THE LOST YEARS
1942-46
In January, 1972, the California State Department of Parks and Recreation approved Manzanar as a historic landmark. The final wording as it appears on the plaque (see picture above) was agreed upon after a year of controversy and negotiations. The Manzanar Pilgrimage of April 14, 1973, dedicating the plaque, attracted over 1500 participants.
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Cover: The Manzanar Cemetery monument designed and built by R.F. Kado, a landscape architect and stone mason, was completed in August, 1943. When informed that the former camp site had been designated as a historical landmark by the State of California, Mr. Kado stated, “I built it for all the Japanese people and I built it to last a long, long time.”

Cover photograph by Bob Nakamura.
INTRODUCTION

On February 19, 1976, President Gerald L. Ford rescinded Executive Order 9066, issued by then President Franklin D. Roosevelt on February 19, 1942. The Executive Order would have been quickly forgotten, like many other executive orders, had it not involved the personal tragedy of 110,000 persons of American birth and choice. In all the printed pages which have chronicled the mass evacuation and detention of persons of Japanese ancestry during World War II, the description which stands out most sharply in our minds is "intense suffering," an expression used by several authors on the subject.

This Syllabus is not intended to detail every period during 1942-1946. It is compiled to give an overview of the events which brought about the evacuation, life in the ten "relocation centers," segregation and resettlement. It was compiled out of our personal collection of publications and was a functional instrument for use during the campaign to name Manzanar a historical site.

The Chronology of Events which opens the Syllabus was compiled from WRA publications and copies of the *Manzanar Free Press* in the possession of the editor. It is detailed enough to give the serious student of the Evacuation a base from which to do further research.

As to the contents of this Syllabus, the choice was arbitrary. Historian Roger Daniels' paper, "'Why It Happened Here,'" which was read at the 25th anniversary symposium, held at the University of California at Los Angeles, was chosen for its concise and honest presentation, and secondly, because it parallels closely this editor's beliefs and feelings regarding the Evacuation. We are grateful to Dr. Daniels for granting us permission to print his paper in full. This paper represented an early stage of Dr. Daniels' research into the problem and a slightly different version appears in his book, *Concentration Camps, USA: Japanese Americans and World War II*, published by Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

The Fellowship of Reconciliation was one of several religious organizations in the U.S. which stood by the evacuees to give moral, financial and personal support. The article titled "Life in the Relocation Center" was taken from *OUTCASTS! - The Story of America's Treatment of her Japanese American Minority*, by Caleb Foote, published in the February, 1944 issue of *Fellowship* magazine. We are indebted to the present *Fellowship* staff in New York for permission to reprint parts of this article.

The two short poems included in this reading are unpublished material given to this editor by two members of the *Manzanar Free Press* staff. We have lost touch with both persons and are unable to
ask permission to print their works. However, we believe they should be printed and I take the liberty of using them for the first time.

The author of the first poem "Manzanar" was a 15-year old girl in 1943 who worked part-time as a reporter after attending Manzanar High School.

The author of the second untitled poem is James Shinkai, a veteran Nisei journalist from the Northwest who was feature editor on the original staff of the Manzanar Free Press.

Two publications from the War Relocation Authority were the source for the section on Segregation and Relocation. "Segregation of Persons of Japanese Ancestry in Relocation Centers" is the title of a printed brochure outlining procedures as to how segregation was to be conducted and on what basis evacuees would be sent to the Tule Lake Segregation Center.

"Why Relocate?" is a mimeographed instructional bulletin prepared by the Adult Education Office of the Department of Education in Manzanar and distributed to evacuees in an attempt to persuade them to relocate outside the Western Defense Command. Pertinent excerpts from both publications were used to acquaint those who may not be familiar with the details of these two particular events.

For those who desire more detailed material — historical, sociological or other points of view, a short bibliography is included. Since our intention was not to list every publication, our choice, again, is arbitrary. We urge our readers to examine other rationales and develop their own concepts about this many-faceted tragedy in Asian American history.

The photographs are from the collection of and through the courtesy of Visual Communications in Los Angeles.

THE MANZANAR COMMITTEE
Edited by Sue Kunitomi Embrey
1976
A CHRONOLOGY OF EVACUATION AND RELOCATION

—1941—

December 7 —Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.

December 8 —Declaration of war against Japan.

—1942—

February 13 —Letter to the President from the Pacific Coast congressional delegation recommending the evacuation from strategic areas of all persons of Japanese ancestry, and others, both aliens and citizens, whose presence might jeopardize or hinder the Nation's war effort.

February 19 —Executive Order 9066 of the President authorizing the Secretary of War or designated military commanders to prescribe military areas from which any or all persons may be excluded, or in which their movements may be restricted.

February 21 —Hearings of House Committee on National Defense Migration (the Tolan Committee) begin on the Pacific Coast with regard to problems involved in dealing with enemy aliens and other persons living in that area.

February 23 —Telegram from the Tolan Committee to the President, cabinet members, and congressional leaders urging establishment of a regional office of the Alien Property Custodian in the Pacific Coast area.

March 2 —Proclamation issued by Lieut. Gen. J.L. DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, designating military areas in the states of Washington, Oregon, California, and Arizona from which certain persons or classes of persons, as the situation might require, might be excluded. Restrictions placed on Japanese, German, and Italian aliens. Military Area No. 1 included roughly the western half of the three coastal states and the southern half of Arizona. Military Area No. 2 comprised the remaining portions of all four states. Period of voluntary evacuation begins.

March 6 —Federal Reserve Bank designated as a cooperating agency to assist persons to be evacuated in disposing
of their property or making other arrangements for handling such property. The Farm Security Administration was later authorized to render similar assistance with respect to agricultural property and to help in placing other operators on farms that had been vacated.

March 14 —The Wartime Civil Control Administration (WCCA) established as an agency of the Western Defense Command, under Col. Karl E. Bendetsen, to have direct supervision of the evacuation program.

March 14 —Proclamation issued designating the states of Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Utah as military areas No. 3, 4, 5, and 6 respectively.

March 16 —Work underway on clearing land and erection of housing for evacuee assembly center at Manzanar, California, under direction of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

March 18 —Executive Order (9102) issued by President Roosevelt creating the War Relocation Authority, a non-military agency, with authority to formulate and carry out a program for a planned and orderly relocation of persons evacuated from military areas. Milton S. Eisenhower appointed director.

March 19 —Telegrams sent by Tolan Committee to 15 Western Governors to determine attitude of their states toward receiving Japanese evacuees; all but one of the replies are unfavorable.

March 21 —Enactment of Congressional legislation (HR 6758) providing penalties for persons violating orders as to entering, remaining in, or leaving military areas.


March 27 —Effective date of curfew order covering German and Italian aliens and all persons of Japanese ancestry in Military Area No. 1, requiring them to be in their places of residence between the hours of 8 p.m. and 6 a.m.; forbidding possession of firearms, explosives, cameras, radio transmitting sets, or shortwave receiving sets, and barring travel extending more than five miles from home without permit.
March 29 —Further voluntary evacuation from Military Area No. 1 by Japanese, aliens or American-born, prohibited after this date by order of Lieut. Gen. DeWitt.

March 30 —Three thousand people of Japanese ancestry ordered to evacuate the Terminal Island area in Los Angeles Harbor by April 5 and move to the assembly center at Santa Anita.

April 7 —Salt Lake City conferences attended by 10 Western governors or their representatives, and by other state officials and representatives of federal agencies including the War Relocation Authority, to discuss relocation program and ascertain the views of the various states toward it. States represented were: Utah, Arizona, Nevada, Montana, Idaho, Colorado, New Mexico, Washington, Oregon, and Wyoming.

April 16 —Construction started on Gila River Relocation Center near Sacaton, Arizona.

May 7 —Organization of National Student Relocation Council, a non-government agency, initiated through the efforts of the American Friends Service Committee with the approval of the War Relocation Authority and the War Department, to assist in a program by which evacuee students are enabled to continue their education at colleges outside the evacuated area.

May 8 —Arrival of first contingent of evacuees at the Colorado River Relocation Center near Parker, Arizona.

May 8 —Evacuation of Japanese in Arizona completed.

May 16 —Atlantic coast designated a military area by the Eastern Defense Command.

May 19 —Civilian Restriction Order No. 1 issued by the Western Defense Command establishing all assembly centers and relocation centers on the eight far western states as military areas and forbidding evacuee residents to leave these areas without express approval of the Western Defense Command.

May 21 —Departure of first group of evacuees from Portland Assembly Center for agricultural work in Malheur County, Oregon, under assurances from Governor and local authorities that law and order would be maintained.

May 27 —Opening by War Relocation Authority of relocation center at Tule Lake, California near the Oregon boundary.
June 1 —Control of Manzanar, which has been operated as an assembly center by the Wartime Civil Control Administration, transferred to the War Relocation Authority.

June 2 —First step in evacuating people of Japanese Ancestry from Military Area No. 2 in California (roughly the eastern half of the state) taken by Lieut. Gen. De Witt with issuance of Proclamation No. 6 forbidding the people of Japanese descent to leave this area.

June 7 —Evacuation of 100,000 people of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 1 completed.

