This study of the battles of the Modoc War and of Gillem's
Camp is prepared as set forth in Historical Resource Study Proposals,
Lava Beds - H-2 (Historical Base Map and Field Research) and Lava
Beds - H-3 (Gillem's Camp Self-Guiding Trail).

Men may argue forever on what wins their wars,
and welter in cons and pros,
And seek for their answer at history's doors
But the man with the rifle knows.

From George B. Busch, Duty, The
Story of the 21st Infantry Regiment
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Erwin N. Thompson
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INTRODUCTION

From the beginning encounters between American whites and the Modoc Indians were classical in nature. The high, cool, lake-dotted borderland between California and Oregon witnessed somnolent days of peacefulness broken sharply by moments of fierce violence. Beneath the shining perfection of Mount Shasta, death came to both Indian and white in the form of whining bullets. An observer might have predicted the outcome to be a wretched remnant of the redmen struggling against total extermination.

It came to that in the end. But not before a handful of Modocs stunned America by winning bloody fights against incredible odds. The battle flags were theirs; yet, final victory, if such there was, belonged to the whites. That time is called the Modoc War.

Capt. John Charles Frémont (though it could have been anyone) established the precedent for violence. In May 1846, he was moving along the dim trail that joined California to the Columbia River, when he was overtaken by a courier whose message urged him to return south to partake in the defeat of Mexican rule. Frémont reversed his footprints near Upper Klamath Lake and headed back. That night the Modocs' neighbors, the Klamath Indians, slipped through the shadows and attacked the young explorer's camp with arrows and axes, killing three men. Though Frémont was in a hurry he still found time and opportunity for revenge
by raiding a village as he headed toward his troubled destiny.¹

Later that year a group of fifteen Oregon settlers, including Jesse and Lindsay Applegate, passed through the Klamath and Modoc country working its way eastward to carve a new route for the Oregon Trail. They hoped this South Road would allow future overland immigrants to reach the Willamette Valley of Oregon with less difficulty than they themselves had experienced on the Columbia River route. When they reached the north shore of Tule Lake on July 6, they found the lower end of Lost River too deep to ford. Lindsay Applegate described how they surprised an Indian and forced him to disclose a crossing place: "he led the way up the river about a mile and pointed out a place where an immense rock crossed the river." The group was delighted to find that "the sheet of water running over the rock was about fifteen inches deep, while the principal part of the river seemed to flow under." Known as Stone Bridge, this unusual ford served travelers through the Modoc country for the next several years.²

Other than the loss of some cattle by theft, the immigrants who traveled the South Road that first autumn had little trouble with the

¹ John Charles Frémont, Memoirs of My Life (2 vols., Chicago, 1887), 1, 480-91. On his northbound trip Frémont camped at the southeastern corner of Tule Lake, May 1, and named it Rhett Lake in honor of Barnwell Rhett of South Carolina. Later he named Lost River after a boyhood friend, one McCrady.

Modocs. However they experienced one of the worst winters in Oregon's early history, and many starved and suffered greatly. Perhaps because of this difficulty, travel remained light on the South Road until the early 1850's. When prospectors located new gold deposits in northernmost California, a marked increase in travel and settlement followed. Although the mines lay west of their homelands, the Modocs came more and more into contact with free-wheeling whites. Influenced more by greed than self-protection, the Indians began attacking pack and wagon trains. In the fall of 1852, they slashed out at several small caravans at a place on the eastern shore of Tule Lake where the South Road went between an outcropping of lava and the water. Soon to be called Bloody Point, this narrow shore received the bones of at least 36 whites that year.

Fifty miles west of Tule Lake, the leading mining center of Yreka reacted sharply to these attacks. A posse of citizens under Ben Wright rode toward the lava country to revenge the killings. Twice that fall, the Wright party attacked the Modocs, inflicting heavy casualties. For the moment Modoc strength was crushed; yet the bloodshed of that

3. Ibid., p. 183, quoting Virgil Pringle, an immigrant of that year.

4. There is some doubt about the exact location of Bloody Point today. See enclosed map, "Lost River Battle, Nov. 29, 1872." Conversation with Mr. Francis S. Landrum, Klamath Falls, Oregon, May 1967. Col. Jefferson C. Davis, in 1873, referred to it as "Murder Point." House Documents, 43rd Congress, 1st session, No. 122, p. 105.
time left a heritage of bitterness on both sides. The prevailing
attitude among whites that all Indians should be exterminated was
greatly reinforced. The surviving Modocs, including two named
John Schonchin and Curleyheaded Doctor, would not forget Ben Wright.  

While they continued to make minor raids on small parties of
whites from time to time, the Modocs offered no great threat in their
greatly weakened state. Even during the Rogue River War, 1856-57,
they played no significant role, other than defending themselves
when necessary. Instead, they gradually cultivated relations with
whites by assimilating their culture. Although many in the tribe
remained in their homeland around Lower Klamath, Tule, and Clear
Lakes, and Lost River, which joined the latter two, a number of men
worked for the whites on their ranches and in Yreka. Modoc men soon
learned that the white miners would pay a price for a Modoc woman,

5. There are several secondary descriptions of the attacks and
counterattacks of that fall, nearly all of them exaggerating the num-
ber of white travelers killed. One of the better accounts is Harry L.
Wells, "The Ben Wright Massacre," The West Shore, 10 (1884), 314-20.
Keith A. Murray, The Modocs and Their War (Norman, 1949), pp. 19-27,
discusses the events of 1851 and 1852 in considerable detail, with
the aid of secondary sources. An unusual defense of Ben Wright appeared
in the Army and Navy Journal, May 3, 1873, p. 603; it quoted the Sacra-
mento Union to the effect that Wright was not even in the Modoc country
in 1852. In 1863, Major C.S. Drew, 1st Cavalry, Oregon Volunteers,
stated that from 1846 to 1863, 151 persons were killed and about 300
wounded in the vicinity of Bloody Point, House Documents, 43rd Cong.,
1st Sess., No. 122, p. 105.
and the Indians became the peddlers of their own flesh. They adapted themselves to the white mode of clothing and accepted readily such customs as drunkenness. The Modoc after 1860 seemed but a caricature of his former self.

Long before the time of troubles, the Modocs had lived proudly in their hard, beautiful land. They and their more-numerous blood-relatives, the Klamaths, had occupied the area that came to be south-central Oregon and the northern fringe of central California. Hunting, fishing, and root-gathering had provided sustenance; occasional forays against the Pit River Indians to the south and the Paiutes (Snakes) to the east had provided the means for the development of leaders and the skills of warfare. Contributors to and borrowers from the culture of the Great Basin, they had lived contentedly in their semi-permanent villages along the streams and lakes in the quiet valleys.6

Guarded on the west by the snow-covered and occasionally volcanic peaks of the Cascade Range, on the north by immense pine forests, on the east by gaunt ancient ridges and vast alkali plateaus, and on the south by incredibly twisted lava flows of recent origin, the lakes and streams gave haven to immense numbers of birds and fish. The marshes and meadows provided seeds, roots, and berries. Animals, small and large, dwelt in the valleys and among the sage and junipers of volcanic

6. Theodore Stern, The Klamath Tribe, A People and Their Reservation (Seattle, 1965), pp. 4-23
cones and isolated ridges. It was a land of distant vistas, clear-cut horizons, storm-swept lakes, hazy autumns, fog-enshrouded cliffs, snow-covered lava flows, honking geese, whistling winds, and deep silences—silences that would in a few years be broken by the roar of howitzers and the crack of mortars.

CHAPTER 1

White Men Talked Too Much

By the early 1860's, white settlers in both Oregon and California were arguing that the Klamaths and Modocs should be placed on a reservation and the rest of their traditional homelands be made available for settlement. The Klamaths, who had maintained more peaceful relations with the whites over the years, offered no opposition. The reason they so readily accepted was that the proposed reservation included nearly all the land they claimed as theirs. J. W. Perit Huntington, Superintendent of Indian Affairs in Oregon and son-in-law to one of the Applegates, and the Klamaths signed a treaty in 1864 establishing the Klamath reservation. Although the treaty was not proclaimed until February 17, 1870, Huntington did not hesitate to put its provisions into effect immediately. With the concurrence of the Klamaths, he recommended his father-in-law's brother, Lindsay Applegate, for the position of sub-agent.

The Modocs were less happy about the state of affairs. Living on both sides of the California-Oregon border, they found themselves in a cross-fire between factions in both states. Huntington believed the Modocs to be his responsibility and planned to have them sign the same treaty. This would require them to surrender all their lands and move to the Klamath reservation. Meanwhile, in Yreka, Elijah Steele had other ideas.

A native of New York, Steele had emigrated to California by way of Wisconsin, where he had practiced law and had been a state senator. He had spent his first few years in California working in the mines, finally settling in Yreka, and resuming his law practice in partnership with A. M. Rosborough and J. Berry. Appointed agent for northern California Indians in 1863, he had developed a considerable sympathy for the Modocs, who in turn had given him their trust. Although he had already lost his position as agent by 1864, and apparently knew that the Oregon officials were working out the terms of a treaty, Steele undertook to make his own treaty with the Modocs. The Indians were happy to agree, for Steele proposed they keep their lands north of Tule Lake, along lower Lost River.  

Now, with bewilderment, the Modocs learned that their "treaty" with Steele had no authority. Moreover, they were reluctant to give up their territory and to live among the Klamaths. Only with a great deal of persuasion did Huntington secure the marks of the Modoc leaders. They left their homes and moved to upper Klamath Lake. Within a few months resentment came into the open and caused a sharp division within the tribe. One portion followed "Old Schonchin," an elderly man recognized by white authorities as the chief of the tribe. Chief Schonchin was willing to fulfill the terms of the treaty and to remain

2. Jeff C. Riddle, The Indian History of the Modoc War, and the Causes That Led To It (n.p., 1914), pp. 260-61; Stern, p. 39; Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Oregon (2 Vols., San Francisco, 1888), 2, 557. Stern argues implausibly that Steele believed that most Modoc territory was in California. Bancroft says that Steele knew the Oregon Superintendency was preparing for a treaty.
on the Klamath reservation. The other group was much more militant and, before the end of 1865, concluded to leave the reservation and return to Lost River. This group had several strong leaders, including Old Schonchin's brother, John, who had witnessed Ben Wright's attacks in 1852, and Keintpoos, better known to history as Captain Jack. 3

Jack was a strong leader who had considerable control over his fellow dissenters. However he was not an absolute leader. The character of the tribe, with its strong emphasis on individual action, the number of other strong leaders who insisted on exerting themselves within the group, and Jack's personal ability to be conciliatory in the face of impossible odds, all combined to limit his authority. Since the Wright posse had killed Jack's father in 1852, he had cause to hate whites. However in recent years Jack had been one of those Modocs who had developed friendships with Yreka citizens. He especially trusted the two lawyers, Steele and Rosborough. If labels may be applied, Jack was a moderate whereas John Schonchin was an extremist.

When Jack's band returned to Lost River just north of Tule Lake, white settlers had already moved in with their herds and had erected

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cabins. For the next four years, the two groups lived warily side by side. Considering that each thought of the other as a trespasser, relations were good, marred but occasionally by a misunderstanding concerning property "rights." As time passed and the settlers invested more and more in their claims, they grew increasingly concerned about the Modocs. While attempting to put on a show of casual friendliness to the Indians, they demanded that the Oregon Superintendency move the Indians back to the reservation. The authorities attempted to do this several times, without success.

When U. S. Grant entered the White House, he faced the difficult problem of Indian-white relations throughout the West. One of the several changes adopted in 1869 was the "quaker Policy." The government hoped that by having the various churches nominate Indian agents, some of the past abuses of administration would be avoided. This innovation had its effect in Oregon when Alfred B. Meacham, hotel and toll road operator from the Blue Mountains of northeastern Oregon, was appointed Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Oregon on May 15, 1869. A strong Republican and member of the Methodist Church, Meacham set out to clean up the agencies, which in his opinion had been scandalously mismanaged.

Meacham was satisfied with the character of Lindsay Applegate, sub-agent at Klamath. However he lost Applegate that fall when Capt. O. C. Knapp was appointed to the position. Unassigned in the army since May of that year due to a reduction in strength, Knapp asked for his discharge and received it on October 25, a little more than three weeks after he took over the sub-agency. He was not a forceful man and he was to run the reservation's affairs with a loose hand. During the year he was in charge, he and Superintendent Meacham developed little regard for each other.

Nonetheless, Knapp and Meacham cooperated in December 1869 to persuade Captain Jack's people to move back to the reserve. On December 30, Jack led his band to Modoc Point, on Upper Klamath Lake, where a wary truce was agreed upon with the Klamaths. No sooner did the Modocs settle down than the Klamaths demanded tribute for the land and heaped other indignities on the returnees. Knapp tried to solve the matter by moving the Modocs to another location. Again the Klamaths made demands on the Modocs. Knapp tried a second move

5. Historians have considered Knapp to be a representative of the army, which did have a number of officers serving as agents. It would seem, however, that Knapp lost this tie almost as soon as he entered upon his duties as agent. Murray, p. 45; Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army...1789...1903 (2 vols., Washington, 1903), 1, 605; Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs...1870 (Washington, 1870), pp. 52 and 67.

6. An example of Knapp's hostility toward Meacham may be found in his report for 1870. Describing the successful effort to return Captain Jack's band to the reservation, Knapp listed Meacham (whose contributions to the success were considerable) as "others." Ibid., p. 68.
and at the same time was forced to cut off the Modocs' rations because of lack of money. Jack had had enough. Toward the end of April 1870, he and his group again fled and returned to the lower Lost River area.  

Meacham's brother, John, replaced Knapp on October 1, 1870. Eleven months later he was succeeded by Johnson N. High. Then, on May 1, 1872, L. S. Dyar replaced High. This rapid turnover in the Klamath Agency did little to help solve the Modoc problem. Yet there was one change during Knapp's last months in office that did hold promise. The eastern part of the reservation was occupied by a large number of Snake Indians, who got along as poorly with the Klamaths as did the Modocs. To keep the peace, Superintendent Meacham drew a boundary between the Snakes and the Klamaths and appointed the commissary at Yainax, Ivan D. Applegate, in charge of the Snakes and the remaining Modocs. Ivan and his brother, Oliver, had assisted their father, Lindsay Applegate, when he was sub-agent for the reservation. Ivan knew the Indians and their problems well and, possessing the characteristic abilities of his prominent family, proved to be a capable administrator of the eastern Indians. Acting almost as an independent agent, he was to maintain his special position

7. Ibid., pp. 54 and 68. Most of the Modocs left with Jack at this time. However, during the next two years many of them drifted back to the reservation, only a few still remaining with Jack at the outbreak of hostilities. Murray, p. 58.
at Yainax through the administrations of Knapp, John Meacham, High, and Dyar. Alfred Meacham, assuming the Modocs would trust Ivan, hoped this reorganization would encourage Captain Jack to return. But Jack was far too disenchanted to live again near the Klamaths.

Meacham next proposed to create a separate, six miles square reservation for the Modocs at the mouth of Lost River. Although the Commissioner of Indian Affairs later forwarded this forlorn proposal to the Secretary of the Interior, he tempered it with an alternate suggestion that the Modocs be moved to a new reservation to be set up in southeastern Oregon. Nothing came of either proposal. Before he left office, Meacham finally came full circle and decided the solution was the forced removal of Jack's band to Yainax.

Agent L. S. Dyar had been on the job only four months when he made his first annual report. Although he has been accused of being ignorant of the bitterness the Modocs felt toward the Klamaths, he

8. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs . . . 1870, p. 54; and 1871 (Washington, 1872), p. 300. A few writers have mistakenly concluded that Oliver Applegate was the special commissary in charge at Yainax. Oliver did help the various agents from time to time and at the outbreak of the war was in charge of the Modocs on the reservation. Ivan Applegate lost Captain Jack's favor in 1871 when he caused a warrant to be issued for Jack's arrest in connection with the killing of a medicine man. Murray, pp. 62 and 82; Dillon, pp. 60-61; and Riddle, p. 254.

9. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs . . . 1871, pp. 305-06; and 1872, p. 65. By 1871, Captain Jack's band had been influenced and strengthened in its ideas by the new Indian "Dreamer" religion, which promised that the Indians would recover all their lands and destroy the whites. Murray, pp. 63-65; Wheaton to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, May 6, 1873, in Olaf T. Hagen, "Modoc War, Official Correspondence and Documents, 1865-1878," typescript; Stern, p. 114.
was but following Meacham's conclusions when he too recommended that Captain Jack's band be moved back. He warned that, if the Modocs were allowed to wander another year, "I fear serious consequences." By this time T. B. Odeneal had replaced Meacham as Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Oregon. He gave full support to the recommendation, stressing that military force would be necessary.10

During the past two years, 1870-1872, Captain Jack had appealed for assistance to his white friends in Yreka, particularly Steele and Rosborough. Both men advised him not to resist the authorities and, at the same time, offered to give their legal expertise to help the Modocs obtain a separate reservation on Lost River. Out of these contacts grew rumors that Yreka whites of low character were advising the Modocs to resist forcibly any efforts to move them. Whether or not this was the case, there seems to have been no such effort on the part of Steele and Rosborough.11


11. Much is yet to be learned about the roles played by several groups of whites in the area. Suggestions have been made that whites in Yreka stood to make money selling ammunition and supplies to the Modocs if they went to war. Others have suggested the Yreka businessmen wanted the Modocs to remain close at hand and at peace because of their regular trade. Still others have suggested that several cattle-men in the Lost River area had not yet got title to their lands and were anxious to have Captain Jack's band remain there as a means of
Besides the settlers and the Department of the Interior, a third element found itself very much concerned with the Modocs by 1872—the United States Army. Oregon and California were both in the Military Division of the Pacific. Maj. Gen. John McAllister Schofield, recently the Secretary of War, commanded the Division with his headquarters at the Presidio, San Francisco. The Division of the Pacific consisted

scaring off other potential settlers. Once the Land Selection List was approved in 1872, and the original settlers had their claims approved, they no longer needed the Modocs and now urged the government to remove them. One of the most influential men involved in land acquisition at this time was Jesse D. Carr of California. By the eve of the Modoc war, Carr had acquired the beginnings of his vast holdings east of Tule Lake. At that time Jesse Applegate, Lindsay's brother, had run into trouble in Oregon courts and was living on the Carr ranch at Clear Lake. Carr's biographer, Robert B. Johnston, has found no evidence to support the idea that Carr encouraged the Modocs so as to scare off competitors. Alfred B. Meacham, Wigwam and War-Path, or the Royal Chief in Chains (Boston, 1875), p. 362; J. P. Dunn, Massacres of the Mountains, A History of the Indian Wars of the Far West (New York, 1886), p. 549; Colonel William Thompson, Reminiscences of a Pioneer (San Francisco, 1912), pp. 85-86; Robert B. Johnston, letter to Park Historian Harry V. Sproull, Lava Beds NM, March 18, 1966; Kenneth McLeod, Klamath Falls, Oregon, oral interview, 1961, typescript at Lava Beds NM; conversation by writer with Mr. Francis Landrum, Klamath Falls, Ore., May 27, 1967; Canby, "Confidential" letter, to CO, Dist. of Lakes, Feb. 7, 1872, in Hagen; Capt. R. F. Bernard to Maj. S. Buck, AAG, Dept. of California, Jan. 26, 1873, in Hagen; Bancroft, 2, 587n.

12. John McAllister Schofield graduated from West Point in 1853 and was commissioned a 2nd lieutenant in the 1st Artillery. A captain at the beginning of the Civil War, he swiftly rose to major general in the Volunteers. In 1892 he received a Medal of Honor for action during the Civil War. In 1864, he became a brigadier general in the regular army. From May 1868 to March 1869, he served as Secretary of War during the Johnson administration. Promoted to major general in March 1869, he continued to follow a distinguished career. From 1888 to 1895, he served as commander in chief of the US Army. He became a lieutenant general in 1895 and soon after retired. Died 1906. Heitman, 1, 865 Dictionary of American Biography (20 vols, New York, 1943), 16, 452-54 (hereafter cited as DAB).
of two departments, California and the Columbia. Brig. Gen. E. R. S. Canby commanded the latter, maintaining his headquarters at Portland, Oregon. Canby kept himself informed of the Modoc situation through two subordinate posts: Fort Klamath, just over the western boundary of the Klamath reservation, north of Upper Klamath Lake; and Headquarters, District of the Lakes, which in 1872 was at Camp Warner, Oregon, both posts being sixty miles from Tule Lake.

Before Meacham left the superintendency, he wrote General Canby in January 1872, asking that 50 or so soldiers from Fort Klamath be dispatched to move Captain Jack to the reservation. In an effort to

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13. Edward Richard Sprigg Canby graduated from the Military Academy in 1839, whereupon he was appointed a 2nd lieutenant in the 2nd Infantry. A colonel in the 19th Infantry at the outbreak of the Civil War, he was a major general of Volunteers by the end of hostilities. He was breveted twice in the Mexican War, and twice during the Civil War. He had commanded the Division of the Pacific before the Civil War but afterwards was outranked by Schofield. His career during the war embraced everything from restoring order in New York City following the draft riots in 1863 to command of the Military Division of West Mississippi, i.e., the Gulf States and the Southwest, where he was severely wounded. His tragic death at the Lava Beds in 1873 stunned the nation. Heitman, 1, 279; Bancroft, 2, 614n; DAB, 3, 468-69; Max L. Heyman, Jr., Prudent Soldier, A Biography of Major General E. R. S. Canby, 1817-1873 (Glendale, 1959); J. F. Santee, "Edward R.S. Canby, Modoc War, 1873," Oregon Historical Quarterly, 33(1932), 70-78 (hereafter cited as OHQ.).

14. Francis Paul Prucha, A Guide to the Military Posts of the United States, 1789-1895 (Madison, 1964), pp. 82-83 and 114. Fort Klamath was established by Oregon Volunteers in 1863. Its principal mission was to influence the Klamaths and to maintain peace between them and the whites. Camp Warner was established in 1866. By 1872, it had been relocated northeast of Tule Lake and 35 miles north of the California border. Because of the Modoc War, the District of the Lakes was reorganized to include Fort Klamath, and eventually headquarters moved to it from Warner.
dramatize the seriousness of the situation, he enclosed a petition for removal signed by 44 settlers who claimed to live on Lost River. Canby refused to take hasty action. He was "not surprised at the unwillingness of the Modocs to return to any point of the reservation where they would be exposed to ... the Klamaths." However he promised Meacham that he would direct the troops at Fort Klamath to continue to protect the settlers. Similar correspondence flowed between the two men throughout February, Canby finally offering to send a force of 50 or 60 men to Yainax to protect the whites. Meacham replied by saying that Yainax was too far from the source of trouble; he recommended either Linkville (Klamath Falls), west of Tule Lake, or Langell Valley, to the east.

While no military force established a camp at any of these designations, Maj. Elmer Otis, commanding officer of the District of the Lakes, did send a patrol through the countryside, reporting afterwards to Canby, "I do not anticipate any serious trouble."15

In the latter half of March and early April, Otis himself made a patrol through the country. He interviewed a number of settlers and learned that a majority of them had complaints against the Modocs for

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15. 1st Lt. Caziarc, AAAG, Dept. of Columbia, to CO, Dist. of Lakes, Feb. 16, 1872, in Hagen; NA, Microfilm 666, 1871, Roll 21, Meacham to Canby, Jan. 25; Canby to Meacham, Feb. 5; Canby to AAG, Div. of Pacific, Feb. 7; Meacham to Canby, Feb. 9; Canby to Meacham, Feb. 17; Maj. G. Hunt, CO, Ft. Klamath, to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, Feb. 18; Meacham to Canby, Feb. 19, and 22; and Otis to Canby, March 10, 1872.
thievery and threats. Two whites, Henry Miller and (Abe?) Ball, supported the Indians and assured the major that the settlers had no grounds for fear. Otis climaxed his journey by meeting Captain Jack on Lost River on April 3. He informed Jack of the complaints he had heard and warned him to restrain his men. Later Otis advised General Canby that trouble would occur if the Modocs were not permanently settled by summer. This information reached Secretary of War Belknap by early May, and he promptly passed it on to Secretary of the Interior Delano. It may have been this intelligence that caused the Interior Department to order Superintendent Odeneal in July to proceed with removing the Modocs.16

Supporting Otis' concern, the Yreka Union published an article, "An Indian War Imminent," on April 27, describing a series of insolent acts on the part of the Modocs. However in its next issue, one week later, the newspaper adopted a quieter tone: "we have been unable to learn that any acts of actual hostility have either been committed or contemplated."17

During most of May, Otis kept a patrol in the Lost River country. However, he soon came to doubt the value of this because "the Modocs are now scattered all over the country from Yreka to the Yainax Agency and in the mountains in the vicinity of Lost River." Canby concurred.

16. NA, Microfilm 666, 1871, Roll 21, Otis to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, April 13; "Abstract of Proceedings of Conference . . . Captain Jack . . . 3rd April, 1872, and . . . Conference at Linkville"; Canby to AAG, Div. of Pacific, April 13; Secretary of War to Secretary of Interior, May 2, 1872.

17. The Yreka Union, April 27 and May 4, 1872.
and on May 22 ordered the patrols discontinued. It proved a sound decision, for the summer of 1872 passed in peace. The main reason for the quiet was that neither the Indian Office nor the Army undertook any overt moves against the Modocs. During the summer Maj. John Green became commanding officer at Fort Klamath. A courageous and competent officer, Green set out to learn for himself the temper of the Modocs and the geography of the country.

On September 9, accompanied by Troop B, 1st Cavalry, he rode out of Fort Klamath. Five days later, he arrived at Captain Jack's camp at the mouth of Lost River. True to his earlier message to Green, Jack did not come out of his lodge to meet the major, claiming

18. Special Order No. (?), Dist. of Lakes, May 3; Otis to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, May 11; and Caziarc to CO, Ft. Klamath, May 22, 1872; all in Hagen.

19. Murray, p. 72. Ivan Applegate suggested to Odeneal that the Indians not be moved before winter.

20. John ("Uncle Johnnie") Green was born in Germany. He enlisted in the Mounted Rifles in time for the Mexican War. Commissioned in the 2nd Dragoons in 1855, he remained with the cavalry throughout his career. Breveted twice during the Civil War, he was promoted to major in 1868. He retired as a lieutenant colonel in 1889, disappointed at not having his own regiment. After retirement he was breveted to brigadier general, 1890, and in 1897 awarded the Medal of Honor for bravery during the first battle for the Stronghold, 1873. Died at Boise Barracks, Idaho, 1908. Heitman, l, 473; Cyrus Townsend Brady, Northwestern Fights and Fighters, American Fights and Fighters Series (New York, 1916), p. 293; Walter F. Beyer and Oscar F. Keydel, Deeds of Valor, How America's Heroes Won the Medal of Honor (2 vols., Detroit, 1902), 2, 171 and 173; NA, Congressional Medal of Honor File--John Green.
that "white men talked too much" and that his mother was ill. Green continued on his patrol, eventually visiting Camp Bidwell, in northeastern California, and Camp Warner. He returned to Fort Klamath on October 1.  

While Green was on his patrol, events began taking a dramatic turn at Canby's headquarters. Superintendent Odeneal informed the general that the Modocs were definitely to be moved to Yainax. While it did not appear that the Modocs would offer any resistance, Canby decided not to risk relying solely on the small force at Fort Klamath. He directed Green to consider himself to be under the District of the Lakes for this one operation, so that the district commander would have "the power in an emergency to control all the military force at the several posts in that section of the country."  

By this time, Lt. Col. Frank Wheaton had replaced Otis as commanding officer of the District. A capable career man, Wheaton


23. Having served on the US-Mexico Boundary Commission for five years as a civilian, Frank Wheaton entered the Army with the grade of 1st lieutenant in the 1st Cavalry, 1855. During the Civil War he was promoted to brigadier general in the Volunteers and breveted to major general. Following the war he was assigned to the infantry, serving in the 39th, 21st, and 2nd Regiments, in that order. In 1872 he was a lieutenant colonel in the Twenty-first. He retired in 1897 with grade of major general. Heitman, 1, 1022; DAB, 20, 38-39.
was soon to regret, if only for a short time, that he had ever heard
the word "Modoc." At the end of October Canby informed him that
Odeneal had selected November as the time for removing Captain Jack.
Canby also told Wheaton to use his own discretion, yet warned him
"that if the intervention of the troops becomes necessary, the force
employed should be so large, as to secure the result at once and be-
yond peradventure." These were to prove fateful words.24

Two weeks later Wheaton emphasized the same point to Green at
Fort Klamath. He told Green to give Odeneal whatever assistance he
needed, and to "report at once whether in your opinion a larger force
than you now have will be required." At the same time he notified
Canby that if necessary he would move "with every available mounted
man from Harney, Bidwell, Warner and Klamath and compel Captain Jack's
immediate compliance."

Green reported back to Wheaton on November 25 that Superintendent
Odeneal had just arrived. As of yet Odeneal had not disclosed his
plans; nevertheless Green recommended that the cavalry troop at Camp
Warner "be kept in readiness to join that at this post, if required
by the superintendent." Green concluded with the assurance that he
would notify Wheaton "of any emergency as soon as I am aware of it
myself."25 To examine this exchange of correspondence from a distance,

24. NA, RG 98, Ft. Klamath Letters Received, Caziarc to CO, Dist.

25. Wheaton to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, Nov. 14, 1872, in Hagen;
NA, RG 98, Ft. Klamath Letters Received, 1st Lt. Adams, AAAG, Dist. of
Lakes, to CO, Ft. Klamath, Nov. 14, 1872; Ft. Klamath Letter Books,
vol. 8, 1872-73, Green to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, Nov. 25, 1872.
it would seem that each person had performed to perfection and that every eventuality had been foreseen. Events during the next few days would prove the opposite.
Superintendent Odeneal, for reasons he kept to himself, decided to remain at Linkville instead of going to the Lost River camps to talk personally with Captain Jack. Instead, he sent Ivan Applegate, instructing him to tell Jack that the Indian leaders were to ride into Linkville for a conference. The Modocs' response was to the point: they would not go to Linkville, they did not wish to talk with Odeneal, and they would not move to the Klamath reservation.

Deciding that he had done all he could, Odeneal wrote Major Green on November 27, informing him of Applegate's report and requesting "that you at once furnish a sufficient force to compel said Indians to go to Camp Yainax." It would take at least four days for reinforcements to arrive at Lost River from Camp Warner. Thus, Odeneal's phrase "at once" was an indication that he believed the small force at Green's disposal was sufficient. He hoped there would be no need to shed blood; but he wanted Captain Jack, Black Jim, and Scarfaced Charley arrested should the Modocs resist. Ivan Applegate rode that night to deliver Odeneal's letter to Fort Klamath, 35 miles away.¹

¹. NA, RG 98, Ft. Klamath Letters Received, Odeneal to "Sir", Nov. 27, 1872. So few were the Modocs who fought the troops that almost every man came to prominence during the war. Black Jim and Scarfaced Charley will appear again in this narrative. The latter is said to have acquired his name as a boy when he cut his face in a fall from a stagecoach. Murray, p. 85.
Applegate arrived at the post at 5 a.m., Thursday, November 28. Lt. Frazier A. Boutelle, the officer of the day, received him. When the officer learned of the message, he assured Applegate that troops would not be sent because there were not enough of them at the fort. Two hours later, Boutelle was amazed to hear Capt. James Jackson, commanding officer of Troop B, 1st Cavalry, order him to get ready to march to Lost River. No record has been found of Applegate's conversation with Green. Whether or not Ivan reinforced Odeneal's "at once" request with the advice that one troop could handle the problem is a matter of conjecture. An officer who may have been a witness wrote later that Odeneal's message stressed that only "a show of force" would be necessary. On the other hand, the orders and intentions of Canby and Wheaton were quite clear--no direct action was to be taken against the Modocs until a sufficiently large force was assembled. Nevertheless Green ordered the march. The onus of the decision was his alone. Now and for the next few days his superior

2. Brady, p. 264, quoting Boutelle. Frazier Augustus Boutelle joined the Civil War army as a quartermaster sergeant. Commissioned in 1862, he became a captain in the Volunteers. After the war, he reverted to the enlisted ranks of the regular army. Commissioned a 2nd lieutenant in 1869, he retired in 1895 with the grade of captain. He received a brevet 1st lieutenancy for the Modoc War. James Jackson was also an enlisted man in the Civil War, but received a regular army commission in 1863. He received two brevets during the war, and another one (lieutenant colonel) for the Modoc War. In 1896 he was awarded a Medal of Honor for action during the Nez Perce War, 1877. Retired in 1897 with the grade of lieutenant colonel. Heitman, 1, 233 and 567.

officers were ignorant of the events being set in motion.

According to Boutelle, he had an opportunity to talk to Green before leaving the post. He told the commanding officer that the number of troops was too small, so small that it was "just enough to provoke a fight." Green replied, "If I don't send the troops, they (the citizens of Klamath Basin) will think we are all afraid."4 By then Green had already written Orders No. 93: "In compliance with the request of the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Oregon . . . Captain James Jackson 1 Cav. with all the available men of his troop, will proceed at once . . . to Capt. Jack's camp . . . endeavoring to get there before to-morrow morning, and if any opposition is offered . . . he will arrest if possible Capt. Jack, Black Jim, and Scarfaced Charley."5

The patrol consisted of Jackson, Boutelle, Assistant Surgeon Henry McElderry, and 36 enlisted men of Troop B, 1st Cavalry, riding with three days' rations on their saddles. Later, a pack train with four additional enlisted men would follow. The patrol left Fort Klamath at noon "in a cold rain and sleet storm," and arrived outside Linkville just after dark that evening. Jackson met briefly with Odeneal who

4. Brady, p. 264. It should be noted that Boutelle was a second lieutenant in 1872. When writing to Brady about the Modoc War many years later, Boutelle tended to sound as if his were the one cool brain present. Such are the advantages of hindsight.

5. NA, Microfilm 666, 1871, Roll 21, Orders No. 96, Hdqrs., Ft. Klamath, Nov. 28, 1872.
advised him, "if there is any fighting let the Indians be the aggressors." Ivan Applegate formally joined the patrol at this point to serve as guide, interpreter, and Odeneal's representative. Following along the foot of a low ridge of hills that lay southwest of lower Lost River, "a very tired lot of soldiers" halted one mile from Captain Jack's camp at daybreak, November 29.6

Jack's winter village of about 15 men and their families was located on the south side of a sharp bend in Lost River, between the Natural Bridge and the mouth of the stream. Across the deep river, one-half mile downstream, stood a second Modoc village of about 14 families. Among the warriors in this encampment were Hooker Jim, Curleyheaded Doctor, and Boston Charley. On the same side of the river as this second camp were the cabins of several settlers including Dennis Crawley, Dan Colwell, and a man named Bybee. Crawley's cabin was nearest to the village.7

During the halt, Jackson had his weary soldiers adjust their saddles, then formed them in two platoons, himself in command of one and Boutelle, the other. Nearing the camp the troops moved into line, then rode at a trot to the edge of the village where they halted. Seventeen of them dismounted and formed a skirmish line. Some of the

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6. Ibid; Brady, pp. 264 and 273; Jackson to Green, Dec. 2, 1872, in Hagen.

7. Meacham, pp. 366-67; Map, Site of Lost River battle, History File, Lava Beds NM. Throughout the Modoc War the Army found it impossible to believe it was fighting so few Indians. Twenty years after the Lost River fight Jackson would still claim he attacked a village of 120 warriors. Brady, p. 258.
others held these men's horses, while the rest stood by awaiting orders. Jackson saw that he had succeeded in surprising the Indians who only now began a commotion, due partly to the arrival of Scarfaced Charley. He, apparently by coincidence, had just come across the river in a boat and at this moment fired a single shot from his weapon. Jackson, through Applegate, called to the Modocs to surrender and for the leaders to come forward. For a moment, it seemed as if Odeneal's "show of force" would succeed.

While Applegate, who had entered the village proper, was translating Jackson's orders, a few Indians disappeared within their lodges only to come out again stripped and carrying their weapons. Captain Jack himself was nowhere to be seen and was not to make an appearance that day. However among those who had recovered from their surprise were Scarfaced Charley and Black Jim. Seeing that these armed Indians had gathered together about 30 yards in front of his skirmish line, Jackson ordered Boutelle to take some four to six men from left of the skirmish line to arrest this group. Meanwhile, Applegate, from his vantage point, realized that the Indians were ready to fight. He ran back toward Jackson shouting, "Major, they are going to fire!"

