THE EVACUATION AND RELOCATION OF PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY DURING WORLD WAR II: A HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE MANZANAR WAR RELOCATION CENTER

Historic Resource Study / Special History Study, Volume Two

MANZANAR
National Historic Site • California
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By Harlan D. Unrau

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United States Department of the Interior • National Park Service
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Despite the intervening years since World War II and the opening of previously sealed government records, it is little known that evacuees in all ten relocation centers persistently resisted the conditions in the camps. Evacuees regularly repudiated the government's Americanization program and experienced a resurgence in Japanese cultural values. They rejected WRA-imposed political and economic bureaucracy, while rejuvenating prewar Japanese patterns of community leadership. They redeployed themselves from labor projects selected by camp administrators to those regarded valuable by evacuees. Because this type of resistance was daily and incremental, rather than occasional and dramatic, it has gone largely unnoticed.

More visible, both during the war and in later studies of the period, were displays by evacuees of open resistance such as strikes and violent confrontation with WRA authorities and the military police who provided the external security for the centers. One of the most renowned examples of evacuee resistance during the evacuation and relocation center period was the violent event, variously termed or described as an "incident," "riot," or "revolt," that occurred at Manzanar on December 6, 1942.1

HISTORY

Events of December 5-6, 19422

Assault on Fred Tayama. On Saturday evening, December 5, 1942, at about 8:00 P.M., Fred Tayama, a Nisei evacuee at Manzanar, was assaulted in his apartment (Block 28, Building 11, Apartment 3) by six masked men. He was taken to the camp hospital and, when questioned there by Ralph P. Merritt, who had become Project Director at Manzanar on November 24, gave the following account:3

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He had just finished a shower and was in his apartment alone, lying face down on his bed with the light on, using a Japanese-American dictionary for the preparation of a speech he was to make, reporting on the happenings of the recent JACL conference in Salt Lake City. There was a knock on the door. Thinking it was a friend, Tayama said "Come in" without looking up. Six masked men entered, at least one of them carrying a club. The masks were black cloths drawn tightly across the face just below the eyes and tied behind the head. Caps pulled low over the eyes completed the disguise. Three men went on each side of the bed. Tayama was struck on the head and arms with the club. He rolled out of bed and engaged three of the men. A young girl passing outside heard the noise, screamed, and the men ran away. A neighbor called the hospital and an ambulance was sent.

Although Tayama was severely beaten, his injuries, including a badly cut scalp, were painful but not serious.

Tayama, a 37-year-old Nisei who had moved with his family from Hawaii to a fruit farm in the Sacramento Valley before settling in Los Angeles before the war, had returned the previous day from Salt Lake City where he had served as the center's representative at the national convention of the Japanese American Citizens League. At the convention, Tayama had supported a proposal urging the War Department to draft Nisei for the American armed forces. Dillon Myer, the WRA director, was a guest at the convention, and many of the residents of Manzanar assumed that the director had allowed himself to become a spokesman for the JACL. Having worked closely with WRA administrators at Manzanar, Tayama was suspected by many camp evacuees as being an "ini" or informer ("dog" in Japanese) to federal investigative agencies regarding camp activities.

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According to a WRA memorandum, Tayama was a former owner of a chain of restaurants in Los Angeles and the head of the Southern District of the Japanese American Citizens League prior to the war. The report noted that it appeared "that he is regarded by a large number of evacuees" as "an FBI informer" and was "disliked for that reason." 6

**Arrest of Harry Y. Ueno.** 7 Tayama could not positively identify his attackers, but he told police that he was sure that one was Harry Y. Ueno (Block 22, Building 3, Apartment 4), an outspoken Kibei who had been employed in marketing and fruit stand operations in Los Angeles prior to the evacuation. Later, one of the suspects that was questioned in the case identified Ueno as one of the assailants. 8 In September 1942, Ueno had organized the Kitchen Workers' Union at Manzanar to represent Manzanar's 1,500-Kibei-dominated mess hall workers more effectively than did the Japanese American Citizens League-inspired Manzanar Work Corps chaired by Tayama. Thus, Ueno's group was composed largely of anti-JACL, anti-administration Kibei and Issei, 9 and Ueno had become an avowed enemy of Tayama. At Merritt's request, Assistant Project Director Ned Campbell had requested that the Manzanar police assist in rounding up a number of possible participants in the assault. Accordingly, Ueno was taken into custody and questioned. Unable to give a clear account of his activities that evening, Ueno was handcuffed and taken to the county jail in Independence by Campbell, 10 thus becoming the first Manzanar evacuee to be jailed outside the camp. Two other Kibei suspects were taken into custody and questioned at the Manzanar jail during the night. The two men were questioned until about 5:00 A.M. on Sunday, December 6, when they were released.

Shortly before his arrest, Ueno had gained a measure of popularity at Manzanar as a result of reporting allegations to the FBI that Campbell and Chief Steward Joseph Winchester were stealing meat and sugar intended for the evacuees in order to sell them for profit outside the camp. Thus, Ueno's arrest aroused widespread hostility and resistance among the evacuees. Contrary to the purported WRA rationale for this action — that Ueno had been identified positively by Tayama as one of his assailants — many evacuees charged that Ueno was innocent and was being victimized due to his recent allegations against Campbell. Many of the members of the Kitchen Workers' Union were Terminal Islanders who were notoriously anti-WRA in sentiment, convinced that the agency's staff members were grafters and caustic in their denunciation of individuals suspected of being informers or collaborators. Many were convinced that unionist Ueno's

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7. Considerable information on the role of Harry Y. Ueno in the events of December 5-6 may be found in Hansen, Mitson, and Embrey, "Dissident Harry Ueno Remembers Manzanar," pp. 58-64, 77, and Sue Kunitomi Embrey, Arthur A. Hansen, and Betty Kuhlberg Mitson, Manzanar Martyr: An Interview with Harry Y. Ueno (Fullerton, California, California State University, Fullerton, The Oral History Program, 1986).


brazen exposure of corrupt practices, and the investigation he was promoting, were at the root of his being punitively confined in the county jail "outside" the camp. Thus, they reached the conclusion that Ueno was imprisoned not because he had beaten Tayama, but, rather, because Campbell, who had transported him to the Independence jail, wished him removed from the camp as a result of Ueno's accusations.11

Sunday Morning Meeting. At 10:00 A.M. on Sunday, December 6, about 200 evacuees assembled in the mess hall of Block 22 (Ueno's block) to discuss his arrest and consider ways of effecting his return to the camp. This meeting, comprised primarily of Block 22 residents and a sprinkling of Kitchen Workers' Union members, entertained several plans of action, including the imposition of a center-wide mess hall strike. After about 20 minutes, the meeting was adjourned, and a second meeting to consist of block managers, mess hall workers, and various Kibei evacuees was arranged for 1:00 P.M. in Block 22.12

Sunday 1:00 p.m. Mass Meeting. News of the noon 1:00 P.M. meeting apparently spread throughout the center, for the crowd that subsequently arrived at Block 22 was so large (estimated to be about 2,000) that the gathering had to be moved outside the mess hall to the adjacent firebreak area. Shigetoshi Tateishi, a Kibei born in San Francisco and educated in Japan who was the block leader for Block 23, led the meeting. Some fiery speeches were delivered over a hastily-installed public address system, devoted to accusations against "dogs" among the Japanese as well as the Caucasians at the camp. A Committee of Five was selected to negotiate Ueno's reinstatement with Merritt. This committee included: Gengi Yamaguchi, a 40-year-old Issei educated at the University of Southern California and employed as a landscape gardening contractor and proprietor of a retail produce business in Los Angeles before evacuation who was block manager for Block 13; the aforementioned Shigetoshi Tateishi; Sakichi Hashimoto, a 42-year-old Issei who lived in Block 19 and was a member of the Kitchen Workers' Union executive committee; and Kazuo Suzukawa, a 38-year-old Issei who served as chef for the mess hall in Block 8. The principal spokesman for the Committee of Five, however, was Joseph Y. Kurihara, a Hawaiian-born Nisei, wounded World War I veteran, and outspoken American patriot who, while a friend of Ueno's was unaffiliated with the union. After Pearl Harbor, Kurihara had attempted to volunteer for the U.S. armed forces, but had been rejected because of his Japanese ancestry. Embittered by his rejection and the humiliation of evacuation, he had become one of the most prominent dissidents at Manzanar.

A detail of evacuee policemen was sent to the meeting by John M. Gilkey, the Caucasian Acting Chief of Internal Security at Manzanar. The police detail returned to the police station and reported that they were not wanted and had been asked to leave. Alarmed by the huge assemblage, Merritt, in company with Gilkey, decided to go to the meeting. At the same time, he ordered Ned Campbell, Assistant Project Director, to request Captain Martyn L. Hall, Commanding Officer of the 322d Military Police Escort Guard Company that had been assigned to Manzanar, to form a contingent of his men outside the center's gate in the event of trouble. When Merritt and Gilkey arrived at the mass meeting, the evacuees were breaking up. Merritt and Gilkey were told that the purpose of the meeting had been to (a) protest the arrest of Ueno and demand his unconditional release, and (b)

11. "FBI Survey," p. 202; Weglyn, Years of Infamy, pp. 122-23; and WRA, "Manzanar 'Incident.'"

denounce and threaten physical violence to Tayama and other camp residents on a "blacklist" of evacuees regarded as "stool pigeons" and "traitors to our people" who were cooperating with federal investigative agencies. The list included Togo Tanaka and Joe Grant Masaoka, brother of Mike Masaoka, national executive secretary of the JACL, who had been serving as the camp's documentary historians. They were also told that a Committee of Five had been appointed by the evacuees to discuss their grievances with Merritt. 13

Merritt's Interaction with Evacuee Crowd. Merritt and Gilkey returned to the Administration Building to await the arrival of the Committee of Five. The committee, marching at the head of a large crowd, many of its participants "yelling and marching in an irregular manner," arrived at the Administration Building about 1:30 P.M. 14 Captain Hall and about 12 soldiers arrived through the main gate of the camp at the same time, forming a line between the police station and the Administration Building with mounted machine guns.

Merritt, Gilkey, and Hall walked out to meet the unruly crowd. The Committee of Five demanded the immediate release of Ueno. Merritt walked among the crowd and talked to them for approximately 45 minutes. He refused to negotiate with the crowd, indicating that he would talk with a representative group and demanding that the crowd disperse. As Merritt, Gilkey, and Hall attempted to reason with the leaders of the throng, they were surrounded by four evacuee men whose actions indicated they were attempting to protect him. The crowd, for the most part, was respectful to Merritt, and as he walked among the men several of them laughed and joked with him. Generally, however, the crowd remained unruly and surly, led by agitators who were attempting to keep sentiment stirred up. Campbell was struck by an evacuee, and Merritt immediately ordered him into the police station when Campbell attempted to retaliate. At Merritt's urging, the leaders finally agreed that they would attempt to convince the crowd to disperse. They climbed on a car and talked to the crowd in Japanese for some time. As a result, the crowd became more menacing, some individuals making obscene gestures toward the soldiers and shouting obscene words in Japanese and English. On the verge of getting out of control, the crowd surged forward at times until it was close to the line of soldiers whose ranks had swelled to approximately 30 men in response to Captain Hall's request. 15

Merritt's Agreement with the Committee of Five. When it became apparent that the crowd would not disperse, Merritt, Gilkey, and Hall discussed the course of action that should be taken. Merritt decided the "fanaticism" of some members of the crowd indicated there was imminent danger of bloodshed. The soldiers continued to be taunted and insulted, some stones and sticks being thrown at them by persons in the crowd. Many of the Caucasian school teachers and project appointed personnel were scattered around the fringes of the crowd, raising concern that some of them might be injured if force were used to disperse the mob. Sensing that it was no longer in control of the crowd, the committee urged Merritt to concede before matters got completely out of hand. Although

the project director publicly reiterated his earlier refusal to this demand, a private conference with the police chief and the commander of the military police convinced him that this concession was necessary in order to avoid bloodshed. Merritt thus decided to compromise in an effort to forestall violence. Since Ueno’s arrest, Merritt’s men had investigated Tayama’s beating and had been unable to discover any conclusive evidence that Ueno had attacked Tayama. Thus, Merritt directed the Committee of Five to the side of Block 1, Building 1, Apartment 1, directly across the road from the police station, and after some discussion out of the crowd’s earshot, the committee, after first rejecting his terms, agreed to the following:

a. Ueno would be returned to the jail at Manzanar within an hour after the crowd dispersed, and he would be tried in such manner (i.e., before the camp’s Judicial Committee) as Merritt and WRA officials determined.

b. The crowd would disperse immediately.

c. There would be no more mass meetings without Merritt’s consent until the Ueno case was settled.

d. There would be no attempts to free Ueno from the Manzanar jail.

e. All future grievances would be discussed and negotiated with Merritt through recognized committees.

f. The Committee of Five would help to find the assailants of Tayama and aid in maintaining law and order in the center. 16

Merritt also announced that a subsequent statement pertinent to Ueno’s return would be issued at 6:00 P.M. that evening at the Block 22 mess hall. 17

After the terms of this agreement were reached, Kurihara reportedly burst into “a fanatical tirade, disclaimed loyalty to the United States, expressed the hope that Japan would win the war, and threatened death to all informers.” He expressed the apparent sentiments of many in the crowd when he said “that no one should be punished for beating such informers as Tayama.” 18 After being reminded of the agreement that had been reached, Kurihara apparently quieted down. Merritt shook hands with the Committee of Five, and Kurihara addressed the crowd, apparently explaining the agreement and urging the evacuees to return to their quarters.

Dispersal of Crowd. Kurihara spoke to the crowd in Japanese, and the evacuees responded with applause. Merritt turned to Higashi, the Japanese chief of internal security who was standing nearby, and asked whether Kurihara had explained the agreement.

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Merritt was assured that "the speech was all right." Merritt later learned that Kurihara had not explained the agreement but had renounced his American citizenship and had reminded each evacuee that he should remember he was a Japanese. He reportedly told the crowd that a victory had been won in obtaining an agreement to return Ueno to Manzanar and that the crowd should disperse temporarily and reassemble at 6:00 P.M. at the police station to secure Ueno’s release. The Japanese chief of internal security may have been intimidated, but it is possible that he did not fully understand all of Kurihara’s speech to the crowd. Later, it would be learned that this man knew little Japanese and did not understand all of what Kurihara said.

The crowd refused to disperse until the soldiers left the camp. At Merritt's request, Captain Hall moved the soldiers back to the entry gate at the center’s periphery “in the face of humiliating catcalls.” The crowd was not satisfied by this pullback, and the soldiers were ordered back to the highway where they remained until the crowd broke up. By 3:00 P.M., the crowd had dispersed and the soldiers had returned to their quarters.

That afternoon, Merritt, Gilkey, and Hall toured the camp by automobile and found it quiet. Football games were underway, and children were playing in the streets. They returned to the police station, where the Committee of Five was waiting, and arrangements were undertaken to return Ueno to Manzanar.

Ueno’s Return to Manzanar. Ueno was returned to the Manzanar jail about 3:30 P.M. The Committee of Five remained until he arrived. Merritt repeated the terms of his agreement with the committee and Ueno and shook hands with them.

Sunday Evening Mass Meeting. When the Committee of Five appeared at the Block 22 mess hall at 6:00 P.M. to affirm the return of Ueno, it encountered a crowd of some 2,000-4,000 evacuees. Again the meeting was transferred outside to the adjacent firebreak. As the crowd milled about the dusty firebreak, various grievances were aired, including charges that Campbell and Chief Steward Joseph Winchester had been stealing sugar from a camp warehouse for sale outside the center and that the evacuees’ clothing allowance had not only been delayed by administrative bungling but was also inadequate. On the grounds that it had accomplished its objective, the Committee of Five attempted to resign. This suggestion was shouted down by the crowd which apparently felt that the administration had not gone far enough by merely returning Ueno to the Manzanar jail. According to some of the more militant elements in the crowd, Ueno should be unconditionally released, even if release required his enforced removal. Moreover, the crowd demanded that evacuees like Fred Tayama, whom they accused of collaborating with the WRA administration and informing the FBI about pro-Japanese activities in camp, should be killed as “inu” or traitors. A list of 50 female “dogs” was also read. Having degenerated into an uncontrolled demonstration, the meeting broke up when its

19. Ibid., p. 7.
leaders announced a hurried plan of action. The crowd divided into two main groups, one to ferret Tayama out of the camp hospital and finish the job begun the previous night, and the second to liberate Ueno from jail. Members of the crowd armed themselves with knives, hatchets, hammers, screw drivers, stones, and any other weapons they could secure.  

About 6:30 P.M., Dr. James M. Goto, the chief evacuee medical physician at Manzanar, telephoned Merritt at his apartment and Arthur L. Williams, Assistant Chief of Internal Security in the camp, at the police station, reporting that a group was advancing toward the hospital, demanding that Tayama be turned over. Dr. Morse Little, Chief Medical Officer at the hospital, also called the police station as he saw the crowd approaching the hospital, requesting military police protection. Williams telephoned Merritt and was told to request the military police to escort an ambulance to the hospital for the purpose of removing Tayama. Following a request by Merritt, the military police agreed to take a circuitous route to the rear of the hospital, thus avoiding Block 22.

About the same time, one of the Japanese policemen (Jack Shimatsu, Block 14, Building 6, Apartment, 2) informed Williams that, according to his father, approximately 2,000 people attended the meeting at Block 22, and it was agreed that two groups would be formed, one of which would go to the hospital to get Tayama, while the other would go to the police station to release Ueno and kill all evacuee policemen because they were "stooges" of the WRA administration. Evacuee members of the police force were blamed for the arrests which had been made, and the mob intended to injure or kill them. Williams immediately notified Merritt by telephone that the crowd was marching toward the police station. When Merritt heard this, he told Williams to ask Hall to place a military guard at the station.  

Hospital Incident. The crowd that converged on the hospital consisted of some 50-75 persons. The crowd was prevented from entering the hospital building by three evacuee women employees. Nevertheless, the group clamored around the hospital grounds, insistent in its determination to get Tayama. Believing that Tayama had been spirited away by the military police before the crowd arrived, Dr. Little agreed to permit a group of five evacuees from the crowd to accompany him in searching the hospital wards. The search was conducted, but Tayama, hidden by evacuee personnel on the lower shelf of an orthopedic bed, concealed by blankets, was not found.

The ambulance and military escort arrived during the search, but the soldiers were told that Tayama was not there. However, the soldiers removed Fred Tayama’s mother, a tuberculosis patient who had entered the hospital suffering from anxiety neurosis after her son’s beating, in the ambulance. The milling crowd jeered and threw stones at the ambulance, believing that Tayama was in the vehicle. The hospital building was also pelted with stones, and a window was broken.

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24. “Board of Officers, December 10, 1942,” Exhibit C.

25. Ibid., p. 57.
At the suggestion of a leader in the crowd, the frustrated evacuees then divided into groups for the purpose of locating Togo Tanaka, Tokataru (Tokie) Slocum, John Sinoda, George Hayakawa, Tom Imai, and other former JACL leaders who had supported evacuation and were suspected of collaborating with federal investigative agencies. Small bands went to the apartments of these persons, but these men, having been warned, had retreated or been taken to various hiding places, including the military police compound south of the camp, and could not be found. In some cases, the apartments were ransacked by the increasingly angry evacuees.26

Thereafter, the hospital would remain quiet until about 9:30 P.M., when those who were wounded in the skirmish at the police station would be brought for treatment. At this time, WRA authorities was discovered that Tayama had not been moved from the hospital as Dr. Little had presumed, but instead had crawled under a bed with the assistance of evacuee personnel when he heard the crowd approaching. The military police were again called, removing Tayama from the hospital to the military police compound.27

**Police Station Incident.** The crowd heading for the police station arrived about 6:50 P.M., surging into the building and completely surrounding it. Headed by the Committee of Five, this crowd consisted of approximately 500 men and boys. The jail was opened, but Ueno refused to leave the cell until Merritt arrived to release him. Meanwhile, Williams talked to the Committee of Five and others who were in the police station, reminding them of the agreement reached earlier in the day. The committee insisted that he call Merritt. Williams telephoned Merritt, advising him, however, not to attempt to come to the police station because the crowd was "completely out of hand."28 Merritt realized that the agreement reached at noon had been broken and that the evacuee police force was either unable or unwilling to cope with the situation, most of its members having disappeared into the approaching darkness. Fearing that life and property in the center were in danger, he concluded that order could not be maintained without the assistance of the military police. Accordingly, Merritt instructed Williams to telephone Captain Hall and request him to take command of the situation and "if necessary declare martial law."29

Meanwhile, however, Private Ruggiero, the sentry at the gate, fired two volleys of three shots in the air as a warning for the purpose of summoning the military police.30 In response to this signal from the sentry, rather than as a result of Williams' request made a few minutes later, Captain Hall dispatched to the center all of his men (approximately 135) who had been on alert since the afternoon meeting.31

The first detachment of military police arrived at the camp under the command of Second Lieutenant Stanley N. Zwaik. By 7:15 P.M., the detachment was "deployed in a line of

29. "Board of Officers, December 10, 1942," Exhibit C.
skirmishers in the roadway immediately west of the Relocation Center jail. When the
remainder of the soldiers arrived, they cleared the dimly-lit street in front of the police
station with some difficulty and forced the crowd back from the sides of the building.

At the request of Williams, the soldiers allowed the Committee of Five to remain in the
front office of the police station with five of his evacuee police, three of whom had fled
there for safety while only two had remained on duty.

Merritt attempted to join Captain Hall, but was not allowed to pass through the sentry
line. He returned to Campbell's apartment where he, in company with Robert Brown and
Campbell, watched the crowd through the window and communicated with Williams via
telephone. Thus, Williams was the only member of the WRA staff present at the police
station.

After the military deployment, the crowd grew quiet. Captain Hall talked to the
Committee of Five in the police station for about 30 minutes, listening again to a list of
their demands. He reminded them of the agreement reached earlier that day and then
went out to urge the crowd to disperse. Apparently, the committee, fearing that violence
would soon erupt, offered to have themselves jailed if Ueno would be released. When Hall
rejected this overture and his further efforts to disperse the crowd were met by "several
Japanese throwing large stones," he returned to his soldiers to await developments.
A
line was drawn in front of the soldiers, and the crowd was ordered not to cross it.
Meanwhile, the milling crowd surged back and forth, coming as close as ten feet to the
line of military police.

The temper of the crowd became increasingly threatening, some observers noting that the
attitude of the crowd was "insulting, ugly, jeering, and menacing." Some soldiers later
stated that they were called "boy scouts" and were told to say "please" when ordering the
crowd to move back. Stones, sand, and lighted cigarettes were thrown, and a door in
the jail was broken open to release Ueno. Some members of the crowd sang Japanese
patriotic songs and spit on the soldiers, while others attempted to disarm several soldiers
and reportedly taunted the soldiers "to shoot." Some shouted "Banzai," a traditional
"greeting to the Japanese armed forces."

After waiting for a short period, Captain Hall and Lieutenant Zwaik addressed the crowd
between 8:00 and 8:45 P.M., urging its participants to disperse once more. When they were
rebuffed, Hall determined that the crowd would not disperse without force. Thus, he

32. Ibid., p. 56.
33. WRA, "Manzanar 'Incident,"" p. 12, and "Board of Officers, December 10, 1942," Exhibit C.
36. According to one evacuee, agitators in the crowd stayed in the background and threw rocks, while the
evacuees in the front were primarily curious bystanders. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community
Analysis Section, November 19, 1943, Report No. 97, "One Evacuee's Version of Events Leading Up to the
Incident of December 6," by Morris E. Opler, RC 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File No. 61.315, No. 5.

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decided to use tear gas grenades (CN-DM type) to disperse the crowd. The soldiers threw
four or five grenades into the crowd, causing its participants to scatter rapidly amid the
resulting smoke, chaos, and confusion. The wind was blowing from the north to the south,
and since most of the crowd were assembled north of the point where the grenades fell,
the majority did not suffer ill effects. However, most of the crowd scattered to the west or
north, some elements apparently reforming and starting back for the jail while others
advanced toward the soldiers. At about the same time, although no order to fire was
given, shotgun and sub-machine gun blasts by two soldiers, Privates Ramon Cherubini
and Tobe Moore, were fired into the crowd. Moore fired three 12-gauge shotgun blasts,
while Cherubini fired two bursts (about 14-15 shots) with a .45 caliber Thompson sub-
machine gun. The soldiers who fired did so on their own initiative, believing that their
lives were in danger. Earlier, when rocks were being thrown, one of the soldiers had
asked one of Captain Hall's assistants under what conditions he could fire. He had been
told not to fire unless ordered to do so or unless rushed by the crowd. This direction was
consistent with the policies of the military police who had been "trained and ordered to
fire upon an unarmed mob only when commanded so to do, or when rushed by the
mob."38

During the melee, a driverless automobile used by the camp's fire chief, was released by
the crowd and headed for the police station. The vehicle struck the northeast corner of the
station, gained speed, and traveled the length of the building's east side, before crashing
into an Army truck loaned to the WRA that was parked on the southeast side of the
structure. As it careened toward the soldiers, Lieutenant Zwaik, who could not see that it
was driverless, opened fire on the vehicle under direct orders from Hall with a Thompson
sub-machine gun, firing six or eight times.39

Amid the shooting, the crowd dispersed in panic. When the smoke and dust cleared,
injured and dying evacuees lay on the ground near the police station. Some were
immediately carried into the police station by the evacuees, and an ambulance quickly
removed them to the camp hospital. The time was about 9:30 P.M.

During the night, the camp remained in a turbulent state. Meetings were held in many of
the mess halls throughout the camp, and mess hall bells tolled continuously. Beatings of
alleged informers ensued, and the military police patrolled the camp, breaking up
numerous evacuee gatherings.

Casualties. As a result of the altercation, one youth (James Ito) was killed instantly, and
eleven others were injured. One of those injured died in the Manzanar hospital on
December 11 as a result of his wounds and complications. Four of the casualties were
Nisei, two were Issei, and five were Kibei. All wounds were "from the side or behind,"
extcept for those of James Ito who was shot from the front at a distance of no more than 25
feet.40 The casualties included:

39. Ibid., p. 63, and Exhibit C.
James Ito — 17 years old; born in Los Angeles; unmarried; had a brother serving in the U.S. Army and another brother working in the sugar beet fields; reportedly "a quiet boy who seldom went out at night;" shot through the heart and abdomen from a distance of no more than 25 feet; pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.

Jim Kanagawa — 21 years old; born in Tacoma, Washington; educated in Japan; unmarried; bullet wounds in stomach and lung causing perforation of pancreas and stomach, requiring operative repair; died of complications related to bronchial pneumonia December 11.

Tom Hatanaka — 26 years old; born in Sacramento; unmarried; a produce broker prior to evacuation; assistant manager of one of the cooperative stores at Manzanar; bullet wound in abdomen and rupture of small bowel; 14 inches of small bowel excised.

Charles Sakihara — 18 years old; born in Sacramento; unmarried; worked in Manzanar motor pool; bullet wound in left hip.

George Kano — 25 years old; born in Los Angeles; unmarried; employed as a night watchman in the public works office; had worked in the Idaho sugar beet fields; bullet wound in left forearm.

Kenjiro Nagamini — 50 years old; born in Japan; came to United States in 1919; bullet wound in left femur and compound fracture.

Harry Nukada — 28 years old; educated in Japan; bullet wound in right shoulder.

Jingo Nakamura — 40 years old, born in Japan; came to the United States in 1919; married; father of two sons; employed as a carpenter; bullet wound in right shoulder.

Frank Takahashi — 22 years old; born in Los Angeles; educated in Japan; married; one child; a kitchen worker; bullet wound in left thigh and fractured femur.

Henry Mukado — 20 years old; born in Los Angeles; educated in Japan; employed as the timekeeper in a mess hall; bullet wound in back.

Henry Inouye — 24 years old; Kibei; bullet wound in left thigh.

Yoshio Yoshihiro — 31 years old; born in the United States; educated in Japan; married; one child; employed as a junior cook; suffered from exposure to tear gas; no wounds. 41

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Arrests. Neither charged nor given a hearing, Ueno was again removed from Manzanar after midnight following the riot and taken to the jail at Bishop. A few days later, he was transferred to the jail in Lone Pine, along with a number of other suspected evacuee troublemakers who had been rounded up by WRA and military authorities. The members of the Committee of Five were arrested Sunday night, December 6, and transported to the Bishop jail. Five other evacuees were arrested Sunday night or Monday morning on the basis of a list supplied by Ned Campbell and the camp internal security staff. Eleven additional evacuees were arrested on Thursday, December 10, at the request of Merritt. By December 15, the jails at Lone Pine and Independence had been turned over to the WRA, and 15 of those arrested were incarcerated in Lone Pine and seven in Independence. Military police guarded the jails, and the WRA furnished food and blankets for the prisoners. Of those arrested by December 15, ten were Issei, ten were Kibei, and two were Nisei. One of those arrested attempted to commit suicide by consuming rat poison in the Independence jail, but, after being returned to the Manzanar hospital to have his stomach pumped out, he was returned to jail.42

All arrests made on Sunday night, December 6, were conducted by the military police. Thereafter, the military authorities requested that further arrests be made by camp internal security officers accompanied by soldiers. The purpose of this request was "to avoid any question of military law that might be raised as a result of the arrest of civilians by military officers."43

Those arrested were held pending determination as to whether they should be prosecuted in the local or federal courts, and whether they should be sent to an isolation center, a different relocation center, or be returned to Manzanar. A partial list of evacuees that were arrested included:

Ted Akahosi — Issei
Koiji Arataka — Issei
Harry Hashimoto — Issei
Raymond Hirai — Issei
Ben Kishi — Kibei
Tamotsu Kono — Kibei
Joseph Kurihara — Nisei
Tadao Nakagawa — Issei
Fred Ogura — Issei
Kazuo Suzukawa — Kibei
Shigetosh Tateishi — Kibei
Harry Ueno — Kibei
Ernest Wakayama — Kibei
Gengi Yamaguchi — Issei
Toshimoro Asashi — Kibei
Yenuchi Fugisawa — Issei

42. WRA, "Manzanar 'Incident,'" p. 17.
Altogether, 26 evacuees, presumed to be the ringleaders of the altercation on December 5-6 or who were "believed to be trouble makers," were arrested and transferred to jails in Lone Pine and Independence. Ten of these persons were later returned to Manzanar. The remaining 16, including Kurihara and Ueno (with the exception of Kurihara, all were Kibei) were sent to a temporary isolation center in an abandoned Civilian Conservation Corps camp near Moab, Utah, via a two-day journey by bus and train on January 9, 1943.

The isolation center had been established in the mountains outside of Moab by WRA authorities for dissidents and "troublemakers" from all ten relocation centers. Meanwhile, the WRA, having concluded that some more formal arrangements were needed for removing persistent and chronic "troublemakers" from relocation centers, moved ahead with plans for establishment of an isolation center on the grounds of an inactive Indian boarding school near Leupp, Arizona.

On February 16, 1943, the WRA issued a confidential policy statement governing removal of "aggravated and incorrigible troublemakers" from relocation centers. Under the procedure established, relocation center project directors were instructed to prepare docket files on each candidate for isolation for submission to the Washington office. If the candidate was an alien, the project director could recommend his transfer to an internment camp; otherwise, the transfer would be either to another relocation center or to an isolation center.

Accordingly, the group of Manzanar agitators was transferred from Moab to Leupp on April 27, 1943. The Leupp center, replete with guard towers, a high fence, and 150 military police assigned to guard about 45 prisoners, received small contingents of agitators from the relocation centers until December 1943, when it was closed, and its remaining inmates, including Ueno, were removed to the Tule Lake Segregation Center.

Ueno's own odyssey during this period was noteworthy. During the weeks he was jailed with other dissidents in Lone Pine, the military police guarding the jail sometimes reportedly became drunk during the night and peppered their cell doors with rifle shots. His last two weeks at Moab were passed in the county jail after disagreement with the authoritarian edicts of Francis Frederick, Moab's chief of internal security and acting project director in the absence of Project Director Raymond Best. Ueno was trucked, along with five or six other men, in a 4-foot x 6-foot box to Leupp. Upon arrival there, he was jailed in nearby Winslow for several days where he was served "adulterated" food, housed...

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44. Ibid., p. 14.
47. Weglyn, Years of Infamy, pp. 125-52. For more information on the experiences of the Manzanar evacuee "troublemakers" who were transferred to Moab, Leupp, and Tule Lake, see Drinnon, Keeper of Concentration Camps, pp. 95-116.
in cramped quarters, and left inadequately protected from the weather. When finally taken to Leupp, he was jailed for about two weeks before being granted housing in a barrack. In spite of repeated WRA promises and his persistent demands for their fulfillment, Ueno never received a trial or hearing to determine his guilt or innocence to any charge that led to his removal from Manzanar.

When Ueno was transferred to the Tule Lake Segregation Center in December 1943, almost a year to the day after the altercation at Manzanar, he spent an initial week in an Army-supervised stockade before being permitted to live in the residential compound. At last reunited with his wife and children, he promised camp authorities that he would remain apart from all camp politics. Although a distressed Ueno had renounced his citizenship while at Moab, he was ultimately persuaded in late December 1945 by his knowledge of the devastated condition of postwar Japan to remain in the United States and thus spare his family further hardship. Three months later, he was released from Tule Lake, one of the last to leave. After working for a railroad in several small central California towns, Ueno turned to farming in the Santa Clara Valley, and in 1954 his American citizenship was restored.45

Protective Custody for Evacuees Whose Lives Were Threatened. On Sunday night and Monday, December 6 and 7, threats were made against many evacuees at Manzanar who were outspoken pro-American advocates or who were perceived to have pro-WRA administration sentiments. Those threatened included staff members of the Manzanar Free Press, members of the internal security police force, and evacuees who had supervisory jobs in the center. Many of these evacuees, including Tayama, Tanaka, and Slocum, had been active members of the Japanese American Citizens League prior to evacuation, and many had encouraged evacuee cooperation with the government's relocation policies. John Sinoda, a 25-year-old Kibei who held a key position in the camp's employment office, was severely beaten by a gang with clubs at the outdoor theater, receiving scalp lacerations. Others were assaulted, including George Kurata, the camp housing coordinator, who managed to escape from his attackers.49 By Monday noon, approximately 40 evacuees had entered the camp Administration Building, asking for protection and indicating that they were afraid to remain in their barracks. The administration also aided removal from the barracks those evacuees whose names appeared on the dissidents' blacklists and deathlists. Thus, the number of evacuees taken into protective custody by the camp administration subsequently increased to 65 individuals.

The evacuees in protective custody slept on cots in the Administration Building at night and were crowded into a room in one of the military barracks in the military police compound south of the camp during the day. There was insufficient room for all of them, however, and they were forced to take turns "in getting warm." They were fed in the kitchen in the military police compound.50

Faced with the dilemma of protecting the 65 people, Merritt and his staff immediately began a search for a place outside of Manzanar to house them on a temporary basis. Merritt and Brown had been associated with T. R. Goodwin, Superintendent of Death Valley National Monument, during their days with the Inyo-Mono Associates as well as the Citizens Committee established by the military to ease public relations for the camp with the Owens Valley residents following evacuation. Thus, Merritt sent Brown to Death Valley to inquire as to whether the national monument had any place to house the people. Goodwin offered the abandoned Cow Creek Civilian Conservation Camp, comprised of 16 deteriorating buildings adjacent to the monument’s headquarters. After considerable discussion and clearance was received from WRA Director Myer and General DeWitt, the 65 evacuees, who became known as “refugees,” were sent to Cow Creek on December 10. They were transported via “a military convoy of jeeps and weapons carriers,” accompanied by ten WRA staff members led by Assistant Director Campbell and about 12 soldiers armed with rifles. The cavalcade included a truckload of hay, one of furniture, and one of food.

The Cow Creek camp was administered by Camp Director Albert Chamberlain, a WRA employee, and Fred Tayama was elected unofficial “mayor” by the refugees. The WRA staff, evacuees, and soldiers shared the same latrines and showers and ate at the same times in the mess hall which was supplied from Manzanar. After improving their quarters and the grounds of the camp, the evacuee men, needing something to do with their time and appreciative of the hospitality shown by the National Park Service, painted signs, cleaned out springs, built dams, dug ditches, mixed cement, installed radio antennas, and conducted other odd jobs in the national monument without pay. The evacuee women spent their days, caring for their children, assisting in the mess hall, and housekeeping. During their stay, Park Service personnel, as well as the soldiers, took groups of evacuees sightseeing in the national monument and on trips to pick up supplies and mail. The camp had a swimming pool that was enjoyed by the older children. The 65 evacuees remained at the Cow Creek camp under military guard, primarily for their protection, until arrangements could be made for their release through indefinite leave and assistance could be provided for relocation. The American Friends Service Committee played a major role in obtaining jobs and homes for the evacuees, sending representatives to Cow Creek to interview and assist them in planning for relocation. As a result of this organization’s efforts, many of the evacuees relocated to Chicago where the Friends had established a hostel to help those relocating from the relocation centers. As jobs and housing became available, departing evacuees were taken to Las Vegas, the nearest railhead, via military escort. By mid-February, the “refugee” camp at Cow Creek was vacated.51

Following the events at Manzanar on December 5-6, Merritt blamed the FBI, in part, as a cause of the riot, stating that FBI use of informants in the camp had been the special targets of the rioters. According to an FBI investigation, however, only six of the 65 persons removed to Death Valley had ever been interviewed by agents. Of the 65, two had been prominently associated with the Japanese American Citizens League, were outspoken in their loyalty to the United States, and had served as informants for the FBI. These two individuals were Fred Tayama and Togo Tanaka, the latter having been employed as a


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documentary historian for the center's administration. Several other evacuees had been interviewed by the FBI in connection with investigations by the bureau, but, according to bureau officials, "could in no sense be considered as confidential informants." These evacuees included Tom Imai, Assistant Chief of Police at Manzanar, and Joseph Blamey and Ted Uyeno, both editors of the *Manzanar Free Press.* In addition, Tomoasa Yamazaki had been interviewed by FBI agents on two occasions.52

**Additional Military Assistance.** In the aftermath of the altercation at Manzanar, Captain Hall believed that it was necessary to secure additional military assistance to reinforce his military police at the camp. The District Attorney of Inyo County and Major Henderson, Commanding Officer of a detachment of the California State National Guard stationed at Bishop, 50 miles away, informed Hall that Henderson had men available. At Hall's request, some 50 officers and men immediately traveled to Manzanar on the night of December 6 to aid in guarding the camp under Hall's direction.53

During a meeting on Monday morning, December 7, Merritt and Captain Hall agreed upon a plan to govern administration of the camp. Merritt would resume full control of the internal administration of the center, while the military would maintain armed patrols within the camp and would be responsible for law and order. Mail, telephone, and telegraph services would be censored by the military. Although mail delivery was restored within the camp on December 9, mail from the center to the outside world remained restricted.

On Monday morning, December 7, Colonel Harrie S. Mueller, accompanied by Major Green, arrived from the Ninth Service Command at Fort Douglas to take general charge of the military police at Manzanar. Despite their presence at the camp, however, Captain Hall remained on duty.

Additional military police units were sent to Manzanar on Monday. At 2:00 P.M., Company A, 753rd Military Police Battalion, from Reno, Nevada, arrived at Manzanar with three officers and 93 men, and at 7:00 P.M., Company D, 751st Military Police Battalion, arrived at Manzanar from Camp Williston with three officers and 104 men.

These military police units, which were housed in "pyramidal tents" in the military police area, reinforced and cooperated with the 322d Military Police Escort Guard Company in maintaining law and order at the troubled camp. After these units arrived, the members of the California National Guard returned to their headquarters at Bishop.54

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As an uneasy calm settled over the camp, the censorship restrictions were gradually relaxed. Church services (but no other mass meetings) were permitted on December 13, and by December 16, most censorship restrictions had been removed.

On December 22, Project Director Merritt informed the "Commanding Officer, Military Headquarters, Camp Manzanar" that he wanted the military police to maintain 24-hour guard duty at five locations in the camp "until further mutual adjustment or agreement." These points included the (1) switchboard; (2) post office; (3) warehouse area; (4) power switch; and (5) water line through the upper part of the camp. According to Merritt, this arrangement would "justify the release of one company at this time, with the understanding that two companies remain for the duties outlined above and such emergency duties as may from time to time become necessary, and that these companies be maintained at least at full company strength."55

The military was willing to keep soldiers in the center until the WRA could establish an internal police force capable of maintaining order at Manzanar. As calm returned to the camp during the Christmas holiday season, it was determined that one company of military police could return to their headquarters. On December 23, Company D, 751st Military Police Battalion was released, leaving the 322d Military Police Escort Guard Company and Company A, 753d Military Police Battalion to patrol the camp. Because of continuing calm in the center, the latter company returned to Reno several days after Christmas.56

**Maintenance of Essential Center Services.** WRA and military authorities determined that essential center services, such as heat, water, light, food, garbage disposal, and supply deliveries, would be maintained during the emergency period following the violence. These services were maintained Sunday night, December 6, by the WRA administrative staff with the help of a few selected evacuees. On Monday, scattered groups of evacuees reported for work. Some were sent home, however, either because they were too few to function effectively, their supervisors felt their safety required such action, or because their work duties were located outside the fenced perimeter of the residential area. Sufficient numbers of evacuees (with the exception of Saturday, December 12, when the plumbers and electricians failed to report for duty) reported for work throughout the week, however, to keep the essential services operating during the daytime. Operation of such services during night hours was maintained by WRA appointed personnel.57

**Schools.** The Manzanar schools convened classes on Monday, December 7, but demonstrations and disturbances, particularly by high school boys who locked several teachers in classrooms and wrote obscene, threatening, and pro-Axis statements on blackboards, as well as a shortage of oil for heating, caused officials to send the students

55. Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director to Commanding Officer, Military Headquarters, Camp Manzanar, Manzanar, California, December 22, 1942, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 216, File No. 13.311A, "Detail of Military Personnel (General).


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to their quarters about 11:00 A.M. on December 8. Because the Caucasian teachers lived in barracks throughout the center, they were sent to local towns on December 8 to live temporarily for their protection. They were returned to the camp on Friday, December 11, because the crowded and expensive living conditions in the towns were unsatisfactory. Upon their return to Manzanar, they were assigned to live in the administration offices in Block 1. The schools, however, did not reopen until January 10, 1943.

Funerals/Memorial Services. On Monday, December 21, a funeral was held for the two young men who died as a result of the wounds they suffered during the altercation on December 6. The evacuees requested special permission to conduct memorial services in the camp’s outdoor theater. They also asked that mass meeting restrictions be lifted so that 1,000 persons could attend. Ninth Service Command authorities rejected these requests, suggesting instead a service in Bishop with only family members present. When the evacuees rejected this proposal, it was mutually agreed that 150 mourners would be permitted to attend a service in the woods outside the sentry line with Rev. Nagatomi, the Buddhist pastor, officiating. According to Merritt, only those evacuees authorized “to attend the funeral in cars provided with Caucasian drivers, and such Caucasian members of the staff as have been requested to attend” were to “be permitted through the Center limits.” Despite these restrictions, the entire evacuee population in the camp expressed its collective sentiments on the day of the funeral with a two-minute prayer and time of silence at 1:00 P.M.

On Christmas Day, Project Director Merritt described the funeral in a letter written to his Aunt Luella, a daughter of John Shepherd who had grown up on her father’s ranch where the relocation center now stood. He observed:

Last Monday we buried our dead. At the Buddhist funeral held in the woods, beyond the Lacey Ranch, we mourned with their families the death of the two boys, innocent of wrong doing, the victims of the riot. The only soldier present stood at the head of one of the coffins — the brother of the dead boy. This soldier of Japanese ancestry was on active duty at a distant point, but the Army granted my request to bring him home to his family. The Buddhist Priest prayed that the lives of these young men would be a sacrifice for the sins of all the camp...

Negotiations Between Evacuee Committees and WRA Administrators. As an uneasy calm settled over the troubled camp, efforts were quickly initiated to begin dialogue between the evacuee population and WRA administrators. On Monday, December 7, the block managers and two representatives from each block met at the Block 22 mess hall

under the chairmanship of George Murakami. A committee of six evacuees, calling themselves the "Negotiating Committee," was selected. The members of the committee were Murakami, Fred Ogura, Koichi Masunaka, Thomas Ozamoto, Shunichi Ikanda, and Bill Tanabe. Purporting to represent the block managers, this committee attempted to meet with Merritt, but the project director referred them to Captain Hall. Robert Brown, the camp's WRA Reports Officer and newly-appointed Acting Assistant Project Director, attended the meeting with Hall and the committee. The evacuee committee demanded release of all prisoners who had been arrested and demanded that F. D'Amat, the Spanish Consul from San Francisco (Spain, a neutral country, was looking after the interests of Japanese citizens in the United States on behalf of the Japanese government), be called to the camp. Captain Hall refused to comply with both demands. That evening, Fred Ogura, one of the spokesmen for the committee, was arrested as part of the continuing WRA campaign to rid the camp of suspected troublemakers.

On Tuesday, December 8, the committee, led by Ozamoto, the block manager of Block 24, called on Merritt and repeated its demands concerning release of all prisoners and calling the Spanish Consul. The committee made veiled threats of stopping essential services for WRA appointed personnel if evacuee demands were not met. Merritt again refused cooperation with the committee, responding that stoppage of essential services for his staff would be met by curtailment of all essential services for the entire evacuee population, including food and heat. He also stated that the Spanish Consul would have no interest in any of the evacuees except those who were aliens, but he indicated that the committee could write the Spanish Consul if it desired. During the ensuing days, the Spanish Consul visited Manzanar on December 17 with a representative of the U. S. Department of State. After interviewing a number of Issei in the center, the consul informed Merritt that the Issei had advised him they would return to work only if the Spanish Ambassador so directed — a step taken to protect themselves from recriminations should Japan win the war. At Merritt's suggestion, the consul telephoned the Marquis de Fontana, a diplomat in the Spanish Embassy in Washington, advising him that Manzanar was "a good place" and that the Issei wanted to know if they should go back to work. According to Merritt, de Fontana stated that the ambassador said, "Tell the damn fools to go back to work." Accordingly D'Amat met with the Block Managers Assembly and advised the Issei to return to work. The evacuees did not immediately return to work, however, because when the Nisei were advised of the Spanish Consul's advice, many of them felt that if they returned to work immediately, it would appear that they were obeying the orders of the Spanish Consul. Finally, however, both Issei and Nisei returned to work on December 19. While the negotiations continued with the Spanish Consul, Ozamoto, spokesman for the evacuee committee, called on Merritt each day during the week following the violence, his attitude reportedly becoming "increasingly conciliatory." On several occasions, he requested permission for the block managers to hold a mass meeting in the camp, but all requests were referred to Captain Hall and denied. On Thursday, December 10, Hall


64. "WRA Memorandum," p. 18.
stated that he would grant permission to hold such a meeting if a Caucasian interpreter and an Army officer were present. Since no Caucasian interpreter was available, the meeting was not held.

Reports from many evacuees indicated that they were threatened or intimidated by evacuees they did not know and told not to go to work for the administration. The reports, together with the fact that only essential services were continued by evacuees until December 19, convinced WRA authorities that "some kind of informal organization was controlling the action of the evacuees, and there was reason to believe that it operated through threats of physical violence." By Tuesday, two days after the violence, all evacuees who reported for work were wearing black arm bands as "a sign of mourning for those who were shot." WRA authorities also believed that the arm bands represented "permission by an evacuee committee to work." Failure to wear the arm bands while working "resulted in threats of violence." According to WRA authorities, the committee headed by Ozamoto was believed to be close enough to the controlling group "to be useful when the time to negotiate arrived."

On Sunday, December 13, one week after the altercation occurred, Merritt and Hall determined "the time was ripe to permit a mass meeting composed of representatives selected from each block for the purpose of selecting a committee to negotiate" with Merritt. Thomas Ozamoto was notified that such a meeting could be held the next morning at 9:00 A.M. The plans were for Hall to address the group, explain the bad faith of the Committee of Five on the preceding Sunday, and indicate that the group could elect a committee to negotiate with Merritt. Although Merritt did not plan to attend the meeting, he posted a mimeographed notice in each mess hall on December 13, informing the camp residents as to "the facts concerning last Sunday's events." Because the Committee of Five had broken its agreement with him, he had been forced to call in the military to "maintain law and order." He had called in the military "as a last resort to protect life and property from the rule of mobs." "Law and order must be preserved in any community at any cost," and if "it cannot be preserved through the police it must be preserved through the military." Soon after this notice was posted, the committee cancelled the meeting scheduled for the next morning, believing that Merritt's announcement had been "too brutal."

On Monday, December 14, the evacuee committee and block representatives, after cancelling their morning meeting with the project director, asked to meet with Merritt that afternoon. The meeting was attended by three representatives from each of the 36 blocks in the camp, one of whom was the block manager. The representatives purported to have been chosen fairly by the residents of each block. The method of selection varied from block to block, however, some holding elections while others circulated petitions naming the three representatives that were signed by a majority of the residents of the block.

Merritt addressed the afternoon meeting, accompanied by Brown and two interpreters, John McLaughlin and Father Leo Steinbach, the Catholic priest at Manzanar. Merritt informed the gathering that he was not there to negotiate or discuss the "incident." His

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65. Ibid.
66. WRA, "Manzanar 'Incident,'" pp. 23-25.
purpose in speaking was to report that the results of the prior week were "due directly to
the bad faith of the committee of five in breaking its agreement reached on Sunday,
December 6, and to advise them that he would receive any committee that was fairly
selected and truly representative of the people of Manzanar." The meeting was given one
and one-half hours to select such a committee to negotiate evacuee grievances with Merritt
with the goal of returning the camp to "normalcy."\textsuperscript{67}

During the meeting, four members of the original evacuee "Negotiating Committee" were
selected to negotiate with Merritt. Led by Thomas Ozamoto as chairman, other members
of the new committee included Koichi Masunaka, Block 19; George Murakami, Block 34;
and Shunichi Ikkanda, Block 16.\textsuperscript{68} The new committee met with Merritt on Tuesday and
Wednesday, December 15 and 16, recounting the "general background of unrest and
dissatisfaction of the evacuees at Manzanar" and requesting that Merritt "return to
Manzanar all those who had been arrested, for the purpose of a fair hearing." The
committee was told that the future of the men who had been arrested was no longer
within the control of the project director, and that some of them would not be returned to
Manzanar but would be treated fairly by the government. The representative character of
the committee was also discussed. Merritt proposed to continue meeting with the
committee, helping to determine whether its membership needed to be supplemented by
other evacuees to represent various minority group viewpoints in the camp, and to work
out a solution for returning the project "to normalcy."\textsuperscript{69}

Christmas Day. As the Christmas holiday season approached, Merritt determined to
relieve tensions at Manzanar. Just before Christmas, truckloads of Christmas trees, cut
from the nearby mountains by WRA staff members at Merritt's suggestion, were taken to
the camp and distributed to each mess hall. Presents sent by religious and other
philanthropic organizations to the children at Manzanar, which had been stored in
warehouses, were used to decorate the trees. In response, about 100 young people
gathered to sing Christmas carols in front of Merritt's barracks on Christmas Eve. A
special festive Christmas edition of the \textit{Manzanar Free Press}, which had not been printed
since the violence occurred, was printed for distribution throughout the center.\textsuperscript{70}

In his aforementioned letter to his Aunt Luella on Christmas Day, Merritt attempted to
place the recent violence in historical perspective. Describing the peace that had returned
to the camp, he noted:

\begin{quote}
\ldots Today Manzanar has again become the scene of a test of racial tolerance —
the greatest test a democracy has ever met. We are face to face with the question
of whether we can live in peace and security with American citizens of Japanese
ancestry and Japanese who by virtue of our laws are non-citizens. To all of them
we have pointed to American democracy as a better way of living. These people,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{68} WRA, "Manzanar 'Incident,'" pp. 28-30.
\textsuperscript{69} "WRA Memorandum," p. 20.
ten thousand of them, are now held inside a barbed wire fence as a measure of
national protection in this time of war.

The reality of this great drama is on my mind this Christmas morning because
only thirty days ago the War Relocation Authority sent me here to Manzanar as
Project Director with full administrative authority. It was like coming home to be
back on the desert of Inyo that I have loved and once again to see the seven-mile
shadow of Mt. Williamson. But Manzanar was a volcano about to erupt. I knew
that too when I came. Evil work had been done by the slow boiling of many
bitternesses. Some are old; some are as new as yesterday. These ten thousand
people had no grudge in common. Many people were filled with many hates
about many things — race hates, war hates, political hates, class hates such as
those between Japanese born in America to whom Japan is a foreign country and
Japanese born in America but educated in Japan who have become pro-Japanese,
and just the common kind of hates we all know too well.

After describing the pleasant events surrounding the Christmas celebrations at the center,
Merritt completed the letter by describing his goals and hopes for the restoration of peace
in the camp:

So we greet this Christmas morning. Shall the problems of keeping this peace and
good will be solved by the military, or by being overtrustful of this show of
goodness, or is there some safe middle course through which the ideals of peace
and good will can mingle with the realities of race tolerance? If there is an
answer, it will be the corner-stone upon which a future peace of the world will
rest.71

With the removal of the additional military police unit from the center several days after
Christmas, a semblance of normal operations returned to Manzanar. In early January 1943,
the camp’s operations fully resumed with the block managers reconvening on January 6
and the opening of schools on January 10.

CAUSES

WRA Investigations

Following the violence at Manzanar on December 5 and 6, WRA administrators, shaken by
the seething tensions in the camp, launched several investigations in an attempt to
determine the principal causes of the unrest. In a document, entitled “The Manzanar
‘Incident’: December 5 to December 19, 1942,” WRA investigators concluded:

From the preceding sketchy picture of what happened for two weeks at
Manzanar it can be seen that an extremely complex situation developed. To list
briefly some of the contributing factors to the general condition: self-government
charter controversy, personal grudges, Japanese-American Citizen’s League,
camouflage, housing, dissatisfaction with certain administrators. The two most

important factors were: first, the inherent conflict between those culturally Japanese and those culturally Americans, and secondly, the close confinement within the area. The latter is a strong force that tends to aggravate any pre-existing conflicts.

The clean sweep that would eliminate a goodly portion of these problems naturally would be relocation. . . .

Although many factors contributed to the tensions that led to violence at Manzanar, WRA authorities nevertheless concluded that the confinement within barbed wire fences of various divergent groupings of persons of Japanese descent was a major underlying cause of the unrest. These groupings ranged from traditional, and hence conservative, rural agricultural communities such as Florin near Sacramento, where members of the burakumin, a class of Japanese "untouchables," had settled, to "Japanesy" working class communities such as Terminal Island and San Pedro near Los Angeles Harbor, to middle class neighborhoods in West Los Angeles and Los Angeles suburban communities such as Pasadena and Glendale. Evacuees from agricultural areas, such as Bainbridge Island, Washington, Florin, French Camp near Stockton, Venice, and the San Fernando Valley, and college-educated professionals from Los Angeles had little in common. Furthermore, stresses and strains had developed between the younger largely-Americanized Nisei and the older, more Japanese-oriented Issei who had dominated prewar Japanese American communities.

In the aforementioned WRA report on the events of December 5 and 6 submitted to Director Myer on December 22, 1942, a section entitled "Probable Causes" elaborated further on the underlying factors leading to the violence. The report noted in part:

Ueno was very popular at Manzanar. Tayama was despised as an informer and a stool pigeon. The spark that set off the incident was the arrest of Ueno on suspicion of participating in the assault on Tayama, and his removal to a local jail. Few of the evacuees believed that Ueno was guilty, most of them thought that he was arrested because of the personal animosity of Mr. Campbell; that, even if he were guilty, he ought not to be punished for assaulting an informer of Tayama’s character; and that his guilt should be determined by a hearing at Manzanar rather than in the local courts.

It is the consensus of the administrative staff at Manzanar and many of the evacuees who were interviewed that, while the arrest of Ueno was only an immediate cause of the incident, the real causes lay in a long series of deep-seated grievances which culminated in the event on Sunday, December 6. Tom Ozamoto detailed most of these grievances when his committee met with Mr. Merritt on December 14. Dr. Goto listed many of the same grievances. Togo Tanaka and other representatives of the Manzanar Free Press confirmed this analysis. . . .

72. WRA, "Manzanar ‘Incident,'" p. 31.

Thus, the WRA report listed 25 reasons as the underlying causes for the unrest that led to violence at Manzanar. The grievances were listed "without attempting to indicate the particular persons who assigned them as basic reasons for the unrest." The list included:

1. Discrimination against the Issei and their exclusion from positions of importance in project administration.

2. Reliance by the project administration upon JACL leaders who were not regarded as representative of the evacuees and upon other purported leaders who aided in the evacuation.

3. Pre-evacuation quarrels and differences between various factions of the Japanese.

4. The presence of informers within their relocation center.

5. Rumors of misappropriation of sugar.

6. Frequent changes in the Project Director.

7. Frequent changes in administrative policies.

8. Indecision and vacillation in the determination of administrative policies.

9. Delays in the payment of clothing allowances.

10. Delays in making wage payments.

11. The wage differential between chefs and cooks.

12. Variation in food between the kitchens in different blocks.


15. The presence of objectionable flag-waving groups within the center.

16. The assumption by the JACL of the right to speak for the evacuees without consulting them, on such subjects as the application of the selective service system to the Japanese Americans.

17. The separation of Japanese aliens held in internment camps from their families, many of whom reside in Manzanar.

18. The labor policy for the camouflage net project.

19. The arrest of evacuees and their trial outside the relocation area.
20. The administration’s effort to organize an evacuee council without consulting representative Issei groups.

21. Dissatisfaction with some members of the administrative staff.

22. The attitude of some members of the administrative staff toward the evacuees; unnecessary familiarity, fraternalism.

23. Uncertainty about the future in this country.

24. Loss of income and property as a result of the evacuation.

25. The unfavorable national press.  

Togo Tanaka, January 25, 1943

Togo Tanaka, an active JACL leader during pre-evacuation days and one of the documentary historians employed at Manzanar, prepared a lengthy analytic report, entitled "An Analysis of the Manzanar Riot and Its Aftermath: Its Causes, Principal Participants, Occasion, Consequences," on January 25, 1943. This report, the last of the documentary reports to be prepared, was written during his stay at the Cow Creek Civilian Conservation Corps Camp in Death Valley. He prefaced the report with a statement that placed his work as a relocation center documentary historian in perspective:

The Documentary Historian, compelled by circumstances to be an unwilling Principal in the Manzanar disturbance of December 6, concludes his duties with this report. Because, like it or not, he was a Principal in the event, he runs the risk of submitting a paper lacking in the objectivity expected of such an assignment. This report has been purposefully delayed. A detached perspective has been better afforded by the lapse of time. Moreover, the time has been spent by the Documentary Historian in solid manual labor with congenial Park Service Rangers here in Death Valley. He cannot help but feel that this atmosphere, freeing him from fear of assault and violence and uncertainty, has cleared up mental processes clogged by seven months in bewildering situations of which he was more often than not, unprepared. . . . In a very real sense, the documentary work has been, to him, a continuing search for the truth. The cost in personal defamation of character and slander sustained partially as a result of the work has not been light. . . . If time sustains the truth, accuracy, and historical value of the work, he will feel that the cost will not have been too heavy.

Tanaka observed that the "Manzanar Riot" was the "logical outgrowth of pre-evacuation factional conflicts among evacuees, clashes of ideology intensified by war, and the unhealthy condition of accumulating resentments within the limited area of the Center." Pre-evacuation conflicts "centered chiefly around two fairly distinct and identifiable groups." The conflicts were "a curious mixture of pre-war personal feuds, political, business and social rivalries of long standing." Evacuees "from Southern California,  

particularly Los Angeles, carried these conflicts into Manzanar in March, April and May, 1942."

During the "early stages of Manzanar's development," Tanaka noted that there was "little doubt that individuals associated with the two groups expressed this rivalry in efforts to secure key administrative jobs." Continuing, he observed:

... In a very real sense, there was jockeying and maneuvering for what may be described here as political control or leadership of the population. It was generally felt by members of both groups in the beginning that 'we're all in the same boat now, so let's pull together.' But old incompatibilities and jealousies flared anew in short order, individuals within each group resorted to torpedoing one another. It is significant that these two factions represented the only articulate citizen element within the Center having a semblence [sic] of organization.

In the light of what has already happened, it is quite safe to record here that this situation of a feuding citizen element helped pave the way for the formation of a third group which came much closer to achieving the goal that the pre-evacuation groups failed to reach — the ostensible leadership of Manzanar's population.

Tanaka identified and described the three groups or factions at Manzanar. These were: Group I, the Japanese American Citizens League, an organization of which he was a member; Group II, the Anti-JACL group; and Group III, the Anti-Administration-Anti-JACL group.

Regarding Group I, Tanaka noted that there were over 350 clubs and organizations in the pre-war Japanese communities throughout southern California. Of the dozen that survived war and evacuation, the JACL was "undoubtedly the largest from the standpoint of membership, organization staff, finances, prestige, and enemies." For many years in Los Angeles, the "most persistent criticism of, and opposition to, the JACL was furnished by a numerically small but articulate group" which he termed the Anti-JACL group.

Group II (the Anti-JACL group in pre-war days), according to Tanaka, had "held a reputation among the Japanese population generally as being 'Aka' (Red) meaning 'Communist.'" In the communities "where economic control or dominance was held largely by a Japanese-speaking non-citizen element, to be labelled 'Aka' was synonymous with ostracism." Tanaka observed that "individual political thinking among the Japanese was neither characteristic nor conspicuous." Among the "so-called Anti-JACL group, however, it was." Some individuals, "who shied away from this group for personal economic or social reasons, considered it more as a 'left wing,' 'liberal,' or 'progressive' group rather than the 'Aka' label more generally recognized."

Tanaka noted that, unlike Groups I and II, the Group III faction was "primarily Japanese-speaking" and had "no pre-evacuation history as an organized body." Unlike Groups I and II, its "war ideology was openly and admittedly anti-American, pro-Axis." According to Tanaka, "Group III's principal appeals for evacuee support and sympathy, however, were bolstered more by the general unpopularity of Groups I and II rather than by any wholesale adherence to the war ideology its more fanatic obvious leaders preached."
Tanaka observed that any "discussion where 'groups' are involved compel certain general statements," and that generalizations "at best, are only approximately true." In the Manzanar riot, there were individuals who figured as Principal Participants who considered themselves as belonging to no 'group.' Other principals had "deliberately" attempted "to dissociate themselves from previous labels under which they had been known." Within "the small circle of the groups themselves were frictions tending against any 'group' unity." Nevertheless, "both in the developments leading to the disturbance, and in the riot itself, Groups I, II, and III crystallized as definite associations or factions."

Tanaka listed some of the relationships among the three factions. Group I individuals were on the "Death List of Group III." Individuals in Group II were on the "Death List" of Group III. Groups I and II, numbering less than 40 principals, were evacuated for reasons of personal protection to Death Valley. Group III leaders were jailed for their efforts. "Differences of opinion, personal dislikes, harbored grudges of long standing, and old rivalries separated Groups I and II." In their "positions and attitudes on the war, however, they were united — ideologically." Their "community of interests and willingness to cooperate with each other, however, ended there."

During the pre-evacuation period, individuals associated with Group I "were, among the Japanese population, more affluent; in business they were undoubtedly the more financially successful; they were generally described as the entrepreneurs or employers; socially they carried greater prestige." Individuals in Group I "through positions of office in the Japanese Citizens League, regularly receipted for a heavy bill in accusations, rumors, public charges." There were numerous charges that "Group I members were grafters, or frauds cheating the J.A.C.L. treasury" or "they were disreputable would-be capitalists exploiting Japanese American labor or obstructing legitimate unionism." "That Group II members were parties to these public and private efforts to discredit Group I" was "acknowledged by the former."

Tanaka observed that Group II "came in for the same type of abuse and slander in pre-evacuation days." This "torpedoing was admittedly aided and abetted by Group I." More than the other factions, Group II "was characterized in its composition as intellectual intelligentsia among the Japanese." Rumors and "vicious backyard talk about Group II invariably centered around the alleged loose morals and unconventional behavior of its members."

Group III leaders "exploited this relationship of bad feeling and malicious personal slander between Groups I and II, to good advantage in winning evacuee support and in neutralizing potential sympathy for the obvious representatives of 'pro-Administration' and 'pro-American' thought." Tanaka noted that it was "now apparent" that Group III held "both Groups I and II in contempt for the latter's position on the war which was regarded by Group III more often than not as 'dreamy idealism' or 'wishful thinking contrary to real facts.'" Group III held Groups I and II in "disgust for the latter's evident desire to cooperate with the Caucasian administration, a desire that was interpreted by Group III as 'licking the white man's boots.'" Group III also viewed Groups I and II "with fear, distrust, and suspicion because of the latter's alleged willingness to cooperate with the federal investigative agencies within the center." This "latter relationship played an important part" in the "outbreak of violence" on December 6.
On the "night of the riot," Tanaka noted that "it can be recorded" that no love was apparently lost between Groups I and II, despite the fact both were refugees from the same disturbance. "Mutual distrust, suspicion, and dislike" were "only temporarily stifled."

Tanaka recalled "that members of Group II arrived at Manzanar as evacuees before Group I," thus enabling Group II members to establish "themselves at the relocation center first." When Group I members "arrived a month or so later, they generally discovered that Group II 'had laid the mines and torpedoes in advance of our coming.'" They "prepared the Administration — and volunteer evacuees for a hostile reception for us; they kept up the vicious rumors to perpetuate themselves in their petty little jobs, continuing jealousies and frictions of pre-war and pre-evacuation days." On the other hand, Group II "members felt justified in their attitude toward the latecomers," characterizing the JACL members as "troublemakers and would-be big shots" who were "used to grabbing selfish control of everything."

Tanaka reported that approximately 95 percent of the Manzanar evacuees "were neither active nor passive participants in the incident." Rather, "they were interested, curious, fearful, somewhat bewildered spectators." None of the three groups "commanded any substantial loyal following." Groups I and II "certainly did not," as individuals "associated with either have been completely vilified, hung in effigy." In Tanaka's opinion, Group II "represented a spontaneous outburst of pent-up emotion growing out of fears and uncertainties which continually made for a neurotic state of mind among a large section of the population." The "incentive to resist the kind of talk espoused by Group III (Harry Ueno-Joe Kurihara-Genji Yamaguchi) did not (and still does not) exist within the limiting confines of barbed wire fences and watchtowers."

Tanaka observed that the "impression given in most newspaper accounts of the Manzanar disturbance" was that the "instigators were all 'pro-Japan' or 'pro-Axis' (and the same was applied to their alleged followers) and that the intended victims of violence were 'pro-American.'" This, however, was not "necessarily an accurate picture." "If it implies that all the outstanding 'pro-American' individuals have been driven out of the Center and only 'pro-Axis' or 'pro-Japan' elements are left, it is entirely erroneous and misleading." Undoubtedly, "differences in ideology and position on the war played an important part," but these were "incidental to clashes of personality and organizational friction in leading to the riot itself."

One of the most difficult problems facing WRA administrators, according to Tanaka, was "that of securing or getting evacuees sympathetic, or at least cooperative, in their attitude toward the W.R.A. administration." "If even partial success is attained, the vicious circles of rumors which make for so much unrest and fear would be cut down considerably." The evacuees were "a disbelieving, distrustful, suspicious populace," because of "the long and unbroken series of 'broken promises,' about the true nature of which there is little understanding." Added to this unconscious "source of resentment and grievance," was the disillusionment and "bitterness of a frustrated citizen element which can be satisfied completely only by a return to the normalcy of outside life." This "underlying situation" provided "a setting for disturbance, an occasional outbreak of violence."
Thus, on December 6 Manzanar "was not unlike a powder barrel." "Groups I, II, and III constituted exceedingly short fuses." One single incident — the attack on Tayama and the subsequent arrest of Ueno — "ignited the whole barrel."

Elimination "of the apparent and most active members of these Groups has reduced the hazard of another blow-off of major proportions in any predictable immediate future." However, Tanaka warned that this did not "necessarily mean that the underlying situation has been corrected." 75

Evacuee Perspectives as Documented by the Community Analysis Section

Several reports prepared by Morris E. Opler, the WRA-appointed Community Analyst at Manzanar who had served on the faculty of Cornell University, included the perspectives of evacuees concerning the causes and background of the violence at the camp on December 5-6, 1942. One revealing description of the events that led to the violence was provided by an anonymous evacuee in a report dated November 19, 1943. This evacuee, who was an eyewitness to some of the events leading up to the violence as well as a confidant of some evacuees who were involved in the controversies swirling throughout the center, stated:

I don’t know the date of this kibei meeting. It was held in Kitchen 15. There the chairman opened the meeting by announcing that all loyal American citizens should get the heck out of the kitchen. Kurihara and Slocum had a clash in words. Slocum was pro-American and Kurihara was anti-American and they bitterly hated each other. At that meeting Uyeno [sic] agitated very much. Karl Yoneda was the secretary and it seemed that he put in the wrong memorandum as to the procedure of the meeting, which aroused the kibei boys to threaten him at one time. At that time the kibei boys were against the forming of the fair practice committee for the Center simply because of the fact that they thought that all JACL members would become the ones in charge. They said the JACL leaders were trying to get a hold of it, and it did look like those JACL leaders were trying to get a hold of it, and it did look like those JACL fellows were putting themselves on everything.

So Uyeno [sic] and Tsuji (both have been pulled in since), with the help of kibei agitators, formed a kitchen work corps, which was non-cooperative and agitated against the Administration. It seemed that at that time the kitchens weren’t getting their allotment of sugar and Uyeno [sic] went to complain to Campbell and asked, "Where does the sugar go to. It comes into the camp but it doesn’t come into the kitchens?"

Fred Tayama had just returned from Salt Lake City from a JACL convention and the following night he got beat up or rather mobbed. Uyeno [sic] was pulled in on suspicion of being one of Tayama’s assailants. The agitating group got together outside the grounds of kitchen 22 and demonstrated. They had a loud

75. Manzanar Relocation Center, Documentary Report, No. 91, January 25, 1943, by Togo Tanaka, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 69, File, “Manzanar — Incident Material.”
speaker set up on top of the oil tank. The leading agitators wanted the administration to return Uyeno [sic] to the Center within 24 hours. He was in the Independence jail. There were 5 chosen to act as spokesmen for the group who were trying to get the Administration to release Uyeno [sic]. At that meeting the agitators openly threatened to kill or get Winchester [Chief Project Steward], Campbell especially, Tayama, who was already in the hospital, Slocum, and all known 'dogs.' Those 5 go-betweens did not succeed but they were arrested too.

On December 6 again they had a meeting at Kitchen 22. The agitators inside of the mob tried to forcefully get Uyeno [sic] and the 5 men out. Uyeno [sic] had been brought back to the Center at the time that they demanded his freedom, but he was being kept in the Manzanar jail. On December 6, the fateful day, another open meeting was held at Kitchen 22 outdoors. There the agitators incited the mob to take things into their own hands. Half of the group was to go to the hospital and was to finish off Tayama. The other half was to go toward the Administration and get Campbell and free those who had been taken into custody.

Well, by this time soldiers were in camp lined up on 'A' street. The mob was there. It seemed that the head persons were behind the front line bystanders. The agitators were not in the front line. Those agitators, it seemed, wanted to stay in the background and heckle rather than being in the front. The agitators threw rocks at the Manzanar jail and at the soldiers too. It seemed that the agitators wanted the soldiers to fire upon the crowd. So the soldiers started throwing tear gas at the crowd to disperse them. Most of the crowd tried to disperse but by this time a soldier was shooting with his tommy gun. Several were injured at the time. One died instantly. He was an innocent bystander.

This is straight from block 22 block manager who was in the thick of it all the time. All the while that the Kitchen Work Corps was complaining about the sugar, complaining to Campbell and Winchester, they didn't realize that the warehouse workers were taking the sugar. It seemed that there is definite proof that one kitchen, namely number 10 used 3000 lbs. of sugar in one month. The food delivery crew was composed mostly of Terminal Island kibeis. It was not Winchester or Campbell's fault that each kitchen did not get its share, because of the fact that the food distributors were mostly from blocks 9 and 10.

If Cambell had been ousted and if stricter control over the food distribution had been maintained, the incident would not have happened. Her[e] is another thing. Slocum was supposed to have said he would be the last Jap in camp if at all. He said this back in Los Angeles. He said that he would never be put in a camp like this. It looked funny when he came then; as though he came for no good purpose.

It seemed that the Blood Brothers, the B.B.'s, a kibei goup [sic], were out to get anybody who was connected with camouflage [sic] or J.A.C.L.

The man who told me this said that Uyeno [sic] was pulled in on suspicion of beating up Tayama not because the police or administration had any evidence
that he was one of the assailants but because he was a dangerous agitator. So they got him first.

It seemed that Uyeno [sic] tried to get a job at the warehouse but was unable to do so. He thought that by getting in on the ground floor he could get evidence as to where the sugar went to. Rumor was flying, thick and fast around that time as to having seen Campbell drive out of this center in a panel truck loaded with meat. It seems that Campbell is in the thick of it. They sure hated his guts. I never had contact with him but I heard plenty. This fellow said that Campbell was a s.o.b. and that if he had been dead and buried the whole thing wouldn’t have happened. You see, Doc., Campbell tried to be a dictator in this camp, that’s why. The whole thing came out of this sugar thing too.

I think the people in the center still don’t know whether the sugar was actually stolen by Campbell or misappropriated by the food delivery crew.

This is what this fellow told me. It isn’t the way I understood it up to now. I had understood that Campbell and Winchester were up to their necks in sugar. Not only sugar, but there was the meat problem too. But this fellow, though he didn’t like Campbell, says that this wasn’t it. He says that the food distributors were more to blame. He knew this but he couldn’t tell. Those San Pedro boys are pretty tough and he didn’t want to get his neck in a sling. He says that in the warehouse they would just take a knife and slit down a bag of sugar. I can believe it because I have heard that eggs are delivered to the kitchens with the top row there only. Underneath the eggs are gone. Then the kitchen workers blame each other. Same with meat. Those fellows take their own boxes along and cut off pieces and throw them in there and the kitchens get shorted. If the kitchen workers complain to the food distributors about unfair distribution, the distributors lessen their allotment to that kitchen all the more. It seems that the whole damn squabble in the center is always food.

Kurihara was a fellow 35 or 40. He was a Hawaiian. He was bitter. He was an American Legionnaire [sic] and being stuck in a place like this nearly killed him. I first heard him speak December 5 outside kitchen 22 where the loud speaker was installed. He was definitely an agitator and I knew from the way he said things that it was just no good. He mentioned names, saying, ‘Let’s go get so and so,’ and the crowd would respond, ‘Let’s go get him.’ They didn’t at that time, but they tried to later on.

They had a little misunderstanding that brought things to a head later on too. The spokesmen, those 5 men, thought that it was understood that Uyeno [sic] was to be freed within the Center, but the Administration only meant that he was to be brought back to the Manzanar jail from the Independence jail.

The fact that the incident happened on December 6 had nothing to do with it. Nobody thought of Pearl Harbor but the newspapers. That was just a coincidence. The fellow who told me this was on the kitchen crew at Block 22 when this
happened so that he was in the thick of it. He was the foreman there or the one in charge, pretty much. Uyeno [sic] worked in that same kitchen crew.\textsuperscript{76}

On September 13, 1943, Opler prepared a report based on an interview with a Nisei from Venice who had relocated as a college freshman to the University of Utah in Salt Lake City in January 1943. While the college student was visiting relatives at Manzanar, Opler took the opportunity to talk with him about his experiences in the camp prior to his relocation. The Nisei provided some poignant insights into the stresses and strains in the camp that led to violence:

The main cause of the riot on December 6 was the feeling of the people that they had been betrayed by members of the Los Angeles chapter of J. A. C. L. They don't blame the leaders of other chapters or those in the national office but they do have it in for this Los Angeles bunch. It is felt that these fellows, in order to show their patriotism and gain favors for themselves, had given information even before evacuation about what people had said or done. Therefore they were blamed for a great many of the internments and hardships. It was believed that they had not only done this on the outside but had continued it on the inside, in other words, they had been acting as stool pidgeons [sic]. They are also charged with misleading the people while they were still on the outside and with getting them to accept evacuation. Therefore those who had become bitter over the way evacuation has gone, or who had lost much in evacuation, had it in for them.

Tayama was the worst hated of them all. He was beaten up, and he hid in the hospital. A group were out looking for him. They searched his home. They didn't find him there but they came back with tales of the fine furniture he had there and the amount of food stored in his place. This made the people more sure than ever that he was getting special favors from the government for his 'work.' Ueno and some others were jailed for beating him up. I knew there was going to be trouble, for a mob formed in the afternoon. Then in the evening they heard that Tayama was at the hospital. The mob formed again. I knew that there was going to be plenty of trouble so I stayed home, right in block 16. And, sure enough, the shooting followed. The people blamed the M.P.'s. They say they were just itching to fire.

I was working up at the hospital during this period. I was driving a truck, picking up the wash for the hospital. . . . I saw the body of the boy, James Ito, who was shot and killed. He was in the ice box when I saw him. His clothes were there too. They were a bloody mess. The other fellow who died following the shooting was up in the hospital too. I didn't get a good look at him; I just went through the ward once while he was there. He was shot in the stomach and they say he was in terrible agony till he died.

The riot was all mixed up in several ways with the mess halls. They have always been a focus of trouble. It was charged that Tayama was getting special favors

\textsuperscript{76} Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, November 19, 1943, Report No. 97.
and privileges that others were not getting. Even now if one thing appears at one meshall and not at another, favoritism is charged. . . . 77

On January 24, 1944, Opler prepared a report, entitled “Evacuation, Events at Manzanar, and Relocation (From a Well-Educated Man of Professional Background).” Among the observations of this evacuee were the following:

A great deal of the trouble which led to the incident here can be traced back to hard feelings which began before evacuation and during evacuation. Take the position of the issei. They had been kicked around pretty much in this country. But they stuck it out, made a living, raised their families, and some did pretty well. Then came the crisis between the two countries and war. The issei were crowded into the background or interned. If anyone was called to see the mayor [of Los Angeles], it was T.[ayama] (an officer of the J.A.C.L.), if anyone went to see the F.B.I. or any other agency of official it was T.[ayama] and his friends. The J.A.C.L. didn't have more than 1,500 regular members up and down the coast. I was an officer of one district with 12 clubs in it and altogether we didn't have more than 500 members. While many of the nisei were too young to join this was not a good representation. It was just not a representative body and a good many were sore because it undertook to speak for all the Japanese. . . .

Later on the story grew up that T.[ayama] and the J.A.C.L. people had agreed right away to evacuation and had helped pick out the site for Manzanar. T.[ayama] had nothing to do with the selection of the place. It's true that he was brought up to see it before the people came but this was so there would be someone to assure the people that the place was inhabitable.

Also there was a great fear of informers and spies. There was some of this at Santa Anita, where a fellow who was supposed to be a Korean was beaten up. Here they suspected fellows like S.[locum] From what I heard him say more than once I really believe he turned people in before he came here. If he did help the government it was pretty stupid of them to put him in here where the families of his victims could get back at him. At any rate the families of many of those interned felt that there were informers in here who had turned the family heads in out of malice or for some trivial remark made during a time of peace. . . .

There were a whole series of mistakes. The first was the embittering of the volunteers. They didn't get their union wages; in fact they didn't get paid for months. Many had come up without any resources for they expected to get paid regularly here. Some had promised to send money to relatives still on the coast. They were running around here without a nickel for months. 78


78. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, January 24, 1944, Report No. 139, “Evacuation, Events at Manzanar, and Relocation (From a Well-Educated Man of Professional Background),” by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File No. 61.318, No. 7.
On April 22, 1944, Opler prepared another report based on interviews with a Nisei from French Camp near Stockton, California. This young man, a neighbor of Fred Tayama, commented on the tensions in the camp that led to violence, stating that the "first tension I ever felt over the things which were to lead to the riot was when I heard that they [JACLers] formed an American Citizens Federation for niseis only." He noted further:

...I believed that to leave out the kibei group who were citizens also would create bad feeling between the two groups...Their point of view seemed so selfish. It looked like the JACL bunch wanted to start in again under another name. They put themselves up for everything that came along. The same little bunch wanted to be the officers and to run everything...This riot really did not start directly within Manzanar because there was a tension between the people and the JACL on the outside before coming to camp. We were led to believe that the JACL was going to protect our rights. I suppose that they did their best but to some it wasn't good enough. We don't remember any attempt of the JACL to go to Washington, D.C. and protest for the American citizens of Japanese ancestry. But they told us to evacuate quietly and to prove our loyalty.

Another reason is that the members of the JACL were turning in issei who had had anything to do with the Japanese government. Instead of doing that we thought they were supposed to help us out. After I got here in May I met a fellow who was a member of the JACL who admitted that the leaders had turned in issei that they had something against...

The first I knew about the trouble was when my sister told me that T.[ayama] had been beaten up during the night. I was the only one in the family who didn't wake up when all the noise of the beating was going on. He lived in the barracks right across from us. This was the night of December 5.

I was not surprised. There had been threats against T. He had been away to a JACL meeting in Salt Lake City and while he was away there was talk against him. They said that he was getting special privileges and special food. He seldom ate at the messhall and they always had plenty. They say that when they broke into his house that night there was plenty of sugar and all kinds of rationed items there. I believe it. His relative was head of all the distribution of food supplies in camp and I think they looked out for themselves.

After this man [Ueno] was arrested they tried to get him out and of course there was some shooting here at Manzanar by the U.S. soldiers, which I guess you can't blame them for. Still, perhaps, it could have been avoided. I wasn't there at the time of the shooting but from what I have heard, some of these Japanese here at camp threw rocks at the soldiers, started up a truck and tried to run a truck into the soldiers. The truck didn't hit the soldiers but ran into the police building.

After hearing all that I felt that the soldiers had to look out for themselves and they had the orders to shoot, so I believe that we can't blame them entirely...
Two of my friends were shot in the leg and in the stomach that day. I think they were innocent bystanders because I know those boys pretty well. Both of them have relocated.


Prepared in February 1946 by Brown and Merritt, the "Project Director's Report," in the *Final Report, Manzanar,* provided a lengthy analysis of the factors that led to the "Manzanar Incident," thus expressing the views of its authors with the benefit of hindsight and reflection, an opportunity to discuss issues with evacuees, and access to WRA and relocation center records. According to this report, the operation of the center under WRA administration "began to develop in a more or less normal manner" after June 1, 1942. While the operation of the center was developing during the ensuing months, however, "the development of leadership within the Center became stranded upon the shoals of mismanagement and meddling."

The struggle for leadership at Manzanar, according to this report, "was the struggle between Nisei and Issei." While there were "many variations and off-shoots of this struggle given names such as "Pro-Japanism" and "Pro-Americanism," these titles, according to the authors, were "more nearly handy labels to be pasted over old feuds rather than a representation of any real source of the struggle."

Block representatives had been a part of the Manzanar picture since WCCA days. At first block managers were appointed by the management from three nominees selected by the residents in each block. Later, as the camp was filling to capacity, a new method was effected whereby a block could elect a leader once the population of that block reached 200.

Most of the potential leaders of Manzanar recognized that eventually the block manager position would be an important one, but the younger people (Nisei) also recognized that under existing social customs governing Japanese American communities, only the elders in the community would be elected leaders. To counteract this trend, the Nisei began to exert efforts to obtain important administrative jobs and dominate the political life of the center. After the center had been operating for four months, most of the important administrative positions which were available to evacuees were held by Nisei, while most of the block manager positions were held by Issei.

Considerable discussion was conducted over the form of community self-government at Manzanar. The Washington office informed the relocation centers that a pattern of self-government would be forthcoming and requested the projects not to do anything of a permanent nature in formulating self-government procedures. The notice from Washington disturbed the Nisei who were not, in their estimation, adequately represented in any governing body in the centers. To offset this problem, they moved in two directions. At Manzanar, a group of young Nisei, led by Fred Tayama, organized the Manzanar Citizens' Federation on July 12. Simultaneously, the Japanese American Citizens League, with headquarters in Salt Lake City, organized an effective lobby to have the

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79. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, April 22, 1944, Report No. 231.
Washington office recognize the Nisei as the only persons capable under law to vote or hold office in the relocation center community governments.

The Manzanar Citizens’ Federation was a coalition of pro-America and pro-Communist patriots whose concerns coalesced in the matter of military service, with volunteering for a "second front" the overriding concern. At Manzanar, those who organized the Manzanar Citizens’ Federation claimed that the Issei were only representing one generational point of view. They claimed that cases of discrimination and infringement of civil liberties in the evacuation program could only be fought by a citizens' group — the Nisei. They also claimed that the Issei were not considerate of the Kibei group and that the Kibei were, in reality, American citizens who needed guidance from the new organization.

Four objectives were adopted as the focus of the new organization. These were to: (1) improve conditions in the camp; (2) educate citizens for leadership; (3) participate in the war effort; and (4) prepare a postwar program to meet the needs of all evacuees.

According to Brown and Merritt, the Nisei who established this organization around these goals were accused by other evacuees in the camp, comprised mainly of Issei and Kibei, of proposing such an organization merely for their personal gain. Opposition developed at the first meeting, coalescing around the general theme — "We do not need a Citizens’ Federation or self-government. The government put us behind barbed wire, let it take care of us."

Personality clashes entered into the struggle for leadership of the camp’s community government. At the first meeting of the federation, the arguments between individuals quickly became a clash "over records and past performances of these individuals."

In the aftermath of this meeting, Joseph Kurihara emerged as an emotional leader of the opposition to Nisei ideals, goals, and organizational framework. He quickly began efforts to establish a "counter organization called the Manzanar Relocation Center Federation." According to the proposed constitution for this federation, its purpose was to "act in accordance with the Constitution of the United States, and strive with the united efforts for the preservation of the Real Democratic principles." The federation would "act in the capacity of intermediary in carrying out instructions of the authorities to avoid misunderstanding and complexity among the Issei, Nisei, and Kibei groups." Membership in the federation would be "open, without restriction upon recommendation by fellow residents" and approval by the "Membership Board." Membership fees would be 25 cents a year, the fund to be under the "sole jurisdiction and control of the officers," and the proceeds to be "used to defray administrative expenses of the federation."

On September 4, WRA Administrative Procedure No. 34 arrived at Manzanar from Washington, containing regulations for the establishment of community government in the relocation centers. The "bombshell" in the document was that "only citizens could hold elective offices in any center." The Japanese American Citizens’ League had thus won its battle, since enforcement of the procedure would place Nisei in control of center community government.

Administrative Procedure No. 34 directed the individual project directors to appoint a commission to draw up a charter for community government, the items that the WRA
required in the charter being enumerated in the document. The entire center population would then be asked to vote on the acceptance of the charter.

In accordance with the directive, Project Director Nash appointed a commission to draw up a charter for Manzanar. Essentially, the members of the commission were leaders of the Manzanar Citizens' Federation. After they drew up a preliminary charter as directed by the WRA, a struggle between Nisei and Issei erupted over voting on the charter. Dates for the election were set and postponed twice, as the evacuee population in the center came “to a fine pitch of excitement” over the issue.

According to Brown and Merritt, the state of confusion in the center began “catching in the ranks of the members” of the WRA appointed personnel. The chief of community services and the employment officer were the first to “break openly and denounce each other in a staff meeting.” The chief engineer, never very sympathetic with the evacuees, was the subject of a number of attacks in written memoranda by key WRA staff. This discord between members of the staff was “immediately picked up by evacuees and used to point out in evacuee circles the ineffectiveness of federal management.”

Two orders by center management during the late summer caused considerable unrest among the evacuee population. The first was an order for all persons to move out of Blocks 1 and 7, the first to be used exclusively for administrative offices and the latter to be used for schools. At first, the residents, led by a group of openly identified 'anti-administration' evacuees, refused to move from their quarters, arguing that the government had sufficient money to build schools and office buildings. Because schools were important to many evacuees, the residents of Block 7 "eventually gave in to pressure and moved." However, the residents of Block 1, composed primarily of bachelors, staged "what amounted to a sit-down strike which occasioned several 'ultimatums' by the management, the last one of which was obeyed but not without a great deal of resentment."

The second instance "of bungling on the part of the administration was a hurriedly written bulletin by the Project Director" following a meeting held by the Kibei in the mess hall of Block 15 on August 8. At the meeting, anti-administration voices roundly denounced the WRA administrators and the federal government in Japanese. Incensed by the meeting, Project Director Nash issued Director's Bulletin No. 16 stating that "no more public meetings will be permitted where Japanese is spoken as the principal language."

Anti-administration forces were quick to point out that this order canceled the inherent right of free speech in America guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Furthermore, they used the bulletin as evidence that the administration was not in sympathy with problems facing the evacuees, and that the tone of the notice clearly demonstrated that Manzanar "was a prison camp, not a Relocation Center."

During this period, tensions mounted among the block managers. In August, for instance, the first block manager resigned after having made a fiery speech against the administration in which he asked, among other things, who was to pocket a supposed $14,000 profit from the camp's canteen/general store and who authorized a printing bill of $2,000 which, it was rumored, was the price paid to print the script. He urged the people not to move from Block 7 for schools, and concluded by claiming that his American
citizenship was meaningless and that he wanted nothing to do with America. This first 
open rift in the block managers touched off "a series of accusations, recriminations, and 
resignations the next month or two." Soon, the chairman of the block managers, who had 
at one time enjoyed considerable personal popularity in the camp, was attacked for 
immoral behavior. Although he scoffed at these charges at first, he later tendered his 
resignation, the grounds for his resignation never being "completely clarified in any of the 
meetings."

According to Brown and Merritt, the first signs of nationalistic sentiments at Manzanar 
began to be noticed during the summer months following an announcement by 
Washington on July 20 that Kibei would not be allowed to leave the camp on work 
furloughs. Many of the Kibei, their emotions "taut because of conflicts of language, 
ideologies, and living patterns," felt that the order keeping them in the center, even 
though they were American citizens, was "a great act of discrimination."

Led by "anti-administration" leaders, many Kibei openly denounced their American 
citizenship and pledged their allegiance to Japan at a public meeting in early August. 
Tokie Slocum also attended the meeting and openly boasted of being an FBI informant. 
After this declaration, Slocum found it necessary to hustle out of the meeting for his own 
protection. The meeting became so boisterous that WRA staff members intervened and 
asked for adjournment. Such pronouncements presented an opportunity for many Nisei, 
who had ambitions to control the community government of the center, to point out that 
there was a large element of "dangerous pro-Japanese forces" in the camp "whose avowed 
purpose was to smash any constructive program of the administration and make the camp 
a "prison camp for Japs."

Evidence of a rising underground movement began to surface as bulletins appeared in the 
mess halls and latrines signed by the "Blood Brothers" and the "Black Dragon Society." The 
first attacks were leveled against the community government program, but soon they 
switched to tirades against the camouflage net project. Other targets included the 
Manzanar Cooperative ("an obvious plot to impoverish us Japanese"), the education 
program ("We don't need a useless American education"), and furlough work in the sugar 
beet fields of the western states ("the white man told us to get out of California; now they 
want to use us as economic serfs. Do not go on furlough.")

Amid the struggle for power in the camp, the Kitchen Workers’ Union was established in 
late September under the leadership of Harry Ueno. As "his bargaining weapon," Brown 
and Merritt observed that Ueno "manufactured out of wholecloth, without any basis of 
fact, that the administration was stealing sugar which belonged to the evacuees and was 
selling it outside at black market prices." Ueno was "able to stir up a great deal of 
excitement among the evacuees, but was unable to use this to any advantage with the 
administration." Ueno managed, however, "to get himself thoroughly disliked by the then 
Assistant Project Manager [Ned Campbell] who, on several occasions, threatened to throw 
the organizer bodily from the room."

Failing "to gain a point in having his union recognized and also failing to have his union 
members go on strike because of the sugar," Ueno, according to Brown and Merritt,
"joined forces with the ‘pro-Japanese’ group," which had rallied around the leadership of Joseph Kurihara. The names of Campbell and Chief Steward Joseph Winchester were thus added "to the list of ‘dogs, stooges, and informers, who, by this time, were going to be ‘liquidated’ by the people."

Harvey M. Coverley, the new Acting Project Director, sensed the seriousness of the charges posed by Ueno. Accordingly, he launched an investigation of the sugar controversy and presented his findings to the block managers. These men, for the most part, accepted the administration's findings that the charges were baseless and transmitted the information to the residents of their blocks. By this time, however, "it was too late to kill the old antagonism between the organization of the Kitchen Workers and the administration, particularly certain individuals in the administration."

In this state of turmoil, Roy Nash, who had served as project director of Manzanar since the WRA had assumed administrative control of the camp on June 1, resigned to "take up new duties in South America." For the next six weeks, the center was administered by two different acting project directors, Coverley and Solon T. Kimball, sent from the regional office in San Francisco.

On November 24, Ralph P. Merritt, who had been chairman of the Inyo-Mono Associates and of the initial Citizens Committee in the Owens Valley appointed by Thomas Clark in March, arrived from his ranch in Nevada to serve as project director. Although associated with the establishment of the camp, he had been away from the area for more than six months and "was not aware of the manifold conflicts which had brought the management and evacuees to an exploding point." A number of staff members, however, sensed the "potential powder barrel, and, in a series of early conferences" with Merritt "attempted to outline the situation as it stood at that time."

On his first day on duty at Manzanar, Merritt wrote that he was "greeted by a staff meeting with all the courtesy and curiosity which usually attends such occasions." Beneath "the veneer of the pleasantries of those first greetings," however, he sensed a "tenseness that came from misunderstandings, lack of leadership, and frustrations." Because of insufficient housing at Manzanar, much of the staff lived in Independence and Lone Pine. Merritt observed that it "was obviously a problem of first importance to build sufficient housing on the Center so the staff members might develop a better understanding of their problems and better relationships with each other and the evacuees whom they served."

The next day, Merritt attended a meeting in Town Hall in which the charter for community government was discussed. The Nisei "tactfully explained that the basic principles of the charter were the result of the planning of the Washington staff of WRA." The Issei, on the other hand, "were solidly in opposition to the adoption of any form of government which would rob them of power and prestige, and the opportunity to participate in the government affairs of the community."

Merritt's attention was caught by the statement of one impassioned speaker: "Look out the window and what do you see? There is barbed wire, there is a watch tower, and there is a soldier who guards us by day and night and shoots us if we break the law. Because it is called self-government and we have no self-government, I move that the damned charter be thrown out the window." The motion was passed unanimously. Merritt observed that he vaguely "began to understand that the problem of first importance with the evacuees was the creation of a
method of Center administration that would create, rather than destroy, mutual confidence." Less than two weeks later, these tensions would result in violence.  

Joseph Kurihara Statement in March 1944 and Merritt Interview with Kurihara, November 12, 1945

By March 1944, Joseph Kurihara, one of the principals in the events at Manzanar on December 5-6, 1944, had been transferred to the Tule Lake Segregation Center. At the request of the Community Analysis Section in the WRA's Washington Office, Kurihara, still embittered by his experiences at Manzanar and subsequent treatment by the WRA, prepared a written statement concerning the issues that led to violence at Manzanar. Kurihara stated:

Camp Manzanar was sailing along very satisfactorily until the introduction of the J.A.C.L. around the beginning of August 1942. This was the dynamite which only needed a spark to touch it off. I started to blast them to Hell, but they were so well entrenched behind the Administrative wall with official backing, it took several blastings before they were completely routed.

Togo Tanaka, one of the leading sponsors had personally admitted to me that he saw the sign of defeat on the very first night of the meeting. He withdrew and did not appear at the second meeting. However the sneaky Fred Tayama and Kiyoshi Higashi persisted in trying to salvage the bursted pieces of J. A. C. L, and attended without authorization, the National Convention of the J.A.C.L. at Salt Lake City, Utah.

In the meantime the Kibeis were very active trying to form a group of their own to offset the J.A.C.L. Permission to organize was not only denied but even the usage of the Japanese tongue thereafter was definitely prohibited. My petition to form the Manzanar Welfare Organization likewise was denied before presentation by Assistant P.D. Ned Campbell. None other than the J.A.C.L. was recognized and permitted, a discrimination which roused the feelings of the interested and the impartial.

This political controversy would have remained dormant had the J.A.C.L. been kept out of the centers. It was natural that feelings against everything American would be keenly entertained through the sting of evacuation. In the midst of such treacherous atmosphere, the J.A.C.L. had been boldly introduced. Had we been respected and treated as American citizens, the reaction might have been a welcoming one, but when we were classed as Japs and treated as such, I cannot see where in we should further americanize the youngsters of the centers. Unjustly General DeWitt had denounced us as 'Once a Jap, always a Jap.' Why then must we keep our vows to uphold the constitution of the U.S.? We were not

unloyal. We were made disloyal by the greatest saboteurs in the service of the country, General DeWitt. . . .

Concluding his remarks, Kurihara sounded a warning that represented the frustrations and bitterness of many evacuees:

In short, let's take the fences out, the towers should also be removed. If the Army must have them, have them erected miles away. Give the inductees the chance to scout the surrounding hills. Give them every privilege of humanity. Short wave news and free expression of their emotions. Cut out all the vicious lies and discrimination. It is Un-American. All the dirty things said and done will not help win the war. Otherwise do not criticize what they do over there if America can not practice Democracy and the Doctrine of the Four Freedoms.

Finally make no promise which cannot be kept, or threaten the Japanese. They will surely call your bluff.81

After the war's end, on November 12, 1945, curiosity led Merritt to seek out "possible hidden reasons" behind the violence at Manzanar on December 5-6, 1942. At Tule Lake, he interviewed Joseph Kurihara, then making preparations to leave for Japan as a result of having renounced his American citizenship. Merritt prepared a memorandum to WRA headquarters, dated January 7, 1946, based on his interview with Kurihara. During the 2 1/2-hour dialogue, Kurihara provided some significant insights regarding his personal involvement in the unrest at Manzanar that Merritt passed along to his superiors:

. . . . The substance of his statement was that at the time of the evacuation a number of the Nisei leaders of JACL sold out the Issei and the Japanese cause in general. When he met those same leaders in Manzanar he made up his mind to expose them and drive them out of the Center. These men were Tayama, Tokie Slocum, Tanaka, Higashi, and Karl Yoneda. . . .

He said that, in the summer of 1942, Slocum had gotten himself a job on the police force and was working on the graveyard shift for the purpose of taking records from the administration offices to copy them and return them before daylight in order to have complete knowledge of all that was going on in the Center. Slocum was in fear of Kurihara and told him what he was doing and agreed to give Kurihara copies of all of the material which he got. I asked Kurihara for evidence of this and he showed me documents copied from the Manzanar files, particularly certain documents which he said were written by Tayama which were transmitted to the FBI through the Manzanar Police Department.

On August 8, 1942 the Kibei meeting was held in which Kurihara spoke as a representative of the citizens' group who had been mistreated by the

Military and Congressional Investigations

Government. Tayama sent a report of this to the FBI. Kurihara gave me a copy of that report at Tule Lake. Because of the statement made by Tayama about Kurihara's speech, Kurihara says he decided to kill Tayama and therefore he organized the group which beat up Tayama on December 5th. Kurihara was not a member of the group and pretended to be surprised next morning when he heard the news of the beating. In the attempt to find the culprits of the beating, I, as Project Director, arrested Harry Ueno, a mess-hall worker who had been the head of the Kitchen Workers' Union.

On the morning of December 6th, a meeting was held at Kitchen 22 to demand the release of Ueno and from this meeting the Manzanar 'riot' was precipitated. Kurihara was a speaker at the meeting held that day and was one of five people who composed a committee to call on the Project Director demanding Ueno's release. Because he was the most talkative, he became the leader of the group. As Project Director, I made an agreement for settlement of the disturbance on the evening of December 6th. Kurihara went before the group and spoke in what was supposed to be Japanese, telling them of the settlement. He admits and it is now generally agreed that he spoke a Hawaiian dialect of Japanese which was not understood by the crowd except when he told them that a report would be made at 6 o'clock that evening at Kitchen 22. Such a meeting was in violation of the agreement. This meeting developed the mob which later created the riot. When the mob appeared and the situation got out of control, Kurihara says he tried to prevent violence and get them to go home but that he lost control and the crowd broke up to be led in various directions by those who had particular grievances against Tayama, who was in the hospital, Slocum who was supposed to be in his barrack, Tanaka in his barrack, and others.

Kurihara took full responsibility in his talk with me for this entire matter. He said that he had spent three years in praying for forgiveness and in studying Japanese so that he in future might speak understandably. He said he was returning to Japan with the feeling that he would probably be killed but he intended to speak for America and the democratic way of living.82

MILITARY AND CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS

Following the violence at Manzanar, the Ninth Service Command ordered the Commanding Officer, Central Security District, Reno, Nevada, to convene a Board of Officers to investigate the conduct of the 322d Military Police Escort Guard Company during the events of March 5 and 6 with particular reference to the use of weapons on the night of December 6. On January 3, 1943, Captain Hall testified that 2d Lieutenant Zwaik had fired at the driverless automobile on his direct order and that Privates Ramon Cherubini and Tobe Moore had fired their weapons under a standing order that in "dealing with an unarmed mob no shots will be fired, except on orders from an officer or unless men are in danger of physical attack." He believed that their actions were consistent with his orders, and he indicated that the men did not deserve disciplinary punishment." Each of the men also testified that they had fired their weapons, because they believed

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82. Quoted in Weglyn, Years of Infamy, pp. 132-33.
they were "being rushed by the Japanese" and were in "personal danger." On January 4, the board issued a statement of findings, exonerating the military police of any wrongdoing or violation of orders. The findings included the following statements:

1. Private Ruggiero had "fired two volleys in the air as a warning, in obedience to his eighth General Order; that he gave the warning because of the gathering of the Japanese mob at the Manzanar Police Station; that he was on sentry duty near the Police State, at Post #3."

