MORRISTOWN

June 30, 1967
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Winter Encampment
1777

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Lenard E. Brown

DIVISION OF HISTORY
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
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PROLOGUE

These are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will in this crisis shrink from the service of their country; but he that stands it now deserves the love and thanks of man and woman. Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph.

- Tom Paine, The Crisis, Number 1.
CHAPTER I

Ending One Year - Beginning Another

The last months of 1776 were not good for the Continental Army in New York and New Jersey. On November 16th General William Howe's British regulars captured Fort Washington. Three thousand men with all their equipment and scores of cannon were lost in what was a near catastrophe. But worse was yet to come. Howe dispatched Lord Cornwallis with twelve regiments up the Hudson River and across it at Yonkers. He moved down the west bank to capture Fort Lee, the other guardian of the Hudson Valley, without a struggle. The dispirited and dwindling American army retreated to Newark only to be driven out on the 29th and forced to retire to Trenton on the Delaware River. On December 8th they crossed the river with Cornwallis in deliberate pursuit. On the 10th the American army with Washington totaled about 5,000 men, most of them nearly naked or so thinly clad as to be unfit for service. Washington's worries were not decreased by the slowness

1. William Howe, commanding the British forces in the middle colonies was in his middle forties. A clever strategist and able tactician, his one failing was not to pursue the enemy after victory was achieved. This lack was to bring him into disrepute with parliament before the end of the American war.

of General Charles Lee to join the main army. Lee, Washington's second in command, was a professional soldier and in the eyes of many, including his own, was better qualified than Washington to lead the Continental army.

After the capture of Fort Lee Washington had instructed him to rejoin the main army as soon as possible, but on December 12 Lee was still in the Jerseys moving toward Washington with less than deliberate speed. He chose to spend the night of the 12th in a tavern at Basking Ridge while the 2,500 men in his command encamped at Vealtown, three miles away. On the morning of the 13th General Lee was captured with a letter to General Horatio Gates, describing "a certain great man as most damnably deficient," still in his pocket. There was little doubt to whom he referred. Upon hearing of Lee's misfortune, his second in command, General John Sullivan, hastened to join the main army. These troops were in little better condition than those already with Washington, and the enlistments of all but 1,400 were due to expire on December 31. Defeat, desertion, and dejection had robbed the cause of thousands of supporters and the "time to try men's souls" was at hand.

4. Ibid., 290.
To think of an offensive operation at such a time would seem to have been the ultimate in foolish day dreaming, yet on December 14, Washington expressed the hope that "under the smiles of Providence" and reinforced by the troops commanded by Lee, he might be successful in thwarting the aims of the British. The news that General Howe had suspended military operations until spring and retired, with the greater part of his army, into winter quarters in New York, leaving only a chain of outposts to hold New Jersey, was vastly encouraging. Yet Washington feared that once the Delaware became frozen over the Hessians would move on Philadelphia. This had to be prevented. On Christmas eve, at a meeting with Generals Nathaniel Greene, John Sullivan, Hugh Mercer, William Alexander, Matthias Roche de Fermoy, and Arthur St. Clair and several Colonels a plan was adopted to clear the invaders from the Jerseys.

The next evening the American army moved toward the river. The Delaware was to be crossed in three places. One group would attack the Hessian garrison at Mount Holly, a second was to secure the bridge at the south edge of Trenton and cut off the retreat of the Hessians, and the third and largest force under command of Washington would strike the town at two points. After the swift reduction of Trenton, the three divisions would reunite and strike at New Brunswick and Princeton.

Crossing the ice-filled river the main force reached the New Jersey side by three in the morning and began the 9-mile march to Trenton an hour later. The weather had turned worse and a driving hail and sleet made the march even more difficult for the thinly clad men. At 8 o'clock in the morning of December 26, the two wings of the main army struck Trenton almost simultaneously and in less than an hour the battle was over. The complete success of the attack can be judged by the capture of 886 men and 23 officers and the total rout of the 600 who escaped and fled to Bordentown with news of the attack. Because neither of the other divisions had succeeded in crossing the Delaware, Washington retreated over the river to plan his next move. Aware of the impact of this swift victory and pleased with the behavior of the troops he planned a second operation against the enemy in New Jersey.

On the 29th Washington recrossed the river and by the 31st had 5,000 troops in Trenton. This maneuver almost cost him all that he had gained 5 days earlier, for Cornwallis was at Princeton, less than 14 miles away, with 8,000 fresh troops and a strong artillery train. On January 2, 1777 the British force entered Trenton and

7. The battle of Trenton has been described many times by many authors, however, perhaps the best description is that of Washington written to the President of Congress on December 27, 1776. Fitzpatrick, Writings, VI, 442-44.

8. "In justice to the Officers and Men, I must add that their Behaviour upon this occasion reflects the highest honor upon them." Ibid., 444.

Washington took up a position on a ridge with the Delaware River at his back. Cornwallis decided not to press the attack, feeling that the next morning would provide ample opportunity to "bag" Washington. During the night, however, the American army, after building campfires and giving ample indication of digging in for a battle, moved around the left flank of the British and by morning were at Princeton. 10 After a hard fight the town was captured. With Cornwallis rapidly approaching from the south, Washington abandoned plans to strike at New Brunswick and marched for Morristown where he planned to rest and regroup. 11

Militarily the victories at Trenton and Princeton were important to the cause of the Americans for it cleared the British out of all of New Jersey but a small strip between New Brunswick and Amboy. But more notable than the military effect was the impact the twin triumphs had on the spirit of the colonies. The series of reverses that the military had suffered in the late summer, fall and early winter of 1776 had discouraged the Whigs. The disasters prior to December had made the collapse of the revolution appear to be near.


