed the San Francisco Service Center since 1968. Another veteran, Landscape Architect Donald F. Benson, was associate director and charged with sharing line supervision of the Center's component offices. The director's staff included three assistant directors: Harold Danz, who headed the Office of Finance and Control; Robert Luntey of the Office of Programming; and Louis Farr in charge of the Office of Organization Development and Manpower.
Staff support and liaison with the Washington Office was the responsibility of James Stewart, whose desk was located in Washington.

The organization provided for a unique staff unit that was intended to serve a significant professional function—the planning and design consultants. Its members: John W. (Jay) Bright, Charles Riebe, and David Turello, had responsibilities in six areas: 1) Quality Control in which they were to ensure that the professional service provided by DSC would be the "highest quality, commensurate with the nature of the resources in the National Park System"; 2) Systems Analyses that charged the consultants with advising the Center's management and key Washington and regional office personnel on organization processes, management, and planning and design standards; 3) Project Consultation that required the regular consultation with team captains in the execution of specific projects; 4) Policy Formulation and Implementation assistance to the Center's directorate in policy matters; 5) Outreach Activities that made the consultants responsible for propagating Service Center practices and standards to outside persons and organizations; 6) Project Leadership that made them available to operate as leaders of selected priority projects. In time, this unit evolved in the Office of Quality Control and came to embrace other fields of expertise. The unit's creation was a response to a demand that the service has had continuing difficulty in meeting—assuring quality professional performance.

Another important innovation was the Office of Research Service, headed by Supervisory Landscape Architect Gerald Patton, composed of a team of natural and social scientists. The unit's staff performed three primary functions: 1) participation in planning studies "as consultant members providing expertise in their respective disciplines; interpretive, urban, and trail planning; and geology"; 2) preparation of interpretive prospecti; 3) authoring environmental impact statements. Preparing and monitoring special research studies was a secondary function. The office was a response to the new climate created by
the mandates of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and changes in departmental and agency regulations.

The Office of Construction Services, under the direction of Supervisory Civil Engineer Alan D. Huebner, provided construction supervision for all DSC that were administered for the Park Service by the Federal Highway Administration. The nature of its responsibilities required that the unit be divided into two components: office and field. The former included the chief, an assistant, and regional construction coordinators. This central staff performed several appropriate administrative and supervisory functions that included:

1) Assisting project supervisors in interpreting plans and specifications and in solving field problems.
2) Assigning Construction Services personnel to projects.
3) Determining construction needs and through the team managers arranged for A/E contracts for layout and supervision, and acting as the contracting officer's representative.
4) Arranging for field personnel housing, equipment, and transport.
5) Reviewing and coordinating change orders and contract correspondence and fund clearance.
6) Coordinating review and processing of shop drawings.
7) Coordinating the collection of data for and submission of "as-constructed" drawings to team managers for drafting.
8) Keeping records and arranging for corrective work under the contract guarantee.
9) Reviewing construction plans and specifications prior to advertising for bids.
10) Reviewing FHWA project construction documents.

The field personnel included architects, landscape architects, engineers, engineering technicians, and construction representatives who provided the on-site supervision of construction contracts. While some were permanently stationed in field areas, a majority moved from park to park. Each area where construction was underway had a project supervisor assigned who was the con-
tracting officer's representative. If supervision of the contract required additional personnel, they became project supervisors. The functions that the field staff performed included:

1) construction layout
2) inspecting contract work
3) preparing contract correspondence and documents, including change orders, work orders, and pavement estimates
4) processing shop drawings
5) enforcing contract labor and other "social" provisions
6) collecting information, making recommendations, and enforcing corrective action when problems arose
7) preparing as-constructed drawings and completion reports
8) on FHWA projects, landscape architects coordinated the work to ensure that the construction performed to sound professional practice and that the intent of the plans and specifications was not subverted.

Supervisory Civil Engineer Donald Bressler, another veteran service employee, headed the Office of Plans and Design Services, which provided technical expertise and professional support in mechanical, electrical, electronic communications, structural, safety, and sanitary engineering. The unit also included a wilderness consultant, an estimating section, and lands section, a communications office, and a roads section.

The Service Center had an unusually strong contract administration staff, headed by Leon Thygesen as contracting officer. It was manned to handle a broad range of contracts; and included on its rolls engineers, architects, and contract specialists.

A small Office of Surveys provided all the preliminary design data for both in-house and contracted designs. Those data included surveys, including construction staking; topographic mapping; orthophot prints; aerial photography; and field survey information. The personnel included an office staff that operated as the Center's technical resource people in all phases of aerial
and ground surveys and a mobile field group. Edward Blair headed the survey operations.

The large volume of documents generated by the Service Center required a major Office of Graphic Services, which under the direction of Henry Drews, consisted of four divisions: mapping services, graphic arts, drafting services, and microfilming services.

The innovative planning and design teams and their managers were the heart of Service Center operations. Grafted upon the traditional functional concept of a centralized professional research and development organization, the teams were a response to the regional directors' growing responsibilities and power. At the same time, they reflected a conscious effort to preserve elements of the profession's functionally-oriented value system. The key to the planning and design teams' position was their relationship to the regional offices. In an important sense, they were extensions of the regions' professional staffs operating in a centralized disciplinary pool. As such, the teams carried out the Service Center program for their associated regions. An exception was the Historic Preservation Team, which worked for all the regions and was strictly functional in its structure.

The teams consisted of two types of staffs: a core team of leaders, with clerical support, who administered the team's program. A typical core team included the team manager, a program specialist, an architect, a landscape architect planner, and an engineer. The work was performed by persons detailed from the Offices of Research and Consulting Services, Construction Services, and Planning and Design Services. The size of the detailed staff varied with the program.

There were seven regional planning and design teams. They were: Northeast, Manager Robert Steenhager; Southeast, Manager Arthur Beyer; Southwest, Manager Robert Budz; Western, Manager Kenneth Raithel; Pacific Northwest, Manager
Kenneth Goslin, Midwest, Manager; Donald Purse; and National Capital Parks and urban Areas, Manager Edward Peetz. The Historic Preservation Team, as has been noted, performed work on a service-wide basis. Its manager was Merrill J. Mattes.

6. This description of DSC's original organization is derived from documents contained in the Manager's Office, Book I. See accompanying Table of Organization: Director to the Directorate — Washington Office and Field, 3 November 1971; and Director, DSC, to Management Team Members and Resource Personnel, DSC, 21 January 1972.

The service now had an organization to provide what it had never had before—a central research and development capability. That organization faithfully reflected the dilemmas the Park Service faced in trying to deal with the competing values of management, professions, development and preservation, centralization and regionalization. It was tested under trying circumstances.

The merging of the service centers and transfer to Colorado was undertaken so abruptly that careful, reasoned judgment was almost impossible. The new center was distant from both the resources it was intended to serve and the research sources necessary to carry out its mission. The new quarters in the Villa Italia Shopping Center in Lakewood, Colorado, were overcrowded, wretchedly designed, and incompatible with the use to which they were put.

The service almost immediately faced the need to gear up for a major development program: the American Revolution Bicentennial. Almost everyone believed that the Denver Service Center would be short-lived.

There was an experimental quality about the Service Center's organization that reflected its novelty. No one professed to believe that the 1972 structure was going to approach permanence—even by NPS standards. They were not mistaken.

By the end of 1973, after less than two years of operation in Colorado, the Service Center experienced its first organic reorganization. The Park Service underwent a major restructuring that created two new regions: the North Atlantic Region, with its regional office in Boston, and the Rocky Mountain Region, with its central office in Lakewood, Colorado. This affected the Service Center by
altering the simplicity of having each planning and design team serve one
region. Two of those teams now served two regions: the former Northeast Team
would serve the Mid-Atlantic and North Atlantic Regions and the former Mid-
west Team would serve the Midwest and Rocky Mountain Regions.


The internal character of the Service Center also changed. Its head was al-
ready termed manager, Denver Service Center; and he now had an associate mana-
ger for production, David W. Wright, who became the immediate supervisor of the
regional planning teams. Donald Benson, who had been an associate director, be-
came the associate manager for professional support. Except for the increased responsibilities of the two teams that had become bi-regional, the
planning and design units were not affected. Administrative and support elements
underwent significant changes. Many of their functions transferred to the Rocky
Mountain Regional Office; while the programming activities became the responsi-
bility of an Office of Administrative Services under Robert Luntey's supervision.
John W. "Jay" Bright took over Quality Control and Environmental Impact State-
ment coordination, which had a staff that included an architect, civil engineer,
ranger, and environmental specialist. The Office of Contract Administration had
a major staff that included a general engineer, nine civil engineers, four archit-
tects, two landscape architects, and two attorneys. Those administrative units
were components of the manager's staff.

Associate Manager Benson and his assistant, General Engineer Bessler, super-
vised five divisions: Planning, Design, Construction, Graphic Systems, and Sur-
veys, the first three of which included the major part of DSC's professional
corps. The Division of Planning, headed by John Reynolds, included sixteen
landscape architects, two rangers (planners), one ranger (historian), three
interpretive planners, a social science analyst, a concession specialist, a
civil engineer, a park ranger, eleven historians, four ecologists, three soci-
ORGANIZATION CHART

MANAGEMENT ASSISTANT 1  
MANAGER 2  
WASO LIAISON 3

QUALITY CONTROL EIS COORDINATION 6

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES 13

ASSOCIATE MGR. PROFESSIONAL SUPPORT 3

PLANNING 53
DESIGN 71
CONSTRUCTION 45
GRAPHIC SYSTEMS 50
SURVEYS 5

ASSOCIATE MGR. PRODUCTION 2

MID ATLANTIC & NORTH ATLANTIC TEAM 7
SOUTHEAST TEAM 7
SOUTHWEST TEAM 6
WESTERN TEAM 6
PACIFIC NORTHWEST TEAM 5
ROCKY MOUNTAIN & MIDWEST TEAM 6
NATIONAL CAPITAL TEAM 17
HISTORIC PRESERVATION TEAM 8

TOTAL POSITIONS 356

Recommended:  
Manager, Denver Service Center

Concurred:  
Director, Development

Approved:  
Associate Director, Administration

October 31, 1973
The Historic Preservation team is the production oriented unit responsible for accomplishing the service center Historic studies and preservation program. The Team Manager has supportive and consulting responsibility to the Regional Director. The Historic Preservation Team Manager has functional relationships with the other team managers and with the Chiefs of the Division of Planning, Design, Construction, Graphic Systems, and Surveys.
ologists, a geologist, and an urban planner. The Division of Design, under Howard Haiges, included six architects, nine landscape architects, twelve historical architects, thirteen civil engineers, five electrical engineers, three mechanical engineers, three highway engineers, two student engineers, three general engineers, one sanitation engineer, five engineering technicians, and one natural resource specialist.

The Divisions of Planning and Design functioned as professional pools that supplied personnel to the planning and design teams, either on permanent detail, or in the case of scarce disciplines on an "as needed" temporary assignment. Those persons on permanent detail received their professional supervision from members of the regional teams' supervisory staffs.

The Division of Construction Services, headed by Alan Heubner, included twenty civil engineers, four engineering technicians, three landscape architects, four exhibit (restoration) specialists, and eleven construction representative. These personnel also served as a pool, and were detailed to projects for varying periods.

8. Organization Chart, Denver Service Center, 31 October 1973. The numbers cited were for late 1973 and were subject to change, especially during 1974.

Several observations about this organization are in order. One is that it provided fertile ground for intra-mural conflict between managerial and professional values because it attempted to impose a marriage between/geo-graphically-oriented team concept centered upon the managers of the planning and design units and a functional one that was the basis for the several divisional pools. A second is that it contained an organic contradiction in that one of the planning and design teams, the Historic Preservation Team, was founded upon a functional, not a geographic principle. A third is that, while its formal theory reflected a strong managerial bias, its operational structure
reflected a compelling professional commitment. One of the most accurate measurements for determining the degree of an organization's professionalism is the distribution of its higher grades. In short: how aggressively does it reward technical competence? Exclusive of the Office of Service Center Liaison in Washington, the Service Center had twenty-four GS-13, 1h, and 1s positions that were strictly managerial, including the managers of the planning and design teams and the division and office chiefs. On the other hand, it had two GS-15, twenty-four GS-1h, and fifty-two GS-13 positions that reflected professional status, including eight GS-1h and eighteen GS-13s who exercised professional supervision. In brief: of 102 upper grades, less than one-fourth were exclusively managerial; and slightly more than three-fourths of the occupants of higher graded positions held them by means of recognized professional competence. At that point, the Service Center certainly had valid claims to being a professional organization.

A fourth observation is that, whatever its shortcomings in conforming to orthodox managerial theory, the Service Center carried out the major part of the American Revolution Bicentennial under its 1973 organization. A survey of that development is central to the history of the Center.
CHAPTER VI

SERVICE AND THE BICENTENNIAL: A TESTING

The merging of the service's planning and design offices into the Denver Service Center was hardly an accomplished fact before the nation's celebration of its two-hundredth birthday presented it with a windfall and a challenge. This report is not the proper vehicle for discussing the merits of the American Revolution Bicentennial. It is sufficient to recall that few voices--and none from the service--questioned the appropriateness of a celebration and that the national parks and monuments had important parts to play in that celebration. A happy coupling of patriotism and opportunity that would have been appreciated by at least some members of the revolutionary generation marked the manner in which we commemorated our heroic origins. Compared with many local and national representatives of the public and private sectors, the Park Service managed to avoid most of the crass violations of good sense and taste that usually attend effusions of patriotic nostalgia.

The service did not approach the Bicentennial entirely innocent of forethought. The author of this study, along with five other members of what was then the Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation, prepared a 1970 report for the secretary of the interior that warned of the anniversary's approach and suggested ways in which the service should fulfill its role of key preservation agency. Proposals included recommendations for developing existing revolutionary period resources through restoration of historic landscapes and structures, enhancing interpretative programs, and installing visitor facilities. The report noted that "Because of limited funds and personnel, past research for the American Revolution sites ... has been spotty and variable, and usually directed at pressing development-related problems. Little research for broad interpretive needs has been accomplished."
To correct that deficiency, a comprehensive research and publication program was a part of the department's recommendation. Significant integration of the appropriate national historical landmarks into the service's interpretation was seen as an opportunity to add depth to NPS involvement.

The development needs of twenty Revolutionary areas were listed. Twelve areas were identified as needing restoration/reconstruction work; fourteen needed new or updated exhibitry; six required archaeological research; and five required new historical research. The authors' approach to the service's research and development program was fundamentally conservative. The needs they identified were basic to carry out the agency's responsibilities to the Revolutionary resources under its administration. They were even less adventurous in recommending additions to the national park system. Only three: Boston National Historic Sites, Longfellow National Historic Site, and George Washington Country Parkway, were proposed. They did not even envisage the addition of Valley Forge, to say nothing of such major sites as Brandywine, Savannah, and Monmouth. However, by including

the 680-mile George Washington Country Parkway that was envisaged as connecting northern Virginia sites associated with Washington, they may have created a momentary illusion of creative daring. The fact that almost four hundred of those miles were already covered by roads belied that impression. They were bolder in seeing the service as a catalyst for stimulating and influencing the quality of public and private programs.

In an almost quixotic surge, the report's authors foresaw a service role in the following activities: to commemorate significant events and personalities; to explain the American Revolution and its "modern relevance"; to relate the Bicentennial
to nationwide historic preservation; relate the Bicentennial to the national park idea and the "quest for a quality environment; provide timely information about events; and participate in the Bicentennial Exposition." 5

5. Ibid., 19-29.

Perhaps caught up in the spirit of the moment and emboldened thereby, the authors ventured "other thoughts for uplifting and stimulating the American people during the Bicentennial years." In that vein, they offered some suggestions for "undertakings in which . . . we would gladly participate with other appropriate agencies and groups." Those included "international themes deserving emphasis,"

6. Ibid., 31.

Which would develop the themes of the continuing character of the Revolution and its being a product of English constitutional and political experience; the national capitol's role, the center-piece of which would be the ill-fated National Visitor Center; "the congress and the American Revolution," which with unintentional humor, suggested a program of lectures by members of Congress because "The words of Members of Congress carry especial authority, particularly to the the young,"; artistic and literary competitions that "could result in an outpouring of creative literary and artistic activity without parallel in American history," and finally, "namsake cities," in communities with names like Lexington, Concord, Brandywine, and Saratoga, would stage special celebrations.

7. Ibid., 31-34.

The report's influence on the national Bicentennial planning was, at best, minimal. But it did provide a point of departure from which the service could begin to develop its own program and against which it could measure its performance in celebrating the nation's birthday. Two quotations informed the service's commemoration.
Bicentennial program:

If we would attain to the wisdom and to an understanding of our heritage we must understand the American Revolution. For surely an awareness of the magnitude of the sacrifice and an appreciation of the timeless quality of the ideals that brought our country into being will strengthen us as a people.

Of all the approaches to history, perhaps none communicates the past more directly and universally than physical evidence. An authentic structure or historic object in its original location can convey a sense of history unmatched by books or pictures. 8

8. Ibid., 9 - 10.

While a healthy skepticism is beneficial in assessing the motives and accomplishments that attended the Bicentennial, the cheap cynicism that was expressed ex post facto by a person who had a key role in the program that it represented "another example of approaching a problem by throwing money at it" detracts from an effort to develop an accurate and useful record of the service's experiences during an important period.

Hindsight provides lamentable examples of flawed values, shallow imagination, disordered priorities, and faulty performance. There were, on the record, more examples of responsible, competent, and constructive professional accomplishment that enhanced the value and utility of the nation's major Revolutionary historic resources.

Service participation took two major forms. One fell under the heading of "activities," which included celebratory programs, "living history" demonstrations, and dedications. The second consisted of the specially funded "development" program that was aimed at the long-term improvement of the appropriate National Park Service areas. Included in those functions were essential research, planning and design, preparation of construction documents, and construction. The Denver Service Center carried out that development program.
The development program had a three-year budget of $100,000,000, later adjusted to $101,000,000, beginning in fiscal year 1974. Because significant research, planning, and design work was accomplished prior to 1974, the total Bicentennial development exceeded that $101,000,000 by several hundred thousand.


During the three years of the official Bicentennial program, more than two hundred programmed packages, including almost one thousand component parts, were undertaken by DSC. The packages included historical and archeological research, preliminary design, master plans, environmental impact studies, construction, construction planning, interpretive planning, and cooperation with the Harpers Ferry Center for exhibit production. Those activities did not represent the Service Center's total workload. Simultaneous with the Bicentennial developments, work continued in non-Revolutionary areas, including major projects at Fort Vancouver, Bent's Old Fort, and Fort Larned.