8. Several months later, Scarfaced Charley told Boutelle that he had fired his gun accidentally at this time. Boutelle believed him. Applegate stated that the shot was meant as a signal for the sleeping camp. Brady, pp. 266 and 274-75.
Perhaps a trifle too eagerly Boutelle yelled to his men, "Shoot over those Indians," raised his pistol, and fired at Scarfaced Charley. At that precise moment, Charley fired also. Neither bullet, though coming close, found its mark. The Modoc War had commenced.

Firing became general on both sides. Jackson later reported that his men "poured in volley after volley." The Modocs scattered behind lodges or crouched in the sagebrush, returning the fire even more hotly than they received it. For a moment it appeared that the tired troopers would break; however with the encouragement of their officers, they held their positions. Slowly the warriors fell back. Noticing the lessening in Indian firing, Jackson ordered a charge which moved through the village. Boutelle led this skirmish line beyond the village into the sage where he established a picket line. He continued to exchange fire with the Modocs, but now at long range. This occasional firing continued until the afternoon. The Modocs, withdrawing completely, lit the evening sky with the livid colors of burning hay-stacks and one or two isolated cabins.

In his first report, written the following day, Jackson said his men had killed eight or nine warriors. As estimates so often are in war, this was a vast overestimation. Only one Modoc warrior, Watchman, was killed during the fight, and one other, Skukum Horse, was wounded. The Modocs later claimed that the soldiers also killed three children in the opening fire. Although it did not appear in
the official reports, there appears to have been one other fatality among the Indians. Once the village was secured, Jackson ordered the lodges fired. A Modoc woman lay ill in one of the lodges and was burned to death. Unsubstantiated charges held that the act was done deliberately.⁹ Among his own soldiers, Jackson lost one man killed and seven wounded, one of whom died later.

After the village was taken, Jackson allowed the women and children to leave, believing that so many Indians had been killed "there would be no further resistance." While Boutelle guarded the wreckage, Jackson had the wounded taken across Lost River in the few canoes available. The water was too high to use the ford at Natural Bridge. Jackson, learning that a skirmish had occurred across the river, decided to move to Crawley's ranch. The troops marched up the river eight miles to the next ford, later called Stukel, then down the east side. Boutelle brought up the rear with a few men to insure that the Modocs would not carry out a counterattack. Troop B arrived mid-afternoon at Crawley's cabin where it learned the details of the second fight that day.¹⁰

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⁹. Alfred B. Meacham, Wi-Ne-Ma, (The Woman Chief), and Her People (Hartford, 1876), p. 81; Riddle, pp. 46-47.

¹⁰. In addition to the sources already cited, the following were relied upon for the Lost River Battle: NA, RG 98, Ft. Klamath Letters Received, Jackson to Green, Nov. 30; House Documents, 43d Cong., 1st Sess., No. 122, pp. 42-44, Jackson to Green, Dec. 2, 1872; Brady, pp. 261-63, Jackson, 264-69, Boutelle, and 273-76, Ivan Applegate; NA, RG 98, Regimental Returns, 1st Cavalry, Dec. 1872-Jan. 1873.
Perhaps because there were so many of them, at least one of the Applegates seemed always to be wherever there was action. Oliver Applegate just happened to be in Linkville when Jackson arrived on the evening of November 28. Accompanied by a Klamath Indian, Dave Hill, and a settler, Charlie Monroe, Oliver hastened toward Lost River, hoping to intercept two Modocs who were thought to be spying on Jackson's movements. The three, armed with two revolvers and a Henry rifle, were still keeping a watch on Lost River when Jackson rode by before dawn. Oliver spoke to his brother, Ivan, and to Captain Jackson, informing them that he and his companions were going across the river to Crawley's cabin. Jackson told the trio, "If you hear any firing on my side of the river you had best move up opposite on your side."

Several citizens, A. J. (Jack) Burnett, W. J. Small, George Fiocke, and Harry Duncan, who had been following the troops in search of excitement, joined Oliver. The seven men made their way to the cabin where they found Dennis Crawley, O. C. Brown (an employee of the Indian Office), Bybee and his family, Charles Monroe, Dan Colwell, Jack Thurber, and possibly one or two others.

This ragtag group took a position at dawn in a gully between the cabin and the east-bank village, which was 400 yards distant from the gully. When the sun came up, they could see the Indians moving about in their early morning duties.
After what seemed a long wait, they heard a shot from the west, probably Scarfaced Charley's. The Modocs heard it too, and there was an increase in activity in the camp. One of the citizens left the gully and rode the half-mile upstream to see how Jackson was doing. He returned and said that Captain Jack was surrendering peacefully. The citizens decided that they would "capture" the eastern village, feeling certain their show of force was sufficient. They rode into the center of the village and shook hands with a surprised Curleyheaded Doctor and some others. Hooker Jim, recovering his wits, ran toward the river. Brown chased him and made him give up his weapon. Another Modoc, Miller's Charley, retrieved the weapon momentarily but then surrendered it to Dave Hill. However the citizens began to realize that rounding up Modocs was not so simple as it had seemed.

Aware, finally, that the Indians were waiting to see what happened in Captain Jack's camp, and seeing that the Modocs would have an advantage in fighting from their partially dug out lodges, the citizens decided they were overextended. Withdrawing as rapidly as they could, the whites fired into the lodges as they went. The Modocs returned the fire and gave chase.

Reaching Crawley's cabin, the whites were able to sort out the sounds of firing coming from Jackson's side. Meanwhile, the Indians on their side "were still shooting at us at long range . . . and from their horses . . . while the women, children and old men could be seen making their
escape down the river." The Modocs did not rush the cabin, and it was clear they were preparing to withdraw. Unable to get reinforcements from Jackson to give chase, some of the whites now turned to help transport his wounded across the river. Although the citizens' efforts were abortive and were to cause a future tragedy, Jackson gave them credit for preventing the eastern village from reinforcing Jack's group.

Casualties were light for both the Indians and the civilians. Jack Thurber was killed at the beginning of the fighting. Two civilians, riding toward the village and unaware of the situation, were attacked. One of these, Joe Penning, was wounded, the other, William Nus, killed. The Army was unable later to establish the number of casualties suffered by the Indians. Jeff Riddle, many years afterward, said that one Indian woman and one baby were killed in the fighting. This was partially supported by Riddle's mentor, A. B. Meacham, who wrote that George Fiocke "killed an Indian infant being held by its mother—with a double-barrelled shot-gun." At least three Modoc men (Miller's Charley, Black Jim, and Duffy) were said to have been wounded, as were some Modoc women. 11

11. Riddle, pp. 46-47; Meacham, Wi-Ne-Ma, p. 80; Oliver Applegate, "The Battle on the East Side of Lost River," in Hagen. There is some confusion over first names for some of the civilians, e.g. Murray, p. 89, gives Nus' name as Wendolen.
Whether or not all these casualties did occur, the people of both villages made their escape without harrassment, once the fights were over. The men of Jack's village and the women and children of both groups traveled by boat from the mouth of Lost River, across Tule Lake, to the beds of frozen fire on the south shore. This journey of thirteen miles on water took the Modocs most of the cold stormy night, November 29-30. The next day, they were reunited with a group of men from the eastern village who had ridden more than 30 miles around the east side of the lake.

This group of horsemen included Curleyheaded Doctor, Hooker Jim (his son-in-law), One-eyed Mose, Boston Charley, Steve, and Long Jim. Angered by the citizens' attack on their village, they took revenge by attacking settlements along the north and northeast shores of the lake. They first came to William Boddy's cabin, three and one-half miles from Crawley's. Leaving the women of the family unmolested, they killed the unsuspecting Boddy, his son-in-law, Nicholas Schira (Schearer), and Boddy's two step-sons, William and Richard Cravigan. Riding on, they killed three men in the Brotherton family, two herders, and Henry Miller, the last being the man who had assured Major Otis in the past spring that the settlers need not fear the Modocs. Before they reached the Lava Beds, these Modocs disposed of at least 14 male
settlers.  

To the Indians these deaths were justified because of the white settlers' attack on them. To the whites of Oregon and northern California, when they learned of them, these murders were justification for a war of extermination. Hapless Captain Jackson did not learn of this trail of blood until two days after the event.

The day after the fight, Jackson, resting his exhausted command at Crawley's ranch, learned for the first time that other settlers lived nearby and that they had not been alerted to his movements. That morning he sent a small detachment over to the Boddy ranch. It soon returned and reported that the ranch was deserted. Thinking that Boddy had been warned and had escaped, Jackson forgot the matter. On the evening of December 1, two travelers arrived at Crawley's and informed the startled captain that the Boddy men had been murdered, while the women had started walking across the mountains toward Linkville. Expecting the worst, Jackson sent Boutelle and a patrol eastward on the morning of December 3. The patrol returned that day with the news of the Modocs' revenge.

In his first report to Green, written November 30, Jackson realized that he would not be returning to Fort Klamath immediately. He told

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12. It is difficult to compile a complete list of those killed. Known deaths included William Boddy, William Cravigan (also called Boddy, Jr.), Richard Cravigan (also called Boddy), Nicholas Schira (Schearer), Henry Miller, William Brotherton, W. K. Brotherton, Rufus Brotherton, John Shroeder, John Tober (Sover), __ Collins, Robert Alexander, Adam Shillingbow, and Christopher Erasmus. Bancroft, 2, 576, 576n, and 577n; Jackson to Green, Dec. 2, 1872, in Hagen; The Yreka Union, Dec. 7, 1872.
Green, "I need enforcements and orders as to my future course." He was not unduly worried, however, for he believed that his gallant troop had killed Captain Jack, Scarfaced Charley, and Black Jim, the three leaders he had been ordered to arrest. Still, he should have some additional troops just in case the Modocs came out of the lava beds to attack the settlers.

In his second report, two days later, and just after he had learned of the settlers' deaths, Jackson noted that he had sent a detachment of five enlisted men and some civilians to Jesse Applegate's (Jesse Carr's) ranch on Clear Lake, and that he would "move the Infantry you send me into Langell Valley and Clear Lake." Also some reinforcements had already arrived—a company of 36 Klamath Indians under "Capt." D. J. Ferree, a rancher outside Linkville and the brother-in-law of A. B. Meacham. Jackson did not make it clear if he still believed Captain Jack was dead. And he had no way of knowing that his one-half day's battle was but the beginning of a disastrous seven months' war.

Neither Wheaton, sick in bed at the moment, nor Canby knew the war had started. At the very time Jackson was attacking Captain Jack's village, Wheaton was preparing two messages. One of these was to Major Green at Fort Klamath telling him, "should you require the services of Captain Perry's Troop [F, 1st Cavalry], it can be sent you at

a moment's notice." He also wrote Superintendent Odeneal that "the necessary preliminary steps have already been taken for the concentration of all available mounted men of the Garrisons at Harney, Bidwell, Warner and Klamath." He promised to send these troops to Green "whenever it becomes necessary."

As late as December 1, Wheaton was still planning the movement of troops to Fort Klamath to aid in the removal of the Modocs. His shock on learning the history of the past two or three days can only be imagined. Canby too found it difficult to understand just what had happened. The general learned of the fight from Oregon's Governor La Fayette Grover. Later, on December 3, Major Green attempted to explain what had gone wrong: "It was believed, that the Modocs would submit." He added unconvincingly that the troop "could almost have destroyed them, had it not been fair to give them a chance to submit, without using force."

Wheaton, indirectly defending Green, wrote Canby on December 5 that the Indian agents had assured Green that Captain Jack would surrender in the face of force. He said that the Modocs' resistance "was as unexpected as it was deplorable." Canby was still in the dark as late as December 10, when he informed Schofield that perhaps full details from Wheaton would explain the apparent "want of proper precautions." Schofield passed on the information to Washington, admitting that he did not yet know if the cause of events was "due to the fault of any officer of the government."
Considerable additional correspondence passed among Washington, Schofield, Canby, and Wheaton during the next month. In the end, Canby summed up the opinions more concisely than anyone: "While I think that Major Green was in error . . . I do not think that he or the Superintendent should be judged wholly by the result. If the measures had succeeded . . . [they] would probably have been as highly commended as they are now censured." Later commentators have not been so kind. Bancroft wrote, "I myself think that he [Green] wished to show how easy a thing it was to dispose of the Modoc question when it came into the proper hands." Lieutenant Boutelle, after his retirement, took an opposite view, "the greater sin lies at the door of Mr. Odeneal, who would not trust his precious skin to a council on Lost River." Green himself escaped from official censure and went on to prove during the next seven months that he was a proficient and courageous, if impulsive, officer.\(^{14}\)

\(^{14}\) The principal sources used for the fight on the east bank and the aftermath of the Battle of Lost River are: Jackson to Green, Dec. 2, 1872; Oliver Applegate, "The battle on the East side of Lost River"; Wheaton to Odeneal, Nov. 29; Orders No. 94, Ft. Klamath, Nov. 30; Orders No. 95, Ft. Klamath, Dec. 1; 1st Lt. Adams, Camp Warner, to CO, Ft. Klamath, Dec. 1; Green to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, Dec. 3; Gov. Grover to Canby, Dec. 4; Wheaton to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, Dec. 5; Canby to AAG, Div. of Pacific, Dec. 10; Schofield to AG, Washington, Dec. 13, 1872; and Canby to AAG, Div. of Pacific, Jan. 15, 1873, all in Hagen; House Documents, 43d Cong., 1st Sess., No. 122, Schofield to AG, Washington, Dec. 17, 1872; NA, RG 98, Ft. Klamath Letters Received, Adams to Green, Nov. 29; and Jackson to Green, Nov. 30, 1872; Army and Navy Journal, Dec. 7, 1872, p. 265; The Yreka Union, Dec. 7, 1872; Brady, pp. 267-69; Bancroft, 2, 573, 573n, and 577; La Fayette Grover, Report of Governor Grover to General Schofield on the Modoc War (Salem, 1874), p. 8.
Jolly Set of Regulars and Volunteers (Troop Movements and Incidents, December 1, 1872-January 15, 1873)

When word of the Lost River battle spread over Oregon, a few men among the excited populace came to the same conclusion as did Major Green—that the war might be a prolonged one.¹ A war meant men, and reinforcements began moving toward Captain Jackson's field camp at Crawley's ranch. Besides sending the readily-available men of Company F, 21st Infantry, to Jackson, Green gave Agent Dyar 30 guns and ammunition for distribution to citizens in the Modoc country. Fort Klamath was now stripped of nearly all its strength.²

Colonel Wheaton, at Camp Warner, wasted little time moaning over the Lost River battle. He urged instead the speedy march of the already-alerted Troop F, stationed at the post. On December 3 the troop was in the vicinity of Goose Lake where it joined up with a detachment from Troop G, patrolling out of Camp Bidwell. Both units made forced marches toward Crawley's ranch.³ Capt. David Perry, already having experience

². Unfortunately, the regimental returns of the 12th and 21st Infantry are not at this time available for study. Thus, it is not possible always to determine exact strength figures.
³. MA, RG 98, Ft. Klamath Letters Received, Adams to Capt. R. F. Bernard, Dec. 3, 1872. At this time the Army had not yet adopted officially "Troop" as a cavalry designation. However cavalrymen already used it freely, and it is used throughout this report to help clarify which unit is being discussed. Since all regular army cavalry units in the Modoc War were from the 1st Cavalry Regiment, this designation will not usually be used, i.e. a reference to Troop F will indicate that it is Troop F of the First Cavalry.
in fighting Indians, commanded Troop F, while 2d Lt. John Kyle, only two years out of West Point, was in charge of the detachment from Troop G.\footnote{David Perry joined the regular army as a 2d lieutenant in the 1st Cavalry, 1862. Breveted once during the Civil War, he emerged from it a captain. In 1866 and 1868 he was breveted twice for gallantry in engagements against Indians in eastern Oregon and southwestern Idaho. In 1877, he commanded troops in the first battle, and defeat, of the Nez Perce war. The last seven years of his career he served with both Negro cavalry regiments, the 9th and 10th, retiring as a colonel in 1898. John Gowdy Kyle graduated from West Point in 1870 and was appointed a 2d lieutenant in the 1st Cavalry. He was severely injured in an accident at Camp Bidwell in 1874. Promoted to lst lieutenant in 1876, he died the following year. Heitman, 1, 610 and 785.}

Wheaton also ordered Capt. Reuben Bernard and the rest of Troop G to ride west from Camp Bidwell. The main reason for this, said Wheaton, was to give a sense of confidence to settlers in the Pit River valley, south of Tule Lake.\footnote{Reuben Frank Bernard began his army career as an enlisted man in the 1st Dragoons in 1855. An expert blacksmith, he developed a reputation for his skill in handling horses. Commissioned in the 1st Cavalry early in the Civil War, he emerged from it with the regular army grade of 1st lieutenant and the brevet grade of colonel. Promoted to captain in 1866, he retired as a lieutenant colonel in 1896. Before his retirement he was awarded the brevet grade of brigadier general for actions against Indians in both Arizona and Oregon. According to a sketch of his military career, Bernard participated in 103 battles and skirmishes. Heitman, 1, 214; Dillon, pp. 62-63.} He thought the troop would "not be detained any length of time in the Modoc Country," since there were only 70 Indians to contend with. Wheaton would not prove to be a successful prophet.\footnote{NA, RG 98, Ft. Klamath Letters Received, Adams to Bernard, Dec. 3, 1872.}
On the same day Wheaton ordered out Bernard, General Canby reached across the Columbia River to Vancouver Barracks and directed Maj. Edwin Mason to lead Companies B and C, 21st Infantry, to the scene of hostilities by special train—as far as the tracks led south. "Today the garrison is alive with preparation for war," wrote a correspondent. "The greatest excitement prevails, but the troops are in good condition, and joyous over the expectations of coming events." The joy would evaporate soon enough; for the moment however the troops were enchanted by the "interesting and conspicuous appearance" of Major Mason, "mounted upon a snow-white war steed and wearing a fur cap."

The two-company battalion crossed the Columbia by steamer. A train carried it from Portland to the end of the tracks at Roseburg, Oregon. From there the soldiers slogged on foot through the mud up the Umpqua Valley to Jacksonville, then through the snow on the Cascades, down into the Klamath country. They reached Crawley's ranch on December 21.9

7. Canby to AAG, Div. of Pacific, Dec. 3, 1872, in Hagen. Edwin Cooley Mason entered the Volunteers as a captain in 1861. Accepting a commission in the regular army a year later, he was a colonel and a brevet brigadier general of Volunteers by the end of the war. Assigned to the 21st Infantry as a major in 1871, he retired as colonel of the 3d Infantry, 1895. In 1890 he was awarded the brevet rank of brigadier general, U.S.A., for the Modoc and Nez Perce Wars. Died 1898. Heitman, 1, 694.


Major Green, still at Fort Klamath, had a new crisis on December 3. Not all the rebellious Modocs had located on lower Lost River. A group of fourteen families, including such men as Bogus Charley, Shacknasty Jim, Steamboat Frank, and Ellen's Man George, had been living on their old homeland on Hot Creek, 25 miles southwest of the Lost River camps. This Hot Creek band had had little in common with Captain Jack's people and did not wish now to become embroiled in disorder. Also, several ranchers in that area, including John Fairchild and P. A. Dorris, persuaded the Hot Creek band that peace was preferred to war. Three of these ranchers wrote Captain Jackson on December 3, informing him that the Hot Creeks were willing to go to the reservation. Because of the temper of whites around Linkville, however, the ranchers asked Jackson to provide an escort for these Indians to insure their safe passage.10

Jackson turned the matter over to Green, who promptly informed the ranchers that if they brought "the forty Indians . . . to Major Jackson's camp at the mouth of Lost River, they will be protected to the Yainax agency." However Green's directions were not carried out exactly, and these Modocs found themselves approaching Linkville rather than Jackson's camp. When the citizens of that community learned that Modocs would be coming through the town, a number of them, excited by alcohol, decided this would be a good opportunity to revenge their fellow settlers. Although this group was eventually talked out of the

violent plan, the Hot Creeks heard about the threats and fled. Before long, the troops and the settlers learned that these Modocs had joined Captain Jack in the lava beds. The citizens of Linkville were not overly concerned about their own stupidity however; they still believed it would be easy to exterminate the Modocs.11

Other Oregonians reacted to the outbreak of violence in more regular ways. Although the army did not solicit his aid, Governor Grover ordered General John E. Ross and two companies of the Oregon Volunteer Militia into the field.12 Company A, under Capt. Harrison Kelly, first camped ten miles above Crawley's on Lost River. Company B, commanded by none other than Capt. Oliver Applegate, was stationed at Yainax where, in fact, it was formed largely from Indian volunteers. By December 12, Ross had moved the companies to Van Bremer's ranch on Willow Creek west of Tule Lake, where "we found the ranch deserted and a notice on the door to the effect that the proprietor had fled through fear of the Indians."13

Meanwhile the build-up at Crawley's ranch continued. Captain Bernard with 24 men of Troop G arrived on December 8. Two days later, Major Green, accompanied by Surgeon McElderry, left Fort Klamath to take direct control


13. Ibid., pp. 31-32. Only part of Company B made the move; Applegate still had the rest of it at Yainax.
of the field forces. The two officers traveled south with Perry and Kyle who had arrived with Troop F and the rest of Bernard's Troop G.\[14\]

Green soon dropped to second-in-command when Wheaton, recovered from his illness, arrived at the "miserable shanty" of Crawley's ranch to assume command on December 21. With the arrival of the 21st Infantry companies the same day, the field force reached nearly its full force for the coming battle against the Modocs. At Crawley's ranch were Companies B and C, 21st Infantry, Troop B, the irregular company of Klamaths, and a few Indian scouts, all "camped on an open plain near the Lake with sage brush for fuel, cold winds, snow, and rain."

Perry had taken Troop F to Van Bremer's on December 14, where he joined Companies A and B, Oregon Volunteers. From there, Perry and 30 men from Troop F, Kelly and 25 men from Company A, and 1st Lt. J. H. Hyzer and 10 men from Company B (the latter two the Oregon Volunteers), made a patrol to the southwest corner of Tule Lake. There, from a high ridge, they could see across the lava beds that sheltered the Modocs.\[15\]

\[14\] Orders No. 98, Ft. Klamath, Dec. 8; and Green to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, Dec. 9, 1872, in Hagen. NA, RG 98, Ft. Klamath, Letters Received, Adams to Green, Dec. 5; and Bernard to Green, Dec. 8, 1872. Henry McElderry entered the army as a private in 1863, but soon became a hospital steward. After serving as a "medical cadet" for one year, he was appointed assistant surgeon in 1866. He won a brevet to major in 1890 for action in Texas and in the Modoc War. In 1884, he was promoted to major surgeon. Died on active duty, 1898. Heitman, 1, 664.

\[15\] The Oregon Volunteers left Van Bremer's on December 19 and camped at William J. Small's ranch near Whittle's Ferry on the Klamath River, about 12 miles southwest of Linkville. They returned to Van Bremer's, December 22. Grover, pp. 33-34.
To complement Perry's move to the west side of the lava beds, Bernard's Troop G had moved to Louis Land's ranch near the southeast corner of Tule Lake. With the troopers were ten of the fifteen scouts who had recently been recruited among the Snakes around Yainax. From here, Bernard could keep a distant eye on the eastern side of the lava beds should the Modocs emerge from that side.

The approximate strength now at Wheaton's disposal was 320 men (Troops B, F, and G--150; Companies B and C, 21st Infantry--64; Oregon Volunteers--60; Klamaths--30; and Snake scouts--15). A modest supply system served the troops. It consisted of a field depot at Crawley's ranch, under the supervision of 1st Lt. William Boyle, and a sub-depot at Jacksonville, under 1st Lt. E. W. Stone. The latter also had a key role in communications since Jacksonville possessed the telegraph office nearest to Wheaton.

As yet, only a few of the troops had seen the lava beds, that vast place "broken like the waves of an ocean." Few, if any, had any realization of the terrible difficulties the terrain would provide. Rumors

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16. These scouts were authorized by Canby on December 10. Apparently, they were recruited by Oliver Applegate and outfitted by Fort Klamath. NA, RG 98, Ft. Klamath Letters Received, telegram, Wood to CO, Dist. of Lakes and CO, Ft. Klamath, Dec. 10, 1872; and Oliver Applegate to CO, Ft. Klamath, Dec. 24, 1872.


had spread that the Modocs were in a part of the lava beds located on the south shore of Tule Lake, a strongpoint as yet unnamed but which would soon be known as Captain Jack's Stronghold. It was also believed, correctly, that the Indians had made themselves self-sufficient by acquiring a herd of 100 cattle as a source of food. 19

Despite this herd that the Modocs had found grazing in the grassy gullies of the lava field, the Indians were anxious to acquire more supplies. An opportunity arose on Saturday, December 21, when they spied a lone army wagon moving north on the road east of the lava beds. An escort of only six men guarded it.

When Captain Bernard had left Camp Bidwell, he had understood that he would be in the field for only a few days and had traveled as lightly as possible. When he had learned that his troop would be in the field for some time, he had sent back to Bidwell for additional ammunition and commissary stores. The wagon was carrying these supplies.

At three p.m., only two miles from Bernard's camp at Land's, the Modocs rode down on the wagon. Their first fire killed one man, mortally wounded a second (who died the next day), and killed five horses. 20 Bernard could hear the gunfire from the camp. He ordered Lieutenant Kyle and ten men to the rescue and, in haste if not in order, the troopers drove off the Indians and rescued the wagon intact. The troopers


20. Form 55, List of Wounded, Actg. Asst. Surg. Jno. B. White. Pvt. William G. Donahue was hit with a bullet one inch "below spine of the ilium." He died Dec. 22. Pvt. Sidney A. Smith was hit three times: left temporal, abdomen, and left leg. "This man was found by the roadside after the engagement. Entirely naked, scalped, and with both ears cut off."
could not be sure that they inflicted any casualties among the Modocs, but they had saved the supplies.21 Even while the skirmish was going on, Bernard dispatched a message to headquarters. Before midnight, Captain Jackson's Troop B arrived at Land's ranch to reinforce Bernard. Although the threat had passed Jackson remained at Land's.22

The day after Christmas, Wheaton, who was getting the feel of his command, wrote Canby a long report. Besides describing the present locations of the various units, he outlined briefly his plan for a major attack: "The day before the fight I shall move up with the Troops on the west side to a point 3 miles from the Modoc stronghold . . . at day light next day we will skirmish into the lava beds and close on the Modoc Cave or fortification . . . while the Troops on the east side, close . . . simultaneously." He was not yet ready for such an attack. Among the immediate problems was a critical shortage of small-arms ammunition. Green had issued nearly all Fort Klamath's Spencer carbine ammunition to nervous civilians after the Lost River battle.

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21. The Yreka Union reported on Jan. 4, 1873, that the Modocs lit a fire and danced a victory dance in sight of Bernard's camp that night.

22. This account has drawn on: The Yreka Union, Dec. 28, 1872; Dillon, pp. 20-21 and 20n; Wheaton to Canby, Dec. 26, 1872, in Hagen; NA, RG 98, Regimental Returns, 1st Cav., Dec. 1872; and Ft. Klamath Letters Received, Adams to CO, Ft. Klamath, Dec. 21, 1872. In the Hagen typescript there is a reference to "Lands burnt Ranch." The original report, in NA, Microfilm 666, 1871, Roll 21, has been checked and the middle word does not appear to be "burnt." Unfortunately, I was unable to decipher the word, unless it is "branch." If so, it might imply that the creek on which the ranch was located was called Land's Branch.
In addition, there were not enough rounds available for the Sharps and Springfields: "some of the troops today have but 5 or 10 rounds apiece."\(^{23}\)

Progress continued however. On January 1 Wheaton moved his headquarters and Mason's infantry from Crawley's ranch to Van Bremer's. This placed him on the west side of the lava beds from where he would mount his major attack. Here the troops experienced a further delay, for Wheaton decided not to move until a section of two twelve-pounder mountain howitzers arrived.\(^{24}\)

\(^{23}\) Mason at this time was more optimistic. He reported 60 rounds per infantryman, and 40 for each trooper. Wheaton to Canby, Dec. 26; and Mason to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, Dec. 25, both in Hagen.

\(^{24}\) "Form 2, Invoice of Ordnance and Ordnance Stores . . . for transportation to Major John Green," in Hagen. The form contains the following:

- 2 12 Pdr Mountain Howitzers, Bronze, Cal 4.62"
- 2 carriages for 12 Pdr MH with Thills, complete
- 2 fuze gauges for Bormason [Bormann?] fuze
- 10 ammunition chests for MH, complete
- 2 gunner's haversacks
- 5 pack saddles and bridles
- 2 lanyards
- 2 priming wires, field
- 2 sponges and hammers for 12 pdr MH
- 2 thumb stalls
- 2 tube pouches
- 1 vent cover
- 48 shell, 12 Pdr MH, strapped and fixed
- 204 spherical case shot 12 Pdr MH strapped and fixed
- 48 canister shot 12 Pdr MH strapped and fixed
- 400 friction primers
- 29 boxes, packing
The Oregon Volunteers found this wait irritating for they had been certain at the beginning that it would be a short campaign. When the howitzers finally did arrive at Van Bremer's early in January, a relieved Wheaton reported that the 30-day volunteers "would not have remained a day longer than January 6 had it not have been certain that the guns were coming."\(^25\)

During this wait, a number of patrols went out from Van Bremer's to learn more about the country and the Modocs. At least two of these patrols exchanged fire with Modoc pickets on the bluff overlooking the lava beds from the west.\(^26\)

Finally all was ready, and Wheaton selected January 17 as the date for the attack. On the 15th, he assured Canby that "a more enthusiastic jolly set of Regulars and Volunteers I never had the pleasure to command." He could not believe that the Modocs would attempt any serious resistance, but if they should "make good their boast to whip a thousand soldiers, all will be satisfied."\(^27\) Wheaton had no cause to think he was overly optimistic.

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25. NA, Microfilm 666, 1871, Roll 21, Wheaton to Canby, Jan. 15, 1873; The Yreka Union, Jan. 4 and 11, 1873.


27. NA, Microfilm, 1871, Roll 21, Wheaton to Canby, Jan. 15, 1873. Canby, still at Portland, was now acting commander of the Military Division of the Pacific. General Schofield had left temporarily for the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii) on a diplomatic mission—although some thought it was for his health. Army and Navy Journal, Jan. 11, 1873, p. 345; DAB, 16, 452-54.
Back in December, Wheaton had drafted his first plan of attack on the Stronghold. Although circumstances, such as the Modocs' attack on Bernard's supply wagon, had brought about a few changes, his battle order of January 12 was essentially the same. His forces, all dismounted, would attack on both the east and west, with the main blow falling on the western side under the immediate control of Major Green. Bernard's smaller force would hit on the east side, keeping the Modocs from escaping in that direction. Green's right flank and Bernard's left flank would push toward each other and by joining would prevent the Modocs from fleeing into the masses of lava to the south. The lake itself would be an effective barrier against escape to the north.¹

Green's western force would consist of:

Major Mason's battalion of 21st Infantry

Company B, 2d Lt. H. D. W. Moore²
Company C, Capt. T. H. Burton
Detachment, Company F, 1st Sgt. John McNamara³

¹ General Field Order No. 1, Hdqrs., Dist. of Lakes and ... in Modoc country, Dec. 20, 1872; and Wheaton to Canby (containing General Field Order No. 3, Jan. 12, 1873), Feb. 7, 1873, both in Hagen.

² Superseded in command by 1st Lt. J. M. Ross, who arrived at Van Bremer's with 19 additional infantrymen Jan. 15, 1873. NA, Microfilm 666, 1871, Roll 21, Wheaton to Canby, Jan. 15, 1873.

³ This detachment is not considered to be a separate unit in the reports. Apparently it was absorbed by one or both of the two companies.
General Ross’s Oregon Volunteer Militia

Company A, Capt. Hugh Kelly
Company B, Capt. Oliver Applegate

Troop F, 1st Cavalry, Capt. David Perry

California Volunteers, Capt. John O. Fairchild

Section, Mountain Howitzers, 2d Lt. W. H. Miller

The California Volunteers were a quite irregular group. In contrast to the governor of Oregon, California’s chief executive could not get himself excited over the Modocs. He refused to call up the militia, feeling assured that the U. S. Army could take care of the situation. He did authorize the sending of 50 Springfield rifles to Yreka when that town demanded weapons. The citizens were furious when they learned they were expected to pay the freight. Some of the rifles were sent to Fairchild at his ranch, north of Van Bremer’s. By the eve of the January 17 battle, Fairchild, although considered to be a friend by the Modocs, had recruited and armed 24 men from the general area. Wheaton was glad to have bodies and accepted their services for the attack.

Bernard, on the eastern side, had his own Troop G with Lieutenant Kyle and Jackson’s Troop B, which had been at Land’s ranch since the wagon skirmish. Also under his command was a group of twenty Klamath scouts under Dave Hill.

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4. The California Volunteers did not appear in General Field Order No. 3; but they did take part in the battle.

5. The Yreka Union, Dec. 21, 1872.
Green's command marched from Van Bremer's in the morning, Thursday, January 16. The wagons and artillery (on pack mules), guarded by a detachment from Applegate's Company B, took an easier but longer route along the shore of Lower Klamath Lake to the north, thus avoiding a series of parallel ridges between Van Bremer's and the lava beds. The cavalry and infantry, traveling light, marched directly eastward twelve miles, arriving at the southwest corner of Tule Lake at one p.m. The wagons did not arrive until dark.6

Before dawn, January 17, Captain Perry led Troop F down the narrow trail leading from the top of the bluff to the lava beds. His men secured the trail against possible Indian outposts and remained in position along it for the time being. At 6:30 a.m., the main command descended in this order: Mason's battalion of 21st Infantry, Fairchild and the California Volunteers, Ross with the Oregon Volunteers, then Miller with the two howitzers. When the last of these reached level ground, Perry's troop came down the trail and formed at the rear of the column.7

On the east side, Bernard's command moved out on the 16th also. His rough, rocky trail wound some 16 miles through the lava flows. A thick fog wiped out landmarks, and Bernard suddenly discovered he had approached the Stronghold more closely than he had planned. A sharp


7. Ibid.
critic of the battle, Lieutenant Boyle, who was in charge of the supply depot back at Van Bremer's, wrote that Bernard "relied on his own judgement [rather] than upon the man employed as guide." Bernard ordered a "retreat as skirmishers" when he saw his error; however the Modocs were already tailing him and fired on his left flank and pack train. He ordered a small charge to discourage the Indians from getting closer, three of his men being wounded in this exchange. After pulling back one-half mile, the eastern force went into camp at dark near a rock outcropping that the troops called Hospital Rock. Boyle, probably reflecting camp gossip, thought it was "a sad blunder for had the troops taken their position at night without the knowledge of the Indians, how different might have been the result of the next day's fight."

