SPECIAL REPORT

COVERING THE PROPOSED

FORT UNION NATIONAL MONUMENT

Submitted by
Region III Headquarters
National Park Service
Department of the Interior

Santa Fe, New Mexico
June, 1939
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I.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SITE

A. Synopsis

Fort Union is generally recognized as the outstanding historic United States military post in New Mexico. For four decades, from 1851 to 1891, it played an important part in the establishment of permanent United States rule in the Southwest.

Established in 1851 to counteract the depredations of frontier Indians and to protect the Santa Fe Trail, Fort Union experienced a varied existence. Typical of most United States military posts in the West at that time, it was at first undermanned. During the Civil War its greatest distinction lay in its importance as a base of supply and operations, in which it served to keep much of the Southwest from being controlled by the Confederate forces, keeping at the same time the lines of communication open between Missouri and the Southwest. After the Civil War, it became the center of army activities upon the New Mexican frontier. Abandoned in 1891, because of the absence of Indian disorders and the abandonment of the Santa Fe Trail, it reverted to private ownership.

The national significance of Fort Union is without question. As the base of the United States Army in that part of the Southwest, it protected the New Mexico frontier against the Indian and the invader; as the guardian of the Santa Fe Trail during the American period, it
insured the development of trade and the movement westward of the immigrant; as an architectural monument, the remains of which are evident today, it tells an eloquent story of the material culture, life, and activity of the frontier days of the Old West.

B. Accurate Description of the Site

Fort Union is located, as an old army report states, in latitude \(35^\circ 54' 21"\) north; longitude, \(27^\circ 54' 15"\) west; altitude 6,700 feet. Upon a dirt road some nine miles northwest of Watrous, New Mexico, about twenty-eight miles northeast of Las Vegas, it marks a spot upon the old Santa Fe Trail, evidences of which are still ample in that locality. U.S. Highway 85 is within four or five miles of the fort in one place.

Within the heart of a great cattle ranch, Fort Union still retains the evidences of its one-time importance as a military center and as a stopping place upon the Santa Fe Trail. Row after row of adobe, brick, and stone walls mark the size and location of the post itself. A forest of chimneys still standing, and piles of fallen bricks, mounds, and roofing tin strewn on all sides, emphasize the deterioration which has taken place since the army's abandonment.

One of the earliest descriptions of Fort Union was that given by Major E. S. Sibley, later a famous Confederate general. He, who was responsible for much of the construction, described the completed

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\[1\] See H. Woods, Fort Union, Ms., 48. This longitude is measured from Washington, D.C.
Nine sets of officers' quarters; each set -- with one exception, which is composed of three rooms and a kitchen -- 18 feet long and 15 feet wide. These quarters have earthen roofs; and five of them have, in addition, board roofs. The other sets of quarters will also be covered with board roofs, as soon as lumber for the purpose can be saved, and it can conveniently be done.

Two barracks - 48 feet long and 18 feet wide, with two wings 50 feet long and 16 feet wide; board roofs.

Hospital - 48 feet long and 18 feet wide, with a wing 46 feet long and 16 feet wide; board roofs.

Storehouse - 100 feet long and 22 feet wide, with a wing 45 feet long and 16 feet wide; board roofs.

Commanding Officers' Office and a Court Martial Room - 48 feet wide; earthen roof.

Offices for Assistant Quartermaster and Commissary of Subsistence - 38 feet long and 18 feet wide; earthen roof.

Smoke House - 100 feet long and 22 feet wide; board roof.

Guard House and Prison - 42 feet long and 18 feet wide; earthen roof.

Blacksmith's and Wheelright's Shop - 50 feet long and 18 feet wide; board roof.

Bakehouse - 31 feet long and 17 feet wide; earthen roof.

Ice House - 20 feet long and 30 feet wide; earthen roof, covered by board roof.

Quarters for Laundresses - 114 feet long and 18 feet wide; six rooms; earthen roof.

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In addition, yards to five sets of officers quarters have been enclosed, and two corrals have been made, each 100 feet square. The lumber used in the construction of these buildings, with the exception of 14,872 feet, has been sawed at the post. Forts Defiance, Fillmore, and Conrad are similarly constructed, lacking an icehouse.

An inspection in 1854 by Colonel Joseph K. F. Mansfield, resulted in the following description:

Fort Union is situated at the foot of the Mesa opposite Gallinas Mountain on the west side of a valley stretching nearly north and south, say 35 miles. About 7 miles to the southward is Barclay's Fort on the Mora River, whence the old road to Santa Fe crosses the valley. About 15 miles to the northward the road from the valley of the Mora crosses the valley and 5 miles further is Ocate Creek, and 3 miles farther still in a canyon of the mountains is a farm attached to this post. This valley is well adapted to grazing and large quantities of hay are annually cut on the Ocate for the public animals. This post is now directly on the shortest road to Santa Fe, a chance having been effected through the exertions and reconnaissance of Major J. N. Carleton, U.S. Dragoons, to open the road to the northward off Wagon Mound and Gallinas Mountain, thereby saving in distance about 13 miles and by the exertions of Major Sibley, U.S. Quartermaster, to open the road from the post to Las Vegas direct, thereby saving several miles in distance westward. Thus situated, it is well located for a depot for the supply of the northern posts, direct to Burgwin and Fort Massachusetts through the valley of Taos, and to Santa Fe and Albuquerque either via Burgwin or Las Vegas. It is well adapted for keeping beef cattle and superfluous dragoon horses and mules, etc. The supplies of flour, corn, and hay and fuel are obtained from the neighboring valleys as conveniently as at other posts in New Mexico and at reasonable terms. The buildings of all kinds are as good as at any post and there seems to be enough of them to satisfy the demand of the service. It is important, however, that a good wagon road be opened to cross the

\[ J. K. F. Mansfield, Report. \]
More Mountain directly to Burgwin about 12 miles south of Don Fernandez de Teos, and a distance of about 50 miles. For this object I would recommend an appropriation of two thousand dollars. For a sketch of this valley and a plan of the post see C and D herewith appended.

The post is established on a reservation of eight miles square and like the farm is claimed by Citizens. It was commenced in 1861 by Brevet Lt. Col. E. B. Alexander of the 8th Infantry and continued successively by Bvt. Major J. H. Carleton, 1st Dragoons and Major G. Morris of the 3rd Infantry and Bvt. Lt. Col. V. Brooks, 2nd Artillery. It is too close under the Mesa for a tenable position against an enterprising enemy, unless the immediate height be occupied by a Block House, which could readily be done. It seems to have been selected on account of a good spring of water and will undoubtedly answer a very good purpose and should be retained.

This locality, like that of the More Valley and the sources of the Pecos River, is exposed to the depredations of the Jicarilla Apache and the Utah Indians who frequently are quite annoying and troublesome.

The above descriptions concerned the first location of the fort. During the early 1860's, the army decided to move it farther out onto the plains toward the east. The original fort, becoming the site of the ordnance reserve, still played an important part in the story of Fort Union.

The setting and description of Fort Union as it appeared in 1867, has been given by an English surveyor by the name of Bell, who said:

Fort Union is distant from Maxwell's by the road fifty-two miles; from the point where our line of survey crossed Red River, fifty-six miles. The

4/ Bell, New Tracks in North America, 121-123.
country is for the most part a vast grass-covered plain, drained by the Red River. We are never, however, out of sight of mountains, some of which are isolated, and rise out of the plain with grotesque outlines, such as Wagon Mountain, shaped exactly like a huge wagon drawn by a pair of horses. Most of them partake of the Mesa formation, as Mesa Apache, while others form ranges jutting out from the Rocky Mountains as the Cimarron range, behind which are raised in stately grandeur the snow-capped summits of the main chain. The most beautiful, however, is Turkey Mountain, which sends up its three lofty and graceful peaks exactly in a direct line to Fort Union from the northeast.

Being on horseback, I took the mountain road to the fort on the 21st of August, and had one of the most romantic rides I can remember in all my wanderings. The partly volcanic nature of the rocks, together with the abundance of water, gave a fertility and freshness to the whole landscape, which contrasted most delightfully with the monotonous plains. Rich grassy parks, studded with noble trees, and watered by an abundance of rivulets, were bordered in by glorious turrets of rock, and overshadowed by the pine-clad summits of the peaks, which, with the art of nature, broke the oppressive regularity of the skyline.

For twenty miles I wound my way through this beautiful country, yet all seemed given over entirely to nature, and there was not the trace of a human being except the path upon which I rode. No flocks or herds cropped the tender grass. I looked in vain amongst the trees and up the valleys which opened into the pass, now on one side and then on the other, but there was no shepherd, no hut, no farm to be seen; the wild turkeys had all been either shot or driven away by the officers from Fort Union; and the same might be said of the deer, but with this exception — the absence of game — naturally remained exactly as God had made it.

Fort Union is a bustling place; it is the largest military establishment to be found on the plains,
and is the supply centre from which the forty or fifty lesser posts scattered all over the country within a radius of 500 miles or more, are supplied with men, horses, munitions of war, and often with everything needed for their support. It is not in the least fortified, as, of course, such a precaution would be useless; but it is a vast collection of workshops, storehouses, barracks, officers quarters, and offices of all kinds belonging to the different departments. The dwellings, although built, as are all the other buildings, of sun-dried bricks, are most comfortable. They are roofed with thin iron sheeting, covered with earth. The rooms of the officers are lofty and well-furnished. The hospital, containing about 120 beds, is a very fine building, to which two resident surgeons are attached. A large settler's store must not be forgotten, at which the daily sales average 5,000 dollars. Over 1,000 workmen are here kept constantly employed, building and repairing wagons, gathering in and distributing supplies, making harness, putting up buildings, and attending to the long trains of goods and supplies constantly arriving or departing. When we think for a moment of the hundreds of miles that everything has to be brought by a slow and expensive mode of conveyance -- 600 miles by wagon from the end of the railway, and nearly 1,500 by rail from St. Louis; when we consider the price of labor; when, in fact, we view the economic aspect of affairs, even a traveller cannot help being amazed at the enormous expenditures of money necessary to maintain so large an establishment in such a locality. The millions of dollars which are yearly absorbed by such a place as Fort Union must be something marvelous; and the opportunities for peculation and growing fat by the misapplication of public money, by exorbitant charges if not by actual fraud, are probably greater here than any other branch of the public service.

In 1875, a comprehensive description was given by Assistant Surgeon

P. Moffatt of the United States Army. His report read:

Fort Union is situated in latitude 35° 54' 21'' north; longitude, 97° 54' 15'' west; altitude 6,700 feet.

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Circular No. 8, War Department, Surgeon's General's Office, May 1, 1875.
Santa Fe is one hundred miles southwest. The nearest railroad station is Las Animas, near Fort Lyon.

The most important settlements in the vicinity are Mora, 18 miles to the west, and Las Vegas, 20 miles distant, on the Santa Fe road.

The post is in a beautiful valley about 26 miles long by five and a half wide, having on the north and east a wooded range of hills known as Turkey Mountains, and on the west a low and rocky range running into table-land.

The craters of several extinct volcanoes are in the vicinity, and on sinking wells in the vicinity of the arsenal, a stratum of lava is found of varying depths.

The water supply is obtained partly from wells, and in part from an excellent spring about a quarter of a mile distant. That from the wells is hard, from lime in solution.

Twenty miles distant the road to Santa Fe crosses a ridge which is the divide between the tributaries of the Mississippi and the Rio Grande. Five miles northwest of Las Vegas are a number of hot springs, noted for their efficacy in rheumatism and chronic syphilitic complaints. The temperature is 140 Fahrenheit.

Among the useful wild plants found in the vicinity is the common hop (Humulus lupulus). This grows abundantly along the mountain streams, and the product is of the best quality.

The following statement relative to the climate and its effect upon health is by Assistant Surgeon W. H. Gardner, United States Army....

Fort Union was established in August, 1851, and was first located on the present site of Fort Union arsenal. The reservation, nearly square, contains 51\(\frac{1}{2}\) square miles. There is also a timber reservation of 50 square miles.