The Bicentennial development experience was marked by certain inconsistencies occasioned by the exigencies of programming, planning, conflicts, land acquisition problems, and funding or time constraints. For instance, Hamilton Grange, Cowpens, and Federal Hall were omitted, in spite of their intimate associations with the Revolution. However, in the case of Cowpens, extensive advance planning was completed, but no construction followed. Conversely, Gloria Dei (Old Swede's) Church, the so-called Kosciuszko Memorial, and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal were included in the program, in spite of their lack of immediate involvement with the events being celebrated. Other non-Revolutionary areas were Fort McHenry, Fort

10. Gloria Dei Church is a colonial structure. The Kosciuszko House was a building in which the Polish count lodged briefly more than a decade after the Revolution. The C & O Canal was a successor of the Potomack Company, whose first president was Washington, but its institutional and physical history began in 1828.
Necessity, and Statue of Liberty, which received a kind of honorary Bicentennial status.

About sixty percent of the programmed funds were spent on construction contracts. Research, planning, design, preparation of construction documents, contract administration, exhibit production, and overhead absorbed the balance. Somewhat more than seventy percent of that construction money went into five major undertakings at Colonial, Fort Stanwix, C & O Canal, Independence, and in the National Capital Parks. A total twenty-two units shared in the largesse of the official Bicentennial development.


Eighteen of the service's Bicentennial developments involved the construction of new or expanded interpretive facilities, including visitor centers. Fifty were restorations or stabilizations of historic structures; and four: Fort Stanwix, the Graff House and City Tavern, Independence, and the Yorktown entrenchments, were reconstructions. Roads, parking lots, utilities, and fire and intrusion alarm/suppression systems accounted for the remainder of the projects.

Merrill J. Mattes, writing from the dual vantage points of first-hand knowledge and a historian recording the events, identified six major problems that attended the program's execution.

12. Mattes was Manager of the Denver Service Center's Historic Preservation Team until his retirement in May 1975 and the author of the study cited in fn. 9.


A problem from which, in varying degrees, all others flowed was the nature of the budget cycle. In a reversal of the normal state of affairs, the service, without much warning, had an impressive sum of money available to it; and the
Denver Service Center, which had the major production role, was not equipped to handle its task. The normal budget cycle for construction—from preliminary design through final inspection—was three years. Under ideal conditions, archaeological and historical research, the assembly of a data base, and the completion of an approved master plan would have preceded the three-year cycle. The original $100,000,000 was programmed for a period beginning July 1, 1973, and extending through fiscal years 74, 75, and 76, with all construction completed by June 1976. Director George S. Hartzog declared, almost by ukase, that all Bicentennial projects would be completed by December 1975. Thus, as of July 1973, the service had only two and half years instead of the normal three to carry out an abnormal development program.

Under reasonable circumstances, the first Bicentennial fiscal year would have been 1972, providing three full years for the program's completion. But the service faced a set of circumstances that included the fact that the budget cycle was beginning a year late and an insurmountable December deadline. Those facts could not be changed. What could be altered was the Service Center's production rate. From a normal year maximum completion rate of approximately sixty-six percent, the rate had to rise to one hundred percent if the commemorative deadline were to be met. The degree of success attained in improving production was reflected in the fact that most projects were completed in early 1976.

14. Ibid., 11.

A second problem grew out of the time constraints that deranged the sequence between research and planning and the development phase. Under the best of prevailing conditions, inadequate time was often scheduled for the predevelopment work. In some cases, schedules made no provision for required research; and planning preceded upon superficial knowledge of the resources upon assumptions that had not been tested by adequate study. The research and planning phases were
frequently abridged to a degree that compromised the quality of the professional performance and its products. Their time-consuming natures made it difficult to integrate their practitioners into an accelerated development effort.

From the perspective of the professionals in the several disciplines, especially the ones recently recruited into the service, adjustments to a development-oriented application from an academic one was often frustrating. Pragmatic canons of timeliness, funding concerns, immediate utility, and subordination to managerial values often conflicted with professional standards of objectivity, intellectual curiosity, and pride of authorship absorbed and valued by the professional community. Tensions between institutional and professional values are common and often creative. But during stressful periods, balances are especially delicate; and the conflicts are corrosive.

The review of reports and plans was a third activity that caused problems, some of which were not definitively resolved by the end of the bicentennial. The Service Center had its own internal review system that included first line supervisors, team co-chairs, bi-regional team managers, legislative compliance personnel, and the Office of Quality Control. The central concerns were the professional adequacy of the components of the product packages and the packages' holistic quality. The park and regional offices reviewed in the interests of adequacy for meeting operational needs as delineated in master plans, memoranda of agreement, and task directives. The Washington Office, especially its Historic Preservation Office, reviewed for conformity to policy - that sometimes amorphous corpus of basic legislation, tradition, doctrinal dicta, and subjective opinion that is accorded general acceptance by Park Service personnel.

Two problems plagued the review process. One was the length of time consumed. Some steps were repetitive or superficial, with representatives of more than one office reviewing for the same purposes. All of them took too long, rendering deadlines meaningless. By common, if grudging, consent, the Service Center stream-
lined its internal review and persuaded the other interested offices to adhere to
deadlines of twenty to thirty days, after which approval would be assumed. Needless
to say, the Center's clients were not universally pleased when their tardy comments
did not result in desired changes.

The other problem was less tractable. It was concerned with the quality and
utility of reviews. From the standpoint of quality, post facto review has limited
value unless there is adequate time to incorporate effectively the fruits of the
review into the final product—assuming that those fruits merit inclusion. If
the reviewer's knowledge and perceptions are superior to those of the product's
authors or he invokes a higher standard of competence, his contributions can be
critical to the product's quality. Nothing in the service's organization insured
that quality of review by guaranteeing that reviewers would be more competent or
experienced than originators. The review function was determined by one's filling
a staff or managerial position rather than recognized professional leadership.

Thus a professional planner, designer, or researcher could devote several months
of thorough, informed effort to a subject or problem and have it reviewed by per-
sons with only a superficial, or even lay, knowledge of the subject and appropriate
methodology.

Effective and economical quality control can not be realized through review
unless that function is preceded by a consultative one during production. Ser-
vice organization did not provide for such an integration of technical super-
vision and support with sound disciplinary quality control.

The problem was compounded by the lack of professionally grounded performance
standards for most fields, except engineering and landscape architecture. The
Activity Standards provided minimum production requirements, but they supplied only
superficial guidance for determining whether a design, an archaeological excavation,
or a research manuscript met professional standards.
When the Bicentennial ended, the problem of the quality and usefulness of review remained unsolved. That the majority of products were of acceptable quality testified in favor of the competence of the professionals—no to the excellence of the organization's quality control system.

This may be the place to note that, as has been the case of non-Bicentennial projects, decisions concerning the application of policy sometimes outweighed technical considerations. Those decisions were not taken in a vacuum. In addition to the pressures caused by time constraints, political exigencies persuaded the service's leadership to interpret and apply policy in ways that were inconsistent with standard policy and professional judgment. While the Directorate was often adamantly in defending resource integrity through a strict invocation of policy, it was capable of more pragmatic flexibility when it acquiesced in the reconstruction of Independence's City Tavern and Fort Stanwix.

15. The "no reconstruction" policy, whose strict enforcement is favored by some philosophically-inclined professionals, was also violated in decisions to reconstruct Fort Vancouver and Bent's Old Fort. Consistency was not served when that policy was invoked in deciding not to reconstruct the field fortifications at Saratoga and ignored in determining to reconstruct the ones at Yorktown. The arguments for both were identical.

The Denver Service Center took on the Bicentennial program with a serious manpower shortage in critical professional and technical skills. President Nixon imposed upon all federal agencies exacerbated that shortage. The deficiency was particularly significant on the Historic Preservation Team, the service's key Bicentennial unit, especially affecting its architectural capability. Historical architects and preservation specialists (illogically called exhibit specialists) were limited to eight of the former and five of the latter. One of the architects, Orville Carroll was committed, or overcommitted, at Minute Man, Longfellow House, Salem Maritime, and Fort Stanwix. Another, Penelope Hartshorn Batchelor, was located in Philadelphia and assigned the key responsibility for the extensive Independence restoration/reconstruction work. A third, Archie Franzen, was committed to the C & O Canal...
and Harper's Ferry. That left five Laurence Coryell, Robert Simmonds, Harold 
La Fleur, T. Russell Jones, and Marshall MacDonald. Coryell was supervisory 
architect; and MacDonald died suddenly in December 1973.

The preservation specialists were itinerants, moving from job to job as the 
work required, spread much too thinly and working many hours of uncompensated 
over time.

The historical staff numbered ten persons, two of whom were Merrill Mattes, 
Manager of the Historic Preservation Team, and F. Ross Holland, Supervisory 
Research Historian. Four historians: Edwin C. Bearse, George Svejda, Charles W. 
Snell, and John Luzader were duty stationed in Washington, while John D. R. Platt 
and reemployed annuitant Charles Hatch were detached to Independence and Colonial, 
respectively, leaving only two functioning historians, Erwin N. Thomson and Anna 
Coxe Toogood, to work in Denver. The Bicentennial was underway only a few months 
when Holland transferred to the new North Atlantic Regional Office, to be succeeded 
by Luzader; and Hatch, who was expected to be, along with Luzader, a key subject 
matter specialist, was terminated because of health problems.

The options available to solve the manpower problems were limited. Recruiting 
new employees would not be a solution until relief was had from the presidentially- 
imposed ceiling. More immediate relief came from shifting architects from non-
historic design and planning work and converting them by fiat into historical 
architects. Critics later called attention to the transferees' lack of training 
in preservation technology, but a majority of them were able to compensate for 
that deficiency through on-the-job training, personal initiative, and association 
with more experienced colleagues. Construction supervisors received training that 
enabled them to fill the gaps in the restoration ranks more effectively than anyone 
expected. Beginning 19 July 1973, after the ceiling was eased, additional architects 
and historians, temporary, full-time, and part-time, were transferred from other 
agencies of recruited.
A glaring deficiency was the Service Center's lack of an archaeological capability. The first step in its correction was Dr. Wilfred Logan's transfer from the Mid-West Archeological Center in 1973. By the end of the program he had three professional assistants. Although most of their duties involved contract administration, an important beginning was made in building DEC's nascent anthropological potential.

By dint of resourcefulness, cooperation between service personnel staff and Civil Service Commission people, and luck, the Historic Preservation Team's staff numbered seventy-five persons at the peak of the Bicentennial development. Other teams, especially the Mid-Atlantic/North Atlantic Team, experienced similar, if less spectacular, growth.


Another problem that Nattes identified was the mechanism for contracting for design and construction work. Timeliness and quality were not adequately served, especially in instances involving historic preservation efforts.

It was determined, for example, that the limit of contract design costs of 5 percent of estimated construction costs was unrealistic in circumstances calling for abnormal effort (overtime) to meet tight deadlines; accordingly a ruling was secured that in certain certified circumstances exceptions could be made in this area. A special waiver was obtained also regarding the public notice requirement for small contracts where meeting deadlines would be defeated by such procedures. 17

17. Ibid., 22-23.

The most important procedural change was made by substituting the standard of selecting the lowest bidder from among those responding to an advertisement by negotiating with a limited number of pre-selected bidders. This produced a cost
plus fee contract, more closely supervised by Center personnel, in place of a fixed price one, monitored by service personnel. The circumstances that would justify the nonconforming procedure were:

1) The historic fabric required unusual preservation methods which had to be improvised on a continuing basis.

2) The restoration work required special experience in that specialized field in order to achieve innovative and unconventional solutions.

3) The imponderables of the old structure made it impossible to draft accurate detailed plans or definite contract documents.

4) Hazardous conditions resulting from the presence of old materials required flexible methods of decision making to ensure safety to workmen and structure.

5) Some degree of continuing research and experimentation of indeterminate cost, was needed to make final selection of suitable materials and ensure structural stability.

6) A close working relationship between the contractor and construction supervisor (restoration specialist) must be ensured, and such specialist must have freedom to perform actual work on the job as conditions warrant. 18


The obligation to treat historic fabric and its integrity with particular care complicated these conditions. In some cases, the salvage and preservation of representative components that required replacement were justified to contribute what was sometimes pretentiously referred to as "the state of the art."

Construction work did not monopolize the contracting picture. Archaeological and historical research that for one reason or another overtaxed the Service Center's capabilities were contracted for. Achieving an acceptable level of performance for such personal services was attended by some frustrating problems. Academics often found site-oriented, applied research, with its obsession with detail, uncongenial. Some foundation-centered professions did not enjoy working within the pragmatic limits of the service's cultural resource program entailed.
Others looked upon the service as an uncritical client who would provide a source of funds without imposing a too-demanding standard. Correcting that misapprehension consumed time and bruised egos. Experienced establishment that in a majority of cases contracting for personal services was, in the final analysis, more expensive and less productive than using service personnel. There were some important exceptions, but exceptions they remained.

The degree of success realized by the service was due, in the main, to the skill of Chief Contracting Officer Leon Thyesen and such members of his staff as Peter Meyer, Robert Laubenheim, Everett Simpson, and William Siney, and the staff archaeologists and historians who helped administer the contracts.

We have noted that that the Bicentennial did not occur in a vacuum; and Mattes noted that fact as the sixth problem. While all organizational levels accorded the first priority to the Bicentennial, the service’s responsibility to its non-Revolutionary natural and cultural resources could not ignored completely. In fact, they made legitimate, sometimes pressing, demands upon the service’s capabilities. Of the eight regions, three—the North Atlantic, Mid-Atlantic, and Southeast, plus the pro-region, the National Capital Parks—were parties to the Bicentennial development program. The other five regions continued to compete for funds and manpower to execute programs affecting their areas. Western congressmen may have shared the patriotic fervor of their eastern colleagues, but they certainly did not believe that the national celebration should exclude their constituencies from participation in more mundane programs—and the budget if Congress’s creature.

It is true that general development in non-Revolutionary areas was limited or deferred; however, pollution abatement and historic preservation construction projects continued to required the skills of Service Center engineers, historical architects, historians, and construction supervisors.

Merrill Mattes did not cite another problem that is a part of the record of how the service performed its bicentennial role. The Service Center’s organization has been described in the preceding chapter. To recapitulate: That organization
19. Suora,

attempted to blend functional and team modes into a structure that partook of both. The basic units were the regional teams, each one assigned to provide professional planning and design services for a region. Superimposed on this geographically-oriented pattern was a functional one that provided for teams, divisions, and offices that supplied service-wide expertise in construction, graphics, specifications, interpretive planning, surveys, and historic preservation. The teams' organizational integrity was compromised by the fact that, in theory, their personnel were divided into two groups: the core team members who included supervisors, some senior professionals, and clerical persons, and the other professionals came under the supervision of chiefs of planning, design, and construction. In practice, the team members were supervised by the appropriate core team personnel. This self-concious attempt to meld the potentially conflicting values of geographic and functional responsibility and flexibility came a cropper when the Civil Service performed its 1974 audit and the Service Center underwent an extensive reorganization. Those events are noted earlier in this study.

20. Suora.

While the Center's management was able to reconcile itself to the existence of the extra-team functional units that were concerned with construction, graphics, surveys, and specifications, it was less comfortable with the anomaly represented by the Historic Preservation Team. That organization, whose activities were critical to the Bicentennial program, was unabashedly functional in both philosophy and structure and indifferent to regional boundaries. The majority of managers believed that the archaeologists, historians, historical architects, and restoration specialists should be assigned to the regional teams and integrated into the planning and design branches. The cultural resource professionals, supported by the Associ-
ate Director for Preservation argued that flexibility in matching professionals to resources and effective technical supervision were better served by a separate, functionally-oriented unit. They further contended that abolishing a team that was so essential to the execution of the bicentennial program would jeopardize that program. Those arguments did not persuade the local leadership; and at least twice—during 1973 and again during the Center's 1975 reorganization—attempts were made to incorporate the historical functions into the regional teams. The latter did reduce the preservation unit to the status of a division, making it administratively inferior to the teams.

Whatever the merits advanced for reorganization and regardless of claims for long-term benefits, reorganizations exact high costs in morale and productivity that are especially taxing when they occur during expanded programs. A case could be made that the Service Center's reorganization did effect some managerial improvements, but its impact on productivity and professional performance during the Bicentennial was, at least temporarily, deliterius. The adverse effects were limited by the average employee's and supervisor's ability to cope with institutional distractions and get on with his work.

The Bicentennial's influence on the service's professional capabilities was less controversial. The impetus provided by the expanded and accelerated schedule had immediately tangible results on the Historic Preservation Team's complement of historians. Within a few months, one historian transferred from the U. S. Army's Office of the Chief of Military History to the Service Center, followed shortly thereafter by a transferee from General Services Administration. A valuable former employee returned from an assignment with the Air Force history staff; and a new man was recruited from academia. A temporary appointment that did not count against the personnel ceiling and a student trainee joined the staff.

21. John Albright, James D. Moore, Louis Torres, and Jerome Greene respectively.
Another historian was recruited as an "in-take trainee." The number of holders of advanced degrees engaged in full-time research increased by fifty-five per cent. The improvement of the service historical capability was a major step in slow recovery from a period of decline that occurred during the mid-1960s. The post-1966 recovery, significant as it was, was weakened by the retirements of such pioneer leaders as John Hussey, Roy Appleman, and Albert Manucy and the reorganization of the Washington Office's Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation (OAHP), which fragmented the service's central corps of historians and placed the operational personnel in the developmentally-oriented planning and design centers.

In spite of the strengthening of the historical capability, it continued to suffer from some important deficiencies, the most glaring of which was the absence of an architectural historian.

With all its improved potential, the historical capability experienced two reverses that threatened to jeopardize its ability to meet its responsibilities. Charles Hatch, a veteran whose career dated from the 1930s and who possessed an expert knowledge of Yorktown, had been retained as a reemployed annuitant to conduct the critical documentary research for that place's expensive development. Personal tragedies and poor health forced him to end his long, productive career during the summer of 1971. Two accomplished military historians, Jerome Greene and Erwin Thompson, replaced him; and their studies were Bicentennial landmarks. The second was George Sveda, an immigration history specialist, whose performance outside his specialty was so inadequate as to force his transfer to a regional office and his eventual separation.

The historians' accomplishments were sources of much indispensable knowledge and considerable self-congratulation. As a profession, service historians have
suffered from a minority complex that borders on the chronic; and any experience that relieves its symptoms is constructive. They were vital to the Bicentennial's success—and even the most benighted philistine knew it. The twelve historians who worked in the Service Center's historical unit between January 1972 and July 1976 completed more than two hundred studies, of which seventy-five related to officially designated Bicentennial areas. Several of those reports were major research undertakings that contributed significantly to knowledge of the Revolution. However, the service would have been helpless to accomplish its tasks if it had not had available to it the results of earlier research, much of it dating from the 1950s and 60s. In fact, large parts of its program at Colonial, Fort Moultrie, Fort Stanwix, Salem, Saratoga, Independence, Hopewell Village, Morristown, King's Mountain, and Minute Man would not have become realities if the earlier research and writing had not been done. The three years covered by the Bicentennial were inadequate to complete research requirements.

