QUARTERING, DISCIPLINING, AND SUPPLYING THE ARMY AT MORRISTOWN, 1779-1780

FEBRUARY 23, 1970
DISCARDED
QUARTERING, DISCIPLINING, AND SUPPLYING THE ARMY AT MORRISTOWN, 1779-1780

To Dr. Alan E. Kent
With best wishes
In friendship

DR. GEORGE J. SVEJDA

George J. Svejda

DIVISION OF HISTORY
OFFICE OF ARCHEOLOGY AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION

FEBRUARY 23, 1970

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

WASHINGTON, D.C.
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INTRODUCTION

It is indeed a desirable thing to be well descended, but the glory belongs to our ancestors.

Plutarch

"Quartering, Disciplining, and Supplying the Army at Morristown, 1779-1780" (MORR-H-3) is a study of the winter encampment of the Continental Army at Morristown, New Jersey, during the seven-month period from December 1779, through June 1780.

The 18th century was a century of ferment, a century of a contest between the established order and new ideas.

The Revolutionary Army was the product of the ideals of the American Revolution and of Washington's idealism and leadership. Men of many nations fought in this army. Some died in battle; others stayed to become citizens of the new nation. The road to freedom was long, difficult and costly. Battles such as Ticonderoga, Trenton, Saratoga and Guilford Court House are historically important events in the Revolutionary War - Valley Forge and Morristown are also historically important as sites of winter encampments of the Continental Army.

Except for raids, forays and chance encounters, armies of the time of the American Revolution spent their winters
George Washington and his army endured a miserable and depressing hibernation at Valley Forge where the ragged heroes nursed their chilblains during the long, hard winter. At Morristown, the Continental Army survived two hard winters under equally or perhaps more wretched conditions.

In December of 1779, Morristown became for the second time the base of the main body of the American Army, where the majority of the soldiers were to spend the next seven months. Upon their arrival, the soldiers' first task was to provide themselves with shelter. When they had completed their hutting, under difficult weather conditions, they settled into a daily routine of camp life which proved to be hard and monotonous, characterized by a complex of difficulties which possibly never existed to an equal degree at any other time during the war for American independence. The snow not only blanketed the soldiers but also blocked the roads, preventing the organized military drill and disrupting the supply system. Soldiers were often without meat for two or three days. Many had no shoes or stockings, others no pants or blankets. In some cases the soldiers boiled their shoes and ate them. It may be said that the tragedy of the Morristown winter encampment of 1779-80 reflects the weakness of the Continental
Congress, the depleted finances and the inefficient and corrupt organization of the auxiliary services. It is truly remarkable that the army, poorly and inadequately fed and clothed and miserably sheltered from the severe and prolonged winter, did not dissolve altogether. That this did not happen is due to the greatness of Washington, whose perseverance and determination helped keep the Revolution alive. The Greek historian Polybius stressed the importance of tenacity when he wrote twenty-two centuries ago: "Some men give up their designs when they have almost reached the goal. Others, on the contrary, obtain a victory by exerting, at the last moment, more vigorous efforts than before." In holding fast to fundamentals, firmness and persistence is usually needed. This Washington had. The army, inspired by Washington's leadership, emerged at the end of the encampment prepared to resume the battle which eventually led to the British defeat and to the signing of the peace treaty that officially ended hostilities between the United States and Great Britain. Virgil's famous line, "parcere subjectis et debellare superbos," - to spare the prostrate and break down the proud - is a fair summary not only of Roman policy in war but also of the policy of Washington. Thus at the end of the 18th century, we witness the partial break-up of the first British Empire, which had been brought into existence by the Earl of Chatham as a result of the Seven Years' War.

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One cannot closely study this period without being inspired by the raw courage and tenacity of these men--little more than a "rabble in arms"--who in the face of apparently insuperable odds of adversity, desertion, and disease held firm, to form the nucleus of an army that carried Washington and the country to ultimate victory and independence.

About two thousand years ago, the Greek philosopher Plato, in his work *The Republic*, recommended that youth be inculcated with the patriotism necessary for the success of the ideal nation. Today we witness not only a decline in parental discipline, but also a lack of patriotic feeling. There is a clear decline in accepted standards. Freedom is easier to lose than to attain. It was Patrick Henry who said that "Bad men cannot make good citizens." "It is impossible," he added, "that a nation of infidels or idolaters should be a nation of free men. . . . A vitiated state of morals, a corrupted public conscience, is incompatible with freedom." Freedom, although God-given, depends on each of us. It is a fragile gift which we must preserve and fortify. Freedom is not for the lazy. It demands character, will and education. It required decisiveness, self-respect and self-reliance.

History gives us many examples of democracies which have been destroyed by external and internal powers. Awareness of the his-
torical past should stimulate our concern that nothing threaten our freedom, for which Washington and his men fought and suffered. The Roman consuls once ignored the alarming voice: *Caveatis, consules, ne quid detrimenti. Res publica caparet* - "be on guard, Consuls, so that the Republic does not suffer." And Rome eventually collapsed. Let us hope that in this country such a warning will never be similarly ignored.

Since the existence of every human society is determined by its ideas and institutions, it follows that social progress and well-being depend primarily on the truth of the principles on which the society is built and on the good order which prevails in its administration.

In connecting the source material for this study, I have borne in mind the injunction "For whatever was written in former days was written for our instruction." (Romans 15:4). But the study of documents is only one element, and not the most important, in the pursuance of historical research. The most important is experience and the spirit of inquiry.

The preparation of this study led me to Morristown, New Jersey, where I received the encouragement and assistance of Mr. Melvin J. Weig, Superintendent of the Morristown National Historical Park, and his excellent staff. My colleagues, John
Luzader, Francis F. Wilshin, and Edwin C. Bearss shared with me unselfishly their extensive knowledge of history, and I am grateful to them for their assistance. To Mr. Frank B. Sarles, Jr., go special thanks for reading the study in the final form. My gratitude is also due to Mrs. Maxine Gresham for her typing of the manuscript and to my wife Hana for her patient understanding.

George J. Svejda
I. CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE MORRISTOWN ENCAMPMENT

1779-1780

The direct circumstances which led to the establishment of the military headquarters at Morristown were based on the events in the South, where during September-October of 1779, Vice Admiral Count Charles d'Estaing's squadron was cooperating with the American forces commanded by General Benjamin Lincoln in a joint assault upon Savannah, Georgia. Washington was fully counting and depending on a joint action of d'Estaing's fleet against the British forces in New York City. However, on October 9, 1779, the joint expedition upon Savannah failed, and on October 20 the French fleet departed for the West Indies and France. Unaware of his debacle (during which Count Casimir Pulaski was mortally wounded) and facing Sir Henry Clinton's forces, firmly established in New York City, as well as the problem of the oncoming winter, Washington was forced to consider a winter campsite for his troops.


Except for raids, forays and chance encounters, armies of the time of the American Revolution spent their winters in hibernaculo. By and large, the winter encampment played an important role in the comparatively slow-paced warfare of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. Skill in choosing a suitable winter campsite was considered one of the requisite qualities of a good military leader, and involved the assurance not only of sufficient space, but also of good transportation facilities and water and wood supplies, to mention only a few essentials. Such were the problems which concerned General Washington in organizing the winter encampment of 1779-80.

Contrary to the practice which prevailed in the Roman army, by which every encampment was fortified, the winter camps of the 18th century were seldom fortified; however, competent military leaders were careful to take advantage of favorable terrain, so they could quickly draw up their troops in order of battle if necessary.

It was the Quartermaster General, Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene, who in early November 1779 was entrusted by Washington with the task of selecting the quarters for the winter encampment of 1779-80. On November 3, 1779, Col. Clement Biddle found a favorable location under the mountain back of Quibbletown and

5. The first wintering of the Roman Army in Sicily took place in 259 B.C. Cf. for this Wilhelm Ihne, The History of Rome, Vol. II. (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1871), p. 61. The Latin term hibernaculum means "winter quarters." This is the term used by Gaius Julius Caesar.
Scotch Plains, New Jersey. Shortly afterward Lord Stirling expressed his belief that this position was too exposed to enemy attack, expressing his preference for a site near Quibbletown Gap. On November 10, 1779, Colonel James Abeel reported to General Greene that, although he saw no possibilities between Boonton, Baskinridge and Chatham, there existed between First and Second Mountains a "most Beautiful Place for an Incampment"; however, when Greene visited the area, he found both sites unsatisfactory.

Washington was looking primarily for a location which would serve the "double purposes of security and subsistence." In his opinion such a location should be free "from the insults of the collected force of the enemy" but also near other American outposts in order to give the location security. In his letter of November 17, 1779 to Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates, Washington stressed that the circumstances and "the abilities of the Quarter Master, Forage Master, and Commy. to support us in provision, forage, and the transportation of them to the places of Centenment" should be considered.

8. Abeel to Greene, November 10, 1779, in ibid., Vol. 3.
In his two letters to Washington of November 17 and 20, 1779, General Greene pointed out that he had found the sites described by Lord Stirling and Colonel Abeel so different from his expectation as to be unsatisfactory. In his reply to Greene of November 23, 1779, Washington expressed his regret that both areas fell short of expectations and pointed out that if the whole army could not be encamped together it could winter in a chain of encampments if necessary. Around November 22, 1779, Greene must have found another location for the winter encampment at Acquaquenack, but on November 23, Washington rejected it as "too much exposed," and too far from a source of hay forage. However, on November 25, 1779, Washington wrote to Greene that the stores between Trenton and the proposed encampment at Acquaquenack were just too few to tempt the enemy, and consequently the site at Acquaquenack could be tentatively accepted. Prior to that, on November 23, 1779, Colonel Abeel, who had been checking the terrain around Morristown, reported that "the ground back of Mr. Kemble's... a pretty large spott...well covered with Timber & pretty well watered....I believe will be the best I have as yet seen." On the following day he again expressed his belief

that this was the most suitable place for the winter encampment of all the grounds he had viewed.

Greene, writing to one of the officers on November 30, 1779, stated his opinion that there were only three suitable grounds for the winter quartering in New Jersey, of which two were a short distance from Morristown. The third, at Acquaquenack, was the best place, but close to New York City. On the same day Washington informed Greene in a letter that "From a consideration of all circumstances I am led to decide upon the position back of Mr. Kembles....You will therefore proceed to laying off the Ground. I shall be at Morris town tomorrow and shall be obliged by your ordering me a late dinner. I understand my Quarters are to be at Mrs. Fords."

Washington's decision on Morristown as a site for his winter encampment was based on his realization that a diminution of his forces was imminent due to "the expiration of enlistments," together with "an immediate necessity of sending a further reinforcement to South Carolina." Consequently he was obliged "to seek a more remote position than we would otherwise have done."

Later, writing to the President of the Continental Congress on

16. Greene to?, November 30, 1779, Morristown National Historical Park Manuscript Collections, #432.
December 4, 1779, Washington informed the Congress that Morristown could afford better security than Scotch Plains. In addition, Morristown could "supply water and wood for covering and fuel." On November 29, 1779, the New York Gazette and Weekly Mercury revealed the location of the winter encampment of Washington's army at Morristown, stating: "We are told that General Washington is to cantoon his Army this Winter in the County of Morris, in New-Jersey, between the Town of Morris, and that of Mendam."

Thus the decision was made and publicly revealed, and the troops were ready to move to this new location for hibernation.


II. QUARTERING OF THE ARMY AT MORRISTOWN, 1779-1780

1. PREPARATION OF THE CAMP

Writing from his headquarters in Morristown on December 4, 1779, General Washington reported to the President of the Continental Congress:

I arrived here on Wednesday the 1st Instant, and am exerting myself to get the Troops huttered in the Country lying between Morris Town and Mendam, about three miles from the former.¹

Washington's arrival in Morristown on December 1, 1779, was amidst a "very severe storm of hail & snow all day." The Ford Mansion, which had sheltered the Delaware troops during the 1777 encampment, was occupied as Washington's headquarters during the winter encampment of 1779-80. From this base of the Army, as it lay on high ground, Washington could keep an eye on possible British moves from New York.

Morristown itself was situated in a strategically advantageous position, surrounded by hills from which it could easily be defended. Furthermore it was located in a rich agricultural part of the State, whose produce could easily supply sustenance to Washington's army, while iron supplies could be provided from

¹ Washington to the President of Congress, December 4, 1779, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 17, pp. 216-17.
³ For an illustration depicting the Ford Mansion, which served as headquarters for General Washington during the winter of 1779-1780, see Appendix A.
the numerous furnaces and forges in Morris County. Brig. Gen. Louis Lebègue Duportail, Commandant of the Corps of Engineers, in his letter of January 16, 1780, to Quartermaster General Greene, stated that "a chain of hills, have the advantage, that we never can be brought to a general action; the hills being divided by deep valleys, which form each, in a manner, a distinct post."

In his letter of December 7, 1779, to Gov. William Livingstone, Washington wrote from Morristown: "We have taken up our quarters at this place for the winter. The main army lies three or four miles of the Town." While the Ford Mansion became Washington's headquarters and thus the American military capital, the site selected for the winter encampment of the army troops was three or four miles south of Morristown, in a mountainous tract of land known as Jockey Hollow, which also included portions of the "plantation" of Tory Peter Kemble, Esq., and the farms of Joshua Guerin and Henry Wick.

Washington's troops arrived in Morristown between the first and last week of December of 1779, and encamped in two lines below the crest of the mountainous tract of about two acres. Eight infantry brigades occupied a position on the Jockey Hollow site; these included the 1st and 2nd Maryland Brigades, the 1st and 2nd Connecticut Brigades, Hand's Brigade, the New York Brigade, and the 1st and 2nd Pennsylvania Brigades. Two additional infantry brigades were assigned to nearby campgrounds, Stark's Brigade on the southeastern slope of Kemble's Mountain, and the New Jersey Brigade near the mouth of Indian Graves Creek, more than a mile from "Eyre's Forge."

2. COMPOSITION AND STRENGTH OF THE ARMY AT MORRISTOWN


7. Ibid.

8. See Appendix B, showing a map drawn by the French engineer, Captain Bichet de Rochefontaine, and Appendix C, showing a map drawn by Gen. Robert Erskine. Both of these maps show the locations of the units as well as the camp in relation to the neighboring territory. See also infra, pp. 16-17.
Gunby, was ordered to Morristown via Windsor on November 20, 1779. Upon reaching there, the Brigade occupied ground on a hill along the Jockey Hollow Road near Primrose Brook, referred to locally as the Maryland field. In December of 1779 the brigade had a total strength of 1,425 men.

The Second Maryland Brigade was ordered to Morristown on November 20, 1779, where upon its arrival it was assigned to a camping ground paralleling the opposite side of the Jockey Hollow Road and extending up a hill toward the "Harvey Loree Place." Commanded by Brig. Gen. Mordecai Gist, the Brigade included the Second Maryland Regiment, under Capt. Benjamin Price, the Fourth Maryland Regiment under Col. Josias Hall, the Sixth Maryland Regiment, under Col. Otho Holland Williams, and


Hall's Delaware Regiment, making up total strength in December of 1779 of 1,451 men. On the morning of April 17, 1780, the Maryland troops left Morristown for the South.

The First and Second Connecticut Brigades were situated along the south and east slopes of Fort Hill, approximately 600 feet northeast of the Tempe Wick Road. The First Connecticut Brigade was ordered to proceed from New Windsor to Morristown on November 28, 1779. Commanded by Brig. Gen. Samuel Jolden Parsons, the Brigade included the Third Connecticut Regiment, under Col. Samuel Wyllis, the Fourth Connecticut Regiment of Col. John Durkee, the Sixth Connecticut Regiment of Col. Return Jonathan Meigs and the Eighth Connecticut Regiment of Lt. Col. Isaac Sherman, with a total enlistment, in December of 1779, of 1,688 men. The First Connecticut Brigade did not stay long


18. Ebenezer Parkman, Diary, American Antiquarian Society.

in the Morristown area; on February 2, 1780, it left the encamp-
ment to guard the country from Newark to Perth Amboy together
with other troops of the Connecticut Line, spending the winter
and spring of 1780 on outpost duty. The First Connecticut
Brigade finally left the Morristown area June 7, 1780, to
become a part of Major General The Marquis de LaFayette's
Connecticut Division.

The Second Connecticut Brigade was under the command of
Brig. Gen. Jedediah Huntington and included the First Connecticut
Regiment of Col. Josiah Starr, the Second Connecticut Regiment
of Col. Zebulon Butler, the Fifth Connecticut Regiment, headed
by Second Lieutenant Daniel Bradly (?) and the Seventh Connecticut
Regiment of Col. Herman Swift, with a total enlistment in December
of 1779 of 1,458 men. Part of this brigade's strength was sent
in February of 1780 to Springfield, New Jersey. When on May 13,
1780, the New Jersey Brigade commanded by Brig. Gen. William
Maxwell was dispatched to relieve the Connecticut troops,
General Huntington and his men were ordered to return to Morristown
and occupied the empty huts of the Maryland Line. It was there,

20. Washington to Major General Arthur St. Clair, February 2,
1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 17, p. 479.
21. See General Orders, June 7, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit.,
Vol. 18, pp. 486-87.
22. Monthly Return of the Continental Army... for December 1779,
23. Washington to General Huntington, March 29, 1780, in
Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 18, p. 175.
24. Washington to General Huntington, May 13, 1780, in
ibid., p. 355.
at the end of May 1780, that the Fourth and Eighth Connecticut
Regiments rose in mutiny.

The campsite of Hand's Brigade was north of the Tempe Wick
Road, approximately 300 feet southeast of the point where it joins
the Jockey Hollow Road. The Brigade was commanded by Brig. Gen.
Edward Hand, and included the First Canadian Regiment, headed by
Col. Moses Hazen, the Second Canadian Regiment, under Capt.
Abraham Livingston, the Fourth Pennsylvania Regiment of Lt. Col.
Adam Hubley. In December of 1779 its total combined enlistment
was 1,147 men. On November 21, 1779 General Hand was ordered
to proceed with his men from Pompton to Morristown. During
the entire winter the Brigade stayed in the encampment, leaving
Morristown on June 7, 1780, to become part of the Division
commanded by Maj. Gen. Baron von Steuben. During the encampment
its commanding officer, General Hand, also served as President
of the General Court Martial.

26. McClintock, op. cit., pp. 13-14; Sherman, op. cit.,
pp. 289 and 294.
27. Monthly Return of the Continental Army...for December 1779,
28. Washington to General John Sullivan, November 21, 1779,
29. See General Orders, June 7, 1780, in ibid., Vol. 18,
pp. 486-87.
The New York Brigade was situated on the east side of the Jockey Hollow Road, "A little more than half way (or about two and a half miles) from the Morristown Green." Their march to Morristown began at Pompton, New Jersey, on November 25, 1779. After seven days' delay at Rockaway Bridge, the Brigade arrived in Morristown on Sunday, December 5, 1779. The New York Brigade was commanded by Brig. Gen. James Clinton and included the Second New York Regiment of Col. Philip Van Cortlandt, the Third New York Regiment of Col. Peter Gansevoort, the Fourth New York Regiment of Lt. Col. Frederick Weisenfels, and the Fifth New York Regiment of Col. Lewis DuBois. In December of 1779 a combined total enlistment of this Brigade was 1,226 men.

The entire brigade stayed in Morristown until May 30, 1780, when it departed north for Kings Ferry, New York.

The campsite of the two Pennsylvania Brigades was still farther down the Jockey Hollow Road, on the west slope of Sugar Loaf Hill. The First Pennsylvania Brigade was commanded by Brig. Gen. William Irvine and included the First Pennsylvania

33. Ibid., p. 815.
Regiment headed by Col. James Chambers, the Second Pennsylvania Regiment headed by Col. Walter Stewart, the Seventh Pennsylvania Regiment of Lt. Col. Morgan Connor and the Tenth Pennsylvania Regiment of Col. Richard Humpton, with a combined total enlistment, in December 1779, of 1,290 men. On December 26, 1779, General Irvine and a detachment of his First Pennsylvania Brigade were ordered to Westfield, New Jersey, and an order of December 28, 1779, instructed him to replace guards heretofore kept by General Wayne. However, most of the troops belonging to the First Pennsylvania Brigade remained in Morristown. A tragedy occurred when the Commander of the Seventh Pennsylvania Regiment, Lt. Col. Morgan Connor, "was lost at sea in January, 1780." Because General Wayne was absent from camp until late spring of 1780, command of the Second Pennsylvania Brigade was given to Col. Francis Johnston of the Fifth Pennsylvania Regiment as of December 1779. This Brigade also included the Third Pennsylvania Regiment under Col. Thomas Craig, the Sixth Pennsylvania Regiment headed by Col. Robert Magaw and the Ninth Pennsylvania Regiment of Col. Richard Butler, with enlistment, in December of 1779, of 1,112 men.

The campsite of Stark's Brigade, which occupied the southeastern slope of Kemble's Mountain, was commanded by Brig. Gen. John Stark. While the Brigade came to Morristown on December 14, 1779, from Rhode Island, its troops came from three different States. The Brigade was composed of the Second Rhode Island Regiment, under Lt. Col. Israel Angell; the Connecticut Regiment of Col. Henry Sherburne, the Connecticut Regiment of Col. Samuel Blatchey Webb, and the Massachusetts Regiment of Col. Henry Jackson, with a total number of troops, in December 1779, of 1,270 men. Jackson's Massachusetts Regiment was the only Bay State unit that cantoned at Morristown during the winter of 1779-80. Stark's Brigade left Morristown on June 7, 1780, becoming a part of the division commanded by General von Steuben.

The New Jersey Brigade came to Morristown around mid-December 1779 and was encamped near the mouth of Indian Graves Creek.

42. Sherman, op. cit., pp. 281-85.
43. Lauber, op. cit., p. 715.
45. See General Orders, June 7, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 18, p. 487.
The Brigade was commanded by Brig. Gen. William Maxwell, and included the first New Jersey Regiment, under Col. Matthias Ogden; the Second New Jersey Regiment, under Col. Israel Shreve; the Third New Jersey Regiment, under Col. Elias Dayton; and the independent Spencer's Regiment, named for its commander, Col. Oliver Spencer. The total number of troops of this Brigade as of December of 1779 amounted to 1,313 men. The Brigade stayed in the winter encampment until May 11, 1780, when it left Morristown to reinforce the Second Connecticut Brigade of Brig. Gen. Jedediah Huntington. In June of 1780, during the departure of Washington's troops from Morristown, the New Jersey Brigade formed part of the Advance Corps.

The strength of each brigade differed from month to month during the entire winter encampment. The following tables present the numerical strength of each brigade encamped in Morristown between December 1779 and June 1780, by month, with figures of


50. See General Orders, June 7, 1780, in ibid., p. 486.
each brigade tabulated under the following headings:

**Officers Present Fit for Duty** - including Field, Commissioned and Staff Officers.

**Noncommissioned Officers** - including Sergeants Major, Quartermaster Sergeants, Drum Majors, Fife Majors, Sergeants, and Drummers and Fifers.

**Rank and File Total** - including the number of privates present fit for duty, sick present, sick absent, on command, and on furlough.
### STRENGTH OF BRIGADES AT MORRISTOWN IN DECEMBER 1779

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<td><strong>521</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,321</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>11,538</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total of officers and men: 13,380

STRENGTH OF BRIGADES AT MORRISTOWN IN JANUARY 1780

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade</th>
<th>Officers Present Fit for Duty:</th>
<th>Noncommissioned Officers:</th>
<th>Rank and File Total:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Maryland</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Maryland</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Connecticut</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>1,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Connecticut</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>1,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand's</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Pennsylvania</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>1,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Pennsylvania</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stark's</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>1,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>273</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>10,464</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total of officers and men: 11,697

### STRENGTH OF BRIGADES AT MORRISTOWN IN FEBRUARY 1780

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade:</th>
<th>Officers Present Fit for Duty:</th>
<th>Noncommissioned Officers:</th>
<th>Rank and File Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Maryland</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Maryland</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Connecticut</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Connecticut</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand's</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Pennsylvania</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>1,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Pennsylvania</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stark's</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1,015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|         | 392 | 1,098 | 9,871 |

Total of officers and men: 11,361

STRENGTH OF BRIGADES AT MORRISTOWN IN MARCH 1780

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade</th>
<th>Officers Present Fit for Duty</th>
<th>Noncommissioned Officers</th>
<th>Rank and File Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Maryland</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Maryland</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Connecticut</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>1,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Connecticut</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand's</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Pennsylvania</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>1,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Pennsylvania</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stark's</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>988</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

404 983 9,495

Total of officers and men: 10,882.

STRENGTH OF BRIGADES AT MORRISTOWN IN APRIL 1780

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade</th>
<th>Officers Present Fit for Duty:</th>
<th>Noncommissioned Officers:</th>
<th>Rank and File Total:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Connecticut</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Connecticut</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand's</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Pennsylvania</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Pennsylvania</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stark's</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>677</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

329                       817                       6,629

Total of officers and men: 7,775

### STRENGTH OF BRIGADES AT MORRISTOWN IN MAY 1780

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade</th>
<th>Officers Present Fit for Duty:</th>
<th>Noncommissioned Officers:</th>
<th>Rank and File Total:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Connecticut</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Connecticut</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand's</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Pennsylvania</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Pennsylvania</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stark's</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>921</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total of officers and men: 7,607

STRENGTH OF BRIGADES AT MORRISTOWN IN JUNE 1780

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade:</th>
<th>Officers Present Fit for Duty:</th>
<th>Noncommissioned Officers:</th>
<th>Rank and File Total:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Connecticut</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Connecticut</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand's</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Pennsylvania</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Pennsylvania</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stark's</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>420</strong></td>
<td><strong>877</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,108</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total of officers and men: 7,405

57. Compiled from Monthly Return of the Continental Army...for June, 1780, The William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan. On the Monthly Return for June, 1780, the names of the Commanders of the two Pennsylvania Brigades are transposed. The name of "Wayne" is given as Commander of the First Pennsylvania Brigade, which should have been given that of Brig. Gen. William Irvine, and the name of "Irvine" is given as Commander of the Second Pennsylvania Brigade; it should have been that of Gen.-Wayne.
The following table gives a month-by-month record of the total full strength of the brigades at Morristown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1779</td>
<td>13,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1780</td>
<td>11,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1780</td>
<td>11,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1780</td>
<td>10,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1780</td>
<td>7,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1780</td>
<td>7,607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1780</td>
<td>7,405</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In December of 1779 Washington's forces at Morristown included 521 officers, 1,321 noncommissioned officers and 11,538 enlisted men, giving a total of 13,380 soldiers. This does not mean, however, that all these men were actually present at Morristown. Washington himself said that "the amount of an army on paper, will greatly exceed its real strength."

It should be recalled that the troops were arriving at the Morristown encampment between the first and last week of December of 1779, and that all but two of the ten brigades occupied positions on the Jockey Hollow site. The two infantry brigades assigned to nearby campgrounds were Stark's Brigade, on the southeastern slope of Kemble's

59. See supra, p. 19.
60. Washington to the President of Congress, November 18, 1779, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 17, p. 126.
Mountain, and the New Jersey Brigade, near the mouth of Indian Graves Creek, more than a mile from "Eyre's Forge." In December 1779 the total strength of Stark's Brigade was 1,270 men, and that of the New Jersey Brigade 1,313 men, making a total of 2,583 men. If this number is deducted from the full strength of the Washington forces in Morristown in December of 1779, 13,380 men, one would arrive at a total of 10,797 men, which is not too far from the approximate number of 10,000, which Washington had on December 15, 1779, at the Morristown site.