The next morning, leaving the wounded and a small guard behind, Bernard's force of 100 officers and men moved through the thick fog toward the Stronghold two miles away. 8

Green too was hampered by the fog which created weird patterns as it drifted across the jagged edges of the lava flow. Burton's Company C, deployed as skirmishers, led the way until its left flank reached the shore. Here the whole command filled canteens and then lined up again. The skirmish line was extended to the right, or south, in the following order: Company C on the extreme left, one-half Company B to its right (the other half had been held back as a reserve and to protect the

8. Ibid., Bernard to Green, Jan. 19, 1873.
artillery until the latter was moved up), then the Oregon Volunteers. The California Volunteers served as flankers for the 21st Infantry battalion. This skirmish line moved forward. After it had traveled 1-1/2 miles, about half way from the base of the bluff to the Stronghold, the line reached the head of a bay (Canby Bay) and pivoted toward the northeast in order to head for the Stronghold. At this point Green ordered Troop F into line on the extreme right flank. Around eleven a.m., however, Green ordered Perry's troop to move to a position between the 21st Infantry and the Oregon Volunteers. He did not make clear his reasons for this change in his reports.9

Getting underway again (no easy task in the extremely uneven terrain where a lieutenant or a sergeant could see and control not more than a handful of his men at any one time), the western command came under its first enemy fire. (Pvt.?) J. N. Terwilliger, F Troop, later recalled, "Several of F Troop were wounded as the line advanced. Guttermuth and Hollis, close to myself, were victims. We took Hollis under cover, took off his belts, gave him a drink of water, and as he was badly wounded we signalled the hospital corps, and two men were shot in attempting to reach him." The Modocs, hidden by the fog, knowing the terrain, and taking advantage of the excellent concealment provided by the hundreds of outcroppings and ridges, slowly withdrew, reducing Green's advance to a mere crawl. Terwilliger described the scene, "We

9. House Documents, 43d Cong., 1st Sess., No. 122, Green to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, Jan. 25; and Mason to Green, Jan. 21, 1873.
all remember the cold dismal foggy day, the fog being so thick we could almost cut it with a knife." Then, at two p.m., Green's men reached "a very deep chasm, beyond which no advance could be made without great sacrifice of life."10

A great deal has been written about the deep chasms around the Stronghold. Most participants in the battles who wrote then and later tended to overestimate these depressions between the fingers of lava. When one was being fired upon, they undoubtedly did look wide and deep. However, they were not nearly the chasms the soldiers described. Murray, who has studied the terrain in detail, writes, "The whole area . . . is broken into a series of roughly parallel gullies about a quarter of a mile long, possibly a hundred feet wide, and averaging about twenty feet deep. In some places, jagged rock outcroppings make the depth as much as thirty feet. The slopes up either side vary from gradual to precipitous."11

Meanwhile, Bernard's force was advancing from the east. It too was affected by the grotesque rock formations looming through the fog, although the terrain on the east was not quite as difficult as that on the west until one reached the Stronghold itself. Bernard's units advanced in a skirmish line also, Troop G on the right next to the lake, Troop B and the scouts on the left flank. Suddenly, the Modocs opened


11. Murray, p. 122
fire. Bernard reported that his men reacted by rushing forward 100 yards when they too were stopped by "a deep gorge." The troops then fell back 150 yards where they established a defensive line behind "forts" quickly thrown up with the plentiful loose rock on the ground. This static line began about 100 yards from the lake and ran toward the south "about one mile and a half long." If this distance is accurate it means that each of Bernard's troopers was responsible for 80 feet of front.

When Green's troops reached the chasm on the west, he reported the situation to Wheaton. Both men were reluctant to order a charge that would cause "an immense sacrifice." Although he could hear Bernard's fire, Wheaton now agreed with Green that the attempt to encircle around the south must be given up. Green then proposed that an attempt be made to connect his left flank to Bernard's right by moving along the shoreline immediately north of the Stronghold.

Contact was made with Captain Bernard by shouting across an arm of the lake. Bernard reported that he was four or five hundred yards from the Stronghold and learned of the change in plans. His troops, behind their rock walls, were apparently defense- rather than offense-minded by now and could not or would not move readily toward the north. However Green later gave them credit for drawing some of the Modoc fire at this time, thus assisting the western force's advance.

The drive around the north began about mid-afternoon. The Modocs fired accurately from the heights of the Stronghold at the running
soldiers below them. The Oregon Volunteers, saying that a ravine prevented them from advancing, took no active part. Green, Mason, and Perry, with nearly all the 21st Infantry, Troop F, and the California Volunteers, pushed on. Under the Stronghold's rock outposts, within fifty yards of the Modocs, they were pinned down among the boulders along the shoreline. "It was at this point our greatest number of casualties occurred," reported Perry later. "I was wounded about 4 p.m., having raised myself upon my left elbow to look at a man who had just been killed."\(^{12}\) It was here too that Green is said to have bravely exposed himself to enemy fire in order to encourage his men to keep going. Many years later he received a Medal of Honor for this feat.

Part of this group, knowing "that, killed or wounded, they would fall into the hands of the Indians" fought their way across and reached Bernard's position. Burton and a part of his Company C and Fairchild with his California Volunteers found themselves trapped and unable to proceed. Only by lying prone and not moving could they escape the accurate fire of the Modocs. They were ordered to remain in place until darkness, when they finally succeeded in joining the rest on the east side.\(^{13}\)

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\(^{12}\) Wheaton to Canby, Feb. 7, 1873, in Hagen; House Documents, 43d Cong., 1st Sess., No. 122, Green to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, Jan. 25, 1873; and Brady, p. 296.

\(^{13}\) House Documents, 43d Cong., 1st Sess., No. 122, Green to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, Jan. 25; and Mason to Green, Jan. 21, 1873; Brady, p. 296; Dillon p. 25.
At five p.m., Wheaton, stranded on the west with the Oregon Volunteers, Lieutenant Ross and his reserve detachment, and a few men of the infantry and cavalry who had not succeeded in crossing with their units, realized that he had failed to capture the Stronghold. The fog had lifted by then and, through his signal officer, 1st Lt. John Q. Adams, he signaled Green and Bernard that the battle was over.¹⁴

The two howitzers had been brought into action earlier in the day, but the results had proven disappointing. Wheaton's general field order had included a paragraph that three shots would be fired at the beginning of the battle as a signal for Bernard to attack. Firing was then to cease 1½ minutes while the Modocs were given an opportunity to let their women and children leave the Stronghold. The fog changed all that. The guns were brought up, assembled, and fired. But no one could tell where the rounds were landing. Afraid of hitting Bernard's men, the leaders ordered the guns silenced. They fired no more that day.

"It was a very unfortunate circumstance for the howitzers that we had waited so long for," wrote Boyle, "as the troops had to depend on their rifles." However, Wheaton learned one important lesson from this experience--it was impossible "to carry the enemy's position by direct attack unless more artillery was employed."¹⁵

¹⁴. Ibid. The fog had begun thinning at 2 p.m. By 5 p.m. the air was clear.

¹⁵. Wheaton to Canby, Feb. 7, 1873, in Hagen; Thompson, pp. 100-01; The Yreka Union, Jan. 25, 1873; and Dillon, p. 24.
After signaling to Green that the remnant of the western force was retiring, Wheaton turned to General Ross to discuss the retrograde movement. There was not much to discuss, "With as little delay as possible . . . we gathered up our wounded . . . Company B, Capt. Applegate, being in front and Co. A, Capt. Kelly, acting as rear guard."

In the official report, the Oregon Volunteers climbed the bluff rapidly but orderly. Morale was not high, for they had failed to take the Stronghold. One of their number said bitterly that the Volunteers could have won the war that day had Wheaton let them.

The regulars, as so often before and since, were not impressed by the performance of the thirty-day soldiers. Lieutenant Boyle noted that when "the Oregon Volunteers had learned that the Indians would fight and would not run at the approach of the soldiers . . . they were not as anxious to shoot Modocs as they were in the morning." He felt that "had the volunteers maintained their line during the day and not fallen back . . . we might have succeeded." Although the Oregon troops appear to have held back when the drive around the north began, Wheaton was kinder than Boyle. In his dispatches, the colonel spoke highly of the performance of both the Oregon and California Volunteers. Now he and Ross climbed the bluff with their disheartened men. An observer of the withdrawal disagreed sharply with the official version, calling the climb, "a wild free-for-all." Taking the long route by way of Lower Klamath Lake, the Volunteers reached the relative comfort of the camp at Van Bremer's long after dark on the 18th. It was a slow march
for "it was only with the greatest difficulty our wounded . . . could be moved." The dead were left on the field. 16

Casualties were equally a problem on the east side of the battlefield. When Green reached Bernard's command at dusk, he found that the eastern force "could scarcely move" because of the "deep chasm." Assuming command, Green ordered Bernard to challenge what seemed to be a Modoc attempt to approach the position via another ravine, "which he did successfully." Like the Oregon Volunteers, old-fighter Bernard came under criticism for his actions. Not only did he advance too far on the 16th, thought Boyle, he "did not obey the orders of Colonel Green, when ordered to advance his left so as to draw the fire of the Indians," when Green's units were trying to encircle around the north. Bernard's reply probably would have been that the chasm prohibited mobility and, besides, the mission of his smaller force was simply to assist the larger western command, whose job it was to take the brunt of the battle.

Another problem that Bernard may have faced was his Klamath scouts. They were on his left and appear not to have been excessively offensive-minded. One student has suggested "that the Klamath called over to the Modocs and reached an agreement that they would not shoot

16. Wheaton to Canby, Feb. 7, 1873, in Hagen; Grover, pp. 37-39; Dillon, pp. 24-26 and 30; and Thompson, pp. 102-06. A strong defense of the Oregon Volunteers is found in Captain Applegate's official report to Ross, Feb. 2, 1873, in Hagen. Applegate says he never got the order to move around the Stronghold by the left flank.
at each other." Whether or not this occurred, the army did not again employ these scouts. At any rate, their small number precludes their being a major factor in Bernard's troops' ineffectiveness. In the end, Bernard's reputation suffered little. When news of the battle reached the outside world, the *Army and Navy Journal* proclaimed that "Bernard's forces bore the brunt of the battle, and suffered terribly."

When he learned that Wheaton was retreating to the west, Green decided to withdraw to Land's ranch by way of Hospital Rock. In the official report, this slow march appeared simply, "this I began to do at 10-1/2 p.m., but as several of the wounded had to be carried in blankets, it was 1 p.m. the following day before the last of the column reached there." This march, "over the rocky path that only a chamois could make its way on," averaged barely one mile an hour, including a stop for rest at Hospital Rock. A participant, 2d Lt. William Miller, recalled, "It was through this bright moon light and over this echoing rock that the regulars, already worn out ... laden with their wounded ... were compelled to make their way to safety."

The straggling column reached Hospital Rock without incident. Here, the small guard had hot coffee and some food waiting. Some of the men slept during the break, but not Terwilliger who knew one of Troop G's cooks and coaxed him into a meal. Terwilliger recalled that "the cook took an axe, and broke open a cracker box. It sounded just like a shot, and every trooper was out of his tent with his carbine."

The battle-weary soldiers zig-zagged in their torn boots over
the razorsharp lava. Lieutenant Miller described "a California vol-
unteer, whose leg was broken . . . riding horse back . . . with the
broken leg hanging loose." A comrade tied a rope to the ankle of the
broken leg "by which the swinging limb was pulled this way and that
. . . in order to avoid a jagged rock and sage brush along the trail." Another wounded man was carried the whole way in a blanket. When the
column reached Land's ranch and the order to halt was given, the men
promptly fell asleep right where they were.

After a day's rest, Green led his men (except Troop G) around the
north side of Tule Lake back to Wheaton's headquarters at Van Bremer's,
arriving there on the 20th. The wounded jolted on to the hospital at
Fort Klamath aboard wagons, there being no ambulances. Captain Bernard
took his troop eastward to establish a new camp at Applegate's ranch
on Clear Lake. 17

Within a few days after the battle the various officers began com-
piling their reports. Out of this avalanche of words emerged the sta-
tistics, figures that caused the nation to wonder what had happened at
the Stronghold. Wheaton set the overall strength of the attacking force
at 400, of whom 225 were regulars. These figures included camp guards,
Lieutenant Ross' reserve, and others whose duties kept them out of
battle. Major Green took a more careful count and found that the total
actually involved in fighting was 300--175 regulars, 104 volunteers,
and 20 Klamath scouts.

17. House Documents, 43d Cong., 1st Sess., No. 122, Green to AAAG,
Dist. of Lakes, Jan. 25, 1873; Army and Navy Journal, Jan. 25, 1873,
p. 377; Stern, p. 83; Dillon, pp. 27-30; Terwilliger, "Incidents of the
Modoc War," ms.
As to the number of Modocs who participated, none of the whites was certain. One of the major problems in guessing this figure was that no one had seen a single Modoc on January 17. Wheaton put forth the most conservative guess--150. Governor Grover raised the figure a little by estimating from 150 to 200. The Yreka Union accepted 200 as correct. None of these would have believed that less than 60 Modoc men took part in the engagement.

Casualty figures presented an equally unbalanced picture. Among the whites there were 37 casualties, broken down as follows:18

Regular troops- 19 wounded, of whom one later died
7 killed

Oregon Volunteers- 5 wounded
2 killed

California Volunteers- 4 wounded, of whom two later died

Total 37

In the rapid withdrawals, the Army was forced to leave at least six bodies on the field.19 The Modocs left none. Neither did they have

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18. These figures were compiled from: Wheaton to Canby, Jan. 19, 1873; List of Wounded prepared by Asst. Surg. H. McElderry, forwarded by Dept. of Columbia, Feb. 5, 1873, both in Hagen; NA, RG 98, Regimental Returns, 1st Cavalry, January, 1873; House Documents, 43d Cong., 1st Sess., No. 122, Green to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, Jan. 25, 1873; Grover, p. 39.

19. From Asst. Surg. Mc Elderry's report, which includes details on the regulars only. It is not certain if the two Ore. Vol. bodies were left behind. They probably were, due to the hasty retreat.
any casualties. Even the eternally optimistic army reports for once remained silent on this subject. Three hundred men had been unable to make the slightest dent on the magnificent union of lava ribs and Indian skills. That night, even the shabby "medicine flag" of animal skins and hawk feathers assumed the appearance of elegant defiance in the cold moonlight.

Who was to blame? The Army and Navy journal was not at first certain: "It is hard to determine at this distance, but . . . . there would seem to have been a miscarriage somewhere in allowing our troops to struggle so ineffectually in the fog against an unseen foe."\(^20\) Wheaton knew that his men had entered the battle with high morale and with the anticipation of victory in their eyes. Then to what was due the miscarriage? The men who fought knew the answer, "The Modocs were scarcely exposed at all to our persistant attacks. They left one ledge to gain another equally secure. One of our men was wounded twice during the day, but he did not see an Indian at all, tho' we were under fire from Eight a.m. until dark." There was only a handful of Modocs, but a handful that fought from a superb, natural defensive position. The soldiers lost that day not so much to the Modocs as to a bewildering enemy composed of fog and lava. Wheaton prophesied that 1000 men and "a free use of mortar batteries" would be needed to dislodge the enemy.\(^21\)

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21. Wheaton to Canby, Jan. 19, 1873, in Hagen.
His critics ridiculed such an extravagant statement. Shortly, Wheaton himself would pay the price of failure. He would be relieved and sent back to the quiet of Camp Warner. The Army and Navy Journal made a prophecy too: "Time will fully vindicate General WHEATON in every particular, and those who have cried 'blunder, blunder,' when there was no blunder, will realize the fact of having done a brave officer a cruel injustice." Time and events would prove both prophets right.
CHAPTER 5

Gradual Compression

(Troop Movements and Incidents, January 18-April 11, 1873)

The day after the battle, the Modocs searched the lava beds for booty. They claimed later to have found that day rifles of various makes, nine carbines, a large amount of ammunition, and field equipment of various sorts. This rich haul provided them enough additional material to renew their resistance if and when the troops should return.1

The soldiers were in no hurry to come back. The Oregon Volunteers, having served more than thirty days, lost little time heading "to the four winds." They were happy now to leave the complicated problem of the Modocs in the hands of the regulars. The Volunteers disbanded officially on January 24, and not until the warmer days of spring came would they take to the field again.2

Wheaton too prepared to leave Van Bremer's ranch for a new camp where his dispirited men could recuperate. He realized that before they could fight again they would have to overcome the "morbid fear or panic" that had left them demoralized.3 Moreover, Van Bremer's was not that

1. Riddle, p. 56. Among the weapons were "Spencer sporting rifles, old patent Henry rifles, Remington rifles, and Ballard rifles."

2. Grover, p. 40; O. Applegate to Ross, Feb. 2; and 1st Lt. J. H. Hyzer to O. Applegate, Jan. 22, 1873, both in Hagen.

pleasant a place. The ranch owners, having returned once the troops had arrived, were charging outrageous prices for such supplies as they had. Oregon's "Colonel" Thompson, with his usual sharp pen, told how he paid fifty cents for one egg. "From that time until our departure," he wrote, "I spent a considerable portion of my time in studying human villainy with the Van Bremers as a model."  

Ordering an officers' call, Wheaton informed his command that he would move north to the Lost River (Stukel) Ford and camp there until reinforcements arrived. Lost River Ford, although only a few miles above Crawley's ranch, was a much more pleasant location. Here the river ran close under a high ridge that sheltered it at least partly from the winter winds. In contrast to the flat open plain at Crawley's, groups of trees lined the river at the ford. Furthermore, Wheaton's communication line would be greatly improved since the ford was only 12 miles from Linkville and one day's hard ride closer to Fort Klamath than Van Bremer's. The command moved on January 21, traveling the 25 miles in that one day.  

Reinforcements were already enroute to the Modoc country. Even before the battle, Batteries A and M, 4th Artillery, at the Presidio, San Francisco, and Troop K at Camp Halleck, Nevada, had been alerted for possible movement.  

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5. Dillon, p. 29.  
General Canby ordered these units and four additional ones—Companies C and E, 12th Infantry, Department of California, and Company I, 21st Infantry, and Battery E, 4th Artillery, Department of the Columbia—to proceed to Wheaton's headquarters.⁷

In addition to the troops, Wheaton planned to put four boats on Tule Lake before he attacked again—two flat boats for carrying supplies, two others for transporting artillery.⁸ His boat plans would have to wait. On January 23, Col. Alvan Cullom Gillem was appointed to command the expedition against the Modocs.

Gillem, a West Point graduate, was a native of Tennessee. He had first sharpened his sword as a second lieutenant in Florida against the Seminoles. A friend of his fellow-Tennessean, Andrew Johnson, Gillem found his star rising during the Civil War, wherein his performance was competent but not outstandingly brilliant. A major general of Volunteers by the end of the war, he was appointed colonel in the regular army in 1866. In 1870, he became colonel of the 1st Cavalry and was, in fact, Wheaton's commanding officer and colonel of all the troops.

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⁷ House Documents, 43d Cong., 1st Sess., No. 122, p. 46, Canby, telegram to AG, Washington, Jan. 20, 1873. Troop K was to stop temporarily in Surprise Valley, near Camp Bidwell. It departed there for the lava beds, Feb. 8. Company E, and probably Company C, 12th Infantry, came from the Presidio. Battery E, 4th Artillery, was from Ft. Stevens at the mouth of the Columbia.

⁸ Boyle said the boats would be equipped with mortars, which would fire from the lake. Wheaton said only they were to haul howitzers. The two flatboats were to be purchased, the others built at Tule Lake. Dillon, pp. 29 and 31; Wheaton, telegram to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, Jan. 31; and Stone, telegram to Canby, Jan. 31, 1873, both in Hagen.
cavalry units involved in the Modoc War. Before Gillem arrived on February 7, other events occurred to remind the soldiers that they were still at war.

Bernard, completing his move to the new camp on Clear Lake, sent two wagons with an escort of 22 men back to Land's to bring the grain supply. The loaded wagons left Land's on January 23 for the return trip. The train had traveled two miles when a group of Modocs leaped from an ambush and attacked. The situation was similar to the attack on his wagon enroute from Camp Bidwell back in December. The escort, larger this time, fought off the Indians, while a messenger rode at high speed to inform Bernard. Reinforcements hastened from Clear Lake and found the Modocs already retiring toward the lava beds. For a change, the soldiers suffered no casualties, and they saved the wagons and grain. They were certain they had killed and wounded several

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9. Murray, p. 132, puts forth the thesis that Gillem was not popular with his fellow officers because his friendship with Johnson brought about his swift rise in the Volunteers. If Gillem was unpopular, it was not because of his swift rise—which took four years, 1861-65. Many other regular army officers rose further much more swiftly during the Civil War. If anything, Gillem lagged behind. Murray also contends that Gillem's career suffered once Johnson left office. The military record does not imply this. Gillem became a regular army colonel, which was not unusual for officers of his grade and experience. It is true that Gillem was not popular with the Radical Congress, for he was of the Lincoln-Johnson school concerning reconstruction. Concerning the Modoc War, Gillem was not unpopular until he started losing the battles. Even then, though there was a sharp drop of confidence in his tactics and strategy, observers continued to think of him as a kindly gentleman—a characteristic that may have been a disadvantage to his leadership. Heitman, 1, 457; Dillon, pp. 69-70; DAB, 7, 287-88; Klamath County Museum, Research Papers No. 2, "The Samuel A. Clarke Papers."
Indians. After this minor attack, an uneasy quiet settled over the Modoc country.

While Wheaton awaited the arrival of Gillem, important developments were occurring in the national capital. On January 30, Secretary of War William Belknap directed that hostilities against the Modocs be suspended and that the troops act only to protect settlers. Behind these orders stood Secretary of the Interior Columbus Delano, an earnest man who failed to understand his responsibilities and during whose term of office the Indian Bureau was scandalously corrupt. Delano had asked Belknap to take this step because Interior had decided to send a "peace commission" to the Modocs in order to find out why hostilities had started and how the war could be ended without further bloodshed.

No other than A. B. Meacham, the ex-Superintendent for Oregon, had proposed the idea of a commission to Delano. Meacham was in Washington as a member of the Electoral College. When he and other Oregonians also in Washington, including Lindsay Applegate, learned of Wheaton's failure to end the war, they met and concluded that negotiations were better than bullets. This group convinced Delano of its

10. Wheaton, telegram to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, received Jan. 27, 1873, in Hagen; Dillon, p. 33, wherein Boyle says the wagons were partly burnt; Army and Navy Journal, Feb. 15, 1873, p. 425; The Yreka Union, Feb. 1, 1873, which stated one Modoc killed and three wounded.

11. AG Townsend to Sherman; and Sherman, telegram to Canby, Jan. 30, 1873, both in Hagen.

wisdom, and the Secretary promptly began forming such a commission with Meacham as its chairman.13

At the same time Canby received orders to halt the fighting, a rumor spread in southern Oregon that Captain Jack wanted "to have a big talk looking toward peace negotiations." Wheaton attempted to verify this rumor by sending 1st Lt. John Adams to Fairchild's ranch in order to feel out the Modocs.14 Adams reported back that there was dissension among the Modocs. Captain Jack and his supporters wanted peace, but another group led by Curleyheaded Doctor and Shack-nasty Jim rejected the idea and threatened Jack's supporters' lives. Adams was convinced "that Jack is so anxious to stop fighting that he will eagerly seek the proposed interview, though he naturally dreads doing anything that would displace him and make a new Chief."15

A severe snow storm raged through the Modoc country at the end of January, delaying Gillem's arrival and delaying word of the peace commission's formation. Wheaton spent the snow-bound days planning his next attack on the Modocs. After soliciting his subordinate


14. John Quincy Adams served in the army during the Civil War, gaining experience in the Signal Corps. In 1867 he accepted a commission as second lieutenant in the 1st Cavalry. He retired in 1896 with the grade of captain. Heitman, 1, 153.

15. Wheaton to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, Feb. 5, 1873, in Hagen; Army and Navy Journal, Feb. 8, 1873, p. 404. Reported to be on Jack's side were Scarfaced Charley, Black Jim, and Big Dick. Others in the opposition included Bogus Charley and Ellen's Man George.
commanders' opinions, he decided that next time he would attack only from the east side, except for a small force of Indian scouts (if he could get Warm Springs from northeastern Oregon) on the south. He would also employ four batteries of mortars. Despite his opinion that "the Modoc position is a perfect Gibraltar," he personally expressed his optimism, "of course we can take it."\textsuperscript{16} That same optimism was not to be found among all the troops. Captain Bernard wrote, "many of the troops . . . would much rather serve ten (10) years on Alcatraz for desertion, than attack the enemy again in the lavabeds."\textsuperscript{17}

Finally, Colonel Gillem arrived at the Lost River camp and assumed command of the district and all the troops in it.\textsuperscript{18} One of his first acts was to send Wheaton back to Camp Warner. Wheaton left believing that his colonel would recall him if and when hostilities resumed. He was to be disappointed. Gillem quickly set about to putting things in his order. After he had listened to the various experts, he decided that the Modocs had only 55 to 75 men, the first accurate estimate of enemy strength made by army personnel. He also prepared a plan for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Wheaton, telegram to Canby, Feb. 1; and letter to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, Feb. 3, 1873, both in Hagen.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Bernard to Maj. S. Burk, AAG, Dept. of Columbia, Jan. 26, 1873, in Hagen.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Gillem to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, June 1, 1873, in Hagen; NA, RG 98, Ft. Klamath Letters Received, Camp at Lost River, General Orders No. 4, Feb. 8, 1873. The Dept. of Columbia did not cut orders on Gillem's assumption of command until Mar. 4, NA, Microfilm 666, 1871, Roll 20, General Orders No. 2, Hdqrs., Dept. of Columbia, Mar. 4, 1873.
\end{itemize}
the distribution of the troops he had and the reinforcements that he knew were enroute: 19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At his own camp on Lost River</td>
<td>Troop B, 1st Cavalry</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Companies B, C, and I</td>
<td>21st Infantry</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At Applegate's on Clear Lake</td>
<td>Troop G, 1st Cavalry</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop K, &quot; &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At Van Bremer's ranch</td>
<td>Battery A, 4th Artillery</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery E, &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery M, &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company E, 12th Infantry</td>
<td>about 45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company C, &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>158 plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At Dorris' ranch, Hot Creek</td>
<td>Troop F, 1st Cavalry</td>
<td>about 54</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total in command</td>
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<td>505 plus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not only did Gillem anticipate the arrival of a peace commission, he learned that General Canby himself was coming down from Portland in order to be present during the delicate process of negotiating. Gillem decided to move his headquarters to Fairchild's ranch, mainly because the commissioners could more readily make contact with the Modocs from that location. This move was completed by mid-February; however Mason's three infantry companies and Troop B remained at the Lost River camp.

The peace commission had undergone some changes since its first members had been selected. When it arrived at Fairchild's it was

19. Gillem to Canby, Feb. 9, 1873, in Hagen.
composed of Alfred Meacham, chairman, Jesse Applegate, at whose ranch on Clear Lake Captain Bernard was then stationed, and Samuel Case, the acting Indian agent at Alsear, Oregon. General Canby was not considered a part of the commission at this time, although he did give close attention to its activities, and the commission made it a practice to consult with him regularly. Meacham thought of the general as an "advisor."

The first efforts of the commission, which was officially organized February 18, concentrated on establishing a system of communication with the Modocs. A day or two after its organization, it sent an Indian woman and her white husband, Matilda and Bob Whittle to the Stronghold. Beginning with these earliest visits, Mrs. Whittle was accompanied by a Modoc woman, Artina Choakus (also known as One-Eyed Dixie). The Modocs replied to these feelers by agreeing to talk with John Fairchild and with Frank Riddle, a resident of Yreka married to a Modoc woman known then as Toby. During the next two weeks these several emissaries made a number of contacts. Because of the Modocs' request, their old Yreka friends, Elijah Steele and A. M. Rosborough,

20. Meacham, Wigwam, pp. 422-25; Annual Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1873, p. 74; Oliver Knight, Following the Indian Wars, The Story of the Newspaper Correspondents Among the Indian Campaigns (Norman, 1960), pp. 115-17. Both Frank and Toby Riddle accompanied A. B. Meacham on a speaking tour of the United States after the Modoc War. Meacham made Mrs. Riddle the heroine of his book Wi-Ne-Ma, cited elsewhere in this study. The title is Meacham's name for Toby Riddle. The Riddle's son, Jeff C. Riddle, wrote The Indian History of the Modoc War, also cited in this report.
also arrived at Fairchild's and, according to Meacham, Judge Rosborough was made a member of the commission on March 4, at the request of General Canby. 21

Meanwhile, the Modoc war had attracted the attention of a number of newspapers across the nation, and reporters arrived at Fairchild's to cover the dramatic story of a handful of Indians holding off the U. S. Army. This was the first Indian campaign in the west to be extensively covered by a number of reporters, each competing with the others to be the first in print. 22 One of the most outstanding of these men was Edward Fox, an Englishman who had served in the British army. Fox worked for the New York Herald and was extremely ambitious to meet the Indians. Against the wishes of the commissioners, he did manage to visit the Stronghold. 23 Fox then published an article describing the Modocs and their problems. This article undoubtedly further stimulated the already-active "peace" societies in the East to demand that the Modoc war be ended. Oregonians, of course, continued to demand the capture or destruction of the enemy. 24


22. Knight, p. 155.

23. Ibid., pp. 109 and 128. Other correspondents to visit the Stronghold after Fox were Robert D. Bogart and H. Wallace Atwell (both from the San Francisco Chronicle), and Alex McKay (representing both the San Francisco Evening Bulletin and the Yreka Union.)

24. An example of Oregon's fear that a peace would be arranged by which the Modocs would go unpunished is found in Governor Grover's telegram to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Mar. 6, 1873, in Hagen: "I protest on behalf of the State of Oregon against the consumation [sic] of any treaty with the Modoc Indians which shall screen from trial and punishment those savages . . . indicted for the murder of eighteen peaceable citizens."
Meacham and his associates hardly knew how to handle the reporters and concluded to make their meeting secret and to tell the newspapermen only what they wished them to hear. The reporters reacted strongly and some of them wrote dispatches bitterly attacking the various members. Meacham was described as being able to "talk the legs off a cast-iron pot in just ten minutes," and "words roll from his silvery tongue like green peas from a hot platter." Robert Bogart, representing the San Francisco Chronicle, called him a "Micawber politician," but concluded that Meacham was basically an honest man.

Bogart also took after the Applegates with a vengeance. He accused the Applegate clan of corrupt deeds in their past associations with the Klamath agency. At one point Oliver Applegate received a letter from a friend that said, "I see the s of b of a Correspondent for the Chronicle is still at his abuse. Yesterdays Chronicle has a letter . . . which abuses the Applegates in general and you in particular." Jesse Applegate was most upset at Bogart's attacks.

A prominent citizen of Oregon ever since his arrival in 1844, Jesse Applegate was widely known as a literary man and territorial leader. In recent years, the "sage of Yoncalla" had run into financial trouble when held liable for the bond of a state treasurer who had absconded with the funds. As a result, Applegate found it convenient to

25. J. M. McCall, Ashland, Ore., to O. Applegate, Feb. 21, 1873, in Hagen; Knight, pp. 135-38. Bogart was eventually recalled by the Chronicle and later was court martialed by the U. S. Navy on an embezzling charge.
live on the California side of the border where he settled on Jesse Carr's ranch at Clear Lake, land which he had earlier surveyed for Carr. It was at this ranch that the army had established its camp and referred to it always as Applegate's ranch.

Jesse did not think much of the commission's efforts to settle the war, and he was exceedingly unhappy with Bogart's attack on the family, "two of my nephews have been employed ... on the Klamath Reservation ... and the press has charged them with having a personal interest [in forcing the Modocs to surrender]." He concluded, "I am not a proper person to sit in judgement upon their conduct, or be a member of a tribunal charged to make investigations that might impugn it." Applegate's resignation was accepted. 26

About the time Applegate left Fairchild's, an incident occurred that caused the peace commission to conclude for the moment that the war was over. On his return from a visit to the Stronghold, March 5, Elijah Steele reported to the commissioners that the Modocs had agreed to the terms of surrender. The jubilation felt at headquarters was marred, however, by John Fairchild's announcement that Steele had made a grievous error. He had been with Steele and now insisted that the Yreka lawyer had not understood what the Modocs really said. Steele offered to return

to the Stronghold to confirm his report. He did so and, to his amazement, found that he was indeed in error. Moreover, the Modocs were angry with him for his misinterpretations. They told Steele to take back the message that they wanted the commissioners to come personally to the Stronghold if negotiations were to continue. Meacham, on learning this depressing outcome, wired Secretary Delano "this undoubtedly means treachery."

Delano promptly replied, "I do not believe Modocs mean treachery. The Mission should not be a failure." 27

A few days later the Modocs seemed to have reconsidered their demands. Captain Jack's sister, Queen Mary, arrived at Fairchild's and said the Modocs had agreed to surrender as prisoners of war providing they were removed to some place far from the lava beds. Canby set March 10 as the date of surrender and on that day sent wagons to the designated place to receive the Indians. But no Modocs appeared. A second date was set; but again the wagons returned empty. Apparently unaware of the various cliques and dissension among the Modocs, Canby nonetheless concluded correctly that the end was not yet in sight. 28 Meacham cast about for somebody to blame for this breakdown. He found his man in the person of Charles Blair of Linkville. According to Meacham, Blair had visited the Modocs and had told them that "the object of the Peace Commission was to

27. Meacham, Wigwam, pp. 427-29; Meacham, telegram to Delano, Mar. 4; and Delano, telegram to Meacham, Mar. 5, 1873, in Hagen.

28. Meacham, Wigwam, pp. 432-36; Meacham, telegram to Clum, Mar. 7; Canby to Sherman, Mar. 8; Canby, telegram to Sherman, Mar. 11; Meacham, telegram to Clum, Mar. 11; Canby, telegram to Sherman, Mar. 13, 1873, all in Hagen.
get possession of the Indians indicted for murder . . . and have them hanged." Reporter H. Wallace Atwell (Sacramento Record) agreed, describing Blair as "a worthless fellow who . . . has at one or more times graced the inside of the Penitentiary."\(^{29}\)

By this time Commissioner Case had also resigned, pleading urgent business at his own reservation. The Interior Department set about to recast the commission. By the end of March the Reverend Eleazer Thomas, a 58-year-old Methodist minister from Petaluma, California, and Agent Dyar had replaced Jesse Applegate and Case. Also, General Canby was now formally affiliated with the commission, being given the authority to replace any member he saw fit.\(^{30}\)

Canby, in charge of both the troops and the peace commission, now decided on a policy of applying pressure to the changeable Modocs. Sherman's orders to suspend hostilities were still in effect, but they did not prohibit a careful watch on the Indians. Using various justifications--concern lest the Modocs leave the lava beds, prevention of unsavory whites from misleading the Indians, discouragement of Modoc raids--Canby directed an increase in patrols and the movement of troops to critical observation posts nearer the lava beds.\(^{31}\)

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29. NA, RG 48, Office, Secretary of Interior, Special File, Modoc War, Folder 30, Meacham to Clum, Mar. 8, 1873.

30. Dillon, p. 76; Meacham to Clum, Mar. 24; Sherman, telegram to Canby, Mar. 24, 1873, both in Hagen.

31. NA, Microfilm 666, 1871, Roll 21, Canby, telegrams to Sherman, Mar. 14 and 17; RG 48, Office, Secretary of Interior, Special File, Modoc War, Canby to Sherman, Mar. 17, 1873.
The first major patrol at this time was the march of Troop K under Maj. James Biddle from Applegate's ranch to headquarters at Van Bremer's. Troop K had left Camp Halleck, Nevada, by train on January 21. At Reno it had mounted its horses and had ridden the 150 bitterly cold miles to Camp Bidwell. There the troopers had learned about the battle for the Stronghold and had marched out on February 8 for the lava beds. After six days of exhausting travel through snow and ice the troops had reached Land's ranch, only to find no feed for their horses. Biddle had marched them then to Bernard's camp at Applegate's.

When the order for the patrol arrived from Gillem, Biddle secured the services of a guide to lead the troops through the country south of the lava beds. At least part of the route followed the Tickner Road.

32. James Biddle entered on active duty as a first lieutenant in a New York regiment, 1861. He emerged from the Civil War as a colonel and brevet brigadier general of Volunteers. He had accepted a regular army commission as captain in 1862 and after the war served in the 24th (old) and 11th Infantry. In 1870, he transferred to the 1st Cavalry. After he arrived at the lava beds in 1873, he was promoted to major and transferred (on paper only for the time being) to a vacancy in the 6th Cavalry. He retired in 1896 with the grade of colonel. His name is familiar to students of western history because of his wife, Ellen McGowan Biddle, who wrote Reminiscences of a Soldier's Wife (Philadelphia, 1907). Heitman, 1, 217.

33. Maurice Fitzgerald, "The Modoc War, Reminiscences . . .", Americana, 21 (Oct., 1927), 498-521; a typed copy at Lava Beds NM was used in this report. NA, RG 98, Regimental Returns, 1st Cavalry, Jan. & Feb., 1873; Biddle, p. 101. Mrs. Biddle said that 3 soldiers died from frostbite during this march; however the regimental returns do not show any deaths for Troop K for this period.
In 1871, H. C. Tickner, Yreka, had set out to locate a road that would go south from Van Bremer's, around the south end of the lava beds, to join the existing road then running from Linkville down the east side of Tule Lake to the Pit River valley. Such a route would greatly shorten travel distance from Yreka to the Pit River settlements. Despite difficulties encountered with terrain and laborers, Tickner had had the road fairly well built or cleared by the summer of 1872. The only complaint that travelers had voiced was the lack of water, particularly where it skirted the lava beds. To Sgt. Maurice Fitzgerald the patrol was an adventure he would not forget.