The service's ambivalence regarding the role of the historical architect as a practitioner of a distinct discipline helped create a weak professional posture from which to address a major preservation responsibility. In spite of the examples and efforts of men like Charles Peterson, Henry Judd, and Charles Grossman and the informed recognition of every other agency engaged in historic preservation, both here and abroad, a strong body of specialists, firmly grounded in preservation theory and practice, did not mature. The personal competence of individuals, adequate for the projects on which they worked, could not compensate for the absence of a strong institutional base. Consequently, the service was poorly equipped for carrying out the Bicentennial development.

Supervisory Architect Laurence Corvell and his successor, Vernon Smith, attacked their problem by recruiting new personnel and arranging for the transfer of architects from other organizations. Some of the new employees had received specialized preservation training, while others, like the traditionally educated older hands,
were fortunate if they had an interest in historic architecture. Most of the transferees adjusted well to the peculiarities of their new assignment and performed more creditably than almost anyone expected. The quality of the Historic Structure Reports and design and construction documents improved materially. Complex and diverse evidentiary and conservation problems challenged the personal and professional resources of the Service Center's staff. In a majority of cases, the work performed was a credit to the service and its professional people. If the Park Service can point with pride to the work at Independence, Minute Man, Colonial, and the Revolutionary forts, it is in large part, because diligence, professional pride, and intelligent supervision overcame inexperience and lack of training.

In terms of manpower, the ranks of the historical architects were stronger in 1976 than ever before, numbering almost fifty persons. The demands placed upon them honed or developed skills. But there was, at the same time, a serious lack of scientific expertise. Few members of the staff were firmly grounded in current investigative and conservation methods; and no service-wide scientific facility existed. For all its successes, the service's preservation effort was inadequately scientific; the few innovative contributions flowed from an experience that should have provided a fertile opportunity for disciplinary advances. The Park Service was lucky to have muddled through as well as it did.

The National Park Service's traditional leadership in archaeology was not conspicuous during the Bicentennial development. Of the three archeology centers, two were excluded by geography and expertise; and the third, the Southeast Archeological Center, was only peripherally involved. The Service Center had two men working at the site of Fort Stanwix in Rome, N.Y., and beginning in 1973, an experienced supervisory archeologist, Dr. Wilfred Logan. The two at Rome moved to other assignments; and the Center was left with no seasoned staff of historical archeologists. What it did have was from two to four recently recruited, part-time or temporary employees who spent a significant part of their time on surveys mandated by the Historic Preservation Act of 1966. Dr. John Cotter, who as a re-
employed annuitant functioned as regional archaeologist in Philadelphia, provided on-site support at Independence. Most of the Bicentennial program was accomplished through contracts with academic and private practice professionals; and Dr. Logan and his staff performed yeoman service in administering those contracts and as consultants for their colleagues in the Service Center.

Historical archaeology had not enjoyed the same degree of institutional status as that accorded Indian archaeology. It did not emerge from the Bicentennial experience significantly stronger, largely because the service did not support a program that would provide the necessary climate.

The Bicentennial provided an opportunity for a tentative effort to develop a historical landscape architecture capability. One person, Arnold Gustafson, joined the Historic Preservation Team in that capacity, but devoted most of his time to administering contracts at Colonial and Salem Maritime. The Center's management was skeptical about a permanent need for that speciality; and the service still has no expertise in a field in which it should be a leader.

Beyond executing its program, the most important institutional fact associated with the Bicentennial experience was the existence of a service-wide historic preservation organization that integrated the appropriate disciplines. The second most important fact is that its potential was not realized.

Was the Bicentennial a success? The most favorable verdict is a qualified "yes."

As a development program addressing parks' physical needs, it left the official Bicentennial areas with improved facilities, restored or reconstructed historic features, and new or updated exhibits. The service emerged from the period with an enhanced professional corps, in both numbers and experience. If measured against the department's proposed role, as it was defined in the secretary's 1970 report to the Bicentennial Commission, the performance was less impressive. The non-developmental needs received only superficial attention as development-oriented tasks taxed the service's resources. Very little archaeological and historical research
and writing directed toward interpretation of significant events was undertaken. A few manuscripts were published for sales in the parks, but there was only limited concerted effort to make the results of service research available to the public. A few proposals were made to investigate important subjects or themes represented by service areas, but they never received respectable priority. In general, it can not be claimed that the Bicentennial was characterized by vision and inspiration. In that, as in much else, the service reflected the national mood—probably deviating therefrom on the side of quality.
Key Bicentennial Program Personnel

Washington Office

Directors — Ronald Walker; Gary Everhart
Deputy Directors — Russell Dickenson; William Briggle
Associate Director — Ernest A. Connally; John Cook
Assistant Directors — Raymond Freeman; Robert M. Utley
Chief Historian — Harry W. Pfanz
Chief Historical Architect — Henry Judd
Chief Archeologist — Douglas Scovill
Bicentennial Coordination Office — Julie Rowe, Jean Henderer, James Hunter
Bicentennial Action Group Chairman — Russell Dickenson
Programming — Lowell G. Sturgill, George Gowans, William Quick

Northeast Region (1974 — reorganized as Mid-Atlantic Region with changed boundaries)

Director — Chester Brooks
Assistant Director, Cultural Resources — Sydney Bradford
Archaeologist — John Cotter
Historian — John Bond
Architect — Henry Magaziner
Coordinator — Laurence Correll (after mid-1973)
Programs Officer — Vincent Mauro

North Atlantic Region

Director — Jerry Wagers
Assistant Director, Cultural Resources — F. Ross Holland
Architect — Blaine Cliver
Historian — Ricardo Torres-Reyes
Coordinator and Deputy Director — Dennis P. Galvin
Programs Officer — William Locke

Southeast Region

Director — David Thompson
Historical Architect — John Garner
Historian — Lenard Brown
Chief, Southeast Archeological Center — Peter Faust
Coordinator — Benjamin Davis
Programming Officer — Vincent Gannon

Denver Service Center

Manager — Glenn Hendrix; John Henneberger
Deputy Manager — David Wright; Donald Bressler
Assistant Managers

North East Team (1975 — reorganized as Mid-Atlantic/ North Atlantic Team)
Robert Steenhagen
Southeast Team (1975 — merged into Southeast/Southwest Team — Arthur Beyer)
Southeast/Southwest Team — John W. Bright
National Capital Team — Edward Peets; Elwood Rensch
Historical Preservation Team (1975 — redesignated a division)
Chief - Merrill Mattes; John Luzader
Supervisory Historian - F. Ross Holland; John Luzader
Supervisory Architect - Laurence Corvell; Vernon Smith
Supervisory Archaeologist - Wilfred D. Logan
Chief C & O Canal Restoration Team - Richard Huber
Professional Support Division, Chief - Howard Haiges
Graphics Division, Chief - Henry Drews
Contracts Division, Chief - Leon Thygesen
Construction, Chief (until July 1975) - Allen Heebner

Field Construction Coordinators:
Chief - Kramer Chapman
Independence - Fred Spencer
Colonial - James Congrove
National Capital Parks - Wayland Fairchild
Programming Chief - Robert Lunte; Donald Bressler; Richard Falb
Quality Control Chief - John W. Blyght; Donald Bressler
Engineering Systems Chief - Charles Riebe
Bicentennial Coordinator - Donald Benson; Donald Bressler

Harpers Ferry Center
Manager - Marc Sagan
Deputy Manager - Ellsworth Swift
Assistant - William Brown
Research Services - David Wallace
Chief Curator - Harold Peterson
Chief, Exhibits - Russell Hendrickson
Special Assistant - Alan Kent
Service Center Liaison - Ralph Roan
CHAPTER VII

Restructuring the Denver Service Center

While the Denver Service Center was still maturing its internal structure, developing its complex relationships with the Washington and regional offices, and deep into the Bicentennial program it became the subject of a Civil Service personnel management audit that became the catalyst for changes that permanently affected its organization. To understand the events that attended and followed the audit, it is necessary to review the Center's structure as it existed in mid-1972, a year and a half after its 1970 reorganization.

The Center's chief was its manager, reflecting the service's infatuation with current administrative terms. His authorized immediate staff included an administrative assistant and four offices: 1) Quality Control and EIS Coordination; 2) Administrative Services; 3) Contract Administration; and 4) Equal Employment Opportunity; and two associate managers. One of these was the associate manager for professional support, who supervised five functional divisions: 1) planning; 2) design; 3) construction; 4) graphics; and (5) surveys. The other supervised eight "Planning and Design Teams": 1) Mid-Atlantic and North Atlantic; 2) Southeast; 3) Southwest; 4) Western; 5) Pacific Northwest; 6) Rocky Mountain and Midwest; 7) National Capital; and (8) Historic Preservation. Except for the "core" members of the planning and design teams, the

1. See Chapter V.
character in relationship with the agency of which it was a component. The logic of the Center's mission dictated that it would be a functional unit. However, the service is organized into geographic regions, each with its particular resources and priorities. By 1972, the regional offices had more than eclipsed the Washington Office as centers of real authority. However, that accretion of power was not accompanied by a restoration of professional capabilities - most of which had been concentrated in the Service Center.

Without versatile operational professional staffs of their own, the regional directors were determined to have an effective representative in the Service Center - one that would ensure that regional priorities and interests would have a controlling voice in the performance of professional tasks. The regionally-identified planning and design teams provided that representation and were in a real sense extensions of the regional directors' staffs.

The Service Center, like its eastern and western prototypes, was fundamentally functional rather than geographic in function and form. Its mission was to provide a service-vise, multi-disciplinary capability that could respond to agency needs without being limited by geographically dictated priorities.

Thus while the Service Center's organization was awkward, it reflected the anomalies inherent in an attempt to accommodate competing and conflicting administrative and functional values. However well-intentioned the architects of its organization, it was inevitable that the Service Center would eventually be subject to a critical review of its personnel management by the Civil Service Commission. Its structure was simply too nonconforming to current management theory and policy.

The Civil Service Commission's Denver Regional Office conducted its evaluation between 8 July and 10 August 1971. The auditing team consisted of five members.
of that office staff: Glenn Sutton, Personnel Management Specialist; Peter G. Thiel, Occupational Health Representative; Gary B. McDaniel, Labor Relations Officer; Gary J. Bracken, of the Personnel Management Training Institute; and John W. Still, Personnel Management Specialist. The "agency participant" was Seymour Kotschek, Chief of the National Park Service's Branch of Compensation, Evaluation, and Employee Relations.

The team collected the information for its assessment from the following sources: 1) seventy-eight interviews with personnel; 2) 156 responses to questionnaires distributed to approximately 250 employees; 3) desk audits and supervisory interviews of twenty-three positions; 4) reviews of position descriptions; 5) reviews of a sample of fifty-six promotions; 6) review of forty-five other personnel actions; review of records of training, performance evaluations, incentive awards, suspensions, disciplinary actions, adverse actions, and equal employment opportunity actions; and (5) review of agency and Center policies and their implementation relating to labor-management relations, training, promotion, placement, equal opportunity employment, and position classification.

At the time of the review, the Service Center had 365 permanent and 117 non-permanent employees. About half of the permanent employees were professionals, approximately one-fourth were clericals, and another fourth occupied administrative and technical support positions. The majority of temporary employees were in clerical jobs. There were 117 female employees; and twenty-six employees were members of classified minorities, representing twenty-three and five per cent respectively. The women's average grade was 5.7 compared with 10.1 for men. The average grade for minority workers was 6.9 and 10.2 for non-minority personnel.


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The evaluation team reported on six topical areas: position management and classification; promotion and internal placement; equal employment opportunity; obtaining quality personnel; training; and management performance. Except for the last two, its assessment was unfavorable.

The objectives in reviewing position management and classification were to evaluate the Service Center's effectiveness in meeting the following goals: 1) pay equity and compliance with the Classification Act; 2) economy and efficiency of operations, supported by clear definitions of responsibility and authority; and (3) suitable career progression and opportunities.

Not surprisingly, the team's survey of the Service Center's history and organization since its formation in 1971 showed that little progress had been made toward/economy in staffing that was supposed to result in merging the eastern and western centers into one in Colorado. That justification was specious on its face. There had been no corresponding diminution of workload. In fact, the opposite was the case. Neither was there any resulting organic improvement in performance through making the performance of the work more expeditious. In fact, the Center's distance from most of the resources it served and from the sources for planning and research data had made the accomplishment of essential tasks more difficult and expensive.

These facts had been confirmed by a recent Department of the Interior management audit that revealed that personnel reductions had been "minimal." However, neither that audit nor the review that was underway attacked the merger that created the Denver Service Center and assumed that the undesirable results flowed from "flawed" center practices. The team further reported that a number of 1-17 positions were admitted to various positions including that "rather than refine a leger de anination structure, management is
pursued a policy of obtaining the highest grade levels possible, e. g., several secretary positions upgraded, the request to upgrade team managers, an auditor raised from GS-12 to GS-13, and the delegation of authority to a large number of jobs.

3. Ibid., 3.

The team audited a twenty-three-position sample to examine the base level of work performed by employees engaged in planning and design, since that work was identified as key to the accomplishment of the Center's mission. The audit concluded that eight positions were "not supported at the grade level allocated"—that eight others were "very weak," and that seven position descriptions supported current grade levels. The reviewers decided that "reviews of ten positions indicated nine allocations were not substantiated at their grade levels." Furthermore, they claimed that classification maintenance was weak. Nineteen percent (101) position descriptions were not available for review; four percent were in draft form pending allocation; seventy-three percent were current; and four percent were in draft form after allocation. The Annual Certification (Summary Form 1C-147) indicated that as of 30 June 1974, supervisors considered only forty-seven positions in need of revision. Most internal audits were conducted in response to specific events, such as requests for promotion.

Based upon the audits and some interviews, the team concluded that "job dilution" was a serious problem, especially at the GS-13 level, in that many higher graded personnel were spending a disproportionate part of their time on lower level duties, including drafting, that could be
performed by members of the technical support staff. The review team also alleged that there was a lack of understanding of the responsibilities of both individuals and units. Not surprisingly, they noted that work was assigned with slight concern about grade level. Their elucidation of that point is worth quoting because it reflected the personnel specialists' difficulty in understanding the problems that attend the effective utilization of specialized professionals in executing a service-wide program, especially one that did not conform to the examples found in personnel manuals. They observed:

Because of the nature of the DSC organization, projects are assigned to individuals on the basis of availability, professional expertise, and personal preference of the team manager. This arrangement does have advantages in terms of flexibility, responsiveness, and opportunity for creativity. However, it results in a large number of high graded employees spending a relatively small amount of time performing grade controlling duties. We feel the Service Center should be aware of the disadvantages and costs of organizing and assigning work in this way. While nearly all incumbents of GS-12 positions perform some GS-13 level work (barely enough to justify a borderline evaluation), our findings indicate that fewer, better utilized GS-12 positions could accomplish the same amount of difficult work.

Because some difficult work is assigned to almost all professionals, there is pressure to upgrade every professional job to the GS-13 level; an allegation that would have surprised most of the employees. In effect, there is an informal career ladder with GS-12 as the journeyman level. Professional employees in GS-12 expect to be promoted to this level without competition because they perceive (correctly) that they are performing at substantially the same level as those employees already in GS-13. Management also perceives the similarity in difficulty of work and has upgraded a number of jobs from GS-12 to GS-13. These upgrades have aggravated the job dilution problem and have perpetuated the perception of GS-12 as the unofficial "journeyman level."

7. Ibid.

The lack of formal, consistently applied career advancement system reduced the credibility of the cooperative promotion program through frequent use of competitive promotion, "career" to reinforce the perception that classification is denied upon the individual's qualification.
rather than the positions' duties.

The reviewers concluded that none of the three position management and classification scales had been met and that the most important "single factor contributing to the problem is that position management and classification are handled almost exclusively on a case-by-case basis."

The auditors recommended the following actions to correct the position management deficiencies:

1) Conduct an organization analysis to include:
   a) definition of authority and responsibility of each position
   b) definition of criteria to be used in assigning work to persons in each grade level
   c) complete classification of all positions
   d) utilization studies to determine the need for additional support in lieu of professional positions
   e) consideration of establishing a policy of contracting the less difficult projects.

2) Establish career ladders for major occupations with defined journeyman grades based upon the results of the organization study.

3) Build a position classification maintenance system to provide continuing attention to pay equity and effective position management.

4) Take immediate steps to preclude further job dilution and potential morale problems through the following actions:
   a) correct obvious errors, i.e., "incument only" allocations
   b) prohibit permanent promotions above GS-12 until the organization analysis is complete
   c) establish a tentative table of organization for each unit, including projected grade levels for each position at or below present levels, allowing no positions to be filled at higher grades until the study is completed.

The Civil Service Commission would assess the effectiveness of the
actions taken by examining the adequacy of the Service Center's plan to comply with classification standards and the degree of progress made. It also would monitor future classification audit results, the results of the organization analysis, and the fixing of journeyman grades for career ladder occupations. Cost savings and other economies that were expected to result from improving position management would be reviewed.

The second area studied was promotion and internal placement, whose goals were identified as ensuring the highest possible quality of employees and providing equal consideration of "all qualified candidates based on merit factors." The evaluation included the review of the records of 140 promotion actions processed since January 1973 and interviews with personnel specialists and members of promotion panels. The auditors found that:

1) Supervisors and managers interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the promotion system, particularly the Service-wide Career Development and Placement plan, stating that certificates often contain names of applicants entirely unsuitable for professional positions at the DSC.

2) Selecting officials have circumvented or interfered with competitive procedures in order to obtain the person they felt was best qualified. For example, names were added to certificates after they were received, applicants were considered after vacancy announcements were closed, and selecting officials indicated persons whose names should appear on certificates.

3) Qualifications for jobs filled under the local plan were faced with problems which precluded assurance that eligibles certified were actually the best qualified for the position. In most cases, panel members did not receive instructions on how to rate applicants, nor did they have specific knowledge of that required for successful performance in the particular job. Because of the lack of information, panel members rated applicants on irrelevant factors. For example:

Applicants living in the local area were given preference over non-local applicants.

Previous or current Park Service employees were given preference over other applicants.

Applicants who possessed skills which the panel felt were either in short supply or highly marketable, other than the skills required in the job for which they applied, were retained in the file and were not considered equally with others.
Applicants who were at the same grade level as the position vacant were not given equal consideration as they "could not profit" by being certified.

Applicants who stated they were about to lose their job were given preference while those who had just accepted a job were not given equal consideration.

4) A large number of non-competitive promotions and reassignments were effected in violation of requirements for competition.

In November 1972, 32 reassignments were effected non-competitively on the basis of a memorandum issued by the DSC Manager. Ten of the affected employees have since been promoted.

Of the 120 promotion actions received, 71 were processed competitively and 99 were processed non-competitively. One-third of the non-competitive actions were based on unplanned accretion of higher-level duties and responsibilities, one-fourth were career promotions based on previous competition, and the remainder were excluded from competition because they purportedly were made in jobs where promotion potential was inadvertently omitted from records processed prior to January 1973.

