LESSONS FROM KETTLE CREEK:
PATRIOTISM AND LOYALISM AT ASKANCE
ON THE SOUTHERN FRONTIER

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On the morning of February 14, 1779, some 600 of the king’s loyal Americans, popularly known as Loyalists or Tories, camped on the north side of a crossing of Kettle Creek on the then northwest frontier of Georgia. Their local guides prepared to lead them to sympathizers in the Wrightsborough Quaker settlement and, from there, to the British troops that had occupied Augusta during the previous two weeks. The red-coated soldiers had themselves come to Georgia from New York on a mission to rendezvous with thousands of frontier Carolinians whom British leaders imagined would begin a counterrevolution wherein Americans who would, in theory, need little more than the support of the regular British army to eventually restore to the Crown, at the least, all of the colonies south from Maryland. To the advocates of this grand scheme, it had the potential to significantly change history.¹

The battle of Kettle Creek that ensued later that morning would come to loom large in the folklore of the South as one of the few Patriot victories in Georgia, a state otherwise seldom remembered as even having a Revolutionary War past.² The real clash of arms, as opposed to the battle of legend, however, actually resulted in few casualties for either side: twenty dead identified as Loyalists and four of the attacking militiamen killed and three men mortally wounded. It failed to affect the outcome of the southern campaign of 1778-1779.³

Kettle Creek does have importance, not as a dramatic end to a spectacular conspiracy, but as representing the important reasons why this southern strategy failed that day and would fail repeatedly to the end of the war. Had the significance of the battle of Kettle Creek been fully understood in 1779, the events of 1775-1776 could have been seen in ways that would have avoided instead of encouraged British military and political actions in the South in 1780-1781. Instead of thousands of Americans devoted to restoring colonial rule, the Loyalists in this particular fight demonstrated that what largely remained of the “king’s men” consisted of desperate and cowered members of what historian Linda Colley described, for all of America, as
a coalition of poly-ethnic minorities who sought the protection more than an opportunity to die for an already failed cause.\textsuperscript{4}

The events that cumulated in the battle of Kettle Creek did have a basis in that a few years earlier, thousands of southern frontiersmen appeared to have actively and very publicly came forward in support of the king’s cause. In 1774, hundreds of the backcountry Georgians, including such later Whig (rebel) leaders at Kettle Creek as John Dooly and Elijah Clarke, signed petitions in support of royal rule. They specifically opposed the actions of the coastal oriented rebels as threatening the British protection of their families on the frontier from Indian attack. Royal Governor Josiah Martin of North Carolina arranged a similar petition drive in his colony. In South Carolina, thousands of frontiersmen who opposed the Revolution refused, en mass, to sign the Continental Association. Throughout the Carolinas overall, at least some 2,500 Loyalists took up arms and marched against the Revolution in 1775-1776; what leaders in London hoped could start a civil war in favor of the Crown.\textsuperscript{5}

The numbers of men who rose up in opposition to the rebellion in its early years in the South proved deceptive, however. While held as a prisoner, before fleeing to British warships on February 11, 1776, Georgia colonial governor Sir James Wright suffered the indignity of “western” riflemen firing into his house and endangering his family.\textsuperscript{6} The Loyalists in the backcountry who rose up were suppressed by even larger numbers of their neighbors at the battle of Moore’s Creek Bridge in North Carolina and in the Snow Campaign of South Carolina. Scotsman Baika Harvey, a new arrival to the Kettle Creek-Wrightsborough area, watched the demise of the efforts of the king’s men:

> the Americans are Smart Industrious hardy people & fears Nothing . . . I am Just Returned from the Back parts where I seed Eight Thousand men in arms all with Riffeld Barrill guns which they can hit the Bigness of a Dollar between
Two & Three hundreds yards Distance the Little Boys not Bigger than my self has all their Guns & marches with their Fathers & all their Cry is Liberty or Death Dear Godfather tell all my Country people not to come here for the Americans will kill them Like Dear in the Woods & they will never see them they can lie on their Backs & Load & fire & every time they draws sight at anything they are sure to kill or Creple & they Run in the Woods like Horses I seed the Liberty Boys take Between Two & Three hundred Torreys & one Liberty man would take & Drive four or five before him Just as shepards do the sheep in our Cuntry & they have taken all their arms from them and put the head men in gaile.

The “head men” went into exile from where they would advocate, despite what Harvey had witnessed, an invasion of the South by British troops to encourage a new uprising.

British leaders failed—or refused--to understand the nature of what remained of their American support and from that mistake made tragic miscalculations. Even if the regular American armies had been thoroughly defeated, the Continental Congress bankrupted, and the French compelled to abandon the war, strategists then and since have failed to explain how the 30,000 soldiers could occupy almost every town, county, and state in America to keep subdued a popular and well armed nationalist rebellion among more than one million people. From the earliest days of the fighting, leaders in London had instead called for a strategy of seizing the southern ports with the British army and navy as bases from which to invade the interior and establish fortified outposts from which to Americanize the fighting. Lord George Germain, secretary for the colonies and chief architect for the British war effort, correctly saw that the war would be decided by Americans but he also believed, to the point of obsession, that at least half of the population still supported the king’s cause. This figment of his desperation became the basis of a vision of thousands of Americans restoring their colonies to the crown. In 1777, the king’s troops tried to rally such support in frontier Pennsylvania and New York. The defeat of the king’s regular troops at Saratoga by the professional American army, and other failures, obscured the significance of the serious defeats that the Loyalists also suffered at the hands of
their neighbors in those campaigns. The British would therefore continue this strategy in the South with invasions of Georgia in 1778, South Carolina in 1780, and North Carolina in 1781. These attempts to rally the backcountry people to the king's cause in the Carolinas that started with the Kettle Creek campaign continued almost to the end of the war. Even Lord Cornwallis made his invasion of Virginia, en route to his disastrous defeat at Yorktown, while pursuing illusionary legions of Americans. In the end, these efforts achieved little more than creating such historical footnotes as making Georgia the only part of the United States ever reduced to colony status and South Carolina the distinction of having more Revolutionary War battlefields than any other state.

Richard Holmes has argued that, by 1778, months before Kettle Creek, the British no longer had a viable long game. Scholars of the Revolution now know that the Ministry sought to win a war by popular support that was outnumbered, at best, by three to one. An estimated 100,000 Americans actively served in the Whig war effort. The 30,000 of their neighbors who took up arms for the king’s cause might have balanced their opposition as a military force when added to the numbers in the British regular army, Indian allies, escaped slaves, and German auxiliaries. This number of Loyalists in arms, however, only comes to one third of those Americans who, at the end of the war, moved to British possessions rather than remain in the new country, implying that some two thirds of even the men who did take up arms had a greater commitment to America than to the king’s cause.

Historian Robert Harvey has compared the British strategy to the attempt, two centuries later of the United States to “Vietnamize” its war in Southeast Asia. In both instances, the invaders tried to build a popular consensus around groups outside of the local mainstream. The British even feared a “domino effect” in that if America won independence, Ireland would be
next. Critics of both wars, and of Iraq, echo Vietnam-era descriptions of a super power, in the end, dragging out a war for years in order to try to save face when caught in a situation it could not seemingly win, lose, or abandon. To modern observers, the American Revolution eventually degenerated into making the king’s soldiers peacekeepers in a land without peace, as they tried to indigenize the war as part of a hopelessly flawed effort at nation building. The king’s ministers also faced the now classic contradiction of needing to use armed force to achieve its ends at the same time that force of arms proportionately increased local resistance. 11

Beyond the numbers in 1775 and 1776, historian William H. Nelson argues that, whatever the motivations of the individuals who supported the American Revolution, after 1776 only two significant populations of Loyalists remained, one along the frontier from Georgia to New York, and the other in the mid-Atlantic ports. He noted that these Americans lived in areas that suffered most from a proximity to the far wealthier neighboring areas’ economic interests and relatively little from any British policies. These two groups were only marginally influenced by the trans-Atlantic trade, a motivation of the Revolution in other areas for supporting the Revolution. By 1779 and the battle of Kettle Creek, after years of Whig efforts at recruitment and suppression, what remained of American desire for the restoration of colonial rule, excluding critics of the often incompetent and corrupt new revolutionary governments would not have numbered in the thousands. 12

II

Not every British leader misread the situation. The Earl of Carlisle, while heading an official peace commission to the Americans, wrote to his wife as early as 1778:

The leaders on the enemy’s side are too powerful; the common people hate us in their hearts, notwithstanding all that is said of their secret attachment to the mother country. I cannot give you a better proof of their unanimity against us than in our last march; in the whole country there was not found one single man capable of
bearing arms at home; they left their dwellings unprotected, and after having cut all of the ropes of the wells had fled to Gen. Washington. Formerly, when things went better for us, there was an appearance of friendship by their coming in for pardons, that might have deceived even those who had been the most acquainted with them. But no sooner our situation was in the least altered for the worse, but these friends were the first to fire on us, and many were taken with the pardons in our [sic, their] pockets. Beat Gen. Washington, drive away Monsr. d’Estaing, and we should have friends enough in the country; but in our present condition the only friends we have, or are likely to have, are those who are absolutely ruined for us [that is, those afraid, from experience, to express their loyalty openly], and in such distress [that is, as refugees protected and supported at British expense] I leave you to judge what possible use they can be to us.\textsuperscript{13}

The selection of Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell to command the Georgia invasion force in 1778-1779, implies that serious doubts about the southern Loyalist strategy existed from even before the beginning of the campaign. Campbell only learned of the existence of his expedition on the night before its fleet sailed from New York City. Being an engineer, he had almost no experience in commanding troops. His force consisted of an odd collection of units of northern and southern Loyalists, with German battalions and his own Seventy-first "Scots Highlander" Infantry Regiment. The latter included, as “Highlanders," at least some impressed Englishmen of questionable physical quality. This regiment had hardly seen any combat. Even the fleet transporting his army had serious problems.\textsuperscript{14}

Quite likely, General Sir Henry Clinton, the commander of the British forces in North America, dispatched the highest ranking officer he could afford to lose, with the troops that the British army east needed, on what Clinton regarded as a strategic mistake imposed upon him by Germain. The British general believed that he only had enough forces to maintain what his army already held while either pursuing a Loyalist strategy or moving against the Continental army of George Washington. Simultaneously implementing both plans would incite more Americans against the king’s cause by holding forth the image of the Loyalist as an armed collaborator to a foreign army; also, any American who did come forward, without the protection of the regular
army risked defeat and the retaliation at the hands of nationalistic neighbors. That Clinton entrusted one of the most critical roles in the Georgia campaign, the covert recruitment of the Loyalists, to Boyd, a man so little known that he appears in only one record relating to these events before his death in battle, also questions the general’s faith in the success of the expedition to Georgia in 1778.