The horses picked their step "along a dim path, invisible to ordinary eyes, winding through endless defiles, or narrow passages between immense quantities of basaltic rock." Near one of the cinder cones, which Fitzgerald called Sugar Loaf Peak and which may have been the large cone today called Big Sand Butte, the troopers caught sight of two Indians who quickly disappeared; "it was difficult to restrain some of the boys from pursuing them, but our orders not to fire or attack unless fired upon were imperatives." The sergeant did not note in his reminiscences that his troop captured the 34 horses these Indians had

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34. A blow-by-blow description of Tickner's efforts to build the road may be found in the Yreka Union, 1871-72, particularly the issues for Sep. 30, Oct. 14, Nov. 11 and 18, and Dec. 30, 1871, and Apr. 20 and Aug. 31, 1872. Also useful is a description of the road by J. D. Howard, on file at Lava Beds NM. The army employed Tickner as a guide and messenger in 1873 and it is quite possible he was the guide employed by Biddle for this patrol.
been herding. Although the Modocs later protested bitterly that this capture was a violation of the truce, they did not get the horses back. Biddle brought the herd into Van Bremer's, which again was headquarters, Gillem, Canby, and the commissioners having moved there from Fairchild's.

Neither Canby nor Gillem had yet seen the lava beds personally. On March 23 the two officers, accompanied by a strong cavalry patrol, rode from Van Bremer's to the bluff overlooking the sea of lava. Canby's report of this patrol was barren of detail except that he reported meeting Captain Jack. Other participants recorded a more interesting story. Sergeant Fitzgerald told how the patrol took the long route by way of Lower Klamath Lake. Upon reaching the edge of the bluff, the patrol dismounted and looked out "over the placid expanse of Tule Lake stretching away many miles northward and eastward, while to the east and south lay the seemingly level expanse of the lava beds."

"While leisurely gazing over the imposing landscape," he wrote, "we suddenly heard a shout from the rocks near the foot of the bluff, and then observed an Indian waving his cap." Dr. Thomas Cabaniss, a contract surgeon with the army who knew many of the Modocs, was half-way down the bluff at the moment and decided to talk to the Indian. Accompanied by Correspondent Fox, he did so and learned that Captain Jack wanted to talk personally with General Canby. Cabaniss and Fox remained at the bottom as hostages of a sort, while Jack climbed half-way up to

a juniper tree. After some discussion, Canby and Gillem went down to meet the Modoc leader. Sergeant Fitzgerald wrote that those on the bluff "could only conjecture as to what was being said." Canby reported later that it was an unsatisfactory meeting in which Jack said he wanted the army to leave and his people to be able to return to Lost River.

Meanwhile Fox and Cabaniss learned from their hosts that the Modocs were still upset over Biddle's capture of their horse herd. Trying to impress them, Fox replied that the troops who had taken the horses were 100 new soldiers. However, Fox concluded, "I am grieved to say they did not look very scared." Captain Jack returned to the Stronghold; Canby rode back to Van Bremer's; but Fox decided that night to get his hair cut lest it be too attractive a scalp should there be another encounter. 36

Canby continued to move the troops closer to the lava beds. On March 17 Gillem ordered Major Mason to move his three companies of the 21st Infantry, Troop B, and the howitzers from the camp at Lost River to Applegate's, where Mason assumed command of all the troops on the east side, including Bernard's. A week later, Mason moved his command to a new camp on Scorpion Point at the southeast corner of Tule Lake, about five miles west of Land's ranch and only eight miles from the Stronghold. From here, Troop G made a two-day patrol east and south

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36. NA, RG 98, Regimental Returns, 1st Cavalry, March, 1873; Canby, telegram to AAG, Washington, Mar. 24, 1873, in Hagen; Knight, p. 140; Fitzgerald; Dillon, p. 64.
of the lava beds, returning to camp on March 29.\textsuperscript{37}

When he had the camp on Lost River broken up, Gillem ordered Major Green to report to Van Bremer's to assume direct command of all the troops on the west side. Eight companies (Troops F and K and a large detachment from Troop H, Batteries A, E, and M, and Companies E and G, 12th Infantry) were already at Van Bremer's, and one other, Battery K, 4th Artillery, was enroute from the Presidio. Through the rest of March a number of these units went out on patrols, mostly toward the lava beds.\textsuperscript{38}

On April 1 Canby took his policy of "gradual compression" one step further by moving headquarters, the commissioners, and all the troops at Van Bremer's to a camp site at the base of the already well-visited bluff. Here, on the edge of the lava beds, three miles from the Stronghold, the troops established an elaborate bivouac, known as Gillem's Camp. This change was not without its lighter side. That first night in the new camp, Gillem "was awakened by one of the peace Commissioners with information to the effect that our camp was to be

\textsuperscript{37} Jackson's Troop B did not leave the camp at Lost River until March 29, several days after Mason had led the infantry companies to Clear Lake. Mason to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 10, 1873, in Hagen.

\textsuperscript{38} Although the regimental returns continued to refer to Troop H as a detachment, nearly the whole troop was in action against the Modocs from March on, its strength varying from 33 to 46. Troop F moved from Dorris' ranch to Van Bremer's, Mar. 25. Troop E, 1st Cavalry, was also enroute from Ft. Lapwai, Ida.; but would not reach the Lava Beds until May, being detained for a time at Camp Harney, Ore. NA, RG 98, Regimental Returns, 1st Cavalry, March-June, 1873.
attacked before day, and that the line of tents occupied by the peace
Commission General Canby and myself was to be the object of their
attack." Gillem attempted to quiet the nerves of the poor unnamed
commissioner. 39

The next day, the commissioners met the Modoc leaders for the first
time since negotiations had begun. This brief, unsatisfactory meeting
was held in the no-man's land between Gillem's Camp and the Stronghold.
It ended abruptly when a severe storm whipped in over Tule Lake resulting
in an agreement that a tent should be erected for future meetings. Both
sides agreed that a level stretch of rock-free meadow, rather closer to
the camp than to the Stronghold, would be satisfactory for future meet­
ings. The soldiers erected a regulation wall-tent for the purpose.

Frank and Toby Riddle served as interpreters at this meeting.
Afterwards they warned that the Modocs were considering an attack on
the unarmed commissioners at a future meeting. Meacham and the others
scoffed at the idea. With such a large number of troops on the doorstep
of the lava beds, the Indians would not dare do anything so rash.

Intentionally or not, the progressive increase of troops at Gillem's
Camp was impressive. Not all the units at Van Bremer's arrived at the
same time as did the headquarters. On April 2, the date of the first
meeting, Battery E arrived. On April 4, when a second meeting was held,

39. Gillem to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, June 1, 1874, in Hagen.
Battery K came in. The Modocs could witness all these movements from the Stronghold.

The meeting on the fourth was as unproductive as the first. Only Meacham and Rosborough, accompanied by Fairchild and the Riddles, attended. Jack appeared with six men and his own family. After it was over, Canby sent word to the Modocs that the troops would move still closer. During the night of April 4-5, Boston Charley and Hooker Jim stayed at Gillem's Camp. This casual visiting may have seemed odd to the outside world, but it was justified on the grounds that through these visits communication with the Indians was maintained. Also, the Modocs could see for themselves the army's growing strength. On April 6, Mason moved his five companies from Scorpion Point to Hospital Rock, only two miles from the Stronghold. The pressure was mounting. But the Modocs did not weaken in their determination to resist. With these relentless conditions, the increasing "compression" was bound to result in an explosion.40

On the face of the slope behind Gillem's Camp, Lieutenant Adams established a signal post on a small outcropping of rock about 75 feet above the tents. From here he could signal Hospital Rock and he also had a good view of the meeting tent. The signal men on duty, April 8, watched an Indian messenger come into the camp below. Captain Jack was

40. Mason to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 10, 1873, in Hagen; Annual Report of Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 1873, p. 76. Murray, p. 168, says this second meeting occurred Saturday, April 5.
asking for another meeting. The soldiers scanned the peace tent site and reported to Canby's headquarters they could see "six Indians, and also in the rocks behind them twenty other Indians, all armed." The Riddles' warning of treachery came to mind and the commissioners declined the meeting for that day.

Two days later, the Modocs requested a meeting for April 11. Again the Riddles expressed a fear that such would be dangerous. This time the commissioners listened to the warning. On the morning of the 11th, they met to discuss the situation. Meacham and Dyar argued that the meeting should not be held. General Canby and Doctor Thomas felt otherwise. Canby assured the commissioners that the Modocs would "dare not molest us because his troops commanded the situation." His signal men reported that only five unarmed Modocs could be seen at the tent. Thomas' argument was "that where God calied him to go he would go."^41

Reluctantly, Meacham and Dyar agreed to go along. Eight persons left Gillem's Camp that morning. First on the trail were Canby and Thomas, on foot. Dyar on a gray horse and Meacham on a sorrel rode behind. Then came Frank Riddle, also on foot. Toward the rear rode Bogus Charley and Boston Charley who had spent the previous night at Gillem's Camp, staying with the Riddles at their cave north of the tents. Last of all rode Toby Riddle, sick at heart in her belief that the Modocs

^41. Meacham to Delano, April 16, 1873, in Hagen; Annual Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1873, p. 77.
would strike that day.  

When they reached the peace tent, the whites counted eight Indians including the two Charleys who had ridden with them, all of them armed: Captain Jack, Schonchin John, Ellen's Man, Hooker Jim and Black Jim. This was far different than the six unarmed men promised. General Canby opened the meeting by passing out cigars. Sitting on a rock near a small fire the Indians had built east of the peace tent, Canby opened a conversation with Captain Jack. The tensed commissioners realized that this confrontation was accompanied with danger.

Tens of thousands of words have been written on the events of the next few minutes. One of the first descriptions written by a participant was sorely-wounded Meacham's report to Secretary Delano:

Gen. Canby assured the Inds. that he was here for the protection of both parties, and to see that the Com.sn faithfully performed their promises. About this time two armed Indians [Barncho and Slolax] suddenly appeared from

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42. Mason to Major Wood, Dept. of Columbia, June 12, 1873, in Hagen. Boston Charley acquired his name because of his light complexion. He was about 22 years old in 1873. A soldier described him as "a stocky little Indian . . . not much over five feet in height; his dress was that worn by the ordinary civilian of the working class--brown coat, calico shirt, dark pants and cap, all a little the worse for wear." Bogus Charley was about the same age. Said to have earned his name because of his penchant for playing jokes on people. Dillon, p. 63; Murray, p. 148; Harper's Weekly, 17 (May 17, 1873), 415.

43. These 8 are named in Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1873, p. 77. Major Mason stated that Bogus Charley did not stop at the tent, but rode directly on to the Stronghold. Mason to Wood, June 12, 1873, in Hagen.
the brush in our rear. An explanation was asked and Capt. Jack replied [sic] by snapping a pistol [a misfire] at Gen. Canby, saying in Indian "all ready" after which Gen. Canby was dispatched by Cap. Jack with a pistol and knife. Dr. Thomas by a pistol shot in the breast and a gun shot in the head by Boston [Charley]. Meacham [and Dyar] attempting to escape toward camp, the former followed by Schonchin John, and the latter by Black Jim and Hooker Jim. Schonchin fired six shots at Meacham, hitting him four times, and leaving him for dead. Boston attempted to scalp him and was deterred by the Modoc woman [Toby Riddle]. Dyar escaped unhurt, although fired at three times by Black Jim who was only a few feet away, and twice by Hooker Jim by whom he was pursued. After running about two hundred yards he turned upon his pursuer with a small pocket derringer [sic], when, the Ind. turned and run back--thus letting Dyar get away.44

The tensions of gradual compression had exploded. The author lay dead. The time was twelve minutes past noon.

Ten minutes earlier, 1st Lt. William Sherwood had received mortal wounds on the east side of the Stronghold. Major Mason had established a semi-circle of outposts on top of the scattered hillocks that lay between his camp at Hospital Rock and the Stronghold. On April 11, Pvt. Charles Hardin was posted as a guard of the first relief on one of these rocky ridges. During the morning Lieutenant Sherwood, the

44. Meacham to Delano, Apr. 16, 1873, in Hagen. A most detailed description of all the incidents that occurred at the meeting and a blow-by-blow account of the attack may be found in Murray, pp. 180-91. Various details may be found in several scattered sources: Mason to Wood, June 12, 1873 (Mason gathered much of his material from Dr. Cabaniss), and Dyar to Clum, Apr. 13, 1873, both in Hagen; Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1873 (Meacham's report, Oct. 5, 1873), pp. 77-78; and Brady, p. 245. Also useful but colored somewhat by the passage of time is Meacham's lengthy description in Wigwam, pp. 468-500.
officer of the day, visited Hardin's post. The young officer was in an exuberant mood. Referring to the commissioners, he said, "Well, this is the last day of the war and now we can all go home and rest." He told Hardin to be on the lookout for Modocs who might signal their wish to visit the Hospital Rock camp.

A few minutes after Sherwood left, Hardin discovered two Indians about 400 yards away waving a white flag. He yelled to them and his cries were heard back at camp. Sherwood returned to the outpost to learn what was happening. When he saw the Indians, the lieutenant said he was going out to see what they wanted. Hardin urged him not to go; but Sherwood went, and the private kept him covered with his Sharp's carbine. Sherwood returned and informed Hardin that the Indians would come back at one p.m. and that they wanted to talk with Major Mason.

Hardin was off guard duty at noon when Sherwood and Lieutenant Boyle went out to meet the Modocs the second time. The private and his companions climbed upon Hospital Rock from where they could watch

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45. William L. Sherwood, a native of New York, entered the army as a second lieutenant in 1867. He was promoted to first lieutenant in 1872. Died from wounds received April 11, 1873. Charles Buff Hardin joined the army as a private in August 1872. After his first 5-year enlistment, he returned to civilian life for a year, then reenlisted. In 1882, he accepted a commission as a second lieutenant in the 18th Infantry. Retired with the grade of major. Heitman, 1, 500 and 882; Army and Navy Journal, May 3, 1873, p. 603.
the lieutenants' progress. The two officers went almost half a mile beyond the picket posts and met an Indian in advance of the truce flag who asked if Boyle was tyee, or chief. When Boyle said he was not, the Indian urged the officers to go with him to the flag site where Steamboat Frank was waiting to talk with them.

The unarmed lieutenants suddenly felt very exposed and, politely breaking off the discussion, started back to camp. Almost as soon as they turned their backs, the Modocs began firing. "Boyle told Sherwood they best separate . . . which they did, but poor Sherwood had not gone over thirty paces when he was shot in the arm and leg." By then, the lieutenants had disappeared from the soldiers' sight behind a lava ridge. At Hospital Rock the entire guard relief quickly formed and rushed toward the scene of the shooting. An unnamed officer from Gillem's camp who happened to be visiting Mason's command excitedly ran after the guard and, overtaking it, assumed command. However he led the men in the wrong direction. The sergeant of the guard tried to correct him, but the officer would not listen. The desperate sergeant turned to Hardin and said, "You know where they are. I cannot get away from this lunatic. You drop back and when clear run up this draw and hurry to that hog-back. The officers are down behind that."

Hardin did so and saw that Boyle had already escaped toward camp. Then he saw Sherwood lying on the ground, "I called to him asking if he was badly hurt and he answered saying he was." Hardin signaled his
fellow guards who broke away from their hysterical commander. They ran to Hardin's position. Sherwood was carried into camp, where he died from his wounds three days later.  

As soon as the attack on Sherwood occurred, Mason signaled the word to Gillem's camp. Colonel Gillem sat down immediately to write a message to Canby informing him of the attack. Cabaniss offered to take the message but, even before the doctor got out of camp, the signal-officer saw that Canby was under attack.

Sergeant Fitzgerald was one of those sitting idly that noon on the slope near the signal station. He and his fellow soldiers were brought to their feet when the signal sergeant yelled, "They're firing on the peace tent!" The men ran down the steep hillside toward their tents where their arms were stacked. "Each man grabbed his gun and started at top speed towards the council tent; but before we had gone many steps, the command 'fall in' rang out clear and strong, and the military instinct of obedience prevailed." The troops formed into a skirmish line and moved forward at double time. On their way out they met a hysterical Dyar and, behind him, Toby Riddle.

46. This account is taken from two participants, Maj. Charles B. Hardin, in the Proceedings of the Annual Meeting and Dinner of the Order of Indian Wars of the United States, Jan. 24, 1931; and Lt. W. H. Boyle, "Personal Observations on the Conduct of the Modoc War," ms, typescript in Hagen. Pvt. Peter Murphy, Co. I, 21st Inf., was commended for "covering" the two lieutenants. Mason to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 10, 1873, in Hagen.

47. House Documents, 43d Cong., 1st Sess., No. 122, Gillem to AAG, Div. of Pacific, Apr. 20, 1873.
"When we reached the tent, a gruesome sight was presented to our view," Fitzgerald recalled. "About twenty feet to the south lay General Canby on his back; his body was pierced by three bullets, and all his clothing had been removed." They also found "the dead body of Rev. Mr. Thomas, also stark naked." Meacham had lost his clothing too "save a pair of red flannel drawers." Cabaniss discovered that Meacham was still alive and forced some whiskey into him. 

At both Gillem's Camp and Hospital Rock, the soldiers reacted to the killings by clamoring for an immediate attack on the Stronghold. Their officers ordered restraint. The time for a major assault had not yet arrived.

Reporter Atwell was with the troops when they reached the peace tent. He was shocked when he saw the "terrible-looking object" that was the half-scalped Meacham. And, in sorrow, he removed his coat and covered the general's naked body. Later a strip of canvas was torn from the peace tent and wrapped around the naked form. Still later, a photographer took a picture of the forlorn tent showing the gap left by the removal of the shroud.

Until now, a considerable body of sympathy had developed around the nation, particularly in the East, for the plight of the Modocs. When word was flashed of the murders, this sympathy largely, if not completely

48. FitzGerald's reminiscences.
49. Knight, p. 143.
evaporated. The death of the highly-respected Canby, the only Regular Army general officer to be killed in the Indian wars, aroused a latent feeling of revenge. "The Red Judas" screamed the San Francisco Chronicle. Harper's Weekly said "The treacherous murder . . . is one of the most tragical events in the history of Indian wars." The Army and Navy Journal noted that "no event in connection with our Army since the Rebellion has created such excitement throughout the country as the news of the assassination." Headquarters of the Army issued a general order that read in part "thus perished one of the kindest and best gentlemen of this or any other country, whose social equalled his military virtues." 50

Why had the Modocs carried out these killings which would surely bring swift and thorough revenge? Was it just a matter of the Modocs lacking knowledge of how the whites would or could react? It was not that simplistic. Captain Jack had argued against the scheme when it was first proposed, probably by Schonchin John. Jack and those who supported him could not be sure that these deaths would serve the Modocs' cause. However, Canby's "gradual compression" of the past two months had had the effect of strengthening Schonchin John's arguments. As the noose grew tighter the Modocs had fewer alternatives and less to lose. They were surrounded by hundreds of troops, troops that were moving

ever closer. Many of the Modocs had been indicted for murder in Oregon; should they surrender they would die at the end of a rope. The peace commissioners could not satisfactorily guarantee their future safety. Desperation was the force that drove the extremists to conclude however rashly that a simultaneous blow against the army leaders of both camps and the peace commissioners would be so devastating that the troops would have to leave. A humiliated Jack finally went along with the madness. When Jack at first had refused to participate, an Indian put "a squaw's hat on his head, and another threw a shawl over his shoulders. They tripped him and threw him down on his back and taunted him." Captain Jack still had his manhood; he joined them, saying that he himself would kill Canby.51

Any second thoughts no longer counted. Canby was dead. Sherman wired Schofield, who had recently returned from Hawaii, "The President now sanctions the most severe punishment of the Modocs and I hope to hear that they have met the doom they so richly have earned by their insolence and perfidy." Sergeant FitzGerald put it simply, "the Indians had to be punished, and no time was to be lost."52

On April 12 Mason reported that the Modocs were firing on his pickets west of Hospital Rock. It was an inconclusive exchange of


52. NA, Microfilm 666, 1871, Roll 21, Sherman to Schofield, Apr. 13, 1873; FitzGerald's reminiscences.
bullets, but nevertheless "the left picket post gave way." Lt. Edward Theller, with part of Company I, 21st Infantry, reoccupied the picket post without serious incident. The firing continued until dark and resumed briefly the next morning. It was not important by itself, yet an astute commander might have shown a little concern that, for troops who demanded an opportunity for revenge, the pickets withdrew rather quickly and with little cause.\footnote{Mason to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 10, 1873, in Hagen.}
The War Department reacted quickly to the tragedy of April 11 and selected Col. Jefferson C. Davis to fill Canby's position as commander of the Department of the Columbia. It would take Davis considerable time to reach the lava beds; for now the full burden of the war rested on Gillem. He moved swiftly to punish the Modocs and to bring an end to the four months of turmoil.

Gillem's resources appeared to be more than adequate for the task of subduing about 60 Modoc warriors, even if they were ensconced in a veritable Gibraltar. Either at hand or enroute were four batteries of artillerymen (prepared to fight as infantry), five troops of cavalry, five companies of infantry, and 70 Warm Springs Indians. To support the troops, Gillem still had the two mountain howitzers and had increased his artillery with the addition of four Coehorn mortars.

Wheaton, after the January battle, had seen the need for mortars in order to get at trenches and caves within the Stronghold that could not be reached by direct fire. Gillem had agreed when he had assumed command in February, requesting the four mortars and 300 shells. While Canby could see the value of mortars, he had reduced the requisition.

for shells to 75. From what he knew of the Stronghold and from his Civil War experience, hand grenades would also be valuable for close-range fighting. The depot at Benicia had no hand grenades and had offered to send 150 time fuze shells instead. Canby had wired back that the hand grenades should be sent for. On March 26 he had learned that 500 hand grenades had been acquired and were enroute to the lava beds. However there is no hint that these grenades ever arrived or ever were used in the fighting to come.²

Communications between Gillem’s Camp and Hospital Rock had also been improved in recent weeks. Although Gillem had not at first thought much of Wheaton’s plan to acquire boats for Tule Lake, he had changed his mind and had put two or three on the lake by this time. These could transport messengers and small amounts of supplies between the two camps—a mere five miles by water but almost fifty by land.³

2. Gillem to Canby, Feb. 11 and 13; Canby to Col. J. C. Kelton, AAG, San Francisco, Feb. 17 and 25; and Kelton to Canby, Feb. 19, 20, and 27, and Mar. 26, all in Hagen. The Coehorn mortar was invented by a Dutch military engineer, Baron van Menno Coehoorn, in the 17th century. The United States used this small portable mortar in both the Mexican and Civil Wars. It was particularly effective against personnel behind fortifications. Mounted on a heavy wooden block it weighed 296 pounds. Its tube, 5 3/4 inches caliber, had a fixed elevation of 45 degrees. Minimum range—25 yards; maximum range—1200 yards. Each shell and its bursting charge weighed 18 pounds, although commonly referred to as a 24-pounder. Francis A. Lord, "The Coehorn Mortar," Civil War Times Illustrated, August 1966, pp. 18-19; Albert Manucy, Artillery Through the Ages, National Park Service Interpretive Series, History No. 3 (Washington, 1949), p. 60.

3. Gillem to Canby, Feb. 11, 1873, in Hagen; The Yreka Union, Apr. 12, 1873.
After the first battle for the Stronghold, Wheaton had solicited from Green, Mason, and Bernard their ideas for the next attack. Then deliberating on them, Wheaton had formulated his own plan (see page 73). Undoubtedly, all these ideas were now available to Gillem as he prepared his plans for the coming attack. In the end, his concepts almost duplicated Wheaton's attack of January 17. Gillem recognized that the natural strength of the Stronghold combined with the Modocs' determination would make a direct assault too costly. He too would attack from both east and west, surround the Modocs on the south, and drive them into surrender through attrition. The major differences now were Gillem's far larger force and the fact that he had both howitzers and mortars. Major Mason, accompanied by the artillery section, would attack from the east; Major Green, having the mortars, would attack from the west.

Mason's forces at this time consisted of Troops B and G, and Companies B, C, and I, 21st Infantry. Seventy experienced Warm Springs were already riding down from the Warm Springs Reservation and would join him in time to take part in the attack. Second Lt. Edward S. Chapin, 4th Artillery, took charge of the howitzer section. Mason's total strength was in the neighborhood of 300 officers and men. Green's

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4. Mason to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, Jan. 27; Bernard to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, Jan. 30; and Green to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, Jan. 30, 1873, all in Hagen.

5. NA, RG 98, Regimental Returns, 1st Cavalry, March and April 1873. Approximate strengths: Troop B--59; Troop G--51; Warm Springs--70. Regimental returns for 21st Infantry not available at this time; each of its 3 companies estimated to be about 40 men present for duty (the strength of the two of them on January 17 was reported to be only 64).
command was somewhat larger. The total number of officers and men in Troops F and K, Batteries A, E, K, and M, and Companies E and G, 12th Infantry, was approximately 375. About one-third of the regulars had participated in the January 17 attack, and nearly all of these were concentrated on the east side under Mason. Only Perry's Troop F of the "old-timers" was with Green's command on the west. The demoralization they had undergone in January had largely disappeared. However, in the next few days they were to demonstrate a certain caution in tangling with the Modocs. By April 14, all was in readiness. Gillem's orders rang loudly, "Tell your men to remember Gen. Canby, Sherwood and the flag."

During the night of April 14-15, Mason's men moved forward in the darkness and took their position on about the same line that Bernard had occupied in January. The infantry companies were closest to the lake, under Capt. George H. Burton; then the two cavalry troops (dismounted); while the Warm Springs, also dismounted, composed the left flank. Bernard commanded both the cavalry and the scouts.

6. Ibid., and for 4th Artillery. Approximate strengths: Troop F--43, Troop K--67, Troop H--45, Battery A--20, Battery E--45, Battery K--30, Battery M--35. Returns for 12th Infantry also unavailable; estimated strength 40 per company. Although these and the figures in note 5 are but estimates, they are of interest. The Army outnumbered the Modocs at least 10 to 1; still, over the years, there had been a tendency to exaggerate to the point where the Army is said to have had 1000 or more troops, an exaggeration of nearly 50%. The detachment from Troop H remained as a guard at Gillem's Camp. Green to AAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 2, 1873, in Hagen.

7. Dillon, p. 41; Mason to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 10, 1873, in Hagen.
At two a.m. on the 15th, Green's Troops F and K (dismounted) moved out from Gillem's camp and made their way quietly to the far side of the (Hovey) peninsula. Sergeant FitzGerald was there: "We advanced in single file, each with carbine and sixty rounds of ammunition; in his haversack, each carried fifteen hardtack and a small piece of bacon." There was no fog to confuse the soldiers this time: "It was a beautiful and balmy night; not a breath of air was stirring, nor could the slightest sound . . . be heard." The silent march seemed uncanny to the sergeant: "There was no moonlight; but a star-bespangled sky afforded enough light to enable us to pick our footsteps over the jagged rocks . . . We were cautioned not to make the slightest noise."  

Then, according to FitzGerald, a soldier stumbled and accidentally fired his weapon. A Modoc sentry gave a cry of alarm, and those in the Stronghold picked it up echoing the cry through the mournful blackness. Gillem reported simply that both the east and west forces "took their positions without loss."  

Green had appointed Capt. Marcus Miller, 4th Artillery, in charge of the main force (Batteries E, K, and M, Companies E and G, 12th Infantry). For the time being, Capt. Evan Thomas' Battery A was to remain in reserve with the mortars, already packed on mules. At eight a.m., Miller led his men toward the Stronghold, with Battery E at the head.

8. FitzGerald's reminiscences.

of the column. About one-half mile out, Battery E deployed as skirmishers, staying close to the shore. After passing the cavalry troops, Miller deployed all his units into a skirmish line with Companies E and G, 12th Infantry, on the left nearest the lake, then Batteries K, M, and E on the right flank. As in the first battle, progress was exceedingly slow as the troops dodged from one hump of lava to the next, "a party remaining still and firing to cover the advancing party."

Battery E on the extreme right was the first to come under fire from a few Modocs under cover behind rocks. There was one major difference this time: this battle was not dependent on the light of one day only. The troops were prepared to stay.

The first significant action occurred at 1:30 p.m., when Green's infantry and artillery "made a beautiful charge, driving the Indians back several hundred yards, to a very strong position near the crest of the lavabed." Gillem's descriptive word "driving" may have implied too much. The Modocs withdrew skillfully from their outposts, their intention being to resist from their main strongpoints. As they withdrew, they continued to bother the soldiers with flanking fire.10 The cavalry was able to observe this action from the peninsula, "the infantry instead of pressing forward to form a junction with Col. Mason's command . . . were compelled to turn and face the Indians who were

10. Ibid.; Miller to 1st Lt. W. H. Winters, June 2, 1873, in Hagen.
annoying them by persistent sniping on the flank." FitzGerald was
of the opinion that the advance could be characterized as "desultory
fighting."

The forward movement carried the infantry companies far enough to
the right to allow Green to order Troops F and K into the line from their
holding position on the peninsula. The two troops occupied the extreme
left flank, next to the lake, and commenced a drive on the high rocks
that dominated the northwestern end of the Stronghold. It had been
from here that the Modocs had pinned down Green's men on the shore
during the earlier attack. FitzGerald got his first good view of the
Stronghold at this time: "When the natural formation did not meet all
the requirements . . . the Indians had constructed artificial barriers
of stone about four feet in height as breastworks with loop-holes to
shoot through." The troops charged these positions, finding most of
them abandoned, "but behind a barrier which three or four of us reached
at the same moment, a Modoc had the termerity [sic] to remain until one
of our party named [Pvt. Charles] Johnson looked over it and received
a bullet through the head, killing him instantly."ll

As dark dropped down over the lava beds, Green ordered a halt,
straightened the line, and suspended operations for the night. The
troops threw up hasty forts of loose rock, each large enough to protect

ll. FitzGerald's reminiscences.
five or six men, many of which structures still stand. Throughout the night the mortars continued to fire periodically into the Indian defenses. Although Green's men had not yet made a serious effort to unite their right flank with Mason's left, the day's operations had been generally satisfactory, albeit slow-paced and undramatic.

On the east side, Mason's day was quite similar. His troops, supported by artillery fire, began to move forward at daylight. They made a rather feeble attempt to move by their left flank around the Stronghold to the south, but found it "impossible to effect the junction without weakening the line too much." A year later, Gillem bitterly criticized Mason's actions on the 15th. The colonel complained that Mason had said, "it was not part of my plan to expose my men unnecessarily."

Gillem also doubted that Mason had moved up as close to the Stronghold as he had reported (400 yards). "I have examined the ground occupied," wrote Gillem, "and am convinced that the distance was nearer seven hundred than four." Had Mason been more aggressive, thought the colonel, the Stronghold would have been surrounded the first day.12

12. Gillem to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, June 1, 1874. Murray, p. 212, arrives at a stunning conclusion concerning Mason's unaggressiveness: "Mason must have detested Gillem so much that he wanted the failure of Gillem's plans to bring discredit on his commander." This is a most serious charge and strangely Murray does not offer evidence to support it. To be sure, Mason's command was very unaggressive during this battle. In understanding the cautiousness, perhaps it might be noted that most of Mason's men were veterans of the January 17 fight. The memory of that disaster must have had a certain effect on their minds. Mason to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 10, 1873, in Hagen.

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Both the howitzers and the mortars continued dropping shells on the Stronghold during the second day of the fight, April 16. The troops probed and tested the Modoc defenses. The Indians, shifting their few men from place to place, effectively challenged the soldiers. The best that Gillem could say was that progress was slow. He again ordered Green to push out on his right flank. Again this effort failed. This time, Mason reported from his side that Modocs were firing on one of his flanks and from the rear and that this diversion was keeping him well occupied. When Miller, who had been trying to maneuver past the Modocs' trenches to the south, learned that Mason had been driven back, he decided to break off the attempt.13

When it became apparent that the southern junction could not be effected, Green crossed to Mason's command (undoubtedly by boat) to confer on alternate plans. Repeating the January experience, they decided to attack simultaneously at the northern end of the Stronghold and unite their forces. Gillem could see little advantage to this plan, except to deprive the Modocs of their water supply. Since Green's cavalry already controlled some of the high ground in this area, the maneuver succeeded after a fashion, although the Indians resisted every step.

13. It is difficult to determine which flank the Modocs fired at. According to Gillem, a copy of Mason's report said it was his left flank; but Gillem had in his possession Mason's "original" dispatch, which read right flank. The conflict arises out of Gillem's futile vendetta against Mason. Gillem to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, June 1, 1874; Miller to Winters, June 2, 1873; Mason to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 10, 1873, all in Hagen.
Gillem, summarizing the junction, said "During this day the command advanced to within the immediate vicinity of the caves... in some places so near as to render it necessary to fall back in order not to interfere with the shelling." Sergeant FitzGerald was not that certain of the success: "We could make little headway; and, judging from the distant report of firearms in that direction, the other command was not having any better success in its efforts to reach us." He recalled withdrawing a short distance at the end of the day: "we straggled back, tired and hungry, through the rocks, harassed all the time by galling fire, to very near the place we occupied the night before, though a little closer to the Stronghold." Nevertheless, the colonel's confident report, not FitzGerald's skepticism, became the official document. At any rate, the advance of the 16th seems to have been effective, for "During the night of the 16th the firing [small arms, mortars, and howitzers] was almost continuous, the Indians endeavoring to pass through our lines in several places, evidently for the purpose of procuring water." 14 One hypothesis that may be made is that while the two forces had not physically united, they were close enough to each other to dominate the terrain and to effectively...

14. House Documents, 43d Cong., 1st Sess., No. 122, Gillem to AAG, Div. of Pacific, Apr. 20, 1873; Gillem to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, June 1, 1874, in Hagen; FitzGerald's reminiscences; Thompson, pp. 115-16. Thompson said that Green and Mason disobeyed orders when they made the northern junction--"I know what I am saying." Although Thompson is not a generally reliable source, he may have been right in this instance. Gillem's reports are worded in such a way that it is not possible to determine if he was consulted or if he approved in advance.
cover the ground between them with fire, thus preventing the Indians from reaching the lake.

Gillem was not happy with Mason's efforts this day either. Mason reported that he controlled "the Mesa which commanded the 'Medicine rock' and the whole eastern and southeastern side of the Modoc Stronghold." Gillem later expressed doubt on the grounds that such a position would have prohibited the Modocs' escape. However, Gillem's memory failed him there. From the "mesa" that Mason controlled, identified today by the line of fortifications thrown up by the soldiers, he could indeed see across into that part of the Stronghold. However, he would not have observed necessarily the withdrawal of the Indians, for a deep ravine separated him from the Stronghold. One arm of this ravine runs off toward the southeast (from the southeast corner of the Stronghold), and at that point it is unusually deep and precipitous. Under cover of darkness, an army could have slipped through it undetected by soldiers behind their fortifications on the high ground farther to the north.\(^\text{15}\)

The Modocs harassed the soldiers during the night by random firing and taunts "in very plain, if not classical English." Although Gillem believed that the Modocs were trying to get water, which they may have been, they had other reasons for their activity. They had decided

\(^{15}\) Mason to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 10, 1873, in Hagen.
to abandon the Stronghold. During the night, the women, children, and part of the men silently withdrew to the south, working their way through the tortuous lava flow that went back as far south as the mountains. Today this rugged feature, that caps itself at the lake's edge with the Stronghold, is called the Schonchin Flow. A few sharpshooters remained behind to create the impression that the area was still strongly defended. Again, the mortars fired throughout the long night.

April 17 was anti-climactic. Both Green and Mason began moving forward, cautiously at first, then more rapidly as they became aware that, despite a few snipers' bullets, the Indians had abandoned the Stronghold. There was no improvement in Gillem's opinion of Mason's men. The colonel advanced with Green's left on the 17th. He could not find any of Mason's units as he moved forward. Angry, Gillem "got upon the highest rock available, and ordered repeatedly 'Forward' 'Forward,'" until finally, Mason's Troop G under Captain Bernard came up to join with Green in sweeping the area.¹⁶

The army had at last captured the impregnable Stronghold. It was an empty success. The troops had failed utterly in their prime mission --to capture or destroy the Modocs. Yet, it was a turning point in the war. The Modocs had been driven from the position that had best offered

¹⁶. Gillem to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, June 1, 1874, in Hagen.
them the chance of continued resistance. From now on the campaign
would be different. No longer would assault and siege be the soldiers'
lot. The war was about to become fluid, a campaign of motion, of pur-
suit, and of still more disaster. The Modocs were yet to demonstrate
their best—or, from the soldiers' point of view, their worst.