2. The next shots were "fired by 2d. Lt. Stanley N. Zwaik shortly thereafter, at a driverless automobile released by the Japanese so that it would crash into the Police Station; that he fired from 6-8 shots from a Thompson sub-machine gun on orders from Capt. Hall, his commanding officer."

3. Shortly thereafter, "upon the surge of the mob toward the troops, other shots were fired by two soldiers of the 322d MPEG Company; that these were the shots that killed one man instantly and wounded nine [eleven] others; that these shots were fired by Pvt. Tobe Moore and Pvt. Roman Cherubini; that Pvt. Moore fired three shots with a shotgun; that Pvt. Cherubini fired approximately 14-15 shots with a Thompson sub-machine gun."

4. The "shots fired by Pvts. Moore and Cherubini were not fired on the direct order of any officer or non-commissioned officer, but were fired in accordance with instructions they had received in a standing order from the company commander, to the effect that in event of an engagement with a weaponless mob they were to fire only on orders from an officer or if they were in danger of a physical attack; that Pvts. Moore and Cherubini fired at the mob because members of the mob were closing in and surging toward them."

5. Pvts. Moore and Cherubini "fired the shots that killed one Japanese and wounded nine [eleven] others, one of whom died on December 11, 1942."83

Although the Board of Officers absolved the military police of any malpractice or violation of orders during the violence at Manzanar because the men believed they were in personal danger, a somewhat divergent interpretation of the events on the night of December 6 emerged during hearings conducted by a special subcommittee of the Senate Committee of Military Affairs during January-March 1943. Under questioning by Senator A. B. Chandler of Kentucky on March 7, Project Director Merritt testified that the "wind was blowing and blew the tear gas [fired by the military police] away from the crowd," while Hall claimed that his men were forced to shoot after the tear gas failed to disperse the gathered evacuees. After further questioning, Hall admitted that after the first tear gas canisters were fired, the evacuees "went back and gathered in little knots and crowds and in some of the kitchens. We gassed them again in those places and they broke up." Since the shots by Cherubini and Moore followed the second round of tear gas firing, this admission...
provided the basis for future questioning as to whether the military police were in actual physical danger, or whether they fired blindly at the unarmed evacuees at point-blank range amid the chaos and confusion of the "night-time" mob scene. Captain Hall raised further questions by informing the subcommittee of the overwhelming amount of "firepower" that the military police at Manzanar possessed to counter the demonstrations of the unarmed evacuees. Weapons issued to the military police company at Manzanar, according to Hall, included "four light machine guns," "two heavies," "eighty-nine shot guns," "twenty-one rifles (Enfield)," and "twenty-one tommie guns." 84

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

WRA-JACL Perspective

In a periodical article, entitled "The Manzanar Riot: An Ethnic Perspective," Arthur A. Hansen and David A. Hacker, two historians who have conducted considerable research on the topic, analyze the historical perspectives from which the violence in the camp has been interpreted. Until 1974, most accounts of the events at Manzanar on December 5-6, 1942, according to Hansen and Hacker, have been filtered through what might be labeled the "WRA-JACL" perspective. The appellation is appropriate because nearly all of the original documentation on the violence was prepared by WRA personnel or evacuees with JACL connections and because secondary compilers have virtually without exception simply buttressed this official version. This perspective has resulted in uniform meanings being drawn from disparate information.

The WRA-JACL perspective, according to Hansen and Hacker, has three principal features. First, as a general rule, the primary sources refer to the violence on December 5-6 as an "incident," thus scaling down the event to commonplace proportions, while the secondary works term it a "riot," thus inflating its significance to "melodramatic" levels. Second, this perspective has tended to view the "riot" episodically, thus militating against sustained, in-depth analyses of causation, causing it to be misconstrued as a denouement rather than as one development along a continuum of evacuee resistance, and reducing the riot to a purely local phenomenon instead of being related to a pattern of resistance activity within all the relocation centers. Third, this perspective has viewed the riot as a microcosm of World War II, dramatizing the riot as an ideological confrontation between pro-American and pro-Japanese factions, confusing the aggressively patriotic posture of the JACL — a small minority — with that of the Nisei as a whole, and displaying an incapacity to understand ethnic identity in terms other than subversive. 85

Ethnic Perspective

In contrast to the WRA-JACL historical perspective on the violence at Manzanar, Hansen and Hacker posit an "ethnic" perspective. Whereas the WRA-JACL perspective interprets the riot in terms of its ideological meaning within American society, the ethnic one focuses

84. Quoted in Weglyn, Years of Infamy, p. 124.
upon the riot's cultural meaning within the Japanese American community, with particular reference to Manzanar's evacuee population. Although the two authors indicate that their "new" perspective toward the Manzanar Riot is new, they argue that it conforms closely to and draws sustenance from a number of general studies — mostly recent and unpublished — on evacuation. This perspective, according to the authors, promotes analysis and understanding rather than "ideological reification" as does that of the WRA-JACL.86

As a first step in this direction, Hansen and Hacker replaced the word "riot" with "revolt." According to them, terming the event the "Manzanar Revolt" forces "us to see it not as an uncaused and inconsequential aberration, but as one intense expression of a continuing resistance movement." This change also "credits the participants in the action with a greater degree of purposeful behavior." For "while a riot's members are momentarily conjoined because they do not like where they have been, those involved in a revolt have some sense of where they want to go." "Overall" this "redefinition of the collective manifestation encourages us to view it in relation to social change within a larger structural framework, thereby affording a more sociologically meaningful analysis." "Instead of dismissing the 'riot' as an isolated, spontaneous, and unstructured phenomenon," the causes of the riot could be found in the Japanese American social system. Because the "ethnic" perspective viewed the "revolt" as an "expressive moment within a process of cultural development," it looks "backward to the prewar West Coast Japanese American community in search of explanatory antecedents for the revolt." At the same time, it also looks "beyond the revolt to ascertain its connection to subsequent subcultural evolution."

According to Hansen and Hacker, the prewar West Coast Japanese American community was dominated by Issei who hung on tenaciously to Japanese traditional cultural values. From the time of their arrival in the United States at the end of the 19th century, the Issei had experienced a series of attacks — both legal and extra-legal — which necessitated the development of self-sufficient "Little Tokyos." Each anti-Japanese attack forced the Issei to retreat further from American cultural values and to depend increasingly on their traditional Japanese culture. This, in turn, reinforced group solidarity. Thus, by the outbreak of World War II, the two most significant characteristics of the Issei-dominated Japanese American community were group solidarity and the predominance of elements of Japanese culture.

These characteristics prevailed less among the children of the Issei. During the 1930s, the Nisei generation matured and represented a potential challenge to the group's solidarity.

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as well as its cultural orientation. As citizens growing up in America, Nisei came into
greater contact with American society and consequently underwent increased
Americanization, thus serving to widen the social distance between Issei and Nisei.

On the other hand, the Nisei, according to Hansen and Hacker, were not as thoroughly
Americanized as some observers have stated, for countervailing forces, such as parental
influence and social and economic discriminatory practices in the larger American society,
were diminishing the social distance and returning the Nisei to the Japanese American
community. In addition, many Kibei were non-assimilationists, thus contributing to group
solidarity. While the JACL elements penetrated American society through social, economic,
and political activities, they, like other Nisei, were generally young, uninfluential, and
almost wholly dependent upon the Issei-dominated Japanese community for their
economic livelihood. The events of December 6, 1942, at Manzanar, according to Hansen
and Hacker, "must not be seen in isolation or ascribed solely to ideological motivations."
When "viewed within the ethnic (i.e., community) perspective, all of the occurrences of
that day — the massive crowds, the membership of the Committee of Five, the
composition of the death-lists and blacklists, the demands for the dismissal of specified
members of the appointed staff, and the character of the internees' evening demonstration
at the jail — assume a definite cultural logic." They observe that "the mounting discontent
of the internee population, which heretofore found sporadic expression through grumbling
about camp conditions, work slowdowns, strikes against war-related industries and profit­
oriented camp enterprises, and pervasive gang activity and 'inu' beatings, became
crystallized into concerted resistance action through the symbolic juxtaposition of Harry
Ueno and Fred Tayama." To buttress this interpretation, the historians quoted a
"perceptive" analysis of the situation provided by Morton Grodzins:

The situation was made to order for a popular anti-administration demonstration.
The issue cut through political and cultural lines. The question could be put as
one involving administrative integrity and fairness to the evacuees. Loyalty to
America had nothing to do with it . . . . The demonstrations that followed, though
in part engineered by the genuine pro-Japanese elements in the camp, were not
pro-Japanese demonstrations. Rather, they were simply demonstrations against an
administrative policy that according to the trend of thought in the camp, jailed on
flimsy evidence one of the community's benefactors.

Thus, Hansen and Hacker concluded that the events surrounding the Manzanar Revolt
"were but a logical culmination of developments originating with the administration's
decision to bypass the community's natural Issei leadership to deal with its own
artificially erected JACL hierarchy and to embark on a program of Americanization at the
expense of Japanese ethnicity." When the WRA removed the JACLers from the camp after
the revolt, the "Issei took a step toward restoring the dominance they had enjoyed before
the evacuation, and the entire community served notice that their self-determination and
ethnic identity would not be relinquished without a struggle." "Through the operation of
continuing resistance activity, Manzanar would eventually be transformed into a Little
Tokyo of the desert where, as in prewar days, the most salient community characteristics
were group solidarity and the predominance of elements of Japanese culture." This
transformation would be symbolized by the "Peace of Manzanar."

With establishment of the "Peace of Manzanar" following the violence that erupted at the center on December 6, 1942, Project Director Merritt optimistically observed that throughout "1943 and into 1944. ...the life of the Center crystallized into a pleasant and unexcited mood where normal human relations developed at their best." In spite of the "conflicting emotional decisions that had to be made by Center residents on loyalty, segregation, and relocation," schools "were in full swing," "health services" were "organized to a high state of efficiency," and "industrial operations in the manufacture of clothing, furniture, and many types of food stuffs, occupied and trained many people for later usefulness." Religious "organizations developed strength and large followings." The center’s agricultural pursuits "began to harvest a crop remarkable in variety and volume for the use of the residents." Recreational and social life "in the American pattern was at high tide and filled with enthusiasm and fine spirit." The "whole community moved outwardly and, in growing degree, inwardly, toward an understanding of the ideals of a high order of simple, peaceful, happy living." This movement was "due, in part, to the fact that the administration secured the cooperation of the evacuees in constructing living quarters on the Center to accommodate all members of the staff." Thus, "every employed staff member was able to live on the Center and work in the spirit of understanding and harmony." It was "due also to the leadership in Town Hall by the Block Managers and their Chairman (Kiyoharu Anzai), and the leadership throughout the Center, by all groups and points of view among the evacuees who found that the tragedy of evacuation and the restrictions of war could be forgotten in the common interest of mutual help in a sound community program."

According to Merritt, Manzanar "reached its highest level of accomplishment" during the autumn of 1944. Stressing the positive attributes of life in the relocation center, he continued:

... There was no crime, people were busy and happy, and there was a general understanding and acceptance of the policies of the Washington staff and full cooperation with the Project Director and his staff. The residents of Manzanar were never coddled. Life was severely [sic] simple and as economical as a sixteen-dollar-a-month-wage scale would indicate. Mess hall meals cost an average of 12 1/2 cents; movies and the newspaper were free services from the Co-op; health services without cash gave security to the aged and ill; and the excellent schools prepared children for the eventual return to normal living in America.

On July 12, 1945, WRA Director Myer announced that all relocation centers would be closed by the end of the year, thus initiating the "final phase of feverish relocation activity" at Manzanar. Schools closed on June 1, and week by week other administrative sections in the center completed their responsibilities and closed their doors. The last evacuee left Manzanar on November 21, 1945, and Merritt reported with optimism and pride that the "spirit of the last day was the same as the spirit of the three years previous." The evacuees
"were courteous and cooperative," and the staff "remained at its post until the job was complete."

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

On December 15, 1942, shortly after the outbreak of violence at Manzanar, Ralph P. Merritt, who had assumed his position as project director at the camp on November 24, reorganized the entire WRA administrative staff at Manzanar. The streamlined organization, which provided for more efficient operation of the center, consisted of three divisions, each led by an assistant project director, directly supervised by the project director — operations, administrative, and community management. The operations division was placed under the supervision of Robert L. Brown, who had functioned as the center's reports officer, while the administrative division was placed under Edwin H. Hooper, an experienced federal government administrator who had been supervising officer of administration under the old organization. The community management division was placed under the supervision of Lucy W. Adams. Although this organization was not approved at the Washington level until May 13, 1943, it functioned at Manzanar from the date it was established.

In the new organization, the office of the project director supervised the reports and legal divisions, while the administrative management division was comprised of the supply, finance, office services, personnel records, and statistics sections. The supply section supervised mess management, procurement, and the postal service units. The finance section consisted of the budget and accounts and cost accounting and property control units, the latter unit including warehousing. The statistics section included the former employment and housing division, known as the occupational coding and records section. The balance of the former employment and housing division was placed under the direct supervision of the project director. The community management division supervised the health, education, community enterprise, and welfare sections. The operations division oversaw the internal security, agriculture, fire protection, manufacturing, public works, and transportation sections.

As part of the staff reorganization in early 1943, a list of job classifications, definitions, and ratings was prepared by Arthur H. Miller, employment officer at Manzanar, to establish uniformity in job titles for project work for both appointed personnel and evacuee personnel. The U.S. Department of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational Titles was used as a basis for the job titles and descriptions.¹


³ War Relocation Authority, Manzanar, California, "Official List, Job Classifications, Definitions, and Ratings," January 6, 1943, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 230, File No. 77,000.
Although some minor staff realignments would be implemented periodically, this organizational framework would remain until a final reorganization of the WRA staff at Manzanar on October 1, 1944. Under this new organizational set-up, which would remain in effect until the center closed on November 21, 1945, the office of the project director (Ralph P. Merritt) supervised the legal, reports, and relocation divisions. The administrative management division, under the direction of Assistant Project Director Edwin H. Hooper, supervised the supply, finance, mess operations, statistics, evacuee property, personnel management, and office services sections. The community management division, under the direction of Assistant Project Director Lucy W. Adams, was charged with planning, direction, and coordination of the activities of sections dealing with the total program of the center — internal security, health, education, community activities, welfare, housing, community analysis, community government, and business enterprise sections. When Robert Brown, assistant project director of the operations division, left Manzanar on July 18, 1944, to work for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Merritt decided that his vacated position would not be filled. Rather, the various sections of the former operations division, consisting of the engineering, motor transport and maintenance, agriculture, and fire protection sections, were parceled out to the administrative and community management divisions for overall direction, while the section chiefs operated somewhat independently. The salary structure for the WRA administrators at Manzanar during late 1944 and 1945 was: Merritt $6,500; assistant project directors and principal medical officer, $5,600; and divisional chiefs and sectional chiefs, $3,800 - $4,600. Several chiefs of smaller sections, such as statistics and office services, were paid $2,000 to $3,200. 5

Appointed Personnel

During 1943-45, one of the chief problems facing WRA administrators at Manzanar, according to the Final Report, Manzanar, was the "education of the appointed personnel staff and the evacuees in the methods used by the government in its business operations." Most of the appointed staff at Manzanar had never worked for the government before and only a few of the evacuees had. Consequently, both WRA staff members, as well as evacuee employees, repeatedly suggested operational procedures and occasionally conducted policies that violated "either government regulations or law."

At the time of appointment, new WRA employees were provided a considerable amount of information on the purpose, organization, and policies of the WRA. Despite this effort to orient the new employees, however, there was never time to arrange for more than one such conference with each new employee because of inadequate staff personnel.

Recruitment of appointed personnel continued to be a problem throughout the 1943-45 period, since recruitment had to be approved by the 12th Civil Service District which covered the entire Pacific coast from its headquarters in San Francisco. Aside from an


5. "Organization Chart, October 1 to December 31, 1944," and "Organization Chart, April 1 to June 30, 1945," RG 210, Entry 48, Box 222, File No. 22.720, "Charts, Organization Chart."
acute manpower shortage on the west coast during the war, other factors that contributed to difficulties in recruiting appointed personnel to Manzanar were: (1) high rates of pay, plus overtime and double-time, in west coast war-related industries; (2) isolation of the relocation center; (3) the adverse climate of Owens Valley with its hot dry summers, cold winters, and numerous sand and dust storms; (4) the temporary nature of the employment as many felt that the project would close long before it did; and (5) the fact that a significant portion of the nation's population did not wish to work with persons of Japanese ancestry.

Manzanar was from two to three days by mail service from the San Francisco office of the Civil Service Commission, which made it virtually impossible to obtain approval on an assignment in less than one week. High paying jobs were so plentiful on the west coast that a number of applicants stated that they did not care to wait a week to learn if they were to be approved for employment and accepted other jobs instead. Although the Civil Service Commission offered the project "its wholehearted cooperation," it was never able to recruit a sufficient number of well-qualified or even reasonably well-qualified applicants interested in working at Manzanar. Thus, the burden of recruitment was left largely to WRA project administrators and personnel. Recruitment was primarily conducted by the assistant project directors through their personal contacts, by the personnel officer through contacts principally in Los Angeles, and by soliciting the cooperation of project staff members who referred to the personnel management section any persons they could interest in employment at the center.

The project staff was credited with securing a high percentage of the 224 persons who were hired after August 1, 1944. Between that date and closure of the project on November 21, 1945, the average number of appointed personnel at Manzanar per month was 155. Some 69 promotions were awarded, almost all of which were for personnel assigned as "War Service Indefinite" employees. The policy of the WRA at Manzanar was to promote wherever possible, thus enhancing the morale of the staff and enabling it to retain the expertise of as many experienced employees as possible.

Inadequate housing initially posed an impediment to employment of appointed personnel. On August 1, 1942, the housing quarters for WRA personnel at Manzanar consisted of nine apartments and 17 bachelor quarters. These units proved insufficient for the growing staff, and in order to obtain as well as retain employees, it became necessary until July 1943 to use evacuee barracks in the camp to house them and their families while additional new quarters were constructed. Beginning that month, as new housing units were completed they were made available to the staff living in the barracks.

By January 1944, all appointed personnel housing units were completed. Families of three or more were assigned to two-bedroom apartments, while families of two received one bedroom apartments. Single women were housed in dormitories, and single men in

6. Erica Harth, "Children of Manzanar," Massachusetts Review, XXXIV (Autumn 1993), pp. 367-91. Harth was a daughter of a female WRA relocation counselor at Manzanar who had been recruited in Los Angeles. Her family lived at Manzanar (her father worked in Inyokern and spent weekends at the center) from July 1944 until the center closed. On page 372 she noted, "The administrative section where we lived was literally white. Its white painted bungalows stared across at the rows of brown tarpaper barracks that housed the internees. Our house was small but comfortable, with a separate room for me, a kitchen and a bathroom... it seemed a normal enough home, a safe haven against the dust storms and air raid drills..."
bachelor quarters, two to an apartment. Single section chiefs or above received one
bedroom apartments, as did single employees who secured medical certificates from the
principal medical officer showing that they required diets different from those served in
the administrative mess, provided that they agreed to share the apartment with another
single person.

Lack of recreational facilities also contributed to low WRA employee morale at the isolated
relocation center. Until the fall of 1944, there were no staff recreation facilities at the camp.
Staff members with automobiles were able to go to nearby towns for limited
entertainment, but many staffers had no access to transportation. In late 1944, an
Appointed Personnel Recreation Club was organized to provide a clubhouse and
recreational facilities for staff members and their families. By Christmas, a clubhouse was
ready for occupancy. All employees of the WRA and the post office and their family
members over 14 years of age were eligible for membership. Dues were set at one dollar
per person per month. The WRA furnished dishes, silverware, chairs, and a refrigerator
for the use of the club. A piano, lamp, shuffle board and badminton sets, electric and
coffee grills, and card tables were purchased by club members at a cost of approximately
$150. The clubhouse featured a snack bar that served coffee, hamburgers, and other
snacks. The club was organized into sections of special interest, such as music, bridge, and
sports. Special occasions were observed with picnics, parties, or dances. Surplus funds
from the club were to be presented to Hillcrest Sanitarium for use by evacuees when
discharged from the hospital.

The staff at Manzanar averaged slightly less than 200 during the entire operation of the
center. Between May 1 and December 1942, 209 new employees were hired by the WRA
and 20 additional personnel were transferred from other government agencies to the
camp, thus providing the center with an average staff of slightly over 200 persons for that
period. In 1943, 234 new appointments were made, and nine employees were transferred
from other government agencies. The following year, 86 new appointments and six
transferees were added to the staff. In 1945, 223 new appointments and 11 transferees
were made. From May 1, 1942, to December 31, 1945, 788 personnel were hired or
transferred to maintain an average center staff of slightly less than 200.7

At the request of Project Director Merritt, Arch W. Davis, who had become reports officer
at Manzanar in September 1944, initiated the Manzanar Magpie, a small mimeographed
paper designed to boost staff morale and increase communication among appointed
personnel. The paper, which was printed on a monthly basis from November 20, 1944, to
April 1945, carried information of interest to appointed personnel, as well as amusing
articles concerning employees and poems, rhymes, and other articles composed by
personnel.8

210, Entry 4b, Box 73, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

Reports." A set of the papers may be found in RG 210, Entry 48, Box 221, File No. 22.400C, "The Magpie."
Evacuee Personnel

During 1943-45, evacuee personnel constituted the majority of the work force at Manzanar. Throughout these years, they continued to be paid $12, $16, and $19 per month, depending on skills classification of their work. Employment procedures that were developed during 1942 became more formalized, and on-the-job training programs and efforts to provide for a more disciplined and efficient work force were implemented.

As of February 28, 1943, a total of 4,789 evacuees were employed at Manzanar. This number included:

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<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tr>
<td>Project administration</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mess operations</td>
<td>1,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehousing</td>
<td>178</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transportation Operations</td>
<td>87</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health and sanitation</td>
<td>386</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>86</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Community Services</td>
<td>435</td>
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<tr>
<td>Building Construction</td>
<td>224</td>
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<td>Buildings and Grounds Maintenance</td>
<td>655</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fire Protection</td>
<td>46</td>
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<td>Industry</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Enterprises</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of this total, 146 males and 19 females were making $12; 2,989 males and 1,186 females were making $16; and 355 males and 94 females were making $19.9

As the relocation of evacuees out of Manzanar accelerated during early 1943, evacuee transfers from one job to another became frequent, thus causing instability in the center’s workforce. To correct this problem, the administration took steps to “freeze” many of the employees in their jobs. This freeze, however, was subject to many qualifications as indicated in a memorandum on May 20, 1943:

No worker may transfer from a more essential job to a less essential job, but he may transfer from the less essential job to a more essential one. Transfers may be made between less essential jobs, provided the transferee is not qualified for a more essential job vacancy. Thus far, the Employment Office has been able to meet practically all the requirements of the various departments so that no work has really suffered through the shrinkage of population, but this is rapidly becoming more difficult.

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Department heads and section heads are encouraged to come to the Employment Office for a frank discussion of any work problems so that every effort may be made to make the necessary adjustments, particularly in key jobs, in order to keep all the work rolling.

The Project Director has designated the following jobs as more essential because they concern the care of the sick, internal security, fire protection, the feeding of the people, the payment of allowances, the planting and harvesting of crops, and the maintenance of utility services:

Hospital professional and technical workers, orderlies, and nurses' aides
Internal Security policemen
Fire Department firemen
Finance Department bookkeepers, clerks, accountants, and typists
Mess Division cooks and workers in food warehouses and storage, food transportation
Agriculture farm workers for planting and harvesting crops
Public Works workers necessary for the maintenance and upkeep of utility services and care of government property

Although the WRA relocation program resulted in a declining population at Manzanar during 1943 and 1944, approximately 42 to 51 percent of the employable evacuee population in the camp continued to be employed during those years. Of the 9,170 residents in April 1943, 4,267 or 46.5 percent were employed. By December 1944, 2,448 of the 5,549 remaining residents (44.1 percent) were employed. In March 1945, increasing relocation resulted in a "sporadic job termination movement," and a sharp decline in evacuee personnel began to have a significant impact on center operations during subsequent months, resulting in WRA efforts to recruit every available evacuee still in the center.10

CENTER PHOTOGRAPHY

Although the WRA had not formalized a policy governing the photographing of its relocation program, three of its official agency photographers visited Manzanar to take photos of its operations during 1942. Clem Albers visited in the camp in early April, just after the first large groups of evacuees began arriving and almost two months before the WRA took over administration of the camp from the WCCA. Francis Stewart visited the center in late May and early June 1942 and was at the site when the WRA took over administration of the camp on June 1. Later in February 1943, he would return to the center to take more photographs. In late June-early July 1942, Dorothea Lange traveled to the center to take photos. Selected photographs taken by Albers, Stewart, and Lange were published in Stone S. Ishimaru, War Relocation Authority, Manzanar Relocation Center,
Manzanar, California: 1942-1945 (Los Angeles, TecCom Productions, 1987). The entire collection of their photographs may be found in Record Group 210 of the Still Picture Branch at Archives II of the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.\(^{11}\)

Of the three official photographers, Lange was the most noted, having achieved professional recognition for her documentation of migrant labor conditions during the Depression while working for the Farm Security Administration. Because of her reputation as a social activist with liberal political leanings, her WRA photographs were scrutinized closely by military authorities and many were impounded. Working from an "antagonist" position, Lange took photographs that were intended to reveal the injustice of evacuation and relocation. In April 1942 she began her WRA work in northern California by photographing the "normal life" of Japanese American families who had been in America for several generations, emphasizing their contributions to American society. Lange wanted her photographs to reveal the "pattern of mass blame" and its physical, psychological, and social effects on the evacuees during evacuation, as well as the process of transforming the assembly and relocation centers from spartan barracks into livable dwellings. From Lange's perspective, the environment of Manzanar, with its climatic challenges posed by heat, dust, and extreme cold, epitomized the oppression of its residents. Although few of her photographs were published during the war because they were seen as advocating an "unacceptable view" of evacuation and relocation, they were reinterpreted during the late 1960s and 1970s as providing a "true" picture of those events. In 1972, for instance, many of her photos were selected by Maisie and Richard Conrat for an exhibit and book of pictures, entitled Executive Order 9066: The Internment of 110,000 Japanese Americans (Los Angeles, California Historical Society, 1972). The traveling exhibit was presented, under the joint sponsorship of the National Archives, the California Historical Society, and the Japanese American Citizens League, at the Whitney Museum in New York, the Corcoran in Washington, the De Young Memorial Museum in San Francisco, and a Tokyo department store.\(^{12}\)

Although Albers, Stewart, and Lange visited Manzanar during 1942 to take photographs, it was not until January 2, 1943, that the WRA issued Administrative Instruction No. 74, describing regulations and procedures for photography in the relocation centers. The instruction provided that it was "the intention of the War Relocation Authority to document its program as fully as possible by means of photographs." The "major part of such documentation" would be "in black and white still photographs," but to "a lesser extent photographic documentation " would also "include color stills and movies." Photographs would be used "not only for documentary purposes, but also for information to be made available to the public and to the evacuees." Responsibility for the agency's photographic documentation program was assigned to the photographic section in Denver, Colorado, an office responsible to the chief of the reports division in the Washington office.

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According to the instruction, WRA photographers would visit all relocation centers and will make photographic records of activities, "giving approximately equal attention to all" elements of the centers' operations. WRA photographers would "at all times observe the right of privacy of the individual." They would take photos of "industries within relocation centers making goods and articles for the armed forces, as a necessary part of documentation." However, such pictures would not be used for any "purpose other than documentation without approval of appropriate officials of the Army or Navy." WRA photographers were forbidden to take photographs of personnel, equipment, or installations of military forces at relocation centers, unless special permission to do so is secured from appropriate officials of the Army.

Although the WRA placed "no restriction or prohibition on possession or use of cameras in relocation areas," it would observe "restrictions and prohibitions of other agencies of the government, such as the War Department and Department of Justice." Under regulations of the Western Defense Command, cameras were regarded as contraband for persons of Japanese ancestry within the areas of that command. Thus, photographs could "be taken in those centers only by official photographers of WRA, or by persons, not excluded by the applicable regulations, who are granted special permits by the Project Director or by the Director of WRA." Department of Justice regulations prohibited the possession or use of cameras by Japanese nationals anywhere in the United States.

Under the terms of the WRA instruction, evacuee-established cooperative associations in the relocation centers could establish photographic services. If such a service was established, however, "the prohibition against the use of cameras by alien evacuees, which is applicable to all relocation centers, or by any evacuee where the relocation center [such as Manzanar] is within the Western Defense Command, must be observed."

The reports officer in each relocation center would be provided with a camera "for taking photographs, with the objective of enabling him to photograph significant events and activities at the center when no official photographer is present, and also to render certain limited photographic service to the evacuees," such as family photographs at funerals.

Film of all official WRA photographs were to be sent undeveloped to the photographic section's laboratory in Denver. One file print of each exposure was to be sent to the chief of the division in Washington for clearance. Photographs not suitable for publication, because of subject matter, would be "designated for impounding, and negatives of such photographs" would "be forwarded to Washington." "All existing prints of such photographs" would "be destroyed." If approved, one file print would be made by the photo laboratory for its use, and one print would be sent to the relocation center in which it was taken. Photos would be released for publication by the reports officer at each center or by the chief of the reports division in Washington. 13

During the fall of 1943, Ansel Adams, recognized as one of the finest landscape photographers and most exacting printers in the history of American photography, was requested by Project Director Merritt to travel to Manzanar to "interpret the situation as it had developed in time." Adams had wanted to contribute to the war effort, but he was too

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13. War Relocation Authority, Washington, Administrative Instruction No. 74, January 2, 1943, RG 210, Still Picture Branch, National Archives and Records Administration, Archives II, College Park, Maryland.
old for military service. Thus, he welcomed the opportunity to photographically document the relocation center. He had been upset by the disruptive effect the evacuation and relocation program was having on the lives of evacuee friends, but he "would not say the operation as a whole was unjustified." He noted that "the fact remains that we, as a nation, were in the most potentially precarious moment of our history — stunned, seriously hurt, unorganized for actual war." Adams did not consider the evacuation as a threat to democratic principles, he saw Manzanar as "only a wartime detour on the road of American citizenship, . . . a symbol of the whole pattern of relocation — a vast expression of a government working to find suitable haven for its war-dislocated minorities." Thus, he took some 200 photographs (at present the photographs are in the Ansel Adams Collection in the Prints and Photographs Division of the Library of Congress, although copies of some are also in the aforementioned Record Group 210) that would be organized in exhibit form by the Department of Photography of the Museum of Modern Art in New York in November 1944 and published in a book entitled Born Free and Equal (New York, U.S. Camera, 1944). The subtitle of the book, "Photographs of the Loyal Japanese Americans at Manzanar Relocation Center," emphasized his efforts "to record the influence of the tremendous landscape of Inyo on the life and spirit of thousands of people living by force of circumstance in the Relocation Center of Manzanar." While the "people and their activities" were his "chief concern," there was "much emphasis on the land" and the influence of the camp's natural environment throughout this book. Adams stated in the foreword:

This book in no way attempts a sociological analysis of the people and their problem. It is addressed to the average American citizen, and is conceived on a human, emotional basis, accenting the realities of the individual and his environment rather than considering the loyal Japanese-Americans as an abstract, amorphous, minority group. This impersonal grouping, while essential to the factual study of racial and sociological problems, frequently submerges the individual, who is of greatest importance. . . .

Adams wanted "the reader to feel he has been with me in Manzanar, has met some of the people, and has known the mood of the Center and its environment — thereby drawing his own conclusions — rather than impose upon him any doctrine or advocate any sociological action." He claimed that he "intentionally avoided the sponsorship of governmental or civil organizations, not because I have doubts of their sincerity and effectiveness, but because I wish to make this work a strictly personal concept and expression." Adams hoped that the "content and message of this book will suggest that the broad concepts of American citizenship, and of liberal, democratic life the world over, must be protected in the prosecution of the war, and sustained in the building of the peace to come." As an apologist for the evacuation, he thus used his photos to demonstrate the success of the evacuation and relocation program and to emphasize the successful adaptation of the evacuees to life in the camp. He hoped his photographs, including close portraits of evacuees, small business, industrial, and agricultural activities, family groupings, and social activities, would reassure Americans outside the camp that
the people of Manzanar were now worthy of equal status, and could make valuable contributions to any American community.\textsuperscript{14}

The best source of photographs for documentation of Manzanar is the Toyo Miyatake Collection. Miyatake, a 47-year-old photographer who had operated a photograph studio in Los Angeles since the 1920s, was evacuated, along with his family, to Manzanar in 1942. As a professional photographer, it was perhaps more his instinct than any historical motive that initially made him smuggle his lens and film holder into the camp along with the few personal belongings that he and his family were allowed to take. Although prohibited to take photos, Miyatake collected pieces of wood and various plumbing fixtures, and with the help of a carpenter friend, he secretly built a crude wooden box camera. Attached to the back was his one 4-inch x 5-inch sheet film holder, while his lens, fitted to the front, was focused by rotating it on the end of a threaded drain pipe. Superficially, the camera looked like a lunch pail, enabling his clandestine photographic documentation to continue. Ordering film by mail from his supplier in Los Angeles, Miyatake began what he called his "historic duty." After some nine months, he was caught by the camp police in early 1943 and obliged to explain his conduct to Project Director Ralph P. Merritt. Notwithstanding Miyatake's violation of military regulations, the director concurred with the evacuee's explanation that his photographs represented a history he was compelled to record — his own. As a concession to the military rule forbidding Japanese Americans the right to take photographs, Merritt allowed Miyatake to set up pictures of his choice, but a Caucasian appointed staff member would trip the shutter. As camp life "normalized" in early 1943, this restriction was relaxed and Miyatake was allowed to send to Los Angeles for his studio and darkroom equipment. Later that year, he established a fully equipped photo studio at Manzanar that was operated by Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises. Thus, he became the unofficially appointed camp photographer. Miyatake was also permitted to travel to the Poston and Gila River relocation centers to take photos, some of which were published in Allen H. Eaton's *Beauty Behind Barbed Wire* (New York, Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1952). Selected photographs from the Miyatake Collection were published in Graham Howe, Patrick Nagatani, and Scott Rankin, eds., *Two Views of Manzanar: An Exhibition of Photographs by Ansel Adams/Toyo Miyatake* (Los Angeles, Regents of the University of California, 1978) and in Atsufumi Miyatake, Taisuke Fujishima and Eikoh Hosee, eds., *Toyo Miyatake Behind the Camera: 1923-1979*, trans. by Paul Petite (Tokyo, Bungeishunju Co., Ltd., 1984). Miyatake's collection of more than 1,000 photographs of Manzanar (presently housed at the Toyo Miyatake Studio operated by his son, Archie Miyatake, in San Gabriel, California) depict the growth and quality of life in his community, showing agricultural growth, artistic involvement, professional acumen, and typical life scenes during the 1943-45 period.\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Graham Howe, Patrick Nagatani, and Scott Rankin, eds., *Two Views of Manzanar: An Exhibition of Photographs by Ansel Adams/Toyo Miyatake* (Los Angeles, Regents of the University of California, 1978), pp. 9-12. Also see, Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director to Allen Eaton, Department of Arts and Social Work, Russell Sage Foundation, May 16 and November 26, 1945, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 222, File No. 22.600, "Photographs."
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CHAPTER TWELVE: OPERATION OF MANZANAR — JANUARY 1943 — NOVEMBER 1945

COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT

Reestablishment

On New Year's Day, 1943, Merritt sent a letter to WRA Director Dillon Myer, the substance of which became the charter on which community government would be reestablished in the center and upon which the "Peace of Manzanar" would ultimately rest. In the letter, Merritt stated that every effort had been exhausted to bring about the type of center government desired by Washington. However, he rejected the form of self-government as proposed by the Washington office:

Viewing the plan for creation of evacuee self-government, as an analyst and not as a critic, it now seems clear that the positions of the majority of the evacuees toward self-government deserves serious open-minded consideration by the Authority. Evacuees who approach the plan of self government without emotion and with the desire to be constructive divide themselves roughly into two classes: first, those who question the sincerity of a plan of self-government which prohibits a large percentage (and particularly the more mature people) from the holding of office and, secondly, the exercise of any plan of self-government prepared and limited by the authorities above, whose authority includes the maintenance of a barbed-wire fence as visual evidence of the actual complete lack of the fundamentals of self-government. Their view boils down to the conclusion that it is silly for mature men to spend time playing with dolls.

It was Merritt's belief that any form of government which was democratic and American in spirit must of necessity represent the will of the people. Democratic government could not be handed down to people by higher authority, but must be based on understanding acceptance of a charter representing the will of the governed.

Merritt continued:

The conclusions reached, after long discussion and thoughtful consideration of the Japanese leadership at Manzanar, appears to be that the majority of the evacuees will immediately accept a form of government comprising judicial committees, internal policing, the administration of blocks, and advisory action on the great range of problems touching the lives of all evacuees, provided the Project Director assumes the responsibility for proposing an acceptable form of government and supervises its general administration. Definite and overwhelming opposition has been growing and now must be accepted against attempting to involve the evacuees in responsibility for a type of apparent self-government purporting to originate from within their body, yet in fact designed to implicate them in a participation and acceptance of the fundamentals of evacuation, detention and control, and in the artificialities of a wartime experiment, by which citizens and Japanese Nationals are deprived of liberties accorded other citizens and other alien Nationals.

Opposition to the establishment of evacuee government as set forth in the purposed [sic] charter has come from all elements in the camp. The Issei believe that deprivation of their holding of office further accentuates discrimination. An
active Kibei group is pro-Japanese in tendency and unwilling to participate in any form of American governmental procedure. Many of the Nisei base all their opposition on the fallacy of the offer of the opportunities of self-government which is to exist in form only.

The discussion to this point has had to do with the adoption or rejection of the proposed charter. All this, however, does not mean that there is no opportunity for the growth and development of phases of self-government based upon a slowly developing degree of confidence between the evacuees and the administration, and a clear recognition of the part of the evacuees for the need of certain forms of internal government operation.

I am not discouraged on the development of sound and sincere principals [sic] of self-government at Manzanar, based upon the demonstration of need for the functions of government and the expressed desire of the evacuees to participate, in their own interests, and in suitable compliance with the policies of the Authority. I do not believe that any tailor-made program for self-government, operating on a time schedule, could be effective, acceptable, or even a reality. Self-government is a method of group procedure that arises from recognized needs and is developed from within, with the acceptance of the majority, to meet such needs. That such method of procedure must also be acceptable to the Authority is obvious. Self-governing is a process of growth from within, not the imposition of authority from without. It is a slow process based on bitter experience. Therefore, temporary measures, not labeled self-government, must be used as a bridge to the desired point. 16

On January 6, 1943, one month after violence erupted in the camp, the block managers reconvened and began weekly meetings with Merritt "for a complete, full, and candid discussion of all matters which touched the administration of the Center." Gradually, "confidence between the Administration and the evacuees developed and an unwritten code of procedure and regulations was created through mutual understanding." 17

Peace Committee

In addition to cooperation and consultation with the block managers, Merritt consolidated his policy of accommodation at Manzanar in early 1943 by acknowledging and working with a "Peace Committee," a spontaneous arbitration and control group of evacuees that emerged at Manzanar in the wake of the violence. Consisting of representatives from each block, the committee was led by Seigoro Murakami, who had been a judo instructor and Japanese language school teacher before evacuation and had organized a judo instruction program in the camp. 18


17. Ibid., p. 988b.

Designations of "Mayor of Manzanar" and "Father of Manzanar"

In March 1943, Kiyoharu Anzai, an Issei who had studied at the University of California and the Pacific School of Religion in Berkeley prior to evacuation and was the father of a Nisei military volunteer, became chairman of the block managers. Merritt, conscious of Japanese cultural patterns, deferred to those traditions by conferring the honorary title, "Mayor of Manzanar," on Anzai, who would remain as chairman of the block managers and discharge the duties of his honorary position until the close of the center in 1945.

After becoming chairman of the block managers and receiving his honorary title, Anzai, working together with Merritt, "found a way to bring the Administration and the evacuees into a more cordial relationship." Using "the accepted Japanese cultural approach," Anzai reciprocated Merritt's overtures of goodwill by designating the project director as the "Father of Manzanar." Realizing the delicacy "of the compliment and the possibilities of accord arising from the use of this title," Merritt "permitted and joined in the device by which it was possible for Japanese aliens to give complete loyalty to Caucasian leadership." The "device" was used by Merritt to encourage the alien evacuees who dominated the block managers assembly "to advocate the American way of living as a means of creating better public acceptance for their children."

"Peace of Manzanar"

Shortly thereafter, an alien, who had previously criticized the government and whose attitude had been described as pro-Japanese, became the "chief advocate of the school system," while another Issei "constituted himself as the public relations officer of the Project hospital." In response, Merritt proposed that "the common ground of agreement should be the 'Peace of Manzanar' which should be preserved at all costs by all persons." This theme, according to the Final Report, Manzanar, would form the framework for "all evacuee activities from January 1943 until the date of the closing of the Center."

Regardless of differences in nationalistic views, of the selfish interests of organizations or individuals, the 'Peace of Manzanar' was maintained and the result was community accord, peace and cooperation.

Block managers were elected "by the formal or informal vote of the residents of their blocks subject to veto" by Merritt. The project director only exercised the veto on two occasions, but in both instances the majority of the block managers agreed that the person "was unsuitable for the position."

The block managers assembly became "a vital and important force within the life of the Center." Its secretary had a staff who arranged for all evacuee meetings, assigned rooms for such meetings, and directed the "life of the Center in acceptable channels." According to the Final Report, Manzanar, few "important events took place in Manzanar without the support or approval of Town Hall, the little building from which the forces of the peaceful life of Manzanar flowed."

Thus, community government at Manzanar during 1943-45 "was not cut to the formal pattern followed in other centers." Instead, "it arose," according to the Final Report,
Manzanar, "from the people and accomplished the purposes of the Authority by creating peace, good-will and renewed confidence in the American way of living."**19**

**EDUCATION**

**Recommencement of School**

Following the violence on Sunday, December 6, 1942, WRA education administrators attempted to hold school as usual the next day. Because of continuing unrest and disruptions, however, "it was considered unwise for the children to congregate in groups." The administrators then determined that the schools could not be reopened successfully until requested by the evacuees. In response, the Peace Committee sponsored a resolution, which was circulated in every block and signed by virtually all parents of school-aged children:

As parents of school-aged children in Manzanar we wish to endorse the present Manzanar school program. We will see that our children attend regularly and behave in an orderly, polite manner at school and toward the teachers. We wish to cooperate with the school department in carrying out the best possible education program in a peaceful, orderly fashion. We trust that the schools can reopen soon after the first of the year.

School authorities meanwhile took advantage of the "recess" to complete improvements in the classrooms and formalize school policies and procedures. Merritt established "lines of procedure" that "released materials and labor for work on the school barracks" and "facilitated the distribution of books, supplies, and other equipment."

The interim "recess" also provided time in which to improve "the organization and morale of the teaching staff." After the violence, teachers volunteered "to help carry on emergency services" in the center. Nine teachers resigned in December, but "for those who remained improved relations with other appointed personnel became evident." As the camp returned to normal, teachers' study groups formed to revise and improve curricula and plan a schoolwide testing program. Three new teachers arrived in addition to a nursery-school supervisor who established a preschool teachers training program. The nursery, elementary, secondary school, and adult education units, as well as the libraries and the visual aids museum, were reorganized to make them more "autonomous."

On January 6, 1943, the education office issued an announcement that elementary, secondary school, and adult education classes would be resumed on Monday, January 11. A new regulation, stating that no one over 16 years of age would be required to attend school, was implemented, thus providing for "smoother high-school functioning thereafter." Some 25 former pupils over 16 years of age withdrew from school. The bulletin announcing commencement of the school program stated:

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The re-opening of school brings additional responsibility to students and parents. Teachers and administrators are determined that schools shall offer the same type of work and meet the standards of the public schools of California. Most students desire to do serious work, and they recognize the importance of an adequate education for successful living. Disturbances and misconduct will be dealt with firmly. Expelling from school and other disciplinary measures will be taken as necessary. Earnest and sincere students will be protected from such disturbances.

Although elementary and adult classes reopened on January 11, a shortage of material delayed construction in the secondary school block. Thus, high school classes did not reopen until January 18. Two weeks later on February 1, nursery school classes also resumed.

Students returning to school found "plasterboard lining their ceilings and walls, and linoleum on their floors." Stoves had been installed, so that the rooms were warm and fairly comfortable for the first time since cold weather had set in during the fall of 1942. The schoolrooms had "chairs for all the children, with tables for most, as well as supply cabinets, bookcases, blackboards, and shelves." The teachers attempted "to smooth over the break that had been caused by the riot and to turn their energies to educating the children." The Parent-Teachers Association conducted a series of back-to-school meetings which were attended by more than 2,000 parents and adults.20

School Standards

By the spring of 1943, the schools at Manzanar had become "fairly well organized."

On June 7-8, 1943, the chief of the Division of Secondary Education in the State Department of Education visited Manzanar to inspect the junior-senior high school program. On June 21, Walter F. Dexter, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, informed WRA Director Myer that the "junior-senior high school at Manzanar meets the standards contained in the School Code of California and the Rules and Regulations of the California State Board of Education." The teachers "hold appropriate California credentials with but few exceptions and in these instances the teachers are well trained." The "course of study has been carefully developed, appropriate school facilities and equipment have been provided, and instruction is well organized."21

The elementary school was examined by the Helen Heffernan, Chief, Division of Elementary Education of the State Department of Education on September 23-24, 1943, and on October 11 she wrote to Carter:

On the basis of the observation, may I take this opportunity to state that I believe the quality of education which I observed in the schools at Manzanar compares


21. Ibid., Appendix 9, p. 395.
favorably with the educational program in the schools from which these children came.

It was particularly interesting to me to observe the development of your nursery school and kindergarten program. For children from homes in which a foreign language is frequently the spoken language, this early opportunity for contact with English-speaking people is of the utmost importance. Under the conditions which exist in the relocation settlement it is of tremendous value that young children of preschool age have the opportunities you provide for them for use of educative materials, undisturbed rest, and excellent guidance on the part of young women who were charged with this responsibility. The nursery school and kindergarten programs provide opportunity beyond that available to many children in the school districts from which the Manzanar school children were transferred.

It is a pleasure to comment specifically upon the excellent physical education and health education in progress. The individual records being kept for each child are the equivalent of those kept in efficient school systems.

It was a source of much satisfaction to me to examine the records on standardized tests which have been given at Manzanar during the past year, and to note that the children enrolled in your schools have reached or surpassed the national norms on such tests. In view of the dislocation they experienced in their educational program last year, the standards which they have attained is the best possible evidence of the effectiveness of your educational program and the devotion with which teachers have worked with these children.

In addition to these evaluations, the Committee on School Relations from the University of California, Berkeley, the accrediting agency of the state, inspected the secondary school program and placed Manzanar High School on its accredited list. Thus, the University of California was willing to accept Manzanar high school graduates, although evacuees were prohibited from Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2.

As they sought to provide a quality education to the evacuees at Manzanar during the 1943-45 period, the educators at Manzanar began "to reach several common agreements as to certain beliefs which were shaping our education program." These key tenets, according to superintendent Carter, included:

1. Japanese American citizens must be taught the same fundamental skills as any other American citizens, and special emphasis should be given to English and speech instruction.

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22. Ibid., pp. 393-94.
2. There must be a conscious effort on the part of the classroom teacher to promote a better understanding of American ideals and loyalty to American institutions.

3. The schools must equip the child with better than average formal educational and vocational experience.

4. The teacher must provide the link "between the stagnant life with the center and the changing world beyond the barbed wire fence."

5. The teacher must not allow the Japanese American child to become too absorbed in his misfortunes and feelings of being the only object of prejudice in America.

6. Teachers in adult education programs must recognize that even greater skill must be "exercised in bringing American culture to the Issei and Kibei." 24

Buildings/Facilities

According to the Final Report, Manzanar, "great ingenuity was required in setting up special rooms for the high-school classes." A high school study hall-library was "built in the large mess hall building" of Block 7. The kitchen-pantry section of the mess hall was developed into a two-room home economics unit. A model home apartment was set up in the high school block. This project was described in a mimeographed bulletin, entitled "A Barrack Becomes A Home," prepared by the Manzanar home economics supervisor. In the bulletin, the importance of the model home was explained:

It has been felt by many authorities that this lack of a normal home situation has had a more detrimental influence on the young people of the camp than any other phase of the evacuation. Under such circumstances, the need for training in all fields of home economics was far greater than in the average school. . . .

The high school clothing classes were taught in two ironing rooms in Block 7. Thus, they were equipped with electric outlets for irons and electric machines.

Prior to completion of the Auditorium during the late spring of 1944, physical education facilities were "inadequate." Nevertheless, the facilities, as described in a mimeographed bulletin, entitled "Health and Physical Education," prepared by the health and physical education supervisor, included a hazard course, health room, and outdoor play equipment.

The physics and chemistry laboratory was placed in a laundry building. The boiler room was converted into a storage and supply room, while every other laundry tub in the laundry room was covered by a work board, with a supply cabinet set in between each tub. Large work tables were spaced in the center of the room.

During the 1943-44 school year, classrooms were enlarged, with each barrack divided into three classrooms. Each classroom had sufficient arm chairs or students' tables to "give adequate service."

One barrack was set aside for music and "little-theater work." After the Auditorium was completed, the "little-theater building" proved "more desirable for class work."

The education superintendent's, business, and high school offices were located in one barrack "well finished inside, with adequate office equipment." The elementary school office was located with the elementary school in Block 16, while the adult education office was in Block 7 near the library office, the visual aids room, and the cosmetology school.25

Preschool Program

The preschool program operated under the supervision of the Superintendent of Education until early 1943, when a trained nursery school worker arrived at Manzanar. After the nursery schools were well organized, the supervisor was made responsible for the kindergarten program. Thereafter, the preschool program was administered under the principal of the elementary school.

During 1942-43, Manzanar authorities organized 18 nursery school units and seven kindergartens. Of the nursery school units, six were afternoon sleep sessions. The preschool units were housed in "regular elementary-school buildings scattered throughout the community." An undated map in the "Education Section" of the Final Report, Manzanar shows that nursery schools were located in Blocks 1, 9, 11, 17, 20, 23, 30, and 32, while kindergartens were located in Blocks 1, 11, 20, and 31. Almost 1,000 children between the ages of three and six participated "in an environment which emphasized health, safety, social and emotional adjustment, and mental development through wisely selected play materials."

Continuous "in-service training of evacuee teachers through field supervision, demonstration, and staff meetings was offered as a requirement since no credentialed teachers trained in preschool techniques and methods were available." More than one-half of the preschool teaching staff were young English-speaking mothers of nursery-school children. Training courses covered subjects such as child development, techniques and methods, music, rhythm, arts, handicrafts, play materials, play yard equipment, child records, and administrative reports.

The parents of all children enrolled in the preschool automatically became members of a parent club that functioned in connection with a nursery or kindergarten unit. A central

board, consisting of the chairmen of the individual units, the preschool parent-coordinator, preschool supervisor, and president of the board selected at large, coordinated all phases of the preschool parent activities. All parents held membership in the national Parent-Teachers Association.

Parents shared in financing the preschool program and contributed "many hours of service" in constructing, maintaining, and beautifying the preschool rooms and equipment. A bazaar and quilting bee netted funds sufficient to finance equipment needs for more than two years. A monthly fee of 10 cents per parent enabled the children to have periodic parties.

Because of the relocation of most of their evacuee teachers during 1944-45, the preschools "were streamlined almost out of existence." Two of these teachers went to college to major in preschool education, and a number of others began to teach in nursery schools and child care centers outside of California. Despite the decline of the preschool program, however, all children of kindergarten age completed their kindergarten year. The success of the preschool program at Manzanar was shown in the children's ability to meet first-grade school requirements. In 1942, 25 percent of the children entering the first grade were unable to speak English. The children of the classes of 1943 and 1944, on the other hand, had attended preschool, and all of these children, except for one child who had been transferred from Tule Lake, were able to speak English when entering the first grade.26

Elementary School Program

The elementary school program was difficult to administer until the 1944-45 school year, when the various grades (kindergarten — sixth grade) were consolidated in Block 16. During the first two school terms, it was necessary to scatter classrooms throughout 12 different blocks — Block 1, Building 14; Block 3, Building 15; Block 5, Building 15; Block 9, Building 15; Block 11, Building 15; Block 17, Building 15; Block 20, Building 15; Block 21, Building 15; Block 23, Building 15; Block 30, Building 15; Block 31, Building 15; and Block 32, Building 15.27

During 1943-44, the Manzanar elementary school was directed by Principal Clyde L. Simpson, "whose enthusiastic leadership put the elementary schools on a standard California public school basis." When Simpson was transferred to the relocation section in January 1945, Eldredge Dykes, the head high school teacher and an experienced school administrator, assumed his position.

The elementary school staff reached its greatest number during the spring of 1943, when it had 35 teachers and a supervisor of teacher-training, principal, vice-principal, and music

26. Ibid., pp. 233-36, 400. For more information on preschools, see "Report On Nursery Schools At Manzanar," [ca. January 1943], RG 210, Entry 48, Box 227, File No. 64.711, "Report on Nursery School at Manzanar." For further data on evacuee teachers, see "The Contribution of the Evacuee Personnel to Education at the Manzanar Relocation Center," Manzanar, California, August 1945, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 68, File, "Education Reports."

27. "Map of Manzanar Relocation Center," [1943], RG 210, Entry 48, Box 22, File No. 22.700, "Maps, Charts, Sketches."
Education

supervisor. On May 29, 1945, when the Manzanar schools closed, the elementary staff included 17 teachers and a principal.

Standardized achievement tests were administered to all elementary children each year. A large percentage of the children had Nisei parents, which gave them "a better advantage in English performance." The scores of the elementary children, at each testing, "reached or exceed the national norms on all the skill subjects." They were especially "high in spelling and arithmetic computation." According to the Final Report, Manzanar, the center's elementary school curriculum "was like that of any other progressive California school which emphasizes the social studies program." The report further stated that the school newspaper, the softball league games, the assembly programs, the girls' glee club, the rhythm bands, flute bands, and well-organized playground work all indicated matured activities that are not usually found in a three-year-old school."28

Secondary School Program

Leon C. High served as the secondary school principal during the 1942-43 school term. After leaving the center to accept employment as a school principal in a nearby town, Rollin C. Fox served as principal during 1943-45, completing "the organization of the high-school program," which was similar to that "found in any public school." The secondary school took over all of the barracks in Block 7. In addition, some classes were conducted in Block 1, Building 8, Block 2, Building 15, and the ironing room in Block 7.29

In general intelligence, Manzanar's secondary students "stood at about the same level" as "students in the public schools throughout the nation" despite "a reading and language handicap." In age, Manzanar's secondary students "were somewhat younger than were students in Los Angeles city and county, and even San Pedro, the places from which the students came." Attendance "was better than average," but in "social adjustment, Manzanar's students were in need of continued significant help." According to the Final Report, Manzanar, "industry was good but spotty; initiative, generally weak; classroom participation, poor." Manzanar students presented fewer disciplinary problems than students in outside high schools, and most high schoolers found "that the standard for making an 'A' was higher at Manzanar than it was in their 'back home' school."

Manzanar's secondary school curriculum and instructional courses were similar to that found in the public schools. Five types of diplomas were offered: general, college entrance, commercial, homemaking, and agriculture. Manzanar did not have organized outlines for all of its courses, however, and this proved to be "a real handicap."

The secondary teaching staff was composed of appointed personnel and evacuees, the former comprising the majority. The evacuee teachers generally did not hold teaching credentials, although most of them had some teacher training. Evacuee teachers decreased


29. "Map of Manzanar Relocation Center," [1943], RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 222, File No. 22.709, "Maps, Charts Sketches."
in number much more quickly than did the student population. Turnover was rapid, and replacements were difficult to find.

Appointed teachers, all of whom held teaching credentials, worked closely with the evacuee teachers. Approximately one-half of the Manzanar high school teachers were California-trained and credentialed, the majority receiving some or all of their education at the Berkeley and Los Angeles campuses of the University of California and the University of Southern California. The center experienced difficulty in retaining teachers because "of the year-'round period of service required (as contrasted with the 10-month or shorter period in most public schools)." The ratio of one teacher to 35 high school students was below "the accepted minimum standard" for secondary schools, a situation that presented administrative difficulties in scheduling work loads. The center's inability to employ substitute teachers was also "a serious and an unsolved problem."

The secondary school enrollment "ranged from a high of 1,400 to a final of less than 600." In the standardized testing program the following "facts were discovered." Manzanar students were about "one year retarded as late as a year and a half from the closing of the schools." By June 1945, however, they were "at least average in most subjects, and above grade in some." They continued to be "deficient" in English composition and the "practical use of the rules of grammar." In "spoken language," they made "significant progress but were still retarded in enunciation, pronunciation, stage presence, and the like." In mathematics, they "fared better, but were nevertheless weak in general mathematics achievement in the upper grades." They were "slightly below average" in "comprehension, reading rate, and related areas."

At the conclusion of the first school year (1942-43), commencement exercises for Manzanar High School took place outdoors during the early evening of July 3, 1943. The emphasis of the program was on relocation and Americanism. Miss Sakuma, the class secretary, spoke on the subject, "Our Next Step — Relocation," urging those who relocate to keep in mind that they are "ambassadors of good will." The class president spoke on "The Problems of Minority Groups," reminding the audience that evacuees should not be bitter, because the problems faced by Japanese Americans were largely those faced by other minority groups. He urged a realistic and brave approach to the entire problem and a sympathetic understanding of the plight of other minority groups rather than preoccupation with the difficulties of those faced by persons of Japanese ancestry alone. Entertainment featured the Manzanar High School Choir singing the "Ballad for Americans," a patriotic piece of music. Taking his theme from the ballad, Project Director Merritt delivered the commencement address, pleading with the audience to remember that "this country is young and strong" and that "its greatest songs are still unsung." To those who asked why the barbed wire, the towers, and the soldiers, he answered that the final word on American race relations has not yet been stated. He recalled the vision of an America composed of many peoples who have given of their talents and asked the graduates to believe in America. Turning to relocation, he asserted that the country needed and wanted the "God-given talents of those of Japanese ancestry for work, for family loyalty, for the creation of the beautiful." 

One of the first events to be held in the newly-completed auditorium was the graduation ceremony for 177 seniors on June 18, 1944. Approximately, 1,200 evacuees and appointed personnel attended the event. Clad in traditional caps and gowns, the graduates received their diplomas from Superintendent of Education Genevieve Carter. Assistant project director Lucy W. Adams greeted the class and introduced the commencement speaker, Dr. Cecil Dunn, professor of economics at Occidental College, who spoke on the topic of "Peace and Our Responsibilities." 31

Of the approximately 500 high school graduates from Manzanar, "not one was rejected by a receiving school for credits earned' at the center. A "better-than-average success" was also achieved by high school graduates who entered college. 32

Adult Education Program

Following the outbreak of violence at Manzanar on December 6, 1942, the adult education program was reorganized into three sections. These divisions included adult English for non-English-speaking groups; academic courses for those who wished to attend classes at the junior college level; and cultural courses for those who desired to study for personal development and improvement.

On January 11, 1943, adult education classes resumed with approximately 1,500 students enrolled in more than 30 courses. Attendance quickly dwindled, however, as a result of the registration, relocation, and seasonal furlough work programs. In January 1943, some 630 young people of college age were enrolled in 24 academic courses, but by the middle of March, some 320 students who had dropped out and six courses had to be discontinued for lack of students. When the semester ended in June, less than 200 students, mostly female, were still attending classes.

During the summer of 1943, the adult education program, under the leadership of Dr. Melvin Strong who had replaced Charles K. Ferguson as director, introduced more commercial courses to help students better qualify for educational or employment opportunities outside the center in an effort to stimulate relocation and yet keep students sufficiently interested in attending classes. The courses, designed at the junior college level and accredited by the California State Department of Education, were offered especially for those contemplating relocation to outside schools. New classes were added to the adult English group, and vocational training in woodcarving, tailoring, librarianship, agriculture, and cosmetology were introduced.

During the remainder of 1943 and early 1944, the adult education program was affected by a shortage of teachers, as five evacuee instructors departed for Tule Lake and 11


relocated. Of the original group of evacuee teachers, only six remained. By recruiting evacuees and soliciting the aid of some appointed personnel teachers, the adult education program continued. Under the direction of Miss Dorothy Yamamoto, 15 young women were enrolled in apprenticeship training in a "cosmetology school."

In April 1944, Miss Kazuko Suzuki assumed temporary leadership of the adult education program after Strong resigned. Two months later, Dr. Kenneth L. Wentworth arrived at the camp to direct the program. In May, an auto mechanics course was introduced, and 24 students registered. By mid-June the course had become so popular that more than 60 students had registered for future classes. The department "saw the need for more vocational courses," but these plans never materialized because Wentworth left the center in late June after serving only a month, and the vocational training supervisor terminated in October.

During the summer of 1944, student relocation counseling became a part of the adult education program. Materials were collected for some 600 trade schools and institutions of higher education, and students and parents were encouraged to use them.

On September 1, 1944, Dr. Gladys C. Schwesinger arrived at Manzanar as Supervisor of Adult Education, and Henry W. Hough took over the work of Vocational Training Supervisor. Hough would stay at the center for only three weeks, however, thus continuing the rapid turnover in program leadership.

During late 1944, a shortage of instructors and "an attitude of indifference on the part of the residents" hindered development of the adult education program. An Adult English Activity Hall was opened, however, offering cooking demonstrations and craft activities conducted by both evacuees and Caucasians who used English "as the medium for exchanging ideas." Emphasis was placed "on enabling the evacuees to mingle informally with English-speaking Americans, to learn their language functionally, and to acquire American points of view and ways of doing things."

In February 1945, Dr. Schwesinger transferred to the community welfare section, and the adult education program "tapered off." The few remaining evacuee teachers were preparing to relocate, most of the evacuee college-age persons who had been evacuated to Manzanar had already relocated to attend schools or work on the outside or serve in the armed forces, and many parents were contemplating relocation at the end of the school term. During the summer of 1945, however, classes were offered in "brush-up commercial courses, adult English, cabinet-making, and tailoring."

Libraries

The original Manzanar library, which was established in an evacuee's living quarters during April 1942 with a gift of 17 books and 80 magazines, expanded to include a collection of 24,000 volumes (20,000 volumes were donated by other libraries) and a periodical subscription of 157 magazines. Originally organized under the recreation
section, the library was transferred to the education section in July 1942. By autumn the several branches of the library were consolidated into the main library in the center of the camp and a branch fiction library in the southwest corner of the center. Takako Saito served as director of the library from April to July 1942, and Ayame Ichiyasu served as director from July 1942 to January 1943.

In October 1942, the school libraries were organized. The high school library was established first, as books from the community library were transferred to the mess hall in Block 7 which was converted for use as a study hall. The supervisor of student teaching organized a small professional library of more than 200 books in her office for loan to student teachers and regular teaching staff in the elementary and secondary schools. In November 1942, children's books were ordered for an elementary school library and placed in the elementary teachers' study room for teachers to borrow for use in their classes.

In June 1943, following the arrival of Ruth Budd, a trained librarian on the appointed staff, the libraries were reorganized. A central library office was established in Block 7, and a centralized union catalog of the holdings in all libraries was commenced. The professional and elementary school libraries, originally independent units, were placed under the direction of the community librarian. The two book collections were moved into the same room, and two evacuee librarians were added to the staff to direct the new library.

A three-unit weekly staff training program in library science was commenced for evacuees, and when a student completed the entire course, he was classified as a trained assistant. A total of 39 persons entered the course "at one time or another," but only 14 completed the three units, primarily as a result of the continuing relocation of evacuees.

The main library was located in one entire barrack in the center of camp. It was equipped with six mess hall tables, benches, and a camp-constructed charging desk and card catalog cabinet, and had a seating capacity for 50 readers. This library "was invariably crowded at night." It contained both fiction and non-fiction titles for adults and children until November 1944. That month all "easy books" were transferred to the elementary school library. In January 1945, the juvenile non-fiction volumes were divided between the elementary and high school libraries. Fiction for junior and senior high school students, as well as adult fiction and non-fiction titles, remained in the central library, which also contained a Japanese language collection of 994 books. Mending of all library books was handled by an evacuee at the main library. The main library was never completely catalogued, in part because of the large number of volumes and the "problem of weeding out several thousand worthless books that were placed on the shelves at a time when hundreds of donated and discarded books were sent into the Center."

A branch fiction library, known as the hilltop library, was located in an ironing room in the southwest corner of the camp. It contained 1,453 catalogued fiction books, approximately one-half of which were for adults. Two mess hall tables for adults and two small painted tables for children provided a seating capacity for 18 persons. This library "was a favorite spot for young people to gather" on "cold winter evenings," because the "two librarians" made "it into a very attractive place."
In June 1944, approximately 350 volumes and several hundred pamphlets were moved from the teachers' study room to be housed with the newly-established professional-visual aids library. Located in "the visual aids room," this library "contained over 3,000 mounted pictures, maps, models, exhibits, films, charts, and phonograph records." The microphone and motion picture projectors were placed in this room. The library also subscribed to education periodicals, and the librarian supervised the visual education museum in Block 8, Building 15.

The high school library had a seating capacity of approximately 300 and a catalogued collection of about 3,000 titles. The preschool library, with 169 catalogued books, was handled by the preschool supervisor.

In June 1944, Block 16 was set aside for the elementary school. The elementary school library, consisting of 2,791 books, was moved from the teachers' study room in Block 1 to a room in one of the barracks in Block 16. The room, which was decorated by an evacuee mother, was opened to children on July 5, and 240 youngsters visited the facility on its first day of operation. The average daily attendance was about 200 children. A summer reading club was begun, with 197 children joining the club and 120 reading the ten books required to obtain a membership certificate. After school started in September 1944, each elementary class was scheduled for one library instruction period per week. Because many children had been unable to bring toys to the center when they were evacuated to Manzanar and many toys were unavailable because of wartime restrictions or evacuees' financial difficulties, a toy loan library was attached to the elementary school library in which toys could be borrowed for seven-day periods.

During the summers of 1943 and 1944, outdoor story hours for elementary school children were conducted twice a week during the evenings. During the school year, story hours were held on Saturday mornings, separate sessions being held for children aged three to six and for older children aged seven to eleven.34

Hospital Class

One full-time credentialed teacher, with experience in exceptional children's education, supervised classes for handicapped children at the Manzanar hospital. Conducted in cooperation with the medical section, the classes originated within the elementary school program. At one time, two credentialed evacuee teachers assisted the program, but both relocated to teach outside the center before the school program ended.35


Education

Summer Programs

A primary purpose of the summer program in 1943 was to provide opportunities for make-up school work on both the secondary and elementary levels. Only the children whose grades and achievement test scores indicated a need for remedial work were scheduled for academic classes. All other children were enrolled for activities which "gave them a different type of group experience from any offered during the academic school year."

Another part of the 1943 summer program was "the offering of step-up subjects, a schedule of courses on the secondary level which enabled half-year students to complete work necessary to enter school the following fall on an annual basis." Some 470 students were enrolled in subjects, such as English, mathematics, and history. At the close of the high school summer session, members of the graduating class received their diplomas, thus making it possible to end mid-year graduation and have only one senior class the following year. Thus, all Manzanar high school students went on a regular annual school year basis when classes started in September 1943.

During the summer of 1943, a boys' sports program was organized in connection with the Boys' Club Center. Different hours of activity were scheduled for various age groups. The secondary school girls were offered a sports program two evenings a week, while other secondary school activities continued "in the form of clubs such as the Baton Twirlers' Club, the Arts and Crafts Class, the Choir Club."

Approximately 450 elementary school children attended a 6-week school program during the summer of 1943 "which stressed drill in school subjects." In addition, some 425 pupils were enrolled in one or more classes in the activities program — "in industrial arts, general arts, music, drama, rhythms, and dancing." Sewing and knitting classes, and "other applied arts activities" were also offered.

All nursery schools and kindergartens conducted summer activities until August 27, 1943 with programs that followed much the same schedule as that of the regular school year. Greater emphasis, however, was placed on "play activities at the kindergarten level."

The summer program for 1944 was supervised by the community activities supervisor who worked closely with the superintendent and principals of the education section. Approximately one-half of the center's high school students preferred to work during the summer rather than engage in daytime activities. For secondary school students, attendance in make-up classes was compulsory for students who had received a D or F in English. Other classes that were offered included mechanical drafting, typing, shorthand, speech, and woodshop.

During the summer of 1944, a reading program in connection with organized book clubs on the elementary level "was unusually effective." Stenciling, knitting, and sewing classes were offered, and Junior Red Cross clubs on the junior high and elementary levels were active.

As the camp population dwindled during the summer of 1945, limited recreational activities were offered. For elementary school students, scheduled activities included
industrial arts, sewing, knitting, rhythm, dancing, piano, story hours, book clubs, boys' softball leagues, and general arts. Most high school students remaining in the camp preferred to work, but the Youth Center, social club activities, athletic leagues, and block activities provided outlets for teenagers.

Adult education activities during the summer of 1945 were geared toward short limited units of instruction relating to relocation. A men's cabinet-making class was altered to take care of adults who wished to make trunks, cabinets, or chests in preparation for relocation. The Adult English Activity Hall 'gave way to use of the Hall by small informal groups of Issei, wishing to use the kitchen stove, the sewing machines, and other facilities when the block sewing machines were not available.'

High School Organizations

During early 1943, a training institute in parliamentary procedure and school leadership was held for interested high school students. There was little "semblance of group unity or feeling of belonging to a student-body," however, since they "had come from 206 different schools." Thus, the high school students tended to group themselves into numerous clubs that were not officially organized, known by such names as the Venice Boys, San Pedro Club, Roosevelt High Gang, and the Hollywood Bunch. Later, however, a student body council was elected, and the study body government began operation under the leadership of the "Associated Student Body" composed of officers, a judicial committee, and girls' and boys' leagues.

Although some high school clubs were loosely organized and short-lived, some "were lasting and made real contributions." Among the clubs were: the Girls Athletic Association, which sponsored intramural play days and outings; the Boosters Club, sponsored by the student body association for the purpose of ushering and helping with various high school and community events; the Latin, Spanish, and French clubs which fostered cultural studies; the Journalism Club, which edited the school newspaper, first called the "Campus Pepper," and later changed to "The Spot" during 1944-45; the annual staff, which prepared for printing the high school annual titled "Our World" in 1944 and "Valediction" in 1945; the Future Farmers of America, which furthered interest in practical agricultural program activities; the Campus Strutters, a baton-twirling club for girls that performed at intramural games, assemblies, and programs; and the Lettermen's Club, composed of boys who earned letters in intramural athletics. Other clubs included home economics, science, shorthand, woodshop, choir, orchestra, dramatics, library, and national honor society.

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36. Ibid., pp. 255-60. Also see, "Activity Programs, Manzanar," [Summer 1943], pp. I-II and 1-11, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 68, File, "Community Activities — Publications."

**Elementary School Organizations**

A variety of elementary school organizations continued to be "stable and active throughout most of the school's life." These groups included the Glee Club, composed of pupils in the third to sixth grades; the Junior Red Cross, which made cards, craft articles, and games for the United Services Organization and local hospital; the "Whirlwind" staff, composed of ten elementary children and their teacher advisors who edited about five editions of the school newspaper per year; three rhythm bands that performed at Parent-Teacher Association meetings and school and community programs; and class softball teams, which played in interclass tournaments during the spring months of 1943, 1944, 1945.\(^{38}\)

**Adult Education Organizations**

During the fall of 1942, the adult education program organized a student body fund and several clubs, including commercial, botany, chemistry, and mathematics. College Hall, the office of the Manzanar Intercollegiate Association, established a club house and social room to promote college relocation. The Adult English Activity Hall, organized in connection with the adult English program, served as a meeting place for Issei who could practice their use of English and meet socially with Caucasians on an activity-related basis.\(^{39}\)

**Special School Events**

To foster a feeling of unity with students throughout the nation, the Manzanar schools encouraged active participation in such nationwide and state-wide observances as Thrift Week, Boys' and Girls' Week, and Book Week. During Fire Prevention Week in the fall of 1944, cash prizes were offered for essays and posters that were assigned and graded by the English and art teachers.

Each year the education section observed National Education Week and California Public School Week. Parents were invited to visit the classrooms and all-school exhibits at the visual education museum. The exhibits were attended by some 3,000-4,000 evacuee residents, as well as many visitors from communities outside the center.

Entertainment events were conducted by the schools for the evacuees and residents in surrounding communities. These included the 1943 and 1944 Christmas concerts performed by the high school choir; a graduation concert on July 3, 1943, in which the high school choir gained attention for its production of "Ballad for Americans;" a senior play, "Growing Pains," produced by the drama class in January 1944; a musical comedy, "Loud and Clear," written, produced, and directed by Louis Frizzell, high school music instructor, involving the high school choir and orchestra — the first event to be held in the

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new auditorium on June 16, 1944; "Out of the Frying Pan," a drama presented in the auditorium on April 6, 1945; "Looking Backward," a musical with selections from past programs presented by the high school's music department as the last program of the high school; and "The Round Up," a play day sponsored by the Manzanar Girls' Athletic Association. This latter event was the first instance in which any neighboring high school participated in Manzanar school events. Some 300 high school students from the center and 60 high school girls from other Owens Valley towns participated in the athletic events. A football game with Big Pine High School at Manzanar on October 25, 1944, was the first and only interschool athletic event that Manzanar had an opportunity to enter during its operation.

Elementary school pageants were performed by about 500 students during California Public School Week during April 1943 and 1944. The theme for the pageant in 1943 was "From Many Lands and People," and that for 1944 was "The Making of America." In April 1945, "Rhythm Review" was performed in the auditorium by 350 pupils, featuring the rhythm work on each grade level and musical numbers associated with the social studies program.

Visual Education Museum

After nearly five months of preparation, the visual education museum in Block 8, Building 15 was opened to the public on December 5, 1942, the day before violence erupted in the center. The director of the museum was Kiyotsugu Tsuchiya, who had served as curator of a Chicago museum prior to the evacuation. Although the evacuees did not initially attend exhibits in large numbers, special exhibits were scheduled twice a month and by mid-1943 attracted from 2,000 to 4,000 visitors. People who visited the camp from the outside often included a trip to the museum as part of their visit. The variety and type of exhibits that were shown during the 2 1/2-year operation of the museum until it closed on May 29, 1945, included: flower arrangement display, fine arts exhibit, progress in transportation, wartime rationing, Youth Week, thrift (effort to stress importance of more conservative standard of expenditure as many evacuees were rapidly using up their savings), photography, Hollywood movie studios, chrysanthemum show, arts and crafts, hobbies, doll show, Education Week, embroidery and woodcraft, and Relocation Week. Many of the exhibits featured arts and crafts prepared by evacuees in the center.

The museum program supervised visual aids rooms in Block 7 established for the use of teachers. In addition, the museum staff sponsored a number of skill and hobby clubs, including a Japanese music study club, mineral club, gem-cutting club, entomology club, and taxidermy club.

After the county health department issued an order preventing the keeping of birds and animals as pets in the blocks, the museum staff secured permission to keep the animals in a zoo at the edge of the residential area so that the animals would not have to be destroyed. The churches helped finance the construction of shelters for the "accumulation of cages of rabbits, chipmunks, squirrels, chickens, Barn owls, and bantam hens."

40. Ibid., pp. 266-70. Also see Manzanar Free Press, June 17, 1944, p. 1, and "Education Week," Project Report No. 84, April 10, 1945, by Ray Hayashida, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 68, File, "Education Reports."
The museum completed a recreational park for children equipped with picnic tables and a stone barbecue pit. This park developed "into one of the most beautiful spots in the community." 41

Public Relations

The teachers of Manzanar played a significant role in building relationships between evacuees and appointed personnel. Teachers served as sponsors for clubs, youth groups, and class parties during non-school hours. Because food for refreshments was difficult to obtain, they often gave their ration points and supplemented the food furnished by the mess division. Many teachers were active in church affairs, and some taught Sunday School classes. With few exceptions, WRA teachers, going into neighboring communities, universities, or other school systems "served as ambassadors" for Manzanar. Those who had church affiliations in California or membership in a lodge, American Legion, or Woman's Club, developed helpful relationships with outside communities through attendance at conferences and summer sessions. Each year the Manzanar staff was invited to attend the Inyo County Teachers' Institute, and in 1944 the last session of the institute was held at Manzanar.

The county superintendent and co-supervisor of education were issued monthly passes, and they used these to make numerous trips to the center. The county school board, however, refused to work with Manzanar officials for use of federal funds in the camp made available through the state department for vocational training. The relationship with the State Board of Education was cooperative, although the main avenue for keeping in touch with California educational officials was correspondence since travel conditions made it difficult to bring people to Manzanar and WRA regulations prevented Manzanar educational personnel from business leave for such contacts. The University of California, Berkeley and Los Angeles, kept in close touch with the Manzanar program throughout the war.

In the beginning, a few teachers were hired at Manzanar "who might be classified as of the 'missionary' type." During the final two years, however, the staff, according to the Final Report, Manzanar increasingly "was made up of sensible, sincere persons who maintained a sympathetic relationship with the evacuees, without going to extremes as crusaders for causes." 42

Parent-Teachers Association

Because of ill feeling in adjoining school districts in Owens Valley, Manzanar Parent Teacher Association members were aligned directly with the National Congress of Parents


and Teachers rather than being affiliated with neighboring or state organizations. More than 800 evacuees in the camp were paid members who belonged to the National Congress. This number did not include the parents of preschool children, who numbered about 200 paid members. The organization provided many Issei with their first opportunity to participate in community life.

The general plan of the Manzanar Parent-Teacher Association was adjusted to meet the evacuee’s ideas on effective participation for parents. A high school committee worked closely with the high school staff in planning monthly meetings and programs during the year. The high school PTA sponsored many of the high school events, such as Public School Week and American Education Week. It served by moving chairs and setting up the stage for school programs; installed plasterboard in unlined high school rooms; provided supervision for the study hall while the school was still unorganized; and sponsored teas for faculty meetings and graduation ceremonies.

Until the 1944-45 school term, the elementary school classes were scattered in classrooms throughout the center. There were elementary school PTA units for each building in which classes were held, and each unit held bi-monthly meetings featuring speakers who discussed various phases of the camp's education program. A concerted effort to turn the attention of the residents, as well as that of the children, toward less extravagant spending for special occasions began with the PTA meetings as many evacuees were rapidly using up their savings. Parent-Teacher Association groups raised more than $1,000 from bazaars, movies, membership fees, and other projects, to purchase curtains for classrooms; provide cash donations for tuition to the University of California, which partially paid for the extension courses in education taken by evacuee teachers; purchase three phonographs and industrial arts tools when it was impossible to buy such items through regular procurement channels; purchase a mimeograph machine for education office; and supplement the evacuee teachers’ contributions for children’s Christmas treats.

Three or four Parent-Teacher Association conferences were held at Manzanar. In March 1943, the president and vice-president of the California Parents and Teachers Congress and the vice-president of the National Congress visited Manzanar. On two occasions, the president of the Inyo County PTA visited Manzanar to speak to the parents. The Dean of Women from Chaffey Junior College assisted in the project’s three-day PTA conference in August 1944.43

Fall 1945

The Manzanar elementary and high school classes met for the last time on May 29, 1945. Most of the other functions in the education section closed during August and early September. The elementary school library closed on August 10, adult classes were discontinued on August 11, the main library was closed on August 29, and the preschools did not meet after August 29. In an effort to encourage relocation, WRA authorities made no provision for school during the fall of 1945, although as late as August 9 the Manzanar Free Press reported that there were still 831 children in the camp between the ages of six

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43. Ibid., pp. 276-82.

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and 18. The article noted that 429 families were involved, and "by failing to resettle are depriving their children of the opportunity of an education." 44

Industries

Following the violence at Manzanar on December 6, 1942, industrial operations were suspended for several weeks, while the WRA "management took stock of the situation." Some of the plans for industrial development within the relocation centers were dropped, because the WRA was concerned that development of activities in the centers which would tend to turn them into places of "permanent abode" would undermine its evacuee relocation program. The senior manufacturing superintendent at Manzanar was transferred to other duties, and his assistant, Harry R. Haberle, who had 25 years of experience in various manufacturing enterprises, was assigned the task of "carrying out a limited industrial program" which would "stress vocational training and the development of new skills among the evacuees, rather than production of articles for a consumer market." The center administrators soon determined that a number of production units at the center would be transferred to his supervision.

At the height of its activity, the industrial section employed about 300 persons. In addition, the various activities of the industrial section enabled "scores of unskilled evacuees, especially women" to develop skills which would help them obtain employment in private industry when they relocated. It was estimated that at least 50 percent of those employed "learned a new skill or became more proficient in a skill already known."

During the summer of 1944, the accelerated relocation program at Manzanar resulted in the rapid loss of manpower to operate essential services in the center. Accordingly, the WRA determined to curtail all activities not essential to the minimum operations of the center. Thus, the work of the industrial section terminated on September 30, 1944, and its food-processing units were transferred to the mess section.

Clothing Factory. The clothing factory had been commenced with six "domestic electric sewing machines" in the ironing room of Block 2 in August 1942. By January 1943, two warehouses were converted for use as a factory, power sewing machines received from the Works Projects Administration were installed, and the "complete factory began operation."

A survey found that only one evacuee at Manzanar had operated "a power machine on a production line" prior to evacuation. This evacuee, a young woman, was employed as the first "chief operator" to aid in teaching the clothing manufacturing trade to others. The new WRA-appointed superintendent of manufacturing, having supervised garment factories for years, "personally took charge of the operation and trained the operators as they were recruited." As a result, "inexperienced workers were trained into designers, pattern makers, cutters, machine operators, floorladies, and machinists, all skilled workers capable of handling any type of power machine on any type of production line in the garment industry." These skills aided many of the workers to acquire jobs in the American garment industry, particularly in the midwestern states, when they relocated.

The factory produced garments from "baby layettes to tailored suits." The largest orders, however, were for "overalls, coveralls, hospital uniforms, children's dresses, and shirts and blouses." It produced nurses' aide uniforms for all centers, as well as a large percentage of nurses', doctors', and janitors' uniforms. These items were produced for the WRA and furnished to evacuees as work clothes, or they were provided to Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises which paid the WRA wholesale prices and sold the articles to the evacuees at the camp's general store. Clothing manufactured for sale through the cooperative consisted primarily of articles which could not be purchased in the open market and which the evacuees needed.

The clothing factory, which made a profit throughout its operation, employed an average of 65 persons. Between June 1943 and June 1944, the factory produced 39,930 garments, and at its close in September 1944 it was producing an average of 4,000 garments a month having a value of $4,500.

**Furniture Shop.** Because many types of furniture were needed by the center during its early months of operation, the engineering section initially supervised the men "who worked the machines obtained" from the National Youth Administration. In February 1943, all cabinet-making machinery and crews were placed under direction of the industrial section, which immediately "concentrated on a program of making" desks, chairs, and filing cabinets desperately needed at the expanding relocation center "by streamlining the cabinet shop, and working out 'assembly line' methods of production."

The evacuee foreman in charge of the furniture shop was a "finished cabinetmaker." The superintendent of manufacturing also aided the shop by organizing "production lines" and training "the unit in mass production methods." Although lumber and materials were difficult to procure, a "source of magnolia wood was discovered which was not for the moment in demand." Enough of this " in 1 x 6 and 1 x 12 widths" was acquired to be used "for all desks, cabinets, and some chairs, to serve for the duration of the project."

Between June 1943 and June 1944, the furniture shop produced 5,931 articles of furniture for the center, "mainly executive and secretarial desks, chairs for these desks, filing cabinets, stationery cabinets, baby cribs for the Children's Village, and chairs for Manzanar school."

Between July and September 1944, when it was discontinued and returned to the engineering section to be used for center maintenance work, the shop produced an additional 923 articles of furniture. During its operation, the shop "regularly employed" 22 men, 20 of whom secured jobs in furniture factories or cabinet shops throughout the country when they relocated.

In late 1943, the furniture shop supplemented its regular operations by producing Christmas toys from "the odd and short pieces of lumber which had been carefully saved for months." After being painted in an improvised paint shop, the toys were sold to the Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises, which in turn retailed them to the evacuees.

**Alterations Shop.** Early in 1943, the alterations shop was turned over to the industrial section, and its 17 women employees were set up in a room in the clothing factory where they had access to materials necessary for their work. The shop was needed because many of the garments (work clothing, P coats, and other woolen outer clothing) which the evacuees were able to purchase from the WRA warehouse or obtain through distribution...
of the community welfare department were too large. The shop altered approximately 300 garments a month. After the industrial section closed, the alterations shop was transferred back to the welfare division, where it continued to operate until the center closed.

**Typewriter Repair.** In January 1943, the typewriter repair crew was transferred to the industrial section, where it continued servicing center typewriters. Late in 1943, when parts became almost impossible to procure, a contract was let to an outside service company, and the center's typewriter repair shop was disbanded.

**Sign Shop.** The sign shop was transferred to the industrial section in early 1943 and placed under the supervision of a commercial artist who had been employed in a motion picture studio prior to evacuation. This evacuee "was allowed to have five workers on his 'staff' and to train them," while turning out needed signs for center management. Among the types of signs made in the shop were directional, road, office identification, bulletin board, and warning.

The sign shop operated until April 1944. By the time of its closure, it had trained ten men, all of whom were able to find commercial artist jobs when they relocated. The evacuee manager relocated to Washington, D. C., where he joined the advertising department staff of the *Washington Post* as a commercial artist.

**Domestic Sewing Machine Repair Unit.** In early 1943, a crew of five evacuees was turned over to the superintendent of manufacturing for training to service center domestic sewing machines owned by the WRA. At the outset of the project, 100 machines, which had been obtained from surplus government stocks, were in use in the center's schools and block managers' offices. A small shop, including a lathe, irons, and welding equipment, was set up in the clothing factory, and its crew maintained the center's "domestic machines," "even when new parts had to be made from raw material." The shop serviced about 80 machines per week.

**Mattress Factory.** To meet the pressing need for mattresses in the center, a mattress factory was established at Manzanar in January 1944, employing 19 persons, only one of whom had prior experience in the trade. Thus, the factory, which produced 800 mattresses a week, also served as a "training school." After all center residents had mattresses, the factory was disbanded in August 1944.

**Food Processing Units.** In early 1943, the industrial section "was given the job of organizing all food processing" in the center, which at that time included shoyu, bean-sprout, and tofu operations. The section's responsibility was to "see that the products met health and nutritional standards, that labor difficulties were ironed out, and that the product or products reached the mess hall tables and did not go to the individual apartments."

When the industrial section closed in September 1944, the food processing units were transferred to the mess section.

The shoyu plant produced approximately 1,500 gallons per month, employed three evacuee employees, and produced shoyu at a cost lower than the mess section could procure in outside markets. The evacuees at the center "were particularly eager to make
this product as the kind available to them on the open market did not meet their standard."

Established in October 1942, the bean sprout plant employed four men and produced an average of 7,000 pounds of bean sprouts per month.

Opened in August 1942 and reorganized in January 1943, the tofu plant soon reached a production average of "10,000 one and one-fourth pound cakes per month." Eight evacuees were employed. Daily production commenced at 4:00 A.M., thus enabling the fresh cakes to be delivered to the mess halls in the afternoon in time for the evening meal.

In September 1943, a pickling plant was established to "utilize excess vegetables coming daily from the farm during harvest, and also to keep down home pickling." The plant "pickled 105,000 pounds of excess vegetables, mainly root crops," which were used in the mess hall the following year.

Between harvests, the pickling crew manufactured miso, a sauce used to flavor baked and fried foods and salads. During 1944, the miso operation produced 36,000 pounds of miso for use in the mess halls.

In May 1943, a swarm of wild bees was caught by an evacuee ex-beekeeper who proceeded to "add more hives whenever he could obtain permission to visit the sagebrush slopes west of the Center." During the fall of 1943, the bee-keeping activities of this evacuee were placed under the industrial section, and he was placed on the section's payroll and furnished with wood and nails to build new hives. The number of hives expanded to 50, and the first crop of 170 gallons of honey was distributed to the mess halls.

Responsibility for the storage of Manzanar's vegetable crop was placed under the industrial section in 1943. During the summer, a root cellar was constructed and the vegetables, including Irish potatoes, onions, winter squash, sweet potatoes, carrots, turnips, and cabbage, were sorted, cleaned, and stored. Except for sweet potatoes, which "suffered 30 percent loss because of inadequate circulation," these vegetables were stored "with less than normal shrinkage." The stored vegetables were distributed to the mess halls until April 1944.

A vegetable dehydrating plant was constructed at Manzanar in 1943 "using surplus parts and scrap." The plant "successfully dehydrated some 200,000 pounds of vegetables," which amounted to the "daily surplus not used by the kitchens during the farm harvest." The most successful crops to be dehydrated were peas, beans, carrots, and turnips. The dehydrating plant was so successful "that designers" in the Department of Agriculture "paid several visits to Manzanar for the purpose of incorporating some of its features into their own."45

AGRICULTURE

The quarrel between the City of Los Angeles and the Army and the WRA over lease of the Manzanar site for the relocation center initially hampered the activities of the camp's agriculture section. Difficulties were encountered concerning the manner in which the city wanted irrigation water utilized at the center. Water was taken from streams flowing down from the mountains and from two wells located at the project. Furthermore, the city lodged complaints with the WRA concerning the manner in which commercial fertilizers were used on Manzanar's farm fields. At first, the city refused to approve a hog project, even though the WRA agreed to locate it at least one mile from the Los Angeles Aqueduct. Finally, the city's rate for irrigation water on the project was based on the price for domestic water in Los Angeles.

Finally in June 1943, the federal government, through condemnation proceedings, preempted use of the Manzanar site. A federal court set water rates more favorable to the WRA for irrigation and domestic use, thus freeing the agriculture section from various restrictions in water measurement and allocation.

The agriculture section was supervised by Farm Superintendent Horace R. McConnell, a WRA appointed worker, from May 27, 1942, until April 1, 1945. In July 1943, Henry A. Hill was added to the staff as assistant farm superintendent. Upon McConnell's resignation on April 1, 1945, Hill became acting farm superintendent until the center closed.

During 1943 and 1944, the number of evacuee workers on the vegetable-growing projects fluctuated between 75 in winter and 250 during the harvest period. The evacuee workers included some 40 to 75 women. Eight to 12 evacuees worked on the hog farm during those years, while 20 to 28 men were employed on the poultry farm. One evacuee was hired to tend the beef cattle herd during those years.

During the fall and winter of 1942-43, Manzanar acquired additional farm machinery, including four used 35-horsepower track tractors, four new small Case wheel tractors, and five new Ford wheel tractors. Pulled equipment for the track tractors was secondhand, while that for the Case and Ford tractors was new although limited in amount. No vegetable or feed crops were planted after January 1, 1945, thus eliminating the need for drawbar farm implement use after that date.

**Vegetable Production.** During the winter of 1942-43, evacuee farm workers cleared and leveled land, built irrigation canals and ditches, and constructed diversion dams in the flowing streams at Manzanar. The rabbit menace was overcome with the acquisition of five greyhounds and afghans. By the spring of 1943, approximately 400 acres of land were producing vegetable and stock feed crops, the crops raised that year totaling about 20,000 tons.

After experimentation, thirty-two varieties of vegetables were selected "as being the most desirable for Center use that could be raised satisfactorily." The varieties were "selected because they produced the most food value per pound of vegetables and at the same time

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supplied a well-balanced diet" for the evacuees. Approximately 80 percent of the vegetables used at Manzanar during 1943-44 were produced at the center. The cost of producing vegetables was less than the cost of purchasing them on the open market, and the center's vegetables were fresher and thus more desirable to the evacuees. Several varieties raised at the center that were preferred by the evacuees were unobtainable on the open market because of wartime conditions. Root vegetables "did well with high yield and good quality," and tomatoes, peppers, eggplant, cucumbers, melons, squash, string beans, and cabbage also did well. Lettuce, peas, dry beans, and sweet potatoes, however, did "not produce well due to the hot arid summer climate." Extreme alkaline soil conditions in portions of the center also contributed to poor yields.

By 1944, four fields covering 370 acres were cultivated at Manzanar. Two fields were located north of the camp along U.S. Highway 395. North Field No. 1 comprised 12 acres of cucumbers, eggplant, peppers, sage, and other herbs. On Field No. 2, a 141-acre plot north of Shepherd Creek, potatoes, nappa, daikon, uri, kaboucha, carrots, onions, cabbage, spinach, beets, lettuce, gobo, radishes, dry onions, green onions, and turnips were grown. This field was irrigated from Shepherd Creek, and a barley windbreak planted on its northwest side protected the vegetable crops. Guayule rubber plants were grown west of the north fields.

Two fields were also planted along the highway south of the residential camp area. Field No. 1 consisted of 99 acres of cultivated alfalfa, sweet potatoes, lettuce, peas, cucumbers, carrots, corn beans, dry onions, daikon, tomatoes, and cabbage. Field No. 2, located further south, consisted of 118 acres of honey dew melons, tomatoes, potatoes, winter squash, squash, milo, corn, watermelons, peppers, cabbage, and asparagus.

**Poultry Farm.** Construction of the poultry farm began in July 1943, and in August the WRA purchased 12,000 unsexed day-old white leghorn chicks to be delivered at a rate of 2,000 per week. An additional 8,000 chicks were ordered for delivery in April 1944. The evacuee workers cleaned the chicken houses, yards, and feeding/watering troughs regularly, gathered eggs "daily at 3:30 p.m.,” and planted lawns around the farm warehouse. They also planned and laid out "some attractive flower gardens, which were well cared for until the Project closed.”

Approximately 50 percent of the barley and wheat used for feed was shipped to Manzanar from other relocation centers, but alfalfa and milo corn were raised at Manzanar. The balance of the grain and supplemental feeds were purchased from outside sources in ton lots. To cut feed costs and to insure an adequate supply, a hammer mill was purchased and installed to grind grain and make alfalfa meal. To this mixture of ground grain and meal were added animal protein, minerals, and several different supplemental feeds. This substance was mixed by hand into three different mashes: chick, growing, and laying.

Egg production at the poultry farm amounted to 53,420 dozen in 1944 and 60,435 dozen the following year. Total value of the eggs for that two-year period was $45,520. To deplete the laying flock in line with the center's population decline, as well as to close out

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47. "North Field No. 1, Manzanar, 1944; “North Field No. 2, Manzanar, 1944; “South Field No. 1, Manzanar, 1944; and “South Field No. 2, Manzanar, 1944;" RG 210, Entry 48, Box 222, File No. 22.700, "Maps, Charts, Sketches."
the poultry project, the slaughter of hens for the mess section was commenced in July 1945. Some 6,760 hens, having a dressed weight of 20,480 pounds and a value of $5,839, were slaughtered between July and November that year. Although egg production was the primary purpose of the poultry farm, meat birds were also raised. The birds were killed and dressed by evacuees at the farm and delivered to the mess section. The killing room was equipped with two 30-gallon water tanks heated by butane gas. The number of birds slaughtered during 1943 was 2,077 (dressed weight — 6,000 pounds, valued at $1,800), and 6,881 (dressed weight — 21,370 pounds, valued at $6,296) were slaughtered the following year. Meat birds were "closed out before 1945."

Hog Farm. The hog farm at Manzanar was operated as a "feeder project." Because of the comparatively short life of the project and the opposition of the City of Los Angeles to hog raising, "it was not deemed advisable to go into a breeding program." In October 1943, the farm was constructed about one mile from the center, and the first feeder pigs that were purchased arrived in November. There was "no preference as to breed," and requirements were "only a sound weight of from 50 to 90 pounds per head."

During the first two weeks, the hogs were fed grain and garbage, but after that period they were eased into a full-garbage feed diet. The daily routine consisted of cleaning and washing the feed platforms each morning. At 9:00 A.M. garbage from the mess halls was collected in a dump truck and delivered to the feeding platforms. Afternoon garbage was collected and delivered to the hog farm about 4:00 P.M.

Prices paid by the mess section for dressed pork ranged from 16 to 17 cents per pound. This price was lower than on the open market, thus making the hog farm a profitable project operation.

During 1943-45, a total of 2,320 feeder pigs were purchased at an average cost of 15 cents per pound ($32,224 in value). Of this total, 2,066 hogs, yielding 396,125 pounds of pork valued at $67,288, were slaughtered in Bishop for center use. Forty-five hogs which remained at the center when it closed were sold.

Beef Cattle. A beef cattle project was commenced at Manzanar in December 1943 with the purchase of 199 cows at a cost of 6 1/2 to 8 cents per pound. George Creek ran through the cattle area and supplied water in sufficient quantity for spring and early summer irrigation of the meadows as well as for year-round drinking water.

In March 1944, an additional 95 head of cattle were purchased. This lot "consisted of good grade cows and young steers." Thus, the purchase price ranged from 9 1/2 to 10 1/2 cents per pound.

The herd was "of mixed breed" and provided an opportunity "to determine which type produced the best beef value." This factor was "important since the cattle program was considered a doubtful source of profit at Manzanar."

Seventy-six calves were raised, and through the late spring and early summer of 1944, the herd "made fair gains." By fall, however, it "became evident that a beef herd could not be kept in slaughtering condition" unless quantities of outside feed were purchased, because the "late fall and winter grasses were not of a quality to keep cattle fat." Alfalfa and corn
were the only crops grown for stock feeding, and the acreage for these crops was limited "owing to a shortage of water during summer months."

Slaughtering, "if successful for Center consumption, necessarily had to be a continuous operation." As stock feed costs were high during 1944, it was determined to close out the beef herd and resume beef purchases through the Army Quartermaster. No more cattle were purchased, and the beef herd was liquidated in December 1944. All told, 361 cattle were slaughtered in 1944, providing 139,505 pounds of beef for the center's mess halls valued at $23,560.23.

By late 1943 the acreage devoted to vegetable and feed production at Manzanar had been expanded to 440 and 110 acres, respectively, but these totals were reduced the following year to 310 and 45. Total vegetable production at Manzanar during 1942-44 was 7,747,201 pounds, of which 7,259,241 pounds were used at the center and 847,960 pounds were shipped out of the camp. In December 1943, for instance, one carload of carrots was shipped to Tule Lake, and in January 1944 one carload of 34,000 pounds of carrots was shipped to Poston. During the harvest in the fall of 1943, 19,320 pounds of honey dew melons and 18,000 pounds of watermelons were shipped to Tule Lake. The total value of the vegetable crops, based on 85 percent of the Los Angeles wholesale market values at the time of harvesting, was $217,228. Some 428,000 pounds of stock feed, valued at $4,550, was raised at Manzanar during 1942-44.48

Guayule. Although separate from the center's agricultural food program, the guayule rubber plant experimentation program at Manzanar related to war-related agricultural production and scientific research. In 1942, a group of evacuee scientists at the center heard about experiments being conducted in California by the U.S. Department of Agriculture in which efforts were underway to produce rubber from guayule plants to meet the nation's wartime rubber needs. Encouraged by Dr. Genevieve Carter, the center's superintendent of education who saw the guayule project as a chance to develop scientific work as well as educational opportunities for the evacuees, the men contacted Dr. Robert Emerson, a professor at the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena. Through his efforts, waste cuttings and seedling culls were delivered to Manzanar in April 1942 from several Salinas nurseries. The guayule research project at Manzanar was directed by Dr. Kenji Nozaki, while the scientific work and nursery propagation and field work was supervised by Walter T. Watanabe. Breeding and flower biology efforts were directed by Masuo Kodani. By March 1943, a lath house and propagating beds had been built at the southwest corner of the camp, and a chemical laboratory had been constructed in the ironing room in Block 6, a cytogenetics laboratory had been established in the hospital, field plots had been planted in various locations outside the residential area, and a breeding laboratory had been set up in the ironing room in Block 35.

Experiments were made on the extraction of rubber from guayule cryptostegia, and other less promising rubber bearing plants. The evacuee scientists succeeded in propagating guayule from cuttings, a process hitherto considered to be highly impractical. They also succeeded in hybridizing the plant, and by selection improved the strain so that the

rubber yield would be higher. They perfected a new and rapid method of processing the guayule so that the costly and often awkward storage period could be eliminated. They developed a new method of reducing the amount of resin in the finished product. Samples of the tested rubbers were vulcanized in Los Angeles, and proved to be of good quality.

Through experimentation, it was found that Salinas strains of guayule were capable of surviving the winter at Manzanar, but Texas strains proved to be more hardy. Texas strains were also found to be superior to Salinas strains in rubber production.

Scientists from Stanford University, the University of California, Los Angeles and Berkeley, and the California Institute of Technology visited the camp in increasing numbers during 1943-45. Several professional papers were prepared for publication in scientific journals by the evacuees while they were in the center.49

MESS HALL OPERATIONS

The mess halls continued to operate during 1943-45 much as they had (described in Chapter 10) prior to the violence that erupted in the center on December 6, 1942. By 1945, the average staff for a mess hall serving 300 evacuees consisted of a chef who supervised a time checker, seven waitresses, three cooks, 4 cook's helpers, and 11 kitchen helpers. Meals averaged from 2,800 to 3,500 calories per day per person, including men, women, and children. The supply of fresh vegetables from the center's farm was adequate and the variety considerable, especially during the summer months.