11. Fitzpatrick, Writings VI, 471.
In addition to giving the colonies new hope the two battles increased the reputation of Washington both in this country and in Europe as a military leader. 12 The ten days after Christmas had produced a considerable change in the fortune of the revolution and the arrival of the army at Morristown marked the close of the campaign of 1776. A new chapter was to open at Morristown.

The selection of Morristown as a place to regroup was based on both strategic and political reasons. Strategically the town was located in a hilly area protected by two large swamps on either side of the main road from Madison. Further east were the First and Second Watchung Mountains and Long Hill that served as a barrier to British movement. The country nearby had abundant forage and provisions so that the army would not suffer from lack of food. Morristown was located near the major roads leading to the Hudson Highlands and New England to the North as well as to Philadelphia and the southern colonies. From this area Washington could observe the movements of the British in New York and along the Jersey coast and meet any enemy movement with an American counterblow. In addition to the strategic value, the inhabitants of the region had demonstrated a loyalty to the American cause during the dreary, anxious weeks of


November and December. Washington led his army to Morristown with the hope that he would have a week or two free of British pursuit, for he anticipated that they would soon move against Philadelphia. The Colonial army arrived on January 6 and, as it turned out, did not leave until late May, thus Morristown became the second winter encampment of the American army.

When the army arrived on the 6th, it rode the crest of a wave of enthusiasm and renewed hope. The skill of Washington in striking at Trenton, out-maneuvering Cornwallis, and capturing Princeton had buoyed up the army as well as the people. But within days of their arrival the troops began once again to think of home. Many had agreed to stay six weeks beyond the end of their enlistment on December 31 under the urging of their leaders and the promise of a $10 bonus. But the thought of home and fireside began to pull the soldiers, individually and in units away from the encampment. This dwindling away of his meager forces caused the commander-in-chief much anguish and soon he was writing in the most pessimistic tones of "scarce having any army at all."

14. The first had been during the siege of Boston, 1775-76.
15. In a letter to the President of Congress on January 7, Washington described the situation in these words, "The severity of the season has made our troops, especially the Militia, extremely impatient, and has reduced the number very considerably. Every day more or less leave us." Fitzpatrick, *Writings*, VI, 447.
Washington's despondent comment would seem to be well justified in the presence of about 14,000 English troops in the Jerseys and his belief that they would be striking at the Morristown encampment. To oppose this force, there were less than 1,500 continental troops available for service in the first two months of 1777. The make-up of this small group constantly changed as militia units departed and others entered the service for periods as short as a month. During the winter it would be the militia who would provide both the offensive punch and the defensive counter against the British. These poorly organized and trained units with their independent attitude and lack of discipline were to cause Washington great anguish during the months ahead.

In late 1776 Congress authorized for the first time the enlistment of men for three years or the duration of the war, but until these sixteen new battalions could be filled, Washington had to carry on with the present situation. Three difficulties made the maintenance of the army a problem: desertions, the undisciplined state of the militia, and the slow enlistments of new troops. From the beginning desertion had been a major problem of the colonial army, and,


19. On January 22, 1777 he wrote to John Parke Custis, "... I do not think that any officer since the creation ever had such a variety of difficulties and perplexities to encounter as I have." Fitzpatrick, Writings, VII, 53.

20. The noted British historian, George Otto Trevelyan, commented on the militia in these terms: "Warm weather brought (them) out of their
although it was most often a case of homesickness or resistance to the demands of military discipline, it crippled the military arm of the revolution at crucial times. From the middle of January until the end of the stay at Morristown in late May, the letters from Washington to state and national officers often deal with the problem of how to stop desertion and to insure the prompt arrest of those who return to their homes without a discharge. He even offered the opinion that unless the threat of desertion could be reduced, one half of the army would have to be sent to bring back the other. 21

The problem rising from desertion was nearly equalled by the difficulties caused by those who remained to bedevil their officers and the surrounding country-side with undisciplined actions. Perhaps the most serious breach of control was the continual looting of the civilian population under the guise of identifying the intended victim as a "Tory." 22 The worst offenders were the Jersey Militia who apparently evened old scores and avenged themselves upon their political opponents for what they had suffered at the hands of the British in November and December. The other militia units might have been equally rapacious but were limited to the quantity of

villages; but when autumn was over and the frost had set in they were as hard to move from their accustomed retreats as animals which had entered upon their period of hibernation." Trevelyan, The American Revolution, (4 vols., London, 1907), II, 4.


22. Ibid., VII, 47.
plunder they could carry, while the natives easily disposed of all loot seized or appropriated.  

The combination of short enlistments and slowness in recruiting was the third difficulty that plagued the American army during the winter of 1777. Washington believed that he could have cleared the British out of the Jerseys and perhaps even struck at New York after a brief rest near Morristown, but the departure of a large number of his troops in January destroyed that hope. During the first two months of the year the effective number of troops dropped sharply until, by March 6, Washington was anticipating a force of less than 1,500 men. Recruiting lagged painfully. The veterans returning from the army, doubtless remembered the hardships of the previous campaign and discouraged others from joining the companies being formed. Conditions remained the same until April, when recruits again began to arrive and by the 20th of May there were slightly over 8,000 troops in New Jersey. Not well trained perhaps and lacking in


25. Ibid., 260. On the 14th he reported his strength as less than 3,000. Ibid., 319.

26. Lundin, Cockpit, 228.
discipline, and, for the most part, untried in battle, these men had enlisted for three years or the duration of the war. For the first time the Continental Army had a force that could be described as permanent.