According to a statement issued by the Council of War on March 27, 1780, the operating force at Morristown amounted "to about 7,000 rank and file, thirteen hundred of whom will have completed their term of service the last of May; at the Highlands about 2600 including twelve hundred whose services will expire at the same period and at Danbury about 800, including three hundred of the same description." In a letter of April 2,

61. See supra, p. 9.
62. See supra, pp. 16-17.
64. Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 18, p. 166.
1780, to the President of the Congress, Washington revealed

that Our whole operating force present on this and
on the other side of the North River, amounts to
only Ten thousand four Hundred rank and file, of
which about Two Thousand Eight Hundred will have
completed their term of service by the last of May (Two thirds of it by the end of this Month).

The above figure corresponds approximately to the strength
of the brigades at Morristown which in March of 1780 amounted
to 10,882 officers and men.

On the morning of April 17, 1780, the Maryland troops left
Morristown for Charleston, South Carolina. Subtracting the
total strength of the First and Second Maryland Brigades as of
March 1780, 2,226 officers and men, the strength of the
brigades at Morristown after April 17, 1780, would have amounted
to 7,775 officers and men.

Between March 27 and May 30, 1780, about 1,300 men completed
their terms of service at Morristown. Of the 3,400 men in the
Highlands and at Danbury on March 27, 1780, a total of 1,500 com-
pleted their terms of service by the end of May 1780. In a

65. Washington to the President of Congress, April 2, 1780, in ibid., p. 198.
66. See supra, p. 22.
67. Washington to the President of the Congress, April 17, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 18, p. 270.
68. See supra, p. 22.
69. See supra, p. 23.
70. See estimate issued by the Council of War, March 27, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 18, p. 166.
71. See statement issued by the Council of War, March 27, 1780, in ibid., p. 166.
statement sent to the Committee of Cooperation on May 31, 1780, Washington declared that "the batalions [sic] in this quarter completed by drafts as recommended by the Committee in their circular letter will amount to 22680; the balance of 17320 must consist of Militia."

On June 2, 1780, the Committee recommended the enlistment of 17,325 men, of which the State of Massachusetts was to supply the highest quota, 4,725 men.

Subtracting the figure of 17,325 from 22,680, one arrives at a figure of 5,355, which is slightly different from the number of rank and file men for the month of June, which is given as 6,108. In addition to this number of 6,108 enlisted men, there are also 420 officers and 877 non-commissioned officers, making a total of 7,405 officers and men present and fit for duty. The Monthly Return of the Continental Army for June 1780 shows the 1st and 2nd Connecticut, Hand's, New York, 1st and 2nd Pennsylvania, Stark's, and the New Jersey brigades listed at Morristown with a total strength of 7,405 officers and men. All these brigades are listed in spite of the fact that many of them had already left the winter camp for other

72. Washington to the Committee of Cooperation, May 31, 1780, in ibid., p. 457.
73. Ibid., p. 470.
74. See supra, p. 25.
assignments. As may be recalled, the First Connecticut Brigade spent the winter and spring of 1780 on outpost duty. In June of 1780, the strength of this brigade was 953 officers and men. Subtracting this amount from the total strength of 7,405 men listed for June 1780 leaves a figure of 6,452. The New Jersey Brigade had departed from their winter encampment on May 11, 1780 and the New York Brigade had withdrawn from Morristown for Kings Ferry, New York, on May 30, 1780. Hand's Brigade left Morristown on June 7, 1780, and Stark's Brigade departed on the same day. The total strength of the New Jersey Brigade for June 1780 is listed as 1,089 officers and men, while for the same month the New York Brigade had 909 officers and men, Hand's Brigade 1,022 officers and men, and Stark's Brigade 788 officers and men, making a total of 3,808 officers and men. The remainder of the total force of 6,452 officers and men totalled 2,644, representing the troops of the 2nd Connecticut Brigade, 555 men strong; the 1st Pennsylvania Brigade, 983 men strong; and the 2nd Pennsylvania Brigade, 1,106 men strong.

75. See supra, pp. 11-12.
76. See supra, p. 25.
77. See supra, p. 17.
78. See supra, p. 14.
79. See supra, p. 13.
80. See supra, p. 16.
81. See supra, p. 25.
The high point and low point of the numerical strength of the brigades occurred respectively in December 1779 and June 1780. As previously mentioned, the army had begun to break camp in May and finished in June 1780. After the departure of those brigades which left during these two months, it seems most probable that at the time the troops officially ended their winter hibernation, there were about 2,644 officers and men left at Morristown, who were then assigned to other duty.
III. DAILY LIFE AT THE ENCAMPMENT

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ARMY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

To secure the independence of a country and then to defend that independence, it is necessary to have a military force. From time immemorial rulers have acquired military forces through hiring mercenaries for wages or by conscription or recruitment of the most physically fit men of their particular nation. Other rulers have introduced compulsory military service, requiring participation in the defense of the country by every citizen able to bear arms. The army of ancient Sparta not only included the most honorable names but was also known for its military skills. Similarly, during the peak of the Roman State’s power in the first century after Christ, universal military service was imposed on every Roman citizen between 17 and 60 years; the younger citizens, those of up to 45 years of age, served in the field, while those 45 years old and above remained garrisoned in the fortresses and cities.


For many centuries heads of state avoided the establishment of a standing military service, recruiting soldiers only from certain classes. The beginning of the standing army system came with the Roman military occupation of Spain in the 2nd century B.C., and for centuries thereafter the military organization of the European states followed throughout the centuries the Roman system, adjusted of course to local conditions.

In the 12th century each soldier furnished his own arms. The tresher, the axe, the sword, the spear and the bow and arrow were the weapons used for attack, while the shield and helmet provided protection. Plate-armor was used only by the nobility.

The chivalric army of the 13th and 14th centuries was composed of three parts: the heavy cavalry, the infantry and the light cavalry. The backbone was the heavy cavalry, in which each man wore an armor, shielding not only his entire body but also partially the body of his horse. This was mainly because battle in this period actually consisted of a series of combats, in which personal heroism decided the outcome. The infantry and the light cavalry were used only for preliminary skirmishes, for cover and reserve, and of course for pursuit of a defeated enemy.


The army looked after its own food supply, mostly at the expense of the territories through which it marched.

The Hussite Wars marked a change in military practice, when John Zizka transformed the army in such a way that the infantry became the decisive element, not only in offense but also in defense.

The beginnings of the modern army go back to the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527), who in his books *Dell' Arte della Guerra* (On the Art of War) and *Il Principe* (The Prince) accurately portrayed the nature of modern warfare. Machiavelli understood the nature of the sovereign nation-state and stressed that its very existence must depend, as a last resort, on strength in war. He ridiculed the limited type of warfare practiced in Italy during his time and pointed out that when the state has to fight for its existence there can be no limitation in means. Machiavelli emphasized that the Prince's sole guide must be expediency; that he must not limit himself by any moral considerations in his dealings with his own people or with other states.


The mercenary army of the 16th century consisted of heavy infantry, or pikemen; light infantry, or musketeers; heavy cavalry, or cuirassiers and light cavalry, or arquebusiers. The basic unit was the regiment.

It was Wallenstein who created the concept of the generalissimo, in whose hands was concentrated all power over the army and who was assisted by a general staff. The colonels, who were named by him, were no longer masters of their regiments. Following the death of Wallenstein the role of generalissimo was transferred to the Emperor, who from that time named the higher, and later even the lower, officers.

The Thirty Years' War was a war conducted by enlisted men. In May of 1625 Wallenstein's army had only 15,000 foot and 6,000 horse. In the cavalry the important element was the light cavalry, or arquebusiers.

Following the Seven Years' War (1756-63) came the division of the military continents into single countries and to recruitment

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9. Wallenstein was a Czech by birth. His correct Czech name was that of Valdštejn.


11. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 386.

12. Ibid., Vol. 11, pp. 385-86.
by conscription; military service continued to be lifetime.

2. ORGANIZATION OF THE CONTINENTAL ARMY

The Continental Army was not a fully "national" force, but rather an army in which the contingents of troops were identified by the States from which they came. Although the regimental officers of the State "lines" or regiments were appointed by their respective State legislatures, the Congress appointed the general officers. Because of the inability of Congress to raise revenues through taxes for the support of the army in 1778, it instructed the States to supply their own lines or regiments. This created unfortunate differentiations, since some States were more generous in the supply of their lines than were others. In spite of this diversity, the Continental Army was an expression of a national feeling.


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The Continental Army was organized on the British pattern. It was composed of infantry, artillery, and very little cavalry. A regiment or battalion, composed of eight companies (as opposed to the ten of the British regiment) was the basic organizational unit of the Continental Army. Above this level the organization was flexible. Several regiments usually formed a brigade, commanded by a brigadier general, and several brigades formed a division, commanded by a major general.

On December 27, 1776, the artillery was organized by Congress as a brigade of four regiments headed by a chief of artillery, Brig. Gen. Henry Knox.

A small corps of engineers, together with the even smaller contingent of artificers, handled the repair and servicing of ordnance. The Quartermaster General was in charge of supply and transport; however, as a rule, civilians rather than service troops were employed to carry out the actual work.

3. HEADQUARTERS: FORD MANSION

Washington and his suite occupied all but "two rooms on the eastern side of the main passage, which were reserved for Mrs. Ford and her family." The General used the lower southwest room as his dining-room, while the room "immediately over it was his sleeping-room."

Because the Ford Mansion was not large enough in size to meet his needs, Washington ordered the erection of two log additions, one of which on the east end of the Mansion was used as a kitchen, while in the larger one, on the west side, "Washington, Hamilton, and Tilghman had their offices."

Subsequently additional work in or around the Mansion was done. A letter of July 26, 1780, from Lieut. Col. Richard Kidder Meade to Mrs. Theodosia Ford shows that Ford Mantion was used as Washington's headquarters between December 1, 1779, and June 23, 1780, and also points out that "The Stable was built and the two Rooms above Stairs finished at the public expense, and a well, which was interely [sic] useless and filled


20. John W. Barber and Henry Howe, Historical Collections of the State of New Jersey; Containing a General Collection of the Most Interesting Facts, Traditions, Biographical Sketches, Anecdotes, Etc. Relating to its History and Antiquities, With Geographical Descriptions of Every Township in the State. (New York: Published for the Authors, by S. Tuttle, 1844), pp. 385-86; Lossing, op. cit., p. 310. Cf. also Joseph Lewis to Samual Morris, Morristown, January 12, 1780, and Joseph Lewis to Daniel Marsh, Morristown, January 20, 1780, Lewis Papers, Photostatic Copies in Morristown National Historical Park Manuscript Collection.
up before, put in thorough repair by walling &c."

In January of 1780 Daniel Dyer acted as an assistant cook at the Headquarters, and in March of that year Sergeant Bildad Edwards, of the Guard, served as steward. In June of 1780 Mrs. Hannah Till was added to the staff of servants at the headquarters. Although there is no final record as to the length of time spent by the various servants at Headquarters, nor any final records of dismissal, "it is improbable that new ones were added to the force without some of the old ones being dropped."

A special contingent of troops was assigned to the Commander-in-Chief. This was Washington's Life Guard, a select troop of about one hundred Virginians, which at Morristown was increased to about 250 men, under Gen. William Colfax. Day and night two sentinels paraded in front and two in the rear of the Ford Mansion, and a few rods southeast of the Mansion there stood in the meadow "formed by the angle of two roads" about fifty rude log huts accommodating Colfax's men. According to


one source "the Guard uniform consisted of a dark blue coat with buff collar and facings, red vest, fitted buckskin breeches, black shoes, white bayonet and body belts, black stock and tie for the hair, and a black cocked hat bound with white tape. The buttons were gilt."

4. CONSTRUCTION OF THE CAMP

Upon his arrival at Morristown, Washington was confronted with the problem of providing winter shelter for his army and the establishment of a functional camp routine. The troops arrived in pitiable condition.

John Barr, who served as an ensign in the Fourth New York Regiment of the New York Brigade, recorded in his Diary that his unit arrived in Jockey Hollow on December 5, 1779, and "encamped on the Ground of our Winter Quarters three Miles West of Morris Town." He continues that it "began to snow about 9 o'clock & the wind rising gradually until it blew up a violent storm," and that the "snow fell about Six Inches deep."

According to an Army surgeon, Dr. James Thacher, of a Massachusetts regiment which reached Morristown on December 14, 1779, "The snow on the ground [was] about two feet deep, and the weather

25. Lauber, op. cit., p. 815.
extremely cold; the soldiers [were] actually barefoot and almost naked. . . . Our lodging last night was on the frozen ground." In December of 1779, Maj. Gen. Johann De Kalb wrote the following passage on the conditions of the Morristown encampment:

It may truly be said that a foreign officer, who has served in America as long as I have under such adversities, must be either inspired with boundless enthusiasm for the liberties of the country, or possessed by the demons of fame and ambition, or impelled by an extraordinary zeal for the common cause of the king and his confederates. I knew, before I came, that I should have to put up with more than usual toils and privations, but I had no idea of their true extent. An iron constitution like mine is required to bear up under this sort of usage."

Washington assigned his Quartermaster General, Nathanael Greene, to prepare the area for each regiment and the placing the huts on it. The huts were to be modeled after the construction of the Pennsylvania huts built at Raritan during the previous winter. The prescribed dimensions of the huts were to be strictly adhered to and the soldiers were told that any hut

26. James Thacher, A Military Journal During the American Revolutionary War, from 1775 to 1783, Describing Interesting Events and Transactions of this Period, With Numerous Historical Facts and Anecdotes, from the Original Manuscript. To Which is Added An Appendix, Containing Biographical Sketches of Several General Officers. (Boston: Published by Richardson and Lord, 1823), pp. 215-16.

which differed from the model would be "pulled down." The construction of the huts was to be supervised by the officers who were to live in the camp with the enlisted men. In addition, the soldiers were instructed not to destroy or waste any fences while building the huts; potential offenders were warned of "the most certain and rigorous [sic] punishment."

Each hut was designed to accommodate 12 men. It was to be about 14 feet wide and 15 or 16 feet long in floor dimensions, about 6 1/2 feet high at the eaves, with wooden bunks, to have a fireplace and chimney at one end and a door in the front side. At first there were no windows, and it was only in the spring that windows were cut in these huts. The officers' cabins were larger in size and were designed to accommodate two to four officers; these had two fireplaces and chimneys each and frequently two or more windows and doors. The tools necessary for the construction of the huts were issued to each brigade, and the officers in charge were responsible for these tools. In the construction of the huts officers and men of each regiment worked together, starting usually at 8 a.m. and continued "if weather

28. Washington to Greene, November 17, 1779, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 17, pp. 118-19. An excellent account of the building of the huts may be found in Joseph Plumb Martin's A Narrative of Some of the Adventures, Dangers and Sufferings of a Revolutionary Soldier; Interpersed With Aneadotes of Incidents that Occurred Within His Own Observation. (Hallowell: Printed by Glazier, Masters & Co. 1830), pp. 121-22.


30. Weig and Craig, op. cit., p. 15. For illustrations showing reconstructions of typical log huts used by officers and soldiers in the winter encampment of 1779-80 see Appendix E and Appendix F.
It was stressed will permit Untill the whole is Finished." It was stressed that "conveniency, health, and every good consequence will result from a perfect uniformity in the camp."

Upon its arrival in Morristown the shivering army was sheltered in tattered tents. In his Diary John Barr noted that two days after the arrival of the New York Brigade at the winter encampment, they began on Tuesday, December 7, 1779, to build their huts. Work on the huts was made very difficult because of the inclement weather. Writing from the winter encampment in December of 1779, De Kalb remarked:

We are here going into winter-quarters in the woods, as usual. Since the beginning of this month we have been busy putting up our shanties. But the severe frost greatly retards our work, and does not even permit us to complete our chimneys.35

In spite of frost and snow, however, the work on the huts moved steadily forward. It was decided that the huts for the private soldiers should be completed first, and that only after

31. See Orderly Book IV, in Lauber, op. cit., p. 192.
32. See General Orders, November 19, 1779, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 17, p. 137.
34. Lauber, op. cit., p. 815.
35. Kapp, op. cit., p. 182.
these had been completed would the construction of the officers' huts begin. The regimental officers, together with regimental and brigade staff, were to hut with their respective units.

The reluctant civilians of the Morristown area were at first unwilling to provide quarters for the higher officers, whose rank and situation required lodging in the houses near the vicinity of the winter encampment; and Gen. Nathanael Greene complained about this situation in a letter of December 21, 1779, to Washington. It was only when Washington took it upon himself to requisition quarters from the unwilling inhabitants that the higher officers were able to sleep indoors. The first soldiers moved into their huts around Christmas of 1779. Maj. Ebenezer Huntington of Col. S. B. Webb's Regiment of Stark's Brigade, in a letter of December 24, 1779, described the stress and delay in these words: "You will by date perceive that we are in camp, tho' expect, if good weather, to have the men's Hutts so far completed that they may go into them on Sunday or Monday. . . .

The severity of the weather hath been such that the men suffer'd


much without shoes and stockings, and working half leg deep
in snow." Shortly afterward it was revealed that there was
a shortage of bedding straw. Despite all obstacles the men
worked relentlessly, and on February 14, 1780, Thacher recorded:

"Having continued to this late season in our
tents, experiencing the greatest inconvenience,
we have now the satisfaction of taking possession
of the log hut, just completed by our soldiers,
where we shall have more comfortable accommodations.
Major Trescott, Lieutenant Williams, our pay master,
and myself, occupy a hut with one room, furnished
with our lodging cabins, [sic] and crowded with
our baggage."  

Although the hutting for the officers was completed by mid-
February 1780, the construction of the winter encampment was still
far from complete. The construction of hutting was hampered not
only by the severe winter but also by the lack of lumber and
experienced carpenters. There was a great demand for lumber and
carpenters, and Quartermaster General Greene had an inadequate
supply of both. In his opinion "Every officer feels the peculiar
inconveniences of his own situation, and is proportionally urgent
for assistance."  As a result of this restriction, even Washington
was unable for over a month to get a new log kitchen for his
headquarters and "had to put up with makeshift meals." General
Maxwell, on the other hand, complained that he had to share a

40. Quarter Master Joseph Lewis to Samuel Hains, January 3,
1780, Morristown National Historical Park Collections, #1005.
42. Greene to Washington, January 21, 1780, George Washington
Papers, Library of Congress.
43. John C. Fitzpatrick, George Washington Himself. A Common-
sense Biography Written from His Manuscripts. (Indianapolis: The
fourteen-by-twelve feet room with his aide and a chaplain.

In addition, life itself in the huts seemed hazardous. According to a General Order issued on February 16, 1780:

Where Huts have been built on the declivity of Hills and are Sunk into the ground, particular Care is to be taken to have the Snow removed and trenches dug Round to carry off the water, without which the Soldiers will sleep amidst Continual damps, and their Health will consequently be injured.

Even with the completion of the huts the soldiers still suffered from exposure to cold weather; as late as June 5, 1780, the cold forced General Hand to build a fire in his quarters.

With the completion of the hutting, other construction was undertaken, including the completion of the orderly hut, parade grounds, etc. The question also arose as to what store-houses should be built at Morristown and what storage buildings rented. Finally eighteen sheds, storehouses, and stables were either rented from the owners or built on land leased for that purpose.

44. Correspondence of General Nathanael Greene, Vol. 1, p. 73, American Philosophical Society Library, Philadelphia.

45. See General Orders, February 16, 1780, in Morristown Orderly Book. Typewritten copy at Morristown National Historical Park.


47. See "Acc't of Buildings belonging to and Rented for the use of the United States in the State of New Jersey," May 6, 1780. Morristown National Historical Park Collections, #1204.
Each brigade encamped at the Morristown site occupied a sloping, well-drained hillside area approximately 320 yards long and 100 yards in depth, including a parade ground which was about 40 yards deep in front. As early as December 25, 1779, Washington ordered that as soon as the hutting was completed "each brigade is to have a good parade [ground] cleared in front of its huts and is to join in opening proper communications between one brigade and another." Above the parade ground were the soldiers' huts, eight in a row and three or four rows deep for each regiment; beyond those were the huts occupied by the captains and subalterns, and still higher were the field officers' huts, all separated by camp streets of varying widths. A young schoolmaster from Windham County, Connecticut, Ebenezer Fitch, who visited the Morristown encampment at the end of December 1779 described it as a "log-house city" wherein the troops dwelled among the hills "in tabernacles like Israel of old." The completed camp seems to have included between 1,000 and 1,200 log structures.

48. Weig and Craig, op. cit., p. 15. See also Appendix G showing the contemporary sketch of the Stark's Brigade Camp.
50. Weig and Craig, op. cit., p. 15. The hutting arrangement is to be seen in the contemporary sketch of the quarters of General Stark's Brigade. Cf. for this Appendix G.
52. Weig and Craig, op. cit., p. 16.
With the completion of the huts, which certainly were warmer than the tents or the open ground, and with the clearing of parade grounds, the army secured itself in its winter encampment and entered upon a regular army camp life and routine.

5. LIFE AT THE WINTER QUARTERS

While the Continental soldiers were in winter quarters during 1779-80 their sufferings were great. The roads were deep in snow, bloodstained from the shoeless feet of infantrymen. While the snow and frost were quite severe at Morristown during December of 1779, they were even more severe during the following month. A vivid description of the sufferings of the troops is given by Dr. Thacher in his *Military Journal*. On January 1, 1780, he recorded:

A new year commences, but brings no relief to the sufferings and privations of our army. Our canvass covering affords but a miserable security from storms of rain and snow, and a great scarcity of provisions still prevails, and its effects are felt even at head quarters, as appears by the following anecdote. "We have nothing but the rations to cook, Sir," said Mrs. Thompson, a very worthy Irish woman and housekeeper to General Washington. "Well, Mrs. Thompson, you must then cook the rations, for I have not a farthing to give you." "If you please, Sir, let one of the gentlemen give me an order for six bushels of salt." "Six bushels of salt, for what?" "to preserve the fresh beef, Sir." One of the aids gave the order, and the next day his Excellency's table was amply provided. Mrs. Thompson was sent for, and told that she had done very wrong to expend her own money, for it was not known when she could be repaid. "I owe you," said his
Excellency, "too much already to permit the debt being increased, and our situation is not at this moment such as to induce very sanguine hope."

"Dear Sir," said the good old lady, "it is always darkest just before day light, and I hope your Excellency will forgive me for bartering the salt for other necessaries which are now on the table." Salt was eight dollars a bushel, and it might always be exchanged with the country people for articles of provision. 53

The great blizzard which came on January 3, 1780, brought snow between four and six feet deep, which buried some of the soldiers during that night "like sheep." Washington himself, requisitioning supplies from the New Jersey Magistrates in a letter dated January 8, 1780, also described the seriousness of the situation when he wrote:

For a Fortnight past the Troops both Officers and Men, have been almost perishing for want. They have been alternately without Bread or Meat, the whole time, with a very scanty allowance of either and frequently destitute of both....The distress we feel is chiefly owing to the early commencement and uncommon vigor of the Winter, which have greatly obstructed the transportation of our supplies. 55

The rigors of the winter in the vicinity of New York are also described in the Pennsylvania Packet for January 27, 1780:

January 10.- The very remarkable and long-continued severity of the weather at New York, (the like not having been known, as we are informed, by the oldest man living,) has stopped all the avenues of intelligence, and almost cut off all social intercourse between people of the same neighborhood. The

54. Ibid., pp. 220-21.
incessant intenseness of the cold, the great depth and quantity of the snows, following in quick succession one on the back of another, attended with violent tempests of wind, which for several days made the roads utterly impassable, has put a stop to business of all kinds, except such as each family could do within itself. And as many were slenderly provided with necessaries for subsistence, we have reason to apprehend that we shall shortly hear many melancholy accounts of private distress in the country, and that from the sea-coasts and vessels at sea, the accounts will be dreadful.\textsuperscript{56}

The height of the crisis came when hungry and desperate soldiers openly plundered the local inhabitants. It seems that the motivation for this behavior rested in the fact that the local citizens were selling food to soldiers at exorbitant prices. By the application of severe punitive measures, Washington was able to restore discipline to its normality within several weeks. But the cold continued, and on February 9, 1780, the New Jersey Gazette, published at Trenton, stated that:

\begin{quote}
The weather has been so extremely cold for nearly two months past that sleighs and other carriages now pass from this place [Trenton] to Philadelphia on the Delaware, a circumstance not remembered by the oldest person among us.\textsuperscript{58}
\end{quote}


Even the Hudson River froze over solid. In March 1780 Thacher wrote:

The present winter is the most severe and distressing, which we have ever experienced. An immense body of snow remains on the ground. Our soldiers are in a wretched condition for the want of clothes, blankets and shoes; and these calamitous circumstances are accompanied by a want of provisions. It has several times happened that the troops were reduced to one half, or to one quarter allowance, and some days have passed without any meat or bread being delivered out....Our soldiers, in general, support their sufferings with commendable firmness, but it is feared that their patience will be exhausted, and very serious consequences ensue.59

The soldier in the Morristown encampment was caught up in the usual camp routine, involving guard mount, drill, inspection, and other military duties. The purpose of the winter encampment was not only to shelter the soldier during the winter months but also to keep him in good physical condition so that he would be ready for the spring and summer campaigns. To achieve this goal, a strong military discipline was necessary. Most probably the day in camp began at sunrise; the "troopbeat" came at 7 o'clock in the spring, but most probably at a later hour during late fall and winter. For the soldiers this was the signal to assemble on the parade ground for review and to receive their assignments.

59. Thacher, op. cit., p. 228.


Guard mounting and outpost duty were the two principal
tasks of the soldiers at the Morristown encampment. The guard
mount was necessary to the security of the camp, and the manning
of certain outposts was considered necessary to serve as a
deterrent to possible British action. At this time the bulk of
the northern British army was confined to New York and Staten
Island, and Washington realized that not only had the enemy's
army to be held in check, but also communications between the
capital at Philadelphia and the posts in the Highlands had to be protected.

Guard duty became an integral part of camp life. While the
huts were being constructed, the guard was naturally reduced to
a minimum. General Orders issued by Washington on December 4,
1779, emphasized that "The ordinary guards [were] to be reduced
as much as practicable for the present, that the least possible
interruption may be given to hutting." As soon as the hutting
was completed, a more systematic procedure was introduced. The
Main Guard, centered in and about Morristown proper, usually
consisted of two divisions; it was relieved every couple of days
until March 11, 1780, and from then on either every other day

62. See General Orders, December 4, 1779, in ibid.,
Vol. 17, p. 216.
63. See General Orders, December 7, 1779, in ibid.,
pp. 233 and 255.
or daily, and from May 6, 1780, on, every week.

The outposts were detachments from the units at the Morristown camp which were assigned to duty at important positions strategically located at different distances from the camp. Outposts were located at Trenton, New Brunswick, Princeton, Westfield, Rahway, Springfield, Paramus, Elizabeth-town, Pluckemin, Baskingridge, Newark, Crane's Mills, Ringwood Iron Works, and Burlington. These detachments varied in strength from 200 to 2,000 men, and were numerically strongest in the vicinity of Westfield and Springfield.

The camp guard was chosen on the basis of 27 men from every two battalions, and as a rule it was posted in the front and rear of the camp, with sentinels spreading out to the right and left. In this manner, the entire camp was surrounded by a chain of sentinels about 300 paces from the camp. A picket guard, which was assembled daily, consisted of two officers and fifty men, who were to "lay on their arms" and be prepared

64. See General Orders, March 11, 1780, and General Orders, April 7, 1780, in ibid., Vol. 18, pp. 105 and 232.
65. See General Orders, May 6, 1780, in ibid., p. 337.
66. The location of the American outposts in the Morristown area is well presented in Weig and Craig, op. cit., p. 5.
for immediate orders from the brigadier general of the day. 
In addition to this number there was Washington's Life Guard, mentioned above, a special contingent consisting of about 250 men whose duty was to guard the Ford Mansion. According to one source, "A system of beacons and signal guns was arranged which at the first boom brought the Lifeguard inside to barricade the doors and take posts at the open windows with their muskets until the regular brigades could form on their parades and march up the road to their alarm posts." With these protective measures the security of the winter encampment was supposedly assured, and this security made it possible for the remaining soldiers to carry out their daily routine duties.