Campbell, however, led his command, such as it existed, in defeating an outnumbered professional American army and capturing the colonial capital of Savannah. He then linked up with British troops from neighboring East Florida and boasted, after overrunning much of Revolutionary War Georgia, of being the first officer to tear a star and stripe from the rebel flag. Campbell then used his commission as the royal civil governor of Georgia to receive oaths of allegiance from almost 1,800 men whom he hastily organized into a colonial militia. Most of these Georgians, however, quickly returned to the Whig cause, or simply fled. The experience with the Wilkes County frontier in early February 1779 proved typical. A Mr. Freeman, a delegation of Quakers from Wrightsborough, and a group of Baptists arrived in Campbell’s camp to offer the surrender of the settlements in that last area of Georgia. Campbell sent then Captain John Hamilton and his Loyalist horsemen from Augusta through the Kettle Creek-Wilkes County frontier, to receive the voluntary submissions of that population and to find Boyd and his Loyalists. Hamilton, apparently working in conjunction with McGirth’s men, forced the submission of the outposts and people before being surrounded and nearly forced to surrender by Whig militiamen under Andrew Pickens and John Dooly at Robert Carr’s Fort near Kettle Creek. As he later related to a British historian, he had already discovered that:

although many of the people came in to take the oath of allegiance, the professions of a considerable number were not to be depended upon; and that some came in only for the purpose of gaining information on his strength and future designs.
Campbell should not have been surprised by Hamilton’s experience. His superiors in New York had assured him of a reinforcement of 6,000 Carolinians, as well as significant numbers of Indian allies. In his journal, he documented how his expectations steadily declined. By the time that his troops had penetrated the backcountry in search of a rendezvous with Boyd, Campbell had lowered his expectations to 1,000 men. Although reports arrived in Georgia that thousands of Loyalists had gathered on the Saluda River in South Carolina, Boyd’s uprising actually numbered, on its best day, no more than 600 to 700 men of questionable value to the British’s aspirations. Campbell lived the scenario described by the Earl of Carlisle in 1778. By the early hours of February 14, 1779, to avoid entrapment, Campbell and his troops evacuated Augusta. Had he known more about the proximity of Boyd’s command, he could have prevented the battle of Kettle Creek by sending reinforcements. Even if Boyd's 600 Loyalists safely reached the British camp, however, they would have been an insignificant reward for what had been expended and expected. After escaping from Augusta, the British troops did attack and destroy a regular American force at Briar Creek, Georgia, on March 3, 1779 but still another victory in a formal battle could not for the army’s failure to find substantive Loyalist allies. The Redcoats also found oaths issued by Campbell in the pockets of the dead and captured Americans. On March 11, a disenchanted Archibald Campbell left the South forever to seek other venues for his considerable ambitions. Word failed to reach him of the defeat of 600 of his promised Cherokee and Creek Indian allies by the same rebels who had dealt an end to his Tories at Kettle Creek.

British officials attempted to continue to facilitate the southern strategy, however, and reinstated Governor Sir James Wright and his provincial government. In 1779, while the army continued to seek the rumored legions of Loyalist soldiers, however, rebel leaders like Pickens,
Dooly, and Clarke used small bands of riflemen to effectively defeat Loyalists, Indians, and even Redcoats. These rebels confined the area of restored colonial rule to hardly more than the range of British muskets and bayonets. By the summer of 1779, one observer wrote:

> the whole country within twenty-five miles of Savannah has been plundered and every man almost who had submitted to, and received protection of government, either killed or taken prisoners, and the few that have escaped that fate, have been obliged to submit to such terms as the rebels pleased to subscribe.²¹

The British navy, army, and engineers served well in the European style of wars and usually won its formal fixed battles in America. This military machine, however, proved of limited use in fighting a land based guerilla war. British regulars and their American allies became the prey of rebel partisans. Such attacks further weakened Loyalist resolve. In 1780, the British would successfully overrun all of Georgia and most of South Carolina, while organizing militias, as Campbell had done in Georgia in 1779, but would still fail to create a credible American military force for reclaiming their rebellious colonies. They only revisited their experiences in Georgia in 1779 on a larger scale. As a South Carolinian wrote:

> The greatest cause of the Militia not turning out so well as was perhaps expected was the atrocious cruelties exercised upon them whenever they fell into the hands of the Rebel Militia, cruelties so great that they exceed all belief and were they to be mentioned in England would be generally rejected as the exaggerations of a heated fancy.²²

Just before learning of the total destruction of his corps of provincials and militia by frontier riflemen at King’s Mountain in 1780, for example, Lord Cornwallis wrote despondently of the king’s American allies. Despite the fact that they were well trained [in the use of the musket and bayonet] and outnumbered Washington’s army, they were “dastardly and pusillanimous”; that arming his militia amounted to giving weapons to the rebels. He might have later mused on the fact that most of the men responsible for the destruction of his provincials at King’s Mountain had traveled hundreds of miles from today’s Tennessee, on their own initiative and leaving their
homes vulnerable to Indian attack, for the opportunity to kill other Americans who served, voluntarily as provincials and conscripted as militia, with the British military.23

Many of what remained of the Loyalists clearly foresaw the outcome of the war and owned property that they wanted to avoid losing to Whig plunderers or to confiscation and banishment laws enacted by the individual states against the active supporters of the king’s cause. Americans of all politics wanted to continue to live, and in America. They acted accordingly and contributed largely to the two thirds of the king’s men who did not evacuate with the British army at the end of the war. Their number included local leaders who met with Boyd at Wrightsborough in 1779 but who ended the American Revolution claiming land bounties as Whig refugees who had continued the war in other states or under the category of citizens who had peacefully remained as politically neutral in Georgia after August 20, 1781. A suspicious similarity even exists between the names of men known to have served in Loyalist units such as the King’s Carolina Rangers and some of the recipients of these land certificates. (Two-thirds of the men who received bounty land grants in Georgia did so only as citizens.)24

Many of the dedicated Loyalists remained in or returned to America. Claims for property loss filed with the British government after the war provide biographical information on some of these men. Jonas Bedford, for example, a New Jersey born son of English parents, had been wounded thirteen times as a militia officer in the wars with the Indians of the 1750s and had raised a company to suppress the Regulators in the 1760s. Subsequently, he received colonial commissions in North Carolina as a militia officer and a justice of the peace. Refusing to take any active role in the war until 1780, when threats from bandits to burn his home caused him to abandon his wife and eight children, Bedford joined the Loyalists at King’s Mountain as a private and later served in John Moore’s (of Kettle Creek fame) troop and in Thomas Brown’s
King’s Carolina Rangers. He narrowly escaped execution by vengeful Whigs during the war and would eventually refugee to Georgia, East Florida, and England. Nonetheless, in 1823, he died as a man of property at his home in backcountry North Carolina. Even the notorious South Carolina Tory raider Daniel McGirth remained in Georgia after the war, usually as a free man, until his death in 1804. Prominent North Carolina Loyalist John Hamilton lived in Norfolk, Virginia, as British consul from 1790 until the opening of the War of 1812. His past did not prevent his having prominent Americans such as Stephen Decatur as friends. At least one Loyalist community remained in Abbeville District, South Carolina, after the war. Its members moved onto Indian lands to found the “New Britain” community, in what would eventually become Tennessee, in 1806. Despite their community’s past, they were led by a man named George Washington Morgan. Many Loyalists, including survivors of Kettle Creek, succeeded so well at staying in the United States that they and their descendants helped to create the country. Modern descendants of these families often come to mistakenly remember their Revolutionary War ancestors as Whigs, an understandable mistake considering the drastic changes in political control during the war.