Fort Union includes the post proper, the depot, and Fort Union arsenal.
The arsenal is thus described by Captain W. R. Shoeemaker, ordnance officer in charge: Fort Union arsenal is one mile west of Fort Union, on a reservation belonging to the Ordnance Department, and is inclosed by a wall forming a square of 1,000 feet each side. The buildings are, one barrack 100 by 26 feet with porticoes in front and rear; one set officers' quarters 54 x 75 feet; and office 45 x 18; one main store-house 216 feet long, three smaller store-houses, shops, &c. All of these are of adobe with stone foundations. The water supply is from a good well, and two cisterns of 16,000 gallons each.

Fort Union is thus described by Captain G. C. Smith, assistant quartermaster, United States Army: The depot is adjacent to and north of the post. The buildings are, six sets used as offices and quarters; five store-houses, shops and corrals. The quarters are well built of adobe, laid on stone foundations, with tops finished with brick and roofs of tin. These sets are each 79 x 57 feet; the other three, each 56 x 55 feet. The store-houses are each 200 by 40 feet, except the southern one, which is one-half the width of the others. In the plaza, fronting the northern sets of depot quarters, are two cisterns holding 2,400 gallons each, the supply of which comes from the roofs of the store-houses.

Fort Union is a four-company post; the arrangement of the main part of which is shown in Figure 50.

A, Officers' quarters; BBBBB squad-rooms; C C mess-rooms, D, forage rooms; E, bakery; F, quartermaster's store-rooms; H, issuing-room; I, quartermaster's stables; M, cavalry corral; N, quartermaster's corral.

All the buildings are of adobe, one story high, on stone foundations, and with the exception of the hospital, are all roofed with tin.

On the northeast side of the parade-ground, and directly opposite the line of officers' quarters, are the quarters of the men. Each set occupies three sides of a rectangle within which is a small court-yard or open space with a well in the center. The main buildings are each 73 by 27 feet. They are used as squad rooms and dormitories, and at the present time have an average occupancy of 30 men each, giving an air space of about 700 cubic feet per man.
The wings on one side of each set are used as orderly and company store-rooms; those on the opposite side, for kitchens and dining-rooms. Those quarters are really comfortable dwellings, although deficient in facilities for ventilation.

In rear of the blocks occupied by the men's quarters and separated from them by a wide street, are situated the quarters of the married soldiers and laundresses; and in rear of these again, and at proper distance, are the cavalry stables and other out-houses.

On the southwest of the parade-ground are situated the quarters of officers, consisting of nine buildings in one row. Each building is divided by a single hall running from front to rear, on each side of which are three capacious rooms -- except the middle building (the commanding officer's quarters), which has four -- affording the regulation-allowance of quarters for an officer with the rank of captain. As in the case of most of the buildings here, the roofs are made too flat, so that they allow of leakage when violent rains occur, as they frequently do during the rainy season. In other respects the quarters are good; they all have good yards and out-houses in the rear, and are upon the whole very comfortable residences.

The guard-house is situated in the line of the laundresses' quarters. The structure itself may be well suited for the purpose for which it was intended, but the location of it is inappropriate, as no extended view of the post can be had from its vicinity.

Sinks for the men and for the families of soldiers have been constructed at all available points, but the accommodations in this respect are not sufficient without the necessity of traveling to a greater distance than is likely to be done under all circumstances.

The post hospital is situated outside of the garrison inclosure, and about 300 paces to the east of it. The hospital building faces towards the southeast. It consists essentially of a central building 15 feet wide, running back 130 feet, this being a hall 11 1/2 feet wide inside. Attached to each side of this central hall are three wings, each 51 x 29 feet outside, the long axis parallel and the short axis at right angles to, the hall. These wings are separated from each other by spaces 6 1/2
feet wide. An adobe partition through the center of each wing, and at right angles to the hall, divides each of them into two rooms, 19 by 30 feet, by 12 feet 9 inches high; thus giving twelve rooms, each of the above dimension. The two front wings are used as dispensary and store-rooms, the rear half of each posterior wing for kitchen and dining room respectively. The two middle wings and the front rooms of the posterior wings are used as wards, making six wards, occupied by six beds each, giving 1,200 cubic feet of space to each occupant. In case of emergency, the capacity could readily be increased one-fourth by temporarily using some of the store-rooms as wards. The hospital differs from all other buildings at the post, in being roofed with shingles, and in having a roof with the usual pitch. Although not constructed upon the best plan, in a hygienic point of view, it is amply adequate to the requirements of a four-company post. For the reason that this post is located on the thoroughfare to and from New Mexico, that is the base of supplies of the district, it occurs that there are at almost all times men in the hospital not belonging to the command at Fort Union, but who have been taken sick or hurt while on route to or from other points, and been detained at this post for treatment or discharge on surgeon’s certificate of disability.

Fort Union is situated upon the stage-road between the railroad terminus, on the northeast, and the city of Santa Fe, on the southwest. A daily stage, conveying the mail, is received from each point. From this point mail communications can be had with Santa Fe in twenty hours; with department headquarters at Fort Leavenworth in four to six days, and with Washington in seven to nine days. A line of telegraph also passes this place en route from the railroad to Santa Fe along the stage road, and having a station at this point.

Fort Union, as a frontier post, may be considered desirable, not so much from the natural surroundings as from the facilities by stage, mail, and telegraph, of communication with the outside world.

One question I should like to add before closing: Are adobe quarters productive of rheumatism, I believe they are a fruitful source not only of rheumatism, but sciatica, and other forms of neuralgia.
Since 1875 there has been no great change in the surroundings of Fort Union. Except for deterioration, not much has happened to mar its picture. Together, the fort, the plains, the mountains, and the old trails present a picture of unity in isolation; and each seems to cling to the other in token of a far more glorious past.

C. Identification of the Site

The identification of Fort Union can be made without a question of a doubt. Not only is this the original site, but the structures there are original. In no way have those structures or the site been altered, restored, or modified, with the exception of deterioration through destruction, vandalism, and some erosion. From the time of the abandonment by the army, local citizens have used the fort as a source of building materials, and the owners up to recent years have removed certain usable items, such as timbers.

D. Historical Narrative

The story of Fort Union has been told in connection with the history of the Southwest upon many occasions. Perhaps the best studies upon the fort as such, have been those of the historical technicians of the National Park Service. The report of Henry Woods, *Fort Union, The History of New Mexico's Most Famous Military Post*, is included as the appendix of this report.

6/ An accurate description of the fort as it is now will be submitted in future reports to be made by National Park Service technicians. Based upon the investigation and field surveys, those reports will include accurate surveys, measurements, and other studies preparatory to the development of the area.
E. Evaluation of the Site

Fort Union falls into various themes of national history. Although it may be considered as a part of "Political and Military Affairs, 1830-1860", because of its military activity from 1851 to 1860, it may well be considered to fall more properly into other categories. As part of "The War Between the States, 1861-1865", it was one of the outstanding factors in holding the Southwest for the Union; and its place in "Westward Expansion and the Extension of National Boundaries, 1830-1890" is expressed in its place in Indian warfare, in its protection of the territory of New Mexico from attack and invasion, and in its vital connection with the Santa Fe Trail. "Means of Travel and Communication" may be considered as one of the themes of Fort Union, because of its connection with the Santa Fe Trail and the people who travelled thereon; and "Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture to 1890" may also be one of its themes, because of the importance of the Santa Fe Trail to commerce.

The museum possibilities at Fort Union are unlimited, because of the artifacts to be found there and the extensive history of the area. It is thought that through the cooperation of the War Department and local citizens, many of the likely museum pieces removed from the area may be returned, especially if adequate museum facilities are furnished in the future.
II.

PARK DATA

A. Ownership

Fort Union is owned by the Union Land and Grazing Company, a corporation whose members live mostly in the eastern part of the United States. Captain Edward B. Wheeler of Las Vegas, New Mexico, is the agent for the company.

B. Appraised Value

The full value of this site cannot be estimated, because of the historical significance attached to it. The assessed value of some 1,200 acres, which is the minimum acreage necessary for proper preservation and development, varies from two to ten dollars per acre. Any appraised value of the building materials in the structures can only be made after an extensive study, excavation, and clean-up of the area.

C. Condition, including Previous Development

Fort Union is in a state of ruin, due to deterioration after the abandonment by the army in 1891. There has been no attempt to preserve the site, other than the construction by the owners of fences around the ruins to keep out cattle and vandals. Recently, no trespassing signs have been put up by the owners prohibiting hunting and wood hauling (see the attached exhibit in Part IV). No restoration or reconstruction work has been done upon the site or its structures.
D. Care, including Past, Present, and Probable Future

Fort Union as an active military post received adequate care from the army up to the time of its abandonment. However, since the 1890's to the present, there has been little care, a factor which has resulted in vandalism and deterioration. As stated above, a fence around the important buildings offers a minimum of protection. Too, the fact that the property has been under one ownership has meant some protection. In the future, it should receive a maximum of care, especially if it is preserved and maintained by the Federal Government.

E. Accessibility

Fort Union at the present time is accessible, being only nine miles by dirt road from U. S. Highway 85. The building of an adequate road from that highway, from a point five miles from Fort Union, will add to its accessibility.

F. Possibility of Preservation

The cost of preservation will depend upon the initial amount of stabilization which will be accorded the ruins and structures. A CCC camp for a period of several years could be occupied in road building, clean-up, excavating, and stabilizing, and building the necessary administrative, exhibit, and custodian's quarters. Once preserved, a custodian and rangers or guides will be necessary to protect and maintain the area and to handle visitors. Because of the interest in Fort Union and its possibilities of tourist attraction, it may be considered desirable to charge an admission fee.
G. Suggested Development

It is urgently recommended that Fort Union be established as a national monument by Presidential proclamation. A CCC camp should be established there to preserve and develop the site adequately. The work to be done, aside from road building, clean-up, and constructing of necessary buildings, will be largely work of preservation and restoration of landscape features. No attempt should be made to restore or reconstruct the buildings of Fort Union, because of the evidences of past material culture which are contained therein.

It also is recommended that some 1,200 acres be acquired by donation to insure adequate preservation and development. The attached map shows in very rough outline the area to be donated around the main Fort Union ruins. Additional land to be donated will include the old Arsenal ruins and 100 feet on all sides of it (the site of the first fort), a 200-foot right-of-way for the road to U. S. Highway 85; a 100-foot right-of-way for the road between the two Fort Union areas; and 500 feet of scenic easement on each side of the entrance road. The construction of certain under-passes along the road for the passage of cattle will be required by the donor. An engineer's report, containing an accurate boundary description, will be submitted later, as will a suggested development plan for the area, if it is established as a national monument.

H. Relationship of Site to Areas Already Administered by National Park Service

Fort Union is approximately 100 miles from the Region III Head-
quarters of the National Park Service in Santa Fe, and about 110 miles southwest of Capulin National Monument. Most of the other National Park areas in New Mexico are within a day's automobile drive from Fort Union.

Audrey Mchamer
Regional Historian.

Henry A. Johnson
Regional Director. 6/10/39
FORT UNION

The History of New Mexico's Most Famous Military Post

By

Henry Woods
Student Technician
National Park Service
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FACTORS LEADING TO THE BUILDING OF FORT UNION

From three o'clock to six on the afternoon of August 18, 1846, the little adobe city of Santa Fe echoed the cadence of marching feet. A sinuous, blue column poured from the mountains to the east and filled this ancient seat of Spanish and Mexican authority with a throng of soldiery. Before the sun set, a new flag flew over the Governor's Palace, and a new era of New Mexico history had its inception. Its prophet was Brigadier-General Stephen W. Kearney, who, on the following morning, intoned to a curious native gathering in the plaza:

'... We have come among you to take possession of New Mexico, which we do in the name of the Government of the United States. We have come with peaceable intentions and kind feelings toward you all. We come as friends to better your conditions ... You are no longer Mexican subjects, you are now become American citizens .... I am your governor --- henceforth look to me for protection ....'

Kearney's conquest was perpetuated on February 2, 1848, by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which gave to the United States not only New Mexico but Upper California as well -- an area of almost a million square miles. September 5, 1850, as part of Clay's famous Omnibus Bill, better known as the Compromise of 1850, Congress organized over one-fourth of this huge area into the Territory of New Mexico. The eastern boundary was fixed on the 103rd Meridian of Longitude; the western line was the same as the eastern line of California, the northern boundary ran on the thirty-seventh parallel of latitude from the California line eastward to the divide between the San Juan Valley and the Rio Grande northward along the divide to the thirty-eighth parallel and eastward along that parallel to the 103rd Meridian. The southern boundary was the international boundary, which was in dispute with Mexico, from the mouth of the Gila River to the Rio Grande. East of the Rio Grande the southern boundary ran along the thirty-second parallel of latitude to the 103rd Meridian of longitude. Thus in 1853, with the addition of the Gadsden Purchase of about 30,000 square miles, the Territory of New Mexico included all of the present states of New Mexico and Arizona, and parts of Colorado and Nevada.