A number of the "gradual accretion" promotions evidenced misunderstanding of the proper use of this exception. For example, old and new position descriptions differed only in terms of the level of supervision received, a factor which must result from planned management action.

The review team concluded that the Service Center's promotion and placement practices frequently did not operate in a manner that attracted the most highly qualified personnel; that the practices did not assured consideration of all qualified candidates; and that the Service Center consistently "violated the requirements of the Federal Merit Promotion Program and agency promotion requirements."

6. Ibid., 8-9

The conclusion was that the restructured actions seemed antithetical. The most apparent was that a work force made up of transient, employees, 24 percent, were not required to meet permanent controls for
processing promotions that would obtain "top-quality" personnel and assure
the equitable consideration of all applicants. Training sessions for supervi-
sors would clarify situations in which "gradual accretion" promotions
would be proper.

The third area that the examiners reviewed was equal employment op-
portunity, one of the era's pieties to which almost every ambitious civil
servant paid some expedient lip-service. Like all pieties, it spawned its
share of flummery and evasion. A steady stream of directives, memoranda,
and procedural edicts flooded into the in-boxes of managers, supervisors,
and personnel specialists telling them to provide equal employment oppor-
tunity and upward mobility, to prove that they were abandoning their be-
nighted ways, and making compliance with the new order a factor in ap-
praising performance. Simple-minded faith in the power of official pro-
nouncements was not entirely misplaced. Men who had been indifferent or
hostile to equal rights issues were converted by legislative mandate and
Civil Service Commission regulations into custodians of minority interests.
The newfound civic piety not infrequently advanced the interests of both
the converted and the intended beneficiaries.

As pieties will, EEO flew in the face of accepted, even mandated,
policies and practices; and the problem of how the new standards were
to be incorporated into a merit system which was itself vulnerable to
abuse and evasion was not easily solved. Conscientious managers and super-
visors faced conflicting requirements of fairness that challenged in-

genuity and principle.

Interviews with Service Center personnel indicated that the employees
believed that they were not discriminated against. The Center also received
credit for conducting negotiations for cooperating agreements with colleges
that had large numbers of minority students and for having established an

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EEO Committee and a network of counselors. However, the absence of women and members of minorities from higher-graded professional positions, the absence of a current-year Affirmative Action Plan, and the lack of commitment by most managers and supervisors earned the disapproval of the auditors.

The reviewers reached the internally contradictory conclusion that the "net effect of management's efforts has been an environment of non-discrimination," but that that was not sufficient because "Affirmative action has been nearly non-existent with the result that progress toward EEO goals has been minimal." If one assumed that these goals were to lead to a non-discriminatory environment, the conclusion's statements were irreconcilable. Correction of the flawed situation lay in procedural requirements that centred upon the performance of certain ritualistic actions. A careful reading


of the Commission's report tempted one to conclude that there was more concern with compliance with procedural formulae than with eliminating unfair hiring and promotion practices.

The auditors then turned their attention to the subject of how well the Service Center went about obtaining "quality" personnel. To that end, they posed three questions: 1) What planning was done to meet staffing needs?; (2) What recruitment sources and methods were employed?; and (3) How timely and effective were the success methods?

The examiners looked into the not-unusual handicap of having a knowledgeable and respected staff of the professions represented in the Service Center that ranged from licensed to unlicensed. And they seemed content with that state, resisting valiantly any attempt to educate them. Perhaps that made judgments easier to reach. At any rate, they found that EEO had done little to project manpower needs, ignoring the tentative nature of the programming
information upon which these needs had to be projected and the exigencies of the American Revolution Bicentennial program that made extraordinary demands upon the Service Center's resources.

In cooperation with the Center's administrative management specialist, the examiners developed a projection of staffing requirements for fiscal year 1975 that they expected to fill three needs: 1) provide a format for projecting losses and estimated manpower gains within the framework of expected ceiling and other restrictions; (2) to serve as a guide for recruitment, detailing the number and kinds of positions to be filled, and the types of appointments or programs to be used in filling them; and (3) to provide a vehicle through which the equal employment opportunity goals detailed in the Affirmative Action Plan could be translated into specific actions.

The examiners' survey persuaded them that recruitment for professional positions had been limited, almost exclusively, to the Service-wide Career Development and Placement Plan, personal referrals by SEC employees, and "walk-in" applicants, and that Civil Service Commission registers had been used primarily to fill temporary positions or to reach name-requested candidates. They argued that this approach led limited opportunities to make selections from among the best qualified available candidates and to meet the responsibilities for hiring minority and female candidates imposed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.

While finding the quality of Service Center professionals to be generally high, they also contended that highly qualified candidates had not been considered. In the first place, SEC rarely went to SEC registers for professionals without a "name request." If the name requested was within reach, other eligible were, in most cases, not given serious consideration. If the person requested were not within reach, Service Center appointing officials often cancelled
the certificates without considering the identified eligibles. Thus an unidentified number of qualified eligibles, who had a right to expect consideration, were excluded arbitrarily from the selection process.

Secondly, an important National Park Service policy militated against securing the most qualified person for a position. That was the requirement that positions at and above the GS-9 level had to be filled, if possible, through the EEE placement system, and that other sources could be used only if that system did not produce highly qualified eligibles. This meant that "best qualified" was defined as applying to those already working for the service. It also meant that a significant number of female and minority candidates were excluded.

Thirdly, there was very little "cutreach" recruitment. Individual managers, on their own initiative, occasionally sought contacts with professional societies, colleges, and universities, but they were not rewarded for doing so; and there was no planned, intensive program for exploiting those sources.

The Service Center operated under a strict manpower ceiling that had been imposed by the Washington Office and the Department of the Interior in response to the Nixon administration's political commitment to reducing federal employment. To function within that ceiling, the Center resorted to temporary appointment, which included approximately one-third of the current employees. The problem was that the highest qualified eligibles on most Civil Service registers would not accept temporary appointment, hoping to obtain permanent employment. Therefore, the managers did not have access to a major source of quality candidates for significant numbers of positions. The Park Service policy violated Civil Service Commission regulations against filling continuing positions with temporary appointments by not providing full open competition and
undermining the merit system's principles. There was no disputing the substance of those findings; the Service Center was not in a position to be able to take a very elevated position in corning the deficiencies. It had not created the ceiling; it had a program that had to be executed, including the Revolution Bicentennial; and it did not have the permanent staff to perform that task; and it was not the EEO system's creator.

The palliatives recommended included the Service Center's obtaining approval to recruit from all sources simultaneously, developing joint DSC and personnel office recruitment plans, coordinating staffing efforts with "EEO actions such as contacts with minority and women's organizations, and efforts to enlist minority and female students in cooperative education and work-study programs," and attempting to establish more realistic ceiling requirements.

8. Ibid., 1h-17.

The auditors were favorably impressed by the quality of training received by DSC employees, perhaps more so than the recipients of that training. There was certainly a generous training budget of $5,165.00 that was equitably distributed. All but two supervisors had received supervisory training. The intake training was considered more than adequate. Approximately half the supervisors made training a subject of employee conferences; and trainees completed evaluation forms that were at least kept on file. No one appeared to be seriously interested in determining whether the evaluations resulted in improvements, but then it's procedure and that seemed to satisfy the examiners.


The examiners' approval of the quality of EEO analyses fell short of ecstatic, but it was more favorable than the employees and some of the managers.
believed was highly developed, albeit quite informal, communications between management and employees and vice-versa. The workforce appears to be well motivated toward doing a quality job and are consistently rewarded for a job well done. This is accomplished through frequent informal feedback by supervisors to employees, by the use of honor awards and official commendations, and through liberal use of cash awards, and Quality Step Increases. Most employees feel that good performance is adequately recognized and rewarded."

10. Ibid., 20.

The thoroughness of the examiners' study of this area was not convincing in light of the fact that more than twenty percent of the employees had either never been evaluated or had received no evaluation within the previous two years and the examiners' statement that the only disciplinary action taken within the past two years was the withholding of within-grade increases for two employees. In connection with that finding, the number of increases withheld appears to have been almost triple the alleged number; and $200 was in the process of attempting to terminate one employee and beginning to assemble information to discharge another. Other disciplinary actions, including oral and written

11. Ibid., 20-21; Historic Preservation Files.

reprimands were matters of record.

The Civil Service Commission audit became a landmark in the Denver Service Center's history less because of its contents than for the way in which the Center's management responded to it. As was noted in the reviewers' report, the audit had three goals: 1) effect pay equity and compliance with the Civil Service Classification Act; (2) effect an economy and efficiency of
of operations supported by clear definitions of responsibility and authority; and (3) provide equitable career progression patterns and opportunities. The Commission gave DSC a year in which to bring its personnel management into compliance with regulations and to begin the correct the deficiencies alleged in the audit.

The first step taken was preparation of an "action plan" that detailed the actions that were to be taken in complying with the Commission's mandates. The first of these was an examination and clarification of DSC's role and function by Assistant Director Ray Freeman and his assistant, Russell Olsen. Their deadline was 15 October 1971. David Wright, Robert Budz, Thomas Gregory, and Robert Walton undertook the demanding task of studying and clarifying the Service Center's current organizational components by 15 October. By 15 November, Olsen, Thomas Lee, Ira Butter, David Wright, Robert Budz, William Jones, Donald Bressler, Lawrence Woodson, and a regional office representative were to "clarify the organization pattern for DSC within the Team Manager Concept." On the same date, they would submit a definition of supervisory roles. Between 15 December and 15 July 1972, Regional Personnel Officer Art Haas and Classification Specialist Lawrence Woodson would conduct a comprehensive personnel audit. In the meantime, personnel specialists would establish five major levels for professionals, review temporary appointments, develop recruiting and upward mobility procedures, and submit an EEO plan/service on interterm promotion plan. By 15 October 1972, the classification compliance would be completed and a final report submitted to the Civil Service Commission.

Two related matters were major sources of concern to Service Center personnel. The first and more personal one was the effect of the unfolding events upon careers. Would people be fired, transferred, downgraded, or promoted? Who was anyone representing individual employees' interests—or were they part in the shifts that would inevitably accompany the actions taken under the guise of compliance with Civil Service mandates? The answers to these and other questions depended upon how the second matter—the Center's structure—emerged; and it was to reorganization that the task force addressed its attention and energies, while suspicious employees exchanged rumors, ingratiated themselves with potential patrons, and managed to carry out a heavy Revolutionary War bicentennial development program.

Contrary to an impression common among the service's employees, both within the JSC and in the regions, the Personnel Management Evaluation did not mandate a reorganization. It listed "required actions" as:

1) "Take appropriate steps to bring all JSC positions into compliance with JSC classification standards by October 1, 1974. Provide the Denver Region with a plan for achieving this objective by October 1, 1974."

2) "Comply with OEO and agency regulations concerning promotion and internal placement actions."

3) "Prepare and submit by September 30, 1974, to the JSC Denver Region an affirmative action plan which meets the requirements of FMR Letter 711-22 and Denver Region Letter 713-29. JSC's Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Representative will provide assistance in preparing the plan."

4) "Revise Cooperative Education agreements to reflect the responsibilities of all parties for assuring equality of opportunity."

5) "Based upon a realistic evaluation of anticipated losses, gains and staffing needs, establish employment goals designed to activate a recruiting program which attracts applicants from all segments of the service center's recruiting community. Such goals are to be incorporated into a comprehensive internal upward mobility and external recruiting program which provides equal opportunity to minorities and women for employment in positions where such opportunity does not exist. Ensure that appropriate minority and women's groups are included in this effort and are aware of the numbers and kinds of positions to be filled."

6) "Develop, implement, and maintain a well-defined system for evaluating affirmative action program effectiveness and for measuring the results of JSC actions."

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7) "Review the use of temporary appointments and identify situations where these appointments are being used to fill positions for which there is a continuing need." 13


The were, in addition, twenty-one "recommended action," which were equally silent about reorganization. The actions that the Commission required and recommended could have been taken by the Service Center without reorganizing. Important persons within the Center favored a reorganization, however; and the decision to reorganize was a product of their influence and the way the task force elected to carry out its assignment to "clarify the organization pattern for DoC within the Team Manager Concept." The dominant figures in the story of the resulting realignment were Russell Gleen, DoC, and David Wright and Donald Dressler, DoC. They, more than any others, were the architects of the Denver Service Center's structure.

There is evidence that a majority of non-supervisory professionals favored a functional organization. Relations between offices, which had since the fall of 1971, insisted upon a regionally-oriented team structure, dictated that a purely functional organization would not receive serious consideration. The task force's assignment to "clarify the organization pattern . . . within the Team Manager Concept" reflected that reality. There would be geographic teams. The question was what kind of teams. The task force's committee produced what later came to be referred to as "Alternative Strong Team Concept."

15. Because the records on deposit in the NADD Denver Facilities include no activity plan that summaries internal documents, a comprehensive, sequential account of discussions and how decisions evolved is impossible to develop with a comfortable degree of certitude. The reader, therefore, is warned that this narrative contains some tentative conclusions.

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After citing the three goals that the evaluators used in their audit and the Action Plan's first four items, the task force committee presented "A Rationale For The Proposed Organization" that its members believed if only more than respond to the intent of the projected actions. This was because the proposed reorganization would "pinpoint responsibility for project accomplishment," clarify responsibility for supervision, and provide "flexibility to assign projects commensurate with the grade levels of the people who would be carrying out these projects." Teams would be enlarged, made "more integrated," and enjoy greater operating flexibility. Moving personnel among the teams to meet programming changes would become more simple. The timely performance of assignments and improved career opportunities would result from the proposed organization. There was nothing novel about these justifications. Every reorganization proposal that is embalmed in the service's records made similar promises.

The Service Center's direction would, of course, be the responsibility of its manager, who would have immediate supervision of staff functions, including equal opportunity employment, contract administration, office administration, and quality control and legislative compliance. Assisting him and having line authority would be the associate manager for operations and his deputy. They would be responsible for the center's routine operations and supervise the assistant managers. The latter would include the heads of the regional teams and an assistant manager for specialized services. The former, who occupied the most important operations positions, would be above the line supervisors of all the teams' functions in relation between 201 and the regional directors served by the several teams. The assistant manager for specialized services would supervise service-wide specialization - it would not be feasible to assign to regional teams.

The core of the organization, which, in the final analysis all other components were intended to support, would be the regional teams. Each would im-
include a planning, design, construction, and historic preservation section.

Provision for specialized skills that could not be duplicated on every team would come from the specialized services support team. Surveys, graphic services, technical, and scientific support activities would thus be available to the regional teams as the need arose. Technical support would include units to provide such specialized engineering skills as electronics, transportation, security, liaison with the Federal Highway Authority, construction specifications, and estimating. Scientific support would come from a small number of natural and social scientists, archaeologists, and historic preservation specialists.

Central to the strengthening of the regional teams were provisions for abolishing specialized functional units that were important vestiges of the Tom Vint heritage. Vint and his colleagues, whose careers preceded the era of regional director dominance and the Managerial Revolution, saw the design and service centers as confraternities of functional specialists whose assignments were founded upon competence without regard for geographic association. They also located supervision within the disciplines' senior professors and accorded specialists greater independence and more direct participation in decision-making. The Vint vision had always been under attack from administrators, especially regional officers, superintendents of large parks, and persons with a generalist bias. The task force, probably unconsciously because its membership included no one intellectually committed to the Vint school, proposed to administer the *occum de grace* to the functionally-oriented, professionally-biased deployment of skills. Their commitments were to their assigned task and the new managerial imperative with its weaker disciplinary values and the stronger generalist identification that their assignment reflected. The local institutional embodiment of that imperative was the "team concept." This identification with the new school of management did not mean that the task force's members were students of the literature being produced by such didactic organs as the Harvard Graduate School of Business.

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Administration. In fact, none showed the slightest interest in the new theories' academic and industrial spokesmen. The intellectual sources of their ideas are impossible to identify, probably confirming a suspicion that theoretical constructs account for very little in the service's bureaucratic alignments. Even the pragmatism that apparently informs organizational changes owes very little to pragmatic philosophy. While students of management certainly influence corporate organizations in the private sector, their impact upon the National Park Service is superficial—in spite of the numerous workshops conducted by management consultants who purport to be apostles of the new orthodoxy. Institutional and personal loyalties, self-interest, and responses to transient pressures have been more important catalysts than doctrine.

Consistent with the regional-specific organization they were proposing, the committee called for the abolition of two of the Service Center's autonomous functional units: Construction and Historic Preservation. The former's absorption into the bi-regional teams would give those teams full responsibility and control of the annual construction program, along with the functional construction specialists. The committee justified assigning historic preservation personnel to the teams by arguing that the service's cultural preservation function would be stronger and provide an "opportunity to insulate [sic] into all members of each team, the need to consider historic preservation as a matter of course on any project not only just historic preservation projects per se."

The acting manager of the Historic Preservation Team, that unit's personnel, and Washington Office conservationists took immediate and vigorous exception to the proposal to create a non-centralized professional organization. This consis-

16. For a detailed account of the several attempts to abolish the Center's historic preservation unit, see Miller, .

found formal expression in Associate Director for Professional Services Ernest Allan Connelly's 1972 memorandum to the director.
Dr. Connally noted that each of the three historic preservation professions: archaeology, history, and historical architecture, comprised several specialities that their practitioners had developed through study and experience. He argued that those specialities needed to be "applied singly and in combination wherever . . . they are needed, not limited by regional boundaries. The nature of the task is a much more logical basis on which to assign specialists than its location. The efficacy of that flexible approach has been demonstrated time and again, most notably in the bicentennial program, by the Historic Preservation Team as presently organized."

17. DSC Manager's File, Associate Director, Professional Services, to Director, 20 December 1971.

He observed that because the service's leadership, at all levels, tended to be "preoccupied with concerns other than historic law and practice," cultural resource preservation needed to be represented by persons and organizations who could and would express independent professional judgments.

Planning and development, especially in an organization such as DSC dominated by modern construction, can be made responsive to historic preservation needs only if the historic preservation staff operates from an institutional base . . . . Such influence as historic preservation has had . . . arises from its institutionalism. That the Historic Preservation Team has not had as much influence as desirable is chiefly a result of failure to institute a few simple procedural requirements, not of a failure to integrate its personnel with Regional Teams. 18

18. Ibid.

The associate director called attention to the truism that continuing interaction among professionals fosters growth and enhances the quality of their work. And he elucidates the obvious when he noted that expert supervision and review reinforces an organization's professionalism.

