FORT STANWIX

HISTORY, HISTORIC FURNISHING, AND HISTORIC STRUCTURE REPORTS
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Aerial view of the site of Fort Stanwix during excavation. The fine white line defines the periphery of the fort.
As the Nation’s principal conservation agency, the Department of the Interior has responsibility for most of our nationally owned public lands and natural resources. This includes fostering the wisest use of our land and water resources, protecting our fish and wildlife, preserving the environmental and cultural values of our national parks and historical places, and providing for the enjoyment of life through outdoor recreation. The Department assesses our energy and mineral resources and works to assure that their development is in the best interests of all our people. The Department also has a major responsibility for American Indian reservation communities and for people who live in Island Territories under U.S. administration.

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The reconstruction of Fort Stanwix is one of the National Park Service's major Bicentennial efforts. It also illustrates the successful combination of history, archeology, and historical architecture in the accomplishment of a major preservation project.

The British first built Fort Stanwix in 1758 to guard the strategic portage between the Mohawk River and Wood Creek from the French. Following the French and Indian War and the British conquest of Canada the fort was abandoned and gradually fell into disrepair. Its site became strategically important again with the coming of the American Revolution, however, and the Patriots rebuilt the fort in time to thwart a British invasion of New York by way of the Mohawk River Valley. The wood and earthen structure fell into disuse and was abandoned for the last time in 1781. Buildings of the City of Rome, New York eventually blanketed its site.

In 1935, at the request of citizens of Rome, the Congress authorized Fort Stanwix as a national monument. Years passed and there was no further Federal action. In 1963 the Secretary of the Interior designated the site a national historic landmark; coincidently it fell within the boundaries of an urban renewal project. The city received urban renewal funds in 1965, began to clear the site, and requested the National Park Service to prepare a master plan for Fort Stanwix.

The Fort Stanwix master plan, approved on March 14, 1967, called for the reconstruction of the former fort—prematurely perhaps, for studies that would indicate the feasibility of the proposal had not been made. The plan noted that reconstruction would require the removal of existing structures, donation of the site to the National Park Service, archeological investigation, historical research, and the preparation of plans.

The extensive study and documentation needed to reconstruct a structure of the magnitude and character of Fort Stanwix is presented in the historic structure report. This report for Fort Stanwix consists of four basic sections: a historic data section, an archeological data section, an architectural data section, and an administrative data section, the latter immediately following this foreword.

A historical data section provides available pertinent information on a structure's construction and use together with appendixes containing copies of appropriate documents and illustrations, a bibliography, and recommendations for further study. Historian John F. Luzader prepared such a section for Fort Stanwix in 1969. It contains not only data on the fort's history but a history of the 1777 military operations around Fort Stanwix as well. Although not necessary for reconstruction itself, the latter was needed for interpretive purposes and was included with the structure report as a matter of convenience. A single comprehensive study is the result.

An archeological investigation was essential to the reconstruction of Fort Stanwix. Although the surface remains of the fort had been obliterated by city streets and some 70 buildings, extensive remains were believed to exist beneath ground level. A preliminary archeological investigation explored a small portion of the site in 1966 and a major investigation took place between 1970 and 1972. The results of these investigations are presented by Archeologists Lee Hanson and Dick Ping Hsu in the archeological data section of the Fort Stanwix report. The National Park Service has published
this report separately under the title "Casemates and Cannonballs."

Beginning in 1971, Historical Architect Orville W. Carroll worked closely with the archeological team and maintained contact with Historian Luzader as the work progressed. His report is a synthesis of his own investigation of written and graphic sources and information provided by the other disciplines. The results of his work and his recommendations are presented in the text and drawings of the architectural data section.

After the professional reports are submitted and analyzed, the area superintendent or regional director completes the report by adding its administrative data section. This brief section states the significance of the structure, its Order of Significance as recorded in the Service's List of Classified Structures, and its proposed treatment. The section also outlines any cooperative agreements, legislation, or documents having a bearing on the use of the structure. In short, the administrative data section is an administrative summary of the professional reports and recommends action for preservation, restoration, or reconstruction.

After the proposed treatment is determined and funds to support it are available, a historical architect prepares needed working drawings and specifications and work can begin. The project should close with the preparation of a historic structure preservation guide to direct site managers in the structure's care and maintenance.

Reconstruction of Fort Stanwix alone would be insufficient to make it meaningful to most visitors. Furnishings are needed. The initial step in providing such furnishings is the historic furnishings study, gathering and presenting pertinent evidence on the contents of a structure in its historic period.

(Furnishings at Fort Stanwix include its armament and military equipment.) This study is usually prepared by a historian or curator. When data on the furnishings of a specific structure are not available he seeks comparable data from similar structures. Historian Louis Torres prepared the Fort Stanwix furnishings study in 1974. His study, though not a section of the historic structure report, is included as a fitting companion to the other sections.

This publication is presented less for its information on Fort Stanwix than for the process of restoration directed research within the National Park Service that it illustrates. Each section appears here as an entity as it was prepared by its author. Thus, though there is some duplication in texts and illustrations, this juxtaposition makes the role of the individual reports and their continuity readily apparent. We hope that others committed to the vital but difficult task of preserving this Nation's heritage will find it useful.

**Administrative Data**

Fort Stanwix National Monument was authorized by an Act of Congress approved August 21, 1935 (49 Stat. 665). A master plan for the monument approved on March 14, 1967 recommended that it include 18-acres of the historic fort site and that events that had taken place there be interpreted through a reconstruction of the 1777 fort.

When completed the reconstructed fort will be proposed for listing on the List of Classified Structures as a structure of the First Order of Significance.

The site contains 16.2 acres. Apart from easements given to local utilities for lines which traverse the monument, there are no formal cooperative agreements governing its administration.
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# FORT STANWIX

## CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY HISTORY

1758 TO 1777

John F. Luzader

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to provide an account of the history of Fort Stanwix (Fort Schuyler) that stood on a site within the limits of the modern city of Rome, New York. The emphasis is upon the story of the fort's construction and its role in the defeat of Gen. John Burgoyne's campaign of 1777, an American victory that resulted in the internationalization of the War of Independence. Other incidents, including the two Treaties of Fort Stanwix and the border warfare of 1778–81, are mentioned very briefly, not because they are insignificant but because they are not central to the purpose noted above.

Special thanks are due to a number of persons whose assistance was valuable in the preparation of this work. Among them are: Melvin Weig, former Superintendent, Morristown National Historical Park, now retired; his successor, James Coleman; Roy E. Appleman, former Chief, Park History Studies, National Park Service, retired; Historian William Meuse, formerly of Saratoga National Historical Park, now with the Harpers Ferry Center, National Park Service; Dr. Eugene Kramer, Senior Historian, New York State History Office; the staff of the Rome Historical Society; and the staffs of the Map Division, Library of Congress, Huntington Library, New York Public Library, Boston Public Library, New York State Library, British Public Record Office, Public Archives of Canada, New Jersey Historical Society, and New-York Historical Society. A particular debt is owed to my colleagues: Archeologist Lee Hanson, Architect Orville Carroll, and Historian Louis Torres.
THE ONEIDA CARRING PLACE
AND ITS EARLY FORTS

The city of Rome, New York, lies athwart an ancient route along which travelers, traders, and warriors moved for centuries. On the south-east side of the city are the headwaters of the Mohawk River, which flows eastward until it joins the Houston to reach the Atlantic Ocean. On the northern side is Wood Creek, which with the Fish Kill (Creek), Lake Oneida, and Oswego River forms a passage to the Great Lakes. Using this route, the Indian and colonial trader had only to carry his canoe over the nearly level land between the two riparian systems to travel by water from the ocean to the Great Lakes and Canada. The short portage between the Mohawk and Wood Creek came to be known as the Oneida Carrying Place. Possession of this portage was a significant strategic position on the northwest frontier, which carried with it control of the water route. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of that frontier. That the Mohawk was the gateway to a vast western region was apparent to the colonists and the government in London. More immediately important were its associations with the local Indians. The area from the upper Hudson to Lake Erie was the land of the confederacy known as the Six Nations of the Iroquois, which was composed of the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, and Tuscarora nations. In spite of their limited numbers, the Iroquois were the strongest native power in eighteenth century North America; and they were the generally consistent foes of the French and their Indian allies, supporting first the Dutch and then the English in their colonial wars. But for them, the English colonists would have been flanked north and west by France and her native confederates, the Algonquins and Hurons. They were economically important as the entrepreneurs of a fur trade that made the northwest frontier one of the most important economic areas in North America.

Provincial interest in the region and its people appeared early in the Colonial period. Dutch traders in Fort Orange (Albany) carried on an extensive beaver trade with the natives and were constantly concerned that France would seduce the Iroquois and possess their lands. This concern continued after the colony became English, and as early as 1727 the province built a small fortified trading post at the mouth of the Oswego River on Lake Ontario. This was eventually replaced by a larger and stronger post; and, before the middle of the century, stockades stood at the falls of the Oswego and at both ends of Oneida Lake. The size of the garrisons varied, depending upon the intensity of the international rivalry for the Indian trade.