It was a strange land -- this newest accretion of the United States. Lieutenant Colonel Emory, with Kearney's advance guard, gives us his impression of what is now central western New Mexico:
Strolling over the hills alone, in pursuit of seed and geological specimens, my thoughts went back to the States, and when I turned from my momentary aberrations, I was struck most forcibly with the fact that not one object in the whole view, animal, vegetable, or mineral, had anything in common with the products of any state in the Union, with the single exception of the cottonwood.

Lofty mountain peaks, covered on their uppermost reaches with sub-artic timber, give way to grass-covered mesas and finally to burning deserts. River valleys are all too few and the bulk of the soil is denied that which could transform it into a similarity with the upper valley of the Rio Grande, into whose prolific bosom, says Gregg, whatever is thrown grows to a wonderful degree of perfection.

Taken as a whole, inhospitality was the paramount feature of the New Mexico that General Kearney conquered -- inhospitality not only of its arid plateaus and semi-arid mesas, but of the people as well. For here was a clash of two cultures utterly alien -- the driving, restless, material-minded Anglo-Saxon and the indolent, aesthetic, carefree Hispanic. The United States was incorporating, for the first time, into its continental limits, a vast territory inhabited by a people patently hostile. Scarcely had the dust of Kearney's two columns, one pressing southward under Doniphan, and the other westward to California, disappeared, when the natives began a bloody revolt whose center was at Taos. Colonel Sterling Price, whom General Kearney had left in Santa Fe, quickly crushed the uprising and hung the leaders. But the latent hostility of a large part of the populace toward the conquerors was thus convincingly demonstrated.

Over the whole uneasy scene loomed the sinister figures of the wild tribes of New Mexico, as Gregg called them, in distinction from those tribes who professed Christianity. There were five principal wild tribes that inhabited or extended their peregrinations into New Mexico. These were the Navajos, the Apaches, the Utes, the Kiowas, and the Comanches. No area was ever harried by five more fierce, capable, unrelenting tribes. Of the Apaches, Curtis says:

'The primitive Apache was a true nomad, a wandering child of Nature, whose birthright was a craving for the warpath, with courage and endurance probably exceeded by no other people, and with cunning beyond reckoning ... Fear to him is unknown. Death he faces with stolid indifference ....
No people could be better fitted than the Apache to conduct continuous predatory warfare. Every form of plant and animal life pays him tribute. An entirely naked Indian, without implements of any sort, would stop on a mountain slope and in a few minutes be sitting by a cheerful fire, preparing a welcome meal.  

The Navajos, Gregg designates the most important though not the most numerous tribe, because of their ability as herdsmen and cultivators of the soil. Despite these sedentary traits, the Navajos were great raiders and plunderers, being probably the most accomplished horse thieves among the red men, which is covering quite a bit of territory. It is said that the Navajos made peace with the Mexicans in the spring to allow them to plant their grain, which they promptly stole as soon as it was ripe. They were tall, well-built, arrogant Indians -- energetic, industrious, and independent.

On the plains to the northeast of New Mexico roamed the Comanches and Kiowas. They preyed on wagon trains and travelers, but not unfrequently ravaged the settlements of northern New Mexico. Wonderful horsemen and deadly accurate with the lance or arrow, these two tribes were the red scourge of the Santa Fe Trail. To the west of them ranged the Utes, similar in habits, but prevented by geographical position from being a very serious hazard to the commerce and settlements of New Mexico.

Colonel Sterling Price commanded the Territory, now organized into the Ninth Military Department, until October 11, 1848, being succeeded by Colonel John M. Washington, who was in turn succeeded, on October 23, 1849, by Colonel John Munroe Munroe served as Military Governor until March 3, 1851. During the terms of these three departmental commanders and military governors, the Indians were especially troublesome; Doniphan and Price organized three expeditions against the Navajos and Colonel Washington led another. All were unsuccessful as far as obtaining any definite results. In the meantime, the Apaches went on the warpath and in the winter of 1848 three detachments were sent in pursuit of these marauders, but to no avail. In the spring of 1849 small commands under Captain W. H. Sherman and Lieutenant A. E. Burnside did succeed in defeating two small bands of Apaches. This was the only tangible result of the campaigns. During 18 months of 1849-50 the property loss, mainly in sheep, mules, cattle, and horses from the Apache and Navajo raiders was estimated at $114,500. 

Protests went to Congress from the populace and the territorial legislature. Suggestions also were in abundance, ranging
from a mere display of military might to elaborate lines of military posts. These recommendations came from the Secretary of War, the Indian Commissioner, troop officers in the territory, the New Mexican delegate to Congress, and from private individuals.

The system of frontier defense that had been used in the territory up to this time had been very simple. It involved the stationing of troops in a few villages and at the one military post in the territory, Fort Marcy, established by Kearney at Santa Fe in 1846. One company of the First Dragoons was located at Taos, a second at Albuquerque, and a third at Socorro. Garrisons of about twenty men were placed at Tome and Dona Ana. At Fort Marcy were stationed one company of the Third Artillery and a company of the Second Dragoons.

No sooner had American army officers become acquainted with the complicated situation in New Mexico then they realized the importance of new army posts. As early as December 1848 orders were issued from the Adjutant General’s office for a careful examination of Texas, New Mexico, Oregon, and California by competent authorities assisted by officers of the Corps of Engineers and topographical Engineers. The examinations were to be made with a view toward locating permanent military posts. In the selection of sites, the officers and engineers were to be guided by the following considerations: (1) protection to the white settlers, (2) economy and facility in supporting the troops, (3) defense of Mexican territory against Indians within the border of the United States. These orders were not carried out until more than a year later.

In the spring of 1850 Captain Henry B. Judd, Third Artillery, made an examination along the Pecos. With Light Company C, equipped as cavalry, and a train of five wagons, Judd traveled about 200 miles from Las Vegas to the southern extremity of the Bosque Grande. Judd considered the Bosque Redondo and the Bosque Grande particularly suitable for mounted garrisons. A military post along the Pecos, however, was not selected until the time of the Civil War. In March Major Steen reported to Lieutenant McIaws that he had made an examination of the Santa Rita Copper Mine country and found it suitable for the location of a military post. The following month Captain W. N. Grier examined the New Mexican frontier and found that the line to be defended passed through Abiquiu, the Rio Colorado, Rayada, La Junta, Las Vegas, and San Miguel, -- a broken and mountainous country. Grier reported
to Molaws if the settlements within this line were to be adequately protected and the two roads leading to the United States were to be kept open, additional military posts would be necessary.

Inspector General George A. McCall made a tour of inspection of the military posts of the department. In his report to Adjutant General Jones, December 24, 1850, McCall maintained that the only effective way to distribute troops in New Mexico was to post them in the heart of the Indian country; forces should be of sufficient strength to overawe the Indians. McCall, accordingly, recommended the establishment of three such military posts: one was to be located in the Navajo country near Canyon de Chelly; a second in the Apache country, somewhere on the eastern slope of the Sacramento Mountains; a third on the Gila or near the old Santa Rita Copper Mine. These posts were to be strongly garrisoned with forces ranging from 350 to 500 men each. At the close of 1850, mounted troops were reported at Las Vegas, Santa Fe, Albuquerque, Dona Ana, Socorro, Rayada, and Abiquiu, in addition to the infantry at these places, and at Taos, San Elizario, and El Paso. In November the post at the mouth of the Gila was temporarily established which later became the famous Fort Yuma.

At the instance of Secretary of War Conrad, Quartermaster Thomas Swords was sent to New Mexico in May 1851. He found many unfavorable conditions such as high rents, shortage of water, grass, timber, and an unhealthy condition of soldiers' morals.

Such were the implications of this knotty problem with which the government was faced in the defense of this vast territory. To summarize its basic aspects, the United States Government was confronted with: (a) serious depredations from five savage tribes of Indians, (b) a hostility from inhabitants of the Territory who had given allegiance to Mexico in the past war, (c) demoralization of troops as result of the vices of New Mexican town-life, (d) the high cost of transporting subsistence to troops in the Territory.

No comment has been made, as yet, upon transportation costs, but here was an important angle of frontier defense. The total transport costs of the army increased from $150,000 in 1846, to $2,094,405 in 1851, which must be attributed to the maintenance of troops on the western frontier. The added expense of animal-drawn overland transport became the largest single item in the maintenance of the United States Army.
After all recommendations on the New Mexican situation had been assembled, the War Department assigned Colonel Edwin Vose Sumner to the command of the Ninth Military District, embracing the Territory, and incorporated into his instructions the crux of the best recommendations. He was to revise the entire system of defense in New Mexico, reorganize and build army posts and make such changes as his discretion might dictate. He was also instructed "as early as practicable to make an expedition against the Navajos and, also, one against the Utahs and Apaches, and inflict upon them a severe chastisement." Along with all of these activities, he was to reduce expenditures, a seeming impossibility. Colonel Sumner arrived in Santa Fe on July 19, 1851, and took command of the district. Edwin Vose Sumner was preeminently fitted for his position. As Captain of one of Kearney's companies of Dragoons, he had made the march to New Mexico in '46. Having been promoted to major, he was left with four troops in occupation of the Territory when Kearney went on to California. The opportunity had been his to observe, at first hand, conditions in New Mexico before assuming command there. No doubt some very definite ideas had evolved in his mind concerning the amelioration of conditions in New Mexico. At any rate, he wasted no time in putting a plan of action into effect. The building of three new posts was immediately begun -- Fort Union, Fort Fillmore, and Fort Conrad. The latter two were built on the Rio Grande, Fort Fillmore near El Paso, and Fort Conrad at Valverde. By far the greatest historical interest attaches to the first, not only because it was for years the largest and most important post in New Mexico, supply depot, departmental headquarters, and primary objective of the Confederate invasion, but also because it influenced immeasurably the history and development of the most famous of all western routes, the Santa Fe Trail.
II.

THE SANTA FE TRAIL

Fort Union was located, as Sumner wrote, "near the Mora River and on the line of communication with the Missouri Frontier." Colonel Sumner, schooled by 32 years of army experience to think and write in military terms, veils the true importance of Fort Union's location behind the phrase "line of communication." The two groups of wagon ruts which joined at the Mora River, had in three decades become important arteries of a great trade in which Americans had invested over $10,000,000, mostly in the last few years, and realized a return that was often fabulous. In the year before Fort Union's establishment more than 500 wagon loads of goods, valuing over $2,000,000 had traveled from Missouri to Santa Fe, the great trading center.

From Independence, Missouri, the route of the trade ran directly west across Kansas to Dodge City where the traces parted. One cut southward over a desert belt of fifty miles, known then as the Jornada (journey without water) to the Cimarron, from which the trace derived its name. From there it ascended the river and, passing south and west over the upper tributaries draining the Canadian, it gradually climbed toward Las Vegas Mesa. Up on Las Vegas Mesa, the trace came to the banks of a little stream known as the Mora River. Its waters flow down into the Pecos to the Rio Grande and on into the Gulf of Mexico.

The Mountain Route went 375 miles up the banks of the Arkansas, across vast undulating prairies, covering with lush grass and traversed by rows of cottonwood lining the streams. At the foot of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains, where Bent's Fort was established in 1829 as a gathering place of mountain trappers and a way-station on the route to New Mexico, it turned southwest up the valley of the Purgatoire River toward the Spanish Peaks, and then bore directly south, threading its way between the Sangre de Cristo and Mt. Raton. Descending by precipitous drops, which as late as 1844 tried the skill of veteran wagoners and explained a decided preference among prairie traders for the desert trace, the Mountain Route came out on Las Vegas Mesa. Then, united at the Mora, the trail defiles through the gorge of the upper Pecos, whose waters tumbling down from the southern extremity of the Sangre de Cristo and wearing a channel across the Glorieta Mesa -- a southern continuation of Las Vegas Mesa -- afforded to wagon transports the only natural gateway north of El Paso from the east into the upper.
valley of the Rio Grande. This gorge is known as Apache Pass. Fourteen miles beyond lies Santa Fe.