He correctly noted that nothing in the Civil Service Commission's criticism of Service Center management suggested a need to integrate historic preservation
personnel into the geographic teams; and he gave an in-depth analysis of reasons for the center's existence that he told:

We are aware that these considerations [professional values] may also apply . . . to some other disciplines represented at DEC. That this is so suggests that the proposed reorganization should be carefully considered against the background of why we have a central center for professional services. It is to provide for the most economical and efficient employment of scarce dollars and people. That means putting the supply where the demand is, service-wide. That means placing particular people in the particular jobs for which they are best qualified, service-wide. If we put most of the dollars and people in Regional teams, have we not lost much of our flexibility to connect supply to demand and to assign people according to qualifications? So why retain a central service center? Why not put the Regional teams in the Regional Offices, where they are closer to the job, cheaper, and more responsive to Regional Directors? If the Regional Team concept as proposed in this plan is adopted, the principal rationale for a central service center will have been demolished, and Regional teams should be placed in the regions. In our view, however, DEC should be retained and organized according to its major professional services so as to field the best combination of talent for a particular job wherever it is located in the National Park System. 19

Ernest Allen Connally spoke for the values that had informed the creation of the design and service centers. It followed that he was not an advocate of the emerging managerial concepts that relegated discipline's canons to a subordinate role. Knowledgeable and articulate as he was, the associate director for professional services was not a favorite with many of the service's administrators; and he was never less so than when he rose to defend professional standards. Service Center managers did not attempt to refute his arguments or challenge his account of why the Service Center existed. They contented themselves with uncomplimentary references to his personality, effete effete . . . his failure to be a power team player.

Fortunately, they contented themselves with oral comments and informal internal memos, while the . . . out of DEC's two most内的 to the less gratifying task of adjusting their proposal as it affected the historic preservation 5 motion.

Dr. Connally urged that if, in spite of the logic for a per related pro-
The Service Center’s manager, Glenn Hendrix, forwarded the third alternative proposal and Associate Director Connolly’s memorandum to the regional directors on 31 December 1974, and the subject entered the 3 January 1975 agenda for the regional directors’ meeting in Washington. The regional directors reaffirmed their confidence in the "assistant manager concept" and approved of the bi-regional teams, but they saw no advantage in abolishing the historic preservation unit, especially during a period of heavy emphasis upon cultural resource development, such as the American Revolution Bicentennial.

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The organization that evolved following the regional directors' conference was a hybrid that retained the by then sacrosanct geographic teams as the Service Center's dominant component, supported by three offices: Contract Administration, Quality Control and Compliance, and Equal Employment Opportunity, and five functional divisions: Professional Support, Graphics, Historic Preservation, and Program Control. Of the five teams, four served two regions; and one, the National Capital Parks Team, served one. Each team had three branches: Planning, Design, and Construction. The teams were headed by assistant managers, who were the Center's key operational officers, occupying positions of critical importance as functionaries of the Center and de facto representatives of the regional directors. The offices and divisions, excepting AD, which was a one-person office, were supervised by chiefs of their respective units. The overall management was the responsibility of the Director, assisted by an associate and deputy associate. Interpretive planning, which had been a small, but significant function since 1970, was abolished; and its activity, including one person, moved to the Harpers Ferry Center, while its chief was relegated to a shadowy role in Quality Control and Compliance.

The new organization initially affected the grades of thirty-four employees. Four GS-15s, eleven GS-11s, four GS-13s, two GS-12s, one GS-9, and two GS-7s were demoted and eight GS-11s were promoted. A number of those demoted regained their grades through appeal, reassignment, or transfer.

Director Russell Dickerson, Secretary of the Interior, 3 July 1976. Documents examined during preparation of this study contain references to adverse personnel actions, but they were not sufficiently extensive to support an accurate account and analysis.
The new organization was the product of deliberate decision on the part of the task force and DOE management to undertake a complete reorganization instead of attempting the more demanding training position classification and compliance with effective position manager at a case-by-case basis. Surviving documentation does not provide a convincing insight into the reasons why the choice was made. A case could be made for arguing that more persons wanted to reorganize the Service Center in a manner that would strengthen the planning and design teams and took advantage of an opportunity to do so. That is this writer's belief, but the evidence is less than conclusive.

The mechanics used in effecting the reorganization was the oft-threatened and assiduously avoided Reduction in Force (RIF) combined with competitive promotions. This meant that all positions were abolished and the employees assigned ones in the new organization. At the same time, supervisory positions were filled through the National Park Service Merit Promotion Program. Resorting to this internally contradictory procedure was justified by claiming that it was "critical to the success or failure of the organization." 23


Numerous problems attended the process, as evidenced by some instructive excerpts from the Commission's followup review. The GES's Federal Employee Appeals Authority (FEAA), in responding to an appeal from a downgraded employee, held that an agency could not use its merit promotion program to circumvent "or otherwise violate the assignment right established by the Commission's reduction in force regulations. Since the record has established the appellant's subgroup superiority and in the absence of any claim that the appellant is not qualified, we conclude that the appellant was not afforded a proper offer of assignment."
The service took the FAA decision to the Appellant Review Board (ARB), which upheld that decision with the following comment:

It is recognized that under the Commission's regulations an agency has no obligation to fill vacancies in a reduction in force. However, when an agency has a regulation requiring filling vacancies in a reduction in force or has established a clear policy as to, or offering displaced employee assignment to vacancies the Commission's reduction in force regulations must be consistently followed and applied to all affected personnel, and the usual attention to subgroup superiority and veterans preference must be given.

A more serious problem surfaced when the American Federation of Government Employees of Denver, Colorado, filed a complaint against the National Park Service alleging, among other things, discrimination because of age. The Commission found that the tests for compliance with regulation had been met in downgrading GS-15s to 13s. The situation affecting GS-13s and 13s was less satisfactory, and the Commission found:

In our review of downgrades from GS-14 (or higher levels) to GS-13 positions, we identified 12 cases of individuals demoted by RIF. We also identified eight employees who had been promoted by competitive merit promotion to the GS-11 grade level from GS-13 positions during the reduction in force. The average age of the demoted employees was 54 years 1 month. The average age of promoted employees was 56 years 10 months. This significant difference between the ages of the two groups raised questions about age being a factor in the selections. Further examination was undertaken.

One case of a GS-13 employee who had been restored to the GS-11 grade level as a result of an appeal to the Civil Service Commission's FAA.

Six cases where the agency had acted properly in taking downgrading actions by observing seniority, superiority and qualification requirements.

Five cases were identified, however, where the employees possessed career status, veterans preference, and met qualification requirements for at least one of the positions which were filled at the GS-11 level in the reduction in force. The positions were offered for competition by use of the multi-competition procedures and were filled by selection of employees in lower subgroups, i.e., nonveterans. The actions taken to downgrade these five employees were therefore found to be irregular under Part 351 of the Commission regulations in that the career veterans' assignment rights had been violated.
Further, our review of the above cases disclosed that the average age of the five people downgraded was 52 years 4 months, while the average age of the two people promoted to the positions was 35 years 1 month; the difference in ages of the two groups was 17 years 3 months. It was in these groups that the wide age difference was paramount and this accounted for the general appearance of age discrimination in the wider groups of GS-11 employees downgraded. While evidence was not present to conclude that overt discrimination had occurred in these cases, certainly the appearance of such would have been totally avoided had the DSC honored the assignee rights of the career veterans under RIF procedures. Initially it used merit promotion procedures to effect promotions of the nonveterans to the GS-11 positions. 26

26. Ibid., 4-5.

The Commission directed the Service Center to cancel the demotions, to determine whether the affected employees had suffered financial loss and make restitution, and to take necessary steps to insure proper placement procedures. 27

27. Ibid., Appendix D, page 3.

The Civil Service Commission also found that the Service Center had been remiss in insuring that persons who had experienced demotions through no fault of their own had received special consideration for reappointment. Two years after the reorganization, of the twenty-three demoted, four had been reappointed, three had retired, and sixteen remained to receive special consideration for reappointment. 28

28. Ibid., 7-8.

Other criticisms dealt with the implementation of merit promotions, misuse of part-time and contractor assignments, the presence of a disproportionate number of GS-11 promotions, and failure to comply with Fair Labor Standards Act provisions. 29

29. Ibid., 10-11; 11-12; 12-13; 13-14.

If one takes into consideration the problems inherent in the simultaneous employment of the RIF and merit promotion procedures, the decision to effect

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a major reorganization, the suspicions of many of the employees that no one represented their interests, the retirement of the DSC manager and his replacement by a person unfamiliar with the Center's internal problems, and the exigencies of a heavy workload occasioned by the Revolutionary War Bi-centennial, the remarkable thing is that there were not more serious flaws in the DSC's response to the Civil Service Commission's management review.

30. Glenn O. Hendrix retired early in 1975 and was replaced by John Henneberger of the Southwest Regional Office.

The Center's involvement in compliance with the management review did not end in 1975 but continued for another four years, as follow-up reviews and the Service Center's responses entered the record of personnel management. In the final analysis, the importance of the Civil Service Commission review lay in the Service Center's reactions and the fundamental reorganization that followed it, a reorganization that created the climate within which the service's largest corps of professionals have functioned, for better or worse, during the past decade. It represented an abandonment of the discipline-centered structure that had developed during the years when the service created a staff of practitioners of several professions organized on the basis of functional relationships in favor of a management-centered value system, a system that subordinated functions to management ends to a degree that had not been imagined by the earlier generation of leaders.
A NONCONFORMING FUNCTION: HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN DSC

The three professions most directly involved in discharging the Park Service's cultural resources responsibilities: archaeology, history, and history, and historical architecture, contain some of its most self-conscious employees. The system's expansion to include archaeological and historic resources grafted onto an organization designed to manage natural scenic areas brought responsibility for a very different type of monument and park. Horace Albright had an intellectual vision of how the natural and cultural components of the national heritage would be integrated into one system, but that vision was not always shared by his contemporaries and successors. While individual practitioners of the preservation professions have become members of the service's establishment, they have, in most cases, done so at the expense of their professionalism.

For its part, the Park Service has not been completely at ease with its cultural resources and the professions they brought into the organization, because archaeological and, especially, historic features require an unique philosophy of preservation and use. A more difficult problem has been the effective utilization of members of disciplines whose values, standards, and methodologies differ fundamentally from those of the traditional service professions. The situation resembles that of the service's relationship with professors of the natural sciences. However, the Park Service's reaction toward those professionals was less ambivalent. Their utility is more readily recognized, their methodologies are less arcane, and their status as a disciplinary community more generally acknowledged. This condition has been confirmed by the fact that from the days of Dr. Harold Bryant, Charles Russell, and George Wright to the present, the service has accommodated itself to the existence of autonomous operational science organizations. The historical disciplines have been accorded comparable status during only slightly more than a dozen years between 1931 and 1983; and there was a period during the mid-1960s when they had no bureaucratic existence.
From the 1930s until the second half of the 1960s, the locus of the archaeological and historical professional activities was in the field areas; and that was where the majority of the operational professionals worked. That distribution had much to commend it from the standpoint of the person's relationship with the resources with which he worked. But it exacted a price in isolation from his fellow professionals and a corollary isolation among the disciplines. The consolidation of an interdisciplinary capability in the Washington Office's Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation (OAH) in 1966 and the two service centers in 1970 was a reasoned response to the perceived need to end the isolation among the related disciplines and their isolation from the service's non-preservation functions, especially planning.

As long as the service center organization was basically functional in character, the presence of such a specialized unit was more or less easily accommodated— at least it was not an affront to the organic organization. This did not mean that there was universal agreement that the unit, then termed the Office of History and Historic Architecture (OHA), belonged in a planning and design center. It did mean that the service had an integrated corps of historical architects, restoration specialists, and historians under the technical supervision of a senior colleague.

The consolidation of the centers into the Denver Service Center and basing the latter's organization upon geographically determined teams introduced a new problem: How would a unit that was by its nature functional and service-wide in the application of its skills relate to the other components of so disparate a parent organization? That question was central to the historic preservation function for a half dozen years.

From the first year of the Denver Service Center's existence until July 1975, the historic preservation unit was one of eight teams, seven of which were assigned to execute the planning, design, and construction program of a region.
That organization reflected a peculiar team concept. While there were seven planning and design teams and a historic preservation team, a majority of the persons working on team assignments were assigned to one of three divisions. The persons assigned to the teams comprised what was termed the "core team." The Historic Preservation Team included Team Manager Merrill J. Mattes (succeeded in May 1975 by John Luzader as acting manager); Supervisory Historian R. Ross Holland, Jr. (succeeded in 1974 by Luzader); Supervisory Historical Architect Laurence Corvell (succeeded in 1973 by Vernon C. Smith) Archaeologist Wilfred D. Logan; Legislative Compliance Specialist Glennie Wall; Program Coordinator William P. Kelly; an archaeologist; and architect; a secretary; and a reports assistant. The historical architects, whose de facto supervisor was the supervisory historical architect, were assigned de jure to the Division of Design. An engineering technician and the restoration (exhibits) specialists, who also worked under the supervisory architect's direction, were assigned to the Division of Construction Services. The historians, who were technically supervised by the supervisory historian, were officially assigned to the Division of Planning. All supervision of those personnel working on historic preservation projects was performed by the supervisory architect or supervisory historian under the general direction of the Historic Preservation Team's manager. That supervision included recruitment, assignment to projects, technical oversight, and performance appraisal. The illogicality of the organization was accentuated by the fact that the associate manager for production was responsible for the Historic Preservation Team, while the divisions to which the operational employees were assigned were under the associate manager for professional support. Because the formal organization was ignored to the extent that a vast majority of the professional staff was ignorant of their official assignments, the set-up worked amazingly well and permitted the Service Center to accomplish almost the
first half of the American Revolution Bicentennial program, in addition to a substantial non-Bicentennial work load.

For reasons that can not be documented because no documents exist, the Service Center's management decided, shortly after the start of the Bicentennial program, to abolish the Historic Preservation Team and announced that decision over the Center's public address system. However, that change was aborted because it would have adversely affected the execution of the program.

It would have required an act of uncritical faith to expect that the Service Center's organization could survive a searching analysis. The 1974 Civil Service Commission audit was such an analysis; and resulted in a proposed reorganization that would radically have realigned the historic preservation staff. The Historic Preservation Team was abolished, and the historical architects, restoration specialists, and historians were to be absorbed into five new bi-regional teams. This proposal would have effectively eliminated technical supervision for the affected functions.


The proposal was consistent with the type of team concept that informed the new organization. It was also an attempted reversal of the centralizing, functional thrust that had been underway in the service's preservation structure since 1963, and which the formal organization of the service centers had been at some pains to accommodate since March 1970. Reaction from service preservationists was swift and negative. Arguing that the Park Service's historic preservation objectives were best served by an integrated, functional unit, they unanimously opposed the proposed organization.

3. Earnest A. Connally to Director, 18 November 1974; Lusader to Hendrix, 15 November 1974.
The Washington Office disapproved the proposed reorganization; and the service center's management proposed a new organization. The preservation unit became a division, stripped of its programming capability but comprehending all cultural resource specialists excepting those assigned to legislative compliance activities, who were incorporated into the manager's office's Office of Quality Control and Compliance, and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Preservation Team, which became a component of the National Capitol Parks Team. While the newly constituted

Historic Preservation Division continued the existence of a separate, functional preservation unit, it would not do so as an autonomous coequal with the bi-regional planning and design teams. It depended upon them for programming and to a certain extent for its administrative services. The result was a division of administrative and professional responsibility that did not win the unreserved concurrence of the leadership of either the teams or the division. This was due, in part, to the existence of disparate value systems and, in part, to territorial jealousies. Divided responsibility is difficult under most conditions and must be concurred in by the parties involved. Because the Service Center's teams' leadership only acquiesced to an imposed organization, they accepted what they believed to be an unsatisfactory arrangement as a temporary expedient that would be eliminated when the time was right.

The Historic Preservation Division began its existence in the reorganized Service Center on 2 July 1975. It consisted of three branches: archaeology under Supervisory Archaeologist Wilfred D. Logan; historic architecture under Supervisory Architect Vernon C. Smith; and history under Supervisory Historian John Luzader, who was also division chief. The Branch of Archaeology was a new component that filled a need for a capability to provide that discipline's support to the Service Center's preservation and planning programs. The Branch of Architecture soon became the largest component because of the heavy emphasis upon
historic architecture that marked both the Bicentennial and standard programs. The Branch of History remained relatively stable in size and continued to carry out both development-related and thematic research.

Within less than a year, the time seemed propitious for making desired managerial changes that would strengthen the planning and design teams by eliminating the Historic Preservation Division. Acting upon a request by Acting Deputy Director that the Manager, DSC, "examine the whole question of DSC organization, with special reference to overhead and to historic preservation, and to make appropriate recommendations," discussions got underway that led to a proposed "organizational adjustments for Fiscal Year 1977." Those discussions soon revolved around how to organize historic preservation personnel and functions. One option was to retain the Division and enhance its capabilities by restoring its programming functions, doubling the number of historical landscape architects to two, and increasing its editorial staff.

5. Historic Preservation Division Files, Memorandum of Record, Conference, Manager, DSC, John Henneberger; Associate Manager Donald Bressler, and Chief, HPD, John Luzader, 8 March 1976.

The restoration of the programming capability would have restored the preservation unit's equality with the planning and design teams. Increasing the number of landscape architects would have started the development of a much-needed capability for restoring historic landscapes. Increasing the size of the editorial staff would have solved the problems caused by the increasing backlog of unpublished reports. Associate Manager Donald Bressler rejected the proposals as "going against the team concept," and he and Manager John Henneberger declared that making the Historic Preservation Division co-equal with the teams was "not an alternative."

6. Ibid.

A second alternative was to maintain the status quo by retaining the Division in its current form and relationship with the planning and design teams. The
Division chief's argument for a centralized preservation unit, in either the upgraded or current form, was summarized in the following terms:

The centralization of the Service’s historic preservation capability has several advantages. Among these are the following: (1) Versatility and flexibility that makes it possible to assign members of the three disciplines to work wherever their particular talents are required without being limited by arbitrary geographic boundaries; (2) The disciplines work together in close and continuing contact, fostering a degree of rapport not possible when they were separated; (3) Persons with varying professional experience work together in a manner that makes possible a sharing of the fruits of that experience; (4) Less experienced persons are frequently assigned to work with older colleagues, providing valuable training and career development; (5) Assignments are made and performance is evaluated by persons experienced in the field, who can understand the problems peculiar to the work and give advice and support, and who know and understand the provisions and requirements of the Historic Sites Act of 1935, National Preservation Act of 1966, National Environmental Act of 1969, Executive Order 11593, NPS Activity Standards, and the NPS Management Policies, and who meet on equal terms with professionals in other agencies and institutions.

A major justification for locating the centralized historic preservation unit within the Service Center has been to facilitate its participation in planning. There are several places where a research operation could function more easily than from Denver—Washington, Philadelphia, Boston, San Francisco—to name the most obvious. A part of the unit’s effectiveness lies in what at first blush might seem to be an inconvenience—its independence; and that independence is more secure if the professional is a member of a centralized disciplinary entity.