The Oneida Carrying Place was one of the most critical points on the route to the Great Lakes and Canada. On July 10, 1702, two Indian tribes, the Twightwighs (a Miami group) and the Tcorcondatics (perhaps a Seneca group) petitioned Governor Cornbury of New York, asking that a path be marked over the portage and that trees be removed from Wood Creek to permit the passage of canoes. The governor granted their request and promised to send guides to meet the Indians and conduct them to Albany.¹

More than two decades later, on November 10, 1724, Cadwallader Colden, then Surveyor General and later Lieutenant Governor and author of a classic history of the Five Nations, prepared a memorial concerning the fur trade for Governor William Burnet in which he referred to the Carrying Place, describing the portage as being three miles long except in dry weather, when its length was
five miles. Occasionally the provincial government's officials, especially the Commissioners for Indian Affairs, gave their attention to matters related to the portage, as when they considered the complaints of forty-seven traders who were having trouble with the Oneidas because the Indians were making too much of a good thing of their situation at the Carrying Place.6

The Oneida Carrying Place’s position on the route between Albany and the Great Lakes was described in the following terms:

Oswego, along the accustomed route, is computed to be about 300 miles west from Albany. The first sixteen, to the village of Schenectady, is land carriage, in a good waggon road. From thence to the Little Falls of the Mohawk River, at sixty five miles distance, the battoes [sic] are set against a rapid steam; which too, in dry seasons, is so shallow, that the men are frequently obliged to turn out, and draw their craft over the rifts with inconceivable labour. At the Little Falls, the portage exceeds not a mile: the ground being marshy will admit of no wheel-carriage, and therefore the Germans who reside here, transport the battoes in sleds, which they keep for that purpose. The same conveyance is used at the Great Carrying Place, sixty miles beyond the Little Falls: all the way to which the current is still adverse, and extremely swift. The portage here is longer or shorter, according to the dryness or wetness of the seasons. In the last summer months, when the rains are most infrequent, it is usually six or eight miles across. Taking water again, we enter a narrow rivulet, called the Woodereek, which leads into the Oneida Lake, distant about forty miles. This stream, tho’ favorable, being shallow, and its banks covered with thick woods, was at this time much obstructed with old logs and fallen trees. The Oneida Lake stretches from east to west about thirty miles, and in calm weather is passed with great facility. At its western extremity opens the Onondaga [Oswego] River, leading down to Oswego, situated at its entrance on the south side of Lake Ontario. Extremely difficult and hazardous with rifts and rocks; and the current flowing with surprising rapidity. The principal obstruction is twelve miles short of Oswego, and is a fall of about eleven feet perpendicular. The portage here is by land, not exceeding forty yards, before they launch for the last time.4

By the middle of the eighteenth century, the Oneida Carrying Place was an active station on the western route with four landing places, an upper one on each end for use during the spring and early summer when the waters were high and the lower ones for the drier seasons. Indians and possibly a few white settlers took advantage of the location, supplying wheeled vehicles to carry freight over the portage.

The Carrying Place’s military potential became obvious in 1755, when William Shirley, Governor of the Massachusetts Bay and Major General of the Royal Forces in North America, prepared for his Niagara campaign. Capt. William Williams of the 51st Regiment of Foot was sent to Oneida to open the road between the river and Wood Creek. Supplies and men moved up the old route, bound for Oswego, where ships were being readied for the lake voyage to Fort Niagara. The general moved his headquarters into a newly-erected building and directed the operations from there throughout the rest of June and July. It was here that he received official news of Gen. Edward Braddock’s defeat on the Monongahela on July 9. That event was a great personal tragedy to him, for his son and namesake was among the slain. To his sorrow and immediate burdens was added the vastly increased responsibility for the success of British arms in the Colonies. Braddock’s death made him the commanding general in North America.5 Here in his log headquarters, Shirley struggled with the problems of his new role. It was a difficult one for a 61-year-old man who had spent his adult life in the courts of law and in colonial administration. Everywhere he turned problems faced him, not the least of which was the effective use of the services of another important civilian turned soldier, William Johnson. Here, also he enlarged the purpose of his expedition from the limited objective against Niagara (Frontenac) to the conquest of the Great Lakes region. To that end, Oswego should be fortified because “It is as much the key of these lakes and the southern and western country lying round them, to the English, as Nova Scotia is of the sea coast and eastern parts of North America; and the loss of them to the French ... must not only make them absolute masters of the navigation of all these lakes, ... but let them into the heart of the country inhabited by the Six Nations.” By reducing the French posts, Britain would secure “the whole southern country behind the Appalachian or Allegheny [sic] Mountains to the Crown of Great Britain, and have a further effect, to render Canada itself, of little or no value to the French.” 6

Throughout the summer, General Shirley worked at strengthening Oswego and preparing to
take the offensive against Niagara. However, the campaign was delayed when a council of war recommended that it be deferred until spring, "when greater numbers of men, vessels, provisions, and muskets would be available". Deciding to winter his units at Oswego and Wood Creek, the general continued to plan for the next year and to seek support for his theories of how the British should move against the French in the lake country.

Shirley was concerned about the security of the Albany-Oswego supply route. He had a healthy respect for French and Indian tactical mobility and was alert to the route's vulnerability to raids. On October 29, while stopping at the Carrying Place en route from Oswego to Albany, he prepared a set of instructions for Captain Williams that dealt with the security of that part of the supply line. After ordering him to assemble all of his command at the portage and to remain there until ordered elsewhere, to safeguard military stores, and to provide for transport over the Carrying Place, Shirley instructed Williams:

You are to employ as many of the Men of the Detachment under your Command as you possibly can, in finishing the Fort this day marked out at this place and called Fort Williams and Compleating Barracks therein to contain 150 Men. you are to build therein a Storehouse of about the same Dimensions [sic.] of that already built here, and as soon as the Barracks are fit to receive the Men of your Detachment you are to Quarter them therein.

He instructed the captain to repair the road over the portage, to build a bridge over the "morass," and to provide quarters for one officer and thirty men who were being detached from Oswego to his command. He then informed him that "I have ordered Captain Marcus Petri with the Men under his Command to build a Fort at the upper Landing on the Wood Creek, to be called Wood Creek Fort." When Petri had completed the fort, he was to clear Wood Creek of obstructions; and Williams would station thirty men and an officer at the fort and build a storehouse there.

The captains carried out their assignments. Fort Williams was erected near the Mohawk landings. It was a stockade with four half-bastions, each mounting a cannon. Inside were barracks for 150 men and two storehouses or blockhouses that Shirley was directed to build in October. The Wood Creek Fort, subsequently called Fort Bull, was a smaller, weaker post, built of a double row of palisades, the outer one 15 to 18 feet high and the interior one about the height of a man. It mounted no cannon and could accommodate approximately thirty men.

Shirley's fears for the safety of the supply route were well-founded. Early in the morning of March 27, 1756, a French party commanded by an officer named de Lery attacked Fort Bull. Everyone within the fort, except a woman and a few soldiers, was killed. The post's magazine caught fire and the powder exploded, wrecking the fort. A sortie from Fort Williams and the belief that William Johnson was within striking distance with a superior force deterred the French from attacking the larger fort.

Alarmed by this threat to the security of the Carrying Place, the British began strengthening their position. Two engineers, Mackellar and Sowers, started building a new and stronger fort on the site of the one recently destroyed. It was a stockade with a ditch on three sides. On the side toward Wood Creek, the water was raised by a dam that impounded the water to facilitate floating bateaux down Wood Creek. The post was approximately 150 feet square, but the nature of the ground prevented building a perfect square. The work was completed by Major Charles Craven; and by August a stronger fort, named Fort Wood Creek, with three structures, probably barracks and storehouses, had been completed.

At the upper landing of Wood Creek, Major Craven erected a new post, named Fort Newport. It was built to receive supplies brought over the portage from the Mohawk and to cover a dam that raised the water of the creek so that upon opening the flood gate bateaux could float down to Fort Wood Creek, three miles away "which saved much Land Carriage, & in dry Seasons 7 Miles to Canada Creek."

Fort Williams had been built hurriedly and was not strong enough to provide an adequate degree of security. Therefore, Craven was instructed to replace it with a new fort, called the Pentagon or New Fort and designated Fort Craven by later writers. It was built of "Hewed Loggs Horrisontaly [sic.] layed, & tyed with Cross Beams, nine feet wide & filled with the Earth dug out of the Ditch. The Bastions intended for Bomb proof Magazines . . . , the Rampart near the Gates was raised higher than the Gates, the hight [sic.] being
near 10 feet & almost as High, all round." When the Pentagon was completed, Fort Williams would be razed. As shall be seen, it was never completed. 

By the end of the summer of 1756, the Oneida Carrying Place was an active unit in the colonial military supply system. Three forts stood guard; Wood Creek, Newport, and Williams, and the Pentagon was nearing completion. Two dams on Wood Creek cut the portage time so that the seven miles from the upper landing to Canada Creek could be negotiated in an hour and a quarter. There was a brick kiln, a saw-pit, and forge; and sutlers' houses lined the road leading from the Mohawk. A large post garden lay at the junction of the river and Little Creek. Craven's camp was located in an open area near Fort Williams and the Pentagon, which was still under construction. The situation at the Carrying Place had never been so strong.

The year 1756 was a critical one for British interests. William Shirley's plan for a comprehensive campaign on all frontiers was wrecked on the shoals of shortages and colonial governments' unwillingness to contribute to a common effort. Less ambitious efforts against Crown Point and Ticonderoga and the forts on Lake Ontario were all that were salvaged. Toward these undertakings Shirley turned his energies. In spite of personal sorrow and political frustrations, he gave of himself unstintingly. He vested the command of the Crown Point expedition in John Winslow and retained the direction of the Great Lake campaign for himself.

The destruction of Fort Bull had been an illustration of one of Shirley's most serious military problem—enemy activity along the western supply route and the difficulty of maintaining the British garrison at Oswego. William Johnson investigated the matter, but little could be done except reprimand Captain Williams for building a defective fort and not providing for adequate defenses of the Carrying Place. 

Williams had also ignored repeated orders to forward supplies to Oswego, had left his post against orders; and the situation at that place had become so bad that its commander, Col. James Mercer, had been forced to drag supplies through the snow from various forts along the route. Finally, the new Governor, Sir Charles Hardy, had organized a relief party.

Through April and May, supplies, workers, and arms were rushed to Oswego in preparation for the campaign. Shirley worked hard at recruiting men for his expedition, which, if brought to full strength, would give him an effective strength of approximately 4,500 men.

While the general was struggling with these preparations, a political campaign directed against him bore fruit. He lost the patronage of the Duke of Newcastle, letters poured into London criticizing every phase of his civil and military administrations, local critics won over Governor Hardy, and the Ministry removed him. After a period of uncertainty about the command in North America, Col. Daniel Webb was named Shirley's interim successor. He would be followed by James Abercromby, who would eventually be superseded by John Campbell, the Earl of Landown, who was to become the commander-in-chief in North America. While he awaited the arrival of his successors, Shirley went ahead with his plans for Crown Point and Ontario.