A Missouri trader and trapper by the name of Becknell is credited with opening up the Santa Fe trade. He set out with a small party from Arrow Rock, Missouri, September 1, 1821, and ascended the Arkansas River to what he described as the left fork of the Arkansas, probably the Purgatoire River. A little later they were struggling through what must have been Raton Pass. Going southward, Becknell struck the Canadian River and turned westward up this stream, reaching Santa Fe on November 16. He and his party were warmly received by the natives; Becknell was an honored guest of the governor. The expedition returned and paid out a 1500% profit to those who had been so fortunate as to invest! Rumors of the fabulous profit spread over Missouri, Becknell returned the next year by a route approximating what was afterward known as the Cimarron Trace; the party almost perished from thirst on the Jornada. But the profits of the trade indicated by Becknell's first expedition were worth great hardship. Before long the dust on the trail began to thicken. In 1825, according to Gregg, ninety proprietors and altogether one hundred and thirty men made the trip. Senator Benton of Missouri had become so interested in the possibilities of the trade as to introduce a bill in Congress asking for an appropriation to build a road to Santa Fe. A modest sum of $30,000 was voted. Of this, $20,000 went for treaties with the Indians whose territories the road was to cross, $10,000 went for a survey and the placement of markers. Benton's so-called "road" followed the Cimarron route. Before long, however, the markers were washed away or blown away. They were somewhat superfluous, for the trail never had the rigidity of a railroad or a modern highway -- at least not until it reached the junction of the traces. "It was a living thing which changed and wandered and grew. It was not names upon a map -- it was people; people traveling, singing, swearing, sweating, fearing, fighting, going in clouds of dust by day, plowing through quicksand and mud, sitting around great fires at night, hunters, trappers, traders, soldiers, emigrants, of all degrees of intelligence, virtue, and vice, of most races, bound together only by a common hardihood and a common exposure to the vastness and desolation and beauty of the trans-Missouri wilderness." Before the Mexican War military protection to the Santa Fe traders had been scanty. In 1828 a series of Comanche and Kiowa depredations on the Trail caused a furore in the Missouri settlements and an insistent demand was made that the Federal Government send troops to protect the caravans. In the spring of
1829, Major Bennett Riley was ordered to take four companies of the Sixth Infantry and accompany the traders as far as the International boundary. 32/ Riley exceeded his literal orders. A short time after the caravan had crossed into Mexican territory it was beset by a horde of Kiowas. Word was sent back to Riley, who promptly marched American troops into Mexican Territory and put the Kiowas to flight. 33/ Riley retired to Chouteau's Island in the Arkansas and waited the return of the traders. 34/ On the return trip the train was escorted by Mexican troops. A large group of Comanches and Arapahoes swooped down upon it. Unfortunately for them, the Indians gave out of ammunition at a critical point in their attack. The furious traders pursued and slaughtered them with such savage cruelty as to shock even the Mexican regulars.

Only twice was the experiment of sending military escorts repeated. At all other times the traders were forced to rely on themselves for protection. In reality, the large caravans did not seriously want for protection. Santa Fe caravans were veritable moving fortresses. "The traders soon learned that no one cared as much for their skins as they did themselves. Their occupations made them good shots and superb riders; they were fiercely self-reliant and they knew the ways of the Indians. In effect they became soldiers in their own defense -- better soldiers than the government could have enlisted and sent into the field." 35/ It was the solitary travelers and small trains that met massacres at the hands of the Comanches and Kiowas. The government, of course, did not feel that it could escort every small party down the Trail.

Thus was the Santa Fe Trail when Colonel E. V. Sumner rode out in the early spring of 1851 to select the site for his master post. More than a mere "line of communication", the Trail was a great avenue of commerce whose yearly volume was beginning to run into millions of dollars. Nor had the zenith of its importance been reached. Trade with Santa Fe and its environs was now unhindered by the prohibitory taxes of Arrijo and promised to reach amazing proportions. Westward travel had received another great impetus a short time before. On the property of an old Santa Fe trader named Sutter, who had crossed the mountains into California in 1838, a nugget of gold was found by one James Wilson Marshall. 37/ An influx into California began in the spring of 1849 that is unparalleled in the history of any state. Independence, Missouri, at the head of the Santa Fe Trail, became the rendezvous of thousands of gold seekers. While the greatest number chose what became known as the Northern Route to California, up the Platte, and across the Territory of Utah, the Santa Fe Caravan Route was next in
It was known as the Southern Route. At Santa Fe this route deviated in different directions; by the old Spanish trail round the north banks of the Colorado crossing Rio Virger to Mojave River and desert, and through Cajon Pass to Los Angeles; by General Kearney's line of march through Arizona, along the Gila; by that of Colonel Cock down the Rio Grande and westward across the Sonora tableland to Yuma. At the time of Fort Union's construction the steady stream of fortune hunters to California had not noticeably abated. Indeed, news of the great strike was just reaching the outlying sections of the south and east.

Twitchell cites another reason for Sumner's selection of Mora River site for Fort Union, besides its strategic value for the protection of the Trail. This was the value of the locality as a forage producing region, knowledge of which Sumner had gained while in command of Kearney's Dragoons in 1846.
III.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE FORT AND THE EARLY YEARS

Fort Union was placed on the west side of the grassy valley formed by Gallinas Mountain on the east and a mesa on the west. At the point where the fort was placed, the valley is about four miles wide, broadening out both to the north and south. Numerous canyons cut back into the mesa, the largest of which is called Big Canon, about two miles above the fort. The Mora River cuts through the mesa in the southwest corner of the reservation, which was eight miles square. Sharp sandstone bluffs, wooded with cedar and pine, define the valley on the west and command the fort to such an extent as to lead other officers to question Sumner's judgment in its location. Later on, Canby was to move the fort further out in the center of the valley, in anticipation of Confederate attack.

The construction of Fort Union, and other posts mentioned above, was begun by troops whom Sumner abruptly removed from the New Mexican towns. His own headquarters were taken to the embryonic Fort Union from Santa Fe. The rapidity with which Sumner made these changes can be traced to his violent disgust at life in the New Mexican towns. He felt that it was working toward the complete demoralization of the American soldiers.

Sumner held that the whole population of New Mexico was being kept up with Government money, which was probably not far from the truth. The inhabitants of Santa Fe were especially blatant in protesting the removal of the center of the military establishment from their midst. The bewhiskered old colonel poured out a full measure of scorn on these people in a report to the Adjutant General:

'I reached Santa Fe on the 19th of July and assumed command of the Department. My first step was to break up the post at Santa Fe, that sink of vice and of extravagance, and to remove the troops and public property to this place (Fort Union). I left one company of artillery there and shall have a cavalry station within striking distance of that place during the coming winter (Galisteo).

I understand that many applications have been made to the Government by the people of Santa Fe to have the troops ordered back there. I have no hesitation in saying that I believe most of these applications proceed directly or indirectly from those who have hitherto managed to live, in some way, from the
extravagant expenditures of the Government. I trust their petitions will not be heeded.

I have also withdrawn the troops from the towns of Las Vegas, Rayaldo, Albuquerque, Cebolleta, Socorro, Dona Ana, San Eleazar, and El Paso, and I have established this post (Fort Union), near the Mora River, and on that line of communication with the Missouri frontier. This will be the Department Headquarters and general depot. I have also established a post on the Rio Grande (Fort Fillmore) near El Paso, one at Valverde on the same river (Ft. Conrad), and one at Canon Bonito (Ft. Defiance). These posts have all been selected with a view to cultivation, as well as the defense of the frontier, and they are now being built by the troops and the expense will be very small. I designed establishing a post in the Utah country this fall, but it is so late I am obliged to postpone it till spring.

I consider the withdrawal of the troops from the towns a matter of vital importance, both as regards discipline and economy. It is unquestionably true that most of the troops in this territory have become in a high degree demoralized, and it can only be accounted for by the vicious associations in these towns. These evils are so great that I do not expect to eradicate them entirely, until I can bring the troops together, in considerable bodies, for discipline and instruction.

In the same order by which he moved the headquarters from Santa Fe to Fort Union, Sumner directed the discharge of all citizens employed in the public service in New Mexico, excepting a few clerks. The transfer of the quartermaster stores to Fort Union from Santa Fe was accomplished in twenty days, almost exclusively by public wagons; all citizens employed in the quartermaster's department had been discharged shortly before.

Because of the fact that Sumner was away much of the time during Fort Union's construction, Lieutenant-Colonel E. B. Alexander and Major E. S. Sibley, Sumner's quartermaster, superintended most of the actual building. Sibley describes the completed post as follows:

'Nine sets of officers' quarters; each set -- with one exception, which is composed of three rooms and a kitchen -- 18 feet long and 15 feet wide. These quarters have earthen roofs; and five of them have,
In addition, board roofs. The other sets of quarters will also be covered with board roofs, as soon as lumber for the purpose can be saved, and it can conveniently be done.

Two barracks - 48 feet long and 18 feet wide, with two wings 50 feet long and 16 feet wide; board roofs.

Hospital - 48 feet long and 18 feet wide, with a wing 46 feet long and 16 feet wide; board roof.

Storehouse - 180 feet long and 22 feet wide, with a wing 45 feet long and 16 feet wide; board roofs.

Commanding Officers' Office and a Court Martial Room - 48 feet wide; earthen roof.

Offices for Assistant Quartermaster and Commissary of Subsistence - 38 feet long and 18 feet wide; earthen roof.

Smoke House - 100 feet long and 22 feet wide; board roof.

Guard House and Prison - 42 feet long and 18 feet wide; earthen roof.

Blacksmith's and Wheelright's Shop - 50 feet long and 18 feet wide; board roof.

Bakehouse - 31 feet long and 17 feet wide; earthen roof.

Ice House - 20 feet long and 30 feet wide; earthen roof, covered by board roof.

Quarters for Laundresses - 114 feet long and 18 feet wide; six rooms; earthen roof.

In addition, yards to five sets of officers quarters have been enclosed, and two corrals have been made, each 100 feet square. The lumber used in the construction of these buildings, with the exception of 14,872 feet, has been sawed at the post. Forts Defiance, Fillmore, and Conrad are similarly constructed, lacking an icehouse. 48/
While most of the above building was in progress, Sumner was on a lengthy but unsuccessful campaign against the Navajos. He had started out on the 17th of August with four companies of dragoons, one of artillery, and two of infantry. The Navajos eluded the troops and Sumner did not succeed in dealing them a decisive blow, as he had hoped. At Canon Bonito, Fort Defiance was established to check the Navajo raiders. Major Backus, with five companies, was left as a garrison and the remainder of the column returned to Fort Union.

In the following spring an interesting experiment was made. The heads of the War Department conceived the idea of having the troops provide for a part of their own sustenance by the cultivation of crops on the various post reservations. General Scott penned a general order outlining the scheme, and the soldiers at Fort Union became part-time farmers. Through probably no fault of their own, they were complete failures at their new avocation.

At this time there were at Fort Union three companies of the First Dragoons, two companies of the Third Infantry, and one ordnance detachment, totalling 409 officers and men.

Sumner and Indian Commissioner Calhoun concluded a treaty with the Navajos about this time, which the Navajos speedily broke. The New Mexico Press championed the cause of frontier defense and took Sumner to task for such peaceful policies and lack of military energy. Sumner retaliated March 5, 1853, with a newspaper article slurring the populace of New Mexico. He proposed what amounted to the abandonment of the Territory to the Indians, declaring that the Government should issue the inhabitants guns and let them defend themselves. Of course, the natives were infuriated and demanded Sumner's recall, which was ordered in a short time.

As a matter of fact, the situation in New Mexico was no fault of Sumner's. He was a capable, efficient army officer, but as appears above, utterly intolerant of criticism. The fault lay in the system of defense, promulgated by Secretary of War Conrad, consisting of a chain of fixed posts, weakly garrisoned. Mobile Indian raiders struck with the rapidity of lightning and fled to a hideout in the mountains. By the time word was communicated to the nearest army post and a pursuit organized, the Indians were miles away. "Old Fuss and Feathers" Scott, the General-in-Chief, had for some years attacked the system in his annual report. He advocated a greater concentration of forces in a few posts and a system of mounted
patrols which should constantly scour the country for Indian raiders. Congress ignored the recommendations until 1854 and then voted three regiments of mounted troops.