June 10 Plans announced to establish field offices of the War Relocation Authority at Denver and Little Rock in addition to the one at San Francisco.

June 17 —Dillon S. Myer appointed national director of the War Relocation Authority succeeding M.S. Eisenhower.

June 26 —Opening of trial at San Francisco on suit brought by the Native Sons of the Golden West to bar Japanese Americans from voting.

June 29 —Announcement that a total of 1,600 evacuee workers had been released from assembly and relocation centers to help relieve an acute labor shortage in sugar-beet areas in eastern Oregon, Utah, Idaho, and Montana.

July 9 —Evacuation of approximately 10,000 persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 2 in California (eastern portion of the state) started, with movement direct to relocation centers instead of the assembly centers as in the evacuation of Military Area No. 1.

July 18 Opening of Gila River relocation center near Sacaton, Arizona.

July 25 —National Defense Appropriation Act including (among many other items) $70 million appropriation for the War Relocation Authority for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1942 signed by President Roosevelt.

August 7 —Evacuation of 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry from their homes in Military Area No. 1 and the California portion of Military Area No. 2 completed.

August 8 —Appointment of Elmer M. Rowalt as Deputy Director of the War Relocation Authority.
August 10 —Arrival of first contingent of evacuees to open the Minidoka Relocation Center near Eden, Idaho.

August 12 —Opening of Heart Mountain Relocation Center near Cody, Wyoming.

August 18 —War Department proclamation designating as military areas the four relocation centers outside the Western Defense Command issued by Secretary Stimson.

August 19 —Announcement by Lieut. Gen. J.L. DeWitt of a program under which any persons deemed dangerous to military security would be excluded from vital areas in the Western Defense Command.

September 10 —Individual exclusion program for 16 states in the Eastern Defense Command announced by Lt. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, providing for the exclusion of “any person whose presence in the Eastern Military area is deemed dangerous to the national defense.” The War Relocation Authority was authorized to assist persons excluded from either the Western, Eastern or Southern military regions to re-establish themselves in non-prohibited areas.

September 11 —Opening of the Central Utah Relocation Center near Delta, Utah.

September 14 —Opening of Rohwer Relocation Center near McGehee, Arkansas.

September 15 —Announcement made that the Evacuee Property Division of War at San Francisco had set up branch offices in Seattle and Los Angeles and was responsible for the administration of evacuee property holdings valued at more than two-hundred million dollars.

September 15 —Order issued by Western Defense Command permitting evacuee workers at the Poston and Gila River Relocation Centers to enter certain parts of Military Area No. 1 in Arizona to assist in the harvest of the long-staple cotton crop.

September 20 —Resolution adopted by national convention of the American Legion at Kansas City asking that control of relocation centers be “returned to military authorities” and that evacuees “be denied the privilege of leaving these camps under any pretext for the duration of the war.”

September 21 —Joint Resolution introduced in the United States Senate by Senator Rufus C. Holman of Oregon
proposing amendment to the Constitution giving Congress the power to regulate conditions under which persons subject to dual citizenship may become citizens of the United States.

September 25
—Offices of the War Relocation Authority opened in New York City and Baltimore to assist persons excluded from Eastern Military areas to find work and homes in non-restricted areas.

October 1
—Effective date of WRA regulations under which evacuees may obtain permits to leave relocation centers for temporary or permanent residence outside if the following conditions are met: (a) applicant’s loyalty to the United States is unquestioned; (b) that he has an offer of employment or other means of support so as not to become a public charge; (c) that he will keep the Authority advised of any change of residence; (d) that there is reasonable assurance that his presence will be acceptable in the community to which he is going.

October 6
—Opening of the tenth and last relocation center at Jerome, Arkansas, near Dermott.

October 10
—Robert O’Brien, former Assistant Dean at the University of Washington appointed national director of the Student Relocation Council, succeeding Dr. Robbins Barstow who returned to his duties as president of the Hartford Theological Seminary.

October 12
—President Franklin D. Roosevelt celebrates Columbus Day by declaring Italian aliens no longer considered enemy aliens.

October 19
—Gen. John L. DeWitt issues Public Proclamation No. 13 exempting all citizens of Italy, as well as aliens of enemy nationalities in military service of the U.S. from curfew requirements, travel restrictions and provision of change of residence notices.

October 24
—More than 8,000 evacuees engaged in harvest work in Western states to relieve acute shortage of farm labor.

October 30
—Assembly centers cleared with movement of final contingent of evacuees from Fresno to Jerome Relocation Center.

November 3
—Final group from Fresno Assembly Center reach Jerome Relocation Center in Arkansas, completing transfer of control from Army to WRA.
November 14 —Gila River Center demonstration protesting arrest of two evacuees charged with beating an evacuee.

November 18 —Poston Center camp 1 disturbance over arrest of two evacuees charged with beating an evacuee.

November 23 —General strike ends at Poston.

December 6 —Manzanar riot; two evacuees killed, several wounded when M.P.'s shoot into crowd.

December 19 —All activities resume in Manzanar.

December 24 —Public Proclamation No. 15 abolishes curfew and travel limitations for German aliens.

—1943—

January 28 —Secretary of War Stimson announces plans for formation of special combat team of Japanese American volunteers.

February 3 —Loyalty registration of all persons over 17 years of age for relocation and Army recruitment begins.

February 20 —U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals dismiss charges brought by native Sons of the Golden West that American-born Japanese are not citizens.

June 9 —California Governor Earl Warren signs anti-Japanese Fishing Bill prohibiting issuance of commercial licenses to alien Japanese.

June 23 —U.S. Supreme Court unanimously upholds curfew legality in Hirabayashi vs. U.S. case.

July 31 —Tule Lake designated as Segregation Camp for “disloyal” evacuees.

August 7 —Arizona Superior Court rules unconstitutional state law regulating business with ”restricted” persons. Law believed aimed at Japanese ineligible to citizenship.

August 14 —New cemetery monument dedicated at Manzanar.

September 2 —S.S. Gripsholm sails for Japan with 314 persons and 12,207 letters and messages from relocation centers. Total of 1400 Japanese are to be exchanged for Americans stranded in Far East.

October 11 —Last contingent of “disloyal” evacuees arrive in Tule Lake.

November 1 —Mass demonstration begins in Tule Lake. U.S. Army takes over control of Center.
January 5 —Legality of evacuation of all Japanese from the West Coast upheld by Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in California.

January 14 —Military control ends at Tule Lake.

June 30 —Jerome Relocation Center first to close with 5,000 residents transferred to other centers.

July 18 —Sixty-three men convicted of draft evasion file mass appeal in 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver, Colorado. Sentenced to three years each, defendants contend that their ‘‘obligations to serve in the armed forces was dissolved when they were denied full rights as citizens.’’

July 29 —Indictment of 26 Japanese Americans charged with violation of Selective Service Act dismissed by Judge Louis E. Goodman, because the defendant ‘‘is, under the circumstances, not a free agent.’’

October 28 —New Law 405 permits renunciation of American citizenship during war time.


December 18 —Supreme Court rules validity of Army evacuation order in Korematsu case, 6 to 3. Dissenting opinions by Justices Murphy, Roberts, and Jackson, condemn ‘‘legalization of racism.’’

December 30 —WRA announces opening of relocation offices in Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles.

—1945—

January —Hood River, Oregon, American Legion removes names of 17 Nisei soldiers from Honor Roll.

April —Vandals deface home owned by Japanese Americans in Seattle.
May
—Secretary of War Stimson condemns attack on Nisei veteran’s home in Madera, California.
—Two Nisei soldiers appeal to Secretary of Interior Ickes for protection of parents from terrorist shootings in Livingston, California.

June 23
—Dillon Myer orders closing of Gila and Poston centers by October 1st.

August 11

August 25
—Manzanar to close by December 1st.

September 1
—Manzanar Free Press, first center paper to publish, last to cease publication as printed newspaper.

September 4
—Western Defense Command revokes all military restrictions against the Japanese.

November 21
—Manzanar closes as last 42 evacuees leave at 11 a.m.

—1946—

March 20
—Tule Lake Center officially closed.

June 30
—War Relocation Authority program officially ends.

(Compiled from WRA publications and Manzanar Free Press in personal possession of Sue Embrey, April, 1971.)
WHY IT HAPPENED HERE

By Roger Daniels, c 1967

Writing in *Harper’s Magazine* in September, 1945, constitutional law specialist Eugene V. Rostow unhesitatingly characterized the evacuation and incarceration of the West Coast Japanese as “our worst wartime mistake”\(^1\). Two decades of scholarship has merely rung the changes on that indictment. Professor A. Russell Buchannan of UC, Santa Barbara, writing on World War II in the authoritative New American Nation Series has argued that it was “the most widespread disregard of personal rights since... slavery.”\(^2\) Most educated persons today would echo those sentiments; in addition, most Americans seem to have changed their basic attitudes toward Japanese. This dramatic change of image is perhaps best reflected in a pair of Gallup polls which asked a cross-section of Americans to characterize Japanese. In 1942, the images was negative: the five most frequently mentioned adjectives were “treacherous,” “sly,” “cruel,” “warlike” and “hard-working.” In 1961 the same question drew a quite positive set of adjectives: “hard-working” moved to the top, followed by “artistic,” “intelligent” and “progressive,” with a residual “sly” ranking fifth.\(^3\)

With this highly favorable image, in part at least a result of the magnificent and well-publicized performance of Japanese-American troops during the war plus a reaction against wartime excesses, it is almost impossible for the generations that have come to maturity since the war to comprehend how it was possible for such an undemocratic act to occur in this country under the most liberal government it had ever known. When you try to explain to students that it was one of the most popular wartime acts, many look at you with stunned disbelief. My paper this morning will have a dual burden: to tell first of all, what happened here and how it happened, and then to try to place the wartime evacuation into a more long-range historical perspective.