The three-day battle was over. Now it was time to count the
cost. Asst. Surgeon McElderry's casualty list was much shorter this
time. Yet, it was long enough. The number of casualties was 23, of
whom six were killed and seventeen wounded; nearly all of them were
from Green's command. Mason's infantry suffered no casualties; one
of the wounds was accidentally self-inflicted (Pvt. Eugene O'Connor,
Battery M); only one officer was a casualty (1st Lt. Charles P. Eagan,
12th Infantry); and one of the wounded was a Warm Springs Indian.17

As in the earlier battles, the number of Modoc casualties is
difficult to determine. The Army and Navy Journal reported that 16
"warriors" were killed and one Indian woman captured. A student of
the fight determined the bodies of three men and eight women were
found in the Stronghold. Lieutenant Boyle wrote that three bodies
were found and two old women and one elderly man were taken prisoner.
The soldiers lifted at least one scalp. An English artist, William

of Wounded in Maj. John Green's Command, April 15-17; Mason to AAAG,
Dist. of Lakes, June 10, 1873, both in Hagen; NA, RG 98, Regimental
Returns, 1st Cavalry, 4th Artillery, April 1873; House Documents, 43d
Cong., 1st Sess., No. 122, Gillem to AAG, Div. of Pacific, Apr. 20, 1873.
Simpson, on a world-wide tour for The Illustrated London News, arrived at the lava beds shortly after the capture of the Stronghold. While someone held the scalp out at arm's length, Simpson drew the grisly object. He was told that Sgt. G. W. Lee, Troop K, had removed it from the body of Scarfaced Charley. That was a mistake, for Scarfaced Charley was still very much alive. Simpson also reported that three prisoners were taken, but he increased Boyle's count of enemy bodies to four. The artist decided that "the number of Indians killed has never been clearly ascertained." Sergeant Fitzgerald witnessed another gruesome sight, "the head of a Modoc severed from the trunk, perhaps by some soldier, that was as black as the darkest native of the Congo. Passing troopers generally saluted it with a vicious kick."18

Another alleged incident illustrated that savagery knows no bounds among men of different shades. The soldiers came across a very old Indian woman who begged for her life. The lieutenant asked, "Is there anyone here who will put that old hag out of the way?" A soldier stepped forward, "placed his carbine to her head and blew out her brains."19

Simpson, who rendered a number of excellent drawings of the Stronghold immediately after its capture, described it for his English readers:


19. FitzGerald's reminiscences.
"In the first hollow on the west of Captain Jack's cave, the long ridge of rock on the right has been rent in two along its whole length, and the Modocs could pass along it under perfect cover, with embrasures or holes from which they could fire with safety." In the hollow, or depression, itself "were the wickie-ups, or wigwams of twigs and mats, where the women and children lived." He visited the cave that was identified as Captain Jack's: "Bones, some of them picked; others with the pickings still left; horns of cattle; hoofs; skins, with the hair on; hides, and pieces of deer skin . . . . Fish in a putrid state, and fish bones, were in shelves of the rock; pieces of fat and dark, questionable-looking lumps lay about which were said to be meat."

As for the cave itself, it "was simply a circular hole in the lava . . . . It was perfectly bomb-proof, and only a vertical fire could by chance drop a shell into it. It was near the center of the stronghold, and had a number of similar crater-like holes around." John Muir, who visited the lava beds one year after the war, gave a similar description of the cave: "It measures twenty-five or thirty feet in diameter at the entrance, and extends but a short distance in a horizontal direction." Even then, the bottom of Jack's cave was still covered with animal bones from the Modocs' occupation. 20

Among the bones, rags, and wickiups there was little of the loot of war that appealed to the collector instinct among soldiers. However

there was one trophy that assumed importance in their minds—the "medicine flag." At three different high points in the Stronghold the Modocs had erected these emblems, the guarantors of victory. One in particular, standing on one of the highest rocks, had long been visible to the soldiers, and to them it had become a symbol of Modoc defiance, the enemy's regimental colors as it were.

The troops captured this medicine flag on the last day of the fight. It was no star-spangled eagle embroidered on a field of blazing color. Simpson, realizing its importance as a symbol, drew and described it as consisting of a "mink's skin and hawk's feathers with medicine bead." These were fastened to the end of a stick "about four feet long, and is just as it was cut from the tree." He said that the small white bead had been placed among the feathers, and the pole "stood on a heap of stones during the fighting." After the battle, a photographer took a picture of two soldiers standing on the "medicine rock." This rock may still be identified today toward the northeastern end of the Stronghold. It is quite possible that the medicine flag fluttered from here during the battle.\(^{21}\) Its capture and removal symbolized the soldiers' success in taking the Stronghold. But that was all it symbolized. The

Modocs were still their own masters, somewhere in the lava beds to the south.
Gillem had no idea where the Modocs had gone. He worried that they may have slipped away to the southeast to join their occasional allies, the Pit River Indians. On the other hand, he was concerned they might return to the shore of Tule Lake. The day following the capture of the Stronghold, he decided to take action to counter either possibility. He placed the infantry and artillery at both Gillem's Camp and the Stronghold; the cavalry and the Warm Springs prepared for patrols around and into the lava beds.

FitzGerald recalled F and K Troops' hike back to Gillem's Camp to get their horses and supplies. Two nights without sleep and the tension of battle had worn out the men, "and by the time we reached camp, we were 'all in.' Never have I been so completely exhausted as after that [three-mile] walk." On the way they found the body of a young civilian packer from Yreka, Eugene Hovey. Hooker Jim and a few cohorts had made a raid on Gillem's Camp during the last day of the battle, hoping vainly to draw at least some of the soldiers from the Stronghold. These Modocs had accidentally come upon Hovey who was leading a pack mule toward the Stronghold. When the troopers found his body they saw that the Indians had "flattened the packer's head between
two rocks to almost the thickness of one's hand."¹

Gillem ordered the Hospital Rock camp broken up since the infantry was already at the Stronghold and the cavalry would be going to Scorpion Point after the patrols were completed. Bernard took part of the cavalry force on a patrol to the east and north, while Perry led the remainder and the Warm Springs on a long patrol down the east side of the lava beds, across the south on the Tickner road, then back to Scorpion Point by way of Van Bremer's and Ball's ranches, and Gillem's camp. By the first evening Perry's force reached Sorass (Dry) Lake, southeast of the lava beds where, according to FitzGerald, they captured two Modocs. The Warm Springs promptly killed and scalped their victims. That night they held a "scalp dance" and "howled and danced all night long with hands joined in a circle." Sweat streamed from their naked bodies as they danced frenetically "while one brave held a pole in the center from which both scalps dangled." These Warm Springs did not continue with Perry but returned to headquarters the next day to prepare for a patrol directly into the lava beds.²

When Perry returned, April 21, he announced that he had found no trace of the Modocs having left the lava flows. This was hardly news to those who remained at Tule Lake. On the very day the cavalry patrols

1. FitzGerald's reminiscences.

2. Gillem to AAG, Div. of Pacific, Apr. 20; Miller to Winters, June 2, 1873, both in Hagen; Dillon, pp. 45-47; FitzGerald's reminiscences.

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rode out, the Modocs fired an occasional round into the Stronghold. This sniping stimulated the infantry and artillery (Batteries E and M, Company G, 12th Infantry, and Companies B, C, and I, 21st Infantry) to hasten their construction of a number of outward-facing, stone forts around the perimeter of the Stronghold. They also placed the artillery and the mortars so that they aimed at the lava flow to the south. The colonel's doubts on the whereabouts of the Modocs seemed strange to the soldiers, for they could see some Modocs standing in plain sight albeit at long range. The regulars also saw the Indians build a large fire in which they "seemed to be burning their dead."3

Throughout the 18th, details at Hospital Rock packed the equipment and supplies. The 21st Infantry moved its material to the Stronghold that day. The next morning, April 19, a long caravan carried the cavalry's supplies to Scorpion Point. Only a small escort accompanied the train, "stretched out over the trail for at least a mile." Lieutenant Boyle, the supply officer for Scorpion Point, worried that the Modocs would attack; however, the train reached the new camp safely.

The Warm Springs returned from their patrol into the lava beds

3. Mason to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 10; Green to AAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 2; Miller to Winters, June 2, 1873, all in Hagen; Dillon, p. 46. Little is known of the precise location of different units at the occupied Stronghold. Apparently a substantial camp was set up in a large depression near the northeast corner. Captain Miller, again commanding his own Battery E, reported that his men were assigned to guard the right (south?) of the area. Units occupying the Stronghold were Companies B, C, and I, 21st Infantry; Company G, 12th Infantry; and Batteries E and M. Gillem's camp was occupied by Batteries A and K, and Company E, 12th Infantry.
on April 20, bringing the information that the Modocs were holed up in the (Schonchin) flow only four miles south of the Stronghold. To reaffirm their presence, the Modocs put in an appearance this same day and succeeded in reaching the lake. A disgusted Boyle wrote, "In plain sight of General Gillem's camp, they procured water and some ... [bathed]." He added, "only a feeble attempt was made to get them or attack them." Gillem reacted to this bold play by posting the Warm Springs at this point, near the head of the (Canby) bay. ¹

On April 21 the Modocs made their boldest after-battle foray against the army when they attacked another heavily-escorted mule train between Scorpion Point and the Stronghold. It was a brief skirmish, but nevertheless they succeeded in killing Pvt. Morris Darcy, Battery M, and wounding Pvt. John Welsh, Company G, 12th Infantry. ⁵ The Modocs did not make an appearance during the next few days; but Gillem knew they were still in the lava flow, somewhere near a large bald cinder cone that he could see clearly from his headquarters. Some of his men had already nicknamed this Sugar Loaf, but most of the soldiers called it Sand Butte (today's Hardin Butte).

General Schofield was as disappointed as anyone in the failure to end the war. He perked up a little when he learned from Gillem

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¹. Dillon, pp. 45 and 47-49; House Documents, 43d Cong., 1st Sess., No. 122, Gillem to AAG, Div. of Pacific, Apr. 20, 1873.

⁵. Asst. Surgeon McElderry, Form 55, List of Wounded, Battle of April 20, in Hagen.
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that the Modocs were still in the lava beds. Hoping that the expedition might still be able to surround the enemy, he dispatched more troops. Capt. Henry C. Hasbrouck, a competent and determined fighter, left the Presidio on April 17 with his Battery B, 4th Artillery. The next day, Battery G, also of the 4th, under Capt. John Mendenhall, left Point San Jose, California, for the lava beds. Schofield advised Gillem that it would be better to shell or starve the Modocs into surrender than to engage in chasing them all over the countryside.

Gillem immediately put Schofield's recommendations into effect by sending the Warm Springs into the lava again to locate a trail on which he could move the howitzers and mortars closer to the Modocs. McKay and his scouts returned with the information that the artillery could be moved successfully. Gillem was not satisfied with McKay's report and decided to send out Capt. Evan Thomas, 4th Artillery, with a substantial patrol to the sand butte, four miles distant.

6. Schofield to Gillem, Apr. 22, 1873, in Hagen. Henry Cornelius Hasbrouck graduated from West Point in 1860. He served in the 4th Artillery throughout the Civil War and in the post-war period. From 1882 to 1888, he was commandant of cadets at West Point. Slowly climbing through the grades, he became a brigadier general in December 1902, retiring in January 1903. He received the brevet grade of major for his action in the battle of Sorass Lake during the Modoc War. John Mendenhall graduated from the USMA in 1851 and became a second lieutenant in the 4th Artillery. During the Civil War he served as both a judge advocate and an inspector general of Volunteers. Senior to Hasbrouck, he was promoted to colonel of the 2d Artillery in 1888. His career closed with his death in 1892. Heitman, 1, 509 and 703.

7. Schofield to Gillem, Apr. 22, 1873, in Hagen.

8. Dillon, p. 50.
William Simpson, deciding it was time to move on to other adventures, left Gillem's Camp on April 26. He would accompany Major Biddle who was taking as escort to Yreka to meet the new department commander, Jeff Davis. With Simpson was his fellow-Englishman, Edward Fox, who also had decided he had seen enough of the Modoc campaign. Before these gentlemen left, they saw Captain Thomas march off at seven a.m. in the opposite direction to confirm McKay's report on the trail. 9

Thomas' patrol gave every appearance of being able to accomplish its goals. He himself was the son of Lorenzo Thomas, who for several years had been the Adjutant General of the U. S. Army and who had retired just four years earlier. Young Thomas had joined the army as a second lieutenant in the 4th Artillery in 1861 and had been breveted for his actions at Fredericksburg and Gettysburg. Neither Green nor Gillem were concerned that he had very little experience in fighting Indians. With him were the sons of two other generals: 1st Lt. Thomas F. Wright, whose father, George Wright, a brigadier general of Volunteers, had commanded the Military Division of the Pacific and had drowned at sea off the coast of California in 1865; and 1st Lt. Albion Howe, son of Civil War General A. P. Howe, who was now a major in the 4th Artillery. Lieutenant Wright had attended West Point for one year in

9. Simpson, p. 381. Fox did not get beyond Yreka. When his paper learned of the latest events, it persuaded him to remain another two weeks. Fox agreed, but stayed in town and did not return to the lava beds.
the late 1840's, but had not served on active duty until the Civil War. By 1865, he was a colonel and brevet brigadier general in the Volunteers. Howe was also a Civil War veteran, having fought at Cold Harbor and Petersburg. 10

Two other officers, 2d Lt. George M. Harris and 1st Lt. Arthur Cranston, along with Dr. Bernard A. Semig, made up the commissioned officers of the patrol. Thomas also took along H. C. Tickner, as a guide, and a civilian packer, Louis Webber. The 59 enlisted men in the patrol consisted of Company E, 12th Infantry, and Batteries A and K, all three having been at Gillem's Camp since its establishment and having participated in the attack on the Stronghold.

Company E took the lead, immediately deploying as skirmishers. Thomas, accompanied by Wright and Tickner, walked behind. Then, marching in a column of twos, came Harris' Battery K, followed by Howe with Battery A. Behind them Lieutenant Cranston and Doctor Semig kept company; while at the tail was a tiny rear guard composed of one sergeant and three privates. About the same time, Donald McKay and 12 Warm Spring Scouts left their camp at the bay, working their way south with the intention of joining the patrol at the hill.

The patrol made its way through a more or less level area which consisted of an ancient eroded lava flow, too irregular to call a valley

10. Heitman, I, 547, 953, and 1063. The Army and Navy Journal, May 3, 1873, p. 601, made reference to the three generals' sons but, as it quite often did, got mixed up by saying that Howe was the son of a retired colonel, Marshall Saxe Howe.
but much easier to cover than the newer flows on either side—one almost directly south of Gillem's Camp, the other south of the Stronghold, today known respectively as the Devil's Homestead and Schonchin Flow. Before much distance was covered, the lack of experience and the general carelessness that was to mark the patrol became apparent. The infantrymen, instead of deploying to the flanks as skirmishers, huddled together as they slowly moved up the gradual slope toward the butte.

Semig noticed that the infantry was not up on top of the ridges on either flank as he knew it should be and mentioned his concern to Cranston. Cranston passed the word up the column, and "the Lieutenants detailed parties for each flank, but . . . these passed at the foot of the ridges nearest the column and kept drawing away from the ridges." First Sergeant Romer, Battery A, watched this with growing disgust and, in exasperation, "went out on the right flank and did certainly, all by himself" climb up on the successive ridges to guard against Indians who might try to slip up on the flanks of the column.

Semig and Cranston also noted with some concern that both batteries were closing up on the infantry so that the whole command was "marching more in the shape of a skirmishers than a skirmish line and main column." Their concern was justified for, unknown to the patrol, Scarfaced Charley and a number of Modocs were shadowing the soldiers. First Sergeant Romer, by himself, was hardly a large enough flank guard.11

11. Gillem to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, June 1, 1874, in Hagen.
At noon the soldiers reached the sloping uneven basin at the foot of the west side of the hill. The grass-covered butte itself rose about 200 feet above the men. To the south of their stopping place a low ridge ran west a few hundred yards from the base of the hill then curved around to the north another few hundred yards. To the east and northeast of the butte and of the patrol the ugly tumbled rocks of Schonchin Flow rose above the basin some twenty feet. The grassy, bush-strewn, mile-wide area itself was dotted with humps of lava, depressions, caves, and ungainly rocks. Within a few feet of any given point a man could step from a position giving him a view of the whole to a pit where he could see less than thirty feet. Here, Captain Thomas ordered a halt for food and rest.

The events of the next few hours will never be pieced together in their entirety; there were too few survivors and too much hysteria for that. Yet from the fragmented, secondhand reports, a general account may be reconstructed.

No alarm was felt as the men relaxed. Some took off their boots to ease their tired feet. Others lolled about, "clustered together in a friendly group." One report said that Company E was still deployed as skirmishers during the halt. If so, the infantrymen were undoubtedly as unprepared for trouble as they had been during the march.¹²

¹² Army and Navy Journal, June 14, 1874, p. 647, letter to editor, 2d Lt. George M. Kingsbury, 12th Infantry; Dillon, p. 51. Boyle said neither flankers nor pickets went out.
While the men ate, Captain Thomas, Lieutenant Harris, and two
enlisted men prepared to climb the hill in order to signal to Gillem's
Camp that they had arrived at their destination safely. They did not
make the climb. In one moment, the crash of rifles from the northeast,
est, south, and west, from 400 to 1,000 yards distant, cut through
the silence of the lava beds.

Lieutenant Wright was the first to react. He immediately ordered
a "set of fours" from the left of his skirmish line to advance on the
Schonchin Flow ridge to the northeast only fifty yards away. These
four men covered only twenty yards when a snarling fire came from
their very goal. The men ran back to Wright's position. At this
point, Thomas ordered Wright to "advance" with all of Company E toward
the ridge on the west, away from the hill. The surviving men of
Company E claimed that Wright led them to this bluff, "losing a comrade
here and there" while doing so. In the end, Wright was deserted by
all his men save seven or eight, for the Modocs fired from this ridge

13. Army and Navy Journal, June 14, 1873, p. 697. Kingsbury,
who took over Company E after this disaster, was presenting a neated
defense of the infantrymen's conduct. His second-hand description must
be treated with care. Gillem to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, June 1, 1874,
in Hagen, gives a generally similar description of this part of the
battle. The use of the "set of fours" indicates that Wright was well
acquainted with Emory Upton's system of tactics, adopted by the army
in 1867. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New

14. Gillem to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, June 1, 1874, in Hagen.
Gillem's account is almost meaningless for he uses the term "left"
without any reference to the compass. Later, the colonel implies that
the ridge was to the west.
with even greater fury. The deserters ran toward the northwest, back the way they had come.  

When Thomas gave his order to Wright, Lieutenant Cranston volunteered to take five men to dislodge the Indians from rocks to the north of the hill. Thomas gave his permission. All six were slaughtered.  

Now the command dissolved. Half the soldiers, in hysterical shock, deserted their comrades and, each for himself, raced madly back the way he had come. Colonel Gillem wrote, "At this time ... all organization ceased."

But not all resistance. Thomas, Harris, Howe, Semig, and a handful of men also withdrew toward the west, following after Lieutenant Wright and the few who had stayed with him. Tickner, the guide, had seen enough; he ran after the fleeing soldiers toward Gillem's Camp. Semig bravely halted on open ground, dressed the wounds of two soldiers, then hurried on to catch up with Thomas, overtaking him "in a hollow with some small rocks and sage bushes, not over fifty yards from the ridge which Wright's command had been ordered to take." Thomas, believing that Wright had taken the ridge, shouted for him "and as a reply received several shots."  


16. Gillem to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, June 1, 1874, in Hagen.

17. Ibid.
Defending themselves as best they could in the depression, Thomas and all his command, now reduced to the officers and twenty men, fought until all were killed or severely wounded. Wright and his small group suffered the same fate. Corporal Noble from Battery A reported that "Wright was first shot through the groin, dangerously wounded." He buried his watch so that the enemy could not have it, then "a second bullet passed through his heart and he shortly afterwards breathed his last." A lieutenant, not at the scene, wrote soon after, "Wright was severely wounded on the way to the heights, and his company, with one or two exceptions, deserted him and fled like a pack of sheep; then the slaughter began." Wright's replacement later declared that the infantry had not run any faster or farther than the artillery.18

Tickner, beating his own path to safety, ran into McKay and the Warm Springs scouts. McKay, already aware of the disaster, was trying to move closer to the scene of the attack to aid the regulars. He did not make it. Gillem later said that every time the Warm Springs tried to advance, the soldiers would fire on them thinking they were Modocs. This is perhaps somewhat overstated. Few soldiers were firing anymore; they were either running or dead. Gillem would have sounded more plausible had he written that the Warm Springs understood perfectly

18. Ibid; Army and Navy Journal, May 3, p. 602, and June 14, 1873 p. 697 (Kingsbury); Don Rickey, Jr., Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay, The Enlisted Soldier Fighting the Indian Wars (Norman, 1963), p. 279.
what was happening; there was little that the 12 scouts could do for anyone, except to stay alive in order to fight another day.\textsuperscript{19}

The troops at Gillem's Camp and the Stronghold could hear the sounds of firing from the sand butte. Lieutenant Adams up at the signal station was even able to discern that some kind of action was taking place. No one took alarm however. Major Green was sure the patrol was large enough to take care of itself. Even when the first breathless soldier staggered into camp at one-thirty p.m. and gasped his story, Gillem's people marked him down as one who had obviously and simply lost his nerve.\textsuperscript{20}

It was mid-afternoon before the extent of the disaster became clear and rescue parties could be formed. While Lieutenant Boyle decided that Gillem, again caught in a crisis, "lost all control of himself and would not act nor let others," the colonel's surprise and indecision were nothing compared to the record of the relief columns.\textsuperscript{21} Major Green led the column (Trimble's detachment from Troop H and Cresson with a detachment from Troop K) from Gillem's

\textsuperscript{19} Gillem to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, June 1, 1874, in Hagen; FitzGerald, in his reminiscences, reacted the opposite to Gillem. He wrote that the Warm Springs were but a few hundred yards away when the shooting began and went into a defensive position behind a rock barricade: "Their abject fear of the Modocs unnerved them and rendered them practically useless in such emergencies."

\textsuperscript{20} Dillon, p. 52; NA, Microfilm 666, 1871, Roll 22, Schofield, telegram to Sherman, Apr. 29, 1873; Green to AAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 2, 1873, in Hagen.

\textsuperscript{21} Dillon, p. 52
Camp and, on the trail, met a second group of three or four companies from the Stronghold. These rescuers would hardly take pride in the fact that the first rescued man was not brought into Gillem’s Camp until 32 hours after the attack.

To be sure, a number of things went wrong. By the time the columns got under way, not only was dusk settling in but the weather suddenly turned "blustery." It took the tensed soldiers six hours to make their way over the unfamiliar trail. By the time they reached the vicinity of the sand hill, it was already too dark to locate any survivors who might still lie out in the sage and craters; besides, there was the unspoken fear that the Modocs might still be waiting to lace this group with bullets. Green was not at all sure but what he had missed Thomas on the trail. Halting on the now-deserted ridge that Wright had died trying to reach, the soldiers fumbled in the darkness to throw up rock forts. The wounded and a few others who had not run that afternoon could hear the rocks falling into place. Not knowing if the sounds were coming from friend or foe, they hesitated to give themselves away.

Then, toward midnight, a half dozen men, most of whom were wounded, decided that the sounds came from their own, and stumbled into the line of safety. The rescuers believed these survivors could lead them to the others still lying out in the darkness. The orders were given, and for a while rescuer and rescued floundered about but with not a
trace of success. The command spent the rest of the dark hours building still more forts. 22

At dawn Lieutenant Boutelle and his sergeant cautiously moved off the ridge searching over the lower ground in front, then so suddenly they were shocked, "we came upon the most heartbreaking sight it has been my fate to behold." Lying in the little hollow were the bodies of Thomas and Howe, the wounded Harris and Semig, "together with a number of enlisted men, all dead or wounded." 23

Green's men continued to search the basin throughout the day. Occasionally they spied a Modoc or two who let himself be seen against the skyline. To the north of Thomas' men, the rescuers finally discovered the bodies of Wright and the few men who had stuck with him. Nowhere could they find the bodies of Cranston and his group. These were to be listed as missing.

One officer wrote of that day as the most saddening and fatiguing in his army career. The victims when found presented "different forms of anguish and distortion, some in the position of desperate defense, others prostrate . . . in dire helplessness." Another described "the dead and wounded, officers and men, in one confused heap. Almost all had been shot several times--Major Thomas four times, Captain Wright three," and the Modocs had stripped many of the bodies bare. The army

22. Brady, pp. 306-07, quoting Boutelle; Green to AAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 2, 1873, in Hagen.

fraternity throughout the country read with shock and horror an unsigned article in the Army and Navy Journal that "the bodies of Captain Thomas, Lieutenant Howe, Acting Surgeon Semig, Sergeant Romer, and six others, were found hidden in some sage brush stripped naked." Semig was wounded twice but there was hope he would recover. The article continued, "Lieutenant Wright's body lay a little to the left (of Thomas), and on the right was Lieutenant Harris, severely wounded, and the bodies of five of his men, stripped of all their clothing."^24

The rescue column took all the daylight hours of the 27th searching for bodies, recovering the wounded, and burying many of the dead where they lay. At this distance one cannot be certain if that much time was necessary. The rescuers were quite determined, however, not to begin the return journey until they were cloaked with the security of night. Gillem and Green either had forgotten to include a medical officer or had labored under the mistaken belief that the Stronghold would supply one. Eventually this omission was discovered, but it took Surgeon McElderry until noon to reach the scene. Gillem would get the blame eventually; but, as he had on November 28, 1872, Green had again disclosed that flaw that caused him to work out his problems.

and their solutions incompletely. When McKelderry did arrive he worked on the wounded with only a dressing case and his skills. Boutelle witnessed the doctor's difficult task: "Added to the horrors of the day was an absence of water . . . . The pleadings of some suffering from peritonitis . . . were dreadful and continuous. When it ceased we knew what had occurred. They were dead."

The trip back during the night of April 27-28 was a horror by itself. Boutelle provided the most graphic account of the terrible journey. Although he detailed his men off into three reliefs: "one to carry on the stretcher, one to carry the guns of those bearing the wounded, and one resting," he hardly knew how to describe what followed. The exhausted, terrified reliefs sought the refuge of night to save only themselves, ignoring the pleas of the others to take a turn at carrying the nine six-man stretchers. "Added to the horrors," wrote Boutelle, "a bitter storm of sleet and rain came down in torrents, freezing as it fell." After the storm hit, the night was "as black as a wolf's mouth," and the details slipped off to join "the mob working its weary way toward a beacon kept burning . . . on the bluff near Gillem's camp."

In the end, Boutelle realized that it was useless to attempt to persuade the men to return to carrying the wounded and "that my muscle was worth more than my authority." He shouldered a stretcher handle

25. Brady, p. 309, quoting Boutelle; Green to AAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 2, 1873, in Hagen.
and with men he could trust, carried the wracked and dying Harris
back to camp. 26

The "mob" finally reached Gillem's Camp an hour after sunrise,
April 28. It had taken twelve hours to cover four miles. Yet Boutelle
was understanding of his men: "The nervous strain was too great for
ordinary endurance." 27 An unforeseen result of the suffering of the
wounded was the construction of a crude but comfortable chair to be
mounted on a mule for the transport of future wounded. 28

"We have sickening news again from the Lava Beds," wrote Lieutenant
Jocelyn at Camp Warner, as news of the disastrous patrol and its casu-
alties began pouring in. 29 Thomas, Howe, and Wright were dead. Harris
was mortally wounded. Cranston was missing and presumed dead. Semig
had lost a foot and was suffering from partial paralysis caused by a
shoulder wound. Twenty enlisted men, including those with Cranston,
and Packer Webber had been killed. Sixteen other enlisted men were
wounded, many of them severely. 30 Two-thirds of the patrol had fallen


27. Ibid., p. 311, and pp. 315-17, quoting Trimble.


30. Figures are based on the following: Stone, telegram to Wood,
Apr. 29, 1873; A. Surg. Henry McElderry, Form 55, List of Wounded in
Maj. Thomas Command ... Apr. 26, 1873; Gillem to AAG, Dept. of Columbia,
June 1, 1874, all in Hagen; Army and Navy Journal, June 14, 1873, p. 697
(Lt. Kingsbury); Harper's Weekly, 17 (May 17, 1873), pp. 410-17, "The
Modoc War"; NA, RG 98, Regimental Returns, 4th Artillery, April, 1873.
victim to the Modocs' accurate rifle fire. The rest had run. It was a stunning defeat. The nation and, more severely, the army reacted sharply.

Frank Wheaton at Camp Warner could scarcely believe the news. He had been removed for far less cause. More in shock than in bitterness he wrote, "we cannot understand it and are filled with grief and horror at the terrible loss." A stinging rebuke of Gillem appeared in the usually noncommittal Army and Navy Journal:

The charity which covers with the mantle of oblivion the mistakes of the dead, stays our criticism on the conduct of this latest expedition against the Modocs, which has resulted so disastrously. But we need a fuller explanation than is contained in the report of General Gillem . . . as to the reasons which prompted him to send Captain Thomas on so delicate a mission as that of hunting for Indians among the lava rocks, and leaving him entirely to his own resources and unsupported.

The editors hoped, quite clearly, "for different results under the management of General Davis," who was "a cool, capable, and determined officer." Davis himself did not blame Gillem as much as he did the soldiers for being cowards and Captain Thomas for "not pushing his skirmish line farther to the front and on his flanks before halting." But then, as now, the commander was ultimately responsible. Gillem had had his opportunity and had been found wanting. Most critical of all

31. Wheaton to Oliver Applegate, May 2, 1873, in Hagen.

was the lack of faith in him that many of his subordinates now felt. Davis would put up with him for a while; nevertheless Gillem must have realized that his days in the lava beds would be few.

Even now, in defeat, his characteristic concern for his men came to the top. He officially commended enlisted men who had died--an act that cool and capable officers seldom seemed to find time for during the Indian wars. In his final report on the Modoc War, he wrote "Two men seem to require special mention, their conduct was the subject of commendation by those who fled ... as well as those [who] remained .... These gallant men were 1st Sergeant Robert Romer, Co. 'A' 4th Artillery, and 1st Sergeant Malachi Clinton, Co. 'E' 12th Infantry." Both sergeants were brave men who not only did their duty but tried to get others to do their duty as well; "The former was killed with his Commander, Captain Thomas, the latter was mortally wounded with Lieut. Wright."33

As they had ever since November, the Modocs escaped virtually unscathed. Although Schofield received a report that claimed five Modoc bodies had been found by the rescuers, the Modocs later told Surgeon McElderry that only one man lost his life in the attack.34 Captain Jack may have lost a great deal of sympathy for his killing of General

33. Gillem to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, June 1, 1874, in Hagen.

34. NA, Microfilm 666, 1871, Roll 22, Schofield, telegram to Sherman, Apr. 29, 1873; Gillem to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, June 1, 1874, in Hagen.
Canby, but he and his men now gained the respect of fighting men that is reserved for the underdog overcoming odds. Still, the victory dance would not have been quite so lively had the Indians known the temper of Jefferson C. Davis, who even then was approaching the lava beds to take command.
A Very Square Fight

(Troop Movements and Incidents, April 29-May 9, Battle of Sorass Lake, May 10, 1873)

Col. Jefferson C. Davis, who never forgave the other Davis for having the same name, arrived at Gillem's Camp May 2. His 27 years in the army had involved many adventures, some of them unfortunate. Nevertheless he was all soldier—he knew it, and his subordinates knew it. He was well aware of life in the enlisted ranks, having been a corporal and sergeant in the Indiana Volunteers during the Mexican War. In 1848 he had gone into the regular army by accepting a second lieutenant's commission in the 1st Artillery.

When the Civil War came, he jumped to the volunteer grade of brigadier general in the first year, only to remain at that level throughout the war despite an outstanding record as a combat leader—although he did receive the brevet grade of major general. He might have gone higher had it not been for an unfortunate incident in the fall of 1862, when his commanding general, Maj. Gen. William Nelson, argued with him in a hotel lobby. Davis, insulted, retaliated in the fiery tradition by throwing a card in Nelson's face. Nelson then slapped him. Davis left the room, procured a pistol, and shot the general dead. Saved from punishment through the efforts of his friend, eye-witness, and participant in the original argument, Gov. Oliver P. Morton of Kentucky, Davis was
never to regret that he killed Nelson. He believed however that this incident was the reason he did not make major general in the Volunteers nor brigadier general in the regular army. After the Civil War he became colonel of the 22d Infantry and went to Sitka where he received the newly-purchased Alaskan Territory from Russian authorities.

Davis took one look at his new command and realized that it was in no condition to attack the Modocs for the time being: "I found them laboring under great depression of spirits; their cheerless winter camps, heavy losses, and repeated failures, had doubtless diminished their zeal and confidence" even before the disaster of Thomas' patrol. This latest tragedy had further lowered morale, "so much so that I deemed it imprudent to order the aggressive movements it was my desire and intention to make at once." As for the soldiers as fighters, "a great many . . . are utterly unfit for Indian fighting of this kind, being only cowardly beef-eaters." Nevertheless they were salvageable, and he recommended they be kept in the field, trained, and made to fight. "I shall," he concluded, "take such steps while here as I think will ensure this training."2

The new colonel set out to rebuild morale and to make soldiers once again out of the dispirited men. He let Gillem retain his title

1. Heitman, 1, 358-59; DAB, 5, 131.

2. Davis to Schofield, May 4, 1873, in Hagen; House Documents, 43d Congress, 1st Sess., No. 122, p. 109, Davis to Schofield, Nov. 1, 1873.
as commander of the expedition for the time being. However the real
commander was Davis himself, and the word spread quickly throughout
the camps. Gillem, sick at heart and in body, realized that he was
through, yet he outwardly went through the form of office. Davis,
displaying his energy and confidence for all to see, continued his in-
spection of both terrain and troops. On May 5 he advised Schofield,
"I have examined the lava beds, they are very strong but not insurmount-
able. Troops not now in condition to attack but will be soon."³

As after the earlier set-backs, the army's reaction to the Strong-
hold and Thomas fights was to order still more troops to the lava beds.
Wheaton's long-ago request for a minimum of 1,000 troops was finally
being recognized. Batteries B and G had preceded Davis, having arrived
at their camps on April 28 and 29 respectively. Until now the artillery
batteries had been equipped to fight as infantry. Battery B however
had been mounted at Redding, California, the head of the railroad, and

³. Davis, telegram to AAG, Div. of Pacific, May 5, 1873, in Hagen.
Colonel Thompson said of this time that "desertions were by the whole-
sale." This is incorrect, not only at the end of April but through the
war. At a time when about one-third of the army deserted annually, the
number of absentees in the lava beds was remarkably low. A check of the
regimental returns of the 1st Cavalry and 4th Artillery discloses the
following:

<table>
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<th>Total desertions in regiment, Feb.-June, 1873</th>
<th>Desertions in the regiment's units in lava beds, Feb.-June, 1873</th>
<th>Total desertions in regiment, April, 1873</th>
<th>Desertions in the regiment's units in lava beds, April, 1873</th>
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<td>46</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th Art. 31</td>
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would be used as cavalry in the coming events. The War Department now advised Schofield that he was authorized to enlist 400 Indian scouts, and it ordered the 4th Infantry Regiment in Arkansas to proceed to California. Almost immediately there were second thoughts. The 4th Infantry was held at Omaha, and the idea of 400 additional scouts died a quiet death. 4

During Davis' first week at Gillem's Camp, he employed two Indian women to scout around the base of the Sand (Hardin) Butte to search for the bodies of Cranston and his men. By May 6 these women had found the bodies; but not until the 9th did a patrol (the remnants of Batteries A and K and Company E, as well as Company G, 12th Infantry) go out to attempt recovery. This effort failed because the bodies had already decomposed too much for removal. The troops gave them a hasty burial on the spot, marking the graves with headboards. 5

Davis' plans to suspend operations until the troops were fit to fight received a jolt on May 7. The Modocs seized the initiative by swinging out of the lava beds to attack a wagon train traveling from a new camp being established on the Peninsula, or Island, to the old cavalry camp on Scorpion Point. This was the fourth such attack in this general area since the beginning of hostilities.