Except during short periods when ration-point values were very low, meat consumption at Manzanar remained approximately at the level allowed by rationing. Efforts to provide palatable foods were undertaken by the evacuee steward who prepared menus which the Chief Project Steward Joseph R. Winchester approved. A considerable part of the menu consisted of rice, sukiyaki, miso, tofu, chop suey, chow mein, shoyu sauce, and various pickled vegetables.

Menus for a typical mid-week day indicate that meals served at Manzanar were generally wholesome and well-balanced, if not always the type preferred by all evacuees. On Wednesday, January 6, 1943, for instance, the following meals were served (quantities to serve 100 persons):

Breakfast
- 1/2 grapefruit
- Corn Flakes, 1 ounce Ind. 
- Bacon
- Hot Cakes
  - Flour
  - Lard
  - Baking Powder
  - Salt
  - Milk
- Syrup
- Coffee
- Sugar
- Milk, fresh
- Milk, evaporated

Lunch
- Kidney bean salad
  - Kidney Beans
  - Onions
  - Mustard (prepared)
  - Mayonnaise
  - Vinegar
  - Lettuce
  - Salt-Pepper to taste
- Veal Fricassee and Dumplings
  - Veal
  - Lard
  - Flour
  - Milk, evaporated
  - Salt-Pepper to taste
- Dumplings
  - Flour
  - Lard
  - Baking Powder
  - Milk
  - Salt to taste
  - String Beans, #10
  - Rice
  - Tea

Supper
- Split Pea Soup
  - Dried Peas
  - Soup Stock
  - Salt to taste

50. "Menu," January 6, 1943, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 69, File, "Miscellaneous Reports."
On holidays, special meals were served in the center's mess halls. "American" menus were generally used on Thanksgiving and Christmas, but "a full Japanese meal" was served on New Year's Day, because it was "a Japanese holiday of great importance." On January 1, 1944, for instance, the menu consisted of the following types and quantities of food (quantities to serve 100 people):

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<th>Kuchitori</th>
<th>16 pounds</th>
<th>10 pounds</th>
<th>Season to taste</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lima beans</td>
<td>16 pounds</td>
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<td>Sugar</td>
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<td>10 pounds</td>
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<td>Season to taste</td>
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<td>Eggs</td>
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<td>Milk</td>
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<td>Sugar</td>
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<td>Salt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicken</td>
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<td>Shoyu</td>
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<td>Sugar</td>
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<td>Fresh orange half</td>
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<td>Carrots</td>
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<td>Ajinomoto</td>
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<td>Sugar</td>
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Meals were served "cafeteria style" in the mess halls — a system that many evacuees objected to. One evacuee mother, for instance, complained that "we line up, receive our food all dumped on one plate, scramble for seats, and dash to the back with the dirty dishes when we are through eating." While the evacuees ate, "the dishwashers" kept "up such a constant clatter of dishes, and making so much noise, one can hardly think, let alone eat, decently." The "biggest problem" however, was "the harm this system" was "doing to our children." The "constant change of faces at meal-times" was upsetting to young children, "especially the tiny tots who are just beginning to learn to eat and speak properly." One of the distractions was "the noise and the sight of people walking back and forth." As the evacuees were served in lines, the ones "at the head of the line" were "served first and finish first." If we "are unfortunate enough to sit at a table where the early diners are, they gobble down their food, jump up, dash to the back to dispose of dirty dishes, leaving space at the table for other diners, thus making two different sets of people the child will be interested in." The table etiquette of the children was "atrocious." Young children "6 and 7 years of age, with no supervision from older folks, gang together at one table, laughing and talking loudly, eating sloppily, with no thought [sic] of manners." If "they could only eat with their families, they could be made to eat properly, out of shame, by their older brothers and sisters, if not by their parents." "I know many children don't get enough to eat because of this." At "the rate they are going, by the time they get outside they will be little savages." "Not only are the children of that age becoming unmanageable, but even children 2, 3 and 4 are becoming like that."

The "whole system," according to this evacuee, seemed to "be harming people." Even if the lines had to be maintained because of a lack of workers, "tables should be assigned each
family, so that there won't be this mad scramble for seats, and so that the family may be
united at mealtime." If possible the lines should be "eliminated, because of the
psychological effect it has on many people." Efforts "should be made to maintain a normal
atmosphere," because lining "up for meals, getting food slopped at us all on one plate is
making many feel like hobos and tramps waiting in a breadline for a handout."51

As the war continued, rationing needs for the center's mess halls were processed
according to "a definite plan." Several days before the beginning of each two-month
period, Winchester notified the Washington office of the estimated requirements for ration
points. These estimates were based on the anticipated camp population and conformed to
allocations made to families throughout the country. The allocation for Manzanar,
however, was "slightly less than that ordinarily made to institutions at large."

The Washington office obtained ration points from the Office of Price Administration.
Checks for ration points were then mailed to the project. They were deposited on receipt
and then drawn upon as required. As with money, points were obligated as requisitions
were written, even though final payment was not granted until goods were received.

Within the center, it was necessary to issue food on the basis of actual population and not
on the anticipated population upon which points were originally allocated. Shortages or
overages were then adjusted at the beginning of the next period. Regulations of the Office
of Price Administration allowed a 45-day advance food supply to be carried at the center.

At the beginning of each week, the population count in the center was obtained from the
statistics section. Rationed food was then issued in accordance with this figure.

Between August 1942 and September 1945, the ration program for the center allotted
559,145 points, of which 550,073 were used and 9,072 were saved. From March 1943 to
August 1945, the ration program for processed food allotted 9,566,646 points to Manzanar,
of which 6,548,368 were used and 3,018,278 were saved. Between April 1943 and
September 1945, the ration program for meats, fats, and cheese amounted to 11,491,258
points, of which 9,591,581 were used and 1,899,677 were saved.

Chief Project Steward Winchester served as chairman of the Manzanar panel of the Lone
Pine Ration Board. He also directed an evacuee-staffed office which issued shoe stamps
for resident evacuees. Ration books, and occasionally, tire and gasoline coupons were
issued for relocating evacuees.

By February 1, 1945, the mess section began to close mess halls as the center's population
declined. By August 1, only 18 mess halls remained in operation.

As the number of people served in a single mess hall was reduced to approximately 125,
that mess hall was closed and the residents were sent to another within the group of four
blocks set off by firebreaks. As each kitchen closed, its remaining food stock was
distributed to other kitchens. This process continued until only one mess hall in each four
continued to operate. During the last weeks of the center's operation, only one mess hall

51. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, January 31, 1943, Report No. 1b, "The Mess
Hall System at Manzanar (By an Evacuee Mother)," RG 210, Entry 16, Box 346, File 61.318, No. 1.
in eight, then one in 16, continued to operate. Two days before the last evacuee left the center on November 21, one of the last two mess halls was closed, the other being left to service the few residents who remained. Two evacuee chefs were asked to remain until the last days. Otherwise, no special provision was made and mess hall help was obtained when, and as, available. Because of labor shortages, 75 percent of the work in the center's mess halls was performed by voluntary part-time workers during the final weeks of the camp's operation.

During the entire operation of the relocation center, approximately 28,790,221 meals were served to evacuees at an average cost of 12 2/3 cents per meal (or 35 1/4 cents per day) and a total cost of $3,384,749.02. Only two minor instances of food poisoning occurred. According to Winchester, feeding "some 10,000 persons — some of whom had American food standards and tastes, others of whom held to their Japanese standards and tastes — was accomplished according to satisfactory nutritional standards and was held well within the cost limits set by the Government." 

COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES

Early in 1943, the community activities section, under the direction of Supervisor Aksel G. Nielsen, was reorganized into five departments — arts and crafts; athletic activities; entertainment, social, and activities; music; and gardening. This arrangement was maintained until the center closed, except that early in 1945, a sixth department called "Youth Activities" was added. An assistant supervisor, who could speak Japanese, was hired to serve as liaison between the administrative staff of the section and both the Issei and Nisei evacuee population segments. By June 1943, the section employed 102 evacuee personnel to supervise recreational activities in the following categories:

- Arts and Crafts — Handicrafts, woodcraft, painting, sewing and needlework
- Athletics — Men and boys, girls and women
- Gardening and landscaping
- Music
- Boy Scouts
- Entertainment, hall leaders, social activities

Departmental Activities

Arts and Crafts. During much of 1943-45, this department was the largest in terms of staff and evacuee participation. Before relocation drained many of its members, the department numbered 40 instructors.

Sewing was by far the most popular activity in the arts-and-crafts department. Some 2,500 older girls and women studied sewing. At one time, the department was able to operate three separate centers, each with a complete staff. Approximately 100 electric sewing machines were borrowed from the industrial section for the classes.

52. Unless otherwise noted, material for this section was drawn from "Mess Operations Section," Final Report, Manzanar, Vol. IV, pp. 1,328, 32-34, 46-54, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 73, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."
Community Activities

Paper-flower making was a popular evacuee activity directed by an evacuee teacher who had won many purple ribbons at California state fairs. At the height of its popularity, two schools operated for 5 1/2 days a week, with buildings packed at every session. Instruction in making 50 different types of flowers was offered. Flowers were made for funerals, weddings, and other special events.

Many evacuees participated in woodworking classes, making furniture and knick-knacks for their quarters. One of the most popular hobbies at Manzanar was working with roots of old trees — roots were shaped into birds, ships, canes, and other curios. Younger boys confined their woodcraft activities largely to making model airplanes, and model airplane clubs held exhibits and several public flight exhibits.

Embroidery classes were convened under a skilled evacuee embroidery instructor. Instructional classes were also held in knitting and crocheting, one "expert teacher" showing "her hundreds of adult pupils how to make seaters, socks, mittens, bags" and other items.

Stenciling became a popular hobby after "its many interesting patterns were demonstrated." Younger Nisei girls, with some background in the subject, taught the classes.

Two primary Japanese cultural activities were sponsored by the arts-and-crafts department. One was Japanese brush-lettering — the making of Asian characters with brushes. The second was flower-arrangement led by two evacuee instructors. The classes included learning the customs involved in correct Japanese tea service, as well as the traditional pattern of arranging flowers.

Athletic Activities. The athletic department differed from the other departments under the community activities section in that it was made up and supported almost entirely by Nisei, whereas most of the other departments were dominated largely by Issei. By early 1945, as a result of the relocation of many athletic leaders as well as active participants, the athletic department "lost much of its former importance and became relatively weak as a department."

The most popular sport of all the athletic activities was softball. During the summer of 1942, "nearly all the young people, especially the boys, belonged to a softball team." As other sports developed, participation in softball "fell off noticeably, but the game never lost its leading position as [the] number one sport in the Center." Teams were organized into leagues according to ability and as far as possible according to age. The three main age groups for which softball leagues were organized included junior high school boys, young men, and older men. In June 1945, there were three leagues and 24 teams for boys under age 16. One summer, the center had a league of three teams comprised of older men, most of whom had never played the game before. Leagues for younger girls were also established, and in June 1945 the girls were organized into three leagues and 21 teams.

Volleyball was somewhat more popular among the girls than the men. Indoor facilities were not available until the auditorium was completed in 1944. Thus, the sport was
"confined to the light evenings from April to September." In June 1945, there were 14 girls' teams and five teams for men.

Approximately 100 persons, the majority of whom were men, belonged to the Tennis Club when the sport was at its peak in the center. Because of the poor surfacing of the four tennis courts, no one was allowed to play without tennis shoes. This rule undoubtedly restrained a number of people from joining, because money was often not available for such purchases, and tennis shoes were practically unobtainable in the center store.

Golf facilities were constructed entirely through the labor of evacuee volunteers. Some members loaned money to finance the building of a small club house, while others with connections, secured golf equipment. At its peak, the golf club had about 150 members. The WRA employed three instructors, one of whom was a woman. At first the golf course had nine holes, but it was later expanded into an 18-hole course. When the membership dropped because of relocation, nine of the holes were allowed to revert back to sagebrush.

Early in 1944, a regulation baseball diamond for "hardball" was constructed. Uniforms were secured for eight teams, the cost being met from the five-cent charge for motion pictures. Evenings were short, so playing was generally confined to double-headers on Saturday and Sunday afternoons. Players were limited to a single eight-team league with each team playing one game per week. Several younger teams wanted to join, but there was no opportunity for them until 1945, when, with relocation, most of the members of the older teams had left the center. Baseball was supported largely by collections taken during the games at the diamond. The problem, however, was "not so much to get money as to get equipment."

By June 1945, Manzanar had three boxing clubs with 105 participants, 5 boys' track teams, and 120 individuals involving in wrestling.

The community activities section did not possess any football equipment until after the 1944 spring season when the camp's high school turned over its equipment to the section. Lack of uniforms, however, did not keep the boys from playing football. During 1942 and 1943, several touch football leagues were organized, but enthusiasm for the sport declined as time passed.

During 1942 and 1943, basketball was played on Saturday and Sunday afternoons, but the sport was difficult to promote because of lack of indoor facilities. In the fall of 1943, with the installation of artificial lights on two of the courts, it was hoped that night ball could be promoted. As the lights were not strong enough, however, the results were poor. Basketball was popular with the girls as well as the boys, and, at its peak, there were two girls' leagues and four boys' leagues.

Basketball players hoped that basketball courts would be installed in the auditorium during 1944. However, it was determined that the auditorium floor would be constructed of soft wood and thus be unable to stand up under basketball playing. Although badminton and volleyball were permitted in the auditorium and courts were painted on
the floor, neither sport became popular, and acquisition of equipment continued to be a problem. A girls’ ping pong tournament was held in 1945 with 36 participants.\footnote{53}

**Entertainment, Social, and Club Activities.** This department sponsored and coordinated special events at Manzanar, such as carnivals and fairs. However, it also supervised some regular activities, such as Japanese drama and social and folk dancing, as well as clubs centered around various activities and age groups.

When the community activities section turned over a number of recreation halls to the education section for use as classrooms during the fall of 1942, it retained supervision of a few which it planned to develop into adult social halls. Because of lack of equipment and the WRA’s refusal to install linoleum on the floors, and in some instances plasterboard on the walls, these buildings never served their intended purposes.

Prior to early 1944, the WRA did not have a public address system of its own. Before that time, loans from private individuals served "as a not-too-desirable substitute." Four technicians on the WRA payroll owned public address systems, and two of them owned two systems each. It was agreed that when the systems were used for non-WRA activities and when there was an admission charge for the events, the owners would be allowed to charge two dollars an evening for the use of the system and an extra dollar for the use of records.

Before the auditorium was constructed in 1944, it was difficult to schedule a special event since no large building in the camp was available. This problem inevitably meant obtaining permission for use of a mess hall, which meant that tables and equipment had to be removed before the hall could be converted to social use. Usually, this rearrangement was done after supper, while decorations were set up during the interval between supper time and the time when the guests arrived. When the party was over, the mess hall had to be cleaned and the furniture replaced so that the hall was ready for breakfast the following morning.

By October 1944, an activity schedule had been established for use of the auditorium. The high school was given use of the building Monday through Friday from 8:00 A.M. to 5:30 P.M. as well as Friday evening and Saturday mornings. The community activities section used the auditorium Monday through Thursday evenings and Saturday afternoons. Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises was given use of the building on Saturday evenings and Sunday afternoons and evenings. Beginning in February 1945, motion picture shows were presented in the auditorium on Saturday and Sunday evenings. During 1945, talent shows, recorded concerts, dances, concerts, dramas, pageants, and an oratorical contest was held in the auditorium.\footnote{54}

**Music.** Music played a significant role in many special events and programs at Manzanar. Moved from block to block because the evacuees objected to the noise, the music

\footnote{53. Engineering Section to Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director, December 12, 1944, and Community Activities to Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director, January 22, 1945, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 220, File No. 18.010.}

\footnote{54. Rollin C. Fox, Chairman to Members of the Auditorium Committee (and attachments), October 20, 1944, and Lyle G. Wentner to Ralph P. Merritt, January 26, 1945, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 220, File No. 18.010.}
department, under the leadership of Louis E. Frizzell, a popular appointed high school
teacher, finally settled in Block 24, Building 15, where a model music hall was established.
The hall contained a large room for the band, orchestra, and chorus, and seven smaller
rooms for instrumental practice. Evacuees made furniture for the hall and planted trees
around the building. The evacuee musicians contributed to the music program either by
purchasing instruments themselves or in some instances using small WRA cash
allowances and keeping the instruments in playing shape.

Various music organizations were established in the camp, including a mixed glee club, a
community orchestra, and a band. A senior swing band played for many dances, while a
younger swing band, known as the "Five Bombers," was one of the most popular musical
groups in the camp. A solon orchestra as well as a mandolin and guitar orchestra also
made numerous appearances. Smaller, but popular, orchestra units that performed for
short periods during the camp's history included "Mac's Orchestra," which featured a steel
guitar; the "Hot Shots," and the "Sierra Stars," the latter group including unorthodox
instruments such as wash boards and pans.

The music hall staff, never large, gave instruction in "whatever instruments were
available." The chief instrument for instruction was the piano, but since only four pianos
were made available by the WRA, it was often necessary to regulate the number of
students who could be admitted for instruction. Most other instruments were furnished by
the players themselves, although the WRA provided a few such as a drum, three horns,
and a bass fiddle. A number of soloists were also developed by the music hall staff.

Japanese musical activities encountered difficulties when the education section took over
many of the recreation halls during the fall of 1942. After that time, it became almost
impossible to find places for players to practice because of numerous objections by
evacuees and many had to give up. It was not until after the segregation to Tule Lake in
late 1943 and early 1944, when building space again became available, that some of the
"abolished activities were reinstated." It was then that a whole barrack was set aside for
the practice of Japanese music.

When space became more plentiful and interest in Japanese music developed "more
normally," a number of new music organizations were established. Among the most
prominent were biwa, shakuhachi, koto, shamisen, and shigin, a form of traditional
singing.

As the musicians gained experience and skill, musical programs were performed in the
camp. After the auditorium was completed, "friendly competition arose as to which
musicians would present programs in it." According to the Final Report, Manzanar, it
"became necessary to regulate Japanese concerts and to ask the various groups to
consolidate or take turns." Japanese "music groups were asked to hold down their
programs to not more than one a month." In addition to programs in the auditorium, four
musicals were permitted in each mess hall per month.

Gardening. The community activities section made it possible for residents to have their
own victory gardens. During the summers of 1942 and 1943, a number of evacuee
gardeners were employed by the WRA. These workers beautified the general garden area
by planting borders of flowers along the firebreak which was used for the camp's "Victory
Communities had taken steps to establish gardens in the firebreak area approximately 300 feet x 1,200 feet. Each family or individual was allowed a maximum plot of 30 feet x 50 feet. Some 200 families and/or individuals participated. They dug and maintained irrigation ditches, established water schedules, regulated irrigation hours, and supervised gardeners cultivating their own garden plots. According to the Final Report, Manzanar, this activity "did much for the older people, for many of the Issei did not know how to enjoy themselves in social activities." Sometimes "the enjoyment of dining on their own harvest would be added to their pleasure, but usually the garden products were donated to the block kitchen."

Youth. During 1943-44, various youth clubs were formed in the center to provide avenues for social interaction and recreational activities for young people. However, as the camp's young adults relocated during 1943-44, the center's population increasingly became composed of older people and children of school age. Activities which the Issei had known in their youth increasingly gained prominence. The relatively few younger Nisei left in the center were not the ones accustomed to assume leadership. Thus, the more the Issei took on the role of leaders in the center, the more the remaining Nisei "seemed to refrain from taking part in planning or decision-making."

Alarmed by the increasing development of Japanese customs and activities at Manzanar, the WRA undertook in early 1945 to establish a Youth Council, composed of representatives of the different young peoples' clubs, to plan and make recommendations for an overall community youth program that would promote "Americanized" activities. It was believed that this council would enable young people to take their place in community life and accept part of the responsibility for a well-rounded recreational program. Many youth, however, declined to participate in the council so representatives from each block were selected to represent the youth. Although many of these young people also refused to participate, the WRA went ahead with its plans.

With the reduction in the center population following segregation to Tule Lake, the mess hall in Block 14 was set aside as a combination Youth Center and United Services Organization clubhouse. One room, furnished at USO expense, was reserved for USO club use. The rest of the mess hall was devoted to the Youth Center. Booths for four and eight young people were constructed along the walls, with small square tables and chairs placed at their ends. The kitchen in the former mess hall was used for cooking and storage, while one corner was converted into a conference room. The Youth Center was reserved for young people between the ages of 13 and 30.

The Lone Pine Ration Board granted the ration points needed for successful operation of the Youth Center. The Community Activities Cooperative Association (CACA), an organization that will be examined in the next section of this chapter, hired a manager and a cook for the center.

The Youth Center did not prove as successful as planned. A group of boys, primarily from Terminal Island, "came habitually to the Center as a gang." This "one-sex grouping had a

restraining influence on the girls who felt that the Center was a boy's hang-out and not a place for dating." Consequently, they felt "embarrassed about coming to the Center without escorts."

This problem was partially resolved when the WRA arranged to have the girls' clubs take turns and furnish helpers for the center each evening. The club members washed dishes, served as junior hostesses, and helped in other ways. Similarly, boys' clubs aided the girls' clubs. Thus, at least one girls' club and one boys' club were present together in the Youth Center each evening.

Community Activities Cooperative Association

Early in 1943, the community activities section was informed that WRA money could no longer be spent on equipment, materials, or supplies. Thereafter, the evacuees would have to finance their own recreational activities. Despite initial opposition, various evacuee groups started financing their own activities, usually under leadership of an instructor who made a flat charge for participation in his/her activity. After some groups were accused of misappropriating funds, efforts to establish a bookkeeping system were initiated but proved to be unenforceable. When a Fourth of July community-wide carnival was sponsored by the community activities section in 1943, with approximately 50 clubs given concessions in the form of refreshment stands and game booths, it became necessary "to have a strong central organization which could set up rules regarding the disposition of their earnings."

Accordingly, on November 11, 1943, the Community Activities Cooperative Association was established to ameliorate these problems. According to CACA's by-laws, the organization was designed to "plan for and obtain for the membership of the Association worthwhile cultural and recreational activities such as entertainment, social activities, hobbies, music, sports, gardening and such other leisure-time activities as shall be deemed suitable for the Manzanar community." CACA would "collect and disburse such funds as the membership shall direct" and establish "a satisfactory bookkeeping and accounting system for the Association."

Initially, the organization was administered by a board of ten directors who were elected by a congress which in turn was elected by the members of the CACA. Members in good standing included those who had paid the quarterly membership dues of 35 cents for adults and 20 cents for high school students and children per three-month term. The by-laws stated that any organization was entitled to at least one representative in the congress and that each organization should be allowed to elect one congress representative for every 40 members. The board of directors was elected from and by the congress for three-month terms. On June 15, 1944, the by-laws were amended to extend the directors' terms to six months and allow the community activities section department heads to become members of the board of directors automatically.

The board of directors hired an executive secretary to keep minutes at board meetings, collect membership dues, and handle the receipts and expenditures of the organization. Later, after the community activities section was limited in the number of employees that it could have, the board hired leaders and workers for activities which were not supported
by the section. Among such positions were those of golf-course caretaker, goh and shogi instructor, and a Japanese brush-lettering instructor.

The CACA obtained use of Block 16, Building 15 and converted it for use as a gift shop. Here individuals and organizations could exhibit and sell “made in Manzanar” articles, many of which were the products of arts-and-crafts classes. Exhibits were accepted on a consignment basis, with ten percent of the sale price being retained by CACA and the rest turned over to the owner. The gift shop became a popular stop for center visitors, and the shop experienced difficulty in getting enough articles to meet the many requests.

During the first year of Manzanar’s operation, paper flowers had to be used for occasions such as funerals, weddings, and parties, because fresh flowers were not available in Owens Valley and Manzanar was too far from Los Angeles to purchase cut flowers from city florists. Accordingly, CACA cultivated about an acre of land and planted flowers and vegetables which were sold at popular prices either at the garden or through Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises. Fertilizer, tools, and garden produce were retailed at cost. Flower and vegetable seed were produced which could be sold slightly above cost to the evacuees. The proceeds helped finance other CACA activities.

As CACA developed, it had tremendous impact on center activities. Formerly, evacuees had looked toward Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises for aid in financing programs and activities, but “now the accepted thing was to look toward the CACA for help.”

CACA provided regular budgets to the departments in the community activities section to finance various recreational and social activities and appropriated funds for special projects. Among the more noteworthy projects was sponsorship of an essay and poster contest during Fire Prevention Week in 1944 for which liberal prizes were offered to winners at various age levels. Six principal prizes and unlimited participation awards were offered for a speech contest in 1945. CACA served as financial sponsor for the 1943 county fair and two carnivals held at the center in 1943 and 1944. In addition, it sponsored and paid for free motion picture programs, constructed the aforementioned baseball diamond, and helped the players obtain “free uniforms.”

CACA’s strength was augmented by a ruling from Washington which empowered it to decide which organizations should be allowed to raise money through public programs in the center. It was also empowered to retain a percentage of funds raised by clubs and other organizations. In time, the CACA treasury mounted to thousands of dollars, and it became one of the “big businesses of the Center.”

Public Relations with Owens Valley Residents

Although the principal concern of the community activities section was “to make life as pleasant as possible for the residents of Manzanar,” sometimes events “were shaped” specifically “with the entertainment of the people of Owens Valley in mind.” One of the more successful events “for bettering public relations with the valley people” was the Manzanar Fall Fair held on September 18-19, 1943, attended by several hundred valley residents. On other occasions, valley residents, numbering into the hundreds, visited Manzanar to enjoy indoor and outdoor concerts, exhibits, and other attractions.
Although relationships between the center and valley residents would never be "as cordial as they might have been," a "friendly and cooperative attitude," slowly developed "between many individuals and the Center" as a result of such public relations efforts. Evidence of such "neighborhood friendliness" included a Girls' Play Day attended by teenage girls from Independence, Lone Pine, and Bishop; a visit by the Lone Pine Boys' Club; and bond drives and a festival to raise funds for a swimming pool when Manzanar helped the valley out with the loan of its public address system. On one occasion the supervisor of community activities refereed a football game between the Bishop and Big Pine high schools.

Valley residents were invited to attend the fair on Saturday, while Sunday was reserved for evacuees only. Manzanar Free Press employees provided guided tours for valley residents. The tour included the industrial plant, hospital, farm, Victory gardens, nursery schools, visual education museum, guayule project, and shoyu factory. A vegetable plate dinner was prepared by the Fair Committee for 300 visitors in the mess hall of Block 7. The dinner was served by high school girls, and a charge of 50 cents was made for the meal.

After dinner, the visitors were escorted to the fair grounds where they were invited to see the main fair exhibits — outdoor agricultural exhibit in front of the Children's Village, the garden exhibits in Block 10, Building 15; and the combined industrial and arts-and-crafts exhibits in Block 16, Building 15.

Throughout the evening, free entertainment was provided on the outdoor stage. A "Queen of the Fair" was chosen by a panel of judges, the guests being invited to witness the coronation ceremony. Later, they attended a coronation ball in her honor and that of her four ladies-in-waiting.

Attendance at the two-day fair was estimated to be from 5,000 to 6,000. Booths and concessions were awarded to clubs wishing to sell food, drinks, or other articles. The clubs retained two-thirds of the profit, while one-third was turned over to CACA. Gross income from the booths and concessions was $4,269.02, while the net profit was $1,892.93. One-third of this sum ($541.18) was turned over to CACA for its role in sponsoring the fair.

Special Events

Among the special events conducted at Manzanar under the direction of the community activities section were carnivals, obon festivals, concerts, dances, and exhibits. Approximately 6,000 people attended the first carnival held at Manzanar on July 4-5, 1943. Free stage entertainment was provided by the section each afternoon and evening. Various organizations set up booths where food was sold or games were played.56

A second carnival was held between Blocks 16 and 17 on July 1-2, 1944. Although the center population was smaller than it had been the year before, twenty-eight clubs operated 34 booths, featuring concessions that sold hot dogs, hamburgers, tortillas, ice

cream, soft drinks, and punch. Although no games of "gambling" were permitted "since that type of game has been outlawed by Town Hall," there were "a number of interesting novel games of skill."\textsuperscript{57}

Each summer during early August, the Buddhist Church conducted a traditional two-day outdoor obon festival to commemorate the souls of the departed. The festivals, which featured dramatic dancing, were well attended, the number of spectators and participants being about evenly divided. Block rehearsals with one or two major dress rehearsals were held some weeks in advance of the festivals.

During 1943 and 1944, and before relocation took its toll of orchestra and band members, a series of outdoor concerts were conducted at Manzanar. The orchestra also appeared as a supporting element in a number of indoor musical and dramatic programs. During summer evenings, outdoor recorded music concerts were conducted. Records were "discriminatingly selected with particular audiences in mind." Modern music was played when younger crowds were desired, while Japanese recordings were presented when an appeal was to be made to the older Issei. Classical music generally attracted few evacuees.

Special holidays were often celebrated by community-wide dances, some of which were sponsored by the community activities section, while others were promoted by clubs. A combined "Oklahoma" dance party, for instance, was sponsored by all of the clubs. Stage entertainment was provided for non-dancing guests, and cakes, pies, doughnuts, and other sweets, which had been contributed by "Caucasian friends," were auctioned. New Year's Day dances, often featuring a turkey luncheon, Halloween dances, Sadie Hawkins dances, and parties for special occasions, as well as weekly and bi-weekly dances, "were held as a matter of course."

Periodic arts-and-crafts exhibits were popular with the evacuee population. Among the more successful exhibits were paper-flower shows, woodcarvings with interesting designs made from the roots of locust trees, furniture, leathercraft, embroidered pictures, knitting, women's clothing and fashions, oil and water color painting, stone carving, and cartoons.\textsuperscript{58}

Closing Recreational Program During the Summer of 1945

Rollin Fox, the Manzanar high school principal, assumed the duties of the supervisor of community activities when Aksel G. Nielsen left the WRA to join the United Nations Rehabilitation and Relief Agency on June 30, 1945. As the center's population continued to decline as a result of relocation, a two-part summer recreational program was established. One element of the summer program was a series of recreational activities "that contributed to the interest, welfare, and morale of the residents, and were not of a kind to retard relocation." A special children's summer recreational program for elementary school age children which began on June 18 was planned for a four-week period. Since many

\textsuperscript{57} Manzanar Free Press, July 1, 1944, p. 1.

children remained in the camp at the end of the first four-week session, a second four-week session followed with some 250 children participating. The program included arts-and-crafts classes, knitting and sewing, industrial arts for boys, dramatics, group singing, table games, boys' and girls' rhythms, playground play, hikes and picnics, a story hour, and a library book club.

A preschool session (preschools were transferred from the education section to the community activities section after the schools closed in June 1945) was included in the summer program. A WRA appointed staff member, assisted by two evacuee teachers, conducted the preschool activities. Some 65 children were enrolled in three groups when the summer program opened, but this number decreased by August 29 when the program closed.

After the community activities section recreational program for older children closed on August 11, the protestant church sponsored a two-week summer vacation Bible school from July 23 to August 4. The average attendance was approximately 125.59

HEALTH

Medical Hospital Services

During 1943-45, the health section, which operated under the direction of Principal Medical Officer Dr. W. Morse Little, provided extensive hospital services to the evacuees at Manzanar. All medical cases were cared for in the camp hospital or clinics, except those requiring specialized care. Advanced cancer, genito-urinary surgery, neurosurgery, chest surgery, and psychiatric cases were generally referred to the Los Angeles County Hospital. The total cost of operating the health section during 1943 was $132,675.24; 1944, $193,088.71; and 1945, $118,139.33.

Daily ward rounds in the hospital were conducted by the attending physician each afternoon, except for Saturday and Sunday, at 1:00 P.M. Present on the rounds were the complete medical staff, consisting of the chief nurse, medical social worker, public health nurse, and nurse in charge of the floor on which the patient's room was located.

Out-patient services were offered daily and non-hospitalized patients were required to attend public health clinics serviced by the health section. The work of the clinics was directed toward preventive medicine. Daily clinics were conducted for general medical, optometry, dental, school health, surgical, and eye, ear, nose, and throat problems. A schedule was established for the clinics: Monday, child health, food handlers; Tuesday, maternal health, chest, gastro-intestinal; Wednesday, child health, food handlers; Thursday, maternal health, chest, gastro-intestinal; Friday, child health, venereal disease; Saturday, maternal health. In addition, three-day orthopedic and ophthalmological clinics were conducted at the center every two months in cooperation with the California State Health Department.

59. Unless otherwise noted, material for this section was drawn from "Community Activities Section," Final Report, Manzanar, Vol. III, pp. 803-903, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."
According to medical officials, Manzanar had a generally low incidence of serious disease, other than degenerative diseases. Because of the larger number of older evacuees in the center, these diseases "were moderately increased." Since medical services were free, patients came in for treatment early, and thus comparatively few developed "the fulminating cases often seen in private practice in which the patient fails to come to the physician until he is seriously ill." This factor increased the number of out-patients, but saved much of the doctors' time in having to treat more severe disease arising from neglect.

There was, however, a "high incidence of psychoneurosis, hypertension, and peptic ulcer" at the camp. Psychoneurosis tended to improve as the adjustment to camp life progressed and as home follow-up was carried out by the medical social worker and public health nurse.

The laboratory at the Manzanar hospital was "well-equipped." It performed all laboratory functions, "including Kahn and Kline tests, and water and sewage-control tests." The only laboratory work sent out consisted of the "pre-marital and pre-natal Wasserman tests, which were sent to the state laboratory in accordance with state law."

Ambulance service was available 24 hours daily and required the employment of six evacuee drivers. Two ambulances and one station wagon were used to pick up and take home emergency, pregnancy, and infant and preschool cases for whom walking was "contra-indicated." The ambulances also transported handicapped children for the special hospital school and "all women workers on the swing and night shifts."

The hospital laundry operated every day but Sunday and employed 26 persons. Laundry services were provided for all units of the health section, Children's Village, and the motor transport and maintenance sections. Blankets for the entire camp were laundered at least twice yearly.

Special kitchens were established to feed children under five years of age and prepare special diets. The mess hall in Block 28, adjacent to the hospital, was set aside for special diets for ambulatory cases and their families. The mess hall was operated by the mess section with diets served on individual order of the attending physician. A kitchen in every four blocks was operated as a formula kitchen, in addition to the usual meal service, to prepare and serve infant and preschool diets. Baby formulas and children's foods were prepared by the mess chef on special order from the attending physician and were given to the mother at 10:00 A.M., 2:00 P.M., and 6:00 P.M. All formulas and food were dispensed by diet aides who were trained by the health staff but who worked under the supervision of the mess section.

A morgue was established, but it did not provide embalming services since there were no undertakers in camp. Autopsies were conducted on approximately 30 percent of the cases. The evacuee residents of the camp, according to the Final Report, Manzanar, "were so cooperative in this that about 90 percent autopsies could have been performed if there had been enough medical personnel."

Mortuary services were performed by an undertaker in Bishop. Upon a death at the center, the body was placed "in a refrigerator in the morgue, where an autopsy would be
performed if requested by the attending staff." If the case had not been under treatment, or if the circumstances attending death were suspicious, an inquest was by the county coroner in Lone Pine. Bodies were picked up by the undertaker within eight hours of death and taken to Bishop for embalming. After embalming, the body was returned to Manzanar where it was "inspected both before and after being clothed."

Funeral or memorial services were held according to the religious affiliation of the deceased. The body was then cremated or buried according to the wishes of the next of kin. If cremation was requested, it was shipped to a crematorium in southern California, and the ashes were later returned to the Manzanar columbarium.

Cases involving infectious disease could not be shipped for cremation because adequately sealed coffins were not available. These bodies were interred for later cremation when the special coffins would become available. All costs, including a regulation casket, were paid for by the WRA.

Public Health Services

The health section, according to the Final Report, Manzanar, provided a "full array of public health services under physical conditions that were sub-standard."

Maternity cases were seen for the first time usually two to three months into the pregnancy, and every two to three weeks thereafter. Except for a few precipitate deliveries who were later hospitalized, all cases were hospitalized for delivery. Minimum hospitalization after a birth was ten days.

Caudal block anesthesia was used during childbirth. In approximately 90-95 percent of the cases, this anesthesia was effective. Since there continued to be shortage of physicians and nurses in the camp, this anesthesia proved especially useful as its use "allowed careful control of the case and proper after care with a minimum of professional aid." Because of lack of space, an inadequate nursing staff, and construction large wards in the hospital, it "was impossible to segregate the abortions, other than to use a separate obstetrical room, or the labor room, or a separate nursery."

Pediatrics was treated "as a separate part of medicine." All children up to 14 years of age were hospitalized "separately in a ward which allowed partial segregation." In spite of the large number of communicable disease cases handled at the hospital and the use of a single nurse and several nurses' aides in the communicable-diseases and pediatrics wards, "only two cases of cross infection (chickenpox) occurred."

All children in the center were "followed in well-baby clinics and school health clinics." A "100-percent immunization for pertussis, diphtheria tetanus, and typhoid" was conducted. Thus, the incidence of communicable diseases, which had been high during the first few months of the camp's operation "began to decline and in general, it continued low thereafter." Well babies were seen every month up to one year of age, every six months to three years of age, and once at five years of age. Booster doses of triple vaccine were administered just before admission to school. In 1943, all elementary and secondary school children were examined by a physician and a dental assistant. The following year,
children in grades 1, 3, and 6 were examined only, "together with those children who had previously revealed defects."

A dental chair was set up in the school clinic, where a dental aide examined and corrected minor tooth problems. During 1943-44, an orthopedic surgeon was present at the hospital for three days every two months at which time he examined all crippled children and operated on those requiring it. By 1945, however, the patient load declined "appreciably," and only two clinics were held during the war.

Food handlers in the Manzanar mess halls were given a complete physical examination. In "suspicious cases among women, a pelvic examination was made, and in all other cases a fluoroscopic with plates was taken." Blood serology was conducted on a routine basis, but "positive blood" did not preclude working so long as the patient was considered non-infectious and remained under medical treatment.

Although the prevalence of venereal disease in the camp was low, venereal disease clinics were held weekly. During 1943-45, only three cases of gonorrhea were found, and the majority of the venereal disease cases were categorized as syphilis.

Tuberculosis cases were numerous at Manzanar, and a large number of evacuees were hospitalized. Medical officials believed that this development was probably the result of overcrowded living conditions, and the "social stigma which the Japanese attached to" the disease. A person who suspected that he had tuberculosis would conceal his symptoms until the disease was "so well established that he had spread it to others." Consequently, all persons showing even a slight "suspicion" of chest pathology when seen in the chest clinic were X-rayed for tuberculosis. In addition, all food handlers were fluoroscoped, and, upon the slightest suspicion, were X-rayed. All pediatric cases admitted to the hospital were routinely skin-tested, and all reactors and their families were X-rayed. These procedures, together with a rigorous program of "contact checking," resulted in a large percentage of the camp population being X-rayed.

During the first 18 months of the center's operation, the number of active cases of tuberculosis was high. After late 1943, however, few new cases were discovered.

Generally, tuberculosis patients were placed "at bed-rest" and given a "hi-caloric, hi-vitamin diet for from two to three months." If indicated, pneumothorax treatment was initiated. In cases of cavitation, pneumothorax was commenced as soon as the patient's general condition permitted. During the last six months of the health program in 1945, a specialist in tuberculosis from the Los Angeles County Hospital visited the center every two months and advised the health staff on specialized care.

During the operation of Manzanar, two tuberculosis patients died and six were transferred to Hillcrest Sanitarium in the Los Angeles area for specialized care. In November 1942, two babies died of tuberculous meningitis within three weeks of infection. However, no other similar cases occurred.

Sanitation for the camp, a subject of utmost concern to public health officials at Manzanar, was "in general, unsatisfactory." This was due in part to the lack of sanitary facilities in the barracks, and the fact that the services of a sanitarian were not continuously available.
Nevertheless, only two cases of mass food poisoning occurred during the camp's operation, both of which took place "in the early days of the Center's existence." This low incidence of gastro-intestinal disease was attributed to "the excellent cooperation given by intelligent persons in the Engineering and Mess Sections," the "high type of sanitary work carried on when a sanitarian was available," and the "loyalty of a small number of evacuees, who in the absence of a sanitarian, served as sanitary aides often with inadequate guidance and supervision."

Because of the "large number of cross connections in the Center's mains, the water supply" was frequently "under suspicion." However, most of these connections were eventually eliminated. Acceptable chlorine residuals were maintained in the water supply at all times. At the time of the spring and fall rains, a high organic content in the water supply was recorded which led to many complaints of "too much chlorine." Although large amounts of chlorine were needed during these periods, the "residual was kept constant."

Sixteen Japanese baths that were installed in the center to accommodate the desires of the Issei were "chronic offenders of the sanitary code." WRA authorities continuously attempted to ameliorate this problem by urging that submerged inlets be raised 18 inches above the tub, but "protest and appeal to the evacuees did not improve matters." According to the Final Report, Manzanar, "a respectable Japanese bath" was "taken only from a submerged outlet." As "usual when scientific progress comes into contact with deep-seated mores, educational efforts produced no relief."

Sewage disposal, after processing in the camp treatment plant, was discharged into a dry creek bed. Traces of chlorine were kept until the water disappeared. The sludge was transferred to a digestion chamber and later to drying beds. Sludge digestion constituted a continuing health problem, and adequate temperature pH and digestion was not achieved until late 1944.

Medical Social Work Activities

The work of the medical social service was integrated with other units of the health section, as well as with social welfare agencies both inside and outside the project. According to the Final Report, Manzanar, the WRA conducted medical social work on "an intensive scale" in the center, because it was dealing with "a population suffering from the impact of forced migration." Basic functional duties of the medical social service included: (1) making office and home visits with the patient and patient's family to assist the attending physician in the proper care of the patient; (2) certifying clothing grants for patients who were chronically ill; (3) obtaining glasses as recommended by an ophthalmologist; (4) serving as liaison person in social problems affecting the medical care of patients; (5) issuing and keeping marriage health certificates safe; (6) keeping files and records of patients hospitalized outside the center; (7) closely coordinating the medical and social care of chronically ill patients; and (8) handling all sickness and compensation cases. 60

60. "Procedure Used in Carrying on the Work of the Manzanar Hospital Medical Social Service," [1943], RG 210, Entry 48, Box 225, File No. 62,000.
Closing Health Section Procedures

During 1945, as the number of evacuees declined, the proportion of ailing and helpless individuals in the population increased, throwing "an additional burden upon the diminishing hospital staff." Although the clinic attendance dropped off, "it continued heavy, as organic disease became masked and complicated with psychosomatic disorders which accompanied the growing sense of insecurity of the residents." As a result, patients required "more thorough investigation."

To cope with this situation, the health section formulated a two-pronged course of action. It provided "fullest cooperation to the relocation program by making estimates of the medical need of each dependency case, by reassuring the insecure through a 24-hour program of mental hygiene that their medical and personnel needs would be taken care of, and by tracking down irresponsible rumors and referring excited inquirers to the most likely source of accurate information." In addition it eliminated "non-essential services so that the undersized staff could give adequate care to the greatest number of persons."

The curtailment of medical services coincided with the arrival in August 1945 of Dr. Agnes V. Bartlett as principal medical officer. The entire evacuee medical staff also relocated with the exception of an evacuee physician, Dr. Takahashi, who, though ailing and frail from long service and advanced years, carried a "magnificent share of the medical work" during the last 4 1/2 months of the center's operation.

In July 1945 all elective surgery in the Manzanar hospital was discontinued. Most of the tuberculosis cases had previously been relocated to institutions near the Pacific Ocean, and all chronic "bed-to-bed" cases had been processed by the medical social worker and the welfare section for placement in their counties of residence "at such time as residence verification" could be made. As far as possible, after the completion of these cases, all patients with serious illness which showed need for long hospitalization were sent to the Los Angeles County General Hospital for care until convalescent, when they were to be converted to terminal departure status and cared for by their county of origin. All prosthetic work, not in process and authorized by June 30, was eliminated from the evacuees' financial aid. The public health clinics were curtailed and limited to a general medical clinic, a minor surgery clinic during the mornings, and an eye-nose-throat clinic during the afternoons. Immunization of infants was continued until November 1, but well-baby conferences were limited to periodic weighing by an evacuee graduate nurse and conferences with mothers whose children appeared to need a physician's attention. All emergency cases coming to the hospital for medical care at non-clinic hours were screened by the nursing supervisor. In-patient hospital care was conducted by rounds every morning at which the nursing service, the principal medical officers, and the medical social worker were present.

With the lifting of the exclusion ban in January 1945, the remaining tuberculosis patients were moved to Hillcrest Sanitarium in the Los Angeles area and Ward 4 in the Manzanar hospital was closed. The hostel across the way from the hospital was closed in August at which time its residents were transferred to the hospital. In October, the relocation of "bed-to-bed" patients to outside hospitals began, because the stationary engineer and crew had relocated, thus resulting in termination of hot water service and steam heating to the
hospital wards and the closing of the laundry. Thereafter, contract hospital laundry services were secured in Bishop.

On ten days' notice, the final consolidation of hospital service was completed on October 6 with the closing of Wards 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7. The hospital mess hall was closed on November 2, and thereafter bed patients were served with trays from the Block 34 mess hall, and the ambulatory hostel patients were escorted there for meals three times a day. The last "bed-to-bed" patients were transferred out of the center on November 12.

During the last week of evacuee occupancy, the health section consisted of one physician, one administrator, one nurse, three duty nurses, and one secretary. The hospital census showed six hostel patients, two maternity patients, and two nursery infants. The last evacuee employee of the health section terminated on November 19, and voluntary assistance was given by an evacuee woman who was not on the payroll up to 4:00 P.M. of the last day of center occupancy. The last two confinement cases and babies were delivered at Manzanar before the center and hospital services closed on November 21, 1945.

On November 10, the principal medical officer took personal charge of the 27 boxes of ashes remaining in the Buddhist Church at Manzanar. These remains were stored in the camp pharmacy, and permits for their transfer were obtained. The last ashes were transferred from the health section to the evacuee property section for shipment on November 21.

Statistical data for the health section in the Final Report, Manzanar provided information on the number of patients, bed occupancies, clinics, births, and deaths from December 1942 to September 1945. The totals included:

- In-patients: 4,028 (Monthly Average — 118.5)
- Out-patients: 63,323 (Monthly Average — 1,862.4)
- Average number of beds occupied: 90.7
- Dental clinics: 40,727 (Monthly Average — 1,197.9)
- Optometry clinics: 6,009 (Monthly Average — 176.7)
- Births: 479 (Monthly Average — 14)
- Deaths: 107 (Monthly Average — 3.1)61

MANZANAR COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISES, INC.

Operating Agreement

During 1943-45, Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises was owned, operated, and managed entirely by the evacuees under the terms of an operating agreement executed with the WRA. The operating agreement between the WRA and Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises, Inc., was executed on March 1, 1943, approximately five months after the Cooperative assumed control of the business. The operating agreement reflected the general pattern

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61. Unless otherwise noted, material for this section was drawn from "Health Section," Final Report, Manzanar, Vol. III, pp. 768-800, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."
determined by the WRA for all cooperatives in the relocation centers as expressed in Administrative Instructions Nos. 26 and 27, and their supplements, and in Section 30.7 of the WRA Manual. The agreement provided:

1. The Cooperative was given a license to operate all private enterprise exclusively within the center.

2. The WRA was to make available necessary space and buildings — to be kept in repair by the WRA — for the operation of the business.

3. The WRA would render financial, legal, personnel training, and other similar services whenever such was feasible.

4. The WRA would provide assistance in establishing working relations between the Cooperative and outside business concerns for procurement of merchandise and operation of its business.

5. The Cooperative would conduct its business in accordance with WRA directives.

6. The Cooperative would select its employees through the WRA personnel section and pay them at project rates, plus clothing allowances, and would pay sick and unemployment allowances.

7. Motor vehicles would be assigned to the Cooperative from the motor pool at cost of operation.

8. The Cooperative books and records should be open at all times to appropriate WRA officials.

9. The Cooperative would provide adequate surety bonds for employees designated by the WRA.

10. The Cooperative would pay all taxes and assessments due under the laws of California and the United States.

11. No members of the Cooperative Congress should be allowed to benefit financially under the provisions of the agreement.

12. The agreement was subject to cancellation upon 30 days' notice by either party.

The operating agreement remained in force during the entire period that the Cooperative was in business at Manzanar. The only changes made were in the minor adjustment of charges for use of WRA vehicles.62

Facilities

As the Cooperative business expanded more facilities, supplies, and personnel were needed, including floor space, equipment, employees, materials, and supervision. At the time of its greatest need, it was not possible for the Cooperative to have the amount of floor space required. As the population in the center decreased and more space became available, however, this need diminished. Managers of the Cooperative, as well as many evacuees, hoped that a shopping center would be provided by erection of buildings in one of the center’s firebreaks. This plan was never realized, however, because of labor and material shortages. Another proposal for moving several barracks to a firebreak for reconversion into a community shopping center did not materialize because of labor shortages.

Thus, the Cooperative established services in scattered locations throughout the center as space became available. At the time of its greatest expansion, the Cooperative employed 237 evacuees and rented seven barracks and six ironing rooms from the WRA. The rental rate was 28 1/2 cents per square foot per annum for barracks provided with heat, light, power, water, and rubbish removal services, while the rate for unheated warehouses was 23 1/2 cents per square foot.

Dispersal of operating units throughout the center required more supervision, travel, trucking, and duplication of equipment and personnel. For the evacuees, it meant more traveling, confusion as to where each service was located, and loss of time by not being able to perform several errands in a short trip. However, as the population of the center continued to decrease, and as the date for closing the camp approached, there was neither the need for, nor a justification of, expenditures for establishing a shopping center.

Procurement

When the Cooperative was established and took over the business of Manzanar Consumer Enterprises on October 1, 1942, it found a well-established procurement system under the direction of a purchasing agent. Contacts had been made, credit established, goods ordered, and plans developed for purchase of goods to be sold through the various branches of the business still to be established. An operating surplus of nearly $40,000 was already available and was turned over to the Cooperative by its predecessor. Procurement was centralized under the authority of the assistant general manager, who was administratively responsible as purchasing agent to the general manager and acted upon the recommendations of the department heads.

Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises became a member of the Association of California Cooperatives and the Associated Cooperatives of Northern California and joined in establishing the Federation of Center Enterprises. These actions enhanced its credit rating and purchasing contacts and enabled management to secure some goods previously unobtainable.

For some time, many items either could not be purchased on the open market or were very difficult to get in sufficient quantities. Commodities, such as potato chips, soft drinks, candy, and other confections were among the articles that were difficult to obtain.
Manzanar Cooperative

Enterprises, Inc.

Manzanar was a new customer in a wartime economy that had numerous shortages of material goods, and dealers generally extended preferential treatment to established accounts. Manufacturers or processors insisted that the local ration board or regional board take steps to augment their supplies of sugar or fats to make it possible to provide for the needs of Manzanar. Such actions were not taken until the Washington office finally intervened and rendered assistance. Over a period of many months, more of these items made from fats and sugar were on sale in the center’s canteen, but, as in stores throughout the United States, never in such quantities to meet the demand.

A scarcity of yard goods, clothing items, and shoes also posed problems for the Cooperative at Manzanar. At first, only odd lots of shoes exempt from rationing could be handled, because the Manzanar evacuees did not have shoe ration stamps. In time, this problem eased as stamps were issued to evacuees on the same basis as civilians in the general population, and the supply, type, and quality of shoes in the center improved.

The Manzanar Cooperative was unable to send out buyers in the usual manner of mercantile establishments. At first, WRA travel restrictions on evacuees did not permit them to leave the center at all and later only with approved escort. Purchasing by mail and telephone from Manzanar did not meet the needs of either vendors or consumers. When the Federation of Center Enterprises was established, a procurement office was established in New York City. Three buyers were employed, thus enabling the Cooperative to procure many items that had been unobtainable until that time.

In 1944, the Manzanar Cooperative sent two of its officers, the general manager and the treasurer, to Chicago to attend a joint WRA Cooperative meeting. While there, the representatives contacted firms for the purchase of goods. After the representatives returned to Manzanar, a Miss Watanabe, one of their contacts who had relocated from the center, telegraphed that she had located some desired merchandise, but that the vendor wanted cash before delivery. The representatives quickly sent the sum of $2,500 to complete the purchase. Neither the goods nor the refund ever arrived at Manzanar, and there were no further contacts with the former evacuee. Thus, officials at Manzanar concluded that the money was embezzled.

Merchandising Methods

Prior to its transfer to the Cooperative, the management of the canteen consisted of evacuee men experienced in merchandising. Some of these men, and many trained by them, were carried over into the new management. Stocks and inventories had been built up to a value in excess of $46,000 at the time of the transfer from Manzanar Consumer Enterprises on October 1, 1942.

The general manager of the Cooperative, acting under the authority of the Board of Directors and the Congress of Delegates, was responsible for the determination of merchandising methods. Each of the eventual 16 operating units of the Cooperative had a department manager, assistant, and sale clerks.
As goods arrived at Manzanar, they were sent to one of the Cooperative’s three warehouses located to the east of Blocks 2 and 3. As they were requisitioned, goods were delivered from the warehouses to the department managers.

The usual methods of competitive display and sales techniques were not used by the Cooperative at Manzanar, since there were no competing private enterprises and store space was not available for display purposes. Residents could not leave the center to shop in neighboring towns, although they could and did purchase goods through mail order channels. Although there was little need for advertising, evacuees were informed as to what was available in the Cooperative establishments through the Manzanar Free Press, the camp newspaper that was partially subsidized by the Cooperative.

The mark-up on goods sold by the Cooperative varied with the nature of the item and frequency of its turnover. The general mark-up for most items was between 15 and 25 percent, although it was lower on some merchandise that sold readily.

At times there was a financial loss for services such as those furnished by the shoe repair, barber, and beauty shops, because these services could not be performed at a profit for the price the community was willing or able to pay. Such losses were rectified in subsequent periods by an increase in prices for other services or by increased mark-ups in other departments, such as the canteen and general store.

As the population of the center declined in 1945, the Cooperative reduced its stocks and inventories which had reached a peak of approximately $100,000. On September 15, 1945, the stock of the canteen was transferred to a private group who agreed to operate the business for the remaining weeks of the camp’s operation. Similar arrangements were made with the fish market, barber, beauty, shoe repair, and watch repair shops, photo studio, and other departments which were still in demand. Following the withdrawal of the check cashing service on September 21, checks were cashed on a restricted basis by the WRA finance office. Motion pictures were discontinued in early November 1945. The general store disposed of its stock via a clearance sale which lasted for more than a month, and the remainder was sold to vendors or jobbers. Thus, the Cooperative membership took only a small loss in liquidating its stock. The administrative offices were closed per resolution of the Congress of Delegates on November 15, and the books, records, and office were transferred to Los Angeles where the remaining business negotiations were to be concluded.

**Patronage Rebates**

During the period from May 24 to October 1, 1942, when Manzanar Consumer Enterprises operated the center’s canteen, a total of nearly $40,000 had accumulated as undivided profits. After the Cooperative took over Consumer Enterprises on October 1, it was determined to apply this amount toward paid up memberships to all evacuee residents of the center who were 16 years of age and over. This decision, together with future rebates to be declared, was more than sufficient to give the 7,000 adult residents at Manzanar their membership certificates. Additional rebates were declared periodically and paid in the form of cash orders and/or free services redeemable at any of the Cooperative.
branches. The total rebates for the three years that the Cooperative was in business amounted to more than $150,000.

Following April 1, 1945, no further rebates were declared in anticipation of liquidating Cooperative costs and losses. As of November 13, nearly $7,000 remained in the reserve fund to meet the costs of liquidation. The balance, after all liabilities were met, was to be donated at the discretion of the three trustees to a charitable or philanthropic organization.

Services

When Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises took over the business on October 1, 1942, its administrative offices were housed in one barrack in Block 1. Its services included a canteen located in one barrack in Block 8, a fish market in the ironing room of Block 8, and a general store in one barrack in Block 21. In addition, the Manzanar Free Press was subsidized, and motion picture showings were conducted for camp residents. In late 1942, an outdoor theater was constructed in the firebreak between Blocks 20 and 21 with funds provided by the Cooperative for showing of motion pictures free of charge. During October, the Cooperative established check cashing services in its administrative offices in Block 1, a barber shop in the ironing room of Block 21, a beauty parlor in the ironing room of Block 15, and a mail order service in the ironing room of Block 10.

In January 1943, a shoe repair shop and laundry services were opened in the ironing room of Block 10. Because the work involved in going to the block laundry rooms to wash clothes took more effort than some residents were capable of, or willing to undertake, the WRA had made arrangements with a commercial laundry in a neighboring town to receive work from Manzanar. Because of the inability of the commercial laundry to continue its service and the diminishing amount of work to be done, the laundry at Manzanar was closed in February 1945.

In April 1943, a photo studio was opened in the ironing room of Block 30. All types of photographs were desired by the evacuees, and commercial photographers seldom came to the camp. Cameras were not allowed in the hands of the evacuees at Manzanar except toward the end of the camp's existence. Thus, the Cooperative established a photo studio to centralize photographic services. It became necessary to pro-rate the appointments among the blocks so that all persons would have an opportunity to have photographs taken. The charges were nominal and the service provided by Toyo Miyatake, who had operated a photographic studio in Los Angeles prior to evacuation, was considered "excellent." The studio performed all the work for the school annuals as well as a considerable amount for WRA administrators.

In May 1943, an American Express Company travelers check and money order service was opened in the Cooperative's administrative office in Block 1 to meet the growing needs of those relocating from the center or going out on other types of leave. To meet the demand for artificial flowers for special occasions and sporting goods for the expanding athletic programs at Manzanar, a flower shop and a sporting goods shop were opened in Block 16 in May 1943, and a watch repair shop was established in the ironing room of Block 10. In April 1944, a sewing/dressmaking shop was opened in the ironing room of Block 32. At first, no private sewing machines or other personal equipment were allowed in the center,
and the WRA did not provide sewing equipment. Later, however, evacuees were allowed to have their sewing equipment sent to them, and the WRA set up sewing machines in each block under the supervision of the block managers. These machines, however, did not take care of the instances when sewing was performed for hire. The Cooperative sewing shop did not last long; however, because seamstresses could make more money by sewing privately, and customers could save accordingly. The shop was unable to survive the competition presented by "private enterprise."

In May 1944, a gift shop was opened in one barrack in Block 16. Many arts-and-crafts items were made by evacuees in their quarters or in the shops or classes established throughout the center. Because all private enterprise was to be carried on through the Cooperative, a need arose for establishing a shop where such items could be sold at uniform prices. As a result, the gift shop was opened. Makers of articles consigned their products to the shop which established a 15 percent mark-up plus sales tax. However, many makers and buyers resented this 15 percent mark-up and the sales tax when the same or similar articles could be bought on the Manzanar "black market" minus both charges. The gift shop continued to lose money and was finally turned over to the community activities section in December 1944 and operated under a license from the Cooperative. Articles sold in the shop included getas, zoris, embroidery, needle work, sweaters, hand-made clothing, novelties, toys, furniture, water and oil prints, and pencil sketches.

A private employment services unit was opened in the administrative office in Block 1 in June 1944. From the outset, there was demand by evacuees for private employment of evacuees for personal services such as laundry, sewing, and child care. Appointed personnel also desired to employ evacuees for household duties, including cooking, child care, and other personal services. At first, no controls were exercised over this employment in terms of work hours or compensation. Eventually, however, the consumer enterprises division in the Washington office issued instructions that all private employment be channeled through the Cooperative and that wages were to conform to those paid for comparable services in neighboring communities. The worker, however, would receive only the regular WRA wage and clothing allowance. The balance of the pay would be retained by the Cooperative to supplement its profits. These instructions were met with widespread opposition and non-compliance, and six months after its inauguration the plan was officially discontinued. 63

INTERNAL SECURITY

Appointed Personnel

On December 10, 1942, four days after the outbreak of violence at Manzanar, the WRA regional director in San Francisco authorized the employment of ten additional Caucasian men to be employed on the center's internal security force. These men were recruited locally as rapidly as possible, and by January 1943 they were working at the center. Several of the recruits were installed as police officers, but most were served as temporary

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63. Unless otherwise noted, material for this section was drawn from "Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises Inc., Final Report, Manzanar, Vol. III, pp. 665-748, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

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guards. They were permitted to carry sidearms while patrolling the warehouses and appointed personnel living areas. Most of the guards were later terminated and replaced by men "who were better qualified for the work."

On April 21, 1943, John W. Gilkey, the acting chief internal security officer, was made the chief internal security officer. By May 1943, the center's police force had secured five additional Caucasian internal security officers and seven guards. Officers and guards worked in eight-hour shifts and provided 24-hour coverage to the center. One guard was assigned to the telephone switchboard from midnight to 8:00 A.M., while another guard was assigned to the main gate where he issued passes and checked admissions into the center. Other guards patrolled the center and its perimeter as well as the appointed personnel living area. Guards duplicated the patrols of the evacuee police, "watching for fires and endeavoring to prevent crime."

One of the principal problems encountered in recruiting appointed personnel for the internal security positions was to find qualified men who met the job description. They were to have several years of police experience, plus training in a recognized police school, or a training period in the police department of a war relocation center. Often appointments had to be made in which men lacked one or more of the required qualifications, and the WRA was forced to ask the Civil Service Commission to lower the qualifications for appointment.

Retention of appointed personnel internal security officers was difficult, because ex-police officers often terminated when they could not adapt themselves to conditions in the center. At times, men joined the section with the idea that they were going to "push a bunch of Japs around." When they found that this was not permitted at Manzanar, they terminated. The "type of men wanted, and who were finally obtained, were such as could adapt themselves to a program of crime-prevention, who could learn to work with a minority group, and who, at the same time, could be satisfied with the grind of patrol duties."

All Caucasian appointed personnel police officers attended meetings and classes that were organized to assist them in better understanding the type of police work required in a relocation center. They were also "drilled" in WRA regulations and local county ordinances. Soon it became unnecessary to duplicate the patrols of the evacuee police, and thereafter appointed and evacuee personnel "worked in closer harmony on the force."

In December 1944, the associate chief of internal security segregated to Tule Lake. He was replaced by one of the appointed internal security officers, a retired policeman from Los Angeles. On November 1, 1945, besides the chief and his associate, five internal security officers remained on the force. Two of these men were trained police officers, one was a discharged military police officer, one had been trained at Manzanar first as a guard and later as an internal security officer, and the fifth had worked as a guard in Los Angeles defense plants and had trained with the Los Angeles Police Department.
Evacuee Police

At the time of the outbreak of violence at Manzanar on December 6, 1942, Manzanar had 82 evacuees on its internal police force, including three policewomen and three secretaries. The department was divided into three shifts, an office detail, and an investigation unit. The patrolmen wore armbands to identify them as police officers, while the investigators wore plain clothing.

During the afternoon of the violence, nearly all the evacuee police personnel remained on duty, but by the evening, when the trouble flared into shooting, only six men remained on the job. A few of the younger members of the police department had to be removed from the center to Death Valley for protective purposes. On the morning of December 7, no evacuee police reported for duty.

Some of the evacuee officers expressed a desire to return to duty prior to December 26, 1942, the date of the general return to work by all evacuee personnel. These officers held a meeting and decided to return to duty as soon as the residents of the center expressed a "vote of confidence in them as police." The block managers met at Town Hall during which "a vote of confidence was given to the police department."

Reorganization of the Police Department

In late December 1942, a plan to reorganize the police department was presented to the block managers. The WRA authorities recommended that each block be represented in the police department by at least one man, and that the block managers give to the department the names of the men they desired to serve as police officers. If the man nominated qualified as a police officer, he would be placed on the payroll. Shortly after January 1, 1943, the police department "was completely reorganized with most of the officers on the original force being retained." The detective section, however, became known as "investigators," and were required to wear uniforms or other means of identification.

An advisory council was established, consisting of 14 of the older men in the department. This group served in an advisory capacity to the chief internal security officer and the evacuee chief of police. The advisory council functioned in the department to settle internal misunderstandings and dissension and served as "go-between in family troubles, minor disturbances within the Center, and wherever arbitration was required."

The advisory council conducted hearings whenever an evacuee was recommended for dismissal after which it issued a recommendation for dismissal or probation. The chief reasons for discharge were failure to obey orders of superior officers, failure to cooperate with fellow officers, and "making trouble."

In January 1943, the police instructional school reopened, continuing until early 1945. Policemen completed courses in fingerprinting, investigation, laws and procedures of arrest, and regulations and laws of the State of California and Inyo County. Traffic control classes were held for selected groups of patrolmen. After March 1945, new men were trained by older members in the department. In June 1943, the policewomen, who were
...arily engaged in investigating family problems, were transferred to the welfare section, when "it was found that the work they had been doing could be handled better" by that section.

In December 1943, the officers of the internal security section asked for another election. Because of "political dissension," however, the advisory council urged the chief of internal security to submit names to Project Director Merritt with the request that he appoint an evacuee chief of police and evacuee supervisors for the department. This plan eliminated "the need for elections and the politics that go with elections." The appointments made by Merritt "were a complete success," according to the Final Report, Manzanar, "because the Project Director had made them, for by this time residents of the Center were more than willing to follow the Project Director's every suggestion."

In March 1944, the internal police department was reorganized again at the "request of the personnel of the department." The chief of internal security was "given complete supervision over the evacuee officers." Thereafter, orders were issued directly to the sergeant of a shift or to the investigators without going through the evacuee chief. The position of evacuee chief was eliminated, and the evacuee who held this title was transferred to the investigators' section and given the rank of captain.

As the center population became smaller during 1943-45, the number of personnel on the police force was gradually reduced. Appointed personnel on the force averaged approximately ten during 1943-45. In January 1943, the evacuee police force was nearly 80, but by January 1944 the size of the force had been reduced to approximately 50. In January 1945, there were 37 evacuee men on the force, but by October 1945 only 12 men remained in the department. By November 1, two evacuees were left on the payroll and these terminated within the first week of that month. When evacuee officers terminated for relocation, they were given an identification card "which the men were proud to have as it represented a token of their service in Manzanar."

After the evacuee police left the center, appointed personnel continued to "give the kind of service which the residents had learned to expect." During the closing period, "extra guarding of warehouses became necessary to prevent fire and theft, and unwanted animals were disposed of by shooting and gassing."

Facilities and Equipment

During 1942-43, the Manzanar police department used three half-ton former Civilian Conservation Corps trucks for "sergeant's patrol and emergency calls." Better vehicles were secured by the end of 1943, and by the end of 1944, the police were using sedans for patrol. These autos were also used to escort residents in the center and assist the relocation office with departing evacuees.

In late December 1944, call boxes, installed for the use of the camp's Fire Department, were placed at the service of the police for emergencies. Although these boxes aided the police force, they did not "answer the need of a signal system" that the department had requested as early as 1943. Thus, the "usual way to contact a man was by driving through the Center, locating the officer wanted, and giving the information required."
A jail had been built at the rear of the main office in the police station in 1942. It consisted of a room 20 feet square in which was installed a double tank, rented from the sheriff of Inyo County. In 1943, wire mesh was placed over the windows of the room. While adequate for overnight prisoners or for those awaiting trial, the jail was far "from suitable to take care of prisoners serving terms." Thus, space was arranged for such prisoners in the county jail in Independence beginning in 1943.

Police officers were permitted to carry clubs while on patrol. The only other weapon permitted the entire force was a sidearm carried by the chief internal security officer, although it was never "necessary to use either clubs or firearms." Judo holds were sometimes used by evacuee police to make arrests.

Police uniforms had first been introduced in November 1942. As produced by the camp's sewing factory, the uniforms consisted of a wine-colored shirt and green pants. Caps were ordered from a mail-order house, and badges were purchased from a Los Angeles badge company.

Although many of the uniforms "fitted poorly," they were used until the fall of 1944, when new uniforms were donated by the block managers. The new uniforms consisted of khaki pants and shirts to match the caps purchased in 1942.

**Police Program**

**Public Relations.** During 1942, the evacuees at Manzanar had shown reluctance to make reports to the center's police force. Policemen were generally looked down upon and were often referred to as "dogs" and "stool pigeons." A few policemen were "beaten up" when off duty. Cooperation from the residents was "completely lacking, and when the police worked with the FBI and other outside agencies, popular feeling ran especially high."

Thus, it was "realized that this fear, resentment, and lack of cooperation must be broken down and corrected before law enforcement could be made an effective reality."

Following the violence on December 6, 1942, the Judicial Council was eliminated, and Project Director Merritt "took over the job of handling the Project court." Sentences currently being served in Manzanar's jail were converted to probation, jail space was rented from the office of the Inyo County sheriff, and all subsequent sentences were served there. Thereafter, sentences to the jail were never for more than 60 days, and most averaged about ten days. Cases were generally decided by probation and suspended sentences. The project director's court soon became known "as being a fair and impartial one with the residents quite satisfied as to the way it was run."

During 1943, the police department undertook activities to regain the confidence of the people. Police officers called on residents and introduced themselves, offering their services. They began delivering telegrams and messages to the residents, calling them on the telephone, picking up and loading baggage for furlough workers, and escorting evacuee teachers who were working late at night to their homes. Evacuee and appointed police gave lectures in the center's schools and block meetings. Older members of the department began to act as arbitrators in family disputes and neighborhood arguments and to settle minor disturbances out of court. Ambulance calls from 5:00 P.M. to 8:00 A.M.
were covered by the internal security section. In 1944, for instance, the police carried out the following "small services" for the camp residents: car escorts — 3,464; telephone calls — 369; telegram delivery — 905; message delivery — 3,270; and picking up/delivery of baggage — 2,940.

Gradually, the evacuees began to rely on the police "for all types of assistance." More and more people came to the police "with their problems and troubles." Block managers and others would sometimes warn police of anticipated trouble, whereupon the police would attempt to prevent the trouble from developing.

During 1943-45, the police continued their efforts to stem juvenile delinquency by referring most cases to the welfare section. If a juvenile had to appear before the project court for a hearing, the session would be closed with the parents present to assist in any corrective plans that were determined. The police continued their efforts at crime prevention by assisting community activities and promoting recreational programs that were "directed toward guiding the young people of the Center." The greatest accomplishment of the internal security section was "gaining the confidence of the residents of Manzanar."

Appointed personnel also worked to establish cooperative relationships with outside police authorities, such as the Inyo County sheriff's office, "which harbored resentment against the whole WRA program." The chief internal security officer and his assistant called on the sheriff to offer assistance. They conducted classes in photography and criminal investigation in the sheriff's office, assisted the sheriff in collecting evidence after several murders occurred in the county, and hired two local men who had previously worked for the sheriff. Assistance given to local officers in serving civil papers and provided to the FBI and others with business in the center.

**Animal Shelter.** The police department maintained and supervised an animal shelter built in July 1943 "to care for or dispose of sick and unwanted animals." Prior to this time, it was not "uncommon for passing motorists to dump their animals on the highway near Manzanar and trust to their being taken care of by the residents." Disposal of these unwanted animals presented problems, until the police were given responsibility over all animals in the center. Several months prior to construction of the animal shelter, a police officer was assigned the task of animal regulation, and a set of animal regulations, adapted from the Palo Alto Humane Society Handbook was prepared. Between May 1 and 15, 1943, all dogs in the center were to be licensed free of charge, and a small metal disk containing a number was issued to the owner to be fastened to the neck of the dog by use of a collar. Block managers notified police when unwanted animals appeared in their blocks. These and other unclaimed animals were disposed of at the animal shelter "through the use of a carbon-monoxide gas chamber." With the cooperation of the health section, all dogs were inoculated for rabies and distemper. The hospital reported cases of animal bites to the police, whereupon the biting animal was picked up and impounded for ten days of observation. After examination by the health section for rabies, the animal, if considered safe, was returned to his owner. If considered dangerous or diseased, the animal was put to death.

**Safety Proceedings.** The Manzanar Safety Council held regular monthly meetings and made recommendations to Project Director Merritt for safety rules and regulations in the
center. The associate chief of internal security was the first appointed personnel member to serve on this council, and he participated in it for two years.

A traffic control program was commenced in March 1943. Following traffic surveys, traffic control signs were installed, indicating speed limits, schools and hospital zones, and stop signs. With a few minor changes, the 1941 California Vehicle Code was accepted as the law for regulating vehicular traffic. The maximum speed limit allowed in the center was 20 miles per hour, except for school and hospital zones where it was set at ten miles per hour. WRA drivers' licenses were required for all drivers, examinations being handled through the motor pool supervisors.

The traffic control program resulted in slower driving and fewer accidents in the center. When an accident occurred, it was investigated by the police who made reports to the survey board and the project director. After being cited for a traffic violation, the offender appeared in the project court. Court hearings resulted in fines, license suspension, or suspended sentences.

Patrolling. During 1942-43, the police patrolled the center on foot with "check-ups" by the patrol sergeant in a car. As men became less available during 1944 and 1945, patrol cars supplemented foot patrols. Constant patrols were maintained at all times in sections of the camp that had the most trouble and violations.

Manzanar evacuees "found it a relaxation and pleasure to wander outside the 'mile-square' Center and into the rest of the [relocation] area where they could build fires for picnics." At times, children ventured out to the farm areas where they interfered with agricultural and irrigation work. Thus, the police "outlined two picnic grounds in some groves, made a number of trails and posted signs" to provide designated recreational spots. The public works section built fireplaces and provided caretakers for the picnic grounds. Picnics and fires were not allowed except in the two designated picnic areas.

Recreational regulations were issued by the center's police force. Persons going to picnic areas were required to present a block manager's pass, or if it was a group of persons, a pass from Town Hall. All picnic parties were to use the west gate on the perimeter of the residential area. The gate guard checked and picked up the passes when the picnickers left the residential area. When they returned, the passes were given back to them for return to Town Hall or to the block managers. A report was made to the chief of internal security if people had not returned to the center by closing time. The motor pool provided transportation for food and to small children and the aged and infirm who had passes to go to the picnic areas.

Persons going to the swimming pool were to use the north or west gates on the perimeter of the residential area, but they had to leave and enter through the same gate. The swimming and wading pool could be used from 1:00 P.M. to 4:30 P.M. on week days and from 9:00 A.M. to 4:30 P.M. on Sundays when a lifeguard was on duty. The pool was reserved for men on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday until 1:00 P.M. Women could use the pool on Thursday and Sunday afternoons from 2:00 P.M. to 4:30 P.M. Children under the age of eight could not use the pool, unless accompanied by an older member of the family. The pool was closed in 1945, because lifeguards were no longer available.
To leave the residential area for work purposes, farm and maintenance crews had a blanket pass held by the foreman of the crew, while each member had a badge. The gate guard checked the pass number, made certain that each member of the crew had a badge, both for leaving and entering the gate, and counted the number of men on the trucks. Farm crews were provided white badges, while maintenance crews had red badges. A blue work badge was issued to men and crews that left the area via the east gate for work projects outside the relocation area.

To enforce the regulations in the picnic areas, the police department established a mounted patrol, for which the horses were rented and later purchased. The evacuee mounted patrol covered a beat of about 10 miles per day. On holidays and Sundays, when large crowds were expected, extra police were assigned to the picnic grounds.

**Investigations and Arrests.** Police investigations were generally conducted by older evacuee police officers, working under the direction of the chief internal security officer. Exceptions to this rule, however, were made for investigations connected with the violence on December 6, 1942, the FBI, military registration, and immigration officials, all of which were handled by appointed personnel officers. During the military registration, the Army reported to the police the names of evacuees who made threats. Caucasian officers, assisted by other appointed personnel, made immediate arrests, and the troublemakers were removed from the center. Arrests were generally made in the middle of the night without incident. Segregation of evacuees to Tule Lake presented few problems or incidents for the police.

Written reports were prepared by the officers making the case investigations. Evacuee police wrote their own reports, but appointed personnel were assigned to follow up the cases to insure that they had been handled properly.

Arrests were made by both evacuee and appointed personnel. No arrest "was made unless a person was 'caught in the act' or unless a warrant had been issued." Warrants were not issued "without a complete investigation, and a high degree of certainty that the person named in the warrant was the true offender." As a result, the person "charged generally pleaded guilty and was ready for punishment." There are no records "of a person so charged being found 'not guilty.'"

**Relocation Office Assistance.** The internal security section assisted the relocation office not only by checking the evacuees in and out of the center but also by preparing identification cards for furlough workers and others. The department took photographs and fingerprints of all evacuees who left the center during 1943 and 1944. Evacuee baggage was picked up at the barracks and loaded into trucks and buses, and the evacuees were escorted to the gate clerk's office by police cars. When evacuees returned to the center from leaves or furloughs, they and their baggage were taken home by evacuee police.

During 1944, a "new problem" was presented to the police "in the return to the Center of evacuees who had gone out on visits." At first, the police checked visitors in and out of the main gate, collected money for meals, and notified the records office of arrivals and departures. Later, the fiscal department collected money for meals, and the records office installed clerks at the main gate to check arrivals and departures. However, the police still
kept a record and maintained control over all motor vehicles that entered the center. Motor vehicles were grounded at the police station upon their arrival in the center. Automobiles were not released to evacuees until they left the center.

Violations

With the exception of battery (and battery only during 1942 and 1943), violations of law at Manzanar were infrequent. The type of person involved in battery cases "was the first to relocate, for in general he was the kind who did not like restriction and could not get along with other people."

While all violations of law were brought to the attention of the project director, most were taken care of by the police and without a trial in the project court. Acting as arbitrators, the police were "often better able to handle such cases especially when they were matters of threatened disturbance or family and neighborhood misunderstandings." The method used by the police was "to talk with the disturbers of the peace and in some cases to give a police probation to them." For instance, in a traffic case involving juvenile offenders, the "boys were given a book on traffic investigation," "ordered to study it," and "write a paper on accident investigation."

Several "unlovely types of private business" which persisted at Manzanar despite law enforcement efforts to eliminate them were gambling and the manufacture and sale of liquor. To a lesser extent, there were "occasional charges of prostitution," but there was little evidence "that immorality, especially for hire," was "a grave issue" in the camp. Some individuals in the camp, according to the community analyst, made "a rather good living by gambling." This form of private enterprise was difficult to cope with "because the laws of the State of California" were "exceedingly mild and the "Project Director's authority" was the "sole instrumentality in dealing with the matter." The manufacture and sale of liquor, "usually rice wine and brandy," posed continuing problems for the police. Brandy, especially, brought high prices among the evacuees. While it was probably impossible to eliminate such traffic entirely, the police made efforts to keep it from getting "out of hand."

Violation of the center's rules against intoxication generally resulted in project court "probations for the first offense." For the second and subsequent offenses, however, sentences to the county jail were given.

The project regulation that was hardest to prevent was that of "going out of bounds, or, in other words, the act of leaving the Center without a proper pass." According to the Final Report, Manzanar, the "attraction of the mountains for hiking and climbing, the nearby creeks for fishing — not to mention the satisfaction gained from going outside of the Center for a while — were all great temptations to many of the residents." This was "true even when the Military Police were stationed in towers guarding the Center with guns and searchlights." The punishment prescribed by the project court was "generally to be put

on probation." Much "attention was given to publicity against this form of conduct, but in spite of all that could be done to prevent it, the 'out of bound' violation never completely stopped.'

The total number of cases which were reported to the Manzanar police from September 1942 to November 1945 was 1,285 (there had been 136 arrests prior to September 1942). Of this total, 186 cases were pending at the time of the center's closure, while 1,099 had been closed. A total of 238 persons were arrested in cases arising during this period. These cases were classified as follows:

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CHAPTER TWELVE: OPERATION OF MANZANAR — JANUARY 1943 — NOVEMBER 1945

Class IV (Continued)

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<td>Mental cases</td>
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<tr>
<td>All cases not listed above</td>
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FIRE PROTECTION

During 1943-45, fire protection services at Manzanar continued to be provided by three platoons of 16 evacuee men each under the direction of an appointed fire protection officer and an assistant fire protection officer. An evacuee fire chief and an assistant evacuee fire chief supervised the three platoons. Until January 2, 1945, the three platoons rotated on an 8-hour schedule. After that date, they went on 24-hour duty, with off-duty periods of 48 hours. Each platoon consisted of one captain, one assistant captain, and 14 firemen. The average number of firemen on regular duty during 1943 was 34, and in 1944 the average number was 40. During both years, the number of volunteer fire fighters was 34.

The camp fire department also had seven fire inspectors, each assigned to a certain portion of the camp to ensure fire safety regulations were employed. The fire inspectors were responsible directly to the fire protection officer. The chief hazards that the inspectors looked for were pennies that had been inserted behind burned-out fuses, homemade electric cookers, frayed or worn extension cords, line overloads, papers or other combustibles stored in or beneath dwellings, and carelessness in places where public assemblies were conducted. The inspectors also supervised the fire drills in the elementary and high schools and gave fire prevention talks in the recreation and mess halls. Each day the platoons were taken out for drill and instruction supervised by the fire protection officer or his assistant.

On April 3, 1943, a Dodge fire truck was delivered to the center. The truck had a pump capacity of 500 gallons per minute and carried 1,200 feet of 2 1/2-inch and 200 feet of 1 1/2-inch fire hose and 150 feet of 1-inch booster tank hose with nozzle. Shortly thereafter, the motor pool provided a 1/2-ton pick-up truck that carried 1,000 feet of 2 1/2-inch hose with nozzles. These two trucks, in addition to the Ford pumper acquired in 1942, permitted the laying of at least five lines of 2 1/2-inch fire hose at major fires.

The total number of fires reported at Manzanar between July 1, 1942, and June 30, 1945, was 91. Of this total, 18 occurred in the mess halls, 27 in the barracks, 17 in the service buildings, and 21 were grass/brush fires. Building damage was estimated to be $6,819, contents damage was $16,096, private loss was $2,993, and government loss was $19,982.

65. Unless otherwise noted, material for this section was drawn from "Internal Security Section," Final Report, Manzanar, Vol. III, pp. 911-62, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 72, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."
On July 28, 1944, Manzanar's only large fire occurred, destroying warehouses 33, 34, and 35. Origin of the fire was never determined, and the total government loss incurred was $20,632, with $1,581 in additional loss to evacuees who had power and hand carpentry tools stored in the warehouses. The fire was not discovered until flames billowed through the roof. A still alarm preceded the telephoned alarm by several minutes.

All off-duty firemen reported for work, and volunteers were numerous "but of little help, because of a strong south wind which drove the flames toward block 4 and the several blocks in line with it." Evacuees living in the endangered blocks sprinkled their own roofs, while block fire brigades, which had been formed by the block managers at the recommendation of the fire protection officer the year before, wet down roofs of nearby warehouses 16, 17, and 18 and assisted the residents of Block 4 in wetting the roofs of their barracks. Some 1,200 feet of 2 1/2-inch and 150 feet of 1-inch hose were laid at the scene of the fire. All available equipment at the center was on hand for use. In August 1945, the evacuee fire protection force at Manzanar had declined to such a low point that two Caucasian experienced fire fighters were employed to bolster "the dwindling force of evacuee firemen, many of whom were new on the job because of rapid turnover." During the next several months, two additional Caucasians, who had neither previous fire fighting training nor experience, were hired. In September 1945, a new schedule was arranged whereby two platoons, each headed by an assistant fire protection officer and consisting of two fire fighters and such volunteers from the appointed personnel as could be on hand in the event of fire, served 24 hours on duty followed by 24 hours off duty. By November 1, all evacuee firemen had relocated, thus leaving fire protection for the camp in the hands of the hired fire fighters and volunteers from the appointed personnel who continued to receive weekly drills.

COMMUNITY WELFARE

Early in 1943, the center's administrative organization was reorganized with the community welfare section being placed in the division of community management. In addition to the work the section had carried on prior to that time (as discussed in Chapter Ten of this study), welfare took over administration of marriages, funerals, transfers between centers, liaison responsibility between the administration and the center's churches, supervision of the Manzanar Red Cross unit, YMCA and YWCA activities (including the organization's clubhouses and dormitories), housing, and "certain kinds of visits between centers." The welfare section continued clothing allowances, public assistance grants, and family counseling. Ashes of cremated persons were received and held by the welfare section pending building "of columbaria in the churches."

According to the Final Report, Manzanar, the year 1943 "was characterized by stabilization of Center life in general, Welfare working on family counseling, housing, clothing allowances and grants, and particularly on transferees between centers." The registration

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66. Edwin H. Hooper, Chairman of Board of Survey to D. S. Myer, Director, War Relocation Authority, August 18, 1944, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 214, File No. 11.134, "Board of Survey, Manzanar."

67. Unless otherwise noted, material for this section was drawn from "Fire Protection Section," Final Report, Manzanar, Vol. IV, pp. 1,081-1,100, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 73, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."
program, followed by Kibei, segregation and leave clearance hearings (These topics are covered more fully in Chapter 14 of this study.), continued throughout the year "with referral of special family problem cases to Welfare." The work of the welfare section necessitated voluminous record-keeping, and by July 1, 1943, a permanent system of records and monthly reports had been established.68

Community Hostel

From the earliest days at Manzanar, the welfare section had proposed construction of a hostel in which blind, aged, and infirm persons could be placed. Most of these persons had no relatives, and, in most cases, although needing medical supervision, they did not require hospitalization.

In February 1943, the Washington office authorized conversion of one barrack next to the hospital into a community hostel. The barrack was converted into a unit for attendant care of chronic patients. Four private rooms and two large dormitory rooms were constructed with two baths, toilets, a small diet kitchen, and one entrance room. The hostel was supervised by the principal medical officer, and its staff was placed on the hospital’s payroll. Case work and grants-in-aid for the hostel’s occupants were conducted jointly by the medical social worker and the welfare counseling aides.

Personnel and Office Space

During 1942, the welfare staff was limited to one appointed counselor. The following year, one assistant counselor and one junior counselor were added. During 1944 and 1945, additional appointed staff positions, ranging between 9 and 19 from August 1944 to October 1945, were authorized to cover the family counseling and temporary assistance programs related to relocation, a topic which is discussed more fully in Chapter 15 of this study.69

In addition to the appointed personnel, the welfare section had a large evacuee staff, since the majority of the section’s work was conducted by evacuees. At its peak, the welfare evacuee staff numbered approximately 140 persons, who served as clerical personnel, counseling aides, and supervisors of the Children’s Village.

The office space for the section expanded from a single room with benches and tables in July 1942 to space equivalent to about two barracks in 1945 scattered throughout the center. The Children’s Village comprised three barracks adjacent to the hospital.


69. Ibid., pp. 487-618.
Inter-Camp Transfers

At the time of evacuation, many families were separated because members were living in different evacuation zones. Thus, the WRA made attempts to reunite such families, when the families requested it. Efforts were undertaken to include members of immediate families, dependent parents, married children where the social and economic connections had "been very close," and in some cases more distant relatives. Requests to be transferred were initiated by the family through the welfare section by filling out and signing Form No. 149. Transfers, which were handled through the welfare section, were numerous "through 1942 and reached their peak in 1944." Until the summer of 1944, the time of one evacuee counselor and one stenographer "were completely taken up with transfers."

The first large group of transfers to another relocation center occurred on February 24, 1943, when 181 persons were transferred from Manzanar to the Minidoka War Relocation Center near Twin Falls, Idaho. Although the vast majority of the residents at Manzanar had come from the Los Angeles area, the entire Japanese American population on Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound near Seattle, consisting primarily of strawberry farmers and rural entrepreneurs, had been evacuated to Manzanar because the Puyallup Assembly Center was not ready to take them. Arriving at Manzanar on April 1, 1942, the Bainbridge people had been quartered in Block 3. These people had never felt at home in a center composed chiefly of urban southern Californians and asked to be moved to Minidoka, where other friends and acquaintances from their home state of Washington had been sent. The climate at Minidoka was more like what they were used to, and it was closer to the area from which they had been evacuated.  

Crystal City Family Internment Camp Transfers

The results of prolonged separation of families in cases involving the internment of family heads were recognized both by the WRA and the Department of Justice. As early as November 1942, inquiries were sent to Manzanar, requesting lists of families of interned members who expressed a desire to join interned family members in an internment camp, if such a camp were established by the Department of Justice. The welfare section was asked to prepare the list and to interview the families involved.

During the period from November 1942 to March 1944, when the last group of families left Manzanar for the Crystal City Family Internment Camp in Texas, families changed their minds, some of them several times. A total of 47 families, comprising 131 persons, originally applied for transfer. The head of the family at Manzanar, as well as each child over 14 years of age, was interviewed "to allow for free personal decisions." A family summary was prepared for each family by welfare section counselors. While families were considering the plan, some of the interned members were paroled to Manzanar, and thus the reunited family remained in the center.

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On June 2, 1943, eight families were transferred from Manzanar to Crystal City, and on March 5, 1944, an additional four families were transferred. In all, only twelve families, comprising 24 persons, were transferred.

Internees and Parolees

The internment of alien heads of families, sons, and in a few cases, of wives and mothers, in Department of Justice internment camps caused prolonged separation of families and was, according to the Final Report, Manzanar, "perhaps the most disturbing single factor in the evacuation program." Eight internment camps had been established at Fort Missoula, Montana; Santa Fe, New Mexico; Sharp Park, Colorado; Tuna Canyon, Tujunga, California; Kennedy, Crystal Park, and Seagoville, Texas; and Montreal, North Carolina. Most internees had been taken from their families suddenly during mass FBI raids in the wake of Pearl Harbor with "no chance for adjusting family and business problems." In some cases, internment had "entailed serious financial loss," and in a few cases "illness and mental instability had resulted."

The "fact that definite charges against the interned member could not be known to the family members involved, together with prolonged uncertainty about the future of the internees," was "very disturbing to family life and to morale in general" at Manzanar. Children were particularly affected, and deep resentment and bitterness often accompanied such cases.

Of the total evacuee population at Manzanar, 297 had been interned and were paroled to the center (with 31 actually released). Of this number, 290 were males and 7 were females. In most cases, only one family member had been interned, but in a few cases there were two or more. Approximately 10 percent of the population in the center were members of families in which a member was interned. Of the 297 paroled to Manzanar, 48 were later segregated to Tule Lake, ten were transferred to other centers, and six died. Twenty-eight of those interned had sons in the U.S. Army.

Internees were paroled to Manzanar following completion of hearings conducted by the Department of Justice. If approved for parole, the internees had to obtain formal acceptance from the relocation center before they could rejoin their families. Parolees arrived at Manzanar at periodic intervals, although no "one could be certain when hearings would take place." Months of waiting were involved, and in a few cases family members were allowed to visit interned members. In a "very few cases, where serious illness or death occurred in a family, the interned member was allowed to visit the Center while parole was still pending."

In considering the advisability of accepting a paroled member in the center, upon notice from the Department of Justice that the interned was eligible for parole, the welfare section interviewed the family at Manzanar. In most cases, the family was eager for the interned member to come to Manzanar, but in a few cases, there were family reasons which made this inadvisable. Some wives had become involved with other men during the separation from their husbands. In some cases, this development was discovered before the husband returned, but sometimes it was the duty of the welfare section to help the family clear up these relationships after arrival.
On August 22, 1944, the Department of Justice issued a ruling making provision for cancellation of parole status. This program appealed to many parolees, because special permits were required for parolees to relocate, and cancellation of parole status removed the stigma attached to such persons. After a parolee applied under this program, the Department of Justice contacted the relocation center for an extensive "summary based on the record of the parolee since he had come to Manzanar." The welfare section, working closely with the project attorney’s office, prepared about 75 summaries. Lengthy waiting periods ensued, and many parolees did not receive replies to their petitions before relocating. Many decisions were still pending at the time of the closing of Manzanar, and a directive from the Department of Justice for general release of paroled aliens was received after the closing of the center on November 21, 1945.

Children’s Village

Harry and Lillian Matsumoto, evacuees appointed as superintendent and assistant superintendent of the Children’s Village when it was established opposite Block 29 in June 1942, served in that capacity until July 1944. Eva M. Robbins, assistant counselor at the Jerome War Relocation Center, was transferred to Manzanar to become superintendent in July 1944. Although she had many years of experience in the child welfare field and had supervised other children’s institutions, this assignment was her first experience with a group of children of Asian background. While she “found the children ‘real Americans,’” with reactions of the average institutional child, she also found them more than normally upset by the prospects of another wholesale transfer.” Accordingly, she “put forth every effort to insure private-home care for these institutionalized children who longed for ‘real homes.’” To help Robbins, Adele L. Moore was hired as assistant superintendent in November 1944. Although she came without professional child welfare training or institutional experience, she had taught school and had training and experience in adult social work. In May 1945, Moore replaced Robbins as superintendent when the latter was transferred to the community welfare office to spend more time on child welfare counseling in the center.

By June 30, 1942, Children’s Village had become the home of 62 children, aged one year to 19 years. The facility offered physical and medical care to the children, and provided for their social, recreational, and religious needs. Case work services were given every child “in an effort to know and meet the need for normal development and to give, as far as possible, an understanding to the child of his own position.” A case history was kept for each child, and children were discharged to parents, relatives, or to foster homes "as promptly as suitable plans could be completed."

In 1943, several applications came from other relocation centers, requesting long-term care for young infants, born out of wedlock to “school-girl” mothers. The WRA medical social service recommended these referrals to Manzanar as “the situations were most difficult to meet.” Because of limited staff, however, the Matsumotos and WRA personnel at Manzanar established a policy to accept no child under four months of age. Nevertheless, the urgency of these cases forced the Children's Village to accept babies at the age of three months. Arrangements for the care of small babies in the nursery were made, and eventually 11 babies were accepted.
After the original group of older children was discharged from the Children's Village, no
more boys and girls of high school age were accepted. As time passed, applications came
for younger and younger children, so that babies and youngsters gradually took the places
of children who were 17 and 18 years old. From September 1942 until the village closed in
September 1944 children admitted to the village included those from (1) orphanages who
had evacuated with relatives or others, (2) foster homes and broken homes, and (3)
families in relocation centers who required temporary care during illness of the mother or
other emergencies. Infants of unmarried mothers from hospitals and maternity homes in
other relocation centers were also sent to Manzanar for care.

After establishment of the Children's Village, eight children were admitted and six
discharged during the remaining months of 1942. As of December 31, 1942, the number of
children in the village was 64. During 1943, 21 children were admitted, and 28 were
discharged. The following year, 11 children, including one readmission, were taken in,
while 23 were discharged. In 1945, three children were readmitted, while 48 were
discharged before the village closed on September 21. Thirty-two of those discharged in
1945 left the village in August and September. Of the 101 individual children admitted to
the village during its operation, 48 were discharged to parents, two to other relatives, six
to foster parents, five to wage homes, ten to boarding homes, and 20 to institutions for
temporary care.

One of the emphases of the Children's Village program was the effort to reunite families.
As the boys and girls of the initial group finished high school, they were discharged from
the village to live with a parent, relative, or friend. Some, who received aid in securing
jobs in the eastern United States, relocated early.

Some children in the initial group had parents who had boarded them in the Japanese
Children's Home in Los Angeles prior to evacuation. Some of these parents and children
were separated during evacuation. Included in this group were six parents located in
other relocation centers, whose nine children were finally discharged from the village and
transferred to their parents in other centers. With one exception, this reuniting of families
was the only placement work done during 1942. A child whose plan for adoptive
placement had been started prior to evacuation was placed in January 1943.

The Children's Village undertook considerable efforts to find foster homes for its charges.
During December 1943, a series of conferences were held to clarify California adoption
laws in relation to the village. The State Department of Social Welfare assumed
responsibility for those adoption cases in California where the child was placed by the
parent and consent was given for adoption. The California Children's Home Society
consented to assume responsibility in cases where a parent wished to relinquish the child
for adoption in order to have a foster home found by an agency. Although several cases
were presented to the society, however, it was unable to find homes for the children. The
WRA attorney in the Washington office determined that the Children's Village only had
the legal "role of custodian of its children," and thus did not have "legal status to consent
to adoptions."

Despite the effort to find foster homes for the children, few families were found. The WRA
was promoting relocation for all evacuees, and a "great wave of insecurity was felt by
prospective foster parents within the Center, and few Japanese American families were
found who would then consider taking an added responsibility." Because California did not consider placing children "of mixed blood except with families of like mixture," an "additional handicap was experienced in placement work for ten of the children." Many letters of inquiry came from the eastern United States regarding possibilities of receiving a child from Children's Village, but "state law requirements for accepting an out-of-state child hindered many applicants." Complicating the process was the fact that there were requests for more "younger children than were available."

Placement planning for the children passed through three general procedures. Initially, individual contacts were conducted between the village superintendent and the relatives or prospective foster parents, with the Children's Home Society or the State Department of Social Welfare assuming legal responsibility. When area relocation offices were established in 1943, they were asked to assist by securing foster home studies of applicants through local child welfare agencies. The relocation officer assumed responsibility for securing approval of the child's acceptance and placement by the "receiving state" for placements outside California. Any placement from the center in California required consent from the Western Defense Command and the State Department of Social Welfare.

With lifting of the West Coast exclusion order on January 2, 1945, a third procedure was initiated. All village summaries were referred to the respective child welfare division of the state in which the child held legal residence, and that state, together with the county agency, accepted responsibility for placing the child. 71

EVACUEE PROPERTY

Establishment and Operation

During 1942 and early 1943 evacuee property concerns were handled at Manzanar by the legal division or the welfare section, although other sections occasionally were also involved. As time passed, however, it became clear to project administrators that a separate administrative office should be established to assist the evacuees with problems, such as storage and transportation of personal property, lease or sale of real or other property, collection of rents, and related issues.

The Federal Reserve Bank in San Francisco took charge of evacuee-owned personal property during the evacuation, and a considerable amount of this property was shipped to the project in 1942. The welfare section was provided a small crew of warehouse workers, and warehouse space was provided for storage of this property. The crew inventoried all property items, and delivered it to the evacuee owners whenever possible. The owners, however, had little room in their quarters, so a considerable amount remained in storage.

On February 13, 1943, an evacuee property officer was appointed at the camp, and offices for the new evacuee property section were established near the center's Administration Building. The officer reported directly to the assistant project director in charge of the administrative management division. The employees who had been employed by the welfare section to handle evacuee property, as well as the property records, were transferred to the new office. David S. Bromley became the evacuee property officer in January 1944 and remained at Manzanar until after the center closed.

A second office was established in a receiving and shipping warehouse under the supervision of an evacuee who would remain with the section until the fall of 1945. The section began operation with an evacuee crew of 14, but this staff gradually expanded until February 1944 when 44 evacuees were employed by the section. After the segregees were transferred to Tule Lake, the evacuee force was reduced to 22 and later to 13. Early in 1945, the staff was gradually increased as the relocation program progressed, reaching a final peak of 37 in midsummer of 1945.

Six warehouses were assigned to the section. Dead storage, such as the property shipped to the center by the Federal Reserve Bank, was kept in two warehouses. Three warehouses were used for receiving and shipping. One warehouse was used as a lumber storehouse, from which lumber was issued to relocating evacuees who crated their own property.

The evacuee property section, working closely with the project attorney’s office, offered advice when requested and assisted evacuees with property questions dealing with real estate, personal property, collections, sales, and shipping. Evacuees were assisted with preparation of forms needed to ship their property to government warehouses for storage or to have property removed from private storage to WRA warehouses, as well as with regard to requests for return of contraband from the Department of Justice. Approximately 85 percent of the cases were settled at Manzanar, but those cases which could not be closed at the center were referred to the San Francisco and Los Angeles field area offices for further attention.

Property Shipment

WRA authorities believed that more personal property had been shipped to Manzanar than other centers because it was situated nearer to the homes of most of the evacuees. Many families had all their furniture in their quarters in the camp, with the "possible exception of cooking ranges." Upon relocating, it was "not unusual for one family to have 60 or 70 crates of personal property to ship to their relocation point."

Most evacuee property was shipped from Manzanar warehouses via Western Truck Lines or the Pacific Motor Trucking Company, a subsidiary of the Southern Pacific Railroad that offered daily service. If shipment was made by rail in carload lots, the property was hauled to Lone Pine, either by government truck or by the Pacific Motor Trucking Company. After the railroad discontinued "door-to-door" delivery service, all shipments to California points were made via Western Truck Lines.

In late 1943 and early 1944, the evacuee property section had charge of the shipment of personal property and baggage for the more than 2,000 segregees who were transferred to
Evacuee Property

Tule Lake. As families were listed for transfer, the section checked on their needs for lumber and packing material and delivered this material to them. Three evacuee property crews were formed to call on each family, list their property on appropriate forms, and have the forms signed by the family head. Pick-up crews followed, accompanied by military police who inspected each crate for contraband, and delivered the property to assigned warehouses. As soon as property was stored in a warehouse, it was placed under military guard until the segregees and their property left the center. Personal baggage was picked up the day before the segregants were to leave, tagged, and placed in warehouses guarded by military police. On the morning of departure, this baggage was loaded on trucks and delivered to the Lone Pine train station by evacuee employees with special passes. After the segregants left, arrangements were made with Lyon Van and Storage Company to send three "expert car loaders" to Lone Pine to ensure full utilization of the freight cars.

Arrangements were made with Pacific Motor Trucking Company to haul the goods from Manzanar to Lone Pine train station. A crew of evacuee workers from Manzanar was sent to Lone Pine on special passes to assist in unloading the trucks. A carload a day was shipped for 17 days, reaching a total aggregate weight of 700,000 pounds.