7. DSC Manager's Office Files, John Luzader to John Henneberger, 8 March 1976.

A third alternative, and the one favored by DSC managers, was the disbanding of the Historic Preservation Division and the distribution of most, if not all, of its personnel among the teams. That action would have eliminated the divided responsibility inherent in the 1975 reorganization and brought all of the Service Center’s components, except the Divisions of Graphics and Professional Support, into conformity with the planning team concept. Furthermore, it would have been a clear-cut triumph of that concept over the functional. At the same time, it did not address the issues of effective utilization of professional expertise raised by Luzader in his argument quoted above.

The Center's management did not find his argument persuasive and proceeded
with organizational proposals that were intended to "strengthen the team concept and reflect adjustments needed to cope with a shifting and declining professional services workload in planning and construction." The proposal also purported to be a follow-up of the July 1975 reorganization and recommended changes affecting surveyors, scientists, as well as preservation personnel. Concerning the last, the proposal provided for assigning the supervisory personnel and an unspecified number of historians "who work with only minor support from other units" to a Branch of Historic Preservation in the Professional Support Division. Those former supervisors would function as consultants and coordinators, but only the supervisory historian would continue to perform supervisory services over the historians assigned to the branch and as its chief. Most of the historians, all of the historical architects, and the one permanent full-time archaeologist would transfer to the teams, where they would be incorporated into the branches of planning and design, whose chiefs would be their administrative and technical supervisors. The temporary archaeologists would be terminated upon the expiration of their appointments.

8. DSC Manager's Office Files, Henneberger to Associate Director, Administration, WASO, 5 May 1976 with inclosures.

Before the DSC proposal took documentary form, Assistant Director for Park Historic Preservation Robert M. Utley, who had been one of the architects of the service's post-1966 cultural resource capability, prepared a detailed critique of the move to disband the centralized preservation unit. He provided a summary of the rationale for the multidisciplinary functional organization under the following five headings:

1. Historians, historical architects, and archaeologists are specialized professionals. They are not interchangeable in the way administrators, program managers, planners, and park managers are.

2. The requirements of the research task, rather than arbitrary geographical boundaries, form the most effective basis on which to organize these specialists.
3. Historic preservation work is a multidisciplinary task requiring close interaction among its component disciplines. Direct supervision by a historic preservation specialist reinforces professionalism by affording informed direction and insuring informed review of the product.

4. Historic preservation work is complex, and its success rests heavily on the qualifications, abilities, and professional maturity of its individual practitioners. To attract, develop, and hold qualified people, a professional environment is essential.

5. The role of the preservationist in the Service is twofold: to contribute professional data and judgments to the decision-making process, and to carry out the decisions once made. If this contribution is to be effective, it must come from an organizational base not directly dominated by managerial or unrelated professional concerns, such as planning or modern construction. 9


Although Utlev had been a party to the 1970 transfer of historic preservation functions and personnel from the Washington Office to the service centers and a consistent supporter of DSC, had reached the conviction

that the demonstrated advantages of the multidisciplinary professional team concept in historic preservation can never be effectively realized in an organization so dominated by concern for modern development as is DSC. There seems to be an irreconcilable incompatibility between approaches, needs, and demands of new construction as contrasted to those of historic preservation. This combination, as already noted, has had some deadly effects on our preservation record, as a number of recent projects around the Park System amply demonstrate. 10

10. Ibid.

Utlev recommended that two alternatives be considered. The first was that the archaeological centers be increased in number and converted to historic preservation centers that would incorporate all the appropriate disciplines. The second was that the preservation personnel and their functions be distributed among the regional offices. The former had much to commend it, if enhancing the service's professional potential were a primary concern. Although distributing the specialists among the centers would inevitably be accompanied by a loss of service-wide flexibility in matching expertise with assignments. The second had the common sense advantage
of closer juxtaposition of expertise with the resources being served, but that would be accomplished at an even greater cost to flexibility. Both alternatives would require a significant increase in the numbers of employees, because simply transferring persons to either centers or regional offices would not sufficiently enhance the capabilities of the gaining organizations. The centralized unit, serving the entire system, remained the most economical alternative.

The Service Center managers' unofficial reaction was more heated than accurate; and one of the draft responses reflected a factually flawed perception of both the record and the issues. The formal reaction was not notably logical, but it was

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less vehement. It adverted to the difficulty of supervising several disciplines in one office, but did not examine whether DSC's organization or the proposed "adjustment" facilitated functional supervision. It noted that setting up a mechanism for achieving the best results in historic preservation had "never been a high priority in the Service" and gave the Service Center credit for creating the first "full-scale unit" to achieve that purpose. It further averred that "The ideal would have been a continuation of the same full-scale Historic Preservation Team as part of the Denver Service Center with support as needed from other units."

12. DSC Manager's Files, Henneberger to Assistant Director, Development, WASO, 11 May 1976.

But it did not demonstrate why he was recommending abandoning the "ideal." The only logical answer that could be deduced from the correspondence was to serve an idiosyncratic "team concept."
The Washington Office's reaction to the proposals was simple. Assistant Director Ray Freeman could not "tell from the information you provided how much the proposed organizational adjustments will reduce DSC overhead." Further, "the only changes that should be made ... are those which directly reduce overhead." That principle applied to the Preservation Division. "If we are not going to accrue overhead savings, I see little justification for reorganization of this unit." The manager was directed to prepare material to answer Freeman's questions about overhead and organization and bring them to Washington for discussion "sometime May 26-28." The Center's management failed to convince the Washington Office; and the


only change effected was the combining of associate and deputy associate manager positions—an anticlimactic result.

14. DSC Manager's Office Files, Henneberger to Assistant Director, Administration, WASO, 9 June 1976.

The service's key preservation unit remained intact and its relationships with the other Service Center components remained officially unchanged. But the two efforts to absorb its staff and functions into the planning and design teams left their mark. Fundamental organizational and production issues and problems were identified during discussions attending the preparation of the DSC proposal that needed resolution and that could have been resolved within the Center's framework. Unfortunately, the territorial fight obscured them; and no leadership toward a consensus omnium ameliorating or removing the sources of friction emerged. Management remained obsessed with removing what it perceived to be a nonconforming component; and the preservationists remained committed to functional autonomy, even if that autonomy was as circumscribed as the one provided by the current organization. Thus both sides invoked double standards by which they judged the performance of the teams and the division. The teams and the Center's central
office was intent on obligating funds to the apparent exclusion of other factors. The preservationists were primarily concerned with technical quality, even if that were achieved at the expense of timely obligation of money.

Disagreements over the practical exercise of accountability and responsibility, scope of work, and application of standards continued to mar relationships on the managerial level. Tensions that should have been creative too often became grievances, with management consistently siding with the team's position and the preservationists nursing a minority complex. This description applied only to the managerial level; and even there it should not be applied too literally. Personal relations were generally amicable and there were more incidents of cooperation than controversy. The people doing the work got on as well together as they normally did; and cooperation among them was the rule happily for the accomplishment of the program.

Communication between the Historic Preservation Division and the teams was a matter of common concern that was amenable to improvement. The division chief appointed five members of his staff to serve as liaison with a team, to monitor the program, and to identify existing and potential programming problems. These men carried out their duties in a manner that was mutually beneficial to the division and the teams, although they were vulnerable to at least some degree of tension that trying to work with feet in two camps can produce. It was hoped that their services would help eliminate some of the pressure for reorganization and to provide a mechanism for transition if and when a reorganization occurred. A corollary objective was to provide the persons selected with an opportunity to develop their administrative skills.

15. DSC Manager's Office Files, undated September 1976; "Proposal For Program Liaison Between Historic Preservation And The Regional Teams"; Luzader to Bressler and Assistant Managers, 29 March 1977; Bressler to Assistant Managers, 30 March 1977.

The next, and climactic, chapter in DSC's historic preservation saga began less than a year after the close of the 1976 chapter. During May 1977, three events occurred that caused the unresolved issue of what should be done about the historic
preservation function to surface. The first occurred on 3 May when Associate Manager Bressler told Elwood Rensch, assistant manager, National Capital Team, and Richard Huber of the C & O Canal Restoration Team that the Historic Preservation Division would soon be disbanded. Because of common concern about work on the C & O Canal, the two managers discussed the matter with the Division's chief, to whom the information was news. Soon thereafter, the division chief


learned that an exhibit specialist was transferring to one of the teams. He then learned that plans were afoot to transfer other members of his staff to the Middle Atlantic/North Atlantic and Pacific Northwest/Western Teams, which were slated to move to the Service Center Annex. A heated and unilluminating conversation between the associate manager and division chief produced no result other than persuading the latter that the Center's leadership was determined to disband his unit. He repeated the much-rehearsed arguments against that action and asked for a decision based upon an informed, disinterested weighing of available options.


The Center's manager directed the division chief to prepare a formal discussion of alternative organizations, which the latter submitted on 8 June. That paper reviewed in some depth the rationale for the existence of a service-wide, multi-disciplinary preservation unit. It also called attention to the fact that the Service Center's Role and Function Statement assigned the division a subordinate
position vis-à-vis the bi-regional teams by describing the latter as "accomplishing all planning, design and construction projects and accompanying environmental docu-
ments for their respective geographic regions, including related historic studies, historic architecture . . ." and in defining relationships, stated "The team is responsible for the timely production, within budget of history studies, reports, and historic architectural projects and their coordination with all other projects, while the projects themselves are scheduled and performed by the Historic Preservation Division." On the other hand, the division's Role and Function Statement was less explicit about the relationships, noting only that teams provided "administrative and program coordination."

The division chief summarized the effects of the organizational relationship in the following paragraph:

Locating the responsibility and attendant authority for the accomplishment of the historic preservation program in the regional teams had the practical effect of reducing the historic preservation unit's role to that of a pool of resource persons. A natural product is the creation of a climate that encourages the Assistant Managers who head the teams and their staffs to exercise more active control over the activities of preservationists, sometimes without consultation with the appropriate supervisors. More important, that climate encourages them to seek direct control of preservationists by attempting to influence the assignment of personnel and the direction of the work and to have them transferred to their teams. In short, the Historic Preservation Division is an anomaly within the organization of the Denver Service Center because it is a preservationist unit in a design and construction agency and because it cannot conform to the logic of an organization structured upon regional entities. 20

20. Ibid.

The discussion continued with a description of an autonomous unit that would be co-equal with the regional teams. That was followed by a description of the alternatives that would provide the teams with a functional historic preservation component.

By the spring of 1977, an important change appeared in arguments for re-
organizing the historic preservation capability. Earlier discussions had justified proposed changes as being made necessary by the need to make the entire DSC organization internally consistent with the geographic team concept or because of the exigencies of fiscal year programs. The existence of nonconforming units like the Graphics and Professional Support Divisions weakened the force of the former; and the latter had proved a weak reed in 1976. While alleged deficiencies had not been completely absent from earlier discussions, they had not figured prominently. The argument for an internally consistent organization remained important, but they came to be reinforced by criticisms of the preservation unit's performance.

The new emphasis was, in part, a response to the preservationists' arguments that cultural resource interests were best served by a specialized professional organization. It also resulted from the polarization that flowed from the earlier reorganization controversies.

Some of the criticisms were frivolous, but others were substantive. One fundamental criticism concerned the utility of the work the division produced. No one contended that the work was substandard in quality. To the contrary, the critics charged that it was too self-consciously professional, making reports too voluminous and detailed, and plans and designs too rigid to serve management needs. Professionals were accused of insensitivity to management requirements, resisting "control of content," and having too cavalier an attitude toward schedules and funds. Team managers contended that work too frequently was not completed on time and within programmed funds.

A second criticism alleged that regional priorities were not observed and that some other criterion was invoked in determining the sequence of tasks performed. There was a lack of precision in identifying the point at which the division became culpable, since the work schedule was developed jointly, theoretically on the basis of Washington and regional priorities.

The third major criticism was intimately associated with the other two: that "control of funding is mismanaged with the team accountable for expenditures, but
no control of time or money," with resulting deficits and tardy completion of work.

Another criticism was that the division did not offer adequate opportunities for promotion and career development and that it had failed to develop a historical landscape architecture capability. There was an irony in that allegation in the light of the Center's management's decision that such a capability was not needed.

Some critics accused the division personnel of excessive travel in carrying out research, visiting too many libraries, courthouses, and archives and spending too much time at those repositories.


Those were important issues, and the same criticisms could be heard from regional and park critics of the Service Center. "Overplanning," "reinventing the wheel," accusations of excessive travel, delayed production, excessive costs and overhead, and allegations of insensitivity to regional concerns were some of the flaws attributed to it. The division's critics were more discriminating. They contended that the historic preservation unit was peculiarly culpable; and that no effort was made at an objective comparison of its record with the performance of other organizations.

The most emphatic criticisms concerned the division's productivity. Although its personnel completed 571 assignments between February 1972 and July 1977, their critics accused them of failing to work within the constraints of budgets and schedules. A survey of a few data for fiscal year 1977 can be instructive. The Service Center's "non-historic preservation" budget totaled $30,943,300 for 1,686 projects. The "historic preservation" budget for 203 projects was $3,119,400. At the end of the fiscal year 51.62 percent of the non-historic funds were obligated, and 15.37 percent of the projects had been completed, and 63.50 percent of them were underway. For the same period, 55.39 percent of the historic funds were obligated, 19.50 percent of the projects were completed, and 62.50 percent were underway. To summarize: the Historic Preservation Division's obligation rate
exceeded that of the Service Center average by 3.38 percent, the completion rate by 1.13 percent, and was one percent below the average for projects underway. The deficiencies were common to the Service Center; and they were important.

Because correspondence and other documents are silent concerning the particulars of other criticisms, an analysis of their relevance is impossible.

Whatever the merits of the arguments for abolishing the Historic Preservation Division might have been, significant issues did exist that the division's chief believed needed to be investigated and resolved by an objective study and recommendations to management. To that end, he suggested that the Manager, DSC, request the Washington Office to create a study task force representing the disciplines affected, management, regions, and parks that would study the entire subject of historic preservation and make recommendations concerning its organization, location, roles, and functions. He believed that only in that way could the issues raised by the several parties be addressed in a manner that would enhance the service's cultural resource capabilities. The suggestion received short shrift.

The idea of a study did bear fruit after the Manager, DSC, while acting as Assistant Director, Planning and Design, asked the Chief, Management Consulting Division, WASO, Russell Olsen to undertake a "Management review" of the division. The study's formal objectives were:

1. To determine if the Historic Preservation Unit was organizationally compatible with the rest of the Service Center.

2. To determine the productivity of the Unit, its relationship to other organizational units throughout the Service, and its relationship to the accomplishments of the total construction/planning program...
3. To determine what was the best organizational alignment for the Historic Preservation function given the role of the Denver Service Center. 25


There was no provision for professional, regional, or park representation in the study's preparation.

Mr. Olsen and two members of his staff visited the Service Center during the week of 11 July 1977 to conduct interviews and collect data. At Mr. Olsen's request, the division chief identified and defined four organizational alternatives:

1. No change

2. Establish an autonomous unit co-equal with the planning and design teams.

3. Assign all historic preservation personnel to newly established historic preservation branches on the teams.

4. Establish a small core of senior professionals that would continue to work across team boundaries and assign the rest of the preservation personnel to new branches on the teams. 26


Two other options emerged during reviews with non-Service Center personnel: 1) Assign all historians to the Washington Office and archaeologists and architects to existing cultural centers; 2) Assign all historic preservation functions to the regional offices. 27


The management consultants suffered from a serious disadvantage in that they were almost totally ignorant of the function they investigated, including the admission of one member that had learned only recently that the service performed its own historical documentary and architectural research. They imposed additional restrictions

upon their investigation by declining to examine Form 10-238a, task directives, review correspondence, programs printouts. One consultant briefly looked at two completed history studies during an interview, but refused to discuss them except in connection with the subject of service publications, a program that she believed was inappropriate and should be discontinued. The investigators, further, 

29. Ibid., Interview with Sandy Guill, 14 July 1977.

labored under a misapprehension that was never dispelled that the division's only products were reports, refusing to understand that construction drawing, the architects' and exhibit specialists' involvement in restorations and reconstructions, and the restored or reconstructed resources were among the division's products. They also refused to acknowledge that division personnel had participated in preparing twenty-nine planning documents between 1974 and 1977 and that the division had never failed to comply with a request for planning assistance. In fact, they would not read the materials documenting those activities. They were so ignorant of the content of Activity Standards as to contend that they were not guidelines for activities.

30. Olsen Report, 8, 9, 10

The consultants relied principally upon interviews to develop their information base. Although they reported that they interviewed 104 persons, the precise number is difficult to determine because at least twenty-nine of the members of DSC's staff who were listed as informants were not contacted, including a historian who was in Germany and an architect who had retired a year earlier. The total was made more difficult to determine by the fact that the report referred to comments by twelve superintendents, but only eight superintendents and one site manager were listed. At least one who was contacted and commented favorably on the division's performance was omitted. The consultants reported that they interviewed fourteen regional office personnel, but listed twenty-one as informants.
The selection of informants cited was sometimes capricious. For example: among the nine areas whose superintendent or manager was identified as a source, one was not interviewed, two managed parks where the division had performed no work, one where the first project was in an early stage, and one from which criticism was directed at the project supervisor and the electrical engineer, neither of whom was a member of the division's staff, although the consultants interpreted the interview as being unfavorable to the division.

The consultants interviewed some informants singly, others three or more at a time. They took no notes during the discussions and made no tape recordings, relying upon their memories in preparing their report.

The reports became a matter of record on 8 September 1977, when Mr. Olsen transmitted it to the Service Center's manager. Four characteristics marked it:

31. See f. n. 25.

1) ignorance of the disciplines and functions the authors investigated; 2) a methodology that violated the canons of empirical investigation; 3) factual inaccuracy; and 4) an extreme and overarching management bias that reflected a value system that held that people, resources, and organizations exist to be managed and that every element is to be ordered to that end. It had become obvious at the investigation's start that only two alternatives would receive serious consideration: 1) the creation of a "core" preservation unit and the establishment of a branch on each planning and design team; 2) assigning all preservation personnel to teams. The consultants' investigation and report were accordingly directed toward justifying the selection of one of those options.


To that end, the management consultants authored a wholesale indictment of the Historic Preservation Division as an irresponsible, arrogant, corps of elitists.
in which the investigators found no redeeming attributes. Their report was a most hostile attack made upon a Park Service professional unit by a component of the service's management apparatus. It was certainly one of the most sweeping assaults upon a body of professional values and assumptions that had informed service preservation theory and practice since the days of Albright, Bryant, and Chatelain.

The reactions to the management survey were instructive. Eighteen informants and two regional offices disavowed the contents. The most instructive comment came from the Manager, DSC, who wrote: "The report is not a balanced examination of the historic preservation function. There are errors. I accepted the report as a basis on which to restructure as I wanted to get on with full implementation of the team concept within DSC." Ironically, the proposed reorganization that provided for implementing that concept also recommended another extra-team unit called the Branch of Special Studies.

The management review report and DSC reorganization proposal languished in Washington Office for almost five months until 15 February 1978, when the principal investigator, Russell Olsen, as Acting Assistant Director, Administrative Services, approved the proposed reorganization.