First of all I would like to try to convey something of the feeling of the weeks after Pearl Harbor in Los Angeles: much of the material presented will be drawn from the pages of the Los Angeles *Times*, which I recently read from December 8, 1941 through March, 1942. The result would have been much the same had I read any other California newspaper: The *Times* was not especially prejudiced against Japanese (by 1941 California standards that is) and was more moderate than many papers. The predominant feeling that one gets from reading
the press of that period is one of near hysteria. Hawaii, which had actually been attacked, was relatively calm. California, thousands of miles from the scene of operations, was nervous and trigger happy. The paranoid style in California life is neither recent nor is it confined to the county immediately to the south of us. A thousand movies and stories and reminiscences have recorded the solemn mood with which the nation reacted to that “day of infamy” in 1941. Yet, at Gilmore Field the Times informs us:

“Eighteen thousand spectators at the Hollywood Bears-Columbus Bulldogs football game...jumped to their feet and cheered wildly when the public address system announced that a state of war existed between Japan and the United States.”

In its first editorial reaction, the Times announced that California was a “zone of danger”: and invoked the ancient vigilante tradition of the state by calling for:

“alert, keen-eyed civilians [who could be] of yeoman service in cooperating with the military and civilian authorities against spies, saboteurs and fifth columnists. We have thousands of Japanese here...Some, perhaps many, are...good Americans. What the rest may be we do not know, nor can we take a chance in the light of yesterday’s demonstration that treachery and double-dealing are major Japanese weapons.”

Day after day, throughout December, January, February, and March, the Times and the rest of the California press spewed forth racial venom against Japanese. The term “jap,” of course, was standard usage. Japanese were also “Nips,” “yellow men,” “mad dogs” and “yellow vermin,” to name only a few of the choicer epithets. Individual columnists and bylined writers in the Times added their bit. Ed Ainsworth cautioned his readers:

“to be careful to differentiate between races. The Chinese and Koreans both hate the Japs more than we do...Be sure of nationality before you are rude to anybody.”

Just after a series of murderous and sometimes fatal attacks on Japanese residents by Filipinos, a Times sports page feature was headlined:
Columnist Joe Shippey, who often stressed that some Japanese were alright, prophetically suggested, on New Year’s Day, that there be established:

“a number of big, closely guarded, closely watched truck farms on which Japanese-Americans could earn a living and assure us a steady supply of vegetables.”

If a Nazi has suggested doing this with Poles, Shippey undoubtedly would have called it a slave labor camp. But the palm for shrecklichkeit must go to Westbrook Pegler, a major outlet of what Oswald Garrison Villard once called “the sewer system of American journalism.” Taking time off from his vendettas with Eleanor Roosevelt and the American Labor Movement, Pegler proposed, on December 9th, that every time the Axis murder hostages:

“the United States could raise [them] 100 victims selected out of [our] concentration camps [for German Bundist, Italian Fascist and] many alien Japanese.”

I shall conclude this brief survey of incitement to racial violence by our supposedly responsible press by quoting a few headlines, none of which had any basis in fact and all of which heightened local hysteria by making people believe that military or para-military Japanese activists were all around them:

JAP BOAT FLASHES MESSAGE ASHORE
ENEMY PLANES SIGHTED OVER CALIFORNIA COAST
TWO JAPANESE WITH MAPS AND ALIEN LITERATURE SEIZED
JAP AND CAMERA HELD IN BAY CITY
VEGETABLES FOUND FREE OF POISON
FOOD PLOT FEARS SPIKED
CHINESE ABLE TO SPOT JAP
MAP REVEALS JAP MENACE
Network of Alien Farms Covers Strategic Defense Areas Over Southland
JAPS PLAN COAST ATTACK IN APRIL
WARNS CHIEF OF KOREAN SPY BAND
In short, any reading of the wartime California press — or for that matter viewing the wartime movies that still pollute our television channels — shows clearly that while a distinction was continually being made between “good” and “bad” Germans — a welcome change from World War I — few distinctions were ever made between Japanese. The evil deeds of Nazi Germany were the deeds of bad men. The evil deeds of Tojo’s Japan were the deeds of a “bad” race. While the press was throwing fuel on the fires of racial animosity, other faggots were contributed by politicians, federal officials, and, above all, the military. The Governor of California, Cuthbert L. Olson, a liberal Democrat, had insisted, before Pearl Harbor, that Japanese Americans should enjoy all their rights and privileges even if war with Japan came, and correctly pointed out that equal protection under the law was a “basic tenet” of American government. But Olson’s constitutional scruples were a casualty of Pearl Harbor: on December 8th, the Governor told the press that he was thinking of ordering all Japanese, alien and citizen, to observe house arrest “to avoid riot and disturbance.”

The Federal Department of Justice, working partially through the F.B.I. and calling on local law enforcement officials for assistance and detention began round-ups of what they considered “dangerous” enemy aliens. Throughout the nation this initial round-up involved about 3,000 persons, half of whom were Japanese, with most of the latter living in California. In other words, the federal authorities responsible for counter-espionage thought that some 1,500 persons of Japanese ancestry or nationality constituted some kind of danger to the nation. This was slightly over one percent of the Japanese population of the nation. It might be useful to give the 1940 census figures. There were, in the continental United States about 127,000 Japanese, less than one-tenth of one percent of the total population. Among the 127,000, almost ninety percent (113,000) lived in the three Pacific states and Arizona, while almost seventy-five percent (94,000) lived in California. Almost two-thirds of the total were native born citizens. The nearly 1,500 who were rounded up were almost universally of the issei or immigrant generation — and thus enemy aliens — and usually community or organizational leaders. The government, acting as it so often does on guilt by association, automatically pulled in the officers and leading lights of a number of Japanese organizations and religious groups. Many of these were perhaps “rooting” for the emperor rather than the president and thus technically subversive, but most of them were rather elderly and inoffensive gentlemen and not a threat to anything. This limited internment, however, was a not too discreditable
performance for a wartime government security agency, but it must be noted that even at this restrained level the government acted much more harshly, in terms of numbers interned, toward Japanese nationals than toward German nationals, and more harshly toward Germans than to Italians. It should also be noted, however, that more than a few young Nisei leaders applauded this early round-up and contrasted their own native son loyalty to the presumed disloyalty of many of the leaders of the Issei or immigrant generation.

In addition to the selective round-up of enemy aliens, the Justice Department almost immediately announced the sealing off of the Mexican and Canadian borders to “all persons of Japanese ancestry, whether citizen or alien.” Thus by December 8, 1941, that branch of the federal government particularly charged with protecting the rights of our citizens was willing to single out one ethnic group for invidious treatment. Other national civilian officials discriminated in other ways: Even Fiorello La Guardia, who was for a time director of the Office of Civilian Defense as well as Mayor of New York, pointedly omitted mention of the Japanese in two public statements calling for decent treatment for enemy aliens and suggesting presumptive loyalty for Germans and Italians. Seventeen years earlier La Guardia had been one of three Congressmen to speak openly in favor of continued Japanese immigration, but in December, 1941, he could find nothing good to say about Japanese.

Even more damaging were the mendacious statements of Frank Knox, Roosevelt’s Republican Secretary of the Navy. On December 15, in a story that made front pages all over the country, Secretary Knox, returning from a quick inspection of the damage at Pearl Harbor, spoke of “treachery” there and insisted that much of the disaster was caused by “the most effective fifth column work that’s come out of this war, except in Norway.” The disaster at Pearl Harbor, as is now generally acknowledged, was caused largely by the unpreparedness and incompetence of the local military commanders, as Knox already knew. But the Secretary probably didn’t want the people to lose faith in their Navy, so the Japanese population of Hawaii — and indirectly all Japanese-American — was made the scapegoat on which to hang the big lie. (Knox, it should be remarked, was a Chicago newspaper publisher in private life and had a professional understanding of these matters.)

But the truly crucial role was played by the other service, the United States Army. The key individual, initially at least, was John L. DeWitt, in 1941 a Lt. General and commander of both the Western Defense Command and the 4th Army, both headquartered at San Francisco’s Presidio. Despite these warlike titles DeWitt was essentially an
administrator in uniform, a staff officer who had specialized in supply and had practically nothing to do with combat during his whole Army career. Serving under him, in December, 1941, as a Corps Commander and in charge of the defense of Southern California was a real fighting man, the then Major General Joseph W. Stilwell, the famed “Vinegar Joe” of the heartbreaking Burma campaigns. His diary of those hectic days gives an accurate and pungent picture of the hysteria and indecisiveness that prevailed at DeWitt’s headquarters. 