Military Inspection

Until April 1944, all incoming shipments for evacuees were inspected by the military police, and any contraband articles were removed. The ruling on contraband was subject, in part, to the interpretation placed upon it by the commanding officer of the military police detachment at each relocation center. At Manzanar, for instance, kitchen knives and potato parers were confiscated. Sharp tools, such as hatchets and chisels, were taken, as were cameras and short-wave radios. As contraband was accumulated by the military police, it was boxed and shipped to the Lyon Van and Storage Company in Los Angeles, where it was stored for the Army. A complete record of confiscated contraband was kept after establishment of the evacuee property section. Late in 1944, when the government lifted most restrictions on contraband, the confiscated articles were returned to the WRA for distribution to the owners upon their request. Military inspection was discontinued in April 1944, and no more contraband was seized after that date.

Final Phases

After the exclusion orders were lifted on January 2, 1945, it was anticipated that a large number of evacuees would make plans to relocate to their former homes on west coast. A Manzanar planning committee was appointed to assist the evacuee property officer to arrange for the orderly movement of evacuee-owned property. This committee, which included the relocation officer, senior engineer, property control officer, and supply officer, developed plans for expediting the movement of property.

Additional evacuee personnel were hired, and a crating, or box-making, plant was established in a warehouse where all property would be crated preparatory to shipment. New forms were developed to tally itemized property picked up from evacuees'
residences and crated. The general rule was two boxes for three persons, but if a family indicated that it needed more they were issued additional boxes.

As the relocation program continued, it became increasingly difficult to obtain adequate evacuee help, thus making it necessary to issue lumber to individual evacuees so that they could do their own crating. The small crating crew crated property that belonged to sick relocatees or to women who were left in camp and unable to do their own crating. After all evacuee craters had relocated, a few Caucasian carpenters were employed to complete the job.

Individual evacuees were requested, whenever possible, to pick up their lumber and deliver their goods to the warehouses. Some borrowed trucks from various sections in the center to haul their lumber and deliver their property. Others, who were unable to do so, were asked to lock their belongings in their quarters, and leave the key with the evacuee property officer who would pick up their belongings as quickly as possible.

Finally, it became necessary to deliver truck loads of lumber to the block manager's offices. They in turn issued the lumber to evacuees in their blocks according to need.

The Terminal Islanders, located primarily in Blocks 9 and 10, presented special problems for the evacuee property section. Early in October 1945, the relocation office began negotiating for the mass movement of all Terminal Islanders to a single housing project in the Los Angeles area. On a Friday afternoon, the evacuee property officer was advised that this group must be prepared to move the following Tuesday morning to a temporary housing project at Long Beach. Since some 73 families were involved, the section was faced with the almost impossible task of getting all of the Terminal Islanders' property picked up and stored before they left.

The block managers and the evacuee property officer agreed that volunteer labor would pick up and deliver all goods to the if the WRA would furnish the trucks. Two mess halls were set aside for storage of the Terminal Islanders' belongings. Starting on Sunday noon, Terminal Island men turned out in masse and worked until 10:00 P.M. that night, finishing the work the next morning. When the evacuees had completed their work, two mess halls were "crammed full of property, all properly marked and numbered."

When the last evacuee departed from Manzanar on November 21, 1945, approximately 100 family lots of property which had not been picked up were still left in the barracks or warehouses. These lots were soon picked up, the work being completed in approximately two weeks.

The property of the Terminal Islanders, as well as that of other evacuees who left the center during its final months of operation, had not been weighed. After this was accomplished, letters were sent to the Terminal Island evacuees who had goods in project storage beyond the 60-day limit. By January 17, shipping instructions had been received on all but two of the 73 lots stored at Manzanar.

In January 1946, it was estimated that about 30 lots of property would have to be shipped from Manzanar to the government warehouse in Los Angeles, because of the inability of their owners to accept them. In addition, there were ten unidentified items, for the most
Evacuee Property

part of negligible value, and four small lots of property which had belonged to deceased evacuees without heirs, which would probably also be shipped to the warehouse.

Accomplishments

The evacuee property section at Manzanar handled a total of 1,260 cases relating to evacuee property during its three years of existence. These cases, which amounted to nearly $180,000, included sales of real (farm land, hotels and apartments, residences, stores and shops, and industrial property) and personal (farm machinery, automobiles, trucks, store fixtures and equipment, and household furniture) property, real estate leases (farm land, hotels and apartments, residences, stores and shops, and industrial property), debt adjustments, and collection of old accounts. A total of 3,080 lots of family goods were received at Manzanar, while 4,262 lots were shipped to relocation points and 796 lots were shipped to other relocation centers.  

CHAPTER TWELVE: OPERATION OF MANZANAR — JANUARY 1943 — NOVEMBER 1945

Photo 57: Sumiko Shigematsu, foreman of power sewing machine women, 1943; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.

Photo 58: Benji Igushi driving tractor, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.
Photo 59: Potato field, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.

Photo 60: Guayule field, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.
CHAPTER TWELVE: OPERATION OF MANZANAR — JANUARY 1943 — NOVEMBER 1945

Photo 61: Hog farm, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.

Photo 62: Oil storage tanks with school children, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.
Photo 63: Science lecture, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.

Photo 64: Third grade class, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Francis Stewart, February 10, 1943; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.
Photo 65: Dancing in the auditorium, ca. 1944, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.

Photo 66: High school graduation ceremony, auditorium, 1944, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.
Evacuee Property

Photo 67: Sunday school class, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.

Photo 68: People leaving Buddhist church, winter, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.
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Photo 69: Evacuee fire department, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.

Photo 70: Baseball game, looking east, observation deck in background, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.
Photo 71: Basketball game, guard tower in background, looking west, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.

Photo 72: Girl's volleyball game, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.
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Photo 73: Golf course, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Francis Stewart, February 13, 1943;

Photo 74: Band concert, outdoor theater, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.
Photo 75: Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises store, 1943, Majako Suguki, clerk; Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.

Photo 76: Manzanar Co-Operative Enterprises office, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.
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Photo 77: "Handy Family, Block 20," Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.

Photo 78: Funeral services in auditorium for Rev. S. Nagatomi, Buddhist priest, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.

Photo 80: Roy Takeno, town hall meeting, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.
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Photo 81: "Mr. Ishi, Flower Grower," Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.

Photo 82: Mess line, noon, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.
Photo 83: Toyo Miyatake family, 1943, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Ansel Adams Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY POLICE IN PROVIDING EXTERNAL SECURITY FOR THE MANZANAR WAR RELOCATION CENTER

In early May 1942, the first persons of Japanese ancestry began to arrive at the relocation centers operated by the War Relocation Authority from the assembly centers administered by the Wartime Civil Control Administration. By June 5, when the movement of evacuees from their homes in Military Area No. 1 into assembly centers was completed, the transfer of evacuees to relocation centers was well underway. There were, however, two exceptions to this phase of the government's evacuation program — Manzanar and Poston. Both camps had been established initially by the Army as "reception centers" to serve not only as assembly centers but also as permanent relocation centers. The former, which is the focus of this study, had been opened as the first assembly center by the WCCA on March 21 but was transferred to the WRA on June 1 to become an officially-designated relocation center. As the government's evacuation program continued, provision for the external security of both the assembly and relocation centers by military police units was developed by the Western Defense Command.

DEVELOPMENT OF POLICIES TO PROVIDE FOR EXTERNAL SECURITY AT ASSEMBLY AND WAR RELOCATION CENTERS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND: 1942

First Order Governing Function of Military Police at Evacuation Centers, April 15, 1942

On April 15, 1942, the first order governing the functioning of military police units at evacuation centers (a term covering both the assembly and "reception" centers then being administered by the WCCA) and the relationship of those units with the centers' civilian managers or directors was issued by Lieutenant General DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Defense Command. The order included a brief statement outlining the purpose of the centers:

They [the evacuees] have been moved from their homes and placed in camps under guard as a matter of military necessity. The camps are not 'concentration camps' and the use of this term is considered objectionable. Evacuation Centers are not internment camps. Internment camps are established for another purpose and are not related to the evacuation program.

According to DeWitt's order, the centers were "operated by civilian management under the Wartime Civilian Control Administration." Civilian "police available will be on duty to maintain order within the camp." Responsibilities of the civilian police would include "search of individual evacuees and their possessions for contraband" and "escort of visitors and evacuees throughout the camp." The camp director was responsible "for all means of communication within the camp."

The order described the functions of the military police at the evacuation centers. These included:
1. The military police are assigned to the Center for the purpose of preventing ingress or egress of unauthorized persons and preventing evacuees from leaving the Center without proper authority. The Assembly Centers in the combat area are generally located in grounds surrounded by fences clearly defining the limits for the evacuees. In such places the perimeter of the camp will be guarded to prevent unauthorized departure of evacuees. The Relocation Centers are generally large areas of which the evacuee quarters form only a part of the Center. These Centers may have no fences and the boundaries may only be marked by signs. At such Centers the military will control the roads leading into the Center and may have sentry towers placed to observe the evacuee barracks. The balance of the area may be covered by motor patrols. The camp director will determine those persons authorized to enter the area and will transmit his instructions to the commanding officer of the military police. The camp director will determine those persons authorized to enter the area and will transmit his instructions to the commanding officer of the military police. The camp director is authorized to issue permits to such evacuees as may be allowed to leave the Center.

2. In case of disorder, such as fire or riot, the camp director or interior police are authorized to call upon the military police for assistance within the camp. When the military police are called into the camp area on such occasions the commander of the military police will assume full charge until the emergency ends. The question of the disposition of unmanageable evacuees is not a responsibility of the military police.

3. The commanding officer of the military police is responsible for the black-out of the Evacuation Center. A switch will be so located to permit the prompt cut-off by the military police of all electric current in the camp. He will notify the camp director of his instructions relative to black-outs.

4. The commanding officer of the military police is responsible for the protection of merchandise at the post exchanges furnished for the use of the military personnel.

5. Enlisted men will be permitted within the areas occupied by the evacuees only when in the performance of prescribed duties.

6. All military personnel will be impressed with the importance of the duties to which their unit has been assigned, the performance of which demands the highest standards of duty, deportment and military appearance.

7. A firm but courteous attitude will be maintained toward the evacuees. There will be no fraternizing. Should an evacuee attempt to leave camp without permission he will be halted, arrested and delivered to the camp police.
8. Commanding officers of military police units will be furnished copies of operating instructions issued to the camp director. They are required to maintain such close personal contacts with the camp director and his assistants as will assure the efficient and orderly conduct of the camp, and the proper performance of the duties of each.1


DeWitt outlined the organizational arrangements of the Western Defense Command to implement the aforementioned order in the U.S. War Department's Final Report, published in 1943. The Commanding Generals of each Sector of the Western Defense Command were responsible to DeWitt for the external security at each of the centers located in their respective Sectors. One or more military police companies were assigned to each center as required by the area and evacuee population.

The Sector Provost Marshal was responsible for the actual supervision of the military police at all centers in his Sector. The Provost Marshal, Western Defense Command, advised the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, in matters pertaining to external security at the centers, and prepared the policies and orders of the Commanding General for transmittal to the Commanding Generals of the various Sectors. The Provost Marshal, Western Defense Command, as well as other officers from that headquarters, periodically inspected the manner in which announced functions and policies were carried out by the military police companies at each of the centers.2

External Security Provisions in Memorandum of Agreement between the War Department and the War Relocation Authority, April 17, 1942

On April 17, 1942, War Department and the War Relocation Authority officials signed a Memorandum of Agreement delineating the responsibilities of each in the implementation of the government's program to evacuate persons of Japanese descent from the west coast to assembly centers and ultimately to relocation centers, the latter to be administered by the WRA. Section 9 of the Memorandum of Understanding provided for external security measures at the relocation centers by the military:

In the interest of the security of the evacuees relocation sites will be designated by the appropriate Military Commander or by the Secretary of War, as the case may be, as prohibited zones and military areas, and appropriate restrictions with respect to the rights of evacuees and others to enter, remain, or leave such areas will be promulgated so that ingress and egress of all persons, including evacuees, will be subject to the control of the responsible Military Commander. Each


relocation site will be under Military Police patrol and protection as determined by the War Department. Relocation Centers (Reception Centers) will have a minimum capacity of 5,000 evacuees (until otherwise agreed to) in order that the number of Military Police required for patrol and protection will be kept at a minimum.3

Civilian Restrictive Orders and Public Proclamation No. 8

Subsequent to the aforementioned Memorandum of Agreement, the Western Defense Command issued a series of Civilian Restrictive Orders and Public Proclamation No. 8 in compliance with its terms. On May 19, 1942, Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1 established all assembly and relocation centers in the eight far western states under its jurisdiction as military areas from which evacuees were forbidden to leave without express written approval by the Western Defense Command. Succeeding Civilian Restrictive Orders Nos. 18, 19, 20, 23, and 24 described the boundaries of the various centers.

Public Proclamation No. 8, issued by the Western Defense Command on June 27, 1942, further assured the external security of the relocation centers. Under its terms all center residents were required to obtain a permit before leaving the designated center boundaries. The proclamation specifically controlled ingress and egress of persons other than center residents. Violations were made subject to the penalties provided under Public Law 503, 77th Congress.

Four of the ten war relocation centers were established outside of the Western Defense Command and hence outside the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Western Defense Command. To secure uniformity of control, the War Department published Public Proclamation WD:1 on August 13, 1942. This proclamation designated the Heart Mountain, Granada, Jerome, and Rohwer relocation centers as military areas and as War Relocation Project areas. In addition, it contained provisions similar to those of Public Proclamation No. 8 relative to the ingress to and egress from relocation centers.4

Memorandum of Understanding as to Functions of Military Police Units at the Relocation Centers and Areas Administered by the War Relocation Authority, July 8, 1942

In July 1942 a "Memorandum of Understanding As to Functions of Military Police Units at the Relocation Centers and Areas Administered by the War Relocation Authority" was developed to prescribe the functions of military police units at relocation centers within the jurisdiction of the Western Defense Command. It was signed by E.R. Fryer, Regional Director, WRA, on July 3, and by Karl R. Bendetsen, Colonel, G.S.C., Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, for the Western Defense Command on behalf of DeWitt. The memorandum defined a "center" or "relocation center" as "a community administered by

Development of Policies to Provide for External Security, 1942

the War Relocation Authority pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 9102, issued March 18, 1942." The term "area" or "relocation area" meant "the entire area which surrounds and includes a relocation center, which is under the general administrative jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority, and which has been designated a military area pursuant to Executive Order No. 9066, issued February 19, 1942." The lengthy memorandum, which incorporated much of DeWitt's first order issued on April 15, contained sections dealing with: (1) the purpose of relocation areas; (2) freedom of movement of evacuees; (3) functions of the project directors; (4) functions of civilian and military police units; (5) conduct of enlisted men; and (7) cooperation between commanding officers of military police units and the WRA:

1. Purpose of Relocation Areas — Relocation areas have been established for the purpose of caring for Japanese who have been moved from certain military areas. They have been moved from their homes and placed in relocation areas as a matter of military necessity. . . .

2. Freedom of Movement of Evacuees — Japanese evacuees in the relocation centers should be allowed as great a degree of freedom within the relocation areas as is consistent with military security and the protection of the evacuees. In general, the evacuees will have complete freedom of movement within the relocation areas from sunrise to sunset. From sunset to sunrise the evacuees will not be allowed beyond the center limits without the special permission of the project director. The boundaries of the relocation centers and areas shall be marked, respectively, by signs in both the English and Japanese languages indicating their limits.

3. Functions of the Project Directors — Relocation centers are operated by civilian management under the War Relocation Authority. A project director is in charge of each center. The project director will determine those persons authorized to enter the area and will transmit his instructions to the commanding officer of the military police. The project director is authorized to issue permits to such evacuees as may be allowed to leave the center or area.

4. Functions of the Civilian Police — Civilian police will be on duty to maintain order within the area; to apprehend and guard against subversive activities, or undercover crimes and misdemeanors; to make such search of the person and property of the Japanese evacuees as may be necessary to guard against the introduction or use of articles heretofore or hereafter declared contraband; to control traffic within the center; and to enforce camp rules and regulations.

5. Functions of the Military Police — The military police on duty at relocation centers and areas shall perform the following functions:

a. They shall control the traffic on and the passage of all persons at the arteries leading into the area.
b. They shall allow no person to pass the center gates without proper authority from the project director;

c. They will maintain periodic motor patrols around the boundaries of the center or area in order to guard against attempts by evacuees to leave the center without permission. The perimeter of the relocation area shall be patrolled from sunrise until sunset and during such other times as the commanding officer of the military police units deems advisable. The perimeter of the relocation center shall be patrolled only from sunset to sunrise;

d. They shall apprehend and arrest evacuees who do leave the center or area without authority, using such force as is necessary to make the arrest;

e. They shall not be called upon for service in apprehending evacuees who have effected a departure unobserved;

f. They shall be available, upon call by the project director or by the project police, in case of emergencies such as fire or riot. When called upon in such instances, the commanding officer of the military police unit shall assume full charge until the emergency ends.

6. Conduct of Enlisted Men — Enlisted men will be permitted within the areas occupied by the evacuees only when in the performance of prescribed duties. A firm but courteous attitude will be maintained toward the evacuees. There will be no fraternizing.

7. Cooperation between Commanding Officers and the War Relocation Authority — Commanding officers of military police units will be furnished copies of operating instructions issued to Project Directors. The Project Directors and their assistants and the commanding officers will maintain such close personal contacts with each other, as will assure the efficient and orderly operation of the area, and the proper performance of the duties of all.

Circular No. 19, Policies Pertaining to Use of Military Police at War Relocation Centers, September 17, 1942

On September 17, 1942, Circular No. 19, "Policies Pertaining To Use of Military Police At War Relocation Centers," was promulgated by the Headquarters, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. Reiterating many of the aforementioned provisions for external security at the war relocation centers, the circular formalized and amplified the earlier policy statements. Section 3 of the circular stated that the "boundaries" of the "War

5. "Memorandum of Understanding As To Functions of Military Police Units At the Relocation Centers and Areas Administered by the War Relocation Authority," July 8, 1942, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs. Japanese War Relocation Centers.
Relocation Project Areas" within the territorial jurisdiction of the Western Defense Command, including Manzanar, "shall be marked with appropriate signs in both [the] English and Japanese language." The circular stated that the provisions of Public Proclamation No. 8 "require that those Japanese persons evacuated to a War Relocation Project Area shall remain in that area, except as movement is authorized in writing by this headquarters, transmitted through the War Relocation Authority." Violations of these provisions were "subject to prosecution as provided by Public Law No. 503, 77th Congress."

Section 4 of the circular noted that a War Relocation Project Area comprised the "entire area" of a relocation center, including "the populated area and the administrative and industrial area." Relocation centers were not "concentration camps" or "internment camps." While the relocation program "up to the present time has related particularly to the Japanese, the same program may be extended to other civilians as military necessity may dictate."

Section 5 of the circular stated that the project director of each relocation center "will determine those persons authorized to enter the center or the area, other than evacuees being transferred by War Department authority." The project director was "authorized to issue permits to such evacuees as may be allowed to leave the center or the area." He "will transmit his instructions regarding passes and permits to the commanding officer of the military police unit."

Section 6 of the circular stated that "Civilian police, operating under the Project Director, will be on duty to maintain order within the area; to apprehend and guard against subversive activities; or undercover crimes and misdemeanors; to make such search of the person and property of the evacuees as may be necessary to guard against the introduction or use of articles heretofore or hereafter declared contraband."

Public Proclamation No. 3, which had been issued by the Western Defense Command on March 24, 1942, designated "certain articles of contraband which are denied to all persons of Japanese ancestry within the limits of this command."

Section 7 of the circular stated that each relocation center "will be under military police patrol and protection as determined by the War Department." Military police escort guard companies had been assigned to duty at each of the relocation centers in the Western Defense Command.

Section 8 of the circular listed seven functions that the military police units were to perform at the relocation centers. These were:

a. They shall control the traffic on and the passage of all persons at the arteries leading into the area;

b. They shall allow no person to pass the center gates without proper authority from the project directors;

c. They will maintain periodic motor patrols around the boundaries of the center or area in order to guard against attempts by evacuees to leave.
the center without permission. The perimeter of the relocation area shall be patrolled from sunrise until sunset and during such other times as the commanding officer of the military police units deems advisable. The perimeter of the relocation center shall be patrolled only from sunset to sunrise;

d. They shall apprehend and arrest evacuees who do leave the center or area without authority, using such force as is necessary to make the arrest;

e. They shall not be called upon for service in apprehending evacuees who have effected a departure unobserved;

f. They shall be available, upon call by the project director or by the project police, in case of emergencies such as fire or riot. When called upon in such instances, the commanding officer of the military police unit shall assume full charge until the emergency ends;

g. They shall inspect parcels and packages consigned to evacuees at those centers where the inspection is directed by the Commanding General, Western Defense Command. Special instructions for such inspections and for the confiscation of designated items of contraband will be issued by the Commanding General, Western Defense Command.

Section 9 of the circular stated that evacuees "in the relocation centers should be allowed as great a degree of freedom within the relocation area as is consistent with military security and the protection of the evacuees." In general, the evacuees "will have complete freedom of movement within the relocation area from sunrise to sunset." "From sunset to sunrise, the evacuees will not be allowed beyond the center limits without special permission of the project director." "Sentry towers, with flood lights, may be placed outside of the boundaries of the center to assist the military police in maintaining proper control."

Delegation of Responsibility for External Security of War Relocation Centers from Western Defense Command to Ninth Service Command, November 22, 1942

On November 22, 1942, DeWitt issued a memorandum delegating responsibility for all external security of the war relocation centers within the jurisdiction of the Western Defense Command to the Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, with headquarters at Fort Douglas, Utah. The memorandum stated that "all persons of Japanese ancestry" had been transferred "from Assembly Centers operated by the Wartime Civil Control Administration under the control of this headquarters, to War Relocation projects, operated by the War Relocation Authority." Effective immediately, war relocation centers outside of the Western Defense Command were "of no further concern of this headquarters." The memorandum stated that the Commanding General, Ninth Service

Command was designated "as the agent responsible for the enforcement of all security measures in connection with these projects, and for the enforcement of such parts of Public Proclamations 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 as apply." Thereafter, the Ninth Service Command and the WRA were "to deal directly" with each other "on all matters pertaining to these projects without further reference to Western Defense Command." Escort guard companies "presently on duty at these projects" were "assigned to the Ninth Service Command." All matters "concerning the operation of these projects for which the War Department is responsible under the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 17, 1942," would "be handled directly between the War Relocation Authority and such agencies as the War Department may designate." The Commanding General, Western Defense Command, however, would be "kept informed as to instructions issued and agreements entered into, under this directive." The war relocation centers at Manzanar, Tule Lake, Poston, and Gila River "are within the evacuated area of the Western Defense Command and, therefore, have a special status and are of particular concern to this headquarters." Accordingly, the Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, was directed to "provide for immediate reports to this headquarters of any incidents occurring within these centers involving disaffection or riot on the part of center residents in order that appropriate instructions may be issued to provide for the security of the evacuated area whenever such action appears necessary."

The memorandum indicated that the policies outlined in Circular No. 19 issued on September 17, 1942, would govern the military police unit activities under this delegation of authority. Policies regarding (1) authorization to issue permits for ingress or egress from war relocation centers, (2) emergency employment of Japanese evacuees outside of the centers within evacuated areas of the Western Defense Command, and (3) parcel inspection at the centers issued by the Western Defense Command on August 11 and 24, September 13 and 21, and October 29, were attached to the memorandum as "statements of policy."

Authorization to Issue Permits for Ingress to and Egress from War Relocation Project Areas, August 11, 1942. On July 8, 1942, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, on behalf of the Commanding General, wrote a letter to the Regional Director and Executive Assistant and all WRA Project Directors and Assistant Project Directors governing policies for authorization to issue permits for ingress to and egress from WRA areas. This authorization letter was superseded by a memorandum to the WRA director from the Western Defense Command on August 11, 1942. Pursuant to sections 3 and 4 of Public Proclamation No. 8, issued by DeWitt on June 27, 1942, this memorandum delegated to the WRA director, and "to each person whom such Director may designate in writing, to grant written authorization to persons to leave and to enter War Relocation Project Areas." Each "authorization shall set forth the effective period thereof and the terms and conditions upon and purposes for which it is granted." The Commanding General, however, retained "the jurisdiction to and this grant of authority shall not authorize the Director, War Relocation to permit" (1) release "of persons of Japanese ancestry from any relocation center or project area for the purpose of private employment within, resettlement within, or permanent or semi-permanent residence within Military Area No. 1 or the California portion of Military Area No. 2," or (2) travel "of persons of Japanese ancestry within Military Area No. 1 or the California portion of Military Area No. 2." Release or travel "shall be by authority of the Commanding General under permits
issued by or under authority" of the Civil Affairs Division of the Western Defense Command.

**Delegation of Authority to Issue Permits for Ingress to and Egress from Relocation Areas, August 24, 1942.** On August 24, 1942, WRA Director Dillon S. Myer issued a directive designating and authorizing "the Regional Director of the Pacific Coast Region of the War Relocation Authority, and all Project Directors and Assistant Project Directors" to "grant written authorizations to persons to leave and to enter the particular relocation area or areas over which they have, respectively, been authorized to exercise jurisdiction." No authorization to enter a relocation area "shall be for a period in excess of 30 days."

**Parcel Inspection at Certain War Relocation Authority Projects, September 13, 1942.** On September 13, 1942, DeWitt issued a memorandum to the Commanding General, Communications Zone, concerning "Parcel Inspection" at the Tule Lake, Manzanar, Poston, and Gila River war relocation centers. Each of these relocation centers was located "within areas evacuated of persons of Japanese ancestry," thus necessitating "establishment and maintenance" of "security measures not currently requisite at other relocation centers."

Section 2 of the memorandum provided "for contraband inspection of all packages destined for delivery to any center resident (any person of Japanese ancestry or the non-Japanese spouse of any such person who is a center resident)" at the four relocation centers. Inspection was to be accomplished by the military police stationed at each of the centers. Inspection was "applicable to all such packages irrespective of the method of delivery and will be inclusive of parcel post and express." In all cases it would "precede delivery to the addressee."

Section 3 provided that inspection would be conducted "in a manner which will insures the detection and removal from all such packages of contraband." The following basic requirements were to be observed:

a. Each package will be opened in the presence of the addressee.

b. Item of contraband discovered and removed from a package will be labeled and plainly marked. Such label will show the addressee's name and the sender (if the latter is known). Each item of contraband discovered will be appropriately numbered by an identifying serial number.

c. A receipt will be issued the addressee for each item of contraband discovered and removed. Such receipt will bear the identifying serial number previously assigned the item covered.

d. By arrangement with the project director inspection will be conducted in a building at or near the center. The building should be chosen with a view to facilitating the presence of the addressee, the inspection procedure and the delivery of packages.

e. A contraband register will be maintained. Each item of contraband seized will be entered in the register. The descriptive entry may be limited to
the assigned serial number. Periodically, contraband so seized will be
delivered to the custody of the project director for safe keeping. A
covering receipt reflecting the serial numbers of the items delivered will
be obtained from the project director.

f. No item of contraband will thereafter be delivered to a center resident
without the express permission of this headquarters.

Section 4 of the memorandum delineated a lengthy list of "articles, commodities or things"
that were considered contraband. The list included those items "the use, possession or
operation of which are prohibited by paragraph 6, Proclamation No. 3, of this
headquarters." Among these items were "firearms, weapons or implements of war or
component parts thereof, ammunition, bombs, explosives or the component parts thereof,
short-wave radio receiving sets having a frequency of 1,750 kilocycles or greater or of 540
kilocycles or less, radio transmitting sets, signal devices, codes or ciphers, cameras."

Also listed as contraband were "articles, commodities or things" the "use, possession or
operation of which are prohibited by Public Proclamation No. 2525, promulgated by the
President of the United States on December 7, 1941." These items included "papers,
documents or books in which there may be invisible writings; photographs, sketches,
pictures, drawings, maps, or graphical representation of any military or naval installations
or equipment or of any arms, ammunition, implements of war, device or thing used or
intended to be used in the combat equipment of the land or naval forces of the United
States or of any military or naval post, camp, or station." The provisions of this category of
contraband were subject to the following exceptions:

. . . . (1) First class mail will not be inspected; (2) Magazines, periodicals,
newspapers and books printed in the English language by publishers in the
United States and transmitted as second class mail by the original publisher to
such person of Japanese ancestry will not be confiscated or withheld as
contraband. . . . if, however, such magazines, periodicals, newspapers and books
have been mailed by a person other than the original publisher to such person of
Japanese ancestry, then the same shall be searched for contraband which may be
secreted between the pages or covers thereof and in the event any such
contraband is found, the same together with the container thereof, shall be
confiscated and disposed of. . . .

Section 5 of the order stated that the "tools and implements of an artisan or of a
professional person of Japanese ancestry" were "not absolute contraband," and thus were
"not subject to confiscation." These items included "wood-working tools, agricultural
implements, dressmakers or tailors trade tools, and mechanics tools." The memorandum
observed that it was "not intended to prevent the development of skills, crafts, trades and
professional endeavors within relocation centers."

Section 6 of the directive noted that the WRA "has concurred in this order and has agreed
to provide for the issuance of appropriate instructions to each project director affected."
The instructions would "direct the discontinuance of current postal, express, or other
parcel delivery service and in lieu thereof the delivery of all packages to military police for
inspection."
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: ROLE OF THE MILITARY POLICE

Emergency Employment of Japanese Evacuees Outside of War Relocation Authority Projects Located within Evacuated Areas of Western Defense Command, September 21, 1942. The Western Defense Command issued a directive to the Commanding General, Ninth Service Command and Communications Zone, on September 21, 1942, concerning emergency employment of Japanese evacuees outside of the four relocation centers located within the evacuated areas under its jurisdiction. The directive stipulated that the Western Defense Command did not object to such employment of evacuee labor provided "the points outlined" were "understood and observed." Accordingly the following information was to be furnished to each commander of military police units stationed at the four centers:

...Evacuee labor may be used by project directors at locations not within the boundaries of the Relocation Project under the following conditions:

1. That the work to be done is essential to the operation of the project and involves meeting a current emergency.

2. That payment therefor is not to be received from private individuals or private firms — that is, that it is not 'private employment'.

3. That military guards are to be furnished to prevent the unauthorized absence of evacuees from the area in which the work is to be performed. This is not to be construed as indicating that the military personnel is to act as guards in connection with the work party. Military personnel is to be provided solely for the purpose of controlling exits from the particular area involved in order that unauthorized departure of evacuees may be prevented.

4. In the event an evacuee laborer does escape or does effect an unauthorized absence from the area, the military personnel assigned to secure the area are not to take action for the apprehension of the individual. The Military Commander is, however, to immediately notify local county and state civilian law enforcement officials and the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In addition, thereto, an immediate report of the occurrence is to be made to this headquarters.

Authorization to Issue Permits for Ingress to and Egress from War Relocation Project Areas for Purposes of Emergency Hospitalization and Incarceration, October 29, 1942. On October 29, 1942, the Western Defense Command issued a directive to Dillon S. Myer, the WRA Director, supplementing the authority granted in the aforementioned memorandum of August 11, 1942. Under the October 29 memorandum, authority was delegated "to the Director, War Relocation Authority, and to each person not of Japanese ancestry" that he designated "in writing, to grant written authorization for persons to leave and to enter War Relocation Project Areas for purposes of emergency hospitalization, institutional detention and incarceration." Each authorization was to "set forth the effective period thereof, if this can be determined, and the terms and conditions upon and the
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purposes for which it is granted." Complete records were to be kept by the WRA and submitted to Western Defense Command headquarters as well as the commanding officer of the military police company on duty at the individual project in question.7

MILITARY POLICE UNIT OPERATIONS AT MANZANAR WAR RELOCATION CENTER: 1942-45

Camp Manzanar

As aforementioned in Chapter Eight of this study, a group of buildings, referred to as the "Military Police Group" and generally known as the "military camp" or "Camp Manzanar," was constructed "south and immediately adjacent to the Relocation Center, separated by a five-strand barbed-wire fence." The military encampment was separated from the relocation center "by an unoccupied open space of level ground about 200 yards from the southerly boundary" of the latter. The facilities were "adequate for one Escort Guard Company of Military Police."8

First Military Police Unit at Manzanar: 747th Military Police Escort Guard Company. In a report prepared in early April 1942, Melton E. Silverman, feature writer for the San Francisco Chronicle, discussed the first military police unit to be assigned to external guard duty at Manzanar. Silverman noted that "Lieutenant Harvey Severson and his company of the 747th Battalion of Military Police" had arrived at Manzanar from Fort Ord, a military base located near Monterey, on March 19, two days before the first evacuees arrived at the center. Silverman quoted Severson as claiming that the "men don't like this job." The lieutenant reportedly observed that he could not "blame them very much." "They've been trained and educated to kill Japs, and here they're supposed to protect them."

Silverman went on to describe his perception of the military police during the first several weeks of the camp's operation. He stated:

Many of the military police had never seen Japanese before. They had come from Texas, Montana, South Dakota, Iowa, North Carolina, and New England. The Japanese were strange to them, and so were California, the deserts, the Indians from the reservation farther north, the huge snowy Sierra.

At first, during the early days of the camp, they had a chance to meet some of the Japanese — particularly the Japanese girls, but when the evacuees arrived in large numbers, the soldiers were ordered not to talk to their charges.

They were limited almost entirely to guard duties, guarding the entrance to the camp, patrolling its border [In compliance with their general orders, the military police guarded only the exterior boundary of the relocation center, maintaining

only one sentry inside the center at the main gate], standing by when each
trainload of Japanese arrived and assisting in the first registration and induction.
Even when relieved of their duties each day, they were not permitted to visit at
Manzanar. To them, more than the Japanese, Manzanar was a concentration
camp.

Silverman also noted that residents in nearby Owens Valley towns were irritated by the
behavior of some of the military police. One of the military police had "accidentally" killed
a fellow soldier at Manzanar, necessitating an investigation by the county coroner at the
taxpayers' expense.9

Investigation of Military Police, May 1942

In late May 1942, J. A. Strickland, Assistant Chief, Interior Security Section, conducted an
investigation of the military police at Manzanar for the Western Defense Command. After
his investigation, he reported on his findings which were passed along to his superiors
and to WRA officials in Washington.

During the investigation Strickland contacted law enforcement officials in Independence,
Lone Pine, and Bishop, as well as District Attorney George Francis, Assistant District
Attorney John McMurray, and Superior Judge William D. Dehy in Independence. The
"consensus of opinion" of these men, according to Strickland, was that "the Military Police
[enlisted personnel] at Manzanar are misfits." The men he talked to had "no love for the
evacuees," but they did not "think it proper nor becoming to the Army to have a man
going around the county bragging about having shot" an evacuee who had strayed
outside the fence at Manzanar. Private Edward Phillips, the military policeman who shot
the evacuee, was "guilty of this in his talks" with individuals. Private Beckmeyer, "who
seems to be subject to St. Vitus dance or some disease that causes a continuous jerking of
the muscles," made local law enforcement officials nervous," and they were "all afraid of
this man being trusted with a gun." The law enforcement officials did "not ask for the best
that the Army has to guard the evacuees," but they believed "that we should have at least
average Army men entrusted with this duty." Discipline between the officers and the
enlisted personnel of the military police company was "not at par with Army regulations."
The enlisted men, "while on duty at the center, as well as while visiting the towns, are
oftentimes untidy, dirty and slovenly in appearance."

Strickland commented on the relationship between the military police authorities and the
interior police at Manzanar. He found this relationship to be "satisfactory," "close
cooperation being maintained by both groups." The relationship between "the Center
Manager and the military authorities," however, seemed "to be strained from the Center
Management side." According to Strickland, Roy Nash, the first WRA Project Director, left
"the burden of discipline completely to the Army," while he was "desirous of allowing
total freedom to the evacuees."

9. Ibid.
204-07, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."
Concerning the relationship between the military police and the evacuees, Strickland noted that since "the shooting of the evacuee by the Military Police, the evacuees have enclosed their feelings in a shell." The evacuees were "resigned to the fact that the military authorities are in charge and that they will be punished or shot if they venture across the sentry lines." However, there was the feeling that although "the evacuee who was shot was wrong in being beyond the sentry line, even though given permission by the sentry, after he had been shot and no punishment directed toward the patrolman, at least the patrolman should not be allowed the freedom of the county in which to brag about the shooting." This information "came from an evacuee in the center who had not been outside and his information must have been open to the evacuees in the center."  

**Construction of Guard Towers** (also referred to as Observation or Watch Towers)

On May 7, 1942, War Relocation Authority officials visited Manzanar as negotiations were underway for transfer of the center from the Wartime Civil Control Administration to the WRA to become effective on June 1. Following the visit, John H. Provinsse, chief of the WRA Community Services Section reported to WRA Director Milton Eisenhower that it was proposed

> to install during the coming week 8 observation and guard towers on the project in order to facilitate the military patrol work. Inasmuch as our direction of effort should be away from surveillance of these people as enemies or as anything else than participant American citizens, it seems extremely undesirable to establish such guard towers. Mr. Fryer [who accompanied Provinsse] said that he would do everything he could to prevent their erection. In case they are erected while the project is still in Army control, they could be removed after the War Relocation Authority takes over, or they could be allowed to remain without being used. The military contingent at the present time consists of one company of 99 men and patrols are established around the external confines of the project. . . .

By early June the towers were under construction despite WRA objections. The Manzanar Free Press carried a somewhat disingenuous article on June 6 reporting on the progress of the construction:

> Have you noticed those towers going up around this center and wondered whether those incipient skyscrapers were the prelude to a carnival or a fair?

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11. Memorandum To: Major Ray Ashworth, J. A. Strickland, Assistant Chief, Interior Security Section, May 30, 1942; Memorandum For: Provost Marshal, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army (Through: Chief of Staff), Karl R. Bendetsen, Colonel, G.S.C., Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, June 5, 1942; and Memorandum For: Director, War Relocation Authority, by Bendetsen, June 5, 1942; RG 338, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Wartime Civil Control Administration and Civil Affairs Division, Central Correspondence, 1942-46, Box 67, File No. 370.093, "Military Police."

Upon being interviewed, Lt. C. L. Durbin, of the 747 Military Police explained that they were watch towers and that six to eight are now under construction.

Following the arrangements at other centers, these towers will be modelled after them in providing improved visibility to the watchmen and providing further security to the residents.

Lt. Durbin also declared that a wire fence will be put up in front of the center. However, along the border of the other three sides, red pennants are to mark the limits of this community.13

On July 31, Project Director Nash delivered a speech to the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco during which he outlined the responsibilities of the military police at the camp as well as the measures that had been taken to ensure its external security. Among other things, he noted:

The Relocation Center is that district, approximately a mile square, in which all the buildings of Manzanar are located. It is fenced with an ordinary three-strand barbed-wire fence across the front and far enough back from the road on either side to control all automobile traffic. Four towers with flood lights overlook the Center; the Relocation area is the whole 6,000 acre tract of which the Center is but a part.

... There is a company of Military Police stationed just south of the Center, whose function it is to maintain a patrol about the entire area during the day; and to man the towers and patrol the Center at night. A telephone is being installed in each tower so that if a fire breaks out, it can immediately be reported. The whole camp is under the eyes of those sentries. While evacuees are required to be within the camp itself, there is no curfew.14

322nd Military Police Escort Guard Company, June 1942

During June 1942, the 322nd Military Police Escort Guard Company, was transferred to Manzanar, replacing the 747th which had provided external security at the camp since March 19. Most members of the military unit were recruits from New York and New Jersey. Like the members of the 747th, most of the recruits in this company had no prior experience with Japanese, and for many it was their first glimpse of Japanese.15

On July 8 Sergeant George Reed of the 322nd suffered severe burns on his right arm and leg as a result of a gas tank explosion at the military compound at Manzanar. He was

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15. Uyeno, "Point of No Return," Rafu Shimpo, Parts 12, 22, and 23, Embrey Collection.
taken to the Manzanar hospital and placed under the personal care of Dr. James Goto. It was anticipated that he would be a patient in the hospital for several weeks.16

Investigation of Military Police, August 31 — September 1, 1942

After June 1, 1942, when the WRA took over administration of Manzanar, there were an increasing number of complaints about "laxity" in enforcement of camp security regulations under Project Director Roy Nash. Throughout the summer, the military units at Manzanar complained that the WRA was permitting the evacuees to violate orders of the Army. According to a memorandum from DeWitt to Bendetsen on June 19, there seemed to be a distinct attitude of camaraderie and brotherhood between the camp management and the Japanese. In other words, there seems to be an overly friendly attitude — in the opinion of the officers on duty with the Military Police Company.17

Among the accusations of the military police officers were that Nash had issued picnic passes for large groups to leave the center, sent groups out of the center without passes and Caucasian guards, and allowed movement across the center's boundaries after curfew. Captain Hall, the commanding officer, attended the camp director's daily conference two or three times a week "as observer, not as a participant." Although guard trucks passed "through camp every four hours posting guard," three "guard towers" were "needed in [the] back" or west side of the center. The guards "in [the] rear" walked "through brush" and were "unable to see much of their area." One "man alone" had "no protection against attack." They were not "able to get replacement bulbs for searchlights" in the observation towers when bulbs burned out. The military police did "not inspect vehicles for contraband." The vehicles were "stopped by [a] gate guard and directed on into camp to [the] Interior Police Station for information as to how to obtain pass." All roads "entering [the] camp have now been closed except [the] main gate." Local residents had informed military police that "when location of [the] camp was announced all local sporting goods houses experienced a sell out of guns and ammunition." Thus, the entire "neighborhood" was a "self appointed police force to see that evacuees stay within limits."18

As a result of the complaints of laxity by the Army which were submitted to the War Relocation Administration on August 27, the WRA assigned P. J. Webster, Chief, Lands Division, in its San Francisco regional office, to investigate the matter. Webster conducted his investigation during August 31-to September 2 "in order that a report could be furnished the Wartime Civil Control Administration, which would serve as the basis for a communication to the Commanding General." During his investigation, Webster interviewed 36 individuals, 12 of whom were connected with Manzanar. He "drove


17. Memorandum For: Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division (Through: Chief of Staff), J. L. DeWitt, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Commanding, June 19, 1942, RG 388, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Wartime Civil Control Administration and Civil Affairs Division, Central Correspondence, 1942-46, Box 12, File No. 323.3, "Manzanar."


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approximately 100 miles in and around the Relocation Center and as far south as Keeler and as far north as Independence," including "a trip through the agricultural area and west of the Relocation Area where it is claimed that Japanese have been fishing and swimming." He inspected "the military police guard system in operation during daylight hours and at night" and "personally inspected the knives and hatchets."

In his report, submitted to E. R. Fryer, Regional Director, on September 7, Webster listed eight specific claims of "WRA laxity" at Manzanar that the Army had sent to the WRA. These included:

1. That 'there is potential danger to the security of property and materials adjacent to subject alien camp because of laxity in the adequate policing and guarding under the new administration by civilian authority.'

2. Particular stress is laid on 'vital material supplies and processing equipment' in connection with mining operations near Manzanar and 'potential danger to life and property because of inadequate policing and guarding at subject alien concentration camp . . . .'

3. That 15 to 20 Japanese aliens on many occasions have been seen by 12 persons 'riding in Army trucks driven by a Japanese driver, seldom with a white civilian escort, driving all over the district surrounding the alien camp, in many instances over 30 miles from subject camp.'

4. That Japanese have been seen fishing and swimming in streams 'at distances of from 3 to 9 miles from the concentration camp with no escort or guards.'

5. That Mr. Horton, Civilian Chief of Police at the War Relocation Area, had 'collected several large boxes of short handled axes and hatchets, and also large quantities of long bladed knives from male Japanese internees, all of which the new civilian administration had ordered him to return to their owners as their personal property' and that Mr. Horton had refused to do this.

6. That on Saturday, May 10, 1942, a Japanese, Isami Noguchi, driving a Ford V-8 - 1940 Station Wagon with no license plates, parked his car alongside of Military Prohibited Zone sign, which he read, and then walked into the Sierra Talc Ore mill at Keeler and asked why talc ore was considered vital to the war effort. [Noguchi was a world-renowned Japanese American sculptor who was a voluntary relocatee at Poston for a time.]

7. That Dr. James Goto, — 'now located at the Manzanar Evacuation Center, leaves this Center almost weekly in order to come to Los Angeles to work in the Los Angeles County General Hospital.'
8. That on August 8, "six Japs were up here in Bishop wandering about our streets and buying fruits and vegetables in the Safeway Store. — As far as they know" (referring to two white women residents of Bishop who saw these Japanese "there seemed to be no guard with them.")

Webster’s investigation resulted in a number of conclusions. Regarding the above mentioned Claims Nos. 1, 2, and 3, he observed:

While the impression is widespread in Owens Valley, that Japanese evacuees have been riding around in motor vehicles and have been in Lone Pine and Independence unescorted by Caucasian guards, no one could be found who would state positively that he had seen a Japanese under these circumstances. There are a number of instances where Japanese have been, and are being, allowed to leave the Center under guard and permit which could be easily construed by a casual observer as a case of Japanese being out of the Center unescorted.

Webster elaborated that of the 24 persons he interviewed who had no connection to the center, a "number . . . started out by saying that it was common knowledge that Japanese were traveling around in trucks and shopping in Lone Pine and Independence without escort." However, "in no case" could he find "anyone who would state positively that they themselves had seen a Japanese under these circumstances."

Webster also related the substance of an interview with Captain Archer and Lieutenant Buckner who had been transferred to the 322nd Military Police Escort Guard Company at Manzanar in late June. He noted that their joint statement indicates that actual cases of Japanese either driving cars or visiting Lone Pine or Independence unattended by a white are few or non-existent. These two officers stated that there is no way that a motor vehicle can leave the Center and get to the highway without either passing through the main entrance of the Center or through the Military Police encampment, and that no motor vehicle is allowed to leave or return to the Center without a written pass. Military Police guards are requested to carefully check every pass without fail, and it was my experience that this procedure was rigidly adhered to even to the extent of requiring Mr. Nash himself to present his pass.

These officers further stated that they had received numerous complaints that Japanese were riding around outside of the Center or were visiting Lone Pine or Independence without guard. On such occasions these officers told the person making the complaint that all they had to do under these circumstances was to call them on the 'phone and that they would come immediately and take such Japanese into custody. However, there has not been one single instance in which anyone has made such a report.

These two officers stated that before they were assigned to Manzanar, at the end of June, they believed that the Japanese had more freedom to go to and from the Center. They stated that they were rigidly enforcing their instructions regarding permits for anyone to leave and return to the Center. Without exception the
number of Japanese who have been checked out of the Center checks out exactly
with the number that have returned to the Center. In other words, there are no
Japanese unaccounted for.

Concerning Claim No. 4, Webster noted:

There is little doubt that Japanese have done considerable fishing and some
swimming outside of the Relocation Area and, in all probability, some fishing is
being done at the present time.

Webster observed that each "of the twenty-four persons interviewed, who are not
connected with Manzanar, were asked if they had any first-hand knowledge of fishing or
swimming by Japanese evacuees." Most of the interviewees said "that they believed that
fishing and swimming were being done by the Japanese; but there were only two cases
where anyone said they had first-hand knowledge of fishing; and no one had personally
seen any Japanese swimming."

In one case, E. B. Austin, an employee of the Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power, reported that on August 22 he caught an evacuee fishing along Shepherd Creek,
two miles west of the relocation center. This evacuee had told Austin that he often fished
in the creek and that "many of the Japanese" fished in the stream. The evacuee told him a
friend of his was fishing one-half mile west because the fish were larger there. The
evacuee had a "bag" that Austin "estimated held from 35 to 50 fish." Austin had reported
the incident to the military police and the local game warden, but both men had done
little, the guard stating that "he frequently heard that the Japanese got out of the Center
with a permit on detail and then sneaked away and went fishing."

Chief of Internal Police Horton told Webster that "he had no doubt that Japanese working
on the garbage crew had been fishing in the Owens River in connection with their trips
east of camp to dump garbage." This "practice of fishing on return trips was so well
known that working on the garbage crew was a very popular job and there were many
applicants." Although fishing in the Owens River had been halted for about a month,
Horton related that "a party of 9 or 10 Japanese were found by the Military Police and Mr.
Baxter, County Health Officer, sometime ago fishing 3 or 4 miles west from the Center on
Georges Creek." The party had a truck and was supposed to be getting native plants for
gardening purposes. They had a permit which allowed them to get past the military police
guard and "this was simply a case of their taking advantage of the situation."

Although none of the people interviewed by Webster had seen any Japanese swimming
outside the center perimeter, he investigated "places where Japanese could have gone
swimming."

**Small Dam at Southwest Corner of Center** — In late June a small dam about two feet high
had been built across Bairs Creek at the picnic ground located at the southwest corner of
the center. The pool behind the dam had been used by children "for wading and paddling
around." When it was realized that the water from Bairs Creek flowed directly into the
Los Angeles Aqueduct, Project Director Nash had issued Project Director's Bulletin No. 7
on July 3, stopping all swimming in any streams that were tributary to the aqueduct. Webster inspected the site "and found that the little two-foot rock dam had been torn down in the middle so that it impounded no water."

**Settling Basin — Manzanar Water System** — Completed in July, the concrete settling basin, located about one-half mile to the north and west of the center, made "an ideal swimming pool." In Nash's absence, Assistant Project Director Ned Campbell announced in the July 7 issue of the *Manzanar Free Press* that the entire area west of the center would be open to the evacuees. The news article stated:

Extension of the boundaries to embrace the fields and creeks surrounding the former center confines was announced by Ned Cambell... today. The new limits run in parallel lines straight west from the watch towers located on the southeast and the northeast corners of the center, and extend four miles into the foothills. Picnics and outings can now be held at any time although the residents are cautioned to use their own discretion in keeping the grounds clean and observing reasonable hours. Swimming in the creeks, however, is strictly prohibited since they are the source of the Center's water supply. Neither will fishing be allowed until permits are received. Strict adherence of the rules must be observed... or the extended boundaries may be revoked.

After this announcement, a group of Japanese went swimming in the settling basin on July 8. The following day the *Manzanar Free Press* reported that "Permission for camp residents to go beyond the west boundary line up toward the hills was cancelled... after complaints were received that people were swimming in the community water reservoir and also in the aqueduct streams."

**Shepherd and Bairs Creeks** — Webster noted that reports "have been circulating in the Manzanar area that Japanese have built several crude stone and brush dams " in Shepherd and Bairs Creeks "to dam up enough water for swimming." A survey of the creeks on September 2 revealed "a dam approximately 1-1/2 miles west of the settling basin but it does not appear that this was built by the Japanese." On Bairs Creek there were "three small dams which might be used for swimming but which apparently were built before the Japanese came to Manzanar." Six dams, "two of them quite large, which may have been made by the Japanese" were also found on the latter creek. The two larger dams impounded "enough water to permit swimming of a very modest type while the other dams are too small to permit anything but wading."

**Los Angeles Aqueduct** — Although there was no definite evidence that the Japanese had done any swimming in the Los Angeles Aqueduct, Webster observed that it "would be much more difficult for them to swim here than west of the Center, because of the difficulty of getting to the aqueduct and because the chances of being apprehended are considerable." The aqueduct was "well patrolled by the City of Los Angeles."

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Webster reported that he had conferred with Nash regarding fishing and swimming outside the relocation center boundaries. Although not having any first-hand knowledge, Nash "had no doubt that this had been taking place." He thought such activities would "continue unless more guards were assigned by the Military Police to patrol the west boundary of the Center."

Webster also noted that he had discussed the issue with the military police. Captain Archer and Lieutenant Buckner thought it was possible for the Japanese to leave the Relocation Center and fish or swim. They said they had heard that the Japanese were doing some fishing and swimming west of the Center, but if this were true they were doing it at a very great risk to their personal safety. They said that there were about 120 soldiers in their unit, and this made it difficult to post an adequate guard on the west side, twenty-four hours a day. At the present time there are 11 guard posts being maintained on a 24 hour basis. Besides this guarding service this unit is expected to carry on a heavy training program.

After speaking with the military police, Webster had personally reconnoitered the west boundary of the center. He reported:

I inspected the guarding service along the west line, which is approximately 7/10 of a mile in length. This area is patrolled, but so lightly that a person could go over the line without being noticed. This is particularly true because there is a trash-burning dump a little distance from the west boundary of the Center. In connection with this dump, a long trench has been excavated and the dirt therefrom forms a long barrier about five feet high. If a person gets over this barrier he can proceed a considerable distance to the west, out of sight of anyone patrolling the west boundary. Furthermore, at night there are no search lights along the west boundary.

Webster elaborated further on his investigation of security measures on the west side of the center. He stated:

On the other hand, the guards have been instructed to shoot anyone who attempts to leave the Center without a permit, and who refuses to halt when ordered to do so. The guards are armed with guns that are effective at a range of up to 500 yards. I asked Lt. Buckner if a guard ordered a Japanese who was out of bounds to halt and the Japanese did not do so would the guard actually shoot him. Lt. Buckner's reply was that he only hoped the guard would bother to ask him to halt. He explained that the guards were finding guard service very monotonous, and that nothing would suit them better than to have a little excitement, such as shooting a Jap.

Another statement which Lt. Buckner made emphasizes the attitude of the Military Police and also that they take the patrol service with the utmost seriousness. He said that he, personally, would not be willing to attempt to cross through the beam of light thrown by one of the four search lights now installed for a thousand dollars, even though he had on his soldier's uniform.
Sometime ago [in May] a Japanese was shot for being outside of the Center. The evidence as to just what happened is conflicting. The guard said that he ordered the Japanese to halt — that the Japanese started to run away from him, so he shot him. The Japanese was seriously injured, but recovered. He said that he was collecting scrap lumber to make shelves in his house, and that he did not hear the guard say halt. The guard’s story does not appear to be accurate, inasmuch as the Japanese was wounded in the front and not in the back. This incident is recorded as an indication that, if the Japanese are leaving the Center on the west side to fish and swim, they are doing so at great peril to themselves; and that, if they continue this practice, in all probability one of them will get shot.

Realizing that the patrolling of the west side was not satisfactory, Captain Archer, over a considerable period of time, has been trying to get additional watch towers and search lights. His request has just been approved and plans are now under way for the installation of four more towers, which will make a total of eight. When this installation is completed (the additional four towers would be completed by early November) there will be a tower at each corner, and at the middle point of each of the four sides of the Center. Twelve powerful search lights will be installed which will throw a broad beam of bright light around the entire Center. When this is completed it appears very unlikely than any Japanese will leave the Center without permits during hours of darkness.

As to Claim No. 5, Webster felt that it was "relatively unimportant." "About 50 of the knives and 11 of the hatchets referred to have already been returned to [the] Japanese." The policy has been "to return these articles when it could be shown that they were needed by the Japanese in connections with their regular employment."

In support of this conclusion, Webster summarized the substance of an interview with Chief of Internal Police Horton. According to Webster, the chief related:

When the Japanese began arriving at Manzanar at the end of March, all baggage was carefully searched for contraband. This was in accordance with Army instructions and was carried out jointly by the Army and WCCA. During May and up until [the] WRA took over the project about June 1, the Internal Police were under the direction of Major Ashworth, Internal Securities Section of WCCA. Major Ashworth not only continued this practice of searching the baggage of the Japanese, but he added several items to the list of contraband, including all sharp instruments and flashlights. Prior to Major Ashworth’s taking charge no receipts were given to Japanese for any articles collected. This was deemed unnecessary because the Army had no intention of returning these articles. Capt. McCushion gave these instructions. Mr. Horton estimates that the number of articles taken, with no record of the owner, is somewhere between 100 and 150. From May on, receipts have been given by the Internal Securities Section for articles taken and the practice of confiscating such articles is continuing at the present time.

Throughout the entire period a Japanese was allowed to keep any article, such as knives and hatchets, provided that he could show a ‘work slip’ or ‘order’ from some properly constituted authority that these articles were needed in the work.
which he was to perform on the project. For example, a cook with knives
necessary for cooking could keep these knives if he could show that he was
definitely going to be employed as a cook at the project. Such knives would have
to be kept at the place of his job and not at his home. If a Japanese cook was not
given a job as a cook when he first came to the project and therefore had to give
up his knives but later became a cook, he could reclaim his knives and use them
on the job. Mr. Horton estimates that at least 50 knives have been returned on
this basis.

Also, about six hatchets have been returned to Japanese working as farmhands
and recently about five hatchets have been given out to be used in connection
with stone masonry. Mr. Horton explained that his understanding of the policy
back of this procedure was that it was an unnecessary risk to have dangerous
weapons, which were not necessary to the performance of actual jobs, lying
around the homes of Japanese which, in case of a disturbance, might be used to
commit personnel injury or damage to property.

Regarding Claim No. 6, Webster could find no record "that a person named Isami
Noguchi ever has been registered at the Manzanar Relocation Area." Webster expanded on
this conclusion by summarizing the results of a conversation with Nash. The Project
Director observed that personnel records at Manzanar indicated that no one by that name
had ever been "an inmate" at the camp. However, he stated:

. . . . I recall distinctly Mr. Triggs, who was the Camp Manager under [the]
WCCA telling me that before my arrival there had appeared at Manzanar an
artist named Mr. Noguchi. I do not recall his first name. He said that this
gentleman came voluntarily with introduction from someone on the White House
staff, and wanted to teach art in Manzanar and other Assembly and Relocation
Centers. Mr. Triggs, for reasons best known to himself, refused admission to Mr.
Noguchi, who is at present located in Poston. Whether or not this is the same
man, I cannot say.

Concerning Claim No. 7, Webster found no evidence "that Dr. James Goto has left the
Relocation Center except on two occasions when he went to Lone Pine attended by a
Caucasian." Webster observed that he conferred with both Nash and Goto about these
allegations. Nash informed, and Goto confirmed to, him that Goto had left Manzanar "on
only two occasions since he entered as an internee." The

first occasion was on Sunday, June 7th, when he and Mrs. Goto were my guests
at dinner in Lone Pine in company with Colonel Cress, Assistant Director of the
War Relocation Authority. The second occasion was on Monday, July 20th at 2:00
A.M. when the police wakened me to say that the Dow Hotel at Lone Pine made
an urgent request that Dr. Goto be permitted to come in to attend a man who
was one of their guests who was in extreme pain, no doctors being available in
Lone Pine at the moment. I consulted the Commanding Officer of the Military
Police and personally drove Dr. Goto to attend the patient. We returned together
to Manzanar at 4:00 A.M. Dr. Goto has not stepped outside the Manzanar Center
on any other occasion.
In regard to Claim No. 8, Webster noted that in "all probability Japanese were seen in the Safeway store in Bishop on August 8, unattended by a Caucasian, inasmuch as there were 26 Japanese who stopped in Bishop on that date enroute from the Fort Lincoln, North Dakota, Internment Camp to the Manzanar Relocation Area." In response to questioning, Nash had informed Webster:

We have constantly received Japanese both from Fort Lincoln, North Dakota, and from Fort Missoula, Montana (which are Concentration Camps). These people have been coming in from one or the other of these points about every week since I have been here. Our records show that under date of August 8th, 26 Japanese were inducted at Manzanar who arrived here at 3:43 P.M. by Inland Stage, having come from Fort Lincoln, North Dakota, by Union Pacific to Ogden, Southern Pacific to Reno, and thence by stage from Reno to Manzanar. The stage from Reno necessarily comes through Bishop and stops there for nearly an hour. The Japanese who are transported on the stage are under no obligation to stay in the stage during this stop. They are perfectly free to enter any shops they like and I have no doubt that under this date Japanese were seen in the Safeway Store and other stores in Bishop.

The Webster report was submitted by the WRA to the War Department. On October 2, John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, wrote to Myer, commenting that the "complaints received by Wartime Civil Control Administration are typical examples of how rumors spread." McCloy had sent the report to Bendetsen who had written in response: 'The report is comprehensive and indicates that all alleged incidents were thoroughly investigated; it tends to disprove the verity and accurateness of the complaints.'

Despite the efforts of the military police and WRA authorities, evacuees would continue to leave Manzanar without required passes throughout the history of the center. In the "Internal Security Section" of the Final Report, Manzanar, John W. Gilkey, Chief Internal Security Officer of the camp from September 13, 1942, until March 1, 1946, observed:

The Project regulation, hardest to prevent, was that of 'going out of bounds,' or, in other words, the act of leaving the Center without a proper pass. The attraction of the mountains for hiking and climbing, the nearby creeks for fishing — not to mention the satisfaction gained from going outside of the Center for a while — were all great temptations to many of the residents. This was true even when the Military Police were stationed in towers guarding the Center with guns and searchlights. The punishment prescribed by the Project court was generally to be put on probation. Much attention was given to publicity against this form of conduct but in spite of all that could be done to prevent it, the 'out of bounds' violation never completely stopped. It is doubtful if even a long jail sentence would have eliminated it entirely.

22. "Report of Investigation at Manzanar Relocation Area, August 31 to September 2, 1942," P. J. Webster (and attached correspondence), RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 68, File, "Report of Investigation."

Reinforcement of 322nd Military Police Escort Guard Company After Violence on December 6, 1942

As discussed in Chapter 11 of this study, the 322nd Military Police Escort Guard Company was reinforced by 50 officers and men from a detachment of the California State National Guard stationed at Bishop during the night following the riot on December 6, 1942. The next day, the national guardsmen were withdrawn after members of A Company, 753rd Military Police Battalion, and D Company, 751st Military Police Battalion, arrived to reinforce and cooperate with the 322nd in patrolling and guarding the camp. Several days after Christmas, the reinforcement units were withdrawn, leaving the 322nd as the sole military police unit at the camp. The activities of the 322nd, as well as of the reinforcement units, are discussed in that chapter.

319th Military Police Escort Guard Company: June 1, 1943

On June 1, 1943, the 319th Military Police Escort Guard Company was assigned to duty at Manzanar, replacing the 322nd that had been stationed at the camp for almost a year. Prior to its assignment to Manzanar, the 319th, commanded by Captain Donald R. Nail, had provided guard service at a nearby "Prisoner of War Camp."24

Captain Nail quickly made his presence felt at Manzanar. Since WRA appointed personnel at Manzanar were required to store their guns and ammunition at the military compound, one of Nail's first actions as commanding officer of the military police at the camp was to request all such persons to "call at his office immediately to identify the guns so that he" could "properly tag and record them."25

Within two weeks of taking command at Manzanar, Nail requested the WRA to undertake maintenance of the buildings in the military camp, noting that the "former command at this station" had been severely criticized "for not obtaining satisfactory maintenance" of the facilities. He "hoped that the accumulated defects" could be "cured without undue delay," reminding WRA officials of their responsibility under agreements between the Army and the WRA established the previous year.26 The problem of appropriate maintenance of the buildings in the military camp at Manzanar would continue to be an issue of contention between the military police and WRA officials until the center closed.27

24. Manzanar Free Press, June 2, 1943, p. 1, and Donald R. Nail, Captain, C.M.P., Commanding, To Project Director, War Relocation Authority, Manzanar Relocation Center, June 13, 1943, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 216, File No. 13.311A, "Detail of Military Personnel (General)."

25. Robert L Brown, Acting Project Director to All Division Heads, June 1, 1943, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 216, File No. 13.311A, "Detail of Military Personnel (General)."

26. Donald R. Nail, Captain, C.M.P., Commanding to Project Director, War Relocation Authority, Manzanar Relocation Center, June 13, 1943, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 216, File 13.311A, "Detail of Military Personnel (General)."

27. A. M. Sandridge, Senior Engineer to Robert L. Brown, Assistant Project Director, June 12, 1944, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 216, File No. 13.311A, "Detail of Military Personnel (General)."
Nail also attempted to impress the evacuees at Manzanar with the importance of staying within the center's boundary fences. On July 3, 1943, the Manzanar Free Press published an article in which Nail instructed "residents not to go under the fence to go after baseballs, golf balls, or for any other purpose." When evacuees found it necessary to go outside the fence, they "must use the gates and secure permission from the M.P. on duty." The article noted that Nail had "received orders to enforce this rule." 28

Changes in Military Police Patrol Procedures, December 1943

Several changes in military police patrol procedures were announced at Manzanar during December 1943. As a result of negotiations between WRA officials and Captain Nail, the military police agreed to withdraw sentries from the gates located above Block 12 and the Manzanar Hospital, thus opening "the gates on the west side of camp for the benefit of the residents to travel to and from the Manzanar cemetery without the complications of the Military Police." The gates would be locked at night, but they would be open between 9:00 A.M. and 5:00 P.M. During the daytime hours, an internal security officer would be stationed at the gate "to inspect the red passes and to allow work crews out." The red passes would be distributed by the block managers.

Manzanar residents, however, were warned "that all persons who go out through those gates must remain within the Manzanar area." The "center area" was "designated by white signs." Any person "found outside of the area" would be "severely dealt with by the project director and the Military Police." If an evacuee violated these regulations, the military police could revoke the "privilege." 29

On December 25, 1943, approximately one year after the violence at the camp, Project Director Merritt received what he called a "Christmas present" from Captain Nail. Starting on Christmas Day, the military police would no longer patrol the perimeter of the camp or man the gates and guard towers from 8:00 A.M. to 6 P.M. The only exception would be a soldier stationed at the rock sentry house to control traffic at the main gate of the center. This change in procedure was, according to Merritt, a sign of drastic changes in the attitude of the military police toward the evacuees at Manzanar. 30

Reduction of Military Personnel and Modification of Military Mission at War Relocation Centers, March 28, 1944

On March 28, 1944, War Department officials in Washington submitted to the Western Defense Command proposals for reduction of military personnel at relocation centers within its jurisdiction. The recommendations, which had the concurrence of WRA Director Myer, proposed that henceforth Manzanar, as well as Gila River and Poston, would each have only two officers and one-half of a military police escort guard company assigned to

30. Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director to Dillon S. Myer, Director, WRA, December 24, 1943, Box 18, File, "WRA-Military Police," Coll. 122, Department of Special Collections, UCLA.
them, whereas Minidoka and Central Utah would each have only one officer and 12
guards. Tule Lake would continue to have one full military police escort guard company
to provide for its external security.

Because of the proposed reduction in military personnel at the relocation centers, the War
Department recommended changes in the "mission assigned these units" under Section 8
of Circular No. 19, issued on September 17, 1942. The proposed changes included:

1. The military police would only control the traffic on and the passage of
all persons at the arteries leading into the centers rather than the area
itself.

2. Rather than preventing persons from passing through the centers' gates
without authority from the project directors, the military police would
merely assist WRA authorities in accomplishing this task.

3. The military police would reduce motor patrols around the boundaries of
the relocation areas, but they would maintain at least one motor patrol
around the boundaries of the areas each day.

4. The military police would no longer apprehend and arrest evacuees who
left the centers or areas unobserved without proper authorization.

5. While the military police would continue to be available to project
directors in case of emergencies, such as fires or riots, administrative
control of the centers would remain with the directors. Previously, the
commanding officer of the military police would take charge of the
centers in such situations until an emergency ended.

6. The military would no longer inspect parcels and packages consigned to
evacuees in the centers.31

The Western Defense Command did not object to the proposals for personnel reduction at
the various relocation centers with "the exception of Manzanar," officials noting that they
were "withholding comment with regard thereto until receipt of [the] War Relocation
Authority's recommendation." The proposed changes in Circular No. 19 were also
approved for the designated centers, with "the exception of Manzanar." The Western
Defense Command forwarded the proposals and their comments to the Commanding
General of the Ninth Service Command on April 7.32

Command, Presidio of San Francisco, California, March 28, 1944, RG 338, Western Defense Command and
Fourth Army, Wartime Civil Control Administration and Civil Affairs Division, Central Correspondence,
1942-46, Box 67, File No. 370.093, "Military Police — Relocation Centers."

32. Western Defense Command, Presidio of San Francisco, California, to Commanding General, Ninth Service
Command, Fort Douglas, Utah, April 7, 1944, RG 338, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army,
Wartime Civil Control Administration and Civil Affairs Division, Central Correspondence, 1942-46, Box 67,
File No. 370.093, "Military Police — Relocation Centers."
As a result of further negotiations with the WRA, the recommended changes for military police procedures and staff reductions at Manzanar were approved by the Western Defense Command and the Ninth Service Command. Accordingly, on April 17, 1944, the Ninth Service Command issued a directive, entitled "Revised Mission of Guard Forces at War Relocation Centers," implementing the changes at all the relocation centers under its jurisdiction, including Manzanar.33

Service Command Unit 1999: April 20, 1944 (Redesignated Ninth Service Command Detachment, Manzanar Relocation Center, November 1944)

On April 20, 1944, Service Command Unit 1999, commanded by Captain Ed Fackler, Jr., replaced the 319th Military Police Escort Guard Company which had been stationed at Manzanar since June 1, 1943. In line with the military police staffing reductions that had been implemented by the Ninth Service Command three days earlier, the new unit consisted of only two officers and 64 men, whereas the 319th had comprised three officers and 135 men.34

Changes in External Security Arrangements, Spring — Fall 1944

With the reduction in military personnel at Manzanar, changes in the external security responsibilities of Service Command Unit 1999 were initiated. Project Director Merritt described the changes in a letter to Colonel Earl M. Wilson on May 11, 1944:

Under the Escort Guard Military inspection of all incoming baggage and packages was strictly carried out through guards located at the main gate, the postoffice, and at parcel post. All military inspection of baggage and parcel post was abandoned by the Military Authority immediately after April 20th. Since the WRA is not responsible for inspection of contraband no inspection has taken place at Manzanar since April 20th.

Capt. Ed Fackler, Jr. determined that it would require 50 men out of the 64 men retained at the military post to perform the necessary functions required for the maintenance of the post, therefore, 14 men would be available for guard services if and when required. This number was insufficient to man the towers even by confining guard hours to the period from 6 at night to 6 in the morning. No guards are, therefore, stationed in any towers at any time. At my request Capt. Fackler has maintained the lights in the towers during the dark hours for whatever moral value this may be (entirely confined to the comfort of mind of people residing in surrounding area). As far as is known there is no danger whatsoever of any evacuee trying to leave the Center, therefore this decision of the Military would only seem to affect the public relations with persons living...

34. War Relocation Authority, Semi-Annual Report, January 1 to June 30, 1944, p. 52.
outside the Center and up to the present time no protest or comment has been heard.

A continuous military guard has been maintained at the main gate of the Project and at the South gate from 8 at night until 8 in the morning. The military also uses a jeep patrol to make the trip around the external boundaries of the 5700 acres lying open on the West side of Highway 395, therefore, a total of about 7 guards are in use out of the 64 men now stationed at Manzanar.

On the other hand the maintenance of the Service Command Unit is of inestimable value as a standby Military Authority which can be used to its full force in the event any civil disturbance occurs in the area. No such disturbance is anticipated but all precautions are taken to see that no adverse conditions arise. A continuous record of 18 months of complete peace and harmony, and almost complete absence of even any requirement for internal policing, would seem to justify the belief that conditions at Manzanar are in a satisfactory external as well as internal condition.

Merritt concluded the letter by stating that in "all matters Capt. Fackler and his officers have been fully cooperative and the relations between the Captain and myself are cordial." There was mutual understanding "of the problems which are being administered both by this Center and by the Military." 35

As the military presence at Manzanar continued to decline, some evacuee residents of the camp apparently took advantage of the situation to slip outside the boundary fences. This problem, as well as its solution, increasingly became issues of concern to WRA management. In early October 1944, for instance, three evacuee youths were arrested by the Inyo County game warden after he found them "with speckled trout — a type that cannot be seen within center boundaries." He had found the trout "packed in snow which is not found within the barb wires of Manzanar." The youths were released after paying a fine of $16. Angered by this situation, Merritt informed the Block Managers at a Town Meeting that "It will not be a fine of one month's salary or a month's sentence in the internal security jail for the next offenders found outside the center boundaries." Instead, the penalty would be "30 days in the county jail at Bishop." 36

On November 11, the Manzanar Free Press reported that the Ninth Service Command had issued instructions to reduce the military personnel stationed at Manzanar to two officers and 40 enlisted men. The designation of the unit at the camp was also changed from Service Command Unit 1999 to Ninth Service Command Detachment, Manzanar Relocation Center. 37

35. Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director to Col. Earl M. Wilson, War Relocation Authority, May 11, 1944, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 216, File No. 13.311A, "Detail of Military Personnel (General)."

36. Manzanar Free Press, October 4, 1944, p. 3.

Two days later, on November 13, Merritt telegraphed WRA Director Myer in Washington that Captain Fackler had requested that the military "be relieved of responsibility" of the "guard towers around the center area" as the "towers" were no "longer manned." Accordingly, Merritt informed WRA headquarters that "for protection of government property" he was "removing all lights and windows from towers." Furthermore, he requested "teletype authority for dismantling of towers no longer used by military and not useful to us in order that salvage lumber may be put to useful purposes." 38

Upon receipt of the telegram, Director Myer wired a teletype message to Merritt the following day. He stated that "If [the] lights are no longer needed on towers, suggest you remove lights, windows and ladders." However, the towers "should remain in place for possible future use [by] some other agency." 39

In anticipation of the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions regarding the constitutionality of the government's evacuation program and the authority of the WRA to detain and control the movements of loyal U.S. citizens in the Korematsu and End cases (Further information on these cases will be considered in Chapter 16 of this study.) that would be delivered on December 18, 1944, the Western Defense Command issued a directive that incorporated changes in Circular No. 19 affecting the functions of the military police at relocation centers. On March 28, 1944, the circular had been amended to mandate that the military police would not allow persons to pass the centers' gates without proper authority from the project directors. On December 1, this section of the circular was further amended to revise the mission of the guard forces at the relocation centers:

No person shall be permitted to enter or leave a War Relocation Project Area without a proper permit issued for these purposes either by the Commander, Western Defense Command or by the Project Director. Persons of Japanese ancestry to whom an individual order or certificate has been issued by the CG, WDC, exempting them from all provisions pertaining exclusively to persons of Japanese ancestry, contained in the Proclamations, Exclusion Orders, and Civilian Restrictive Orders pertaining to persons of Japanese ancestry, issued by this headquarters, including Public Proclamation No. 8, dated 27 June 1942, and the Civilian Restrictive Orders issued thereunder, shall be allowed, on or after the effective date of such individual order or certificate, to leave War Relocation Project Areas, and such individual orders or certificates of exemption shall be accepted as permits to depart from the said Project Areas.

The foregoing paragraph shall not be construed as authorization for an individual who is the subject of an Individual Exclusion Order to enter, travel in or be in the area of Western Defense Command from which said individual has been

38. Telegram, Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director, Manzanar to D.S. Myer, Director, War Relocation Authority, November 14, 1944, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 35, File No. 43.503, #1, "November 1942 — December 1944."

39. Teletype, D.S. Myer, Director to Ralph P. Merritt, Manzanar Relocation Center, November 14, 1944, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 315, File No. 43.501, #1, "November 1942 — December 1944."
excluded. Such authorization must be obtained by separate permit or certificate from the Commanding General, Western Defense Command. 40

This revision was forwarded by the Ninth Service Command to the military detachment at Manzanar on December 9, 1944. 41

Security Measures at Manzanar During Closing Phases of the Camp, 1945

On December 17, 1944, the Western Defense Command issued Public Proclamation No. 21, lifting, with reservations, the exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from the west coast, effective January 2, 1945. All persons of Japanese ancestry, unless their records indicated that they were potentially dangerous to national security, could return to the west coast effective January 20. 42

Following the issuance of Public Proclamation No. 21, Merritt issued two bulletins to the Manzanar evacuees concerning the use of cameras in the center and revoking the earlier regulations prohibiting contraband in the camp. With the issuance of Public Proclamation No. 21, the WRA, according to Project Director’s Bulletin No. 74, February 19, 1945, determined that there was “no longer any reason why citizen evacuee residents” of the centers could “not bring cameras” into the camps “and use them freely.” The possession and use of cameras by Japanese aliens was still forbidden under alien enemy regulations issued by the Department of Justice. To protect the right of privacy of the evacuee residents, commercial photographers and all visitors would continue to have to obtain permits in order to use cameras and take pictures within the center area.

That same day Merritt issued Project Director’s Bulletin No. 75 revoking previous regulations prohibiting contraband in the center. The bulletin noted that effective January 2, 1945, there were “no contraband regulations which are applicable to American citizens of Japanese ancestry who are not excluded.” WRA regulations, however, would continue to prohibit the possession of “short wave radio receiving sets in any of the relocation centers.” Project regulations would also continue to prohibit “the possession in the Center of radio transmitting sets or devices which could be used for radio transmission, fire arms or weapons of any kind, ammunition, and all things other than cameras which are listed under alien regulations as contraband for aliens.” 43


41. W. E. Allen, Captain, A.G.D., Assistant Adjutant General, Ninth Service Command to Commanding Officer, NSC Detachment, Manzanar War Relocation Authority Center, Manzanar, California, December 9, 1944, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 216, File No. 13.311A, “Detail of Military Personnel (General).”


43. Project Director’s Bulletins Nos 74 and 75, February 19, 1945, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 224, File No. 41.079A, “Project Director’s Bulletins, Nos. 1-79.”
Despite the lifting of the restrictions against persons of Japanese ancestry provided in Public Proclamation No. 21, the Western Defense Command quickly announced that all persons of Japanese ancestry would be categorically classified by the Army for detention, exclusion, or freedom of movement. Thus, the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command assumed the authority of the detention of citizens upon grounds that were not publicly disclosed by the Army. As a result, hearings were held at Manzanar by teams of Army officers commencing in January and continuing until July 1945. The hearings, opposed by WRA officials, were presided over by a full colonel and provided a forum in which those persons of Japanese ancestry who were American citizens but subject to individual exclusion or detention orders might present their case. Through these hearings, the Army, according to Merritt, "ignored the courts and set up what was, in effect and procedure, a civil court martial based on racial origin of citizens." At Manzanar, the Army did not detain any aliens nor any women regardless of their past records, but more than 200 male citizens were detained by the Army even through previously they had been given leave clearance by the WRA and by examining intelligence agencies. 44

During these hearings, on April 10, 1945, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army issued instructions "concerning detention of persons of Japanese extraction and use of current rosters (List MAU)" to the Commanding General, Ninth Service Command. The instructions, which will be considered more fully in Chapter 16 of this study, were to be forwarded to the commanding officers of military police detachments at each of the relocation centers within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Service Command. Section 8 of the instructions stated:

The entire responsibility for the control of departures of Japanese Americans from Centers rests with the military authorities. The Commanding Officers of Military Police Detachments will make every effort possible to maintain amicable relations with War Relocation Authority authorities and will work with them to assist them in the accomplishment of their War Relocation Authority task subject solely to the fact that they, the Commanding Officers of Military Police Detachments, are completely and solely responsible that no individual leaves the Center unless he has been cleared or approved for departure by the Commanding General, Western Defense Command. Previous instructions in conflict herewith are rescinded. 45

WRA officials at Manzanar reinforced the aforementioned regulations by warning evacuees of the consequences for persons found outside the center boundary without appropriate documentation. In an article in the Manzanar Free Press on May 9, 1945, Merritt announced:

Any resident on the cleared list, who leaves the center area without obtaining a permit from the project administration, may do so, but he will not be permitted to return . . . if the person who violates this regulation wishes to return, he will


45. Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, D.C., April 10, 1945, RG 338, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Wartime Civil Control Administration and Civil Affairs Division, Central Correspondence, 1942-46, Box 67, File No. 370.093, "Military Police — Relocation Centers."
be allowed to enter the gate as a visitor and will be charged 60 cents per day per meal in advance with no job during his stay in the center. In the case in which the party is not on the military cleared list, his case will be taken up by the military authorities and the penalties will be severe. 46

As plans for the closing of Manzanar continued during the spring of 1945, WRA officials and military police authorities worked together closely at the camp. In June, for instance, Merritt learned that Lieutenant Burch, commanding officer of the military detachment stationed at the camp, would be transferred effective July 1. Merritt appealed to the Central Security District headquarters of the Ninth Service Command, then located in San Francisco, for a 90-day postponement of Burch’s transfer. Merritt stated:

Lt. Burch has worked most cooperatively with me and has handled the complicated responsibilities of gate procedures for evacuees promptly and most efficiently. During the month of May, we had many evacuee visitors and a large number of evacuees leaving on short-term leave and 400 evacuees from this Center leaving on terminal leave. Between the first of July and the first of September we believe that in addition to visitors and short-term leaves, the number of terminal leaves will exceed 700 in each month. The total number of persons to be checked in and out of our gates on the list of the Western Defense Command will exceed 1,000. To accurately and effectively carry on such work as this requires long experience with these Western Defense records and careful training and control of personnel. No matter how willing and untiring a new officer may be, the introduction of a new commanding officer at this time will inevitably cause delays and a dislocation of the present smoothly coordinated organization between WRA and the 9th Service Command. With lists not only from Western Defense Command, but lists from the Department of Justice, for which my office is solely responsible, and with many types of transportation and a wide range of hours during which transportation must take place, it is evident that a continuation of the present supervision will be of material and vital assistance and any change would add too excessive a load to my already overburdened staff. 47

Although it is not known whether Merritt’s request was honored, plans to close the relocation centers continued during the summer of 1945. On July 12, WRA Director Myer announced that all relocation centers would be closed by the end of the year, and Manzanar would close no later than December 1. 48 On September 4, the Western Defense Command issued Public Proclamation No. 24, rescinding all individual exclusion orders and other restrictions and opening the west coast to the return of any person of Japanese


ancestry. At 11:00 A.M. on November 21, nine days ahead of schedule, the last evacuee left Manzanar. Soon thereafter, the military police detachment at the camp left the site of the deserted relocation center.


CHAPTER THIRTEEN: ROLE OF THE MILITARY POLICE

Photo 84: Entrance to Manzanar during construction, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Clem Albers April 2, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.

Photo 85: Pruning trees, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Clem Albers, April 2, 1943; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.
Photo 86: Military police detail, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Clem Albers, April 2, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.

Photo 87: Discussion over construction of water pipes, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Clem Albers, April 2, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: ROLE OF THE MILITARY POLICE

Photo 88: Evacuees return after clearing brush, boundary, Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Clem Albers, April 2, 1942; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Administration.

Photo 89: Temporary military police tent camp, 1942, Manzanar War Relocation Center, looking west; Seaver Center for Western History Research, Los Angeles, California.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN: THE LOYALTY CRISIS AT MANZANAR — REGISTRATION, SEGREGATION, AND PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMED FORCES

One of the most significant chapters in the history of evacuation and relocation was the registration, leave-clearance, and segregation programs carried out at all relocation centers during 1943-44. These programs, "one of the most exacting experiences" that the War Relocation Authority would undergo during the war, represented "a fork in the road for the evacuated people — a testing of fundamental loyalties and democratic faiths in an atmosphere of high emotional tension." The program "brought to the surface grievances that had accumulated over a period of months and laid bare basic attitudes that had previously been submerged and indistinct." Its net results were, according to the WRA, "unquestionably beneficial both for WRA and for the great bulk of the evacuated people." The trauma and turmoil that the efforts to determine evacuee loyalty brought to the relocation centers by these programs, however, would raise serious doubts concerning the credibility of this conclusion.¹

NATIONAL HISTORIC CONTEXT

Registration Program

Military Background of Program. The military background of the registration program dated to the early phases of evacuation when the U.S. Selective Service System was advised by the War Department to discontinue inducting registrants of Japanese ancestry until further notice. On March 30, 1942, the War Department issued an order, discontinuing the induction of Nisei into the U.S. armed services and placing them in a IV-F classification (unsuitable for military service). At the time there were about 5,000 Nisei from Hawaii and the mainland in the Army, the majority having been drafted. Enlisted Japanese Americans in the Army soon found themselves in a precarious situation. The personal attitude of their commanding officers was decisive; some Nisei stayed in the service, while others were discharged without explanation.

No clear-cut Selective Service policy was established to evaluate the status of draft-age Japanese Americans until June 17, 1942, when the War Department announced that it would not, aside from exceptional cases, "accept for service with the armed forces Japanese or persons of Japanese extraction, regardless of citizenship status or other factors." Later on September 14, the Selective Service adopted regulations, prohibiting Nisei induction and classifying registrants of Japanese ancestry IV-C (declarant and nondeclarant aliens), the same status as that for enemy aliens.²

¹. War Relocation Authority, Semi-Annual Report, January 1 to June 30, 1943, p. 8. Numerous secondary works provide the historical context for the operation of these programs in the relocation centers. These include: Girdner and Loftis, Great Betrayal, pp. 279-91ff; Personal Justice Denied, pp. 185-212; Davis, Behind Barbed Wire, pp. 83-97ff; Myer, Uprooted Americans, pp. 67-90, 144-56; Daniels, Concentration Camps USA, pp. 104-17ff; Weglyn, Years of Infamy, pp. 134-55; and Richard Dinnon, Keeper of Concentration Camps: Dillon S. Myer and American Racism (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987).

Soon after his appointment as Director of the WRA on June 17, 1942, Dillon Myer came to the realization "that the most important key to the regaining of status" of Japanese Americans "was the opportunity for service with [the] armed forces." Myer believed that participation in the military service was important for two reasons. First, as American citizens, the Nisei should have the same rights and responsibilities as other American citizens, including the responsibility to fight for their country. Second, it was important to the future of the Nisei that they have the opportunity to prove their patriotism in a dramatic manner, and thus regain their rightful place in American society. Starting in July 1942, he began pressing this point home to the Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy and other officials of the War Department. 3

Myer's efforts would later be reinforced by the Japanese American Citizens League, which in November 1942 petitioned President Roosevelt for reinstatement of the draft for citizens of Japanese descent. The JACL conducted a one-week conference in Salt Lake City in late November 1942, that was attended by representatives from each of the relocation centers. Manzanar's representatives to the conference were Fred Tayama, Joe Grant Masaoka, and Kiyoshi Higashi, all of whom would play important roles in the violence that broke out at the camp less than two weeks later. At the conference, the JACL adopted resolutions declaring that it "its stand on the principles of duty to country and to Americanism is unwavering and holds even greater significance in these times of stress." In addition to asking for reinstatement of Selective Service procedures for Japanese Americans, other resolutions passed included expressions of confidence in the WRA, greetings to Nisei soldiers, commendation to the President of the United States on his selection of liberal personnel in WRA, gratitude to religious bodies for their work on behalf of loyal Americans and residents of Japanese ancestry, and an appeal for funds for recreational purposes in the relocation centers. 4

During the summer of 1942, the War Department began a program to recruit some American citizens of Japanese descent as "exceptional cases" under the meaning of its June 17 directive. The Military Intelligence Service (MIS), the intelligence branch of the U.S. Army, realizing that men skilled in the Japanese language would be vitally needed in the Pacific Theater, had established a language school for this purpose at Camp Savage, (and later at Fort Snelling), Minnesota, under the leadership of Colonel Kai E. Rasmussen. During the autumn of 1942, recruiting officers were sent out to all WRA centers in an effort to enlist volunteers among the male citizens at the centers who had a working knowledge of the Japanese language and who demonstrated promise that they could be trained to become language "experts" in a comparatively brief period of time. The men were recruited both as instructors and translators. Ironically, many of the evacuees at the centers who were able to meet these qualifications were Kibei, a group considered by military and WRA experts to be generally the most disaffected element within the Japanese American population, and the largest number of volunteers came from the Tule Lake War Relocation Center, where "disloyal" sentiments were greatest. By the end of 1942, a total of 167 male American citizens at the centers had met the necessary


requirements and were either already enrolled or in the process of being enrolled in the language school at Camp Savage.\(^5\)

Nisei soldiers in the MIS were attached to every major combat unit in the Pacific, including the Alaskan Defense, Southeast Asia Area, Central Pacific Ocean, Southwest Pacific Area, and South Pacific Area commands, as well as the European Command. The Nisei "intelligence" soldiers were attached as individuals to military units in these commands and given noncommissioned ranks, thus depriving them of "proper recognition, awards and promotions." Nevertheless, they made considerable contributions to the American war effort. Due primarily to the work of the MIS, General Douglas MacArthur stated, "Never in military history did an army know so much about the enemy prior to actual engagement." General Charles Willoughby, G-2 intelligence chief, said, "The Nisei saved countless Allied lives and shortened the war by two years.\(^6\)

On January 28, 1943, the Secretary of War Stimson announced that the Army had decided to form a special Japanese American combat team and that recruits would be accepted from the relocation centers, the Hawaiian Islands, and elsewhere on the mainland of the United States. In the near future, the secretary added, a special enlistment program to recruit personnel for the team would be carried out simultaneously at all relocation centers. Four days later, President Roosevelt wrote to Stimson, approving the combat team plan and calling it a step toward restoration of the evacuated people to their normal status in American society. By February 6, ten recruitment teams were on their way from the War Department in Washington to the relocation centers, and the 21,000 male citizens of military age in the centers faced one of the most crucial decisions of their lives.\(^7\)

**WRA Administrative Background of Program.** In early January 1943, when the WRA was first informed of the plans for a large-scale Army recruitment program at the relocation centers, the agency was developing its own plans and strategies to conduct a mass registration of all adults in the centers to speed up the leave-clearance process — the process of determining leave eligibility for evacuees based on national security considerations. Prior to this time, the WRA had attempted carry through its leave and/or relocation policies with little effect because of red-tape involved with the clearance program. Both the Army and the WRA needed much the same type of background information on the people in the centers to conduct their respective recruitment and leave-clearance programs. The Army needed information on male citizens of draft age for induction purposes, while the WRA needed it on all residents 17 years of age and older for leave-clearance purposes. Thus, the decision was made to combine Army recruitment and WRA leave-clearance registration in one massive operation to be carried out jointly by both entities.\(^8\)

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8. Ibid., p. 9.
Program Implementation. Two basic questionnaires were developed to implement the Army recruitment and WRA leave-clearance programs. One form (DSS Form 304A), titled, "Statement of United States Citizens of Japanese Ancestry," was for male citizens of draft age, while the other (WRA Form 126 Rev.), titled "War Relocation Authority Application for Leave Clearance," was for all female citizens as well as alien males and females. The questionnaires were complicated and lengthy, each including some 30 questions. The questionnaire titles, wording of questions, and the fact that the Army questionnaire was voluntary while the WRA's was compulsory would lead to considerable misunderstanding and turmoil in all ten relocation centers during the registration program. 9

The ten Army recruitment teams, each headed by a commissioned officer and staffed by two non-commissioned Caucasian sergeants plus one sergeant of Japanese ancestry, were organized quickly. One representative from the WRA staff at each relocation center (Robert B. Throckmorton, project attorney, was the representative from Manzanar) was brought to the War Department in Washington to be attached to the teams. During January 29 to February 5, 1943, the combined Army teams and WRA personnel were given an intensive course of training at the War Department in the details of handling the registration program at the relocation centers.

During the training sessions, it was decided that the detailed planning and implementation of the registration program at each relocation center would be the joint responsibility of each project director and Army recruiting team captain. The Army recruiting teams would administer the military's role in the registration program, while the WRA would be responsible for the registration of female citizens and alien men and women.

At the training sessions in Washington a check-sheet of possible evacuee questions to be asked during the registration program was formulated for the Army recruiting teams. The check-sheet was to be read by a member of the Army team to the evacuees at each relocation center. In the document the possible implications of voluntary enlistment from behind barbed wire were rebutted by such statements as:

The circumstances were not of your own choosing, though it is true that the majority of you and your families accepted the restrictions placed upon your life with little complaint and without deviating from loyalty to the United States. 10

The WRA did not prepare a similar check-sheet to explain its part of the registration program — an omission that would contribute to the agency's mishandling of its responsibilities.

On February 3, President Roosevelt, who had been informed about the upcoming registration program, sent a letter to Secretary of War Stimson in support of the undertaking. Roosevelt informed Stimson that the program was "a logical step, and no loyal citizen should be denied the democratic right to exercise the responsibilities of his

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citizenship, regardless of his ancestry." This letter would also be used by the army and read to the evacuees at each center before the registration program began.\(^{11}\)

The teams arrived at the centers during the first week of February 1943 and immediately arranged for a series of meetings to be held with evacuees in designated messhalls. At these meetings prepared statements were read to the assembly residents regarding the purpose and significance of the registration program, and some minimal efforts were undertaken to answer questions. Actual registration was commenced at most centers around February 10.

At the outset, there was confusion, resentment, and widespread reluctance to register at virtually all the relocation centers. At some centers, such as Minidoka, these initial difficulties were quickly overcome, while at others, such as Tule Lake, they persisted and were even intensified as time went on. Despite the turbulence and the emotional atmosphere that prevailed for varying lengths of time at the relocation centers, the registration program produced useful information to both the Army and the WRA.

The primary benefit in terms of the WRA's administrative needs and ultimate objectives was the accumulation of extensive background information on virtually all adult residents of the centers. For the first time, data required in connection with leave-clearance determinations was readily available on practically everyone who might conceivably apply for indefinite leave. The groundwork had been laid for faster processing of leave applications and decentralization of leave procedures, and ultimately a thoroughgoing program to segregate those whose loyalties lay with Japan.

The chief benefit for the Army was the recruitment of 1,208 carefully selected volunteers from the centers by June 30, 1943, the number of volunteers ranging from a low of 40 at Rohwer to a high of 236 at Poston. Although this number was a small proportion of the 10,000 eligible that the War Department had estimated and fell short of the 3,000 that it had expected to recruit, those who did volunteer represented from the standpoint of both loyalty and military fitness, "the cream of the draft-age group at the relocation centers." Combined with several thousand volunteers of Japanese ancestry simultaneously recruited from the Hawaiian Islands and enlistment of several hundred Nisei from the mainland outside relocation centers, the volunteers formed the nucleus of "a hard-hitting combat unit." By the end of June, the greater proportion of the volunteers from the centers had entered the Army and were in training at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, in preparation for active duty overseas.

The most significant questions asked of the relocation center evacuees during the registration program were Questions 27 and 28 that appeared on both the Army and WRA questionnaires. The two questions on the Army form were to be answered only in front of a representative of the Army recruitment teams, while the other questions were to be filled out with the help of registrars or counselors at each of the centers. On the Army questionnaire, Question 27 asked draft-age males: "Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty, wherever ordered?" On the WRA form,

\(^{11}\) Block Managers Assembly Minutes, February 8, 1943, p. 2, Box 10, File, "Community Government — Block Managers' Reports, January — September 1943," Folder 2, Coll. 122, Department of Special Collections, UCLA.
Question 27 asked: "If the opportunity presents itself and you are found qualified, would you be willing to volunteer for the Army Nurse Corps or the WAAC?" On the Army questionnaire, Question 28, known as the "loyalty question," asked:

Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power or organization?

On the WRA questionnaire, Question 28 asked:

Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power or organization?

Before the registration program had progressed very far at most centers, however, large numbers of alien residents were protesting against the wording of Question 28. Since Japanese aliens were not eligible for naturalization as American citizens, they pointed out that they could not conscientiously answer "yes" to the question as it was worded without becoming virtually "men without a country." On the other hand, a "no" answer could result in deportation. Realizing the logic of this position, the WRA, on February 12, instructed all relocation centers to insert on WRA Form 126 Rev. - "for all aliens but not for female citizens" — the following substitute for the original Question 28:

Will you swear to abide by the laws of the United States and to take no action which would in any way interfere with the war effort of the United States?

Although this change in Question 28 was made to meet the objections of many aliens, other questionnaire problems were never addressed. For instance, the obvious absurdity of asking aliens, especially males, whether they would be willing to enlist in the Army Nurse Corps or the Women's Auxiliary Army Corps was never clarified. 12

There were a total of 77,957 residents eligible to register at the ten relocation centers. Of this number, 65,078, or 87.4 percent, answered Question 28 with an unqualified "yes," while 5,376 answered "no," 1,041 qualified their answers, and 3,254 failed to register. Including the 234 who did not answer the question, 9,905 Japanese Americans did not answer the loyalty question with a "yes." Thus, approximately 12.6 percent of the total possible reacted negatively to the "loyalty" question. The great bulk of the non-affirmative answers came from the citizen group. Approximately 26.3 percent of the male citizens and about 15 percent of the female citizens failed to provide unqualified affirmative answers. Only 3.6 of the male aliens, and 3.5 percent of the female aliens failed to provide unqualified affirmative answers. 13

12. Thomas and Nishimoto, Spillage, p. 57; Broom and Kitsuse, Managed Casualty, p. 225; and Weglyn, Years of Infamy, p. 136.

Aside from Questions 27 and 28, most of the other questions on the two forms were less controversial. The questions asked for information on topics such as education, previous employment, knowledge of the Japanese language, number of relatives in Japan, foreign investments and travel, religious and organizational affiliations, sports interests, hobbies, magazines and newspapers customarily read, and possession of dual citizenship. As the registration program was completed at the various centers and as the younger residents were subsequently registered upon reaching the age of 17, the completed questionnaires were transferred to WRA headquarters in Washington for cross checking against the records of federal investigative agencies. Under an agreement between the WRA and FBI, the latter took the principal responsibility for this record check and provided the WRA with information on each registrant that was available in its files as well as those of the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Service. By July 1, some 73,900 cases had been submitted to the FBI, and approximately 61,200 had been returned with available intelligence information.14

Evacuee Reactions to the Registration Program. According to the WRA, the underlying factors explaining resistance to the registration program at most centers was "an extremely intricate pattern of influences dating back to the time of evacuation." Two of the most significant factors were "evacuee resentment against the government resulting from evacuation and detention in relocation centers," and "administrative miscalculations and errors of judgment both in the explanation and the execution of the registration program."

At the outset of the registration and enlistment program, most WRA personnel believed that it was "a distinctly forward step for the evacuated people." The War Department's decision to accept Army volunteers from the evacuee population at the centers was regarded as an opportunity for the evacuees to provide the American public with proof of their patriotism and loyalty. The registration program was understood to be a practical administrative step taken to speed the return of qualified evacuees back to private life.

To many evacuees, however, both the recruitment and registration programs were understood "in a vastly different light." After undergoing the trying experiences of evacuation and the perplexities of several months' detention in a relocation center, "a considerable minority — particularly among the citizen group — was deeply resentful against the Federal government and highly suspicious of any action it might take affecting their future status." This point of view was reflected, according to the WRA, in some of the "milder" qualified answers to Question 28, such as "Yes, if my civil rights are fully restored" or "Yes, if I can return immediately to my former home." Furthermore, a "yes" answer to Question 28 proved offensive to many Nisei, because it implied that they once had an allegiance to Japan and its emperor. According to the WRA, some of the "most thoroughly embittered citizens tended to regard the whole enlistment and registration as 'just another government trick,' and nearly 3,000 "went to the point of requesting expatriation to Japan."

In hindsight, the WRA recognized that it had handled the program poorly. At the time the agency "was so absorbed in the mechanics of an enormous operation that it failed to appreciate the advantages that might have been gained from early consultation with key evacuee residents." There was insufficient time for "adequate advance planning or for the

formulation of wholly clear-cut instructions covering every phase of the operation." The confusion that arose about the original wording of Question 28 for aliens was one result of the haste in which the program was formulated.

The linkage of WRA registration and Army recruitment was also understood by the former agency's officials to be "unfortunate." The WRA stated:

... From the very beginning, the recruitment phase of the operation, because of its more dramatic character, tended to obscure the real significance of registration not only in the minds of the evacuees but even in the eyes of many WRA staff members at the centers. And at some of the centers, this initial confusion was never entirely eliminated. It is probably literally true that hundreds of the evacuees went through the registration without any real understanding of the significance of Question 28 or even any adequate appreciation of the reasons why they were being asked to fill out the questionnaires.15

Other observers looked behind the responses for reasons to explain the evacuees' reaction to the registration program. These analysts argued that the registration program demanded a personal expression of position from each evacuee, a choice between faith in the future in America and outrage at present injustices. The registration raised the central question underlying exclusion policy, the loyalty issue which had dominated the political personal lives of the Nisei for the past year. Questions 27 and 28 forced evacuees to confront the conflicting emotions aroused by their relation to the government. To illustrate this point, one evacuee later noted:

Well, I am one of those that said 'no, no' on them, one of the 'no, no' boys, and it is not that I was proud about it, it was just that our legal rights were violated and I wanted to fight back. However, I didn't want to take this sitting down. I was really angry. It just got me so damned mad. Whatever we do, there was no help from outside, and it seems to me that we are a race that doesn't count. So, therefore, this was one of the reasons for the 'no, no' answer.16

Personal responses to the questionnaire inescapably became public acts open to community debate and scrutiny within the closed world of the relocation centers, thus making the difficult choices excruciating. One young evacuee, for instance, later related:

After I volunteered for the service, some people that I knew refused to speak to me. Some older people later questioned my father for letting me volunteer, but he told them that I was old enough to make up my own mind.17

Another evacuee later described his anguish in answering the questionnaire:

Because of the incarcerations, here I was, a 19-year-old, having to make a decision that would affect the welfare of the whole family. If I sign, 'no, no,' I would

15. Ibid., pp. 11, 14.
17. Ibid.
throw away my citizenship and force my sisters and brother to do the same. Being the oldest son and being brought up in the Japanese tradition, it was up to me to take care of my parents, sisters, and brother. It was about a mile to the administration building. I can still remember vividly. Every step I took, I questioned myself, shall I sign it 'no, no,' or 'no, yes?' The walk seemed like it took hours and then when I got there a colonel asked me the first question and I cursed him and answered, 'no.' To me, he represented the powers that put me in this predicament. I answered 'yes' to the second question. In my 57 years, I have never had to make such a difficult decision as that.18

Loyalty Review. With the ambiguous results of the registration program in hand, the WRA began to decide who should leave the camps. The WRA's initial leave policies had been in effect for several months. With the results of the registration program, it was now ready to modify these policies. The War Department, however, was not content to leave this matter to the WRA. Despite the continuing protestations that evacuees were a matter for the civilian WRA, the War Department plan of January 20, 1943, called for the formation of a Japanese American Joint Board (JAJB), which would also have a hand in deciding whom to release from the centers. While the WRA would retain ultimate authority over leave clearance, the JAJB would recommend individual releases.19

Composed of one representative each from the WRA, Office of Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence Service, and the Provost Marshal General's office, the board was established to assist in determining the loyalty of American citizens of Japanese ancestry, determine eligibility of applicants for war plant employment, and assist in the selection of volunteers for the Army. Early in 1943 the board decided to consider the cases of all evacuee American citizens 17 years of age and older and make recommendations to the WRA on the granting of indefinite leave.20

The board floundered in its efforts to determine the "dangerousness" of each evacuee. Finally, an ever-changing system was adopted that would bring an adverse recommendation if any one of a number of "factors" were present. The "factors" included whether the person was Kibei; whether he refused to register; whether he was a leader in any organization controlled or dominated by aliens; and whether he had substantial fixed deposits in Japan. By adopting this approach, the board was spared having to find an illegal or even disloyal act as the basis of recommending continued confinement. Instead, individual characteristics and legal acts became cause for a finding of "dangerousness."