4. NA, Microfilm 666, 1871, Roll 22, Townsend, telegram to Schofield, May 2, 1873; Schofield, telegrams to Davis, May 2 and 6, 1873, in Hagen.

5. Capt. E. V. Sumner, ADC, to Capt. C. H. Hoyt, AQM, June 2, 1873, in Hagen; Army and Navy Journal, Mar. 17, 1873, p. 630. Sumner names the two women as Artena and Dixie.
The four wagons were lightly guarded, having an escort of only 15-20 men. The soldiers defended them briefly, suffering three men wounded. The 20 Modocs drove off the escort, captured the wagons, eleven mules, and three horses. Peter Schonchin, a youth at the time, recounted in later years that the Indians discovered two barrels of whiskey in the wagons, got gloriously drunk, then drove the wagons through the lava smashing them to bits. This good story is probably apocryphal. The wagons were returning to Scorpion Point to pick up another load of Boyle's quartermaster supplies and thus were probably empty. The Army and Navy Journal reported simply "They burned the wagons." 6

When the two squaws went out to search for Cranston's body, they found no sign of Modocs in the vicinity of the butte. On May 7, Davis, anxious to learn where they had gone, sent out a patrol of Warm Springs to search their trail. McKay's scouts returned with the information that the Modocs had moved through the lava beds in a southeasterly direction. It was possibly a flank guard of the Modocs who discovered and attacked the wagon train on that same day. Peter Schonchin claimed that after leaving the vicinity of the butte, the Modocs "crossed the lava flow to the east and stayed there several days at an ice cave at end

6. Davis, telegram to AAG, Div. of Pacific, May 8; Mason to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 10, 1873, both in Hagen; Army and Navy Journal, May 17, 1873, p. 630; J. D. Howard, "Diary," typescript at Lava Beds NM; Murray, p. 244. Peter Schonchin told the story to Howard, Sep. 5, 1924, when the two passed by the site where the attack took place—the rimrock near the south end of Casuse Butte (said Schonchin). Murray errs slightly in saying the wagons were carrying supplies to Scorpion Point.
of a large natural uridge," Captain Jack's Ice Cave today, using the ice as a source of water. From there, according to Schonchin, they made their way south to today's Caldwell's Cave, which is north of the Tickner Road, then eastward toward Dry Lake.\(^7\)

When Davis learned that the Indians were moving toward the south-east, he decided to send a patrol down the east side of the lava beds to prevent the Modocs from escaping.\(^8\) He appointed Captain Hasbrouck to lead the three units of the patrol, companies that had moved to the new Peninsula camp on May 8: his own Battery B, temporarily under 1st Lt. James B. Hazelton; Jackson's Troop B, with Lieutenants Moss and Boutelle; and Troop G, now under the command of Lieutenant Kyle (Bernard having returned to Camp Bidwell because of illness).\(^9\)

Hasbrouck and his command, which also included a detachment of Warm Springs Indians, moved out the morning of April 9, proceeding on horse to a shallow lake near the southeast corner of the lava beds. The troops had already affectionately named this Sorass Lake.\(^10\) They reached the lake that evening. Finding no water, Hasbrouck imaginatively renamed it Dry Lake, which unfortunately is what it is called today.

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7. Howard, entry for October 29, 1928. There is no way to verify Peter Schonchin's description of the Modocs' route--except that only a few caves in the lava beds have ice.


10. Dillon, p. 47n.
He directed the two cavalry troops and the scouts to set up their camp on the west side of the lake bed. The battery moved farther south about one mile and established its camp within the trees that dotted the plain below Timber Mountain.¹¹

Two hundred yards north of the cavalry camp was a line of low rock outcroppings running west to east, and another two hundred yards farther this line was superseded by a higher rock bluff, rising some thirty feet above the lake. Before retiring for the night, Hasbrouck placed some guards on the higher bluff in case the Modocs should appear.

Just before daylight, May 10, the Modocs did just that. They slipped past the outposts, took up a main position on the high bluff, and sent a smaller group down to the rocks below. The first the sleeping troopers knew of all this was a roar of shouting and firing as the Modocs attacked the camp.

The soldiers fell out of their blankets, the horses stampeded, and all was confusion. For once however panic did not overtake reason. The officers reacted swiftly and succeeded in restoring order among the startled troopers. Private Hardin recalled the scene; "Men rolled over behind saddles and bundles of blankets--no covering however small being ignored, fastened on belts and pulling on boots under a hail of bullets."¹²

¹¹ Brady, p. 320.

¹² Ibid; Rickey, p. 287.
Hasbrouck ordered Boutelle to Battery B's camp to order the artillerymen up. Then he directed Kyle to take part of his G troop to round up the horses. Within a few minutes after the Indians' opening fire, Hasbrouck's command had organized sufficiently for him to order Captain Jackson to take the right and Lieutenant Moss to take the left and charge the Modocs with B Troop and the rest of G.

McKay's men had succeeded in catching their horses, and Hasbrouck dispatched the mounted Warm Springs, one-half to the left, the other to the right, to outflank the Modoc position.

According to Hardin, the troopers paused momentarily when ordered to charge. At this critical instant 1st Sgt. Thomas Kelly, G Troop, "sprang up and shouted, 'God damn it, let's charge.'" Five months of frustration gave way at that moment, and the troops rushed the lower ridges, paused, carried the higher bluff, and pursued the running Modocs across sage and lava toward the west. So swift was the action and the Modocs' retreat that McKay's scouts were unable to get behind the enemy. By the time Battery B arrived, the fighting was over.13

The troops chased after the Modocs three or four miles but finally gave up because of lack of water. The Modocs had withdrawn in such haste that they left behind the body of a dead warrior, Ellen's Man George. Hasbrouck's men searched the field and recovered "a number


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of ponies, a lot of blankets, fixed ammunition, and loose powder and bullets." Still, it was an expensive battle for the troopers; eight lay wounded, three of them mortally. The Warm Springs lost two men killed also.

That night, "just after sundown, the wagons sent for having arrived, the wounded were transported to Peninsula Camp." Hasbrouck led his men to Scorpion (he called it Promontory) Point, "the nearest place to water." Lieutenant Boyle, as usual not terribly impressed with the conduct of his fellow soldiers, called the battle more of a draw than a victory. But he did admit that "it was the beginning of the end." Davis, pleased that his men had not run away, was more optimistic--allowing that the Modocs were still at large, it had been "a very square fight, and whipped the Modocs for the first time."\(^{14}\)

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\(^{14}\) Brady, p. 320.

\(^{15}\) Dillon, pp. 55-56; House Documents, 43d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 105, Davis to Schofield, Nov. 1, 1873.
CHAPTER 9

Each Warrior Came Forward

(Pursuit and Surrender of Western Band, May 11-22, 1873)

A draw or a victory, the fight at Sorass Lake changed the mood of the Modoc War. Davis' presence was making itself felt, and there was a new buoyancy of spirit and a quickening pace in operations. The watchdog, the Army and Navy Journal, editorialized: "General Jefferson C. Davis has not disappointed expectation in his management of the Modoc business; he has infused new life into a command demoralized by mismanagement."¹

The mood of the Modocs changed too. Unknown to the army, a fierce debate raged among the Indians following Sorass Lake. The argument centered on the conduct of that battle, particularly who was responsible for the death of Ellen's Man. Behind that was the more serious matter of the entire resistance itself. The Hot Creek band had in the beginning not wanted to get involved in the fighting. Now that the Modocs were on the run and morale was sinking, the Hot Creeks sought out Captain Jack as the man responsible for Ellen's Man's death. In the individual-oriented tribal organization of the American West, it was an easy matter for the Hot Creeks to decide to go their own way. There was little that Captain Jack or his supporters could do about it. The

¹ Army and Navy Journal, June 7, 1873, p. 85.
split came. Hooker Jim, Bogus Charley, Scarfaced Charley, Shacknasty Jim, Steamboat Frank, eight other men, and their families rode toward the mountains west of Van Bremer's. Captain Jack, Schonchin John, Black Jim, and their group remained for the moment in the lava flow north of today's Big Sand Butte, west of Sorass Lake.  

Davis, unaware of this development, made his plans to follow up Sorass Lake. It was at this time that he decided on his new tactics, "to move them (the troops) all into the lava-beds and form a series of bivouacks from which they could fight when opportunity offered, or could rest and take things easy, like the Indians." There would be no rest for Hasbrouck's command. As soon as he arrived at Scorpion Point, May 11, Hasbrouck sent a message to Davis saying he was sure the Modocs were located near Sandy (Big Sand) Butte. Following instructions he turned in the horses and led the same units (Battery B, Troops B and G, and the Warm Springs) south to the butte by way of Sorass Lake and Tickner Road. Camping on the plain on the south side, his men built a scattering of rock fortifications that still stand.  

Davis also ordered Mason, at the Stronghold, to take a large command southeast across the lava beds, past Juniper Butte, and to coordinate with Hasbrouck for an attack on this new Modoc position.


There would be no repeating of the error of too small a patrol as in Thomas' case. Mason's command consisted of Companies B, C, and I, 21st Infantry, and Batteries A, E, G, K, and M, 4th Artillery. On April 12 the troops marched, according to Mason, "in a hollow square, covering about three quarters of a mile front." Davis wrote that this was a "scramble (it cannot be properly called a march)," but that it was exceedingly creditable to the troops and commander." Mason reached his destination at three-thirty that afternoon and camped on a level area two miles north of the hill. The troops erected a large network of rock fortifications around the perimeter of the thirty acres it took to contain so large a patrol.

Hasbrouck and Mason were now two and a half miles apart with the butte and the supposed location of the Modocs between them. Soon after his arrival Mason discerned Indian activity "in a belt of black lava to my right and front," that is, to the west and southwest. The next morning Hasbrouck walked over to Mason's camp and the two officers planned an attack. Either then or on the following morning, May 14, they climbed Big Sand Butte to make a visual reconnaissance of the area. They decided to delay an attack until more water could be carried to

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4. Ibid. Difficult to find, off the main tracks of today's visitors, these fortifications, on national forest land, still exist in a remarkable state of preservation. One may detect from their architecture that different companies around the perimeter had different ideas on how best to use rocks in constructing the forts.
An Indian scout reported to Hasbrouck on the afternoon of the 14th that he thought the Modocs had fled. First Lt. J. B. Hazelton spoke up and volunteered to take a patrol into the lava to determine the facts. He succeeded in rounding up 26 volunteers for this patrol, another indication of the changes wrought by Davis. The patrol returned, confirming that the Modocs had indeed left.

Hasbrouck followed the Indians' trail to the west eight miles on May 15, finding that it left the Tickner road and bore toward Antelope Springs (Antelope Well). He gave up the pursuit and returned to Big Sand Butte to await the arrival of horses. Mason's command, very short of water, moved back to Juniper Butte. It did not stop there, for Davis directed it to return to the Stronghold and to pack up prior to moving to Gillem's Camp. The Stronghold had lost its value as a base now that the Modocs had left the lava beds.

Hasbrouck received his horses on the 16th and rode west from the butte the next day. About half-way between Big Sand Butte and Van Bremer's ranch he met Captain Perry riding south with a patrol. The two exchanged information. Hasbrouck continued on to Van Bremer's, while Perry rode south toward Antelope Springs. It was their intention that on May 18 Hasbrouck would ride south and Perry would retrace his

5. Brady, p. 322; Mason to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 10, 1873, in Hagen.

6. Brady, p. 323; Mason to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 10, 1873, in Hagen.
steps to the north; hopefully they would either catch the Modocs between them or at least pick up the trail.

The westbound Modocs had circled around to the south of Van Bremer's Mountain (Mount Dome) and made their way up the long ridge joining Sheep Mountain to Fairchild's (Mahogany) Mountain looming over Fairchild's ranch.\(^7\) Hasbrouck moved south from Van Bremer's as he had planned. Before he had gone far, his men discovered a fresh trail leading up the ridge to the west. Not at all certain this was the main trail, Hasbrouck continued on slowly while dispatching Captain Jackson and some troopers to check it out. "Very soon shots were heard," reported Hasbrouck, "and I ordered B troop and the Warm Springs to join Captain Jackson at a gallop."\(^8\) The troopers rode hard after the Indians, firing at elusive targets, for almost eight miles toward the north. The Modocs drove their horses even harder, ducking and weaving over the irregular ridges, around knobs, and through thickets of juniper and mountain mahogany. The Indians splintered and scattered in many directions until, finally, the troopers reined in their exhausted horses. Five Indians lay dead--two men and three women. Hasbrouck hastened to point out that the women were accidentally killed because of the confusion and haste. In addition the soldiers took into custody several women, children,

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7. Riddle, p. 127.
and horses. Then they rode slowly down to Van Bremer's ranch.  

Davis, possibly already aware that only part of the Modocs had been discovered, ordered the cavalry and infantry to converge on Fairchild's ranch for a final push. On May 19 Hasbrouck moved his command there from Van Bremer's. The next day, Mason marched westward from Gillem's camp with the infantry, stopping briefly at Van Bremer's. At the same time, Mendenhall prepared to move the artillery batteries (except B) eastward to the Peninsula camp. The lava beds were emptied of troops.

At Fairchild's, Hasbrouck's men mounted up on May 20 to renew the pursuit. Before they left the ranch, Fairchild told the authorities that a Modoc woman had come in saying that the Indians wanted to surrender. This development changed the situation. Davis decided that negotiations were now more pertinent than pursuit. He employed the same two women who had found Cranston's body to go up the mountain, seek out the Modocs, and inform them of the terms of surrender.

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9. Ibid. Battery B did not take part in the pursuit. Before dashing up the ridge, Hasbrouck sent it a message to remain on Tickner road with the pack train until sent for. The message never reached Lieutenant Hazelton, commanding, and he continued on down the road. Battery B did not get back to Van Bremer's until the next day.

10. Brady, p. 323; Mason to AAAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 10, 1873, in Hagen. Davis was definitely aware of the split in the Modocs by at least May 21, as is shown in SO 59a, Headquarters, Dept. of Columbia, May 21, 1873, in Hagen.

11. Sumner to Hoyt, June 2, 1873, in Hagen; Brady, p. 323.
At this point Davis decided to relieve Gillem of his command. On May 21, Special Orders 59a pointed out that the Modocs had dispersed and that their capture would depend on detachments of mounted troops acting independently of each other. As for the foot troops, their operations "must be made to conform to the new order of things." This being the state of affairs, operations could now "more conveniently be carried on under the immediate orders of the Department Commander, while on the spot, than under those of a special commander of the expedition." This elaborate explanation concluded, "Colonel A. C. Gillem is therefore relieved from duty with this command and will proceed to Benicia Barracks," from where he had come. The timing of Gillem's relief was particularly cruel; the western band of Modocs would surrender within hours after Gillem's departure. The rest of Special Order No. 59 restored Frank Wheaton to command of the expedition. This was Davis' and the army's way of saying that Wheaton had not been responsible for the earlier disasters. Although Wheaton's reputation glowed again, there was no mistaking Davis' direct command of future operations.  

John Fairchild and his wife went up the mountain on May 22 and after a short parley came down again with 63 Modoc men, women, and children. "'Here they come!' was the cry that . . . brought every person, citizen, and soldier, old and young, to his feet." The excited

12. SO 59a and 59b, Headquarters, Dept. of Columbia, May 21, 1873 in Hagen.
crowd pressed forward to witness the surrender, "First came Mr. Blair, the manager of Fairchild's rancho, mounted; fifty yards behind him was Mrs. Fairchild, and further still twelve Modoc bucks, with their squaws and pappooses [sic]." The procession barely moved; here and there gaunt ponies "seemed scarcely able to bear the women and children who were literally piled upon them."

A hush fell over the waiting crowd as the party approached: "The Modocs said nothing. No one approached them until General Davis came forward. He met the procession fifty paces from the house, and was formally introduced to Bogus Charley." Then each warrior came forward, greeted Davis, and laid his rifle at the colonel's feet. Davis spoke to them, demanding all their weapons and warning against attempts to escape. He directed them to a clump of trees on the opposite side of Cottonwood Creek where they were to camp. "At this point the tailings of the crowd came in," wrote a witness. "There were half-naked children, aged squaws who could scarcely hobble, blind, lame, halt, bony, the scum of the tribe."

Bogus Charley, who spoke English, gave Colonel Davis the details of the split with Captain Jack. He also told him, erroneously, that Boston Charley had been killed. Another warrior was not with the group—Hooker Jim, "the Lost river murderer." But, shortly, Hooker Jim came in alone, and he too surrendered. Two days later on May 24, Mason's infantry came up from Van Bremer's to take charge of the prisoners-of-war.
The cavalry had one more job to do--capture Captain Jack. Colonel Davis wired General Schofield, "I hope to end the Modoc War soon." 

13. This description is from an unsigned article in the Army and Navy Journal, May 31, 1873, p. 665. Other variations are found in Klamath County Museum, Research Papers No. 2, "The Samuel A. Clarke Papers"; Davis, telegram to AAG, Div. of Pacific, May 22, 1873, in Hagen; and, less reliable, Riddle, p. 127.
CHAPTER 10

Thus Ends the Modoc War

(Pursuit and Surrender of Captain Jack, May 23-June 4, 1873)

Captain Jack, Schonchin John, and their followers traveled eastward from the lava beds. Keeping on the ridges between Tule and Clear Lakes they first went north to a favorite campsite on the east side of the Bryant Mountains, northeast of Tule Lake. After a few days they packed up again, this time heading toward Steele Swamp east of Clear Lake. They never reached it.¹

The day after the western band surrendered, Colonel Davis reorganized his mounted troops into three squadrons: 1st Squadron—Captain Perry, Troops F and H, and twenty Warm Springs; 2d Squadron—Captain Hasbrouck, Battery B, Troop G, and twenty Warm Springs; 3d Squadron—Captain Jackson, Troops B and K, and twenty Warm Springs Scouts. Thirty pack mules were attached to each squadron. Trusting the already-captured Modocs not to betray him, Davis dispatched Steamboat Frank, Bogus Charley, Hooker Jim, and Shacknasty Jim to find Captain Jack's band and persuade it to surrender. He also sent the two Indian women who had been his messengers and scouts in the past. The pressure on Jack was increasing. Davis felt confident that with his mobile forces and spies, he would

¹. Riddle, pp. 131 and 141.
soon bring the remaining Modocs to bay.  

Jackson's Third Squadron left Fairchild's ranch on May 24. Riding by way of Lower Klamath Lake and Lost River Ford, it arrived at the Peninsula camp at 10 a.m. on the 25th. There it proceeded to refit for the coming pursuit. Twenty-four hours behind it Hasbrouck's Second Squadron arrived at this newest camp. The squadrons learned on May 28 that the Modoc scouts had discovered Captain Jack camped on Willow Creek, a small swift stream that drained the highlands east of Clear Lake. At three-thirty in the morning, May 29, both squadrons rode toward the rising sun, stopping briefly at Applegate's ranch, where Davis had already moved his headquarters. The four Modoc scouts joined them here and guided the command to Willow Creek.

Stopping momentarily from two to three miles short of Jack's camp, the squadrons deployed. Jackson's 3d Squadron crossed the stream at

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2. Ibid., pp. 141 and 146; Green to AAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 2; Sumner to Hoyt, June 2, 1873, both in Hagen.

3. Schofield, telegram to Sherman, June 2, 1873. Davis sent out his Modoc scouts May 27. They returned next day reporting that Captain Jack was camped on Willow Creek, 14 miles from Applegate's. A rumor flew around that Jack was planning to raid Applegate's during the night of May 28. He did not. House Documents, 43d Cong., 1st Sess., No. 122, p. 110, Davis to Schofield, Nov. 1, 1873.

4. Hasbrouck to 1st Lt. W. H. Winters, Adj., Cavalry Command, June 20; Jackson to Winters, June 20; Green to AAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 2, 1873, all in Hagen. Meacham, Wigwam, p. 585. Hooker Jim guided Hasbrouck; Steamboat Frank guided Jackson; Bogus Charley and Shacknasty Jim accompanied Major Green who chose to ride with Jackson's squadron.
one of its few crossing places and moved up the south bank. Hasbrouck rode along the high ground close to the north edge of the canyon that bore the river's bed on its bottom. Because of the great depth of the canyon and its sheer walls, communication between the two squadrons was almost non-existent from this point on. Hasbrouck's men encountered some very rough terrain as they moved up the creek and gradually they fell behind the other squadron.

Jackson, moving over a rocky plateau covered with trees, reached the suspected area at three p.m. and could see some Modocs in the trees across the canyon. He ordered 1st Lt. Henry N. Moss, B Troop, to lead a skirmish line to take possession of the canyon. Second Lt. George R. Bacon and 12 men moved forward to take a small butte that commanded both the canyon and surrounding country. While 1st Lt. Charles C. Cresson with Troop D rode past Moss, "dismounted in the timber, & deployed along rocky walls of Willow Creek canon preparatory to crossing & enveloping Modoc Camp on foot."\(^5\)

Just after K troop dismounted, three Modocs yelled from across the creek that they wanted to surrender. Jackson held back his men, and one of the Indians crossed over to the troops. It was none other than Boston Charley. He told Jackson "that all the band were hidden

\(^5\) Bacon and Moss were fairly recent graduates of West Point. Both had undistinguished, brief military careers. Cresson had joined the Volunteers in 1861 and had risen to the grade of lieutenant colonel by the end of the Civil War. All three were to be out of the army by 1879, Cresson through retirement, the other two by resignation. Heitman, 1, 179, 338, and 731.
around in the rocks and timber and wanted to surrender." He volunteered
to bring them in.

The end of the war was possibly minutes away. Then, as so often
in the past, hopes fell apart. A Warm Springs scout accidentally
fired his weapon, and the Modocs scattered like pellets from a shotgun.
Attempting to rectify the result, Jackson sent Boston Charley back
across the creek to try to persuade the Indians to return. By this
time Hasbrouck's squadron had come up and occupied the deserted Indian
camp, finding the Modocs' "camp equippage and an immense lot of ammu-
nition and arms." Discovering Boston Charley wandering about Hasbrouck
took him prisoner, along with eight Indian women and some children.
Not until two hours later did he learn of Charley's mission. By then
the Modocs were far away, and it was too late in the day to renew the
pursuit. The troopers took little pleasure in learning that one of
their prisoners was Mary, Captain Jack's sister. The squadrons camped
for the night.6

6. Green to AAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 2; Jackson to Winters,
June 20; and Hasbrouck to Winters, June 20, 1873, all in Hagen; Sgt.
Michael McCarthy, "Journal of Michael McCarthy," ms, containing a
letter to 1st Sgt. C, June 1, 1873; House Documents, 43rd Cong.,
1st Sess., No. 122, p. 111, Davis to Schofield, Nov. 1, 1873. Davis
said the Modoc camp was near where the old emigrant road crossed Willow
Creek. On the north side of Willow Creek today, at a point one mile
southeast of Sagebrush Butte are some well-engineered rock fortifications.
Whether or not this is the site where the squadrons camped for the night
is unknown. The area is believed by some experts today to be the site
of Captain Jack's surrender. If so, then the fortifications are probably
not of army origin, for Jack's surrender took only a few minutes and the
troops, who had just arrived, promptly left to escort him to Applegates--
unless Jack surrendered at the original campsite.
Early on the 30th both squadrons moved up Willow Creek. Within three miles the Warm Springs scouts discovered the Modocs' trail turning off to the north. They followed it for eight miles until it gave out. Continuing in the same direction the cavalry descended a bluff into Langell Valley. Early in the afternoon the trail became clear again, and the troops followed it six miles in a northeasterly direction. About an hour before dark they spotted three Indian men who ran into a canyon on the eastern side of the valley. The Warm Springs chased them and "among the rocks at the head of [the] ... sharp canyon near the crest of the bluff" they found the Modocs.

Scarface Charley, deciding his race had been run, came down the face of the bluff and offered to surrender to Doctor Cabaniss, who was with the command. The Modoc offered to return to the bluff to persuade the others to surrender. Doctor Cabaniss went with him and talked with Captain Jack. The Modoc leader told Cabaniss that he would surrender the next morning. By the time the doctor returned, darkness had come. Green had no alternative but to accept Jack's promise. He ordered the cavalry to camp "at first water." The squadrons rode to Wilson's ranch, from three to five miles distant, and there spent the night. Cabaniss, still proving his friendship for and understanding of the Modocs, returned to their camp with a supply of bread and stayed with them until morning.  

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7. Green to AAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 2; Jackson to Winters, June 2, 1873, both in Hagen; Meacham, Wigwam, p. 586, quoting Clarke.
Early the next day Schonchin John, "the old villain," Scarfaced Charley, "the best and bravest of the entire Modoc band," twelve other men, and their families (ten women and nine children) quietly gave themselves up to the troopers. The end of hostilities was tantalizingly close. But once more it slipped away. Doctor Cabaniss said sadly that Captain Jack "with three warriors escaped in one direction, [and the] remaining nine escaped in different directions." Rising before the others, these last of the Modocs had slipped off in the pre-dawn gloom. The desperate, tired men could not yet bring themselves to surrender the flicker of freedom that was still theirs.  

As the sun burned across the sky the second and third squadrons crisscrossed Langell Valley, the Bryant Mountains, and all the cruel earth north of Clear Lake. Occasionally a detachment would find a trail only to discover that another group was already following the sign. Besides the regulars, the Oregon Volunteer Militia was back in the field. This time three companies cross-stitched southern Oregon: C (Capt. Joseph H. Hyzer), D (Capt. Thomas Mulholland), and E (Capt. George R. Rodgers). The ubiquitous Colonel Thompson was also with them, still carrying all his prejudices.

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8. Green to AAG, Dist. of Lakes, June 2; Stone to Wood, June 1, 1873, both in Hagen; NA, Microfilm 666, 1871, Roll 22, Schofield, telegram to Sherman, June 2, 1873; Meacham, Wigwam, p. 586.

9. Jackson to Winters, June 20, 1873, in Hagen.
The Oregon government had become alarmed in April when it seemed the regulars could not bring the troubles to a conclusion. Fearful that the Modocs would attack settlements after they left the Stronghold, the militia had again responded to cries of alarm. As soon as General Ross learned that Jack's band had moved to the Clear Lake-Langell Valley area, he moved his men into the valley hoping to prey on the viscera of defeat.\footnote{10}

Hasbrouck and Jackson had flushed the quarry and had captured half the band. Now it was Perry's turn. On May 31 he took two-thirds of the squadron, with Charley Putnam, Jesse Applegate's nephew, as his guide, eastward from Applegate's toward the upper Lost River, "where it is supposed Modoc Jack has secreted himself." Captain Trimble, with the rest of the squadron scoured the angle between Clear Lake and Lost River.\footnote{11}

The two captains "scouted around the hills all day" with no success. Early the next morning, June 1, they resumed the hunt. Before long the persistent Warm Springs struck a trail that looked promising, except that it branched and the branches diverged. Sgt. Michael McCarthy wrote that "the command was broken up in detachments and ordered to follow some particular trails that appeared to lead in different directions, but nevertheless appeared to have one particular destination."\footnote{12}

\footnote{10. Grover, pp. 18-19; Thompson, pp. 118 and 126.}
\footnote{11. Adams to Green, May 31, 1873, in Hagen.}
\footnote{12. McCarthy, letter, June 1, 1873. Part of the explanation why so few Indians left such clear trails seems to have been their want of food. They stopped frequently to dig roots.}
The squadron, in several detachments, followed the tracks five miles toward the south, arriving again at Willow Creek. Using the same tactics as had the 2d and 3d Squadrons, Perry retained the major portion of the command on the north bank of the creek and sent Trimble across to the south side. Slowly the two groups moved upstream spotting signs here and there that indicated they were still on the trail.13

Perry reached a point where the creek canyon "turned a sharp angle to the left." He approached the rim of the canyon "and stood on a ledge projecting well out," where he saw "on the opposite bank of the ravine and about a hundred yards to my left an Indian dog suddenly appear at the top of the ravine, and just as suddenly an arm appeared and snatched the dog out of sight." Perry felt that the coveted prize was his. The final drama was about to be enacted. His men realized it too and lined the canyon wall to witness the events on the other side.14

Sergeant McCarthy found himself in a detachment consisting of Captain Trimble, a citizen (Putnam?), two Warm Springs, himself as


14. Brady, pp. 303-04. It is difficult to determine how much of this description should be taken literally. Perry, as squadron commander, was interested in acquiring as much credit as possible for capturing "the coveted prize." He was on the wrong side of the creek for that--although it would be he who wrote the official report, not Trimble. In his account he says his scouts talked with Captain Jack before Trimble reached the scene. However, Sergeant McCarthy's description is given preference here, because I consider him more accurate.
sergeant, a corporal, and 14 privates. This patrol moved along the tableland south of the creek, carefully searching for evidence of the Modocs having preceded them. "We had been thus detached about an hour and were taking a short cut to avoid a promontory or bend on our left. On this bend was a small clump of junipers." They might have passed by the promontory, but "Captain Trimble told me to send a man to examine it and the man, an old soldier named Shay, found a Modoc on the point who had been so intent watching the troops moving on the other side that he was cut off before he knew it and surrounded."

The two Warm Springs disarmed the prisoner who was Humpy Joe, a half-brother of Captain Jack. The troops immediately dismounted and started to rush forward in a skirmish line. But the Warm Springs warned them not to be hasty; patience was more important than aggressiveness at this critical moment. The soldiers "sat down out of [illeg.] sight of anybody in the canyon, but within a few yards of Jack's hiding place."

Humpy Joe asked to speak to Fairchild. Putnam, informing him that Fairchild was on the other side of the canyon, asked where Jack was. The prisoner replied that Jack was hidden in the canyon bottom. Putnam reminded Joe that the troops surrounded the Modocs and urged him to call

15. Michael McCarthy, "Army Sketches," ms, p. 2. In his June 1, 1873, letter, McCarthy says "5" others or Troop H. In "Army Sketches" he accounts for 15 enlisted men other than himself. It is thought he meant "15" in the letter.

16. Ibid.

Jack telling him to come up. Sergeant McCarthy wrote, "After some parley Jack came up on our side, handed his gun to Jim Shay shook hands with him and surrendered himself." 18

The rest of Jack's group--one or two men, two boys, three women, and some small children--came out of the canyon. 19 It was a sad ending for this man who with less than 70 men had defeated the army repeatedly for seven months. Sergeant McCarthy was a little surprised when he saw the long-sought warrior, "he looks rather younger than I thought he was. Altogether he is only a passable looking buck and don't at all look the character."

When Trimble became certain that his prisoner was really Captain Jack, "he threw his hat in the air and cheered like a good fellow. We all followed suit. The cheer was taken up on the other side by the Troops . . . and there was considerable noise." McCarthy added, "Thus ends the Modoc war." Colonel Davis shared the sergeant's relief. "I am happy," he telegraphed San Francisco, "to announce the termination of the Modoc difficulties." 20

18. McCarthy, letter, June 1, 1873.

19. Ibid.: 1 man, 2 boys, 3 women, 3 or 4 children; Meacham, Wigwam, p. 587: 2 men, 4 women, some children.

20. McCarthy, letter, June 1, 1873; Davis to AAG, Div. of Pacific, June 1, 1873, in Hagen.
CHAPTER 11

The Bodies Swung Round and Round

Word of Captain Jack's surrender quickly reached the 2d and 3d Squadrons, and these troopers rode into Applegate's ranch. The Oregon Volunteers continued to track a while longer, making their contribution by capturing the notorious Black Jim. When he learned of this minor success, Major Green requested General Ross to bring in his prisoner.¹

Meanwhile Trimble and Perry escorted their prize prisoner to Davis' headquarters at Applegate's. The prisoners who had been captured in Langell Valley had already reached the ranch and were quartered in a corral. Jack and his family joined them. There was none of the drama experienced at Fairchild's ranch--that would come later. In the evening, June 1, Davis ordered shackles put on the legs of Captain Jack and Schonchin John. The chiefs were greatly humiliated by this, but their fate lay in Davis' hands now. Of his surrender Jack had little to say. He provided no ringing phrases for future historians to cull, analyze, and admire. In his final report Davis recorded that all Jack said was that his "legs had given out."²

On June 4 Davis moved his headquarters to the camp on the Peninsula. The heavily-guarded Modoc prisoners traveled separately in a wagon.

¹ Grover, pp. 18-19.
² House Documents, 43d Cong., 1st Sess., No. 122, p. 111, Davis to Schofield, Nov. 1, 1873; Meacham, Wigwam, pp. 588 and 591; McCarthy, "Army Sketches," p. 3.
Anticipation and excitement flowed through the throng of soldiers and civilians as they waited for the arrival of Captain Jack. In mid-afternoon a cloud of dust announced that the procession was drawing near:

Soldiers, citizens, and everyone who could spare a few moments gathered near the barricade and watched the procession as it . . . passed up the sandy stretch at the base of the bluff where the tent containing the prisoners is located. Lieutenant Chapin, Company F, Fourth Artillery, was in advance. Next came a large wagon loaded with Modocs, followed by two loaded with baggage. The rank and file of Battery G marched beside the wagons, and forty mounted Warm Spring scouts followed in the rear. The Warm Springs supplied the lack of music by sounding their war whoops.

"Where is Captain Jack?" "Where is Captain Jack?" was the cry among the spectators. None had the pleasure, however, of seeing the warrior's face. He had anticipated the excitement . . . and was concealed in the wagon, completely in a blanket.3

The prisoners climbed from the wagon, the men shuffling off to one side of the makeshift enclosure, the women to the other. One of Jack's two wives, "Lizzie," and their three-year-old child was allowed to stay with Jack out of deference to his position.

Davis intended to punish summarily those Modocs whom he considered to be the leaders during the months of violence. To identify those who had attacked the settlers in November he brought two widows to

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3. Army and Navy Journal, June 14, 1873, p. 697. The army made almost no reference to the physical aspects of the Peninsula camp. Even its location is somewhat of a mystery. Only in this description is any reference found concerning a barricade. This suggests that the narrow neck of sand joining the peninsula to the mainland was barricaded, probably with a rock wall, and that the camp was against the eastern side of The Peninsula hill--the prisoners' tent being right at its base. There is a considerable sweep of high level ground to the east of the hill that could support a camp of the dimensions involved.
the Peninsula, Mrs. William Boddy and her daughter, Mrs. Nicholas Schira. The suspected Indians were brought out so that the two women could point out who had killed their husbands. The women were of no help. Davis was standing near them when, suddenly, Mrs. Schira "drew a pistol and went for Steamboat Frank, and Mrs. Boddy drew a knife and dashed at Hooker Jim." The startled colonel lunged at the women and succeeded in disarming them. In doing so he received a cut on the palm of his hand from Mrs. Boddy's knife. The flurry quickly subsided, and Davis was no wiser than before the women came.

Frank and Jim were not the only Modocs whose lives were endangered after capture. As soon as Captain Jack was made prisoner Davis sent orders to Mason at Fairchild's to move all five infantry companies to the Peninsula and to bring with him all the Modoc prisoners from the western band. Mason never explained why he did not order an escort to accompany each wagon or group of prisoners. Perhaps he decided that since the war was over, escorts would be unneeded. Whatever the reason, James Fairchild's brother, John, was driving a large ranch wagon eastward on June 8, filled with 17 Modoc men, women, and children, without an army escort. As he crossed Lost River, Fairchild met Lieutenant Hyzer and a detachment of Oregon Volunteers who at that time were camped at Crawley's ranch. Hyzer stopped the wagon and questioned Fairchild about...

his passengers. Apparently satisfied the Volunteers returned to their camp.

A few miles farther on Fairchild spotted two horsemen passing him, then waiting for him to come up to where they stood. The horsemen raised their rifles and ordered the wagon to stop. They cut the traces and began firing. The four mules, startled by the noise, dashed off dragging Fairchild behind them. When the two men finished firing, four Indian men (Te-hee Jack, Pony, Mooch, and Little John) lay dead, and Little John's wife was severely wounded. Just then Sergeant Murphy with a patrol of ten men from Battery A came upon the scene. The horsemen fled. Murphy sent to the Peninsula for assistance and eventually got the surviving prisoners to the camp.