Life at the Morristown winter encampment was centered on the "grand parade," a level piece of ground situated between the New York and Pennsylvania encampments. It was here that the camp guards, as well as the detachments assigned for outpost duty, reported for inspection, where military executions usually took place, and where drill and ceremonial parades were held.

68. Ibid., p. 185.
69. See supra, p. 39.
71. Weig and Craig, op. cit., p. 40; Cf. also General Orders, May 25, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., p. 422.
The "New Orderly Room" was near the grand parade, and there Washington's orders were communicated to the army, and courts martial frequently held.

At specified times the soldiers were required to present themselves either on their brigade parades or on the grand parade ground. One such order, issued on April 12, 1780, advised the soldiers of their next day's duties and requested that they be closely shaved, their hands and faces clean, their clothing clean and neat, and their arms in order. Evidently the soldiers were advised nightly of their next day's duties and they were required to follow them under penalty of strict punishment. Roll call was held every morning and evening and every soldier was expected to attend. Inspection of cartridge boxes was held every morning by a captain. From time to time the army drew upon the Park of Artillery for a supply of powder, paper and lead; the soldiers made their own cartridges.

The camp guards were required to assemble for inspection and orders on the grand parade, usually at 9 o'clock. An hour prior to this they were to have been inspected by a non-commissioned officer, who was to see that the men had "their

74. Ibid., p. 262.
faces and hands washed, their Beards close shaved, their hair combed and tied if Long enough, their shoes clean, and Clothes brushed, their Arms and Accoutrements clean and in good order, their flints well fixed, and the proper Quantity of Ammunition in their Pouches."

The guards were to be provided with espontoons or half-pike weapons, usually carried by infantry officers, and only as many cartridges as their boxes were able to hold. The Brigade-Major of the day together with a fife and a drum major, gave assistance in the formation, inspection and manoeuvre of the guards. Following the inspection and short drill, the daily parole and countersign were imparted.

General Orders issued on Wednesday, March 29, 1780, specifically stated: "The General or other officer of the day is to give the Parole and Countersigns to all guards or cause it to be done by the Brigade Major, that the omissions and mistakes which have happened of late may be avoided in future." The Main Guard would then relieve that in Morristown, who were to march back to camp and "be dismissed on brigade parade." The picket guard, following inspection on the grand parade by the officers of the day, was retired to its huts where it awaited further orders.

77. See Hawkins' Orderly Book, No. 1, Hazen's Regiment, Hand's Brigade, entry of March 1, 1780, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.


By and large the officers were kept fully occupied in their duties. There was a scarcity of general officers in the army, and for this reason the colonels commanding the brigades, instead of the brigadiers, were ordered to roll in the duties of the day. General Orders issued on January 31, 1780, stipulated that "The old and new officers of the day will attend Head Quarters daily at one o'clock; the former to make report of the transactions of the preceding day and the latter to receive any new orders the Commander in Chief may have to give." These new orders were issued through the Adjutant General's Office in Morristown. A subaltern, a drummer, and two noncommissioned officers were appointed to police each regiment and to insure "the Cleanliness of the Camp, and to cause all dirt and Filth to be removed from the Huts, and the Utensils to be kept perfectly clean, and in good order."

A brigadier and a field officer of the day usually superintended the policing of the camp and the service of the guards, and saw to it that the regulations for both functions were carefully observed.

81. See General Orders, January 31, 1780, in ibid., p. 473.
82. See General Orders, March 10, 1780, in ibid., Vol. 18, p. 103.
Prior to mid-April of 1780, no uniform system of maneuvering seems to have been established, mainly because of the severe winter. The entry in the orderly book of Colonel Hazen's Regiment of Hand's Brigade for February 1, 1780, provided that "The Long Roll shall beat every day at Noon; at which Time the Officers Commanding Companies shall cause their men to parade without arms, and their Rolls to be called."

With the arrival of spring and more suitable weather, a more regular and systematic program of drill and inspection was established, although its particular form differed in each Brigade. Brigade Orders issued on April 14, 1780, for the soldiers of Colonel Hand's Brigade had the following to say in this respect: "As the Weather is now good, and the Ground dry, the whole of the Brigade not on Duty will Exercise and Manoeuvre every Day, from Eleven to one o'clock, Except on Sundays and Mondays, by Regiments. It is expected that officers of every Denomination will attend strictly to this very necessary order." Another brigade exercised between 6 and 7 a.m. and


86. Ibid., entry of April 14, 1780.

58
between 4 and 5 p.m. According to General Orders issued on Friday, May 12, 1780, the troops, as of Monday, May 15, 1780, were to begin and to continue to exercise every day except Friday and Saturday at 6 a.m. by companies and at 5 p.m. "in the same manner but without Arms." Three times weekly, every Monday, Wednesday and Saturday, the Inspector General, Baron von Steuben, or in his absence one of the Inspectors, was to "exercise on the Green near Morristown two Battalions detached from the Line with four Field pieces each Battalion to consist of one Colonel or Lieutenant Colone [sic], one Major, Six Captains, Seven Lieutenants, Eight Drums, Eight Fifers, Two hundred and fifty six rank and File." Furthermore, the sub-inspector was directed to exercise "a Battallion drawn from each Brigade in the Division once a Week, or oftener if he has Leisure, until further orders."

Those men who were not involved either in guard duty or in drill were assigned to the numerous fatigue tasks of the camp. Among these was construction work, such as the building of

a hospital, supply rooms, orderly rooms, guard huts, sinks and vaults, all indispensable to the health of the army.

The most common duties, however, were giving assistance to the Quartermaster and Commissary, and tasks such as driving wagons to places where provisions and forage were available, bringing these supplies back to the camp and storing and distributing them. Provisions also had to be repacked and often barrels repaired, cattle killed and prepared for the use of the army, tallow made into candles and soap, and wood cut, not only for the camp use but also for the hospitals at Pluckemin and Baskingridge. Within the camp area the streets and the parade grounds had to be swept and kept clean, the springs had to be kept open and "the snow removed and


trenches dug round to carry off the water, without which the soldiers will sleep amidst continual damps and their health will consequently be injured."

Through General Orders issued on Wednesday, March 8, 1780, Washington ordered that "All the great roads leading thro' camp are to be cleared and repaired immediately by the brigades thro' or near which they pass; and care is to be taken to have free communications opened from one brigade to another thro'out both lines of the army."

By General Orders issued on April 15, 1780, the Quartermaster General was ordered to repair immediately the public roads between Morristown and Somersett Court House. Other miscellaneous tasks were the escort of prisoners of war to the jails at Easton and Philadelphia and the driving of horses to Pennsylvania and outlying areas such as Lancaster.

93. See General Orders, February 16, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 18, p. 16; General Orders, March 8, 1780, in ibid., p. 95; cf. also Stewarts' Orderly Book, entry of January 28, 1780, Morristown National Historical Park Collections.

94. General Orders, March 8, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 18, p. 95.

95. General Orders, April 15, 1780, in ibid., p. 260; cf. also Orderly Book V, in Lauber, op. cit., p. 315.


Among the more unpleasant duties the soldiers faced were the digging of graves, compulsory attendance at executions, and the burying of the dead. General Orders issued on Sunday of February 20, 1780, specifically emphasized that "Dead carcases in and about camp are to be buried by fatigue parties from the brigades near which they lie." Curiously enough, in spite of the severe winter, the death rate among the soldiers was rather low. The following table gives the total deaths among the soldiers at Morristown, by month:

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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
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<td>December</td>
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<td>May</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>June</td>
<td>24</td>
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There was thus a total of 113 deaths in the army during the Morristown encampment, or an average of 16 per month. Of this total the New York Brigade had the highest rate—18 soldiers dead—followed by Hand's, the 2nd Pennsylvania, and the New Jersey brigades, each having 16 dead during the period of the encampment.

98. See General Orders, February 18, 1780, and General Orders, May 25, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 18, pp. 23 and 422.

99. See General Orders, February 20, 1780, in ibid., p. 34; Orderly Book V, in Lauber, op. cit., p. 269.

Possibly the rather low death rate can be accounted for at least in part on the theory that very sick soldiers were sent elsewhere for treatment.

Other duties at the Morristown encampment included the making of tents, the building of ovens and general repair jobs. Bread for the soldiers was provided from the ovens at Morristown, under the supervision of Christopher Ludwig; otherwise the soldiers cooked their own meals. Vestiges of fire-place ovens at the encampment site bear witness of the soldiers' efforts in this respect.

In general, a day in the life of a soldier at Morristown was a full one. It ended with tattoo in the evening and the final drum roll-off. A quarter of an hour after tattoo, the noncommissioned officers visited the men in their huts and reported to their officers "an exact state of their respective Companies." Then after their day's work, the soldiers bedded themselves down in their huts.


6. SOCIAL ACTIVITIES AT THE MORRISTOWN ENCAMPMENT

The monotony of camp life was somewhat relieved by occasions such as the dinners which Washington frequently gave, with officers and often distinguished civilians as guests, by executions of spies and prisoners, funerals, visitors to the camp, and the like. Music undoubtedly was a popular diversion at the Morristown camp. From time immemorial, music has not only exercised a cheering effect on the soldier's mind, but also lightened the rigors of his life. Almost all ancient nations knew wind instruments of different types and put them to military use. During the Middle Ages, drums were introduced into the infantry. In later periods, particularly during the 18th century, military bands were established. In the Continental Army, each company included two drummers and fifers. The drums were particularly important, as they were used not only to pace the march, but also to give signals. The bugle was also used for giving commands for the cavalry, and in certain instances for the light infantry. The Marquis de Chastellux, who

visited the Morristown encampment in 1780, recorded that
"Each brigade had a band of music; the march they were then
playing was the Huron."

The soldiers amused themselves by listening to music and
also by playing on various instruments. Simeon De Witt, a
member of the New York Brigade, in his letter to John Bogart
of January 10, 1780, noted that the men amused themselves
by "playing on the flute."

A factor which undoubtedly influenced morale was the
presence of women in the camp. Indeed, as soon as the army had
established itself at the winter quarters, women began to appear
in spite of an official warning on the part of Washington issued
on January 2, 1780, which stated that "No provision is to be
Issued to any Woman or Women whatever, but such as may be ordered
by the Commanding Officer of the Regiment; nor is any Woman
whatever to be admitted or Harbourd in Camp, except by Leave

105. Marquis de Chastellux, Travels in North-America, in
the Years 1780-81-82. Translated from the French, by an English
Gentleman, who Resided in America at that Period. With Notes by
the Translator. Also, A Biographical Sketch of the Author:
Letters from Gen. Washington to the Marquis de Chastellux: and
Notes and Corrections, by the American Editor. (New-York:
White, Gallaher, & White, 1827), p. 65.

106. De Witt to Bogart, January 10, 1780, John Bogart
Papers, Rutgers University Library.
obtained from the Commanding Officer of the Regiment, for which the Commanding Officers of Companies will be Responsible."

One officer, who felt that women were useful for domestic work as well as for attending the sick, suggested that they receive equitable rations with the men, and that "a number of Women of good Character [be] proportioned to that of the Men in each Company." There is no written evidence that this suggestion was ever taken up.

Martha Washington arrived in Morristown from Philadelphia at the end of December 1779 and joined her husband at the Ford mansion. During her stay there she comforted her husband and assisted him in entertaining their guests. Local history likes to relate that Martha Washington, entertaining her guests in a speckled homespun apron, supposedly told them that "American ladies should be patterns of industry to their country women....We must become independent of England by doing without those articles which we can make ourselves. Whilst our husbands


and brothers are examples of patriotism, we must be examples of industry"; however, this charming anecdote seems to be legend rather than historical fact.

Another officer who was fortunate enough to have his wife lodge with him was General Greene, whose wife Kitty and their son George joined him around the time the army arrived in Morristown for the winter encampment. They stayed in a farmhouse overlooking the artillery park, and on January 29, 1780, their second son Nathanael Ray was born there.

In camp, babies were born and also children died and were buried. According to one source, "There was deeper sorrow when General and Mrs. Knox buried their little daughter Julia, another of the large family of little ones that Mrs. Knox, notwithstanding her splendid vitality, lost in following the Army."112

Martha Washington, Kitty Greene and Mrs. Knox thus shared with their husbands the difficult times of the Morristown winter encampment. It is difficult to ascertain the correct number of


112. Mary Gay Humphreys, Catherine Schuyler. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897), p. 175.
other women in the camp; but whether or not their number was small they undoubtedly gave comfort and aid to many soldiers.

Catherine Schuyler, who visited General and Mrs. Washington at Morristown during that winter, has left a vivid picture of the social life at the winter quarters. According to her, Washington intended to have "concerts once a week at his house," but she does not seem to have recorded the program of any of these concerts nor written anything about the musicians.

Dancing was also a popular diversion in camp life. To forget their miseries the officers formed a dancing group, to which Washington and 34 other officers subscribed $400 each. The first of these "officers' balls" was held on February 23, 1780, the second on March 3, 1780, and the third on the evening of April 24, 1780, in honor of the French Minister, the Chevalier de la Luzerne, who was visiting the Washington headquarters.


114. Humphreys, op. cit., p. 168.


The last event was chided by a British newspaper, which stated that "Fifty females, 'tis said, were picked up for a dance and 'tis supposed his departure will scarce leave a jill of Taffia in the whole camp of the pious friends of St. Patrick, whose general orders of the 16th of March last, will certainly never be forgotten by the true friends of Ireland."

The dances were usually held either in the large room above the commissary's store house in the "Continental House," or at the Arnold Tavern, both of which bordered on the Green. Lt. Erkuries Beatty, in his letter of March 13, 1780, to his brother Dr. Reading Beatty mentioned that he had been "at two or three Dances in Morristown" and "at a Couple of Dances at my Brother John's Quarters at Battle hill." There was no doubt that outings of this kind were good for the morale of the soldiers; Erkuries Beatty himself admitted that he found "the evenings very agreeable."

By and large the officers obtained more leaves and participated in a wider variety of social activities than the enlisted men. This was of course only natural because of rank and position. The majority of officers received short leaves or


furloughs and thus were able to visit their families and friends for at least part of the severe winter. They were asked to establish a system of priority for furloughs and advised to leave their regiments properly officered. This privilege was to expire by April 1, 1780, "at which time the General expects all officers to be present in their corps." To relieve the distress caused by the lack of provisions, Washington let many of the soldiers be dismissed before their enlistments and terms of service had expired.

Opportunities to escape the camp environment have been recorded by some officers. Lieut. Erkuries Beatty, in his letter of March 13, 1780, to his brother Reading wrote:

I got leave of absence for three Days to go see Aunt Mills and Uncle Read who lives about 12 Miles from here....that night Cousin Polly and me set off a Slaying with a number more young People and had a pretty Clever-Kick-up, the next Day Polly and I went to Uncle Reads who lives about 4 Miles from Aunts, here I found Aunt Read and two great Bouncing female cousins and a house full of smaller ones, here we spent the Day very agreeably Romping with the girls who was exceeding Clever & Sociable.

121. See General Orders, December 8, 1779, in ibid., p. 234.
122. See Washington's letter to the Brigadiers and Officers Commanding Brigades, January 6, 1780, in ibid., p. 358.
123. Erkuries Beatty to Dr. Reading Beatty, March 13, 1780, in Beatty, op. cit., p. 214.
Captain Samuel Shaw, of the Third Continental Artillery Regiment, wrote to a friend of "the lovely Maria and her amiable sister." "By heavens," he continued, "the more I know of that charming girl, the better I like her; every visit serves to confirm my attachment, and I feel myself gone past recovery." According to the records of the First Morristown Presbyterian Church there were eleven marriages between "camp folks" during the period of the Morristown winter encampment. Naturally the romance between Washington's handsome and dashing aide-de-camp, Lieut. Col. Alexander Hamilton, and the charming Betsy Schuyler, which resulted in a marriage before the end of the year, was the most talked-about event in the camp. Hamilton's deep love for his Betsy caused a fellow officer to remark that "Hamilton is a gone man."

Some officers seemed to enjoy themselves at these dances, as in the case of Lieut. Erkuries Beatty, who wrote in his letter of May 1, 1780, to his brother Reading: "If I had Paper I

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would tell you about a sort of a...dance I was at two Nights ago when we kicked up a Hell of a Dust."

We should, however, remember that an officer was expected to clothe and support himself largely from his own pay and other private means, and that he "paid for recreation out of his own pocket." In many cases his clothing was so deficient that he was unable to "enjoy visits with the ladies." Despite such hindrances, the romantic element thus played an important role in the lives of some officers.

Recreation during the winter of 1779-80 was provided for the soldiers by the Masonic order. Four Masonic meetings are known to have been held in Morristown during the winter encampment, of which the most important was the festival of St. John the Evangelist, observed on December 27, 1779, at the Arnold Tavern. Some of the most important men of the day were there, including Washington, Schuyler, Hamilton, Gist, Van Rensselaer, Livingston, Butler, and Lewis. The Lodge which sponsored this festival was the American Union Lodge, of the Connecticut Line. This Lodge had been warranted on February 15, 1776, during the siege of Boston, by Worshipful Master John Rowe, Esq., Provincial Grand Master of Massachusetts, to work anywhere in North America.

The participants in the festival proceeded to the Presbyterian Church for services, where they heard a sermon by the Rev. Dr. Abraham Baldwin of the Connecticut Line and then returned to the Arnold Tavern. Following their unanimous vote to present their thanks and appreciation to Dr. Baldwin and request that he send the Lodge a copy of his address, the Masons focused their meeting on the topic which had become the most crucial in the Freemasonry of the Revolutionary period.

The American Union Lodge was not the only one active in the American Revolutionary Army. Of the nine other military lodges, a few were Scottish; a few were Irish; the largest number had been warranted by the Antient Grand Lodge of England or its subsidiaries. There were also military lodges in the British Army, warranted by either the Modern Grand Lodge of England or by the Antient Grand Lodge. The American Union Lodge was "Antient" in both spirit and practice. The Masons assembled at the Arnold Tavern, aware of difficulties caused by the existence on the American continent of thirteen separate


Colonies, and of the schism in Masonry between "Antient" and "Modern," presented a petition to the assembled Brethren asking the establishment of a Grand Lodge for all the United States. The most important phrase of this resolution was:

With sincere regret we contemplate the misfortunes of War which have unhappily separated us from the Grand Lodge in Europe, and deprived us from the benefits arising therefrom, so essentially necessary for the well-being of Masonry, and which has in many instances been subversive of the very institution of the Order. At the same time we lament that political disputes and national quarrels should influence the exercise of charity and benevolence, and their several virtues, so necessary for our present and future happiness. Yet, considering the present situation of our Lodges, and Masonry in general, the necessity for the honor of the Craft, and the importance of enjoying the benefits of so valuable an institution, that some exertions are made for checking the present irregularities, restoring peace and harmony to the Lodges, for opening a way to the enjoyment and fruits of benevolence, charity and brotherly love, and for the re-establishment of the Order on the ancient respectable foundation; which we conceive can never be done more effectually than by the appointment of a Grand Master in and over the United States of America. 132

As Brown suggests, "Why have two rival systems of Freemasonry? Why should Scotland, Ireland, and France have any voice in America's Masonic affairs? How can an American Provincial Grand Lodge carry on with a Grand Lodge in England while America is at war with England?....If one nation with one head was the only

possible answer to the political anarchy of the times, then why would not one National Grand Lodge headed by one Grand Master be the answer to the increasing anarchy of Craft government?" Thoughts such as these were occupying the Brethren assembled that wintry day in Morristown. A painting by John Ward Dunsmore of their resolution being read presently hangs in the Revolutionary Room of the Museum of the Morristown National Historical Park. Washington is shown in an attitude of attentiveness while the petition is being read. Also on display in the Museum is one of Washington's Masonic scarves, which was presented to Judge Gunning Bedford at a dinner given in his honor.

The 1779 Morristown "Petition to the Most Worshipful, the Present Provincial Grand Masters in Each of the Respective United States of America" was approved by Washington and the others present at Arnold's Tavern. It was also read at an entered apprentice lodge at Britton's, near Morristown, on January 31, 1780, and unanimously approved. It was also approved at a convention Lodge held at Morristown on March 6, 1780, under authority of the American Union Lodge, and presented to the

134. For a reproduction of this painting see Appendix H.
several Grand Masters for their consideration. One of the two provincial Grand Lodges of Massachusetts--that established by Henry Prince in 1733--blocked the movement, not because of opposition to the principle of the Resolution, but in the belief that the Nation should be at peace before the undertaking of such a change in the Craft.

By General Orders issued on April 18, 1780, "The Members of the Ancient and honorable society of Free and Accepted Mason's (in the different Lines and Staff of the Army)" were invited to attend the funeral of Major Daniel Piatt of the First New Jersey Regiment, held at 3 p.m. on Wednesday on April 19, 1780, at Morristown.

Except for Christmas the only holiday celebrated by the army was St. Patrick's Day, observed on Friday, March 17, 1780. The Irish Parliament had endeared itself to the American patriots by petitioning against trade restrictions, and Washington considered it fitting that his soldiers be given this holiday. He directed that "all fatigue and working parties" cease on St. Patrick's Day and that the officers see that the troops of each state line were kept within their own encampment.


137. See General Orders, March 16, 1780, in ibid., p. 120.
Pennsylvania Division Orders, signed by Col. Francis Johnston, on March 17, 1780:

The Commanding Officer desirous that the Celebration of this [St. Patrick's] day should not pass by without having a little Rum issued to the Troops has thought Proper to direct Commissary Night to send for a Hogshead which the Colonel has purchased for this Express purpose in the Vicinity of Camp.... The Colonel expects the Troops will conduct themselves with the greatest sobriety and good Order.138

One soldier wrote that St. Patrick's Day was observed "by Some of Our Officers to a very high Degree and in a notorious Manner." On the other hand, the New York Gazette and Weekly Mercury described the St. Patrick's day celebration as having been observed with Irish music and a flag-raising ceremony, but chided Washington for making the revelry so dry.

Among the more interesting events which took place in the spring of 1780 were the visits of dignitaries and notables to the encampment. On April 19, 1780, the French Minister, the Chevalier de la Luzerne, together with the Spanish agent, Don Juan de Miralles, arrived in the winter quarters from Philadelphia, their arrival being announced by the discharge of thirteen cannon. After leaving their carriages the distinguished visitors


139. Ebenezer Parkman, Diary, entry of March 18, 1780. American Antiquarian Society.

were mounted on elegant horses, which, with
General Washington, the general officers of our
army, with their aids and servants, formed a most
splendid cavalcade, which attracted the attention
of a vast concourse of spectators. General
Washington accompanied his illustrious visitors
to take a distant view of the enemy's position
and works, on York and Staten island, and of the
different posts of our army, while preparations
were making for a grand field review of our
troops.

The field parade was prepared under the direction of Baron
von Steuben, and on April 24, 1780, to general admiration, the four
army battalions paraded before the distinguished guests. Following
the review, there was a grand ball in the evening "at which were
present a numerous collection of ladies and gentlemen, of distin-
guished character." The occasion was topped off with a display of
141 fireworks by the officers of the artillery. During the visit
Don Juan de Miralles, due to exposure to the rigorous weather,
contracted a severe cold, and on April 28, 1780, died of pneu-
142 monia. He was given a state funeral which provided Morristown
with quite a fine spectacle. Describing this event, Dr. Thacher
said:


142. Washington to the Chevalier de la Juzerne, April 26
and 27, 1780, and Washington to the President of the Congress,
April 28, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 18, pp. 301, 303,
and 312.
I accompanied Doctor Schuyler to head quarters, to attend the funeral of M. de Miralles. The deceased was a gentleman of high rank in Spain, and had been about one year a resident with our Congress, from the Spanish Court. The corpse was dressed in rich state, and exposed to public view, as is customary in Europe. The coffin was most splendid and stately, lined throughout with fine cambric, and covered on the outside with rich black velvet, and ornamented in a superb manner. The top of the coffin was removed, to display the pomp and grandeur with which the body was decorated. It was in a splendid full dress, consisting of a scarlet suit, embroidered with rich gold lace, a three cornered gold laced hat, and a genteel cued wig, white silk stockings, large diamond shoe and knee buckles, a profusion of diamond rings decorated the fingers, and from a superb gold watch set with diamonds, several rich seals were suspended. His Excellency General Washington, with several other general officers, and members of Congress, attended the funeral solemnities, and walked as chief mourners. The other officers of the army, and numerous respectable citizens, formed a splendid procession, extending about one mile. The pall bearers were six field officers, and the coffin was borne on the shoulders of four officers of the artillery in full uniform. Minute guns were fired during the procession, which greatly increased the solemnity of the occasion. A Spanish priest performed service at the grave, in the Roman Catholic form. The coffin was enclosed in a box of plank, and all the profusion of pomp and grandeur was deposited in the silent grave, in the common burying ground, near the church at Morristown. A guard is placed at the grave, lest our soldiers should be tempted to dig for hidden treasure. It is understood that the corpse is to be removed to Philadelphia. This gentleman is said to have been in possession of an immense fortune, and has left to his three daughters in Spain, one hundred thousand pounds sterling each. Here we behold the end of all earthly riches, pomp, and dignity. The ashes of Don Miralles mingle with the remains of those who are clothed in humble shrouds, and whose career in life was marked with sordid poverty and wretchedness.143

General Edward Hand described the ceremony more simply:
"Don Juan de Miralles a Spaniard of Distinction...has been
sometime in America & will never leave it. We planted the
old Gent’n in Morristown Church Yard a few days ago."

Another important event at the Morristown headquarters was
the visit of three members of the Continental Congress Committee,
Philip Schuyler, John Mathews and Nathaniel Peabody, who
arrived in the camp at the end of April 1780 for the purpose
of examining the state of the Continental Army and consulting
with Washington on steps to improve the prospects of winning
the war. The Committee became a liaison body between the
Congress and headquarters, thus rendering a valuable service.
In its first report the Committee presented revealing facts:
"Before we had an opportunity closely to view and examine into
the real state of things, we had no conception of the almost
inextricable difficulties in which we found them involved."
The report also pointed out the variety of hardships under
which the soldiers were suffering, and warned that "Their

144. Hand to Yeates, May 7, 1780, Letters to Jasper Yeates,
New York Public Library.

from the Original Records in the Library of Congress by Gaillard
Hunt, Chief, Division of Manuscripts. Vol. XVI. 1780: January 1-
Thacher, op. cit., p. 233.

146. The Committee at Headquarters to the President of
Congress, May 10, 1780, in Edmund C. Burnett, ed., Letters of
Members of the Continental Congress. Vol. V: January 1, 1780;
patience is exhausted. In a more complete report, issued on May 25, 1780, the Committee criticized the Congress and recommended that it take speedy action if the situation were to be saved, as the "patience of the soldiery who have endured every large degree of conceivable hardship, and borne it with fortitude and perseverance, [sic] beyond the expectation of the most sanguine, is on the point of being exhausted."