After about a year of making such determinations, as well as performing its other work such as clearing laborers for vital war plants, the board was terminated. It had handled nearly 39,000 cases and made over 25,000 recommendations for leave clearance. Of 12,600 recommendations against release, the Western Defense Command reported that the WRA ignored half of them and released the evacuees anyway.21

18. Ibid., p. 197.
19. Ibid.
Participation in U.S. Armed Forces

Selective Service Milestones. Counting draftees, volunteers, and pre-Pearl Harbor enlistees, more than 33,000 Nisei served in World War II, 6,000 of them in the Pacific Theater. During 1943-45, some branches of the military, in addition to the regular Army, were opened to persons of Japanese ancestry. On July 22, 1943, for instance, the Women's Auxiliary Army Corps began accepting Japanese Americans. On December 13, the first evacuee girl to be inducted into this organization, Miss Iris Watanabe of the Granada War Relocation Center, was sworn into service in the office of the Governor of Colorado in Denver. Some branches of the military, however, remained closed to Japanese Americans for the duration of the war. The Navy, for instance, did not announce its acceptance of Nisei until November 14, 1945, several months after the war ended. At least one Japanese American served in the U.S. Marines, and several hundred served in the U.S. Merchant Marine.

On January 20, 1944, the Army announced that Selective Service inductions of Nisei would be resumed. As a result, 3,377 men were called before July 1, 1944. Of this number, 1,430 were accepted, 460 were inducted into the Enlisted Reserve Corps, and 194 entered on active duty. Of those called, 188 refused induction, and 106 of them were arrested by officials of the Department of Justice by June 30, 1944. The "great majority answered the call willingly," however, and "the departure of most of the boys" who were "summoned to active duty" were occasions "marked by patriotic demonstrations in the centers."

The principal resistance to the Selective Service developed at the Heart Mountain War Relocation Center where 76 men refused to be inducted, "owing largely to the influence of a group in the community which called itself the 'Fair Play Committee.'" The head of this committee argued that it was unjust to draft Nisei until all discrimination against Japanese Americans was eliminated, and the Nisei were admitted to all branches of the Army and Navy on an equal footing with other Americans. These arguments "were cautiously phrased, however, in an effort to avoid statements that might incriminate the committee members." The committee chairman, a U.S. citizen born in Hawaii who had never been to Japan and had no record of disloyalty, was segregated to Tule Lake on April 1, 1944, together with several of his principal supporters. At Tule Lake, he was later taken into custody by the FBI on charges of violating federal sedition and conspiracy laws.

On June 12, 1944, a mass trial for 63 defendants from Heart Mountain began at the federal district court in Cheyenne, Wyoming. Each of the men was charged with violation of the Selective Service Act through failure to submit to a pre-induction physical examination. While acknowledging that the defendants "were loyal citizens of the United States" and that they desired "to fight for their country if they were restored their rights as citizens,"

the court sentenced all of the men to three years in a federal penitentiary on June 26. About half of the men went to Fort Leavenworth, while the remainder were sent to McNeil Island in Washington. The 63 men remained in prison until receiving conditional releases on an individual basis in 1946.

Meanwhile, on November 2, 1944, seven leaders of the Heart Mountain Fair Play Committee, who had played a leading role in resisting the Selective Service at that relocation center, were convicted of counseling others to resist the draft, but this conviction was overturned by the 10th District Court of Appeals on December 14. Later on December 12, 1947, President Harry S Truman officially pardoned all of the men, and their full citizenship rights were formally restored. Ultimately, 267 persons from all ten relocation centers would be convicted of draft resistance.25

On November 18, 1944, the Selective Service established procedures permitting voluntary induction of Issei. Several months later, on March 21, 1945, Kazuo Ono, an evacuee in the Minidoka War Relocation Center, was the first Japanese alien evacuee to volunteer for service in the Army. Before being accepted by the Army, he made two unsuccessful attempts to enlist.26

On May 28, 1945, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to review the decision of a lower court that Americans of Japanese ancestry residing in relocation centers may not refuse draft summons. Less than one week later, on June 1, the U.S. Army ruled that drafted Japanese American soldiers would no longer be placed in the Enlisted Reserve Corps while awaiting call to active service. Henceforth they would be processed in military reception centers on the same basis as other drafted men.27

100th Battalion/442nd Regimental Combat Team. While Nisei evacuees in war relocation centers were officially prohibited from serving in the U.S. Army on June 17, 1942, an all-Nisei infantry battalion was activated in Hawaii on June 10. Ironically, no mass evacuation or confinement of Nisei in government-operated relocation centers had been undertaken in Hawaii in the wake of Pearl Harbor.28

The 100th Battalion/442nd Regimental Combat Team, which would ultimately develop from this activation, was noteworthy because it was the only Japanese American unit to be established in the U.S. Army. In addition, it was the most highly decorated unit in the Army. The unit also had the honor to be reviewed by President Harry S Truman in July 1945 upon its return to the United States. On July 15, 1946, President Truman would honor the unit with a Presidential Unit Citation. The combined 100th and 442nd suffered 9,486 casualties and won 18,143 individual decorations for valor in battle, including a


Congressional Medal of Honor and almost 10,000 Purple Hearts. The casualty rate for the unit was more than 300 percent of its authorized strength of 4,000 men.

The 100th/442nd had an unusual organizational history. One of its units, the Anti-Tank Company, was assigned to a glider assault. The 100th Battalion was also credited for the capture of a German submersible in October 1944. In addition, by rescuing the "Lost Battalion" of the 36th Infantry Division, 442nd members became "honorary Texans." Two of the 442nd members would later become members of the U.S. Senate representing Hawaii during the postwar period — Masayuki "Spark" Matsunaga and Daniel Inouye.

The 100th Infantry Battalion was activated as a six rifle company Separate Battalion on June 10, 1942. The troops consisted of Japanese American members of the Hawaiian Territorial Guard. Because of doubts about its loyalty, the battalion was transferred to the mainland at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, for training, and then was given only wooden guns with which to train. Correspondence of the soldiers was read by military authorities before being mailed. The battalion was transferred to Camp Shelby, Mississippi, in January 1943 to complete its training. The 100th arrived in Oran, North Africa, on September 2, 1943, and was attached to the 34th Infantry. It landed at Salerno on September 26 and participated in the Italian Campaign, fighting as part of the 34th at Cassino. As a result of its accomplishments during the Italian campaign, it became known as the "Purple Heart Battalion." On November 25, Secretary of War Stimson gave the battalion special recognition for its accomplishments during the Italian Campaign, announcing its casualty list, listing decorations, and mentioning high praise accorded the men by their officers.

Meanwhile, in January 1943, the War Department announced formation of the segregated 442nd Regimental Combat Team (RCT), and the new unit was activated on February 1, 1943. Upon announcement of the RCT, some 10,000 Nisei in Hawaii volunteered immediately. On March 28, the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce held a farewell ceremony in front of Iolani Palace for 2,686 Nisei volunteers for the RCT. The RCT, composed of both Hawaiians and volunteers from the ten relocation centers, began military training at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, in May 1943. Later in January 1944 the Selective Service draft was reinstated for Nisei, thus providing additional personnel for the RCT. Comprised of three rifle battalions, an anti-tank company, a cannon company, a service company, and a medical detachment, plus the 522nd Field Artillery Battalion and the 232nd Engineer Company (Combat), the only unit to start with Nisei officers, and the 206th Army Band, the 442nd went overseas in May 1943. The main body of the RCT arrived in Naples, Italy, on June 2, and on June 10 it was joined with the 100th Battalion in attachment to the 34th Infantry. After the breakout from Anzio, the RCT soon saw action north of Rome, where the 100th earned a Distinguished Unit Citation for liberating Belvedere, a town south of Florence and the seemingly impregnable Gothic Line. The 442nd stayed in Italy as part of the 34th Infantry until September 1944, when it went to France, landing at Marseilles on September 30. There it was attached to the 36th Division, also known as the Texas Division. The 442nd's Anti-Tank Company was detached to make a glider assault with the 517th Airborne. Soon the RCT was attached to the 36th Infantry for the Rhineland Campaign.

The 442nd fought in the Vosage at Bruyères in eastern France, and then rescued the Texas "Lost Battalion" (1st Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment, 36th Division). The 442nd's casualties resulting from the daring and highly-publicized relief effort for 211 men from
October 15 to November 12 were heavy: 161 killed in action (13 were medics); 2,000 wounded (882 seriously); and 43 missing. Distinguished Unit Citations were awarded for actions at Belmont and Biffontaine prior to the rescue mission.

On November 28, 1944, the 442nd was posted to the French-Italian border with the 100th Battalion, near Monaco. This "Champagne Campaign" lasted until March 1945, when the regiment returned to Italy for the Po Valley Campaign. Attached to the 92nd Division, the RCT broke through the supposedly impregnable "Gothic Line" on April 5, less than one month before the war ended in Italy on May 2. In March the 522nd Field Artillery Battalion was detached from the RCT to participate with the 7th Army in the Central Europe Campaign, where it was among the first American units to liberate the German concentration camps at Dachau.29

Impact of Military Participation on Relocation Center Life. The movement of young men out of the relocation centers into the armed forces, although numerically small, had a profound impact on life in the camps. By December 1944, for instance, 1,543 men, ranging in numbers from less than 100 to nearly 300 from each center, had been accepted for service and were on active duty. By late 1944 the servicemen had been coming and going from the relocation centers for more than a year, returning to the relocation centers on furlough for visits with their families and friends. They had come back in uniform, and portions of barracks in all centers were established as United Services Organization (USO) entertainment facilities. Thus, the USO facilities became a feature of life in the relocation centers that link them with communities throughout the United States. In the centers, women worked on 1000-stitch belts, in the Buddhist tradition, for the protection of the soldiers on the battlefields. Mothers spent time preparing food for parties, and their daughters arranged dances and other social affairs attended by young people who gathered to socialize with the soldiers. The senryu poets, beginning in 1944, began to write of the uniformed Nisei and the feelings of their parents about them.

At first the coming and going of soldiers affected only relatively few persons in each center, but, many of those affected were parents who had themselves accepted the centers as homes for the duration of the war. Most of the parents of soldiers were men and women who belonged to the core of Issei who had formulated community sentiment. With reopening of Selective Service procedures to the Nisei in January 1944, more and more evacuees began to be affected as sons whose parents had opposed volunteering were taken in the draft. The activities of the USOs were increasingly participated in by at least mothers and sisters of families who had kept their attention averted from resettlement and the outside world. Farewell parties for drafted young men increased. Sometimes these events were merely family affairs, but more and more entire blocks became interested in the young men who were leaving. The recurring farewells became an increasingly prominent feature of relocation center life, and to a greater extent than in outside towns of

similar size the whole community began to be affected and to give some recognition to the departing young men.

Inevitably, casualty lists began to have meaning for people in the relocation centers. Sentiment among the evacuees developed that the centers as a whole should pay tribute to the men in uniform. At first there was resistance to such ideas. Gradually, as the WRA administrators encouraged the erection of honor roll tablets listing the men in the armed forces in each center, sentiment swung behind the idea of community ceremonies. Buddhist and Christian ministers and community council chairmen and other evacuee spokesmen arranged ceremonies in honor of Nisei who had been killed. Memorial services became more and more frequent, and interest in them became widespread.

By midsummer 1944 the effects of Nisei participation in the U.S. armed forces on the evacuees in the relocation centers had become marked. For instance, an Issei mother observed in July:

You know things are a lot different than they were a while ago. People really rebelled at the time of registration. They said awful things about the government, and they spoke of the boys who volunteered almost as if they were traitors to the Japanese for serving a country that had treated the Japanese so badly. When Selective Service was re-instituted all one heard was that the government had no right to draft men out of a camp like this. At first when the boys left, their mothers wept with bitterness and resentment. They didn't think their sons should go. This week five have gone from our block. I tell you I'm surprised at the difference. Wives and mothers are sorry and they weep a lot. But now they really feel it is a man's duty to serve his country. They wouldn't want him not to go when he is called. When they talk among themselves, they tell each other these things. They feel more as they did before evacuation.30

Congressional Investigations

Prior to January 1943, the War Relocation Authority had implemented its evacuee relocation program with only a limited amount of national publicity. During the first half of 1943, however, as relocating evacuees began to fan out across roughly 75 percent of the country, the program attracted increasing attention from the national news media and Congress.

One of the developments that contributed toward making the WRA evacuee relocation program a national issue was the investigation conducted during January - March, 1943, by a special subcommittee of the Senate Committee of Military Affairs. The seven-member subcommittee, chaired by Senator A. B. Chandler of Kentucky, was appointed to consider the advisability of S. 444, a bill introduced for the purpose of placing the WRA under the administrative control of the War Department. The subcommittee opened its investigation in late January with hearings in Washington, D.C. Following these hearings in the nation's capital, Chandler and a special investigator travelled to the field and continued the

investigation at a number of the relocation centers. The last formal public hearing was conducted by Chandler at Phoenix, Arizona, on March 8.

From the public relations standpoint, the investigation took on special significance since it occurred simultaneously with the registration program in the relocation centers. Statements attributed to the subcommittee chairman and others regarding the percentage of negative answers at some of the centers to Question 28 were widely published "without any indication of the background of registration or the climate of human emotion in which it was taking place." The impression created in the minds of the American public by these comments was "that a heavy proportion of the people in relocation centers were actively disloyal to the United States and basically loyal to the Emperor of Japan." Thus, a significant portion of the nation's press and public "became increasingly critical of WRA's policies governing relocation of the evacuated people and operation of the relocation centers."

The subcommittee report itself, however, expressed "only moderate disapproval of WRA activities," and it did not recommend placement of the agency in the War Department. In its final report, approved by the full Committee on Military Affairs on May 7 but not released until July 16, the subcommittee made four basic recommendations: were:

1. That the draft law be made to apply to all Japanese in the same manner as to all other citizens and residents of the United States.

2. That those who answered "No" to the loyalty question and those otherwise determined to be disloyal to the United States be forthwith placed in an internment camp, and that such determination should be made at the earliest possible date; and that the cases of those asking for repatriation should be disposed of at the earliest possible date.

3. That the loyal able-bodied Japanese be allowed to go out to work under proper supervision at the earliest possible time, in the areas where they will be accepted, and where the Army and Navy authorities consider it safe for them to go. . . .

4. That the proper, necessary Executive and departmental orders be issued to immediately make effective the policies outlined under Recommendations Nos 1 and 3.31

On July 3 WRA Director Myer testified before the Chandler subcommittee in executive session and approved California Senator Sheridan Downey's resolution for segregation of "disloyal" evacuees prior to its introduction in the U.S. Senate. Three days later, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 166, asking the President of the United States to order immediate

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: THE LOYALTY CRISIS AT MANZANAR

segregation of "disloyal" persons of Japanese ancestry and calling for a public statement on conditions in relocation centers and plans for future WRA operations.\(^\text{32}\)

During June 1943, the House Special Committee on Un-American Activities appointed a subcommittee to conduct an investigation of war relocation centers and WRA relocation and segregation policies, as well as evidence of subversion and disloyalty among the evacuee population. The subcommittee was composed of John M. Costello of California, chairman, Herman P. Eberharter of Pennsylvania, and Karl E. Mundt of South Dakota. Led by Congressman Costello who was determined to prove that the WRA was "coddling" disloyal evacuees in the relocation centers, the hearings began on June 8 with sensational anti-Japanese witnesses. Following its highly-publicized investigation during which it was critical of WRA policies, the committee recommended on September 30, 1943:

1. That the War Relocation Authority's belated announcement of its intention of segregating the disloyal from the loyal Japanese in the relocation centers be put into effect at the earliest possible moment.

2. That a board composed of representatives of War Relocation Authority and the various intelligence agencies of the Federal Government be constituted with full powers to investigate evacuees who apply for release from the centers and to pass finally upon their applications.

3. That the War Relocation Authority inaugurate a thorough-going program of Americanization for those Japanese who remain in the centers.

The hearings of the Special Committee, as well as those of the Chandler committee, served as a catalyst to spur WRA efforts, already underway, to segregate the "disloyal" evacuees under its charge into a separate center.\(^\text{33}\)

Segregation Program

The idea of separating the evacuated people into two groups on the basis of their "fundamental loyalties" stemmed back to the earliest days of the government's evacuation program. During the spring of 1942 Lieutenant Commander K. D. Ringle, Military Attache for the WRA from Naval Intelligence, prepared recommendations for segregation of those evacuees determined to be "disloyal." He urged the agency to conduct a segregation program based on the assumption that the overwhelming majority of "disloyal" evacuees would be found among the Kibei and their alien parents. Under his proposal, all Kibei should be questioned by administrative boards in the relocation centers and "called upon to declare and demonstrate where their natural sympathies lay." This early recommendation for the military's desire to divide persons of Japanese ancestry based on

\(^{32}\) U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Segregation of Loyal and Disloyal Japanese in Relocation Centers: Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Report on Senate Resolution No. 166 . . . . 78th Cong., 1st Sess., S. Doc. 96, September 14, 1943, pp. 1-25.

"loyalty," and especially singling out the Kibei for such segregation, would continue to be a theme that military authorities emphasized throughout 1942.34

In mid-December 1942 DeWitt proposed a more draconian plan for segregation. His plan envisioned a surprise move by military authorities in which designated evacuees would be gathered, placed aboard trains, and moved to the Poston relocation center, where evacuees not to be segregated would then be removed. The people to be segregated would include those who wished repatriation or expatriation; parolees from detention or internment camps to relocation centers; those with "evaluated" police records during their confinement in assembly or relocation centers; others whom the intelligence services identified as "potentially dangerous;" and immediate families of segregants or wished to join them. The plan, if implemented, would have affected approximately 60,000 persons, or more than half of the evacuee population in the relocation centers.35

The WRA, although itself considering segregation, objected to DeWitt's drastic proposals, because they suggested segregating by category and called for secrecy, military control, cancellation of normal relocation center activities, and raised the probability of rioting and bloodshed. Three steps already under way would, the WRA hoped, eliminate the need for segregation: the indefinite leave program; Justice Department custody for aliens whom the WRA believed should be interned; and an isolation center at Leupp for relocation center "troublemakers."

During the spring of 1943, however, pressures from the aforementioned Congressional investigations, War Department officials, and the Japanese American Citizens League, coupled with the larger-than-expected negative reaction to the registration program, provided the backdrop for a WRA-administered segregation program. From the beginning, however, the WRA took the position "that such a separation would have to be made with the utmost care and only after painstaking consideration of each individual case." Thus, once the registration program had been completed and the results had been tabulated, the WRA was "in position for the first time to undertake a really sound and equitable program of segregation."

Several developments indicated "the desirability of such a program" by May 1943. First, the disturbances at Manzanar and Poston in late 1942, together with the turmoil at Tule Lake and other relocation centers during the registration program in early 1943, demonstrated "that serious social tensions at the centers would doubtless continue and perhaps intensify as long as people of sharply diverging loyalties remained quartered close together." Second, many of the evacuees "whose loyalties lay with Japan — those, for example, who had requested repatriation — wanted nothing so much as to remain secluded for the duration of the war." Third, the "admixture of a disloyal minority in the population at relocation centers was undoubtedly confusing the public mind about the loyalties of the entire group." Once "the patently disloyal had been weeded out," the WRA

felt that the "problem of gaining public acceptance for relocation of the remainder would likely be greatly simplified."36

At a meeting of the project directors at WRA headquarters in Washington in late May 1943, the major point of discussion was a segregation program. Considerable attention was given to the fact that both "loyal" and "disloyal" elements in the centers were pressing for segregation as a way of alleviating the mounting tensions resulting from the turmoil in the aftermath of the registration program. When a final vote was taken at the end of this meeting, the overwhelming consensus of opinion was for segregation. By a vote of ten to one the final obstacle in the way of another forced movement of Japanese Americans had been cleared. All that remained was the development of procedures for the implementation of the program. The targeted groups and individuals to be segregated included repatriates and expatriates; those with records indicating subversive activities; those who answered "No" to Question 28 or provided seriously qualified answers to the question; and passive resisters.37

One of the initial problems faced by WRA administrators in connection with segregation was to find a place where the segregants might be quartered. As early as November 1942, the WRA attempted to find a suitable site for housing repatriates apart from other evacuees, but the search had been unsuccessful. By June 1943, however, the population of the ten relocation centers had dropped to the point where it was possible to designate one of them as a segregation center and to transfer the non-segregant evacuees residing in that center to several of the others. After further consideration, Tule Lake in northern California was selected on July 15 as the segregation center for four principal reasons:

1. It was one of the largest of the relocation centers with a capacity of approximately 16,000.

2. It contained extensive acreage readily available for agriculture and thus could provide the segregants with numerous work opportunities.

3. Its resident population contained a greater proportion of potential segregants than any other center.

4. It was one of the two centers lying in the evacuated zone and special restrictions imposed by the Western Defense Command made it less desirable than other centers for use as a relocation center.38

Whereas the registration program in the relocation centers had been implemented hastily amid confusion and turmoil, planning for the segregation program was complete and

36. Personal Justice Denied, pp. 207-08, and Drinnon, Keeper of Concentration Camps, pp. 65-82.


practical." A "Manual of Evacuee Transfer Operations" was prepared by the WRA Solicitor's Office which set forth "a uniform conception of objectives and procedures, outlining a flexible plan of organization of the work entailed at the projects and providing the means of uniformity in essential detail while allowing latitude in project organization to accommodate special circumstances." The procedures "recognized the need of a well-informed staff and a well-informed resident population."

Director Myer and key members of the WRA's Washington staff met with the project directors and their principal staff members at a segregation conference held in Denver, Colorado, on July 26-27, 1943. The purpose of the conference was "to clarify by discussion and unify interpretation of the segregation policy."

At the conference, WRA Solicitor Philip Glick discussed the manner in which those to be segregated would be screened. Three separate types of "hearings" would be used at each relocation center: segregation, welfare, and leave clearance. The function of the segregation hearings was to determine that the man really said "No" to question 28 and knew what it meant and intended to say "No" and still wants to say "No". Or that he refused to register, that he really wants to be Japanese, that the refusal to register was an evidence of his wanting to be Japanese, or that his failure to answer question 28 represents a desire to be Japanese.

The welfare hearings would be held with the whole family. They will follow the segregation hearing and be held only with families of the segregants. The purpose of the welfare meetings will be to help the evacuees make a choice between centers, answer their travel questions, help them with arranging routine baggage check outs, etc.

The leave clearance hearings were designed to be as complete an investigation as we can make to enable the director to determine whether a definite leave should be given or whether the person should be interned for the duration. This is a serious problem. Washington will send a docket if available. . . . the Leave Clearance Board will then hold exhaustive hearings, getting a written statement from the evacuee. The ideal way to do this would be to segregate no one until leave clearance hearings had been given, but we can't wait. We have to accomplish the mass segregation of those we are reasonably sure need to be segregated now. We are assuming that the repatriates and expatriates can be segregated now and the 'No's' can be segregated after a hearing to determine what the persons meant. For all others, we don't feel sure enough of our judgment to segregate and to deny indefinite leave unless we do complete elaborate leave clearance hearings. Hearings on them will be completed after segregation and we can determine then whether we have made a mistake. We are recognizing that mistakes will be made however careful we may be.\(^{39}\)

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An official pamphlet entitled, *Segregation of Persons of Japanese Ancestry in Relocation Centers*, was published by the WRA in August 1943 for distribution to all evacuees and WRA personnel in the ten relocation centers. According to the pamphlet, segregation was for

Those persons of Japanese ancestry now in relocation centers [who] have had the opportunity to state their individual choices and to back their statements by their actions . . . one of the important sources of information which will be considered will be the answer given by each individual to Question 28 in the registration conducted in each relocation center during February and March, 1943.

The segregation manual outlined the groups of evacuees that would have to attend the segregation, welfare, and leave clearance hearings. Four groups were designated:

Group I. Persons who will be designated for segregation without further hearing. This group includes those persons who made formal application for repatriation or expatriation before July 1, 1943, and did not retract their applications before that date.

Group II. Those persons who, on the strength of their answers to Question 28 or their refusal to answer the question, would appear to be loyal to Japan rather than to the United States. Each of these persons will be asked to appear before a Board of Review for Segregation which will ascertain whether the evidence of pro-Japanese loyalty correctly represents the attitude of the individual. This group includes those who answered "No" to Question 28 and who did not change their answers to "Yes" before July 15, 1943; those who refused to register; those who registered but did not answer Question 28.

The hearings before the Board of Review will be comparatively brief. Those persons found by the Board to continue to hold to their pro-Japanese views will be designated for segregation. Those who sign a statement of loyalty to or sympathy with the United States at the hearings will be reclassified to Group III for further hearings on eligibility for leave clearance.

Group III. Those persons who may have stated their loyalty to or sympathy with the United States, but whose loyalty or sympathy is in doubt because of previous statements or because of other evidence. This group includes:

a. Those reclassified from Group II.

b. Those who answered "No" to Question 28 at the time of registration but who changed their answers to "Yes" before July 15, 1943.

c. Those who qualified their affirmative answers to Question 28.

d. Those who requested repatriation or expatriation but retracted their requests before July 1, 1943.
National Historic Context

e. Those about whom there is other information indicating lack of allegiance to the United States.

f. Those who have been denied leave by the Director.

Persons in Group III as outlined above will be given hearings by the Leave Section at the relocation center with sufficient thoroughness to enable the Leave Section to determine the true loyalty of each individual, and to decide whether or not he should be declared eligible for leave.

Group IV. Those who are eligible for leave. (Not to be segregated). 40

In August 1943 a special review board composed of WRA appointed personnel members was established at each relocation center to conduct individual hearings for those persons who had answered the loyalty question in the negative or had failed or refused to answer it. Only those persons who filed applications for repatriation or expatriation to Japan and, as of July 1, 1943, had not retracted them were consigned to the segregation center at Tule Lake without an individual hearing. Each person who had given a negative answer (or none at all) to the loyalty question was asked if he wished to change his answer. If he said that he did not wish to change, the conversation was terminated. On the other hand, if he said that he wanted to change to an affirmative answer, he was questioned extensively as to his motives for changing, and at the close of the hearing the board made a recommendation to the project director for disposal of the case.

Despite the consequences, most evacuees stuck by their original statements and the rehearing process during the summer of 1943 at the relocation centers registered mostly grief, disappointment, and anger. Numerous Issei professed "disloyalty" as a way of getting back to California or of avoiding release. Many Kibei chose Tule Lake out of frustration with official distrust of their group. Others had no choice; they were family members — elderly, children, or handicapped — who could not leave their relatives. A number of evacuees already at Tule Lake embraced "disloyalty" to avoid moving again. 41

On August 19, 1943, a WRA field station was established at Fort Douglas, Utah, to serve as liaison between the Ninth Service Command of the Army, which was handling the transportation for the segregation program, and WRA officials both in Washington and at the relocation centers. Prior to the first entrainment, a two-day conference was conducted at Fort Douglas, during which all military personnel, train commanders, mess and medical officers, and other staff members received detailed instruction regarding transportation operations.

Between September 13 and October 11, 1943, 33 train trips transported 15,148 evacuees, 6,289 from Tule Lake to other centers and 8,559 to Tule Lake. Each train trip of segregants was accompanied by a military detachment of 50 persons and a WRA staff member whose


duty it was to be alert to safety measures, take necessary health and sanitary precautions, answer questions, and delegate to evacuee train monitors and coach captains responsibilities for getting volunteers to work en route and for keeping the railway cars in a sanitary condition. Evacuee volunteers served the regular meals prepared by army cooks, operated the auxiliary diners which furnished meals for the ill and infirm in sleeping cars, and maintained a high standard of sanitation and neatness in the coaches, kitchens, lavatories, and diners. Car mothers looked after children, and formula girls assisted the Army nurses in the preparation of formulas and infant diets. Arrangements for meals en route were made by the Army, with the WRA supplying perishables, fuel for gasoline stoves, and ice for refrigeration. In the course of these train movements, 129,846 meals were served. The Army, at the urging of the WRA, attempted to provide for the comfort and well-being of the aged, sick, expectant mothers, and mothers with small babies. Sickness en route was kept to a minimum, and no deaths or births took place on the trains. Six persons were removed from trains for hospitalization. No case of unrest, violence, disorderly conduct, or intentional resistance was observed by military personnel or WRA train riders on the trains. In view of wartime travel conditions, the service of the railroads was reportedly "excellent in respect to both equipment and schedules." While some trains were delayed in departure beyond their scheduled times, only two reached their destinations later than scheduled.

With one exception the program was conducted according to plan. It was found that housing at Tule Lake could not accommodate the total number of segregants. Consequently, the transfer of approximately 1,900 people from Manzanar was postponed until additional housing units could be constructed. When it became apparent that the movement of the Manzanar people would be delayed until early 1944, one trip was scheduled in early October to move 297 of the Manzanar segregants whose health required that they make the trip before the onslaught of severe winter weather.

During February 21-26, 1944, the second transfer movement of evacuees — 1,876 persons on four trains — from Manzanar to Tule Lake was accomplished. A third transfer movement of evacuees from Jerome, Rohwer, Granada, Heart Mountain, Minidoka, and Gila River to Tule Lake took place on May 4-25, 1944, when 1,654 persons were transferred via four special trains and two special cars on regular trains.42

Additional individual segregation hearings continued at the relocation centers, thus ensuring that small contingents of segregants were sent to Tule Lake from time to time. Others would be sent as they failed to convince Director Myer, or his authorized representatives, that they were "loyal" and should be granted leave clearance. All told, the later transfers moved 249 more residents out of Tule Lake, while 3,614 additional segregants transferred in. Altogether, some 6,000 evacuees remained at Tule Lake. Meanwhile, Tule Lake was being physically transformed into a segregation center. A double eight-foot barbed wire fence was erected, the military guard was increased to a battalion, and six tanks were lined up conspicuously on the center's perimeter.43


43. Personal justice Denied, p. 208.
The Solicitor's Office was instrumental in establishing an Appeals Board at Tule Lake for handling cases in which persons denied leave clearance and transferred to Tule Lake might feel that "justice had miscarried." A panel of members for the Appeals Board, consisting of prominent citizens not connected with the WRA, was established, and hearings before the board were set for 1944. The Appeals Board, however, served only in an advisory capacity; the authority to grant or deny leave clearance rested in the final analysis solely with the Director of the WRA. Twenty-four appeals were made prior to June 30, 1944, and were scheduled to be heard by the Appeals Board in July.44

While embarking on the segregation program, the federal government also undertook measures to exchange nationals with the Japanese government. On September 2, 1943, the ship Gripsholm sailed from New York for Japan under an exchange of nationals arranged by the State Department, carrying 314 passengers from relocation centers, 149 of whom were American citizens.45

During fiscal year 1944, there were 8,981 requests by persons of Japanese ancestry for repatriation and expatriation to Japan, raising the total number of effective requests to 15,366. The WRA reported that a "marked increase in the number of requests for repatriation and expatriation "has followed every major change in government policy affecting evacuees." About 10,000 of the requests on file were made during or immediately following crises brought about by the Army and leave clearance registration which was conducted in the spring of 1943, the segregation activities of the summer and fall, and the Army announcement on January 20, 1944, that Nisei were to be inducted under Selective Service procedures.

A large percentage of the requests appear to be based more on emotion than reason. The evacuation, the loss of economic security that went with it, and evidences of antagonism outside the centers have filled the evacuees with fear for the future, and any change of policy adds to their alarm. Few of them are motivated to request repatriation or expatriation because they have any real interest in Japan or expectation of going there. They are tired of moving and Tule Lake seems to them the one place where they may be allowed to stay for the duration of the war. They seek segregation to escape pressure to relocate under wartime conditions, to hold their families together, or to protest against the evacuation. Others who do look to a future in Japan have built up fantasies of life there with hardly any actual knowledge of the country they are choosing.46

Thus, the registration and segregation programs pushed evacuees in the relocation centers in opposite directions. Some were released and were heading toward a more normal, productive life in American society. To those who expressed their anger and frustration, however, the programs brought a more repressive, violent, and frustrating period at Tule

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Lake. The programs are appropriately remembered as one of the most divisive events in the camps. It broke apart the community of evacuees by forcing each to a declared choice — a choice that could be made only by guesswork about a very uncertain future. It was a choice that was hard to hedge, and it divided families and friends philosophically, emotionally, and finally, physically, as some went east to start new lives and others were taken off to the grimmer confinement of Tule Lake.

MANZANAR HISTORIC CONTEXT

Registration Program

Program Implementation. The residents of Manzanar first learned of the forthcoming registration program when Assistant Project Director Robert Brown appeared before the Block Managers Assembly on January 29, 1943. Brown emphasized the Army’s role in the registration, explaining “that just the Army would arrive and induct the members in this center.” Later on February 8, Brown informed the Block Managers that the Army was coming to implement the registration program and that the registration would apply to the entire center. Brown noted:

that they [the WRA] are working out a schedule by which everyone in every relocation center can register for this program. This program does make it easier to get clearance and leave permits for relocation purposes. Therefore, it serves a two-fold purpose.

Lieutenant Eugene D. Bogard, Sergeant Irving V. Tierman, Sergeant James A. Hemphill, and Sergeant Kenneth M. Uni (the members of the Army team who were to supervise registration at Manzanar) were also introduced to the Block Managers on February 8. During the ensuing discussion, Throckmorton, Manzanar’s project attorney who had attended the registration program training sessions at the War Department in Washington during the previous week, summarized the thrust of the registration process:

The Army plan is to form a combat unit composed entirely of Japanese-American soldiers, and those who volunteer will be given the opportunity to join this unit. He also mentioned the fact that it is under consideration as to the possibility of Japanese Americans eligible for other branches of the service, and even the AACS for the women. The citizens who are registered in this program will be given recommendation for any type of service if they qualify. . . . The military officials are trying hard to get the Japanese back into normal channels. They figure that if the Japanese are trustworthy enough to join the army, public opinion will favor the actions of the Japanese as a whole. The Army does not expect every loyal person to volunteer, but they will be given an opportunity to declare themselves

47. Personal Justice Denied, pp. 211-12.

48. Block Managers Assembly Minutes, January 29, 1943, p. 3, Box 10, File, “Community Government — Block Managers’ Reports, January — September 1943,” Folder 2, Coll. 122, Department of Special Collections, UCLA.

49. Ibid., February 8, 1943, p. 1.
loyal regardless of whether they are going to volunteer or not. This is the first step towards a solution to this whole evacuation program.50

In conjunction with the meetings held for the Block Managers, other meetings were held with the evacuees on a block-by-block basis. At these meetings, the Army team presented the information on its check-sheet. Reiterating the various factors that contributed to the registration program, Lieutenant Bogard stated in the Manzanar Free Press on February 11:

It is the intention of the Army to begin both the reestablishment of the Japanese population as a constructive part of the war effort and also to utilize the registration as a means of demonstrating the loyalty of the Japanese people once and for all.51

The actual registration program at Manzanar began on February 12, 1943, with five blocks in the center used as registration areas: one block for the Army team registration, and the other four for the female citizens and the alien males and females. The registration for the latter group was finished in four days, while the former was not completed until February 22 because of the stipulated requirement of having Questions 27 and 28 answered in front of a member of the Army team.

During the registration, the impracticality of Question 28 on the WRA form was quickly realized by the Manzanar appointed personnel. Upon consultation with the Washington Office on February 12, the Manzanar staff was "authorized to change the question in any way [they] saw fit or omit it entirely for aliens." Throckmorton informed Merritt, who was not present at Manzanar during the registration because of an appendicitis attack, what happened next:

Relying upon this verbal authorization... I contacted the Negotiating Committee, consisting of 2 citizens and 2 aliens, in order to obtain its advice as to how the question should be altered for aliens... We immediately agreed the question should be so formed that an alien could answer it in the affirmative without renouncing his Japanese citizenship... the question that was finally agreed upon was as follows: "Are you sympathetic to the United States of America and do you agree to faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces?"52

The question as revised by the Manzanar staff was not used until February 13, but because of quick action, the Issei who registered on February 12 were not required to answer Question 28. At the other camps, the reaction of the project directors and their staff was one of wait-and-see for official recommendations or revisions. This waiting policy was well advised, because on the evening of February 13, WRA Director Myer sent telegrams to each center detailing the reworded question as formulated by the WRA.

50. Ibid., p. 4.
52. Throckmorton to Merritt, March 24, 1943, Box 23, File, "Relocation — Registration (1942-April 1943)," Coll. 122, Department of Special Collections.
Myer placed emphasis on the latitude possible in the handling of the question for aliens. He stated in the telegrams that the "substitute Question 28 may also be answered by aliens in a qualified way if they so desire."\footnote{53} When Throckmorton received the Myer telegram, he felt that the question formulated by the Manzanar staff was preferable even though he later expressed the opinion that the Manzanar form of Question 28 for aliens was "a strongly worded question." At the time, however, he felt that the Manzanar wording of the question was the best available.\footnote{54}

Rather than re-start the registration for the Issei, the Manzanar staff decided to use the question they had devised and at a later date repoll the aliens asking the question utilized at the other relocation centers. This policy was responsible for considerable confusion and misunderstanding for both the WRA and the evacuee population at Manzanar.\footnote{55}

Although the Manzanar staff anticipated that the aliens at Manzanar would be able to have a chance to answer the question as formulated in Washington, Project Director Merritt had to request permission for such action. In making this request on March 24, Merritt asked that citizens also be permitted to answer the revised question:

> I cannot conscientiously refrain from bringing out this point which will now adversely affect the lives and position of so many of our people, nor can I refrain from urging upon you that we have an opportunity to recanvass the alien groups who have answered "No" or who have answered "Yes" with qualifications, putting before them another opportunity to cancel their previous reply and answer the revised question sent out by Washington. . . . If this recanvass is permitted by you, I feel certain that we should also then allow our citizens to revise their answer. . . . \footnote{56}

At a special meeting of the Block Managers Assembly on March 30, 1943, Merritt solicited the opinion of this group on whether or not the aliens should be re-polled. According to the minutes of the meeting, Merritt explained why Manzanar had used a differently-worded question:

> Mr. Merritt said that if the alien residents of Manzanar who answered "No" to Question 28 or gave a qualified answer wish to answer the question as it was asked at the other centers, he would advise the Washington authorities accordingly, and do everything possible to extend them the privilege of doing so. He explained that the reason for the different wording of Question 28 at Manzanar was due to the fact that we completed our registration in four days, and used a wording for Question 28 which was hastily made under pressure of completing the registration, and although Washington approved by telephone, this change of wording from the original wording, which was sent out from

Washington gave them an entirely new wording for Question 28. Mr. Merritt stated that this matter is already causing adverse comments between the centers, and they result in unfavorable reactions. He said that for this reason he was laying the whole matter before the Block Managers to obtain their reactions and for them to obtain expression of opinion from the residents of their blocks.57

After discussion of Merritt's comments, the Block Managers Assembly agreed that the aliens should be given the opportunity to re-answer Question 28 based on Washington's rewording.

Approval for the re-polling was also received from Washington, and from April 12 to April 24, the 3,500 Issei at Manzanar answered the reworded loyalty question. Of this number, 3,418 or 97.68 percent of the Issei were able to answer the revised question with a "Yes" — a sharp contrast to the responses elicited during the earlier questioning.

As aforementioned, the results of the registration in the relocation centers were well below the expectations of the Army and the WRA. Instead, the number of persons who responded in the negative were surprisingly high at Jerome, Gila River, and Manzanar, and at Tule Lake a large number did not even register. At Manzanar, there were 6,897 persons of 17 years of age or over who filled out one of the two questionnaires. Of that number, 4,269, or 61.89 percent of those questioned, answered Question 28 with a "No" or a qualified answer before the re-polling of the aliens. Those who answered an unqualified "no" numbered 2,645, or 38.35 percent; while those who definitively answered "Yes" were 2,628, or 38.1 percent.

The answers to Question 27 on the Army questionnaire by male citizens at Manzanar also revealed a lack of interest in volunteering for military service. Only 94 Nisei out of a possible 1,909, or about 4 percent of those canvassed, eventually joined the 100th Battalion/442nd RCT. Of the 1,909 total registered, 960, or 52 percent of the male citizen group, answered Question 28 in the negative.

Even though Question 28 on the WRA questionnaire had been revised by the Manzanar staff largely on account of the Issei, they still reacted to it negatively. Of the 3,356 alien males and females registered at Manzanar, 1,978, or 59 percent, answered Question 28 in the negative or with qualifications. The female citizens also reacted negatively to Question 28. Of the 1,632 female citizens who answered the question, 731, or 45 percent, answered "No" or qualified their answer.58

Thus, at Manzanar a majority of both the male citizens and Issei, as well as nearly half of the female citizens, had answered "No" or qualified their answer to the "loyalty" question. Bothered by this development, WRA officials undertook a series of studies and

57. Block Managers Assembly Minutes, March 30, 1943, p. 2, Box 10, File, "Community Government — Block Managers' Reports, January — September 1943," Folder 3, Coll. 122, Department of special Collections, UCLA.

58. Merritt, "Summary of Tabulation of Forms 304a," March 5, 1943, and "Summary of Forms 126, revised," March 23, 1943, Box 23, File, "Relocation — Registration (1942-April 1943)," Coll. 122, Department of Special Collections, UCLA.
investigations to determine the reasons for this unexpected evacuee reaction to the registration program.

**WRA and Army Investigations of Evacuee Reaction to Registration.** In their haste to rectify the weighty problem of Japanese American loyalty, the Army and the WRA had underestimated the high number of negative responses that would be made during the registration program. For the Army, the registration results appeared to have corroborated their long-held contention that "disloyal" Japanese Americans made necessary an evacuation of all Americans of Japanese ancestry from the west coast. The strong negative response, and especially that of the Nisei, however, appears to have bewildered the WRA. At Manzanar, Lucy Adams, head of the Community Services Section and one of the principal appointed personnel in administering the program, noted:

> All of us I think have been startled by the sweeping repudiation of loyalty to this country, or of hope of any future here. You expected it among the Kibei, but not among the citizens. And to find, by the hundreds, products of our high schools and colleges who've never been in Japan answering "No" to the loyalty question and adding "Want to go to Japan," and listening to the reasons they gave, was shocking. Our first reaction, mine anyway, was anger. I wanted to wash my hands of the whole traitorous bunch and consign them to any concentration camp the public wanted to set up. 59

In order to understand the reaction to the registration, both the Army and the WRA undertook analytic studies of the program's results. At Manzanar the first analysis of the registration program was provided by Project Director Merritt. In a letter written to WRA Director Myer on February 17, Merritt summarized his understanding of the causes for the negative responses by male citizens to Question 27:

> There are, of course, the pressures of the older people who have answered "No" to their loyalty question, and there is the threat of physical violence which lies hidden in certain groups, particularly in the Kibei group who are openly anti-American. 60

Merritt's singling out the Kibei as "anti-American" and as a primary factor for negative answers was echoed by Lucy Adams less than a week later. In a letter on February 23, she observed:

> Another group, including some of the more highly educated ones, has made up its mind that the price in racial discrimination which they'll have to pay to stay in America is too high, and that the only worthwhile future is in Japan. . . . this

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59. Adams to Province, February 23, 1943, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 346, File No. 61.318.

60. Merritt to Myer, February 17, 1943, box 23, File, "Relocation -- Registration (1942-April 1943), Coll. 122, Department of Special Collections, UCLA. There is evidence that Merritt had reason to single out the Kibei as the source of continuing anti-American sentiment at Manzanar. In November 1943, for instance, a mostly Kibei roofing crew admitted that it had used roofing tar to write Japanese salutations to the Emperor and Japanese military deities and other pro-Japanese patriotic slogans on the roofs of several buildings in Blocks 27, 28, and 29.
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group, which includes most of the Kibei, is the dangerous one and I believe the source of a lot of the intimidation and the propaganda.

Adams also echoed the project director's solution for the reluctant male citizen volunteers:

I agree with Mr. Merritt that the soundest thing, and the only one that will prevent the infection of disloyalty from spreading is to make them all immediately subject to the draft, and those who refuse to take the soldier's oath can then be dealt with under the penalties provided.61

While Merritt and Adams viewed disloyal groups, such as the Kibei, as subversive forces that worked against the registration program, the first compendium of reasons for the answers to the "loyalty registration" at Manzanar developed by a "representative group" of evacuee residents of the camp did not list such groups. In a report compiled on February 26, this evacuee group listed eleven reasons for the negative responses:

1. Inability to separate loyalty question from question on volunteering for service in the Army
2. Belief that there is no future in this country for Japanese or Americans of Japanese ancestry
3. Bitterness and rancor left from experience of evacuation
4. Family pressure and family ties
5. Fear that answer to "Yes" on the loyalty question would lose them any rights to Japanese citizenship which they may have
6. Emotional confusion
7. Broken promises made by the Army when evacuation first took place, and by the government
8. Age and lack of leadership among Nisei
9. Failure of Issei to understand the program
10. Rumor that answer on loyalty question would determine the Camp to which individuals would be sent, and anxiety of families to remain together
11. Hope that answer to "No" of loyalty question would prevent their being taken into the Army.62

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: THE LOYALTY CRISIS AT MANZANAR

On the same day that this report was issued another summarization of reasons for the negative answers was presented by the Army team at Manzanar. In the Army summary, many of the causes listed by the Manzanar evacuee group were reiterated. However, the army pinpointed several additional reasons. The Army list included:

1. Influence of parents
2. Bitterness and resentment caused by the evacuation and treatment since
3. Belief that Japan will win the war and a desire to be on the winning side
4. Threats by agitators; propaganda and rumors
5. Belief that racial discrimination will make any future in the United States too difficult, and that a return to Japan is the only solution
6. Lack of faith in the good intentions of the government
7. Bitterness left by Manzanar riot
8. Previous lack of assimilation in American society
9. Belief that the answer "no" would keep the individual from being drafted, and possibly insure his return to Japan
10. Ignorance and misunderstandings

In addition, the Army report listed three reasons for the scarcity of Nisei volunteers for active duty in the armed forces. These included:

1. Opposition to a Combat Unit composed of Japanese-Americans, because it continues the racial discrimination and segregation which they feel is the root of their troubles.
2. Fear that their families remaining in the Center will be ostracized and possibly terrorized if their sons volunteer.
3. Family pressure against volunteering - even when the parents are loyal.

The army report concluded that "with more than 90 percent of the persons interviewed, the answers given, and the reasons assigned for them, were genuine, at the moment."

The latter statement echoed the opinion that Merritt had expressed some days earlier regarding the validity of the registration results. The project director had observed in his aforementioned letter to Myer on February 17:

What now is most needed is the creation of policies to meet the conditions that are disclosed by the first valid conclusions we have ever been able to reach on the matter of loyalties.\textsuperscript{64}

Thus, the first administrative reactions to the registration program results were a sense of shocked disbelief followed by generally repressive proposals. Finally, the results of the registration were accepted. Certain groups and factors, however, appear to have become pinpointed as the principal causes of the negative answers at Manzanar.

In another letter to WRA Director Myer on March 5, Merritt again pointed out the Kibei as "troublemakers" who played a significant role in the large number of negative answers to the loyalty question at Manzanar. He stated:

Among those answering "No" to Question 28 one group stands out. These are the Kibei with no other members of the family in this country, all of whose education and most of whose lives have been in Japan. . . . we found only one of these among the "Yes" answers, and he had changed from "No" to "Yes". This is a group which should be carefully checked, and probably included in any plans for segregation.

Merritt continued by explaining that other groups, or "gangs," were also responsible for "No" answers:

Among young men between the ages of 17 and 20, the strongest influence governing answers to Question 28 appears to be the gang rather than the parents. A sampling . . . shows that in the cases of some of these gangs, the parents and sisters often answered "Yes" to 28, while the boys without exception said "No," and often added "want to go back to Japan".\textsuperscript{65}

While Merritt believed that "gang" or peer pressure was the primary cause of a "No" answer for young men and Nisei in general, he believed that family ties were the greatest influence for "No" answers. In another letter to Myer on February 27, he noted:

The motives lying behind the "No" answer of citizens stem largely from the attitude of the father who is a non-citizen. . . . the father signs "No" on his question of loyalty in the spirit of self-preservation. . . . the tradition of family unity being the basis of Japanese philosophy of life, the father, mother and son, therefore, will sign "No" to the loyalty question.

The project director also pointed out that the failure of the registration program was due in part to administrative mismanagement and lack of sensitivity to a complex situation.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{64} Merritt to Myer, February 17, 1943, Box 23, File, 'Relocation — Registration (1942 — April 1943), Coll. 122, Department of Special Collections, UCLA.

\textsuperscript{65} Merritt to Myer, March 5, 1943, \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{66} Merritt to Myer, February 27, 1943, \textit{ibid}.

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Throckmorton described this administrative failure in a letter to Merritt on March 2. He noted:

In the first place, the program was launched without sufficient preliminary education. To virtually all of the evacuees, the Army was a tough agency, personified by General DeWitt and the Military Police, which had led them into assembly and relocation centers. . . . there is also the factor that we were not allowed sufficient time to make an adequate presentation of the plan. . . . once registration was started we had to devote most of our energies to the procedure of registration and we were able to deny rumors and get out further information only by means of printed bulletins.

Throckmorton also analyzed the causes for "No" answers on a generational basis. For the Issei, he listed two principal reasons. The first was that "the Issei do not now plan to relocate. . . . on the contrary, most of them are at present planning to return to Japan when the war is over." The second reason given by the project attorney was linked with the first, in that the Issei who would return to Japan hoped that life would be financially easier there. Thus, "most of the Issei, primarily from economic motives, answered the loyalty question 'No.'"

Throckmorton also listed two major reasons why Nisei said "No." The first was a protest over the loss of their citizenship rights and discriminatory treatment, while the second was the "family tie." He commented further:

Most of the Issei are, at this time, planning to return to Japan after the duration and, generally speaking, they insist that the children go with them. The children accept the obligation to support the parents in their declining years and, for this reason, they are forced to plan for a future in Japan. . . . most of us, who have worked with the registration at Manzanar, are of the opinion that this is the main reason why many of the Nisei have answered the loyalty question negatively.67

On April 3, 1943, Morris E. Opler, the recently-arrived Community Analyst at Manzanar who had the task of defining trends, themes, and factors that had caused problems in the camp, issued his first study on the registration program at the center. In his report, he also placed emphasis on the family as a determining factor to explain Nisei answers to the loyalty question:

Once their parents. . . . determined that they would answer "No," the children were faced with a grave problem. . . . the pressure upon the children was intolerable. . . . the feeling of loyalty to the old people and the resolve to share their fortunes and keep the family united was the dominant factor in "no" answers of citizens.

Opler also introduced an element of skepticism in relationship to the accuracy of the registration program. He noted that

67. Throckmorton to Merritt, March 2, 1943, Ibid.
for all realistic purposes and in spite of the intentions of the framers of the questions, it is very doubtful whether these questions should be called loyalty questions at all. In a good many cases (the great majority, I suspect) the final decision had relatively little to do with affection for Japan or disaffection for the United States.

In addressing the question of why the Issei had forced their children to answer "No" to the loyalty question, Opler identified two major factors to explain the Issei's rationale:

In my judgment the element of protest dominated any element of affirmation. It was not interest in Japan, but blind resentment over discriminatory treatment which entered prominently into the decision; [and] . . . the loss of confidence in themselves and in the American public which evacuation has entailed.

The Issei, according to Opler, had lost confidence in their ability to manage their lives "outside" of the centers. This was mainly due to the fact that the average age of the Issei was 56, too old they thought to restart their economic lives, and that many Issei had lost all of their money, land, and business as a result of evacuation. Any Issei who still retained sums of money was afraid of losing it in a further move or as a result of relocation. The fear of relocation was caused by the nature of the questionnaire filled in by the Issei which had been titled, "Application for Leave Clearance." Many respondents usually

assumed that if they answered all questions, and particularly Question 28, in a manner satisfactory to the authorities, they would be sent out to face the competitive system in the outside world at this time.

Issei fears and insecurities had thus mandated their "No" answers as well as the "No" answers of their children.

Opler examined the question of why so few Nisei had said "Yes" to Question 27 relating to volunteering for the military. The chief reason for this development, according to his analysis, was the argument presented by the male citizens that asking them to volunteer for the armed services from behind barbed wire was "superpatriotism expected of them" that oddly contrasted "with the abridgement" of their "citizenship rights." Another reason was that many of the male citizens were Kibei who had left Japan to avoid serving in the Japanese Imperial Army, and now they felt little inclination to be members of the U.S. Army. In addition, the attitude of Sergeant Uni, the only Japanese American on the army team at Manzanar, had contributed to the "No" answers. The sergeant was a person

who came from Hawaii [and] whose antipathy to Terminal Island and the residents of Little Tokyo was outspoken and most vigorous. We had many substantiated reports that young men would come before him at the time he was writing answers to various questions, and the sergeant would say, 'Another Terminal Islander — I suppose you are another 'No-No' boy and want to go to Japan?' Careful examination of the registration documents will show that in many cases 'wants to go to Japan' was written in the handwriting of the sergeant and that the person being interviewed vigorously denies that any such thing was ever said.
Opler concluded his report by stating that his study by no means does justice to the complexity of the situation. But it indicates, I hope, that the "no" of a resident of Manzanar, like that of some young ladies, should not always be taken at face value. It suggests, I hope, that a complex situation cannot be properly described by a word of limited meaning, such as 'loyal' or 'disloyal'. Most of all, I trust I have made clear my conviction that the problems of Manzanar are not be settled with an adding machine.\(^{68}\)

On May 21 Lieutenant Bogard, head of the Army recruiting team at Manzanar, refuted Opler's basic contention that the registration did not assess evacuee loyalty. He stated:

Attempts have been made... to minimize the importance of the numerous negative answers of aliens and citizens at Manzanar to the 27th and 28th questions on the Selective Service and WRA Questionnaire... it is believed by the Army Team that most of the decisions made by both the aliens and citizens definitely indicated their affection or disaffection for the United States.

Bogard also questioned the validity of Opler's opinion that the "loss of confidence of the Issei in their future and rehabilitation in America" had been a determining element of affirmation, thus making interest in Japan a matter of secondary importance in a decision to answer "No" to the loyalty question. He explained:

It seems apparent that if the Japanese aliens do not believe their future and rehabilitation in America is possible, their loyalty likewise does not lie with the United States but rather with Japan, and their negative response to the 28th question truly reflects their disaffection for the United States.

He did agree, however, that parental pressure was responsible for the decisions of many Nisei:

The negative attitude of a majority of the parents in the Center was, in the opinion of the Army team, the strongest single reason causing male citizens to answer "no" to the loyalty questions... The parents opposition to the War department's program was based on the deep-seated belief that Japan will win the war. Such matters as 'discrimination', 'harsh evacuation treatment,' etc., were used by the parents and Kibei to stimulate resentment in the children.\(^{69}\)

Thus, both the WRA and the Army arrived at similar conclusions concerning the reasons for the highly negative response of Manzanar's evacuees to the registration program. These common factors, most of which applied to the other nine relocation centers, included fear of the world "outside" of the center, fear of making a living on the "outside," and protests that their constitutional rights had been abrogated by the government. All

\(^{68}\) Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, April 3, 1943, Report No. 3, "Registration At Manzanar," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 346, File No. 61.318.

\(^{69}\) Memorandum for Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, by Eugene D. Bogard, 1st Lt, C.M.P., Army Team Captain, Manzanar, California, May 21, 1943, attached to ibid.
that remained was the decision about what to do concerning the evacuees who gave the
negative answers.70

Two alternative explanations for the results of the registration program were proposed by
a nine-member panel of Manzanar appointed personnel, consisting primarily of heads of
departments and sections including Opler. While the principal concerns of this group were
directed toward an appraisal of the Nisei's plight, the alternatives they outlined for the
WRA on May 18 were applicable to all Japanese Americans who had answered "No" to
the loyalty question:

For some time, and particularly during the past few weeks, the newspapers, the
congressional record and radio programs have been filled with references to the
alleged 'disloyalty' of a substantial portion of young Americans of Japanese
ancestry. It is charged that a particularly large proportion of the Nisei or
American born persons of Japanese ancestry at Manzanar have 'proved'
themselves 'disloyal.' The charges come from political figures who have toured a
Relocation Center for a few hours or who have obtained their information from a
prejudiced and disgracefully untrustworthy west coast press.

There is no evidence that any of those who talk so loudly or violently about the
'loyalty' or 'disloyalty' of the Nisei has ever come to know one of these young
people, or has taken the pains to inform himself concerning the difficulties and
perplexities with which we have confronted these young citizens. Yet these
poorly informed politicians and professional patrioteers, with the noisy blessings
of every organization which belongs to the extreme reactionary and fascistic
fringe to spur them on, are riding the crest of war emotionalism and are
demanding penalties and reprisals of one sort or another against those who they
label 'disloyal.' Their proposals run an ominous gamut; from segregation of those
termed 'disloyal,' through the establishment of strict, Nazi-type concentration
camps for them, to the cancellation of their American citizenship and their
deporation to Japan.

We speak for the Nisei. We speak for these young Americans because we believe
that every American citizen must receive a fair hearing and just treatment in his
native land if citizenship as such is to survive as a meaningful and dynamic
concept. We speak for the Nisei because by doing so we strike out against the
dangerous and un-American forces which have launched an unscrupulous
campaign to discredit them... Those who agitate for segregation, concentration
camps, cancellation of citizenship, deportation and the like, are the mouthpieces
for one or another of equally unwholesome and disreputable groups.

We have our answers now. We can make of them what we will... we can take
these answers literally and translate them into segregation or into legal penalties...
.. we can loose the floodgates of fear, and watch the troubled waters engulf
minority group after minority group until one-third of our population is viewing
the other two-thirds with hostility and suspicion. We can write a black chapter in

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American history which will send the social historian to Nazi Germany for parallels.

Or we can act, even in time of war, like socialized human beings who have some comprehension of complex human situations. We can recognize that no setting was more unauspicious for a determination of simple loyalty than the one into which the Nisei were injected. We can recognize that the answers wrung from them under the strains and perplexities with which they were faced is no more an indication of disloyalty than medieval trials by torture were an evidence of witchcraft. No segment of our population or of any population would have answered differently in the same circumstances. A much more pressing question is that of America’s loyalty to fair-play and the democracy credo. 71

The WRA largely ignored this plea for sympathy and understanding, opting instead for segregation of the “disloyal” elements at Manzanar and the other relocation centers.

Segregation Program

Program Implementation. After the WRA segregation program was outlined, and the groups to be involved delineated, the segregation hearings began at each of the ten relocation centers in August 1943. At Manzanar, however, the WRA had “already gone into segregation, in the arrest of 26 people” following the violence at the camp on December 6, 1942. 72 Furthermore, Manzanar had already undertaken hearings for male Kibei who answered “No” on the “loyalty questionnaire” between April 15 and May 5. Thus, the initial segregation process and the “Kibei hearings” had served as the focal point of the discussions held at the February and May WRA project directors’ meetings dealing with segregation. As a result, Manzanar was the first center to experience “segregation,” as well as the first to use hearings to determine those to be segregated based on the “loyalty registration” program.

In a May 21 report stemming from the “Kibei hearings” at Manzanar, Project Director Merritt, who feared this sizable group in his relocation center, explained the rationale for the hearings. They had been conducted because

503 of the Kibei at Manzanar answered “No” on question 28. . . . out of the total 627 Manzanar Kibei registered by the Army Board in February 1943, inquiry into the questions of what is a Kibei and what creates this amazing percentage of apparent disloyalty became of vital importance. There is apparently little known of this group of American citizens of Japanese ancestry. They are not the ‘forgotten men’, they are men who were never known or understood. As a group of possible danger and potential disloyalty, they are the product of American neglect. They represent the crux of the so-called Japanese problem. Therefore, at


72. War Relocation Authority, Meeting of Project Directors, Little Rock, Arkansas, February 1-3, 1943, p. 177, RG 210, Entry 2.
Manzanar. . . . a thorough and prolonged investigation of this group [was undertaken] in order that essential facts regarding them might be brought out for the guidance of any interested government agencies dealing with Kibei.

Accordingly, a "Review Board of Manzanar," consisting of Lucy Adams, Chief, Community Services; Throckmorton, project attorney; Robert L. Brown, Assistant Project Director; and Director Merritt, had been established. "Each of the 503 Kibei men who had answered No came before this Board and were interviewed at as great a length as seemed necessary in order to permit them to state their position." Merritt continued:

When the Board reviewed the 503 cases it found 138 of that number who desired to swear allegiance to the United States and forswear allegiance to the Japanese Emperor. . . . the remainder of the group, 365, or approximately 60%, express a desire to say 'No' to the loyalty question and most of them added that they desired to return to Japan.

The reasons for maintaining a "No" answer at this hearing, according to Merritt, were:

1. Lack of ability to speak English and an education that is Japanese.
2. Parents or other relatives in Japan and a desire to return to them, in accordance with Japanese custom and tradition by which a son must support his parents and a family must be a unit.
3. Property in Japan owned by the family.

Merritt recommended that those Kibei who answered "Yes" or changed to "Yes" (and were approved by the Board) be given leave clearance; those who answered "No" not be given leave clearance; and if any of the Kibei were "uncooperative," they be removed from Manzanar and placed under "military control in another center." Merritt also recommended that Congress enact legislation making it possible for dual citizens (the laws of Japan and the United States made dual citizenship possible) to divest themselves of their United States citizenship and

to protect the exercise of the rights of citizenship by requiring those, who by accident of birth, were endowed with citizenship but who have been educated in the language and institutions of a foreign land, to demonstrate their ability to speak the language of this country and display a reasonable degree of understanding with regard to the Constitution, the laws and governmental philosophies of the American people. . . .

Merritt concluded the study by stating that

the alien Japanese, proven to be dangerous and the Kibei, actually or potentially un-Americanized as shown by his statements or his record, are the two groups
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requiring closest attention among those of Japanese ancestry in the United States.73

Throckmorton, a member of the review board that conducted the "Kibei Hearings" at Manzanar, concluded "that the original answers to question 28 should not be made the basis for any important action unless they are supplemented by additional information." He observed that it was "quite clear that there was a great deal of misunderstanding as to the meaning of question 28." There had also been "much pressure and confusion at the time of registration that caused people to answer question 28 not in the light of their own personal loyalty but on the basis of other considerations."74

The WRA's failure to understand the ramifications of those "considerations" played a major role in its initiation of a segregation program. However, the recommendation for acquisition of additional information was followed by the WRA when it determined that "segregation hearings" would be conducted.75

The first official mention of the pending "segregation hearings" at Manzanar was announced by Merritt at a special Block Managers meeting on July 13, 1943. Merritt noted that segregation would "commence September 1 and will probably end about October 20 or later." A report by Opler stated that "there was no demonstration of excitement on the part of the residents when they heard this announcement." A survey of first reactions indicated that the appointed personnel were "more excited and disturbed over the question of segregation than the evacuees themselves." Opler continued:

..... Evidently, they [appointed personnel] feel that this should be handled delicately and cautiously, and that the residents should be given the fullest information relative to the question, its implications and consequences. Realizing that their action and procedure during the February registration was hasty and that to a certain degree the issues were involved and confused at that particular time, they are now working on the assumption that if the residents are psychologically prepared they may be able to avoid the tensions and misunderstandings which they fear may possibly arise.76

In another report issued on July 15, Opler noted rather optimistically:

Segregation has been anticipated by many as the only means by which normal expressions can have free, unhampered outlet. ... Segregation will dissolve the

73. Ralph P. Merritt, "A Study of Kibei," May 21, 1943, Box 16, File, "WRA, Kibei," Coll. 122, Department of Special Collections, UCLA.
74. Robert B. Throckmorton, "Comments on Kibei Interviews at Manzanar From April 15, to May 5," July 15, 1943, Box 16, File, "Kibei — Hearings," Coll. 122, Department of Special Collections, UCLA.
constant bickering back and forth between pro-Japanese and pro-American thinking persons.\textsuperscript{77}

Five days later, on July 15, Opler prepared another report on segregation, summarizing the opinion of Kazuyuki Takahashi, Block Manager of Block 35. Takahashi believed that

The whole thing is that the people are sick of this uncertainty. They want some security and peace. They are going to answer anything to get in a center where they can have it. The feeling is that as long as they are going to be pushed out again they might as well go to the segregation camp and feel secure for the duration. I get the feeling that the majority of the administration is thinking in terms of how to get the people out. The residents are thinking in terms of how to remain in a center. So one side doesn’t understand the other side’s point of view, I guess. Don’t you think that most of the aliens do not give a hoot whether they are considered loyal or disloyal by people on the outside? All they are interested in now is in living in peace and security during the war and in not getting pushed around. That will be the main thing in these answers from now on. Family unity and security is what matters to these people now.

People are getting madder and madder about relocation. . . . I suppose these people figure that after segregation there will be nothing that will hold up relocation in the loyal camps.

Takahashi also reported a rumor that reflected another concern of some evacuees at Manzanar regarding segregation. According to the "fantastic" rumor, after segregation "Japanese music, kendo, and flower making or anything that is Japanese" would not be permitted "in the loyal camps."\textsuperscript{78} Thus, the residents of Manzanar reacted to the first announcement of segregation with attitudes ranging from apprehension to anxious expectation.

"Segregation Hearings" and "Leave Clearance Hearings" were held concurrently at Manzanar during August-November 1943. The hearings stretched over a four-month period because of the number of hearings involved and the fact that many of the same Manzanar appointed personnel served on review boards for both sets of hearings. Approximately 2,550 segregation hearings for individual evacuees were held before the "Board of Review for Segregation." Of this number, about 1,000 evacuees also attended a "Leave Clearance Hearing."

In a \textit{Summary of Segregation Program}, Project Director Merritt informed the evacuee population at Manzanar of the need for segregation as determined by the WRA. He also explained that

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\end{center}
Members of the immediate family of a person to be transferred to Tule Lake may accompany him. The immediate family includes the following persons: 1. The spouse; 2. Dependent parent, grandparents; 3. All unmarried children living in the immediate household of the family, including adult children.\(^{79}\)

The decision to allow the families of segregants to accompany them to Tule Lake would have a significant impact on the retention or deletion of a "No" answer to questions of loyalty during the segregation hearings.

Robert Brown, assistant project director, and Merritt characterized the impact of this decision in the Final Report, Manzanar. They observed:

Segregation hearings were a long and painful process since Washington decreed that fathers and mothers who desired repatriation were to be segregees or that entire families might become segregees if one family member asked for segregation. Parents who were repatriates influenced as many family members as possible to join them in requesting segregation. Young men and women, and many boys and girls who never thought of themselves as anything but loyal American citizens, found themselves trapped in the family unity plea and their names appeared on the list of those to be sent to Tule Lake.

Brown and Merritt explained the parents' motivation in influencing their children by saying that "Craftiness for self-protection was made the motivating factor in segregation by the majority of alien segregees. Loyalty was only a minor factor."\(^{80}\)

Another reason for the "long and painful process" of the segregation hearings at Manzanar was reflected in a letter from Philip M. Glick to J. Benson Saks, who had replaced Throckmorton as project attorney on August 20. Glick noted:

\ldots you state that you have two hearing boards and that you allow yourselves approximately 30 minutes for each hearing. It is my understanding from experience reported at other centers that the great majority of those who answered "No" to Question 28 on the registration form are simply adhering to their original answers so that no lengthy interview is necessary for such persons. I wonder whether, in view of the large number of interviews which probably have to be held at Manzanar, it might not be possible to schedule the interviews at much shorter intervals with the expectation that only a few of them would require as long as 30 minutes.\(^{81}\)

Saks responded to Glick on August 28, explaining that "one of the boards was probing the impalpable aspects of intent and attitude too deeply, and too much at length, and that its


\(^{81}\)Glick to Saks, August 18, 1943, RG 210, Entry 20, General Outgoing Correspondence to Relocation Centers, 1942-46, Box 29, File, "Chronological File, Manzanar, August 1943."
hearing was more nearly that contemplated for leave clearance, while the other board was moving along at a much faster clip, and with but perhaps a surface scratching of the factors that induced the original "No" answer and the factors which are controlling with the evacuees at the present time." "Where we are satisfied that we can recommend leave clearance we take the opportunity, at the segregation hearing, of so writing on the evacuee's papers and thus obviate the necessity of a later leave clearance hearing."

Segregation was "explained in terms of its being an American problem and a Japanese problem." The board made "it clear that Tule Lake is to be the place for those who prefer the Japanese traditions, customs and ways of life while the other centers are for those evacuees who look to America and our ways of living."

Of the approximately 2,550 segregation hearings at Manzanar, about 1,000 resulted in having evacuees change their "No" answers to "Yes" on the loyalty question. This group, along with those who had given a qualified answer to loyalty, or who had changed "No" to "Yes" before July 15 [518 evacuees] were to have leave clearance hearings. Denial of leave clearance resulted in transfer to Tule Lake.

"Leave clearance hearings" had been held in the relocation centers virtually since they had opened. The "registration program," for instance, was essentially a "leave clearance hearing." With the advent of the segregation program, the WRA believed it possible to have a mass issuance of "leave" from the relocation centers based on the hearings conducted to implement the segregation process.

The "leave clearance hearings" consisted of questions related to the original "No" answer, the reasons for a change in answer, and the current status of the evacuee's attitude toward the United States. In a letter to Glick on October 4, Saks elaborated:

... the Board conveys to the subject the understanding that its function is to help him state his case fully and without reservation so that the Board in Washington will have a complete and clear picture of the entire individual involved. ... the interviews consume in the neighborhood of thirty minutes. ... After the interview is over the Board reaches a decision as to its recommendation and records the flavor of the interview as well as any impressions gained of the subject or subjects.

Final authority to grant leave clearance resided with the Washington staff, the director supposedly reviewing and approving all requests for leave.

By the end of November 1943, nearly all of the evacuees at Manzanar had gone through one or more hearings relating to the question of loyalty. The hearings relating to segregation and leave clearance, however, posed different issues relating to loyalty. On December 1, Lucy Adams reported:

82. Saks to Glick, August 28, 1943, RG 210, Entry 18, 1942-46, File, No. 3.
84. Saks to Glick, October 20, 1943, RG 210, Entry 20, Box 29, File, "Chronological File, Manzanar, October 1943."
In contrast to the Segregation hearings which discovered the number of people, especially young people who had given up the battle to remain American and had retreated toward Japan, the Leave Clearance hearings were concerned with people, the majority of whom after an initial repudiation or hesitancy about their loyalty have not definitely made up their minds that they wish to remain in this country and are prepared to carry out the responsibilities of citizenship.

Adams attributed this difference between the two types of hearings to the fact that the evacuees involved in "leave clearance hearings"

want intensely to be Americans and are prepared to undergo hardship and opposition and put up a fight for their birthright as citizens or as aliens prevented by law from becoming citizens but wanting to make this their home and the place where they raise their children.

Nevertheless, Adams acknowledged the effect of Japanese culture even among these evacuees, stating that the

feeling toward Japan is mixed. . . . but a majority acknowledge some tie — sometimes racial, sometimes cultural, sometimes family, since almost every family has close relatives living there, and often members of the immediate family.

Adams summed up the "leave clearance hearings" by a discussion of Question 28, the original precursor of the segregation program:

Question 28, the Board members felt, has come to be generally accepted as a fair test and the cornerstone of loyalty, and in general, in contrast to the almost unthinking way it was frequently answered at the time of registration, or until the segregation hearings the answer was sometimes changed, it now has almost the solemnity of an oath.85

Thus, during 1943 the evacuees at Manzanar had been subject to continuous and successive appeals to express their loyalty to America or Japan. The "loyalty registration," "Kibei hearings," "segregation hearings," and the "leave clearance hearings" were all structured to discern commitment. The "welfare hearings," however, were different; their primary purpose was to aid the segregants and their families in their pending transfer to Tule Lake. As head counselor of the Community Welfare Section at Manzanar, Margaret D'Ille personally conducted these hearings. In the Final Report, Manzanar, D'Ille wrote:

Approximately 300 . . . cases were referred to Welfare for counseling, there often being more than one interview per case. Such interviews and plans for these families necessitated joint planning between the Welfare, Education, and Health Section. [According to D'Ille, 106 were deferred for medical reasons, and 260 for other reasons.]

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85. Memorandum, Lucy W. Adams to Ralph Merritt, December 1, 1943, RG 210, Entry 20, Box 30, File, "Chronological File, Manzanar, December 1943."
Family interviews often revealed widely differing points of view in the one family group.

Typical questions asked in the interviews included: Would the children be able to go to school if the family segregated? Would they get the same kind of training that the children were getting in Manzanar? What effect would segregation have upon the family's future possibilities of earning a livelihood in the United States?

... would an expected baby be an American citizen if it was born in the segregation center? Were all segregees to be deported and when? ... will the children lose their American citizenship? ... could we ever come back to California?26

Thus, even the "welfare hearings" were a reflection of the rumors and fears that existed in the camp as a result of one year's search for "loyalty."

At the conclusion of the "segregation hearings," more than 2,200 persons were transferred from Manzanar to Tule Lake. On October 9, 1943, 297 residents were transferred by train. This first group of segregants was composed chiefly of unattached Kibei and Issei.

Departure of the second and much larger group of segregants was delayed by the housing shortage at Tule Lake. According to the Final Report, Manzanar, 1,876 persons left Manzanar for Tule Lake on February 21, 23, 24, and 26, 1944, after additional housing at the segregation center had been made available. Family members of segregants who were seniors in high school were given the option of staying until June 1944 to complete their classwork and obtain their high school diplomas. A few family members refused to follow their families to Tule Lake and were allowed to stay in Manzanar.

After the second group of segregants left for Tule Lake, many evacuees at Manzanar who had not previously asked for repatriation filed requests. Some had originally answered "No" to the loyalty question, later had changed their answers to "Yes," and had been given leave clearance. Some cancelled their applications after several weeks, but other families filed new applications. Transfer of these evacuees to Tule Lake, however, was prevented by the lack of housing space. The segregation center was still not ready to receive any additional residents when the exclusion ban was lifted on January 2, 1945. Thus, a third segregation movement from Manzanar to Tule Lake never took place.27

WRA Investigations of Evacuee Reaction to Segregation Program. Although the various review boards at Manzanar prepared little consistent analytic studies of the segregation program at the camp, Morris E. Opler, the Community Analyst who attended many of the hearings, prepared a number of detailed studies on the WRA's "loyalty registration" and segregation programs in the camp. While there had been disturbances in some relocation centers before the registration program in 1943, it was the evacuees' negative response and resistance to the "loyalty registration" that led to establishment of the WRA's Community


Analysis Section and that group’s subsequent concentration on the issues engendered in
the registration and segregation programs. 88

In his first report concerning the segregation program on July 16, 1943, Opler observed
that the “two largest groups which will be affected by segregation are the repatriates and
their families and those citizens (kibei and nisei) who either maintain their ‘No’ answer to
the loyalty question or whose behavior or record do not convince the review board that
they are interested in the United States rather than in Japan.”

Opler also provided his personal opinion on the purpose of segregation. He stated:

.... I feel that the effect of the segregation program on the center, practically and
psychologically, will depend in large measure upon whether the definition of
segregation .... is actually observed. It makes all the difference in the world
whether those segregated are persons who really, by trustworthy standards, have
indicated their desire to be identified with Japan rather than with the United
States or whether some mechanical and arbitrary means is adopted which throws
people of various interests into this category.

In the report, Opler also addressed the rationale for the "No" answers given during the
already concluded "Kibei hearings." He observed:

.... it is well known that many of these kibei, by giving their "no" answers in the
first instance and by holding to it, are much more interested in avoiding the
military service which they believe is in the offing for the technically 'loyal' than
in demonstrating affection for Japan. Many of them came to this country during
Japan's expansionist and military phase rather than serve in the Japanese army. A
large number of them are cultural intermediates without the strongest ties to
either country. That most of them lean toward Japan in their sympathies now is
due to the harsh treatment and suspicion to which they have been subjected in
this country since the war began. In other words, question 28 has not been
answered on its merits by a considerable number of individuals of this group
(and any others, incidently) but has been used as a counter with which to deal
with the selective service machinery.

Opler foresaw some of the side issues that would affect the subsequent segregation and
leave clearance hearings. In his discussion on the possibility of forced resettlement, which
stemmed in large part from the registration program, Opler understood that

this anxiety over compulsory resettlement. .... has begun to overshadow the basic
issue of identification with the United States. Should this trend persist, and many
citizens who are essentially American in viewpoint and background are
influenced to remain in the 'no' column and so become subject to segregation, a
peculiar and illogical condition will arise. Alien parents, who are almost without
exception in the 'yes' column, will remain unsegregated and eligible for

relocation. Their American-born children, in many instances, will be labelled 
disloyal, will fail to obtain leave clearance, and will be due to be segregated. In his studies Opler continued to explore the subject of loyalty among the Kibei at Manzanar. On July 31, 1943, for instance, he interviewed a young, unmarried Kibei who informed him:

...I think it should be understood that there are subgroups among the Kibei. There are not just two classes of people, loyal and disloyal. There are at least three groups; loyal, non-loyal, and disloyal. I consider myself in the non-loyal group. A good many of the 'No-No' people are in this group. They feel that they must go to Japan for personal reasons.

A similar tripartite division existed for the Issei and Nisei at Manzanar. Thus, while it appeared that the majority of the Kibei were among the "non-loyal" group, the majority of those involved in segregation could also be considered to be "non-loyal." On September 23, 1943, Opler prepared a report entitled, "A Preliminary Analysis of the Segregation Group at Manzanar." In the study, he observed that the segregation roster contained 2,242 individuals, of whom 630, or 28 percent, were 16 years of age or younger. These young people, according to Opler, must be considered "non-loyal," having had no chance to answer Question 28. This "non-loyal" group was augmented by those segregants who had answered "Yes" on Question 28 so that the "total number of persons who have never been confronted with Question 28 or who have answered it in the affirmative is...1113, or almost exactly half of the designated segregants."

Of the remaining 1,129 segregants, 234 were repatriates and 170 were expatriates — two groups that fit the "disloyal" label. Yet Opler noted that in

97 of the 170 cases of expatriation we can say that the action was not self-initiated but arose from the acts and decisions of repatriate or expatriate elders.

Thus, even in cases of expatriation and repatriation the issue of loyalty was affected significantly by personal and family pressures.

The final group of segregants reviewed by Opler in the report was composed of those who had answered "No" to Question 28. He observed that contrary to the "popular impression in many quarters" and the "generally voiced press opinion" that virtually all evacuees destined to Tule Lake had answered "No" to the loyalty question, "it is startling..."
to realize that only 796 of those to be segregated or 35 percent of the 2242 total have maintained a "no" answer.\textsuperscript{91}

Later on January 22, 1944, Opler would submit a memorandum to Lucy Adams in which he reflected on the reasons for the "35 percent." Opler believed that there were four principal reasons that explained the answers of this group: community pressure, family pressure, citizenship protest, and miscellaneous. However, he believed that community pressure was the most significant reason, even though most evacuee respondents would not admit to the fact:

...This is what might be expected. It would be considered too ignoble by the individual to ascribe his final negative decision to gossip, rumor or fear of personal safety. However, we know and we can assume that community attitudes exercised a background influence in a good many instances. In my judgement, \textit{though it is difficult to prove it}, community pressure was most important in many of these cases and the individual now, because he is unwilling to change his stand, has rationalized the whole process in other terms. The influence of the Japanese tradition of 'not backing down' and 'not losing face' after avowing oneself on a subject, must not be underestimated.\textsuperscript{92}

While Opler's suspicions about "community pressure" remained speculative, his interest in the causes of segregation continued. In Part One of a report, prepared on October 19, 1943 and entitled, "Studies of Segregants at Manzanar: The General Picture," Opler took particular interest in the citizen segregants:

It seems obvious... that persons of widely different backgrounds and experiences, particularly in terms of their contacts with and relations to Japan, have become members of the group. At one extreme we have the... Kibei, many of them dual citizens. At the other extreme there are the... young Americans of Japanese ancestry who possess American citizenship only and who have never left these shores. These two polarities alone account for... more than 61 percent of the citizen segregants... Despite the common belief that but one kind of person is going to Tule Lake, namely, a uniformly disloyal individual who has been subjected to much Japanese influence, who has some realistic knowledge of Japan and its culture and who has chosen 'to live the Japanese way', the evidence indicates the existence among the segregants of at least two major groups, each separated from the other by a wide gap in linguistic, educational and travel experiences...\textsuperscript{93}


\textsuperscript{92} Memorandum, Morris E. Opler to Lucy Adams, January 22, 1944, Box 26, File, "Segregation — General — Correspondence, Memos," Coll. 122, Department of Special Collections, UCLA.

\textsuperscript{93} Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, October 19, 1943, Report No. 69, "Studies of Segregants At Manzanar: The General Picture," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File 51.318, No. 4.
In Part Two of the report, which was issued on December 14, 1943, and was entitled, "Studies of Segregants at Manzanar: United States Citizens Only With No Foreign Travel," Opler focused on citizen segregants who were United States citizens only and who had never undertaken foreign travel. Whatever this group knew about Japan has been learned indirectly; it has come from the reading of books or from the lips of others. They are not dual citizens; they have no political claim upon Japan whatever. As the evidence introduced will indicate, a surprising number of these individuals admit that they do not speak Japanese particularly well. Many more freely confess that they read and write Japanese hardly at all. Yet these are people who presumably have indicated, by the maintenance of a 'no' answer to Question No. 28 that they 'prefer the Japanese way of life' and wish to live in Japan after the war! . . . .

It may be assumed that if there are motivations other than preference for Japan which stimulated 'no' answers this is certainly the group in which they will be found, for loyalty to a land one has never seen and to which one is attached only through intermediaries is a somewhat artificial and unrealistic construct.

At Manzanar 155 evacuees fell into this category out of the 501 who had maintained "No" answers before the segregation hearing boards.

In his study of this group, Opler listed four categories of "causation" that led these individuals to opt for segregation. The categories were: protest against abridgement of citizenship rights, race discrimination, and property loss; fear of forced relocation; marriage to aliens or Kibei; and parental influence. Opler utilized a number of representative cases to illustrate each category, providing extensive verbatim excerpts from the segregation hearings accompanied by his professional analysis.

After reviewing ten representative cases illustrating "protest against abridgement of citizenship rights," Opler observed:

. . . . it is evident that the citizenship issue has been of considerable importance. And it should be apparent, moreover, that the loss of citizenship rights has been so keenly felt precisely because we are dealing with a group to whom American citizenship was precious and important . . . .

. . . . Those of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast have long been used as a political issue. They have learned that economic security depends for them on political security. The political security of the Nisei had been assumed until evacuation. This assumption has buckled under the impact of removal. Those who answered 'no' primarily on the grounds of opposition to the invasion of their citizenship rights now assume the opposite; they assume that the floodgates of prejudice and arbitrary treatment which their parents confronted are now to be loosed upon them. No matter how little they know of Japan or of the Japanese language, they have decided that any fate, anywhere, is preferable to this. Perhaps it is, ironically, a compliment to the American ideal that those who have been brought up to it will not accept less in the land of their birth. . . .
CHAPTER FOURTEEN: THE LOYALTY CRISIS AT MANZANAR

After reviewing two cases that illustrated "protest against race discrimination," Opler noted that Nisei who had "flourished" in the "democratic setting" of the prewar years "have in some cases failed to make peace with discriminatory measures." He continued:

.... Whether or not one agrees that the discriminatory measures were a military necessity, there remains the question of whether we who taught these young people to think of themselves as individuals and as Americans first are not in part responsible for the 'no' which is a protest against race discrimination, and whether we should not have some more constructive answer to this 'no' than a trip to Tule Lake and a threat of deportation to Japan.

Opler reviewed three cases to illustrate his "protest against property loss" category. Based on this survey, Opler commented that the property losses of the Nisei, while not "as severe on the average as those suffered" by the Issei "were nevertheless serious." Not only were "present possessions lost but future prospects of gain through inheritance were destroyed." This development had "been especially disconcerting for the oldest child, for it has been the practice to inherit obligations toward parents and family and the means with which to discharge them together." "Now only the former" were "left."

After reviewing five cases for his "fear of forced relocation" category, Opler observed that this "fear has been particularly acute among the residents of Manzanar." He continued:

.... In the first place Manzanar was established as the first assembly center. . . . at a time when the evacuation program was extremely fluid. The first-comers to Manzanar brought with them a conception of a place where they would stay only until investigations of possible subversives were completed and plans for resettlement elsewhere were consummated. Even after the project had officially become a [relocation] center the outcry against it in Owens Valley and in the Los Angeles Press led to the conviction that some day the authorities would yield to the pressure, close the place at short notice and expect the evacuees to make hurried plans for maintaining themselves elsewhere. After the riot there was an almost unanimous conviction that the Center would be closed as a reprisal.

The people who might be expected to react negatively to these rumors and alarms and who dread to attempt a new start now, are those who lost particularly heavily in evacuation, those who have large families, those who are in poor health, those who would find difficulty in making an occupational adjustment outside and those who have misgivings about public opinion in localities where they might settle.

Manzanar has a large number of residents who fall into one or another of these classification[s]. Since the Los Angeles district, which has been the center of anti-Japanese agitation, is the nearest metropolitan area, the Los Angeles papers are the ones which are read at the Center. Thus an exaggerated notion of the degree of public animosity which exists is generated. The two West Coast groups which suffered the most severe property losses during evacuation were probably the people from Terminal Island and the people from the Florin district. Both are particularly well represented at Manzanar. Also, because Manzanar houses a good many people who came from the Boyle Heights district or the business
section of Little Tokyo [of Los Angeles], many of the residents do not feel that
they have the occupational background for adjustment under present conditions.
These persons were salesmen, managers of businesses or wholesale or retail
dealers in produce. They understood conditions of a special nature in a
circumscribed area. They are decidedly uneasy about the prospects of functioning
well in a different environment, away from the advantages which a large
settlement of persons of Japanese ancestry provided. The families which evidence
the great panic at the rumors of the summary closing of Manzanar or the
prospects of forced relocation are those with special health problems, however.

. . . . in spite of the basic assumption of the segregation program, it is sobering to
discover how small a part friendly feeling for Japan plays in the decisions
reached. From my review of the data I conclude that because of the tremendous
force of the fear of forced relocation, it is altogether likely that those segregated
may on the whole represent the individuals weakest in health, wealth and future
prospects, rather than those weakest in essential loyalty.

Opler used four cases to illustrate his "marriage to aliens or Kibei" category. He noted that
one of the "most tragic series of cases is that involving women who have never been
abroad and who are nationals of the United States only but who have maintained a 'no'
answer because of an alien husband or because of marriage to a kibei who has been
'previously interviewed' and is therefore being automatically segregated." He continued
that there were

a substantial number of women, American citizens only with no foreign
residence, who have answered 'no' in order to accommodate alien husbands or to
record answers which agree with those given by kibei husbands. I have the
record of at least a dozen such women, who, if these complications did not exist,
would, I am certain, be more than happy to answer 'yes' . . . .

After reviewing 13 cases to illustrate his "parental influence" category, Opler observed that
it was "difficult to measure precisely the influence of the aliens upon their citizen children"
in regard to segregation. However, he found "certain statistics" to be "informative and
revealing":

. . . Seven hundred and thirty-five or approximately one-third of all persons
listed on the segregation roster are aliens. Of this number only 238 are repatriates
and but 28 are aliens who themselves have answered 'no' to the loyalty question.
Four hundred and sixty-nine or 21% of all persons on the segregation roster,
therefore, are aliens who are going to Tule Lake as the result of the maintenance
of 'no' answers by citizen members of their families. In 86 cases one young citizen
is responsible for taking alien parents and other members of the family to Tule
Lake. Fifty-six of these young people are the sons of aliens and 30 are daughters.
In 19 instances the fathers are the only aliens in the family. In 15 cases it is the
alien mother who will accompany the child as a family member. In 52 cases both
parents are living and present and are able to go to Tule Lake only as the result
of the 'no' answer of one of their children. In other words 86 citizen children are
making it possible for 138 aliens to go to Tule Lake.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN: THE LOYALTY CRISIS AT MANZANAR

When we come to examine the group characteristics of those on the basis of those 'no' answers aliens and other family members are going to Tule Lake we find that youth is the outstanding characteristic. Eighty-two percent of them are 29 years of age or younger. More of them (22) belong to the 18 year old group than fall into any other age classification. We might guess, even if the case records that have been introduced did not offer such conclusive evidence of it, that these youngsters, in spite of the theoretical positions in which their answers place them, are not the ones who have actually determined the destination and the future of the families.

After sketching the struggles of the Issei in the United States prior to World War II, Opler turned to the impacts of evacuation on the Issei and their children. He observed that evacuation happened not when the aliens were in the prime of life, capable of absorbing some severe buffeting as they had been in the past, but after they had spent 25 to 45 years of the most exacting labor in this country and were in average between 55 and 60 years old.

If the issei were old and toil-worn for the contemplation of fresh tasks and a new start, their children were too young and untried to face the aftermath of evacuation with confidence and realistic planning. The immigrants had married late. The age difference between the generations is unusually great. Evacuation found most of the nisei of school age, with the thoughts and dreams and dependency of school children.

Thus, Opler observed that the stage was set for a confession on the part of many issei that their life work and mission in the New World had failed. They felt that they were too old to begin life over again in America. They knew that this time the cooperative methods by which they had surmounted past difficulties would not suffice. All sections of the population had been uprooted and dispossessed. The distress and the need were too uniform and widespread.

At Manzanar this feeling of hopelessness and grievance was especially marked. Here were the people of Terminal Island and of Florin whose economic losses were among the most severe suffered in evacuation. The people of the Venice district are well represented at Manzanar, too, and they, with the Terminal Islanders, were particularly plagued by internments.

The events preceding registration did not reconcile embittered issei to a post-war future in America. The section of the American Press which they saw was the most outspoken in its attacks upon them. They felt the impact of campaigns to force them to sell their remaining land holdings and agricultural machinery. The political air was thick with threats of deportation and further legal penalization.

At Manzanar, too, were the members of the Los Angeles branch of the Japanese American Citizen's League, who were accused of poor leadership and over-
complacency during the evacuation crisis. As the issei counted their losses the
murmur grew that these persons had led the evacuees to camp for a price and
were acting as informers even while the people were in camp. Recrimination and
strife broke out among the evacuees and culminated in the December riot and
bloodshed.

It was in this charged atmosphere and while these many wounds still smarted
that registration began in February. Issei, who were painfully and doubtfully
considering how they might pick up the threads of their lives in America after the
war, were appalled to see that the questionnaire submitted to them was for the
purpose of leave clearance. They envisaged themselves forced out of the Center at
a time when they were poor and discouraged and in the face of hostile public
opinion. Those who had depended upon a Japanese community economically and
socially, were dismayed at the program for thin dispersal in unfamiliar regions.

But their most decided reaction was to Question 28, the 'loyalty' question
submitted to them. It called upon them, in effect, to renounce their Japanese
citizenship, something that enemy aliens, ineligible to American citizenship could
hardly be expected to accept without protest. . . . Many of them resolved to
anticipate their 'liquidation in America' and to cast the die without further delay.

In the meantime, government officials had recognized the doubtful legality of the
original alien question 28. Those who were in charge at Manzanar understood
that they were authorized to offer a substitute question. However, in their desire
to stay reasonably close to the Washington version and because of a
misunderstanding that arose in translating a word from English into Japanese
(where the nearest Japanese equivalent has a much stronger and more military
connotation) the Manzanar revision was still not acceptable to many issei.
Besides, by this time, a negative attitude had swept the camp which would have
made a receptive state of mind toward any question impossible at that time.

It was at this time that the aliens turned to counsel and instruct their children.
Those who had decided that there was no longer a place for them in America
were determined that this country would not 'rob' them of their children as it
had taken their possessions. There began a campaign to prevail upon the children
17 years of age and over to say 'no' to their loyalty question. The friction that was
generated in homes over this issue is almost unbelievable. The scenes of
argument and tears which marked the period are indescribable. In order to
persuade children to answer 'no,' parents had to constantly remind them that
they were being treated as aliens, that America had rejected them, that their
citizenship had not served to protect them . . .

Moreover, the nisei had many complaints of their own. They were anything but
pleased with the Question 28 submitted to citizens. This was especially true of
those who did not possess dual citizenship, for the question called upon them to
forswear allegiance to the Japanese emperor. It read more like a naturalization
oath than something prepared for American citizens. Question 27, the answers to
which were to be used as the basis for organizing a volunteer nisei army combat
team, was viewed with great suspicion, too. It was whispered about that the
announcement of the formation of the combat team had coincided mysteriously
with the arrival from Salt Lake City of the Manzanar delegates from the
convention of the Japanese American Citizens League and that this was the work
of the 'dogs' who were more interested in sacrificing citizens of Japanese ancestry
in battle than in protecting their rights. As a result all the bitterness and
factionalism born of the December incident was injected into the issue.

Out of the turmoil and confusion came family decisions. Though there were some
families that split on the issue, in the main the problem was threshed out in the
family circle and parents and children answered in much the same vein. In view
of the rumors and fears, the suspicion and irritation, the setting and the
intimidation, it is remarkable that so many did hold to a 'yes' answer . . . .

When the machinery for segregation was set up, it was assumed that persons
who had answered question 28 in the affirmative were undoubtedly loyal to the
United States and eager to continue residence in this country, and that one of the
best ways to discover those of contrary opinion and mind would be to review the
cases of individuals whose answers had been 'no.' Allowances were not made for
the peculiar sequences of events at Manzanar whereby those with 'no' answers
finally turned out to be, in the majority of instances, individuals who had been
persuaded and influenced to take their stand by family members who had since
passed over into the 'yes' category. And with the ruling that persons with 'yes'
answers could not be segregated except as members of families of those who
maintained a 'no,' the gate was opened for every alien who had made up his
mind to go to Tule Lake or to Japan to bring pressure upon his child to retain the
'no' answer and they make it possible for him to realize his desires . . . .

The influence of the issei on the answers of the citizens, then, is actually an index
of the total disillusionment and dispossessions of the aliens. That it has become
such an important factor is a sign that a chapter in American history is closed . . . .

There is evidence now that for the first time in our history, a substantial group of
people who have lived here for a life's span, who have seen children and
grandchildren born on American soil, have come to believe that existence in the
United States is untenable for them. While the 'no' answers of the niseis is a
barometer of this to some extent, the full story is not yet told. I know of many
issei, who, though they do not intend to make themselves and their children the
targets of anti-Japanese elements by entering a segregation Center, nevertheless
have made up their minds to return to Japan at the earliest possible moment.
There are more than a few others who have adopted a 'wait and see' policy. If
restitution for losses incurred in evacuation is not forthcoming, if prejudice and
discrimination persist into the post-war period, they too, will leave this country.
Then there are those who await the outcome of the war. What they do will
depend on economic and social conditions in Japan and in this country after the war.\footnote{Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, December 14, 1943, Report No. 99, "Studies of Segregants At Manzanar, II. United States Citizens Only With No Foreign Travel," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File 61.318, No. 5. Other major studies by Opler relating to analysis of segregation at Manzanar include Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, March 17, 1944, Report No. 220, "A Study of Change of Answer Cases At Manzanar," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 348, File 61.318, No. 12.}

In addition to his analytic studies of the results of the segregation hearings at Manzanar, Opler interviewed a number of camp residents regarding their individual viewpoints concerning the factors that led some evacuees to segregate to Tule Lake. On December 15, 1943, for instance, he prepared a report based on discussions with an embittered Nisei from Terminal Island. Opler noted:

After he and his family arrived in Manzanar, most of the Terminal Island people were housed in the same blocks, therefore they were in constant touch with each other. He lived in the environment of bitterness for which the Terminal Islanders were noted. They nursed their bitterness along, never forgetting, always remembering what they had and how much they lost. Naturally if one is constantly reminded of his troubles and injustices, they will always stay with him. The younger people went around in 'gangs' and generally stuck with their own crowd.

When groups were allowed to go out on furlough to the sugar beet fields of Montana and Idaho, this boy went too. Suddenly his father was taken ill, and sent to the Center's hospital. After a month or so he died. This happened while the boy was still out on a furlough and he didn't even know his Dad was sick. Before he left his father was 'perfectly healthy, or else I wouldn't have gone.' When he got home (he wasn't even notified his dad was in the hospital), he found his father dying, and soon after — dead. Maybe it's harsh of the boy to blame the evacuation, and his father's previous internment in the concentration camps of the Alien Japanese rounded up by the F.B.I. 'My Dad couldn't stand this life, and if he had had better attention, he might be alive today:'

All this time he was in constant touch with his grandfather. (I forgot to mention that his father was released and sent to Manzanar to join his family, but the grandfather was kept interned, because of his business 'connections.') His grandfather was in a Federal Internment camp. Almost every day this boy would write a letter to him, telling how they were getting along and encouraging him.

Then he heard that his grandfather was going to be sent to Japan on the exchange ship. The grandfather was given practically no notice of his sailing, so by the time he was able to notify his grandson, he had only a week or so left. The boy made frantic effort[s] to obtain permission to visit his grandfather, and to get power of attorney so that he would dispose of his grandfather's holdings here. His request was denied, on the grounds that he was a 'no' answer, therefore not entitled to any special privileges. One cannot imagine the boy's feelings at this time. He was
so confused and all the things he had done previously, in his confused state, were backfiring on him. His one thought was to get to his grandfather, so that maybe for the last time, he could see him, because, in his own words, 'My grandfather is so old, maybe he won't last the trip out to Japan. If I could only see him!'

Then to top it all, he was fired from his evacuee job, because the Caucasian head thought he was not paying enough attention to his work, because he had used office time to send the telegrams, see the Project Director, and all the other things necessary in order to try to get a permit to visit his grandfather. But by then, I don't think he cared much, as his grandfather had sailed without them having a chance to see each other. Here was another thing to be held against the government, in the boy's mind. He had been willing to pay his own way to see his grandfather, but now nothing seemed to matter. So when the hearings came up, and his name was called, he said he was going to say, 'No, no, no. No to anything he was asked. To h___ with it. To h___ with everything.' It was unfortunate that his rehearing came so soon after his grandfather sailed and after he had been denied permission to see him. The wound was too raw for him to do anything but say 'No, I want to go to Japan.' What he meant was, he wanted to go see his grandfather. . . .

I saw him only the other day, and he said, 'Gosh, I wish I could go out [relocate in the United States], but I can't. Who's going to take care of the family? My old man's dead, and my grandfather is in Japan. The only thing we can do is to go to Tule Lake, and later join my grandfather. But I still wish I could go out.'

On January 24, 1944, Opler prepared a report based on an interview with a "well-educated man of professional background" from Santa Monica. This evacuee, although generally optimistic about his future in America, offered some perceptive insights as to the reasons why many persons from the Florin area near Sacramento had opted for segregation to Tule Lake. The evacuee observed:

I think you'll find that the real reason back of most of the 'no' answers have to do with economics rather than nationalism. The property losses are just too much to take. The government didn't do a thing for us. One agency passed the buck to another. If they had left some the farmers stay to harvest the crops or if they had some arrangements so that money could have been borrowed to save property on which payments were due, it would have helped. Even those who seem to have salvaged something are discouraged. Take the Sacramento Valley farmers, for instance. People who own vineyards around Florin feel that these vineyards are ruined. These people put in a tremendous amount of hand labor to keep these vines in shape. Those who took them over simply won't put in the labor. Vines that are not properly cared for for two years are ruined. It takes years to bring them back. It has been two years already. The whole thing is a vicious circle. The whole area is run down. Farms are not in operation and the value of the crops is less. As a result, business in the area slumps and land values go down. The people see nothing to look forward to there, even if they do go back after this is
all over. So they get disgusted, say 'no' and go to Tule Lake. You will notice that a good many 'noes' are from this district."

Opler devoted considerable attention to the residents at Manzanar who had been evacuated from the Venice area of Los Angeles County. Most of these evacuees had been farmers prior to evacuation, and the majority opted for segregation to Tule Lake. On January 20, 1944, Opler prepared a report based on conversations with a young Nisei farmer from Venice. This man said that he and his family would not be Tule Lake bound now if they still had their farming equipment. It seems that most of the Venice farmers were emphatically told to sell their farming equipment prior to evacuation.