Despite the problems of maintaining an army during the winter, Washington was able to launch a campaign of attrition against the British forces in Perth Amboy, Brunswick and in the other outposts along the lower Raritan River, as well as those on the coast between Perth Amboy and the shore opposite Staten Island. Washington believed that General Howe would strike at Philadelphia in the spring of 1777 and determined to deny him all sustenance for both men and horses during the ensuing months. On January 11 orders were given to Captain Francis Wade, Deputy Quartermaster General to carry out a scorched earth policy in the area east of the road leading from Brunswick to Trenton.

27. The orders read in part: "You are hereby authorized and empowered to collect all the Beef, Pork, Flour, Spiritous Liquors, etc., etc., not necessary for the subsistence of the inhabitants in all parts of East Jersey . . . and as fast as the stores are collected to be removed to Newton, Bucks County in Pennsylvania, and there stored and formed into proper Magazines." The inhabitants were requested to bring the enumerated articles to specified collection points and would be paid for them. Those who did not comply were to have the articles taken by force and would be given proper certificates payable on demand. Fitzpatrick, Writings, VI, 496-97.
Three and a half weeks later, Washington reported the beginning of the second stage of the campaign:

I shall tomorrow send out parties from every quarter to remove all the Wagons, Horses, Cattle and Sheep, or as many as possible from the neighborhood of the Enemy's lines. They are to attend particularly to the Horses, for if we can reduce those that they at present have, and can hinder them from getting fresh ones from the adjacent Country, it will be impossible for them to move their Artillery and Wagons forward, should they incline to make another push towards Philadelphia.

To assure that little food would reach the English outposts along the coast Washington spread his troops in small garrisons from Princeton to Elizabeth Town. Arranged in a fan-like pattern, they reached as close as six miles to the British positions. General John Sullivan's brigade was located at Chatham, and three miles to the south at New Providence a second Brigade was stationed. Nathaniel Greene was at Basking Ridge with his and part of General Stirling's brigade. An advance line of posts were located at Bound Brook, Quibble Town (New Market), Millstone, Elizabeth Town, Princeton, Springfield, and Newark. A division under General St. Clair remained at Morristown. This arrangement enabled the units to retreat toward Morristown in case of a concerted push by the English, and to keep a close eye on the

28. Ibid., VII, 104.

movements of the enemy. The entire project was abetted by the New Jersey residents who had suffered at the hands of the Hessians in November and December.\textsuperscript{30}

In addition to depriving the garrisons of food and forage, these outposts waged a constant harassing war against the parties sent out by the British. This modified guerilla warfare forced the enemy to send out large parties to gather the necessary supplies thus exhausting their horses even more and causing the troops to remain under constant alert. These sudden encounters often did not result in any gain for the colonials, but did waste the strength of the enemy.\textsuperscript{31}

From the middle January until the campaign of 1777 began in June this harassment continued with most satisfactory results in the amount of food and forage captured and discomfort brought to the enemy.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{30} Writing less than 9 years after this period, the English historian, John Andrews, described the people as "Irritated" with the invaders. Andrews, History of the War With America, France, Spain, and Holland, (London, 1785), II, 250.

\textsuperscript{31} Washington's problems in replacing lost or deserting troops was minor compared with those of General Howe, whose source for replacements was 2,500 miles away.

\textsuperscript{32} Thomas Rodney wrote to his brother Caesar in January 14, "... our out parties are cutting them off every day and night, and they have been so cooped up and harassed that ... bets are layd here that we shall be in possession of the whole of New Jersey or New York in ten days." George H. Ryden, ed., Letters to and from Caesar Rodney, 1756-1784, (Pennsylvania, 1908), 154.

The invisible and nearly impenetrable wall that the Americans placed about the British positions soon reduced their horses to a famished condition and caused the outbreak of scurvy among their troops. Skirmishes occurred constantly, each of which took its toll of English lives and frayed even more the nerves of the troops in the garrisons surrounded by hostile civilians and an active, though small, army. One British officer, James Murray of the 57th Regiment of Foot, described his experiences in a letter on February 25 from New Jersey:

We have a pretty amusement known by the name of foraging or fighting for our daily bread. As the rascals are skulking about the whole country, it is impossible to move with any degree of safety with out a pretty large escort, and even then you are exposed to a dirty kind of *tirailleurs*, which is more noisy indeed than dangerous mais qui ne manque pas quelquefois to be a little troublesome.33

In the same letter he asks the rhetorical question: "Would you believe that it was looked upon as a rash attempt to go by land accompanied by two Light Dragoons tho' there are not above 5 or 6 miles of the road, and these next to the shore, but what are occupied by our troops."34


34. *Ibid.*, 42.
While the British and their Hessian allies suffered in the confinement of their garrisons in the Jerseys, the Americans roamed at will, striking at British foraging parties and bringing misery to the enemy. Some direct benefits of the clashes with the English were that it taught the troops the arts of war, inured them to the hardships of a campaign, and instilled discipline. 35 Another benefit was the large amounts of food and forage captured in these raids which found its way back to the American camps and magazines. In view of the disorganized condition of the Commissary Department of the American army, these captured stores may have made the difference between hunger and starvation. 36 Finally, of less immediate but more lasting value, there was the depression and deterioration of enemy troops located in the few towns they still controlled in New Jersey.

Privations, discomfort, and discontent were not confined to the invaders. The Americans at Morristown and the surrounding outposts were scarcely happier or more comfortable. In addition to the common complaints of lack of food and insufficiency of clothing there was sickness in the camp which was brought on by a poorly balanced diet,


36. When the British withdrew from most of New Jersey in January, they left large amounts of stores behind. These too fell into the hands of the Americans.
low resistance and the poor sanitary conditions of camp life. Most alarming of all was the outbreak of smallpox. The army had suffered through the "pox" the previous winter and the thought of a return of the disease was sufficient to cause panic in both the army and the citizenry.