While Schuyler and his colleagues were preparing their report, good news arrived at headquarters in the midst of despair; the Marquis de Lafayette was coming. On May 10, 1780, after more than a year's stay in his native France since his previous visit to the United States, Lafayette arrived in Morristown and announced to Washington, and later to Congress, that King Louis XVI had decided to dispatch a second major force of ships and men to aid the American cause. This contingent of six ships and six thousand well-trained French soldiers, under the command of General Jean B. D. de Vimeur Rochambeau, were to arrive in early June of 1780 at Rhode Island. It was hoped that this assistance would prove more beneficial than the first French

147. Ibid., p. 133.
148. Ibid., p. 166.
149. Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 18, p. 356; Thane, op. cit., p. 206. For an illustration showing Washington greeting Lafayette on his arrival at the Morristown headquarters see Appendix I.
expedition, under the Vice Admiral the Count d'Estaing, which after failing to take Savannah had sailed on October 9, 1779, for the West Indies and France.

Washington was delighted to see this gallant young Frenchman who brought such welcome news, and the troops shared their Commander's feelings. Lafayette remained Washington's guest until May 14, 1780, when he departed for Philadelphia to inform the members of Congress of his activities in France. About six days later Lafayette returned to Morristown, and from this time "until the end of 1780 he continued with the Continental Army in New Jersey and New York State."

The playing of cards was prohibited by order of General Washington of January 8, 1778. Despite this prohibition, the evidence of court martial procedures indicates that gambling was widely practiced. Being intoxicated while on duty was cause for court martial; nevertheless the most popular

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152. Weig and Craig, op. cit., p. 25.
pastime during the Morristown encampment was drinking.

One orderly book dating from Morristown declared, "The Col.
Observing that the open and Abominable practice of Drunkenness
prevails in his Regt. without the least Shame or Restraint
to the Prejudice of Good Order and Discipline-he hereby
Strictly forbids any Liquer [sic] to be Sold in the Hutts,"
and ordered that "the Offenders...be Confined and punished
for Disobedience of orders." It is not known how strictly
this and other regulations were enforced, and it is also
difficult to ascertain with any precision the prevalence of
drinking.

The evidence indicates that visits to the encampment,
Masonic activities and the few dances helped to break the
monotony of camp life as well as temporarily to relieve the
tension. But on the other side, women, gambling and drinking,
while they may have exerted some good influence, most probably also
proved unfavorable to good discipline.

155. See General Orders, January 3, 1780, in ibid., p. 345.

156. Charles Tallmadge Conover, "Original Orderly Books
Written on the Battlefields of American Revolution," The
Journal of American History, Vol. IV, No. 3, Third Quarter
7. A MILITARY ENCOUNTER WITH THE ENEMY

During the Morristown winter encampment periodic alerts and outpost skirmishes occurred, which also interrupted the monotony of the camp routine. The idea of a raid on the enemy at Staten Island had occurred to Washington, who wrote on January 9, 1780, that if the "frost should have made a firm and solid bridge between them and us....I cannot, relinquish the idea of attempting it." Being assured that there was a solid bridge of ice over the Sound, Washington began to plan the expedition. On January 12, 1780, Washington informed Major General Lord Stirling of his selection to command and execute the expedition, and counseled him to take advantage of the element of surprise. The soldiers were to be "clothed in Red," observe "the most profound silence," choose a watchword which would "deceive the Enemy," and finally the full use of the bayonet, because "The Bayonet will be found the most effectual weapon, especially in the Night." On the morning of January 15, 1780, the expedition of nearly 3,000 men crossed the frozen Sound in several hundred sleighs. This supposedly surprise attack ended

158. Irvine to Washington 8, 1780, in ibid., p. 370. This letter is either erroneously dated, or it was dispatched before the receipt of Washington's letter referred to above.
160. Ibid., p. 384.
in failure, however, when the British discovered it in time

and retired into their fortifications. According to

Thacher

The snow was three or four feet deep, and the weather extremely cold, and our troops continued on the island twenty four hours without covering, and about five hundred were slightly frozen, and six were killed by a party of horse, who pursued our rear guard. A number of tents, arms, and a quantity of baggage, with several casks of wine and spirits, were brought off, with seventeen prisoners.162

Thus the object of the expedition "to attack the enemy in their works on Staten Island, by surprize" was "unfortunately defeated."

Describing Lord Stirling's attack on Staten Island, Sir Henry Clinton said:

Thus circumstanced, it is obvious the British posts in that district were on all sides laid open to Mr. Washington's attacks, had his army been in a condition to profit by their very exposed situation. But after the failure of Lord Stirling's attempt against Staten Island in the beginning of the year they suffered no other disturbance for the rest of the winter; but, on the contrary, those of the enemy were kept in perpetual alarm by several successful incursions from our lines. This state of tranquillity was owing in great measure to General Knyphausen's very watchful care, and the alertness of the officers who commanded at the foreposts.164

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162. Thacher, op. cit., p. 225.

163. Ibid.

The failure of the raid on Staten Island incidentally revealed the sad condition of civilian morale. Numerous citizens on the New Jersey side of the Sound accompanied Lord Stirling's expedition as militiamen, and revenged themselves for their sufferings at the hands of the British by looting, not the British redcoats but the inhabitants of the island, despite Lord Stirling's efforts to check this plundering. Describing this sad situation, James Caldwell, a prominent citizen of Elizabethtown, in his letter of January 19, 1780, pointed out: "From the vast multitude who greedily rushed to plunder, our Country has rec'd such disgrace as will not be easily, I may say possibly, wiped off."  

Shortly afterward, on the night of January 25, 1780, the British struck back at Newark and Elizabethtown, where in addition to capturing several soldiers they also kidnapped a number of prominent Whigs. They also burned the Academy at Newark and the courthouse and the Meeting-House at Elizabethtown. A poet


describing the British assault on the church, wrote:

Their first attempt in vain they try,
The reluctant fire seems to die,
But soon they try the other end,
And lo! the kindled flames ascent.

Alas! the building all has fell,
The pulpit, pinnacle, and bell,
And rows of beauteous windows round
Are melted and lie on the ground. 167

This British action was the beginning of a series of new raids in Bergen and Essex Counties which placed the population of these two districts in an uncomfortable situation for the rest of the winter as well as the spring of 1780. In April of 1780, during one of their raids, the British mortally wounded Major Boyles of the Pennsylvania Line, and, according to Thacher


The enemy set fire to several houses, and carried off about fifty of our men, and five or six officers, among whom is Ensign Thacher, of our regiment. The militia pursued, and retook a number of horses, and a quantity of valuable goods, which they had plundered from the inhabitants.\textsuperscript{169}

Another surprise attack came on the night of June 6, 1780, when a British force of about three thousand men crossed over from Staten Island to New Jersey. This invading force, which included British regulars, Hessian auxiliaries and Loyalists, among them some from New Jersey, caught the Americans unprepared, and after some resistance several hundred militiamen and New Jersey Continentals under General Maxwell withdrew from their post at Elizabethtown. The British General Stirling, who had been put in command of the expedition by General von Knyphausen, was seriously wounded, and Maxwell's forces, after receiving additional stiffening from the Continental Army by mid-afternoon of June 7, 1780, resisted the invading force so effectively that General Knyphausen, who in the meantime had arrived to assume personal command of the expedition, was forced to withdraw his men from his advance position about a half mile from Springfield. When American deserters reported that Washington was advancing

\textsuperscript{169} Thacher, op. cit., p. 228.
with his army and was expected to reach Springfield in the
evening, General Knyphausen ordered his men on an additional
march, and in the early morning hours they reached Elizabeth-
town Point. While the invading force were plundering in
the vicinity of Connecticut Farms, N. J., some of their members
entered the house of a Presbyterian Minister, Rev. James
Caldwell, and shot his wife and set the house on fire.

Thacher also recorded that

The British, during their excursion, took the
opportunity of distributing a number of hand bills,
containing a pompous account of the capture of
Charleston, South Carolina, by Sir Henry Clinton,
with the garrison, commanded by Major General
Lincoln.  

As the skirmish continued and advance posts on both sides
were shifted, Washington became convinced that the British
action at Elizabethtown was intended to destroy his capability
to defend West Point and its dependencies. In a letter of
June 20, 1780, to Major William Heath, Washington stated:

170. Clinton, op. cit., pp. 191-94; See also letters of
Washington to Major Jeremiah Talbot, June 7, 1780, and Washington to
Lord Stirling, June 7, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 18,
pp. 487-88; Dayton to Washington, June 7, 1780, George Washington
Papers, Library of Congress; Washington to the President of Congress
Samuel Huntington, June 10, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit.,
Vol. 18, pp. 493-94.

171. The killing of Mrs. James Caldwell is well described
in Thacher, op. cit., p. 237.

172. Ibid.

173. Washington to Lord Stirling, June 8, 1780, in Fitzpatrick,
op. cit., Vol. 18, pp. 490-91; Washington to Major General Philemon
Dickinson, June 13, 1780, in ibid., Vol. 19, pp. 6-7.
I very much suspect their intention is to amuse us here, and to make an attempt upon the Highlands, towards which we cannot conveniently move at this instant without exposing a large quantity of provisions.174

Washington's hesitation was over. On June 18, 1780, an order was sent to Morristown to secure all possible means for moving from northern New Jersey to Pennsylvania all army stores not immediately needed. By a letter of June 18, 1780, Washington instructed Quartermaster General Greene to take seventeen hundred barrels of flour from Trenton and to use "every possible means to hurry it on to the North River and to get this Army in a moving condition." In addition all officers at Morristown were instructed to be in camp at Springfield without fail that same afternoon.

Urgent pleas were sent to Governor William Livingston of New Jersey and Governor Jonathan Trumbull of New York to assemble their militia. The request was also sent to the Council of Massachusetts "intreating them to hasten on reinforcements


175. Joseph Lewis to Major William Stevens, June 18, 1780, (two letters) and Major Richard Clairbourne, June 20, 1780. Morristown National Historical Park Collections, #1068, 1069, and 1070.
intended for their batalions [sic]."

The messengers were ordered to "ride Night and day," In view of Washington's expectation that "The movements of the enemy will probably be rapid and a correspondent spirit of energy should animate our efforts." In a letter of June 18, 1780, to the President of Congress, Washington again stressed the seriousness of the situation which had arisen with the return of Sir Henry Clinton's fleet from Charleston to New York:

A very alarming scene may shortly open, and it will be happy for us, if we can steer clear of some serious misfortune in this quarter. I hope the period is not arrived, that will convince the different States, by fatal experience, that some of them have mistaken the true situation of this Country. I flatter myself, however, that we may still retrieve our affairs, if we have but a just sense of them, and are actuated by a spirit of liberal policy and exertion, equal to the emergency. Could we once see this spirit generally prevailing, I should not despair of a prosperous issue to the Campaign. But there is no time to be lost. The danger is imminent and pressing. The obstacles to be surmounted are great and numerous, and our efforts must be instant, unreserved and universal.

News of the enemy movements were discouraging. On June 19, 1780, Major Lee reported to Washington that "I am privily of


opinion you will hear of General Clintons being before West 183
Point in less than 48 hours."

By June 21, 1780, Washington was ready to challenge the
British danger with a sizeable number of troops. By General
Orders of June 21, 1780, Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene was
given command of "the advanced Corps of the Army consisting
of Maxwell's and Stark's brigades, the Light Horse and 184
Militia." In informing Greene of his assignment to hold
the pass at Springfield, N. J., Washington emphasized:

The objects of your command are as far as possible
to cover the country and the public stores; the
dispositions for this purpose are left entirely to
your discretion, with this recommendation only that
you use every precaution in your power to avoid
surprise and provide for the security of your corps.
You will pay particular attention to the obtaining
intelligence from the enemy, of their land and sea
force, of their movements and intentions, giving
me punctual advice of whatever comes to your
knowledge.185

It seems that this was what Clinton had been expecting. On
the morning of June 23, 1780, the British troops began a quick
advance northward from Elizabethtown; however, spies provided 186
General Greene with ample warning. The New Jersey Regiment

183. Major Lee to Washington, June 19, 1780, George
184. See General Orders, June 21, 1780, in Fitzpatrick,
op. cit., Vol. 19, p. 50.
186. Dickinson to Washington, June 20, 1780, and Greene to
Washington, June 22, 1780, George Washington Papers, Library
of Congress.
under Colonel Dayton held up the advance position beyond Connecticut Farms. The Americans then retreated to a position near Springfield, where the Rahway River offered an excellent defensive barrier. The British forces were divided into two columns, right and left. While the right column, commanded by Maj. Gen. Edward Mathew, and headed by the Queen's Rangers under Lieut. Col. John Graves Simcoe, pushed its way, despite opposition from Major Lee's corps, a little above Springfield across the river at Vauxhall, the left and main column, under General Knyphausen, encountered strong resistance from Colonel Angelli's Rhode Island Regiment at the bridge directly leading to Springfield. This prevented the Hessian troops crossing the bridge; however, they succeeded in making their way across the river by fording the stream waist-high. As the right column under General Mathew was proceeding down the road from Vauxhall at this time, General Greene, being afraid his forces would be squeezed between two enemies, left the village, with his men for heights not far away, which controlled the approaches to the pass. At this moment General Knyphausen halted his advance, despite the fact that he could have easily pushed his way through the pass and continued to Morristown. Instead he rested his men for about three hours at Springfield, burned it, and returned to Elizabethtown, returning early next morning
over a pontoon bridge to Staten Island. Perhaps the whole
foray was designed to test the morale of Washington's men as
well as that of the people of New Jersey, or it may have been
designed to lure Washington back while another expedition
from New York attacked the weakly defended river fortresses.
But Washington refused to be lured, and no river expedition
was made. The burning of the village of Springfield, however,
was a senseless act. One militiaman described it as follows:

The whole scene was one of gloomy horror - a dead
horse, a broken carriage of a fieldpiece, a town
laid in ashes, the former inhabitants standing
over the ruins of their dwellings, and the unburied
dead, covered with blood and with the flies that
were devouring it, filled me with melancholy
feelings, till I was ready to say - Is the contest
worth all this? ¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁷. For a good description of the Springfield affair see
Stirling to Washington, June 23, 1780, and Greene to Washington,
See also Simcoe, op. cit., pp. 96-100; Clinton, op. cit., pp. 190-
94; Ashbel Green, The Life of Ashbel Greene, V.D.M. Begun to be
Written by Himself in his Eighty-Second Year and Continued to his
Eighty-fourth. Prepared for the Press at the Author's Request
by Joseph H. Jones, Pastor of the Sixth Presbyterian Church,
Philadelphia. (New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1849),
pp. 117-21.

¹⁸⁸. Green, op. cit., p. 121.
IV. DISCIPLINE OF THE TROOPS AT MORRISTOWN

1. NATURE OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE

The word "discipline" embraces many interpretations. First a "discipline" may be a scientific doctrine, a specific branch of learning, a classroom subject, as for example philosophical disciplines such as logic, noetics, ethics. Second, "discipline" can mean a duty, an obligation, an order.

Disobedience, cowardice, and the like, which in civilian life are not regarded as major transgressions, are considered criminal in the military life. From time immemorial, in each orderly state, there has developed special military legislation by which soldiers can be punished if found guilty of insubordination, that is disobedience, mutiny, or sedition; desertion, cowardice, violation of discipline and order, and so forth.

Discipline is essential in an army, and invokes more than merely negative requirements. It requires of a soldier that he stake his life for the defeat of the enemy and expects extraordinary deeds of him. Discipline essentially is power. A cogent observation on military discipline and the basis of its enormous power has been made by Charles Darwin:
The advantage which disciplined soldiers have over undisciplined hordes follows chiefly from the confidence which each man feels in his comrades.¹

It was Henry IV who in 1597 introduced in France the principle that all military labor, including that of sappers and builders of fortifications, should be performed by regular soldiers instead of civilians. By the beginning of the 18th century, this policy had come to be widely adopted by the other European nations.

Military discipline under the stress of battle calls not only for courage and readiness to suffer, but also for initiative on the part of the soldier. Particularly in the 16th and 17th centuries, the soldier of a standing army, was also required to do regular daily work either on the parade grounds or elsewhere, which was monotonous and which he sometimes resented. In many instances, this regular daily working routine led to a decline of discipline among the soldiers.

Washington viewed discipline as essential for his army's success. In his "General Instructions to all the Captains of


³ Ibid., pp. 373-74.
of Companies," issued on July 29, 1757, he wrote:

Discipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable; procures success to the weak, and esteem to all.⁴

At the beginning of the American Revolution the Congress considered the problem of discipline in the Continental Army and drew up a military code of 69 articles which was promulgated on June 30, 1775. On September 20, 1776, a new and more detailed code was issued, which increased the severity of punishments for violations, and it was this code which, with minor changes, served as the basis for military discipline throughout the American Revolution.

Washington and his associates were under no illusions regarding the state of discipline in the Continental army. "We want nothing but good officers to constitute as good an army as ever marched into the field. Our men are better than the officers," wrote General Nathanael Greene on October 3, 1776, to Governor


Nicholas Cooke of Rhode Island. In his letter of October 11, 1776, to his wife Esther, Joseph Reed remarked:

To attempt to introduce discipline and subordination into a new army must always be a work of much difficulty, but where the principles of democracy so universally prevail, where so great an equality and so thorough a levelling spirit predominates, either no discipline can be established, or he who attempts it must become odious and detestable, a position which no one will choose. It is impossible for any one to have an idea of the complete equality which exists between the officers and men who compose the greater part of our troops. You may form some notion of it when I tell you that yesterday morning a captain of horse, who attends the General, from Connecticut, was seen shaving one of his men on the parade near the house.  

In his letter of December 16, 1776, to the President of Congress, Washington wrote: "In a Word, the next will be a trying Campaign and as all that is dear and valuable may depend upon the issue of it, I [think no measure] would advise that nothing should be omitted [to ensure] that shall seem necessary to our success. Let us have a respectable Army, and such as will be competent to every exigency."

Discipline is achieved by training and drill, regulated by qualified officers and conditioned to a large extent by morale. The officers and soldiers of the Continental Army were provided


8. William B. Reed, Life and Correspondence of Joseph Reed, Military Secretary of Washington, at Cambridge; Adjutant-General of the Continental Army; Member of the Congress of the United States; and President of the Executive Council of the State of Pennsylvania. (Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston, 1847), Vol. 1, p. 243.

with the manual written by the Inspector General of the Army, Baron von Steuben, *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States*, which had been adopted by the Continental Congress on March 24, 1779, and distributed in June of 1779. With this work they received an easily understood and comprehensive outline of their duties as well as the methods of preserving order in camp.

The main difficulties which Washington encountered were the laxity of the officers in enforcing the *Regulations* as laid down by Baron von Steuben, the plundering of the soldiers, due chiefly to lack of supplies, and desertions.

*Peccatur intra muros et extra* - the fault is not confined to either side, says the old Latin saying, and perhaps the fault cannot be confined to Washington and his soldiers. As it was mentioned previously, the systematized procedure of drill, mainly because of the severe winter, was only established by mid-April of 1780.

2. LAXITY IN DISCIPLINE IN THE CONTINENTAL ARMY

During the Morristown encampment a general laxity and flagrant disregard for regulations and assignments existed.

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11. See supra, p. 58.
not only among soldiers but among officers as well, and numerous disciplinary violations occurred. Washington encountered great difficulty in getting his officers to enforce regulations and as a consequence, discipline was never strict. The shortage of officers undoubtedly contributed to the lack of discipline, and the officers themselves were not always conscientious in the performance of their duty. In many instances the reward for patriotism was only poverty, and officers without substantial private income found life in the army extremely difficult. Furthermore, the methods employed in selecting officers were inefficient, and as a result many incompetent persons easily became officers.

In a letter of January 22, 1780, to Major Generals and officers commanding brigades, Washington discussed various faults which had turned up in the course of an inspection by the Inspector General of the Army, Baron von Steuben. According to Washington the rolls were in poor order, a large number of the Pennsylvania enlisted men and many Maryland officers were absent. Washington also wanted to know the reasons for the long absence of Col. Zebulon Butler from his Connecticut Brigade, and indicated that, while Stark's Brigade had "fewer men improperly absent than any other," it lacked arms. In addition, he pointed out that the New York Brigade was "in
as bad order as possible" and that the waste of material in
Lord Stirling's Division indicated that the New Jersey Brigade
had "fallen off from what it formerly was, one of the best
in the army." Washington remarked that "most of the corps
in the Army are in worse order than I flattered myself," and that in general they had made little progress in order
and discipline, that in fact some corps had regressed.

Toward the end of January of 1780, by order of Washington,
von Steuben went to Philadelphia to propose to the Congress
the adoption of new laws for the reformation of the Army.

His mission involved the vital question of the real existence
of the army, which, on account of the insufficient recruiting system, and the expiration of the term of a large portion of the soldiers, was about to lose almost one third of its strength, when not even one man could be spared on the eve of a new campaign.13

By General Orders issued on January 31, 1780, Washington emphasized that not only men, but officers as well, were guilty of wandering from camp. Some of these had strayed too near the enemy lines on various clandestine excursions and had been made prisoners. Washington warned that officers so captured would not be exchanged but would remain captive as long as

Day was to superintend more closely the policing of the camp and the activities of the guards. By General Orders issued on April 4, 1780, the officers were instructed to learn the regulations and to begin training their regiments accordingly. Orders issued thereafter indicate that inspections and maneuvers of the Brigades subsequently took place almost every day. Beginning on Monday, May 15, 1780, regimental drill began every day at 6 a.m., except Friday and Saturday and included both officers and men. At 5 p.m., the companies exercised "in the same manner but without Arms."

3. OFFENSES COMMITTED DURING THE ENCAMPMENT

The first major personnel problem Washington faced at Morristown was the relation between the local population and his troops. The farmers neighboring the camp were continually subjected to depredations by the soldiery, and Washington admitted that he was almost helpless under the circumstances. The hardships under which the men labored were so great that they were reduced to the extremity of plundering. In the words

16. See General Orders, May 12, 1780, in ibid., pp. 349-50; See also Supra, p. 59.
of Washington, their plundering could only be "lamented as the effect of an unfortunate necessity." It was during this early period of the encampment that the men were going four or five days without meat and were continually short of bread, the only remedy for the situation being better provision for their food and clothing. As the plundering increased and the local inhabitants became increasingly angry, Washington ordered his officers "to visit the men in their huts at different hours of the night, to report all absentees, who are without fail to be brought to immediate trial and punished as they deserve." But in spite of his order the marauding and robbing increased. Washington's position was that he did not have the power to repress or punish the crimes committed by his soldiers against the local inhabitants as his men were compelled to resort to plunder by the instinct of self-preservation. Despite his feelings, Washington was forced to administer penalties. In one case a

soldier who broke into a store in Morristown received eighty lashes. For abetting an accomplice in robbing a store and taking a bucket of rum while on sentry duty another soldier was punished by one hundred lashes. For allowing his fellow-soldiers to rob a store while he was on guard duty, a third soldier was given a similar punishment. On January 27, 1780, Washington wrote in reply to a remonstrance from the Justices of Morris County, that he would try to restrain the soldiers and promised to punish those pointed out by the inhabitants as guilty of plundering. From Washington's letter, it would also appear that his soldiers had damaged the "prison and County House," for the Quartermaster General was requested "to examine the damage which the Troops have done to it, and to have it repaired as far as circumstances will permit." Even detachments returning to the camp from patrol would rob and plunder the local inhabitants. Washington took note of this fact, stating that "a night scarcely passes without gangs of soldiers going out of camp and committing every species of robbery, depredation and grossest personal Insults. This conduct is intollerable [sic] and a

disgrace to the army, and if any thing can aggravate it, it is that these violences are committed on the property and persons of those who on a very late and alarming occasion, for the want of provisions, manifested the warmest attachment to the army by affording it the most generous and plantiful relief. It has also been reported that when detachments are relieved and are returning to camp, the soldiers straggle, maraud and plunder in the most shameful and injurious manner.

An order was issued stipulating that if any soldiers were found straggling out of the chain of sentinels after retreat beating, they would receive "one hundred lashes upon the spot." If any soldier was caught in the act of "perpetrating robberies," he would receive "from one hundred to five hundred lashes at the discretion of the officer."

For stealing a mutton from a local inhabitant half of the monthly pay of one soldier was withheld until the damage he had done was compensated; this soldier also received one hundred lashes.

Despite repeated warnings many of the men continued to maraud and suffered the lash. At this time whipping was widely

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practiced as a military punishment. According to Thacher
whipping with knotted cords on the bare back, which often cut
through the flesh at every blow, was the most common punishment.
The drummers and fifers were made the executioners, and it was
the duty of the drum major to see that the chastisement was
well performed. The soldiers adopted a method which they said
mitigated the anguish of the lash. They put a leaden bullet
between their teeth, and bit on it while the punishment was in
progress. They would thus often receive fifty lashes without
uttering a groan or hardly wincing.

One of the reasons for poor discipline in the camp was
that the soldiers were not properly supervised by their offices,
who were frequently absent. When the greater part of the
officers received long furloughs, which in many cases were
prolonged even further, the officers remaining in the camp
became increasingly overworked. If one considers the fact that
some of these officers also became ill and in some instances
were lax in their duties, one cannot wonder at the ensuing
neglect and disorder. On January 24, 1780, Washington
informed Gen. James Clinton that there were only "two Brigadiers


27. See for example Hawkins' Orderly Book, No. 1, Hazen's
Regiment, Hand's Brigade, entry of February 3, 1780, Historical
Society of Pennsylvania.
of the line in Camp, and one of them, General Irvine has pressing calls to see his family and waits the return of you 28 or General Huntington." In many cases several regiments were "without a single commissioned officer" while the others had "an overplus." The result was that the common routine 29 and order could not be maintained. Discipline deteriorated to such a level that it was reported that the soldiers brought their arms to the parade ground "so rusty, dirty, and otherwise 30 out of order as to be unfit for service."

Washington was also handicapped by the fact that some of his best associates were stricken by misfortune. Because of ill health, General John Sullivan resigned his major generalcy 31 on November 30, 1779. Another important officer, Maj. Gen. 32 Alexander McDougall, developed gallstones, and Maj. Gen. Israel Putnam was seized early in January of 1780 "by a fit 33 of the Palsy." In addition, Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene, one of Washington's closest associates, was despondent over the

30. See General Orders, February 16, 1780, in ibid., Vol. 18, p. 16.
31. Ibid., Vol. 17, p. 265.
conditions in his Quartermaster General Department in general and the supply of the troops in particular. The obnoxious state of morale among the troops is perhaps best reflected in the desertion rate. During 1779-80 desertions from the Morristown encampment were frequent. Washington realized that the physical hardships his troops were enduring might be a factor in the number of desertions. In his letter of January 30, 1780, to Philip Schuyler, he pointed out that

they bore it with a most heroic patience; but sufferings like these accompanied by the want of Cloathes, Blankets, &c. will produce frequent desertions in all Armies and so it happened with us tho' it did not excite a single mutiny. 34

In his biography of Washington, Douglas Southall Freeman asserts that the officers "at Morristown did their best and succeeded remarkably in keeping desertion at a low figure." Yet, during the length of the winter encampment, 1,066 soldiers deserted. The following table gives the total desertion rate among the soldiers of the brigades at Morristown:

| December 1779: | 102 |

34. Washington to Schuyler, January 30, 1780, in ibid., p. 467.
January 1780: 188
February 1780: 218
March 1780: 117
April 1780: 185
May 1780: 132
June 1780: 124

From the above statistics it emerges that there was an average desertion rate of 152 soldiers per month during the encampment.

In December of 1779, Stark's Brigade had the largest number of desertions 22, while the Hand's Brigade had the smallest number, 4. There were 188 deserters in January 1780, of which the largest number, 42, belonged to the 1st Maryland Brigade and the smallest number, 8, to the 1st Connecticut Brigade. The 2nd Maryland Brigade had 42, the highest number of desertions for February of 1780, while the 1st Connecticut Brigade was the only brigade which had no desertions during that month.