This young farmer did not divulge the figures in the transaction but he intimated that the family lost a great deal of money in selling this equipment.

At the time of evacuation to Manzanar, the farmer had about 12 acres of celery ready for harvest. A white "friend" had taken care of the harvest for him, but as a result the Nisei had received less than half the market value for his crop. Opler continued:

No wonder this young farmer is bitter! He is not so bitter about the underhanded deal as about the selling of the farm equipment so cheaply because he sees no way of establishing himself again without the equipment. This man told me that if he had his farming equipment now he would go out and farm instead of going to Tule Lake."77

In another report on February 11, 1944, Opler interviewed an evacuee who offered his perspectives on the reasons why so many of the Venice people were segregating to Tule Lake. This evacuee observed:

There are 93 people, I understand, going to Tule Lake from our block. All you see is packing and all your hear is hammering these days. Sixteen families are involved. This means that more than one-third of those in the block are going.

I think it can be explained in this way. These are farmers from around the Venice district. The children were used to working on the farm for their parents and minding their parents. They are less independent than the city children and influence the parents less. The children were used to taking orders from the parents without any protest. Consequently there are almost no family splits; if the family goes, it goes as a unit. And since these are country people the families are pretty large. Also, since they are country people they are pretty conservative. Add

96. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, January 24, 1944, Report No. 139, "Evacuation, Events at Manzanar, and Relocation (From a Well-Educated Man of Professional Background)," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File 61.318, No. 7.

97. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, January 20, 1944, Report No. 137, "Venice Evacuee And Segregant (From an Evacuee)," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File 61.318, No. 7.
to this that the people of the Venice region lost particularly heavily in evacuation and you get your picture. 98

Five days later, on February 16, 1944, Opler issued a report on the background of "No" answers by evacuees from Venice. The report featured the observations of an embittered Nisei:

Yes, I'm going. It's no sudden decision with me. I've been 'no' from the beginning. Everyone of the children in our family who was of age said 'no'. I'm from Venice. Lots of the people who lived around Venice said 'no' and are going to Tule. It's on account of the dirty deal we got. We haven't asked for repatriation or expatriation. We are just going on 'no' answers. . . . It was bad enough without registration and question 28 but when that came along it turned the minds of about half of the nisei. Up to that time we had some hope. But we took the stand that the government had no right to ask us such a question; it showed that they were regarding us as aliens. If you had left us outside you could have asked us anything you wanted. Even if some of us had been attacked, even if a few had been killed, it would have been better. It would have been up to us. If we wanted to stay we would have been taking our own chances. Even if the aliens had been made to move, the citizens should have been allowed to remain. It would have showed that this government was treating its citizens alike, regardless of ancestry. I grew up in this country. I can speak Japanese pretty well but I can't read or write it. I've never been to Japan. But if citizenship and hard work and a good record don't bring you any consideration; if they can still do this to you, there's no use talking about loyalty. A man's got to go where there is some security and chance for him and where his face won't be against him. 99

On August 24, 1944, an evacuee research assistant under Opler prepared a report based on an interview with a successful Nisei farmer from Venice who had married a Kibei. Commenting on the large number of Venice evacuees who opted for Tule Lake, the Nisei stated:

There were about eighty-eight Japanese families in Venice. Today the majority of them have gone to Tule Lake. The departure of so many for that Center is due to reasons such as these: they see no future in this country for them since they suffered tremendous losses materially and financially; they believe that Tule Lake will be the only Center that will stay open for the duration; the old people simply wish to go back to their native land; some fear another evacuation if Japan and America should have a war in another decade or two; others feel a summons to take care of their parents in Japan; young people have complied with the wishes of the older folks to accompany them to Tule Lake.

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98. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, February 11, 1944, Report No. 172, "Why So Many Of The Venice People Are Tule Lake Bound (From An Evacuee)," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File 61.318, No. 9.

The Nisei farmer had also wanted to go to Tule Lake, but his Kibei wife had "argued tirelessly that he would be making a mistake." She knew the "economic system in Japan," and that "a person as out-spoken as her husband would never be happy there." She argued successfully that "since he must start from scratch, he would be wiser to begin in America, even though he had been humiliated and depressed."^100

**Cultural Perspectives on Segregation Program.** In contrast to WRA investigations examining evacuee resistance to the registration and segregation programs, David A. Hacker, a historian, prepared an academic study linking the registration/segregation responses of residents at Manzanar with their cultural re-identification during the war. This re-identification had begun immediately after the evacuation and was given impetus by the WRA's "Americanization" program which had attempted to transform the evacuees into "100%" Americans. However, the countervailing Japanization of the relocation centers was acknowledged as a concern of the WRA from the beginning of the camps. Despite pressures both from within and without the camps, the WRA continued to clamor for a continual "Americanization" program throughout the war. The "Americanization" program, according to Hacker, failed to fulfill its objectives. In reality, the camps became more and more Japanese in character.

Japanese culture contained specialized controls that defined and proscribed social behavior. Nearly all of these controls were expressions of obligation — to nation, community, family, and intermingling social interactions. In Japanese society, the community and family interacted as controlling agencies, and gained support from each other. Thus, the family in Japanese society was an enforcer of community standards and mores, while the community provided a clear and concise niche for the individual, but only as a member of the family.

In Japan, the community controlled behavior through formal and informal means. The formal means of control limited behavior by limiting choice. The informal controls utilized gossip, and the fear of rejection caused by it, as well as a system of authority structuring that honored the elders.

Many of the social values and controls used in Japan had been continued by the Issei in the United States. The hostility of outside Caucasian communities in the nation had enforced continuation of those processes as protectors and comforters for Japanese Americans. Thus, the social system produced by Japanese Americans in their prewar communities was neither wholly Japanese, nor wholly American in cultural preference. Predominantly Japanese population settlements had become enclaves, where a hybrid cultural social system evolved, cognizant of economic and social contacts with American culture, while isolated for decades from the mainstream of Japanese culture.

Upon evacuation, the Japanese American social system so carefully constructed before the war, began to disintegrate under the social pressures of their wartime experience. Feelings of rejection, reinforced by evacuation, however, led to heightened group solidarity and identification.

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100. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, August 24, 1944, Report No. 243.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN: THE LOYALTY CRISIS AT MANZANAR

This identification within the camps led to resistance, which was generally understood by the WRA as ideological or political. This stance, according to Hacker, failed to incorporate preexisting conditions in the historical development of Japanese American communities in its analysis and, therefore, was unable to see such resistance as a natural part of the cultural milieu of the evacuees.

After an initial period of disorganization, the communities within the relocation centers began to more closely approximate their prewar configurations. Those configurations were a unique blend of traditional Japanese culture as well as American culture. In the relocation centers, Japanese Americans were faced with rigorous attempts to "Americanize" the social system propagated by them in their prewar communities on the west coast. Redevelopment of this culture at Manzanar, according to Hacker, was the first instance of resistance to WRA policies. Stabilization of that community feeling had progressed enough by the time of the registration program so that responses to it were predicated on community opinion trends.

In controlling the response to registration, the evacuee community used traditional means, such as gossip, to limit positive answers. Even the term *inu* was used to control responses, although gossip itself was often sufficient. The result of this control was the high number of negative answers to the loyalty questions at Manzanar.

This resistance to registration and segregation, as well as relocation, was community-motivated and was meant to maintain the solidarity and identity of the community threatened by those programs. Thus, a cultural choice was more important than a nationalistic one, and community sentiment was more significant than individual sentiment.

According to Hacker, the re-emerged Japanized community at Manzanar had utilized traditional forms of control, such as the maintenance of filial piety and continuance of Issei leadership to determine responses to the registration and segregation programs. As expressed on the block level in the camp, for instance, this control could mandate either a "Yes" or a "No." Before this occurred, however, the traditional leadership which controlled the block had to approve the decision.

For those choosing to segregate, the rejection they felt from America, coupled with the fear of Manzanar's closing had been major factors. For the segregating Nisei, this rejection had been more shocking, but for the Issei, it represented a continuation of historical rejection by American society.

Thus, the evacuees at Manzanar chose a path that led them into conflict with their government supervisors over the government's "Americanization" program. This insistence on American culture as the dominant cultural mode of socialization in the relocation centers led to chronic generational conflict between those Nisei willing to support the WRA program and those Issei, as well as Nisei, wishing to restructure anew their prewar cultural social system. This conflict, according to Hacker, led many observers of the Japanese American evacuees during the war to the belief that pro-

Japanese and pro-American factions existed, in toto, within Manzanar and the other relocation centers.
However, a large segment of evacuees at Manzanar rejected the WRA's "Americanization" program and resisted attempts to classify or designate themselves as pro- or anti-American. They revived their prewar cultural milieu in order to protect and comfort themselves amid the struggles brought on by evacuation. They had been rejected by America and, in turn, were forced to reject America. Many went so far in their rejection that they chose to segregate to Tule Lake rather than risk the possibility of finding themselves relocated in a hostile, culturally different America. More than 6,000 evacuees remained at Manzanar, however, because of the increasing security that developed there after the violence in early December 1942. They had gained that security by the accommodation of the camp's administration, as both the WRA appointed personnel led by Project Director Merritt and the evacuees had agreed to pursue the "Peace of Manzanar." In the wake of the violence, the administration had allowed many of the physical aspects of Japanese culture that had been transplanted in the Japanese American prewar communities to be recreated at Manzanar in exchange for a dubious "peace." The evacuees maintained that "peace," but only so much as it was a natural part of their culture, and only so long as it was convenient.101

Participation in the Armed Forces

Military Intelligence Service. During 1942, prior to implementation of the registration and segregation programs at Manzanar, representatives of the Military Intelligence Service visited the camp to recruit evacuee males. According to the Final Report, Manzanar, "Nisei boys were used in a program clothed with military security long before the Army was reopened to persons of Japanese ancestry." The report continued:

.... Periodically Army officials came from the Military Intelligence Language School at Fort Savage, Minnesota, (later Fort Snelling) both to secure Japanese instructors to teach the Japanese language to Army and Navy personnel destined for specially trained occupation units and to recruit and train Japanese American boys as interpreters and translators in combat scenes in the Pacific War Theater. Aliens and American-born citizens were both used in such military and naval language schools, in the Office of War Information, and in the Office of Strategic Services. There are no statistics at the Project to show how many evacuees left the Center for employment of this kind. The best estimate, exclusive of Nisei who arranged for their transfer to Fort Snelling after entering the regular Army, is 100, the largest proportion of whom were American citizens.

The report continued:

Before segregation, a feeling prevailed in Manzanar among the first generation, that to accept work of this kind with the Army constituted turning against one's own country. Yet periodically Japanese aliens would appear in the office of the Relocation Representative, and after talking aimlessly, would say something to this effect: 'I have lived in this country for years. My children are American citizens. I will never go back to Japan, and even though you call me an alien, I

regard this as my country. Is there not something I can do to help America?" Appropriate employment would then be quietly arranged through a suitable agency.

The report went on to state that great "determination and courage were shown by one particular alien who had been an ordinary grocery clerk before evacuation." After passing tests "for employment in broadcasting activities with the Australian Government, an Australian flight lieutenant "stopped at the Center to pick him up, and actually trembling, he left on an air trip for Australia." At the time he left the center, according to the report, "persons who took such positions were not infrequently referred to as 'dogs' by the Japanese in Manzanar, who also whispered that retaliation would be taken against the families of such people." 102

One of the most prominent evacuees at Manzanar to join the Military Intelligence Service was Karl G. Yoneda. A Kibei born in Southern California, Yoneda went to Japan with his family at the age of 11. Attracted by books as a young man, he developed an interest in Marxism and lefhome at the age of 16, bound for China in search of a Russian writer whose works he admired. In order to avoid being drafted into the Japanese army, he returned to the United States and quickly became involved in the labor movement in California. He joined the Communist Party, and spent the 1930s as the editor of the Communist newspaper Rodo Shim bun and as an organizer of Japanese labor in California and Alaska. He married fellow Communist and labor activist Elaine Black, a Caucasian, in 1933—a union that would last for more than 55 years.

With the coming of World War II, Yoneda, along with all members of Japanese ancestry, was expelled from the Communist Party. Yoneda volunteered to evacuate to Manzanar, and was among the large contingent of evacuees that left Los Angeles by train on March 23. He was later joined by his wife and young son, although government authorities attempted to prevent her from joining her husband and son who were required to evacuate. The Yonedas lived in Block 4, Building 2, Apartment 2 at Manzanar. Yoneda emerged as one of the leaders of the evacuee faction at the camp that advocated cooperation with WCCA and WRA administrators.

On April 4, less than two weeks after arriving at Manzanar as a volunteer, Yoneda was called to the camp administration office to be questioned by two sergeants from U.S. Army Intelligence concerning his thoughts about the center and the number of Communists residing there. Yoneda reportedly told them that Japanese American Communist Party members and supporters were participating actively in the war against the Axis Powers and were willing to enlist if the Army would take them. In the meantime,

102. "Relocation Division," Final Report, Manzanar, Vol. II, pp. 92-63, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File. "Manzanar Final Reports." Camp Savage, Minnesota, was a sub-post of Fort Snelling. The Japanese language school had originated at the Presidio of San Francisco, California, as the IV Army Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS) housed in (present) Building No. 640, an old hangar at Crissy Airfield that had previously been converted into a R.O.T.C. classroom. The school opened on November 1, 1941, five weeks before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Removal of Japanese and Japanese Americans from the exclusion zones forced the Army to relocate the school to Fort Snelling, then Camp Savage. This school was the origin of the Defense Language Institute, which was subsequently moved to Monterey, California. Steve Haller, The Last Word in Airfields: A Special History Study of Crissy Field, Presidio of San Francisco, California (San Francisco, National Park Service, 1994), pp. 91-94.
they would take the message of democracy to the evacuees to help build a livable place and would attempt to aid the war effort in every way possible. He told them the majority of the evacuees were loyal to America, but he refused to provide names of Communists in the camp. Despite his "patriotic" statements, the FBI assigned an evacuee informer, identified as "B," to monitor and report on Yoneda's activities at Manzanar.

Yoneda emerged as one of the leaders of the evacuee faction at Manzanar that advocated working with WCCA and WRA administrators. On July 20, he attended the meeting in Togo Tanaka's quarters during which the Manzanar Citizens Federation was established to press for improved living conditions in the center and help promote the war effort. The organizing group included Koji Ariyoshi, Kiyoshi Higashi, Joe Grant Masaoka, Kiro Neeno, James Oda, Togo Tanaka, Fred Tayama, Tad Uyeno, and Tom Yamazaki, nearly half of whom were members of the Japanese American Citizens League.

During late July, Yoneda and Ariyoshi circulated a petition addressed to President Roosevelt, asking that he "utilize the manpower of Americans of Japanese ancestry, now in evacuation camps, for front line duty in the United States Armed Forces." They obtained 218 evacuee signatures, 50 of whom were women. The petition was forwarded with an "open" letter to Roosevelt on August 5, but no response was ever received.

On August 6, Colonel Kai E. Rasmussen, Commandant of the Military Intelligence Service Language School, accompanied by Sergeant Joe Masuda, interviewed some 90 candidates for the Military Intelligence Service in Block 1 at Manzanar. Yoneda played an active role in the Kibei meeting on August 8, opposing the efforts of the embittered Joseph Kurihara to dominate the proceedings. In late August Yoneda, Ariyoshi, and Masaoka composed a letter to Roosevelt asking that he allow evacuees to do farm work outside the relocation centers in support of the war effort. They collected 793 signatures from Issei and Nisei who were willing to serve in the Food for Freedom Campaign. Although never receiving a direct answer from Roosevelt, the WRA soon implemented a program for evacuees to harvest sugar beets in several western states. During October and November Yoneda left Manzanar with 21 other men, including "four Terminal Island 'tough boys' who had become disenchanted with Black Dragon doings," for a one-month labor contract with a sugar company in Idaho.

On November 23, 1942, a MIS recruiting team headed by Major Karl Gould, accompanied by Sergeant Masuda, arrived at Manzanar for actual recruiting purposes. More than 50 Nisei and Kibei were interviewed and given physicals and oral and written examinations. Fourteen men were selected, including six Kibei. The men, who were sworn into the U.S. Army on November 28 as "buck privates" by Major Karl Gould, included Ichiro L. Obikane, Shori Hiraide, James S. Oda, Sho Onodera, Yoshiki Hirabayashi, Harry Yamashita, Nobuo Yamashita, James J. Kaminiishi, William Y. Murata, Keichi K. Amino, Frank K. Ishida, Henry T. Uyehara, and Koji Ariyoshi. On December 2, four days before violence would break out in the camp, the fourteen men left Manzanar for Camp Savage, Minnesota, via Los Angeles, accompanied by two Army sergeants. On December 7 the men arrived at Camp Savage.

Meanwhile, in the wake of the violence at Manzanar, Yoneda's wife and son, who were on the "death lists," were taken to the camp's Administration Building by a member of the military police patrolling the camp and given protection by WRA authorities. James Ito,
the youth that was killed during the violence on December 6, had been a member of Yoneda’s Idaho sugar beet crew and had signed the petition to Roosevelt drawn up by Yoneda and Ariyoshi asking that persons of Japanese ancestry be accepted for military service. On December 10, Elaine Yoneda and her son were transferred, along with 63 other evacuees, to the abandoned Cow Creek Civilian Conservation Corps camp in Death Valley. On December 19, Elaine Yoneda and her son left for Los Angeles at her own expense after WRA authorities intervened to obtain travel permits for her son.

After graduating from the MIS Language School, Yoneda served in the China-Burma-India Office of the War Information Psychological Warfare Team. He was first stationed in Ledo, India, where he wrote propaganda leaflets, prepared radio broadcasts, and interrogated Japanese prisoners of war. During the next two years, he conducted broadcasts to enemy lines in Myitkyina, Burma, before being sent to Kunming, China, where he prepared propaganda leaflets for air-drops to enemy troops until V-J Day. 103

Koji Ariyoshi, an associate of Yoneda who was selected for the Military Intelligence Service from Manzanar, would later gain some notoriety. After training at the MIS Language School, he was also assigned to intelligence work in the China-Burma-India Office of the War Information Psychological Warfare Team. A native of Hawaii, Ariyoshi returned to Honolulu after the war and established the Honolulu Record, a progressive newspaper that he edited from 1948-58. Having become an admirer of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communists while stationed in Yenan, China, during the war, Ariyoshi promoted U.S.-China relationships during the Cold War era. In 1951-52 he and six others were arrested and convicted for "conspiring to teach and advocate the overthrow of the government by force and violence," but his conviction was overturned in 1958. 104

Service in the U.S. Army. As a result of the registration program in February-March 1943, approximately 100 Nisei at Manzanar volunteered for the Regimental Combat Team. After the Selective Service was reopened to Japanese Americans in January 1944, some Nisei in other relocation centers refused to report for Army duty when drafted. At Manzanar, however, every drafted man responded for a physical examination.

Prior to September 1944, the Personnel Section at Manzanar handled Selective Service activities. In September, an assistant relocation adviser was appointed as a representative of the local draft board. From that time on, this adviser handled the registration of Manzanar men reaching their 18th birthday as well as other matters pertaining to Selective Service procedures. By the end of the war, 116 Manzanar men had been inducted into the Army, while 66 more were classified as 1-A, and 87 were rejected as unfit for service. Four evacuees from Manzanar were killed in action, and 14 were wounded. 105


An article in the *Manzanar Free Press* on April 7, 1943, stated that "Nearly 300 stars will grace Manzanar’s Service flag now being made to honor those who are full-fledged nephews of Uncle Sam." Each star would "represent one service man from this center including all soldiers with families in Manzanar, the volunteers now in training at Camp Savage Military Intelligence School and for the combat unit, as well as those who joined the ranks from the appointed personnel staff." The article noted that the volunteers for the RCT from Manzanar had completed their medical examinations and would soon leave for induction at Fort Douglas, Utah.  

On July 29, 1944, the *Manzanar Free Press* reported that Mr. and Mrs. Takeyoshi Arikawa, residents of Block 31, Building 3, Apartment 4, had been notified three days earlier of the death their son, Private First Class Frank Nobuo Arikawa, Company F, 2nd Battalion, 442nd Regimental Combat Team. He had been killed in action near Castellina, Italy, on July 6. Frank, who was awarded the purple heart and the combat infantry badge, was the brother of Burns T. Arikawa who had also volunteered for the RCT from Manzanar and was on active duty in Italy. Another brother, James, was on duty at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. Both "Frank and James" had been "in the services prior to evacuation." In an editorial that day, the center newspaper observed that:

> Manzanar has its first gold star mother. We had dreaded the day when some family in Manzanar would receive the fatal full [sic] telegram, yet not one of us would have denied that someone here would someday receive that notice.

> Mr. and Mrs. Arikawa with two blue stars and a gold star on their service flag, reside in a relocation center. Made homeless and their security jeopardized by the very agency to which they have given their sons, they must wonder what their reward will be.

A memorial service was held for Frank Arikawa in the recently-completed Auditorium on Sunday afternoon, August 6. Edwin E. Ferguson, Acting Solicitor, sent a memorandum to Director Myer on August 23 that contained excerpts of a description of the service prepared by Kent Silverthorne, Acting Project Attorney at Manzanar. Silverthorne observed that the memorial service had been "the most impressive and moving" service he had ever "experienced." He commented further:

> . . . I had rather expected that they [the Arikawas] would be bitter over their loss, but on the contrary, they are proud that their son has given his life for his country.

> On the surface the services were ordinary enough, but the implications were extremely dramatic. Many who wept, I am sure, wept not so much for Pfc. Arikawa as for those who under such strange and anomalous circumstances were gathered to pay him tribute.

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First a squad of soldiers performed the ceremony of placing the flag at half-mast to the accompaniment of the Star Spangled Banner — a stirring ceremony under any circumstances. It tightened one's throat to see how meticulously Nisei and Issei held hat or hand over their hearts as the National Anthem was being played. . . Then the services in the auditorium were begun before a large audience. The platform was filled with speakers, not the least conspicuous of whom, was our Property Officer, Mr. Bromley, dressed in the full regalia of a Commander of the American Legion. The parents of Frank Arikawa are Buddhists but their children are Christians, so they insisted upon having Japanese Christian Ministers officiate. The fact that their prayers were rendered in broken, barely understandable English, certainly did nothing to detract from their significance. Christian hymns were sung — not too lustily; since fully three fourths of the audience was composed of Issei Buddhists. Mr. Merritt gave a splendid talk which I thought exceptionally honest and courageous. Mr. Bromley made a few appropriate remarks and read an original poem which was worthy of a Rupert Brooke. . . Mrs. Adams' tribute was especially effective because she addressed her remarks directly to the members of the Arikawa family who sat in the front row throughout the services.

The rest of the speakers were evacuees, Issei and Nisei. One Nisei boy gave a particularly fine talk; his thesis being that in spite of evacuation, in spite of the barbed wire, this still the best country of all. The contrast between this and the Issei speakers who respectfully bowed to the chairman and then to the picture of the dead boy before speaking, or reading Japanese poems, was like something in a mixed up dream.109

Meanwhile, the first group of 25 inductees at Manzanar was sworn into the Enlisted Reserve Corps of the U.S. Army in an induction ceremony in Mess Hall 16 on July 31, 1944. The men were inducted by Captain J. M. Lyle, Jr., assistant induction officer from the Ninth Service Command headquarters in San Francisco. Other members of the induction team included: Captain R. A. Smithson, medical examiner; Staff Sergeant Robert N. Bare, administrative assistant; Corporal Francis Halstead, medical assistant; and Private Charles Foo, psychologist's assistant. In addressing the group of inductees, Lyle stated that the men would be subject to call sometime within 30 to 60 days. He also noted: "What assignment you receive or where you will be sent, no one knows. But remember that there is a definite job for you to do."

During the ceremony, Kiyoharu Anzai, chairman of the Block Managers, told the men that the highest honor a person could have is when he is selected to serve in the armed forces of his country. Wherever you are sent, whatever you do, give and do the best of your ability; be proud to have been selected to serve your country. Where you were born, what ancestry you are or what you are doesn't mean a thing as long as you serve your country when she needs you.

Project Director Merritt also spoke at the ceremony, commenting that the group of 25 inductees was "the first evidence that this country is recognizing the statement that 'all men are created free and equal.'"\textsuperscript{110}

Twenty-five more men were inducted into the Enlisted Reserve Corps during a second induction ceremony held at Mess Hall 16 on August 2.\textsuperscript{111}

On May 22, 1944, the Manzanar USO Committee held an "enthusiastic" meeting in the office of its treasurer, Edwin H. Hooper, a WRA employee. During the meeting, Henry Tsurutani, chairman of the committee, exhibited the certificate of recognition of the Manzanar USO that had been received from the National USO. It was announced that USO headquarters would be established in the YMCA clubhouse in Block 19, Building 15. Magazines, newspapers, and USO stationery would be available in the club rooms.

In addition to the chairman and treasurer, the members of the Manzanar USO Committee included: Mrs. May Ichida, vice-chairman; Joan Fukuda, secretary; Mrs. Lucy Adams, Mrs. Ralph Merritt, Mrs. Margaret D'Ile, Aksei Nielsen, Arthur Miller, Rev. H. G. Bovenkerk, Father Leo Steinbach, Mrs. Henry Tsurutani, Mr. and Mrs. Joe Shikami, and Mrs. Asa Ikeda.\textsuperscript{112}

On September 4, parents and family members of service men in the U.S. armed forces were honored during a "Get Acquainted Party" sponsored by the Manzanar chapter of the USO in Mess Hall 16. The meeting drew a capacity crowd of some 350-450 persons. The featured speaker was Sergeant Shori Hiraide, who had returned from the South Pacific and was visiting his parents in Block 23, Building 5, Apartment 2. He related his experiences while serving with the MIS in the South Pacific. Sergeant Fujino spoke on the meaning of Army enlistments by Nisei and the soldiers' hopes and aspirations. He noted that the "Niseis who give their lives and blood willingly for the Stars and Stripes have foremost in their minds the welfare of the Niseis in America and their future, and the hope of seeing them achieve a glorious place in American life." An explanation of the G.I. Bill of Rights and the Soldiers' Dependency Benefits was given by Koichi Ozone in Japanese. Two films, one entitled, "Go For Broke," that featured Nisei service men of the RCT in training, and the other on the invasion of Europe were shown.\textsuperscript{113}

Evacuee Reaction. The announcement in January 1944 that Nisei would henceforth be subject to Selective Service procedures resulted in considerable debate among the evacuees at Manzanar.\textsuperscript{114} One Nisei from Terminal Island, for instance, described his ambivalence to the announcement on February 18:

\textsuperscript{110} Manzanar Free Press, August 2, 1944, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., August 5, 1944, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., May 27, 1944, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., September 2 and 16, 1944, pp. 1 and 3, respectively. Also see translation, Japanese Section, Manzanar Free Press, September 6, 1944, pp. 3-4.

\textsuperscript{114} The Manzanar Free Press promoted support for the draft and included numerous articles describing the activities of Japanese Americans in the U.S. armed forces.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN: THE LOYALTY CRISIS AT MANZANAR

... If only this country had given us our full rights of citizenship the spirit in which we go out to fight would be entirely different. No matter from what angle I think about it, this recent evacuation was plain discrimination and undemocratic. I cannot see that there was any necessity for all the hardships and bitterness we had to go through. ‘We are fighting for freedom! for our rights!’ says Uncle Sam, but it is hard for us remaining loyal niseis to fight for something when we don’t know what credit we’ll get at the end. Maybe the good side of America will give us our full rights of citizenship, but it is depressing and disappointing [sic] to hear the phrase, ‘Once a Jap always a Jap’ after we fight and fight and shed our blood for the victory of our country. There are already about 20,000 people of Japanese blood in Tule Lake but not all went because they were disloyal to this country. Most went because they are fed up with mistreatment, because they think that this country is not worth fighting for, because they fear that this country will never give us the full rights of our citizenship, because they think that this country will go on discriminating against us and treat us like the Negroes have been treated all these years. The Negroes have fought and fought ever since Lincoln gave their right to vote, but what do they get for it?

Well, I am one of the many loyal niseis who are adhering to this country because we still hope and we still think that we can fight to regain our equal rights. Will this be all in vain? What will the outcome be?

As a result of the intense feelings that the announcement created in the camp, WRA camp administrators authorized meetings in each block on February 25-26, the purpose of which were to frame resolutions to be submitted to a general meeting with Project Director Merritt on February 27 and to select three representatives from each block who would speak for them at that time. Merritt had indicated that he would take the camp’s resolutions to Washington, providing they were not “written in a demanding way.”

Opler attended one block meeting that “was conducted in a relatively calm and orderly manner and there was little indication of extreme and irreconcilable bitterness except in one or two instances.” According to Opler

... For the most part the young men took the attitude that the draft was inevitable but felt nevertheless that they should protest against features of its application to them which they resented. While the implication at times was that compliance with the draft rested upon the fulfillment by the government of certain conditions, this was not clearly and definitely expressed. A good many of the boys, when the formal meeting was over and informal discussion was taking place, showed a wry but good-natured skepticism.

113. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, February 18, 1944, Report No. 201.
In other blocks however, divisions and strong feelings were more in evidence, many Nisei indicating they did not mind being drafted but first they wanted a restoration of their civil rights.\textsuperscript{118}

One of Opler’s reports, issued on April 25, 1944, provided an evacuee’s description of the meeting with Merritt on February 27 and a follow-up meeting on February 29 when the final resolutions were adopted by 102 Nisei block representatives. The evacuee observed:

After the Project Director and other Caucasians left our meeting on [February 27], we drew up a list of resolutions to be taken to Washington, D.C. by our Project Director.

. . . . So we delegates were allowed to speak. We voted for a Chairman. The Chairman carried on with discussion and resolutions. After each resolution was proposed we were allowed to vote for or against it.

There were quite a few agitators. We expected that. But the Chairman reminded the delegates of what the Project Director said he would do, and what kind of a petition was required before the Project Director would accept the job of taking it to Washington. That carried the meeting along on a more quiet basis. After the petition was drawn up, a vote was taken to find out how many approved or disapproved of the whole thing. The majority approved so we elected an 11 man delegation to write up the resolutions in final form. . . .

On Tuesday night [February 29], another meeting was called for final approval of the Resolutions as they had been drawn up by the delegates. This meeting was held at 22 mess hall. . . . The agitation was somewhat stronger this time. Some got up and said that the resolutions should be written in a demanding way and should say that all nisei should not be called on to join the army until they had their full rights. . . .

Finally, the chairman said that those who are taking a stand should be clear about what they intend to do and should be ready to take the consequences. He asked how many were willing to go to jail rather than accept the draft under present conditions. About 18 fellows stood up. Then, he asked for a standing vote of those who wanted the resolutions to read that the nisei wouldn’t go into the army until they had certain guarantees. If the majority had stood up this time the ‘noes’ would have won and the resolutions as they were written by the Committee would have had to be changed. About twice as many got up as got up the first time. But it was not enough. So the ‘yes’ won and resolutions remained intact. Of course, there were some who just didn’t know what to do. In other words they were easily influenced and would jump to the winning side.

I spoke to some of the fellows and said this: ‘The resolution already drawn up by the committee will not hurt us or do us harm. In fact, it gives us more of a winning chance to let the public know what we are up against.’ Some of us are

\textsuperscript{118} Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, March 1, 1944, Report No. 218, "The Effects Of The Nisei Draft At Manzanar," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File 61.318, No. 11.
willing to join the army. And I hope the 'noes' do not take too many chances. In fact, I am inclined to believe they wanted to blow off some steam and the meeting was just the place. . . .

In a foreword to the report, Opler noted that since the final resolutions had been adopted on February 29, calmer "heads have prevailed and even many of those who first spoke most strongly have moderated their tone." However, the "amount and intensity of feeling that was displayed at the Tuesday evening meeting suggests that the crisis cannot be considered entirely past until the test, the induction of a considerable body of young men, has taken place without incident."119

The "Manzanar Resolutions," as finally adopted on February 29, consisted of a memorandum to Merritt and resolutions to be submitted to the War Department as well as to the WRA. The resolutions to be submitted to the War Department included:

that in the future we be given the right to fight side by side with our fellow caucasian citizens. . . . and that we be given the opportunity and privilege to enlist or volunteer for all branches of the Armed Services without discrimination or segregation.

that all ranking officers be made to recognize that we are loyal Americans and that no discriminatory treatment be shown and that equal privileges and opportunities for advancement as enjoyed by other American soldiers be also given to us.

that all possible efforts be made by the War Department to acquaint these officers with the difference between the enemy and the loyal Japanese-Americans.

The resolutions to be submitted to the WRA included:

that we in Manzanar be considered as loyal to the United States and that military restrictions against our return to our former homes be lifted by the War Department as soon as possible.

that loyal aliens be given this privilege without discrimination as to race or color.

that where the inductee is the head of the family or is the chief support of the family, the Department of Interior upon request should protect and assist his family until such time as a home can be established elsewhere.

that serious consideration be given by the Department of Interior to problems of needy people of Japanese ancestry in the post-war period.

that honest, sincere efforts be made to impress the employers of such [war-related] factories that no discrimination will be tolerated in the employment of Japanese-Americans.

119. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, April 23, 1944, Report No. 234.
that the WRA should not consider said organization [Japanese American Citizens League] as the spokesman for or in behalf of the citizens in the Manzanar Relocation Center.\textsuperscript{120}

On March 1, the day after the "Manzanar Resolutions" were adopted, Opler prepared a report analyzing the Nisei reaction to the draft. Before listing the principal elements which entered "into the total Nisei reaction," he discussed "what the reaction does not mean." In his opinion it did not

mean that these boys as a group are cowards and are afraid of war and danger. Individuals among them may rationalize distaste for warfare in terms of past mistreatment and therefore may assert a lack of obligation to serve, but there are too many instances of present protestants whose brothers volunteered before evacuation, or who themselves actually were in the army before evacuation and who were discharged, or who were in a 1-A classification before evacuation and were quietly and without protest awaiting their call, to permit acceptance of such an explanation. Nor do I think the response is related to any widespread shiftlessness or abnormal unwillingness to face responsibilities. Too many of these young men had assumed considerable work responsibilities and family responsibilities before this issue arose.

Accordingly, Opler listed eight factors which he considered to be the most significant in explaining the Nisei reaction to the draft at Manzanar. The eight factors were:

1. Resentment over evacuation and the need to reestablish status.
2. Rejection of Services in the Past.
3. Special Treatment of February, 1943 [associated with registration].
4. Isolation and time element.
5. Unfavorable publicity.
7. Repudiation of past leadership [JACL].
8. Lack of tangible incentives, present and future.

In conclusion, Opler observed that the "eight major factors which I have enumerated are not an exhaustive list but they do point to the most important considerations involved." The factors

not only explain, in large measure, the attitude toward the draft, but they also throw much light on the present movement for expatriation and repatriation among evacuee children and their parents. As long as the issue of the draft did

\textsuperscript{120}. \textit{Manzanar Free Press}, March 4, 1944, pp. 1, 3.
not arise, parents, even though they were uncertain of the future in America,
were willing to take a 'wait and see attitude' and to hope that somehow the
problems of compensation, prejudice and rehabilitation would be worked out and
that they would be able to remain in this country. Even through their skepticism,
was great they saw no need to take the initiative in a move that would cut them
and their children off from a possible future in America. They had shown,
however, at the time of the February registration that they would take such action
if they felt unfairly pressed. Then, as a reaction the original Question 28
submitted to aliens, which was interpreted by them as an attack upon their
Japanese citizenship, many refused to answer until the wording was modified. At
the same time there was a rash of requests for repatriation and expatriation. It is
plain, then, that any action which will bring about a more affirmative attitude
toward the draft, will likewise ease the situation concerning repatriation and
expatriation requests. 121

Although such sentiments would continue throughout the history of Manzanar, there were
no incidents of draft evasion among the Nisei at Manzanar.

Photo 90: Lt. Eugene Bogard, U.S. Army, explaining registration,
Manzanar War Relocation Center; photo by Francis Stewart, February 11,
1943; RG 210, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records
Administration.

121. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, March 1, 1944, Report No. 218.

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Photo 91: Memorial service for Pfc. Frank Arikawa, auditorium, August 6, 1944, Manzanar War Relocation Center; Toyo Miyatake Photograph Collection, Toyo Miyatake Studio, San Gabriel, California.
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Initial Relocation Program Plans of the War Relocation Authority

On March 18, 1942, the War Relocation Authority was established by Executive Order 9102 to "formulate and effectuate a program for the removal, from [designated areas] of the persons or classes of persons designated... and for their relocation, maintenance, and supervision." To carry out this function, the director of the WRA was "to provide for the relocation of such persons in appropriate places, provide for their needs in such manner as may be appropriate, supervise their activities... provide... for employment... prescribe the terms and conditions of such employment."

That same day President Roosevelt appointed as the WRA's first director Milton S. Eisenhower, a brother of the general who had previously served as an official in the Department of Agriculture. By his own admission, Eisenhower knew little about the west coast ethnic Japanese, the deliberations that had preceded the decision to evacuate them, or future government plans for the evacuees. He faced a herculean task — hurriedly building an agency to direct and supervise the lives of more than 100,000 people in an atmosphere of racial animosity and suspicion, and, at the same time, deciding what to do with them. He quickly concluded that the evacuation would eventually be viewed as "avoidable injustice," but later he would state that it was an "inhuman mistake."

Eisenhower faced an initial decision that would shape the rest of the WRA program — would the evacuees be resettled and placed in new homes and jobs, or would they be detained, confined, and supervised for the duration of the war? He had been given little or no guidance on this crucial issue. Beyond the fact that the military would deliver the evacuees to the relocation centers operated by the WRA and thereafter wished no further part in the "Japanese problem," nothing had been decided.

The Tolan Committee (discussed in Chapter Three of this study) had reported this major deficiency in planning in March 1942, observing that to "date the committee has been unable to secure from anyone charged with responsibility a clear-cut statement of the status of the Japanese evacuees, alien or citizen, after they pass through the reception." Notably, the committee offered some guidance in the matter, although firmly opposing incarceration of the evacuees for reasons that proved remarkably prophetic:

2. Eisenhower, President is Calling, pp. 96.
3. Daniels, Concentration Camps USA, p. 91, quoting letter from Eisenhower to Wickard, April 1, 1942, and Eisenhower, President is Calling, p. 125.
The incarceration of the Japanese for the duration of the war can only end in wholesale deportation. The maintenance of all Japanese, alien and citizen, in enforced idleness will prove not only a costly waste of the taxpayers' money, but it automatically implies deportation, since we cannot expect this group to be loyal to our Government or sympathetic to our way of life thereafter.

Serious constitutional questions are raised by the forced detention of citizens against whom no individual charges are lodged. Instead the committee favored a loyalty review at the assembly centers as a precursor for resettlement or relocation. After the "loyalty and dependability of all Japanese, alien and citizen alike" was examined at the reception centers, "arrangements" should be implemented "for job placement outside of the prohibited areas of all persons certified."

Only when this process failed to resolve all questions did the committee envision the establishment of resettlement communities.

Eisenhower and other top-level WRA officials started from premises similar to those of the Tolan Committee. They believe that the vast majority of evacuees were law-abiding and loyal and that, once removed from the restricted zone, they should be returned quickly to conditions approximating normal American life. Believing WRA's goal should be to achieve this rehabilitation, they immediately devised plans to move evacuees to the intermountain states. The government would operate "reception centers," and some evacuees would work within them, developing the land and undertaking agricultural development. Many more, however, would work outside the centers, in private employment — manufacturing, farming, or establishing new self-supporting communities.

Mike Masaoka, National Secretary of the Japanese American Citizens League, soon approached Eisenhower with a lengthy letter containing recommendations for policies the WRA should follow regarding relocation. This effort was grounded on the basic position the JACL had taken on exclusion and evacuation:

We have not contested the right of the military to order this movement, even though it meant leaving all that we hold dear and sacred, because we believe that cooperation on our part will mean a reciprocal cooperation on the part of the government.

Among the specific recommendations in the letter was the plea that the government permit Japanese Americans to have as much contact as possible with white Americans to avoid isolation and segregation.

5. Eisenhower, President is Calling, p. 117.
The WRA's plans were in sympathy with such an approach, but the government's experience with voluntary relocation suggested that the WRA would only be successful if it could enlist the help of the interior state governors. Thus, the WRA arranged a meeting for officials representing the ten western states on April 7 in Salt Lake City, the day after Masaoka had sent Eisenhower his appeal for a cooperative relationship with the government. From the federal side, the three principal representatives were Thomas C. Clark, chief of the civilian staff of the WCCA (on temporary detail from the Department of Justice), Karl Bendetsen, director of the WCCA, and Eisenhower. The states were represented by five governors and a host of other officials, including several attorneys general and directors of State Agricultural Extension Services. Also in attendance was a small contingent of large-scale agricultural producers in the interior western states — particularly sugar beet companies with holdings in eastern Oregon, Idaho, Utah, Montana, and Colorado — who were anxious to employ evacuees for harvesting their crops amid the wartime labor shortages. After Clark opened the meeting and discussed its intent, Bendetsen made the first presentation, describing the government's evacuation program and the Western Defense Command's rationale for procedures used to implement it. He described and defended the War Department's evacuations and procedures, arguing that, although some evacuees might be disloyal, once they were removed from the west coast, their danger to American society and the war effort would be minimal. He stated that the United States was faced with two "real" problems, both of which were peculiar to the west coast: (1) possible fifth column activity in the event of an invasion, and (2) the possibility of confusing the Japanese Americans with the enemy. He also pointed out the impracticability of furnishing troops for scattered small contingents of evacuee agricultural workers.

Eisenhower then described the WRA program. He emphasized his concern about the civil liberties of the evacuated people and the problem of making effective use of the manpower they represented. He indicated five types of work plans that he had in mind for the evacuees: (1) public works, including such things as the development of raw lands for agricultural production; (2) production of food, both for evacuee subsistence and for sale, on federally owned project lands; (3) manufacture of goods, such as camouflage nets and cartridge belts, which were needed by the military; (4) private employment; and (5) establishment of self-supporting communities that would be managed by the evacuees themselves rather than by the federal government. Playing down the portions of his plan that concerned private employment, he assured the state participants that security precautions would be taken, evacuees would not be permitted to own land against the wishes of the states, and the WRA would ensure that evacuees did not become permanent residents. The governors of the intermountain states quickly grasped the politics of the situation, and indicated their disagreement with Bendetsen's rationale and Eisenhower's social engineering. They opposed any evacuee land purchase or settlement in their states, and demanded guarantees that the government would forbid evacuees to buy land and that it would remove them at the end of the war. They objected to California using the

6. Eisenhower, President is Calling, p. 116-17.
10. Ibid., p. 29.
11. Ibid.
interior states as a "dumping ground" for its Japanese "problem." People in their states were so bitter over the voluntary evacuation that had been initially encouraged by DeWitt (but was terminated by Public Proclamation No. 4, issued on March 27 and made effective at midnight two days later) that unguarded evacuees would undoubtedly face physical danger. Governor Herbert Maw of Utah proposed a plan whereby the states would run the relocation program with federal financing, while the governor of Idaho advocated rounding up and supervising all those who had already entered his state. The governor of Wyoming wanted evacuees placed in "concentration camps." With few exceptions, the other officials present echoed these sentiments. Only Governor Ralph L. Carr of Colorado took a moderate position. The voices of those hoping to use the evacuees for agricultural labor were drowned out amid the stormy proceedings.  

Bendetsen and Eisenhower, with little or no support from higher federal officials, were unable to face down this united political opposition. Eisenhower closed the meeting: the consensus was that the plan for assembly and relocation/reception centers was acceptable, as long as the evacuees remained under guard within the centers. As he left Salt Lake City, Eisenhower believed that the much of his proposed program as well as the "plan to move the evacuees into private employment had to be abandoned —at least temporarily." Bendetsen came to a similar conclusion, remarking several weeks later: "You can't move people across the street! The premise is that who you consider to be so dangerous, that you can't permit him to stay at point 'A' — point 'B' will not accept."  

Before it had begun, Eisenhower and the WRA had thus abandoned its resettlement plans and adopted confinement policies. West coast politicians had achieved their long-sought program of exclusion; politicians of the interior states had achieved their goal of detention. Without giving up its belief that evacuees should be brought back to normal productive life in American society as quickly as possible, the WRA had, in effect, become their jailer, contending that confinement was for the benefit of the evacuees and that the controls on their departure were designed to prevent mistreatment by other Americans. Accordingly, the agency immediately stepped up its search for suitable relocation center sites, in cooperation with the military and the WCCA, and concentrated the balance of its attention on the twin problems of building an organization and preparing for the reception of the evacuated people.  

Commencement of College Student Relocation

Throughout the balance of April and early May, the issue of relocation was largely submerged in WRA thinking by the more pressing problems of evacuee reception and establishment of the relocation centers. The issue remained alive, however, and eventually it was brought to a head by two simultaneous and parallel developments: (1) the early beginnings of what came to be known as college student relocation; and (2) the

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12. Ibid., pp. 26-27; Eisenhower, President Is Calling, pp. 117-19; and Personal Justice Denied, p. 154-55.

13. Eisenhower, President Is Calling, p. 119.


continuously mounting demand from western sugar producers for evacuee labor to help harvest their extensive sugar beet crops.

The special problem represented by the Nisei college students was noted as early as March 8 by a small group of educators and YMCA and YWCA officials in the San Francisco Bay area and was brought more sharply into focus on March 19 by the preliminary report of the Tolan Committee. In late March, a Student Relocation Committee was formed on the campus of the University of California, Berkeley, and general plans were developed for facilitation of the transfer of Nisei students to midwestern and eastern educational institutions. On April 7, the day of the Salt Lake City conference, President Robert G. Sproul of the University of California informed Tolan of the problem and indicated that he planned to submit proposals for its solution.

At a conference on April 11, WCCA and WRA representatives met in San Francisco to discuss the student problem. Both agencies agreed that permits should be given in a few especially deserving cases to students and others to leave the evacuated areas for immediate travel eastward to pursue their education.

On May 29, at the urging of Director Eisenhower and through the efforts of the American Friends Service Committee, the National Student Relocation Council (later the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council with headquarters in Philadelphia) was established at a meeting in Chicago, attended by college and university officials representing institutions throughout the country. Under the direction of its chairman, Dr. John W. Nason, president of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania, the council spent the summer focusing on the problem of facilitating a Nisei student transfer program for the opening of the academic term in autumn. Throughout April and early May, however, its predecessor organization, the West Coast Student Relocation Committee, had already helped about 75 Nisei students to move out and resume their studies, almost without a break, at schools and colleges lying east of the exclusion zone. By September 30, 1942, a total of 143 junior colleges, colleges, and universities, had been approved for student relocation by both the War and Navy departments. Included were liberal arts colleges, such as Swarthmore in Pennsylvania, state universities, such as Nebraska and Texas, women’s colleges such as Smith and Radcliffe, Catholic institutions, such as Gonzaga, teachers’ colleges such as Colorado State College of Education, theological seminaries such as Union in New York City, technical institutions, such as Milwaukee College of Engineering, and specialized schools, such as Northern College of Optometry and the Oberlin Conservatory of Music.

Under the tentative leave policy adopted by the WRA on July 20, 1942, some 250 students were granted education leaves from assembly and relocation centers prior to September 30. Some of these students left during late July and August to attend summer sessions at various institutions, but the majority went on leave in September, thus resuming their education with the opening of the fall term.

By December 31, 1943, the number of Japanese American students enrolled in American colleges and universities had increased to 2,263. During the last six months of 1943, an estimated 636 evacuees left relocation centers to attend institutions of higher learning. The group included recent graduates of the relocation center high schools, as well as students whose education had been interrupted by evacuation. Included in the number were approximately 200 girls who began nurse's training, the majority of whom enlisted under the U.S. Cadet Nurse's Corps program. In November, relocation officers in the centers began efforts to supplement the work of the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council by exploring opportunities for evacuees to study nursing in nearby approved hospitals and nursing schools. On October 14, the War Department dropped a ban that had prevented admission of students of Japanese ancestry to educational institutions conducting classified activities for the armed services, pending individual investigations similar to those required for work in war plants and approval from the Office of the Provost Marshal General.18

Seasonal Agricultural Work in Western Sugar Beet Fields

On May 13, 1942, the WRA and the WCCA acceded to the repeated demands of the western sugar beet producers, following a suggestion directly from the White House. The two agencies agreed on a joint plan for permitting immediate recruitment of seasonal farm workers at the assembly and reception/relocation centers. Under the plan the WRA undertook to handle negotiations with the employers, while the WCCA assumed a nominal responsibility for keeping track of the evacuee workers and assuring their ultimate return to government centers. This latter objective was accomplished without the use of troops by issuance of civilian restrictive orders by the Western Defense Command, establishing each county or group of counties where the evacuees were to work as a restricted area under the terms of Executive Order 9066 and forbidding any person of Japanese ancestry to leave the designated area without specific permission from the WRA. These orders were enforceable under the provisions of Public Law 503. In addition, the WRA-WCCA agreement set forth five requirements that had to be met before any employer’s application for permission to recruit evacuee workers would be accepted: (1) payment of prevailing wages; (2) provision of adequate living quarters (without cost to the evacuee) at or near the place of employment; (3) assurances from state and local officials that law and order would be maintained; (4) provision of transportation for the workers from the centers to the places of employment and back to the appropriate center; and (5) assurances that employment of evacuees would not result in displacement of local labor.

Movement of evacuees into the sugar beet fields started on May 20, 1942, when a small contingent of 15 recruits from the Portland Assembly Center arrived on farm lands controlled by the Amalgamated Sugar Company near Nyssa, Oregon. The movement of

18. War Relocation Authority, Semi-Annual Report, July 1 to December 31, 1943, pp. 47-48. For further information on the student relocation program, see the John William Nason Papers and the Thomas Ray Bodine Papers in the archives of the Hoover Institution On War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, California. Nason, president of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania, served as chairman of the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council and Bodine served as the organization’s field director from 1942-45. Material in the Nason Papers, Box 21, and the Bodine Papers, Box 5, Folder 15, relate to Manzanar.
evacuees to the beet fields continued during May and June, slacked off slightly in midsummer, and then was resumed in preparation for the fall harvest. Altogether, approximately 10,000 evacuees left WCCA and WRA centers during 1942 for seasonal agricultural work, principally in Idaho, Utah, Montana, Colorado, and eastern Oregon. By conservative estimates the evacuees probably saved enough beets to make nearly 250,000,000 pounds of sugar.\(^{19}\)

**Adoption of Basic Leave Regulations**

Because the procedures to cover seasonal agricultural work did not address the problem of leaves from the centers for year-round employment, the first step toward solution of this issue was taken on July 20, 1942, when the WRA adopted a tentative policy permitting indefinite leaves. Under this policy, only American-born evacuees who had never lived or studied in Japan were permitted to apply for indefinite leave. Such leaves were granted only to applicants who had definite offers of employment somewhere outside the eight western states under the jurisdiction of the Western Defense Command. Before an indefinite leave permit was granted by the WRA director, the applicant was investigated by the relocation center staff and a record check was made with the FBI.

On September 26, the WRA issued a more comprehensive and liberal set of leave regulations which were published in the *Federal Register* on September 29 and became effective on October 1. Under the new regulations, any evacuee — citizen or alien — could apply for leave to visit or reside in any locality outside the evacuated area. Three types of leave from relocation centers were covered by the regulations: short-term, work-group, and indefinite. The three types of permits could be revoked by the WRA director in any case where the war effort or the public peace and security appeared to be endangered.

Short-term leave was intended for the evacuee who wished to leave a relocation center for a period of several weeks in order to consult with a medical specialist, negotiate a property arrangement, or transact other personal business. The leave was granted by the individual relocation center project directors for a definite period after investigation by the WRA staff at the centers. If a project director denied an application for short-term leave, the evacuee could appeal the decision to the WRA director in Washington.

Work-group leave was designed for evacuees to leave the centers as a group for seasonal agricultural work. Like short-term leave, it was granted by a relocation center project director for a definite period (which could be extended) and was subject to investigation at the center. Whenever possible, a record check was made with the FBI and other federal intelligence services for such permits. If the circumstances warranted, however, a project director could grant the permit without the record check.

Indefinite leave was granted to evacuees only by the WRA director in Washington and only if four specific requirements were met. The applicant for such leave must have a definite offer of a job or some other means of support. He must agree to keep the WRA informed of any changes in his job or address. His record at the relocation center and with the FBI and other intelligence services must contain no evidence of disloyalty to the

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United States. There must be reasonable evidence that his presence will be acceptable in
the community where he proposed to make his new home.

Thus, by late September 1942, the WRA was "making definite plans" for resettlement of
evacuees outside the relocation centers. Although the WRA had made resettlement "the
primary aim of the relocation program," it did not mean that the agency "was
contemplating an immediate and wholesale exodus from the centers." To the contrary, the
WRA stated:

... The somewhat elaborate machinery of checks and clearances involved in
applications for indefinite leave, the difficulties encountered by evacuees in
arranging for jobs without the opportunity to deal with prospective employers in
person, the still-evident anxieties felt by many communities toward all people of
Japanese ancestry, the reluctance of many evacuees themselves to leave the
sanctuary of relocation centers in time of war — all these things suggested that
individual resettlement would doubtless be a slow and gradual process. Within
the limits prescribed by national security and administrative expedience,
however, the Authority had determined to work toward a steady depopulation of
the relocation centers and a widespread dispersal of evacuees throughout the
interior sections of the country. ...20

Problems Associated with Implementation of Relocation Program

According to the WRA's Story of Human Conservation, the implementation of the agency's
relocation program was beset by numerous problems. As a result, the "actual movement of
evacuees out of the centers to take up residence in normal communities did not take on
significant proportions until the spring of 1943." Throughout the fall of 1942, the relocation
program was, in the words of the chief of the Employment Division, on a "retail" basis.
The publication continued:

... Each application for indefinite leave was processed individually both at the
relocation center and in the Washington office. In many cases, weeks and even
months went by between the time an evacuee first submitted his application and
the time he was finally able to depart from the center. The Authority's efforts to
find employment opportunities for the evacuated people were handled mainly by
the chief of the Employment Division himself and a few members of his
immediate staff. Contacts were made on a somewhat informal basis and letters
were sent to the various relocation centers advising them that an employer had
been located who would be willing to consider employment of evacuees. From
that point on, the negotiations were between any evacuee who might be
interested and the employer. Inevitably, under these procedures the tempo of
relocation movement from the centers was extremely slow and effected only a
minor reduction in the center populations. By the end of 1942 less than 700
evacuees had left the centers on indefinite leave.21

Establishment of Relocation Field Offices

In late November 1942 WRA Director Myer, impatient with the slow pace of relocation, recommended that field area offices be established in cities throughout the nation where WRA expected substantial numbers of evacuees to be relocated. The offices, according to Myer, could handle much more closely and systematically the kind of contact work with employers that the Employment Division in the Washington office had been conducting somewhat informally. The offices could provide a check on public attitudes toward the evacuated people in their areas and work toward improving the "climate of social acceptance." The offices could also furnish a variety of services that the incoming evacuees would need as they settled in their new homes.

The first field area office was established in Chicago on January 4, 1943, to supervise relocation activities throughout the midwestern states. Within weeks, additional offices were opened in Cleveland, Kansas City, Salt Lake City, and Denver. During the spring, an office was established in New York City to supervise relocation in the eastern states and another was opened in Little Rock, Arkansas, to cover the southern portion of the nation. By June 30, an additional area office had been established in Boston to handle relocation efforts in the northeastern United States. In addition to the eight area offices, the WRA opened approximately 35 subordinate or "district" field offices during the spring to perform similar types of functions in specific localities. Each of the district offices was under the supervision of one of the area offices, and all of the area offices, which also functioned as local relocation offices for the cities where they were located, were responsible to the chief of the Employment Division in Washington. As the network of field offices "was gradually geared up to an operating peak in the late spring of 1943," the WRA was finally "in a position, for the first time, to move directly towards its major goal of restoring a substantial number of the evacuated people to private life outside the west coast exclusion zone."22

Changes in Leave Procedures

During the early months of 1943, the WRA made changes in its basic leave regulations. The changes were made primarily to speed up and simplify the leave procedures by transferring to the field offices and the relocation centers functions which had previously been conducted by the Washington office.

The first significant change in the basic leave procedures was made in tentative form on March 3, 1943, and clarified in greater detail on March 20. The change provided for decentralization in the handling of applications for indefinite leave. The function of issuing leave permits — in cases where clearance had been granted — was transferred to the relocation centers. The function of checking on community attitudes was placed in the hands of the relocation field offices. The "net effect" of this change was "to accelerate the handling of indefinite leave applications and to give the field offices an effective control over the influx of evacuees into the communities of their respective areas."

22. Ibid., pp. 32-33, and Myer, Uprooted Americans, p. 135.
A second significant change in the basic leave procedures was adopted on March 24. Designed to fill a "long-felt need in the relocation program," it established a system of providing final assistance for evacuees going out of the centers on indefinite leave. Such assistance was limited, however, to cases of "genuine need" and was provided only to evacuees who were leaving the centers for the purpose of taking jobs — "not to those going out on student leave or those with independent means of support." The assistance grants amounted to $50 for evacuees leaving the centers without dependents; $75 for those leaving with one dependent; and $100 for those leaving with two or more dependents. Later policy modifications adopted in April and May provided that grants would be made to the families of men in the armed services regardless of the purpose for which they were leaving the centers and that evacuees going out to live temporarily in hostels for the purpose of seeking employment after arrival would also be eligible. Later in October 1943, a change in the schedule of leave assistance grants was made to stimulate family relocation. The $100 ceiling per family had proved to be an obstacle to the relocation of larger families. The new ruling reduced the grant per individual from $50 to $25, but removed the per family ceiling and was thus advantageous to families consisting of five or more persons.

The third significant change to the basic leave regulations was adopted on April 2, 1943. Since the registration program conducted in February and March placed the WRA in a position to eliminate clearance as a separate step in the leave procedures, the amendment of April 2 "authorized the Project Directors to grant indefinite leave permits without referral to the Washington Office and in advance of leave clearance provided basic requirements were met." These included: (1) the applicant must have answered Question 28 during registration with an unqualified affirmative; and (2) the Project Director must be satisfied, on the basis of evidence available at the center, that the applicant would not endanger the national security or interfere with the war effort. Issuance of permits in advance of clearance, however, was prohibited in the case of: (1) those who had applied for repatriation or expatriation to Japan; (2) those whose applications for leave clearance had previously been denied; (3) Shinto priests; (4) aliens released on parole from internment camps by the Department of Justice; and (5) those who were planning to relocate to one of the eastern seaboard states under jurisdiction of the Eastern Defense Command. Later, on December 14, 1943, the WRA notified the War Department that it had decided to lift all special restrictions on relocation in the Eastern Defense Command (except for those cases where the Joint Board recommended denial of leave clearance) and would thereafter grant leave permits for resettlement in that area on the same basis as for other sections of the country.

Relocation in 1943

As a result of the changes in the basic leave procedures, the volume of relocation mounted steadily during the first three months of 1943, soared sharply upward in April and May, and dropped off slightly in June. By the half-year mark, more than 9,000 evacuees had left

the centers to establish residence outside, and by the end of 1943 this figure had risen to more than 17,000.

The majority of those who left the centers in 1943 were Nisei between the ages of 18 and 30. This movement tended to alter the composition of the relocation center populations gradually, yet nevertheless distinctly. By the summer, the oldest and the youngest evacuees were beginning to comprise the majority of the population in the centers. "The more vigorous, more alert, more thoroughly Americanized members of the community were beginning to thin out; the more cautious, the more timid, and the least well adjusted to American life, who had previously occupied a kind of background role at the centers, began to move steadily into the foreground." Thus, the WRA became increasingly aware that the "winnowing effects of the relocation program were going to make the relocation centers somewhat harder places to manage and that the relocation effort itself would become increasingly difficult as time went on."

The relocation movement of 1943 found its primary geographical focus to be the north central states and the intermountain region. Chicago, with its numerous employment opportunities and relative lack of anti-Asian bias, "soon proved to be the favorite relocation spot and remained so throughout the history of the program." Denver and Salt Lake City also attracted large numbers of resettlers, because they had small but reasonably well established Japanese populations during the prewar period which provided a nucleus for further settlement. In addition, the two cities had both received several hundred additional people of Japanese descent during the period of voluntary migration, and many of the evacuees who went out on seasonal agricultural leave during 1942 and 1943 eventually gravitated to them and found year-round jobs. Aside from Chicago, Denver, and Salt Lake City, the resettling evacuees were widely distributed throughout the midwestern and intermountain states. Relocation in the southern states was limited, partially because the WRA did little to encourage it and few of the evacuees looked upon the South with its reputation of racial discrimination and limited economic opportunity as a favorable region for resettlement. During the summer of 1943, an agreement was concluded with the National Housing Administration (NHA) to assist the relocation officers to meet one of their most critical problems. By the terms of this agreement, the relocation supervisor of a specific area was to advise the NHA regional representative of current and anticipated in-migration trends. In return, the NHA would assist the WRA in determining the acceptability of evacuees for housing in localities and recommend communities where the housing shortage was less serious and opportunities for housing were most promising.26

One development that stimulated the increased tempo of relocation during the fall of 1943 was the initiation of a "community invitation" plan in August. By this time it had become clear that there were many cities throughout the country where employment opportunities were plentiful and varied where the original WRA requirement of a specific job prospect for the resettler was virtually "academic." Consequently, the WRA authorized its field offices on August 5 to designate certain communities as open to the evacuees on an "invitation" basis and the centers to grant leave permits for relocation in such communities regardless of whether or not the applicant had a specific job prospect, provided that they had leave clearance and met other procedural requirements. This plan enabled the resettler

an opportunity to meet with potential employers face to face and to "shop around" in search for employment. A large share of the relocation in late 1943 and throughout 1944 was carried out on a "community invitation" basis.  

Seasonal Leave, 1943-44

With the arrival of spring in 1943, American farm interests again requested the services of evacuees in the relocation centers for seasonal agricultural work. By the end of June, more than 5,000 evacuees had been employed. The majority of these seasonal workers went to jobs in the sugar beet sections of the intermountain states, Idaho, Colorado, Utah, and Montana receiving the heaviest contingents. A considerable number, however, took jobs in the Great Plains states, and some even entered seasonal farm work as far east as Michigan. In addition, several dozen went into railway maintenance jobs in several western states.

On March 16, 1943, the regulations governing seasonal leave were significantly modified for the first time since their adoption in May 1942. Under the new policy, the WRA assumed full responsibility for handling the seasonal leave program. The amended regulations provided that seasonal leave was to be issued only for work in areas approved by the relocation field offices and that seasonal workers would be restricted in movement to the county or counties which the field offices designated. Provision was made to exclude grants for seasonal permits from those who had applied for repatriation or expatriation to Japan, those who had been denied leave clearance, and those who had failed to answer Question 28 with an unqualified affirmative.

Because a large number of potential seasonal workers left the centers in 1943 for relocation purposes and several hundred others left to join the armed forces, the number of evacuees employed in seasonal agricultural work was lower than in 1942. It reached a peak in late November when slightly less than 8,000 were reported absent from the centers on seasonal leave. Of this number, probably as many as 50 to 60 percent, elected to remain outside the centers and converted their permits to an indefinite leave basis without returning. According to the WRA:

"... To an even greater extent than in 1942, the seasonal leave program, by removing the evacuees from the secluded environment of the centers and giving them an opportunity to see that life 'on the outside' was not nearly so bad as many of them had imagined, proved to be a definite aid to the relocation program. In February 1944, the seasonal agricultural leave program was modified to provide for issuance of seasonal leave only to persons recruited for agricultural work through the War Food Administration, and employment was authorized only in counties approved by War Relocation Authority relocation officers. This modification of the program improved controls and the systematic granting of leaves to meet critical manpower shortages. Although 5,029 seasonal work leaves were granted by the WRA to evacuees in the slowly dwindling..."


populations of the relocation centers during the first six months of 1944, it remained impossible, however, for the WRA to supply enough workers to satisfy all of the calls that were made for evacuee farm labor.\textsuperscript{30}

Local Resettlement Committees

From the beginning of the relocation program, the WRA realized that it would need the assistance of citizen groups in various localities to gain public acceptance and assist the evacuees in making adjustments in their new communities. Accordingly, the first resettlement committee was organized in Minneapolis in the fall of 1942. After establishment of field offices in a large number of midwestern communities in early 1943, expansion of these local committees proceeded rapidly. By the end of 1943, 26 committees had been established from Salt Lake City to Washington, D.C.

In most cases, the organizing impetus for local resettlement committees was provided by active church-related people, particularly the Society of Friends (Quakers) and interdenominational workers whose efforts were stimulated and guided by George Rundquist, a traveling representative for the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America assigned specifically to Japanese American resettlement work. As a result of his efforts, the Committee for Japanese American Resettlement provided an umbrella organization for the local committees. The committees, although usually formed around a nucleus of active social-minded church members, generally included civic leaders, representatives of organizations such as the YMCA and YWCA, and a variety of community-oriented people without organizational affiliations.

The first job of most resettlement committees was to foster favorable public sentiment toward the relocating evacuees. This was frequently done by personal contact with key officials and important citizens of the communities, sponsoring meetings at which WRA officials explained the nature and purpose of the program, and a variety of public information devices.

The second phase of the work of the local committees was to help the relocating evacuees in making necessary adjustments in their new homes. Initially, this sometimes involved contact work with potential employers. After establishment of field offices in early 1943, however, the principal problem became location of adequate housing. In some communities, the committees established boarding houses, known as "hostels," where arriving evacuees could find room and board at nominal rates for limited periods while they looked for permanent quarters. Hostels operated by church-related organizations were established in Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Des Moines. In many cities, the local committees conducted contact work with local housing authorities and with property owners to gain entry for evacuees and to advise the resettlers where vacancies could be found. A few committees established comprehensive housing registries and undertook efforts to keep them current. In the majority of cases, however, this type of work was conducted by the WRA field offices with advice and assistance from the cooperating groups.

The committees were helpful in assisting evacuee families to enroll their children in school, facilitating the efforts of breadwinners to become members of local labor unions, and aiding the evacuees to become adjusted in the social life of their new communities. While the effectiveness of the committees varied, they "provided assistance in the relocation program at a time when it was desperately needed, especially during the early days when a large part of the public harbored feelings of hostility or suspicion towards all people of Japanese descent."

Relocation Work at the Centers

Because of the slow pace of relocation, the WRA initiated efforts at the ten relocation centers to stimulate relocation in early 1943. Virtually every "device was used to build up confidence among the evacuees and create in their minds a desire to take up residence outside the centers." Pamphlets and releases were prepared in the field offices describing the particular localities involved and outlining the general relocation prospects for evacuees. Periodic newsletters were prepared to keep evacuees at the centers informed of specific job opportunities and other changing features in the relocation picture in each major community. Special teams made up of employees from the Washington office and field offices were sent to centers to describe relocation prospects and interview individual evacuees who might be interested. Photographs and motion pictures giving evacuees the visual impression of living conditions in some of the outside communities were sent to the centers for exhibition. The WRA director and other principal staff members, during their visits to the centers, used these opportunities to emphasize the importance of relocation before evacuee groups. The camp newspapers carried numerous articles concerning persons who had relocated and opportunities for resettlement.

On November 9, 1943, the Washington office sent letters to each relocation center describing steps the WRA was taking to assist group relocation agricultural ventures. These included: (1) stimulation of credit unions to provide resettlement loans; (2) aid to evacuees in securing loans from federal and private financing agencies; (3) exploration of group relocation opportunities by relocation officers, with particular regard to agricultural possibilities; and (4) arrangements for evacuees representing bona-fide groups to make exploratory visits. These endeavors, however, did not seem to be enough, as a "deep-seated core of resistance to relocation at the WRA centers" continued. This problem "became increasingly difficult as the more readily 'relocatable' people gradually moved out." By early 1944, the WRA decided that "the main key to a breakdown of this resistance lay in throwing a greater degree of responsibility for stimulating relocation on the evacuees themselves." The ten project directors were authorized to foster organization of relocation committees composed of WRA staff employees and evacuee leaders, and efforts were initiated to bring the community governments into the relocation process as actively as possible.


Family counseling programs were commenced in the relocation centers during the late spring of 1944. At each center, trained WRA case workers were assigned to interview evacuee families, analyzing their specific problems and attempting to work out a family relocation plan, including financial assistance if needed, which would meet their particular circumstances. This counseling program was conducted on a systematic basis with the eventual goal of covering every family and unattached individual in each center.

Under legislative authority granted in 1942, the Social Security Board was authorized to provide special welfare assistance to persons displaced by restrictive governmental action who might require assistance. This program was administered by county welfare boards throughout the country, but the funds were provided through the Social Security Board. Since the program applied to relocating evacuees who developed need for emergency assistance after resettlement, the WRA worked out a system under which it could allocate part of its funds to the Social Security Board for this purpose with the understanding that the necessary arrangements would be made for handling cases at the local level. In cases where the relocated evacuee was only in need of emergency aid, he was referred to the appropriate welfare agency by the nearest WRA field office and provided necessary assistance in presenting his case. In cases where the evacuee family or unattached individual required continuing assistance, an inquiry was made to the community of destination before the person or family left the relocation center. This action was initiated at the relocation center and forwarded with essential details to the nearest field office from which further contact was then directed toward the appropriate welfare agency. Throughout 1943 and 1944 several hundred evacuees received emergency welfare assistance under the welfare assistance program.³³

Progress of Relocation in 1944

During the first six months of 1944 the volume of relocation out of the centers continued at about the same level as during the comparable period of the preceding year. The totals for January, February, and March were significantly higher, while those for April, May, and June were somewhat lower.

By early spring 1944 a sufficient number of evacuees had relocated so that the WRA could begin plans for closing one of the centers. The Jerome relocation center in Arkansas, which had been the last center to be opened, was closed on June 30, 1944, after approximately 5,700 unrelocated residents were transferred to several other centers, primarily Rohwer and Gila River. Throughout the fall of 1944 relocation continued at a level similar to that during the preceding year. By December 17, when the War Department announced the revocation of the mass exclusion orders, about 35,000 evacuees, including approximately 2,300 who had entered the armed forces, had left the centers on indefinite leave.³⁴

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³⁴. Ibid., pp. 142-43.
Liquidation Program

With the revocation of the mass exclusion orders on December 17, 1944, the justification for maintaining the centers as a place of refuge for the evacuated people was eliminated. Accordingly on December 18, the WRA announced that all relocation centers would be closed within six months to one year after January 2, 1945 — the date the revocation became effective.

The actual time of closing at each center was left on a flexible basis for two principal reasons. First, the WRA realized that it would take a minimum of six months for the remaining evacuees at each center to overcome their "fears and misgivings," complete their "relocation plans," and "make the physical movement." Second, the WRA believed that unless it established an outside limit of one year for the duration of any center, there would be "a strong tendency among the residents to procrastinate," and thus there would be "a real danger of a large and unwieldy residue of people" that needed "to be relocated in the last few weeks before actual closing."

At the same time that it announced the eventual closing of the relocation centers, the WRA also announced the termination of all seasonal leave, liquidation of farming operations at all centers except Colorado River and Gila River — where winter vegetables were still in the ground, and closure of relocation center schools at the end of the spring term in June 1945. While these announcements were made to stimulate relocation, their primary purpose was based on "practical operating necessity." Operations in the centers, according to the WRA, should be gradually liquidated over a period of several months rather than closed out in a hectic, last-minute operation. All liquidation announcements applied to the relocation centers, but were not applicable to the Tule Lake Segregation Center "which was regarded as a specialized problem."

At the time of the revocation of the mass exclusion orders, slightly under 80,000 evacuees still resided in the nine WRA centers, including Tule Lake. The WRA estimated that about 5,000 to 6,000 evacuees would be declared ineligible for relocation and that these detainees would be accompanied in detention by enough family members to comprise approximately 20,000 people. Thus, the WRA projected that it would need to assist in the relocation of approximately 60,000 people within a one-year period — almost twice as many as had resettled in the preceding two and one-half years.

To accomplish this task, and because the majority of the evacuees wished to relocate in their pre-evacuation communities, the WRA established field relocation offices in the west coast evacuated area. During the early weeks of 1945, area offices were established in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle, and district offices were established in some 25 other communities, including Fresno, Santa Barbara, Sacramento, and Portland. For about three months these offices functioned under the general supervision of the assistant director stationed in San Francisco, but in April they were placed on the same basis as other field offices throughout the country and made responsible to the Washington office.

While undertaking efforts to facilitate relocation in the evacuated area, these offices also took steps to gain public acceptance for the returning evacuees. In many communities throughout California, Washington, and Oregon, hostility toward the evacuated people and opposition to their return assumed significant proportions following the revocation of
the exclusion ban, especially in the interior agricultural valleys of all three states as well as some rural sections along the California coast.

After revocation of the exclusion ban, anti-evacuee feelings, which had been simmering throughout the fall of 1944, erupted into violence in several communities in the coastal states. At first, the hostility took the form of well-publicized mass meetings, resolutions adopted by various organizations opposing return "at least until after the war," discriminatory signs posted in shop windows, formation of citizens' leagues whose stated purpose was to oppose the return, and unfriendly editorials and paid advertisements in local newspapers. In several California communities, however, the "hoodlum" element among the groups opposing resettlement resorted to violence and open intimidation. By the end of June 1945, authorities recorded 34 such incidents — attempted arson or dynamiting, shots fired into the homes of returned Japanese, and threats of bodily harm. The worst incidents occurred in Merced and Fresno counties, with seven shootings each; Orange County, which had six cases of intimidation; and Placer County, which had an attempted arson and dynamiting coupled with a shooting.

Although no evacuees were injured during these incidents, property damage was extensive, and the "terrorism" "undoubtedly contributed to the relatively slow rate of return to that State during the first 6 months after revocation of exclusion."35 Fearing that excessive visiting at relocation centers by evacuees who had already relocated would jeopardize the agency's intense relocation efforts and harm relationships with employers generally, the WRA adopted regulations, immediately after the revocation announcement, placing temporary controls on visits to the relocation centers. Project directors were instructed not to admit any visiting evacuees unless they had obtained prior approval from the appropriate WRA field office. The field offices, in turn, were assigned the responsibility of investigating the request of any relocated evacuee for a permit to visit a center in order to make certain that the visit was necessary and contributed toward the development of relocation plans for the family members still in residence. Thus, the control system, which would be operative until April 16, 1945, kept visiting at the centers within "reasonable bounds during a period when the Nation's transportation facilities were badly overloaded, when the center staffs were extremely overworked, and when all attention needed to be focused on the primary business of relocation." A significant feature of the WRA liquidation program policy concerned provision of resettlement assistance to people who had relocated outside the evacuated area before the revocation announcement and who now wished to exercise their option of returning to their former homes. Assistance was made available to such persons in the form of rail fare and transportation of personal property. Grants to cover subsistence while traveling and to assist resettlers during the first 30-day period in their new localities, however, were made available only to those leaving directly from the relocation centers. During 1945, about 5,000 of the approximately 35,000 people who relocated prior to revocation took advantage of this provision and received WRA transportation grants for travel back to their former homes in the evacuated area.36

Final Relocation Drive

To its surprise, announcement of the WRA's post-revocation program to liquidate the centers was received by many the remaining evacuees in the centers "with a marked amount of apathy." The predominant feeling, as reported by community analysts at the centers, was one of "disbelief." "Every possible pretext was eagerly seized upon to justify the rationalization that WRA did not actually intend to close the centers and that its announcement was merely a 'bluff' to stimulate further relocation." Some residents "attempted to build an elaborate case that WRA had made definite commitments to keep the centers open for the duration of the war and that it was guilty of bad faith in the adoption of its liquidation policy." 37

To counteract the evacuee reaction and stem wide-ranging rumors that were sweeping the camps, the WRA concentrated its attention on convincing the remaining evacuees in the centers that the liquidation announcement was not a bluff and that the centers would close. Director Myer visited each of the eight remaining relocation centers during the early months of 1945, speaking before community mass gatherings, meeting with members of the community governments and other evacuee leaders, and attempting to answer all questions. This tour accomplished its principal objective, and, according to the WRA, "the great majority [of evacuees] began gradually to concede this point in their own minds and soon shifted their resistance to other grounds.

The new focal point for evacuee discussion became the difficulties associated with relocating - the nationwide housing shortage, losses the evacuees had suffered during evacuation, public hostility against them, and the fact that many of evacuees still in the centers were older and had passed their prime years of earning power. These arguments were addressed at what came to be called the "all-center conference" held in Salt Lake City in February 1945. Initiated largely by members of the community council at the Central Utah center, the conference was attended by community government representatives from all centers except Manzanar and Tule Lake. After lengthy debate, the conference issued a document requesting more extensive and far-reaching relocation assistance and questioning the "fundamental wisdom of closing the relocation centers." Although the WRA reply to the conference "was generally conciliatory in tone and did make a few minor concessions," its only "feasible course was to stand firm and insist quietly that the centers would be closed.

Throughout the early months of 1945, the relocation totals from the centers mounted steadily despite continuing evacuee resistance. During the week ending May 5, for example, a total of 788 people left the centers - the highest number for any single week up to that time. The WRA's goal was relocation of some 16,000 people between January 1 and June 30 — an objective that it almost reached.

After the war ended in Europe on May 8, 1945, the WRA became increasingly concerned about the transportation problems associated with its relocation efforts. The WRA.


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determined that a "comparatively spaced-out, regular flow of relocation movement, with specific dates for center closures, was clearly essential in the interest of both the evacuees and the Nation at large." On June 22, the WRA announced that the Canal Camp at the Gila River relocation center and Units II and III at the Colorado River center would close by October 1. Four weeks later, on July 13, the agency issued a comprehensive schedule for the closing of all centers, except Tule Lake, between October 15 and December 15. But these two steps, which were taken to hasten relocation and curtail further evacuee procrastination, were not sufficient. In consequence of persistent talk by many evacuees about "staying until the last minute" and threatening that they were "going to see what happened" if they remained in the centers when the deadlines arrived, the WRA announced a mandatory "scheduling" of relocation at all centers, first for the individuals and families requiring special welfare assistance outside the centers and then for all remaining center residents.

On August 1, 1945, the project directors received official notification of Administrative Notice No. 289, the controversial policy statement covering the scheduled relocation of all remaining center residents. It provided that each project director, starting six weeks before the scheduled closing date of his center, should establish weekly quotas for relocation in order to meet the goal of depopulation by the deadline date. The order, however, could become operative two weeks earlier at the discretion of the project director. The quotas were to be filled, insofar as possible, by people who stepped forward and volunteered to develop relocation plans. If the quota for any particular week could not be met by volunteering, however, the project director was authorized to assign a departure date for individuals in sufficient number to make up the quota. Those assigned a departure date were given the option of selecting the place where they wished to relocate. In case they refused to make a selection, they were given a rail ticket to the community from which they were originally evacuated. If an evacuee refused to pack his belongings, they would be packed for him, and he would be escorted to the train, if necessary, by the camp’s internal security force. All centers were urged to avoid the use of force except as a last resort, and they were instructed not to schedule any evacuee for relocation to a community unless the appropriate field office had indicated that temporary housing was available.

Administrative Notice No. 289 was issued two weeks before Japan surrendered to the United States on August 14, 1945, and was "disseminated among the evacuees only a few days before that event." According to the WRA, the two developments "finally convinced even most of the 'die-hards' that a return to private life was inevitable and would have to be accepted." The occurrence of V-J day was important, "superficially because it completely eliminated the protracted argument about 'war-duration communities,' and more significantly because it convinced some of the most relocation-resistant Issei that they would spend the rest of their lives in the United States and that they could no longer count on official intercessions from Japan on their behalf." Thus, the WRA was able to carry out its relocation program and center closing schedule "without resorting to compulsion in more than a half dozen cases." All centers, except for Granada, were closed.
between two and fifteen days before their scheduled dates, and the "evacuees at all centers except Tule Lake were restored to normal communities before December 1."³⁸

Resettlement Patterns

Throughout early 1945, the majority of evacuees leaving the relocation centers were bound for destinations outside the evacuated area. Many of these people had developed their relocation plans before revocation of the exclusion order and were only then carrying them into effect. Moreover, the somewhat precarious state of public opinion on the west coast during the early part of the year meant that "only the bolder-spirited evacuees and those with properties which could readily be reoccupied were inclined to go back to their former homes." By late spring, however, sufficient numbers of resettlers had established themselves in the former evacuated area so that the movement back to the coast began to increase. By the end of June, approximately half of those leaving the centers were going eastward, while the other half were headed "back home." From that point on, the balance swung increasingly in favor of "westward" relocation. By the end of October, the proportion of people moving back to the evacuated area was as high as 85 to 90 percent of the total leaving the relocation centers. During December 1945 and January-February 1946, after the relocation centers had closed, the overwhelming majority of the people who left the Tule Lake Segregation Center, following clearance by the Department of Justice, found their relocation destinations in the evacuated area. After closure of Tule Lake on March 20, 1946, the net results of the WRA relocation program showed that approximately 57,000 evacuees had returned to the former exclusion zone, nearly 52,000 had settled in other sections of the country. In addition, 1,108 went to Hawaii, and 82 to Alaska. Evacuees resettled in every state on the mainland except for South Carolina. Illinois received the most resettlers with a total of approximately 11,200. Colorado and Utah were next with about 5,000 each, and Ohio, Idaho, Michigan, New York, New Jersey, and Minnesota had totals ranging between 4,000 and 1,700. Approximately 3,000 evacuees still remained, either voluntarily or involuntarily, in the custody of the Department of Justice. A group of 450 evacuees were transferred from Tule Lake to Department of Justice internment camps on the day the segregation center closed. Following closure of Tule Lake, the WRA closed most of its district offices in the west coast evacuation area by May 1, and its last field offices were closed on May 15. The agency was liquidated by executive order on June 30, 1946.³⁹

During 1945 and the early spring of 1946 the principal unresolved problem confronting WRA officials in the former exclusion area as they sought to speed their relocation program was adequate housing. To meet this need, the WRA, in cooperation with the Army and the Federal Public Housing Authority (FPHA), developed a program under


which a number of surplus Army facilities in the vicinity of Los Angeles and San Francisco were made available for evacuee occupancy on a temporary basis under FPHA management. By March 20, 1946, some 2,100 evacuee resettlers were living in such facilities in Los Angeles County and about 1,000 in the San Francisco Bay area.

Gradually, the population of these "special projects" was reduced during the spring of 1946. Many of the occupants moved into "normal" quarters, while several large groups, including a significant number of Terminal Island evacuees from Manzanar, found employment with canneries and other concerns that provided trailer housing. In early May 1946, a trailer project at Burbank in Los Angeles County was opened for the approximately 800 evacuees still remaining in the "special projects" who were classified as "hardship cases." The last of the "special projects" was officially closed on May 18.

Aside from housing problems, resettling evacuees faced other obstacles in late 1945 and early 1946. In some sections of California local licensing boards refused to grant permits to evacuees to engage in professional practice or commercial enterprises. Under the so-called "escheat law" enacted by the California state legislature in 1943, many evacuees were deprived of rural homes on the grounds that the property had been purchased or leased by alien parents in the name of citizen children in violation of the statute. In the Seattle area, the local members of an International Teamsters Union undertook a drive to boycott the handling of evacuee farm produce and thus force the returned evacuee farmers off the land. In the Stockton, California, area, some members of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union attempted to foment a strike to protest against the employment of three returned evacuees. This action, however, was promptly repudiated as contrary to the union's policy both by the international president and by the head of the San Francisco local which had jurisdiction over the Stockton unit. The protesting members were quickly suspended from membership, a strike was averted, and the evacuees retained their jobs. 40 Throughout the spring of 1946 the field offices in the former exclusion area cooperated with various groups that were supporting the rights of the evacuees to soften or eliminate the "last vestiges of discrimination" and help create "a more secure future for the evacuated people." At each of the field offices the objective of the WRA was to make as much progress as possible on the solution of these problems before the date of the agency's liquidation and to foster activation of local resettlement committees which would carry on the work after the agency was terminated. Such committees were eventually organized in all west coast communities where WRA had field offices and where significant numbers of evacuees had relocated. However, the progress made in solving these problems was, according to the WRA, "admittedly somewhat uneven."

In concluding its examination of the relocation program, the WRA observed in its Story of Human Conservation that it had adequately discharged its obligations to the evacuees. This "self congratulation" would be questioned by many, especially when compared with what was later done for refugees in the Cold War era. Whether it would have been politically possible for a government agency to do more in 1945, however, is another matter. Recognizing the limitations of the political climate at the end of the war, the WRA concluded:

Although there can never be full or adequate recompense for the experiences which the evacuated people went through, it is best, we feel, to set these down among the civilian casualties of war and to build on the present base toward a better and more secure future for the people of Japanese descent in this country. The building of that future lies largely in the hands of the still-active groups which have supported the evacuated people throughout the war and, even more importantly, in the hands of the evacuees themselves.\footnote{U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, \textit{Story of Human Conservation}, pp. 151-55.}

MANZANAR PERSPECTIVE

Early Phase of Relocation Program (September 1942 — May 1943)

Commencement of Relocation Program. On September 7, 1942, the \textit{Manzanar Free Press} featured a headline "Relocation Starts Rolling." The article noted:

Nisei hopes for permanent relocation in areas outside the Western Defense Command brightened considerably with the arrival last Saturday of Thomas W. Holland, WRA chief of employment, who began interviewing applicants for permanent outside jobs. This is not to be confused with temporary agricultural furlough employment.

Following a general survey of employment opportunities in the midwest, Holland is interviewing individuals at 1-5-2 to clear their records and open the way for their eventual relocation. . . .

Especially requested to appear are those with definite employment offers, but others desiring permanent relocation are also asked to file applications.

The 900 applicants for temporary harvest work will not be interviewed at this time but it was expected that company representatives would arrive within a week to conduct recruiting for furlough work. . . . Outlining the procedure followed in relocating Japanese, Holland stressed that at the present time existing regulations limiting relocation to citizens must be followed. 'But these regulations are temporary in nature and it may be possible in the future to include other classifications,' he said.

After an individual files application, his record is checked with his project head here and sent to the FBI for further clearance. A pass to leave for the job is issued after assurances from the prospective employer and other citizens in the new community are received. If conditions do not prove satisfactory a person may return to the relocation center, it was announced.

Planning to remain the greater part of the week, Holland has established his headquarters at 1-5-2. Although many employment opportunities are agricultural, other types of work including secretarial, hotel, teaching, [and] domestic fields are
offered. While at Manzanar, Holland filled out newly-devised forms, titled "Application for Permit to Leave a Relocation Center for Private Employment" (Form 71), for each applicant that he interviewed. Walter A. Heath, an employment officer, was detailed to Manzanar from San Francisco to sit in on the interviews. Although Heath subsequently held various titles, such as senior administrative assistant, leave officer, assistant relocation officer, relocation program officer, and relocation officer, he was generally referred to as the camp's relocation representative and headed the relocation office and division throughout its entire program.

Form 71 was designed to disclose background information which would serve as a basis for judging loyalty. It covered relatives, residence, education, references, activities, and hobbies, as well as a direct question on loyalty. Additional longhand notes were added to indicate the degree of Americanization, the interviewer's impression of the applicant, and the applicant's choice of relocation locality and type of work. Along with the original Form 71s, Holland also obtained copies of the applicant's "Individual Record" (Form 26) and information and recommendations from WRA appointed personnel in the camp for submission to Washington.

Applicants were told that they might expect an offer of a job in two or three months "if everything turns out all right." Approximately 350 persons completed interviews during the days that Holland was at Manzanar and the weeks following his departure when Heath took over the interviews. Virtually all applicants were between the ages of 20 and 28, and men outnumbered women by a three to one ratio. Later, about 50 additional persons applied before the Manzanar relocation representative's efforts were focused on recruiting seasonal agricultural labor. Because of the interest shown in relocation by the camp residents, Heath warned the evacuees "against over-optimism" in a camp newspaper article on September 17. He noted that relocation was "a slow and laborious process." Much "time may elapse before the records of the job-seekers can be cleared, and before he can leave the gates of Manzanar behind him." Heath also stressed "the difficult task of public relationship being conducted by the WRA to influence the employers and communities to accept the Japanese Americans."

Early "Leave" Efforts.

Seasonal Agriculture Furlough Work — Because of wartime labor shortages, the western sugar beet growers were anxious to use relocation center evacuees to help harvest their crops. Before mid-September 1942, several representatives of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company arrived at Manzanar to recruit seasonal agricultural labor under the WRA's newly-established 'group work leave' program. Later, a representative of the Amalgamated Sugar Company recruited workers at the camp. In both instances, several days' delay elapsed because contract approval from the San Francisco regional office was late in arriving.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN: THE RELOCATION PROGRAM AT MANZANAR, 1942-1945

By the time that active agricultural recruiting finally started at Manzanar, interest had developed to such an extent that waiting evacuees completely filled the space between the two barracks used for recruiting. The evacuees formed themselves into crews ranging in size from two to ten persons, and the crews chose a leader to act as their spokesman. The crews were interviewed by recruiters who selected a farmer's contract requiring a group of suitable size. Work to be accomplished, location, living quarters, and wages were discussed briefly with the crew leader. In almost every instance, the crew agreed to accept the contract offered to it and signed the agreement. Both Issei and Nisei were eligible for agricultural work furloughs.

After the contract was signed, the workers filled out applications for group work furloughs and leave permits. Departure rosters were prepared for each county of destination. The rosters, together with copies of the "Individual Record" (Form 26) for each person, were sent to San Francisco and to the employment investigator, later known as the relocation officer, responsible for the destination area. Sign-ups ranged as high as 150 per day. After the first few days of recruiting, groups of about 100 left Manzanar simultaneously on chartered busses under civilian escort provided by the sugar companies.

For each movement of agricultural furlough workers, a military travel permit had to be obtained by wire from the Western Defense Command. Permits named the destinations and the number of workers authorized to go to each destination. Every movement included workers for a number of localities.

In less than two weeks, 1,018 evacuees left Manzanar for the western beet fields, and during the entire year 1,148 labored under the program. There were no eligibility requirements other than freedom from application for repatriation or expatriation and parental permission for school-age youths. Unattached women were not granted leave by the project director to insure that the "morals" of the evacuees and community sentiment were respected. In several instances, however, the Welfare Section at Manzanar arranged for seasonal agricultural work for the third party in marital triangles, thus contributing to "peace and harmony" within the center.

"Relocation rumors" began to spread soon after the sugar beet workers left Manzanar. Many of the rumors were found to be exaggerated by WRA officials, but they took on credence as they were retold and spread. The rumors included scores of bus accidents, beatings, unsatisfactory housing, little or no work, poor earnings, discriminatory treatment, and racial prejudice. By the end of the season, such rumors had established a pattern that was to continue throughout the entire relocation program. When the seasonal agricultural workers returned to Manzanar in late November, WRA officials established that there had been no beatings, reception had been good almost everywhere except for several localities in Montana where open discrimination was experienced, and housing facilities, while not modern, had been good compared with those encountered by Mexican beet workers as well as housing owned by many Caucasian farmhands. Earnings had averaged $3.00 per day. This low figure had not met expectations, both because of the
inexperience of many of the evacuee workers and the crop yield was poor in many areas.\textsuperscript{45}

**FBI Clearance** — In October-November 1942, Manzanar administrators received several letters from the WRA’s Washington Employment Office listing names of persons who had received final clearance by the FBI for “permanent relocation.” These names included those who had applied in early September when Holland had been at the center. One such letter listing 74 names was announced in the *Manzanar Free Press* on November 30. The article noted:

\ldots A few have definite offers for jobs, but the majority do not. Many others have definite offers and have been cleared, but have not been listed as yet. \ldots

*If these cleared persons do receive offers for work, they should be submitted at the project, as leave is expected to be authorized in a few days.*\textsuperscript{46}

**Early Relocation Trends** — During November and December 1942, Manzanar officials received a few offers of employment from private firms or persons. Most of these came as a result of efforts by the chief of employment in the Washington office. Most offers were for domestic service, and many were “poorly paid positions offered by persons with big hearts and small pocketbooks who wanted to do something tangible to help the evacuees.”

According to the *Final Report, Manzanar*, Heath reported that a “psychological reaction appeared” soon after the relocation program began — a development that would continue “throughout the program.” Evacuees who, at the time of application, expressed a willingness to do “anything” became hard to please when release seemed assured and positions began to open up. “Waiting for something better,” became a popular response. Few wanted to accept a poor job today when a better one might be available tomorrow. Thus, many persons accepted positions but refused departure privilege after the completion of the lengthy Washington procedure that was necessary for final release. This “very human, but exasperating trait of changing one’s mind continued until the end.”

Nevertheless, the relocation program at Manzanar began to be implemented, although long delays developed during which Washington checked community acceptance for final approval. In some cases, however, evacuees arranged for their personal relocation with little or no assistance.\textsuperscript{47}

**First Relocations.** WRA officials received word on November 7, 1942, that the first release from Manzanar under Holland’s program of “permanent relocation” was granted to Esther Naito, a young Nisei who had been attracted by an offer for a clerk-switchboard operator position from Presbyterian College of Christian Education in Chicago. Since she had no experience with a switchboard, immediate arrangements were made for her apprenticeship

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at Manzanar. The job was made possible through the auspices of the American Friends Service Committee. She left the relocation center on November 15 after receiving "a military pass from the regional office in San Francisco." During November and December 1942, additional Washington approvals were received, and 39 relocations or "releases" were authorized. Some of the "releases" were arranged through the Welfare Section and authorized by the Western Defense Command for persons who were parties of racially-mixed marriages and for children of such marriages. Applicants were required to show evidence of community acceptance from their prospective new communities in the form of a letter from law-enforcement officials as well as an ability to earn a livelihood. A few of the "releases" were for students who obtained college or university acceptance and Army release as a result of church committees working through the camp's Welfare Section.49

After the sugar beet workers departed, applications increased for what was to become known as "leave clearance." In an article on December 3, 1942, the Manzanar Free Press reported that "relocation fever" in the camp was "rising." The article noted:

With 312 applicants for private relocation in November, making a total of 644, relocation fever is really becoming an epidemic. Last Monday saw 38 persons crowd the little office where applications are filed, while Tuesday, following the publication of the FBI clearance list, a greater number of applicants swamped the staff.

Mondays may be 'blue' for other departments but it is a banner day for the relocation department. A week ago last Monday, 39 persons rushed in to file their applications after attending the relocation rally at which Thomas M. Temple [chief of the Community Services Division) and Henry Tsurutani [chief of the Legal Aid department] spoke.

To take care of the rush of relocation applications, the relocation office had hired four additional evacuee secretaries, thus increasing its staff to nine.50 Complications in relocation procedures were the "greatest stumbling block" for the overworked relocation office staff at Manzanar. For each individual relocating, the following documentation was required:

1. For Submission to Washington — (a) Several copies of the Individual Record, Form 26, to permit FBI clearance; and (b) several copies of the 4-page application, Form 71;

2. For Local Approval — (a) letters of reference from three pre-evacuation Caucasian friends and one Project supervisor; (b) certificate of clearance with


the Project Internal Security Section and the Project official handling applications for repatriation and expatriation; (c) the Project Director's recommendation; (d) proof of guarantee of employment or other means of livelihood on the outside; and (e) transportation and escort to some point outside the restricted area.

3. Approval from Washington — (a) leave clearance by the Director; (b) favorable sentiment in the community of choice.

4. Military Approval — travel through the restricted area. 51

Leave Office Established. Administered by Ruth Cushion, the Leave Office was established on December 1, 1942, and charged with the responsibility for arrangement of evacuee travel, passing judgment on applications for assistance grants, and conducting necessary clerical work for the departure of evacuees after their relocation plans were completed.

Since Manzanar was located inside the restricted military area, all evacuees leaving or arriving at the camp were required to be escorted to the boundary of the restricted area by a Caucasian WRA employee. As a result, an escort position under the supervision of the Leave Office was filled on December 1, 1942.

Because Manzanar was not directly connected with railroad service, the only means of public transportation directly to the camp was provided by a small bus line that operated between Los Angeles and Reno. The nearest railroad station with regular passenger traffic service was at Mohave, 140 miles distant. From there a local Santa Fe rail line extended to Barstow where it joined the main Southern Pacific Railroad line. The Southern Pacific placed a representative in Lone Pine to sell tickets and take care of travel details, and a railway agent from Mojave went to the center once a week to handle reservations with the Leave Officer. A seven-hour delay between bus and train connections was encountered at Mojave and Barstow. Since both communities were "very unfriendly toward the Japanese," travel through those towns was soon diverted from those communities to Reno, Nevada, a town "more friendly" to evacuees some 265 miles north of Manzanar. As travel from Manzanar became heavier, racial "resentment" also increased in Reno. The situation soon became untenable, and on April 26, 1943, Project Director Merritt determined that "WRA equipment" would henceforth be used to transport evacuees.

All evacuees who left or entered the restricted military area had to have military passes. These passes were issued by the Western Defense Command through the WRA's regional office in San Francisco until the spring of 1944. (After that time, the commanding officer of the military police company at Manzanar was allowed to issue outgoing passes, and, at a later date, passes for those arriving at the camp.) As a result, evacuees waiting to leave on scheduled dates, as well as on emergencies, were held up because their passes were delayed. Prior to the spring of 1944, it was not uncommon for persons of Japanese ancestry coming into Manzanar to wait three days for a travel permit which had been applied for a week in advance of their anticipated arrival. There were no overnight

accommodations in Reno, and the evacuees often had to sit in depots until their permits came through from San Francisco.  

**Impact of "Manzanar Incident" on Relocation.** Following the outbreak of violence at Manzanar on December 6, 1942, administrative offices in the camp were used as dormitories for evacuees taken into protective custody, and evacuee laborers stopped work. The necessity of hurriedly preparing documentation for relocation of the 65 persons taken to the Cow Creek Civilian Conservation Corps camp in Death Valley brought 'total confusion' to the relocation process. Although camp school teachers were used in the emergency, they were not familiar "with procedures" and had little 'clerical experience.'

In the wake of the violence, WRA officials reported that for "the first time, pro-Japanese elements began to work against relocation" as evacuees "commonly understood that a trip to the Relocation Office would place them in danger of physical harm." In spite of this development, however, "a newly hired escort quietly left the Center with 15 relocaters while the work stoppage was under way." The people leaving the camp were "picked up unobtrusively and without fanfare."

The relocation representative at Manzanar was instructed to relocate immediately the 65 evacuees who were taken into protective custody and transferred to Death Valley. Their applications were airmailed to Washington with an appeal for quick action, but little progress was made for several months.

The American Friends Service Committee, in the process of opening a hostel in Chicago in cooperation with the Church of the Brethren, found employment possibilities for many of these evacuees, but clearance "remained discouragingly slow." The Washington office rejected a suggestion that Project Director Merritt be granted authority to approve indefinite leave for the evacuees, but promised to give 48-hour service on applications for each individual. In spite of this promise, however, clearance for most was delayed for several months, and three persons still remained in Death Valley when the camp was closed in mid-February 1943. The three individuals were transferred to the Granada War Relocation Center pending final clearance.

Later on October 19, 1944, Morris Opler, the community analyst at Manzanar, submitted a report on the relocation program in which he commented on the "serious" impact of the "December disturbance" on relocation efforts at the camp. He noted:

> Relocation was off to an early and a good start at Manzanar with the visit and special assistance of Mr. Holland in September, 1942. . . . The bloodshed and tension of that period and of the period that followed made it difficult for evacuees to cooperate with a WRA sponsored program. The fact that those who left the Center in December of 1942 were taken out because they were suspected of participation in the riot or for their own safety caused many who contemplated speedy relocation to abandon the idea for the time being. This was particularly true of those who had been criticized [sic] for friendliness toward the

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52. Ibid., pp. 163-74.
53. Ibid., pp. 66, 68-69.
Administration or toward individual members of the appointed personnel. Since they had been labeled 'dogs' and had been accused of one thing and another through the channels of gossip, they felt that it would be an admission of guilt or an indication of cowardice to leave until such talk and attitudes had subsided.\footnote{Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, October 19, 1944, Report No. 246, "The Relocation Picture At Manzanar During the Summer and Fall Of 1944," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 348, File 61.318, No. 15.}

**Establishment of First Hostel.** WRA officials working with the relocation program concluded that the procedures for release were "too involved" and that employment could be found "with greater ease and better individual adjustment" if evacuees were permitted to locate employment after rather than before release from the camps. Former Manzanar staff members joined others in solving these problems through the establishment and use of hostels, low-cost hotel-boarding houses operated for relocating evacuees. Through the efforts of two former teachers and a former Director of the Community Management Division at Manzanar, the Church of the Brethren accepted sponsorship of a group of evacuees from Manzanar and provided temporary living quarters at a hostel it had established in Chicago in cooperation with the American Friends Service Committee. The former Community Management Director accompanied the group of evacuees to Chicago in late December 1942, and the two teachers left the camp shortly thereafter to assume management of "this first hostel."\footnote{"Relocation Division," *Final Report, Manzanar*, Vol. II, p. 69, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 71, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."}

**Reorganization of the Relocation Office, December 1942 — February 1943.** In late December 1942, the relocation office at Manzanar was separated from the employment office and placed under the supervision of Assistant Project Director Robert Brown. On February 1, 1943, it was placed under the newly-named Assistant Project Director in charge of Community Management, where it remained organizationally until some time after a Washington reorganization effort provided for an enlarged Relocation Division under the direct supervision of Project Director Merritt. The early change at Manzanar was made because Merritt, a strong supporter of the camp's relocation program efforts, believed that relocation and project employment were competing activities and that relocation should be the principal, as well as an independent, function of the WRA organizational structure.