Dec. 8 —Sunday night ‘air raid’ at San Francisco... Fourth Army kind of jittery.

Dec. 9 —...Fleet of thirty-four [Japanese] ships between San Francisco and Los Angeles. Later — not authentic...

Dec. 11 —[Phone call from 4th Army] “The main Japanese battle fleet is 164 miles off San Francisco.” I believed it, like a damn fool...

Dec. 13 —Not content with the above blah, [the 4th] Army pulled another at ten-thirty today. “Reliable information that attack on Los Angeles is imminent. A general alarm being considered”... What jackass would sound a general alarm [which would have meant warning all civilians to leave the area] under the circumstances? The [4th] Army G-2 is just another amateur, like all the rest of the staff. Rule: the higher the headquarters, the more important is calm.

Dec. 18 —[An unidentified subordinate commander in the Long Beach-Torrance area wanted Stilwell to evacuate all Japanese from Terminal Island and to take other measures against the civilian population]. “We talked to midnight,” Stilwell wrote, “by which time he was pretty well calmed down.”

Dec. 19 —[Stilwell tries to soothe the fears of an Air Corps Lt. Col. in charge of a bombing range in the Mojave Desert] ”...he was fearful of a parachute attack that would come in off carriers or from a secret base in Lower California, and murder them all. Or Japs from Los Angeles could sneak up and sabotage everything...(P.S. The colonel has seen some suspicious signaling with flashlights.)
This situation has produced some strange cases of jitters. Common sense is thrown to the winds and any absurdity is believed.

The wild, farcical and fantastic stuff that G-2 Fourth Army pushes out!

Just before Christmas Stillwell was transferred to Washington; shortly after arrival there he noted that Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, Deputy Commander, Army Ground Forces had told him that "DeWitt has gone crazy and requires ten refusals before he realizes it is 'No'."

It was in this panic-ridden, amateurish Western Defense Command atmosphere that some of the most crucial decisions about the evacuation were made. Before discussing them, I should point out, as many of you no doubt realize, that the nearest Japanese aircraft during most of December were attacking Wake Island, more than 5,000 miles west of San Francisco, and any major Japanese surface vessels or troops were even farther away. In fact, elements of the Luftwaffe over the North Atlantic were actually closer to California than any Imperial Japanese planes. But despite the patent absurdity of these fears, it is axiomatic that misconceptions, when acted upon, may become even more significant than the reality that they distort.

The official Army history of the evacuation — written by Stetson Conn, a talented civilian historian in the office of the Chief of Military History — gives us additional insights into Gen. DeWitt's confusion. On December 19 DeWitt formally proposed to the War Department that alien Japanese 14 years of age and older be removed from the West Coast and that these individuals "be held under restraint after removal...in order to preclude their surreptitious return." DeWitt felt on the 19th that these 40,000 persons constituted an immediate and potential menace to vital measures of defense."

A week later, the Provost Marshall General of the War Department, Major General Allen W. Gullion, the Army's top cop, a service intellectual had once read a paper to an International Congress of Judicial Experts on the "present state of international law regarding the protection of civilians from the new war technics," telephoned DeWitt and told him that he (Gullion) had just been visited in Washington by a representative of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce who asked that all Japanese in the L.A. area be rounded up. DeWitt was opposed to this and told General Gullion that:
"I'm very doubtful that it would be common sense procedure to try and intern 117,000 Japanese in this theatre. . . . An American citizen, after all, is an American citizen. And while they all may not be loyal, I think we can weed the disloyal out of the loyal and lock them up if necessary."

At about the same time — late December — DeWitt opposed a pet Army project — to have control over enemy aliens transferred from the Justice Department to the War Department. This was apparently instigated in the Provost Marshal General's office by an empire-building lawyer in uniform, the then Major Karl R. Bendetsen, Stanford man who arranged his military career so that he stayed in the United States throughout the war. Bendetsen and his chief, General Gullion, continually pushed General DeWitt to adopt their point of view. Engaged in a bureaucratic battle with Attorney General Francis Biddle to transfer the enemy aliens from civilian to military control, from due process to martial law, they apparently felt they could win only if a field commander declared that such a transfer was a military necessity.

General DeWitt, not a strong character, as well have seen, soon got the message. By mid-January he was telling the War Department that any raid on the West coast would be accompanied by "a violent outburst of coordinated and controlled sabotage." On January 24 he told General Gullion that:

"The fact that nothing has happened so far is more or less ominous in that I feel that in view of the fact that we have had no sporadic attempts at sabotage there is control being exercised and when we have it it will be on a mass basis."

The next day the quickie investigation of Pearl Harbor conducted by the Roberts Commission was released. One of its erroneous conclusions was that there had been widespread espionage by Japanese residents in the islands. On January 27 DeWitt met with Governor Olson and told Washington afterwards that "the best people in California" wanted all the Japanese out. Two days later DeWitt met with California Attorney General Earl Warren, a Republican who was then preparing his campaign that would retire Olson in November. Warren, the General told Washington, was in thorough agreement with the Governor that the Japanese population should be removed from the coastal areas. In this same conversation, DeWitt, for the first time, joined the growing concensus for a mass evacuation of aliens and citizens, and came around to the Provost Marshall's view that the mili-
tary should have charge of enemy aliens, at least within the Western Defense Command. In the same conversation, Bendetsen told DeWitt that, without authorization from his civilian chiefs, he was meeting with California and other Western congressmen and reporting DeWitt’s new views to them. The legislators were organizing under the aegis of Hiram J. Johnson, California’s senior senator who organized a similar ad hoc steering committee in the 1920s to get Japanese exclusion. What Bendetsen was actually doing was telling the western congressmen that the way to get what both he and they wanted — the removal of all Japanese from the West Coast — was to undercut the Attorney General Francis Biddle, a civil libertarian, but not, in this instance, a fighter. Biddle was also being undercut by one of his own subordinates, Tom C. Clark, who was the Justice Department’s Coordinator for enemy aliens on the west coast.

In early February DeWitt told Washington that what the California authorities really wanted was to move the Japanese to interior agricultural areas of the state to avoid the possible influx of Mexican and Negroes to replace them if they were completely removed. DeWitt thought that this proposal was consistent with “military necessity” as he understood it. By this time the Provost Marshall’s proposal had drifted up the chain of command to the civilian leadership of the department — Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and his Assistant Secretary, John J. McCloy. Both of these men were eastern establishment Republicans brought into the administration as a unity move. On February 3, the civilians, in the words of General Mark Clark, were “pretty much against interfering with citizens unless it can be done legally.” Despite the apparent disavowal of their civilian chief, Gullion and Bendetsen continued to assume, correctly as it turned out, that they would get their own way in the end.

On February 6, Gullion and Bendetsen rejected DeWitt’s California-oriented suggestions about resettlement within the state — in the words of the key Provost Marshall memorandum on the subject because it contained “too much of the spirit of Rotary” and ignored “the necessary cold-bloodedness of war.” Instead Gullion and Bendetsen formally recommended to the civilian Assistant Secretary McCloy that all alien Japanese be interned east of the Sierra Nevadas with as many citizen members of their families as would voluntarily accompany them, and the exclusion of the remaining citizen Japanese from precisely those areas of the West Coast where most of them lived. The next day, February 7th, Stimson and McCloy, who only four days previously were “pretty much against it,” had somehow become converted to the Bendetsen-Gullion view. Perhaps they had become convinced that it was “pretty much legal.” At any rate, by the 7th,
McCloy had decided to send Lt. Col. Bendetsen (he had just been promoted) to the West Coast "to confer with General DeWitt in connection with the mass evacuation of all Japanese." Three days later, Attorney General Biddle, who made a poor fight in a good cause, indicated that he was ready to throw in the sponge, but insisted that the Army would have to do its own dirty work.

The conflict at the Cabinet level necessitated an appeal to the Commander-in-Chief, whose final approval would have been heeded anyway. On Wednesday, February 11, 1942 — the real day of infamy as far as the constitution was concerned — Stimson and McCloy went to the White House just after lunch. They presented Franklin Roosevelt a brief memorandum which listed four alternatives and is worth quoting in full:

1. Is the President willing to authorize us to move Japanese citizens as well as aliens from restricted areas?

2. Should we undertake withdrawal from the entire strip DeWitt originally recommended, which involves a number of over 100,000 people, if we included both aliens and Japanese citizens?

3. Should be undertake the intermediate step involving, say 70,000, which includes large communities such as Los Angeles, San Diego and Seattle?

4. Should we take any lesser step such as the establishment of restricted areas around airplane plants and critical installations, even though General DeWitt states that in several, at least, of the large communities this would be wasteful, involve difficult administration problems, and might be a source of more continuous irritation and trouble than 100 percent withdrawal from the area?

President Roosevelt refused to choose. In a conference that lasted less than an hour, the decision making power was passed to two men who had never been elected to any office. "We have carte blanche to do what we want as far as the President is concerned," McCloy telephoned Bendetsen at the Presidio. According to the Assistant Secretary, FDR's only qualification was, "Be as reasonable as you can."