Webb and Abercromby arrived in America in June, and Lord Loudoun in July; and the three new commanders met in Albany, where Loudoun abandoned the Lake Ontario offensive in order to concentrate upon Ticonderoga. This did not imply an abandonment of Oswego; and on August 12, Webb, with the 24th Regiment of Foot and some of Bradstreet's batteauxmen, was ordered to reinforce the Ontario garrison, about which the new commander-in-chief was becoming apprehensive.

Loudoun's concern was justified. Soon after Webb, now a temporary major general, arrived at the Oneida Carrying Place on August 20, word reached him that Oswego had been captured by the French and that they were advancing toward the Mohawk, 6,000 strong. As soon as he heard the news, Major Craven mounted two six-pounders on one of the Pentagon's completed bastions and prepared to mount two more. Webb was in no frame of mind to defend the portage. Although he had Craven's troops, the garrisons of Forts Williams, Newport, and Wood Creek, the last including 150 of Schuyler's new Jersey Regiment, plus his own 24th Regiment and an unknown number of Bradstreet's men, on August 31 he gave the order to destroy the works and retreat to German Flats.

It was an inauspicious beginning for his American career, whose record included the disastrous failure to support Fort William Henry almost a year to the day later, which earned him the unenviable reputation of Britain's most incompetent general officer in America during the Seven Years' War.
THE BUILDING OF FORT STANWIX

The French capture of the forts at Oswego and Webb's destruction of the posts at the Oneida Carrying Place were severe blows to British prestige on the northwestern frontier. The vital region of the Iroquois was exposed to the machinations and maneuvers of the French and their Indian allies. The tribes of the Six Nations were not favorably impressed by the defence of Oswego and were contemptuous of the abandonment of the Carrying Place. Taking council of their self-interest, many of the province's red friends began to question the wisdom of identifying themselves with so inept and cowardly a lot as their white neighbors seemed proving themselves to be. Might not a more accommodating attitude toward the French—or least a neutral pose—be the better part of wisdom? It required all of William Johnson's and George Croghan's skill to preserve a working relationship with the tribes that would prepare the way for an eventual recouping of English fortunes.

The events not only damaged relations with the Iroquois; they emboldened other tribes already allied with or favorably disposed toward France to harass Anglo-American settlers and traders and to increase their enthusiasm for cooperating with French military efforts.

Nor were the results confined to military matters. The economic effects were crippling for those involved in the fur trade, of which the Iroquois were the middle-men and for which the Albany-Ontario route was the life-line.

The settlers of the Mohawk Valley were left in an extremely dangerous situation. They were vulnerable to Indian raids, and there was a frightening possibility that the French would invade the province and bring organized war and devastation—a possibility that became a reality in November 1757, when Picoté de Bellstre and the Sieur de Lorimer, with 300 regulars and an equal number of Canadians and Indians, moved eastward to German Flats and Fort Herkimer. The inhabitants of the region were predominantly German. They lived on the western fringe of settlement, where they had been settled as a buffer for the older settlements. The provincial government had not always used them well, and they had grievances against the English that the French intended to exploit, at the same time persuading the neighboring Oneidas to join the anti-English coalition. The settlers had confirmed French hopes by secretly agreeing to remain neutral. The fort was garrisoned by 200 men of the 22d Regiment under Capt. Richard Townshend, who warned the Palatines of the approaching French and urged them to take refuge in the fort. Trusting the French to respect their neutrality, they declined his offer. The French avoided the fort and at 3 o'clock in the morning of November 12 attacked the settlement, stealing and slaughtering the livestock and burning the houses and barns. Fifty of the Germans were killed and scalped and 150 were taken captive. The rest were left homeless to face the winter without shelter or food. The garrison was too weak to save the settlement, and its members probably counted themselves lucky to have escaped an attack or siege. When Lord Howe arrived from Schenectady, he found a scene of slaughter and destruction. The French commander on the Niagara frontier, the Marquis de Vaudreuil, reported the affair with obvious satisfaction, writing: "I have ruined the plans of the English; I have disposed the Five Nations to attack them; I have carried consternation and terror into all those parts."

As the year 1757 came to an end, Frenchmen
had reason to be pleased with the progress of the war. Their control of the Ohio Valley was so firm that, for the present, it was not being challenged. They had razed Fort William Henry. The Albany-Ontario line and Mohawk country lay exposed. Governor Vaudreuil made bold plans for carrying the war into the heart of New York. Montcalm would move down Lake George and take Fort Edward. The Chevalier de Lévis would take 3,000 soldiers and Indians into the Mohawk Valley. The Iroquois, persuaded by French strength, would join him in sweeping down the valley; and Albany would be doomed.  

The governor’s plan, similar in design to Burgoyne’s for 1777, never took effect. General James Abercromby, who had succeeded Lord Loudoun as commander-in-chief, was at the head of Lake George preparing to attack Ticonderoga. The French plan for the Mohawk was abandoned, and Lévis and his men were ordered to march from Montreal to reinforce Montcalm.

The defeats of 1757 had far-reaching effects on the British leadership. William Pitt was making plans for redeeming the situation in the Colonies, and these included an invasion of Canada via Ticonderoga and Crown Point, an amphibious attack on Louisbourg, and an attack on Fort Duquesne. The Ticonderoga operation failed with the repulse of Abercromby on July 7, 1758, but the other parts of the plan succeeded; and before the year ended, Louisbourg and Duquesne were English. The tide of war turned and was running in Britain’s favor.

The renewal of British vigor was evident in the Iroquois country. Sometime in the late spring or early summer of 1758, Abercomby, amid his concerns for the expedition against Ticonderoga, decided to repossess the Oneida Carrying Place, and he directed Brigadier John Stanwix to occupy the portage with four New York Independent Companies, 1,400 provincials, and a company of Rangers. He instructed Stanwix “to take Post at the Oneida Carrying Place, which I apprehend will not only cover that Country, but enable them to send out large Scouts, to annoy the Enemy, and remove all the Fears and Objections of the Five Nations have raised against their joining us, upon whom to this Hour, I cannot depend for a single Man.”  

In the meantime, Sir William Johnson had been negotiating with the Oneida Indians to obtain their consent to the construction of a new fort at the Carrying Place. To gain their approval, the British made two promises: that the fort, like the others on the Mohawk, would be demolished at the end of the war; and that there would be a “plentiful and cheap trade.”  

With the Oneida’s acquiescence assured, the British began to plan their new fort. Lt. Col. James Montressor prepared a proposal, probably accompanied by a plan, that provided for:

A Good Post to be made at the Oneida Carrying Place capable of Lodging 200 Men, in the Winter, and for 3 or 400 Men in the Summer, for its Defense; with Logs—A Parapet of such a thickness, as the Engineer shall think necessary, according to the Scituation—

A Ditch to be made, to serve to thicken the Parapet—Barracks to be made underneath the Rampart, with the Flues of the Chimneys, to come thr’o the Top.

The Square will be the Cheapest Form, to be made use of for this Work—

The Bastions in like manner, can be made use of, for Storhouses [sic] or Magazines.

In the Square may be made, Lodgings for the Officers, and the rest of the Quadrangle clear—The whole for be Loged [sic].

And opposite to the Officers’ Barrack may be made a Storehouse for the Deposit of Indian Goods.  

Brigadier General Stanwix ordered his engineer, Capt. William Green, to review the plan and submit his opinion of its usefulness. The captain commented at length:

By a good Post—I understand to be meant, such a one, as will contain with ease, the said Number of Men; To be executed in such a manner, as to protect them from a Coup de Main, and to be of such a Size, as will admit [sic] of a proper Defence by such a Garrison,—The Exterior side of which Square, cannot possibly be less (if so little) that 300 ft wch procures but a very small Defence, from its flanks, & & will make an Exterior Circuit of Logging, of nearly 1420 ft by, at the very least 14 ft high, according to the Scituation may be, & in order to admitt of Barracks under the Rampart, to which the Retaining & Bracing Logwork, as well as the Logwork fronting the Interior Area, must in course be considered, as likewise the Logwork to cover the Barracks, storehouses, and Magazines, that are proposed to be made under the Rampart of the Curtins [sic], and Bastions, by wch it will appear, that the greatest part of the Rampart
round this Post, must be formed & Supported with Logwork.

As I am ignorant of the Scituation I conceive that any Form of a work that does not take up more in it's Exteriour & Interiour Circuit attention being made to an equal Flank Defence must be as cheap and a [s] good as a Square, as it might not be in my Power strictly to adhere to that Figure—As to the thickness of the Parapet, being informed cannon can be brought there, by the Enemy, it cannot be less than 12 ft., if so little, 18 ft being the Standard in such Cases.
The Rampart for the Manuevre of Cannon, and likewise to admit of a Reasonable Breadth for the Barracks underneath cannot be less than 20 ft.
The Breadth and Depth of the Ditch cannot be considered in Proportion for the Earth wanted, to form the said Parapet, and to cover the Loggwork of the Proposed Barracks, magazines & Storehouses to be made under the Rampart.

His Excellency General Abercrombie is pleased to observe in His Letter of the 16th July to the following Purport—That He does not find Himself, vested with the Power of Building Forts, and that His Excellency, does not think, that it would be right for Him, to undertake the Building of those He Proposed &c &c.

I hmbly conceive, that the plan ordered for the Post at the Oneida Carrying Place, is in all Respects & Circumstances to be Considered as a Fort, as it partakes, not only the figure, and the respective parts of a Fort, but even of the Permanent Intentions of a Fortress, as must clearly appear, by considering all the Particulars Ordered in that Plan, the Materials, of which it is ordered to be built with, being only peculiar to the Country and Scituation, and can no ways effect the Intention of that Work, and as to its capacity, in Point of Size, and the proper Strength, requisite in the Execution, when considered, it is ordered To be made a good Post, for 200 Men to 400 Men, I should think it my Duty, to execute it with Propriety, Care, and Attention, in order that it might answer the end Proposed—That of Covering that part of the Country.