Washington had decided to inoculate the army by the time they reached the vicinity of Morristown. Because the soldiers suffering the mild form of the disease could pass it on in its full virulence to anyone not inoculated, the commander determined to quarter the troops in small companies in the houses of the people in the vicinity and have both soldiers and civilians alike inoculated and cared for by the army physicians. Though the thought of inoculation was not greeted enthusiastically by either soldier or citizen, Washington prevailed and by April the threat was ended.

37. The problem of sanitation in the camp continued all winter. In April Washington issued two general orders dealing with cleaning up the garbage and filth (April 10) and removal of offal, dead animals, and carrion about the slaughter house, jail and town. (April 21). Fitzpatrick, Writings, VII, 382 and 451.

38. "I have determined that the troops should be inoculated... I have directed Doctor Bond to prepare immediately for inoculating in this Quarter, keeping the matter as secret as possible, and request that you will without delay inoculate all Continental troops in Philadelphia and those that shall come in." Letter to Dr. William Shippen, Jr., Dated Morristown, January 6, 1777. Ibid., VI, 473.

39. Lundin, Cockpit, 234.
CHAPTER II

To Quarter An Army

The depth of depression reached in late December 1776 by the people supporting the revolution was relieved by the successes of Trenton and Princeton. Other problems remained which would not be washed away by spectacular victories. During the winter encampment at Morristown, most of these were resolved with varying amounts of success. The frequent envy and jealousy between general officers took up much of Washington's time and many soothing letters had to be written before individuals realized that service came before self-esteem. The cumbersome organization of Congress in the conduct of the war required constant attention. And finally there was the need to stress that the 13 independent states must become united states if the victory over the British was to be achieved.

Throughout the entire revolution, the absence of discipline, the uncertainty of quarters for the troops, and the lack of an adequate supply organization were continuing problems which threatened the very existence of the army. The first five months of 1777 saw some of these difficulties wrestled with and partially solved, while others were laid to rest only rise again at Valley Forge in larger and more varied forms.
Time helped solve the discipline problem. As already mentioned, the American army was a volunteer force of freemen, with the emphasis on "free", who did not take kindly to discipline and the regimentation demanded of a military force, or the enforcement of unpopular rules. The answer to disobedience in the military organization of the day was discipline, the harsh punishment of the lash, the pillory, branding, and, in severe cases, death. Washington had seen the result of poor discipline during the French and Indian war and did not hesitate to take vigorous steps to enforce proper military behavior after assuming command of the American army in 1775. He believed that a small, well-disciplined army was superior to a larger, albeit less obedient force. But he warned against excessive harshness and cruelty in the execution of military law and counseled justice tempered with mercy.

The Second Continental Congress adopted its first military code on June 30, 1775. In the next year this code was revised and modified twice; the second revision created a stricter but sounder basis for military justice. By September 1776, a military code of justice had been created that stood - with the exception of minor changes - for the rest of the Revolutionary War. It was this code which was in operation during the Morristown encampment of 1777.

1. Fitzpatrick, Writings, VIII, 359.
2. For detailed study of discipline during this encampment see Sidney Bradford's "Discipline in the Continental Army During the Morristown Winter Encampments," unpublished manuscript in the collections of the Morristown National Historic Site.
During the summer and fall campaign of 1776 the American Army was generally on the move and most often in retreat, but after the victories of Trenton and Princeton the chronic problem of quartering arrived with the onset of cold weather. When the Army reached Morristown on January 6, 1777 Washington felt that it was to be only a brief stop to rest for a few weeks, and recuperate before once again taking to the field to block a British attempt on Philadelphia. He quartered his troops among the populace. This was the usual action when operating in a friendly environment such as Morristown. And in Morristown in January 1777, the reception of the troops was not only friendly but even enthusiastic. Unfortunately there is no complete record of where the men were located during the first days at Morristown, or for the entire period of encampment. A few scattered references from diaries and letters, or reminiscences written many years later, provide our only solid facts. It is from these scattered references that the description of the quartering of troops at Morristown is taken.

3. Washington's belief that the stay at Morristown would be brief was echoed by at least one junior officer. James Read, writing to his wife Susanna on January 8, 1777, from Morristown, indicates that he expected to be there only a few days. Photostatic copy in the Park Collection at Morristown; original in DeCoppet Collection, Princeton University.

4. Louise Rau, "Sgt. John Smith's Diary of 1776," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, II 2(October 1933), 247-70. Smith served with Washington during the most of the war, though he left the army in December 1776 to return the next spring. His comments on quartering in Pennsylvania and New Jersey the last two weeks of 1776 are interesting. On December 26 the Quartermaster of the Company, Captain
Though small, the town was prosperous enough to contain several families of sufficient means to afford large homes. These they offered to the American generals and their aides. Junior officers most often remained with their men. George Washington, tradition relates, made his headquarters at the Arnold Tavern, a three story building facing the town green. General Nathanael Greene and several of his aides-de-camp stayed with a Mr. Hoffman whom Greene described as "a very good-natured, doubtful gentleman." General Benjamin Lincoln had his headquarters at Bound Brook in a two story frame house named "The Battery." General Anthony Wayne, when he rejoined Washington in the spring is said to have stayed at the home of Deacon Ephraim Sayre in Bottle Hill. Officers in command of companies or regiments were quartered with their troops, as in the case of the Delaware Light Infantry which stayed in Colonel Jacob Ford's mansion in Morristown. Two years later that mansion became the headquarters of the Commander in Chief during the second winter encampment at Morristown. In other instances the exact location of quarters were not given, as in the case of Loring Pecks of Rhode Island, found a house to quarter the troops, but the Colonel, Christopher Lippitt, felt they would be as comfortable in tents. Moving again the 28th of December, they were provided houses to quarter in at Bordentown. p. 265-69.