Why did he do it? No historian can ever answer, definitively, that kind of question, but every historian worth his salt must at least
try. Nothing anyone can say in explanation however, can expiate. No doctrine of historical relativism can absolve Franklin Roosevelt from having done what he himself knew was wrong. But the student of history must also try to understand what forces were at work. February, 1942, was not a good time for the United States. The Japanese had landed on the island of Singapore on February 8, on New Britain on the 9th, and were advancing rapidly on Burma. FDR was concerned, first of all, with winning the war, and secondly, with unity at home, so that he, unlike Wilson, could win the peace with the advice and consent of the Senate. He could read the congressional signs well and knew that cracking down on the Japanese-Americans would be popular both on the Hill and with the nation at large. And the last thing he wanted was a rift with establishment Republicans like Stimson and McCloy. So do what you think you have to do to win the war, he told the civilian spokesmen for the military. And one can imagine, perhaps just as they were leaving the great Oval Office where so much of our history has been made, that lionine head lifting up and with the politician’s charm and equivocation saying, “Be as reasonable as you can.” Thus do great and good men do evil acts in the name of the good. The closest historical analogy that comes to mind is Lincoln’s amoral insistence, at the start of the Civil War, that preservation of the union was central and slavery peripheral to the nation’s war aims. But the very centrality of slavery slowly but surely asserted itself despite the politicians, and the war for the union did become, in Mrs. Howe’s prophetic words, a “fight to make men free.”

But the 110,000 Japanese who were sent, eventually, to ten God-forsaken camps in the name of a fictitious military necessity remained merely an incident of global war. Outside the West Coast the internment received very little notice and I suspect that during the war years most Americans east of the Rockies were only vaguely aware of it. The Japanese went quietly and voluntarily, as they had been counseled to do by most of their leaders. Schedules were posted and published, and they went, in the same quiet law abiding manner they had lived their lives up to then. But were they being law-abiding? Was the evacuation, necessary or not, legal? Stimson and McCloy had been satisfied that it was “pretty much legal,” the President signed the executive orders, but what would the Supreme Court say? In the months ahead, the Court had three separate chances to strike down the legality of the evacuation, but instead the court merely struck out as far as civil liberties were concerned.

The first case, Hirabayashi, involved curfew violation. Gordon Hirabayashi, native son, was arrested and convicted for refusing to obey a curfew order by General DeWitt. In a decision handed down
on June 21, 1943 — North Africa had been liberated but we were still fighting in the Solomons — the court upheld the General rather than the citizen. Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, speaking for a non-dissenting but uneasy court, argued that:22

"We cannot close our eyes to the fact demonstrated by experience, that in time of war residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry."

The second and third case — Korematsu and Endo — were handed down in Christmas week of 1944, when final victory in the war seemed assured. Fred Korematsu had simply refused to report, and so was arrested. The court also refused to judge. Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority insisted that:23

Korematsu was not excluded from the Military area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily and finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders — as inevitably it must — determined that they should have the power to do just this. There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered that the need for action was great, and time was short. We cannot — by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight — now say that these actions were unjustified.

In a pithier concurrence, Justice William O. Douglas simply said:

"We cannot sit in judgement on the military requirements of that hour."

Three justices, however, did so sit and found the judgment bad. Owen J. Roberts, Frank Murphy and Robert L. Jackson all dissented sharply with their brethren. Justice Murphy, I think, had the best of it, when he simply and bluntly characterized Black’s majority decision as "a legalization of racism."
The third case involved Mitsuye Endo, a twenty-two year old native daughter of undisputed loyalty with a brother in the Armed forces. She went off to camp, as ordered, but on July 13, 1942, filed for a writ of habeas corpus. Two years and four months later — she was still in camp — the Court ordered her release but refused to inquire into the constitutional question of how she got there, much to the disgust of Justice Murphy and Roberts. Thus, if anyone asks you about the legal status of concentration camps requested by the military, established by executive order and eventually sanctioned by Congress, tell him simply to go quietly and file a writ of habeas corpus upon arrival — but warn him that he may have to wait a long time on the docket.

The Court thus made obeisance to the doctrine of “military necessity,” in itself a dubious extra-legal criteria. But there was no “military necessity.” As we now know, our top military planners did not fear an invasion of the West Coast in 1942, and the Japanese high command never even contemplated one. Is this just the exercise of what Justice Black called the “calm perspective of hindsight”? No, it is not; there was ample evidence available at the time, most glaringly in the differential treatment given Hawaii and the West Coast. The West Coast was a war zone only by virtue of proclamation; Hawaii had been struck by war, and would certainly have been occupied as a necessary prelude to any invasion of the continental United States. In Hawaii, persons of Japanese ancestry constituted roughly one-third of the population: Yet there was no military necessity to round them up. Without the crutch of “military necessity,” the shaky legal underpinnings of the evacuation collapse completely, and we are left with Justice Murphy’s bitter analysis — racism legalized.

This then, is how it happened here. What happened in the camps, and after, is the task of my colleagues. But I promised initially to pursue the even bigger question of why it happened. The answers to that question have to be sought in the years before Pearl Harbor, rather than in the months after it. The answers must be sought first of all, in the whole American racist tradition, a tradition that starts almost, but not quite, with our history. For racial prejudice, as opposed to mistrust of strangers, or ethnocentrism or tribalism, is a new world phenomena. The Elizabethans who first settled America brought with them no settled notions of white supremacy. John Rolfe was quite willing to marry Pocohantas — even though she had cavorted naked before almost all the English — and take her back home to England under the deluded notion that he was somehow marrying into the nobility and thus improving himself. But most Americans soon learned to despise tawny Indian Women — except for intercourse and
work — as they learned to despise, shortly after 1619, the blacks whom they originally treated as indentured servants, but quickly enslaved. And having enslaved them would proceed to construct a new cosmography of racial separateness, superiority and inferiority that eventually included yellow men and then branched off into whole solar systems of ethnic acceptability.

Second, there was the California racist tradition: a tradition based first of all on conquest of a civilized as opposed to an uncivilized people, a tradition that nearly exterminated the real native sons, the Indians, and made the Californians second class citizens in their own land. Woven into the fabric of the California tradition was mob violence, disguised as a passion for law and order, plus the typical inferiority-superiority complex of the developing but still tributary area: blatant braggadocio coupled with constant whining about being misunderstood and mistreated by the powers that be, back east.

And finally, most important of all, but dependent on the other two, was the anti-Oriental tradition. 

California and much of the West both demanded and deplored Oriental labor in their decades of primary development. Chinese did much of the basic construction of the early western railroads; in the heavily masculine western cities they did laundry, cooking and other women’s work. When, during the slack years of the business cycle of the late 19th century, white workingmen became unemployed in large numbers, they turned their wrath more on their Oriental competitors than on the employers who exploited them both. No one will ever know how many Chinese were killed in the West from the 1850’s to the 1890’s, but in a single night in 1871 in the sleepy town that was Los Angeles, about twenty Chinese were murdered by a mob that must have included a significant percentage of the white male citizenry. By the middle seventies, anti-Orientalism was as firmly engraved on California politics as white supremacy was on Southern politics after 1890. It was almost automatic that this fear transferred itself from group to group. Filipinos, Koreans and East Indians all felt California’s special brand of discrimination, but the real enemy for most white Californians from 1905 to 1945 was, of course the Japanese — man, woman or child, alien or citizen.

To the Californian — and here I am speaking of the majority, there was obviously a minority that felt otherwise — the Japanese was a special devil — inferior but also superior, distinctly and untermensch but with frightening ubermenschlich characteristics. Sly, treacherous, hard-working, the Japanese could thrive where a white man could starve. And breed! One fanatic Japanophobe — who happened to be a newspaper publisher and a director of the Associated Press — predicted that with a modest quota plus their allegedly phenomenal
birthrate Japanese population would climb to 500,000 in the 1930’s, 900,000 in the 1940’s, 2,000,000 in 1963, 10,000,000 in 2003, and, for a real population explosion, 100,000,000 in 2063. More soberly, V.S. McClatchy argued:

"The Japanese are less assimilable and more dangerous as residents in this country than any other people... With great pride of race, they have no idea of assimilating in the sense of amalgamation. They do not come here with any desire or any intent to lose their racial or national identity. They come here specifically and professedly for the purpose of colonizing and establishing here permanently the proud Yamato race. They never cease being Japanese... In pursuit of their intent to colonize this country with that race they seek to secure land and to establish large families... They have greater energy and greater determination, and greater ambition than the other yellow and brown races... California regards herself as a frontier State. She has been making for 20 years the fight of the nation against the incoming of alien races whose peaceful penetration must in time with absolute certainty drive the white race to the wall, and prior to that time inevitably provoke international trouble across the Pacific."