In March of 1780, one finds the largest number of desertions, 28,

in Hand's Brigade, while Stark's Brigade had the smallest number, 2. The 1st Pennsylvania Brigade had the highest number of desertions in April, 1780, 47, while the 2nd Connecticut Brigade had only 2 desertions. In May of 1780 the 1st Pennsylvania Brigade had the largest number of desertions, 35, while 3 brigades, the 1st and 2nd Connecticut and Stark's, had only 5 desertions each. In June of 1780, the 2nd Pennsylvania Brigade had the highest number of desertions, while the 2nd Connecticut was the only brigade which had no desertions during this month.

The numerous violations of the military code, including desertions, resulted in frequent courts-martial, which were held in empty huts in the Morristown camp, the homes of staff officers in Morristown, or even at local taverns. The frequency of these courts-martial occupied a great deal of the officers' time. The crime of desertion was usually punished by one

hundred lashes or death. On March 19, 1780, William Miller, a soldier in Captain Cummings' Company of the 2nd New Jersey Regiment was charged with desertion, and because he was found to have been "an old and atrocious offender" the court sentenced him to receive 300 lashes and also to "be sent on board a Continental Frigate, with his Crime, there to serve during the War." On April 9, 1780, two soldiers of the 11th Pennsylvania Regiment and six soldiers from Colonel Hazen's Regiment were sentenced to "run the Brigade Gantelope, once a week, for two Weeks, from right to left, and left to right each Time." The same General Court Martial of the Division sentenced soldier John Raymond of the 11th Pennsylvania Regiment to receive 50 lashes for desertion, but because of "some very particular circumstances" his sentence was commuted three weeks later. Some soldiers were not so fortunate, however, as in the case of George Foster of the 11th Pennsylvania Regiment and John Solsbury of the New Jersey Brigade, who received 50 lashes

45. See General Orders, January 3, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 17, pp. 343-47; General Orders, May 1, 1780, in ibid., Vol. 18, pp. 318-19; General Orders, May 18, 1780, in ibid., p. 380; General Orders, May 24, 1780, in ibid., p. 408.
47. Ibid., entry of April 9, 1780.
48. Ibid., entry of May 1, 1780.
each for desertion. Soldier Benjamin Quackenbush, of the 3rd New York Regiment, was sentenced to "run the Gantlope through the Brigade twice with fixed bayonets at his Breast to Regulate his pace." A sentence given to Jessee Peirce of Colonel Jackson's regiment was to "Run the Gantelope through the Brigade to which he belongs and Be Confined in A Dungeon for the Space of one Month on Bread and water."

December 28, 1779, two soldiers of the 4th New York Regiment were tried by the Division Court Martial at Morristown for desertion and being absent for over twelve months. The first soldier, John McLean, was sentenced to "one hundred lashes on his naked back to be inflicted at four several times." The second soldier, William Harper, received a lighter sentence, having merely to run the gauntlet of his brigade. Corp. James Whitney, of Colonel Jackson's Regiment, was sentenced to receive 100 lashes on his bare back and also assigned to "do the duty of a private Centinel." David McCullum, a soldier

49. Ibid., entry of May 24, 1780.
51. See Orderly Book IV, in ibid., p. 218.
53. Ibid., p. 346.
in Captain Mitchell's Company of the 1st New Jersey Regiment, was "charged with Desertion and Denying his being a soldier." He was sentenced to receive fifty lashes, but the Court also found that the soldier "had been deceived by the late Capt. Wade, for a lucrative or some worse purpose" and therefore recommended mercy. A soldier of the New York Brigade, Charles Williams, was sentenced to receive forty lashes in the morning, thirty in the evening and thirty the following morning. There were also desertions from Washington's personal Life Guard; it is recorded that at least eight members deserted from this body. The British invasion of New Jersey under General Baron Wilhelm von Knyphausen in June of 1780 was intended to encourage desertions. While the British were in New Jersey, Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold arrived at the Morristown Headquarters on June 12, 1780, dined with Washington, and subsequently betrayed the secret arrival of a French fleet and army at Rhode Island to take place within two or three weeks.

55. See Orderly Book IV, in Lauber, op. cit., p. 225.
Because of Arnold's betrayal, Sir Henry Clinton was able to withdraw from the mainland to his fortified islands.

Inconsistency seems to have existed in the imposition of punishments for the various offenses, particularly robbery, as evidenced by the court-martial proceedings. Thomas Warren, a soldier of the Invalid Corps who was tried on January 5, 1780, for "Leaving his post when centinel and for theft," was sentenced to death, but on February 5, 1780, was pardoned. A soldier in the Artillery, Jesse Peck, received 15 lashes for theft, but a fellow soldier, Rubin Parker, was punished with 100 lashes for the same crime. Two soldiers of the 5th Pennsylvania Regiment, James Hammell and Samuel Crawford, were sentenced to death on February 18, 1780, for suspected robbery.


63. Ibid., entry of January 21, 1780.

64. See General Orders, February 18, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 18, pp. 22-23.
Crawford was pardoned, while Hammell was executed on February 20, 1780. By a Division General Court-Martial of the Pennsylvania Line held on February 22, 1780, Samuel Bell and Robert Powers, soldiers of the 10th Pennsylvania Regiment, and Thomas Brown and Jacob Justice, soldiers of the 7th Pennsylvania Regiment, were sentenced to death for "Plundering Mr. Bogart, an Inhabitant near Paramus," but on May 9, 1780, they were pardoned. For concealing stolen goods Sergeant Mitchell of the 9th Pennsylvania Regiment, in addition to reduction to the ranks, also received 100 lashes. Soldier Henry Hillings of Captain Johnson's Company of the 3rd New Jersey Regiment was sentenced on March 19, 1780, to receive 150 lashes for "Quitting his post, and riding General Maxwell's Horse," but Patrick McDonald was sentenced to receive 100 lashes for the same offense.

Drunkenness was fairly prevalent in the Morristown encampment, and many crimes were committed when the soldiers were in

65. See General Orders, February 24, 1780, in ibid., p. 48.

66. Hammell's execution is described in Thacher, op. cit., p. 227.


68. See General Orders, May 9, 1780, in ibid., pp. 342-43.

69. 2nd Pennsylvania Orderly Book, entry of February 15, 1780, Morristown National Historical Park Collections.


71. 2nd Pennsylvania Orderly Book, entry of April 10, 1780, Morristown National Historical Park Collections.
that condition. Drunkenness was a particular problem in the New York Brigade, whose Colonel, on January 13, 1780, issued the following regimental order forbidding the sale of liquors in his soldiers' huts:

The Col0 Observing that the open and Abominable practice of Drunkness prevails in his Reg' without the least Shame or Restraint to the Prejudice of Good order and Discipline he hereby Strictly forbids any Liquer to be Sold in the Hutts Belonging to the Regt by any Body whatsoever and orders the offenders to be Confined and pumnished [sic] for Disobediance of Orders the officers are Requested to pay Strict attention that the Increasing Disorder may be preve[n]ted.72

John Lewis, a soldier in Col. H. Jackson's Regiment, was sentenced to receive 100 lashes for stealing and being drunk while on guard duty. Edmund Burke, a soldier of the 3rd New York Regiment, was court martialed on December 13, 1779, for attacking Fife Major Andrew Gardner with an unlawful weapon and for disobeying Ensign Josiah Bagley, and sentenced to be shot. Washington, however, on February 20, 1780, remitted the sentence against Burke. In pardoning this offender, Washington wrote: "The case of Burke ought to be a striking example to the soldiery of the dangerous excesses and fatal consequences

72. See Regimental Orders, January 13, 1780, in Lauber, op. cit., p. 221.
74. Ibid., p. 344.
into which the pernicious crime of drunkenness will frequently betray them." It was perhaps fear of drunkenness that led Washington to issue an order concerning the army's observance of St. Patrick's Day by which "all fatigue and working parties" were to cease on St. Patrick's Day and the officers were to see that the soldiers of each State line were kept within their own camps. Although there is no record of the effect of this order on the enlisted men, it did not affect the officers, who celebrated this observance in "a very high Degree and in a notorious Manner."

Another facet of the disciplinary problem was the irresponsibility which both soldiers and officers frequently displayed in their attitude to their duties. Although Washington attempted in every way to keep the soldiers and officers within the sphere of their responsibilities, he failed. At a Division Court-Martial, held by order of Major General Lord Stirling between March 10 and 14, 1780, Lieutenant Thomas, of the Third Jersey Regiment, was charged with absenting himself from roll call and sentenced to receive a reprimand "by the Colonel of his Regiment."

75. See General Orders, February 20, 1780, in ibid., Vol. 18, pp. 34-35.
76. See General Orders, March 16, 1780, in ibid., p. 120.
77. Ebenezer Parkman, Jr., Diary, entry of March 18, 1780, American Antiquarian Society.
The same court-martial found Daniel Sullivan, a soldier in Captain Bush's Company in the 11th Pennsylvania Regiment, guilty of "refusing to do his Duty, and absenting himself from Roll Call" and sentenced him to receive fifty lashes. Anthony Patten, of the same regiment, was sentenced to one hundred lashes for desertion and fifty for availing himself of a forged furlough. John Rennigton and Michael Hilands, of Colonel Hazen's Regiment, each received fifty lashes for absenting themselves without leave from their guard duty.

By a division General Court-Martial held by order of General Gist on March 27, 1780, James Stinson, of the Delaware Regiment, received the death penalty for "Promoting and encouraging discontent among the men, and making use of language that tended to countenance desertion." On April 28, 1780, James Coleman, a soldier of the 11th Pennsylvania Regiment, was tried and also received the death penalty for repeated desertion, forgery and disposing of his arms and accoutrements. Sergeant Logan, of Captain Mitchell's Company in the New Jersey Brigade, was found guilty of absenting himself without leave and denying his

79. Ibid.
80. Ibid., entry of May 24, 1780.
81. Ibid.
82. See General Orders, April 2, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 18, pp. 196-97.
83. See General Orders, May 1, 1780, in ibid., pp. 318-19.
enlistment. The Court sentenced him to be reduced to the ranks and be reprimanded by the commanding officer of the regiment. For encouraging desertion, Corporal Robins, of the Delaware Regiment, drew the death penalty.

Lieut. Col. John Eager Howard, of the Maryland Line, was court-martialed on February 16, 1780, for disobedience of orders, neglect of duty, and furnishing incorrect returns. While Howard's fellow officers found him guilty of each charge and sentenced him to reprimand in the General Orders, Washington reviewed Howard's case and absolved him of any disobedience, but agreed with the court on the two latter counts and gave him moderate reprimands for these violations. On February 23, 1780, Maj. James Moore, of the 1st Pennsylvania Regiment, was court-martialed and reprimanded for overstaying his leave, for ungentlemanlike behavior in "promising to return to camp before General Irvine was relieved, and not acting agreeable to his promise," and for "speaking in a very dishonorable and disrespectful manner of Congress." On May 25, 1780, Lieutenant Hunt, of the 4th New York Regiment, was tried on a charge of "Marching

the old Main Guard to camp in a disorderly manner and permitting
the men to straggle contrary to the ordinance of the Army."
Washington reprimanded him in General Orders and declared that
"The Conduct of Lieutenant Hunt was highly unmilitary and
blameable. Too frequent instances occur of similar irregu-
larities and they are at all times inexcus[ible]."
When
Captain James Christie (Chrystie), of the 3rd Pennsylvania
Regiment, refused an order to march the guard from his brigade
area to the Grand Parade, he was rebuked for this offense in
General Orders.
An interesting case is that of Lieut. Adam
Hoops, of the 4th Maryland Regiment, who, at the court-martial
held on April 11, 1780, was charged with unofficer-like and
ungentlemanlike behavior "in swearing when he came off of camp
guard he would not do another Tour of duty as a subaltern and
telling the Adjutant he would return himself unfit for duty in
the next Weekly return." He was also charged with "returning
himself sick and refusing to do duty on that account when in
the presence of one or more of the officers of the regiment,
at the same time pronounced himself not sick but said he had
other reasons for so doing." Finally, "though being returned

88. General Orders, June 1, 1780, in ibid., pp. 466-67.
sick [he had gone] to Morristown Ball...remaining one night and
best part of two days from his regiment without permission from
the commanding officer of the same." The court, however,
acquitted him of all these charges.

Another offense was trading with the enemy, which was pro-
hibited by a Congressional Resolution of October 8, 1777.
In addition, Washington on December 12, 1779, issued General
Orders banning all trade with the enemy. Washington had heard
that some officers were trading with the British in New York and
he called on the officers on outpost duty to halt this "most
pernicious intercourse of traffic." On February 5, 1780, a
prominent officer, John Beatty, Commissary General of Prisoners,
was charged with violating the Commander in Chief's order of
December 12, 1779, and received a reprimand. Washington called
Beatty's conduct "extremely reprehensible" and pointed out that
Beatty had broken a State law but it was "certainly very blamable
in any officer to contravene the views of a State." Washington's


91. Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789. Edited
from the original Records in the Library of Congress by Worthington
Chauncey Ford, Chief, Division of Manuscripts. Vol. IX. 1777:
October 3-December 31. (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1907), pp. 784-85.

92. See General Orders, December 12, 1779, in Fitzpatrick,
op. cit., Vol. 17, pp. 251-52.

93. See General Orders, February 19, 1780, in ibid., Vol. 18,
pp. 32-34.
rebuke resulted in Beatty's sending his resignation on the following day to Headquarters, where he was told to submit it to Congress, which he did. By May 1, 1780, he had left the army and retired to his home, Windsor Hall, near Princeton. In the case of a soldier Jones, about 21 years old, who had gone to New York "4 or 5 times in the trading way, and got bewitched after hard money," Washington stated in his letter of May 28, 1780, to Brig. Gen. William Maxwell:

> If there is a law of the state competent to the punishment of Jones and the Negro, you had best turn them over at once to the Civil Authority; letting them know that if they are caught in similar practices, they will be executed without any delay.  

These are only two known cases in which violations of Washington's orders have been recorded. Apparently Washington's rebuke, particularly of Col. John Beatty, induced both officers and men to restrain themselves from trading with the enemy in New York for the duration of the Morristown encampment.

Cases of assault were quite frequent during the encampment, and it can be said that almost half of these were fights between officers or assaults of officers on soldiers. The case of Edmund Burke, soldier of the 3rd New York Regiment, who was

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95. John Beatty to Reading Beatty, May 1, 1780, in ibid., p. 216.
sentenced to be shot for attacking a fife major with an illegal weapon and whose sentence Washington remitted on February 20, 1780, has been mentioned above.

Cases of one officer striking another with a cane, throwing a brother officer out of a public house, stabbing another officer with a "hanger," and assaulting a common soldier were rather common. On January 27, 1780, Capt. William Price of the 2nd Maryland Regiment was reprimanded for striking Lieut. Edward Duval with a cane and for disorderly and mutinous conduct in the presence of the soldiers of the regiment. Ensign John Spoor of the 3rd New York Regiment was court-martialed for scandalous and ungentlemanlike behavior in forcibly putting Capt. Samuel Treadwell Pell of the Second New York Regiment on the evening of January 29, 1780, "out of the room of a public house in which he had passed the evening." The court found him guilty and he was discharged from the service. When the court martial acquitted Capt. Alexander Mitchell of the 1st New Jersey Regiment for stabbing Lieut. Eden Burroughs with a hanger, Washington disapproved the court's action. There was one case of an

97. See supra, pp. 116-117.
100. General Orders, April 29, 1780, in ibid., p. 314.
assault which resulted in death. William Loudon, a drum major in the Artillery, was indicted for stabbing another artilleryman, Richard Savage, twice with a knife. For some unknown reason, Washington turned Loudon over to the civil authorities. Upon trial by the jury, Loudon was acquitted of murder and found guilty of manslaughter and then was "allowed his Clergy, and burned in the hand pursuant to his judgment." Subsequently the civil authorities returned Loudon to the military. There is no record that he was actually punished for his crime, and most probably he entirely escaped further punishment. The Court-martial held on January 22, 1780, acquitted three soldiers, Daniel Thorn, Joseph Fabro, and David Slater, of striking, abusing and threatening the lives of Lieut. Charles Frederick Weissenfels of the 2nd New York Regiment and of Ensign Daniel D. Denston. Washington, however, disapproved the acquittal because he was convinced that the evidence was against the men.

At the end of May, 1780, the Morristown winter quarters experienced its worst trouble. Before the time arrived for the


102. See General Orders, February 9, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 17, pp. 507-08.
summer campaign it was necessary to prepare the soldiers for it through strict discipline and frequent punishment. On May 25, 1780, General Orders announced that the "Criminals now under Sentence of death are to be executed tomorrow morning Eleven o'clock near the Grand parade: Fifty men properly officered from each brigade to attend. The Camp colour men from the Pennsylvania, Connecticut and New York Lines under the direction of a Serjeant from each to dig the Graves this afternoon. There were eleven of these criminals, and with one exception they were deserters. Three came from New Jersey regiments, three from New York and five from Pennsylvania. Eight had been sentenced to be hanged and three to be shot. On the following day, May 26, 1780, the eleven were brought in carts from their prison to the gallows. The Rev. William Rogers, a Baptist chaplain of one of the Pennsylvania brigades, addressed them at the scaffold "in a very pathetic manner" but loudly so that the soldiers and spectators could hear it, thus "impressing on their minds the heinousness of their crimes, the justice of their sentence, and the high importance of a preparation for death." While the men sentenced to be shot stood by to see the others hanged, the eight were put side by side on ladders leaning against the crossbar on the tall scaffold,

"with halters round their necks, their coffins before their eyes, their graves open to their view, and thousands of spectators bemoaning their awful doom."

"At this awful moment," recorded Dr. James Thacher, "while their fervent prayers are ascending to Heaven, an officer comes forward and reads a reprieve for seven of them, by the Commander in Chief" as well as for the three on the ground waiting to be shot. According to Thacher

The trembling criminals are now divested of the implements of death, and their bleeding hearts leap for joy. How exquisitely rapturous must be the transition when snatched from the agonizing horrors of a cruel death, and mercifully restored to the enjoyment of a life that had been forfeited! No pen can describe the emotions which must have agitated their souls. They were scarcely able to remove from the scaffold without assistance. The chaplain reminded them of the gratitude they owed the Commander in Chief, for his clemency towards them, and that the only return in their power to make, was a life devoted to the faithful discharge of their duty.105

James Coleman of the 11th Pennsylvania Regiment was the eighth man sentenced to be hanged because he had forged "a number of discharges, by which he and more than a hundred soldiers had left the army. He appeared to be penitent, and behaved with uncommon fortitude and resolution."

104. Thacher, op. cit., pp. 233-34.
105. Ibid., p. 234.
106. Ibid.
On the scaffold Coleman "addressed the soldiers, desired them to be faithful to their country and obedient to their officers." He also "advised the officers to be punctual in all their engagements to the soldiers, and give them no cause to desert. He examined the halter, and told the hangman the knot was not made right, and that the rope was not strong enough, as he was a heavy man. Having adjusted the knot and fixed it round his own neck, he was swung off instantly. The rope broke, and he fell to the ground, by which he was very much bruised. He calmly reascended the ladder and said, 'I told you the rope was not strong enough, do get a stronger one.' Another being procured, he was launched into eternity."

It seems that the executions had been ordered to set an unforgettable example and Chaplain Rogers probably knew in advance that most of the men would be pardoned.

The danger of mutiny had hung over the Continental Army for some time. There had been a mutinous unrest during the winter encampment at Valley Forge in 1777-78. Washington could not "enough admire the incomparable patience and fidelity" of his soldiers in spite of their privations. However, he realized

107. Ibid., pp. 234-35.
that there were "strong symptoms...of discontent." These symptoms finally culminated in a mutiny of two Connecticut regiments on May 25, 1780. When Col. Return Jonathan Meigs, Commander of the 1st Connecticut Brigade, tried to restore order he "received a blow from one of the mutineers." The mutiny was quickly suppressed by a brigade of the Pennsylvanians and "The leaders were secured, and the two regiments were returned to their duty." It seems probable that the execution described above of eleven soldiers, scheduled for the morning of May 26, 1780, could have aroused the Connecticut soldiers and thus, given the poor state of the army in general, resulted in their mutiny. In his letter of May 28, 1780, to President Joseph Reed of Pennsylvania, Washington wrote that there was "such a combination of circumstances to exhaust the patience of the soldiery that it begins at length to be worn out and we see in every line of the army, the most serious features of mutiny and sedition."

On May 30, 1780, Washington ordered the release of all prisoners, except "those of the Connecticut Brigade who were confined for Mutiny" and the "prisoners of War."

109. See Washington's letter to Governor George Clinton of New York, February 16, 1778, in ibid., p. 469.
One of the smaller breaches of discipline was neglect of weapons. In order to improve the care of weapons in his unit, the Colonel of the New York Brigade issued an order on May 10, 1780, requesting his officers to see that the sergeants insure the soldiers' maintenance of their muskets in the best condition. If during inspection an officer found that the musket of any soldier was unpolished, such soldier was to receive punishment "upon the Spot with 30 Lashes upon his Bare Back." In addition the sergeant to whose company such soldier belonged was to be "Reduced and to Mount the Guards in the Ranks with a Sholder nott on his Coat as A Badgee of the Neglect of his Duty."

Another breach of discipline concerned Lieut. Anthony Wright of Colonel Flower's Artillery Artificer Regiment who was court-martialed on March 9, 1780, found guilty and dismissed from the service for ungentlemanlike behavior "in drinking at public houses with soldiers at their expence," for going to a dance at night uninvited and "playing cards the same night with private soldiers," and for borrowing a pair of shoes without returning them or giving any recompensation.


An unusual case was that of Capt. Lieut. Theophilus Parke, of Flower's Artillery Artificer Regiment, who on January 24, 1780, was tried for "Defrauding his men of their pay and bounty." The court found him guilty not only of defrauding his men of their pay and bounty, but also for repeatedly forging their names without their knowledge or consent. He was sentenced to be "cashiered with infamy, by having his sword broke over his head on the public parade in the front of the regiment," declared unworthy of "ever holding any post civil or military in the United States," and was to suffer the indignity of having "the charge and sentence...published in the News Papers of the State of Pennsylvania." For losing his musket and cartridge box William Whitehead, a private soldier, was found guilty and sentenced to receive fifty lashes and his pay was stopped until both were paid for. His Colonel approved the pay stoppage but remitted the flogging in the belief that "it Will have a tendence for him Never to abuse the Linnetty [leniency] of his officers." For disobedience of orders, Daniel Lafferty, a private soldier, was sentenced to receive one hundred lashes, but "On Account of Circumstances in his

115. Ibid., p. 161. Captain Lieutenant was the title of an officer who had the rank and pay of a lieutenant, but was invested with the command of a company, troop, or battery.

For neglect of duty Sergeant Chapman of the Connecticut Line was sentenced to be reduced to the rank of private; however, he was ordered restored because "his Guilt was occasioned more through a Natural Indolence than Intentional Neglect." For absenting themselves two days without liberty, James Foster and John Frame of the 8th Connecticut Regiment were found guilty and each sentenced to receive ten lashes. Their sentence was also remitted because the court had "the most tender feeling for the correction of a young soldier" as well as "a view to the Wound the Whip inflicts on [his] character."

Of the numerous courts-martial which took place during the winter encampment of 1779-80 at Morristown, two call for special mention. The first concerned Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold, who during the court-martial held at Morristown between December 23, 1779, and January 26, 1780, was tried on four counts. Despite the fact that Arnold was exonerated on two of these counts, he was found guilty of allowing a Tory-owned vessel to enter the Philadelphia harbor "without the knowledge of the authority of the State or of the Commander in Chief tho' then

117. Stewarts' Orderly Book, entry of April 30, 1780, Morristown National Historical Park Collections.
118. Ibid., entry of May 11, 1780.
present," and of using State wagons for the purpose of transport-

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ing private property. Despite the fact that Washington

recognized Arnold's "distinguished services to his country," he

nevertheless was reluctantly compelled to reprimand Arnold,

stating that "he considers his conduct in the instance of the

permit as peculiarly reprehensible, both in a civil and military

view, and in the affair of the wagons as 'imprudent and

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improper.'"

The second famous court-martial concerned Dr. William

Shippen, Jr., who was charged with mismanagement in the affairs

of the hospital department. These charges were pressed against

him by Dr. Benjamin Rush. Following a long and bitter trial

which started on March 14, 1780, Dr. Shippen was finally

122

acquitted on August 18, 1780.

There is no doubt that the results of Arnold's court-martial

added to the disaffection of this able general, which finally

led to his tragic betrayal of this country.

In general, one can observe the following characteristics

of the disciplinary situation at Morristown: 1. A constant

source of annoyance was the depredation to which the neighboring

120. General Orders, April 6, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit.,


121. Ibid., p. 225.

122. Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789. Edited

from the Original Records in the Library of Congress by Gaillard

Hunt, Chief, Division of Manuscripts. Vol. XVII. 1780:

May 8-September 6. (Washington: Government Printing Office,

1910), pp. 744-47.

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farmers were continually subjected by the soldiery, which resulted in strained relations between the military and the civilian population; 2. Discord within the ranks, which resulted in low morale; 3. Inequitable administration of punishment for the offenses of soldiers and officers.

It is difficult to judge the leniency aspect of discipline during the Morristown winter encampment. Washington attempted in every way to keep the soldiers within the sphere of discipline, but he encountered great difficulty in getting his officers to enforce regulations and as a result discipline was never consistently enforced. Perhaps part of the fault lay with the Congress, which could have introduced and authorized more severe penalties for violations of military regulations. Perhaps Washington might be blamed for having failed to enforce more rigorous discipline in his army. Soldiers who dared to violate military regulations could never be certain of their punishments because the military regulations were interpreted broadly and inconsistently. The punishments meted out for the various crimes were apparently not imposed in accordance with the seriousness of the offense. The sentences of the officers varied from a reprimand to cashiering and as a rule the commissioned officers were never subjected to the whip. The situation was different with the private soldier, who usually suffered flogging and in some cases even paid with his life.
for violation of discipline. Both simple offenses and
desertion were punishable with 100 lashes, although the
latter was also frequently punished with death. Washington's
reluctance in some cases to punish severely and his general
extreme leniency can be interpreted in many ways. It has
been stated that:

One is tempted to say that Washington exhibited
too great a leniency and that perhaps better
discipline would have resulted if more death
sentences had been carried out. But in consider­
ing the nature of his soldiers, the constant
shortages that beset the army and the character
of the Continental Congress and state governments,
Washington undoubtedly followed a judicious path.
Moreover, in the end he won, while the strictly
disciplined British lost.123

This much is true. But one must also consider another fact,
that Washington understood the true nature of discipline. For
many people, discipline means little more than chastisement or
punishment. But there is another side to it. The word "discipline"
is derived from the Latin verb discere, meaning "to learn." The
Commander-in-Chief, therefore, who achieves true discipline does
so by creating an atmosphere--both free and orderly--in which
learning can be readily imparted and voluntarily assimilated.
Washington was a benevolent man, who in exercising his authority
was always motivated by affection and consideration for his

123. S. Sydney Bradford, "Discipline in the Morristown Winter
Encampments." Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society,
soldiers. He worked diligently by precept and example, to
develop their abilities and to accent their good qualities
while not overlooking their defects. He encouraged them to
be self-reliant and resourceful, but always had the courage
to say "No" when he believed he should. However, he also
realized that extremely strict discipline and severe penalties
could arouse rebellion among the soldiers, who were already
under great pressure due to hunger and the severe winter.
Therefore, he frequently showed leniency toward offenders,
applying the ancient law of _jus gladii et aggratiandi_,
that is the right to impose punishment and the right to grant
amnesty. The military commanders of ancient times had such a
law at their disposal and Washington also would seem to have
exercised this privilege.