Under the reorganization plan of February 1, 1943, the relocation office was headed by a WRA senior administrative assistant. The expanded office had two WRA appointed personnel — a senior escort who, with an evacuee typist and a WRA-appointed escort, handled travel arrangements, military passes, and leave credentials, and a senior clerk (school teacher on detail) who supervised six evacuee clerical typists who filled out forms — and two evacuee interviewers who assisted the office head in interviewing applicants for leave clearance and outside jobs. Despite the organizational changes and additional personnel, the relocation office was often overworked, a problem complicated by the fact that Washington was "hopelessly behind" in clearing applications.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 69-72.}
Impact of Registration, Segregation, and Leave Clearance Programs on Relocation. The registration program at Manzanar during 1943 had a significant impact on relocation. According to the Final Report, Manzanar, the registration program "created great mental and emotional turmoil at Manzanar, particularly among the alien group." Revision of the loyalty question "to permit aliens to respond to their intent in obeying the laws of the United States, rather than in being loyal to the United States" had made it possible for them "to become eligible for leave clearance." The report continued:

In all the confusion, approximately 50 percent of the citizens answered the 'loyalty' question in the negative. Although it is doubtful this answer represented the true feeling of more than half of those who had given it, no way was found to correct the situation easily and quickly. Persons who answered in the negative were not eligible for relocation.

After a number of weeks, Washington provided a procedure for reconsidering persons who had first answered 'no' and who later claimed loyalty to the United States. Leave clearance hearings were held for all 'no' persons. Transcripts of the hearings and recommendations by the boards and the Project Director were sent to Washington for review. . . .

On an average, several weeks were required at the Project for a given case in order to assemble pertinent information, have a hearing, transcribe and summarize the hearing, and get proper signatures. It was then not unusual to wait as long as six months for a decision from Washington, with the average wait being perhaps four months. No substantial number was cleared until one year after registration.

Throughout the following months, the Relocation staff spent a great deal of time serving as members of Leave Clearance Boards. Even more time was spent with individuals desirous of relocating and anxious about their status. Numerous letters and wires were written to Washington in an effort to expedite action on individual cases.

In addition to preventing or delaying relocation of large numbers of evacuees, the registration, segregation, and leave clearance programs "brought to Center residents a great fear of forced relocation and of split-ups in families." This development, according to Heath, "did much to crystalize feeling against relocation, and this fear persisted even when the reason for it had faded." 57

In his aforementioned report on relocation, Opler reiterated many of Heath's themes concerning the impact of registration, segregation, and leave clearance on relocation. He observed:

Unfortunately registration came hard on the heels of the riot and the issues and divisions which had much to do with the December disturbance again came to the fore. In fact, many who had remained aloof from the events leading up to the trouble of December were, out of anger or because of intimidation and family

57. Ibid., pp. 72-74.

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pressure, caught up in the difficulties growing out of a qualified or negative answer to Question 28 and were denied leave clearance.

Persons to whom indefinite leave is closed can be expected to make some kind of a psychological adjustment to that fact and to rationalize their position. Thus the Center was filled with skeptics and opponents of relocation and with people who had a stake in the maintenance of Manzanar, with most of its population, and all of its facilities and services. 58

Relocation Rates, 1943-44. The number of evacuees relocating from Manzanar during the early months of 1943 were 60 in January, 64 in February, and 78 in March. The figures, according to the Final Report, Manzanar, did "not indicate the popularity of the program but only the ability to complete detailed clerical work at Manzanar and in Washington."

In April 1943 the WRA established simplified procedures that allowed evacuees "with no adverse factors in their backgrounds" to be released for relocation subject the approval of the individual project directors. As a result, relocation rates increased to 192 in April and 182 in May. According to the Final Report, Manzanar, persons who relocated "during this time were those who had been clamoring at the gates to get out and who remained eligible even after registration." During the spring of 1943, most evacuees relocating continued to be Nisei with men outnumbering women. Gradually, Issei "began to go out in greater numbers but the program continued to be much more successful for those of the second generation." The number of evacuees relocating from Manzanar declined to 85 in June and 66 in July — a level that continued until the spring and summer of 1944, when it climbed above a monthly average of 100. The number of relocations remained at that monthly level until the fall and early winter months of 1944, when relocation rates underwent "a sharp incline upwards." 59

Middle Phase of Relocation Program (June 1943 — January 1945)

Factors That Influenced Relocation Program.

General — In the Final Report, Manzanar Heath discussed the general feelings of the evacuee population at Manzanar toward relocation efforts during the late spring of 1943 as the center began its second year of full-scale operation. Among other things, he observed:

More than a year after evacuation, the war, which the evacuees had expected would end within three to six months, showed less promise than ever of early completion. The honeymoon vacation feeling at Manzanar had been lost in the dust and heat of the preceding summer, and that chapter of life at the Center finally closed with the 'incident' on December 6, 1942.

58. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, October 19, 1944, Report No. 246.

When a man is in jail, his every hope and plan centers on his re-entry into the free world. The days that he spends in confinement are considered wasted days and his dreams are of the time when the doors of his prison will clang behind him.

On the surface there seemed to be a great similarity between the man in jail and the man in the relocation center. Many of the evacuees who came to Manzanar showed resentment at being detained. Among them were many who had completed plans for evacuation to the East and who were caught by the ‘freeze order’ of March 27, 1942 which had prohibited further voluntary evacuation.

Also in the Center were many who pointed to their peaceful compliance with evacuation orders as proof of their loyalty. Here was injured innocence personified...

Into this setting had come the relocation program. It would appear that relocation would have been accepted as an unexpected pardon by a prisoner, a cause for rejoicing, an opening of bars. It was all of these things for some of the Manzanar evacuees. Yet, strangely enough, the great majority of Center residents did not react in this way at all. There were but few at the gates clamoring to get out, or breaking into a run every time an additional bar was lowered with the easing of the restrictive measures.

The reasons for this reaction to relocation, according to Heath, were "many and varied; each contributed toward a cumulative effect that was a result of an unreasoning and unreasonable distaste for relocation." For example, Heath noted:

.... One man would hesitate to relocate because of fear of prejudice. A friend might tell him that his fear was silly, but not to relocate because in the open area the climate was bad. A second friend would argue that one need not worry about either of these points, but that damages could be recovered from the Government by staying in the Center. Many agreed that relocation was undesirable and stayed in the Center.

Heath listed six issues that in his opinion formed the background to explain the evacuees' reaction to the relocation program at Manzanar. These issues were: (1) fear; (2) pro-Japanese influence; (3) uncertainty about the future; (4) roots in California; (5) group loyalties; and (6) climate.

Fear — Heath observed that sometimes it seemed "that there was only one reason for evacuees not relocating, and that was fear; the others were only rationalizations." While fear was "one of the greatest deterrents" to relocation, "it was not always voiced." The "gripping fear of physical violence towards one's self and particularly one's family can not be imagined by those who have not experienced it." Fears of social discrimination, discrimination in employment and of being laid off, illness and necessary hospitalization "all did their share in discouraging relocation." Particularly among the older people, many of whom spoke little or no English, these fears were "paramount."
Pro-Japanese Influence — Heath observed that an "underground element of increasing importance — active or inactive sympathy for Japan — was fostered largely by some of the Issei and Kibei." Since America needed manpower, they reasoned, "it would be a disservice to Japan to go outside." These people believed that it "would be a service to Japan to discourage relocation." In addition, there was "a larger group who did not identify their own future with that of America, because it was individually necessary for them to return to Japan on account of family responsibilities or property matters."

When the segregants were transferred to Tule Lake in late 1943, this pro-Japanese influence that had been "a continual damper on the [relocation] program" was lessened. However, because "of illness or pregnancy within the family, and because no decision had yet been made on leave clearance, at least 250 segregants did not go to Tule Lake with the main movement." Later there was "no space for them there and they remained in Manzanar to the detriment of the relocation program."

Uncertainty about the Future — Encouraged by the pro-Japanese elements at Manzanar, some evacuees developed a "belief in the uncertainty" of "a future" in "the United States." This uncertainty was abetted by west coast newspaper stories calling for deportation of all persons of Japanese ancestry and legislation to strip Nisei of citizenship. There was widespread fear among the evacuees "that they would be deported or economically and socially forced to give up life in America." While many fought "all the harder to win a place in this country," others were resigned to "lose fight" and "determined to do nothing that would make them unacceptable in Japan."

Roots in California — According to Heath, many evacuees at Manzanar were "deeply rooted" in the California communities from which most of them had been evacuated. They would say with emotion that Santa Monica was their 'second home.' They had made no choice between Japan and the United States. Their choice had been between Japan and Santa Monica or between Japan and Glendale. Later, during the days of Center closure, they refused employment and housing in any but the exact locality of their pre-evacuation residence. Only in the final weeks... did they accept housing an hour's distance from their old homes. It then became clearer as to why it had been so difficult to relocate the evacuees in the East.

Group Loyalties — According to Heath, ties "of friendship and mutual assistance among certain groups" at Manzanar often strengthened "a desire to resettle in a body." An "outstanding example"

of this occurred with the Terminal Island group. They came from the same locality in Japan, worked together and lived together on Terminal Island, lived in the same blocks in Manzanar, and, for the most part, returned in the same motor caravan to a block of housing near Terminal Island. Later they went to work as a group in the same fish canneries.

Climate — Heath observed that never "did climate mean so much to any group as to the Manzanar evacuees." The climate in any place east of California was viewed by many evacuees as "unhealthy" and "bad." The "factor of climate kept large numbers of Manzanar people from bettering themselves im measurably." Such considerations as "community
acceptance, broad vocational opportunity, and social equality were of no importance to them compared to climate."\(^{60}\)

Morris Opler, the community analyst at Manzanar, prepared a series of studies regarding the evacuees' reaction to the WRA relocation program in the camp in which he reiterated, as well as elaborated, on many of Heath's aforementioned issues. On October 16, 1943, for instance, he issued a report entitled, "The Present Situation In Respect to Relocation at Manzanar." Based on a series of interviews and preliminary studies, Opler summarized the factors that he believed were influencing the slow tempo of relocation at Manzanar during the fall of 1943:

1. **Age**: Because Japanese immigration was a phenomenon of the two decades following the turn of the century and was cut off in 1924, the issei or family heads are now past their prime and have the misgivings that old people who have suffered serious financial reverses might be expected to show concerning a new start in unfamiliar surroundings.

2. **Previous Departures**: A large percentage of the young, unattached, better-trained individuals have already left Manzanar on relocation, and as the total of these eligibles has shrunk, the rate of relocation has dropped.

3. **Occupational Specialization**: The presence of large numbers of persons whose occupational background is intimately associated with the West Coast (Terminal Island fishermen) or who functioned in activities for which there is little call or in which it would be difficult to become established now (those who were engaged in professional or managerial activities) has been a check on relocation.

4. **Status Considerations**: The reluctance of many, especially older persons who had considered themselves established and independent, to accept employment where they will be under supervision, particularly under the supervision of Caucasians, where linguistic difficulties and prejudice are likely to be operative.

5. **Immobility**: The long term of residence of many of these people within a relatively circumscribed section of the country, their complete familiarity with the economic and climatic conditions of this particular region, their many misconceptions about other areas, and the consequent resistance to scattering, have likewise been of considerable moment.

6. **Fear and Uncertainty**: These worries, material and psychological, cover a great range. Some of them seem naive and unrealistic until it is realized that the evacuees have been removed from the normal stream of American life during a period when the nation has made dramatic transition to war conditions. The adjustments to travel conditions, rationing, taxation, housing conditions, etc. which have come to the

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average citizen gradually, seem impossible barriers to those who must face their cumulative weight the day after they leave a Center.

A number of basic fears have been noted on the economic side, moreover. There is the fear that the wages offered relocates will not be sufficient to pay expenses and taxes at present costs and rates. There is the objection that W.R.A. assistance does not provide for the 'extras' which evacuation and relocation entail, such as the obtaining of household goods (if they can be obtained at all) to replace those sacrificed or lost at the time of removal, the provision for clothes suitable to the new life of a markedly different climate, etc. There are the fears that housing will be inadequate, found only in undesirable locations, will be too expensive, or will not be obtainable at all. Important, too, is the fear that any economic or occupational adjustment, no matter at what cost they are made, will not be permanent; that post-war shifts and problems arising from the absorption [sic] of returning soldiers will leave large numbers of Japanese and Japanese Americans far from their original bases, jobless and with few assets.

Fears relating to social security are effective too. There is the concern about unpleasant incidents, insults and discrimination. There are just a sufficient number of such instances reported in the public press and their occurrence is evenly enough spaced to constitute a deterrent to relocation. . . . There is the fear of going to a region to which many relocatees have gone, lest the charge of 'Japanese colonization' arise again, and there is the contrary anxiety concerning professional opportunity, professional care, marriage and recreational possibilities if the community chosen does not contain persons of Japanese ancestry. There is nervousness over . . . the chance that future regulations may prevent reunion with relatives in Centers at a time of crisis, etc. Some of these misgivings seem strained and absurd, unless one appreciates how many unexpected shocks this segment of our population has received in the year and three-quarters since Pearl Harbor.

7. Draft Status: The uncertain draft status of the male of military age has acted as a deterrent upon those in this category and all those who depend on them. If the young man has capital he fears to relocate and risk it, lest he be forced to liquidate his business hurriedly a second time if national policy on this issue changes. If he has dependents he dislikes to attempt to support them on the outside when he may be forced to leave them less well cared for than would be the case in a Center.

8. Property interests: There are those who still have substantial property interests on the west coast. They intend, if it is at all possible, to stay as near to their holdings as they can and to return to them at the earliest possible moment. The recent statement of the President, and the relaxation of dimout [blackout] regulations along the Pacific coast have encouraged them to think of eventual return to their homes rather than in terms of relocation.
While Opler believed that these eight issues explained the current evacuees' attitudes toward relocation, he noted that the "primary reason why the rate of relocation has lagged in recent months is simply that so many of the residents of Manzanar do not at present have the leave clearance which will permit them to resettle." Commenting further, he observed that the segregation program had resulted in tensions and restlessness "in the community which favors a contemplation of relocation for those for whom it is possible." Little advantage could be taken of these developments, however,

. . . . . as long as 1000 members of the community are denied leave clearance, for a rough count indicates that 4500 persons, or well over half of those not bound for Tule Lake, are concerned in the fate of this block of 1000. It is unlikely that many of these 4500 will make any important move until they have a clear conception of what may be expected from the leave clearance hearings now in progress. It is important to realize that the family tie, always close in Japanese and Japanese-American communities, has been still more greatly solidified by evacuation. Even where it was weakening, it has now been reaffirmed. The financial losses suffered by the parents have given the children a still further sense of obligation to the old people. The humiliation and suffering brought by evacuation has made it a point of honor not to desert a close relative, particularly a parent or child. Property losses, rebuffs to status, uncertainties in nearly every other sphere, have made the personal and family tie more precious. As long as there remains the threat that one member of a family may be denied leave clearance and may ultimately be sent to Tule Lake, it may be accepted that the vast majority of other family members will take little initiative [sic] toward relocation.61

WRA and Evacuee Staff Interpretation — To convince evacuees at Manzanar of the desirability of relocating, the WRA appointed personnel in the camp's relocation office believed that their primary job "was one of promotion and selling." They believed that "this could be done best by a sales agency that protected the interests of its clients' and did not engage in "high-pressure methods."

To promote relocation, the staff at Manzanar searched for a Japanese word that "would combine with relocation a feeling of hope and anticipation." The Japanese word tenju that was ordinarily used for "relocation" was commonly translated "emigration." After lengthy conferences, the evacuee counseling staff determined that the Japanese expression shin seikatsu — translated "new living" — was superior to use of the word tenju and thereafter it was used in Japanese translations. Thus, the relocation office became known in Japanese

61. Manzanar Relocation Center, Community Analysis Section, October 16, 1943, Report No. 68, "The Present Situation In Respect To Relocation At Manzanar," by Morris E. Opler, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 347, File 61.318, No. 4. These themes were further amplified by Opler on June 28, 1944, in Report No. 240, "Resistances To Resettlement," Box 348, File 61.318, No. 15. The despair, fears, and uncertainties experienced by some evacuees, particularly the older Issei, were not only reflected in their apparent lack of interest in relocation but also in other forms of negative behavior. During the winter of 1943-44, for instance, there were reports that gambling and bootleg operations were increasingly becoming a menace to the tranquility of family life as well as the peace and welfare of the entire center evacuee population.
by the English equivalent of "place to talk about new living." In English, the words "resettlement" and "re-establishment" were frequently substituted for "relocation." 62

Obstacles Posed by WRA Policies —

1. Induction Policy: The WRA policy prohibiting reinduction of relocated persons back into centers, unless residence on the outside was proven to be impossible, discouraged relocation. Manzanar residents generally had little confidence in the "government" and felt they themselves should be the final judge of whether or not they could live satisfactorily on the outside. According to Heath, the strict project interpretation and the disposition of the first reinduction request at Manzanar "did much to convince residents that relocation was a one-way proposition and that they would not be allowed to re-enter a center no matter what adversity faced them." "It took a long time," according to Heath, "to break down this attitude." The first applicant for reinduction made his request about two weeks after his relocation "without making an effort to get adjusted outside." Six months later he was still attempting to regain admission to Manzanar "without having made conscientious effort at adjustment." He was finally readmitted, and subsequently "more liberal reinduction interpretations were made." Heath noted that "this restrictive policy on reinduction prepared people to make a real effort on the outside and was undoubtedly a stabilizing influence on relocated persons." However, the policy was "a two-edged sword that cut both ways."

2. Age and Dependency: By December 31, 1944, only 364 males, between the ages of 20 and 40, remained at Manzanar. Of these men, a number had recently received leave clearance, but some were still not eligible to relocate. Others had property in California to which they wished to return. Some had such large families and so little money that it was difficult for them to relocate with the limited financial assistance available.

According to Heath, many evacuees "had understandable reasons for not going out," and age and health were "handicaps for a considerable number." Manzanar, "in its scenic setting, with its grounds becoming more and more pleasant, was an ideal old men's home."

3. Feelings of Insecurity and Fear: Relocation centers, such as Manzanar, "did make good on their promises of security for those to whom they offered haven." Thus, according to Heath, the Manzanar resident "had only one insecurity — his future." He "would decide that issue when he saw 'how things come out.'" Until then he "would refuse to let himself think about it." 63

WRA Organizational Relationships — Much of the relocation program at Manzanar depended upon the Washington office for policy formulation, technical advice and assistance, and leave clearance approval for individual evacuees. While the relationship


63. Ibid., pp. 85-86.
between Washington and Manzanar was generally satisfactory, according to Heath, it left "something to be desired" and "coordination with the Central office was always lacking."

An active Washington liaison person served Manzanar for less than six months during the relocation program. At other times monthly reports and correspondence were the "sole means of communication." During the nearly four years of the center's operation, "only one conference was held for relocation program officers."

The leave clearance program, in particular, presented serious difficulties at Manzanar. As originally established, the program required "tremendous effort by Project personnel in order to meet deadlines." In Washington, however, the program was "never adequately implemented." It was customary "to wait an average of four months, and sometimes longer, for a decision on leave clearance applications which required perhaps an hour of actual work." These delays were "exceedingly harmful to the relocation program and to evacuees." Finally, personnel from the various relocation centers, including Heath, were detailed to Washington "to complete the job."

With few exceptions, the relationship between the Relocation Division at Manzanar and the WRA field offices "remained excellent." Considering the handicaps under which they worked, the relocation officers in the field offices, according to Heath, "remained dependable, patient, and tireless in their efforts for evacuees."64

Initiatives to Promote Relocation Program.

Influence of Relocated Evacuees — One of the most significant single aids to relocation at Manzanar, according to Heath, was the "comeback" from those who had relocated from the camp. Many of their first letters commented on the fine treatment they were receiving "even from servicemen." Eventually their letters were concerned "more and more on wartime problems of living and less on discriminations, real or fancied." According to Heath, the "fact remained... that they were outside, had no thought of coming back, were making fair to good wages, and were gaining valuable experience." These "things could not go altogether unnoticed." Since "early relocatees were young people, their success was important to the Nisei group." The Issei, however, "saw in this but little indication for an 'enemy alien' to expect as much."

Occasionally, there "was a misfit who did not adjust himself well on the outside and who wrote discouraging letters." According to Heath, such instances, however, were "remarkably few" at Manzanar. At first their influence was felt, but it "came to be realized generally that some persons are doomed to failure wherever they are."

During the entire operation of Manzanar, there were only 109 re-inductions, of which only 16 were readmitted because "of maladjustment." Other reasons included impending service in the Army, pregnancy of a serviceman's wife, and ill health.

According to Heath, it was rarely possible to uncover "unfavorable relocation letters written to Manzanar residents." Favorable letters, however, were frequently published in the Manzanar Free Press, but residents "soon began to look on such letters with suspicion."

64. Ibid., pp. 87-89.
An effort was undertaken to get relocating people to write letters back to Manzanar. To encourage residents to write to resettlers, a large wall directory of relocated block residents was placed in each block office.

During the spring and summer of 1944 increased efforts were undertaken for solicitation of information from those who had resettled. WRA administrators felt that a better response would be gained from an invitation from Town Hall than from project appointed personnel and that center residents would place more credence in information gained and released by their own representatives. Accordingly, a list was prepared noting the names of older and more responsible people who had relocated. A letter and questionnaire was drawn up which attempted to solicit information regarding conditions and reception on the outside. Because the WRA refused to pay for mailing expenses and all efforts to obtain money for postage from Town Hall and other organizations ended in failure, the letter and questionnaire were sent out over the signature of Heath. As a result, only six blanks were completed and returned.

Visits of relocated persons to Manzanar were "extremely effective" in encouraging relocation. According to Heath, most returning persons "obtained satisfaction from telling of their own successes on the outside," and nearly all urged their friends to join them.

The WRA administration at Manzanar discouraged relocated persons from visiting the center until they had been outside the center for six months. This decision was implemented because of transportation difficulties as well as the belief that "early maladjustments were usually remedied within this prolonged period."

Considerable effort was expended by the project administration to get persons "conveniently in and out of the Center" after the six months' period. During the last six months of 1944, for example, the daily average number of visitors in the center was 34.

On several occasions, the Relocation Division attempted to make formal use of visitors, but usually without much success. Some visitors were asked to speak at high school assemblies, current event classes for adults, and Block Managers' meetings. Selected persons were used as part-time advisers in the relocation office, but they attracted little interest. Issei would not rely on these young people, and Nisei often wanted more information than these people were able to provide.65

Short-term, Trial and Seasonal Leaves — WRA administrators at Manzanar adopted seasonal and short term leave and ultimately indefinite leave (trial period) policies to permit evacuees "to taste of the pudding without committing himself to eat the entire dish." According to Heath, most evacuees liked "the sample," and some "stayed out" while "many more relocated after returning to the Center and resting for a while."

Seasonal leave permitted departure from the center for several months to engage in seasonal work (usually agricultural or cannery factory employment). At the expiration of seasonal leave, either return to the center or conversion to indefinite leave was

65. Ibid., pp. 96-99.
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Compulsory. Travel expenses were ordinarily paid by the companies contracting for evacuee labor or by the War Food Administration.

Indefinite leave for a trial period permitted return to the center during the fifth and sixth months of residence outside. At the end of the trial period persons who remained on the outside were eligible for reimbursement of train fare, meals en route, and, if necessary, a $25 stipend for subsistence expenses. Movement of persons on trial leave was subject to approval by Heath.

1. Seasonal Leave: According to Heath, many frustrated persons "were able to arrange family permission for seasonal leave, and on the strength of this experience, to convert later to indefinite leave at a later time." Some refused to take indefinite leave status because of high earnings possible on seasonal leave, but these cases were offset by those who were financially able to relocate because of their previous high earnings while on seasonal leave. During 1944, seasonal workers averaged $12 to $16 per day, sums that approximated the average monthly salary of an evacuee in the camp. All told, 2,654 seasonal and furlough leaves were issued before this type of leave was terminated during the center's closure program in 1945. Of this number, 1,589 were for agricultural work in Idaho, while 457 were for seasonal labor in Montana and 371 in Oregon. As aforementioned, 1,148 seasonal leaves were issued in 1942. In 1943 and 1944, leaves were issued to 282 and 529 workers, respectively, who had not been outside the center previously. During these years, 258 evacuees converted to indefinite leave without returning to the center. On May 1, 1945, only 518 individuals remained in the center who had received seasonal or furlough leave.

A comparatively small group of "repeaters" took seasonal leave whenever the opportunity was offered. During Manzanar's operation, 1,322 evacuees took one seasonal leave, while 390 took two leaves, 137 took three, 24 took four, and one took five. Some of these evacuees were prevented by family influence from relocating, while others enjoyed the high wages while on leave and the "winter vacations" in the center. A few had always been casual workers prior to evacuation, and thus were simply following previous life patterns. According to Heath the evacuees "appeared to build good reputations for themselves as workers in the agricultural districts." Farmers "claimed to prefer them to workers of other national origins." As a result, many job offers came from agricultural areas, and a large number of relocations to those areas resulted.

2. Short-Term Leave: Because there were no relocation areas within easy travel distance of Manzanar, short-term leave was "not appreciably used until after relocation was possible within the State of California." Thus, prior to January 1945, short-term leave was used mainly by older and financially secure persons. During 1943 and 1944, 186 and 467 short-term leaves were issued, respectively. At one point, it was found that 80 percent of those who went on short-term leave (excluding visitors to other centers) soon took indefinite leave.

3. Indefinite Leave for Trial Period: As Implemented at Manzanar from May to December 1944, Indefinite leave for a trial period was a "forerunner and a guarantee of successful relocation." As with seasonal leave, it was also a "practical first step in
obtaining parental consent." Unlike ordinary indefinite leave, trial leave did not provide assistance with travel and subsistence expense until the individual decided to remain outside the center. Thus, people with family responsibilities and in financial need profited little from this type of leave.

During the period when indefinite leave (trial period) was afforded to evacuees at Manzanar, 270 such leaves were issued. Of this number, 93 returned to the center, but the rest relocated immediately.66

Use of the Manzanar Free Press — The Manzanar Free Press staff was cooperative in publishing news about relocation undertakings. Selected job offers were reported as direct news releases from the relocation office, and efforts were made to find additional stories that quoted resettled evacuees concerning living conditions outside the center. In addition, Heath was "on the alert constantly" for letters from resettlers to staff members and center residents, and he interviewed many of the resettlers who visited the camp. Efforts were undertaken to obtain many "short stories" rather than "a few long stories" so that "almost every reader would at least get a portion of the educational material even though many preferred to pass over easily recognized relocation stories" in the newspaper.

The camp newspaper was "a good approach to the younger people who read English easily." As time went on, however, most of those persons relocated, and the English language increasingly "had less and less value for educational work."

Although the mimeographed Japanese language section of the newspaper offered the only "real approach" to those who knew little or no English, this "avenue was never satisfactorily opened." According to Heath, the Japanese section, under its own evacuee editor, reprinted translations of some of the English newspaper's stories. In addition, it carried many other stories and a fairly good summary of war news. The editor, "a man of good Japanese education, but with little ability to speak English," had a "fine recognition of the type of news that the Japanese-reading public wanted, but this was not Relocation news." Heath never succeeded in gaining the cooperation of the Japanese editor to translate articles on relocation.67

Visual Advertising — The Relocation Division at Manzanar placed considerable emphasis on many types of visual advertising to promote relocation at Manzanar, including: (1) bulletin boards; (2) handbills, posters, and throw sheets; (3) displays and exhibits; (4) motion pictures; and (5) pamphlets and field bulletins.

1. Bulletin Boards: During the early period, a large bulletin board was placed outside the relocation office on which was posted a short summary of virtually every relocation offer received by the camp. As time went on, however, and relocation opportunities became more numerous, this posting became more selective. During the final months of the camp's operation, only outstanding offers were exhibited, but "another board inside the office displayed domestic offers in California." In time, the large bulletin board was supplemented by a small, three-faced, glass-covered display board in front

66. Ibid., pp. 100-09.
of the office which contained war maps, pictures of evacuees and employing companies, and reprints of favorable stories about evacuees. The success of bulletin board advertising, however, was somewhat limited by a general lack of evacuee interest in reading the displays.

2. Handbills, Posters, and Throw Sheets: During the spring of 1943, a weekly or bi-weekly sheet of job offer summaries was issued and posted in each block. The attractive sheets, featuring appropriate sketches and the use of two or more colors, were prepared by an artist in the Adult Education unit.

Large individually-painted posters were used to promote "general ideas" rather than advertise specific jobs offered. For example, one poster aimed "at driving home the idea" of the futility of waiting for military permission to return to California consisted of a picture of two black boys playing dice under a street sign reading "Little Tokyo" in Los Angeles. This district, formerly occupied by evacuees at Manzanar, had been taken over by blacks who came to the city to participate in war-related industrial work after evacuation.

Small posters ordinarily advertised specific relocation opportunities, frequently in both English and Japanese, were reproduced on the hectograph. The posters were widely displayed throughout the center's offices and living areas, and even in the latrines. Sometimes an entire series of posters was released for a single group opportunity that seemed to offer promise.

Throw sheets, generally detailed, mimeographed write-ups of job and living opportunities, were sometimes used to promote group resettlement opportunities or new relocation areas or simply to encourage relocation. They were handed out in the relocation office and distributed to evacuees attending meetings, returning seasonal workers, and apartments in the barracks.

One mimeographed throw sheet prepared by the relocation office on March 28, 1944, to promote relocation was entitled, "Relocation Made Easy." The sheet stated:

Relocation is not hard. For almost everyone, relocation can be arranged within just a few weeks. Unless you are one of the few people who are not yet eligible to go out, you are remaining in Manzanar only because you yourself choose to do so.

Concluding with the question, "Why do you choose to remain behind barbed wires?," the sheet stated:

There is a job for you on the outside, and in most instances the job will pay you more than you made before evacuation. There is a community in which you can live and be well received. There is a community that will treat your children better than they were ever treated in California. There is a community that will give your children educational and occupational opportunities that previously were closed to persons of Japanese ancestry. Those are the opportunities of today; perhaps before another spring, they will
be considerably lesser, because the European war may end at any time, and jobs will immediately become harder to obtain.  

3. Displays and Exhibits: On two occasions, "Relocation" was the "subject of an exhibit at the Visual Education Museum operated by the Adult Education unit." Relocation and museum staff combined to display pictures, maps, pamphlets, and letters from relocated evacuees. Evacuee attendance, however, was "not large" at either event.

On several other occasions, displays, featuring photographs and accompanying text, were developed around an idea, such as a desirable farming area or a favorable group relocation opportunity. The theme of one large display was "Family Security in America — Where Shall I find It?" This material, slightly expanded, was later incorporated in a pamphlet in both English and Japanese for general distribution in the center.

Large captioned WRA photographs of relocated evacuees were mounted "in series" and used in similar fashion. Such exhibits were moved from mess hall to mess hall by the Reports Officer Robert Brown.

4. Motion Pictures: The Adult Education unit, and later the Reports Officer, obtained a number of short motion pictures and arranged to have them included as part of regular center motion picture shows in the camp. Such movie shorts were usually concerned with the attractions offered by specific sections of the United States in which there were relocation opportunities. The films, according to Heath, were "good crowd getters" when shown by recruiters.

5. Pamphlets and Field Bulletins: WRA field bulletins and pamphlets, issued by area relocation supervisors, provided details of job opportunities and living conditions in the cities, communities, and areas for which they were responsible. The field bulletins and informational pamphlets were distributed in various center and block offices, and occasionally block managers were requested to pass such materials from apartment to apartment in their respective blocks. For a considerable period this literature was displayed under large titles with other visual types of relocation material on the walls of the block mess halls under the general heading "Resettlement News." According to Heath, however, it was never possible to get evacuees to "go one step out of their way to read these releases."  

The Relocation Committee — In April 1943 Heath and the Assistant Project Director in charge of Community Management called a meeting of selected WRA staff members to consider ways of stimulating relocation at Manzanar. Those attending the meeting included three Japanese-speaking people, a supervising teacher, the head welfare counselor, a missionary serving the center, and the head of adult education. The attendees concluded that the basic obstacle to relocation was fear, physical and emotional, and that

68. "Relocation Made Easy," March 28, 1944, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 70, File, "Relocation Reports."

these fears stemmed from a doubt that persons of Japanese ancestry were welcome in America.

The attendees determined to form a "relocation committee" and decided that the best approach for promoting relocation in the camp was through speakers qualified to address evacuee audiences in Japanese. A sub-committee prepared a skeleton outline for a speech to sell the idea that persons of Japanese ancestry were welcome in American society outside the center. Heath was directed to collect and supply fresh information for the effort, and the existence of a "speaker's pool" was widely publicized in the camp. Individual committee members endeavored to develop interest among the evacuee population to attend meetings featuring the selected speakers. The sentiment against relocation was sufficiently strong in the camp, however, so that "not a single speaking engagement was found." The "relocation committee," as it became known, was thus expanded to include other interested persons, such as the personnel officer, Superintendent of Education, and principals of the elementary and high schools. During the summer of 1943, the committee was expanded further to include a number of prominent evacuees, such as the head of the Visual Education Museum, chairman of the block managers, and director of the Parent-Teacher Association, as well as several influential block managers. Under the chairmanship of the Assistant Director in charge of Community Management, the total committee membership was about 30.

Despite considerable effort, the accomplishments of this committee, until its demise in December 1944, were few. It sponsored a relocation exhibit and prepared a number of recommendations for national WRA relocation policy formulation. Beyond that, the members, according to Heath, "only talked." In his opinion, the education of its individual members, "to a degree, was its greatest contribution."

Heath analyzed the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the "relocation committee." As established, the committee was given no voice in development of camp policies. Thus, evacuee members were expected to risk their community reputations in support of unpopular policies. While making attempts to bring about policy changes that would aid the relocation program and allow them as individuals to give public support to the committee, the policy recommendations were not accepted by the WRA administrators, and the evacuee members sometimes felt that the WRA "was closing its eyes to reality."

Occasionally, the project administration adopted, in principle, proposals made by the committee, and in the final analysis the new policies were similar to the committee's proposals. Trial leave, temporary financial assistance, and government housing to meet the immediate housing needs of resettlers were examples of committee proposals resulting in camp policy revision. In each of these cases, however, the project administration denied that the need existed at the time the proposal was made, and final action generally came months later with no credit given to the committee. 70

Zadan Kai — In June 1944 Project Director Merritt and Heath met with a small group of evacuee leaders to interest them in a field trip that Heath intended to undertake. The evacuee leaders requested that Heath investigate agricultural resettlement opportunities in the nation's midwestern and southern states. After a six-week trip, which included routine

70. Ibid., pp. 117-24.

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work assistance in the St. Louis relocation area office and inspection of farm lands in Nebraska and Louisiana, Heath reported his findings to the evacuee leaders. After lengthy discussion, the evacuees decided to meet again to discuss relocation in general and resettlement in the two farming areas in particular. They suggested that they could conduct more productive discussions without WRA staff assistance or presence. Although they were interested in these opportunities, they feared that differences in climate and agricultural methods, when compared with their pre-evacuation situations, negated their positive aspects.

Despite their rejection of these group relocation opportunities, however, the evacuee leaders continued to meet under the guidance of the chairman of the block managers. They drew other evacuee leaders into their group, and on several occasions asked Heath and visiting relocation officers and recruiters to speak to them. Nevertheless, they resisted tentative efforts for a formal organization to promote relocation, and simply called themselves the Zadan Kai discussion group. The group consulted with returning evacuees about conditions on the outside, and at least one of the Issei on the relocation staff attended all meetings of this informal group. This "overlapping of membership," however, was the only direct connection with the Relocation Division. Although no definite relocation moves resulted from the group’s deliberations, the group, according to Heath, "made a worthwhile contribution to relocation" as a result of educating evacuee leadership to resettlement possibilities.71

**Block Managers Involvement** — Block managers met weekly at Town Hall. Heath or the evacuee relocation coordination assistant or both attended nearly every meeting and discussed relocation policy changes and resettlement opportunities. They also made numerous “personal” contacts with the ever-changing block managers to "win friends" for relocation. According to Heath, some block managers were "sincerely friendly," had "an intelligent desire to help," and made "a real contribution." Unfriendly block managers, however, went so far as "to fail to post relocation material and 'forget' to read notices in their mess halls." While some individual block managers and the chairman of the Block Managers’ Assembly "gave important assistance," they "resisted continuous efforts to give formal organized aid through the Block Managers Assembly or in other organized ways."

Despite this lack of enthusiasm, an ambitious series of eight panel discussions was sponsored by the project administration and Town Hall during the spring of 1944. The subjects discussed by mixed panels of evacuee leaders and staff members were as follows: "Who are Americans?"; "What does America stand for?"; "American Citizenship"; "Some American Problems"; "Problems of Residents of Japanese Ancestry in America"; "Japanese Adjustment to America"; "Future of People of Japanese Ancestry in America"; and "America At War."

According to Heath, the panel discussions and other meetings arranged by the administration and Town Hall had "one thing in common." A speaker, visiting recruiter, or relocation officer, (with interpreter for non-English speaking evacuees) who commanded great respect could draw a fair crowd if no similar event had been offered in

71. Ibid., pp. 124-25.
the camp for a "considerable time." When those conditions were not met, "not more than six or eight people attended." 72

Relocation Counseling Program.

Staff Counseling — According to Heath, evacuees approached relocation "with great timidity, and were always ready to abandon their efforts at the slightest excuse." Thus, evacuee and appointive staff members engaged in counseling and advising "were called upon for the greatest of patience, understanding, and skill." "High pressure methods in relocation were definitely out of order." Obvious problems "of a social nature were referred to the Welfare Section." No actual case work was conducted in the relocation office, but relocation counselors were "in reality, discussing personal evacuee problems and finding solutions." The counselors conducted considerable correspondence "in locating suitable opportunities, in obtaining acceptance of Manzanar applicants, and in giving to Relocation Officers information about persons going to their areas." 73

Promotion of Individual Employment Offers — Most successful promotion of relocation efforts at Manzanar, according to Heath, "appeared to be through the medium of specific job offers." Prospective relocating evacuees were interested in knowing "exactly what hobs and what wages they could expect in the community of their choice." Selected job offers were publicized in the center via numerous aforementioned ways. In addition, while discussing relocation with interested evacuees, the relocation advisers would "continuously consult job-offer files and field bulletins and give pertinent information during the interview."

When group offers were received they were analyzed by the camp's relocation staff. Those that seemed to have little appeal were given only routine publicity, but those that showed promise "were given a great deal of publicity" because the staff believed that "successful promotion of popular offers did much to increase the faith and confidence of Center residents." While numerous campaigns to relocate groups of evacuees from Manzanar failed for a variety of reasons, one effort was notably successful.

During the spring of 1944, a group offer to work in the cannery and dehydration plant at Seabrook Farms in northern New Jersey was given extensive circulation at Manzanar. Soon, however, a much publicized anti-Japanese incident took place near Seabrook, and reports reached Manzanar that the first arrivals at Seabrook were not properly housed. Thus, further publicity of the Seabrook relocation opportunity was temporarily suspended at Manzanar.

By August 1944, however, a considerable number of evacuees from other relocation centers had relocated to Seabrook, and most of them "appeared well satisfied" with their work and social acceptance as well as the community's public schools. English was not required for employment at Seabrook, thus enhancing its attractiveness for some Issei evacuees. Relocation officials at Seabrook thus contacted recruiters from Seabrook and developed a recruiting plan to promote the resettlement effort.

72. Ibid., pp. 125-27.
73. Ibid., pp. 128-29.
Before the recruiters arrived at Manzanar, the *Free Press* carried reports about Seabrook. A series of ten hectographed posters, extolling the advantages of work and residence at Seabrook written in both English and Japanese was prepared and posted one by one at intervals of two or three days. Two Caucasian and two Japanese recruiters arrived from Seabrook and told their stories to the Manzanar block managers. Friendly block managers invited the Japanese recruiters to various mess halls for meals and informal discussions about Seabrook. One entire issue of the camp newspaper was devoted almost exclusively to Seabrook, and a mass meeting was planned and widely publicized. As the day of the mass meeting approached, several of the more influential evacuees were "individually prevailed upon to sign up as lead-off people" for the relocation venture. Their names were announced at the mass meeting, and dates were set for the movement of special railroad cars to Seabrook. After a few evacuees subsequently signed up, other camp residents began to apply, and all names were prominently displayed outside the relocation office. As a result, more than 200 evacuees left for Seabrook within a month's time. Upon their arrival at Seabrook, they sent back detailed positive reports that were printed in the *Manzanar Free Press*. Subsequent promotional campaigns sent approximately 300 additional people to Seabrook in March 1945.  

Relocation Library — The first efforts to supply a reading room and relocation library at Manzanar were undertaken during the summer of 1943. A collection of informational material — much of it colorful Chamber of Commerce pamphlets — and a collection of WPA Writers' Project State Guides were displayed in the entrance to the main library at Manzanar. Later, when space permitted, literature was moved to the relocation office reception room and additional reference works were added. The relocation library included large numbers of Japanese language pamphlets, numerous WPA pamphlets containing information on states and localities, and current WRA field bulletins. Despite these efforts, however, Heath noted that the evacuees "depended more upon first-hand reports from friends for their information on relocation."  

Use of Evacuee Counselors — During the early days at Manzanar, "mature Nisei counselors or interviewers," particularly women, were employed in the relocation office. Such persons, however, were the "first to relocate." Qualified male counselors became particularly "difficult to replace." The feelings against relocation that developed following the 'Manzanar incident' and the registration program "deterred many capable persons from associating themselves with relocation." In addition, an evacuee "who himself did not plan relocation was unsuitable" as counselor.  

As relocation "moved through the younger generation and into the alien group," the need for an older male alien staff member became "acute." A knowledge of Japanese was essential if one was to talk with older evacuees. Older Japanese men traditionally looked only to other men for assistance and advice. Authority and decision-making in the Japanese family reposed in the father, and later in the eldest son.  

During the late summer of 1943, Heath succeeded in convincing a 60-year-old Issei to join the relocation staff. He was respected in the community and his oral English was fairly

good, but he could not write letters in English or fill out anything but the most simple forms. This man thus was used mostly as liaison between the relocation office and the camp Issei and Town Hall. He contributed much to the dialogue between the Issei and the relocation center staff before he relocated to Seabrook Farms in November 1944.

During the winter of 1943-44, a 35-year-old Kibei, who had been successful in the produce field in Los Angeles prior to evacuation, became a relocation counselor. Although relatively young and highly Americanized, he had been selected by Manzanar residents to be a block manager and later to be Executive Secretary of Town Hall. According to Heath, the "promotional ability and understanding of Japanese psychology" of this Kibei "were valuable."

During the spring of 1944, a "large part of the progressive alien group left the Project on seasonal leave" to obtain "a sample of outside living conditions." Upon their return in the fall, several of the men, who had previously been block managers, planned to relocate, and had an adequate knowledge of English, were hired as relocation counselors. One of these counselors, however, was threatened with physical harm if he continued to advocate relocation. Despite the continuing opposition, these men held periodic evening meetings in the camp, securing good results by "emphasizing good wages and personal security." 76

Centerwide Relocation Counseling Program — In June 1944 a centerwide relocation counseling program was commenced at Manzanar to help stimulate resettlement. The program was conducted by the Welfare Section and was designed to interview every Manzanar family head in order "to learn his feeling toward relocation, to discover common obstacles to relocation, and to stimulate relocation through proposed family planning." In addition, the purpose of the counseling program was "to locate and refer to proper sections for assistance, whatever problems of health, law, property, and social adjustment appeared to be retarding relocation." The extensive interviewing program took nine months to complete. 77

Evaluation — As a result of the relocation counseling program, evacuee attitudes toward relocation at Manzanar changed significantly during the fall of 1944. Although many were initially apprehensive or hostile to the program, evacuees generally became more positive toward WRA resettlement efforts. Some, however, would continue to remain embittered or fearful, and others would accuse the government of attempting to shift the burden of their maintenance entirely and unfairly upon their shoulders after uprooting them from their established communities following Pearl Harbor. 78 Manzanar had the lowest relocation rate of all the centers in proportion to total population during the months of February, March, June, and July, and its rate fell below average in January, April, May, and September. In October, November, and December, however, Manzanar's rate was higher than that of any other relocation center.

76. Ibid., pp. 134-37.
77. Ibid., pp. 137-38.
The increased rate of relocation during late 1944 showed the changing character of the resettlement program at Manzanar. On June 30, 1942, the camp had 9,744 residents, while on June 30, 1944, it had only 5,472. On June 30, 1942, the camp had 1,557 males from ages 21 to 39 and 1,263 males 50 years of age and older. On June 30, 1944, there were only 345 males in the lower age bracket, while 962 were in the upper bracket. Thus, in 1942 there had been approximately 1.2 "young men" for each "older man," while in 1944 there about 2.8 "older men" for each "young man." Thus, relocation had been for the young and unencumbered during the early days. By June 1944, however, a higher rate for relocation was maintained by the older and encumbered evacuees. 79

**Final Phase of Relocation Program (January to November 1945)**

**Reaction to Announcement of Impending Center Liquidation.** The announcements terminating the exclusion ban and closure of the relocation centers, according to Heath, "brought into the relocation program an element of compulsion that had been absent." While many of the WRA appointed personnel were skeptical and took a "wait and see" attitude, the general reaction of the evacuees to the announcements was, according to Heath, one of "disbelief." Many residents at Manzanar did not see how it would be possible "for all persons in the Center to be relocated within so brief a span without more physical hardship than the Government was willing to countenance." They frequently voiced the statement "that the Government had once disrupted their lives and that it had no right to do so again." The announcements also resulted in new problems for the camp's relocation office. Generally, the "announcement that centers would be closed within a year's time appeared not to be taken seriously by evacuees in general." According to Heath, there "was a marked disinclination to do anything in haste" as "most evacuees preferred to let someone else lead the way."

In the wake of the announcements and the evacuee reaction to them, WRA administrators at Manzanar, as well as at other relocation centers, determined that one of the first problems to be addressed was to convince the evacuees that the centers were definitely going to close. Until the evacuees were convinced, they would make little effort to plan for the future. Accordingly, in late February 1945, WRA Director Myer arrived at Manzanar to conduct a variety of meetings with evacuees during which he outlined his plans for closing the centers and assisting the evacuees in relocation. He refused "to admit the possibility" that "evacuees could not solve their problems, if given minimum assistance from the WRA." He saw "no problem in employment and housing in the Los Angeles area." Despite his assurances that the WRA would proceed with its liquidation plans, however, many evacuees in the camp "still felt that it was impossible within the year to find places for them to work and live on the outside and that the Government of the United States would not be so inhumane as to force them to leave the Center." 80

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Character of Residual Population on December 31, 1944. On December 31, 1944, the evacuee population at Manzanar consisted of 5,549 persons, including a number absent on seasonal and short term leave. Of this number, 3,125 were citizens; 2,117 were 20 years and under; 2,020 were between 20 and 50; 733 were between 50 and 60; and 401 were over 60. The group had a disproportionate number of older people, and many of those in their prime were "burdened with children." The population included a considerable number of farmers and approximately the same number of small business men who had formerly engaged in the wholesale and retail produce trade. About 350 were fishermen or members of fishermen's families from Terminal Island. A few had been domestic servants prior to evacuation, but a large number had been gardeners, farm laborers, produce clerks, and semi-skilled laborers. Approximately one-half of those over age 40 spoke no English, and many of the rest spoke limited or broken English.

By January 1, 1945, the day before the exclusion ban was to be lifted, the relocation office at Manzanar had received only one application for terminal departure to return to the evacuated area. On the other hand, 46 applications for short term leaves had been received, but many of these did not involve departure until after January 8.81

Preference for California. At the beginning of 1945, administrators at Manzanar estimated that about "50 percent of the Center residents would wish to return to California." A majority had come from Los Angeles and "would normally desire to return to their former residence area."

At the beginning of the year, some newspapers and public officials in California raised loud cries, criticizing the Army for lifting the exclusion ban and permitting the Japanese to return to the west coast. Some predicted harm to returning evacuees, while others urged them to stay away until the war ended and the housing shortage was alleviated, arguing that this was the "fair and patriotic thing to do." At the same time, the Governor of California and some individuals and groups rose to publicly support the evacuees, asking the public to accept them in "the American spirit of justice and fair play."

As the year wore on and evacuees returned to the former exclusion zone despite threats and acts of arson and violence, the California public, according to Heath, "appeared to become resigned to the fact that persons of Japanese ancestry would again live in California." At first evacuees feared "to risk the danger of returning," but this fear "eventually abated since little or no physical violence occurred in Los Angeles where most of them would go."

Although opportunities for employment, housing, and occupational and social acceptance were "still superior in areas to the east," many Manzanar evacuees began to cancel earlier plans to relocate in the eastern states, replacing them with "the hope for any early chance to go 'back home.'" Because of "fear and limited employment and housing on the West Coast," greater numbers of evacuees went eastward during the first seven months of 1945. During the summer months, however, the "determination to go only to California seemed to crystallize in the minds of many more Manzanar residents." During August to November 1945, approximately 80 of those relocating went to California, while the percentage moving directly to California during the entire year was 64 percent. To handle

81. Ibid., pp. 145-46.
the evacuees returning to southern California, buses were scheduled to Los Angeles three
days a week during the closing months of the center’s operations.\textsuperscript{52}

\section*{Major Obstacles.}

\textit{Housing} — As the war neared an end, the shortage of housing Los Angeles became
increasingly serious. While Manzanar residents relocating in the eastern states were able to
find available public and private housing, those moving to the Los Angeles area in 1945
faced mounting difficulties in finding adequate shelter.

By the middle of the summer, some 200 to 300 evacuees were "habitually absent from the
Center on short term leave in an effort to find living quarters in the Los angeles area." As
a result of the efforts of Project Director Merritt and other WRA officials with various
public housing authorities, however, a few veterans’ and servicemen’s families were
accommodated in federal housing projects in Los Angeles in August. The following month
100 trailer units were made available for allocation to former Terminal Island residents
near their pre-evacuation homes. Additional servicemen’s families were also
accommodated with "stop-gap housing." During November 1945, temporary living
quarters in barracks or trailers with community mess halls and sanitary facilities were
provided for about 70 families in the Los Angeles area. These incremental housing
measures were sufficient to take care of those evacuees who had not found "make-shift
quarters." Although no Manzanar evacuees left the camp "without temporary housing
being assured," few Manzanar families who went to Los Angeles during the summer and
fall of 1945 "were really satisfactorily housed."\textsuperscript{83}

\textit{Employment} — Throughout 1945, fair to good jobs in most occupational classifications were
available in many eastern and midwestern states and cities. In Los Angeles, however, few
employment opportunities were at first available to the returning evacuees. Produce
operators in the city managed to keep the field closed to persons of Japanese ancestry
until the end of the WRA program in 1946. Nursery work and employment in war-related
factories were largely closed to returning evacuees, although a few Manzanar residents
were employed in both before the close of the war. Evacuee farmers, who had difficulty in
finding equipment and securing financial aid, were hesitant to grow produce that would
have to be sold in the markets dominated by anti-Japanese operators. Wartime regulations
closed the fishing industry to all Issei, and restrictions were not lifted sufficiently to
permit Nisei to engage in commercial fishing until after the Japanese surrendered on
August 14. Domestics and gardeners, however, continued to be in demand in the city,
providing many employment opportunities for the returning evacuees. Thus, many
returning Japanese evacuees reestablished small businesses in Los Angeles and its
surrounding area. After the first few months following relocation, "most other relocators
obtained employment of one kind or another without the assistance of the War Relocation
Authority." Young people found low-paying jobs rather easily, but many trades and
professions remained closed to them. Older people, however, "were not altogether
successful in finding employment."\textsuperscript{84}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{82} Ibid., pp. 146-47.
\bibitem{83} Ibid., pp. 147-50.
\bibitem{84} Ibid., pp. 150-51.
\end{thebibliography}
Exclusion Lists —

1. Military: Army intelligence personnel entered Manzanar immediately after the announcement that persons of Japanese ancestry would be excluded from the coastal area after January 2, 1945, on an individual basis only. Such officers remained at the camp until Public Proclamation No. 24 was issued by the Western Defense Command on September 4, 1945, withdrawing all restrictions which the military had placed on persons of Japanese ancestry and rescinding all exclusion orders.

On January 1, 1945, Army officers delivered to Project Director Merritt a list of names of all evacuees in the camp deemed to be dangerous to the 'internal security' of the United States. This list classified all evacuees in one of three categories: (1) cleared persons, or those free to travel and reside anywhere in the United States; (2) excluded persons, or those excluded from travel or residence within the evacuated area but otherwise unrestricted; (3) detained persons, or those who were temporarily restricted from leaving the relocation center and who were to be detained by the Department of Justice if military recommendations were implemented. Registration documents and reports of various federal intelligence agencies were used in making the classification, but apparently no attention had been paid to leave clearance granted by the WRA or to such matters as applications for repatriation or expatriation that had been filed subsequent to the registration program. The Army list included 259 Manzanar male citizens of the United States classified as detained persons, but no aliens were "so classified as excluded persons." No females were listed.

Thus, the relocation plans of many Manzanar evacuees were delayed and confused "because many American citizens who had been previously cleared by the WRA as loyal were now classified by the Army as detainees." In 1944, 132 of these persons had been granted seasonal or short term leave. At the same time, many others who had applied for repatriation and who were expecting to be segregated to Tule Lake were found by the Army "to be entirely trustworthy, and therefore, were expected to relocate." The Army also issued exclusion orders to both detainees and excludees, and both groups were confused as to why some were prohibited from departing while others were free to leave for areas outside of the jurisdiction of the Western Defense Command.

Although the exclusion orders named only a relatively small group of evacuees, most of them had families, and an order limiting the movement of the wage earner (perhaps the only wage earner in the family) ordinarily limited the movement of an entire family. Detainees under the Army exclusion orders and their family members totaled 823 persons. Appeals and hearings relating to the exclusion orders continued until V-J Day (August 14), and the status of many remained unclear until all exclusion orders were voided on September 4.85

85. Ibid., pp. 151-53.
2. Department of Justice: Seven Manzanar evacuees who had renounced their American citizenship were prevented from relocating. These evacuees were eventually taken into custody by the Department of Justice. 86

3. Immigration and Naturalization Service: About 75 evacuees at Manzanar were restricted in their movement as a result of Immigration and Naturalization Service regulations. Some had gained entry to the United States illegally, while others had entered on temporary permits that had expired or been abrogated during the war. None of these persons was free to travel for several months. Eventually, one of these persons was taken into custody, while the others were released either under bond or parole arrangements, or both. Special parole arrangements with the Department of Justice were necessary for aliens who had been interned at the outbreak of the war and who were later paroled. 87

4. Promotional Methods: Throughout the closing phase of the relocation program at Manzanar, the WRA undertook efforts to divert evacuees to the eastern states where housing and employment opportunities were "superior" to those on the west coast. Although the majority of evacuees wished to return to their former homes in California, the camp staff emphasized that "satisfactory opportunities and better social acceptance, particularly for evacuee young people and children, existed in the East." 88

Personnel Representatives — In spite of the increased use of eastern recruiters and relocation officers on detail at Manzanar, these promotional efforts met with little success. A relocation officer from Philadelphia was in the center during April and May 1945, placing about 30 evacuees. Another from Salt Lake City, who was particularly interested in acquiring workers for the Toole Ordnance Depot, visited the camp in February and April 1945. A Connecticut businessman of Japanese nationality was at the camp in May, and an industrial recruiter came from Wisconsin for ten days in February, but left without obtaining any evacuees. A relocation officer from Newark, New Jersey, arrived in June and succeeded in obtaining about 30 evacuees for relocation to New England and the mid-Atlantic states, while a relocation officer from New York City served as an assistant to Heath from late July to November 1945. Recruiters from Seabrook Farms contracted with more than 200 evacuees to relocate to their expanded facilities in March 1945. A relocation officer representing the agricultural concerns in Nebraska interested 12 to 15 people in settling in his area. 89

Publicity — Despite the promotional and publicity efforts by Manzanar administrators to assist the eastern recruiters and relocation officers, it "remained impossible to influence any substantial number of evacuees to go to the East." Recruiters from Utah and Idaho, however, "were able to obtain farm laborers or share croppers."

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86. Ibid., p. 153.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid., p. 154.
89. Ibid., pp. 154-55.
During April to September 1945, a six to eight-page mimeographed weekly relocation supplement to the Manzanar Free Press was published. Although some west coast news was carried in the supplement, nearly all space was devoted to news and job offers in the eastern United States.

An extensive number of mounted photograph displays with English and Japanese captions were prepared by Reports Officer Robert Brown. The photographs, mostly of eastern and midwestern relocation opportunities, were moved from mess hall to mess hall and attracted considerable interest.

During 1945 "Japanese language positions" became more "popular," and recruiters, preceded by publicized campaign efforts, continued "to find a few applicants each time they came to the Center." During the year, Japanese language instructors were sent from Manzanar to Army schools at Stanford, Northwestern, and the University of Minnesota, and to Navy schools at the University of Colorado and the Oklahoma Agricultural and Mining College. Some evacuees accepted employment with the Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency. 90

Procedural Changes. Changes in military regulations, coupled with the Supreme Court decision that loyal citizens could not be required to apply for indefinite leave, made procedural short-cuts possible during 1945. Until Public Proclamation No. 24 was issued on September 4, voiding all exclusion orders, all departures had to be cleared with military representatives guarding the gate at Manzanar. However, this procedure was far simpler than obtaining military travel permits as formerly required.

During this period, the actual procedure involved in getting an evacuee and his entire family through the gate was relatively easy. It required preparation in triplicate of a form giving identifying dates, relocation destination, and notes as to special factors involved. One copy served as a gate pass, one copy was filed, and a third copy served as a cover sheet under which the relocation officer in the area of relocation was forwarded relocation summaries, welfare and medical information, and related material. In addition, arrangements had to be made for ration books, a relocation grant, and travel reservations, as well as referrals to the Welfare Section if special assistance was required. 91

Social Welfare and Institutional Cases.

Permanent Dependency — The center's Welfare Section was responsible for all dependency cases, including unattached children that were being cared for in the Children's Village. The Welfare Section "made complete arrangements" for the outside care of such children, and the medical social workers at the hospital provided identical service for institutional cases, referring them to the relocation office after which arrangements were completed. 92

Temporary Assistance — In addition to dependents, Manzanar included a large number of people who did not have sufficient financial resources to re-establish themselves in a new

90. Ibid., pp. 155-56.
91. Ibid., pp. 156-57.
92. Ibid., p. 157.
community. In 1945, the Social Security Board, with additional War Relocation Authority grants, undertook a program to assist needy resettlers with original relocational expenses, such as rent, food, and where necessary, minimum essential furniture. Application for assistance was made in the center where it was processed by the Welfare Section and submitted to the community of proposed relocation for approval by its welfare agency. After June 1, however, such grants were paid at the camp before departure, thus further simplifying the process.

Many Manzanar evacuees objected "strenuously" to this procedure and "refrained from applying for what they termed charity." Some felt that acceptance of such funds might be used against them by an unfriendly Immigration and Naturalization Service. Should they visit Japan in the future, re-entry to the United States might be denied, they thought, on the basis of "pauperism."

Since a "considerable proportion of the total money allocated for this temporary assistance was in the budget for the fiscal year of 1945," Project Director Merritt recommended that every "effort be made to accomplish, prior to June 30, 1945, the relocation of families needing these funds."

Consequently, interviewers called on the largest families throughout the center to learn whether they had relocation plans that had been delayed because of lack of money. In almost every instance, few families had made "mature relocation plans."

Personnel Adjustments. To expedite the relocation program in 1945, three to four evacuee interviewers were employed in the relocation office until summer, and one remained until early autumn. Five to seven WRA appointed personnel from other sections were detailed as assistant advisers to augment the normal relocation staff. Among these were three persons who spoke Japanese, and another person with a background in social work and employment counseling. In January, the principal of the elementary school at Manzanar was transferred to the position of assistant relocation program officer, serving in that position until April when he left for a position with United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. From May through July, the assistant personnel officer was detailed to the relocation office, and, on August 1, the relocation officer on detail from New York City assumed the position of acting relocation program officer.

Relocation Trends in 1945. Although only 125 persons relocated to California from January through April 1945, the visit by WRA Director Myer in February and "a number of good relocation opportunities in the East were remarkable stimulants to relocation." In March 1945, for instance, the number of applications for "terminal departure" — a term that came into use instead of "indefinite leave" — totaled 52 for each of two days in succession, and for a considerable period it averaged 25 per day. The daily average dropped off to 16 in April, increased to 20 in May, but fell to 12 in June and July and 10 in August.
A series of events in late summer 1945 resulted in accelerated relocation levels. On July 13, Myer announced that Manzanar would be closed by November 30. The issuance by Myer of Administration Instruction No. 289 authorizing the project directors to use physical force in evicting evacuees (after due warning) who had failed or refused to arrange for their departures was announced in the Manzanar Free Press on August 18. A follow-up letter to all residents at Manzanar on August 29 from Merritt reinforced Myer's directives. On August 14, the Japanese government formally surrendered, ending the war. Between August 15 and September 15, ten blocks within the center were closed, and the remaining residents were consolidated with those living in partially-filled blocks. This consolidation caused considerable inconvenience to persons who had spent three years in making their apartments and surrounding grounds more habitable. Schools failed to open in September, and no other educational facilities were made available for children. Camps 2 and 3 at Poston and the Canal Camp at Gila River closed on October 1, as scheduled, and only a handful of residents were permitted to remain temporarily until difficult arrangements could be completed.

Thus, the daily average of applications for relocations increased to 38 in September. When commercial fishing was reopened to Nisei and Issei received promise of work in fish canneries in the Los Angeles Harbor area, Merritt worked with Los Angeles housing authorities to locate temporary housing facilities in a trailer park near the former homes of the Terminal Island evacuees. On September 15, a large contingent of Terminal Islanders left for their new homes in one caravan, thus removing the one group that might have proved difficult to relocate.

On September 25, approximately 1,000 single persons and family heads were still in Manzanar who had not yet named an exact departure date. Merritt sent a letter to each of these persons, informing them that on and after October 9, departure dates would be established for those who had not set one for themselves, and that this would be done at a rate sufficient to keep the busses moving as scheduled. Immediately, applications jumped to an all-time high, and thereafter few evacuees required further individual attention. The impact of Merritt's letter was strengthened by the fact that one neurotic woman, a notorious welfare case, and two families with women in late pregnancy were forced to leave according to schedules set by the camp administration.

Busses were obtained to transport from Manzanar 90 persons per day, five days per week, during the six weeks ending November 23. According to Heath, there was "somewhat of a rush for reservations for the last days, particularly by those who had no assured housing." As a result of a scheduling error, 125 persons had been permitted to set November 23 as their departure date, and more than 90 were accepted for the 21st and 22nd. Meanwhile, the relocation program was proceeding considerably faster than had been anticipated in early October. Many evacuees left in private automobiles and trucks during this period, and the three busses per day to transport 90 persons were not needed. Many residents who had set late departure dates continually advanced their departure times. As a result, by November 15, a total of 61 evacuees were scheduled to leave on the 21st, 22nd, and 23d. This number was slightly in excess of one bus load after discounting those who were to leave in private cars and trucks. Thus, camp administrators arranged for the remaining evacuees to leave the center on November 21."
At 11:00 A.M. on November 21, nine days ahead of schedule, the last remaining evacuee, a four-year-old boy accompanied by his mother, passed through the front gate of Manzanar. The occasion was marked by an informal gathering of WRA staff members and a short impromptu speech by Project Director Merritt. Heath commented, albeit somewhat inaccurately, on the symbolism, as well as the irony, of the occasion:

... But even this touch of ceremony did not succeed in placating the sorrows of the little fellow whose protest at leaving Manzanar was expressed in tearful, physical resistance. The only home this small American had ever known was the barrack he was being required to leave; the only place that spelled safety and security was Manzanar.

Caucasians who were gathered around tried to placate him with smiles and soothing words, but he hid his face as if ashamed at so un-Japanese a display of emotion. He squirmed and kicked and to the end resisted the War Relocation Authority.

Yet 18,358 other evacuees had preceded him through that same gate and had found their places in normal American communities. Some had gone willingly enough; indeed, many had been eager to go. An even greater number, however, like this four-year-old child, had stepped through the gate haltingly and in fear. Yet all had found security and companionship and peace in the world 'outside.' This was obvious from the many letters of appreciation which they had sent back to the Administration. ... The challenge which had been set for the staff at Manzanar had been met. The evacuees, uprooted and resentful, had been cared for for three long years; then they had gone 'home.' In the 'going-home' — no matter where it was — the Relocation Division had taken a major hand. Now it was over. The task was finished.95

95. Ibid., pp. 183-95.
CHAPTER SIXTEEN: THE MANZANAR WAR RELOCATION CENTER SITE, NOVEMBER 21, 1945 - PRESENT

After the last evacuees left Manzanar on November 21, 1945, some War Relocation Authority personnel remained at the site to close out the relocation center's operations. On March 10, 1946, the capital or fixed assets of the former center were turned over to the Department of the Interior's General Land Office (after July 16, 1946, the General Land Office was combined with the Grazing Service under the newly-established Bureau of Land Management) for liquidation, while the center's movable property or consumer/capital goods were assumed by the War Assets Administration for disposal. By 1952 all buildings, except two rock sentry structures at the main entrance and the auditorium which still remain at the site, were removed.

The Manzanar site became the focus of annual pilgrimages in December 1969, and as a result of the efforts of the Los Angeles-based Manzanar Committee the historic significance of the relocation center gained increasing recognition. In January 1972, the California State Department of Parks and Recreation designated Manzanar as a State Historic Landmark. On July 30, 1976, the site was listed on the National Register of Historic Places, and in 1977 the City of Los Angeles Cultural Heritage Board declared Manzanar a City Historic Landmark. In February 1985, Manzanar was designated as a National Historic Landmark, and on March 3, 1992, President George Bush signed legislation establishing Manzanar as a National Historic Site under the administration of the National Park Service. Planning efforts were soon initiated for management of the site and protection, preservation, and interpretation of its resources for the American public.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY CLOSE-OUT OPERATIONS

National Perspective: 1945-1947

After the relocation centers were vacated, the War Relocation Authority personnel in the Washington office, various other offices, and each of the centers turned their attention to the job of close-out operations. The closure process for the relocation centers consisted of four principal steps: (1) physical clean-up and placement in stand-by condition in preparation for transfer to federal disposal agencies; (2) inventory and declaration as surplus property of all movable and fixed assets of the physical plant for submission to the Surplus Property Board and its successors; (3) termination of operational activity, preparation of final reports, and consolidation of center records for shipment to Washington office for final disposition; and (4) termination of personnel.1

The War Relocation Authority had under its jurisdiction approximately $100,000,000 worth of government property. By May 26, 1946, all of this had been disposed of except for a small amount of movable property held until June 30 by the Washington office. The $35,000,000 of movable assets had been inventoried and declared surplus. After the various bureaus of the Department of the Interior had selected the items they desired, and

a small portion had been turned over to the Federal Public Housing Authority (FPHA) in the Los Angeles area, the remainder was declared surplus to the regional offices of the War Assets Administration (WAA). The $65,000,000 in fixed assets had been declared to the Washington office of the War Assets Administration, which in turn declared them to the disposal agencies of the departments interested.

Jerome, the first relocation center to close, was turned over to the War Department. Two of the relocation centers (Granada and Central Utah) went to the Farm Credit Administration in the Department of Agriculture, and seven (Minidoka, Heart Mountain, Gila River, Colorado River, Manzanar, Rohwer, Tule Lake) to the General Land Office in Department of the Interior. Eventually, Minidoka, Heart Mountain, and Tule Lake were placed under the custody of Interior's Bureau of Reclamation, while Colorado River was placed under the Office of Indian Affairs.

During the final months of the War Relocation Authority, its personnel section assisted employees to locate other employment. Four Civil Service Commission representatives explored openings in different areas of the United States. By June 30, 1946, when the WRA was liquidated by presidential executive order, approximately 3,000 people — all but the 80 employees who would continue with a liquidation unit — had been terminated. By June 1, about 2,200 of the agency’s personnel had found employment in other fields. Of this total, the majority transferred to other federal agencies, many going to bureaus and divisions in the Department of the Interior and the National Housing Agency as well as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

In order to carry out the final liquidation of WRA, a "War Agency Liquidation Division" was established under the direction of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior. This division, staffed by about 80 personnel, functioned for about a year after June 30, 1946, liquidating the outstanding obligations of the WRA, completing consolidation of the agency's records and file material for disposal to the National Archives, and completing personnel transactions.

From the outset, the WRA had undertaken efforts to document its program as extensively as possible. It was felt that the agency's program was unique and that complete records of its activities would be of value to government administrators and students in the future. Reports from administrative personnel who had been in charge of activities or programs, together with other file and documentary material, were transferred to the National Archives beginning on June 28, 1945. In addition, a complete duplicate set of the material was transferred to the library at the University of California, Berkeley, while a less complete record was sent by the Berkeley library to the library of the University of California, Los Angeles. A series of monographs and special reports on key phases of the WRA program and statistical records were also prepared by WRA staff members for publication and dissemination.²

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MANZANAR PERSPECTIVE, NOVEMBER 21, 1945 - MARCH 9, 1946

The WRA continued to administer Manzanar for almost four months after the last evacuee left the camp on November 21, 1945. After conducting its close-out operations, the agency turned over custody of the capital or fixed assets at Manzanar to the General Land Office effective March 10, 1946.³

Fixed Asset Inventory

Between August and December, 1945, two specially-trained crews of WRA engineers, accountants, and supply personnel visited each relocation center to conduct a detailed inventory of the physical plant. At Manzanar, the Fixed Asset Inventory was prepared on November 15, 1945, six days before the last evacuee left the camp.

The inventory included components relating to six agency control accounts. These were:

- Account No. 34 — Lands and Farming
- Account No. 35 — Buildings
- Account No. 36 — Utilities Systems
- Account No. 37 — Roads and Bridges
- Account No. 38 — Drainage and Irrigation
- Account No. 39 — Other Investments (i.e., water stock, hog and poultry plants, processing plants, and miscellaneous items not otherwise covered)

During the inventory process, each element was identified, appraised, recorded by number and check, and reconciled against the account books at the center. Tracings providing details of buildings, utilities, roads and bridges, and drainage and irrigation layouts were prepared.

As shown in the Fixed Asset Inventory, the total appraised value of inventoried items at Manzanar was $2,807,564.28. The original cost of the buildings and utility systems of the camp that had been acquired from the Corps of Engineers was $3,763,441.02, while the estimated cost of WRA additions and new construction was $251,374.27, thus making the estimated total cost of the fixed assets at Manzanar $4,014,815.29.

The inventory team recommended a depreciation of $1,208,427.51, resulting in a net total appraised value of the center’s fixed assets of $2,807,564.28.⁴

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⁴ "Fixed Asset Inventory," RG 49, San Francisco Regional Office, Division of Land Planning, Records Related to the Disposal of Manzanar and Tule Lake War Relocation Centers, 1945-1948, Box 919, File, "Manzanar Relocation Center Fixed Asset Inventory," California, Real Property Disposal Case Files, Box 89, File, "Manzanar Relocation Center — Manzanar, Ca., Fixed Asset Inventory."
Surplus Property

From November 21, 1945 to March 9, 1946, the Supply Section at Manzanar was responsible for disposition of all property at the center with the exception of the fixed assets. Early in the spring of 1945, procedures for declaring surplus property were determined "and slowly the writing of declarations began." This particular phase of the program "gathered momentum until December 1945." During the next three months, the filing of declarations of surplus property "for all 'major' and 'minor' equipment, materials, and supplies was completed."

Physical inventories of all classes of property at Manzanar were conducted "as soon as released by the using section or unit." After the inventories were completed, all items were classified according to the "Surplus Property Board Manual." A declaration of Surplus Property was made to the disposal agencies on their "forms SPB-1, Declaration of Surplus Personal Property to Disposal Agencies." If and when the disposal agencies certified any items to be "unsaleable," action was initiated so that such property could be removed from property records and placed on the "salvage pile." When disposal agencies sold the property after declaration, the Supply Section delivered the items to the purchaser.

During the process when property was declared to the disposal agencies, it was necessary for Manzanar personnel to work closely with those entities. During early 1945, the disposal agency was known as the Treasury Procurement Surplus Property unit. Later, however, this unit was transferred to the Department of Commerce, thence to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and finally to the War Assets Administration. Thus, "the securing and sustaining of necessary cooperation from disposal agencies required considerable ingenuity and effort on the part of the Supply Officer." Despite the efforts of the Supply Officer, the everchanging reorganization of the surplus disposal agencies caused considerable delay and confusion in getting rid of surplus materials at the center.

During late 1945 and early 1946, the Manzanar Supply Section shipped "a great amount of property to the [WRA] Area and Regional Offices for their use in providing temporary housing for relocated evacuees." It also shipped "considerable building material" to various government agencies "for remodeling proposed housing units for relocated evacuees."

In addition, the Manzanar Supply Section conducted sales of surplus property to other bureaus under the Department of the Interior. It sold project-produced goods, surplus subsistence supplies, and salvage materials.5

Clean-up Operations

As at other the other relocation centers, the Engineering Section, aided by the Supply Section, undertook the clean-up of the grounds and buildings at Manzanar "for declaration to the Surplus Property Board" after the last evacuees left the camp.6 As movable

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property was picked up from the barracks and other vacated structures and removed to warehouses, crews cleaned-up the center and placed it in "a standby condition." Each structure was cleaned and swept out, and the outside area was cleared of litter. Stoves were moved from the barracks to central locations for storage. Windows were shut, and doors were nailed tight. Connections in the water, sewage, and electric systems in the vacated areas of the center were turned off, and a weed eradication program was implemented to reduce the fire hazard.  

On November 30, 1945, the Manzanar post office was closed, and the task of distributing the staff's personal mail was added to the duties of the Mail and Files Office. That same day telephone operations were curtailed by closing the center switchboard from 11:30 P.M. to 7:30 A.M. each day. Telephones were removed from all center offices that had discontinued functioning, and dial telephones were placed in the apartments of Project Director Merritt, the fire chief and his assistant, and the Internal Security Office. The lone coin-operated telephone in the center was placed in the rock sentry house at the center's front gate. Telegraph service was discontinued on November 21, and teletype service was discontinued on November 30.  

After receiving permission to dispose of its surplus subsistence, the Mess Hall Section shipped remaining supplies to government agencies and to two private dealers. By January 29, 1946, all except $1,000 worth of foodstuffs had been marketed.  

**Disposal of Evacuee Property**

When the last evacuee departed Manzanar on November 21, approximately "100 family lots of property which had not been picked up were still left in apartments." Immediately, the center's Evacuee Property Section began collecting the lots for storage pending its shipment to the relocated evacuees. The work was completed in approximately two weeks. 

The property of the Terminal Island people who had recently left the center as a group, as well as numerous other lots, had not been weighed. After the lots were weighed, letters were sent to Terminal Island evacuees who had goods in project storage beyond the "60-day limit." By January 17, 1946, shipping instructions had been received for all but two of the 73 property lots stored at Manzanar. 

At that time, it was estimated that about 30 property lots would have to be shipped to the government warehouse in Los Angeles because of the "inability of their owners to accept them." In addition, there were ten unidentified items (for the most part of no value) and four small lots of property which belonged to deceased evacuees without heirs, which

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would probably also be shipped to the warehouse before the section closed on February 15.\textsuperscript{10}

Relocation Center Cemetery

As the WRA was preparing to close the Manzanar War Relocation Center, WRA officials in the Washington office and at the project discussed the status and disposition of the center's cemetery. On June 6, 1945, John H. Provinse, Chief, Community Management Division, in the Washington office wrote to Project Director Merritt requesting recommendations as to what should be done with the cemetery since "it would appear improbable that any long-time arrangements are possible for care and protection of such cemeteries." "Exhumation, shipment, and reburial at some place chosen by the responsible family relatives" was a possibility. "Cremation after exhumation might be acceptable in many cases." Some burials "without known surviving relatives which if moved at all" would "require reinterment in potters' fields."\textsuperscript{11}

In response, Lyle G. Wentner, Assistant Project Director, responded to Provinse on June 27, stating that "the people of Manzanar erected a monument at the approximate cost of $1,000 at the entrance to their cemetery site, which they considered a permanent burial ground." Thus, there was "no reason whatsoever why these people could not stay where they are."

Although the cemetery had reportedly once contained 80 burials, only 15 burials (dates of death ranged from May 16, 1942 to December 19, 1944) remained, four of whom "are without relatives and whose remains would, by law, be put in custody of the county of their residence for disposal." When people died "intestate and the county assumes custody, the remains are disposed of by cremation in all cases." Bodies that were removed from the cemetery "must be shipped by state law" in metal boxes, "which are not obtainable at the present time." The cost of the metal containers was $50, and the cost of paperwork "incident to removal and shipment" was $25. The project management did not "deem it advisable to request local communities to accept remains for burial."

At the present time, according to Wentner, there were only three families "living in Manzanar who are relatives of deceased persons in our cemetery." Four of the deceased people had no relatives. Eight had relatives who had relocated to various places in the United States. Accordingly, Wentner recommended that the WRA write to the relatives informing them that the center was closing and that the agency wished "to respect their wishes if they desire to have deceased relatives removed from the Manzanar Cemetery."\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{10} "Evacuee Property Section," \textit{Final Report, Manzanar}, Vol. IV, pp. 1,375-76, RG 210, Entry 4b, Box 73, File, "Manzanar Final Reports."

\textsuperscript{11} John H. Provinse, Chief, Community Management Division to Ralph P. Merritt, June 6, 1945, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 226, File No. 61.120.

\textsuperscript{12} Lyle G. Wentner, Assistant Project Director to John H. Provinse, June 27, 1945, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 226, File No. 61.120.
By early January 1946, all but six bodies had been removed from the Manzanar cemetery. On January 7, Project Director Merritt ordered A.M. Sandridge, Senior Engineer - Public Works, to build a "three-wire fence, with posts 4 feet high, around the smallest area of the Manzanar Cemetery necessary to enclose the remaining six graves." The ground "where bodies have been dug and removed" was to be smoothed out. Markers were to be left "only on the six graves in which there are bodies." A two-foot-wide opening in the fence should be provided "for people to enter." The little graves to the north of the cemetery were not to be included as they "are the burying places only of pets." 13

Labor Needs

After the last evacuees left Manzanar, the center was forced to recruit common laborers, as well as a few skilled workers, to complete the camp's clean-up and close-out operations. Between November 21, 1945, and February 9, 1946, when the center's personnel records were forwarded to the Washington office, the Personnel Section at Manzanar recruited 155 new employees, and separated 74. The recruitment of labor was complicated by the fact that many of the mines and chemical companies in the Owens Valley region were restarting postwar operations, and some companies were offering wages that "were excessive even when compared with wartime wages." Thus, many of the new employees tended to be itinerant laborers "who were more or less chronic drunkards." 14

Beginning in October 1945, the appointed staff mess hall at Manzanar was staffed with a crew brought in from Los Angeles. This crew, consisting primarily of former evacuees from other relocation centers, remained at Manzanar until the end of February 1946. 15

Reductions in Force

Beginning on November 30, 1945, when the first WRA appointed employee at Manzanar was terminated because of a reduction in force, the Personnel Section conducted a survey of permanent employees and remaining work at 15-day intervals. A decision was made concerning which employees in the closing sections could be transferred to sections needing additional help, and termination notices were issued to those employees whose services could not be utilized. Notices were issued 30 days prior to the time that an employee's services were terminated.

13. Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director to A.M. Sandridge, Senior Engineer - Public Works, January 7, 1946, RG 210, Entry 48, Box 226, File No. 61.120. By January 1947 there were only five burials left in the cemetery. Samuel B. Morris, General Manager and Chief Engineer to Laurence E. Goot and Burton S. Grant, January 20, 1947, Correspondence, March 1947 — November 1966, Manzanar Relocation Center, Administrative and Executive Files, Water Executive Office, LADWP Historical Records.


Early in November, a representative of the Civil Service Commission visited the center and interviewed every employee who desired to be placed in another federal agency. In December, two representatives of the War Relocation Authority in Washington visited Manzanar for the same purpose. Late in January 1946, another representative of the Civil Service Commission interviewed employees for approximately a week relative to future employment opportunities. In addition, Project Director Merritt and other administrators at the camp "gave the placement of Manzanar employees priority over all other business." All personnel records were transferred to Washington on February 9, and thereafter the Personnel Office confined itself to advising employees on personnel matters, forwarding personnel information to the Washington office, and placing Manzanar employees in other federal agencies.\(^\text{16}\)

**Shipment of Files and Records to Washington**

The Washington office directed the Statistics Section at Manzanar to collect and forward all essential information concerning the evacuees. When the last evacuee had left, personnel from the Statistics Section joined those in the records unit in the effort to dispose of the center's records, separating the papers which should go to Washington from those which should not. Two former workers in the Relocation Division were also detailed to assist in the work.\(^\text{17}\)

**Final Report**

The last staff meeting was convened by Project Director Merritt at Manzanar on February 15, 1946. On that date, the *Final Report, Manzanar*, a 5-volume document consisting of nearly 1,600 pages, was submitted to the Washington office. The voluminous report, prepared in compliance with a directive from the Washington office to all relocation centers, featured exhaustive descriptions of the management and accomplishments of each administrative office, division, and section, and thus provides the most comprehensive and detailed history of the operation of the camp. In the first section of the document, entitled "Project Director's Report," Merritt observed:

> Thus ends the story of Manzanar as a relocation center. . . . The war-time job of every member of the Manzanar staff ended with credit to themselves and a successful completion of the program laid down for them by the national Director. . . .

> Manzanar will return to the desert and be forgotten, but the spirit and achievements of staff and evacuees who here worked together will not die or be forgotten. In these three years and a half, while the world was engaged in its


bloodiest war, the people of Manzanar of many national and racial origins, learned by practise [sic] the way of tolerance, understanding, and peace.18

LIQUIDATION AND DISPOSAL OF MANZANAR WAR RELOCATION CENTER UNDER GENERAL LAND OFFICE (BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT AFTER JULY 16, 1946) AND WAR ASSETS ADMINISTRATION: MARCH 10, 1946- APRIL 1, 1947

On March 10, 1946, the capital or fixed assets of the Manzanar War Relocation Center were turned over to the custody of the General Land Office in the Department of the Interior for liquidation, while movable property or consumer and capital goods were assumed by the War Assets Administration for disposal. The functions of General Land Office and the Grazing Service were reorganized and placed under the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) established within the Department of the Interior on July 16, 1946.

Appraisal Report

After the Manzanar War Relocation Center site was turned over to the General Land Office, that bureau sent five field examiners, including Elton M. Hattan, Ernest R. Cushing, J.D.C. Thomas, C.L. Farrar, and Edmund J. Sweeney, from its Branch of Field Examination in Washington to Manzanar to conduct an appraisal of the property. In late April and early May, the field examiners prepared and submitted an "Appraisal Report: Buildings, Improvements, and Designated Personal Property, Manzanar Relocation Center, Manzanar, California" to the bureau’s Washington office.

One section of the report, entitled "Appraisal Report of Buildings and Structures," which reevaluated and revised estimates of the earlier Fixed Asset Inventory, concluded that the cost to the government of buildings and structures at the former relocation center, amounted to $3,999,612.79. The appraised value of the buildings and structures in place was $550,400.77 (less than 20 percent of the total listed in the Fixed Asset Inventory), while their appraised salvage value (taken apart or torn down and removed from the site) was $279,429.87.

In an appended section, entitled "Explanatory Notes," the field examiners reported that the evacuee barracks and recreation buildings could not "be used in place and will have to be moved or torn down to comply with the court order of condemnation which requires that the property be restored to its original owners in its original condition." Accordingly, they determined the value of the buildings based on "the actual value of the material in the building, with no addition for cost of construction, and no deduction for loss of salvage."

Concerning the salvage material in the structures, the field examiners found that the "doors, except as otherwise mentioned, are home-made of scrap lumber and have no salvage value." The windows were generally "in good condition with very few broken panes." Concerning the "dimension lumber", they noted:

The dimension lumber such as 2” x 6” and 2” x 4” pieces can be salvaged and the greater part of the roof sheathing. There will be considerable waste in the flooring and side walls. The evacuees cut extra doors under many of the windows which will reduce the salvage material in the side walls. There is some salvage material in skirting, from the ground up to the floors.

The field examiners noted that the WRA had dismantled three buildings "with much care" using evacuee labor paid at the rate of $16 per month. The amount of usable lumber salvaged was approximately 7,740 board feet. It was not likely, however, that "that amount of lumber can be saved in the course of normal salvage operations." It was estimated that in normal operations "approximately 60% of the lumber and 25% of gypsum board can be salvaged." The labor cost was estimated "from experience of the WRA here at 16 man days at $12 per day, or approximately $192 for dismantling each building." The value in place of each building was $279, thus resulting in a salvage value of only $87.

Similar detailed evaluations of the appraised and salvage value of all buildings and structures in the former center were prepared by the field examiners. In addition to the buildings and structures, the field examiners prepared inventories/appraisals of equipment and furnishings in the auditorium, hospital complex, and appointed personnel quarters, listing the acquisition cost and appraised value for each item.

**Maintenance of Site**

By May 1946, the General Land Office had established an eight-man maintenance crew at the former Manzanar War Relocation Center under the direction of Clyde F. Bradshaw. Two of the men, George Shepherd and Johnnie T. Shepherd (Johnnie had been employed by the WRA from October 16, 1945 to March 9, 1946), were Paiute Indians living on the tribal reservation near Lone Pine. The Shepherds were general laborers, who mowed the grass and helped on oil, rubbish, and plumbing crews for which they were paid $35 per week. The other members of the maintenance crew included a boiler maintenance man, carpenter, oil and rubbish maintenance man, plumber, general utility and stove maintenance man, and an office man. According to Bradshaw, the maintenance crew "was selected for general ability." All members, "except the Indian laborers," served "in any needed capacity." The water and irrigation systems required "daily attention, frequently at off-schedule hours." Most of the maintenance crew worked "50 to 60 hours weekly." 

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19. In June 1945, Merritt obtained permission from WRA Director Myer to dismantle several buildings, including two recreation buildings, Block 35, Building 15, and Block 36, Building 15, to provide wood for crates in which to pack personal belongings of relocating evacuees. "Project Report, Month of June 1945," Box 73, File, "Reports — Project (Reports Office), June 1945, Coll. 122, Department of Special Collections, UCLA.

Disposal of Buildings, Structures, and Improvements

When the General Land Office assumed custody of the Manzanar War Relocation Center site on March 10, 1946, it acquired the lease to the property that the War Department had obtained from the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, Northern Division, on June 27, 1942. The lease, which was subsequently declared surplus, provided that 90 days after its termination the buildings and improvements erected by the government at the relocation center were to be removed. The General Land Office believed the removal could be accomplished by mid-September 1946; thus, notice was given that the lease, which expired on June 30, 1946, would not be renewed.

Under the terms of the original lease, the City of Los Angeles had the option of indicating that it wished to acquire the buildings and improvements in lieu of site restoration. Exercising its option, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power had submitted to the Surplus Property Board on November 28, 1945, and January 8, 1946, applications for acquisition of various buildings and facilities in the former relocation center. The General Land Office formally acknowledged these applications on March 3, 1946, in view of its impending takeover of the center for liquidation purposes. Accordingly, on March 8 the department submitted an updated and revised list of "Structures and Equipment at Manzanar Relocation Center Needed By Department of Water and Power." The department offered to purchase "eight apartment and dormitory structures to accommodate eighteen families and five single workmen" in the former WRA appointed personnel housing area, together with their furnishings; the auditorium with its incidental equipment and fixtures; 11 buildings in the hospital complex; the appurtenant water and sewage systems associated with these structures; and the entire electrical power distribution system. Later on March 26, the department indicated that it also wished to purchase the laundry building in the former appointed personnel housing area. These requests were formalized by a court stipulation on March 27, 1946, serving notice that these buildings and utility systems were not to removed.

The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power considered a wide range of uses for the buildings and improvements in the former relocation center that it wished to purchase. In terms of the hospital structures, the department considered operating the facility for the benefit of its Owens Valley employees and their families as well as any private patients who might desire medical service; leasing the facilities to a private doctor or group of doctors or to a community hospital district which might be formed to include the Manzanar area; and selling the medical equipment to Bishop Community Hospital. As for the auditorium, the department intended to interest local organizations in purchasing the building and leasing a small parcel of acreage on which it stood. In terms of the former

21. Memorandum, Clyde F. Bradshaw, Superintendent of Maintenance to J. H. Favorite, May 14, 1946, and Hugh G. Fraser, Clerk, Maintenance Department, Manzanar, California to Collector of Internal Revenue, San Francisco, California, May 9, 1946, RG 49, Box 919, File, "Correspondence, Manzanar Maintenance — Gen'l. Land Office."
CHAPTER SIXTEEN: MANZANAR, NOVEMBER 21, 1945 — PRESENT

WRA appointed personnel housing, the department considered renting the structures to employees, as well as non-department people, to meet the postwar housing shortage. Two dormitories might be moved to Mojave where facilities for single employees were needed. The department’s power system branch might find several structures useful for removal to station locations for employee housing. 22

During May 1946, the Federal Public Housing Administration informally arranged to convey eight structures in the former WRA appointed personnel housing area at Manzanar to the Inyo County Housing Commission for emergency housing for veterans, and the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power informally agreed to lease to the Housing Commission for a five-year period a 19-acre parcel of land upon which the structures were located. The negotiations were conducted with the understanding that employees of the department who had served in World War II would be permitted to occupy some of the quarters and that the structures would revert back to the department at the end of the lease. Since the structures which the FPHA proposed to convey to the Housing Commission were among those requested earlier by the department, the General Land Office would not authorize such conveyance until the LADWP withdrew its application. Thus, the department on June 7, 1946, withdrew its application for the eight apartment dormitory buildings designated G, H, L, M, N, O, P, Q. 23

In addition to the LADWP, agencies in the Department of the Interior and other public entities also indicated interest in acquisition of buildings or equipment at Manzanar during late 1945 and early 1946. For instance, the furnishings in the former WRA appointed personnel housing units were earmarked for the U.S. Indian Service, while the hospital laundry equipment was designated for delivery to the National Park Service. The Owens Valley Unified School District wanted two "caucasian housing units" for transfer to Independence to meet urgent teacher housing shortage needs. 24

During the period from late March to mid-May 1946, Ralph Merritt, the former WRA project director who had become the War Assets Administration field representative at the site, pressed the LADWP for "a five-year lease on certain acreage and facilities within the

22. Burton S. Grant, Assistant Chief Engineer of Water Works to Messrs. Samuel B. Morris and Laurence E. Goit, November 23, 1945; Frances H. Lindley, Assistant City Attorney to Northcutt Ely, March 8 and 28, 1946, and attachments; and "In the District Court of the United States in and for the Southern Division of California, Northern Division, United States of America vs. 4700 Acres of Land, more or less, in the County of Inyo, State of California; City of Los Angeles, a municipal corporation, Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles, et al., No. 147-ND, Civil, Notice Not to Remove Fixtures, Additions and Structures, March 27, 1946; Correspondence — Removal of Buildings, November 1945 — April 1946, Manzanar Relocation Center; and "Manzanar Relocation Center, Disposal of Facilities," June 6, 1946, Correspondence, January 1944 — December 1946, Manzanar Relocation Center, Administrative and Executive Files, Water Executive Office, LADWP Historical Records.


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present fenced area of the Manzanar Center." On March 26, he informed LADWP officials that he had lived in Owens Valley for 12 years. Thus it was "natural that I have a strong attachment for the place and should desire to remain" and "to secure a place of living and activity for myself and family." He continued:

The Board does not desire to create a new town in the Valley but at the same time has publicly stated its purpose to obtain and maintain certain facilities now at Manzanar. Board employees, school teachers in near by towns, employees of the State and County, veterans and other residents are in urgent need of housing facilities at this time. Conditions five years from now may be much different but no housing now available should be destroyed or removed. It would appear to be sound policy to permit a five year lease holder to operate the staff housing group of buildings consisting of 22 buildings containing apartments and single rooms, the administration building converted into a social center, the mess hall (of operation is needed and profitable), the reefer building and one warehouse, a total of 26 buildings with all present furnishings and equipment oil storage tanks and water sewage and electrical connecting lines. The lessee should be permitted to use water for lawns and dust control without added charge but should pay on scheduled rates for domestic water and lights and power used. Rates for rentals to department employees and the number of employees to be housed should be approved by the Board.

In addition to the housing area I desire the use of approximately 20 acres in the north west corner of the Center. I propose to buy from whosoever purchases the barrack area of the Center from the Government. The hospital buildings, children's village or blocks 29 and 34 together with water, sewer and electrical lines. This would be used as a tourist and recreational center. Because of the gardens now in this area and the adaptability of the buildings little new capital would be required for a tourist center of about 50 units. Because so little capital is needed for construction the lease might require that I clear the site in five years. Approximately 10 of the 20 acres might be used for agriculture and the lease might be based on such charges as are established.

I also wish to use the bath house and 3 acres of herb garden. . . .

On May 9, Merritt, although aware of the negotiations among the FPHA, Inyo County Housing Commission, and LADWP, again wrote to Department of Water and Power officials, reminding them of his request for a five-year lease. He observed that he desired the appointed personnel housing area at Manzanar to provide employment for his son Peter, who had been working with the Curry Company in Yosemite National Park and had "valuable experience in activities of that nature." He also desired to lease a small area in the vicinity of the hospital to establish "a semi-recreational and tourist facility, taking

advantage of the approximately $5,000 worth of roses and other shrubs that the Japanese had left there." 26

After rejecting the LADWP purchase offer because of the difficulties inherent in selling scattered buildings and utility system segments at the former relocation center, the General Land Office determined to offer the buildings and improvements at Manzanar under the provisions of the Surplus Property Act of October 3, 1944. Notices of sale were published in the Inyo Independent on June 14 and the Los Angeles Times on June 15. In addition notices were sent to 82 private individuals, 23 government agencies, and the State of California, all of whom had previously indicated interest in acquiring buildings or improvements at the former relocation center.

The notice of sale, entitled "Invitation For Offers and Terms and Conditions of Sale of Buildings and Improvements at Manzanar War Relocation Project, June 14, 1946," provided that offers would be received on or after June 14 at the office of the project representative, Joseph H. Favorite, Regional Field Examiner, General Land Office in San Francisco. The purchaser would assume all necessary expenses in "taking down and replacing telephone, electric, and other wires, fences, which may obstruct removal of buildings or improvements and pay all necessary costs in connection therewith." The purchaser would assume responsibility for "the care and protection of the buildings or improvements purchased by him and will be required to remove completely the buildings or improvements covered by the offer, including smoke stacks, chimneys and fireplaces, and clean up the site of the buildings or the improvements to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of the General Land Office or a representative designated by him." Work hours were limited to week days between 8:00 A.M. and 5:00 P.M. The purchaser was required "to fill any post holes under said buildings or excavations necessary for the removal of improvements, to cap all water, gas and sewer lines extending above the ground, to disconnect electric and telephone lines and to make other restorations deemed necessary." The buildings and clean-up operations were to be completed by September 27, 1946. The notice of sale included descriptions of 15 "sales units:"

1. 36 evacuee block units
2. One hospital area unit
3. One warehouse area unit
4. One garage area unit
5. One administration area unit
6. One camouflaged area unit
7. One high school area unit
8. One staff housing area unit
9. One Miscellaneous Unit No. 1 (Assorted Buildings in Military Area, etc.)
10. One Miscellaneous Unit No. 2 (Fence and Pipe)
11. One Miscellaneous Unit No. 3 (Poultry and Hog Ranches)
12. One sewer system unit
13. One water system unit
14. One electric system unit

15. One fuel system unit\textsuperscript{27}

Following publication of the notice of sale, many inquiries were received by the General Land Office project representatives at the site, but only 19 firm offers materialized. Of these, only ten were acceptable. Offers that were rejected included those for which bids were less than 75 percent of the appraised price of the "sales unit." Under government regulations, such offers were submitted to the War Assets Administration which rejected them. Several interested persons failed to make offers, because the "sales units" in which the property was offered were too small. For instance, some persons and companies interested in large-scale salvage operations were only interested in making offers to purchase all of the buildings and improvements in the former relocation center. In response to critics, however, Secretary of the Interior Julius A. Krug defended the terms of the sale, stating that under government regulations the General Land Office had been required to establish "sales units" that would be attractive to persons for small business, residential, or agricultural purposes. The regulations also stipulated that priorities would be given to war veterans to purchase single buildings, as well as to federal, state, and local governments and their instrumentalities and non-profit institutions. The General Land Office, according to Krug, was not authorized to sell the project as a whole since such action would have created an opportunity to large salvage companies to obtain control of the project and thus deny individuals and small businessmen a chance to acquire some of the property.

While the notice of sale provided that after 10 days from the date of the publication the property at Manzanar might be disposed of "by transfer of responsibility of demolition and disposal to the disposal agency designated to perform demolition functions," the General Land Office, and its successor the Bureau of Land Management, permitted an additional period of time to persons who might wish to make offers for the property. The transfer for demolition was sought by the War Assets Administration in order to provide materials for the "HH" program of the National Housing Agency. This program was designed to make available from temporary wartime camps and other emergency installations the materials that were sorely needed to construct housing for war veterans. Accordingly, on July 18, when it became apparent that not enough offers would be received to permit disposal of the project within a reasonable time, the former relocation center was transferred by the Bureau of Land Management to the War Assets Administration for demolition. Excepted from this transfer were 22 buildings in the former WRA appointed personnel housing area, along with their furnishings/facilities and appurtenant utility systems, that were conveyed to the Federal Public Housing Authority for transfer to the Inyo County Housing Commission to establish a war veterans’ housing area known as the "Manzanar Housing Project." In addition, those buildings which were in the process of sale to the aforementioned ten successful bidders were also excepted from the transfer to the War Assets Administration. Arrangements for completion of the demolition work at Manzanar were assigned to the WAA and the Corps of Engineers.\textsuperscript{28}

\begin{itemize}
\item[27.] "Invitation for Offers and Terms and Conditions of Sale of Buildings and Improvements at Manzanar War Relocation Project, June 14, 1946, ibid.
\item[28.] J. A. Krug, Secretary of the Interior to Todd Watkins, Managing Editor, \textit{Inyo Register}, September 11, 1946, RG 270, California, Real Property Disposal Case Files, Box 89, File, "Manzanar Relocation Center -- Manzanar, Ca. Disposal Data." Also see, Samuel B. Morris, General Manager and Chief Engineer to National Housing Administration, June 12, 1946; Oscar L. Chepman, Acting Secretary of the Interior to
\end{itemize}
Chapter Sixteen: Manzanar, November 21, 1945 — Present

During the summer and early autumn of 1946, more than 90 buildings were sold, dismantled, and removed from the site of the former relocation center. These structures included: Block 1, Building 5; Block 2, 20 buildings; Block 7, 20 buildings; Block 8, 20 buildings; Block 18, 20 buildings; Block 36, Buildings 11 and 13; Garage Area, nine buildings; Hospital Area, Doctors’ and Nurses’ Quarters; Children’s Village, Building 3. Virtually all of this demolition work was conducted during August, September, and October, and most was completed by mid-October.29

Leland R. Abel, John C. Ellis, and J.W. Newton, all of Laton, California, were the successful bidders for purchase, dismantling, and removal of all the buildings in Blocks 7, 8, and 2, respectively. The three men were farmers, although Newton also owned the Laton Lumber Company. They received permission to live in the laundry room of Block 7 while they dismantled their purchased buildings, because they claimed they could not afford to stay in area hotels for several weeks. In return for this privilege, they agreed to obey the “fire rules” and stay within the area of the buildings they were removing. They set up a butane stove in the laundry room, which also served as their sleeping quarters and mess. Newton subcontracted with R. J. Roulet, a building contractor and house mover from Bishop, to move four barracks from Block 2 to Olancha. Ellis sold at least one building to a Mr. Garretson at Wasco who used the salvaged materials for domestic uses in his community. A considerable amount of the salvaged materials from Blocks 2, 7, and 8 were used for repair and construction of residential and ranch buildings in Laton.

Telly C. Imus, the purchaser of 20 buildings in Block 18, used the salvaged materials from his structures for repair and construction of residences in Lone Pine and his home community of Big Pine.

Isadore Lindenbaum of Los Angeles purchased nine buildings in the garage unit area. Perhaps because of the distance from his home to Manzanar, he subcontracted with Paul M. Hurst and Robert Blair to dismantle and remove the buildings. The contract, however, did not include equipment, tools, or supplies in the buildings, and officials with the Bureau of Land Management took care to ensure that these items were not removed from the site.30

Nina Taylor, a member of the Ezra Taylor family that had moved to the Manzanar community in 1927, later wrote that her Aunt Anna Taylor had given her “three lots on

29. C. W. Kershaw, Chief, Surplus Real Property Division to D. M. Kennedy, Property Management Division, War Assets Administration, n.d., RG 270, California, Real Property Disposal Case Files, Box 89, File, "Manzanar Relocation Center — Manzanar, Ca., Cal. — 47."