Added to these fears about Japanese immigrants, there was that phenomenon known as the "yellow peril" — the fear of invasion by armed Oriental hordes. This started out as almost pure fantasy: the first yellow peril books in the 1870s and 1880s feared China, in the 19th century a victim rather than a predator. After 1895, it was clear to most that Japan was the real power in the Far East. After a European power, Czarist Russia, was defeated in the Russo-Japanese War, the yellow peril literature began to proliferate. Literally hundreds of books, most of them utterly devoid of any literary or intellectual merit, were written on this theme; there were also movies, articles and even whole pulp magazines devoted to imaginary invasions. In the popular press, particularly the papers of William Randolph Hearst, the shrill warnings about the menace of Japan became an integral part of editorial policy. By the end of World War I, the threat of a coming Pacific War, a war of the races, was part of the conscious intellectual equipment of almost all Americans. When, in the 1930s, Japan began the truly atrocious phase of her imperial expansion into East Asia, the fantasy image seemed to merge with the historical reality.
In short, as the winter of 1941 approached, the American mind was ready to believe anything — literally anything — about Japan and her people. Fear and contempt, as we have been, were strangely mixed. When, after a stunning and unfair blow, Japan scored success after success, it is not at all surprising that men were able to convince themselves that the evacuation was necessary. Naturally, the overwhelming majority of Americans who were aware of it, approved it, and would have approved worse. It has even been argued that the evacuation was a good thing, because it prevented the mass violence against Japanese-Americans that many feel would surely have come. Perhaps. It seems to me however, that using our prejudice to distort due process was, in some ways at least, worse than the mob violence that might have occurred but didn’t. The evacuation did more than commit a legal atrocity against 110,000 innocent people; measured against the total human cost of World War II that wasn’t so very much. Perhaps even more important, as the late Morton Grodzins put it, was that the evacuation gave “precedent and constitutional sanctity for a policy of mass incarceration under military auspices... That... betrayed all Americans.”

Who was responsible for this betrayal? The question of responsibility has been argued back and forth, and will be again. California pressure groups — The American Legion, the Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West, The State Grange, The State Federation of Labor, all played their role, as did politicians. General DeWitt, the Army, Secretary Stimson and President Roosevelt have all been blamed. It can also be argued that history itself was really responsible. But men make history, and surely the names of all the leading culprits have been mentioned in this paper. But nearly unnoticed in all this has been the rather Prussian tradition in America that in wartime generals should become the arbiters of all things. The great French war leader, George Clemenceau once said that “War is too important to be left to the generals.” No American war leader could say such a thing publicly. But for this particular military atrocity, however, I would amend the statement to read: “Wartime decisions of military necessity are too important to be formulated by second rank bureaucrats.” Clearly Bendetsen and his chief Gullion shaped policy and set the stage for the betrayal that was executed by their superiors. Bendetsen, who received the Distinguished Service Medal from a grateful nation for efficiently incarcerating his fellow Americans, admitted (perhaps the right word is boasted) that he “conceived method, formulated details and directed” the mass evacuation of the West Coast Japanese. America has so far been spared from the man on horseback; perhaps what it really has to fear is the middle-echelon manipulator behind the desk.
FOOTNOTES


3. As reported in the Los Angeles Times, May 1, 1961.


5. L.A. Times, December 8, 1941, p. "A."


8. L.A. Times, December 9, 1941, p. 3.


12. L.A. Times, December 25, 1941, p. 8. The precise figure was 2,944 of whom 1,473 were Japanese, 1,243 Germans, and 228 Italians. In 1942, a few additional handfuls were interned on an individual basis.


21. Conn, loc.cit.; for the earlier period see Daniels, Politics of Prejudice, p. 96.

22. Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81; for critical comment see f.n. 1, above; for an explication of the majority view, see Alphaeus T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone, N.Y., Viking, 1956, pp. 672–682.


25. Most of what follows is from Daniels, Politics of Prejudice, the long quote is on p. 99.

Manzanar

Dust storms
Sweat days
Yellow people
Exiles...

I am the mountain that kisses the sky in the dawning,
I watched the day when these, your people, came into your heart,
Tired
Bewildered,
Embittered.

I saw you accept them with compassion, impassive but visible.
Life of a thousand teemed within your bosom.
A thousand that hated and feared you.
Silently, you received and bore them
Daily you fed them from your breast
Nightly you soothed them to forgetful slumber
Guardian and keeper of the unwanted.

They say your people are wanton
Saboteurs
Haters of white men
Spies
Yet I have seen them go forth to die for their only country,
America

I have seen them look with beautiful eyes at nature.
And know the pathos of their tearful laughter
Choked with enveloping mists of the dust storms
Pant with the heat of sweat-days; still laughing.
Their only sin, their faces
Exiles.

And I say to those you harbor and those on the exterior
'Scoff, if you must, but the dawn is approaching
When these, who have learned and suffered in silent courage,
Better and wiser for the unforgettable interlude of detention.

Shall trod on free sod again
Side by side peacefully with those who sneered at the
Dust storms
Sweat days
Yellow people
Exiles.....
LIFE IN THE RELOCATION CENTER

WHAT ARE THE CAMPS LIKE?

The Granada Relocation Center at Amache, Colorado is typical of the ten camps in seven Western states in which evacuated Japanese Americans are living. The centers are managed by a civilian agency, the War Relocation Authority, appointed by the President for this job. A company of military police is stationed at each center to control entrance and exits. The total cost of maintenance of the evacuees in the centers and administration of the centers is borne by the Federal Government.

The buildings are of a temporary type of construction described as "so very cheap that, frankly, if it stands up for the duration we are going to be lucky." They are grouped in blocks, each composed of twelve residential barracks, a recreation hall (usually used for offices), and two large community buildings containing latrines, laundry, showers, kitchen, and mess hall. Thirty or more such blocks make up a center, usually surrounded by a barbed-wired fence, with military guard towers at intervals.

Residential barracks are 120×20 feet, divided into six one-room apartments, ranging in size from 16×20 to 20×24 feet, with from two to seven people housed in each room. They come equipped only with bed, blankets, and stove. Population at the Granada Center, smallest of the ten, was 7,620 in April, 1943, of whom more than two-thirds are American citizens — born and reared in this country. Most of the 2,123 aliens came here as laborers and merchants in the early 1900's, and have not been allowed to become citizens. About half the population came from rural areas, the other half is urban, and their occupations before evacuation embrace practically every phase of American life.

School children make up one-quarter of the population with 1,909 persons registered from nursery school through high school. Classes taught by both Caucasian and Japanese American teachers are
held in barracks with meager equipment. School buildings are now going up at some centers.

THIRTY EIGHT CENTS A DAY

Food is served in community mess halls, cafeteria style. Cost of meals for all relocation centers have averaged not more than forty-five cents per person, and there is rationing just as there is outside. Describing the food in one Center, a California newsmen wrote: "It is substantial, healthy, and not very appetizing. It is a combination of American and Japanese dishes, and tastes like something bought for about thirty-eight cents a day — which is what it happens to cost. They have no butter, but apparently plenty of margarine, and enough tea to serve it twice a day. Meatless days come at least three times a week."

Employment is offered about half of Granada's population in twenty-five different departments, and the pay ranges from $12.00 to $19.00 a month even for the highest skills, with the government bearing the brunt of maintenance. There are farms at all the centers, employing many people. This typical relocation center had a 150-bed hospital, a biweekly newspaper, fire and police departments, and an elected community council to handle minor governmental functions. Cooperative stores, with 2,387 members, gross more than $40,000.00 per month.

PATERNALISTIC DEMOCRACIES

Set up to receive people evacuated from Pacific Coast areas, the ten relocation centers were to have been self-supporting paternalistic democracies. As nearly half of the evacuees of working age had agricultural experience, it was hoped that they could raise all their own food and a surplus as well, with some industries thrown in to make the communities as self-sufficient as possible. Plans were formulated for limited self-government, for schools under advanced education methods, for stores cooperatively operated by and for the community. In short, far-sighted War Relocation Authority policy sought to undo as much of the harm caused by the evacuation as possible.

Actual practice has fallen short of these ideals. The inhospitable locations of the relocation centers, the low wage scale, the rising demand for resettlement outside the centers, the pressures against the WRA, and deep psychological factors have all worked to modify original plans and ideals. It is now realized that no matter how well planned and administered, a camp in which one racial group is segregated is
an un-American and unhealthy thing. Thus the WRA is now bending its policy toward resettlement outside the centers.

**ROASTON, TOASTON and DUSTON**

The location of the centers alone has been enough to deny any possibility that they might speedily become self-supporting. The Hearst columnist who in the early days of the war wanted these people moved into the interior — ’’and I don’t mean a nice part of the interior, either’’ — certainly got his wish. At Poston, Arizona, site of the largest center (Population 20,000), the three sections of the camp were nicknamed Roaston, Toaston, and Duston, and the names tell the truth about most of the centers, where desert heat and dust are bywords in summer. The camps have the hardships of the typical frontier community — mud, inadequate housing, physical hardship, and subjugation of desert land, but without the zest and self-interest of voluntary pioneering.

Factors beyond control of the War Relocation Authority probably forced these locations, for a center had to be away from military zones but near adequate transportation and power, had to have agricultural possibilities on land owned or controlled by the government (to prevent speculation), but could not displace already existing white settlers. Coupled with these restrictions was vigorous local opposition wherever the War Relocation Authority went. Typical of the ignorant prejudice of every Western state was Idaho Governor Clark’s statement: ’’Japs live like rats, breed like rats, and act like rats. We don’t want them buying or leasing land and becoming permanently located in our state.’’ The result was that with limited exceptions the relocation centers were established where nobody else wanted to live: Western desert, arid Great Plains or cut-over parts of Arkansas.