And lastly, the Practicability of executing the post, before the Winter sets in, must still further be judged, not only, by the Number of Artificers, that would be Requisite, to compleat it, in due time, but by considering. It is one of the Reasons, (inter Alia,) His Excellency, General Abercrombie Himself, gives, for laying aside the Scheme of Building a Fort there—By Observing as follows . . . . "Besides, when I Recollect, how far the Season is advanced, and that it is not likely, that by beginning a Fort * now, it would be finished, against the Winter, & consequently not of the use proposed.

* I beg it may be remembered that I have concluded the Post Order'd, to be Fort.

NB The Exterior Circuit of Fort Edward is nearly 1564 Ft and as I am informed, took nearly Two Seasons to build it And the Exterior Circuit of the Fort Proposed, will be nearly 1420 Ft.7

Colonel Montressor answered Captain Green's comments in this brief reply:
The orders for building a Post or Fort at Oneida Carrying place were so plain that they did not seem to warrant any Explanation, except in the Scituation, wch not being exactly the figure of Course is subjected to it. and tho' called a square, has often its four sides unequal, and as part may be unattainable by a swamp, morass &ca. that side has a Parapet and Rampart less strong that the others and without a Ditch, all those alterations and changes are left to the Engineer.

As to its Execution, Amongst the number of Troops on the Mohawk River, there are no doubt carpenters more than sufficient who understand that business.

2d. The winter sets in there as oyer [othcrl parts of the Province of New York, and not sooner: and as to the Practibility of Executing this post or Fort before the winter Major Eyers began Fort Wm Henry in Sept. and it was finished by the end of Novr following being an irregular square of about 300 ft each side with Provincials along and without any Expense.8
General Abercromby had obviously intended that the new station at the Carrying Place be a rather modest affair, less extensive and permanent than what would be ordinarily considered a fort. Both Montressor and Green projected a more ambitious undertaking: a fortification that included curtains, bastions, ramparts, barracks, magazine, and storehouses. In spite of his doubt about his authority to have such a "fort" constructed, the general soon accepted the implications inherent in the proposals and referred to the project as a fort. Abercromby also realized, along with Stanwix, that the engineers were in essential agreement in their proposals, with Green's remarks representing "rather a Protraction on his Part to put that Plan into Execution, than any valid reasoning to invalidate its taking place." He proceeded to authorize Stanwix to order Green to begin construction" without any further Delay."  

Several problems attended getting work on the new fortification under way. In the first place, Captain Green's health was not equal to the task of directing the construction. General Stanwix asked that Montressor be detailed to work with the captain, a request that fortunately was not granted, since in his next letter Stanwix wrote: "Colonel Montressor's letter to Captain Green has given him the greatest shock the poor man was very ill before this proposal has almost killed him."  

Abercromby replaced Green with Lt. John Williams, noting "that he is acquainted with that Part of the Country, & Accustomed to the method of working in it, besides from Capt Greens bad state of health, and the difficulties he stated to former Plan, which was not near so extensive, it is morally [sic] certain he would not execute it within the proper time."  

Secondly, the refortification of the Great Carrying Place was only one part of the operations planned for redeeming British interests in the Iroquois country. Lt. Col. John Bradstreet's plan for attacking Fort Frontenac had been revived, and much of General Stanwix's attention was directed toward assisting in collecting men and having them ready to move up the Mohawk to the Carrying Place, where they were assembled preparatory to marching westward toward Lake Ontario. A total of 5,600 men was intended for the Mohawk-Ontario area, of whom 3,600 would accompany Bradstreet and 2,000 would be employed in building the new fort.  

Desertions and sick lists lowered the effective numbers to the point where Bradstreet ended up with less than 3,000 men and Stanwix had to carry on the construction with a much smaller force than he believed necessary.  

Lieutenant Williams, the newly assigned engineer, joined Stanwix on August 14; and, in spite of the general's pessimism about prospects of carrying out the work within the time available and with the provisions on hand and at Schenectady within a few days he began work on the site marked out within entrenchments that had been laid out by Major Eyres, Abercromby's assistant engineer. Horatio Gates, a survivor of Braddock's defeat and future victor at Saratoga, became the brigade major, responsible for the administrative details of the force at the Carrying Place.  

Work got under way at a pace that must have been gratifying to General Stanwix. The first log for the new fort was laid on August 26, and ten days later the commander wrote:  

we have finished the foundation of the fort inside & outside & tyed the work the work w[i]th retaining Logs & half way round the second tier of logs, are pretty forward with a Magazine in one of the Bastions & laid the foundations of two of the Curtains for Casemats [sic] for the Barracks, have got 40000 Bricks ready to Burn for the Chimneys & propose another Kiln of 100000, if the Weather will allow, in a weeks time shall have a Saw Mill Completed wch. will furnish us plentifully with Boards & plank, and have got ready a great quantity of shingles for Covering such huts & other Buildings as we shall be able to erect & are not without hopes if we get back our men from Col. Bradstreets Enterprize in any time to make tollerable Cover for 400 men for the winter & this Fort will take I view that number at least to defend it as our Bastions are very large & when a Ditch & Glacis is Completed will take up all the height of this fine spot & as Oswego is by you in one of Your letters proposed to be the principle Fortification this will I think answer every purpose if we can in time make it Tenable, in which all pains & industry shall be made upon it.  

While Lieutenant Williams was making such praise-worthy progress, important news reached the Carrying Place. Colonel Bradstreet had captured the French fort at Cataracaui (present Kingston, Ontario) on August 27 and had burned it and the ships moored there.  

At about the time news from the west reached Stanwix, Lieutenant Williams received a letter from Colonels Montressor and Eyres directing him to stop following the plan that he had been
using and follow one that had been considered earlier. General Stanwix had favored the one that Montressor and Eyres were now endorsing, but the lieutenant argued that changing plans at that point would preclude making the fort tenable in time for its use during the winter. The general recorded how the matter was resolved on the spot in the following manner:

that we might not lett half our time be misspent in doing nothing I desired that Williams & Green would examine the ground & form something in which we might have a possibility of succeeding before the Winter wch. would cover in that season 400 men & so far to finish it that no insults might be feared from small Arms, of which Williams sent Montressor a plan and we have proceeded upon it as I desired Mr. Williams in his post Script to say that I determined to try how far we are to proceed upon it, the body of the place will not be large but Bastions will contain—Room for the Guns Eight in Each Bastion which with the Advantage of the Situation and guns sufficient for the post will make it pretty Strong I am told every way preferable to Fort Edward, and if it is thought hereafter not respectable a Fortification may be made to which this as it is the highest ground may serve for a good Cittydel [sic] but as I always doubt my own judgment I called all the Colonels to gether who were unanimously of Opinion to proceed on what we have now been about in preparing & executing near a month wch I think to pick to pieces would be discouraging for such Troops who are already but indifferently inclined to work for no pay, I inclose the Colonels Opinion to you tho I am Confident you will always be so good to me as to believe I shall ever do that wch occurs to me to comply with yur commands & do every thing possible wth me to forward the Service. Col Montressor's plan wch has all along been My Favorite had it been thought practicable in the time, he Calculates it to be executed by 2000 men in three months, for this Month past I could never get above 400 men to Work out of the Troops here fit for duty wch has never exceeded 1100. Guards Piquets Covering parties & perpetual Scouts taking up the rest, including a Capt: & three Subs. with 130 Men I am obliged to employ on the Mohawks River as Batteau men between this and Schenectady.17

General Abercromby responded to Stanwix's letter telling him of the decision to continue building the fort according to Williams' plan following terse terms: “All I shall say upon it is, that—now the Men which were with Colo. Bradstreet are—Returned, I expect that Lieut. Williams will fullfill his Engagement, and so far finish the Present Fort, as to take tolerable Lodgements for 400 Men, and tenable against Musquetry for the Ensuing Winter,—upon Failure of which he must be answerable for the Consequences.” 18

This exchange between the generals helps identify some of the problems that attended building the fort. One source of trouble—one so common that it easy to overlook—was the product of geography. Abercromby's headquarters during much of the autumn was at Lake George. Eyres was on his personal staff and usually at headquarters. Montressor was near-by at Fort Edward; and Stanwix and Williams were at the headwaters of the Mohawk. By the water route, the distance between Oneida Station and Lake George was approximately 160 miles, no great distance by twentieth century standards, but in a primitive environment the time consumed in exchanging correspondence was a matter of days.

Another problem, one closely related to distance, was that of supply. All of the tools and provisions had to be conveyed up the Mohawk from Schenectady, a time-consuming operation when the supplies were in stock; and if the stores in the depot lacked what was needed, the problem was compounded. Then, too, men were required to man the batteaus, four officers and 130 men, according to Stanwix's report.

Another drain on Stanwix's available man power was the necessity to provide for the security of his station. Reconnaissance parties were constantly on patrol to guard against surprise, for he dared not relax his vigilance, even after Bradstreet's success on Lake Ontario. Pickets, camp guards, and covering parties for the work details sent into the woods to cut timber limited the number of men who could be working on the construction. Sickness, injuries, and malingering took their toll. Prior to the return of Bradstreet's column, the largest number of men that Stanwix had on duty was 1,100 of whom never more than 400 were available for work on the fort.

The return of the troops from Lake Ontario made more men available, but they were less numerous than the generals and Montressor had expected, as Stanwix's letter to Abercromby of September 29 demonstrated:

you will perceive the great falling off of our members of weh you will of Lt. Col Bradstreets see near a thousand, numbers of weh are dead or dying dayly
for . . . that Enterprize was perform'd with so much expedition & fatigue that few could well bear it, & I believe his great sweep was wholly owing to it. So that of the 5600 men you ordered for the services only 2750 remained fit for duty the 20th of the month near one half, & the sick list increasing very fast wch is supposed to be owing to their living wholly upon salt pork without pease, roots or greens.\textsuperscript{19}

In spite of the limited number of men available, General Stanwix expected to have the new fort ready for 400 men and secure against small arms by the first of December.