Thus the service's centralized cultural resource preservation unit ceased to exist in March 1978. During its six-year career, its personnel had produced 339 historical manuscripts; 271 construction drawings, plus HABS drawings; completed forty-six archaeological projects; thirty-one planning documents; and had fifty-eight manuscripts in preparation, including three especially lengthy, long-term ones on Golden Gate, Death Valley Mining, and Ninety-Six Battlefield. The division had quintupled the service's historical architectural capability, developed
the Service Center's archaeological staff from zero to eight, recruited the service's first ethno-historian, and more than doubled the staff of research historians. It had also experienced some failures. Efforts to develop a historical landscape architecture capability had been aborted; and plans to establish an adequate architectural-archaeological laboratory had not been completed. Most serious was the failure to convince management that the service's cultural resources would be best served by a specialized professionally-led unit.

The weaknesses and problems that had compromised the service's cultural resource program's effectiveness remained unaddressed. In fact, they were not even identified with a specificity that was a prerequisite for their ameliorization. They continue to exist at this writing.

The primary importance of this unedifying example of institutional infighting lay in the fact that conflicting managerial theories and styles were at issue. The prevailing school of management, at least as it found expression in Park Service practice, is consistent with traditional American faith in the generalist. Its emphasis is upon the administration of programs in which the highest good is the timely obligation of funds. Professional supervision is deemphasized because the manager is in charge of practitioners of disciplines in which he has, at best, a layman's competence. The development of professional expertise is not the route followed by most managers who succeed under this system; and the manager is an administrative, not a disciplinary, supervisor. Unless provision is made for an authoritative agency of quality control with power to intrude itself at any stage in the program's execution, professional performance is at risk.

The Denver Service Center's role as the design and development agent of the several regions and the way in which it organized to respond to its relationship with the regions imposed peculiar tensions upon the managerial function. In brief, the Center's application of the team concept is dominated by the regional factor. If the regions were the foci of professional strength, that factor could be mutually more productive of professional excellence. But most of the regions have not been
professionally strong since the mid-sixties, when reorganization made them more pro-
gramming offices than centers of experts on regional resources. A system that puts a southwestern specialist in the Northeast, a southeastern specialist in the Rocky Mountains, a western specialist in the Southeast, and a novice in a critical centre of historical interpretation and development is one that does not put a premium upon professional excellence.

The manager's problems are compounded by his operating within an imprecisely defined value system. A plethora of theoretical literature has yet to provide the manager with little more than mechanical manuals that fail to supply objective standards of performance. Engineers, architects, scientists, historians, and rangers at least generally recognized standards by which their work can be judged with some degree of precision. A manager is judged more subjectively. If the right people like what he does, he is a good manager if not he is a poor one. He has no appeal to an authoritative professional or functional canon. He does not practice a profession; he performs a function and is a product of the revolution James Burnham predicted in his The Coming of the Managerial Revolution three decades ago.

The Historic Preservation Division reflected an anachronistic style that emphasized function and accorded management a secondary role. It had a bias in favor of disciplinary specialization and perceived the manager as a technical supervisor who matched task requirements with professional skills in making assignments. Judging production was as much a matter of determining how well the resources' professional needs were served as whether money was obligated on schedule. In more self-righteous moments, spokesmen for this school would observe that resources are more important than programs and that the latter's justification was to serve the former.

The two points of view are as old as bureaucracies and need not be mutually exclusive. When they are held by strong advocates, they produce tensions that strong leaders can accommodate and make creative without sacrificing either to
a transient management concept.

DSC's cultural resource preservation personnel experienced a transition that lasted during March and lasted until September 1973. They moved to preservation branches on the several teams; and the change was made less disruptive by the fact that the former division's supervisors functioned as acting branch chiefs on three of the teams during the transition and a former program liaison person served in that capacity on a fourth. The change required the recruitment of four new historians

35. John Lurader, SF/SN Team; Vernon Smith, RM/MW Team; Wilfred Logan, W/PNW Team; John Albright, MA/NA Team; and Richard Huber, head of the C & O Canal Restoration Team, NCR Team.

and six additional architects to provide the teams with the capabilities needed to meet their programmed requirements.

Every reorganization, however benign, exacts a price in morale and productivity. In this case, those costs were lower than anyone had a right to expect—thanks to the dedication and professionalism of the persons affected. Testimony to that effect can be found in the following data for fiscal year 1979: Funds for sixty-eight non-ONPS historic preservation projects totalled $689,200. At the end of September, fifty-one percent had been obligated; sixty percent of the projects were underway, and twenty-eight percent were completed. Twenty ONPS projects were funded at $133,700. At the end of the fiscal year, ninety-five percent of the money was obligated, fifty-five percent were completed; and fifteen percent were underway. One hundred forty-seven historic structure reports were funded at $2,187,700. By the end of September, fifty percent of the money was obligated, four percent of the projects were completed, and seventy-six percent were underway. Fifty-six drawings and specifications were funded for $2,562,500. At the end of the year, thirty-two percent of those funds were obligated, four percent were completed, and sixty-eight percent were underway. In summary, 291 history projects were funded, of which 22.75

were completed, with fifty-seven percent of the funds obligated. By the end of
the fiscal year, the transition was complete with permanent branch chiefs in place.

37. Nan V. Rickey, MA/NA; Calvin Cummings, RM/MW; Wilfred Logan, W/PNW; Harold
LaFleur, SE/SW. John Luzader became senior historian assigned to the Branch of
Professional Consultants, Division of Professional Support. Vernon Smith transferred to the National Capitol Region.

The cultural resource personnel were determined to make their program successful, regardless of the organizational structure.

The reorganization was intended to enhance the status of the planning and design teams, increase historic preservation productivity, and increase opportunities for promotion for preservation personnel. The first objective was certainly served.

A brief check of the record for fiscal years 1979 and 1980 reveals whether the other objectives were realized:

**FY 1979**

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<th>Program</th>
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**Summary:**

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VIII - 25
FY 1980

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Summary:

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38. DSC, PARMS, Professional Services Status Reports, End of FYs 1979, 1980, Data Books.

The completion data may need to be taken with a degree of reservation because of possible differences in defining a completed project.

To recapitulate: Between fiscal years 1978 and 1980, the historic preservation funding declined from a total of $5,573,100 to $3,080,100. The obligation rate went from fifty-seven to fifty-three percent; the percentage underway from fifty-nine and one-fourth to seventy-two percent; the number of projects from 291 to 273; and the completion rate from twenty-two and three-fourths percent to seven percent. The second objective was not realized.

Like other Service Center personnel, members of the preservation staff had
very limited opportunities for promotion above the GS-12 grade. Professionals advanced to that level as rapidly as they fulfilled the performance and time-in-grade requirements. Besides the division chief, four historians, one GS-14 and three GS-13s, were graded above the "full performance" level. In addition to the supervisory architect, three GS-13 architects were similarly graded. Among the archaeologists, only the supervisor was graded above the journeyman level. When the permanent branch chief positions were filled, two members of the staff moved into those jobs, Dr. Wilfred Logan, GS-14, and Harold LaFleur, GS-13, both in their current grades. Two other positions were filled by Nan V. Rickey and Calvin Cummings, who transferred from the Professional Support Division and the Southwest Regional Office, respectively. Richard Huber moved from the position of Chief, C & O Canal Restoration Team, to branch chief in his current GS-14 grade. No other staff members moved into managerial or supervisory jobs; and none was promoted. Of the three announced reorganization objective, only the first was served.

The story of the cultural resource preservation unit is worth reviewing for its contribution to the history of professionals in the service and for the lessons it can teach in personnel management. The National Park Service has yet to discover a philosophy and a method for the maximum utilization of its practicing professions.
NA TIONAL PARK SERVICE SYSTEM PLAN OF 1972

MISSION 66 was the Nixon administration's response to the national park system's weakness against external attacks and physical deterioration. It owed much of its success to the service's accommodating itself to the broadest range of public taste as expressed in the middle class optimism that prevailed during the Eisenhower era. That success exacted a price in compromising standards for inclusion in the system and for what types of development were appropriate for national parks. In an important sense, Mr. Wirth's administration shared the progressive vision and its complacent perception of American institutions and values.

Before MISSION 66's decade ended, these institutions and values and the assumptions that rationalized them were under attack from forces that rejected them, held them to be irrelevant, or wished to redefine them to accommodate new subjective goals. Blacks and poor whites had never been members of the system's constituency. Great natural and scenic parks were too remote for most of them to visit; and the archaeological and historical sites preserved and interpreted a heritage with which they felt little identification. Most of the vocal social activities gave their allegiance and energies to causes such as minority and women's rights, urban reconstruction, crime prevention, opposition to the Vietnamese War, anti-nuclear development, and the diverse, sometimes competing, range of concerns that were unrepresented in the national park system. Many believed that the money and energy that went into parks would be better spent on whatever cause or causes currently commanded their loyalties. The service and the system it administered could become relevant to those interests only if they became agents of change. Environmentalists, who at first blush would seem to be the one natural ally among whom the service could rely, became instead the most articulate and effective critics.

Before the 1960s, the service and conservationists were partners, even when the latter faulted the former for its lack of fidelity to common values by becoming involved in cultural resource preservation and investing too much in physical development. The environmentalists and their organizations were different
from and stronger than the traditional conservationists. They shared with the minorities and social activists a lack of optimism about the future and a suspicion of existing economic and public institutions that was more visceral than cerebral and that made them more doctrinaire and militant. And they enjoyed the true-believer's sense of moral certitude and supercicrity. It was not difficult for them to believe that they were better qualified than timid, self-serving bureaucrats to know what the national parks' purpose was and how they should be served; and their new power helped ensure that they would give effect to that conviction.

The new environmentalists assigned the natural parks (they had little or no interest in the cultural areas) a role that contrasted significantly with that of the system's traditional supporters. These parks had become, for them, important as components of the global ecosystems where human actions must not be allowed to alter what nature had wrought. In them, the natural processes had to be allowed to continue to contribute to the regulation of atmospheric systems, to form biotic reserves and function as natural laboratories and genetic banks.


The environmentalists' view of the parks had two significant implications:

1) emphasis on the need for scientific study of the parks' biological and ecosystem properties; and
2) the parks' management in conformity with their scientific purpose. Touching the former, articulate spokesmen for the new conservation ethic found the service deficient in its appreciation of the need for research, comparing unfavorably with the Forest Service and the bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife. The National Park Service, in spite of the dedication and professional

interests of many of its employees, placed a low premium upon ecological research: operating a reality reflected in the 1972 fiscal year/budget of $133,000,000, from which $1,002,000, or 0.7 percent went to natural science research.

The environmentalists' argument that the parks' management needed to be consistent with the area's scientific purposes began, by implication, with urging a change in selection standards for inclusion in the system. <i>National Parks for the Future</i> included the significant statement:

"New natural-resource parks should be established . . . to provide a system representative of all principal physiographic regions in the nation. There are a large number of representative vegetative-physiographic land types, characteristic of broader regions, not represented in the system. Some of these are scientifically valuable for their undisturbed vegetation as the habitat of threatened wildlife species."

3. Ibid., 105.

Preservation of bentic communities and "representatives of physiographic regions" would replace conformity to popular aesthetics as the criterion for inclusion in the national park system. This led naturally to the subject of how those scientifically important areas were to be managed and used.

Environmentalists, within and outside the service, were highly critical of the way the National Park Service made the parks available to the public; and MISSION 66's intensified developments heightened their disapproval. The inherent contradiction in the service's 1916 mandate to preserve and make available for use the system's resources assumed newly destructive meaning. This was what the environmentalists and their allies in the service saw as the service's "fundamental dilemma."


Resolving a dilemma usually requires that one of the hands be removed, or
at least made too weak or blunt to impale one. The horn the new environmentalists wanted to blunt was the service's old-fashioned commitment to accommodating the visiting public. Less road construction, more primitive facilities, moving more intrusive accommodations outside park boundaries, and setting maximum visitor loads would become management's preservation tools. The National Park Service would ration the resources for which it was responsible—Hopefully in a rational manner.


Most service professionals associated with natural parks agreed, in varying degrees, with the dominant environmental arguments. This was not surprising, given the shared academic backgrounds and value systems. What was more significant was their acceptance of the environmentalist organizations' contention that they had a right and duty to guide policy. Professionals within the agency saw these organizations as members of a constituency that could bring pressure upon the service in support of new philosophies and practices that emphasized resource preservation at the expense of encouraging use.

Stressing ecological criteria for establishing parks and their management for environmental ends shifted the service's favored support base away from the public, whose interest was primarily utilitarian, to the narrower environmental groups. A more intimate relationship accompanied that shift. The service admitted the environmentalists to a more active management and policy role than that accorded the public. There were, of course, reasons why it was easier to form such ties with coherent interest groups than with the inchoate congeries that comprised the public. Having noted the obvious, it would be useful to note, at least briefly, the shift's implications.

Although the parks and the service continued to enjoy broad popularity, their active base of support narrowed and became more insecure. Becoming increasingly
dependent upon a minority, however influential for the moment, they risked the loss of flexibility and capacity for responding to changing political climates. Through too intimate an association with the ecological activists the service was in danger of abandoning management and policy initiative to persons and organizations who could not be held responsible or accountable for implementing decisions that flowed from their influence. Another factor that contributed to the service's weakness vis-a-vis its allies was the very real danger that they might cease to be supporters and shift their interests and tactics to other channels. Whatever psychological benefits some of its leaders and professionals derived from being identified with an ideological movement "whose time had come," the service was less independent and more vulnerable to changing political trends.

Although service professionals scoffed at its importance, the parks' popularity as recreational resources were at the root of their political strength. The public wanted parks, monuments, and sites to exist so that they could visit them and engage in activities that afforded relaxation, inspiration, or simply pleasure. It did not subscribe to a theory that justified the parks' existence for the practice of profession-turning back the biotic clock, or redeeming society. Those interests, when they were present, were tangential. Excluding visitors did not broaden support; and the number of activists, professionals, and theorists constituted a small and potentially capricious minority.

Because the Congress is at once the legislative focus of national political forces and potentially the most important factor in the life of the National Park Service and the system it manages, a summary examination of the relevant relationship during the 1960s is in order.

Constitutional congressional authority to create and fund the service, to define its powers and responsibility, and to establish parks gives the national legislature major policy-making and oversight roles. In a sense that is easy to overlook in the public obsession with the Presidency and its occupant, the Congress is the primary organ for articulating the values that inform the nation-
onal government. At the same time, practical limits to congressional control traditionally tempered its influence.

One of the practical limitations was the members' lack of technical expertise and limited time for becoming proficient in exercising oversight. They and their staffs relied heavily upon the federal agencies and their corps of professionals to give effect to legislative mandate, which was normally expressed in general terms. Another important factor was the growth of executive power that attended the crises of the Great Depression, World War II, the "Cold War," and post-war rehabilitation. Congress frequently deferred to the president to a degree that amounted to the surrender of political and legislative initiative.

The National Park Service benefited by sharing the strong executive's relative power. The Antiquities Act of 1906, which empowered presidents to create national monuments out of portions of the public lands, gave the service opportunities for expansion that did not depend directly upon congressional initiative. Because until after the passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, congressional staffs were so small that the service enjoyed a near monopoly of professional expertise in park issues; and service leaders and spokesmen successfully developed congressional confidence.

That happy state of quasi-independence began to erode as presidents invoked the Antiquities Act less frequently and as the Congress took important steps to improve and enlarge its professional staffs. A third fact surfaced by 1971, when as a result of the conflicts between the Executive and Legislative Branches that marked the Nixon era, the service, like other agencies, functioned in a limbo that sapped its creative energies. Since politics, like nature, is intolerant of a vacuum, the Congress' Interior Committees and their staffs assumed increased initiatory and oversight roles.

An inevitable product of the Congress' enhanced initiative was the way it exercised that initiative in handling proposals for additions to the system. Equally inevitable was the fact that the proposed additions and increased con
gressive responses would reflect the temper of the times. Environmental movements, minority concerns, urban activists, and the strong tendency to view all legitimate governmental organizations and their programs as agencies for social change replaced more modest standards. They required the national park system to do more than preserve and interpret scenic wonders, archaeological remains, and nationally significant historic sites. They demanded that it preserve ecosystems, erase urban blight, correct social injustice, and alter the nation's image of itself—tasks for which the service had not been created and beyond its capabilities.

The alterations in the system's mandate became manifest in the more subjective manipulation of interpretive potentials. The frequently replanned American Museum of Immigration became, in its developed form, less an evocation of the immigrant experience than a collection of exhibits that awarded roughly equal attention to all ethnic groups without seriously attempting to reflect their varying degrees of importance to the national experience. The interpretive programs were often required to incorporate "socially significant" themes that were at variance with or tangential to the nationally significant purposes for which areas were established. Blacksmith shops, candle-dipping, unisex military demonstrations, Indian legends, and far-fetched "living history" activities undertook to embellish park interpretation. The system also had to absorb units for which it was ill-equipped by experience or professional competence because they were located in metropolitan areas that could or would not provide their own recreational and cultural facilities. Insufficient structures, of which the misnamed Kosciuszko House in Philadelphia is an instructive example, entered the system over the objections of service professionals in response to orchestrated pressures from ethnic, minority, and reform organizations. With increasing frequency, congressional initiatives promoted buildings (or collections of structures) as meriting preservation and interpretation because they represented desirable
social concepts and movements, with little or no concern about whether the features lent themselves to interpreting intangible ideas. Service professionals raised reasoned objections to the more egregius flaunting of standards of national significance and argued for more critical selection criteria. But they did not command enough respect in the Department of the Interior and Congress to make their views count. And, unlike the activists, they had no constituency that could counter special interests and political expediency.

Increased congressional initiative brought with it an increased role for that inevitable accompaniment of political action—whatever its origins and intent—the pork barrel. It was not a new threat to the system’s virtue. Congressmen, governors, legislators, and local officials usually had a keen appreciation of the benefits that might accrue from a park’s presence in jobs, business, and income. Some areas, like Platt National Park in Oklahoma and Mount Rushmore in South Dakota, had owed their existence to the pork barrel. The earlier directors did work to keep that influence to a minimum by insisting upon high standards for establishing parks; and they succeeded most of the time. As the initiative shifted to Congressmen increasingly interested in the parks as tools for building support from constituents, the politically weakened agency became more vulnerable.

Important changes, like the weakening of the seniority system that in turn weakened party discipline, meant that the parties’ leadership had to turn to other means, like the constituent benefit bills (a euphemism for the pork barrel) to maintain party unity on key legislation. Public identification with parties weakened during the 1950s and 1960s as more voters split their tickets or called themselves independents. Candidates had to rely increasingly upon their ability to persuade the voters that their election would bring the bacon to their home districts. Because the traditional sources of bacon, like the Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation projects, were losing their popular appeal, congressmen switched their interests from "improvements" to parks as potential sources of popularity with the folks back home; an appealing idea made more so by the in-
creased demand for recreational facilities. United with the environmentalists'


enhanced political skills and influence, this factor persuaded more congressmen to promote the national park system's expansion.