Resentment at the low wage scales is another factor that has disrupted relocation center life. The evacuees employed at the centers receive $19.00 a month for skilled or professional labor, $12.00 for ”apprentices,” with the great majority getting $16.00 a month. In addition, all those in the centers receive meals costing not over forty-five cents a day and minimum housing. It is natural that American citizens and aliens convicted of no crime should resent such substandard pay. This feeling is accentuated because Caucasians working within the Centers receive standard pay. Thus many white school teachers receive in the neighborhood of $2,000.00 a year, but an accredited Japanese American teacher doing the same job, will get but $19.00 a month. These low wage scales mean that many families are using up their reserves and that many others face destitution. The drab-
ness of much of the work, coupled with these small allowances, offers no individual incentive, and many persons find time hanging heavily on their hands.

In the early days of detention, a little girl saw a dog trying to climb through the barbed-wire fence into an Assembly Center. "Don't come in here, little dog," she cried. "You won't be able to go back to America." That thought more than anything else explains the failure of the relocation center as a way of life. Evacuation has created or accentuated psychological and mental attitudes that do far more harm than physical suffering or hardship.

TOO OLD TO START AGAIN

Evacuation effectively smashed the hopes and dreams of both old and young. The older, alien Japanese, although themselves denied the right to become American citizens, have helped build America and have sacrificed their lives so that their children might enjoy the fruits of American citizenship. Evacuation has meant for them a bitter realization of failure. The discrimination against their children has caused them intense suffering; and for themselves separated from the homes and jobs of a lifetime, they know they are too old to start again.

PROMISES FREELY MADE AND FREELY BROKEN

For the younger American citizen of Japanese ancestry the disappointment has been as sharp. As Rep. Clifron A. Woodrum of Virginia observed, "There has been a terrific dislocation for those who are American citizens. They were picked up body and baggage and moved out, and I imagine it would have a severe psychological effect upon a man who was really a loyal American citizen."

The insecurity of not knowing what will happen next is the most pronounced characteristic of both aliens and citizens in the relocation centers. Property losses before and during the evacuation, the sense of constantly being pushed about, change of official policy, government promises freely given and freely broken — all these have bred a fear and cynicism that bodes no good for the future. There is ample basis for this insecurity. A young American born farmer who lived on the California coast was urged by the Army to move voluntarily out of the zone that was to be evacuated. He moved to an inland part of the State, bought a farm, put in his crops, and sent for his family. Then the Army changed its mind, the remaining part of
California was frozen, and he was evacuated. Many thousands like this young man moved in accordance with requests only to be caught by later changes of policy.

COST IS TOO HIGH

The cost in money and manpower has been high. The first year of evacuation cost some $210,000,000, plus the services of many soldiers and thousands of workers, including skilled administrators, needed elsewhere in a time of manpower shortage. In addition, close to 50,000 of those evacuated had been employed at useful labor, nearly half of them in agriculture, where they are so desperately needed today.

WHAT ABOUT THE FUTURE

Two courses are open. One is to continue and expand the individual resettlement program already started, with the end of getting all those who are loyal out of the relocation centers and back into American life. It would involve eventual return of some of the people to the Pacific Coast as soon as the military considers that safe, but for economic reasons most of the people probably will not return to the Coast. Such a resettlement policy, coupled with adequate government protection and the economic means to start life again, would be a fair and sensible solution to the problem. The net result would be the distribution of this tiny minority of one-tenth of one percent of our population throughout the country, where re-absorption into American life would be rapidly completed.

ANTI-JAPANESE CAMPAIGN

The alternative is seen in the vigorous anti-Japanese campaign now in full swing in California and its repercussions, which are being felt throughout the country. This movement has three objectives: (1) to return control of Japanese Americans from the WRA to the Army, apparently with the hope that Americans of Japanese parentage can then be used as forced labor gangs at low cost; (2) to deprive American citizens of Japanese ancestry of their citizenship; (3) to prevent Japanese Americans from re-entering California.

The consequences for success for this anti-Japanese American effort for those people would be catastrophic both for the Japanese Americans and for Americans generally. Former Governor Carr of Colorado has accurately described the situation in these words:
‘‘If we do not extend humanity’s kindness and understanding to these people (evacuees), if we deny them the protection of the Bill of Rights, if we say they may be denied the privilege of living in any of the forty-eight states, and force them into concentration camps without hearing or charge of misconduct, then we are tearing down the whole American system. If these people are not to be accorded all the rights and privileges which the Constitution gives them, then those same rights and privileges may be denied to you and me six months from now for another just as poor reason as the one which is now offered against the Japanese.’’
1. Out of the desert's bosom, storm swept with wind and dust,  
   Out of smiles and curses, of tears and cries forlorn;  
   Mixed with broken laughter, forced because they must;  
   Toil, sweat and bleeding wounds, red and raw and torn.  
   Out on the desert's bosom — a new town is born.

2. Dust clouds, like brown smoke, rose and swirl and blow  
   From hidden lairs in icy crags, towering high,  
   Like hungry pack of wolves, the gale sweeps low,  
   Fangs sharp and bared, shrieking to the sky;  
   The guardian peaks emerge, serene and high.

3. Summer, with long, parched nights and days;  
   And heaven's bowl a shimmering blue of heat;  
   The thirsty hills are choked. The sun's hot blaze  
   Before encroaching autumn, once more retreats.  
   King Winter reigns upon his icy seat.

4. A year is gone. A quickening in the air;  
   The desert stirs beneath the freshening rain.  
   The scent of sage, the wild rose perfume rare,  
   The tumbling brooks break forth in glad refrain;  
   Another Spring — perhaps new hope, new life again.

Shinkai
“Segregation of Persons of Japanese Ancestry in Relocation Centers” was the title of a printed brochure distributed by the War Relocation Authority outlining procedures of segregation of all persons of Japanese ancestry without regard to citizenship. The following excerpts are taken from this brochure and published here for those who may not be familiar with this particular incident of the internment program.

SEGREGATION OF PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY IN RELOCATION CENTERS

In determining which persons will be required to transfer to the Tule Lake Center, the War Relocation Authority will consider carefully the choices which have been expressed by each individual, and all evidence which indicates whether or not his acts support his statement.

In recognition of the fact that many alien-born evacuees are prevented from being loyal American citizens by legal technicalities, and that some individuals who legally are American citizens actually are sympathetic to Japan in the present war, the process of segregation will be conducted without regard to citizenship.

One of the most important sources of information which will be considered will be the answer given by each individual to Question 28 in the registration conducted in each relocation center during February and March, 1943. In this question each American citizen of Japanese ancestry was asked if he would swear loyalty to the United States and forswear loyalty to all other countries; each alien was asked if he would abide by the laws of the United States and do nothing to interfere with his nation’s war effort. In this discussion of the segregation program, these alternate questions will be referred to jointly as “Question 28.”

GROUPS OF EVACUEES

For purposes of consideration for segregation the residents of relocation centers fall into four major groups:

GROUP I. Persons who will be designated for segregation without further hearing. This group includes those persons who made formal application for repatriation or expatriation before July 1, 1943, and did not retract their applications before that date.

GROUP II. Those persons who, on the strength of their answers to Question 28 or their refusal to answer the question, would appear to be loyal to Japan rather than to the United States. Each of these
persons will be asked to appear before a Board of Review for Segregation which will ascertain whether the evidence of pro-Japanese loyalty correctly represents the attitude of the individual. This group includes those who answered "No" to Question 28 and who did not change their answers to "Yes" before July 15, 1943; those who refused to register; those who registered but did not answer Question 28.

GROUP III. Those persons who may have stated their loyalty to or sympathy with the United States, but whose loyalty or sympathy is in doubt because of previous statements or because of other evidence.

Persons in Group III will be given the Leave Clearance Hearing at the relocation center to decide whether or not they should be declared eligible for leave.

GROUP IV. Those who are eligible for leave. (Not to be segregated.)

WHO WILL GO TO TULE LAKE CENTER

The following persons will be moved to Tule Lake Center:

a. All those in Group I;
b. Those in Group II found by the Board of Review to be not loyal or sympathetic to the United States;
c. Those in Group III found to be not eligible for leave will go to Tule Lake only after clearance has been denied by the Director.
d. Those eligible for leave who express a wish to live in Tule Lake Center in order to be with members of their immediate families. Permission for such voluntary transfer to Tule Lake Center may be granted, after an interview by the Welfare Section.

WHO WILL REMAIN AT THE RELOCATION CENTER

After the segregation program has been completed, all persons remaining in the Relocation Centers will be eligible for leave and the WRA will continue its efforts to assist those persons to move outside and resettle into normal American communities.

WHY TULE LAKE WAS CHOSEN

The Tule Lake Center in Northern California was selected as the segregation center for four reasons:
1. With a capacity of over 15,000 persons it is expected to be able to accommodate all those who will be segregated;
2. The farm is well developed and will provide food and employment on a large scale for residents of the center;
3. The Tule Lake Center has more residents who will be designated for segregation, thus reducing the total number of persons to be moved in the segregation process;
4. The center is located in the evacuated area where escort requirements have increased the cost and difficulty of outside relocation.