As the autumn advanced, the euphoria resulting from Bradstreet's success dissipated under persistent rumors that the French and their allies were about to avenge themselves upon the western frontier. Sir William Johnson and General Stanwix warned Abercromby that friendly Indians were bringing frequent news of approaching attacks.\textsuperscript{20} The force at the Carrying Place was vulnerable to attacks on working parties and batteau men; and a large French and Indian force could threaten the camp by attack or, less probable, isolation. The settlements from German Flats eastward to west of Schenectady were in greater danger. Stanwix's troops were the keystone of the defense of the Mohawk frontier, and General Abercromby wrote their commander:

\textit{it—becomes necessary for You to be on Your Guard and to keep out constant Scouts to bring You Intelligence of the Motions not only of the French, but our supposed faithful Allies the Six Nations: For which Purpose You will send out a Scout somewhat stronger . . . , to follow Luttridge the Day after his Departure from you, and give them the same Instructions with this Difference that they are to avoid Luttridge's Tracts [tracks], by which means I should hope you will discover the Intentions of the Enemy both publick and secret: And to enable You to frustrate their Designs the better, I have order'd Fraser's Battalion of Highlanders, lately returned with M. G. [Major General] Amherst from the Eastward to join you forthwith. I should have sent You a stronger Reinforcement, But I am apprehensive You do not find they are much inclined to do anything for themselves, and, as is customary in this Country wou'd willingly exempt themselves from any Share in the Means to secure themselves.}\textsuperscript{21}

Stanwix had asked Headquarters for additional cannon, and Abercromby replied:

\textit{the proportion of Ordnance for the Defence of your Post . . . has been laid before the proper Officer, and it is found far beyond what is requisite: nevertheless, had it been in my Power to furnish you with it, I shou'd not have objected to sending it: but it seems we have no more than two 18 Pounders Iron at Albany that have Carriages; it is true there are more at Schenectady, but as they want Carriages they can be of no Use to You at present I have sent Orders to Mr. Furnis at New York, to make Application to the Lieut. Govr: They certainly might spare some from thence, and they are sufficiently interested in the Defence of the Frontiers not to refuse them: but I do not find they are much inclined to do anything for themselves, and, as is customary in this Country wou'd willingly exempt themselves from any Share in the Means to secure themselves.}\textsuperscript{22}

Rumors of hostile activity continued to reach General Abercromby at Lake George; and in addition to the Highlanders, the Second Battalion of the Royal Regiment was ordered to the Mohawk. When a report reached Headquarters that Stanwix's camp was invested, Colonel Benton of the Royal Regiment ordered the Battalion's grenadier and light infantry companies to march from Greenbush to Schenectady to be ready to proceed to the Oneida Carrying Place, if the report proved to be accurate.\textsuperscript{23}

The fear of a Franco-Indian attack and approaching winter made the completion and arming of the fort increasingly urgent. Both Abercromby and Stanwix urged the lieutenant governor of New York to use his influence to obtain cannon, and an effort was made to purchase pieces brought into New York City by privateers.\textsuperscript{24}

The reconnaissance patrols that went out from Oneida returned with conflicting reports: some claimed that they had seen the enemy, while others reported no evidence of either French or hostile Indian parties. Stanwix continued to fear that the enemy intended to "disturb our Works," although the Indians at Oneida Castle told him that his position was so strong that there was nothing to fear from any hosts in the area. As the autumn
advanced, Stanwix held his breath, hoping that no attack would be made before his fort was ready for winter. On October 22 he expressed himself as follows:

if we hear nothing certain of any strong Armament with Artillery between this & the beginning of November we may give up all expectation of any unseasonable Visit for this approaching winter, wch will enable us to carry our Fort all round en barbet cover our Casmets [sic] for 400 men & Complete our Ditch & Glassic [sic], and I am hopeful I shall be able to leave here six months provisions for that number. 250 beds will be wanting & absolutely necessary as the Company of Rangers are to stay wch I can well accomodate in good huts without the works.25

Artillery for the new fort continued to be the subject of considerable concern for both Stanwix and Abercromby. The former had submitted "calculations" that members of the latter's staff considered excessive; and while there were tubes in the Schenectady depot, there were no carriages, which meant that there was no artillery immediately available. As has been noted, appeals were made to the lieutenant governor, and attempts were made to purchase cannon from privateers. On October 22 Stanwix was still trying to get the guns that his post needed. At Abercromby's suggestion, he wrote to Lieutenant Governor De Lancy asking him to use his good offices in persuading the province to contribute six each 18-pounders, 12-pounders, 9-pounders, and 6-pounders, with 8,000 shot for each piece of ordnance, promising him that the province would be reimbursed with guns from England or Louisbourg. He also wrote Abercromby that he believed some of the Louisbourg cannon should be sent to the Onedia post.

General Stanwix was especially eager to have armament on hand because the fort was ready to accommodate the cannon. By October 22, a bomb-proof magazine with a capacity of 2,000 barrels had been installed under the southeast bastion. Other work accomplished included "seven good Huts, Brick chimneys, Shingled floor'd & lined with—and at least two good Glass windows in each & very sufficient for twenty one officers." The general lived in one "and never desire a warmer a more comfortable or better room, and 'tis by much the worst of them."

Although the work was progressing, it was far from being free of problems. The reports of hostile activity had hindered construction:

&in order to get forward was obliged to send for some Carpenters, & Mr. Dice has been of infinite use to us, but experience of this Sort when works are carried to a Certain degree of perfection are seldom found . . . these troops at first produced but few Carpenters and now the woods become Cold & Wet scarce at all, and indeed there is such a surprizing falling off[f] from the working men of these Battalions that from 5600 intend'd for the service this way that not 1500 left fit for duty & these I am sending down sick in Boat loads every day. I think all the provincials whilst with me have behaved well but they are really worn out, work'd down & fairly jaded with Fatigue, to wch the Batteau Service and Caderaqui [Bradstreet's expedition] has not a little Contributed—Colonel Williams & Colo Dotty's Boston Battalions their time is out the First of November and they begin to be impatient to be gone Jersey Regiment: their time out the 15th of November: no time fix'd for the New York or Rhode Islanders but end with the Campaign, please as soon as you can—let me know when these severl [sic] Regiments are to be dismiss'd.26

Stanwix's personal situation was serious—more so than the correspondence might indicate. He had been ordered to use only the provincial soldiers in the construction, partly for reasons of economy and because Abercromby and Montressor believed that a number of troops had experience as carpenters. While probably many of the men knew something about domestic carpentry, few if any had ever engaged in a major construction at all comparable to building a fort. Of course, most of them were capable of cutting timber and digging ditches, and that was the work that required the most hands.

As we have seen, military duties and sickness contributed their share in slowing construction. But as winter approached, all of the problems were compounded by weather, the necessity of getting the post ready for winter, and the expiration of the troops' terms of service. While the terms of the Massachusetts levies were extended for 15 days by the provincial council, the situation was critical and it never was appreciably eased, because alarms continued to demand extraordinary security measures; and civilian carpenters were in scarce supply on the frontier and those in Albany and Schenectady were probably less than eager to work under the conditions of danger and discomfort that prevailed.

On October 30 Abercromby wrote to Stanwix from Albany concerning the final stages of the year's work and plans for the winter:

I see with Pleasure the Forwardness your present Post
was in, and that we may expect by the 2d or 3d. of next Month to have it so far finished, as to lodge and cover it's intended Garrison against every Insult, but Artillery, which I join in Opinion with you, there will soon be no Room to apprehend anything from, as the Season advances fast in which the Roads will render it impracticable for the Enemy to bring any against it.—I have given Direction for the providing of the Beds, Snow Shoes, & Provisions You say will be necessary and the D.Q.M.G. is to see them worthwhil sent up.—With Regard to the Proportion of Ordnance & its Attviall, I am sorry it is not in my Power to furnish You with the Whole of Your Demands, since you remain of Opinion that You cou'd well dispose of it: Notwithstanding my Requisition to the Lieut. Governor; backed by Your very proper Letter to the same Purpose, we have not been able to obtain more than ten 12 and two 9 Pounders, Iron—Ordnance, mounted on Garrison Carriages, which Mr. Furniss by his Letter of the 23d. was to ship the next day for this—whence, so soon as it Arrives it shall be forwarded to You: and so soon as Capt. Ord come down here, which will be in a few Days, I shall settle with him the Officers and Men—of the Department under his command, that can be spared for the Oneida Station: but I must observe to you, that they will fall far short of what You ask, as I have not in my Department, above 80 Men of that Branch, out of which some are to remain here and others to be left at Fort Edward.

As I see that You Convenience, and intend to hut the Rangers, I suppose You propose the Garrison shou'd consist of 400 Regulars exclusive of them and the Small Detachment of Artillery, and as I intend that Colo. Fraser's Battalion should furnish that Garrison you will either leave them be Detachment or Companies as you see best, and the Remainder of that Battalion, I am inform'd by Colo. Bradstreet can be very well cantoned in the District of Conajohary & Stone Arabia, which Justice Fry has promised the Deputy Qr. Mr. Gen. to prepare and hold in Readiness for them.

I have had a letter from Lieut. Williams, desiring that he might be relieved, but as I have nobody in that Branch, whose Department is not already settled & of Nowise none to send in his Room, You will please to tell him that he must remain there, and indeed nobody can be more proper for it than himself, as he will be at hand so soon as the Weather permits to finish the Work.

With Regard to the provincial Troops, you may dismiss them so soon as Your Works will permit; particularly the Massachusetts & Rhode Island People, who have a long Ways home and the Roads daily growing bad: besides which, the Bostoners, who were with me, are already on their March, which I dare say will make Your's plead hard for their Discharge: The sooner they were all gone, would be but better, as it wou'd be a great Saving in the Article of Provisions, especially in the present Scarcity; However, so long as You can not do without them to finish the Fort fit for the Reception of the Garrison, You must keep them: But at the same Time, such of them as are sick and unfit for Duty, might very well be sent Down immediately as otherwise they will consume a great Quantity of Provisions to no Manner of Purpose.