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124. _Jus gladii_, or the law of the sword, was the right to
decide life and death. _Jus aggratiandi_ was the sovereign right
to pardon. _Jus gladii et aggratiandi_ was the right to punish
and to grant amnesty.
V. SUPPLY OF THE ARMY AT MORRISTOWN

1. SUPPLY CONDITIONS PRIOR TO THE MORRISTOWN ENCAMPMENT

The practice "living from the country" has been known from time immemorial. Moses, sending forth spies into the Promised Land, commended the practice of requisitions in these words: "Be of good courage, and bring us of the fruits of the land." 1

The Huns, Vandals, Goths and Mongols, who successively traversed Europe lived during their marches by plunder and at the expense of the lands they occupied. With the establishment of permanent armies, rulers were faced with the problem of maintenance of their soldiery. A permanent army entailed heavy costs in pay, food, clothing, weapons and munitions, and the pressure of military necessity compelled the states to devise efficient systems for procuring and administering military revenues.

The plan adopted by Congress for the organization of the Continental Army on June 16, 1775, included provision for the establishment of the office of Quartermaster General and his deputy and for the office of Commissary General of Stores and


and Provisions. At the same time the daily ration of the
private soldier was set at: 1 lb. beef or 3/4 lb. pork, or
1 lb. salt fish per day; 1 lb. bread or flour per day; 3 pints
of pease or beans per week; 1 pint of milk per man per day; 1/2
pint rice or 1 pint of Indian meal per man per week; 1 quart
of spruce beer or cider per man per day; or nine gallons of
molasses per company of 100 men per week. This ration, however,
was seldom if ever maintained.

While the Quartermaster General was responsible for transpor­
tation and delivery of supplies, establishment of order of battle,
regulation of march and arrangement of camps, the Commissary
General of Stores and Provisions was responsible for procurement
of food.

On July 19, 1775, Congress appointed Joseph Trumbull,
Commissary of the Connecticut troops, to the post of Commissary
General of the Army, and on the same day it authorized Washington
to select a Quartermaster General. On August 14, 1775, Washington

3. Ibid., p. 220.

from the Original Records in the Library of Congress by Worthington
Chauncey Ford, Chief, Division of Manuscripts. Vol. III. 1775:
September 21-December 30. (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1905), p. 322.

5. *Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789*. Edited from
the Original Records in the Library of Congress by Worthington Chauncey
Ford, Chief, Division of Manuscripts. Vol. II. 1775: May 10-
p. 190.
selected for this post one of his aides, Maj. Thomas Mifflin, 6
of Pennsylvania.

The office of the Commissary General included several
deputies and clerks who were dispersed throughout the country
to procure food. The duties and regulations of this department
were not specifically stated. The only real regulation for
the Commissary Department was introduced August 2, 1776, when
the Congress required the Department to prepare weekly returns
of money received from Continental disbursing officers and
monthly reports of stores under its direction and distribution.
With the exception of these few restrictions the Commissary
General determined the operational procedures of his Department.
The only change which took place in the Commissary Department
during the winter of 1777 at Morristown was the addition of a
Deputy Commissary General, whose task was to purchase commodities
in New Jersey. This office was needed in order to eliminate
the necessity of permitting the soldiers to "victual themselves
where they could," a practice which Washington had allowed since
his recrossing of the Delaware River in December 1776.

6. Risch, op. cit., pp. 3-4; see also General Orders, August 14,
1775, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington
From the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799. Vol. 3: January, 1770-
September, 1775. (Washington: United States Government Printing
Office, 1931), p. 419.

from the Original Sources in the Library of Congress by Worthington
Chauncey Ford, Chief, Division of Manuscripts. Vol. V. 1776:
pp. 627-28.

8. Washington to Robert Ogden, January 24, 1777, in Fitzpatrick,
op. cit., Vol. 7, p. 60.
By the time Washington's army returned to Morristown in December of 1779, the Commissary Department had grown into the large bureaucratic structure. Instead of one Commissary General, there were two Commissary Generals, one for purchasing and the other for issuing. There were several deputies attached to each Commissary General. An oath of office was introduced for each person serving in either branch of the Commissary Department; it seems that this innovation was introduced as a result of findings of malpractice by an investigating committee of Congress established on March 14, 1777, and the oath itself reflects many of the abuses which Congress was attempting to eliminate. For the purchasing department the oath read as follows:

I__________, do solemnly and sincerely swear or affirm in the presence of Almighty God, that I will not collude with any person or persons whatever to enhance the price of provisions, or any article of commerce which I shall at any time hereafter be directed to purchase for the use of the United States; and that I will endeavor, by every honest means in my power, to procure the articles which I may be directed to purchase at the most reasonable rates;


and that I will not charge the public with any advance on any purchases by me to be made, and that I will, in all things, conduct myself as becometh a faithful servant of the public.11

Officials of the issuing commissary took a similar oath pertinent to their services and activities.

During the period between the first (January - May 1777) and the second Morristown encampment (December 1779 - June 1780), the changes in the Commissary Department also included the personnel on the lower levels. It was during this period that a conflict of authority between Congress and the States came to light, particularly in regard to control of the food supply of the army. From the very beginning Congress had felt confident that it could shoulder the entire burden, but on the eve of the second Morristown encampment it started shifting partial control to the States. State executives were asked to release purchasing officials who acted improperly, thus to perform a task which had


12. Loc. cit.

13. Ibid., p. 610.

been assigned to the Commissary General of Purchases over a
year previously. Under this new arrangement, the Department
officials were required to submit monthly reports of their
activities to the State executives. While this shift of
authority was taking place, Congress was trying to decide how
best to oversee the activities of the Department itself. For
this purpose various committees were established to coordinate
the activities of the Commissary and Quartermaster Departments.
On November 25, 1779, Congress finally decided to let the
Board of War supervise them.

The Quartermaster Department was created by Congress on the
same day as the Commissary Department. In its organization
it followed the pattern of the Commissary Department, with a
Quartermaster General at the head, having beneath him a widespread
network of deputies and assistants. The problems which beset
the Quartermaster Department were similar to those which beset

15. A report in this respect had been prepared already on
February 23, 1778, but it was accepted only on April 14, 1778.
Cf. for this Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789. Edited
from the Original Records in the Library of Congress by Worthington
Chauncey Ford, Chief, Division of Manuscripts. Vol X. 1778:
pp. 344-48.

from the Original Records in the Library of Congress by Worthington
Chauncey Ford, Chief, Division of Manuscripts. Vol. XV. 1779:
September 2 - December 31. (Washington: Government Printing Office,

17. See supra, p. 136.
the Commissary Department, and caused a partial failure in its function during both winter encampments at Morristown. While there were only a few complaints against the Quartermaster Department during 1777, Thomas Mifflin, who had served as Quartermaster General, was later investigated by Congress in 1778 to determine whether his own and his subordinates' actions had in any way contributed to the distress of the army. In December 1778, the investigating committee reported the following findings:

it appears that the troops suffered very great and sore distress, in the articles of provisions forage, and camp transportation, that the said distress is therein ascribed to the neglect, deficiencies, or other mismanagement of the said department. 18

But the guilt was not solely with the Quartermaster Department. As part of the original plan, the Quartermaster Department employed soldiers to drive the wagons; this method prevailed in 1777. On March 16, 1779, in a move designed to

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eliminate problems of discipline, Congress issued orders by which soldiers were no longer to be used as wagoners; it was proposed that a corps of wagoners be enlisted by the Quarter-master General to replace them. This method was adopted on April 23, 1779, with the provision that wagoners be hired according to necessity rather than forming a permanent part of the army. Although this system at first alleviated a pressing problem, it eventually failed when the currency used for payment of the wagoners became almost useless. Just as the Commissary Department was unable to find farmers who would sell produce to the Army for nothing, so the Quartermaster Department was unable to find wagoners willing to work for nothing.

The third department in the food supply system of the Continental Army was the Baking Department. Congress had made no provision for cooking the food which was procured by the


been expected to prepare certain types of meals from their daily rations, they were unable to transform their daily ration of one pound of flour into bread, because the baking of bread required a skill which they lacked. Bread was the mainstay of the army, and its lack was a severe blow to the soldiers, who would rather have done without their beef, vegetables, or rum instead. At first the soldiers received daily one pound of flour with which they could bake their own pound of bread. With the increased difficulties in baking, the practice developed of baking bread was done by companies; the soldiers pooled their individual rations and assigned one or two men to prepare and bake for all of them. Although this system had certain advantages, it led to corruption when certain soldiers tried to profiteer from it. The enterprising baker-soldiers began to realize that a pound of flour made up more than a pound of bread—a fact of which Congress was perhaps ignorant—and therefore they were able not only to supply their own companies, but also have some flour to spare. They were then able to sell the surplus to the country people for an excellent profit, which

they pocketed. It was reported that one baker lent flour to
the Commissary Department at the rate of 1,000 rations over
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a period of eight days. As a result of such dealing, many
soldiers felt encouraged to straggle on the march or even
wander from camp under the pretense that they were exchanging
24
their flour with farmers for bread. The remedy came only during
the time of the first Morristown encampment, when on May 3, 1777,
Congress appointed a Superintendent of Bakers and Director of
25
Baking in the Grand Army of the United States. The primary
purpose of this newly established office was to eliminate
profiteering by the company bakers and to guarantee the proper
bread supply of the Continental Army. The Baker General was given
authority to license anyone to be employed as a baker, and nobody
was to be allowed to work as a baker without a license. This
license was to be granted with the approval of the officer command­
ing at any principal post. In addition, the Baker General was
empowered to regulate the pay of bakers and required to make
reports to Congress of his activities and "endeavours to rectify

23. Ibid., pp. 140-41.
24. Ibid., p. 141.
from the Original Records in the Library of Congress by Worthington
Chauncey Ford, Chief, Division of Manuscripts. Vol. VII. 1777:
pp. 323-24. This formal title is often shortened to "Baker
General," and the latter form will be used hereafter in the
present study.
Christopher Ludwig, a German immigrant, was fifty-seven years old when he was appointed Baker General. Born at Giessen, in Hesse, Germany, on October 17, 1720, he had learned the trade of baker from his father. At the age of seventeen he became a soldier and between 1737 and 1740 fought against the Turks and later participated in the seventeen weeks' siege of Prague by the French. Following the surrender of Prague in 1741, he joined the army of the King of Prussia but soon afterward, with the return of peace, he was discharged. He moved to London, where he found employment as a baker on an East Indiaman. After spending three and a half years in India he returned to London in 1745. On a visit to his native town he found that his father had died, leaving him his entire estate. After selling his inheritance he returned to London and then went to sea as a common sailor. Subsequently he stopped travelling and settled in Philadelphia, where, in 1754, he established his bakery. In the following year he married a widow, Mrs. Catherine England.

26. Ibid., p. 323.

27. The name of the Baker General is spelled Ludwig or Ludwick. In this study the author is using the former.
and being frugal as well as industrious he soon became very prosperous. It was reported that:

When he was notified of his appointment by the committee of Congress, they proposed that for every pound of flour he should furnish the army with a pound of bread. 'No, gentlemen,' said he, 'I will not accept of your commission upon any such terms. I do not wish to grow rich by the war: I have money enough. I will furnish one hundred and thirty-five pounds of bread for every hundred pounds of flour you put into my hands.' The committee were ignorant of the increase of weight which flour acquires by the addition of water and leaven.

As a Congressional appointee Ludwig stands out in sharp contrast to Commissary General Joseph Trumbull and other officials of the Commissary Department. He brought to his position long practical experience as a baker, and above all he maintained his reputation for honesty during the entire period of the War. The department of the Baker General did not undergo any radical changes and carried out its task with very few complaints.

At the time of the second Morristown encampment the food supply system of the Continental Army depended on three autonomous departments, whose aid was ineffective and often misguided. The Commissary Department procured the food, the Quartermaster Department transported the food and the Baking Department converted

flour into bread for distribution. In addition there were the thirteen States, which collected provisions for the requisitions in 1779-80. Because the States were fearful of encroachments on their authority, there was never a single coordinating head for all these enterprises. Furthermore, a distrust of central authority, and even of the army, seems to have caused many of the breakdowns.

2. THE PROBLEM OF PROVISIONS

Although most of the States contributed in some degree to the supply of the army, the troops at Morristown came to rely for their supplies primarily on three States. The location of the Morristown encampment in New Jersey resulted in constant demands on this State for assistance. Pennsylvania was the source of many supplies, especially flour, while the major part of the meat supply came from Connecticut. While these three States had successfully carried the burden during the first Morristown encampment in 1777, internal shortages were reported at the time of the second encampment.

If the campaigns of '76 and '78 were "times to try men's souls," the winter of '80 was a time to try their tempers and

One officer reported in December of 1779 that
the whole army has been for seven or eight days
entirely destitute of the staff of life; our
only food is miserable fresh beef, without bread,
salt, or vegetables. 32

In Jockey Hollow the soldiers sought protective cover for
their survival. What has been reputed to be the most severe
winter of the 18th century pressed the soldiers to the limits
of human endurance. In February 1780, Maj. Gen. Baron Johann
De Kalb described the winter as follows: "Those who have only
been in Valley Forge or Middlebrook during the last two winters,
but have not tasted the cruelties of this one, know not what
it is to suffer."

The army at Morristown was indeed badly fed. There were
constant complaints regarding the meat, food and other provisions.
The soldiers lived from hand to mouth, often upon partial rations,
and sometimes they went without rations entirely, and numerous
diary entries such as "very short provisions," "no provision for
the troops," "nothing to eat from morning to morning again"
34 testify to the hardships. Anxiety for bread was evident
everywhere, particularly in early January of 1780. On January 3,

32. Thacher, op. cit. p. 216.
33. Kapp, The Life of John Kalb, Major-General in the
Revolutionary Army, p. 183.
34. Ebenezer Parkman, Diary, entries of January 10, April 18,
29, and May 5, and 13, 1780, American Antiquarian Society.
powers of endurance. The winter of 1779-80 began with scarcity of provisions. Washington realized the effect of the supply shortages on his soldiers' morale. Writing from Morristown, on December 16, 1779, in his "Circular to Governors of the Middle States" which included Governor George Clinton of New York, Governor William Livingston of New Jersey, President Joseph Reed of Pennsylvania, President Caesar Rodney of Delaware, and Governor Thomas Sim Lee of Maryland, he stated:

The situation of the army with respect to supplies is beyond description alarming. It has been five or six weeks past on half allowance, and we have not more than three days bread at a third allowance on hand, nor any where within reach. When this is exhausted, we must depend on the precarious gleanings of the neighbouring country. Our magazines are absolutely empty everywhere, and our commissaries entirely destitute of money or credit to replenish them. We have never experienced a like extremity at any period of the war. We have often felt temporary want from accidental delays in forwarding supplies, but we always had something in our magazines and the means of procuring more. Neither one nor the other is at present the case. This representation is the result of a minute examination of our resources. unless some extraordinary and immediate exertions are made by the States, from which we draw our supplies, there is every appearance that the army will infallibly disband in a fortnight. I think it my duty to lay this candid view of our situation before your Excellency, and to entreat the vigorous interposition of the State to rescue us from the danger of an event, which if it did not prove the total ruin of our affairs, would at least give them a shock from which they would not easily recover, and plunge us into a train of new and still more perplexing embarrassments than we have hitherto felt. 31

1780, Royal Flint, an Assistant Commissary, informed Washington that "the Army are almost perishing for want" and indicated that "I have no more Bread at present in Camp than will serve the troops tomorrow." When the soldiers began to rob the inhabitants of the area, Washington decided to take drastic measures. In a circular of January 8, 1780, directed to the Magistrates of New Jersey, Washington urged immediate apportionment of aid among the counties of the State:

The present situation of the Army with respect to provisions is the most distressing of any we have experienced since the beginning of the War. For a Fortnight past the Troops both Officers and Men, have been almost perishing for want. They have been alternately without Bread or Meat, the whole time, with a very scanty allowance of either and frequently destitute of both. They have borne their sufferings with a patience that merits the approbation and ought to excite the sympathy of their Countrymen. But they are now reduced to an extremity no longer to be supported. Their distress has in some instances prompted the Men to commit depredation on the property of the Inhabitants which at any other period would be punished with exemplary severity, but which can now be only lamented as the effect of an unfortunate necessity. This evil would increase and soon become intolerable were not an instant remedy to be applied.

The distress we feel is chiefly owing to the early commencement and uncommon vigor of the Winter, which have greatly obstructed the transportation of our supplies. These causes have obliged us to exhaust

all the Magazines in the vicinity of Camp, and as they continue to operate we shall be unable to derive seasonable succour from our more distant resources. From present appearances it must be more than five Weeks before we can have the benefit of any material supplies beyond the limits of this State; so that unless an extraordinary exertion be made within the State to supply the wants of the Army during that space, fatal consequences must unavoidably ensue. Your own discernment makes it needless to particularise.

Influenced by these considerations, my duty to the Public and my affection to the virtuous Inhabitants of this State (who next to the Army would be the most immediate sufferers) have determined me to call upon the respective Counties for a proportion of Grain and Cattle to satisfy the present exigency.  

By and large the response to his appeal was satisfactory, and on January 27, 1780, in a letter to the President of Congress, he was able to report:

the situation of the Army for the present is, and it has been for some days past, comfortable and easy on the score of provision: We were reduced at last to such extremity and without any prospect of being relieved in the ordinary way, that I was obliged to call upon the Magistrates of every County in the State for specific quantities to be supplied in a limited number of days. I should be wanting in justice to their zeal and attachment and to that of the Inhabitants of the State in general, were I not to inform Congress, that they gave the earliest and most cheerful [sic] attention to my requisitions, and exerted themselves for the Army's relief in a manner that did them the highest honor. They more than complied with the requisitions in many instances, and owing to their exertions, the Army in a great measure has been kept together.

Snow, freezing and cold hindered the collection of food from the already depleted region, and chronic food shortages continued to plague the soldiers at the Morristown encampment. In addition various States, including New Jersey, were lax in forwarding supplies to the camp, and money was not available or acceptable to procure supplies or teams to transport them. Winter storms provided an additional handicap.

When bread was not available Washington ordered wheat to be delivered to the soldiers "who by beating and husking it, may boil it, and make a tolerable substitute for Bread. Washington frankly admitted that "at one time the Soldiers eat every kind of horse food but Hay, Buck Wheat, common wheat, Rye, and Indn. Corn was the composition of the Meal which made their bread. Rum, the favorite drink of the soldiers, was also scarce. According to General Orders of January 20, 1780, it was "to be issued only to detachments or fatigue parties unless directed particularly by a general order." In an effort to make the soldiers more conscious of the profound importance of their cause, Congress declared certain days "fast

40. See General Orders, January 20, 1780, in ibid., p. 412.
days." Thursday, December 9, 1779 and Wednesday, April 22, 1780, were set apart as days of fasting, humiliation and prayer; all unnecessary labor and recreation were to cease and the chaplains were to prepare suitable discourses on the subjects enjoined by the proclamation. While these days perhaps were of spiritual benefit to the soldiers, from the physical point of view, they were still hungry. One soldier ironically called the fast "A Continental Thanksgiving."
The desperate conditions at Morristown were described by a soldier Joseph Plumb Martin, who after a four days' snowstorm wrote that:

    here was the keystone of the arch of starvation. We were absolutely, literally starved; - I do solemnly swear that I did not put a single morsel of victuals into my mouth for four days and as many nights, except a little black birch bark which I gnawed off a stick of wood, if that can be called victuals. I saw several of the men roast their old shoes and eat them, and I was afterwards informed by one of the officer's waiters, that some of the officers killed and ate a favourite little dog that belonged to one of them.44

While the army was suffering, Colonel Francis Barber, writing from Woodbury, Gloucester County, N. J. reported to Washington

41. See General Orders, November 27, 1779, in ibid., p. 190.
42. See General Orders, April 6, 1780, in ibid., Vol. 18, p. 225.
43. Ebenezer Parkman, Diary, entry of December 9, 1779, American Antiquarian Society.
44. Martin, op. cit., p. 124.
on January 14, 1780, that on his journey there he had seen at Princeton "about forty or fifty cattle belonging to the army, and I was informed by several inhabitants that they had been there in a starving condition for more than two weeks." Colonel Barber was informed by the Woodbury magistrates that there were in the vicinity of Woodbury "above one hundred cattle, which have been purchased for the army a considerable time - some of them for more than a year past."

Although the crisis was temporarily solved when Washington resorted to impressment of supplies from the New Jersey counties and enlistment of the support of the local magistrates, the Army continued to live from hand to mouth for the rest of the winter and spring. On April 24, 1780, it was reported that there were on hand in Morristown supplies of meat for only two days and of flour for a week.

The severe winter, which had damaged not only the winter seed but also the fruit trees and timber, was succeeded by a cold spring. According to the Quaker preacher, John Hunt,


"the prospect of Scarcity, of Cleanness of teeth and want of Bread more and more appeared & the Cry of the poor began to be heard in our once plentyful & peaceful Land."

The situation was indeed desperate. Writing from Philadelphia on April 3, 1780, Greene reported to Washington: "At present things are in the most disagreeable train; and I am much afraid there will be great difficulty in supporting the Army in the most favorable position and utterly impracticable to put them in motion."

Disorganization of finances still prevailed. In a letter of April 26, 1780, to his friend Lieut. Col. John Laurens, Washington stressed that "the great departments of the Army are now in total confusion and Congress have just appointed a Committee in conjunction with me to new model and rectifie them [sic]."

Reforms in the military organization were also considered by a Committee of the Continental Congress during a visit to Morristown. Realizing the seriousness of the situation, they


49. Washington to Laurens, April 26, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 18, p. 300.
urged adoption of remedial measures, stating that "the period which is to end our Liberty, and commence the most disgraceful State of Slavery which human nature has ever experienced is not far distant."

The general discouragement was only intensified by the news which arrived from the South at the end of May of 1780 of the fall of Charleston on May 12, 1780, and the capture of General Benjamin Lincoln and the entire Southern Army by Sir Henry Clinton.

The people who were in charge of supply were often sluggish and incompetent, and army supply was always at the mercy of the State governments, which hesitated to impose taxes on their people for the needed amounts. In his despondency over the situation, Washington confided to his brother John Augustine:

we have no system, and seem determined not to profit by experience. We are, during the winter, dreaming of Independence and Peace, without using the means to become so. In the Spring, when our Recruits should be with the Army and in training, we have just discovered the necessity of calling for them. And by the Fall, after a distressed, and inglorious campaign for want of them, we begin to get a few men, which come in just time enough to eat our Provisions, and consume our Stores without rendering any service; thus it is, one year Rolls over another, and with out some change, we are hastening to our Ruin.  


3. INADEQUATE SUPPLY OF CLOTHING

From the beginning of the war the State of New Jersey was a constant battlefield and the entire State was depleted of supplies of food and clothing. The condition of the army in regard to clothing during the Morristown encampment was pitiable. In a letter of November 4, 1779, to Assistant Clothier General John Moylan, Washington stressed that "Blankets should be delivered before the general distribution of other Clothing." On November 18, 1779, Washington reported that there were only 4,900 blankets to distribute to the whole army and he called this situation "injurious and discouraging." The situation in regard to other articles was "in but little better proportion." Distribution of clothing to the troops was a difficult task; Washington described it as "a work of great difficulty from the scantiness of the supply." The State or Sub Clothiers were ordered to make exact returns to the Clothier General of all clothing in "their hands which may have been procured by their States, at continental expense." On

54. Washington to the President of Congress, November 18, 1779, in ibid., p. 130.
55. Washington to the President of Congress, November 20, 1779, in ibid., p. 152.
56. See General Orders, November 6, 1779, in ibid., p. 84.
November 18, 1779, Washington reported that he was "again reduced to the necessity of acting the part of Clothier General, and...forming estimates to make a delivery duly proportioned to the wants of the army and the scanty stock on hand." What little clothing there was, often arrived late and was inferior in quality. Washington suggested that distribution of articles of clothing should be according "to the length of service of the troops" and proposed that "those who have longest to serve should have the preference."

There was a particular scarcity of shoes, and those which were available were defective. Washington complained about the extensive deficiency of shoes to the Board of War on December 6, 1779, stating:

I will take the liberty to add, that I think it may not be amiss for the Board to enjoin it on the part of the Commissaries of Hides and other contractors for Shoes, to pay particular attention to the quality and to the making of them. It is found that great abuses both with respect to the Public and the Soldiery have been practiced in many cases and especially in the latter instance, by putting in small scraps and parings of Leather and giving the Shoes the appearance of strength and substance, while the Soals were worth nothing and would not last more than a day or two's march.  

58. See General Orders, November 20, 1779, in ibid., p. 139.  
59. Washington to the Board of War, December 6, 1779, in ibid., p. 222.
There was a particular lack of shoes among the Virginia troops, who were unable to march to the South in December 10, 1779, "for want of Shoes, none of which are yet come on from New Windsor." The soldiers were urged to protect their clothing, particularly during the construction of their huts. While clothes were constantly wearing out, Washington described the condition of his soldiers as wretched and miserable, pointing out that "Many of them [are] absolutely naked."

Major General James Wilkinson, who was selected as Clothier General for the Army on July 24, 1779, reported to the Board of War on January 4, 1780, that

The manly perseverance & virtuous resignation of the Soldiery under the compound Calamity of Starvation and Nakedness transcends past examples & exceeds credibility.64

61. Washington to Brigadier General William Woodford, November 25, 1779, in ibid., p. 188.
64. Wilkinson to the Board of War, January 4, 1780, George Washington Papers, Library of Congress.
The State of Pennsylvania caused a controversy when it forwarded 2,000 coats to be distributed to its troops. Washington realized that their superior quality and their uniformity of color and fashion, when contrasted with the motley clothing of the other regiments, would, if anything, arouse jealousy. In the interest of harmony, Washington subjected them to general distribution. The Pennsylvania officials were naturally angry at Washington's decision, and he tried to appease them, writing: "If I know my own heart, I have no predilection or superior attachment to the Troops of one State, more than Another, they all demand my equal attention, and a conscious rectitude tells me that the strictest would only prove that, they have equally had it in every instance."

Erkuries Beatty, who served as regimental clothier of the Pennsylvania Line, described the clothing situation to Reading Beatty as follows:

I will tell you just how you find me, for to give you a small scrap of my trouble - You'll find me sitting on a Chest, in the Center of Six or Eight Taylors, with my Book, Pen & Ink on one side and the Buttons and thread on the other - the Taylors yo'll find some A Cutting out, others sewing, outside of the taylors you will see maybe half Dozen

65. Washington to the Board of War, November 23, 1779, and to President Joseph Reed, November 25, 1779, and to the Board of War, December 6, 1779, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 17, pp. 174-75, pp. 181-84, and 224.

66. Washington to President Joseph Reed, November 25, 1779, in ibid., p. 183.
Men naked as Lazarus, begging for Clothing, all about the Room you will see nothing but Cloth & Cloathing, on the floor you'll find it about knee deep with Snips of Cloth & Dirt-If you stay any time you'll hear every Minute knock-knock at the door & I calling walk in, others going out, which makes a Continual Bussle - presently I begin to swear, sometimes have to jump up blundering over two or three taylors to whip somebody out of the house - othertimes Tudor and my Mess Mates they begin to swear, & with out Swearing, and the taylors singing (as you know they must), and the Men a grumbling...makes pretty Music for your Ear, and thats the way from morning to night, & from Weeks End to weeks end, & I am sure I need not complain for want of Company as you do such as it is-& what makes it a good Deal worse I think of nothing but getting a Change which makes me a good Deal fretfull.67

Captain Joseph Walker, of Stark's Brigade, observed that "to my certain knowledge we had not more than Fifty men in the Regt return'd fit for duty,- many a good Lad with nothing to cover him from his hips to his toes save his Blanket."