III

Why did the majority of the backcountry population join the resistance to British rule? Frontiersmen, like the Over the Mountain men at King’s Mountain left few expressions of their ideals but political issues affecting backcountry residents do surface by implication. During the French and Indian Wars, Great Britain had made allies of the Americans but especially the frontiersmen. With the peace that followed, however, that relationship, as with America as a whole, deviated between mutual indifference and that of master and fractious subjects.
More conflict existed within the colonies than angry expressed at Great Britain, such as the between the backcountry and the coastal elite in the Regulator Rebellions. In North Carolina, from 1764 to 1771, as many as 6,000 frontiersmen rose up against corrupt local governments that belonged to the coastal elite. South Carolina's conflict (1767-1771) involved vigilante communities suppressing bands of thieves and pressuring the colonial government to establish and finance rule of law on the frontier. (Although two thirds or more of the total population of South Carolina lived in the backcountry, the low country port of Charleston had the colony’s only court and local government.)

The Whigs addressed such needs for local government in their efforts to win over the frontiersmen. In the Kettle Creek area and elsewhere on the Georgia frontier, for example, political districts were set up, each of which had a local governing committee, court, and military company. In 1777, that part of frontier Georgia became Wilkes County, with locally elected political representation and government officials. John Dooly served as the county’s first sheriff. For these southern frontiersmen, the end of the war would result in acquisition of more lands, defeat of the Indians, expansion of slavery, and the type of local government and civil authority sought by the Regulators. Pickens, Dooly, and Clarke would become notables. Georgia would name counties for all three and Pickens had counties named for him in three states. Their sons would have important political careers, in new county seats and state capitals established after the war on what often had been Indian territories during the Revolution. As if to memorialize the changes that began during and continued after the war, the settlers around Kettle Creek established a Presbyterian church just north of the battlefield, which they named “Liberty.”

In any revolution, controlling the government, newspapers, and ministry proves a great boon in gaining recruits, silencing opposition, and controlling those individuals who lack
commitment to either cause. With the changes in government during the war, few men could have been classed as Loyalist or Whig for all of 1775 to 1783. For example, the thousands of South Carolina frontiersmen marched for the king’s cause in 1775 when that colony’s traditional colonial government stood in ambiance but they often then became Whig militia over the years that followed under the new order. The centralization of the old colonial governments in coastal capitals aided the revolutionaries, largely people tied to issues such as trade and taxes. The rebels, however, also effectively used propaganda, persecution, and promotion to win over such men as merchants, millers, and blacksmiths, local leaders who could be powerful influences on their neighbors. The revolutionaries even initially reached out to such prominent Loyalists as Moses Kirkland, John Thomas, Daniel McGirth, Thomas Waters, and others. Important men who did not actively work against the Revolution, like Jonas Bedford, were, at least initially, allowed to remain at undisturbed.

By then, the average frontiersmen could see the revolution as being a Regulator like struggle between their local interests and outside government interests and the British army not as an ally but as a foreign invader. Loyalist partisans could win some victories, as they had in Campbell’s wake in 1779, but the British army could never have found peace long enough to have made their militia a credible military force. These same men, for example, found themselves compelled to serve in the Loyalist militia after the British army overran Georgia and South Carolina in 1780 and replaced the state governments as the overall authority. Many of the people of Wilkes County who had fought under John Dooly in the Whig militia at Kettle Creek, for example, would consequently find themselves among the some 250 members of the resurrected colonial militia under Colonel Thomas Waters at the later battle of Hammond’s Store, South Carolina in 1781. There 150 of these former Georgia Whigs died as “Loyalists”
near the Raeburn Creek homes of the same South Carolinians whom they had previously defeated, in the much less bloody but much more famous engagement at Kettle Creek in Georgia. Even the formal provincial units in the South had to disobey orders and enlist prisoners of war to fill their ranks as they steadily declined in numbers from an inability to replace casualties and deserters.34

Aside from local control and political representation, the Whigs also addressed backcountry concerns about the Indians. Even before the war began, the backcountry had moved economically from what historian Margaret Ellen Newell described as dependency to independence, a change that she attributes to bringing about the American Revolution in New England,35 except over the issue of Indians. When the Cherokees attacked the frontier in 1776, with or without British support, southerners launched multi-state, coordinated expeditions that devastated the villages in that nation and in which all three of the principal militia commanders at Kettle Creek served. Many of the frontiersmen who joined in that campaign would remain in the rebel camp. Whether British Indian agent John Stuart primarily tried to keep the peace or organize Indians for war as the king’s allies remains a matter for debate but white frontiersmen, by 1776, saw the king not as a needed protector from the Indians but as encouraging these most feared enemies to war on the backcountry. Settlers in Wilkes County, but especially the families of the Kettle Creek-Wrightsborough area suffered Indian raids in 1774 and then every year from 1776 to the end of the American Revolution because of its proximity to the major Creek Indian trading path. Seven months before the battle of Kettle Creek, the South Carolina militiamen who would fight there had also come to the aid of Colonel John Dooly and his Wilkes County militiamen against the Indians and they would do so many times in the years to come. A faction in Wilkes County even went so far as to form a political party that sought to make war with the
neighboring Creeks and end the business of the established white men who traded with the Indians as a means to force a peace while acquiring Creek lands.\textsuperscript{36}

This threat had psychological manifestations that went beyond the well-known violent clashes over land, game, cattle, and horses. Even the appearance of the Indian warriors frightened and awed the frontiersmen. By 1774, the Wilkes Countians had fortified their homes, including on Kettle Creek; what must have contributed to a chain of forts that essentially marked the white frontier from Canada to Florida. Georgian Absalom Chappell remembered the efforts made by the backcountry people to protect their lives and property:

\begin{quote}
By their own voluntary labor the people of each neighborhood, when numerous enough, built what was dignified as a fort, a strong wooden stockade or blockhouse, entrenched, loop-holed, and surmounted with look-outs at the angles. Within this rude extemporized fortress ground enough was enclosed to allow room for huts or tents for the surrounding families when they should take refuge therein—a thing which continually occurred; and, indeed, it was often the case, that the fort became a permanent home for the women and children, while the men spent days in scouring the country, and tilling with their slaves, lands within convenient reach; at night betaking themselves to the stronghold for the society and protection of their families, as well as for their own safety.\textsuperscript{37}
\end{quote}

Without the protection of a regular standing army, the frontiersmen, in addition to erecting fortifications, organized themselves into militias to defend their settlements. Far from being a mob, they had decades of experience in military organization and discipline. Pickens, for example, kept accounts of the property captured in the battle of Kettle Creek as public property. A formal morning report of Dooly’s regiment a few months later showed it to be a sophisticated organization with quartermasters, musicians, boatmen, blacksmiths, cow drivers, butchers, wagon masters, and deputy commissaries.\textsuperscript{38}

These militiamen were as committed as they were organized. By the time of the battle of Kettle Creek, Elijah Clarke had been wounded at least twice in the war, fighting Cherokees in
Georgia in 1776 and in battle against Loyalist provincials in Florida in 1778. John Dooly lost his brother Thomas, a continental officer, in a battle with the Indians in 1777. Of Kettle Creek, he would write that, as the Loyalists seemed to fire 200 rounds in thirty seconds, only the hand of Providence saved him, Clarke, and Pickens, as they exposed themselves on horseback during the whole fight. Creek. Clarke had a horse shot from under him in the battle but would live to survive more wounds, disease, and other hardships in the war. Dooly would later die at the hands of Loyalists. Pickens eventually spent time, as a prisoner of the British, in the same jail at Ninety Six, South Carolina that had held the condemned Loyalists captured at Kettle Creek.39

However dedicated to their cause, such military leaders also meet the Twenty First Century definition of “warlord.” They often became more devoted to the interests of their followers than to any nation, much as “leaders” like Boyd followed the aspirations generated by their minority groups of Loyalists. John Sevier, George Rogers Clark, Thomas Sumter, and other Whig military leaders of the Revolution would at least locally conspire against or beyond the greater interests of the country they had sacrificed to found. Elijah Clarke, for example, after the war would lead his followers in private campaigns against Spanish East Florida and in an unsuccessful effort to found an independent republic on the Oconee Indian Frontier.40

IV

Why then did anyone risk so much to support the king’s cause and find himself hundreds of miles from home, in hostile territory, on Kettle Creek on the morning of February 14, 1779? British Colonel Robert Gray came close to the answer when he wrote of South Carolina consisting of a patchwork of settlements, each fighting for its own respective cause.41 Aside from the grand ambitions of the British leaders, the events that led to Kettle Creek and its like battles has a lost history found only in understanding the collective consciousness of settlements like
Raeburn Creek, South Carolina, and Tryon County, North Carolina, from where most of the Kettle Creek Tories hailed. These communities supported the king from being outside of and in fear of the mainstream colonial society that would become the basis of the Revolutionary movement. They were themselves “rebels” by refusing to abandon their traditional allegiance and the protection of their freedom to choose to have socially divergent interests. These exclusive minority groups saw the distant king as a protector of their interests, rather than as an impediment for their political and economic aspirations. The British government, in a traditional means of social control, enforced toleration of minorities in colonial America. Robert Harvey has argued that the king’s government even became the protector of Indians and slaves. Linda Colley has pointed out that, overall, the number of Americans who would leave the new United States for British possessions, almost all of whom qualified as members of minorities, comes to more than five times the number of persons who abandoned France after its revolution, an example of how an empire “so often assumed now to be necessarily racist in operation and ethos, could sometimes be conspicuously poly-ethic in quality and policy, because it had to be.” As a consequence, such groups of Americans actually feared their neighbors more than they supported the king’s cause, thus accounting for why significantly more of these men became refugees than soldiers. By 1779, these less than fully committed “Loyalists” belonged to what historians Wallace Brown and Robert M. Calhoon referred to as clusters of “cultural minorities,” settlements of societal fringe groups of what Calhoon identified as religious pacifists, white men who traded with the Indians, unassimilated ethnic minorities, and small farmers: “thousands of previously obscure men” caught “in the machinery of internal security.” The dangers inherent to and the sparseness of the frontier population encouraged the creation of these societal islands. Colonial governments sometimes created such communities by setting aside reserves for specific
ethnic and cultural groups, offering such exclusive areas of common background and social security as inducements to live in the backcountry and on the best lands in the backcountry. Often consist the population of these settlements consisted largely of pro-British immigrant families of significantly different religions and/or attitudes than the much greater numbers of their American born neighbors. The Whigs, however, would use prejudice against minorities as still another tool to gain support in the backcountry.\textsuperscript{44}