Who were the killers? The Oregon Volunteers denied emphatically that they had had anything to do with it. Alfred Meacham wrote that no effort was ever made to find out who they were. An eastern newspaper claimed "it is generally supposed that the guilty parties are Oregon volunteers. Fairchild is of that opinion himself." The army did not doubt it, "the Indian captives . . . were fired into by Volunteers."5

Despite his thwarting the women's attack on the Modocs and sending aid to the victims of the wagon incident, Davis was not averse to punishing Modocs. At first he was thoroughly supported in this by

5. Adams to Mason, June 1; Adams to Green, June 8, 1873, both in Hagen; Army and Navy Journal, June 14, 1873, p. 697; unidentified Philadelphia newspaper clipping, "Modoc Indians Murdered," in Hagen; Sgt. Michael McCarthy, "Army Sketches," p. 4; Meacham, pp. 592 and 595.
General Sherman who wired Schofield, "Some should be tried by court martial and shot; others be delivered over to civil authorities, and the balance dispersed so that the name Modoc should cease." Davis agreed but felt that the four Modocs who had helped to track down the last of the hostiles should be exempted from execution although "two of them, Hooka [sic] Jim and [Steamboat] Frank are among the worst of the Band." Davis wasted no time. By June 5 a scaffold decorated the Peninsula, and hanging ropes had been prepared. Even with the four exemptions Davis had picked out "8 or 10 ringleaders" for execution at sunset, June 6. Amazed, he read a telegram from Schofield ordering a postponement of any hangings. The War Department had concluded that any extreme action should be delayed until the Attorney General made a decision as to whether the Modocs were prisoners-of-war who could be tried by military law, or were murderers who should be turned over to civil authorities for trial. Sherman's sympathies still lay with the troops: "I wish Davis had dispatched those Indians." Not all was lost however. "I believe the same result will be accomplished in a way that will be strictly lawful," he wired Schofield, "and at the same time serve as a rule for the future."  

7. Davis, telegram to AAG, Div. of Pacific, June 5; Schofield, telegram to Davis, quoting Sherman, June 7, 1873, both in Hagen.
The Attorney General's ruling came down on June 9. Sherman wired Schofield that the Modocs' actions since November 29 "constitute war in a technical sense that crimes afterwards committed against the laws of war are triable and punishable by military courts preferably Military Commissions."8 The prisoners were escorted to Fort Klamath, where Jackson's 3d Squadron had preceded them to erect a log stockade "large enough to confine 44 Bucks 49 Squaws and 62 children total 155."9 There was one less prisoner than before the caravan left the Peninsula. Curley Haired Jack had somehow hidden a pistol and, rather than leave as a prisoner, killed himself.10

Schofield instructed Davis on the functions of a military commission. It should have at least three out not more than thirteen members. The proceedings would be the same as for a court martial, and the "usages and laws of War" would govern the sentences. Schofield left it to Davis whether or not those who had helped him after their capture should receive capital punishment. If they were exempted he felt that they and all other Modoc men should be imprisoned, preferably at

8. Sherman, telegram, via Schofield, to Davis, June 9, 1873, in Hagen. In this connection, Maj. H. P. Curtis, Judge Advocate, Dept. of California, prepared a 12-page brief for General Schofield reviewing cases of law in the U. S. that concerned the relations of Indian tribes with the U. S., their status or lack of it as "foreign nations," and the applicability of the laws of war. In Hagen.

9. Boutelle to Green, June 11, 1873, in Hagen.

10. Riddle, p. 156.
Alcatraz, and the women and children sent to some distant reservation. Schofield believed that the commission had the authority to try both those who had killed settlers and those who had attacked the peace commission. The War Department later directed the commission to try only those Modocs who had killed General Canby, Lieutenant Sherwood, and Dr. Thomas. All others were to be treated as prisoners-of-war.¹¹ In the end, only those who had attacked the peace commission faced the judges.

The military commission and its eventual findings aroused deep emotions from both those who demanded more severe punishment and those who thought the punishments much too strong. The state government and many of the citizens of Oregon felt outraged that the military should have jurisdiction and that those Modocs who had killed civilians should be exempt from trial. Citizens of southern Oregon, particularly, believed that only the state courts would inflict sufficient penalty to revenge the dead. Across the continent, pacifists, citizens generally involved in the welfare of Indians, and others besieged Secretary Delano with appeals for mercy. The most active organization on behalf of the captives was the Universal Peace Union headquartered in Philadelphia. A number of Californians, in contrast to their northern neighbors, also came to the Modocs' assistance. One of these, Congressman J. K. Luttrell, representing

¹¹ Schofield, telegram to Davis, June 9; Townsend, telegram to Schofield, June 30, 1873, both in Hagen.
California's 3d Congressional District, wrote the secretary, "the War was caused by the wrongful acts of bad white men." While he favored the hanging of those Modocs who had murdered, he demanded a full investigation of the war. "There never was a time since the organization of our Government, that there was so much corruption and swindling," he wrote, "as is to day practiced on the Indian Reservations on this Coast."\(^{12}\)

The military commission when formed consisted of Lt. Col. Washington L. Elliott, 1st Cavalry, acting as president; Capt. John Mendenhall and Capt. Henry C. Hasbrouck, 4th Artillery; Capt. Robert Pollock, 21st Infantry; and 2d Lt. George W. Kingsbury, 12th Infantry. Maj. H. P. Curtis, Judge Advocate, Department of California, became the judge advocate for the trial.\(^{13}\) The Modocs would not be represented by a legal officer. The first meeting of the commission was held July 1; the trial was over July 9.\(^{14}\)

In the end six Modocs faced the commission: Captain Jack, Schonchin John, Black Jim, Boston Charley, Barncho, and Sloluck. The commission found all six guilty of two charges, each having two specifications:

\(^{12}\) J. K. Luttrell, Member, 3d Cong. Dist., Calif., to Delano, June 17, 1873, in Hagen.

\(^{13}\) Special Field Order No. 1, Headquarters, Dept. of Columbia in the Field, Ft. Klamath, June 30, 1873, in Hagen.

\(^{14}\) Ibid.; Hasbrouck to AAAG, Dept. of Columbia, July 9, 1873, in Hagen.
Charge 1--Murder, in violation of the laws of war.
   Specification 1--murder of General Canby.
   Specification 2--murder of Dr. Thomas.
Charge 2--Assault, with intent to kill, in violation of the laws of war.
   Specification 1--attack on A. B. Meacham.
   Specification 2--attack on Agent Dyar.

The sentence for the six read "to be hanged by the neck until they be dead." President Grant approved the findings on August 22.  

Three weeks later Grant commuted the sentence to imprisonment for life at Alcatraz for Barncho and Sloluck. The two Modocs did not know this. Colonel Wheaton, from his headquarters of the District of the Lakes at Fort Klamath, wrote on the last day of September, "Six graves for the burial of the condemned are dug near and in front of the Guardhouse just outside the parade ground fence." Orders had come to him not to inform the two men of the commutation until minutes before the execution. Besides the graves, the scaffold was also finished by the end of September. It was thirty feet long built of "very strong . . . dressed pine logs one foot in diameter," large

15. General Court Martial Orders No. 32, War Dept., AGO, Aug. 23, 1873 in Hagen.

enough for six men at one time.  

The execution was scheduled for 10 a.m., October 3. The evening before a newspaper editor got permission to witness the last visit between the condemned men and their families. He described the men "seated on the floor, each with space enough that his family might gather around him where they engaged in their death chant. The condemned men sat stolidly without uttering a word." It was an experience he would not care to repeat.

Minutes before the execution the sheriff of Jackson County, Oregon, presented warrants demanding that the prisoners be turned over to civil authorities for trial and punishment. Writs of habeas corpus were also issued by the circuit court of Jackson County. It was too late for civil interference; the military proceeded with a surety as if hanging were a part of the daily ritual between reveille and taps.


Nearly the entire Klamath tribe stood silently watching the scaffold. The Modoc prisoners from their stockade could see the beam from which hung six ropes, two of them now thrown back. Soldiers led Boston Charley, Black Jim, Schonchin John, and finally Captain Jack up the steps to the platform. The Modocs did not resist. Their shackles had been removed; now they stood, each in his appointed place, their arms tied securely with rope. At 9:45 a.m. Oliver Applegate and Dave Hill explained to the prisoners the army's orders, which Lieutenant Kingsbury formally read aloud at 10:00 o'clock.

Then Barncho and Sloluck were led back to the stockade. At least they would not have to watch. A chaplain prayed, no doubt with earnest hope that the white man's concept of afterlife would comfort the condemned who had never penetrated the white man's concept of the real world. At 10:15, the nooses were fitted carefully. There was a slight delay while a soldier trimmed Captain Jack's hair to insure a better fit. An officer then moved from man to man bidding them farewell; and black hoods descended over their heads, cutting off forever from view the familiar world. At 10:20 the captain dropped his handkerchief and an assistant cut the rope holding the drop.

As the drop fell with a thud, a half cry of horror escaped the spectators' mouths. A wail of anguish went up from the stockade. "The bodies swung round and round, Jack and Jim apparently dying easily, but Boston and Schonchin suffering terrible convulsions." They all were
pronounced dead at 28 minutes past ten.  

It was probably Col. H. S. Shaw, a reporter from the San Francisco Chronicle, who happened to walk past a tent at Fort Klamath and saw an amazing sight. In the center of the tent stood a long table "similar to those used in the dissecting-room of a medical college." A black india rubber sheet was spread over the table. In one corner stood a barrel of water and in another was a case of surgical instruments. The curious reporter set out to learn what this strange ensemble was for. He soon was able to inform the Chronicle that he had learned that the heads of Captain Jack and Schonchin John had been cut off for shipment to Washington. The Chronicle was aghast. But the Army and Navy Journal countered that if the story was true, it was not a case of barbarism, but the need to do a medical dissection.  

The report was incomplete but not incorrect. However, the army's attempt at secrecy resulted in the spread of a story, even more grotesque, that still is alive today. On November 2 several wagons carrying government stores from Fort Klamath arrived at the railroad station at Rosebury, Oregon. One of the teamsters entered the office of the Rosebury Plaindealer and invited the editor down to the depot where he showed him a whiskey barrel allegedly addressed to the Society of Natural History,


Washington, D. C. The teamster told the startled editor that the barrel contained the body of Captain Jack, minus the head, which had been shipped separately.\textsuperscript{22}

There is not a shred of evidence that Captain Jack's body was shipped to Washington. However his head was, as were the heads of the other three Modocs who were hanged. On October 25 Colonel Wheaton wrote the Surgeon General notifying him of the shipment of not two but of the four heads of the executed for the Army Medical Museum.\textsuperscript{23}

Soon after the hangings the surviving Modocs climbed aboard wagons for the long drive to Yreka, escorted by Captain Hasbrouck and his battery. They arrived at Yreka on October 17 and stepped on a train bound for Fort McPherson, Nebraska. On October 29 Hasbrouck turned over his 155 charges to Col. J. J. Reynolds and collected a receipt for them. From there the Modocs traveled south to the Indian Territory where they received a tract of land, two and one-half miles square, near the Quapaw Agency and not far from Baxter Springs, Kansas. Here they lived in exile and in poverty. Diseases accomplished what bullets could not.\textsuperscript{24}

Shortly after 1900 a few returned to the Klamath reservation and, despite the continuing unfriendliness exhibited by the Klamaths, tried

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid., Nov. 29, 1873, p. 245.
\item \textsuperscript{23} NA, RG 94, Ft. Klamath, Post Medical History, p. 142, Record for October, 1873.
\item \textsuperscript{24} House Documents, 43d Cong., 1st Sess., No. 122, p. 102, Hasbrouck to AAG, Dept. of California, Nov. 5, 1873; Army and Navy Journal, Oct. 25, 1873, p. 166; Brady, pp. 255-56n; Stern, p. 138.
\end{itemize}
to renew their ties with the world they once knew intimately—a world of mountains, forests, sage, and lava. The Modocs are not yet extinct. But the spirit that drove them to resist the inevitable westering of the whites died in the lava beds. Occasionally, on frost-biting nights, the cries of coyotes haunt the ghostly, star-lit Stronghold, bringing back the memory of that time. A time to remember.
"When I first stood there, one bright day before sundown," wrote John Muir, "the lake was fairly blooming in purple light, and was so responsive to the sky in both calmness and color it seemed itself a sky." The waters of the lake no longer brush the shore at Gillem's Camp. But to the viewer who today stands on the great bluff and looks down at the sea of lava and the distant shadows of the mountains, very little else has changed. If favored with imagination, one may readily visualize the teeming bivouc at the base of the bluffs that was Gillem's Camp for seven adventurous weeks in 1873.

After the first battle of the Stronghold, in January 1873, Lt. Col. Frank Wheaton withdrew his command to Lost River, leaving the lava beds devoid of soldiers. Col. A. C. Gillem drew the line considerably closer when he moved his headquarters to Fairchild's, then to Van Bremer's ranch in February. After early negotiations with the Modocs proved barren, Brig. Gen. E. R. S. Canby, now in the field, began his program of gradual compression, that is, moving the troops ever closer to the Stronghold with the intent of pressuring the Modocs into surrender.

1. Muir, p. 92.
As part of this policy, troops and pack trains left Van Bremer's on April 1, marched eastward to the bluff, and scrambled down the narrow trail, which may still be identified today. Each man carried his own knapsack, haversack, blankets, and weapon. Mules eased their way to the small sward at the bottom, carrying the camp equipage and supplies and "before night everything was landed safely at the foot of the hill and camp established." 

It might have been called Canby's Camp, after the commanding general, or Green's Camp, after Maj. John Green who was in direct command of the troop on this, the west, side of the lava beds. However, Gillem, who was in charge of all the troops and of the campaign itself, contributed his name to the new establishment. Although he would experience a personal humiliation as a military commander at this new camp, his name would stick to the conglomeration of men, women, mules, horses, supplies, tents, and the history that this diversity made.

Top of Bluff

Slightly to the northwest of the camp the bluff reaches up to create a small knoll that is named on today's maps as Howitzer Point. The origins of this name are a mystery. While Keith Murray has questioned which particular area on the bluff should be called Howitzer Point, the

2. The Yreka Union, April 5, 1873
answer is that the two mountain howitzers in Gillem's command were not emplaced on the bluff, neither were the mortars. These two guns, received immediately before the first battle of the Stronghold, came to the lava beds on mules the day before that January battle, and they departed immediately afterwards with the defeated troops. They accompanied the troops to the camp at Lost River Ford. From there, Major Mason took them to the east side of the lava beds to his successive camp at Scorpion Point and Hospital Rock.

Mason employed these howitzers in his eastern attack during the second battle of the Stronghold, April 15-17. Immediately after occupying the Stronghold on April 17, the howitzers were placed in it so that their fire, if needed, could repulse the Modocs should they attack from their new positions from the south.

The Thomas patrol, April 26, had as its primary mission the task of determining whether the artillery could move into the lava beds to attack the Indians more directly. Whether or not the howitzers were moved from the Stronghold to Gillem's Camp at this time is unknown. If they were moved, there would be no reason to transport them all the way to the top of the bluff--Gillem's intentions were to move them into the lava beds, not away from them. It might be argued that Gillem moved the...
guns to the top of the bluff in the week of near-panic that followed the Thomas patrol and before Col. Jefferson Davis arrived on May 2. But there is no evidence to support this, and it is too much to be simply assumed.

It is equally unlikely that the four mortars, that were at Gillem's Camp, were placed on the bluff. The maximum range of these weapons was 1,200 yards, about three-quarters of a mile. From the bluff, their shells would have barely extended beyond the outer fringes of Gillem's Camp. More importantly, documentary evidence does not exist to support the contention that the mortars were taken up the bluff.

In 1961, the park personnel at Lava Beds conducted an interview with Kenneth McLeod, of pioneer stock and something of a history buff. In the course of the interview McLeod said he was certain that a hotel was situated on the bluff during the time Gillem's Camp was in operation. He believed it was a structure operated by the sutters who had followed the army into the field, "This was their storehouse, warehouse, and also they took care of the visitors." He told the park staff that today one could see the remains "of a little main street of some sort." Although McLeod had run onto a source that there was a wooden building on the bluff at that time, he could not recall what the source was.

Contrary to the mortars and howitzers, it is plausible that a hotel

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4. Kenneth McLeod, oral interview. Tape and transcript on file at Lava Beds NM.
of sorts, canvas or wood, was erected on the bluffs. During the weeks the army occupied Gillem's Camp, hundreds of teamsters, camp followers, and others came eastward from Yreka on business or out of curiosity. It is possible that some entrepreneur did establish an overnight "hotel" on the bluff. But it must be added that no supporting documentary evidence has yet come to light.

**Gillem's Camp**

Gillem's Camp stood on an uneven swale located at the base of the steep, 400-600-foot bluff that overlooked the lava beds and Tule Lake. Paralleling the lake shore, running east and west, was the highest ground of the camp—a rise not quite high enough to be called a ridge. To the south of this rise was a considerable dip, low ground that would do for enlisted men's tents. Fingers of lava from the Devil's Homestead Flow marked out an uneven boundary on the east side, extending out into the lake to form a small unnamed peninsula that was the western border of Canby Bay. The water of the lake was shallow along the camp's shore. While it was suitable for both drinking and bathing, no evidence has come to light describing what arrangements were made to separate the two functions.

All the known facts that may be converted into symbols, such as troop dispositions, have been placed on the accompanying map of Gillem's Camp. There is in addition to that material certain historical evidence and interpretations that increase our understanding of the encampment.
One such source is the reminiscences of Peace Commissioner Meacham who recalled the first evening he spent in the new encampment, "Gen. Canby's tent was partly up when I passed near him. He said, 'Well, Mr. Meacham, where is your tent?'" When Meacham replied that his tent had not yet come down the bluff, Canby ordered his own tent prepared for the commissioners. The civilians finally talked him out of it.5

Meacham was also struck by the relative freedom given to such Modoc emissaries as Bogus Charley when they visited the camp during negotiations. They were shown the mortars; they watched the signal men communicate with the forces to the east. All these would, hopefully, impress the Modocs and perhaps frighten them. That they did not was confirmed by Captain Perry, "It was no unusual thing . . . to see an Indian appear on the top of Jack's Stronghold and mimic with an old shirt or petticoat the motion of our flags.6

Signal Rock was a simple outcropping of broken rock about 50 feet above the camp, on the side of the bluff. A photograph taken at that time may easily be related to the site today. From here, an alert signal officer, Lieutenant Adams, spotted the attack on the peace commissioners. Immediately north of Signal Rock is the peculiar outcropping known as Schonchin's Rock. Although this formation is not

6. Ibid, pp. 441-42; Brady, p. 298.
known to have played any direct role in the story of Gillem's Camp, it apparently attracted the soldiers' attention as a curiosity just as it attracts the visitors' today. The photographer who took pictures of the camp in 1873 was careful to include a shot of Schonchin's Rock.

Another 200 yards to the north, closer to the base of the cliff, is located Toby's Cave. This is a natural cave in a large red volcanic outcropping. The cave opening faces east and in 1873 would have overlooked Tule Lake. Today it is outside the park boundary. According to contemporary sources, it was here that Toby Riddle and her husband lived when they were interpreters for the peace commission. And it was here that the hostile Modocs would sometimes stay overnight when visiting the camp to arrange for future meetings.

As far as it is known, prostitutes did not make the journey to Gillem's Camp. But the persistent sutter did. Whether or not he sold liquor or beer to the troops is not clear; he did, however, a good business in tobacco (at one time, $1.50 per pound), soap, clothing, and other necessities. Edward Fox, correspondent for the New York Herald gave a glimpse of the merchandizing, "The squaws also brought in several bags of feathers the other day, which they traded to the sutter for provisions and clothing." Meacham records that the sutter's name was Pat McManus. 7

7. Meacham, Wi-ne-ma, p.66; New York Herald, April 22, 1873.
Although morale was never very high for much of the time Gillem operated this camp, the troops did receive their mail. On February 26, the Yreka Journal announced "that a semi-weekly mail will be carried between Yreka and Gen. Gillem's Headquarters, leaving Yreka every Wed. and Sun. mornings."  

During the time Gillem's Camp was in existence, a photographer named Eadweard Muybridge came up from San Francisco to catch the scene for all posterity. As far as it is known, Muybridge was the only photographer present during the war. From his camera came the pictures that in a glance tell more about Gillem's camp than all the written records together.

Besides the officers and enlisted men, there was another army, a civilian one, at Gillem's Camp. Packers, teamsters, expressmen, guides, interpreters, boat builders, representatives of the press, even women and children milled about. When Maj. James Biddle led his troop to the Lava Beds he also brought his 6-year-old son, Dave. At Gillem's Camp, young Dave became the good friend of General Canby. He spent some time each day visiting the hospital and also "went to the funeral of every soldier who succumbed." According to his mother he and an Indian boy of the same age went fishing in the lake one day at the edge of the camp. Some Indians fired at the boys, but young Dave "coolly strung his fish before leaving."  

8. The Yreka Journal, Feb. 26, 1873, typescript at Lava Beds NM.  
When she learned that her husband was wounded, Mrs. Alfred Meacham came down from Umatilla, Oregon, by rail, stage, and army ambulance to be with her husband. She arrived in the vicinity just as the second battle of the Stronghold was in progress. When the Army refused to let her come to Gillem's Camp itself, she waited at the mouth of Lost River. As soon as the doctors thought it advisable, Meacham was taken by boat across Tule Lake to join his wife. 10

Another woman, equally determined, did arrive at Gillem's Camp. When Mrs. Harris of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, learned that her son, Lt. George M. Harris, had been seriously wounded in the disastrous Thomas patrol, she boarded a train for San Francisco, then traveled north toward the Lava Beds. An officer at Gillem's Camp wrote, "my attention was called to a strange object traveling down the trail, and which could not be made out properly until a gray lace streamer floating behind established . . . that it was a lady's veil." Mrs. Harris reached the Camp only one day before her son died. Sadly, she accompanied the remains back on the long journey home. 11

It is somewhat surprising that none of Muybridge's photographs show the boats that were put on Tule Lake. The Yreka newspaper reported their presence as early as April 12, 1873, but it did not know if there

10. Meacham, Wi-ne-ma, p. 64.

were two or three. These small boats served a very useful function in providing communication between Gillem's Camp and Mason's Camp on the east side of the Stronghold. They were, too, a source of danger for on the "evening of May 12 Generals Gillem and Davis, and several others, crossed the lake from Colonel Mason's camp during a heavy gale and came near losing their lives, the boat becoming almost unmanageable." The boats also carried the wounded from the Stronghold after the April battle to the hospital at Gillem's Camp. This means of transportation was infinitely less painful than being bounced over the lava.12

The "general field hospital" was established under the direction of Asst. Surg. Calvin DeWitt. When he transferred to Mason's Camp on April 8, Actg. Asst. Surg. B. Semig replaced him. The chief medical officer for the whole expedition, Asst. Surg. Henry McElderry, was also at Gillem's Camp and took an active part in the hospital's activities. McElderry described the hospital:

The only two hospital tents at hand were put up for a ward; another ward was constructed of framing timbers, cut from the neighboring bluff: this frame being covered with paulins and having a door cut in front and rear. Five wall tents were put up and served as another ward. Bed sacks were filled with hay. A common tent, raised about three feet from the ground and stockaded, served for a kitchen. A hospital fly tent stretched from rear of one of the wards to the front of the kitchen tent, served for a convalescent mess tent. The dispensary and office were located in two wall tents joined together and opening into each other. The hospital steward on

duty with the command also had his bed in the rear tent.13

As the casualties poured in, first from the attack on the peace commissioners, then the second battle of the Stronghold, and finally from the Thomas patrol, the doctors and the hospital steward found themselves busy indeed. McElderry was quite proud of his staff, especially of Cabaniss whom he considered to be a brave man when under fire. The infantry and cavalry officers of the command raised money among themselves to buy milk, eggs, and chicken to supplement the patients' diet.

Following the disastrous attempt to remove the wounded from the lava beds after the attack on Thomas, some unnamed person devised "a form of mule litter, something like a reclining chair, to be strapped on a packsaddle on a mule's back." McElderry reported that 12 of these mule litters were built and were quite satisfactory. However, there is no specific mention of their actually being used in a combat situation.14

Very little evidence of Gillem's Camp remains to be seen today. Among the few rock ruins is a large circular structure sitting on the higher ground about the middle of the camp site. Its rock wall is three or four feet high today and it is 50 feet in diameter. Muybridge's photographs show that the structure had roughly the same dimensions in 1873.


14. Ibid.
This enclosure is today often called the "howitzer pit." However, as was discussed above, the howitzers were not at Gillem's Camp but at Mason's across the lava beds. The only evidence uncovered that might have a bearing on the purpose of this structure is found in Meacham. While he lay wounded in the hospital tent, his brother-in-law visited him and told him that a Modoc, Long Jim, was being held prisoner "in the stone corral." The guards had dreamed up a plan whereby they would pretend to fall asleep, Long Jim would try to escape, then the soldiers could justifiably kill him. The plan was put into effect with one guard sitting in the gateway, the others, outside. Long Jim played their game, leaped over the wall, and got safely away despite the guards efforts to shoot him.\textsuperscript{15}

It is from Meacham's not-always-accurate pen that we get some information concerning the distribution of the companies. Although not present, Meacham believed that the various companies lined up in front of their own tents when the attack on the peace commissioners occurred. According to his description, the 4th Artillery batteries were in the tents at the northeast corner of the camp, while the cavalry troops occupied the southern part of the camp, in the depression. He did not make clear where the two infantry companies were situated.\textsuperscript{16}

\begin{align*}
\text{\textsuperscript{15}} & \text{Meacham, } \textit{Wigwam}, 518. \\
\text{\textsuperscript{16}} & \text{Ibid. p. 502.}
\end{align*}
On the outskirts of the camp, the troops erected a series of small rock outposts. These were one or two-man shelters, undoubtedly thrown up by the regularly posted guards. A 1951 report said that as of that time there were 15 of these fortifications still standing.17

One other stone structure remains at the camp today. Toward the south, close to the base of the bluff, stands the rock wall that enclosed the temporary cemetery established in April 1873. Two soldiers had already been buried there, on January 17, during the first battle of the Stronghold: an unknown soldier of the 1st Cavalry, and one Brown of the Oregon Volunteers. Probably their graves caused the command to use this same site.

No good report on the cemetery has survived from the time Gillem's Camp was actually occupied. Meacham, however, came forth with one small bit of macabre humor. When he looked out the tent flap from his hospital bed, he saw two soldiers heading toward the cemetery, "one carries a spade, the other a small, plain, straight box, in which is the leg of a soldier going to a waiting-place for him." Meacham was correct; Sergeant Gode, Company G, 12th Infantry, had his leg amputated, buried, and entered on the army records, April 19.18

17. "List of Aboriginal and Historic Structures, Lava Beds N.M.,” July 1951. A personal check uncovered 9 of these, 1967; but there may have been others overlooked in the lava flow.

In August 1873, after the war was over, Lt. George Kingsbury took a detail of six men and a guide from Fort Klamath to the lava beds to transfer bodies from different battle sites throughout the area to the cemetery at former Gillem's Camp. At the scene of the attack on the Thomas patrol, Kingsbury recovered thirteen bodies. From there he marched to the Stronghold where he located two more. These remains were taken to the cemetery, all but one were buried, and the graves carefully marked with headboards. The unburied body was Lt. Arthur Cranston's. Kingsbury sent it back to Fort Klamath and from there it was shipped to the Presidio, San Francisco, for final burial. In his report, Kingston did not say whether he carried out that part of his orders which directed him to enlarge the stone pile that marked the spot where General Canby had fallen.\footnote{HA, RG 98, Ft. Klamath, Letters Received, Wood, Dept. of Columbia, to CO, Dist. of Lakes, Aug. 29, 1873; Kingsbury to Capt. H. C. Hasbrouck, Ft. Klamath, Sep. 4, 1873; and Letters Sent, Vol. 8, 1872-73, Wheaton to AAG, Dept. of Columbia, Sep. 1, and Sep. 30, 1873.}

A report dated the next year, July 2, 1874, apparently prepared by someone who had recently inspected the cemetery at the lava beds, gives the only detailed record of the number of burials. Including seven unknowns and the leg of Sergeant Gode, the total number was 30. This figure agrees with the count made by John Muir the same year. The report also noted that the cemetery wall had broken down in four places.\footnote{NA, RG 98, Ft. Klamath, Letters Received, "List of men buried in the Cemetery at the Lava Beds," July 2, 1874; Muir, p. 94.}
In 1875, the department commander ordered that the remains at Gillem's Camp cemetery be disinterred and reburied at Fort Klamath. He also directed "a rude monument of rocks and stones" erected at the cemetery and at the site of the Thomas patrol's fight and, finally, that the existing monument to General Canby be enlarged by the addition of rocks. 21

In November, Lt. F. E. Ebstein reported on his efforts to accomplish the tasks. At the scene of the Thomas affair he found a few bones which he collected and buried in the cemetery. He also erected "a rude monument" at the site. From there he marched to the site of Canby's death. He erected a "monument of stones, four feet high, placing in the top of the same a wooden tablet inscribed as follows:
'Major General E. R. S. Canby U. S. A. was killed here by Modoc Indians April 11, 1873.'" The next day Ebstein sent a detachment to the camp sites at Land's ranch and the Peninsula. This detachment disinterred two remains at Land's but "found the bodies of the three men buried on the Peninsula in such state of decomposition that they could not be moved at present."

The lieutenant ran into the same problem at the cemetery. His men opened all the graves but was forced to leave 1¼ there. "The coffins, originally roughly constructed," he wrote, "had in all cases separated and the smell arising . . . was so offensive that the men

turned sick." Ebstein recommended that the remainder not be removed for another year. Two wagons carried the fifteen coffins back to Fort Klamath. No mention was made of Sergeant Gode's leg. One year was not enough. In the fall of 1876, a Fort Klamath corporal rode down to Gillem's camp, examined one grave, and grew ill. He also found the stone fence in very bad condition and repaired it. The records of Fort Klamath do not disclose when the rest of the bodies were moved from Gillem's Camp. Only the cemetery wall, rebuilt many times, still stands.

On May 19, 1873, Capt. E. V. Summer, aide-de-camp to Colonel Davis, issued the order, "The enemy having left the lava bed it becomes necessary to break up the present encampment and put the troops more actively in pursuit." The pack mules made their way back up the bluff, carrying the tents and supplies. Soon there was only the wind, the call of birds, "the lake . . . fairly blooming in purple light," and the lava.


A long dreary winter! And for what? To drive a couple of hundred miserable aborigines from a desolate natural shelter in the wilderness, that a few thieving cattle-men might ranch their wild steers in a scope of isolated country, the dimensions of some several reasonable-sized counties.

Capt. J.G. Trimble in C.T. Brady,
Northwestern Fights and Fighters.

There was no question about the good fighting qualities of the Modocs. They were very brave and very skillful also and repulsed all attacks with great loss to the troops and no particular loss to themselves.

Sgt. Michael McCarthy
"Army Sketches."
Appendix A

Strengths

1. U.S. Army

Figures given are approximate. Only those actually in battle listed in b and c, below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Regulars</th>
<th>Vols.</th>
<th>Scouts</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Lost River battle, Nov. 29, 1872</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. First battle of Stronghold, Jan. 17, 1873</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>300</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Second battle of Stronghold, Apr. 15-17, 1873</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>650</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Total in Davis' command at end of war. (Ore. Vols. not under his command.)</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1055</td>
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</table>

2. Modocs

Only an approximation can be given. Conservative estimates begin at 55. More liberal estimates, within reason, reach up to 70. There follows a compilation of 57 names culled from the various documents used in preparing this report. There is a good possibility of duplication in this list, some Modocs being known to different whites by different names:

1. Captain Jack (Keintpoos)—hanged
2. Schonchin John—hanged
3. Schonchin Pete
4. Boston Charley—hanged
5. Black Jim—hanged (wounded Nov. 29)
6. Sloluck (Slolluck, Slolux, Cok)—imprisoned at Alcatraz
7. Dave (Rock Dave?)
8. Dave's uncle
9. Comstock Dave
10. One-eyed Mose
11. One-eyed Watchman—killed, Nov. 29
12. One-eyed Riley (this may be One-eyed Watchman, 11, above)
13. Ike (Big Ike)—killed, Apr. 15-17
14. Joe
15. John
16. Ben
17. William
18. Sam
19. Artenay
20. Mallie
21. Long George
22. Long Jim-- wounded, Nov. 29
23. Ellen's Man George-- killed at Sorass Lake, May 10
24. Jerry
25. Humpy Jerry
26. Humpy Joe
27. Steve (Little Steve)
28. Scarfaced Charley
29. Miller's Charley-- wounded, Nov. 29
30. Bogus Charley
31. Hooker Jim
32. Shacknasty Jim
33. Shacknasty Frank-- wounded Jan. 17 (died in lava beds)
34. Steamboat Frank
35. Curley Headed Doctor
36. Buckskin Doctor
37. Barncho (Broncho)-- imprisoned at Alcatraz
38. Joe Sacksie
39. Lost River Blind Man
40. Tule Lake Blind Man
41. Lost River Old Man
42. Tule Lake Big Man
43. Tule Lake Big Sam
44. Butte Creek Man
45. Old Chuckle Head-- killed (?)
46. Greasy Boots-- killed Jan. 17
47. Pit River Man
48. Te-he Jack-- killed, June 8, as POW
49. Mooch-- killed, June 8, as POW
50. Little John-- killed, June 8, as POW
51. Pony (Poney)-- killed, June 8, as POW
52. Curley Haired Jack-- suicide, at Peninsula, June
53. Old Longface
54. Big Dick
55. Old Tales (Tails)-- killed, Apr. 15-17
56. Skukum Horse
57. Duffy
### Appendix B

#### Casualties

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<td>Officers</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>EM</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td><strong>Warm Springs</strong></td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td><strong>Civilians</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>68</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>143</td>
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#### Modocs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men (killed in action, suicide, murdered, and hanged)</th>
<th>Women</th>
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<tr>
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<td>16 approx. several</td>
<td>several</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>unknown</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C

List of Units

U. S. Army 1st Cavalry - Troops B, F, G, H (detachment), and K
12th Infantry - Companies E and G
21st Infantry - Companies B, C, E, F (detachment), and I
4th Artillery - Batteries A, B, E, G, K, and M

Klamath Scouts - a detachment of 20
Warm Springs Scouts - a detachment of 70

Oregon Volunteer Militia - Companies A, B, C, D, and E

California volunteers - a detachment of 24

Klamath Indian volunteers - a detachment of 36
Appendix D

List of Officers in the field, Modoc War.

Adams, John Quincy, 1st Lt., 1st Cav.
Company officer, Troop F, but did not serve as such.
AAAG, Dist. of the Lakes, Camp Warner, beginning of war.
Sig. officer, Gillem's Camp & 2d battle of Stronghold.
AAG for the command, latter May and early June.

Anderson, Harry Reuben, 2d Lt., 4th Art.
ADC to General Canby.

Bacon, George Robert, 2d Lt., 1st Cav.
Company officer, Troop K.
2d battle of Stronghold
In 3d Cav. Squadron, pursuit of Captain Jack.

Assumed command of Battery A, May 29.

Bentley, Edwin, Asst. Surg., USA.
Took charge of general field hospital, May 25.

Bernard, Reuben Frank, Capt., 1st Cav.
CO, Troop G, was CO, Camp Bidwell.
1st battle of Stronghold, in charge of force on east side.
2nd battle of Stronghold, took sick second day, Apr. 16.
Relieved from expedition Apr. 22, because of illness.

Biddle, James, Maj., 6th Cav.
CO, Troop K, 1st Cav. (Promoted to 6th Cav. while enroute)
2d battle of Stronghold - role unknown.
Left lava beds because of illness, date unknown.