7. Christopher Ward, *The Delaware Continentals, 1776-1783*, (Wilmington,
of Colonel Theodorick Bland who was in a "mansion as peaceful, though not so pleasant as our little farm (in Virginia)" during February. Lieutenant James McMichael of Pennsylvania records that he had "good quarters" or lodgings in January and February at Morristown, Chatham, and Springfield.

As might be expected the enlisted men were not housed as well as the general officers, but often in the same type of quarters as junior officers such as Lieutenant McMichael. Upon arriving in the area, the soldiers often spent a night or two in the open, before being assigned quarters. Most of the men were housed in public buildings, private homes, stables, barns or sheds. Some may have used tents and a few could have built log huts. It would appear, however, that most of the troops were housed in private residences with the owners permission, or at times without.

Because the people of Morris and other surrounding counties were for the most part friendly to the cause of independence, they were willing to quarter the troops. In Morris County the assignment

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10. "January 6, 1777. At 9 A.M. we marched from Pluckamin for Morristown Via Vealtown where we arrived at 5 P.M. and encamped in the woods, the snow covering the ground." Ibid.
of quarters was done by civilian commissioners who would mark on
the door post the number of men to be located in each house. At
times the commissioners' decisions were not accepted by the citizens:
Mr. Urzal Kitchel, a farmer in Whippany, declined to house 41 soldiers,
but agreed to accept 12 for the winter. The ready acceptance of the
troops into private homes in New Jersey could be attributed to several
reasons besides loyalty to the American cause. One, which has already
been mentioned, was the plan to inoculate the army against smallpox.
Another may have been an attempt to mislead the loyalist spies as to
the size of the army by spreading it over a wide area. The strategic
plan to harass the British necessitated the dispersion of the army.
Finally, the willingness of the people to accept the placement of
troops in their homes may have been based on the expectation that they
would be in the area only a short while.

    Magazine, (1859), 293.
12. Ibid. In another case a family of nine made room for 14 officers
    and men during the winter.
    Events (Philadelphia, 1894) 54.
14. On January 7, 1777 Washington indicated that once the troops were
    refreshed, they would move on, although he did not know where. Fitz-
    patrick, Writings, VI, 478.
Not all residents of northern and central New Jersey were sympathetic to the patriot cause. Those who had welcomed the English in November now found themselves being persecuted by the supporters of the resurgent Americans. In many cases this took the form of actual jailing of individuals and confiscation of property, but in others the punishment was to "meanly use" the goods of the Tories without actually confiscating the property. This was the fate of families who became the unwilling hosts to officers and men of the American army. One such family was Philip Van Courtlandt's near Hanover. On December 8, the father fled to New York to avoid being seized by the rebels for his Tory views. The Van Courtlandt family remained at their home and when the Americans reoccupied the region, the house became a waystation for the troops. Malicious neighbors may have directed many to stay there. Troops from New England were occupying part of the house on January 20. Shortly thereafter they left, but another company had taken up quarters in the nursery by the 12th of February and the ample stores of the family were reduced to "a miserable pittance." By the same date their home had been designated as a hospital for the inoculation of the army against smallpox.

16. Ibid., 579.
On February 15, Washington issued Mrs. Van Courtlandt a pass to permit her and the children to leave home in Hanover and join her husband in New York. She left the house to be turned into a hospital for the sick of General Washington's army. The case of the Philip Van Courtlandts was not an isolated one, and no doubt other loyalist families found themselves providing needed quarters for the American army.

Though the evidence seems to point toward the conclusion that the soldiers were housed in private homes during the winter, there has developed a general belief that a major part of the army encamped in Loantaka Valley in a well organized camp of about 300 huts. This story can be traced back to Joseph F. Tuttle, a local historian, during the second half of the 19th century. Tuttle based his account on the memory of eyewitnesses who had seen the camp as small children in 1777. The story was repeated as fact by later writers including Andrew Sherman in his book *Historic Morristown*, published in 1905. The existence of such a large scale encampment appears doubtful in that not one of the published letters or orders of Washington mention or refer to this encampment nor has it appeared in any contemporary references. Archeological investigation has revealed no evidence of the camp.

17. It must be pointed out also that there have been no references found that mention the discovery of evidence of the encampment: bullets, pieces of guns, fire place remains, and other memorabilia of approximately 1,000 soldiers. In contrast, seven brigades, about 1,400 men, encamped at Middlebrook in 1778-79 and archeological evidence of the
It is possible that some of the soldiers constructed huts in the Loantaka Valley, but these would have been an expedient for them and not a planned community of two or three streets as described by Tuttle. One other piece of evidence that would disprove the belief that a large number of log huts were built in the valley of the Loantaka is the order issued by General Washington on December 18, 1777, describing in detail the size and construction of the huts to be built in Valley Forge. Such detailed orders would have been unnecessary if the army had constructed as many as 300 huts only ten months earlier. It would appear that there was not a major encampment in the Loantaka Valley in the winter of 1777, though there may have been a few shelters constructed by individuals or small units.

Some of the troops may also have spent the winter at Morristown under canvas. Initially the thought of spending a New Jersey winter in tents would appear to be improbable, but during the severe winter of 1779-80 at Morristown some of the soldiers remained in tents until February. In January 1780 several storms of major proportions struck the New Jersey area and snow depths of four to six feet were recorded. Occupancy of the land were still coming to light more than 80 years later. "Some Published Items about Camp Middlebrook," *Somerset County Historical Quarterly*, 2 (1913) 20-33.