General Maxwell was embarrassed to ask for a pair of boots which he urgently needed, and General Irvine referred to his soldiers as "quite naked." In his letter of December 19, 1779, to Clothier General Wilkinson, Washington urged him to use "every possible and Instant exertion to have the clothing as formerly

68. Record of Service of Connecticut Men, p. 135.
directed" obtained and delivered to his troops, "Many of them being absolutely naked." General von Steuben, who prepared a report on the New York Brigade in December 1779, stated that "they exhibited the most shocking picture of misery I have ever seen, scarce a man having wherewithal to cover his nakedness in this severe season and a great number very bad with the Itch." He also declared that the clothing of the officers was in such pitiful condition that they were ashamed to appear in the camp. In March of 1780 Dr. Thacher recorded that:

An immense body of snow remains on the ground. Our soldiers are in a wretched condition for the want of clothes, blankets and shoes; and these calamitous circumstances are accompanied by a want of provisions....The causes assigned for these extraordinary deficiencies, are the very low state of the public finances, in consequence of the rapid depreciation of the continental currency, and some irregularity in the commissary's department. Our soldiers, in general, support their sufferings with commendable firmness, but it is feared that their patience will be exhausted, and very serious consequences ensue.  

The need for particular items of clothing depended on how well a particular State supported its own regiment. Some States

72. Thacher, op. cit., p. 228.
provided sufficiently, others less so. Governor Reed of Pennsylvania was informed on April 16, 1780, that his troops urgently needed hats, shirts, and blankets. On the other hand, Governor Caesar Rodney of Delaware was informed that the soldiers of his State's regiment were the best clothed in the army.

Inefficiency of distribution contributed to the already sad state of clothing supply. In some cases the inspectors discovered that various regiments whose soldiers were practically naked had undistributed clothing in their own stores. When supplies eventually arrived, Assistant Clothier General John Moylan in a letter of March 1, 1780, reported to Tench Tilghman that the following clothing was available for distribution in the Continental Store:

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73. Josiah Harmar to Governor Reed, April 16, 1780, Morristown National Historical Park Collections, #351.


4,050 Coats
3,146 Vests
2,977 Breeches and Overalls
9,330 Hose
10,730 Shoes
7,916 Shirts
7,504 Hatts
205 Blankets
340 Pair Boots
840 Cloaks and Watch Coats
1,422 Leather Breeches
6,856 Woolen Caps
2,794 Mitts
254 Linnen Caps
437 Hunting frocks
2,634 Canvas Overalls
4,834 Pair Buckles
401 Sword Belts
6,134 Socks
2,396 Stocks

On Monday, March 13, 1780, the regimental clothiers of Hazen's, Spencer's, Angell's, Jackson's, Webb's, Sherburne's and Livingston's regiments reported to the Clothier General's Store in Morristown, where they received a portion of clothing. On the following day, March 14, 1780, the State Clothiers of Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, and Connecticut were directed to "apply immediately at the Clothier General's Store in Morristown for their respective proportions of clothing." While the shortage of clothing was not as chronic as that of provisions during the Morristown encampment, both, occurring simultaneously, created a very serious situation. The lack of adequate provisions and

77. See General Orders, March 12, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 18, p. 108.
78. See General Orders, March 14, 1780, in ibid., p. 114.
supplies, together with the effects of the cold winter, swelled 79
the numbers of those who deserted and resigned. Those who
remained faced their miseries courageously throughout the period
of the winter encampment.

4. THE FINANCIAL PREDICAMENT

During the period between 1777 and the Morristown encampment
of 1779-80, there was a rapid decline of the Continental currency
to the extent that it became almost worthless. Congress had
printed too much paper money without gold to back it up, and as
a result the value of the currency fell drastically. While a
Continental soldier received his depreciated paper dollars, after
delays of several weeks, his British counterpart was paid
80
regularly and in specie. The depreciation of the value of the
currency caused a rapid rise in prices. Washington pointed out
to Maj. Gen. John Sullivan in February of 1780 that falling money
and rising prices were evils felt by everybody more than the
common soldier, who got -- or was supposed to get -- food and
81
clothing, whatever they cost the public. On the eve of

79. Washington to Elbridge Gerry, Robert R. Livingston, and
81. Washington to Sullivan, February 15, 1779, in Fitzpatrick,
op. cit., Vol. 15, p. 156.
Washington's return to Morristown, Congress stopped the printing presses in the hope that the downward trend could be halted and the currency stabilized. But this hope was disappointed, and throughout the winter of 1779-80 the value of the paper money continued to fall steadily. It was this serious depreciation of the currency that led Congress to shift its reliance for food for the Army onto the States.

In his letter of December 21, 1779, to George Clinton, Governor of New York, William Floyd lamented:

But alass [sic] what is our Situation! Our Treasury nearly Exhausted Every Department out of Cash, no Magazines or Provision laid up, our army Starving for want of Bread, on the Brink of a General Mutiny, and the prospect of a Spedy [sic] Supply is very Snall. This is a melancholy Situation. . . . God only Knows what will become of us next Campaign; our army Cannot be kept together.83

James Lovell, writing on December 21, 1779, declared that "We want immediately four times more than all in the Treasury. We are dependent on the most strenous Exertions of the States."

One delegate declared "I wish I could say that there was one member of Congress adequate to the important business of Finance,"

84. James Lovell to Samuel Adams, December 21, 1779, in ibid., p. 547.
85. Philip Schuyler to Governor Clinton, November 29, 1779, in ibid., p. 529.
and another delegate frankly admitted that "Congress are at their wit's end."

Samuel Huntington, the President of Congress, in his letter of December 21, 1779, to Caesar Rodney, President of Delaware, stated that "The enormous prices to which the necessary Supplies for the Army have been raised have drained the public treasury, and the sole dependence of Congress for the Support of an Army & defence of our liberties must rest on the exertion of the several States."

While this letter makes it evident that the financial problems were at the root of the Commissary Department's reduced role, it also tends to explain why Congress levied requisitions in kind, rather than monetary taxes, which would have proven less valuable in the face of speedily increasing prices.

An unwillingness of farmers to sell became another major problem of the second Morristown encampment. That there were provisions to be had in the country was known to the army and that the depreciating currency was preventing this food from reaching the army was also known. Dr. Thacher blamed the currency problem for the suffering of the army:

86. William Ellery to William Greene, Governor of Rhode Island, December 21, 1779, in ibid., p. 545.

87. Huntington to Rodney, Huntington to Rodney, December 21, 1779, in Ryder, op. cit., p. 332.
It is from this cause, according to report, that our Commissary General is unable to furnish the army with a proper supply of provisions. The people in the country are unwilling to sell the produce of their farms for this depreciated currency, and both the resources and the credit of our Congress, appear to be almost exhausted.  

On December 11, 1779, Congress called upon the several States to provide specific supplies as of the first of April 1780, or "as soon as possible." A barter-like system went into effect when, on December 14, 1779, the requisition was made more general with the promise that such supplies should be credited in lieu of States' money quotas with all accounts compared and adjusted so as to do equity to all the States. Requisitions for specific food provisions were, as usual, ineffective, as the States did not go far beyond reassessing their counties and communities.

By March of 1780, the problem had become worse. Even the members of Congress were alarmed at the loss in value of their own income. James Lovell, a new member from Massachusetts, indicated in a letter to Samuel Adams the independent position of the individual farmer and the power he held: "It lays with the Farmer to say whether he will at any Rate, furnish the Army. He may see now [by not selling] that his Labors are not mortgaged for

90. Ibid., p. 1377 and 1383.
Generations to make Silver and Gold of That which by general
91 Consent has been reduced to meer [sic] Rags." The financial
difficulties continued throughout the winter, and even as late
Howe, stressed:

It is lamentable that we should be obliged to
experience such distresses as we do every where
Those we feel here are not inferior to yours;
we are constantly on the point of starving for
want of provisions and forage. A deficiency of
money is the cause and a cause for which the pre­
sent situation of affairs renders it infinitely
difficult to provide a remedy. We are at a most
delicate crisis; I dread with you the consequences. 92

The inability to purchase flour affected particularly the
operations of Baker General Ludwig. But here the fault lay not
with Ludwig, but primarily with the supply procurement system.
Having been called on to help supply the Baker General with flour
from Connecticut, Robert Hoops wrote to the new Commissary
General:

you may be assured of every exertion in my power to
relieve this distress and was I properly supplied
with Cash believe I could furnish a good quantity of
Flour, but the Rapid depreciation of money has been
such that no Farmer will sell without the Cash in
hand, it is therefore not in my power to do much,
promises and fair words will no longer amuse them. 93

91. Lovell to Samuel Adams, March 28, 1780, in Burnett,
92. Washington to Howe, April 28, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit.,
Vol. 18, p. 308.
93. Hoops to Colonel Ephraim Blaine, December 25, 1779,
Ephraim Blaine Papers, Library of Congress.

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Hoops also described the frustrations of the commissary officials, who knew where they could buy food, but, lacking ready cash, saw it sold to "private purchasers." A lack of currency was evident throughout the supply system, as well as a loss of personal, commissary and Congressional credit. But frustration and disillusion were not restricted to the lower echelons of the department. Commissary General Jeremiah Wadsworth was probably the unhappiest person in his department, faced with the task of alleviating the pressures but also of meeting the almost impossible demands of the office of the Commissary General. Quartermaster General Nathanael Greene described the plight of his and Wadsworth's departments: "the Commissary's and Forage Departments are in a damnable situation for want of money. Col. Wadsworth is at Philadelphia swearing like a disappointed Jew Turk."

Wadsworth was inundated with requests from his subordinates for money, but he had none to give them. In a moment of despair he wrote to Royal Flint that "were an order from Heaven to come for money it could not be paid -- I am harried to death with [requests], my table is heaped with letters, all crying out for

94. Hoops to Blaine, December 25, 1779, in ibid.

Wadsworth had actually resigned as Commissary General of Purchases but had continued to serve for over a month, when on December 31, 1779, he wrote to Samuel Huntington, the President of Congress, a letter which reveals his anguish. The letter also shows the depths to which his department had sunk as a result of Congressional neglect and the poor state of the currency. Wadsworth felt victimized by an ungrateful Congress, which in his view had made it impossible for him to obtain supplies by giving him only a portion of the funds he so urgently needed. He blamed Roger Sherman, a member of Congress from Connecticut:

Mr. Sherman's unbounded influence carries everything before it respecting my matters -- and he, in and out of Congress, uses it all to prevent my having more money. -- What he aims at God knows. I believe Congress to a man are of the opinion the army will disband but they appear to be very easy on the subject and have not answered a single letter of mine since I have been here [Philadelphia] -- and are spending day after day as usual.

One must remember that Congress simply did not have any money to give Wadsworth; it was for this reason that they had turned to the States for assistance. It seems that Congress had not let Wadsworth know he was no longer the principal supplier. Apparently there had been a general lack of communication between Congress,

96. Jeremiah Wadsworth to Royal Flint, December 24, 1779, Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers, Box 130, Connecticut Historical Society.
97. Wadsworth to Samuel Huntington, December 31, 1779, in ibid.
98. Wadsworth to Royal Flint, January 4, 1780, in ibid.
which seemed to have forgotten that it had a Commissary Department, and Wadsworth's department, which found itself in the position of a ghost. In his letter of December 31, 1779, to Royal Flint, Wadsworth begged him to do all in his power to get supplies even though there was no hope of getting money. At the end he bitterly complained about the way business had been conducted up to that time and suggested that "The people had better have their provisions taken from them by force than fraud." It is obvious that Wadsworth had given up hope that Congress would fulfill its obligations.

Flint was a young and vigorous man who had graduated from Yale in 1773 and who energetically encouraged his subordinates. In his letter to Col. Henry Champion, the Purchasing Commissary for Connecticut, Flint gave him high praise and exhorted him to perseverance:

I well know your difficulties - what you have to encounter from a want of cash - and I as well know you have perseverance & abilities for the occasion. Struggle a few days longer and I trust your embarrassments will be removed... I cannot bear the idea of failing at this advanced stage of the war when there is so good a prospect of bringing it to a fortunate close. Was our army now to break up for want of provisions it would give the enemy fresh vigor and stimulate them to persist in a contest in which at present they have no hope of success. Let all these considerations together produce such actions as will enable you to feed the army, and by that means render such a service to your country as ought never to be forgotten.101

99. Wadsworth to Flint, December 31, 1779, in ibid.
The results which purchasers such as Champion were able to accomplish are questionable, but their efforts continued and the evidence shows that supplies trickled to Morristown from neighboring States throughout the winter. It is however, doubtful that these were plentiful enough or that all of them even reached the camp.

By 1779 the problem of finances had deteriorated to such an extent that it caused a radical change in the system of food supply. The country had lost faith in the leadership of Congress as well as in its financial management, as the depreciation went from twenty-to-one in mid-November 1779 to sixty-to-one by the middle of March 1780. In a letter of May 29, 1780, to his friend Lieut. Col. Ludwig Kasimir von Holtzendorff, in Petersburg, Va., General De Kalb complained about the situation:

Provisions and other articles are growing dearer and dearer, being now double what they were a year ago, even if paid in gold, one dollar of which is now equal to sixty dollars in paper. My march costs me enormous sums. I cannot travel with my equipage, and am therefore compelled to resort to inns. My six months' earnings will scarce defray the most indispensable outlay of a single day. Not long since I was compelled to take a night's lodging at a private house. For a bad supper and grog for myself, my three companions, and three servants, I was charged, on going off without a breakfast next day, the sum of eight hundred and fifty dollars. The lady of the house politely added that she had charged nothing for the

rooms, and would leave the compensation for them to my discretion, although three or four hundred dollars would not be too much for the inconvenience to which she had been put by myself and my followers. And these are the people who talk about sacrificing their all in the cause of liberty! Everything else is in proportion to these figures; an ordinary horse is worth $20,000, I say twenty thousand dollars! 103

When Congress found that it could no longer supply money for the increasingly expensive food provisions, it turned the process over to the States, neglecting either to utilize the personnel of the Commissary Department in the new system or to disband the entire Department. The States in turn delegated the responsibility to the counties, with resulting inefficiency and irregularity, and the Army, deserted by the authorities, was left to suffer. The Congress left the Commissary Department to function as best it could on a mere trickle of money that produced frustration and increasing discontent among the department officials. Even though the commissary system had been improved by 1779 and provided with more capable personnel, the lack of sound currency prevented the department from fulfilling its role as food procurer for the army. The Commissary Department bore not only the burden of purchasing food, but also of its transportation. When an official was able to procure food he then faced the problem of getting it to New Jersey and to the troops at the Morristown quarters. Even though transportation was not the

responsibility of the Commissary Department, it nevertheless presented an additional set of problems in the overall supply system for Washington's men. Due to inadequate financial means, constant changes and inefficiency, all intertwined, Washington faced at Morristown a chaotic situation which had grave consequences.

5. THE PROBLEM OF TRANSPORTATION

Procurement is the initial step in supplying an army, and distribution to the soldiers the final one. The food must travel through various channels and in many instances over great distances to reach distribution centers. From the beginning of the war, the transportation of supplies was under the jurisdiction of the Quartermaster Department. To carry on this operation, it was necessary to have an adequate organization with reliable personnel and abundant funds. In addition it was necessary to have wagons and horses as well as maintenance for them. A great obstacle to transportation was the weather. The winter of 1779-80 has been called the most severe and prolonged winter of the 18th century. It was marked by extremes of both snow and cold, which intensified the needs of the soldiers and thus rendered the transportation problem even more serious.

As in the Commissary Department, the people who were in control of the Quartermaster Department during 1779-80 were dedicated and able, but also became frustrated and impotent under the financial
mismanagement of Congress. The attitude of many was perhaps best summed up by one official who wrote about Congress that "they will neither do without us, nor enable us to do for them. . . . If we are necessary to the Public, we ought to be supported; if useless we ought to be discharged." During 1779-80 the Quartermaster Department was headed by Nathanael Greene, an able and energetic man who made no effort to cover up the deplorable conditions in his department. In a letter written to Washington in early January of 1780, Greene stressed

I should betray my trust, were I to amuse your Excellency with hopes and encouragements; and I beg that this description of my department may not only be considered as justly drawn, but dictated by motives of duty, and aiming at the advantage of the public.  

Perhaps because of his unfortunate dealings with Congress, Greene had formed a very low opinion of that body. In another letter to Washington, he summarized his views on why Congress was unable to deal intelligently with the problems of supply and why he disliked working for it. He wrote:


An army is viewed in Congress as a city, which may be supported and provided for, without regarding the emergencies of service. That body seem to be insensible of the great differences there is, in their public estimation, betwixt now and four years ago, not only among individuals, but with the States in general; and instead of strengthening their influence by a just and generous conduct to individuals, they add insult to injury. A political body, that acts upon such barbarous maxims of policy, cannot fail to bring ruin and distress upon the people, as no honest man, that has a regard for his reputation, would feel himself in the power of such people Conscious of my own integrity, as well as faithful attention to the business committed to my trust, I cannot help feeling an honest indignation at the little acts made use of to lessen my merit and create suspicious to my prejudice. 107

Moore Furman, the District Quartermaster General for New Jersey, expressed similar feelings to Charles Petit, Assistant Quartermaster General in Trenton when he wrote on January 26, 1780, that "as things are now circumstanced no man can do business for the public with credit to himself or advantage to the public." Difficulties started at the most critical level of the supply system as the shortage of wagons, teams, and forage developed.

Already on December 8, 1779, Washington informed Congress that

the prospects for grain forage were not good, and he was later quite annoyed when he found that the soldiers in the camp were wasting the forage that was there. After Congress authorized the recruitment of drivers, the practice grew of hiring a complete team of wagons, horses and driver. This system failed when the value of the Continental currency depreciated. In a letter of March 3, 1780, sent from Morristown to Quartermaster General Greene, Joseph Lewis mentioned that many teams had left the service and more were leaving each day. In his opinion it was useless to impress teams, because he did not consider that he had enough money even to buy food for the horses. On March 28, 1780, Lewis wrote that he was "no longer able to procure a single Team to relieve the Distress of the army." Although the situation in Trenton was a little better, Moore Furman found himself in a cramped condition because of the low wages he had to offer the wagoners. In a letter of April 4, 1780, to one of his assistants, Thomas Durie, Furman described his troubles, stating that the wagoners'...
Wages is so low and they do not even get that and therefore they will not Continue before [after] this month end [s]. I don't expect a Team at Command. I have for Several Weeks past been giving notice of these things and it has been handled into Congress, but they give no answer & I am as yet totally Ignorant how the business is to be done after I am stopped. All that in my power shall be done and while I have a Team at Command they shall be employed Carrying on something to Head Quarters for Man or Beast.113

It seems that the negligence of Congress was being felt by almost everyone; workers were finding themselves unable to carry on the jobs they had been hired to do without ruining themselves in the process.

In his letter of May 9, 1780, to Greene, Moore Furman listed the conditions under which he would agree to remain in his post as Deputy Quartermaster General. This letter is enlightening because it enumerates some of the complaints which persons like Furman were making, and also because it would appear that Furman was losing and the frustration he was enduring.

His demands were as follows:

The Service of the appointment hitherto required Constant attendance since I have been in it and therefore prevented my being able to do the least Business for myself of any kind whatever and [I] do not expect it will require less attention hereafter especially while the Main Army remains in or near this state. Therefore [I] cannot think of a less Salary than One hundred pounds in Specie or an Equivalent in Cont1. Money per month, Forage for Two Horses & Traveling Expenses with

113. Moore Furman to Thomas Durie, April 4, 1780, in Furman, op. cit., p. 60.
the Privilege of Appointing all the Subordinate Officers in the State agreeable to the plan which [the] department may be settled on. I wish however, to be understood that if the Arrangement of the Staff is not made so that I shall be of Opinion that I can Execute the Business to the Satisfaction of the Army and the Public in General and with Reputation to myself, I do not hold my self bound to Act any longer than is Sufficient to Settle up my Accounts and it be Convenient to you to appoint [someone] to Succeed me.\footnote{114}

A situation which arose in February of 1780 demonstrates that Congress had very little of power over the States. At that time the State of New Jersey passed a regulation which provided wages for teams of horses and drivers which were lower than the wages paid by neighboring States. As a result owners and drivers refused to work in New Jersey. Despite the fact that this impasse presented a critical situation for Washington's army in Morristown, Quartermaster General Greene felt powerless to act. In his letter to Washington of February 7, 1780, Greene stated, "I do not consider myself authorized to instruct my agents to break over the laws of the State; and now find a stagnation in bringing on the provisions." This incident illustrates the States' failure to work together and to put the national objective ahead of their individual autonomy.

\footnote{114. Furman to Greene, May 9, 1780, in Ibid., p. 63.}
\footnote{115. Greene to Washington, February 7, 1780, in Sparks, op. cit., Vol. 11, p. 393.}

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It seems that the greatest mistake of Congress was the replacement of the soldier-wagoners by hired civilians who could refuse to work for low wages. Although this was a part of the problem, it seems that perhaps even greater part stemmed from the lack of funds to provide for horses, wagons and feed. It would appear that this money would have been lacking even if soldiers had remained responsible for driving. Thus the Quartermaster Department failed basically for the same reasons as the Commissary Department. While the failure of transportation was not the sole reason for the failure in the supply system, it certainly exacerbated the food shortage. As with other difficulties, neither the Congress nor the States could find remedies for the problem in time to help the suffering soldiers at Morristown.

The importance of transport may be noted from a report of expenses at the Morristown camp in the month of May 1780. Of $432,000 expended an amount of $300,000 was spent to buy forage and pay wagoners. The procurement of forage was hindered by constantly rising prices. On October 19, 1779, hay had sold for $50 per ton, corn at $16 per bushel, and rye at $18 per bushel. On January 27, 1780, the Morris County justices fixed the prices at $100 for a ton of hay, $50 for a bushel of wheat,

116. See supra, pp. 141-42.
117. See expenses for May, 1780, at Morristown camp, Morristown National Historical Park Collections, #647.
$35 for a bushel of rye, and $30 for a bushel of corn. Not only rising prices but a Congressional prohibition on Army purchases in States that attempted to fill their quotas contributed to the increasing shortages. In his letter of February 24, 1780, to Quartermaster General Greene, Col. Clement Biddle described the failure of the "Specific Supplies" system adopted by Congress. His agents were compelled by law to cease purchasing forage in those States which undertook to furnish their quota of supplies. As these supplies were not forthcoming, Biddle reported that his hay supply was completely exhausted and that he had the supply of grain sufficient for 24 days. The failure in the forage supply meant, of course, the inability to transport food to the Morristown encampment. Washington, who had been informed through Greene of Biddle's presentation of the state of forage, considered the situation alarming and sent Colonel Biddle to the New Jersey Assembly for additional forage, because this was the State "on which we must depend until a supply can be brought from a distance." Shortly afterward,


on March 8, 1780, the Morristown winter camp was combed for any horses that had not been sent away according to the order of December 8, 1779, and they were removed.

For a four-horse team, a wagoner received in addition to forage and rations, £ 20 per day. In addition to rations the leader of a ten-team brigade was paid £ 180 per month. In spite of this attractive renumeration, there were few who were willing to join the Army as wagoners for even a month or two. The magistrates classified all the teams and their owners in their respective districts on January 27, 1780, in order to ease and distribute fairly the burden, since the Army now had to impress teams. Although a number of teammasters remained faithful to the Army and stayed at the Morristown encampment, it was necessary to impress others for occasions such as the moving out of the Maryland Division, the moving of the Army to meet the British thrusts at Springfield in June 1780, and finally the breakup of the encampment. President Joseph Reed of Pennsylvania, in an effort to aid the Army in its departure from the Morristown camp on June 9, 1780, issued instructions to

121. See General Orders, March 8, 1780, in ibid., p. 95.
122. Morristown National Historical Park Collections, #1007.
123. Morristown National Historical Park Collections, #1021.
124. Morristown National Historical Park Collections, #1061, 1064.
seize the horses "of every Person not having taken the Oath or affirmation of allegiance & Fidelity to the State."

This meant the seizing of all Tory-owned horses in the State of Pennsylvania and their immediate transfer to Washington's army "to remove his Artillery & valuable stores." Because of the possibility that many Tories might leave Philadelphia in order to avoid the confiscation of their horses, Washington ordered that a patrol of "Light Horse" be stationed on each road leading out of the city "to stop all Persons leading Horses, whom they still have Reason to believe are taking Horses out of Town, to avoid Seizure, securing the Horses & delivering them at the Forage Yard in Walnut street." There was also a serious shortage of wagons at all levels of command. On March 30, 1780, Washington ordered a new carriage "at the price of Two hundred and ten pounds in gold" and he instructed John Mitchell to examine the carriage "with a critical eye" and find out if it "is made in the present taste, well fashioned, composed of seasoned wood well put together." On June 23, 1780, the Congressional Committee attached to the Morristown camp informed

126. See Joseph Reed's Instructions to Capt. Samuel Morris, June 9, 1780, in ibid., p. 310.
informed the President Reed that there was a great need for teams to move the Army stores from the Morristown encampment. However, some days later, Colonel Lewis informed Quartermaster General Greene that the inhabitants were turning out rapidly and willingly to do the job.

6. HEALTH FACILITIES

The health of the soldiers was another important consideration at the Morristown encampment. At the time of the Revolution medical knowledge was at an extremely primitive stage. Medical practice in the colonies was characterized not only by limited knowledge but also by crude instruments and quackery. Blood-letting and superstition were prevalent. It was not unusual for the skill and popularity of a doctor to be judged by the amount of drugs he administered to his patients, and since doctors were accustomed to make their own pills, it is not surprising that they should have used them in great quantities to hide their sometimes limited


129. Lewis to Greene, June 25, 1780, Morristown National Historical Park Collections, #1073.
knowledge of medicine. The activities of the medical colleges at Philadelphia and New York, which had been founded prior to the Revolution and had conferred fewer than fifty degrees, without having initiated any medical publication, were suspended due to the war.

The Hospital Department which had been organized by the Continental Congress on July 27, 1775, suffered, as all the other departments, from a lack of money and supplies. In addition it was beset by personnel strife and constant staff turnover. Many hospitals were established at various stages of the war, but the most frequented and important were


133. Duncan, op. cit., pp. 234-36.
those near the seat of war in New Jersey and Pennsylvania,
at Amboy, Philadelphia, Elizabethtown, Fort Lee, New Brunswick,
Trenton, Newark, Princeton, Bethlehem, Lititz, and Lancaster.

In 1776, Dr. John Jones, Professor of Surgery in King's College, New York, published a book in which he showed that the main cause of the great mortality in the London and Paris hospitals was overcrowding, the air of the wards becoming so vitiated and contagious that jail or hospital fever and dysenteries were engendered. He also cited the lesson learned from a European campaign, that after the battle of Dettingen, when all the sick and wounded were crowded together in one general hospital at a village of Feckenheim, a similar mortality resulted; while at other times, those who remained sick in camp, though wanting many of the comforts and necessaries to be found in the hospitals, generally recovered. For these and other reasons he advised that the slighter cases should be treated by the regimental surgeons in camp, and that in no case should private houses be utilized for hospitals, but rather that churches, barns, and all kinds of


135. John Jones, Plain Concise Practical Remarks, on the Treatment of Wounds and Fractures; To Which is Added, An Appendix on Camp and Military Hospitals; Principally Designed, for the Use of Young Military and Naval Surgeons in North-America. (Philadelphia: Printed, and Sold, by Robert Bell, 1776), pp. 102-09.
large outhouses would be occupied to the extent of one-third of their capacities. But even these simple directions were not generally followed in the campaigns of the Continental Army, private houses or tents almost invariably being used for hospitals. In addition there was always a general antagonism between the staff and the regimental surgeons which prevented proper development of the regimental hospital system.