Oppression of minority communities has a long tradition in American history, from the persecution of Quakers in early New England and Virginia to squelching opposition to popular foreign policy in the Twentieth and Twenty-first centuries. In the South, the pro-Confederate majority took actions against opposition communities in the 1860s and even labeled persons involved in such local resistance by the Revolutionary War term “Tories.” Long before the Revolution, the British colonies had internal conflicts that turned violent and which contributed to the group conflict of the war such as the previously mentioned Regulator rebellions. Most of the Regulator leaders would eventually become Whigs but otherwise the social complexities of those two different struggles defy clear attempts at collating Regulator loyalties with the American Revolution. Historian Jack Greene saw these struggles as part of the ambitions of the frontier majority for “improvements” that included a hierarchical social structure which would allow for unrestricted commercialization and exploitation of slaves, Indians, and other minorities. These goals could conflict with the ideals and traditions of the minority ethnocentric settlements on the frontier and who, in some instances, have been among the oppressed and exploited. Some members of these minority communities did serve in the Regulator struggles to protect the interests of their own settlements and enough of the rank and file North Carolina Regulators did become Loyalists who saw the later Revolution as a continuation of their struggle
against domination by the coastal elite. In North Carolina, one early definition of the word “Regulator” meant anyone in the backcountry not supporting the Revolution.45

Herman Husband inspired these communities and often served as a unifying thread between them. He had studied the political writings of Benjamin Franklin and the methods used in the resistance to the Stamp Act. His activism went beyond leadership roles in three rebellions in this world to a journey through all religions he encountered. Husband, for example, became the spokesman, spiritual leader, and moral conscience of the North Carolina Regulators in the 1760s. For his role in that political dissent, his North Carolina Quaker meeting disowned him. Within this resistance movement that Husband inspired, however, historian Marjoleine Kars found that a nucleus of discontent seeded among independent, highly moralistic, closed groups drawn largely from the Quakers and the Baptists. Such congregations must have already appeared as fanatical, if not heretical, cults to mainstream old school Presbyterians like Andrew Pickens, a church elder, and to the traditional Anglicans. Raeburn Creek’s Quakers, the Bush River Meeting, were often former members of Husband’s Cane Creek Meeting including the parents of James Lindley, a man later hanged after his capture at the battle of Kettle Creek. This meeting had unspecified difficulties in meeting the standards required for recognition by the North Carolina Yearly Meeting for the South.46 Following the dispersal of the North Carolina Regulators by the colonial militia, its Baptist members would refugee to Raeburn Creek and became active in its church. They likely contributed to what one visitor mentioned, without further explanation, as that congregation’s “peculiarities.” The Whig Gazette of the State of South Carolina likely referred to such men people when it described the Kettle Creek Loyalists as deluded by Boyd and by a number of persons who came among them from North Carolina on
a variety of pretences. David Fanning, the famed Loyalist partisan from this settlement, would recruit whole regiments from Husband’s Regulators who had remained in North Carolina.47

Details about these people of Raeburn Creek document that they lived as a political culture outside of the mainstream as a prime example of the insular colonial and Tory community. The residents included white men with Indian ties, called "white savages" by mainstream frontiersmen who feared them more than any other threat on the frontier. Loyalist leaders, like many of their followers, often had either British nativity or, at the least, births outside of the southern frontier. (Many Whig leaders were also born in Europe but few, if any, Whig communities consisted largely of European immigrants.) Clarke in North Carolina, Dooly in Virginia, Pickens in South Carolina, and many other rebel leaders, by contrast, had spent all, or almost all of their lives on the American frontier. Boyd, however, reportedly hailed from Ireland, as did William Cunningham and some of the other Kettle Creek Loyalists. Joseph Cartwright described Aquilla Hall, as “one Campbell,” likely a descriptive term for a Tory Scotsman.48

Raeburn Creek became a center of Loyalist activity.49 Moses Kirkland, one of the major architects of the southern strategy lived there, at least during the Regulator years. The Cunningham brothers, prominent among the king’s friends in South Carolina, held leadership roles in this community, as did their cousin, the famous partisan William “Bloody Bill” Cunningham. On, or near, Raeburn Creek lived a James and a John Boyd, as well as Aquilla Hall, James Lindley (father of Hall's son-in-law), Samuel Clegg (a likely relation to Boyd), and other prominent men later at Kettle Creek. In 1775-1776, the area served as a rallying point for the Whig effort to suppress the frontier Loyalists. David Fanning led men from there to aid the
Clerks in their frontier raids in 1776 and in attacks in the Savannah River area to divert a Whig invasion of British East Florida in 1778.50

The Kettle Creek Loyalists came from settlements on Raeburn Creek, South Carolina and from Tryon County, North Carolina, that had Herman Husband as an inspiration but they camped at Kettle Creek en route, to sympathizers in the nearby Wrightsborough Quaker community that also had ties to Husband. Joseph Maddock and other future leaders of that community had moved from today’s Delaware to Orange County, North Carolina in the 1750s but they never completely assimilated into their new meeting. In a dispute over the disowning of a certain female member, Joseph Maddock and other later Wrightsborough leaders risked disownment by supporting the radical Herman Husband’s views in this matter. Husband’s Regulators also met at Maddock’s mill.51

During those troubles, Maddock created the isolated Wrightsborough community in far-off Georgia around his core following, although this isolated meeting also drew Friends from many colonies. He named it for the settlement’s patron, royal governor Sir James Wright. With their prohibition on owning slaves, Quakers must have been a radical minority anywhere on the southern frontier. Up-and-coming men of means, and slave owners, like Andrew Pickens and John Dooly, had little fear of abolitionists, although groups to end slavery in the colonies existed in Great Britain. Mainstream frontiersmen, however, saw slavery as such a means of economic advancement that militiamen wanted African-American and even Indian prisoners treated as spoils of war. Even that early, slave owners must have had concerns about the potential threat to slavery by opposition groups. Contrary to the traditional Quaker principles of pacifism, Maddock quietly allowed men without his faith’s principles of non-violence and non-militarism to settle in his “Quaker” township and to erect a fort. He thus created a radical core exclusive ethnic
community whose radical politics could influence a significantly larger, militant surrounding population.\textsuperscript{52}

Wrightsborough had another tie to frontier radicalism. Rather than do battle with the Indians, as the mainstream frontiersmen advocated, the Quakers tried, with difficulty, to coexist peacefully with the nearby natives. Their three town squares had the names of Maddock, McGillivray, and Galphin. Lachlan McGillivray and George Galphin may have used their considerable influence to try to help Wrightsborough to maintain peaceful relations with the Indians. As typical for members of their community, these two British born white men who traded with the Indians each had mixed white/Creek children. Galphin also sired children by white and slave women. During the American Revolution, the pacifist Galphin risked his property and his life to maintain the peace, contrary to the ambitions of some Georgians, as an Indian commissioner for the Continental Congress. South Carolinians also likely remembered that Galphin, with later Loyalist bandit Daniel McGirth, had been a “moderator,” one of the backcountry leaders who tried to negotiate a compromise during their Regulator struggles. False rumors survived for generations that he and his racially diverse sons were blood thirsty Loyalist bandits.\textsuperscript{53} People of the backcountry of lesser means who feared Indian attack must have looked with askance at both Galphin’s lifestyle and at his huge and thriving speculations in frontier land, timber, livestock, and slavery, as well as the Indian trade. McGillivray’s mixed-blood son, Alexander, worked as an agent for the British and would eventually become the great leader of the Creek nation. The white racist frontiersmen thus must have held as suspect, by association, the Wrightsborough Quakers for their very public acknowledgement of most prominent of the white men who traded with the Indians and who openly, cohabited with non-whites.\textsuperscript{54}
Another settlement on Georgia’s border with the Indians gained a similar reputation as a Loyalist center and even as a refuge for McGirth’s gang. It too supported, through religion, opposition to critical elements of mainstream colonial society. Matthew Moore, apparently an Irish-born member of the Scots-Irish Queensborough Township founded by Galphin and McGillivray, one of Georgia’s first Baptist congregations on Big Buckhead Creek in today’s Burke and Jenkins counties. Moore, a Loyalist who died during the war, likely rallied his congregation for the king behind the leadership of Henry Sharp, his brother-in-law, a deacon at the church, and a colonial malcontent. The latter rallied his neighbors in support of the king because he found himself in rebellion against colonial society. Georgia juries found him guilty of various violations of the colony’s civil law. When a grand jury complained about Sharp trading with the Indians without a license, for example, he received a public lashing. Despite routinely passing hundreds of acres of land on to almost anyone else for little more than the asking, Governor Wright and his council turned down all of Sharp’s requests for land grants, likely because of his reputation as a trouble maker.  