The story of the early years of the fort's existence then is a story of futility. Its garrison had been cut down to garrison other posts -- Fort Defiance, Cantonment Burgwin, Fort Webster, Fort Massachusetts, until in 1853 it consisted of only two companies. In November 1853, fourteen men and a sergeant were sent in pursuit of a band of 300 Utahs. Just what these fifteen would have done if they had been so unfortunate as to catch the Indians is a matter of conjecture. The following February, thirty cavalry were sent after a band of Indians who had stolen cattle and maltreated herdsmen on the property of one Waters. Witness the post commander, Captain Macree's instructions:

'If you find these Indians in camp or otherwise, your first duty will be surround them or cut off their retreat to broken ground -- then, it appearing that they are a guilty party -- demand the surrender of the actual marauders. If they are delivered or pointed out, have them severely whipped, and take a pony as an indemnity to Mr. Waters; if they make a plausible excuse, of their inability to surrender the depredators (and time, if necessary, may be given whilst you keep the Chief in your power), then seize horses or ponies double the amount in value of the stolen animals. In case of resistance or insolence or of their being overtaken flying from your pursuit, attack them. You will, of course, use your discretion in unforeseen circumstances.'

A detachment of fifteen men under Lieutenant Bell, while on a scout down the Canadian, had a brush with the Apaches in which their chief was slain. Before Lieutenant Bell could return to the Fort, these same Apaches were reported in the vicinity of the post herd by the surgeon who had proceeded out to care for Bell's wounded. The harassed lieutenant had to hurry to try to save Fort Union's beef. Captain Macree plead for reinforcements, it being time for the trains to leave for Missouri:

'I can muster and effectively arm but 36 of my only company of dragoons; 13 of these I expect to send on the 14th instant (March) to meet the mail 101 miles from here -- a defensive measure, and the merchants of the territory at this season sent their trains to Missouri for goods.'
General Scott in 1854 advised the abandonment of useless posts, a moderate increase of strength, and the establishment of battalion cantonments at strategic points with a view to supporting mobile columns:

'When at rest, instruction and discipline would be advanced, and each battalion, leaving a small guard behind, might in column, composed of at least a portion of cavalry, be instructed to make an annual circuit through the nearest Indian country -- always in a condition to pursue and strike -- in order to overawe hostile machinations and to punish violation of peace. Similar views have oftentimes been presented in my annual reports, beginning with 1842, but from the want of troops they have been only partially put into practice.'

In these plans General Scott had the hearty approval of Secretary of War Jefferson Davis. In 1854 Colonel Joseph K. F. Mansfield (later Major General, killed leading a corps at Antietam) made a tour of inspection of New Mexican posts, with a view of recommending which posts be abandoned. Colonel Mansfield advised that Fort Union be held. Note how this army engineer, who later was to prepare the defenses of Washington, sized up the location and value of Fort Union:

'Fort Union is situated at the foot of the Mesa opposite Gallinas Mountain on the west side of a valley stretching nearly north and south, say 35 miles. About 7 miles to the southward is Barclay's Fort on the Mora River, whence the old road to Santa Fe crosses the valley. About 15 miles to the northward the road from the valley of the Mora crosses the valley and 5 miles farther is Ocate Creek, and 3 miles further still in a canyon of the mountains is a farm attached to this post. This valley is well adapted to grazing and large quantities of hay are annually cut on the Ocate for the public animals. This post is now directly on the shortest road to Santa Fe, a chance having been effected through the exertions and reconnaissance of Major J. N. Carleton, U. S. Dragoons, to open the road to the northward off Wagon Mound and Gallinas Mountain, thereby saving in distance about 13 miles and by the exertions of Major Sibley, U.S. Quartermaster, to open the road from the post to Las Vegas direct, thereby saving several miles in distance westward. Thus situated, it is well located for a depot for the supply of the northern posts, direct to Burgwin and Fort Massachusetts.
through the valley of Taos, and to Santa Fe and Albuquerque either via Burgwin or Las Vegas. It is well adapted for keeping beef cattle and supernumerary dragoon horses and mules, etc. The supplies of flour, corn, and hay and fuel are obtained from the neighboring valleys as conveniently as at other posts in New Mexico and on reasonable terms. The buildings of all kinds are as good as at any post and there seems to be enough of them to satisfy the demand of the service. It is important, however, that a good wagon road be opened to cross the Mora Mountains directly to Burgwin about 12 miles south of Don Fernandez de Taos, and a distance of about 50 miles. For this object I would recommend an appropriation of two thousand dollars. For a sketch of this valley and a plan of the post see C and D here-with appended.

The post is established on a reservation of eight miles square and like the farm is claimed by Citizens. It was commenced in 1851 by Brevet Lt. Col. E. B. Alexander of the 8th Infantry and continued successively by Bvt. Major J. H. Carleton, Ist. Dragoons and Major G. Morris of the 3rd Infantry and Bvt. Lt. Col. V. Brooks, 2nd Artillery. It is too close under the Mesa for a tenable position against an enterprising enemy, unless the immediate height be occupied by a Block House, which could readily be done. It seems to have been selected on account of a good spring of water and will undoubtedly answer a very good purpose and should be retained.

This locality, like that of the Mora Valley and the sources of the Pecos River, is exposed to the depredations of the Jicarilla Apache and the Utah Indians who frequently are quite annoying and troublesome.¹⁶⁷

The farm, to which Colonel Mansfield referred, had been giving the post commander as much trouble as the Indians. January 20, 1854, Captain Macree reported to headquarters that the corn produced on the farm was costing the Government $5.14 for labor alone, while better corn could be purchased on the market for $3.00. ¹⁶⁸

In 1855, a band of Utes having committed depredations along the upper Red River, Colonel Thomas T. Fauntleroy, now commanding at Fort Union, was sent against them. He overtook them at
Cochetopa Pass with a force of 500 regulars and volunteers and inflicted a defeat "seldom, if ever, equaled in the United States." 69/ Forty Indians were killed, a large number wounded, and six captured.

1857 brought trouble with the Mormons in Utah. They were purportedly flaunting civil authority, and an army of 6,000 was sent into the territory to restore order. 70/ This drained New Mexico of troops. The depleted garrisons were insufficient to check the Indians and outbreaks occurred all over the Territory. By 1858 there were only 147 men at Fort Union under the command of Captain A. J. Lindsey. 71/ There were only 1687 men in the whole department distributed among twelve posts. 72/ Almost this number had been in the field actually campaigning against the Indians in 1855.

From 1838 through 1860 Indian depredations in New Mexico reached their peak. To illustrate in cold figures: The Historical Register and Dictionary of the U. S. Army lists 72 actions and expeditions in which the army was engaged during these three years. 73/ Forty-four of these were in New Mexico. From the end of the Mexican War to the beginning of the Civil War at Fort Sumter, the army had engaged in 196 actions and expeditions; 76 of these were in the Territory of New Mexico. 74/ Over half of the Indian troubles in New Mexico for the period 1848-1861, measured by the criterion of the number of actions and expeditions, occurred in 1858-59.

An extreme reorganization of frontier defense was planned. Between July and September 1859, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Johnston made a tour of inspection of posts in the Territory and, of course, included Fort Union in his itinerary. 75/ Colonel Thomas T. Fauntleroy assumed command of the Department on October 25, 1859. 76/

In an attempt to inject a new spirit into the frontier defense policy in New Mexico, Fauntleroy worked out an elaborate military reorganization program. His plan included no less than twelve proposals. Some involved the abandonment of existing military positions and the creation of new ones; others provided for an intensification program, the strengthening of military posts.

The first proposal related to Fort Union. This post Fauntleroy desired broken up and moved to a point northeast of its existing position. The new location
near the Raton Mountains, Fauntelroy believed would render more direct and adequate protection to the mail from Independence. The new position would also be close to the great Comanche Trail and defend a larger area of frontier settlements. It was to be garrisoned by one mounted company and one company of infantry." 77/
IV.

THE CIVIL WAR

Fauntleroy was never able to take any steps toward putting his elaborate plan into effect. Events in the east had brought the country to the brink of Civil War. He himself was a Virginian and resigned his commission early in 1861 to accept a brigadier-generalcy in the Virginia State forces. The officer who had made the tour of inspection in the late summer of 1859 was, in 1861, made a full general of the Confederacy and commanded the gray forces at Bull Run in the first major battle of the War.

Repercussions of the great conflict were soon to reach New Mexico and the Territory was to experience again, within the space of fifteen years, another expedition bent on its conquest.

Colonel W. W. Loring took command of the Department of New Mexico on March 22, 1861, relieving Fauntleroy. Loring was a southern sympathizer (later a Confederate major-general). When news that Fort Sumter had been fired upon and Lincoln had called for 75,000 volunteers reached New Mexico, Loring was not long in tendering his resignation (May 13, 1861). He remained in the Territory until June 11, waiting for the President to take action upon it. On this date he turned over his command to Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. S. Canby and left for Virginia via Texas.

The new departmental commander, a man of boundless energy and capacity, rose to the situation admirably; never for a minute did his loyalty to the Union waver or his efforts in its behalf cease. Canby's first thoughts naturally concerned themselves with his line of supply. Here was the great difficulty of his position, from a military point of view; his line of communications reached almost a thousand miles back to the Missouri frontier. This must be kept open or his troops must perish or surrender; New Mexico, devoid of developed resources at that time, could not support an army. Fort Union, athwart the junction of the two main laterals of the Santa Fe Trail, now became the vital point in the territory's defense. Retention of this post spelled the difference between victory and defeat. All the strategy of the coming Confederate invasion was to be directed toward Fort Union's capture. And, although Sibley succeeded in taking Santa Fe, Albuquerque, and every town of any importance in the Territory, and other took or invested every other post, because he failed to take Fort.
Union, his campaign was a dismal failure.

Colonel Canby's first communication, after assuming command of the Department, was to the commanding officer at Fort Union in regard to rumored plans of a band of Texans to operate against the supply trains from Missouri:

"Commanding Officer, Ft. Union:

Sir: Information from private sources indicates the possibility of demonstration by the people of Texas against the supply trains on the route to this country from the Missouri River and the lieutenant colonel, commanding directs that the movements of Company A, Second Dragoons, as directed by Special Orders No. 26 of the 15th instant, be suspended altogether, and that the mounted force of your company be held in readiness for any movement that may be necessary for the protection of the trains. Instruction in detail will be sent to you in a day or two by express.

Yours respectfully, sir
A. L. Andersen

Lieutenant Colonel William Chapman was in command of Fort Union at this time. He was directed on June 19 to organize a small party of spies to operate in the country east of Fort Union:

A paragraph from the communication is significant:

"Arrangements are being made by the War Department for guarding the line of communications between the Missouri frontier and this country. The extent of these arrangements is not fully known here, but no apprehensions are entertained except for the trains that may now be between your post and the crossing of the Arkansas. If you should apprehend any danger for them, you will, without waiting for instructions, make the best arrangements that may be in your power for their protection. If it be necessary, in order to replace any portion of your command that may be detached for this purpose, you are authorized to call into the service two or more companies of volunteers to strengthen your command .... the lieutenant colonel commanding does not wish the strength of the garrison to be reduced below 200."