If it were possible to survive in pitched tents during such severe weather, it is likely that some troops may have used them as a shelter for a portion or even all of the winter of 1777, which was not so harsh.

When all the possibilities have been examined the following hypotheses can be assumed regarding the quartering of the troops during the winter of 1777. First, the generally accepted belief that the army erected an actual encampment in the Loantaka Valley, southeast of Morristown, is open to question because of the lack of both physical and documentary evidence and therefore may be disregarded. Second, to have spent part or even all of the winter in tents was possible and some of the men may have done this. Most of the evidence, however, seems to point to the use of private homes or buildings as quarters for the following reasons: The size of the army was less than 3,000 men during most of the winter. It was distributed in the outposts from which they harassed and observed the English. The duration of the stay in Morristown was expected, by General Washington, to be short and this belief would have been communicated to the army and the populace. Finally, the people were loyal to the revolution and welcomed the army triumphant. Thus the most plausible conclusion seems to indicate that a majority of the American Army was sheltered through quartering in private buildings, and only a minority were forced to use tents or hastily constructed log shelters.
CHAPTER III

Supplying The Army

Food and Fodder

The problem of quartering could be effectively dealt with by the utilization of private residences and buildings offered by the people or commandeered by the military. To supply this army was to prove a far more difficult task. It took several days for the men to move from their victory at Princeton to winter quarters at Morristown. Worn out as a result of cold, hunger, and the forced march from Trenton during the night of January 3, 1777 and the battle at Princeton that morning, the troops moved slowly and in dispersed order toward their objective. The commissaries were ordered to precede the troops and notify the inhabitants to prepare food for their refreshment. At both Somerset Court House and Pluckamin they were well received and the local farmers provided ample provisions. ¹ By the time the army reached Morristown, Joseph Trumbull, Commissary General, had moved on to begin establishing magazines and supply depots in New England for the next campaign. A native of Connecticut,

¹ Victor L. Johnson, The Administration of the American Commissariat During the Revolutionary War (Philadelphia, 1941), 60.
Trumbull was successful in creating a relatively efficient commissary department in the New England States. Washington was able to maintain communications with that area via Peekskill, New York, during the winter and could draw on the magazines to feed and clothe the troops.

The promise of full magazines from which to draw supplies was a new experience for the small army that reached Morristown. During the retreat across New Jersey and the swift counter strokes of late December and early January its diet had been sparse. This in spite of the daily diet specified in August 1775, which contained beef, pork, salt fish, bread, flour, vegetables, rice, Indian meal, beer and molasses. Prior to the battle of Trenton the army was subsisting on meat, bread and water, and had no vegetables, salt, vinegar, beer or other liquids available. The supply of clothing was equally depleted, leaving many of the men without socks or shoes. The oft-repeated story of bloody footprints in the snow, contained more truth than fiction. It was with this tattered army, however, that Washington launched his campaign to deprive the

2. Four of the New England States concluded a price fixing convention on January 2, which established rates for basic supplies. This ended the speculative climb in prices. Ibid., 161.


5. On January 2, Henry Knox wrote to Henry Jackson decrying the lack of concern shown by "those who are not an active part of this contest" with the plight of the men who were in want of shoes,
English of supplies, and at the same time collect considerable amounts of food and forage for immediate use or to be stored in magazines in Pennsylvania.

In their rapid withdrawal from southern New Jersey, in December, the English and their Hessian allies had abandoned a great amount of supplies. Sergeant John Smith recorded in his diary that on the 28th of December at Bordentown they found provisions of every kind and on the 29th at Crosswicks the enemy had abandoned "several Hundred Barrals of Pork and Beef salted in bulk." The British and their allies having intended to draw upon the agricultural wealth of New Jersey for their winter supplies had created small magazines, near many of the towns, which they were in process of filling when Washington attacked.

In the hasty retreat of early January, the English forces were able to remove even less food to their new lines, and more supplies, including considerable amounts of flour from the mills on the Raritan River, fell into the hands of the Americans.

stockings and warm clothing. Photostat copy in the Morristown National Historical Park Collections. Original in the Chamberlin Collection, Boston Public Library. Washington echoed this complaint in letters written on the 10th and 14th of January.


7. Tench Tilghman, one of Washington's aides, wrote his father on January 11, describing the vast amounts of supplies left by the enemy. Samuel Harrison, Memoir of Lt. Col. Tench Tilghman (Albany, 1876), 150.
Within a week after the arrival of the army at Morristown the plan to strip the countryside of the food and fodder still remaining in the vicinity of the English outposts was under way. The object was to deprive the enemy of every possible source of subsistence for men and stock over the winter, thus weakening them for the spring hostilities. All food and supplies removed from the farms of local patriots by the American foragers was paid for by the Commissary officers at the established rates. The success of the Americans in denying the enemy food was augmented by the capture of wagonloads of provisions and herds of stock collected by the English. Letters from the Commander-in-Chief and other officers record the vast amount of food and winter forage obtained by the raiding parties operating near the enemy lines. The supplies thus secured helped the army to survive during the winter when, despite the happy outlook in January, the commissary department was unable to supply the troops.