After 1775, when the mainstream establishment joined the Revolution, Sharp continued resistance against his society in general but under the new circumstances. In 1777, Moore persuaded Sharp to emancipate George Liele so that this slave could begin an African-American Baptist ministry. Moore's congregation had been so inspired by Liele’s preaching that they ordained him. As the first black Baptist minister, and with the support of George Galphin, Liele would go on to form at least two congregations on the Savannah River and, later as an evacuee to Jamaica, churches in Jamaica. Georgia law, reflecting the fear that white Georgians had of violent slave revolts, prohibited such assemblages. Rebel authorities, likely because he emancipated Liele, regarded Sharp as so dangerous that they had him imprisoned on a ship to
prevent his escape or release by court order. Freed at the time of Campbell’s capture of Savannah, he led a successful guerilla war against the Whigs until he suffered a mortal wound on March 30, 1779 while fighting alongside Major John Spurgeon, a survivor of Kettle Creek who died in that same battle.56

Many other examples exist of the members of these communities as being true "rebels" of the period. The Highland Scots of North Carolina had been largely royalists in Europe and their American neighbors generally held them in suspicion. With the coming of the Revolution, this mistrust evolved into a violent civil war that culminated in the Whig victory over 1,400 Highlanders and 200 former North Carolina Regulators at the Battle of Moore’s Creek Bridge, North Carolina, on February 27, 1776.57 Backcountry men who banded together to march to British East Florida in 1778, known as “Schoffelites,” were said to have descended from French-German Palatines who had settled in South Carolina. The German community of the Broad and Saluda fork in South Carolina was also predominately Loyalist. Historian Peter N. Moore discovered there a community of immigrant poor, ethnically distinct, non-slave holding Loyalists in the Waxhaws community in the Catawba Valley, on the border between North and South Carolina. This Scots-Irish “Blackjack” settlement found itself “suspect, excluded, and vulnerable.” It suffered abuse from mainstream neighbors who “crushed dissent and heightened fear and hatred of difference.” Like the Irish communities, some of the Germans, the Quakers, and the escaped slaves, the members of this Scots-Irish settlement had been victims of lack of toleration elsewhere, at least as individuals, before finding freedom and liberty on the British colonial frontier. The members of the Blackjack community felt, like many members of the Wrightsborough community, compelled to go to the British camp for protection.58
During the American Revolution, members of these societal islands found themselves not only viewed as traitors but also as criminals. Even when Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown, George Washington demanded that the Loyalists still following the king’s standard be surrendered to civil authorities rather than receive the status of prisoners of war. The rebels, similarly, claimed that they imprisoned the captured Kettle Creek Loyalists as guilty of civil crimes, some of which had been committed before the war, rather than as traitors. James Cannon, a guard of the prisoners taken at Kettle Creek, claimed in the end that his superiors only hanged the most violent offenders, including James Lindley, Samuel Clegg, and John “Rogue” Anderson. Aquilla Hall, another of the men executed, went to the gallows specifically for a murder, circumstances not given, he had committed in North Carolina and for which he, allegedly, acknowledged the justice of his sentence while on the gallows. John “Rogue” Anderson may have been a notorious pre Revolutionary War thief. At least seven men eventually went to the gallows for their participation in the battle of Kettle Creek.

Carlisle and other British leaders recommended a strategy to that of laying waste to the settlements of the rebels. British Major Patrick Ferguson suggested offering a confiscated rebel farm to every man who would join in such a campaign as a means of luring to the king’s cause property less Europeans who made up so much of the rebel military.

By 1775, many southern Loyalist leaders found that they had the tools, even if not yet the will, for such acts of terrorism. They may have represented the best society in the colonial South but their common recruit who chose to refugee to British East Florida often included bandits, escaped slaves, and white men who lived as the frontiersman’s stereotype of the most savage Indians, persons clearly outside of the mainstream of American society. South Carolina’s backcountry had become a magnet for such men who lived on society’s fringes, from the
opening of the new lands following the Cherokee War of 1759 and the rise of the South Carolina
Regulators, frontiersmen who fought to suppress frontier brigands. The general population
could identify enough Loyalists with dubious reputations and motivations to, at the least, impute
the reputation of the Tories as a whole. In 1778, for example, 250 South Carolinians marched to
British East Florida under a Joseph Coffle (or Scoffell), a notorious chicken and horse thief who
had opposed the South Carolina Regulators. Southerners had, for years, been labeling frontier
bandits as “Schoffelites.” Now they applied that term to all South Carolina Loyalists, and also to
self emancipated African-Americans. English born Thomas Brown, one of the pre-war up-and-
coming men on the frontier, recruited a battalion of young men from Georgia and South Carolina
for the king’s service that he freely admitted had close associations with the white frontiersmen’s
traditional Indian enemies. Even some British officers called Brown’s men bandits. South
Carolina Loyalist Daniel McGirth led a mixed band of white, Indian, and black raiders who used
even used rape as a weapon of terror. With an extensive organization that crossed political
boundaries and manipulation of the limitations of the legal situation, they can be seen as
contributing to the beginnings of organized crime in America.

Not yet ready to sink to brigandry by 1778, the British government chose instead to
appeal to discontented Americans such as the respected Colonel John Thomas of Georgia who
suffered imprisonment for trying to join the Schoffelites. Thomas had, with great personal
doubts, openly joined the rebellion after the arrival of the news of the battles of Concord and
Lexington, only to have decided to return to his original allegiance by 1778. The southern
strategy counted upon recruiting thousands of such Americans and well known brigands worked
against efforts to win hearts and minds.
The Loyalists as “criminals” more credibly fit historian Crane Briton’s definition of victims of “dual sovereignty.” Under the authority of the king’s officers, for example, one American could condone, as legal impressments, what his Whig enemies condemned as theft. Raeburn Creek’s Loyalists included active members of both North and South Carolina’s Regulator rebellions, men from communities that saw resistance to corrupt civil authority or, at best, a provincial government that ignored open brigandry, as a moral, if not a religious cause. Thus, opposition to rebel laws that worked against traditional royal authority would hardly appear as criminal acts to Loyalists. Escaped slaves, “white savages,” and other persons living on society’s fringes could also see “lawlessness” as a necessity and morally excusable self-defense from an unjust society. Conversely, the Whigs could argue that they punished common criminals and did not officially persecuting political dissenters. They thus painted their enemies in the worst light among the general population while protecting themselves, in theory, from retaliation by the British. 69

War-time paranoia also traditionally compels the majority in taking drastic action against anyone who does not whole heartedly support the popular cause. Such violence then inspires revenge that becomes classified by the government authorities as criminal acts or even terrorism. The Whigs, for example, would come to remember as sterling Patriots such renowned serial killers as Robert Sallett and the “white savage” Patrick Carr, and such plunderers as former Wrightsborough Quaker Josiah Dunn and George Dooly (John's brother). The Patriot partisan Thomas Sumter had also once been among the white men so reviled among the mainstream who lived as an Indians and spoke fluent Cherokee. Even as John Dooly and his men risked their lives in the battle of Kettle Creek, Whig horsemen under Leonard Marbury robbed the families of some of these men for having, days earlier, taken an oath of allegiance to the king while under
The rebels even actively recruited troops of young frontiersmen without property, popularly called "crackers," who survived by stealing cattle and hunting deer. Although lacking discipline, by being single and having nothing to protect, they had little reason to desert or to fear retribution for their acts of violence and robbery. In 1780, for example, Elijah Clarke used threats and physical intimidation to assemble a force of Wilkes Countians that a pro-British newspaper described:

Clarke's party is said to have consisted of men, whose restless dispositions, or whose crimes prevented their living in any country where even the resemblance of government was maintained, and therefore taking themselves to the vacant lands on the frontiers; living without any control; they made inroads upon the industrious inhabitants of the back settlements, and have frequently involved the Province in wars with the Indians.⁷¹

Men of different races also served in Whig commands. Dempsey Tyner, for example, a Choanoc Indian, African-American, or both, served under Pickens at Kettle Creek. The slave Austin Dabney would earn emancipation for his services fighting under Elijah Clarke, in Augusta in 1782.⁷²

Rachel N. Klein, William H. Nelson, and others historians argue against using such issues as race, reputation, ideology, class, background, and economics to categorize political motivations, and especially as the fortunes of war pushed many people reluctantly into one camp or the other. Class only seems to have mattered in that far more of the members of the rising middle class among the general population joined the rebellion.⁷³

Modern sociologist Daniel J. Levinson offers explanations for the prejudice against such groups as beyond such issues as race and reputation. He argues that refusal to participate in the majority’s “patriotism” makes such already existing “out groups” even more ethnocentric and the majority must then, in his words, “liquidate” the minority to prevent an undermining of the greater group’s efforts. Levinson described liquidation as subordinating and segregating but, in a
civil war, it could also mean extermination. Sociologist Arnold Mindell pointed out that group
prejudices also helps the majority to achieve unquestioned unity of purpose, much as within
closed minority groups dissention is eliminated for the same reason. Historian Robert M. Weir
also wrote that the Regulator Rebellion had brought home to South Carolinians those leaders
who failed to act against the perceived public enemy risked losing authority. In the American
Revolution, as with the South during Reconstruction (1865-1876), the resident opposition
majority also recognized that the enemy occupation forces, however powerful, had to fail if their
local support disappeared, even if by acts of means of violent intimidation. Animosity against the
“king’s men” grew to where Whig leaders who tried to end the atrocities against the Loyalists
lost respect and even authority. Whatever reasons motivated the initial violence, retaliation
followed and later still more revenge, giving all groups even greater motivation to act without
restraint or humanity. British historian Richard Holmes referred to the war as sinking into
“fanaticarchy.”