By mid-November 1758 Stanwix's work at Oneida Station was completed, and he moved his headquarters to Albany, where he commanded the troops posted on the Mohawk and in northern New York.

The first description of the fort that has survived is Colonel Montressor's, which together with a copy of the plan, shows the fort's situation at the close of the first season's work. The Colonel wrote:

This fort was begun the 23d 1758 by the troops under the Command of Brigdr Genl. Stanwix and finished on Barbette as Represented in the draught of Novr 18, 1758 the yellow shows what parts are unfinished A is a small creek wch runs southward and has its head from three springs 500 yards above the Fort. B. The Road from the Landings Place on the Mohawk River over the Carrying place to Fort Newport. C. a section thro DE taking in the Ditch the Common breadth of 40 and not the Breadth as it is upon the middle of the Curtain. The fort is built on a Level spot of Ground Compund of Pebble Stone mixed wt Gravel and Sand is to the Eastward and Southward 19 ft. above the Level of the Swamps and Low Lands. To the Northward the Ground is much on a Level with the fort, but to the Westward it descends gradually for three Quarters of a Mile to Fort Newport to the Common Level of the Swamps. To the West, North and Eastward, the woods are Cleared between 3 and 400 hundr[ed] yards and to the Southward 700 yards. FA Magazine 65 foot long by 16 ft wide Bomb Proof. The logs of wch the fort is built are generally 2 ft thick, flatted on the upper and under sides. The Casementes [sic] (at present Barracks) are covered wt two teer of Square timber from 12 to 24 Ins thick as Represented in the Profil.

The colonel's description is very useful and
probably represents as good a picture of the fort as can be had. However, it and the drawing must be used with some caution. For instance, they do not include the seven “hutts” for officers that Stanwix mentioned in his letter of October 22. Secondly, he described the fort as being completed “en Barbet,” but the plan shows forty-three embrasures. Thirdly, there is a contemporary, though much less detailed, plan that was enclosed in a letter from General Abercrumby to Prime Minister William Pitt, dated November 25, 1758, that gives different dimensions. The plan that accompanied Montressor’s description gave the length between the points of the bastions as 350 feet. The one that accompanied Abercrumby’s letter showed a distance of 330 feet. An explanation of the differences may be that both represent preliminary plans—not actual construction drawings.

The 400 men from Fraser’s Highlanders and the detail of Royal Artillery spent the winter of 1758-59 in the new fort, while the Ranger detachment occupied huts in a camp outside its walls. It was a strong force for the Carrying Place, and the frontier west of German Flats was more secure than it had been since before the opening of hostilities.

Somewhat against his wishes, John Williams remained at Fort Stanwix, as the new post was coming to be termed, in order to be on hand to complete the work whenever the weather permitted. Sometime during the winter or summer, he prepared a plan entitled “Plan of Fort Stanwix Built at Oneida Station. By Provincial Troops in 1758.” This probably represents the first attempt to present an “as built” depiction of the fort by one who not only knew it first hand but was its construction superintendent, and it may be the most important single document relating to the original building of the fort.

Williams’ plan shows a bastioned fort with the points of the bastions forming a square 335 feet to the side. The walls were constructed of logs laid crib fashion to a height of nine feet on the outside and eleven feet on the inside of the curtains. Their thickness at the base was slightly more than 20 feet and at the top 18 feet. The southeast bastion, under which the magazine was located, was nine feet on the outside and 15½ on the inside. The other three bastions may have had higher ramparts than the curtains, but this is not reflected in the plan. The bastions were 120 feet deep, with two sides ca. 38 feet long and two 90 feet. The curtains measured ca. 140 feet. The sally-port, about ten feet wide, was located in the center of the south curtain. Another, narrower gateway about five feet wide in the east curtain gave access to the covered way and thence to the creek.

Inside the fort were four casemates, the roofs of which formed the terreplein for the curtains. These were log structures, built to a height of ten feet in front and approximately eight and a half in the rear. The external depth from the front to the curtain wall was approximately 20 feet. The northern and western casemates extended 119 feet in front and 145 in the rear. The other two casemates were divided by the sally-port and east gate. The south-western one measured 50 by 60 feet; the south-eastern 58 by 60; the east-southern 58 feet square; and the east-northern 52 by 60. The northern and western casemates were divided into three sets of quarters, each with a door and three windows opening onto the parade. The southern casemates consisted of one unit per structure, each with a door and six windows. The eastern ones consisted of one unit per structure, each with a door and four windows. Each unit was heated by a fire-place with a brick chimney that extended above the terreplein.

Nineteen huts were located in the parade, most of them officer’ quarters, but one or more may have been kitchens. The plan does not provide details, but General Stanwix described the one he occupied as being one of the “worst,” saying that they had brick chimneys, were shingled, floored, and having at least two glass windows.

The magazine was located beneath the south-east bastion. It was a bomb-proofed structure, measuring on the inside ca. 69 by 19 feet.

Except a distance of approximately 150 feet where the bastions stood within less than 45 feet of the stream, a ditch, 21 feet wide at the top and eight at the bottom, extended around the fort. A row of eight to ten feet high posts stood upright in the ditch. A similar palisade formed a V in front of the sally-port. The spoil from the ditch was piled against the walls of the fort and as a glacis outside the ditch. A “Necessary house” (latrine), reached by an elevated walk, stood over a portion of the stream opposite the south-east bastion. At the end of the ditch opposite the north-east bastion, a covered way led to the water.

Another season of construction began at
Fort Stanwix during July 1759, and the work that was accomplished during that year was recorded in a "Plan of Fort Stanwix Showing what Works were done at that Post—from July to December 1759." Among the additions were two huts for the officers, bringing the total in the Parade to 21. Chimneys were completed or replaced for some of the officers' quarters. New bedsteads were installed in the casemates. Six cannon platforms were installed on the bastions. The parapet of the north-west "flag" bastion was raised four feet, embrasures created, and a firing step installed. The ramparts of all the bastions were raised. The ditch was widened to 26 feet at the bottom and 40 at the top. The parapet of the curtains was raised by placing barrels and horizontal logs on the parapets of the curtains. A floor was installed in the magazine, and a cellar for garden stuff was built under the south-east bastion. Horizontal pickets were installed on the north-east bastion.

Another, apparently contemporary, plan shows the fort with the same features, minus the "Necessary" and covered way to the stream and without a ditch on the eastern side. The "flag" bastion is shown with embrasures. A store-house, with its western end palisaded, is shown west of the fort. This plan shows a much smaller fort with the sides of the square formed by the bastions only ca. 230 feet long, which probably means that the indicated scale of 1 inch to 100 feet is in error.

While Fort Stanwix took form, William Pitt prosecuted the war with the vigor, boldness, and imperial vision that won him a place in history. As Brigadier John Forbes advanced westward, the French blew up Fort Duquesne. Forbes died shortly thereafter, and General Stanwix replaced him with orders to consolidate the British victory in the Ohio Valley. Louisburg fell, and its victor, Jeffrey Amherst, replaced Abercromby as commander-in-chief. James Wolfe distinguished himself at Louisburg and was given the command that led him to Quebec and immortality. Back in London, Pitt was preparing plans for the expulsion of the French from North America that astonished some of his fellows and must have made General Amherst wonder whether His Majesty's minister knew what he proposed: Invade Canada, launch an attack along the southern frontier, re-establish the fort at Oswego—even attack Fort Niagara. The last was accomplished in late spring and summer of 1759, and Brigadier John Prideaux's and Sir William Johnson's forces passed the new fort on their way to Lake Ontario and Niagara.

In the meantime, money and labor were being expended in improving Fort Stanwix. In 1761 it was still unfinished, with completion anticipated the following year. Yet, even as it was being completed, its importance was diminishing. The defeat of the French in the west and the termination of hostilities reduced the purpose of the fort to showing the flag among the Iroquois. By 1761 the garrison was down to fifty men.

By the end of the war, the fort was a strong post with massive log and earthen walls built up so that all the bastions and curtains were capped by embrasured parapets. The ditch on the eastern side was apparently filled in, but a stockade extended along that face. Two ravelins, one covering the sally-port and a smaller one for the gate leading to the stream, were constructed between 1759 and 1764. The officers' huts were replaced by two buildings measuring 120 by 20 feet and one measuring 35 by 20.

The Peace of Paris ended the Seven Years War in 1763, and Britain's attention turned from conquest to consolidating and administering the Empire. For the American Colonies, that meant the end of "salutary neglect," and Parliament took a more active interest in making the colonies contributing members of the Empire. A series of acts flowed out of London affecting trade, customs, colonial administration, land speculation, and Indian affairs; and most of them collided with an American interest. The product was the American Revolution that ended with independence and the new nation's inheriting most of the problems that had caused the separation. But that gets ahead of our story of Fort Stanwix.

However, as a part of the military establishment on the frontier, the fort shared the historic scene. As has been noted, its primary function after the elimination of the French threat was to provide for an imperial presence in the Iroquois country, particularly among the Oneidas. The Indians' response to that presence was mixed. Insofar as it encouraged increased trade, they favored the existence of posts that would facilitate such commercial contacts. On the other hand, the Indians had acquiesced in the building of Fort Stanwix and other installations on the condition that they would be demolished after the war. The maintenance of the forts during the post-war years was a source of
irritation to the Iroquois that Sir William Johnson had to cope with in his relations with the tribes. At the same time, forces were working that made a wholesale abandonment of the war-time forts unthinkable. The western tribes, resentful of official arrogance, the dishonesty of traders, and their exclusion from consultation when the French surrendered the western posts, and fearful of the advancing English settlements, plotted to expel the British.