The problem of supplying the army at Morristown had its roots in the complexities of the previous eighteen months. Within a month


9. On January 22, Washington reported the capture of 40 wagonloads of food and 100 head of stock by General Dickenson. Fitzpatrick, Writings, II, 48. In February Colonel Theodorick Bland wrote his wife that General Sullivan had captured "5 or 600 cattle, and about as many sheep, belonging to the Tories who had joined or were about to join the enemy." Campbell, The Bland Papers, I, 47. These were two of several reports of such success.
after the firing stopped at Concord and Lexington, the British in
Boston were besieged by an army of 20,000 men. These men had to be
fed although no plans had been made to do so. Prevailing custom
called upon the towns to provision their companies until provincial
governments took over, but soon the distance it was required to move
the goods and food, and the poor condition of the roads made this
impossible.

The New England states took over the responsibility of supply­
ing the army about Boston and were able to provide sufficient food
for the units. The middle and southern states in the summer and fall
also organized departments to feed their troops while in the field.
On June 15, 1775, George Washington was appointed Commander-in-Chief
and the next day the regulations for organizing the Continental army
were adopted which also created the post of Commissary General of
Stores and Provisions. 10 Washington recommended Joseph Trumbull of
Connecticut as the first Commissary General of the Army and on July 19
he accepted the position. With the appointment of Trumbull, Con­
gress ceased to consider the problem of supplying the troops and for
nearly two years Joseph Trumbull presided over a department with no
organizational basis. His major problem was, and remained, to cen­
tralize a system composed of independent states. With the support of
Washington, and the cooperation of the states, he was fairly successful.

11. Ibid., 190.
During the campaign of 1776, the Commissary Department was able to supply the men with plenty of flour and beef or pork. But, except for a brief period in July and August on Long Island, there was a shortage of fresh vegetables, as well as salt and vinegar, which would have been an acceptable substitute. In December 1776, Trumbull left the army under Washington to organize magazines or stores in New England for the next campaign. He left Carpenter Wharton as the Deputy Quartermaster General in charge of supply. Washington questioned the fitness of Wharton to carry on duties which he believed required a man of exceptional ability. But it was upon the shoulders of Carpenter Wharton that the responsibility of supplying the small army at Morristown was to rest.

Unfortunately, Washington's evaluation of the man proved to be true and the commissary department operated in an inefficient and irregular pattern during the first months of the new year. The chief difficulty was caused by Wharton's public announcement that he was commissioned to buy large quantities of supplies for the army. Prices in the Jerseys and Pennsylvania took a substantial jump and this was further aggravated by his deputies bidding against each other, driving the cost of supplies even higher.

13. Ibid., 58.
14. Out of this chaos came few provisions, but many charges of corruption and misdealing since the higher the price paid under the commission system the greater the profit to the individual. Lundin, Cockpit, 231. Johnson, Administration, American Commissariat, 65.
To add to the problem, the supply depots established in New England did not provide enough food for the army and on February 22 Washington wrote Deputy Commissary General Mathew Irwin, expressing his feelings in the strongest terms:

Sir: The Cry for want of Provisions comes to me from every quarter. Gnl Maxwell writes word that his People are starving; Gnl Johnston, of Maryland, yesterday informed me that his People could draw none; this difficulty I understand prevails also at Chatham! What Sir is the meaning of this and why were you so desirous of excluding others from this business when you are unable to accomplish it yourself? Consider, I beseech you, the consequences of this neglect, and exert yourself to remove the Evil, and Complaints which cannot be less fatal to the Army than disagreeable to you, Sir. 15

This situation was speedily brought to the attention of Joseph Trumbull in Connecticut. Washington felt very strongly that the Commissary General should rejoin the Army at Morristown even at the risk of neglecting the job of preparing for the summer of 1777.

15. Fitzpatrick, Writings, VII, 189.

16. In a letter of March 28, Washington demanded to know why Trumbull was not present at Morristown since "there never was greater occasion for the exertions of an Officer in any department, than in yours to recover the business from the confusion and disorder it had got into." Ibid., 325-26.
In early February, Jeremiah Wadsworth, one of his associates, wrote to Trumbull, informing him that the department was in wretched condition and that he should come to Morristown. Wadsworth continued by explaining that though the army was tolerably supplied, there were neither reserves nor a regular plan of forming magazines. Eight weeks later Trumbull received another letter describing a situation in which there was a shortage of cattle, while contractors did not venture from their houses except to bid against each other and drive prices even higher. After being urged and then commanded to come to Philadelphia to straighten out the affairs of his department, Trumbull arrived on April 22 and first suspended and then fired Wharton. Even this action, and testimony before a committee of the Congress, did not end the criticism of the commissary department.

Though there were problems in supplying both subsistence and equipment to the army, the less serious problem during the winter was subsistence. During the first months of the new year, food,


though in short supply, was available from the countryside near
the English lines or the storehouses established by Joseph Trumbull.
A minor crisis came in late April as a result of the removal of
supplies to the interior to prevent them from falling into the hands
of the English, should they hazard a push toward Philadelphia. This
removal had been so thorough that, for the moment, the army was
threatened with a shortage of food. This condition was aggravated
by the English attack on General Lincoln's troops in Boundbrook and
the loss of some quantities of flour, rum, cattle, and sheep. 20
Despite these minor disasters the army was able to survive the winter
with a minimum of discomfort. On April 23, the Commissary General
was able to report the existence of 3,000 barrels of salted fish and
300 of salted meat at Head of Elk on Chesapeake Bay, and that 1,500
barrels of salted meat was enroute to Philadelphia from Lancaster,
Pennsylvania. These supplies and others were being forwarded to the
camp as fast as possible. According to Trumbull there was an ample
supply of flour available for the months ahead and 30,000 barrels of
salted meat in Connecticut and Massachusetts in excess of the needs
of the Northern army. He concluded his report to the Congress with

the statement that the army was receiving fresh meat 3 days out of 7. This reassuring report of late April had no sooner come than the recruits that Washington had been hoping for all winter began to arrive at Morristown. The problem of clothing and equipping them was at hand.