The next day Canby sent to the Adjutant General's office the observations and recommendations regarding the state of affairs in
New Mexico. He advocated strongly garrisoning three posts --
either Fort Fillmore or Fort Bliss and Forts Union and Stanton.
83/ This was to be done with a view of (1) protecting the,
inhabitants of New Mexico from Indian hostilities, (2) protect-
ing the Territory from invasion, (3) guarding communications
with the East. 84/ On the same day Colonel Canby called on
the Governor of New Mexico for three companies of volunteers
which were "to aid in the protection of the eastern frontier
of the Territory and guarding the trains on the route from the
Arkansas to this department." 85/ These troops were to rendez-
vou at Fort Union. Canby gave orders that as soon as these
volunteers were equipped, an expedition of at least 100 mounted
men and two companies of infantry should be organized to escort
the trains from the Arkansas to Fort Union. 86/ Here were his
instructions regarding the detailed organization and conduct of
the expeditions: 87/

'The command will move lightly equipped as possible,
and will take with it rations for thirty days. As
the service will be performed on or near the road,
wagon transportation will be used, but a few fresh
mules should be taken to meet the contingency of
temporary detachments if it should be necessary to
make any. A party of ten spies and guides will be
attached to the command, and particular care should
be taken in selecting them. You will please indi-
cate to Captain Duncan that the lieutenant colonel com-
manding trusts entirely to his discretion for the pro-
tection of the trains, and that he will take such mea-
ures as may, in his judgment, be most necessary to
accomplish this object. He thinks proper, however,
to suggest that the command should be kept as compact
as possible; that no detachments should be made if it
is possible to avoid it, and the country in his front
and flank should be thoroughly searched by the spies
attached to his command.'

Early in July 1861 several companies of artillery and mount-
ted rifles from Texas, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John R.
Baylor, entered New Mexico by way of El Paso. 88/ All the posts
in the southern part of the Territory fell into Confederate hands
with the exception of Fort Craig. 89/ (formerly Fort Conrad) On
July 27, the Union cause received a tremendous blow when Major
Isaac Lynde surrendered his entire command of 500 well armed reg-
ulars, after abandoning Fort Miller to the Confederates. 90/
This disaster compelled Canby to gather all his forces in the
south at Fort Craig.

22
Baylor on August 1 issued a proclamation taking possession of the southern half of the Territory in the name and behalf of the Confederate States of America and designated Mesilla as the seat of government. Meanwhile, on July 6, Brigadier-General H. H. Sibley was charged at Richmond, Virginia, with the duty of driving the Federal troops out of New Mexico. Sibley did not reach Fort Bliss and assume command in person until December 14, 1861. "The Army of New Mexico", as Sibley's brigade was called, consisted of three regiments of mounted infantry, five companies under the charge of Lieutenant Colonel Baylor, two batteries, and three independent companies—a total of nearly 3,500 men.

Canby had heard rumors for some time that a large Confederate force was planning the invasion of the Territory. By the first of the year he was convinced of the truth of these rumors. At this time Canby had 5,646 troops in his department. These were mainly concentrated at Fort Craig and Fort Union—2,266 at the former, and 1,140 at the latter. Seven hundred twenty men were at Albuquerque, and 396 at Santa Fe. The remainder were scattered through the Territory.

Governor Connelly, territorial governor of New Mexico, received word from Canby to hold the militia in readiness to reinforce Fort Union and Santa Fe. The departmental commander himself went to Fort Craig where his greatest concentration of troops had been made. From Fort Craig Canby planned to check the invasion before it had penetrated very far into New Mexico.

In the midst of all these trials which the Union cause was undergoing, two revolts broke out in the department because of the failure of the government to pay and clothe the militia and volunteers as promised. One of these was at Fort Union and the other at Camp Connelly. Colonel Paul suppressed the revolt at Fort Union within a short time, but the commander at Camp Connelly had a great deal more difficulty.

The 12th of February 1862, saw the Confederates 7 miles below Fort Craig. On the 20th they camped across the river from it. The next day at a ford in the Rio Grande, called Valverde, 5 miles above Fort Craig, was fought the first serious battle of the New Mexican Campaign. A small Union force under Lieutenant Colonel Roberts brought on the battle, but before long both armies were engaged in a sanguine struggle. The Confederates were victorious, due to the fear and inexperience of the U.S. Volunteer Troops, and Canby withdrew his troops to the protection of Fort Craig.
Leaving a small force to watch Canby at Fort Craig, the Confederate main body proceeded on up the valley toward Fort Union, their objective. Union forces at Albuquerque and Santa Fe fled at the advance of the Southerners, but successfully brought a quarter of a million dollars worth of quartermaster stores to Fort Union. 105/

Colonel Paul, in command at Fort Union, was in more or less of a quandary. Between Fort Union and Fort Craig was the Confederate Army and communication with Canby was thus cut off. 106/ Canby had succeeded in getting a messenger through to Major Donaldson in command at Santa Fe, directing that officer to come to his relief, but the order was given under the impression that reinforcements were in Santa Fe from Kansas. 107/ Colonel Paul, however, began the organization of an expedition to relieve Canby. 108/

General David Hunter, commanding the Department of Kansas, had in the meantime directed the Acting Governor of Colorado to reinforce Canby in New Mexico. 109/ Acting Governor Weld hurried the 1st Colorado into New Mexico. 110/ They heard at Pueblo of the defeat at Valverde and the advance of the Confederates up the Rio Grande. 111/ Discarding all but actual necessities, they hurried over snow covered mountainous country at the rate of 40 miles a day. 112/ By March 8 they were on the southern slope of the Raton Mountains. As they were preparing to bivouac, a courier from Colonel Paul rode into camp with information that the Confederates were in Santa Fe, preparing to advance on Fort Union. 113/ With only arms and blankets, the "Pikes Peakers" struck out immediately for the threatened post, marking all night and most of the following day. After a brief halt at Maxwell's Ranch, Fort Union was reached in the evening of the 10th.

At this time the Confederate situation, as seen through the eyes of Colonel William Steele of the Texas Mounted Rifles, was none too promising, in spite of the apparent success of Sibley's operations. 114/ His report is remarkable for its accurate discernment of the military situation: 115/

Camp near Dos Anas
March 7, 1862


General: .... Our condition now is nearly as follows: Gen. Sibley, at or near Albuquerque, with about 1,800 men; probably not well supplied with either ammunition or provisions. Below Fort Craig, not over 350 serviceable men. Between the two
portions stand Fort Craig strongly fortified, and with still six guns, two of them 24 pounders, and garrisoned by about 3,000 men of whom 1,200 or 1,500 are regulars and Pike's Peak Volunteers, the remainder Mexican volunteers; provisioned for three months. Gen. Sibley was preceded up the country by two companies of dragoons, destroying supplies of all kinds. It is stated that there were at Albuquerque two companies of regulars, two at Santa Fe, and one at Union. These troops, with these moving in advance of Gen. Sibley and such other troops as can be raised, will be marched into Union in advance of any movement on the part of our troops. Two regiments are reported to be on the way from Denver to New Mexico. Ft. Union is represented as being strongly fortified. It will thus be perceived that the probabilities are that the entire territory, with the exception of Fts. Union and Craig, will be stripped of all public property of value, and that our army will find itself in the midst of a population of 80,000 souls possessing no very friendly spirit toward us -- a country nearly or quite exhausted as regards forage and other army supplies, with a force of nearly 1,000 men in a strong fort with abundant supplies in our advance, a force of some 3,000 (in Ft. Craig) in our rear, either of which is too strong to assail with the means at our command and a population stated, besides holding credits of the Federal Government to a large amount, and we are without funds which are available ....

Wm. Steele, Col. 7th Texas
Ktd. Mil.

Colonel John F. Slough was in command of the Colorado regiment. It so happened that his volunteer commission antedated that of Colonel Paul, who had been a major in the regular army. Slough was thus the ranking officer at Fort Union and, as Paul wrote, "an officer of only six months service and without experience, takes precedence of one of many years experience and who had frequently been tried in battle." 116/

Not knowing of the arrival reinforcements from Colorado, Colonel Canby wrote Colonel Paul the following letter: 117/

March 16

'Place no reliance on the New Mexican troops, except for partisan operations, and then only when
the main operations will not be affected by the result. Concentrate all your reliable troops until the reinforcements from Kansas, Colorado, and California arrive. If in sufficient force to operate directly upon the enemy, advise me of your plans, in order that I may cooperate. Ft. Union must be held and our communication with the East kept open. Ft. Garland is not so important. If it cannot be held, it should be destroyed. All other points are of no importance. While awaiting reinforcements harass the enemy by partisan operations; obstruct his movements, and remove or destroy any supplies that might fall into his hands. This post must be held in order to cut off his retreat. Our supplies will last until the 10th of April, and can be made to last until the end. If it is necessary to abandon the post, everything will be destroyed. I will move from the post at the last moment, and without encumbrances of any kind. The sick and wounded will be left at Limitar. In this case it will be necessary to effect a junction with your command. I will indicate the route and point of junction verbally and by several messengers. Keep the Adjutant General advised of the state of affairs in the department and advise me of the arrival of reinforcements. Do not move from Ft. Union to meet me until I advise you of the route and point of junction.'

Ed. R. S. Canby

By the 18th Canby had received order that the 1st Colorado regiment was at Fort Union. On that date he wrote to Colonel Slough:

Hdqrs. Dept. of Arizona


Sir: Keep your command prepared to make a junction with this force. I will indicate the time and route. Move with as little baggage as possible. Take no tents and only the camp equipage essential for comfort and efficiency. Ammunition, at least 100 cartridges per man and gun. If you have been joined by a sufficient force to act independently against the enemy, advise me of your plans and movements that I may cooperate. In this you must be
governed by your own judgment and discretion, but nothing must be left to chance. There is no necessity for a premature movement on account of this post. We have flour to last until the 10th of next month (April) and it can be made to last until the end. I am jerking beef to serve as bread. Of all other supplies we have enough for three months. The question is not of saving this post, but of saving New Mexico and defeating the Confederates in such a way that an invasion of this Territory will never again be attempted. It is essential to the general plan that this post should be retained. Fort Union must be held and our communication with the East kept open. If you move, a reliable garrison must be left in it. The communication by Fort Garland should also be kept open. If it cannot, that post should be destroyed. All other points are of no importance. While waiting for reinforcements harass the enemy by partisan operations. Obstruct his movements and cut off his supplies. Use the mounted volunteers for these purposes and keep the regular cavalry in reserve. Feed their horses well...'

Ed. R. S. Canby
Col. 19th Inf. Commdg.

A violent controversy arose over the construction of these instructions from Canby. Colonel Paul maintained that Canby desired all troops to remain at Fort Union to insure the retention of that post. Slough claimed that the instructions in the words "harass the enemy" gave him license to conduct a field campaign against Sibley's troops. Paul tried to dissuade him and received this curt reply on March 22:

Hdqs. Northern Division
Fort Union, N. Mex.
Mar. 22, 1862.

'Col. G. R. Paul:
Commdg. Eastern Dist. Ft. Union, New Mexico:

Sir: I am instructed by Colonel Slough to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, and to state in reply that the instructions of Colonel Canby are not only to protect Fort Union, but also to harass the enemy. By moving the command to or near Bernal Springs both ends can be accomplished, and as the command will be between the enemy and Fort Union, the latter is as much protected as if the troops remained here. By being at the Springs we can better operate for the double purpose of harassing the enemy and protecting Santa Fe from depredation.

27
If the enemy at San Antonio are no stronger than reported by Captain Walker, the troops under my command will be sufficient to control their action and to defeat them in case of an attack.

Thinking that the command assigned by you can be spared for the purpose named, the Colonel commanding cannot consent to leave any portion behind.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant

Gurd En Chapin


Paul wrote again on March 22:

'In the name of the department commander, of the best interests of the service, and of the safety of all the troops in this territory, I protest against this movement of yours, made as it is two days before the time agreed on, and I conceive in direct disobedience of the orders of Colonel Canby.' 120/

To no avail, for on that date Slough marched out of Fort Union with the lst. Colorado, a battalion of regulars, a company of the 4th New Mexico, a detachment of Cavalry, and two batteries of four guns -- an aggregate of 1,342 men. 121/ Due to the energy and aggressiveness of a fighting clergyman, Major J. W. Chivington, Slough’s campaign was a huge success.

Chivington, making a reconnaissance in force with about one-third of the command brought on the battle of La Glorieta on March 26, by a collision with a Confederate force under Major Pyron near Pigeon’s Ranch. 122/Pyron’s battalion was the vanguard of Sibley’s Brigade. A hot fight ensued and both majors sent urgent requests for reinforcements. 123/ The Confederate Colonel Scurry was at Galisteo about fifteen miles away. 124/ By a forced march he reached Glorieta Pass the next morning. 125/The remainder of Slough’s command came up during the night and the following day; the second phase of the battle begun about noon. 126/

While this battle raged furiously on the afternoon of the 27th, with the Federals being slowly pushed back, the master stroke of the campaign was executed. Major Chivington, with about 430 officers and picked men, made a wide turning movement
around Scurry's flank, fell upon the small force guarding his trains, dispersed it, and destroyed 73 wagons filled with ammunition, subsistence, forage, baggage, officers' clothing, medical and surgical stores -- all of the equipage and other necessary supplies for a small army in camp and on the march. In addition, Chivington's men bayoneted between 500 and 600 horses and mules.