In the spring of 1763, the western frontier erupted into war along a thousand-mile front. One after another, the posts in the formerly French territory fell, until only Fort Pitt, Detroit, and Niagara stood fast. Frontier settlements were ravaged, and according to some accounts, more people died in 1763 than in 1759, at the height of the Seven Years' War. Not until July 1766, when Sir William met the hostiles in a council at Oswego, did the war end with acknowledgement of British sovereignty and Pontiac's pardon.

With the frontier ablaze, the British would not abide by the promise to demilitarize the intermediate zone just east of the frontier. Instead of destroying Fort Stanwix, attention was directed toward its repair. Engineer Lt. George Demler inspected it and found it in a surprisingly bad state. The southeast bastion, which covered the magazine and cellar, was in an especially dilapidated condition, with its “whole Face fallen down.” The western half of the south curtain and the southwest bastion were “so rotten that they can not stand over this winter.” The casemates were uninhabitable and beyond repair.

The lieutenant began repairing the fort on July 1, 1764. The work was carried on by civilian artificers and laborers, and by the end of the season £140–5s.–10d., New York currency, had been expended and a surprising amount of repair accomplished. During that time the southeast and southwest bastions and the curtains were repaired and made en barbette. The casemates were rebuilt, and chimneys installed in the officers' barracks. The northwest and northeast bastions were rebuilt with embrasured parapets. A covered passageway from the east gate to the small ravelin was built of wood and earth. The escarpment and covered way (glacis) were sodded and a small parapet was installed on the covered way. By the end of the year, work remained to be done on the southern bastions, the parapet on the southeast end of the covered way, the earthen part of the covered passage to the eastern ravelin, and the closing of the northeast end of the ditch by completing the covered way. Whether these were completed during subsequent periods of work is uncertain. More money was expended in early 1765 and in 1767. Yet on May 27 of the latter, Maj. Gen. Thomas Gage recommended to the Secretary of State, the Earl of Shelburne, that Stanwix be abandoned “in order to lessen expenses.” The fort was in ruins and not important enough to merit repairs necessary to make it tenable. He proposed to withdraw the small garrison and leave the fort in the care of an “old half-pay officer” on the condition that he should return everything to the Crown when “required for the King’s service.”

The next year, John Lees, a Quebec merchant, wrote in his Journal, describing the fort as a “neat little fortification built of wood & fit to Garrison 3 Regiments’ but it [is] now falling all to ruins. There is a half pay officer with a Corporal & his men that keep Possession of it, intended chiefly for forwarding Expresses to the Officers at the upper Forts: the country is entirely unsettled round this Fort.”

Thus by the year of the great Indian congress that negotiated the Treaty of Fort Stanwix the fort had become a dilapidated inactive post. Although it is not the purpose of this monograph to provide an in-depth study of that treaty, a brief account is in order.

Britain’s victory over her arch-rival, France, had expelled that power from the North American mainland, leaving her with greatly expanded possessions, incorporating not only Canada and Florida, but also the vast region between the Appalachians and the Mississippi River, a region rich in lands and furs and inhabited by Indian tribes, some of which had been active allies of France. To the government in Whitehall, this acquisition was a valuable territory that required imperial policies that would provide for the orderly settlement of western lands and peaceful relations with the Indians. To those ends, the king issued the Proclamation of 1763 that imposed a temporary settlement west of a line that ran north and south along the crest of the Appalachians, reiterating a pledge made to the western tribes in the Treaty of Easton (1758) to respect native claims and to refrain from settling on them without the Indians’ consent.
The Proclamation offended important American interests and values. The ignorance of its authors had left several hundred whites west of the Proclamation Line in Indian territory. More fundamental was its violation of the common-sense American belief, amounting to an article of faith, that white men were destined to occupy and exploit western lands and that the Indians must be driven away or destroyed. Settlers, land speculators, and fur-traders competed for the new lands, but they agreed in opposing any form of regulation, especially if it emanated from London, that limited their freedom of action.  

The inherent weaknesses of the policy that produced the Proclamation and pressure from economy-minded members of Parliament, greedy speculators, and disgruntled traders forced the British government to revise its frontier policy. A shake-up in the ministry resulted in centering control of American affairs in the new office, Secretary for the Colonies, which was assumed by Lord Hillsborough in January 1768.  

Hillsborough prepared a set of recommendations that was accepted by the cabinet in March contained the first practical plan for the North American West yet developed. While the Indian superintendencies were retained, their powers were limited to imperial functions: land purchases from the tribes, readjustments of the Proclamation line, and settling diplomatic problems. Local matters, including regulation of the fur trade, were left in the control of the colonies. This made the western posts that had been the centers for the trade unnecessary, and all were abandoned except those at Detroit, Niagara, and Mackinac, which were retained for defense. Instead of establishing three western colonies, as had been demanded by expansionists, Hillsborough tried to satisfy them by ordering the Proclamation line shifted westward.  

General Thomas Gage, commander of the British army in North America, complied with the terms of the new policy; and within a year withdrew all the western garrisons except Detroit, Niagara, Mackinac, Fort Pitt and Fort de Chartres. The superintendents dismantled their elaborate trade establishment to the delight of the fur traders, who swept into the West to set up their private posts through the northern country.  

Orders were received by John Stuart and Sir William Johnson, Indian Superintendents for the Southern and Northern Departments respectively. Sir William’s task was to extend the western boundary line from the mouth of the Great Kanawka River in [West] Virginia across Pennsylvania to the Indian village Oswego near the southern border of New York, leaving the troublesome problem of determining the bounds of the Iroquois territory to later negotiations. To accomplish this delicate undertaking, he called a congress of most of the northern tribes to meet at Fort Stanwix during November 1768.  

Johnson’s action was a signal for speculators along the entire frontier to go into action. In Virginia, they pressured the government to appoint Dr. Thomas Walker, an active land-grabber, as the colony’s delegate to the conference; and he set out for Fort Stanwix committed to open as much of Kentucky as possible to settlement. Pennsylvania officials impressed their commissioners with the necessity of obtaining the region between the Susquehanna and West Branch Rivers. In New York, the Indiana Company’s leaders set about persuading Sir William to guarantee that their interests would profit. In June, Samuel Wharton, William Trent, and George Croghan met Johnson at New London, Connecticut, and discussed the best ways to ensure success; and he committed himself to obtaining from the Indians a specific grant for the Indiana Company’s leaders.  

Johnson, thus, deliberately conspired to violate his instructions, which had directed him to ratify a line he had discussed with the tribal leaders in 1765. Under no circumstances, was he to enlarge the boundary from the mouth of the Great Kanawka down the Ohio to the Cherokee [Tennessee] River.  

When the conference convened, 3,400 Indians, commissioners from New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, New Jersey, and Connecticut assembled within the dilapidated fort’s walls. Lines were clearly drawn. On one side was the Virginia interest, whose objective was two-fold: to open Kentucky and to keep any outside company from exploiting that colony’s back country. On the other was the leadership of the Indiana Company, hungrily promoting their effort to obtain their grant in the upper Ohio, quite aware that the region lay within Virginia’s northwest. Because of Johnson’s association, the latter group had the advantage. With his help, they persuaded the Iroquois to sell them the 1,800,000 acres they wanted on November 3, but Virginia’s consent was required. Walker
was appeased by Johnson’s extending the new boundary line past the mouth of the Great Kanawka to the Tennessee River. This would force the Southern Superintendent, Stuart to redraw the southern part of the line in a manner that would open the lands of the Greenbrier and Loyal Companies to settlement or confuse the entire boundary so completely that all the Kentucky country would be thrown open to unregulated speculation.

The treaty was anti-climatic—the important business had already been conducted by the commissioners in private, unrecorded sessions. According to the terms of the treaty, signed November 5, the line began, not at Oswego, but near Fort Stanwix, then west across Pennsylvania to open the Susquehanna Forks area, and thence along the Allegheny and Ohio Rivers to the mouth of the Tennessee. In return for ceding their claims to the lands, the Indians received £10,460 in gifts. Sir William was aware of the fact that he had violated his instructions and deranged the entire boundary demarkation system, at the same time angering the Delawares, Shawnees, and Cherokees by defrauding them of their hunting lands in the Ohio country, to which they, not the Iroquois Confederacy, had the better claim. He was intelligent enough to know that the treaty left the whole western frontier in turmoil. The real thrust of the treaty was revealed in the shift of the boundary to the mouth of the Tennessee, which showed that the line of demarkation could be shifted westward by any speculators with sufficient influence. The company of famous and near-famous men: Benjamin and William Franklin, Samuel Wharton, George Croghan, William Trent, and Sir William Johnson, had left a heritage of cupidity that testified to the sordidness that characterized much of the history of the development of western lands.

Six years after the negotiation of the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, Governor William Tryon reported that Fort Stanwix had been dismantled. Within a decade and a half after its establishment, the fort at the Oneida Carrying Place seemed to have fulfilled its historic mission. But a new career would open for it during the War for American Independence that won it a new and more important place in history.
The end of the Colonial Period found the western and northern portions of the Province of New York still in varying degrees frontier in nature. Much of the western part continued to be Iroquois country. The Confederacy had lost much of its early strength; and its people, especially the Mohawks, Onandagas, and Oneidas, were becoming more "civilized" and dependent on the whites. The Mohawk Valley was thus a region where the races met in frequent contact, and relations between them was an important subject for the local people and the provincial government. Sir William Johnson, who from 1756 until his death on the eve of the Revolution was superintendent of Indian affairs for the tribes north of the Ohio River, was the valley's dominant personality. Its white population was a mixture of German, Scottish, and English with a small number of descendants of the old colonial Dutch families. In 1772 the half of New York bordering on Canada and the Iroquois country, including all of the Mohawk Valley from about two miles west of Schenectady, was separated from Albany County and named Tyron County in honor of Governor William Tryon.