The prevalence of sickness, together with the primitive methods of treatment, had a very important effect on the morale of the army. We are informed in "The Result of Observations Made Upon the Diseases Which Occurred in the Military Hospitals of the United States, During the Late War," by Dr. Benjamin Rush, that the principal diseases which prevailed in the hospitals during the Revolution were the typhus gravior and mitior, and such was their contagion that men who came into the hospitals with other diseases soon contracted these fevers. Drunken soldiers and convalescents were most frequently subjected to these fevers, whose symptoms were aggravated during the winter. Free air, which could only be obtained in summer, always prevented, or mitigated them. Hence the military hospitals


have been styled by the same author as "the sinks of human life in an army" which "robbed the United States of more citizens than the sword.

Dr. Rush observed that Negro soldiers who had previously been slaves died of these fevers in a greater proportion, or had a much slower recovery from them, than the same number of white soldiers. According to Dr. Rush, "Young men under twenty years of age were subject to the greatest number of camp diseases," while the men above thirty years of age were "the hardiest soldiers in the army." The personal experience of Dr. Rush in the American Revolution convinced him that "The native Americans were more sickly than the natives of Europe who served in the American army." The reason the natives of Europe were more healthy than the native Americans was in the opinion of Dr. Rush that the Europeans "were more advanced in life."

Venereal disease was no respector of the heroes of the American Revolution. On January 6, 1778, Baron von Steuben inspired a resolution of Congress laying a pecuniary penalty

138. Ibid., p. 184.
139. Ibid., p. 182.
140. Ibid., p. 180.
on all soldiers and officers entering the hospitals on account of their infections:

Resolved, That the sum of ten dollars shall be paid by every officer, and the sum of four dollars by every soldier, who shall enter, or be sent into any hospital to be cured of the venereal disease; which sums shall be deducted out of their pay, and on account thereof shall be transmitted by the physician or surgeon who shall have attended them, to the regimental pay master for that purpose; the money so arising to be paid to the director general, or his order, to be appropriated to the purchasing of blankets and shirts for the use of sick soldiers in the hospital.  

According to one estimate, out of every five colonists who volunteered and fought for the establishment of the United States of America, one died within a year. Only ten percent died in actual battle; the rest died of disease. Another estimate shows that one out of every twenty-five soldiers was chronically sick. According to one source there was more sickness in the army when it lay in camp and more health when it was in motion. "Misery loves company," says an English proverb, and an inactive soldier, hungry and exposed to inclement weather, had plenty.


142. Duncan, op. cit., pp. 374-75.

143. Ibid., p. 9.

Military hospitals at the time of the American Revolution have been ranked with good reason as one of the main causes of sickness and death in the Army, due chiefly to crowding. Such was the mortality in the hospitals that Dr. James Tilton, a surgeon of the Revolution, in his pamphlet dedicated to the Secretary of War entitled "Economical Observations on Military Hospitals," expressed his belief that

the Americans have out-done all their predecessors in the pomp and extravagance of their hospital arrangements, and have surpassed all other nations, in the destruction and havoc thereby committed on their fellow citizens.145

Dr. Tilton earnestly tried to improve the troubled conditions of the army hospitals. Born in Kent County, Delaware on June 1, 1745, Tilton completed his studies at the Philadelphia Medical School in 1765 and had practiced at Dover, Delaware, until 1776, when he became Surgeon of the First Delaware Regiment at a salary of $25 per month. In 1777 he was made Hospital Surgeon. During 1778-79 he was in charge of hospitals at Trenton and New Windsor, and during the winter of 1779-80, had "charge of hospitals in the camp at Morristown."146

In 1776, when Dr. Tilton was in charge of the general hospital at Trenton, New Jersey, he decided to diminish the sickness resulting from overcrowding by a new system of hospital construction.

145. James Tilton, Economical Observations on Military Hospitals; and the Prevention and Cure of Diseases Incident to an Army, In Three Parts: Addressed I. To Ministers of State and Legislatures, II. To Commanding Officers, III. To the Medical Staff. (Wilmington, Delaware: Printed by J. Wilson, 1813), p. 13.

He discontinued the use of tents and private houses and as hospitals began the construction of a large number of log huts, built roughly, so that the air could freely penetrate the crevices. The mortality from typhus diminished markedly and the general results were so good as to warrant the introduction of the system throughout the army. Dr. Tilton continued his experimentation, and by the time he became Hospital Physician during the Morristown encampment he had carefully prepared plans for a hospital modeled after an Indian hut. These plans were used in constructing the hospital situated near the camping grounds of the Pennsylvania Brigade. The rough log hospital included three wards, and Dr. Tilton described it as the best he had ever contrived. This description is as follows:

But in cold climates and winter seasons, some better protection than tents afford may be necessary. In such cases, the best hospital I have ever contrived was upon the plan of an Indian hut. The fire was built in the midst of the ward, without any chimney, and the smoke circulating round about, passed off thro' an opening about four inches wide in the ridge of the roof. The common surface of the earth served for the floor. The patients laid with their heads to the wall round about, and their feet were all turned to the fire. The wards were thus completely ventilated. The smoke contributed to combat infection, without giving the least offence to the patients: for it always rose above their heads, before it spread abroad in the ward. And more patients could be crowded with impunity in such wards, than in any others I have

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seen tried. This was the expedient I employed in the hard winter of 79, 80, when the army was hutted near Morris Town, and I was well satisfied with the experiment.

But the plan of this hospital hut will be better understood, by turning to the elevation and ground plan, on the succeeding pages. The first of these shews the elevation. In this it may be observed, that the smoke passes off through funnels elevated above the roof; that one window is open and the others shut; that all the air and light are let in from the south front.

In the ground plan A. represents the doors, B. the fire places, c.c. &c. the bunks or bedsteads, in which the patients were placed.

It should be noted also that the walls of this hut were built of rough logs, without hewing; that the chinks were daubed with mortar made of common clay and water only; that the middle or main ward 31 1/2 feet by 19 1/2 in the clear was assigned [sic] to febrile patients; and the smaller end wards 35 1/2 by 16 feet clear were occupied by the wounded and other cases of topical affection.148

This was perhaps the best kind of hospital which could have been provided at the time.

During the Morristown encampment, Washington was greatly concerned about the health of his soldiers. He realized that

148. Tilton, op. cit., pp. 48-50. For plan showing the exterior of the hospital hut built by Dr. James Tilton, hospital physician during the Morristown encampment of 1779-80, see Appendix J. Plan showing the interior is shown in Appendix K. See also Appendix L, depicting a reconstructed army hospital hut built in 1958 after the description and plans prepared by Dr. Tilton.
every soldier should have a "healthy spirit in a healthy body," and did what he could to insure their well-being. Drainage trenches and sinks were dug and the campsite was policed and cleaned regularly. With the approach of warmer weather, the soldiers were assigned cleaning duties in the camp. General Orders of March 8, 1780, informed them that:

The Hot Season of the Year approaching all possible attention is to be paid to Cleanliness in the Interior and environs of Camp, Sink are due to be Dug without Delay; every fair day the Windows & Doors of all the Hutts should be kept open the greatest part of the Day, and Beding [sic] and Straw and Bunks frequently Aired.  

According to General Orders of May 6, 1780, the Commanding Officers were instructed to put the sick of the respective regiments in huts by themselves, and to provide openings for proper ventilation "in all their soldiers huts to admit a free circulation of fresh air."

The extent of sickness at the Morristown encampment is difficult to ascertain mainly because of scanty records. A return of all hospitals dated December 31, 1779, shows that there were

149. See General Orders, February 16, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, op. cit., Vol. 18, p. 16. See also Hawkins' Orderly Book, No. 1, Hazen's Regiment, Hand's Brigade, entries of March 1 and 9, 1780, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.


266 men sick in the flying hospitals at camp, Pluckemin and Baskingridge combined. According to Baron von Steuben's remarks on Colonel Spencer's Regiment for December of 1779, there were 166 fit present, 13 sick present, 12 sick absent, 46 on command and 12 on furlough. The list of those reported sick was carefully examined, as soldiers often feigned sickness.

Discussing the poor condition of the corps, Washington stated in his letter of January 22, 1780, to the Major Generals and Officers Commanding Brigades,

In all our returns there is a greater disproportion between the total number, and the men fit for duty, or who could really be employed in action than in any other army in the world. This of late is not to be attributed to the sickness of the troops, for they have enjoyed very good health for a long time past. The column of sick present is moderate, but the column of sick absent, and on command are excessive. The former far exceeds the Hospital returns, and a very small part of the latter is employed on military duty. A great many of both are probably not to be found anywhere, only serving to swell the pay-rolls, and deceive the government with an idea of its having a larger army on foot than it really has, and perhaps excite expectations which it is not in our power to fulfill. The ill consequences of this in a variety of respects are obvious.  

152. See Report of December 31, 1779, Hospital File, Morristown National Historical Park Collections.
153. See Steuben's Report in Morristown National Historical Park Collections, Manuscript #218.
According to Division Orders of February 3, 1780

The List of the sick absent to be strictly Examined in each Regiment. Such as can not be accounted for and ascertained where they are, to be Immediately struck off the Rolls and Returns; and those who are deemed able to Join, to be sent for without Loss of Time; those who are absent on any Duty, not Military, to be immediately recalled, and such as cannot be Accounted for under the Denomination of on Command, are Likewise to be Expunged [from] the Rolls; two officers of each Brigade may be Sent to Collect those of the sick absent, and on Command, who are supposed to be recoverable; their Reasonable Expenses will be Defrayed, as Some of the Regiments have too many officers on Furlough, those who have been Longest absent to be immediately recalled. The Companies to be Supplied with Non-Commissioned Officers, agreeable to the Establishment, and as there are Some who have an overplus of them, they are immediately to be Transferr'd to Such as are deficient receiving in lieu thereof as many able picked men.¹⁵⁵

Writing by direction of Washington, Lieut. Col. Robert Hanson Harrison, in his letter of May 21, 1780, to Capt. William Reily, of the Fourth Maryland Regiment, suggested that Reily should continue to have some of his men at the Pluckemin and Baskingridge hospitals, because Washington had observed that a number of sick had succeeded in deserting after their recovery.¹⁵⁶


Considering the severe winter, it seems probable that there would have been epidemics of colds and fever among the soldiers. There were periodic complaints of dizziness and sickness during the Morristown encampment. Writing in December of 1779, one soldier recorded: "I was very ill. Seiz'd with a Strange Dizziness & Sickness being not Able to Sit up in the Tent." Another soldier, Ensign John Barr, wrote in his diary for Tuesday, February 15, 1780: "Left Camp on purpose to go home to the State of New York to recover my Health."

The Regulations of Baron von Steuben stipulated that "when a soldier dies, or is dismissed from the hospital, the straw he lay on is to be burnt, and the bedding well washed and aired before another is permitted to use it."

The soldiers who were unable to survive the desperate conditions of the Morristown winter encampment and died, found their resting place in the army burial ground. About 100 men perished in the severe Morristown winter of 1779-80. The severest winter of the century, overburdened logistical system, Congresional impotence, and human error seemed to conspire with the primitive medical service to make survival unlikely. Not only was the

159. Von Steuben, op. cit., p. 122.
medical service primitive, it did not enjoy an especially high priority in the thoughts of most military and political planners. A scarcity of qualified personnel, even by 18th century standards, was chronic. Lack of money and inadequate supplies also plagued the hospital department. Surgeon-General Dr. John Cochran, in a letter of March 18, 1780, to a fellow physician, Dr. Jonathan Potts, described the situation:

> Our stores have all been expended for two weeks past, and not less than 600 regimental sick and lame, most of whom require some assistance, which being withheld, are languishing and must suffer.¹⁶¹

Many basic items were entirely lacking, and the medical supply was so poor that old tent cloth was used for bandages for wounded soldiers. The Congressional Committee which investigated the medical department in May of 1780 found it "destitute of those necessaries which are indispensable for the sick."

The Committee further stated that the medical department had "neither wine, Tea, sugar, Coffee, Chocolate or spirits...and the army grow more sickly every hour" and urged an immediate supply of these items. ¹⁶³

¹⁶¹. Cochran to Potts, March 18, 1780, in Duncan, op. cit., p. 336.
¹⁶². See Letters of May 12 and 16, 1780, Abeel Papers, MS #110, New Jersey Historical Society Collections.
Considering the desperate conditions to which the soldiers at the Morristown encampment were subjected, it is remarkable that the mortality rate was so low. There is no doubt that the sick and wounded soldiers had to endure a great deal, but the generally hopeful, courageous attitude of the soldiery far outweighed any occurrences of complaints, malingering or defeatism.
"Every nation," according to German poet Schiller,"has its appointed day in history." As the thirteen American colonies gained strength and self-reliance, they outgrew the British authority, and there came their appointed day in history, the Revolution when a new nation emerged based on the dignity of man. Many people shared in this struggle. The American Revolution became a source of inspiration to many Europeans, and with ringing words as well as with action they joined the American patriots to win freedom and independence.

Men of many nations fought to make America free. Some died in the battle. Others stayed to become citizens of the new nation. But the road to freedom is always lengthy, difficult and costly.

It costs us nothing today to read of these events in the light of the issues and of the triumph that finally came, but for General Washington, on whose shoulders rested the responsibility for successful prosecution of the war, these were constant trials of his integrity, resolution, courage, and patience. Congress was weak, meddlesom, and vacillating and unable to

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1. The German original for this is "Jedes Volk hat einen Tag in der Geschichte." Quoted from Friedrich Meinecke, Die deutsche Erhebung von 1914. (Stuttgart and Berlin: J. Gottasche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1914), p. 52.
provide the necessary means for supplying and administering an army. As a result, both supply and administration were poorly handled. The soldiers were raw, undisciplined, and sometimes mutinous. There were jealousies and libels, forgeries and slanders almost beyond our present ability to believe. When we recall Washington's calmness in the midst of exasperating annoyances, his unselfish integrity when surrounded by cupidity, jealousy and hatred, his faith that put courage into the hearts of men who marched hungry and left bloody footprints in the snow, we begin to realize his greatness. He did not leave his men and go home to live in luxury, but stayed to endure privation with them.

By the end of 1779, over four and one-half years of conflict with Great Britain had passed and the final question concerning American independence was still in doubt. At that time Washington was greatly concerned over the organization of the winter encampment for his troops, and the choice of Morristown as the site for the winter quarters of the Continental Army was made only after careful deliberation. In early December 1779, the soldiers marched through a deep snow and severe cold to Morristown, where the majority of them were to spend the next seven months.

Upon their arrival, the soldiers' first task was to provide themselves with shelter. When they had completed their hutting,
under adverse weather conditions, they settled into a daily routine of camp life which proved to be hard and monotonous, marked by endless rounds of fatigue duty, inspection, drill, and guard mounting. Life at the Morristown encampment was unexciting, uninspiring, and characterized by a complex of difficulties which possibly never existed to an equal degree at any other time during the war for American independence.

If the campaigns of '76 and '78 were "time that try men's souls," the winter of 1780 was a time to try their tempers and endurance. This winter was the most severe and prolonged of the entire 18th century. The snow not only blanketed the soldiers but also blocked the roads, preventing an organized system of military drill and disrupting the supply system.

2. Thomas Paine joined Washington's army during the retreat from New Jersey in November and December 1776, and it was during this period that he issued the first of 16 pamphlets which came to be known as "The American Crisis." In this publication he addressed himself to those who might be faint of heart: "These are the times that try men's souls: The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of his country; but he that stands it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman. Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph." See Thomas Paine, The American Crisis. Number 1. By the Author of Common Sense. (Philadelphia: Styner and Cist, 1776), p. 1.

Social activities were very limited. Although drinking and gambling may have exerted some favorable influences, at the end they proved unfavorable to good discipline. Visits to camp, Masonic activities and dances undoubtedly helped to vary the monotony of camp life as well as to relieve tension.

The raid upon Staten Island during January 14-15, 1780, the only military encounter with the enemy during the Morristown encampment, ended in failure for the American expedition commanded by Major General Lord Stirling.

Washington encountered great difficulty in getting his officers to enforce the regulations which had been laid down by General Baron von Steuben, and as a consequence discipline was never consistent or strict. The most frequent violation of discipline was the depradation to which neighboring farmers were continually subjected by the soldiery. Washington admitted that under the circumstances he was almost helpless to deal with this problem. The privations imposed upon the soldiers were so great that they were reduced to the extremity of plundering, and the only possible remedy for this situation lay in better provision for their feeding and clothing. Washington's great mercy and leniency in pardoning almost all those sentenced to death is significant. His perseverance and understanding made the
difference between success and failure for himself and his country. The rarity of serious crimes and disorders attests both to his skillful management and to the quality of his men under the most adverse conditions. While discipline was manifestly lax, it is nevertheless a marvel that the army did not find itself in even worse straits in view of the deplorable conditions under which it existed during the greater part of the encampment period. This is perhaps due to one key aspect of Washington's leadership, which may be summed up in the words of St. James: "Be doers...and not hearers only."

The Continental Army at Morristown was plagued by a lack of adequate supplies and provisions. Three autonomous departments had been set up by Congress to handle different aspects of the food supply system; the Commissary Department to procure the food, the Baking Department to convert flour into bread for distribution, and the Quartermaster Department to transport the food. It was the responsibility of the thirteen States to collect provisions to fill the military requisitions during 1779-80. There was, however, no single coordinating head for all these functions, as the States feared encroachments on

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their sovereignty. Apparently, distrust of the central authority, and perhaps even of the Army itself, was one of the major causes of the breakdowns in food administration.

Shortages of food supplies existed even though, as Washington himself was aware, there was not a real scarcity of food in the United States. Analysis of the food sources leads to the conclusion that the soldiers were going hungry in the midst of plenty. New Jersey was the "breadbasket of the American Revolution" and the question remains why the Army suffered so in the midst of this plenty. Quartermaster General Greene felt that the fault lay in an inadequate system of procurement. He discussed the question in his letter to Washington of January 1780:

There is no deficiency in the resources of the country. On the contrary, I have authentic reasons to conclude the country is more plentifully stored with every material necessary for the provision and support of an army, than it has been for three years past. The defect lies in a want of proper means to draw them into public use.

Because of their very nature, the States should have been able to support an army, but it is evident that they were unable to do so. Therefore the problem must have lain, as Greene suggests, in the lack of a workable system for the procurement of supplies for the Army.


6. Greene to Washington, January 1780, in Sparks, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 372. No date of the letter given. Internal evidence leads this writer to believe that the letter was written in early January of that year.
In 1777 the commissary organization was faulty because lines of authority were not clearly drawn and functions were ill-defined. Flagrant neglect and corruption in the Commissary Department also hindered the procurement effort. Negligence in the transportation department caused delays in that segment of the system. By 1770-80 the commissary system had become more sophisticated and was served by more competent personnel. But as a result of the depleted financial resources at the disposal of Congress, payment could no longer be made to the Commissary and Quartermaster officials to allow them to carry out their obligations. Finding itself in the position of being unable to supply the army, Congress called on the States to supply food as a tax in kind. However, the States were not always willing to follow what could only be suggestions by Congress, and the change brought no relief to the army at Morristown.

Only the Baking Department functioned smoothly, mainly because of the ability of its superintendent, the German-born Christopher Ludwig, who not only knew his job well but was also patriotic and honest, and who did not require the enormous sums of money needed by the Commissary and Quartermaster Departments.

In a broad sense then, the disastrous lack of provisions and the inadequate supply of clothing during the Morristown winter encampment of 1779-80 resulted from the financial problems of
the Congress, which rendered its administrative departments practically useless, and forced an insecure reliance on the States. In retrospect, it seems that what was needed was a strong central authority to carry on the war. The main cause of the supply failure was the refusal of the thirteen States either to make the necessary sacrifice of their sovereignty or to work together under the guidance of Congress so that it could function as an efficient central government.

Why then did leaders in Congress and the States neglect the army fighting for their freedom? Perhaps it was from distrust of the Army, or perhaps the State and Congressional leaders simply were not convinced that the army at Morristown could be suffering as badly as Washington claimed. And the Congressmen and Governors, isolated from the Army, probably were unable to appreciate the conditions under which the troops were living.

A letter dated January 4, 1780, to Moore Furman, Deputy Quartermaster General in Pittstown, from Gen. Nathanael Greene, Quartermaster General, laments the state of the soldiery, the country and the legislatures:
Poor Fellows! they exhibit a picture truly distressing.-More than half naked, and above two thirds starved.-A Country, once overflowing with plenty, are now suffering an Army, employed for the defence of every thing that is dear and valuable, to perish for want of food.-A people too, whose political existence entirely depends upon this Army, and the future enjoyment of what they now profess. O foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched you!-Legislatures are guarding against little trespasses, while they suffer the great Barriers of political security to be thrown down, and the Country over-run.7

Looking back to Quartermaster General Greene's letter on the reason for inadequate supply system, cited previously, it must be concluded that he was correct. Because of its inexperience, Congress never seemed to have the right people, at the right times, in the right places, but blundered again and again, while the army suffered in its Morristown winter quarters. It is truly remarkable that the army, poorly and inadequately fed and clothed, but at least sheltered from the severe and prolonged winter, did not dissolve altogether. That this did not happen is due to the greatness of Washington, whose leadership and strength kept the Revolution alive, and to the dedication of his officers and soldiers. At the Morristown winter encampment of 1779-80, the severest trial of the American Revolution took place, and the

8. See supra, p. 205.
highest and noblest ideals of the new nation were forged.

E. Stanton, a private soldier, recounting his hardships at Morristown, expressed his dedication to his country to his friend Thomas Noyes:

but I am in hopes the Army will bee kept together till we have gaind the Point we have been So long Contending For if the Army Could bee Supported I have Not the Least Reason to think that A Man would wish to Leave it till Peace and harmony was Restored to A bleeding but Unconquered and Still to bee Unconquerd Country For my Own Part if we was Paid According to Agreement I could wish I had two Lives to Looes in Defence of So Glorious A Caus Sooner than bee Over Come - I was Free born a and if I can Supporting Selfe I will Stand or Fall in Defence of my Country.  

The army, inspired and held together by Washington's leadership and by the ideals of the Revolution, emerged at the end of the encampment prepared to resume the battle against the British. Washington led his forces admirably to final victory in the year 1781. On September 28 of that year, aided by the French fleet and French soldiers, Washington laid siege to the British and Hessian forces at Yorktown Heights, New York. Shortly afterward, on October 19, Cornwallis surrendered to the Americans at Yorktown. Although the preliminary instruments ending the Revolution were signed in Paris on November 30, 1782,

it was only with the signing of the Treaty of Paris, on
September 3, 1783, that hostilities between the United States
and Great Britain officially ended. After eight years of
struggle and sacrifice, Washington emerged victorious. On
December 23, 1783, he resigned as Commander-in-Chief of
the Continental Army and retired to his home at Mount Vernon.

On January 14, 1784, the United States ratified a peace
treaty with Great Britain, formally ending the American
Revolution.

Frederick the Great once said that "In War God is on the
side of the strong battalions," and history teaches us the
truth of this saying. Nothing important in history has occurred
without decisive action and personal sacrifice. As we look
back we are proud of the soldiers at the Morristown winter encamp­
ment, who endured enormous suffering in order to win independence
from Great Britain. To them and to their Commander-in-Chief we
owe thanks and gratitude. But gratitude, as many a philosopher
has noted, is the principal basis of social harmony. Without it,
progress in culture and civilization is impossible. The

10. Frederick the Great said this in his letter of May 8, 1760,
to the Grand Duchess Louise Dorothea von Gotha. The German original
is "...im Kriege Gott bei den starken Eskadronen ist." Quoted from
Geflügelte Worte. Der Zitatenschatz des deutschen Volkes Gesammelt
und erläutert von Georg Büchmann, fortgesetzt von Walter Robert­
Auflage neubearbeitet, ergänzt, verbessert und bis in die Gegenwart
fortgeführt von Werner Rust und Gunther Haupt. (Berlin: Haude &
darkest pages in history are perhaps those that have been written by the treachery and disloyalty of ungrateful men. The measure of our gratitude must be permanent. Every day we should express our gratitude for the good and for the true, for freedom and the opportunities that have been achieved for us by those who fought the American Revolution, and upon this basis build a productive life. Then we will be able to learn to appreciate every manifestation of goodness and to share this goodness with others and thus preserve it for future generations. As Ralph Waldo Emerson put it in his poem "Forbearance"

Hast thou named all the birds without a gun?
Loved the wood-rose, and left it on its stalk?
At rich men's tables eaten bread and pulse?
Unarmed, faced danger with a heart of trust?
And loved so well a high behavior,
In man or maid, that thou from speech refrained,
Nobility more nobly to repay?
O, be my friend, and teach me to be thine! 11

APPENDIX A


By Courtesy of the Morristown National Historical Park.
APPENDIX C

MAP OF MORRISTOWN DRAWN BY GENERAL ROBERT ERSKINE, GEOGRAPHER
GENERAL OF THE CONTINENTAL ARMY, DATED DECEMBER 12, 1779.

By Courtesy of the New-York Historical Society
APPENDIX D

MAP OF THE ROAD FROM MORRISTOWN THROUGH JOCKEY HOLLOW SHOWING THE LOCATION OF THE SEVERAL UNITS OF THE ARMY, MADE BY GENERAL ROBERT ERKINE, GEOGRAPHER GENERAL OF THE CONTINENTAL ARMY, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF GENERAL WASHINGTON

By Courtesy of the New-York Historical Society
APPENDIX E

RECONSTRUCTION OF LOG HUT USED BY THE OFFICERS IN THE WINTER ENCAMPMENT OF 1779-80

By Courtesy of the Morristown National Historical Park
APPENDIX F

FOUR RECONSTRUCTIONS OF LOG HUTS USED BY SOLDIERS IN THE
WINTER ENCAMPMENT OF 1779-80

By Courtesy of the Morristown National Historical Park

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APPENDIX II

PAINTING BY JOHN WARD DUNSMORE SHOWING THE PETITION BEING READ AT THE FESTIVAL OF ST. JOHN THE EVANGELIST ON DECEMBER 27, 1779

By courtesy of the Morristown National Historical Park
APPENDIX 1

WASHINGTON GREETING THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE ON HIS ARRIVAL
AT MORRISTOWN HEADQUARTERS, MAY 10, 1780. (From a diorama in
the Museum of the Morristown National Historical Park).

By Courtesy of the Morristown National Historical Park
PLAN SHOWING THE EXTERIOR OF THE HOSPITAL HUT BUILT BY DR. JAMES TILTON.
HOSPITAL PHYSICIAN DURING THE MORRISTOWN ENCAMPMENT OF 1779-80

APPENDIX K

PLAN SHOWING THE INTERIOR OF THE HOSPITAL HUT BUILT BY DR. JAMES TILTON, HOSPITAL PHYSICIAN DURING THE MORRISTOWN ENCAMPMENT OF 1779-80

APPENDIX L

RECONSTRUCTED ARMY HOSPITAL HUT, BUILT IN 1958 AFTER A DESCRIPTION AND PLANS PREPARED BY DR. JAMES TILTON IN 1779-80

By Courtesy of the Morristown National Historical Park
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