On another level, supporters of the rebellion like Andrew Pickens and Tarleton Brown
never forgave the members of these minority communities for being the cause, however
unintended, of the British invasions of the South and the resulting years of conflict. Many
Loyalists also blamed the presence of the army as inciting persecutions of their citizens. During
the last years of the war, Tarleton Brown and men like him persecuted the king’s followers to the
point of meeting today's definitions of ethnic cleansing and genocide. By the end of the
Revolution, cynics described the murdering of unarmed prisoners, usually men who dared to
support the British cause, as granting a "Georgia parole."

Later victims of this level of persecution marched to Kettle Creek in 1779 and, in doing
so, demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of determined but diverse communities working
together in rebellion against the majority. Their journey likely began with Joseph Coffle and his
men marching to East Florida in 1778, likely with Boyd as one of their number. Returning to the
South from New York with Campbell’s invasion force, he only left the British army at Savannah
on or after January 10, 1779. Two weeks later, likely with the help of men from McGirth’s band
and Sharp’s Big Buckhead community, he proceeded as far as Wrightsborough where he held a
meeting with Joseph Maddock and other local leaders to find guides for South Carolina. Once
there, Boyd almost certainly used the services of frontier South Carolinians from Thomas
Brown’s rangers to lead him to his home back at Raeburn Creek. Sympathetic and influential
neighbors, including William Cunningham, Thomas Fletchall, Zachariah Gibbes, and
Christopher Neally helped him to gather his band. He reached even further, likely through his
former Regulator neighbors so that he finally began his march south with some 700 men,
including 250 North Carolinians under John Moore. With drums beating, fife playing, and flags
waving, the men of this hastily-formed regiment captured isolated outposts along the South
Carolina Indian frontier as they moved south. Now styled as a colonel, Boyd created his
following almost immediately upon arriving on the South Carolina frontier, only days with
hardly more than a proclamation from Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell. Random
malcontents on a sparsely settled frontier could hardly have organized that quickly but all the
more so in a time and place when communications traveled no faster than a horse. His success
had to have depended upon pre-existing well-organized and networked communities of
sympathetic men ready to march ready to follow a leader of their creation.76

How Boyd succeeded and ultimately failed on that day has significance in several ways.
Brinton wrote that fanatical groups recruit such men as Boyd, Nat Turner, and John Brown from
realistic, practical devotees whom their “following” inspires, conversely, to go on to try grand
but fatalistic schemes “unfettered by common sense” that caused “enough of the prophet’s fire to hold followers.” He sums up such men as transformed by the closed group into “Machiavellians in the service of the Beautiful and the Good.”77 The success and failure of Boyd matches Brinton’s model. Almost nothing credible about his background, including his given name, survives. Any prominence he had must have been confined to within his neighborhood.78 As a resident of the Reaburn Creek area, “there great Colo. Boyd,” as Dooly described him, may have been a previous acquaintance of Andrew Pickens and possibly John Dooly but his one moment of importance came when he convinced—and was convinced by--his like minded neighbors to leave their families and to make a perilous journey of hundreds of miles in a desperate effort to rendezvous with British troops.79 His dedication to their cause became a legend through alleged final words wherein he blamed the failure of his mission upon his being mortally wounded; he proudly proclaimed that he died for his king and his country; and that he wanted none of the devout Andrew Pickens’ “damned rebel” prayers. When Pickens reportedly confronted Boyd’s widow with news of her husband’s death, she allegedly angrily refuted the claim as a rebel lie.80

Definitions of community can include an end of dissent among members that intensifies support of group goals, including among the individual members as long as they remain within the isolation of the group. This dedication, however, evaporates among the rank and file as they leave the confines of the community and experience the realities of the outside world, such as during the march of hundreds of miles through hostile territory to Georgia.81 Men marching to join him under John Moore tried to raid the house of Whig Colonel John Thomas of North Carolina before one young man, together with a household of women and small children drove them off. Boyd’s whole force failed to cross the Savannah River at Cherokee Ford when a Whig lieutenant, using a handful of men, swivel guns (very small cannons), a blockhouse, and sheer
bluff, obstructed their passage. The Loyalists then had to cross the river into Georgia on rafts at the mouth of Vann’s Creek. While challenging that crossing, however, members of a small force of Whig militia suffered a severe defeat that resulted in the capture of thirteen of their number, including two captains. Some 100 of the Loyalists, however, allegedly used this fighting as an excuse to slip away and return home.  

The moment of truth about his uprising and the true nature of the support for the king’s cause came to a head on Kettle Creek on the morning of February 14, 1779. As they approached this Loyalist encampment, Andrew Pickens and his command faced a force of superior numbers that appeared to have every advantage. Boyd’s assemblage camped on high ground on both sides of Kettle Creek, with their headquarters in a cowpen on a narrow, highly defendable, hilltop on the east side of the creek. He felt so secure that he sent his prisoners on towards Augusta, where he mistakenly believed that the British army still waited for him. Dissidents who felt that they had been pressured to participate in this venture were allowed to leave and spare horses were released. The Tory leader who had traveled thousands of miles and faced enumerable obstacles now likely planned for his men to spend that day on Kettle Creek, butchering cattle and cooking on their highly defendable position before making a final day’s march to pass through Wrightsborough and on to a rendezvous with Campbell and the British troops at Augusta. Captain John Hamilton may have even reached Kettle Creek with his horsemen as reinforcements just before the battle. The Loyalists knew that various groups of militiamen had pursued them since they had begun their march but apparently had ceased to care. They had even skirmished with Pickens’ men the evening before.  

The very personal nature of this frontier conflict now revealed itself. Pickens, Dooly, and Clarke immediately moved forward, ordering their exhausted men to check their rifles and to
prepare to attack. Pickens’ advance guard, however, disobeyed orders and fired at the sentries, allowing Boyd to personally arrange a successful ambush of Pickens' main force. At the same time, Dooly and Clarke, respectively, struggled to lead their 140 Georgians through the maze of channels in the cane-choked swamps adjoining the Tory camp. Three of Dooly's men emerged inside the Loyalist camp, however, and successfully fired on Boyd, inflicting three mortal wounds. Whig militiamen then attacked from all directions and the “battle” became a struggle between individuals.84

Pickens’ complicated and confused attack further aided his enemies. The militiamen did not attack the whole Loyalist camp but only the cowpen on the east side of the creek. Most of the Loyalists had camped on high ground on the west side of the swampy, cane choked channels. Loyalist Captain Christopher Neally, alone, brought up 150 of his men camped nearby. The men left still significantly outnumbered their attackers and defended a strong position.85

Boyd had fallen, however, and John Moore of North Carolina, the second in command, could not be found. South Carolina Loyalist John Spurgeon, the third-in-command, tried to rally the Loyalists but Elijah Clarke led fifty of his men in a successful charge against that position. Spurgeon and some of his men would successfully escape to Wrightsborough, from where they were escorted to the British army by Hamilton and his horsemen. With only twenty of their comrades killed in the battle and only twenty-two taken prisoner in the battle, almost of the estimated 500 to 600 Loyalists in the camps on Kettle Creek must have chosen to simply leave and return to their homes in the Carolinas. Even the 270 men who reached the British army proved to have little military value. John Moore, for example, would go on to lead men who served without distinction in the Loyalist defeats at Ramsour's Mill, King's Mountain, and Hammond's Store before the Whigs finally captured and hanged him in 1783.86
The communities of southern Loyalists had formed a secular movement with non-secular roots. Their faith in this effort had been strong within their communities and had been kept alive by Boyd—while he still lived—despite tremendous difficulties of time and distance. In the end, however, reality more than Patriot militiamen persuaded them to give up and either return to their homes or to find refuge in exile. While historians have written about the creation of communities of the king’s friends after the war, the Revolution also often resulted in the destruction of these social groups. Historian Hugh McCall, likely one of Pickens’ Kettle Creek veterans, wrote of the destruction of Boyd’s following:

Dispirited by the loss of their leader, and sore under the lashes of the Americans, the enemy fled from the scene of action; their army exploded, and some of the fragments fled to Florida, some to the Creek [Indian] nation, some found their way to the Cherokees, some returned to their homes and submitted to the mercy of the American government. . .

Among the Kettle Creek Loyalists, John Hamilton, Robert Alexander, Christopher Neally, John Murphy, Zachariah Gibbes, William Payne, William Young, and others lived to flee to distant lands and file claims with the British government for their respective property losses. Whatever they eventually received must have failed to fully compensate them for their sufferings and for what they left behind. They did better, however, than their Indian and their African-American allies. The British abandoned the former and most of the latter; the escaped slaves who were left behind founded isolated free communities that state militias later destroyed.