Many service professionals resented what they saw as trend to turn the system into a source for pork barrel largesse and its resultant cheapening through abandoning exclusionary standards. With neither authority nor responsibility, they became increasingly suspicious of congressional champions of expansion and the service's administrators who acquiesced to that trend, aggravating tensions that already existed. The latter saw matters differently. They were responsible, at least to the department & Congress, for the system's management. Political reality and a healthy regard for congressional powers of retribution persuaded them that accommodation was imperative. An area or a feature became nationally significant by congressional fiat—bothersome professionals notwithstanding. The service's moral authority over the system was weaker than it ever had been.

The changed climate in which the National Park Service operated was not always readily apparent during the later 1960s; and one reason this was so was Director George Hartzog, a strong, mentally nimble, stubborn bear of a man who performances before congressional committees were often stellar. Important congressmen and senators liked and trusted him; and he carried with him an aura of dynamism and power. Bold visions and innovative policies seemed to pour from his office in an almost breathtaking flood; and he usually seemed fully in possession of the creative initiative. George Hartzog was too intelligent not to know that his agency was in a weakened position vis-a-vis the Congress. But he employed his impressive political skills and domineering personality to mask that position and to secure as much latitude for himself and his bureau as possible and to recapture lost
authority and initiative.

Expansion of the national park system, which congressional leadership gave every indication of promoting, provided the most promising hope for a renaissance of influence in the new political environment. The National Park Service thus became committed to an expansion of the system into one that differed radically from the Mather-Albright model. The two-volume National Park Service Plan, published in 1972, was the premier expression of the Order and its seminal planning medium.

The 1972 Plan was the product of study undertaken in response to the "Policy Guidelines for the National Park Service" issued by Secretary of the Interior Walter J. Hickel on 15 June 1969. The eighth of those guidelines read:

The National Park System should protect and exhibit the best examples of our great national landscapes, rivercapes and shores and underwater environments; the processes which formed them; the life communities that grow and dwell therein; and the important landmarks of our history. There are serious gaps and inadequacies which must be remedied while opportunities still exist if the system is to fulfill the people's need always to see and understand their heritage of history and the natural world.

You [the National Park Service] should continue your studies to identify gaps in the system and recommend to me areas that would fill them. It is my hope that we can make a significant contribution to rounding out more of the National Park System in the next few years.

Here was as succinct a definition of the prevailing mood affecting parks as one could find in official statements and a mandate to the service to participate in giving it reality. It seemed to be the most fortuitous opportunity to capture the initiative in selecting areas for inclusion in the system—but on terms compatible with the national parks' new role in American life.

Part One of the 1972 Plan reported on the study of archaeological and historic
resources, which had two primary objectives: 1) to define a national system that would be "balanced and complete" in representing the nation's cultural heritage; and (2) to identify "gaps" in that representation. Its definitive frame of reference was Clark Wissler's 1929 report, which envisioned a system consisting of "selected to serve as indices of periods in the historical sequence of human life in America." In brief, the history plan aimed at providing for a comprehensive cultural resource preservation and interpretation system that would embrace the total of man's experience in America. There is irony in this counsel.

The authors divided American history into nine general themes and forty-three subthemes:

1. The Original Inhabitants
   a. The Earliest Americans
   b. Native Villages and Communities
   c. Indian Meets European
   d. Living Remnant
   e. Native Cultures of the Pacific
   f. Aboriginal Technology

2. European Exploration and Settlement
   a. Spanish
   b. French
   c. English
   d. Other

3. Development of the English Colonies, 1700 - 1775

4. Major American Wars
   a. The American Revolution
   b. The War of 1812
   c. The Mexican War
   d. The Civil War
   e. The Spanish-American War
   f. World War I
   g. World War II
5. Political and Military Affairs
   a. 1783 - 1830
   b. 1830 - 1860
c. 1865 - 1914
d. post - 1914
e. The American Presidency

6. Westward Expansion, 1763 - 1898
   a. Great Explorers of the West
   b. The Fur Trade
c. Military and Indian Conflicts
d. Western Trails and Travelers
e. The Mining Frontier
f. The Farmer's Frontier
g. The Cattlemen's Frontier

7. America at Work
   a. Agriculture
   b. Commerce and Industry
c. Science and Invention
d. Transportation and Communication
e. Architecture
f. Engineering

8. The Contemplative Society
   a. Literature, Drama, and Music
   b. Painting and Sculpture
c. Education
d. Intellectual Currents

9. Society and Social Conscience
   a. American Ways of Life
   b. Social and Humanitarian Movements
c. Environmental Conservation
d. Recreation in the United States

The subthemes were, in turn, divided into facets and were especially critical because they were "important aspects of the subthemes that must be represented in the National Park System if it is to be truly representative of our national heritage . . . . By definition in this study, when all major facets are represented by one or more parks, the National Park System may be regarded as well rounded."


The history of ethnic groups, such as Blacks, Indians, and Hispanics, was included in the themes to which they made important contributions.

The authors studied each of the system's historical components, evaluating them and assigning the theme, subtheme, and major facet to which it was most important.
By dividing the total of major facets within a theme or subtheme into the major facets represented by NPS areas, the authors arrived at a percentage of thematic representation.

Several assumptions controlled the study. Although natural and recreational parks often include historic features, the survey applied only to areas classified as historical or archaeological. Except for Colonial NHP, each historical area was arbitrarily assigned only one theme, subtheme, or facet, even though it might illustrate two or more. All areas were deemed qualitatively equal, ignoring such professional judgments as whether Saratoga or Yorktown were more important than King's Mountain, Guilford Courthouse, or Moore's Creek. A corollary suspension of the critical process was the assumption that all major facets were equally significant, even though they really varied and a true balance required that some facets should be represented by more areas than others. The daunting problems associated with making such measurements in relativity persuaded the authors to consider that a facet was represented if one area could be assigned to it.

A "basic premise" was: "Regardless of the percentage of representation, no theme or subtheme is well represented so long as a prime site, such as Mount Vernon..." remains outside the National Park System." A disclaimer compromised this bold assertion of the system's mission: "This does not imply efforts by the Federal Government to acquire such properties, but it provides flexibility in the event that the present owners ever become unable to insure continuing proper preservation."

12. Ibid., ix.

As of April 1972, the system included 172 classified historical areas. However, by eliminating the eight national cemeteries under service jurisdiction and considering Colonial as too area because of Jamestown and Yorktown's thematic incompatibility, the study dealt with only 159 areas.

A review of how the authors treated Theme 1, Major American Wars, which dealt with seven major wars in which the U.S. engaged between 1775 and 1845, illustrates
the applied methodology. The theme had seven subthemes:

la. The American Revolution
lb. The War of 1812
lc. The Mexican War
ld. The Civil War
le. The Spanish-American War
lf. World War I
lg. World War II

These divided into twenty-six major facets:

la. The American Revolution

la 1. Politics and Diplomacy, 1775-1783 - represented by Independence.

la 2. War in the North - represented by Dorchester Heights, Fort Stanwix, Minute Man, Morristown, and Saratoga.

la 3. War in the South - represented by Colonial (Yorktown), Cowpens, Guilford Courthouse, King's Mountain, and Moore's Creek.

la 4. War on the Frontier - represented by George Rogers Clark

la 5. The Naval War - not represented in the system.

lb. The War of 1812

lb 1. The War at Sea - not represented.

lb 2. The Northern Frontier - represented by Perry's Victory.

lb 3. Eastern and Southern Theatres - represented by Chalmette and Fort McHenry.

lb 4. Political and Diplomatic Events - not represented.

lc. The Mexican War

lc 1. American in Texas - not represented.

lc 2. Prelude to War The Texas Revolution and Bear Flag Revolt - not represented.


ld. The Civil War


ld 2. War in the East - represented by Andersonville, Antietam, Fort Pulaski, Fort Sutter, Fredericksburg & Spotsylvania, Gettysburg, Manassas, Petersburg, and Richmond.

ld 3. War in the West - represented by Brice's Cross Roads, Chickamauga-Chattanooga, Fort Donelson, Kenesaw Mountain, Pea Ridge, Shiloh, Stones River, Tupelo, Vicksburg, and Wilson's Creek.
4 d 1. Naval History—not represented
4 d 5. Political and Diplomatic Scene—represented by Appomattox Courthouse.
Le. The Spanish-American War
Le e 1. Politics Leading to War—not represented.
Le e 2. The 4-month War—not represented.
Le e 3. Diplomacy—not represented.
Lr. World War
L f 1. America's Isolation, 1914-1917—not represented.
Lg. World War II
L g 1. War in Europe, 1939-1945—not represented.
L g 2. War in the Pacific, 1941-1945—not represented.
L g 3. Politics and Diplomacy—not represented.

13. Ibid., 24-27.

Analyzing Theme 4, the authors reached the following unsurprising conclusions:
The American Revolution—the twelve NPS areas represented 80 percent of the major facets and needed one to illustrate the naval war in order to round out the system.
The War of 1812—the three NPS areas represented 50 percent of the major facets and required two to illustrate the War at Sea and Political and Diplomatic events.
The Mexican War—unrepresented in the system, requiring a minimum of three areas to illustrate the war.
The Civil War—the twenty-one NPS areas represented 50 percent of the major facets and needed a minimum of one to illustrate the naval war.
The Spanish-American War, World Wars I and II were unrepresented and required 14 three each to illustrate the wars and round out the system. Therefore, if Theme 4

were to receive adequate preservation and interpretation, a minimum of sixteen areas would be required.

In summarizing the evaluation of all nine themes, the authors reported that they had identified 281 major facets, eighty-five of which were represented. Full representation required the addition of 196 areas. In addition to the 196 unrepresented facets, significant imbalances among those that were represented, viz.: fifty-five major facets were represented by one area each; seven by five or more; two by ten or more; and one facet by fifteen areas. Theme 4, Major American Wars, was the best represented with a sixty-five percent rating; the representation of five themes was fair; four, namely: The Original Inhabitants, America at Work, The Contemplative Society, and Society and Social Conscience were poorly represented. Of the forty-three subthemes, five rated good, nine (plus Theme 3, which had no subtheme) rated fair, and twenty-nine rated poor.


The historical plan tried to do all of these things all of them desirable from the service's perspective. One was to bestow disciplinary legitimacy upon all the cultural properties that had entered the system during a past that saw historical areas established in response to patriotic and political vagaries without reference to any real standard other than the commemorative. It was hoped that this would increase congressional and public support for the system as a preserver of the national experience's artifacts. A second objective was to convey through a long, taxonomically detailed format the message that the National Park Service was deeply committed to historic preservation and interpretation and that it had the required professional capabilities. The Plan's text intended to portray the workings of a confident, objective professionalism that provided the service with a disinterested competence that transcended politics. The third was to provide a rational justi-
fication for expanding the number of cultural areas. The fourth, overarching goal was to capture the initiative in determining standards for inclusion in the nation's park system.

The Plan's history volume suffered from a number of flaws, some of which flowed from its basic assumptions—among them assigning a single theme to each area and according all features and facets equal importance. Others derived from its attempts to obscure with a veil of respectability the record of disjointed, incremental whimsy that had attended the establishment of historical parks. The decision to impose arbitrary, and occasionally absurd, classifications made its methodology vulnerable to facile criticism. The authors were downright quixotic when, for

17. Two glaring examples were Mount Rushmore and Piscataway Park. The former was classified 6 b 2 c to illustrate modern sculpture since 1913. The latter, 9 c 2 b to represent the preservation of the cultural environment, post-1916. The first relieved South Dakota of the burden of dealing with the burden of completing and maintaining the sculptures and dealing with their creator; the second provided for protection from adverse development to vistas across the Potomac from Mount Vernon.

example, they included major facets such as "the Yanks are Coming," the Versailles Treaty, and the World War II in Europe. More important, the Plan reflected an unrealistic sense of the limits of a historic feature's capacity for interpreting intangible ideas, including such themes as "The Contemplative Society" and "Society and Social Conscience." While certainly enhancing the potential for expansion, their inclusion made using federally funded historical programs to make subjective comments on the present vulnerable to subverting efforts to apply standards of national significance, enlarging rather than limiting the system's dependence upon what is, at least momentarily, politically fashionable. Being perceived as an agent of social engineering and an organ for civic pieties makes history a handmaiden of presentism—not a rigorously analytical discipline.

Part Two of the 1972 Plan, which projected a classification and expansionary schema for natural areas, shared its companion's growth goals and its reflection of a new view of national parks. The Wilderness Act and the environmental movement
that produced it worked radical changes in how conservationists, the public, and many members of the political establishment perceived nature and the system's role in protecting the environment from modern culture's onslaughts. The act was a response to the pessimistic conviction that, left unchecked, America's industrial-urban society would destroy the natural world and poison the human and natural environment. Its preamble succinctly gave expression to that assumption: "In order to assure that an increasing population, accompanied by expanding settlement and growing mechanization, does not occupy and modify all areas within the United States . . ., leaving no land designated for preservation and protection in their [sic] natural condition." The Wilderness Act undertook to retard, and if possible reverse, the destructive trend by setting aside more than ten million acres of federally owned lands as inviolate wilderness areas and providing a mechanism for adding to the wilderness system. Its passage overcame bitter opposition from livestock, lumbering, construction, and recreation industries in a legislative fight that generated irrational emotion and gross misrepresentations. But public opinion and effective legislative management produced a landmark in conservation history.

In the new conservation climate, the natural assumed their new roles as components of the world-wide ecosystem, buffers against irresponsible commercial and industrial exploitation of irreplaceable natural resources, biotic reserves, genetic reservoirs, natural science laboratories, and regulators of global atmospheric systems. This emphasis on using the parks as agents to accomplish

universal objectives, like the conversion of cultural areas into vehicles for social change, significantly altered the parks' role in a volatile political
social and political climate.

Part Two's text opened with a forthright exposition of its task and the assumptions that lay behind the undertaking. The controlling assumption was that the "completed" national park system would include representatives of the nation's "significant natural, scenic, and scientific heritage." Employing natural history themes, or "categories of natural phenomena, and regions, among which the theme characteristics differ significantly," the study was intended to define what constituted a completed system. The opening pages were straightforward enough in


labiously delineating the task that lay ahead in classifying the system's components, determining the adequacy of representation, and identifying thematic areas.

The natural history volume accurately reflected the service's conversion to contemporary environmental theory by adopting as the primary criterion for evaluating areas their qualities as representatives of ecological and physiographic phenomena. At the same time, its authors understood that adopting that standard in place of the older one based upon scenic appeal and public enjoyment offered opportunities for expansion in the interests of "completing" the system. A plausible argument could have been made in 1970, using the older criterion, that the natural scenic areas were basically well-rounded, putting at least one park within traveling distance of a majority of the population. Invoking as new standard based upon natural regions and their respective degrees of thematic representation revealed a very incomplete system.

The forty-one natural regions were:

North Pacific Border
South Pacific Border
Cascade Range
Sierra Nevada
Columbia Plateau
Great Basin
If anything was obvious from that list, it was that public-serv ing was being replaced by ecological values. At least a fourth of the regions were too remote for the vast majority of American citizens to ever visit.

The authors then evaluated the natural regions on the basis of the degree in which the themes found representation. Those themes were: 1) Land forms of the present, represented by the following phenomena: plains, plateaus, mesas, cuertas and hogbacks, mountain systems, works of volcanism, hot water phenomena, sculpture of the land, eolian land forms, river systems and lakes, works of glaciers, sea-
shores, lakeshores, islands, corals islands, reefs, and atolls, caves and springs; (2) Geologic history, represented by Precambrian, Cambrian-Early Silurian, Late Silurian-Devonian, Mississippian-Triassic, Permian-Cretaceous, Paleocene-Eocene, and Oligocene-Recent; (3) Land ecosystems, represented by tundra, boreal forest, Pacific forest, eastern deciduous forest, grassland, Chaparral, desert, tropical ecosystems; (4) Aquatic ecosystems, represented by marine environments, estuaries, underground ecosystems, lakes and ponds, and streams.

22. Ibid., Figure 2, "Regional Theme Master Chart."

When the authors ranked the natural regions by adequacy of representation within the national park system, they found that one, the Virgin Islands, ranked 100 percent. Three, the Cascade Range and Chihuahuan Desert-Mexican Highland ranked 90 percent or above. Four, Sierra Nevada, Northern Rocky Mountains, Mohave-Sonoran Desert, and Middle Rocky Mountains, ranked in the eighties. The Colorado Plateau, Interior Low Plateaus, Southern Rocky Mountains, Superior Upland, and North Pacific Border ranked in the seventies. The Florida Peninsula region ranked at sixty-three percent. The Pacific Mountain System, Alaska, Appalachian Ranges, Island of Hawaii, and Maui ranked fifty-three percent to fifty-six. Twenty-four ranked between zero and forty-five percent, with fifteen having no representation.

22. Ibid., 16.

23. Ibid., 18.

Forty-seven regional themes had little or no representation.

The natural history plan shared some of its historical counterpart's flaws. The imperative for comprehensive representation and to make an after-the-fact application of the themes meant that an implicit equality of significance was accorded themes in a manner that conferred illogical values on their representatives.
The authors knew that their work contained unresolved methodological problems and contradictions. Their description of natural history themes contained a revealing, if tortured, statement:

The basic philosophy of a system of themes has implications and connotations that require explanation. Natural history is complex. To individual scientists, as to individual laymen, it may have very different meanings. These differences arise from the consideration of these entities and processes from various points of view. Collectively among human minds, natural history therefore becomes polydimensional and difficult to resolve into a generally acceptable rational system of categories of a nature that would be useful for purposes of evaluation and selection. The only apparently reasonable alternative is a system of themes.... These themes involve not only entities and processes but also the aspects from which they are viewed. By their very nature, themes intersect and overlap. Because of this, no single area is characterized solely by a single theme, although a single theme may be of overwhelmingly dominant importance. 24

24. Ibid., 123.

Injustice to the Plan's authors, it must be noted that much of the problem of reconciling its inconsistencies with at least a superficially rational format derived from the fundamental changes wrought by the new environmentalism upon conservation theory. The park system that was a product of traditional conservation ethics did not easily lend itself to a post facto intellectually rigorous taxonomy.

In a sense, the Plan's weaknesses were irrelevant, except to the extent that they mirrored the period—a period that witnessed changes in how interested parties perceived history, the environment, and parks. They also represented a tardy effort to reflect professional values in ordering the national park system—tardy because those values were invoked to endow with intellectual respectability a system that had developed with slight regard for professional values. That it failed as a professional planning vehicle and an instrument for capturing the initiative from practitioners of politics—within the service, department, and Congress—was to be expected, but the attempt needed to be made. The Plan emerged from a paradoxical mix of pessimism and expansionism, an ambitious professionalism and weakened service that was losing much of its moral authority to an envigorated
congressional committee system, with its own corps of professionals and a
different political agenda.