**Clothing and Equipment**

Providing arms, equipment, and clothing for the troops under his command was an even greater worry to Washington than the need to feed his men. Before the battle of Trenton, his army was described as nearly naked with a desperate need for shoes and stockings - a need that had not been alleviated by the time they reached winter quarters. Clothing was available, but in this period when the state governments still thought of themselves first and the needs of the nation second, it often did not reach the army. Instead it would be appropriated by the states to outfit their militia units. In January, Washington decried the appropriation by New York of 26 bales of clothes intended for the army at Morristown.


22. In a letter to James Mease dated on January 10, Washington wrote "We are distressed beyond Measure for Cloathing (Shoes and Stockings particularly) for want of some person 'to tend to this'." Fitzpatrick, *Writings*, VI, 492.

23. Ibid., VII, 13 and 63.
As in the case of the Commissary Department, the organization of a Department to provide clothing for the troops was still in the formative stages. In early March, Washington nominated James Mease as Clothier General. He noted that the northern states had a sufficiency of clothing, but those from New Jersey south would be dependent on the national government for supplies. Whereupon, Mease was directed to prepare an estimate of clothing needs and present it to Congress so that funds could be set aside for the necessary purchases. But until a formal organization of supply could be established, the troops were dependent on their individual states for equipment, or on the small amounts that were available from the erratic, less than dependable, supply organization, and for this reason Mease was also to solicit the states for clothing supplies.

The plight of militia units who were not adequately provided for by their own states were exemplified by the letter sent to six Virginia Battalions and the Virginia Light Horse Troop on April 7, 1777. Washington reprimanded their commanding officers for the condition of the men who lacked in most necessities, and pointed out that clothing was available at the camp. 24, 25

24. Ibid., 248-49.
25. Ibid., 366.
It appears, however, that the demand outstripped the supply, for on the 18th, Captain Henry "Lighthorse Harry" Lee was requesting that his troops be furnished with caps and boots prior to their appearance at headquarters. Whether the items were furnished in time for the appearance at headquarters is not known, but the Virginia units were able to remain in the army into the summer of 1777.

Because there was no organization to supply the troops on a national level, it fell to the states to provide for their own men. In his letters to state leaders in February and March, Washington stressed the necessity to equip their militia units as there were very few supplies available from the national government. Most of the units that arrived in camp in April and May were equipped sufficiently and required a minimum of additional furnishings. The situation was also relieved by the news that the French ship Mercury had docked at Portsmouth, New Hampshire on the 17th of March. Included in her cargo were 48 bales of woolens, 9 bales of handkerchiefs, thread, cotton and printed linens plus two cases of shoes and other miscellaneous items. This good news was followed by the information that 34 other ships had cleared French ports bound for the United States.

26. Campbell, The Bland Papers, I, 51. This complaint was in no sense unjustified, as the preceding day, Washington had written to James Mease describing the Virginia Regiments (about 1000 men) as almost naked. Fitzpatrick, Writings, VII, 421.

27. Journals of the Continental Congress, VII, 211

The major part of the Mercury's cargo was arms and powder, 12,000 fusees, 11,000 gun flints and a thousand barrels of powder. The arrival of the brig Sally in the Delaware with 6,800 muskets and 1500 gunlocks and the Amphitrite in New Hampshire from Le Havre with 10,000 more muskets, plus powder, cannon, tents and other items provided good reason to rejoice. There would be no want of weapons for the coming campaign. A lack of arms had been a major worry of Washington's until the news at the end of March. The continental army and its militia units had nearly 29,000 weapons for the 1777 and future campaigns. As spring came upon the land the slumbering states began to stir and new recruits began to arrive in camp, many enlisting for three years, or for the duration of the war. Most came equipped, not handsomely but adequately, and there was promise in the activities of the Commissary and Clothier General that they would continue to be supplied.

During the first weeks in May recruits continued to arrive at the encampment at Morristown, and by the last week of the month there were eight or nine thousand well-equipped Continentals in camp. As the spring days lengthened and the roads dried out, Washington's worries over the next move of General Howe increased. Yet Howe did


30. One of the major causes of the weapon shortage was the habit of individuals to take their weapons with them at the end of the enlistment.
not venture forth and at the end of May, Washington transferred his forces to Middlebrook. Located in the first range of the Watchung Mountains and eight miles from New Brunswick, he could better observe the movements of the British and block any overland assault on Philadelphia via Princeton and Trenton. The army quartered in tents in the valley and Washington took advantage of the warm weather and the encampment to discipline the men, and drill the officers in military etiquette. 31

The removal of the army from Morristown between the 28th and 31st of May marked the beginning of the campaign of 1777 and the end of five months of relative inactivity. During these months the army had suffered from inadequate clothing, inconstant food supplies, and infection from smallpox. Many deserted but those who remained preserved the semblence of an army. Upon this foundation of veterans, Washington rebuilt his army in the spring and this force would determine the fate of the middle colonies during the summer and fall.

The 8,000 men at Middlebrook bore little resemblance to the tattered and tired army that had passed near there five months before. On June 2, 1777, Henry Knox, writing to his wife, typified the new spirit:

We have the most respectable body of continental troops that America ever had, no going home tomorrow to suck — hardy brave fellows, who are as willing to go to heaven by the way of a bayonet or sword as any other mode. With the blessing of heaven, I have great hopes in the course of this campaign that we shall do something clever . . .

32. Francis Drake, *Life and Correspondence of Henry Knox* (Boston, 1873), 42.
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