30. Considerable documentation relating to these contracts may be found in RG 49, Box 918, File, "Appraisals II," and Box 919, File, "Contracts Correspondence."
the corner of East Post and South Mt. Whitney Drive” in Lone Pine. After one of the houses from the relocation center was moved to her property, she had new roofing installed and added windows and screen doors. The exterior, as well as the interior, was refurbished with a new finish and painting.  

Meanwhile, negotiations with the Federal Public Housing Authority had continued throughout the late spring and summer of 1946 as federal housing officials attempted to meet the nationwide housing shortage facing returning war veterans. By late August 1946, a total of 36 buildings at Manzanar had been transferred to the FPHA to help meet these needs. Of this total, 25 were used on site for the aforementioned “Manzanar Housing Project,” and 11 were removed off-site. On May 24, 1946, eight buildings in the military group area — Building No. 1, Administrative Building; Building No. 2, Recreation Hall; Building No. 3, Mess Hall; Building No. 4, Officers’ Quarters; Buildings Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, Barracks — were conveyed for off-site transfer. On June 19, 25 buildings in the former WRA administration and appointed personnel housing areas, along with their furnishings and utility systems, were conveyed for use on site. Twenty-two of these buildings were in the former appointed personnel area: Dormitory Buildings A, B, C; Family Apartments E and F; Personnel Apartments G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, and W. Three of these buildings were in the former relocation center administrative area: Administration Building No. 1; Provost Town Hall, Building No. 4; and Personnel Mess Hall, Building No. 6. On July 13, two additional buildings in the military area — Building No. 10, First Aid Building, and Building No. 11, Bath House — were transferred to the FPHA for removal off-site. On August 29, a final building in the military area — Building No. 12 — was transferred for removal off-site.  

During the summer of 1946, the War Assets Administration took steps to demolish all of the buildings and improvements at the former relocation center that had not been transferred to the FPHA or sold, dismantled, and removed from the site. On August 9, John J. O’Brien, Deputy Administrator of the WAA Office of Real Property Disposal, informed the Corps of Engineers that pursuant to a directive prepared on June 20 by Wilson W. Wyatt, a WAA Housing Expediter, the Corps was directed to proceed with the preparation of a plan and specifications for negotiation of a contract to demolish approximately 742 buildings on the site of the former relocation center. The government’s lease of the land for the center, which had expired on June 30, provided that the site be cleared and restored to its original condition by September 30. Thus, the specifications should cover (1) complete dismantlement of all structures; (2) salvage of all usable materials, equipment, and assemblies; (3) stockpiling of all salvaged items onsite with provision for adequate protection from the weather; (5) removal from the site of all materials, equipment, and assemblies which were determined not to be usable; (6) and retention by the government of title to all usable materials, equipment, and assemblies; and (7) complete inventory of all recovered materials, equipment, and assemblies. 


32. C. W. Kershaw, Chief, Surplus Real Property Division to D. M. Kennedy, Property Management Division, War Assets Administration, n.d.; Director, Nonindustrial Division, PN1, Office of Real Property Disposal to Regional Director, War Assets Administration, July 7, 1947; and W. P. Weaver, Assistant Commissioner for Development and Reutilization to Paul C. Williams, Director, Urban and Rural Division, Office of Real Property Disposal, War Assets Administration, August 29, 1946; RG 270, California, Real Property Disposal Case Files, Box 89, File, “Manzanar Relocation Center — Manzanar, Ca., Cal. — 47.”
On August 26, Cecil L. deWolfe, the WAA Deputy Regional Director for Real Property Disposal in Los Angeles, forwarded to the District Engineer of the U.S. Engineer's Office in Los Angeles a detailed list of the buildings and miscellaneous structures to be dismantled and removed from the site. Accompanying the list, entitled "Units To Be Dismantled, Manzanar Relocation Center, Manzanar, Calif., Directive Consecutive No. 7-D-28, Job No. Manzanar ESA 7-299-0," were directions from deWolfe regarding restoration of the site. The restoration work would include removal of concrete slabs, foundations, curbs, piers, or structures that extended above normal ground surface. These materials were to be broken up and buried under "not less than 30 inches of earth cover leaving surface so as to conform with surrounding terrain" or by hauling them "to [the] dump site on government land westerly of the camp for disposal." Cellar excavations and other "unnatural depressions" were to be backfilled "to conform with normal ground surface." Fences were to be restored to their "original condition and locations as indicated by [a] Department of Water and Power representative." Debris or scrap lumber was to include "gathering, burning, and burial of ashes with not less than one foot of earth cover leaving surface level with surrounding terrain." Noncombustible material was to be disposed of in a manner similar to that for "broken concrete." Cleaning up would include "raking and hauling to [the] dump site all refuse or debris remaining after completion of dismantlement and/or restoration operations." Removal of utility systems and roadways in the camp area and concrete-lined ditches, pipe lines and irrigation structures in the agricultural areas would not "be necessary." "Concrete slabs located at the swine farm and chicken ranch, excepting those portions extending above normal ground, may be left undisturbed." "Rock walls and borders along roadways and paths, particularly in the hospital area, may be left in place."33

As initial demolition procedures at Manzanar got underway, Congressman Clair Engle and Senator William F. Knowland appealed to the WAA to sell the auditorium to the Turner Barnes Post No. 8036, Veterans of Foreign Wars of Inyo County, for use as a clubhouse and meeting hall. Accordingly, Paul C. Williams, Director of the WAA's Urban & Rural Division, Office of Real Property Disposal, authorized deWolfe on September 4 to withdraw the auditorium from demolition temporarily and dispose of it to a local governmental agency that would handle its conveyance to the Veterans of Foreign Wars for its salvage value rather than its appraisal value. Disposal to a local governmental agency was subject to certain conditions:

... demolition of the building could not be delayed beyond the point at which it might delay the entire program, since the United States are obligated to vacate the property by September 30, 1946.

The purchaser of the building must assume all obligation of the United States to restore the land upon which the building stands. Or if arrangements have been made with the City of Los Angeles, as lessor, for the purchase to leave the building on its present site, the City, as lessor, must release the United States from its obligation to restore that portion of the installation upon which the

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33. John J. O'Brien, Deputy Administrator, Office of Real Property Disposal to Chief of Engineers, War Department, August 9, 1946, and Cecil L. deWolfe, Deputy Regional Director for Real Property Disposal to District Engineer, U.S. Engineer Office, August 26, 1946, RG 270, California, Real Property Disposal Case Files, Box 89, File, "Manzanar Relocation Center — Manzanar, Ca. Disposal Data."
building is located. In view of the terms of the lease between the United States and the City of Los Angeles, disposal of the building can be made only on condition that it be removed.

The purchaser should further be advised that the United States can grant him entry to the property and access to the building only until September 30, 1946. . . . the purchaser must be charged a price equal to the current market value of the property. 34

During the spring of 1947, the auditorium was sold to Inyo County and a 10-acre "strip of land 320 feet in width extending 1445 feet westerly of the State Highway" on which the building was located was leased to the county. The west boundary of the parcel extended "only a short distance beyond the auditorium sufficient to include a paved street and a fire hydrant." Because the auditorium was located approximately one-quarter mile from the state highway and "it would be impossible to move the large structure for a reasonable cost, the majority of the acreage involved" was located "between the auditorium and the State Highway." This area constituted "an ideal parking location for automobiles and would not be particularly useful to the Department without the expense of fencing same on an irregular boundary." 35

Demolition and removal of the buildings and improvements at Manzanar proceeded slowly during the autumn of 1946 under a contract let to J. F. Combings of Burbank, California. On December 2, 1946, the Los Angeles Times reported that except "for a few staff buildings left standing the war-born town of Manzanar which housed 10,000 Japanese internees today is flatter than Hiroshima." The "once-teeming relocation center" had been "hauled away piecemeal, in trucks." Observing that veterans "got a break," the newspaper noted that a veteran only needed his discharge as a "priority" to purchase a "20 x 100-foot barracks for $333.13, including tax." For his money, he got "8000 square feet of seasoned pine and redwood lumber, 1000 square feet of wallboard, 22 slide windows, four interior doors, 200 feet of wiring and six electrical outlets." Erwood P. Elden, a "Glendale architect and former major in the Army combat engineers," had drawn up four floor plans, any one of which can be built from the materials salvaged from a barracks."

The newspaper praised Ralph Merritt who had become the WAA field representative at Manzanar. Under Merritt's direction, "750,000 board feet of lumber and 600,000 square feet of salvaged wallboard have been redistributed in this neck of the woods." During a special sale that had been arranged at the urging of Merritt from November 15 -27, veterans from Bishop had purchased 52 barracks, while those from Lone Pine had bought 32. Veterans from Independence had purchased 28, Inyo-Kern 27, Ridgecrest 20, Bridgeport 12, and Los Angeles 12.

34. Paul C. Williams, Director, Urban and Rural Division, Office of Real Property Disposal to Cecil deWolfe, Deputy Regional Director for Real Property Disposal, War Assets Administration, September 4, 1946, ibid. Also see, John J. O'Brien, Deputy Administrator, Office of Real Property Disposal to Senator William F. Knowland, October 17, 1946, Rg 270, California, Real Property Disposal Case Files, Box 89, File, "Manzanar Relocation Center — Manzanar, Ca., Cal. — 47;"

According to the newspaper, a typical purchaser at the sale was Joseph Guzman, an ex-Army infantryman who supported his wife and two children by working in a talc mill. They were renting quarters in Keeler, but would soon move into their three bedroom house at Lone Pine, "just as soon as Guzman finds time to build it with his $333.13 worth of materials." Another veteran from Norwalk, a suburb of Los Angeles, purchased one entire ward of the Manzanar Hospital, the materials from which he intended to use for construction of a four-family apartment house.

Federal agencies had also taken advantage of the special November sale. The Birmingham Veterans Hospital near Van Nuys in the San Fernando Valley, purchased quantities of "scarce items" such "as plumbing, medical supplies and lumber." Plumbing supplies and lumber were sent to the Veterans Hospital at Sawtelle in the West Los Angeles area. Nearly half of the salvaged materials from the camp were "redistributed" to the Federal Public Housing Administration for veterans' housing projects in Bishop, southern California, Utah, and Arizona. Citizens in the northern part of Inyo County organized the Inyo County Hospital Association and equipped a "modern hospital at Bishop with $14,000 in supplies" — the estimated value of the supplies was $60,000.

Although much of the former Manzanar War Relocation Center site looked "like it had been the target of an atomic bomb," some buildings remained. Inyo County had purchased the auditorium and planned to convey it to the veterans for use as a social center. Thirty families were living in the former WRA appointed personnel quarters, and 30 more families would soon move in.36

On December 6, 1946, the Inyo Register published an editorial that praised Merritt for "re-distributing" Manzanar for the benefit of "Inyo-Mono veterans and organizations." The last-minute 'redistribution' benefits accruing to this area just didn't happen. They were planned. The pleasing of veterans with 'no red tape' purchases of building materials was the work of Mr. Merritt, who was successful in arranging the new-type sale with WAA officials.

In addition to many of the items featured in the aforementioned Los Angeles Times article, this editorial noted that fire fighting equipment and a fire truck from the former relocation center were "being provided the City of Bishop through a negotiated sale." The Arizona State Hospital had been equipped with "a modern hospital, laundry and steam plant" from Manzanar. The Corps of Engineers had purchased and shipped overseas the center's modern sewage disposal plant. Schools, organizations, parks, cemeteries, and other groups in Inyo County had obtained plants and shrubbery. The article concluded: "As we wave goodbye to Manzanar Relocation Center, it's well to know that Owens Valley and its citizens have benefitted so handsomely in the overall picture.37

In January 1947 nine WAA officials investigated the progress of the demolition project at Manzanar. They found that 98 percent of the buildings had been demolished, and that 92
percent of the site's clean-up was complete. The demolition work had taken longer than expected, and thus the lease of the property had been extended. However, the demolition work was conducted "in an excellent manner" by J.F. Combings. The area engineer had originally estimated that the demolition contract would cost $650,000, but the actual cost of the contract had only amounted to approximately $450,000. As of January 16, only 12 buildings remained to be demolished. They were currently used to house the demolition contractor's personnel. Approximately 90 percent of the camp's building materials had been made available for salvage, and about 90 percent had been removed from the premises. The remainder would be delivered within ten days.

All told, cash sales of building materials from November 14 to December 4 had been $130,000, while the market value of lumber, plumbing, and electrical supplies transferred to the Federal Public Housing Authority and Veterans Administration from 16 blocks and the hospital and camouflage buildings was approximately $150,000. The WAA had realized approximately $14,000 from the sale of the steam plant, laundry, morgue, and sprinkler system to Arizona State Hospital; $6,000 from sale of the auditorium to Inyo County; $12,500 from building sales of the General Land Office between June 14 and July 16; $34,000 from transfer of buildings to FPHA for veterans' housing; $35,000 from transfer of electrical, sewer, and water system components for service to the auditorium and the FPHA veterans' housing project; and $30,000 from salvage and transfer of electrical distributing system components by Schurr & Finlay Electric, a firm in Hawthorne, California, to the FPHA for Los Angeles Housing Authority. The net value of inventory on hand at the site, which included deep well pumps and motors, water pipe lines, lumber, and elements of the sewage disposal plant, electrical system, and oil distribution system, was approximately $52,000.38

Costs for restoration of the Manzanar site were held to the "barest minimum" as a result of cooperative efforts by Merritt and WAA officials and officials representing the City of Los Angeles. Subsequent to negotiations between the WAA and the City of Los Angeles, the latter accepted various improvements at the site in lieu of a complete restoration of the premises: (1) water supply system unit (including one concrete reservoir, one 90,000-gallon steel storage tank, two frame buildings at the reservoir, and iron, steel, and pipe appurtenant to the system, excluding water system components transferred to the FPHA; (2) electric system unit, including poles, cross-arms, transformers, insulators, wire, guy wires, but excluding elements transferred to the FPHA; (3) sewage system unit, including the reinforced tank of the treatment plant, together with the two frame control and chlorinator houses, vitrified clay pipe, sewer piping throughout the camp, manholes, manhole covers and facilities appurtenant to the system, but excluding the elements transferred to FPHA; (4) approximately four miles of barbed wire fencing; (5) two frame houses at the hog and chicken farms; (6) staff housing, public utilities, and the auditorium which were transferred to the FPHA for lease to Inyo County; (7) 15 miles of oiled roadways; (8) concrete-lined ditches and channels; (9) concrete slabs that did not extend above normal ground level, including those at hog and chicken ranches and rock

38. Schurr & Finlay Electric, Hawthorne, California, October 11, 1946 and Samuel B. Morris, General Manager and Chief Engineer to Laurence E. Goit and Burton S. Grant, January 27, 1947, Correspondence, March 1947 — November 1966, Manzanar Relocation Center Administrative and Executive Files, Water Executive Office, LADWP Historical Records.
walls/borders, especially those in the hospital and Children's Village areas and the entrance to the military compound; and (10) trees and shrubs.\footnote{39}

As a result of negotiations in March 1947, the City of Los Angeles and the WAA agreed that the salvage value of the aforementioned components of the utility systems at Manzanar was $12,203. The estimated cost of the site's total restoration was approximately $71,759, while restoration that had already been conducted amounted to $7,217. Thus, the transfer of the utility system components, together with other items such as piers, slabs, rock walls, foundation curbs, roads/streets, and fencing which had no salvage value, would result in savings of approximately $54,693 to the federal government. The agreement was formally confirmed by court stipulation on April 2, 1947. On the previous day, the former Manzanar War Relocation Center site formally reverted back to the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power via court stipulation.\footnote{40}

**Disposal of Agricultural Crops**

On July 17, 1946, Elton M. Hattan, a Bureau of Land Management field examiner, informed Tom Silvius, an employee of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power at Independence, that the "alfalfa hay crop" at Manzanar now belonged to the City of Los Angeles. Hattan had been informed by an official in the BLM regional office in San Francisco that we cannot "sell the hay or any of the other things, such as the fruit crops." The official felt "badly about this because it" seemed "certain that the City" could not "take possession of the entire area until we are through with it." Accordingly, Hattan was told that "we should stop spending our time and money in growing crops for the City of Los

\footnote{39. John Coolick, Special Assistant to Vice Administrator for Field Operations, January 16, 1947, RG 270, California, Real Property Disposal Case Files, Box 89, File, Manzanar Relocation Center — Manzanar Ca. Disposal Data; A. Dewitt Varech, Assistant Attorney General to Robert M. Littlejohn, Administrator, War Assets Administration (and attachment), May 22, 1947, RG 270, California, Real Property Disposal Case Files, Box 89, File, "Manzanar Relocation Center — Manzanar, Ca., Plan 183 — Property Management;" and "In the District Court of the United States in and for the Southern District of California, Northern Division, United States of America vs. 5,700 Acres of Land, more or less, in the County of Inyo, State of California, City of Los Angeles, a municipal corporation, Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles, et al., No. 147-ND, Civil, Stipulation for Amendment of Second Amended Final Judgment and Decree in Condemnation and Judgment for Deficiency and Order Thereon, April, 2, 1947," Correspondence, March 1947 — November 1966, Manzanar Relocation Center, Administrative and Executive files, Water Executive Office, LADWP Historical Records.}

\footnote{40. "In the District Court of the United States ... United States of America vs. 5,700 Acres ... ;" Correspondence, March 1947 — November 1966, Manzanar Relocation Center Administrative and Executive Files, Water Executive Office, LADWP Historical Records; Thomas E. Brown, Deputy Administrator, Office of Real Property Disposal to David L. Enselen, Assistant Attorney General, Lands Division, Department of Justice, March 5, 1947, RG 270, California, Real Property Disposal Case Files, Box 89, File, "Manzanar Relocation — Manzanar, Ca. Disposal Data;" and Paul M. Lee, Acting Deputy Regional Director, War Assets Administration to Department of Water and Power, March 27, 1947, and Cecil A. Borden, Deputy City Attorney to Clyde Errett, Controller, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, August 15, 1947, File, "Manzanar File (not labeled)," Reference Files, City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power, Bishop.}
Manzanar Site, 1947-1960s

During the postwar years, the City of Los Angeles leased much of the acreage of the former relocation center site at Manzanar to local ranchers for grazing purposes. This activity would constitute the primary use of the land for the next several decades.  

During the postwar years, veterans as well as Los Angeles Department of Water and Power employees, continued to live in the Manzanar Housing Project in the former WRA appointed personnel housing area in the southeast corner of the one-time relocation center site. In August 1948, 126 persons were reportedly living in the project.  

In 1951, the housing project at Manzanar was terminated, and the buildings reverted back to the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. The department's records indicate that the vacant buildings were subjected to looting late in 1951. Accordingly, on March 15, 1952, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power held a public auction on the site for the sale and removal of the 26 buildings that had constituted the Manzanar Housing Project. The terms of the sale stated that the buildings were to be reduced "to parts not greater than flat panels" before removal from the site unless exceptions were authorized. Despite the sale terms, however, not all structures were reduced to "flat panels," because some are still in use throughout the Owens Valley today as dwellings and businesses.  

The auditorium was leased by Inyo County to the Veterans of Foreign Wars until November 5, 1951. Although the date is not definitely known, it is likely that a wing of the building was moved to Lone Pine for use as a hall by the Veterans of Foreign Wars prior to termination of the lease. Soon thereafter, the Inyo County Roads Department converted the auditorium for use as a garage to service its vehicles. The building would continue to be used as a garage by the department until 1995.

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41. Elton M. Hattan, Field Examiner, General Land Office to Tom Silvius, City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power, July 17, 1946, RG 49, Box 919, File, "Contracts Correspondence," Subfile, "Alfalfa Hay 1946."


On December 3, 1954, Mary F. Dean, leaser of the Goodale Ranch in Independence, was given permission by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power to remove approximately 250 feet of 2-inch and 3-inch pipe from the ground to make repairs to the domestic water system on her ranch. The work was to be completed by January 31, 1955, the ground and ditches at Manzanar were to be left in a safe and satisfactory condition, and debris was to be cleared away.46

MANZANAR AIRPORT, 1956 - 1972

In 1941 the City of Los Angeles leased to Inyo County 619 acres of Department of Water and Power Land on the east side of the highway at Manzanar for airport construction. The 50-year lease, which was never recorded in the county records, provided that rental of the land would be equal to taxes and 50 percent of net profits. A provision in the lease provided that the instrument would terminate automatically should the land not be used for airport purposes for more than one year. The lease also provided that if the lease was terminated as a result of default by the county, the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) could take over for the remainder of the term if it desired. On May 24, 1956, Inyo County notified the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power that it had abandoned the airport, that the CAA had consented to such abandonment and was not interested in the site, that the premises had not been used for airport purposes for more than one year, and that the county would regard the lease terminated as of July 1, 1956. In connection with the lease cancellation the county marked off the runways on July 18, 1956, and the wind sock and tower were removed on January 8, 1957. The Corps of Engineers indicated that it had no further interest in the airport on December 17, 1956. Later on July 7, 1958, LADWP employees removed electrical equipment, including the obstruction lights, arms, conduit, and wires for obstruction lights, for storage in the department's "Independence Warehouse."47

Thereafter, the land on which the former Manzanar airport had been located, was leased to local ranchers for grazing purposes and used for a variety of special events. From August 14 to September 1, 1957, the airport was used as a bivouac area for an advance party of the Nevada National Guard. Permission was granted to the State of California's Department of Fish and Game to use the land for coordination of an elk hunt during October 1969. During the period from October 30, 1968, to February 1, 1969, Aerojet General of Downey, California, was granted permission to use the land and runways for experimental tests. During April 24-25, 1971, the airstrip was used for the First Annual Lone Pine-Manzanar Time Trials of the Clippinger-Corvair-Corvette Camaro Club. The event was hosted by the Lone Pine Chamber of Commerce, Lions Club, and various area veterans organizations. The "Second Annual Lone Pine Time Trials" were held at the former airport on May 13-14, 1972. Later that spring and summer, the High Sierra Timing


Association of Bishop held drag race meets at the former airport on June 4, July 9, August 6, and September 3.  

INCREASING RECOGNITION OF HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE OF MANZANAR, 1969-1992

In response to the rising movement for ethnic identification and sensitivity on college and university campuses during the late 1960s, a group of Los Angeles-based college students organized a pilgrimage to Manzanar in late December 1969. According to one writer, most of the 250 participants were "Asian students who were curious about the camp and unable to get their parents to talk about life there." As a result of the renewed interest in Manzanar, the Manzanar Committee was soon established under the leadership of Sue Kunitomi Embrey, a Los Angeles school teacher who had been evacuated to Manzanar as an 18-year-old high school graduate on May 9, 1942. She had resided in the relocation center until October 6, 1943, when she relocated to Madison, Wisconsin, under the sponsorship of the YWCA. While at Manzanar, Embrey had helped the Maryknoll Sisters to organize a school in the center, worked in the camouflage net factory, and served as a roving reporter and later as managing editor of the Manzanar Free Press.

When it was established, the Manzanar Committee had a two-fold purpose — public education concerning the historic significance of the Manzanar site and establishment of Manzanar as a state historic landmark. Annual pilgrimages to the Manzanar site have continued to be sponsored by the committee to the present time (since 1973 the pilgrimages have generally taken place on the last Saturday of April). Each pilgrimage has featured a commemorative ceremony at the Manzanar Cemetery, followed by a picnic and clean-up efforts at the site.

In late 1971 the Manzanar Committee applied to the California State Department of Parks and Recreation to declare Manzanar as a state historic site, noting that the site "recreates" for many Japanese Americans "that moment in their lives when all the world was enclosed within this one-mile square." In January 1972, the Department of Parks and Recreation designated Manzanar as California Registered Historic Landmark No. 850, and a 4.33-acre area, including the two rock sentry houses at the entrance to the former relocation center in addition to the cemetery and adjacent parking area, were leased by the LADWP to the

48. Documentation for these activities may be found in File, "Manzanar Airport, 1956-1974," Reference Files, City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power, Bishop.


Manzanar Committee and the Japanese American Citizens League for the historical landmark.  

During ceremonies attended by some 1,500 people at the fourth pilgrimage on April 14, 1973, a plaque was placed on the rock sentry house nearest the highway by the State Department of Parks and Recreation in cooperation with the Manzanar Committee and the Japanese American Citizens League. The plaque was installed by Ryozo F. Kado, an 83-year-old Issei who as an evacuee resident at Manzanar had supervised the two rock sentry houses and cemetery monument. For the occasion, Kado reassembled his seven-man evacuee crew.

The Manzanar Committee's fourth pilgrimage and the ceremonies associated with the installation of the plaque were significant in that they "represented the culmination" of more than a year of heated "negotiations with the State Department of Recreation and Parks." The negotiations had involved "torrid controversies over whether such terms as 'concentration camps' and 'racism' ought to be engraved on the plaque which was to make Manzanar a California Historical Landmark." On three occasions, representatives of the Manzanar Committee and the Japanese American Citizens League traveled to Sacramento in an attempt to get their wording accepted by state officials. After the state found other words, such as "hysteria" and "greed," objectionable, the Manzanar Committee enlisted "community support" in "the form of letters and petitions." State Assemblymen Alex Garcia, whose district included "Little Tokyo," Ralph Dillis, whose Gardena district included many Japanese Americans, State Senator Mervyn Dymally of Los Angeles, and Assembly Speaker Robert Moretti entered the fray on the side of the Japanese American groups. After a stormy 90-minute confrontation with William Penn Mott, the Director of the state Department of Parks and Recreation who would later become Director of the National Park Service, a compromise was worked out. Under its terms, the state would write the first paragraph on the plaque. The second paragraph, to be written by the Manzanar Committee and the Japanese American Citizens League, declared Manzanar to be the first of 10 such concentration camps confining 10,000 persons bounded within barbed wire and guard towers. The third paragraph incorporated compromise language, allowing the state to include wartime "hysteria" as a contributing element to the government's evacuation program and the Japanese to blame evacuation and relocation on "racism and economic exploitation." The final wording of the plaque, which would continue to remain the focus of controversy, stated:

In the early part of World War II, 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were interned in relocation centers by Executive Order No. 9066, issued on February 19, 1942.

Manzanar, the first of ten such concentration camps, was bounded by barbed wire and guard towers, confining 10,000 persons, the majority being American citizens.

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Increasing Recognition of Historic Significance

May the injustices and humiliation suffered here as a result of hysteria, racism and economic exploitation never emerge again.53

In 1974 the California Assembly passed House Resolution No. 135 directing the state Department of Parks and Recreation to study the feasibility of acquiring and developing a plan "for the acquisition and preservation of a portion of Manzanar Internment Camp as an historical unit of the state park system." The resolution read in part:

WHEREAS. A shameful chapter in American history was written during World War II, when thousands of American citizens were locked up in concentration camps without a trial — their only crime being that they were born of Japanese ancestry; and

WHEREAS, Because of the trauma caused by the disaster at Pearl Harbor, reason was driven from the minds of many American people, and liberals and conservatives alike demanded the imprisonment of the Japanese-Americans without trial; and

WHEREAS, One of the most notorious of the concentration camps was Manzanar near the town of Lone Pine; and

WHEREAS, Rather than allowing Manzanar, and what it stood for, to fade into the forgotten past, a portion of it ought to be preserved and restored to a monument of what can happen in America to Americans. . . . 54

On September 16, 1974, the Department of Parks and Recreation released its mandated report entitled, Manzanar: Feasibility Study. The study noted that the "historic significance of the internment camp of the Japanese Americans can certainly be regarded as a notable aspect of U.S. history in relation to mass wartime psychology as exemplified by the public and official reaction to the presence of Japanese populations in America at the outbreak of World War II." The "fact that 10,000 Japanese Americans were forced to live at Manzanar, their Constitutional rights denied, is a sad chapter in U.S. and California history."

Accordingly, the study found that the "entire formerly enclosed 495-acre camp area, plus cemetery, is necessary for an adequate interpretation of the Manzanar story." Since the City of Los Angeles "values this land only for its water rights," it "should be feasible to transfer the land to the State Park System at no cost to the state."

According to the study, the "primary purpose of this project would be historic interpretation." A supplemental purpose "would be development of a garden with structures for shelter." This facility "would provide former inmates solace, the general community an opportunity to reflect and focus on the area's history, and the traveler a resting place." Commercialism was not "intended," and interpretation would "project the


54. State of California, Department of Parks and Recreation, Manzanar: Feasibility Study, inside front cover.
story of Manzanar objectively." This would "be accomplished in reconstructed evacuee barracks," and a citizen's advisory committee would be established to assist the state in the interpretive effort. A "road would be reconstructed through the camp following former road patterns to the cemetery just outside the rear boundary," and the "entire camp area would be fenced with barbed wire to control access, which will help reduce the vandalism potential and impart more of the original camp feeling." Physical remains throughout the camp site, "such as foundations, roads, gardens, and trees, would also be interpreted, but not restored." There was "a possibility that one guard tower could be reconstructed." 55

The efforts by the Department of Parks and Recreation to establish a state historical park at Manzanar faced considerable opposition throughout the 1970s. In 1979, for instance, organizers for a reunion of former Manzanar farmers and community residents sent a letter to the department protesting the proposed development at the Manzanar site which would focus exclusively on the relocation center period. 56

On March 7, 1979, the Lone Pine Chamber of Commerce sent a letter to Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., protesting the proposed plan as "costly, unnecessary and totally unacceptable to the area residents." The Chamber of Commerce could "anticipate nothing "but bad feelings and enmity resulting from the implementation of such a plan." The Chamber of Commerce had "very strong feelings regarding the aesthetics and safety factors" of the plan, and the "pioneer history of the Manzanar area speaks for itself and does not require keying in on 3 1/2 short years for its claim to fame or infamy as the case may be." 57

Native American groups also protested "the projected plan to construct the site for a memorial park to commemorate the limited time Japanese Americans were restricted at Manzanar." On March 12, 1979, a group of Owens Valley Tribal Elders wrote to Inyo County Supervisor Wilma Muth:

We want to point the fact that Indians have a definite history in this Valley. . . .

. . . . We want to mention a painful memory of our people when a great number of our ancestors were slaughtered along the way through and near Manzanar at the hands of the U.S. Government while being driven south on foot to an unknown destination, the valley is sprinkled with the blood and bones of our ancestors. 58

During subsequent years, Manzanar and the government's evacuation and relocation policies during World War II became topics of considerable debate both at the national and the state and local levels of government. On February 19, 1976, for instance, President Gerald R. Ford rescinded Executive Order 9066, issued by President Roosevelt 34 years

55. Ibid., pp. 6-10.
57. Dean R. VanderWall, President, Lone Pine Chamber of Commerce to The Honorable Edmund G. Brown, Jr., March 7, 1979, File, "Manzanar File (not labeled)," Reference Files, City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power, Bishop.
58. Vivian Gonder, et al., to Supervisor, Wilma Muth, March 12, 1979, Ibid.
before. In his proclamation, Ford noted: “We know now what we should have known then: not only was [the] evacuation wrong, but Japanese-Americans were and are loyal Americans.”

In 1977, the City of Los Angeles Cultural Heritage Board declared Manzanar a City Historic Landmark. On July 30, 1976, the "Manzanar War Relocation Center" was listed on the National Register of Historic Places. In February 1985, Manzanar was designated as a National Historic Landmark.

As Manzanar was gaining recognition as a historic site deserving preservation and interpretation, the federal government moved toward admission that the evacuation and relocation programs during World War II had been errors. In 1980, for instance, Congress established the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians to review the circumstances surrounding Executive Order 9066 and its impact on American citizens, as well as aliens, and to recommend remedies. The commission conducted lengthy hearings and published its findings in a report, entitled Personal Justice Denied, in 1982. On August 10, 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed into legislation a bill providing a review of convictions and pardons of crimes for noncooperation with various facets of the evacuation program, as well as payment of $20,000 to each surviving individual who was evacuated and relocated under Executive Order 9066. The legislation established the Civil Liberties Public Education Fund and a board to administer its activities. While the Japanese American community remained divided over whether redress went far enough, the move to establish Manzanar as a historic site was seen by some observers to "offer an opportunity for education and enlightenment that could go a long way toward healing this still-open wound."

During the weekend of August 31 - September 1, 1991, the third Manzanar All Camp Reunion was held at the Westin Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles. The reunion planning committee was chaired by Sue Kunitomi Embrey. The theme for the weekend was "The Lost Years Reclaimed - 1942-45." In a foreword to the reunion booklet, Wilbur Sato observed:

Those years spent in concentration camps were our lost years, but in another sense, those years were also lost to generations of Americans who remain unaware of the injustice inflicted upon us.

In the past, we remained silent, repressing the rage, the guilt and the pain. We tried to forget, but the memories always struggled for expression; the ghosts of the lost years always struggled to be free.

In past reunions, we honored courageous caucasian men and women who fought for our rights and offered kindness and support. They told our story through their observations. It is time now to tell our own stories, to relive those experiences.

The Manzanar Reunion this year will have a new image and more urgent and focused goals. This year we will share our personal experiences with all who will listen. We will present speakers and seminars focusing on the lost years. We will have photo displays, videos and exhibits. Our speakers will be Japanese Americans. We will find our own unique voices.

We will reclaim the lost years and free the ghosts to haunt our sacred ground. This we will do to promote justice, freedom and brotherhood for all Americans and for all mankind. 63

Despite the increasing recognition of its significance, nothing was done to preserve and interpret the Manzanar site. Thus, the surviving buildings and landscape features at the site continued to deteriorate from neglect, weather, and the activities of pot-hunters, although the Manzanar Committee attempted to tend the cemetery and clean the area during its annual pilgrimages. After visiting the site in 1991, John Cox, a 16-year-old prospective Eagle Scout from Northridge in the San Fernando Valley, determined to clean up the area and the rock sentry buildings at the entrance to the former relocation center as a community service project. Thus, a group of about 20 scouts from Northridge Troop 99 led by Cox, along with some parents and National Park Service employees, spent the Memorial Day weekend of 1992 in clearing trash from the site and repairing the two structures, fixing roofs, nailing plywood on the doors, and sealing the windows with plastic sheets. 64

MANZANAR BECOMES A NATIONAL HISTORIC SITE, MARCH 3, 1992

The National Park Service studied the Manzanar War Relocation Center as part of several studies authorized by Public Law 95-348, approved on August 18, 1978. That law established the American Memorial Park on Saipan and the War in the Pacific National Historical Park on Guam. In addition, the law directed the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a study of other areas and sites associated with the Pacific Campaign of World War II. As part of the overall response to the congressional directive to recommend landmarks on the subject of the Pacific Campaign, the National Park Service conducted studies of the relocation centers and found Manzanar "to be the one site of greatest significance and greatest integrity amongst all of the 10." Thus, the former relocation

63. "Lost Years Reclaimed," p. 3, Sue Kunitomi Embrey Collection.
Manzanar Becomes a National Historic Site

center site was designated a National Historic Landmark in February 1985. Later in February 1989, the National Park Service conducted an management alternatives study for the preservation and interpretation of Manzanar, and one of the alternatives that was explored was establishment of the relocation site as a National Historic Site.

On January 16, 1991, California Congressman Mel Levine introduced a bill (H.R. 543) to "establish the Manzanar National Historic Site." Co-sponsors of the legislation were California Congressmen William M. Thomas, Norman Y. Mineta, and Robert T. Matsui. Similar legislation had been introduced late in 1990, but had died in committee. On May 15, 1991, California Congressman George Miller (along with 19 co-sponsors) introduced a bill (H.R. 2351) to "authorize a study of nationally significant places in Japanese American history."

A hearing on the two bills was held before the Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on May 21, 1991, in Washington, D. C. In his opening statement, Congressman Levine observed:

As the 1989 National Park Service feasibility study of Manzanar points out, the 500-acre [the legislation's reference to 500 acres was based on approximate, pre-survey estimates of the area contained in the proposed boundary map referenced in the legislation. Subsequent detailed surveys by LADWP have shown the authorized area to be 555 acres.] site is rich in history, and I expect that the Park Service and the Advisory Commission will make every effort to develop and interpret the full history of the site from its earliest Native American inhabitants to the present.

... it is my hope that Manzanar will serve as a reminder of the grievous errors and inhumane policies we pursued domestically during World War II and a reminder that we must never again allow such actions to occur in this country.

In his opening remarks, Congressman Miller urged the committee to favorably report "H.R. 2351, the Japanese-American National Historic Landmark Theme Study Act" which "complements the Levine bill." The bill directed the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a "National Historic Landmark theme study of the key sites that illustrate the internment period of Japanese-American history." The bill directed the secretary to study the relocation camps, excluding Manzanar, "as well as additional sites and recommend whether or not they should be designated National Historic Landmarks."

Jerry Rogers, the National Park Service Associate Director for Cultural Resources, testified at the hearing, recommending passage of H.R. 543. He noted:

We believe, as Members have already stated, that this aspect of American history is extremely significant should be properly interpreted for the benefit of the public and that that benefit is precisely to assure against that type of error in the future. . . .

I personally found when I was at the site that the most evocative feature of the site is the extensive remains of landscaping work, stone walkways, planting beds, walls, and modified landforms that had been done by the internees in an effort to
beautify and make more comfortable their harsh desert environment. I also believe that the almost transient nature of the remaining resources, that is to say, of the camp itself, the buildings gone, the remnants remaining blown over by sand — I find in that a metaphor for this whole point of this being a lesson, but not something we want to be prominent in American society — a lesson that we can learn from.

... we also would like to emphasize... that we would intend only minimum development at the National Historic Site if it were authorized, and we would instruct our planners that there would be no reconstruction, in whole or in part, of the fencing, the guard tower or barracks and no attempt to recreate the scene that has disappeared. In our opinion, the authenticity of the site speaks far more powerfully than anything we could create by building imitations of the historic buildings that were there or by moving in some buildings that have been taken away.

In addition to Rogers, other witnesses who testified in favor the bills were California Congressmen Mineta and Thomas; Sue Embrey, president of the Manzanar Committee; Hiroshi Takusagawa, a volunteer and original member of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team representing the National Japanese-American Historical Society; Paul Morrisson, assistant county administrator, Inyo County; Rose Matsui Ochi, executive assistant, Office of the Mayor of Los Angeles; William Yoshimo, national director, Japanese-American Citizens League; and David Simon, representing the National Parks and Conservation Association.

On June 24, 1991, the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs reported favorably on H.R. 543 with amendments and recommended that the bill, as amended, be enacted into legislation. As amended, H.R. 543 and H.R. 2351 were incorporated into a revised version of H.R. 543. Title I of the bill provided for establishment of Manzanar National Historic Site, and Title II provided that the National Park Service would undertake a two-year "Japanese American National Historic Landmark Theme Study."

One of the new provisions in the revised bill directed the Secretary of the Interior to "contribute up to $1,100,000 in cash or services for the relocation and construction" of an Inyo County maintenance facility "to replace the facility" in the former relocation center's auditorium "located on the land to be acquired." An 11-member Manzanar National Historic Site Advisory Commission, composed of former Manzanar evacuees, local residents, representatives of Native American groups, and the general public for two-year terms, would be established to "meet and consult with" National Park Service officials "at least semiannually" on "matters relating to the development, management, and interpretation of the site, including the preparation of the general management plan."

Since lands owned by the state or a political subdivision could be acquired only by donation or exchange, the report directed the National Park Service and the LADWP to explore the possibility of donating the land to the National Park Service before considering the possibility of a land exchange. Cooperative agreements with public and private entities for management and interpretation at the site were authorized, as were cooperative

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Manzanar Becomes a National Historic Site

agreements with the State of California or its political subdivisions for rescue, fire fighting, and law enforcement services on a reimbursable basis.  

That same day Congressman Bruce F. Vento, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands, brought H.R. 543 to the floor for consideration by the House of Representatives. Vento urged passage of the measure by stating:

Mr. Speaker, 3 years ago this body passed legislation which acknowledged the injustice of the internment policy and apologized on behalf of the people of the United States. Our willingness to make restitution when we departed from our founding principles of freedom and civil liberties is a sign of our humility and greatness as a nation. Today we have a unique opportunity to build on that record by establishing a national historic site which will serve as a permanent reminder of a time when our country denied its own citizens rights guaranteed in the Constitution and Bill of Rights.

After limited debate and discussion, the bill was passed by voice vote.

Meanwhile, companion legislation had been introduced in the Senate. On March 12, 1991, Senators Alan Cranston (Ca.), Paul Seymour (Ca.), and Daniel Akaka (Hi.) had introduced S. 621, providing for establishment of Manzanar National Historic Site, and on June 20, 1991, Senators Akaka, Cranston, and Brock Adams (Wa.) had introduced S. 1344, providing for a Japanese-American History Theme Study.

On July 25, 1991, Jerry Rogers testified on behalf of the National Park Service before the Subcommittee on Public Lands, National Parks and Forests of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources concerning S. 621 and H.R. 543 and S. 1344 and Title II of H.R. 543. Among his comments, Rogers observed:

We believe that establishing the Manzanar National Historic Site would provide an excellent basis on which to interpret the treatment of Japanese-Americans during 1941-1946. Manzanar is of much greater significance, in our view, than the specific sites that would be examined under S. 1344. The temporary [assembly] camps no longer exist, and we believe other facilities, such as military camps where the Japanese-American combat units trained, are locally important but would not support National Historic Landmark status.

In addition, we strongly oppose the narrow focus of the bill [S. 1344; Title II, H.R. 543]. We believe it would be unwise to enact special legislation mandating theme studies for particular ethnic groups represented in the population of the United States, rather than addressing them through the normal planning process . . .

After making several minor amendments, the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources unanimously recommended passage of H.R. 543, as amended, on November 20, 1991. The Senate amendments were designed to meet the objections of the LADWP. One


amendment stated that nothing in Title I of the bill would affect the water rights of the City of Los Angeles, except for an agreement to be reached between the Secretary of the Interior and the City for the provision of sufficient water for the site. Lands could not be acquired until an agreement for water supply had been consummated with the City of Los Angeles. Another amendment provided that nothing in the bill should create, expand, or diminish any authority of the Secretary of the Interior over lands or activities of the City of Los Angeles outside the boundaries of the proposed historic site.68

On November 26, 1991, H.R. 543, as amended, was brought to the floor in the Senate and passed without debate or discussion.69

Nearly three months later, on February 18, 1992, Congressman Vento brought H.R. 543, as amended by the Senate, to the House floor, recommending passage. Congressman Miller endorsed the bill, and introduced into the record a Los Angeles Times article blaming the LADWP for standing in the way of the bill's speedy passage by demanding concessions and threatening to block transfer of the land unless it received an exemption from the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, and the "public trust doctrine."70 Consideration of the bill was continued on February 19 when the bill, as amended by the Senate, was passed by a margin of 400 yes to 13 no votes, with 21 members not voting.71

Public Law 102-248 (106 Stat. 40), "An Act to Establish the Manzanar National Historic Site in the State of California, and for other purposes," was enacted into law and signed by President George H. W. Bush on March 3, 1992, two weeks after the 50th anniversary of President Roosevelt's signing of Executive Order 9066. According to the act, the site, consisting of approximately 500 acres of land, was established "to provide for the protection and interpretation of the historical, cultural, and natural resources associated with the relocation of Japanese-Americans during World War II."72

Designation of Manzanar National Historic Site, the 367th unit to be added to the National Park System, generated a variety of responses. Some Inyo County interests heralded Manzanar's designation as a boon to local tourism and economic growth.73 Other observers commented on the rightful place of a "Site of Shame" in the National Park System. Robin Winks, Professor of History at Yale University noted:

> With the recent addition of Manzanar National Historic Site to the National Park System, the public has been introduced more dramatically than ever before to a fundamental debate. Should the national parks commemorate and protect only places and events in which we take pride, or should the parks strive to mark events and places that many agree represent shameful episodes in our national experience? . . .

The question is, should we commemorate or should we strive to forget, indeed should we bury from the national consciousness, these fearful times in our history? 

Each of the 367 units of the National Park System — the most intellectually elegant and the best administered system in the world — is a branch campus of our greatest national university. Each unit has a unique mission, and each is to be interpreted so that visitors may comprehend the mission and attain a better understanding of American heritage.

Education is best done with examples. These examples must include that which we regret, that which is to be avoided, as well as that for which we strive. No effective system of education can be based on unqualified praise, for all education instructs people of the difference between moral and wanton acts and how to distinguish between the desirable and the undesirable. If this premise is correct, we cannot omit the negative lessons of history.

MANZANAR NATIONAL HISTORIC SITE, 1992-PRESENT

The 23rd annual Manzanar Pilgrimage was held on April 25, 1992, with more than 2,000 persons in attendance in the cemetery area at the recently-designated National Historic Site. The event, including ceremonies and a picnic, commemorated the 50th anniversary of the initiation of the government’s evacuation and relocation program, as well as the Congressional designation of Manzanar as a National Historic Site. Participants in the ceremonies included William Penn Mott, Director of the National Park Service, Inyo County supervisors, Los Angeles Mayor Thomas Bradley, Los Angeles City Council members Ruth Galanter and Zev Yaroslavsky, Los Angeles School Board President Warren Furutani, and Manzanar Committee members Sue Kunitomi Embrey and Rose Ochi, as well as Christian and Buddhist ministers, Obon dancers, and Taiko drummers.

The establishing legislation provided that the National Park Service would prepare a General Management Plan for the site within three years. Accordingly, a planning team headed by team captain Dan Olson, a senior planner in the Pacific/Great Basin System Support Office in San Francisco, began work in April 1993. The planning team was assisted by a seven-member volunteer team of Japanese American landscape architects organized under the auspices of the American Society of Landscape Architects and Ross R. Hopkins, the first superintendent of the national historic site.

Appointments to the Manzanar National Historic Site Advisory Commission were made on October 28, 1993, pursuant to the site’s establishing legislation. The eleven members of the commission were:

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Th CHAI'fER SIXTEEN: MANZANAR, NOVEMBER 21, 1945 — PRESENT

William Michael, Acting Chairperson
Ronald Izumita
Sue Kunitomi Embrey
Mas Okui
Keith Bright
Glenn Singley
Richard Steward
Vernon Miller
Gann Matsuda
Rose Ochi
Martha Davis

The commission held its first meeting on April 28, 1995, in the Board of Supervisor’s Chambers at the County of Inyo Administrative Center, Independence.76

Scoping for the Manzanar General Management Plan was initiated with a Federal Register notice on April 23, 1993, and continued until June 30, 1993. Three public scoping meetings were held (one in Independence and two in Los Angeles) and comments were provided in 27 letters and in petitions signed by 275 individuals. The petitions asked that the site accurately reflect the experiences of the Japanese Americans confined in the war relocation centers.

The draft General Management Plan was mailed to nearly 30 agencies and organizations and several hundred interested individuals on February 7, 1996, with a comment closing date of May 3, 1996. Availability of the draft document was formally announced by the Environmental Protection Agency in the Federal Register on February 20. News releases announcing the availability of the document and schedule of public meetings were distributed widely in the Owens Valley and regional media.

Four public meetings on the draft plan and accompanying environmental impact statement were conducted March 12-16, 1996. Sites for the meetings included the California communities of Bishop, Independence, Gardena, and Los Angeles. The four public meetings were attended by 178 persons, 43 of whom made comments for the record. A total of 194 written communications on the draft were received during the comment period. These communications included two petitions, 135 copies of a form letter, and 57 individually prepared letters.

Comment on the General Management Plan was highly polarized with most reviewers opting for a proposal that would provide long-term protection of resources and a range of facilities and services for a more meaningful and educational experience for visitors to the national historic site, with an expanded boundary. A significant, although smaller, number of comments, however, questioned the authorization of the site as a unit of the National Park System or urged that the site be operated as economically as possible with American Indian and pioneer history given coverage equivalent to the World War II relocation camp period.

In response to the comments submitted during the planning process, the National Park Service developed a final General Management Plan and Environmental Impact Statement for Manzanar which will be published in late 1996. The General Management Plan and Environmental Impact Statement presents a proposal and two alternatives (no-action and minimum requirements) for the management, utilization, and development of the national historic site. The proposed action would provide staffing and resource management to protect the site's historic and prehistoric features. Features of significance include those associated with the World War II relocation center, centuries of occupation by American Indian cultures, and ranching and agricultural activities.

Under the proposed action, the national historic site would be managed as a cultural landscape based on the World War II relocation center period. The gridwork of the center's road system would be rehabilitated, some areas of dense tree growth would be thinned or cleared, the camp's perimeter fence would be reconstructed, and some of the evacuee-constructed rock gardens and ponds would be rehabilitated. Historically significant orchards and ornamental plants from both the agricultural and World War II eras would be retained and managed as landscape features. A barracks and a guard tower would be reconstructed to enhance interpretation of the relocation center experience.

The plan calls for expanding the current authorized boundary of the national historic site to include approximately 800 acres. The expanded boundary, for which legislation is pending, would encompass historic resources associated with the relocation center and other historic eras at the site.

Visitors would be served by converting the extant relocation center auditorium into an interpretive center and visitor contact facility. Barracks blocks and significant structures throughout the site would be marked to demonstrate the relocation center layout. A shuttle system would provide visitor access and interpretive tours during periods of high public visitation. National Park Service support would be provided for the annual Manzanar pilgrimage, which would continue to occur in the vicinity of the cemetery.

The no-action alternative would continue the current minimal National Park Service capability at the site, consisting of one staff person, to promote resource protection and visitor services on a voluntary basis. Cultural resource quality would continue to decline as a result of the natural forces of erosion and weathering as well as vandalism.

The minimum requirements alternative would be similar to the proposed action in providing resource management and protection and restoration of essential elements of the cultural landscape. The auditorium would be converted to an interpretive center, and wayside exhibits would be provided at outlying areas. This alternative, however, would not include boundary expansion, a shuttle system, or reconstruction of barracks or guard tower structures.

Several alternatives were discussed during the planning process, but were rejected for various reasons. The concept of calling for major boundary expansion was rejected because this would be beyond the scope of legislative intent and because public ownership of surrounding lands may make it possible to protect the historic scene and significant extant resources through cooperative efforts. Extensive reconstruction of relocation center structures was rejected because of adverse visual impacts, high costs, and conflicts with
National Park Service historic preservation policy. Use of portions of the site for recreation and campgrounds was rejected because such activities would conflict with the primary historical purpose of the site. A proposal for erection of a large ceramic mural, memorializing the panorama of Japanese American history, was rejected because of conflicts with the site’s purpose as well as adverse visual quality impacts.\footnote{U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service \textit{Manzanar National Historic Site, California: General Management Plan and Environmental Impact Statement}. 1996. Legislation was introduced in 1995 in the House of Representatives to authorize an exchange of real estate necessary for land acquisition for Manzanar National Historic Site. Sponsored jointly by Representatives Robert T. Matsui and Jerry Lewis, H.R. 3006 passed the House on July 31, 1996. The bill provides for approximately 300 additional acres to the national historic site, thus bringing the total acreage of the site to 813.81. A similar bill will be introduced in the Senate in September 1996.}
Map 1: Boundary Map, Manzanar War Relocation Area, August 27, 1942.
Map 2: Manzanar Farm and Irrigation Map, April 12, 1943.
EPILOGUE

The evacuation and relocation of persons of Japanese ancestry from the west coast of the United States following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, constitutes one of the most dubious episodes in the history of American civil liberties. Approximately 112,000 persons were involved, more than 70,000 of whom were American citizens. Influenced by U.S. military authorities, the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt justified the program as militarily necessary in the light of wartime national security requirements, a line of reasoning that many historians and legal scholars have subjected to severe criticism during the past five decades.

The program was implemented with a series of executive and military orders initiated by Executive Order 9066, a presidential proclamation issued on February 19, 1942, that authorized military authorities to designate certain restricted military areas from which any or all persons might be excluded. On March 21, Congress gave Roosevelt's order statutory approval by passing a law providing penalties for persons who violated orders to enter or leave the designated military areas.

After promulgation of Executive Order 9066, the Western Defense Command, which had been designated by the War Department to oversee the evacuation program, took control of all persons of Japanese ancestry who lived in the exclusion zone — California, the western parts of Oregon and Washington, and the southern portion of Arizona — through a series of military orders and proclamations. Forced to leave their homes, the persons of Japanese ancestry were directed to report to civil control stations for transport out of the zone to 16 assembly centers, temporary camps operated by the Western Defense Command's civilian arm, the Wartime Civil Control Administration. From the assembly centers, the evacuees were transported to ten relocation centers under the jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority, an agency which had been established on March 18, 1942, by Executive Order 9102 to implement an orderly relocation program.

Ten relocation centers were established, including Manzanar and Tule Lake in California; Colorado River (Poston) and Gila River in Arizona; Minidoka in Idaho; Central Utah (Topaz) in Utah; Heart Mountain in Wyoming; Granada (Amache) in Colorado; and Rohwer and Jerome in Arkansas. The first evacuees from the exclusion zone went to Manzanar, a site comprising some 5,700 acres of arid desert land in Owens Valley in eastern California. Opened as a reception or assembly center by the WCCA on March 21, 1942, Manzanar was transferred to the WRA on June 1, 1942, at which time it was formally designated as a war relocation center. At its peak capacity, approximately 10,000 evacuees, the vast majority coming from the Los Angeles area, would reside at Manzanar.

The evacuees were confined in the relocation centers for varying periods during the war, pending their resettlement outside the exclusion zone until the military exclusion zone restrictions were lifted on January 2, 1945. Thus, thousands of persons of Japanese ancestry, including American citizens and Japanese aliens, were subjected to long-term forcible detention without having been charged with any offense and without any pretense of due process of law.
Harold S. Jacoby, a sociologist and staff member at Tule Lake from May 1942 to July 1944 and a member of the faculty of the University of the Pacific in Stockton, California, for more than 40 years before his retirement in 1976, has recently published a book, entitled *Tule Lake: From Relocation to Segregation*, in which he addresses issues relating to the evacuation and relocation program within its historic context. Concerned that his book might be "prematurely set aside" as "a whitewash" because he had been a one-time WRA staff member, Jacoby noted:

The evacuation of the Japanese Americans was a cruel and wholly unnecessary action, motivated far more by economic and political considerations than by military necessity. . . .

. . . It is difficult to believe that this [exclusion] was done solely on the basis of the WDC's [Western Defense Command's] concern for military security. More likely, it was every bit as much a product of the political pressure being applied by influential economic interests, such organizations as the American Legion and the Native Sons of the Golden West, that had long-standing records of being opposed to the Japanese, and by such newspapers as the Hearst press, and the McClatchy's *Sacramento Bee*, all of them looking upon the situation as a golden opportunity to rid the country — and especially California — of an unwanted population element.

As it happened, 1942 was an election year in California, and candidates for public office of all stripes and shades sought to make political capital out of promises to straighten out the 'Japanese problem.' Sadly, this was the temptation to which Earl Warren succumbed. As attorney general, he was in the process of seeking the governorship of the state, and he was faced by an opponent who made no bones about his readiness to deal effectively with the 'Japanese problem.' Warren was no rabble rouser on the subject, but he did lend his personal prestige and that of his office in support of the decision to evacuate the Japanese Americans.

Members of the California Congressional delegation and candidates for their replacement, in order to validate their campaign rhetoric, brought pressure on the White House to take action against the 'japs,' presumably in exchange for their support of other pieces of wartime legislation. It is not at all likely that the military decision of the WDC was solely an outgrowth of this pressure, but it was probably welcomed by the commanding general, as it simplified for him the task of securing acceptance of this drastic action.

Despite his understanding of the context for the evacuation and relocation program, Jacoby nevertheless believes that the WRA carried out its mandate in a responsible manner. Moreover, he finds that recent publications "tend to cover the events of the evacuation in a fashion designed to raise the sympathetic consciousness of the reader with respect to the treatment accorded the Japanese Americans." He objects to "the practice of referring to the relocation centers as 'concentration camps' or 'internment centers,'" and he finds that most "of these books . . . are noticeably incomplete in what they portray with respect to the WRA program in the centers." Thus, he determined to write his book to "provide the public with a more complete and accurate understanding of what took place.
in the centers during those regrettable years." Based on his experiences at Tule Lake, he concluded:

Considering the nature of the task assigned to it and the general wartime environment within which it was forced to operate, the WRA did a commendable, but not necessarily a mistake-free, job in the operation of its camp and resettlement programs; and that, while the centers were hardly vacation resorts, there is no justification for labeling them as 'concentration camps,' with all that the use of such a term implies.¹

Despite the constitutional implications of the evacuation and relocation program, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to interpose its authority, apparently because it hesitated to challenge directly the "military necessity" argument. Despite its reluctance to intervene, however, several cases reached the Court in 1943 and 1944. In separate incidents, Minoru Yasui was arrested for violating a military curfew in Portland, Oregon, on March 28, 1942, and Gordon Hirabayashi turned himself in to the FBI in Seattle on May 16, 1942, for failing to register for evacuation. On June 21, 1943, the Court delivered a unanimous decision in *Hirabayashi v. United States* (320 U.S. 81), and its companion case *Yasui v. United States*, in which it carefully refused to consider the issue of Japanese exclusion from the west coast, holding merely that military curfew regulations issued by the Western Defense Command passed constitutional muster under the war powers granted to the federal government in view of the national emergency following Pearl Harbor and a requirement of judicial deference to military necessity during time of war. Writing for the entire Court, Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone noted in his opinion:

Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection. . . . We may assume that these considerations would be controlling here were it not for the fact that the danger of espionage and sabotage, in time of war and of threatened invasion, calls upon the military authorities to scrutinize every relevant fact bearing on the loyalty of population in the danger areas. Because racial discriminations are in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited, it by no means follows that, in dealing with the periods of war, Congress and the Executive are wholly precluded from taking into account those facts and circumstances which are relevant to measures for our national defense and for the successful prosecution of the war, and which may in fact place citizens of one ancestry in a different category from others.

The following year, on October 11-12, 1944, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in *Korematsu v. U.S.* (323 U.S. 214) and *Ex parte Endo* (323 U.S. 283). The Court delivered its decisions in both cases on December 18, 1944, one day after the War Department rescinded its exclusion zone orders. Fred T. Korematsu, an American citizen, had been arrested in San Leandro, California, on May 30, 1942, for failing to report to the Tanforan Assembly Center with his family contrary to Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34. Later, he

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was convicted in a federal district court, and the conviction was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Mitsuye Endo, also an American citizen, was evacuated from Sacramento in 1942 to the Tule Lake War Relocation Center and subsequently to the Central Utah relocation center at Topaz. She applied to WRA officials for a permit to leave the center which was granted on February 16, 1943, by the WRA. However, because of resettlement difficulties, she was not released from the camp. Thus, in July 1943, she filed a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court asking that she be discharged and restored to liberty. The district court denied her petition, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied her appeal in August 1943.

In the Korematsu case, the Court rendered a 6-3 decision that validated the west coast exclusion order in an opinion that again invoked military necessity and dodged basic issues relating to constitutional liberty. The decision upheld the constitutionality of the exclusion of a single racial group to be within the war powers of Congress and of the president. Speaking for the six justices, Justice Hugo Black noted in his majority opinion:

It is said that we are dealing here with the case of imprisonment of a citizen in a concentration camp solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the United States. Our task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice. Regardless of the true nature of the assembly and relocation centers — and we deem it unjustifiable to call them concentration camps with all the ugly connotations that term implies — we are dealing specifically with nothing but an exclusion order. To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders — as inevitably it must — determined that they should have the power to do just this. There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered that the need for action was great, and time was short. We cannot — by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight — now say that at that time these actions were unjustified.

Justices Owen J. Roberts, Robert H. Jackson, and Frank Murphy entered embittered dissents to Black's majority opinion. In his dissent, Roberts observed that Korematsu's conviction represented a "case of convicting a citizen as a punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a concentration camp, based on his ancestry, and solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the United States."

In his dissent, Justice Jackson observed that it "would be impracticable and dangerous idealism to expect or insist that each specific military command in an area of probable operations will conform to conventional tests of constitutionality." However, he noted that
"if we cannot confine military expedients by the Constitution, neither would I distort the Constitution to approve all that the military may deem expedient." Even if DeWitt's orders "were permissible military procedures, I deny that it follows that they are constitutional." "If, as the Court holds, it does follow, then we may as well say that any military order will be constitutional and have done with it."

In his dissent Justice Murphy stated that this "exclusion of 'all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien,' from the Pacific Coast area on a plea of military necessity in the absence of martial law ought not to be approved." Such "exclusion goes over 'the very brink of constitutional power' and falls into the ugly abyss of racism." He went on to observe:

The military necessity which is essential to the validity of the evacuation order thus resolves itself into a few intimations that certain individuals actively aided the enemy, from which it is inferred that the entire group of Japanese Americans could not be trusted to be or remain loyal to the United States. No one denies, of course, that there were some disloyal persons of Japanese descent on the Pacific Coast . . . . But to infer that examples of individual disloyalty and to justify discriminatory action against the entire group is to deny that under our system of law individual guilt is the sole basis for deprivation of rights.

Despite its divisions in the Korematsu case, however, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in Ex parte Endo, upholding the right of a Japanese American girl of unquestioned loyalty to her freedom on a writ of habeas corpus but again without touching fundamental constitutional questions. Thus, the Court ruled that the WRA could not detain loyal citizens in the camps nor bar them from the west coast. Speaking for the court, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that Endo was entitled to an unconditional release by the War Relocation Authority. He noted further:

A citizen who is concededly loyal presents no problem of espionage or sabotage. Loyalty is a matter of the heart and mind, not of race, creed, or color. He who is loyal is by definition not a spy or a saboteur. When the power to detain is derived from the power to protect the war effort against espionage and sabotage, detention which has no relationship to the objective is unauthorized.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Roberts observed that "I am of the view that detention in Relocation Centers of persons of Japanese ancestry regardless of loyalty is not only unauthorized by Congress or by the Executive but is another example of the unconstitutional resort to racism inherent in the entire evacuation program." Racial discrimination "of this nature bears no reasonable relation to military necessity and is utterly foreign to ideals and traditions of the American people."^2

In retrospect, it is difficult to disagree with Justice Roberts' conclusion that the evacuation and relocation program was the result of racial prejudice that had permeated American society on the west coast, and particularly in California, for more than 40 years. It is equally difficult to escape the conclusion that the Roosevelt administration, by resorting to the relocation program, not only yielded to that racial prejudice but also to the wartime hysteria and mounting fears of an imminent Japanese invasion that were sweeping the west coast in the wake of Pearl Harbor.  

Moreover, the evacuation and relocation programs and their sanctity by the Supreme Court established broader constitutional precedents that are potentially dangerous for the future of American civil liberties. In his *Americans Betrayed*, Morton Grodzins concluded that the Supreme Court failed in a test of its capacity to defend constitutional liberty during a time of national crisis. The "military-necessity" argument, which the Court has never overturned, established a legal precedent that, according to Grodzins, "betrayed all Americans." He further stated:

> Japanese Americans were the immediate victims of the evacuation. But larger consequences are carried by the American people as a whole. Their legacy is the lasting one of precedent and constitutional sanctity for a policy of mass incarceration under military auspices. This is the most important result of the process by which the evacuation decision was made. . . .

Continuing with this line of thought, Eugene V. Rostow, a professor of law at Yale University, wrote a scathing article in the June 1945 issue of the *Yale Law Review* in which he stated that the "many opinions of the three Japanese cases do not consider the primary constitutional issues which are raised by the West Coast anti-Japanese program as a whole." In the article which was published while the war was still underway and thousands of evacuees remained in the relocation centers, he noted further:

> . . . This was a program which included (a) a discriminatory curfew against Japanese persons; (b) their exclusion from the West Coast; (c) their confinement pending investigations of loyalty; and (d) the indefinite confinement of those persons found to be disloyal. These measures were proposed and accepted as military necessities. Their validity as military measures was an issue in litigation. By what standards are courts to pass on the justification for such military action? Were those standards satisfied here?

In response to his own questions, Rostow concluded that the "war-time treatment of Japanese aliens and citizens of Japanese descent on the West Coast has been hasty, unnecessary and mistaken." The "course of action which we undertook was in no way required or justified by the circumstances of the war." Instead, it "was calculated to produce both individual injustice and deep-seated social maladjustments of a cumulative and sinister kind." Continuing, Rostow observed:

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3. For more information on these topics, see Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed*, pp. 361-74.
4. Ibid., p. 374.
All in all, the internment of the West Coast Japanese is the worst blow our liberties have sustained in many years. Over one hundred thousand men, women and children have been imprisoned, some seventy thousand of them citizens of the United States, without indictment or the proffer of charges, pending inquiry into their 'loyalty.' They were taken into custody as a military measure on the ground that espionage and sabotage were especially to be feared from persons of Japanese blood. They were removed from the West Coast area because the military thought it would take too long to conduct individual loyalty investigations on the ground. They were arrested in an area where the courts were open, and freely functioning. They were held under prison conditions in uncomfortable camps, far from their homes, and for lengthy periods — several years in many cases. If found 'disloyal' in administrative proceedings they were confined indefinitely, although no statute makes 'disloyalty' a crime; it would be difficult indeed for a statute to do so under a Constitution which has been interpreted to minimize imprisonment for political opinions, both by defining the crime of treason in extremely rigid and explicit terms, and by limiting convictions for sedition and life offenses. In the course of relocation citizens have suffered severe property losses, despite some custodial assistance by the Government. Perhaps 70,000 persons are still in camps, 'loyal' and 'disloyal' citizens and aliens alike, more than three years after the programs were instituted. . . . If the Court had stepped forward in bold heart to vindicate the law and declare the entire program illegal, the episode would have been passed over as a national scandal, but a temporary one altogether capable of reparation. But the Court, after timid and evasive delays, has now upheld the main features of the program. That step converts a piece of war-time folly into political doctrine, and a permanent part of the law. Moreover, it affects a peculiarly important and sensitive part of the law. The relationship of civil to military authority is not often litigated. It is nonetheless one of the two or three most essential elements in the legal structure of a democratic society. The Court's few declarations on the subject govern the handling of vast affairs. They determine the essential organization of the military establishment, state and federal in time of emergency or of war, as well as of peace. What the Supreme Court has done in these cases, and especially in Korematsu v. United States, is to increase the strength of the military in relation to civil government. It has upheld an act of military power without a factual record in which the justification for the act was analyzed. Thus it has created doubt as to the standards of responsibility to which the military power will be held. For the first time in American legal history, the Court has seriously weakened the protection of our basic civil right, the writ of habeas corpus. It has established a precedent which may well be used to encourage attacks on the civil rights of citizens and aliens, and may make it possible for some of those attacks to succeed. It will give aid to reactionary political programs which use social division and racial prejudice as tools for conquering power. . . .

While the moral and constitutional issues of the evacuation and relocation program have been debated during the past five decades, persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States have undertaken efforts to secure redress for their losses during the war. Although Congress passed the Japanese American Evacuation Claims Act on July 2, 1948, allowing

persons of Japanese ancestry to file claims against the government for losses of property that resulted from the evacuation and relocation program, little was done in terms of redress until July 1970. That month the national convention of the Japanese American Citizens League passed its first resolution accepting redress as an issue of concern for the organization. Four years later, in July 1974, the JACL national convention established the National Redress Committee. In July 1978, the JACL national convention approved guidelines for its National Redress Committee to follow, including working toward securing redress for former evacuees and internees in the form of individual payments of $25,000 and the creation of a trust fund to benefit Japanese Americans. On the 34th anniversary of the issuance of Executive Order 9066, President Gerald R. Ford formally rescinded the presidential proclamation, stating "We know now what we should have known then: not only was evacuation wrong, but Japanese-Americans were and are loyal Americans." On November 25, 1978, the first "Day of Remembrance" program was conducted at Camp Harmony, Washington, site of the former Puyallup Assembly Center.

In late January 1979, the JACL National Redress Committee met with Hawaii Senators Daniel Inouye and Spark Matsunaga and California Congressmen Norman Mineta and Robert Matsui to discuss strategies for obtaining redress. A study commission was proposed. Finally, on July 31, 1980, President Jimmy Carter signed into law the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC) Act. Between July 14 and December 9, 1981, the CWRIC held twenty days of hearings in nine cities during which more than 750 witnesses testified. In December 1982, the CWRIC released its report, Personal Justice Denied, concluding that Executive Order 9066 was "not justified by military necessity" and was the result of "race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership."

In June 1983, the CWRIC issued five recommendations for redress to Congress. First, it called for a joint congressional resolution acknowledging and apologizing for the wrongs initiated in 1942. Second, it recommended a presidential pardon for persons who had been convicted of violating the several statutes establishing and enforcing the evacuation and relocation program. Third, it urged Congress to direct various parts of the government to deal liberally with applicants for restitution of status and entitlements lost because of wartime prejudice and discrimination, such as the less than honorable discharges that were given to many Japanese American soldiers in the weeks after Pearl Harbor. Fourth, it recommended that Congress appropriate money to establish a special foundation to sponsor research and public educational activities "so that the causes and circumstances of this and similar events may be illuminated." Fifth, it called upon Congress to make a one-time, tax-free, per capita compensation of $20,000 to each of the estimated 60,000 survivors who had been evacuated or interned.

While various redress bills were slowly proceeding through the legislative process, Japanese Americans were also taking their struggle for redress to the courts. In January 1983, Fred Korematsu, Minoru Yasui, and Gordon Hirabayashi each filed petitions for writ of error coram nobis to reopen their wartime cases. As a result, U.S. District Court Judge Marilyn Patel granted Korematsu's petition for a writ of error, thus reversing his 40-year-old conviction.

On January 16, 1984, U.S. District Court Judge Robert C. Belloni granted a motion by the government to vacate Minoru Yasui's conviction, but dismissed his petition for a writ of
error. Yasui appealed the dismissal of his petition to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, but in November 1986 Yasui died. His family asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review his case, but in 1987 the Court refused to grant *certiorari*.

On February 10, 1986, U.S. District Court Judge Donald Voorhees ruled that the suppression of evidence by the War Department was a fundamental error and vacated Hirabayashi’s exclusion order conviction. He also ruled that Hirabayashi’s curfew conviction was not affected by the government’s misconduct. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Judge Voorhees’ verdict on the curfew conviction and remanded the case to him with orders to vacate both convictions. Finally, on January 12, 1988, Judge Voorhees set aside Hirabayashi’s curfew conviction. Subsequently, the federal government declined to ask for a review of this order.

On March 16, 1983, William Hohri, the chair of the National Council for Japanese American Redress (NCJAR), filed a class-action lawsuit against the U.S. Government on behalf of 25 named Japanese American plaintiffs and all former evacuated and interned Japanese Americans in general. The lawsuit stated 22 causes of action, including 15 violations of constitutional rights, and asked for $27,000,000,000 in damages. More than one year later, on May 17, 1984, U.S. District Court Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer dismissed the Hohri class-action suit on the grounds of sovereign immunity and the statute of limitations. On January 21, 1986, Judge Oberdorfer’s dismissal of the Hohri class-action suit was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, ruling in favor of the NCJAR plaintiffs on the statute of limitations. On August 26, 1986, NCJAR appealed Judge Oberdorfer’s sovereign immunity ruling, filing a writ of *certiorari* to the Supreme Court. In a unanimous decision on June 1, 1987, the Court vacated the U.S. Court of Appeals’ decision and ordered the district court appeal to be reheard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The federal circuit court subsequently ruled in favor of the government.

On August 10, 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 into law, providing for payments of $20,000 to each surviving evacuee and internee over a ten-year period. The bill also provided for review of convictions and pardons of crimes for noncooperation with military orders and Congressional legislation relating to the evacuation and relocation program, and established the Civil Liberties Public Education Fund. On November 21, 1989, President George Bush signed into law a measure establishing redress and an entitlement program with payments to be paid out during fiscal years 1991-93. Copies of the following letter from President Bush accompanied the redress checks:

A monetary sum and words alone cannot restore lost years or erase painful memories; neither can they fully convey our Nation’s resolve to rectify injustice and to uphold the rights of individuals. We can never fully right the wrongs of the past. But we can take a clear stand for justice and recognize that serious injustices were done to Japanese Americans during World War II.

In enacting a law calling for restitution and offering a sincere apology, your fellow Americans have in a very real sense, renewed their traditional commitment
to the ideals of freedom, equality, and justice. You and your family have our best
wishes for the future.  

When it was found that additional funds were needed for redress payments because the
original estimate of the number of eligible recipients were too low, legislation was enacted
to provide for the additional funds. On September 27, 1992, President Bush signed a
measure into law ensuring that all eligible Japanese American recipients would receive
$20,000 in redress money.

According to Leslie T. Hatamiya, for the approximately 80,000 surviving Japanese
Americans whose rights were violated, passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 and its
subsequent amending legislation "signified the culmination of a 40-year struggle for an
apology and monetary restitution from the United States government for the unjust
evacuation and internment that they had suffered" during World War II. "On a more
universal level, the bill's passage reconfirmed all citizens' constitutional civil rights and
civil liberties." For these reasons, "passage was more than just a victory of Japanese
Americans; it was a victory for all Americans." According to Hatamiya, its passage "was a
promise by the U.S. government that it would never again incarcerate a group of its own
citizens en masse, without due process of law, solely on the basis of ethnicity." Passage of
the Civil Liberties Act "breathed new life into the U.S. Constitution as it entered its third
century." The story of the redress bill's success, according to Hatamiya, serves as a
reminder of the need for the people of this nation "to fight for adherence to constitutional
principles in the coming decades of dramatic social change." He concluded his comments
on the significance of the bill's passage by quoting the words of former Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes, the truth of which remains a challenge for all Americans today:

You may think that the Constitution is your security — it is nothing but a piece
of paper. You may think that the statutes are your security — they are nothing
but words in a book. You may think that elaborate mechanism of government is
your security — it is nothing at all, unless you have sound and uncorrupted
public opinion to give life to your Constitution, to give vitality to your statutes, to
make efficient your government machinery.

ed. by Daniels, Taylor, and Kitano, p. 222.

7. Leslie T. Hatamiya, Righting A Wrong: Japanese Americans and the Passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988
(Stanford, California, Stanford University, 1993).
WHEREAS the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national defense matériel, national defense premises, and national defense utilities as defined in Section 4, Act of April 20, 1918, 40 Stat. 533, as amended by the Act of November 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 1220, and the Act of August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 655 (U. S. C., Title 50, Sec. 104):

Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders who he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgment of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order. The designation of military areas in any region or locality shall supersede designations of prohibited and restricted areas by the Attorney General under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, and shall supersede the responsibility and authority of the Attorney General under the said Proclamations in respect of such prohibited and restricted areas.

I hereby further authorize and direct the Secretary of War and the said Military Commanders to take such other steps as he or the said Military Commander may deem advisable to enforce compliance with the restrictions applicable to each Military area hereinabove authorized to be designated, including the use of Federal troops and other Federal Agencies, with authority to accept assistance of state and local agencies.

I hereby further authorize and direct all Executive Departments, independent establishments and other Federal Agencies, to assist the Secretary of War or the said Military Commanders in carrying out this Executive Order, including the furnishing of medical aid, hospitalization, food, clothing, transportation, use of land, shelter, and other supplies, equipment, utilities, facilities, and services.

This order shall not be construed as modifying or limiting in any way the authority heretofore granted under Executive Order No. 8972, dated December 12, 1941, nor shall it be construed as limiting or modifying the duty and responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with respect to the investigation of alleged acts of sabotage or the duty and responsibility of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, prescribing regulations for the conduct and control of alien enemies, except as such duty and responsibility is superseded by the designation of military areas hereunder.

The White House, February 19, 1942.
APPENDIX B: EXECUTIVE ORDER 9102, MARCH 18, 1942

ESTABLISHING THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY IN THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND DEFINING ITS FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and in order to provide for the removal from designated areas of persons whose removal is necessary in the interests of national security, it is ordered as follows:

1. There is established in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President the War Relocation Authority, at the head of which shall be a Director appointed by and responsible to the President.

2. The Director of the War Relocation Authority is authorized and directed to formulate and effectuate a program for the removal, from the areas designated from time to time by the Secretary of War or appropriate military commander under the authority of Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942, of the persons or classes of persons designated under such Executive Order, and for their relocation, maintenance, and supervision.

3. In effectuating such program the Director shall have authority to—
   (a) Accomplish all necessary evacuation not undertaken by the Secretary of War or appropriate military commander, provide for the relocation of such persons in appropriate places, provide for their needs in such manner as may be necessary, and supervise their activities.
   (b) Provide, to the extent feasible and desirable, for the employment of such persons at useful work in industry, commerce, agriculture, or public projects, prescribe the terms and conditions of such public employment, and safeguard the public interest in the private employment of such persons.
   (c) Secure the cooperation, assistance, or services of any governmental agency.
   (d) Prescribe regulations necessary or desirable to promote effective execution of such program, and, as a means of coordinating evacuation and relocation activities, consult with the Secretary of War with respect to regulations issued and measures taken by him.
   (e) Make such delegations of authority as he may deem necessary.
   (f) Employ necessary personnel, and make such expenditures, including the making of loans and grants and the purchase of real property, as may be necessary, within the limits of such funds as may be made available to the Authority.

4. The Director shall consult with the United States Employment Service and other agencies on employment and other problems incident to activities under this order.

5. The Director shall cooperate with the Alien Property Custodian appointed pursuant to Executive Order No. 9065 of March 11, 1942, in formulating policies to govern the custody, management, and disposal by the Alien Property Custodian of property belonging to foreign nationals removed under this order or under Executive Order No. 9066 of February 10, 1942; and may assist all other persons removed under either of such Executive orders in the management and disposal of their property.

6. Departments and agencies of the United States are directed to cooperate with and assist the Director in his activities hereunder. The Departments of War and Justice under the direction of the Secretary of War and the Attorney General, respectively, shall cooperate to the extent feasible and consistent with the national interest provide such protective, police, and investigational services as the Director shall find necessary in connection with activities under this order.

7. There is established within the War Relocation Authority the War Relocation Work Corps. The Director shall provide, by general regulations, for the enlistment in such corps, for the duration of the present war, of persons removed under this order or under Executive Order No. 9066 of February 10, 1942, and shall prescribe the terms and conditions of the work to be performed by such Corps, and the compensation to be paid.

8. There is established within the War Relocation Authority a Liaison Committee on War Relocation, which shall consist of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Labor, the Federal Security Administrator, the Director of Civilian Defense, and the Alien Property Custodian, or their deputies, and such other persons or agencies as the Director may designate. The Liaison Committee shall meet at the call of the Director and shall assist him in his duties.

9. The Director shall keep the President informed with regard to the progress made in carrying out this order, and perform such related duties as the President may from time to time assign to him.

10. In order to avoid duplication of evacuation activities under this order and Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942, the Director shall not undertake any evacuation activities within military areas designated under said Executive Order No. 9066, without the prior approval of the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commander.
11. This order does not limit the authority granted in Executive Order No. 8972 of December 12, 1941; Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942; Executive Order No. 9065 of March 11, 1942; Executive Proclamation No. 2525 of December 7, 1941; Executive Proclamation No. 2526 of December 8, 1941; Executive Proclamation No. 2527 of December 8, 1941; Executive Proclamation No. 2533 of December 20, 1941; or Executive Proclamation No. 2537 of January 14, 1942; nor does it limit the functions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 18, 1942.
APPENDIX C: WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs
Wartime Civil Control Administration
Statistical Division

EXCLUSION DATES, NUMBER EVACUATED, AND DESTINATIONS OF JAPANESE
BY CIVILIAN EXCLUSION ORDER

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<td>82</td>
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<td>83</td>
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<td>Gila River</td>
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<td>Sacramento, Eldorado, and Amador Counties</td>
<td>5-30-42</td>
<td>710</td>
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<td>2,830</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Placer, Amador, Eldorado, Alpine, Calaveras, Mono, Madera, Tuolumne and Mariposa</td>
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<td>Inyo, Tulare, Kern</td>
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<td>Colorado River</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIXES

108 Tulare County 8-11-42 1,732 Colorado River Colorado River
Alaska Alaska 4-23-42 132 Puyallup Minidoka

December 30, 1942
APPENDIX D: STANDARDS AND DETAILS

Standards and Details—Construction of Japanese Evacuee Reception Centers (June 8, 1942)

June 8, 1942.

STANDARDS AND DETAILS—CONSTRUCTION OF JAPANESE EVACUEE RECEPTION CENTERS
(As agreed upon 6-8-42 by Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt and Colonel L. R. Groves from the Office of the Chief of Engineers)

I. For the purpose of providing uniformity of construction and in order to obviate the necessity of miscellaneous correspondence in connection with construction of Reception Centers in Relocation Areas, it is requested that the following standards and details be observed in all future construction and to the extent possible in current construction of Japanese Evacuee Reception Centers.

2. In general facilities to be provided by the U. S. E. D. will include the following:
   a. Shelter for evacuees arranged in rectangular block units, each containing mess, recreation or vocational building, baths, latrines, and laundry.
   b. Hospital facilities based on minimum 150 beds for 10,000 population and 250 beds for 20,000.
   c. Warehouse facilities based on one (1) 20' x 100' refrigerated storeroom and twenty (20) 10' x 100' storage warehouse or equivalent in floor space per 5,000 population.
   d. Administrative facilities, including store and post office buildings, and one shop building.
   e. Quarters for administrative personnel, including mess hall facilities.
   f. Shelter and facilities for MP units.
   g. Utilities to include:
      (1) Adequate water for culinary, sanitary and fire protection purposes.
      (2) Water-borne sewage disposal conforming to minimum health requirements.
      (3) Electric power and light.
      (4) Necessary access and service roads.
   h. Adequate fire protection.

3. Layouts should be made conforming to recommendations supplied by the Civil Affairs Division of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. Schools, churches, theaters, stores and shop facilities will be constructed by the operating agency, but space and basic utilities must be provided for these items in layouts made by the engineers.

4. The typical block should be designed to house not to exceed 300 persons. General standards to be as follows:
   a. Barracks to be T/O type construction modified to include partitions for family groups, asphaltic roofing weighing more than 45 lbs. per square, interior lining where warranted by climatic conditions, concrete or wooden floors, and electrical service to include one drop outlet in each apartment, with circuit capacity to permit proper installation of one convenience outlet in each apartment.
   b. Bath and Toilet Facilities will generally conform to mobilization type requirements and will provide bath and toilet fixtures on the following basis per 500 persons, or per block.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Showers—12</td>
<td>Showers—8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bath Tubs—0</td>
<td>Bath Tubs—4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lavatories—12</td>
<td>Lavatories—14</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Toilets—10</td>
<td>Toilets—14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urinals—4</td>
<td>Urinals—0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slop Sink—1</td>
<td>Slop Sink—1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

871
Showers will be individually controlled for women, but with central thermostatic installation for men, and control valve for maximum hot water temperature will be provided.

Individual control valves for showers will be placed low enough so as to permit operation by a person of 5'-0" height. Face baths will be installed in the entrance to each shower room. Showers and toilets will be spaced sufficiently far apart and for women provided with separate partitions to allow reasonable degree of privacy.

c. Laundries will contain six tubs with hot and cold water and six ironing boards per 100 persons. Standard benches in the laundry and tables in the ironing room should also be provided.

Convenience outlets for ironing, laundry tubs and ironing boards should be installed lower than usual due to small stature of users.

d. Kitchen and Mess Hall to be of modified T/O construction, with concrete floor, if practicable, otherwise double wood floor.

Refrigerator of suitable capacity will be installed.

Ranges should be provided on the basis of one standard No. 5 Army Range or suitable substitute per 100 persons served. Certain No. 5 Army and other ranges will be supplied upon request to Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, from evacuated Assembly Centers or from available Army stocks. When fuel other than coal and wood is to be used, the construction engineer will supply necessary type of range and advise this Headquarters so that the shipment of No. 5 ranges will not be made. When oil is to be used as fuel, suitable conversion units may be provided for the No. 5 ranges by the Engineer. Ranges will be installed with insulation to protect floors and adjacent walls, also with ventilated hood. Hot water facilities will include storage tanks of not less than 160 gallons capacity and booster heaters in addition to water jackets in ranges. Dishwashing facilities will be arranged so as to have scullery directly connected with mess hall and will include not less than two three-compartment or one two and one three-compartment sinks with necessary drainboards and counters. Standard six_down, wooden mess tables will be provided, tables to be covered with pressed wood or plywood and varnished.

e. Recreation Building to be modified T/O type construction with concrete or wood floor. Ten convenience outlets will be installed along walls to permit use of sewing machines, etc.

5. Hospital Facilities.

Hospital to be modified mobilization type construction. Instructions for layout and equipment will be provided by the Civil Affairs Division, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army.

6. Warehouses.

a. Warehouse to be improved T/O type construction with heavier roof and concrete floor. Refrigerated storehouse to be designed according to local conditions.

b. Railroad siding should be provided in connection with warehouse area when possible, but no spurs for branch lines will be constructed. Some toilet facilities, pit, chemical or flush type and drinking water should be provided in warehouse area if such facilities are not immediately adjacent.

7. Administrative Facilities should include the following:

a. On the basis of 10,000 population two (2) 40'x120' buildings, one (1) 20'x100' warehouse, garages for emergency vehicles, one shop building approximately 40'x120', and buildings to house post office, store and fire station. Construction to be of T/O type. Suitable electric outlets and necessary plumbing to be provided in administrative buildings, post office and fire station.

8. Quarters for Administrative Personnel.

On the basis of 10,000 evacuees provide dormitories, for minimum 40 persons, four modi-
fixed T/O type buildings 20'x100' divided into 8'x12' or 16' cubicles and equipped with bath and toilet facilities. Wiring should include one drop and one convenience outlet in each cubicle. One central mess and one recreation building to be provided for a capacity of about 100 persons.

9. Shelter and Facilities for MP Personnel to be provided for a strength of a minimum of one company of four (4) officers and 126 enlisted men. Actual strength will be indicated in specific directives. Officers' quarters should provide individual cubicles for sleeping quarters with bath and toilet facilities in the same manner as for administrative personnel quarters. One 20'x100' building will be provided for each of the following: Administrative Headquarters and Unit Supply, Guard House, Recreation Room and Post Exchange, and one 20'x30' equipped with hot water and sanitary facilities to be used as a dispensary. Garage or shed (depending on climate) to house emergency vehicles of the Unit.

10. Utilities.
   a. Water supply should be designed on the basis of 100 gallons per capita per day with sufficient pressure to give adequate fire protection, and should have necessary standby supply facilities.
   b. Sewage Disposal. Sewer capacity should be based on approximately 75 gallons per capita per day. Complete sewage treatment should be provided where indicated by local conditions.
   c. Electric Power and Lighting. Installations should be designed on the basis of 2000 KVA per 10,000 population, so as to handle a reasonably ample load for all needs and with sufficient capacity of individual building circuits to prevent constant blowing of fuses. In lieu of street lighting, one (1) light at each end of all main buildings (one for warehouses) should be provided.

11. Fire Protection, generally to be the same as provided for mobilization type Army Camps. Barrels and buckets to be provided on the basis of one set for every four (4) buildings. Fire hydrants should be located throughout area. Two (2) trucks equipped with pumping equipment, hose and ladders to be stationed in each Center (on the basis of 10,000 evacuees.)

12. Access and Service Roads should be properly graded and drained and provided with a simple type of surfacing material, preferably bituminous. A reasonable amount of surfacing material will be left at the Center by the Engineer, to be used for maintenance.

   a. Space heating in suitable form, depending on climate and fuel, most easily and economically obtained, to be provided in accordance with zone requirements established by the Chief of Engineers.
   b. Standard mobilization type plumbing fixtures to be provided in hospital, administration and MP installation.
   c. Electrical installation to provide for special requirements for equipment in hospital and warehouses as well as refrigeration, should be installed in accordance with good building practice and should have a central cut-out switch for blackout needs if the Center is located within an air frontier zone. Separate circuits to be provided for central storage refrigerator and hospital installations to permit operation during blackout.
   d. Adequate refrigeration consistent with local climatic conditions to be provided in all kitchens. Meat blocks will be provided, one for each kitchen.
   e. Suitable shelving will be constructed in kitchen storerooms and MP supply room, Post Exchange and barracks.
   f. All buildings will be screened unless local climatic conditions dictate otherwise, and in any case hospitals, messes and latrines will be screened.
   g. Materials for interior lining of barracks, and screening for windows may, when not installed during normal course of construction, be left at the Center by the Engineer for installation by Camp Manager with Japanese labor.

14. Special Items.
   a. Watch towers of a height commensurate with terrain conditions and equipped with searchlights as required shall be constructed around outside of Camp in locations and
numbers requested by local MP, Commander or Center Managers, but not more than eight to each Center, without approval by this Headquarters.

b. Standard stock fence will be built around the occupied area, excluding MP area. Materials may be left for construction with Japanese labor. Military Police area should be located to provide easy access to main highway serving the Center without having to pass through evacuee area.

c. A 90' flagpole to be erected in suitable location of the MP area.

d. One (1) T/O type barrack-building equipped with benches and tables and a receiving counter to be constructed near entrance to Center to be used for visiting purposes. Adequate parking space for visitors also to be provided.

e. When required, suitable coal bins will be provided for each kitchen and in such other locations as may be indicated. Materials to be provided by the Engineer, and left with Camp Manager for construction with Japanese labor. Screened garbage racks will be provided in connection with each kitchen, to be constructed in same manner as coal bins.

15. Engineer will submit to Civil Affairs Division, W. D. C., and Fourth Army for approval the following:

a. Site plan.

b. Hospital plan.

c. Kitchen and mess layout (floor plan).

d. Bath, toilet and laundry building floor plans.

16. As soon as available, three complete sets of plans will be forwarded to the Civil Affairs Division, W. D. C., and Fourth Army. Two of these sets will be for the W. R. A., one of which is for the Center Manager.

Supplement No. 1

June 18, 1942.

STANDARDS AND DETAILS—CONSTRUCTION OF JAPANESE EVACUEE RECEPTION CENTERS

1. The following list of hospital equipment is added as a supplement to Paragraph 5 of "Standards and Details—Construction of Japanese Evacuee Reception Centers", dated June 8, 1942, as prepared by this Headquarters. Included are items to be provided by the U. S. E. D. and items to be procured by the War Relocation Authority.

2. Hospital equipment to be provided and installed by the U. S. E. D. will include the following:

a. Refrigerators

(1) Main hospital kitchen—one extra large electric refrigerator of approximately 40 cu. ft. capacity.

(2) Ward kitchen—one medium size electric refrigerator of approximately 8 cu. ft. capacity for each kitchen.

(3) Neighborhood dispensary building—(when Center layout indicates need). One small electric refrigerator to be placed in pharmacy room of approximately 4 cu. ft. capacity.

(4) Out-patient building—one medium-size electric refrigerator of approximately 8 cu. ft. capacity to be placed in laboratory.

(5) Morgue—morgue refrigerator for three or four bodies, preferably four.

b. Kitchen Equipment

(1) Large mechanical dishwasher for main hospital kitchen—one dishwasher, electric, large (capacity 150-250 hospital beds); automatic with pump and motor; with capacity 265 gallons per minute; with ¾” Powers steam and hot water mixing valve for final rinse; including necessary racks and other equipment to operate. Equipment requires connections to maintain water for washing at 140 degrees, and to deliver rinse water at 195 degrees. Reference: Hobart Model CM preferred. Second choice, Crescent or equal. Powers valve extra on all makes.
(2) Small mechanical dishwasher for hospital and isolation ward—one dishwasher, electric; semi-automatic; rack type dishwasher with three doors; with pump and motor to deliver 120 gallons per minute; with ¾" Powers steam and hot water mixing valve; with steam sterilizer attachments; with necessary racks. For hospital isolation ward of 35 beds. Equipment requires connections to maintain wash water at 140 degrees, and to deliver rinse water at 195 degrees. Reference: Hobart Model AM-4. Second choice: Crescent, or equal. Powers valve and steam sterilizer attachment extra on all makes.

(3) Usual drain sink in each ward kitchen.

(4) Large double compartment drain sink in main kitchen for cooks’ use.

(5) Usual vegetable preparation sink in kitchen scullery.

(6) Small electric range for each ward kitchen. Hotpoint model JI-B-11 or equal. This model has four hot plates and one oven.

(7) Standard Army ranges for main kitchen. Note: Other kitchen equipment such as steam tables, deep fat fryer, large coffee urn, etc., is not detailed here, assuming it is included in the standard Army hospital kitchen. However, an electric potato peeler and other equipment of the purely labor-saving type should not be provided in these Centers.

c. Laundry Equipment

(1) One 42”x24”x4” wood washer, having one vertical partition, two doors, and two compartments; motor drive; with unit control; with water piping and automatic valves; with dial type thermometer.

(2) One 30”x16”x3” wood washer; one compartment; motor drive; with unit control with water piping and automatic valves and dial type thermometer.

(1) One 30” solid curb extractor; with motor drive; with unit control with galvanized basket.

(4) One 20” solid curb extractor; with motor drive; with unit control; with galvanized basket.

(5) Two 36”x39” air drying tumblers; with double steam coil; with motor drive.

(6) One 16”x100” single cylinder return apron flatwork ironer; steam heated; motor drive.

(7) Two 32”x22”x24” galvanized washroom trucks with casters.

(8) Two 32”x22”x24” wood washroom trucks with casters.

(9) Eight canvas washroom baskets, 30”x20”, with casters.

(10) One 15-gallon copper washroom crook.

(11) Four ironing boards (Troy No. 1-D or Bishop No. 7 type or equal); with suitable electric irons. Approximate weight 6 lbs. and cords. Note: Some variation in sizes of this equipment may be necessary due to procurement difficulties.

The above laundry equipment was planned on the basis of a hospital capacity not in excess of 200 beds. Larger hospital capacity will require washers and extractors of slightly larger capacity.

d. Ventilators

(1) Ceiling fan type with motor for:

(a) X-ray developing room.

(b) Main laboratory.

(c) Dental laboratory.

e. Special Ceiling Lights

For Operating Room, Major Surgery standard Army design.

For Operating Room, Minor Surgery, and for obstetrical delivery room—see typical hospital plan.

f. Autopsy or Mortician’s Table

Standard Army type acceptable.

3. The surgery, delivery room, obstetrical ward, and all wards in the isolation building shall be so painted as to permit frequent soap and water washing.
4. The following list of hospital equipment will be requested by the War Relocation Authority for procurement by a Medical Depot. However, all items not installed by the manufacturer to be installed by the U. S. E. D.

a. Sterilizers

(1) Operating Room Unit—one four-piece battery unit for use with steam, to be installed in surgery sterilizing room. Battery unit to consist of one drawing pressure sterilizer, # 6 size; one water sterilizer, # 2 size with separate tanks for cold and hot water; one instrument sterilizer, boiling type, # 4 size; one utensil sterilizer, boiling type, # 1 size.

(2) Obstetrical Ward Sterilizing Room—one utensil sterilizer, # 1 size, for use with steam.

(3) Disinfecting Room—one bulk pressure sterilizer and disinfector, rectangular type, for use with steam, double door, size 36" x 42" x 84".

(4) Small electric instrument sterilizers, 1000 Watt type. Wall plug outlets should be provided in each ward utility room, the dispensary buildings, and the outpatient building, as shown on the typical hospital plan. Note: All of the above sterilizers, except the small electrical instrument sterilizers, will require water, steam, and waste outlets and proper connections after delivery of equipment. All steam supply lines should have suitable piping to permit uniformly maintained, adequate pressure at the instruments to assure a steam supply for capacity operation of the equipment.

Steam supply systems should deliver normal steam, free from moisture.

b. X-Ray Equipment

(1) One X-ray machine for fluoroscopy and radiography, 100 to 200 MA type.

(2) One X-ray machine, portable, 15 to 50 MA type, for use with base plug connection in each ward.

(3) One developing tank.

Note: Necessary wiring detail and developing room arrangement are shown on the typical hospital plan. Barium plasters or lead lining should be provided on all inside walls of X-ray room, whichever is cheaper. Control Room partition should be lead shield with leaded window. Hall door and developing room door should be lead covered.

c. Operating Room Table

No special attachments necessary.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

June 29, 1942.


TO: The Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, U. S. E. D., 551 California Street, San Francisco, California.

1. Reference par. 2b and par. 11 of "Standards and Details—Construction of Japanese Evacuee Reception Centers," dated June 6, 1942. The following are submitted as minimum requirements:

a. Fire Trucks—Two of these to be provided for each center of 10,000 capacity or less. For centers of greater capacity one truck will be provided for each 5,000 capacity. When service pressure in water mains averages 60 lbs. or more, pumping equipment may be omitted from the trucks. These trucks will be equipped with minimum 600' of 2 1/2" hose, wrenches, hand operated chemical extinguishers and two ladders 12' long. When pressure is less than average of 60 lbs. conventional pumper engines with capacity of not less than 600 GPM will be provided. Not less than 600' of 2 1/2" hose and two ladders 12' long will be included in the equipment.
b. Extinguishers—To be provided for each building on the following basis:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Building</th>
<th>21/2 Gal. SKA²</th>
<th>21/2 Gal. Foamite</th>
<th>1 Qt. C.T.C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barrack</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mess Hall</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H Type Sanitation Building</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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</table>

c. Fire Hose—Sufficient hose should be provided so that including what is carried on the trucks or engines minimum 2000' of hose is available. Hose to be 21/2'' single jacket, rubber lined, in 50' lengths with pin lug couplings.

d. Request that every effort be made to have the equipment listed above actually on hand in each Center so such time as may be set for completion of essential facilities required for beneficial occupation.

For the Commanding General:
WILLIAM L. RITTER, Colonel, A.G.D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

September 23, 1942.

STANDARDS FOR MILITARY POLICE HOUSING—JAPANESE RELOCATION CENTERS

(Based on “Standards and Details—Construction of Japanese Evacuee Reception Centers” and “Directive for War Time Construction,” O. C. E.)

1. General—Shelter and facilities to be provided on the basis of a company of four (4) officers and 126 enlisted men. Buildings to be of modified Theater of Operations type.

2. Buildings—Administration and Supply; Guard House; Recreation Room and Post Exchange; Dispensary; Garage; Mess Hall and Kitchen; Officers’ Quarters; Latrine and Bath House; Enlisted Men’s Barracks Buildings (4).

3. Utilities:
   a. Water—Adequate water for culinary, sanitary and fire protection purposes on basis of 100 gallons per capita per day.
   b. Water-borne sewage disposal.
   c. Electric light and power.
   d. Heating by separate space heaters such as cannon stoves.

4. Officers’ Quarters—Individual rooms, approximately 8’x12’ for sleeping quarters. Each room to have one ceiling outlet and one convenience outlet. Toilets and shower room in building. Hot water to be provided by individual water heater. Recreation room to be provided.

5. Enlisted Men’s Barracks (4)—Buildings to be 20’x100’ each, of modified T/O type. One-room building.

6. Administration and Supply Building—To be 20’x100’ in size. Office space to be provided and space for company supply storage and issue. Toilet facilities. Shelving to be constructed in supply room.

7. Guard House—To be divided into prisoners’ quarters, guards’ quarters, prisoners’ toilet

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²When oil is used for heating purposes one 21/2 gallon foamite extinguisher will be substituted for one S & A extinguisher in each building where the oil is used.

²Group type extinguishers may be substituted for S & A type when the latter are not obtainable.

²One Qt. C.T.C. extinguishers to be provided for use in operating delivery, and in other rooms where electrical appliances, or central electric switches are located.
and shower room, guards' toilet and shower room, and space for the office of the Sergeant of
the Guard.

8. Recreation and Post Exchange Building—Space to be provided for Post Exchange with
suitable shelving for merchandise; major portion of building to be large open room for use as
recreation room.

9. Dispensary—Building approximately 20' x 10' with hot water and sanitary facilities con­
sisting of water closets, lavatories and sink.

10. Mess Hall and Kitchen—To have standard sit-down mess tables, with tops covered
with pressed wood or ply wood, and varnished; two (2) # 5 Army ranges, 40 cu. ft. mechanical
refrigerator, hot water heater and sink, meat block, kitchen store room with shelving.
Building to be screened. Scullery sink. Serving counter or table. Where gas is the fuel, two
heavy duty restaurant type ranges having capacity equal to two (2) # 5 Army ranges will
be provided.

11. Latrine and Bath House—Plumbing fixtures to be provided on the following basis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>per 20 enlisted men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flushing toilets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urinals</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lavatories</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Showers</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Foot baths to be provided at entrance to shower stalls.

12. Garage—To provide space for four (4) vehicles. In warmer sections of country, will
be of open shed type.

13. Watch Towers—Towers of a height commensurate with terrain conditions and equipped
with searchlights as required shall be constructed around outside of occupied area in locations
and numbers requested by local Military Police Commander, but not more than eight to each
Center without the approval of this Headquarters.

14. Fences—Fences will not be built around Military Police area. Materials will be fur­
nished Center directors to fence the evacuated occupied areas only.

15. Flagpole—Ninety-foot flagpole will be erected in suitable location in the Military Police
area.

16. Fire Extinguishers—To be provided for each building on the following basis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Building</th>
<th>2 1/2 gal.</th>
<th>2 1/2 gal.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S &amp; A</td>
<td>Foamite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Garage</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

17. Miscellaneous—All buildings with the exception of the garage will be screened and the
interiors lined with wall board. Material for coal bins and screened garbage racks will be fur­
nished the Center directors who will construct same with Japanese labor.

1. When oil is used for heating purposes substitute one 2 1/2 gal. foamite extinguisher for one S & A extinguisher
   in buildings where oil is used.

2. Pump type extinguishers may be substituted for S & A type when the latter are not obtainable.

## APPENDIX E: TABLE 33 —
TRANSFERS FROM ASSEMBLY TO RELOCATION CENTERS

### TABLE 33 — TRANSFERS FROM ASSEMBLY TO RELOCATION CENTERS
(Regular movements by Transfer Order)

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<th>Relocation Center destination</th>
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