The story of these frontier communities has other elements that merit attention. A frontier “cowpens” stood at the battlefield site, an important fact overlooked in the history of these events. More than merely a split rail pen, a typical cowpen of that place and period consisted of a small farm that had almost all of the features of a frontier fort. It usually included cabins, riflemen armed to hunt game, and even crops, surrounded by a broad meadow that made any
assault a dangerous proposition. Andrew Pickens, in the first battle fought in South Carolina
during the American Revolution, had helped to successfully use a cowpens as a defensive
position at Ninety Six against the backcountry Loyalists in 1775. Such an enclosure could and
was used as a makeshift prison or concentration camp, as it would for the men captured at or
arrested after the battle of Kettle Creek. Some of these cowpens, in the years after the war, would
become towns, such as George Galphin’s cowpen becoming Louisville, an early frontier state
capitol of Georgia, that began as humble symbols of the history, progress, and potential of the
frontier. 89

Another potent element of the battle of Kettle Creek concerned the use of weapons and
the means of resistance. Leaders such as Boyd held these fragile groups together and their
elimination proves decisive in ending resistance and sometimes even the existence of such
groups. Whig militiamen of Kettle Creek had a special means of eliminating a Boyd, Sharp,
Spurgeon, or Ferguson and therefore the last hope of their respective followings—the rifle. 90
Like foreign support, revolutionaries traditionally need weapons “of the people” that can counter
the formal trained military of their enemy. America’s rebels used the rifle. An accurate tool for
use in hunting and in warfare with the Indians, this precise weapon democratized violence by
giving the America’s early revolutionaries a practical means for individual action, much as the
AK-47 would do for partisans in the Twentieth Century. It worked effectively without requiring
formally drilled masses of troops. In time, rebel veterans of Kettle Creek, and their comrades,
proved that the rifle could win even against the disciplined use of the bayonet and smooth bore
musket. Later, at the major battle of Cowpens, the people of Wilkes County used the skill of
being able to load while lying on the ground, previously described by Baikia Harvey, against
Loyalist dragoons and the now battle experienced Seventy-first Infantry Regiment. 91 At Kettle
Creek, the precision use of the rifle killed Boyd, the man who almost single handedly kept his followers together. It became an instance where the tool of a violent revolution worked against the tactics of a comparatively passive rebellion in that guns disrupted a group of men from using resistance in the form of the previously mentioned civil disobedience, what the Whigs regarded as criminal acts, and by seeking to escape, as also explained earlier, to the colonial protections they had previously known.

Also, although no record of the Loyalists bringing their families with them to Kettle Creek has been found, their communities had to have consisted of more than armed men. The fact that the wives and children were left behind, to keep the communities alive, meant little in the backcountry. Frontiersmen, like the famous Daniel Boone of North Carolina and Kentucky, would abandon their families for years at a time, even before the Revolution. Each side believed, sometimes wrongly, that while the men of the other camp might execute or imprison men, the enemy avoided harming non-combatants and might even leave alone property that supported women and children. Colonial Americans, as reflected in the claims filed by Loyalists and the requests for pensions by widows of Whigs after the war, had the pre-Victorian attitude of land and business as the realm of the husband and the home while the household goods belonged to the wife, in life and in law. On the frontier, observers such as Charles Woodmason, William Mylne, and Louis Milfort described the women as an industrious base of settlement while their husbands lived like wild vagabonds. These women, however, could have political commitment as strong as any man and, as the basis of the community must have been at least equally important.  

Decades later, Andrew Pickens wrote of this engagement that cost Mrs. Boyd her husband’s life as “the severest check & chastisement, the tories ever received in South Carolina
or Georgia.” That claim seems exaggerated considering the size of the defeats that the Loyalists later sustained. Pickens would be correct, however, if he meant that Kettle Creek demonstrated conclusively that the king’s followers could achieve little militarily without the regular British army and that any effective, widespread popular Loyalist support which had previously been on the frontier in 1775 and 1776, had ceased to exist. Each half of a tepid partnership of necessity between Loyalist and Redcoat had wanted to believe a fanatical to almost fanatical; delusion that the other would somehow find a way to undermine a broad based, well organized, and often violently ruthless independence oriented government that now only had to refuse to surrender in order to eventually succeed. British leaders like Archibald Campbell, Lord Cornwallis, and Robert Gray would leave highly enlightening memoirs and papers to explain the failure of the southern strategy from the view of the British military. Rebels like Andrew Pickens and Tarleton Brown would leave highly partisan reminiscences that would encourage a contempt for and misunderstanding of the Americans who had been supporters of the British cause, and also for non mainstream communities, that would last for generations. An historical voice, with which the Loyalists of any color could explain their beliefs and actions, largely disappeared with the disintegration of their communities, to be replaced by generations of Whig propaganda and equally simplistic views of the Tories as merely Americans who had formed a difference of opinion. Historians must continue to seek the story of those rebels and dissenters from their actions at places like Kettle Creek. As a contemporary wrote of such military events in America:

Most of these actions would in other wars be considered as skirmishes of little account, and scarcely worthy of a detailed narrative. But these small actions are as capable as any of displaying conduct. The operations of war being spread over the vast continent . . . it is by such skirmishes that the fate of America must be decided. They are therefore as important as battles in which a hundred thousand men are drawn up on each side.
NOTES


2 Almost all of the first histories of the American Revolution carried at least a mention of this battle, which still finds notice in modern works on the South and on Loyalists in the war. Since at least 1847 the site of the battle received local notice and commemoration. Robert S. Davis, “Change and Remembrance: How Promoting the Kettle Creek Battlefield went from the Means to Becoming an End in Itself,” *Journal of the Georgia Association of Historians* 24 (2003): 61-79.

3 Historian Hugh McCall gave much higher casualty figures in his 1816 history: seventy Loyalists killed and seventy-five wounded, while the Whigs suffered nine men killed and some twenty men wounded. The higher numbers were likely supplied by Andrew Pickens, from memory, decades after the battle. Hugh McCall, *The History of Georgia*, 2 vols. (Savannah: Seymour & Williams, 1811 and 1816), 2: 201-3; Andrew Pickens to Henry Lee, August 28, 1811, Thomas Sumter Papers, 1 VV 107, Lyman C. Draper Collection, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison.


7 Baika Harvey to Thomas Baika, December 30, 1775, Orkney Island Archives, Scotland. The different versions of the petitions in support of Wright appear in Robert S. Davis, *Georgia Citizens and Soldiers of the American Revolution* (Easley S. C.: Southern Historical Press, 1979), 11-19. Harvey would have had a hard time distinguishing one group of Americans from the other. Whigs would sometimes wear white paper and the Loyalists green twigs/pine knots, respectively, in their hats as political identification. Thomas Young, "Memoirs of Major Thomas Young," *South Carolina Magazine of Ancestral Research* 4 (Summer 1976): 183.


16 That record is the deposition of William Millen, January 28, 1779, now in the Miscellaneous Papers, 1776-1789, War of Revolution, Military Collection, North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh. No reference to Boyd or his mission survives in the Clinton Papers of the William L. Clements Library or of the British Public Record Office.

17 For the military details on the British invasion of Georgia see David K. Wilson, *The Southern Strategy: Britain’s Conquest of South Carolina and Georgia* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2005).


Owen Fluker represents a relevant example of this type of frontiersman. He fought at Kettle Creek under Dooly but he later, also served for a time, as a Loyalist. The state of Georgia took no legal action against him as a Tory but did allow him a land grant for peacefully remaining in Georgia during the last months of the war. After his death, an informant prevented his heirs from receiving a grant of land in Georgia’s land lot lotteries on the grounds of his help to the British cause. Eliza Bowen, *Chronicles of Wilkes County, Georgia*, ed. Mary B. Warren (Danielsville, Ga.: Heritage Papers, 1978), 19; Robert S. Davis, *The Georgia Black Book* (Greenville, S. C.: Southern Historical Press, 1982), 42. Descendents of such Georgia “pet Tories,” as rebel leaders called men of questionable loyalties, include presidents Jefferson Davis, Herbert Hoover, Lyndon Johnson, and Jimmy Carter. Thomas Ansley, a Carter ancestor, even met with Boyd at Wrightsborough. Robert S. Davis, *The Wilkes County Papers* (Greenville, S. C.: Southern Historical Press, 1979), 49, 51.


The Burke County jail, an isolated log building or buildings on the Georgia frontier, and the tiny village of Ninety Six in South Carolina provide classic examples of political control through perception of control of the government. These places hardly existed as more than names on a maps but both sides expended considerable effort to “hold” these political centers that otherwise lacked any geographical, military, or economic significance. Davis, *Georgians*, 97-118, 139, 161-62; Robert D. Bass, *Ninety Six: The Struggle for the Backcountry* (Lexington, S. C., 1978).


Harvey, “*A Few Bloody Noses*”, 6; Colley, *Captives*, 236.


45 Jack P. Greene, “Independence, Improvement and Authority: Toward a Framework for Understanding the Histories of the Southern Backcountry during the Era of the American Revolution,” in Hoffman, et al, An Uncivil War, 17-20; Franklin, “The Quaker Settlement of Wrightsborough,” 30. Members of the Maverick family could stand as representatives of thousands of such families. They had been fighting in that struggle since the earliest days of the Massachusetts Bay Colony to the extent that by the time the family had crossed the continent, they had given their name as “a synonym for independent eccentricity in America.” David H. Ficher, Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 785.

46 Kars, Breaking Loose Together, 135; Robert S. Davis, Quaker Records in Georgia: Wrightsborough, 1772-1793, Friendsborough, 1775-1777 (Augusta: Augusta Genealogical Society, 1986), 15. During his long life, Husband would continuously stir up rebellions that he avoided physically participating in, due to his pacifist principles. Although, as an exile from the South, Husband would support the American Revolution, in his later years, he also opposed the United States Constitution and he helped to organize the Whiskey Rebellion. See Mark H. Jones, “Herman Husband: Millenarian, Carolina Regulator, and Whiskey Rebel,” (Ph. D. diss., Northern Illinois University, 1982).

Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 51, 53, 71; "Col. David Fanning," unidentified newspaper clipping in the possession of Linda Roholt of Bellevue, Washington, D. C.; deposition of Joseph Cartwright, September 1, 1779, North Carolina Papers, 1 KK 108, Lyman C. Draper Collection; Brown, *The Good Americans*, 46-47. However, with so many bloody attacks on local settlements by the Cherokees and their white allies, including a nearly successful assault on James Lindley’s fort in 1775, it would seem unlikely that many of the Raeburn Creek Loyalists allied with the Indians.

Archibald Campbell remembered Boyd as bringing his Loyalists from Red Creek, South Carolina. Campbell, *Journal*, 58. No such place exists in the upcountry but, in Campbell's native Gaelic, “Red Creek” would be "Raeburn," the name of a waterway in today’s Laurens County, South Carolina. For the settlers of Raeburn, Rabon, Raburns, Raeburn, Rayborn, and Reborns Creek see the COM Index to land grants at the South Carolina Department of Archives and


53 Davis, Quaker Records, 26; Cashin, Lachlan McGillivray, 72, 235; “George Galphin,” Jacksonville (Alabama) Republican, June 1, 1852, p. 2, c. 3-4; Alick Cornels to Creek Headmen, June 14, 1793, in Louise F. Hays, ed., “Creek Indian Letters, Talks, and Treaties” (typescript, Atlanta: Georgia Department of Archives and History, 1939), pt. i, p. 323; Davis, "George Galphin and the Creek Congress of 1777," 14-16, 24-25. For the background of the whites who traded with the Indians of the southern frontier see Amos J. Wright, The McGillivray and McIntosh Traders on the Old Southwest Frontier, 1716-1815 (Montgomery, Al.: New South Books, 2001) and Theresa M. Hicks, South Carolina Indians and Indian Traders (Spartanburg, S.C.: Reprint Company, 1998).

55 Davis, *Georgians*, 108-11. The origins of Matthew Moore’s Big Buckhead Creek Baptists and any ties that they had to Herman Husband and the Separatist Baptists of the Regulators remain undiscovered.


59 Wickwire and Wickwire, Cornwallis, 386.


61 According to legend, Aquilla Hall betrayed a fort to the Indians, resulting in the deaths of the families inside. During the march to Kettle Creek, Hall had made threats to coerce reluctant neighbors to join Boyd's band. He apparently fell into rebel hands after reaching the British army and receiving a provincial commission of ensign. Deposition of Samuel Beckham, et al, June 1, 1812, Joseph Bevan Collection, Georgia Historical Society Library, Savannah; deposition of Joseph Cartwright, September 1, 1779, North Carolina Papers, 1 KK 108, Lyman C. Draper Collection; Clark, Loyalists, 3: 415; McCall, History of Georgia, 2: 205.

63 Robert S. Davis, "The Loyalist Trials at Ninety Six in 1779," *South Carolina Historical Magazine* 80 (April 1979): 172-81. In August, 1779, nine men were sentenced to die for treason in Wilkes County, of whom seven received reprieves. The records do not indicate if these men were or were not connected with the battle of Kettle Creek. Allen D. Candler, comp., *The Revolutionary Records of the State of Georgia*, 3 vols. (Atlanta: Franklin Turner, 1908), 2: 177-79; Grace G. Davidson, comp., *Early Records of Georgia Wilkes County*, 2 vols. (Macon, Ga., : Burke, 1933), 2: 2-12.


in their hats as identification, rags for clothes and moccasins for shoes, they picked up sympathetic southerners along their march (including the Boyd who led the Loyalists at Kettle Creek?) S. D. H. to ?, January 16, 1779, in William L. Stone, comp., *Letters of Brunswick and Hessian Officers during the American Revolution* (Albany, NY: 1891), 238.


A few years before his death, Elijah Clarke wrote to a friend about how much he longed to return to the uninhibited frontier life he had known as a young man. Clarke to Dr. McDonald, December 9, 1794, Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina Papers, 1 V 11, Lyman C. Draper Collection.


Colley, *Captives*, 236; Davis, *Georgians*, 13-17; *Royal Georgia Gazette* (Savannah), February 11, 1779; Davis, *Quaker Records*, 61.


William Millen swore that he met with a Loyalist leader, representing Archibald Campbell, named James Boyd in Wrightsborough. William Millen deposition, January 28, 1779. Zachariah Gibbes, however, would identify his leader at Kettle Creek as Colonel John Boyd. A John Boyd appeared on a November 1777 and a 1779 list of South Carolina Loyalist outlaws that also included John Spurgeon, Boyd’s major at Kettle Creek. Coldham, *American Migrations*, 656, 689; Clark, *Loyalists*, 3: 431. Millen or Gibbes may have been mistaken, although both a John and a James Boyd lived on Raeburn Creek. Two Boys, likely related and working on the same recruitment of Loyalists for Campbell, could explain this otherwise seeming inconsistency. A James Boyd settled on the South Carolina frontier by 1744. Another (?) James Boyd left a will in

79 Davis, Georgians, 11, 13, 57, n. 3; Francis Pickens to J. H. Marshal, May 12, 1858, Thomas Sumter Papers, 16 VV 356, Lyman C. Draper Collection; Motes and Motes, Laurens and Newberry Counties, 259; Robert S. Davis and Kenneth H. Thomas, Kettle Creek: The Battle of the Cane Brakes (Atlanta: Georgia Department of Natural Resources, 1975) 60. Moses Kirkland, formerly of Raeburn Creek, attempted a similar mission to the British headquarters in Boston in 1775 but the Whigs intercepted him at sea. Calhoon, The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 456. No record appears in Archibald Campbell’s accounts of his advancing Boyd any funds. To facilitate his mission, Boyd, like John Hamilton, apparently had an open commission that granted him rank in the provincial forces based upon the number of men he recruited.

80 Davis, Georgians, 20; F. W. Pickens to J. H. Marshall, November 4, 1847, Thomas Sumter Papers, 16 VV 358, Draper Collection.

escorting the men captured at Vann’s Creek to Augusta, upon learning of Boyd’s defeat, surrendered to their charges. Davis, *Georgians*, 13-19.

82 Davis, *Georgians*, 13-16.


84 Moore, “This World of Toil and Strife,” 136.


87 Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, 190-97; McCall, *The History of Georgia*, 2: 203. Henry Williams represents the broad travels of these loyalists. He survived the defeat at Moore’s Creek, North Carolina, near his home to move, with his brothers, to Wilkes County, Georgia. When the British overran much of the South in 1780, he stayed in his new home and became the major in Colonel Waters’ Loyalist militia regiment, at least before Waters’ defeat at Hammond’s Store, South Carolina. After the war, he too went into exile. Troxler, “The Migration of Carolina and Georgia Loyalists,” 5-6, 236.


The effect of the rifle was partially countered by the skill of the era’s surgeons. For example, Captain James Little of Dooly’s regiment nearly died at Kettle Creek but instead lived until 1807. Francis Carlisle and John Harris of Pickens command also received severe wounds in that battle but would live to be old men. Harris had a bullet in his skull that passed through his eye. They, and others, owed their lives to the surgical skills of a Thomas (?) Langdon. Davis,
Georgians, 23, n. 43; Bobby G. Moss, Roster of South Carolina Patriots of the American Revolution (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Company, 1985), 552.

91 Thomas U. P. Charlton, The Life of Major General James Jackson (Augusta: n. p., 1809), 21; Draper, King’s Mountain, 252-4, 258, 272, 314. The rifle and the smooth bore musket/bayonet in the American Revolution find discussion in Henry Lumpkin, From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution in the South (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1981), 135-42. Andrew Pickens and his South Carolina militiamen, including some veterans of Kettle Creek, also served at Cowpens. Pickens kept a pair of pistols that he took in the siege of Robert Carr’s fort and later used at the battles of Kettle Creek and Cowpens. The pistols are today on display in the Pickens County Museum of Art and History in Pickens, South Carolina. “Revolutionary Relics Back From Jamestown,” Atlanta (Georgia) Constitution, May 9, 1915, p. 10B, c. 1-2. William Lake found a cannon ball, likely from a swivel gun, at the Kettle Creek battlefield. He donated it to a World War II scrape metal-drive. A similar shot, said to have come from the Battle of Kettle Creek, is today in the Washington-Wilkes Museum in Washington, Georgia. Davis and Thomas, Kettle Creek, 53. The use of cannons, even the wheel less swivel guns, represented commitment to revolution as opposed to standard frontier warfare. These small cannons, taken from ships or made in the frontier’s early blacksmith shops and iron furnaces, had little use in combat against Indians or individual men. Swivel guns, however, were effective against massed men and fortifications. For a technical description of a swivel gun see Stephenie Ambrose Tubbs and Clay Straus Jenkinson, The Lewis and Clark Companions: An Encyclopedic Guide to the Voyage of Discovery (New York: Henry Holt, 2003), 287.

Pickens to Lee, August 18, 1811, Thomas Sumter Papers, 1 VV 107-1077, Lyman C. Draper Collection.

For another discussion of numbers, community, and loyalties see Carole W. Troxler, *Pyle’s Defeat: Deception at the Racepath* (Graham, N. C.: Alamance County Historical Association, 2001).

Quotation from *The Annual Register or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature for the Year 1781* (London, 1781): 83.