OPERATION OF THE TULE LAKE CENTER

The War Relocation Authority will have full responsibility for operation of the Tule Lake Center, as at present. While many details are yet to be determined, it is expected that the Tule Lake Center will continue to operate under the same general policies which apply to relocation centers, with two notable exceptions:

1. Residents of the Tule Lake Center will not be eligible for leave;
2. Facilities which provide for self-government of the community will not apply, but there will be a representative advisory council of evacuees. Otherwise, the Tule Lake Center will be similar to relocation centers.

As at relocation centers, the Army will be responsible for external security, and it is planned to have the internal security maintained by the residents themselves under the system used at present in the relocation centers.

Because the Tule Lake Center lies within the Western Defense Command, certain articles such as short-wave radios and cameras are prohibited as contraband.

American elementary and high schools will be provided as at relocation centers. However, parents of children will have the opportunity to decide whether they wish their children to attend such schools. Any other schools desired by the evacuees will have to be established and operated without cost to the United States government.

There will be freedom of religion at the Tule Lake Center, but since State Shinto is not regarded by the Japanese government as a religion it will not be permitted.
There will be a hospital and an adequate health program. There will be legal services and assistance in property matters. No restraints will be placed on leisure time function so long as they do not interfere with the peace and security of the center.

There will be a community newspaper in Japanese or English, or both, if desired. Employment will be voluntary and at the same rate of pay, including clothing allowances, as in relocation centers. Unemployment compensation and public assistance grants will be paid. The WRA will supply work clothing for special types of workers.

As in relocation centers, housing generally will be by families.

RIGHT OF APPEAL

In order to provide means for correcting any injustices which may result from the segregation process, an Appeals Board will be established to consider cases of persons living in the Tule Lake Center after the segregation is completed. A resident of the center who feels that he was unjustly assigned to this center may make application to the Appeals Board for a hearing. At this hearing the applicant will have an opportunity to present his case fully. The Appeals Board will have the authority to recommend that the person be permitted to transfer to a relocation center.

Persons living voluntarily in Tule Lake Center after the segregation process who wish to transfer to a relocation center also may apply to the Appeals Board for permission to do so.

MISCELLANEOUS

Citizenship of persons transferred to or voluntarily residing in Tule Lake Center is not affected under present laws.

The status of American citizens who have applied for expatriation remaining in the United States after the end of the war cannot be foretold. It will depend upon post-war treaties, acts of Congress and interpretation of present law.

In the event that Selective Service should become operative for American citizens of Japanese ancestry, it is presumed that no exception would be made of American citizens living in the Tule Lake Center.
OUSTER OF ALL JAPS IN CALIFORNIA NEAR!

San Francisco Examiner 6 AM EXTRA


OUSTER OF ALL JAPS IN CALIFORNIA NEAR!

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WHY RELOCATE?

WAGES AND THE COST OF LIVING

After a year in a relocation center it takes some adjustment to return to the normalcy of outside living. But the problems of the evacuees are not as unique or difficult as they seem to the residents of these isolated relocation centers. The two great sources of anxiety to the evacuee considering resettlement are the question of meeting the cost of living and the uncertainty of community reception.

The question of whether you can support yourself and your family is not a new problem, for you have either faced and solved this problem before or you will have to do so in the future.

To assure the resettler of adequate income, all offers of work and working conditions are cleared through the Regional Relocation Offices of the WRA. Prevailing wages and acceptable working conditions are required. The cost of living is higher now than it was before evacuation, but in almost all cases wages are also higher. All resettlers have found employment which pays enough to support them, and in many cases their families as well. The cost of living would depend largely upon the standards which you wish to maintain.

PUBLIC SENTIMENT AND COMMUNITY RECEPTION

Most of the people you meet will be too concerned with their own troubles to welcome you or to make you uncomfortable. Once away from the West Coast, evacuees meet with little or no discrimination, particularly when they are willing to go half way in fitting into an American community.

You will find, moreover, that Easterners and Midwesterners are not race-conscious toward evacuees, if evacuees themselves are not race-conscious. This does not mean no resettled evacuee has encountered unpleasant incidents. In the midst of war, this would be almost too much to expect. But there have not been any serious instances of
mistreatment, and every difficulty to date has been ironed out. There will be some people whose sense of democracy has been confused by the upheaval of war. There will be many others who appreciate the significance of this war and who will be sufficiently far-sighted and understanding to more than outweigh the blindness of the others.

No one, of course, can guarantee absolute protection to anyone or anything. Experience has shown that in some cases the community needs to be "prepared" before resettlers are introduced into new areas. The sentiment of the community towards evacuees is gauged through the Field Offices and Regional Offices; and if it seems desirable to carry on preliminary public relations work, necessary steps are taken by agencies in contact with the public and the work completed before the arrival of the evacuees.

Whether you are within the barbed-wire enclosure or on the outside, there will always be the possibility of being caught in unpleasant circumstances. But it must be remembered that up to now a decidedly higher proportion of incidents involving physical harm have occurred within the camps.

**LEAVE CLEARANCE — INDEFINITE LEAVE**

Leave Clearance and Indefinite Leave procedures are designed to reassure the public of the loyalty and moral integrity of the evacuees who leave the relocation centers. These procedures serve as protection for both the resettler and the public. They help to protect the resettler from persons or groups who attempt discriminatory action or harm on the basis of race.

Indefinite Leave is permission to leave a relocation center and to resettle outside of the military areas. Indefinite leave does not expire. American citizens and aliens both are eligible for indefinite leave. Leave will be granted to citizens who are unquestionably loyal, and to aliens who are friendly to the United States.

Persons granted indefinite leave may settle anywhere outside of the military areas restricted to persons of Japanese ancestry, except for one or two small areas where there is already a large number of Japanese, and where additional Japanese might arouse public sentiment.

Under present procedures persons with clearances may obtain indefinite leave from the Project Director and travel permits from the local military authorities as soon as he has: (1) an invitation to a hostel; or (2) a definite offer of work; or (3) approval of a field office to come into a specified area to look for work; or (4) an invitation from friends or family who are resettled.
Seasonal Leave restricts the evacuee to the county for which the leave is issued and requires notice to the nearest WRA field officer of changes in employment. INDEFINITE LEAVE DOES NOT carry such restrictions. This makes it possible for the evacuee to take advantage of new work opportunities that might present themselves.

**TRAVEL ASSISTANCE GRANTS**

The WRA Travel Assistance Grant helps the evacuee to meet the cost of transportation and also the initial expenses for subsistence.

It will be given to any needy evacuee who has been granted indefinite leave to accept employment, to go to a hostel, or to join his family outside the center. It is an outright grant and need not be repaid. The grant will be given only once to each member of a family.

The total cash resources of the family are taken into consideration. WRA feels that a person or family should have coachfare plus $3.00 per day, per person, while traveling, plus subsistence expense at place of employment to $50.00 for wage earner, plus $25.00 for one dependent or plus a total of $50.00 for two or more dependents. If the family does not have the money, the WRA will provide enough to make up the difference.

**ALIEN TRAVEL**

The steps necessary for the initial move from the relocation center to the community named on the indefinite leave are the same for aliens as for all evacuees.

Aliens must notify the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the change of address.

For any subsequent move, either for trips or for change of residence an alien must file in writing a statement to the United States Attorney in his district. The U.S. Attorney must receive this travel notice seven days prior to his departure. The notice must be a detailed statement covering purpose of trip, persons to be visited, proposed intermediate and final destinations, intended date of departure, intended date of return, and the addresses or address at which the alien may be found.

If within the seven days, the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation finds no reason why the particular trip or the change of residence will endanger the national security the U.S. Attorney will stamp or write an endorsement on a copy of the statement which the alien will carry on his trip.
WHY RELOCATE NOW

The longer we stay in this artificial community, within the barbed-wire enclosure, the more difficult will it be to readjust ourselves in the world where we belong. Here we forget that we have lived among other peoples, that we have worked for our homes and food. Self-efficiency and industry, independent thinking and attitudes, work habits — all the qualities necessary to live as self-sufficient individuals degenerate in camp.

We do not pretend that relocation is a simple matter. There are many families and individuals for whom resettlement is for one reason or another impossible. But there are others among us, the majority, whose only impediment to relocation is indecision, uncertainty and fear — fear and uncertainty largely fancied and born of ignorance of the changing world outside.

NO EASY WAY OUT

There is no easy way out. Some of us dream of returning to our former communities on the coast. Suppose we were allowed to return to the West Coast tomorrow, or next week, what have we to return to? A few of us might have farms or businesses which we could take over again. But what is there for the rest of us? Nothing. What is there for us in Japan? Out future there is just as uncertain as it is in America. True, life in the center provides us with temporary security. But are we to sacrifice future security for whatever security we now have behind barbed-wire enclosures?

Evacuation is now a thing of the past. It has been our obligation to follow the course set for us by others, and the course has been a painful and trying one. We should not be expected to forget the discriminations, the prejudices, and the malice that have been directed against us. But at the same time we should not be forever embittered and disgruntled over that which cannot be undone.

Surely, our hearts have not been bled into submission. Surely, our will has not been broken and our dreams shattered. There is a place for us in America. There is a future for those who are willing to assume responsibilities for it. Temporary hardships might be necessary to win a better tomorrow.
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