This proved the death blow to the Confederate invasion. There was nothing for Scurry to do except retreat in search of subsistence, of which there was little to be found in this barren country.

Colonel Slough was eager to press on in pursuit of the hungry and demoralized enemy, but Canby sent an order to retire to Fort Union. He was taking no chances of losing the key to his whole defensive set-up. Slough, in disgust, resigned his commission.

With 1,200 troops Canby marched north from Fort Craig, leaving the remainder of his force under Colonel Kit Carson to garrison the fort. He met Sibley at Albuquerque in full retreat down the valley. After some skirmishing, April 8-10, Canby withdrew into the Sandias and awaited reinforcements from Union. On the 13th these arrived and Canby prepared to take the offensive, only to learn that Sibley had evacuated Albuquerque. The pursuit of the weary Confederates began -- Canby on the west side, Sibley on the east. At times the two forces were opposite each other. A small skirmish was fought at Peralta, but other than this, the Confederates were allowed to escape unmolested down the valley and back into Texas. The New Mexicans were extremely critical of Canby for his failure to annihilate or capture the retreating column. The departmental commander defended his actions on the ground that he had nothing with which to feed the Confederates in the event of their capture, since his own troops were half fed.

One thing that had contributed to the precipitate retreat of the Army of New Mexico was the news that a large Federal force was advancing from California to retake the captured posts in New Mexico. This force was organized in California by Colonel James H. Carleton who had commanded Fort Union in the early 1850's. It consisted of about 2,350 men and proceeded across Arizona without opposition. Colonel Carleton held his troops in Tucson from May 20, 1862, to July 20 and then proceeded to Fort Thorn, which he reached on August 7, and immediately communicated with Colonel Canby.
On the 18th of September, 1862, having been promoted to Brigadier General, Carleton assumed command of the Department of New Mexico, relieving Canby who had also received a promotion to Brigadier General. Just before Canby gave up the command, he organized an expedition to protect the trains from Missouri.

At the time Carleton took command of the Department there were 1082 troops at Fort Union, its garrison being double the size of any other in the Territory. Carleton called the attention of the Adjutant General to the importance of Fort Union in a communication of September 3:

'\text{The great mass of subsistence stores which are now in the Territory are at Ft. Craig and Ft. Union. These two points will claim all our efforts in their defense should the territory be again invaded.}'

James H. Carleton was a man of singular forcefulness. He prosecuted the most energetic and successful campaign against the Indians that the Territory had known. In 1863 five new posts were built. In 1865 Fort Selden was built. The garrison at Fort Union was cut down to supply the new posts, but it still remained the most important post in the Territory. In June 1863 there were 445 troops at Fort Union.

No respite was given the Indians by General Carleton. Whenever they showed signs of making trouble, he immediately dispatched a punitive expedition against them. An order to Lieutenant Colonel William McMullen, commander at Fort Union, on August 1, 1864, is typical:

\begin{quote}
Hdqrs. Dept. of New Mexico
Santa Fe, N. Mex.
August 1, 1864

Lieut. Col. William McMullen:
Commanding at Fort Union, N. Mex.

Colonel: I understand from Col. Pearce that the Indians of the plains are very troublesome and menace the safety of the trains coming to New Mexico. Send without delay Capt. N. S. Davis, in command of fifty cavalry, fifty infantry, and with two mountain howitzers, with fifty day's rations, by the Cimarron route to the crossing of the Arkansas, to render such aid as, in his judgment, can be effected with such force. Captain Davis has a carte blanche to manage the matter as he shall deem best, having the purpose in view for which he is sent.
\end{quote}
Let us follow the expedition, which was only one of many, similar in makeup and purpose, during the last two years of the war. From a camp on the Arkansas River, Captain Davis reported the fortunes and findings of his command.

‘Camp on Arkansas River
Twenty-five Miles below Crossing
August 23, 1864
Commanding Officer, Fort Union, New Mexico:

I have the honor to report that near Red River I met four trains returning who reported that a train had been attacked, taken, and five men killed on Lower Cimarron. I offered the trains escort, but they declined returning. Near Palo Blanco met Shoemaker's train, who returned with me. At Arroyo Vegas met Waters' train with two others. Waters returned; the others declined. Near Rabbit Ear met Samson’s trains that had come through; reported having been attacked near Upper Crossing of Cimarron, losing 130 mules; the freight was being brought in by returning ox trains. Found the remains of five men at Lower Cimarron scattered over the prairie, which I had buried. On my arrival here today found camped two trains for Fort Lyon, one for Fort Garland, one for Fort Union, and one citizen train for Taos. These trains while in camp here on the 21st instant, were attacked by the Indians, killing the waggonmaster of contractor's train, Fort Union, No. 48, taking all the oxen of that train and about 100 head from the others. I have sent Captain Butcher to escort these trains to Fort Lyon .... With the aid of Shoemaker's and Waters' trains will take the Fort Union train to Fort Larned. Will endeavor to have the freight sent forward as soon as possible. Although I did not see any Indians on the Cimarron route, found trails of large parties; that are evidently watching the trail; it will not be safe for trains without escort ....

N. S. Davis, Capt. 1st. Inf.
Cal. Vols, Comdg, Det.
Training of volunteer troops was an important part of the routine at Fort Union in 1864. General Carleton outlined the training of a volunteer company in Special Orders No. 17, May 30, 1864:

"The exigencies of public service requires that company H, 11 Cavalry, Missouri Volunteers, take post at Fort Union, N. Mex., until further orders. The commanding officer at that post is charged with personally seeing that this company is put into a state of drill, discipline, and good order. He will have two drills a day every week day -- one on foot and one mounted; will have the officers recite in tactics to himself three times a week, and have the non-commissioned officers recite in tactics to his adjutant three times a week, and will report when the company is properly instructed, and ready at all points for field service."

Fort Union must have been a lively place during these stirring war times. At any rate, there was no dearth of alcoholic spirits at the post; on the contrary, there seemed to be a limitless variety. The account of Lieutenant Colonel William McMullen at the post store from July 1864 to May 1865 is illuminating.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COL. McCULLEN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1864</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>&quot; 24</td>
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<tr>
<td>1865</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; 24</td>
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One Lieutenant Rawn, however, seemed to be able to outdo the Colonel by a wide margin in the matter of absorbing alcohol. Here was his account for the month of March, 1863: 148/

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 cakes soap</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 shewing brush</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>1 &quot; box</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>26 1 bot. wine</td>
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1863

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<td>Apr. 6</td>
<td>cheese</td>
<td>2.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>crackers</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>§§, tob.</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 porter</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 shoes #8, gloves</td>
<td>9.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 14</td>
<td>cigars</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 whis.</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 powder</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 caps</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 1 bot. wine</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 1 pr. shoes</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 1 can tomatoes</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16 tobacco</td>
<td>16.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17 5 cigars</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17 claret</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17 Whiskey</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 1 bot. champn.</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 1 bot. ale</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 cigars</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 bot. ale</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21 1 bot. whis.</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21 2 bots. ale</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21 1/2 gal. whis.</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23 1 bot. ale</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23 1 champaigne</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 cigars</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 3 bots. ale</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25 1 whiskey, lqt.</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27 3 overshirts</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27 2 undershirts</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27 6 pr. 1/2 hose</td>
<td>2.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 whiskey 75, ale</td>
<td>50 2.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33
Thus Lieutenant Charles Cotesworth Rawn, a native of Pennsylva-
nia, spent $66.50 on strong drink within the short space of one month, while stationed at Fort Union and shortly before he was promoted to Captain (November 4, 1863).  

Prices at the fort in 1864-5 are interesting: can tomatoes, $1.50; can jelly, $1.00; pair gaiters, $10.00; box cigar, $6.00; plug tobacco, $.50; envelopes, $1.50; matches, $.13; 15 yards calico, $5.63; hoop skirt, $3.00; pr. kid gloves, $1.25; 6 lbs. crackers, $3.00; 4 cans peaches, $5.00; pen knife, $2.00; shawl, $20.00; bottle red ink, $3.50; cravat, $5.00; castor oil, $.25; novel, $.75; spelling book, $.75; drawers, $2.00; 10 lbs. sugar, $5.00; 10 lbs. coffee, $7.50.  

When Lee surrendered at Appomattox and ended, to all purposes, the four years of Civil War, there were 816 troops at Fort Union, and 3,089 troops in the Territory. The area of New Mexico had been cut almost in half when the Territory of Arizona was organized December 29, 1863, so in 1865 there were only nine posts in the Territory, of which Fort Union was by far the largest.
AFTER THE WAR AND THE DECLINING YEARS

An English surveyor by the name of Bell, a member of an expedition charting a route for the "Southern Trans-Continental Railway", gives an interesting picture of Fort Union in 1867:

Fort Union is distant from Maxwell's by the road fifty-two miles; from the point where our line of survey crossed Red River, fifty-six miles. The country is for the most part a vast grass-covered plain, drained by the Red River. We are never, however, out of sight of mountains, some of which are isolated, and rise out of the plain with grotesque outline, such as Wagon Mountain, shaped exactly like a huge wagon drawn by a pair of horses. Most of them partake of the Mesa formation, as Mesa Apache, while others form ranges jutting out from the Rocky Mountains as the Cimarron range, behind which are raised in stately grandeur the snow-capped summits of the main chain. The most beautiful however, is Turkey Mountain, which sends up its three lofty and graceful peaks exactly in a direct line to Fort Union from the northeast.

Being on horseback, I took the mountain road to the fort on the 21st of August, and had one of the most romantic rides I can remember in all my wanderings. The partly volcanic nature of the rocks, together with the abundance of water, gave a fertility and freshness to the whole landscape, which contrasted most delightfully with the monotonous plains. Rich grassy parks, studded with noble trees, and watered by an abundance of rivulets, were hemmed in by glorious turrets of rock, and overshadowed by the pine-clad summits of the peaks, which, with the art of nature, broke the oppressive regularity of the skyline.

For twenty miles I wound my way through this beautiful country, yet all seemed given over entirely to nature, and there was not the trace of a human being except the path upon which I rode. No flocks or herds cropped the tender grass. I looked in vain amongst the trees and up the valleys which opened into the pass, now on one side and then on the other, but there was no shepherd, no hut, no farm to be seen; the wild turkeys had all been either shot or driven away by the officers from Fort Union; and the same might be said
of the deer; but with this exception — the absence of game — nature remained exactly as God had made it.

Fort Union is a bustling place; it is the largest military establishment to be found on the plains, and is the supply centre from which the forty or fifty lesser posts scattered all over the country within a radius of 500 miles or more, are supplied with men, horses, munitions of war, and often with everything needed for their support. It is not in the least fortified, as, of course, such a precaution would be useless; but it is a vast collection of workshops, storehouses, barracks, officers quarters, and offices of all kinds belonging to the different departments. The dwellings, although built, as are all the other buildings, of sun-dried bricks, are most comfortable. They are roofed with thin iron sheeting, covered with earth. The rooms of the officers are lofty and well-furnished. The hospital, containing about 120 beds, is a very fine building, to which two resident surgeons are attached. A large settler's store must not be forgotten, at which the daily sales average 3,000 dollars. Over 1,000 workmen are here kept constantly employed, building and repairing wagons, gathering in and distributing supplies, making harness, putting up buildings, and attending to the long trains of goods and supplies constantly arriving or departing. When we think for a moment of the hundreds of miles that everything has to be brought by a slow and expensive mode of conveyance — 600 miles by wagon from the end of the railway, and nearly 1,500 by rail from St. Louis; when we consider the price of labor; when, in fact, we view the economic aspect of affairs, even a traveler cannot help being amazed at the enormous expenditures of money necessary to maintain so large an establishment in such a locality. The millions of dollars which are yearly absorbed by such a place as Fort Union must be something marvelous; and the opportunities for peculation and growing fat by the misappropriation of public money, by exorbitant charges if not by actual fraud, are probably greater here than any other branch of the public service.‘ 153/

After the Civil War, the army decided to abandon a number of the older forts in New Mexico. It was decided, however, that
Fort Union should be retained. Major General Pope, in command of the Department of Missouri, wrote in 1871:

'Fort Union, now the headquarters of the Eighth Cavalry, is admirably placed, not only to afford protection against the Utes, but to cover the whole of the eastern and southeastern frontier settlements of New Mexico against the Indians on the southern reservation. It is proposed to keep Fort Union as one of the large posts from which to send out detachments for the summer on the plains east and south.'