Boutelle, Frazier Augustus, 2d Lt., 1st Cav.
Company officer, Troop B.
Battle of Lost River, Nov. 29.
1st battle of Stronghold.
2d battle of Stronghold.
Battle of Sorass Lake.
In 3d Cav. Squadron, pursuit of Captain Jack.
AAAG at Peninsula camp, June.
Boyle, William H., 1st Lt., 21st Inf.
   AAQM & ACS, camp, Lost River.
   AAQM & ACS, Hospital Rock and 2d battle of Stronghold.
   AAQM & ACS, Peninsula camp.

Burton, George Hall, Capt., 21st Inf.
   CO, Company C, 21st Inf.
   1st battle of Stronghold.
   2d battle of Stronghold, in direct charge of all infantry in
   eastern force, under Mason.
   With Mason on patrol into lava beds, May 12.

Cabaniss, Thomas, Contract Surgeon (civilian).
   With troops on various marches and battles.

Camp, Erskine Mason, 1st Lt., 12th Inf.
   Possibly replaced Eagan as CO, Company G, 12th Inf.
   when latter was wounded, 2d battle of Stronghold.

Canby, Edward Richard Sprigg, Brig. Gen., USA.
   CG, Dept. of the Columbia.
   Killed by Modocs Apr. 11.

Chapin, Edward Silas, 2d Lt., 4th Art.
   Company officer, Battery E.
   In charge of howitzers, 2d battle of Stronghold.

Cranston, Arthur, 1st Lt., 4th Art.
   Company officer, Battery M.
   Assisted Capt. Thomas with mortars, 2d battle of Stronghold.
   Killed on Thomas patrol, Apr. 26.

Cresson, Charles Clemont, 1st Lt., 1st Cav.
   Company officer, Troop K.
   Assumed command of Troop K after Maj. Biddle's
   departure.
   2d battle of Stronghold
   In 3d Cav. Squadron, pursuit of Captain Jack.

Davis, Jefferson Columbus, Col., 23d Inf.
   CO, Dept. of the Columbia following death of Canby
   Assumed command in lava beds May 2.
De Witt, Calvin, Asst. Surg., USA
At Gillem's Camp.
In charge of hospital at Hospital Rock, 2d battle of Stronghold.
In 1st Cav. Squadron, pursuit of Captain Jack.

Durrant, H. K. - Listed by Wheaton as being an Actg. Asst. Surgeon.
Nothing else is known about him.

Eagan, Charles Patrick, 1st Lt., 12th Inf.
 CO, Company G, 12th Inf.
 Wounded, 2d battle of Stronghold.

Field, Edward, 1st Lt., (Capt., Apr. 29, 1873), 4th Art.
 Actg. CO, Battery A, effective April 26.
 With Mason on patrol into lava beds, Apr. 12, when he was in
 charge of both Batteries A and K.

Gillem, Alvan Cullom, Col., 1st Cav.
 Assumed command of troops in the field, Feb. 8.
 Relieved from command Apr. 21.
 Returned to Benicia Barracks as colonel of 1st Cav., Apr. 25.

Green, John, Maj., 1st Cav.
 CO, Ft. Klamath
 In charge of troops Lost River and Gillem's Camps.
 In charge of troops in western forces, 1st and 2d battles of
 Stronghold.
 In charge of the Cavalry Command, effective May 25.

Greenough, George Gordon, 1st Lt., 4th Art.
 Company officer, Battery G.

Grier, Matthew C, 1st Lt., 4th Art.
 Company officer, Battery M.
 AAQM & ACS, Gillem's Camp during 2d battle of Stronghold.
 AAQM & ACS, Fairchild's ranch, eff. May 25.

Harris, George Montgomery, 1st Lt., 4th Art.
 CO, Battery K.
 2d battle of Stronghold.
 Killed on Thomas patrol, Apr. 26.

Hasbrouck, Henry Cornelius, Capt., 4th Art.
 CO, Battery B.
 CO, Battle of Sorass Lake.
 CO, 2d Cav. Squadron, pursuit of Captain Jack.
Hazelton, James B., 1st Lt., 4th Art.
Company officer, Battery B.
Battle of Sorass Lake.
In 2d Cav. Squadron, pursuit of Captain Jack.

Howe, Albion, 2d Lt., 4th Art.
Company officer, Battery A.
Assisted Capt. Thomas with mortars, 2d battle of Stronghold.
Killed on Thomas patrol, Apr. 26.

Hoyt, Charles Henry, Capt., AQM, USA.
Chief QM and Chief CS, effective May 25.

Jackson, James, Capt., 1st Cav.
CO, Troop B.
Battle of Lost River, Nov. 29.
1st battle of Stronghold.
2d battle of Stronghold.
Battle of Sorass Lake.
CO, 3d Cav. Squadron, pursuit of Captain Jack.

Kingsberry, George Washington, 2d Lt., 12th Inf.
Became CO, Company E, 12th Inf., following death of Wright.

Kyle, John Gowdy, 2d Lt., 1st Cav.
Company officer, Troop G.
Wounded, 1st battle of Stronghold.
Returned to duty, Mar. 15.
CO, Troop G, during 2d battle of Stronghold, when Bernard became ill.
Battle of Sorass Lake.
In 2d Cav. Squadron, pursuit of Captain Jack.

Leary, Peter, Jr., 1st Lt., 4th Art.
Company officer, Battery E.
Actg. CO, Battery E, 2d battle of Stronghold.

Lydecker, Garret J., Capt. Engrs.
Visited lava beds to prepare drawings after capture of Stronghold.

McElderry, Henry, Asst. Surg., USA
Lost River Battle, Nov. 29.
Chief Medical Officer, following death of Surgeon McMillin, April 6.
Returned to Ft. Klamath, May 27.
Mason, Edwin Colley, Maj., 21st Inf.
CO, 21st Inf. Bn.
1st battle of Stronghold, in charge of inf. in western force.
2d battle of Stronghold, in charge of eastern force.
Patrol into lava beds, May 12.

Mendenhall, John, Capt., 4th Art.
CO, Battery G.
With Mason, patrol into lava beds, May 12.
Placed in charge of all artillery batteries, May 25.

McMillin, Thomas, Asst. Surg., USA
Chief Medical Officer, Modoc Expedition.
Died at Gillem's Camp, heart disease, Apr. 6.

Miller, Marcus Peter, Capt., 4th Art.
CO, Battery E.
In charge of the major force (all except cavalry) in western force, 2d battle of Stronghold.
With Mason, patrol into lava beds, May 12.

Miller, William Haven, 2d Lt., 1st Cav.
Company officer, Troop F.
In charge of howitzers, 1st battle of Stronghold.
2d battle of Stronghold.
In charge of wagon trains, Yreka to Gillem's Camp, Apr. 26.

Moore, Harry De Witt, 2d Lt., 21st Inf.
Company officer, Company B, 21st Infantry.
Commanded 1/2 Co. B, 1st battle of Stronghold.
Was Adj. & Sig. Off. in Mason's command in 2d battle of Stronghold.
Adj. on Mason's patrol into lava beds, May 12.

Moss, Henry Nixon, 1st Lt., 1st Cav.
Company officer, Troop B.
2d battle of Stronghold.
Battle of Sorass Lake.
In 3d Cav. Squadron, pursuit of Captain Jack.

Perry, David, Capt., 1st Cav.
CO, Troop F.
Wounded, 1st battle of Stronghold.
2d battle of Stronghold.
CO, 1st Cav. Squadron, pursuit of Captain Jack.
Phillips, Henry John, Asst. Surg., USA.
Ordered to lava beds following sick leave, May 2.
Became Med. Director, May 25.

Rayner, James Orlando, Post Chaplain
Chaplain for general field hospital, lava beds.

Rheem, Edward Bellas, 2d Lt., 21st Inf.
Company officer, Company C, 21st Inf.
1st battle of Stronghold.

Rockwell, James, Jr., 2d Lt., 1st Cav.
AAG for Colonel Gillem, Feb. 8.
Relieved with Gillem, Apr. 21.

Ross, John Monroe, 1st Lt., 21st Inf.
CO, Company B, 21st Inf.
In reserve with 1/2 Co. B, 1st battle of Stronghold.
2d battle of Stronghold.
With Mason, patrol into lava beds, May 12.

Semig, Bernard Augustus. Probably contract surgeon (civilian).
Had been a Med. Cadet, 1864-65.
Would join army as asst. surg., 1874.

Sherwood, William L., 1st Lt., 21st Inf.
Company officer, 21st Inf. (company unknown)
Killed, Hospital Rock, Apr. 11.

Silva, Valentine Mott Cuyler, 1st Lt., 21st Inf.
Details unknown.

Skinner, John Oscar, Contract Surg. (civilian)
2d battle of Stronghold, with eastern force.
Battle of Sorass Lake.
In 2d Cav. Squadron, pursuit of Captain Jack.
Joined army as asst. surg., 1874.

Stirling, F. S., Contract Surgeon (civilian)
Scorpion Point.
2d battle of Stronghold, with eastern force.
General field hospital.

Stone, Ebenezer Whitten, 1st Lt., 21st Inf.
AAQM, depot at Jacksonville, Ore.
AAQM, depot at Yreka, Calif.
Not actually in field.
Sumner, Edwin Vose, Capt., 1st Cav.
ADC to Colonel Davis

Tallon, John E., apparently contract surgeon (civilian)
Took part in Hasbrouck's pursuit of western band, May.
In the field only briefly, then to Fort Klamath.

Theller, Edward Russell, 1st Lt., 21st Inf.
CO, Company I, 21st Inf.
2d battle of Stronghold.
With Mason, patrol into lava beds, May 12.

CO, Battery M.
2d battle of Stronghold.
With Mason, patrol into lava beds, May 12.

Trimble, Joel Graham, Capt., 1st Cav.
CO, Troop H.
Guarded Gillem's Camp during 2d battle of Stronghold.
In 1st Cav. Squadron, pursuit of Captain Jack.

Wheaton, Frank, Lt. Col., 21st Inf.
CO, Dist. of Lakes, at beginning of Modoc War.
Relieved from field command on arrival of Colonel Gillem.
Reappointed to field command on relief of Colonel Gillem.

Winters, William Henry, 1st Lt., 1st Cav.
Adj., Cavalry Command, in pursuit of Captain Jack.

Wright, Thomas Forster, 1st Lt., 12th Inf.
CO, Company E, 12th Inf.
2d battle of Stronghold.
Killed on Thomas patrol, Apr. 26.
Appendix E

List of Engagements

1872
Battle of Lost River, Nov. 29
Attack on settlers, Nov. 30
Attack on wagon, near Land's ranch, Dec. 21

1873
First battle of Stronghold, Jan. 17
Attack on wagon train, near Land's ranch, Jan. 22
Attack on Lieutenants Sherwood and Boyle, Apr. 11
Attack on Peace Commission, Apr. 11
Second battle of Stronghold, Apr. 15-17
Attack on wagon train, near Scorpion Point, Apr. 21
Attack on Thomas' patrol, Apr. 26
Attack on wagon train, near Scorpion Point, May 7
Battle of Sorass Lake, May 10
Hasbrouck's pursuit of western band, west of Van Bremer's, May 18
Surrender of western band, May 22
Surrender of Boston Charley and others, May 29
Surrender of Scarfaced Charley and others, May 30-31
Surrender of Captain Jack, June 1
Weapons

In addition to the mountain howitzers and Coehorn mortars, a few notes may be found concerning the small arms used by the combatants. The standard weapon for infantrymen at the time of the Modoc War was the 50-cal. Springfield musket, M1868 or M1870. There are several references to Springfields in the records and it is assumed that the infantry companies and most of the artillery batteries were armed with this weapon.

Most of the cavalry troops, and probably Battery B, 4th Artillery (which was mounted), carried 50-cal. Sharp's carbines, which fired center-primed ammunition. Troop F was the exception; it carried Spencer carbines, which used rim-primed ammunition. Hardin (not in Troop F) wrote that the Spencers were unsatisfactory: "Several men of that troop told me that the failure of so many cartridges almost caused panic." He said that the Sharp's carbine rarely misfired.

Ammunition forwarded to the lava beds from the Vancouver Arsenal included:
- 40,000 rounds, center-primed, metallic cartridges, cal. 50.
- 5,000 rounds for Spencer carbine.
- 4,000 rounds for Remington revolvers, muzzle loading, 44-cal.
- 2,000 rounds for Remington and Colt revolving pistols.
(These last two are probably for the same weapon.)

In August 1872, several troops of the 1st Cavalry were designated to receive an experimental Remington single-barreled pistol. Among the troops were four that served in the Modoc war--F, G, H, and K. If this weapon was issued as scheduled, it is quite possible some of the enlisted men of these four troops carried them into action--officers purchased their own weapons.

The report discusses the Modocs collecting weapons in the field after the last battle of the Stronghold--carbines and rifles of various makes. They probably collected even more after their attack on the Thomas patrol, April 26. It may be assumed they were as well armed as the troops, many of their weapons being army-issue. The Yreka Union reported in March 1873 that the Modocs had 13 breech-loading rifles, four of them "needle" or Springfield rifles. They were said to have a number of muzzle-loading weapons.

One weapon not used was poison gas, although it was recommended by an interested citizen in New Jersey.
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1. The lava beds today. Gillem Bluff is to left. Fields occupy the bed of Tule Lake in background. The lava flows have not changed. A - Site of Gillem's Camp. B - Site of attack on Thomas Patrol. C - Stronghold.
2. Natural crack in the lava flow at the Stronghold. Modocs used this as a trench during the attacks. Gillem's Camp was at the base of the distant bluff.
3. William Simpson's dramatic sketch of the Stronghold, published in Illustrated London News. Although simplified, this dramatic drawing gives some sense of the difficulty the troops experienced in capturing the area.
Another of Simpson's drawings showing the entrance to Captain Jack's cave. Remnants of the Modocs' stone fortifications shown here in the center of the Stronghold still stand today. A photograph taken at the same time Simpson drew this shows that he was an accurate artist.
5. The Modocs erected a "medicine flag" on this rock, one of the highest points in the Stronghold. (See title page.) The capture of this mark of defiance became very important to the troops. Tents in the background were erected by the troops occupying the Stronghold after its capture.
William Simpson was not a witness to the attack on the Peace Commissioners, but he had the opportunity to talk to people who had been present. His version is as good as most others and better than many.
7. The strip of canvas missing from the Peace Commissioners' tent was torn off to cover the body of General Canby by those first to reach the scene of the Indians' attack.
8. From the Modocs' position, looking south toward Sorass (Dry) Lake which indeed is dry in this photograph—the dark patch toward the left. Farther south one sees the trees at the base of Timber Butte where the artillery battery was camped at the time of the attack.
9. The low-lying area beyond the ranger is the general site where Thomas' patrol was so devastatingly attacked by the Modocs. The hill to the right is the butte that was the object of the patrol (today called Hardin Butte).
10. The two twelve-pounders behind a rock fortification. The location is identified only as the Lava Beds.
11. Gillem Bluff. The black line shows the general course of the trail that led down to Gillem's Camp.
12. Willow Creek, east of Clear Lake. Near here, on the far side of the canyon, Captain Jack surrendered. The fortification in the foreground may have been thrown up by the cavalry troopers on their first trip up Willow Creek in the pursuit of the Modocs.
13. Northwest end of Gillem's Camp. The lone bell tent in the center of the picture is believed to be General Canby's. The rock corral still stands today. The larger tents at the left end of the far row composed the general field hospital.
Another view of Gillem's Camp. The row of four bell tents in the foreground undoubtedly represents officers' row. Horses have disturbed the earth along the picket line in front.
15. Signal Rock on the bluff immediately above Gillem's Camp. The lower end of the trail down Gillem Bluff may be seen toward the left.
16. The cemetery at Gillem's Camp. The rock wall, but not the gateposts, still stands, although rebuilt many times.
17. Although this stone structure at Gillem's Camp is not positively identified, it probably was a small corral. The bell tent in the background is believed to be General Canby's.
18. A company lined up as if prepared for an inspection at Gillem's Camp. Their uniforms are much neater than might be expected because of the low morale.
Muybridge's panorama of Gillem's Camp. The original glass negatives probably included the black spaces not now in the prints that are available. Other panoramas by Muybridge show that he was highly skilled in this technique. A marks the location of the Stronghold, while B shows the Peace Commission's meeting-place tent.
Map 2. Lost River Fight, November 29, 1872.

1. November 28, Captain Jackson, with Troop B, 1st Cavalry, left Fort Klamath for Modoc camps at mouth of Lost River.


4. After burning Captain Jack's village, Jackson marched to Crawley's via Lost River Ford. (Water was too high at Natural Bridge.) Established camp at Crawley's.

5. Captain Jack's band, and women, children, and wounded from Hooker Jim's band, crossed Tule Lake by boat.

6. Hooker Jim and 12 warriors retreated around Tule Lake, attacking settlers at Boddy's, Miller's, Brotherton's, and possibly other ranches.
MAP 2

LOST RIVER FIGHT
Nov. 29, 1872

LEGEND:

- Lake Shore
- Ridges and Mountains
- Lava Flow
- Road
- Ford
- Ranch or Cabin

MILITARY SYMBOLS:

- Cavalry Troop
- Movement of U.S. Forces
- U.S. Battle Offensive
- Indian Camp
- Indian Movements
- Indian Attacks
- Indian Fortification

LITTLE (LOWER)
KLAMATH LAKE

TULE LAKE

STRAIGHTHOLD

0 5 10 Miles
Map 3. Troop Movements and Incidents, November 30, 1872 to January 15, 1873.

1. December 1, Captain Jackson established headquarters at Crawley's. December 2, 36 Klamath Indian Volunteers arrived at Crawley's.

2. December 2, Detachment from Troop B established temporary camp at Applegate's ranch.

3. December 8, Captain Bernard with Troop G arrived at Crawley's from Camp Bidwell.

4. December 11, Major Green assumed command of field forces.

5. December 11, Captain Perry with Troop F and Lieutenant Kyle with a detachment from Troop G arrived at Crawley's from Fort Klamath.

6. December 13, Captain Bernard with Troop G established a camp at Land's ranch.

7. December 14, Captain Perry with Troop F on patrol west of Tule Lake.

8. December 21, Lt. Colonel Wheaton assumed command of field forces.

9. December 21, Major Mason with Companies B and C, 21st Infantry, arrived at Crawley's from Fort Vancouver.

10. December 21, Modocs attacked wagon train from Camp Bidwell. Lieutenant Kyle with Troop G, from Land's ranch, counterattacked. Captain Jackson with Troop B marched from Crawley's to Land's to reinforce Kyle.

11. January 1, Headquarters moved from Crawley's to Van Bremer's ranch.

12. January 5, Captain Kelly, Oregon Volunteers, with a patrol from Company A, Oregon Volunteers marched to bluff overlooking the Lava Beds. Exchanged fire with Modocs.

January 12, Captain Perry with a patrol from Troop F, 1st Cavalry, and Company B, Oregon Volunteers, marched to bluff overlooking the Lava Beds. Also exchanged fire with Modocs.
Map 4. First Fight For Stronghold, January 17, 1873.

1. January 16, Captain Applegate with 20 men from Oregon Volunteers escorted wagons and howitzers around northern route from Van Bremer's to bluff on edge of Lava Beds. Arrived at nightfall.

2. January 16, Colonel Wheaton, Major Green, with main command, marched from Van Bremer's directly east to bluff. Arrived at 1 p.m.

3. January 16, Captain Bernard, with Troops B and G and Klamath Indian scouts, marched from Land's toward Hospital Rock.


5. January 17, 4 a.m., Captain Perry with Troop F descended bluff. At 6:30 a.m., rest of command came down bluff. At the base, Company C and one-half Company B, 21st Infantry, moved out as skirmishers. Rest followed in column march, with Troop F in rear. Other half of Company B and the howitzers remained in reserve.

6. Command changed to a skirmish line and continued to advance.

7. At 11 a.m. Captain Perry's Troop F moved from right flank northward to a position between 21st Infantry and Oregon Volunteers. Major Green ordered western force to move around north end of Stronghold. The 21st Infantry, California Volunteers, and Troop F crossed to east side but failed to hold shoreline.

8. January 17, Captain Bernard's force attacked in a.m. Stopped by a ravine. Withdrew 150 yards and fought through day from a defensive position. Along with group from the west, he withdrew during the night to Land's ranch. Colonel Wheaton led remaining force on west side back to Van Bremer's. Modocs retained Stronghold.
MAP 4

FIRST FIGHT FOR STRONGHOLD
Jan. 17, 1873

MILITARY SYMBOLS:
- Cavalry Troop
- Infantry Battalion
- Artillery Company
- Infantry Company
- Infantry Detachment
- Headquarters
- Field Depot
- U.S. Army Camp
- U.S. Artillery
- Indian Attak
- Indian Fortification
- U.S. Army Camp
- U.S. Artillery
- Indian Attak
- Indian Fortification

HOSPITAL ROCK AREA TODAY
(Note: Scale)
- Rock Fortifications

TULE LAKE

LITTLE (LOWER) KLAMATH LAKE
Map 5. Troop Movements and Incidents, January 18 to April 11, 1873.

1. January 18, Colonel Wheaton, with Oregon Volunteers, the howitzers, and stragglers from other units returned from Stronghold fight of January 17 to Van Bremer's.

2. January 18, Major Green and all troops on east side of Stronghold withdrew to Land's ranch. Leaving Captain Bernard and Troop G at Land's, Green led rest of command around Tule Lake via Lost River Ford to Van Bremer's, arriving January 20.

3. January 21, Colonel Wheaton moved his headquarters from Van Bremer's to Lost River Ford. January 24, the Oregon Volunteers disbanded. February 8, Colonel Gillem assumed command of all field forces. February 9, Company I, 21st Infantry arrived at headquarters.


5. January 22, Modocs attacked two wagons moving grain from Land's to Applegate's and drove off detachment of 22 soldiers. Same day, Captain Bernard with Troop G recaptured wagons. Exact site of attack unknown; said to be two miles from Land's.

6. February and early March, Troop F at Dorris' ranch.

7. Mid-February, General Canby and Peace Commissioners arrived, and Gillem moved headquarters from Lost River Ford to Fairchild's ranch. 21st Infantry Battalion remained at Lost River Ford (See 4, above).


10. March 23, Canby moved his headquarters from Fairchild's to Van Bremer's.

11. March 24, Mason moved his command from Applegate's to Scorpion Point. Warm Spring Scouts arrived April 13.

12. April 1, Canby and Gillem moved headquarters from Van Bremer's to base of bluff. New encampment known as Gillem's Camp.

13. April 7, Major Mason moved his command from Scorpion Point to Hospital Rock.

14. April 11, Modocs attacked and fatally wounded Lieutenant Sherwood, west of Hospital Rock. April 12, Modocs and Mason's troops exchanged fire.

15. April 11, Eight Modocs attacked Peace Commission, killing General Canby and Dr. Thomas.

A number of patrols was made during this period. They are not shown on map because of a lack of information on their specific routes. Examples:

March 21-22, Troop F from Van Bremer's to Lava Beds and return, 45 miles.

March 26, Troop F from Van Bremer's to Lava Beds and return, 30 miles.

March 27-29, Troop G from Scorpion Point, south and east of Lava Beds, and return.

April 12, patrol from Scorpion Point to Juniper Butte and Three Sisters Butte, and return.
Map 6. Second Battle for Stronghold, April 15-17, 1873. Colonel Gillem's Plan: Major Mason (from east) and Major Green (from west) to attack Stronghold on April 15. Mason's left to join Green's right, thus surrounding Stronghold. (Essentially, the same plan devised by Colonel Wheaton, January 17.)


Hospital Rock: Mason in command of troops: Companies B, C, and I, 21st Infantry; Troops B and G, 1st Cavalry; Warm Spring Indians; and howitzers.

April 15

1. Two a.m. Troops F and K, dismounted, marched from Gillem's Camp to holding position on Hovey Point.

2. Eight a.m. Green's command marched from Gillem's Camp. Battery E led the column. 1/2 mile from camp, Battery E changed to skirmishers. One mile from camp, Battery E came under fire. Rest of column then deployed as skirmishers.

3. Battery A, 4th Artillery, a detachment from Troop H, and the mortars remained for the time being at Gillem's Camp.

4. April 14-15, midnight, Major Mason's command left Hospital Rock and took an assault position about 700 yards east of the Stronghold by dawn April 15. Howitzers kept to rear--too far back to fire effectively.

5. One-thirty p.m., Green's infantry and artillery charged, gaining several hundred yards. During afternoon, infantry and artillery units moved slightly to right (south) creating space at north that allowed the cavalry to move into line by 4 p.m. Mortars moved forward by late afternoon.

6. Attempt to cut off Stronghold at south failed.

7. The cavalry, under Green, gained high ground at northwest corner of Stronghold by nightfall. Western line generally 1/2 mile from Stronghold.

April 16

8. Mortars (to rear of Green's cavalry) and howitzers (now moved up) fired throughout night of 15-16. Ten a.m., general advance began on west side--steady but slow progress. Another attempt to join forces around south of Stronghold failed.

9. By afternoon, Green's and Mason's forces joined at north, cutting Modocs off from water. This united force pushed south, penetrating outer defenses of Modocs by nightfall.

April 17

10. Mortars and howitzers continued firing through night of April 16-17, and at a reduced rate on morning of 17th. Despite a flurry of Modoc firing at 11 a.m., the troops realized by noon that the Modocs had evacuated the Stronghold. Troops entered the Stronghold. Modocs successfully escaped south into Lava Beds.
SECOND FIGHT FOR STRONGHOLD
April 15-17, 1873

MILITARY SYMBOLS:
- Cavalry Battalion
- Infantry Battalion
- Artillery Battalion
- Artillery Battery
- Detachment
- Lake Shore
- Lava Flow
- Movement of U.S. Forces
- Indian Movements
- Hasty Field Fortification
- U.S. Battle Offensive
- Indian Fortification

0 Miles

5 Miles
Map 7. Attack on Thomas' Patrol, April 26, 1873.

1. April 26, 7:00 a.m., Thomas' patrol left Gillem's Camp enroute to Sand (Hardin) Butte to determine feasibility of moving artillery into lava beds. Total strength: 5 officers, 1 assistant surgeon, 59 enlisted men, 1 civilian guide, 1 civilian packer.

2. During march, Company E, 12th Infantry, failed to extend skirmishers far enough to left and right to cover ridges. Both artillery batteries tended to close on skirmishers, rather than keeping their distance as a march column, thus making one mass of troops.

3. Donald McKay and 12 Warm Springs traveled separately; they were supposed to meet main patrol at destination.

4. Twenty-four Modocs under Scarfaced Charley shadowed patrol to Sand Butte.


6. Lieutenant Wright ordered 4 men to advance toward Schonchin ridge to northeast. Modocs attacked them. Lieutenant Cranston took five men to clear rocks to north. Disappeared.

7. Captain Thomas ordered Company E to move to ridge to west, away from the butte. Modocs attacked Company E. Lieutenant Wright wounded; large part of company panicked.

8. Thomas then led 25-30 men from the artillery batteries (rest had fled) after Wright and Company E. Modocs attacked, inflicting great casualties.

Inset map no. 1 reflects the above, which is based on original, but fragmentary, sources. The writer considers it to be as accurate as is possible to recreate at this time. Inset map no. 2 shows alternate possibilities and is based on secondary, traditional, and verbal sources.

Inset map, "Site Today" shows a "Photo Site." This marks the location shown in a recently discovered photograph that contains a number of "bodies." The photograph, not included in this report, is considered to be a post-war reenactment.
1. May 9, Captain Hasbrouck with Battery B, 4th Artillery, Troops B and G, 1st Cavalry, and Warm Springs marched from Peninsula Camp to Sorass (Dry) Lake. All units were mounted.

2. Battery B camped in timber one mile south of lake.

3. Hasbrouck and main command camped at the lake, which was dry. May 10, before dawn, Modocs attacked Hasbrouck from high ridge 400 yards north and lower ridge 200 yards north. Hasbrouck counterattacked, Troop B on right, one-half of Troop G on left, one-half of Warm Springs to left flank, other half of Warm Springs to right flank. Other half of Troop G assigned to collecting stampeding horses. Warm Springs' flanking movements failed to surround Modocs due to rapid retreat of latter. Troops drove Modocs to lava flows north of Big Sand Butte. Battery B arrived at lake from its camp too late to participate in chase. Only Warm Springs succeeded in getting mounted during fight.

4. Hasbrouck pursued Modocs 3-4 miles. Returned all the way north to Peninsula Camp because of lack of water.

**Enlargement of Dry Lake**

A. Higher ridge. Has natural cracks in lava, parts of which are suited for trench fighting; today there is one rock fortification.

B. Lower ridge. Today there is one rock fortification and two rock piles.

C. Two boundary markers.

D. Juniper tree and rock pile--traditional site of Hasbrouck's camp.
1. May 12, Major Mason, with eight companies, marched from camp at Stronghold, through Lava Beds, to site north of Big Sand Butte and east of lava flows.

2. May 12, Captain Hasbrouck, with four companies, marched from Peninsula camp, via Sorass Lake, to site south of Big Sand Butte.

3. May 12, 3:30 p.m., Mason established that Modocs were camped in the lava flow north of Big Sand Butte. May 13 and 14, Mason and Hasbrouck made reconnaissance from Big Sand Butte and planned coordinated attack.

4. May 14, afternoon, Lieutenant Hazelton, with 26 volunteers from Hasbrouck's camp, patrolled into lava flow and determined that Modocs had fled.

5. Internal dissent caused Modocs to split, one group heading west on Tickner Road, other group disappearing temporarily.

6. May 15, Hasbrouck and Mason, unaware of Modocs' splitting, followed trail eight miles westward on Tickner Road. Returned to camps.

7. Mason led his command back to Stronghold camp via Juniper Butte.

8. May 16, Hasbrouck received horses from Peninsula camp and followed Modoc trail westward.

Mason's Camp

A. Three long lava ridges, total about 1500 feet, each ridge contains natural cracks suitable for defense. No evidence of reinforcement.

B. All fortifications on this north side are low, simple, rifle-pit types. Each would hold 1-3 men, crouching or lying.

C. Area fortified is about 30 acres, generally level, grass and brush covered, slightly higher than surrounding country, about 1500 feet in diameter. It has not been surveyed. Numbers on fortifications indicate approximate height of outside walls. Disposition of Mason's 8 companies unknown; but different shapes, sizes, heights, and types of construction of forts reflect individuality of different companies.

D. Tree symbols indicate actual trees--total of 8.

E. Large swale, lower than area containing fortifications.

F. Rock wall, 40-50 feet long, 4 feet high.

G. Rock wall, 50 feet long, 5-6 feet high.
1. Following 2d Battle of Stronghold, Gillem’s Camp consisted of Colonel Gillem, Major Green, Batteries A and K, 4th Artillery, Company E, 12th Infantry, and mortars.

2. Warm Spring Indians established their own camp, April 20.

3. Following 2d Battle of Stronghold, it was occupied by Major Mason, Companies B, C, and I, 21st Infantry; Company G, 12th Infantry; and Batteries E and M, 4th Artillery. Joined by Battery G, April 28, and Battery K, May 13.

4. Camp at Hospital Rock was abandoned on April 19. On April 20, Modocs attacked a wagon train en route from Hospital Rock to Scorpion Point. One soldier was wounded. Exact site of attack is unknown.


6. Peninsula camp established by Troops B and G and Battery B (all from Scorpion Point) on May 7. Exact location in doubt.

7. April 18-21, cavalry troops from Scorpion Point patrolled around Lava Beds following 2d Battle of Stronghold. All returned to Scorpion Point except Troop F, which remained at Van Bremer’s ranch.

8. April 18-23, Warm Spring Scouts patrolled south into Lava Beds. Discovered Modocs 4 miles south, near Sand (Hardin) Butte.

9. April 26, Thomas’ Patrol from Gillem’s Camp was attacked and destroyed by Modocs at Sand (Hardin) Butte. (Map No. 7) On May 6 the bodies of Lieutenant Cranston and his five men were discovered. They were buried on battle site, May 9.

10. May 2, Colonel Davis arrived at Gillem’s Camp to replace General Canby. May 7, he learned that Modocs had left vicinity of Sand (Hardin) Butte in SE direction.

11. May 7, Modocs attacked a wagon train between Scorpion Point and Peninsula camp. Three soldiers were wounded.

12. May 9, Captain Hasbrouck led patrol from Peninsula camp to Sorass (Dry) Lake.

13. May 10, Battle of Sorass Lake (Map No. 8).

14. May 12, Mason with 8 companies marched from Stronghold toward Big Sand Butte; Hasbrouck with 4 companies marched from Peninsula camp toward Big Sand Butte.

15. Modocs, following Battle of Sorass Lake, took refuge in lava flow north of Big Sand Butte. May 14, Modocs, threatened by movements of Mason and Hasbrouck, left lava flow. Split into 2 bands, one moving westward, the other, eastward. (Map No. 9)

16. May 17, Hasbrouck pursued Modocs westward along Tickner Road.

17. May 18, Perry with Troop F marched from Van Bremer’s south toward Antelope Spring. Met Hasbrouck coming from east. Perry continued south. Hasbrouck moved on to Van Bremer’s.

18. May 18, Mason moved his command from Stronghold to Gillem’s Camp. Stronghold now abandoned. May 19, Davis ordered breakup of Gillem’s Camp, placing Mason in charge of all infantry companies and Captain Mendenhall in charge of all the artillery batteries present. May 20, Mason marched the infantry to Van Bremer’s. Gillem’s Camp abandoned.

19. May 20, Davis established headquarters at Van Bremer’s, then at Fairchild’s. May 21, Gillem was relieved.

20. May 22, Western band of Modocs surrendered. May 23, Green took command of all mounted troops at Fairchild’s and organized them into 3 squadrons. May 24, 3d Squadron left Fairchild’s for Peninsula. May 25, 2d Squadron followed.

21. By end of May, 1st, 2d, and 3d Squadrons had arrived at Peninsula camp and on to Applegate’s on Clear Lake.
Surrender of Western Band

1. May 17, Captain Hasbrouck, with Troops B and G, Battery B, and Warm Springs (See Map No. 9), marched from Big Sand Butte to Van Bremer's, via Tickner Road. Met Captain Perry, with Troop F, who was marching from Van Bremer's south to Antelope Spring.

2. May 18, Hasbrouck rode south from Van Bremer's to meet Perry who was to ride north. Opposite Van Bremer's Mountain (Mount Dome), Hasbrouck struck Modocs' trail leading into hills to west. He pursued with Troops B and G and Warm Springs. Due to misunderstanding, Battery B continued south.


4. May 19, Hasbrouck led his command from Van Bremer's to Fairchild's.

5. Colonel Davis arrived at Fairchild's--temporary headquarters for the command.

6. May 20, Modocs indicated a desire to surrender. May 22, 63 Modocs surrendered to Davis at Fairchild's. June 2, Major Mason with 21st Infantry Battalion escorted prisoners-of-war from Fairchild's to Peninsula camp.

Surrender of Eastern Band

1. May 29, 2d and 3d Squadrons moved from Peninsula camp to Applegate's.

2. May 29, 2d and 3d Squadrons marched from Applegate's to Willow Creek. Scouts had reported that Captain Jack's band was on Willow Creek.


5. May 30, 2d and 3d Squadrons discovered Modocs in a canyon (exact site unknown). Scar faced Charley surrendered. Night of May 30-31, troops camped on Lost River. May 31, returned to the canyon where 31 Modocs surrendered. Captain Jack and a few others had fled during night. May 31-June 1, 2d and 3d Squadrons patrolled large area looking for Captain Jack.


7. June 1, 1st Squadron found Captain Jack's trail leading back toward Willow Creek.

8. June 1, Perry with larger part of 1st Squadron moved up north bank of Willow Creek. Trimble with rest of 1st Squadron moved up south bank. Trimble discovered Captain Jack, who surrendered.
MODOC SURRENDER
May 17—June 2, 1873

LITTLE
(LOWER)
KLAMATH LAKE

SURRENDER OF WESTERN BAND

SURRENDER OF EASTERN BAND

MAP 11

LEGEND:

Lake Shore

Ridges and Mountains

Road

Ranch or Cabin

MILITARY SYMBOLS:

Cavalry Troop

Cavalry Squadron

Artillery Battery

Warm Spring Indians

Headquarters

U.S. Forces' Camp

Movement of U.S. Forces

U.S. Battle Offensive

Indian Camp

Indian Movements

Detail of action surrendered

Where Captain Jack surrendered

0 1/2 mile

0 5 Miles