By order of the Surgeon General's Office, in 1875, a complete report on the hygiene of the U.S. Army was made. This report included a description of all military posts. Here is how Fort Union was described in that year by Assistant Surgeon P. Moffatt, U.S.A.

"Fort Union is situated in latitude 35° 54' 21" north; longitude, 27° 54' 15" west; altitude, 6,700 feet.

Santa Fe is one hundred miles southwest. The nearest railroad station is Las Animas, near Fort Lyon.

The most important settlements in the vicinity are Mora, 18 miles to the west, and Las Vegas, 20 miles distant, on the Santa Fe road.

The post is in a beautiful valley about 25 miles long by five and a half wide, having on the north and east a wooded range of hills known as Turkey Mountains, and on the west a low and rocky range running into table-land.

The craters of several extinct volcanoes are in the vicinity, and on sinking wells in the vicinity of the arsenal, a stratum of lava is found of varying depths.

The water supply is obtained partly from wells, and in part from an excellent spring about a quarter of a mile distant. That from the wells is hard, from lime in solution.

Twenty miles distant the road to Santa Fe crosses a ridge which is the divide between the tributaries of the Mississippi and the Rio Grande. Five
PLAN of FORT UNION,
Accompanying Asst. Surgeon Moffatt's Description.
miles northwest of Las Vegas are a number of hot springs, noted for their efficacy in rheumatism and chronic syphilitic complaints. The temperature is 140 Fahrenheit.

Among the useful wild plants found in the vicinity is the common hop (Humulus lupulus). This grows abundantly along the mountain streams, and the product is of the best quality.

The following statement relative to the climate and its effect upon health is by Assistant Surgeon W. H. Gardner, United States Army.

"Fort Union was established in August, 1851, and was first located on the present site of Fort Union arsenal. The reservation, nearly square, contains 51 square miles. There is also a timber reservation of 50 square miles.

Fort Union includes the post proper, the depot, and Fort Union arsenal."

The arsenal is thus described by Captain W. R. Shoemaker, ordnance officer in charge:

"Fort Union arsenal is one mile west of Fort Union, on a reservation belonging to the Ordnance Department, and is inclosed by a wall forming a square of 1,000 feet each side. The buildings are, one barracks 100 by 26 feet with porticoes in front and rear; one set officers' quarters 54 by 75 feet; and office 45 x 18; one main storehouse 216 feet long, three smaller storehouses, shops &c. All of these are of adobe with stone foundations. The water supply is from a good well, and two cisterns of 18,000 gallons each."

Fort Union is thus described by Captain C. C. Smith, assistant quartermaster, United States Army:

"The depot is adjacent to and north of the post. The buildings are, six sets used as offices and quarters; five storehouses, shops and corrals. The quarters are wall
built of adobe, laid on stone founda-
tions, with tops finished with brick
and roofs of tin. These sets are each
79 by 57 feet; the other three, each 56
by 55 feet. The store-houses are each
200 by 40 feet, except the southern one,
which is one-half the width of the others.
In the plaza, fronting the northern sets
of depot quarters, are two cisterns hold-
ing 2,400 gallons each, the supply of which
comes from the roofs of the store-houses."

Fort Union is a four-company post, the arrangement of
the main part of which is shown in Figure 50.

A, officers' quarters; BBBB squad-rooms; C C mess-
rooms, D, forage rooms; E, bakery; F, quartermaster's
store-rooms; H, issuing-room; I, quartermaster's
stables; M, cavalry corral; N, quartermaster's corral.

All the buildings are of adobe, one story high, one
stone foundations, and, with the exception of the hos-
pital, are all roofed with tin.

On the northeast side of the parade-ground, and dir-
ectly opposite the line of officers' quarters, are the
quarters of the men. Each set occupies three sides of
a rectangle within which is a small court-yard or open
space with a well in the center. The main buildings
are each 73 by 27 feet. They are used as squad rooms
and dormitories, and at the present time have an aver-
age occupancy of 30 men each, giving an air space of
about 700 cubic feet per man. The wings on one side of
each set are used as orderly and company store-rooms;
those on the opposite side, for kitchens and dining-
rooms. Those quarters are really comfortable dwellings,
although deficient in facilities for ventilation.

In rear of the blocks occupied by the men's quarters
and separated from them by a wide street, are situated
the quarters of the married soldiers and laundresses;
and in rear of these again, and at proper distance,
are the cavalry stables and other out-houses.

On the southwest of the parade-ground are situated the
quarters of officers, consisting of nine buildings in
one row. Each building is divided by a single hall
running from front to rear, on each side of which are three capacious rooms -- except the middle building (the commanding officer's quarters), which has four -- affording the regulation-allowance of quarters for an officer with the rank of captain. As in the case of most of the buildings here, the roofs are too flat, so that they allow of leakage when violent rains occur, as they frequently do during the rainy season. In other respects the quarters are good; they all have good yards and out-houses in the rear, and are upon the whole very comfortable residences.

The guard-house is situated in the line of the laundresses' quarters. The structure itself may be well suited for the purpose for which it was intended, but the location of it is inappropriate, as no extended view of the post can be had from its vicinity.

Sinks for the men and for the families of soldiers have been constructed at all available points, but the accommodations in this respect are not sufficient without the necessity of travelling to a greater distance than is likely to be done under all circumstances.

The post hospital is situated outside of the garrison enclosure, and about 300 paces to the east of it. The hospital building faces towards the southeast. It consists essentially of a central building 13 x 11 feet wide, running back 130 feet, this being a hall 11 x 9 feet wide inside. Attached to each side of this central hall are three wings, each 31 x 39 feet outside, the long axis parallel and the short axis at right angles to, the hall. These wings are separated from each other by spaces 6 x 9 feet wide. An adobe partition through the center of each wing, and at right angles to the hall, divides each of them into two rooms, 19 by 30 feet, by 12 feet 9 inches high; thus giving twelve rooms, each of the above dimensions. The two front wings are used as dispensary and store-rooms, the rear half of each posterior wing for kitchen and dining-room respectively. The two middle wings and the front rooms of the posterior wings are used as wards, making six wards, occupied by six beds each, giving 1,200 cubic feet of space to each occupant. In case of emergency, the capacity could readily be increased one-fourth by temporarily using some of the store-rooms as wards. The hospital differs from all other buildings at the post, in being roofed with shingles, and in having a roof with the usual pitch. Although not constructed upon the best plan, in a hygienic point of view, it is amply adequate to the requirements of
a four-company post. For the reason that this post is located on the thoroughfare to and from New Mexico, and that it is the base of supplies of the district, it occurs that there are at almost all times men in the hospital not belonging to the command at Fort Union, but who have taken sick or hurt while enroute to or from other points, and been detailed at this post for treatment or discharge on surgeon's certificate of disability.

Fort Union is situated upon the stage-road between the railroad terminus, on the northeast, and the City of Santa Fe, on the southwest. A daily stage, conveying the mail, is received from each point. From this point mail communications can be had with Santa Fe in twenty hours; with department headquarters at Fort Leavenworth in four to six days, and with Washington in seven to nine days. A line of telegraph also passes this place en route from the railroad to Santa Fe along the stage road, and having a station at this point.

Fort Union, as a frontier post, may be considered desirable, not so much from the natural surroundings as from the facilities by stage, mail, and telegraph, of communication with the outside world.

One question I should like to add before closing: Are adobe quarters productive of rheumatism? I believe they are a fruitful source not only of rheumatism, but sciatica, and other forms of neuralgia.

By the early 1880's the Indian menace had disappeared from the Southwest and the Great Plains. Thus one of the chief reasons for the fort's existence had passed. The Santa Fe Trail was now rapidly passing into history. A new trail of steam and steel was pushing its way into the west, which needed no frontier post to offer it protection and which would dispense with supply depots and distribution points.

Late in the evening of December 28, 1872, the rails of the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad were laid across the Kansas-Colorado boundary. On July 4, 1879, Las Vegas, New Mexico, was reached and a Fort Union heard its death knell in the whistle of a steam locomotive. 157/ In 1883, Major General Pope was writing: "Fort Union valuable only as a shelter for troops", 158/ and the following year Colonel L. P. Bradley, commanding the District of New Mexico, wrote: "I think it would be an economy of men and money to break up Forts Union and
Selden and transfer the garrisons of these posts to Forts Win-
gate and Bayard." 159/ Colonel B. H. Grierson made the same
recommendations in 1885 160/ and 1887. 161/ In October 1887
Fort Union performed its last duty. A detachment under Lieu-
tenant J. N. Glass was sent to see that ejected squatters did
not return to the Jicarilla Reservation. 162/ "This detach-
ment was relieved in the early part of December 1887, and re-
turned to Fort Union after accomplishing its duty in a very
satisfactory manner." 163/ Even in 1888 the Fort retained
much of its grandeur — the historian H. H. Bancroft wrote:
"Fort Union is one of the best known military posts of the
territory, having been much of the time the military head-
quartes." 164/ Fort Union was abandoned on February 21, 1891,
165/ and the center of military activity in New Mexico during
the most colorful era of her history was left to vandals and
oblivion.
VI.

APPENDIX

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3/ Gregg, The Commerce of the Prairies, 92 (1844).
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18/ Ibid.
21/ Duffus, op. cit., 244.
23/ Duffus, op. cit., 68.
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26/ Duffus, op. cit., 69.
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28/ Ibid., 84.
29/ Ibid., 89.
30/ Ibid.
31/ Ibid., 91.
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33/ Ibid., 119-20.
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35/ Ibid.
36/ Ibid., 125.
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38/ Ibid., 157.
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    New Mexico State Museum Library.
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45/ Sumner, Report to Jones, Adjutant General, Oct. 24, 1851.


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67/ Mansfield, op. cit.
70/ Bancroft, History of Utah, 497 (1891).
71/ Coan, History of New Mexico, I, 560 (1925).
72/ Ibid.
73/ Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the U. S. Army, II, 403-405 (1903).
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75/ Bender, "Frontier Defense in the Territory of New Mexico, 1853-1861", New Mexico Historical Review, IX, 366 (1934).
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77/ Ibid., 367-8.
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80/ Ibid., Series I, I, 605.
81/ Ibid., Series I, IV, 40.
82/ Ibid.
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86/ Ibid., Series I, IV, 48.
87/ Ibid.
88/ Whitford, Colorado Volunteers in the Civil War, 29 (1906).
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92/ Ibid., 32.
93/ Ibid., 33.
94/ Ibid.
95/ War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, IV, 81.
96/ Ibid.
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104/ Ibid., 58-69.
106/ Ibid.
107/ Ibid.
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141/ Ibid., Series I, IX, 696.
142/ Ibid., Series I, XV, 577.
143/ Ibid., Series I, XXVI, (Part 1), 612.
144/ Ibid., Series I, XLI (Part 2), 512.
145/ Ibid., Series I, XLI (Part 2), 828.
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MAP OF THE MILITARY RESERVATION AT FORT UNION, N. M.
EIGHT MILES SQUARE

Scale 2 inches = 1 mile

Surveyed and drawn by Joel Lambert under the direction of
Brig. Gen. H. M. Eno, U.S.A.
Chief Qr. Mtr. District of New Mexico
August to December 1866
Traced Feb. 8, 1935 by J. E. Hall

Latitude 35° 34' Longitud. 104° 51'
Altitude 667 feet
1866
The Santa Fe Trail

Fort Union and the Santa Fe Trail

Ruins of Fort Union
The Old Arsenal

Main Ruins of Fort Union

Overlooking the Parade Ground
Remains of Officers' Quarters

Officers' Quarters

Close-up of Officers' Quarters
Soldiers' Quarters

Construction Details

Soldiers' Quarters
A Warehouse

Details of Warehouse