The people of the county entered the era of Revolution with divided loyalties. Communities and families split as some members aligned themselves with the rebellious colonists while others remained loyal to England and its provincial administration or hoped to remain aloof from the war. For many the choice was agonizing as men found themselves forced to choose from among conflicting interests. For the Germans, with no sentimental ties to England, the natural choice would seem to have been to cast their lot with the rebels—as many did. However, as they had tried to do during the Seven Years' War, some sought neutrality in a quarrel that they felt was not their concern. For others, remembering shabby usage by New York patricians like the Schuylers, who were leaders in the resistance to imperial authority, and believing that they were more likely to receive fair treatment from a royal governor than a native oligarchy, the choice was to be loyal to the Crown. Among them the Johnson influence may have been a factor. Sir William's wife, Sir John's mother, was a German, and the Palatines had found the baronet fair and sympathetic. The Highlanders were divided, but some had served in the British Army and had little love for the Hudson Valley grandees; and these remained true to their old allegiance. The English and Dutch settlers, mostly native-born, probably included more dedicated members of the "Patriot" party than did the other elements of the population. Thus to the people of the Mohawk country, the Revolution had many of the characteristics of a civil war.

Leadership of the Loyalists centered in the family of Sir William Johnson. His political heirs were his son, Sir John: his nephew, son-in-law, and successor to the superintendency, Guy Johnson; another son-in-law, Daniel Claus; and John Butler, who had been Sir William's deputy. Closely associated with them was Joseph Bryant (Thayendanega), Sir William's secretary and brother of Molly Brant, his Mohawk mistress. Sir John, hereditary head of the family and of the imperial interest, undertook to organize the valley's Loyalists and Indians into a provincial force; but his efforts were thwarted, and he and some of his supporters were disarmed and placed on parole. Fearful that pro-British elements might yet rally on the Johnsons, the state's revolutionary leadership resolved to arrest him. When he learned that his family's old rival, Philip Schuyler, was sending a force under Colonel Dayton to carry out that resolution, he escaped to Canada in May.
1776, where he was commissioned a lieutenant-colonel and authorized to raise a loyal regiment.

American concern for the security of the valley was not confined to local or provincial action. Maj. Gen. Philip John Schuyler, commanding general of the Northern Department, was aware of the region's economical potential and its political and military significance. On June 8, 1776, he wrote to the President of the Continental Congress recommending that troops be posted at the site of Fort Stanwix and that the Indians be advised of 'the Continental's intentions.' He did not wait for an answer from Congress before preparing to carry his suggestion into effect. Three days later, he informed General Washington that he was "preparing everything I can with utmost secrecy for taking post at Fort Stanwix, which I propose to do immediately after the conference with the Indians." Congress did not delay considering the general's recommendation and on Friday, June 14:

Resolved, That General Schuyler and the other commissioners for Indian affairs in the northern department be directed immediately to hold a conference with Six Nations: to engage them in our interest upon the best terms that can be procured, and treat with them on the principles and in the decisive manner mentioned in his letter:

[of June 8]

That General Schuyler's preparations for immediately taking post at Fort Stanwix, and erecting a fortification there, be approved of: and that Gen. Washington be instructed to give him directions for carrying that measure into execution.\(^1\)

The Commander-in-Chief complied with the Congress's resolution;\(^4\) and although the Indians postponed negotiations, General Schuyler pushed preparations for occupying the Carrying Place. He ordered Col. Elias Dayton of the 3d New Jersey Regiment of the Continental Line to take post at Fort Stanwix with 500 men of his regiment, 150 of Colonel Cornelius Wynkoop's 4th New York Continental Regiment, 75 Tryon County Militia "intended for Canada," and an additional 200 of the county militia.\(^5\)

On June 26 General Schuyler gave orders for the shipment of supplies and artillery by batteaux to be commanded by Captains Lansing and Wolcott. Strict secrecy was enjoined, and the batteauxmen were not to be informed of their destination. Preparations proceeded rapidly, and on July 1 the supplies began to move westward from Albany.\(^6\) Colonel Dayton's troops assembled and reached their new post on July 23. In the meantime, Schuyler moved to German Flats to meet with the Indian delegations, in compliance with the Congress's June 14 resolution; and he reported that the occupation of the Carrying Place had not given umbrage to the Indians.\(^7\)

The troops, accompanied by Engineer Nathaniel Hubbell, found the fort dismantled and ruinous.\(^8\) Their task was to secure the vicinity, serve as a center for patrols, and either rebuild the fort or construct a new one. General Schuyler left to Dayton's discretion the selection of the two alternatives, telling him: "As I never was at Fort Stanwix, I cannot positively recommend any particular place for erecting a Fortification, but from the best Information I have been able to procure, I am led to believe the Spot on which the old Fort stood, the most Eligible, of this you must be the Judge."\(^9\) The general apparently expected Dayton to build a new fort, either on the site of the colonial one or at a new location. However, he wisely left the final decisions of how to accomplish that part of the mission to the local commander. While the surviving correspondence that has been studied does not explicitly spell out how the colonel exercised his options, enough information exists to form some conclusions.

Since the Mohawk column did not arrive at its post until the middle of July, the commander and his engineer were faced with the problem of building a fort that could be occupied during the next winter within a severely limited period of time. Although there were more than 900 men in the expedition, only a portion of that number could be employed at a given time in construction, because military and camp duties absorbed part of the available man-power. The condition of the colonial fort was the key to the solution of their problem. If it could be repaired, a great saving of time could be realized. On the other hand, if it was too dilapidated, two alternatives remained: the fort could be razed and the site reused; or another location could be selected and prepared before new construction could be commenced. Two questions require answering: Did the Revolutionary fort occupy the site of the original Fort Stanwix? Was the old fort repaired; or did Dayton's men construct a completely new facility?
The first question is answered by two cartographic representations of the Revolutionary period fort. One of these is a copy of a map by Francois de Fleury entitled, “A Sketch of the siege of FORT SCHUYLER Presented to Col. Gansevoort L. Fleury.” The other is a “Plan of Fort Stanwix” that hung in Peter Gansevoort’s Albany home for many years and now in the New York Public Library. Both of these locate the fort on the site of the original one.

The second question can be answered with almost as much precision. The representations of the Revolutionary fort’s curtains, bastions, glacis, sally ports, and covered way correspond very closely with the earlier plans, particularly Crown Maps 99, 100 and 101. Within less than a fortnight after the troops arrived, Nathaniel Hubbell wrote to General Schuyler praising the soldiers’ performance and predicting, “The Fort will be Tenable by 15 Augst [sic].” A letter from Schuyler to Washington of August 1 is couched in terms that indicate the old fort was being repaired when he wrote, “Fort Stanwix is repairing and is already so far advanced as to be defensible against light artillery.” On the same day, Colonel Dayton wrote to commander, “The Fort here which at present is very defensible against almost any Number of Small Arms we had this day the pleasure to name Fort Schuyler.” Two days later, Schuyler wrote to General Horatio Gates:

Yesterday I received information that the enemy intended to possess themselves of Oswego, and to march a body of troops to destroy the settlements on the river. I can hardly imagine that they will venture to leave Fort Stanwix in the rear, which is already in such a condition as to be tenable against small-arms, and even light artillery.

By the end of August, scarcely six weeks after beginning the work, Colonel Dayton was able to tell his commanding general that, “Unless the Enemy visit us by the first of October, I imagine they will not disturb Fort Schuyler this season.” Thus within two months, the fort was strong enough to persuade the local commander and his superior, who had spent most of the summer engaging in talks with the Indians at German Flats, that it could withstand any force the enemy was likely to bring against it that year. This had been accomplished in spite of rumors of hostile activity, continued drains on Dayton’s man-power in providing scouts, and the loss of Wynkoop’s two companies, who were ordered down-river on August 2. This state of preparedness could have been achieved only by utilizing and repairing the curtains, bastions, ditch, and glacis of the original fort.

While Dayton and Schuyler had hoped to have the barracks for 400 men completed by the beginning of winter, a scarcity of bricks, boards, and nails forced deferment of that portion of the work until the next year. But the engineer went to Albany for materials so that work could be resumed as early in the season as possible. The correspondence does not provide details concerning other buildings constructed during 1776, but they probably included officer’s quarters, a storehouse, and a powder magazine. Supplies and ordnance had been dispatched throughout the summer and fall, and facilities for their storage during the winter would have had a high priority.

The lack of barracks limited the number of men who could be stationed at the fort during the winter months to about 200. This worried Colonel Dayton, whose men’s time would expire at the end of the year, and he wrote General Schuyler telling him that he did not expect the enemy to move against the fort, adding: I conclude General Schuyler will order no more than about 200 men to garrison this Fort the ensuing winter as I suppose that number sufficient and not more than 200 can be properly accommodated. On this account I fear a Separation of my Regiment unless you Sir, should think it fit to order us to a more active and important station, and send a part of Colonel Elmore’s Battalion which I understand is equal to mine in point of numbers, to relieve us at this Post.

General Schuyler complied with Dayton’s request and on October 9 ordered Col. Samuel Elmore’s Connecticut troops to leave German Flats and occupy Fort Schuyler [Stanwix], which they did on the 17th. Because not all the barracks had been completed, a part of Elmore’s command returned to German Flats to winter there at nearby Burnet’s Field. At the end of December, beef and an eight-month supply of flour, along with soap and candles, were ordered sent to Elmore’s men at Fort Stanwix.

One of the last actions taken by the Continental Congress in 1776 was the passage of a resolution on Saturday, December 28, providing:
That Fort Stanwix be strengthened, & other fortifications be made at proper places near the Mohawk river, . . . to be executed this winter, commanding officers of artillery, chief engineer, quartermaster general, & commissary general, provide & perform whatever things in the respective departments are necessary, or may contribute to the accomplishment thereof.23

The winter of 1776-77 was a period of quiet on the northern frontier, but it was not one of complacency. Sir Guy Carleton’s aborted 1776 invasion confirmed American fears that the British intended carrying the war into the interior; and although Sir Guy had withdrawn to Canada, there was ample evidence that the project was deferred, not abandoned. Shortages of every form of material hounded the commanders in the Northern Department. Illness and desertion ate into the effective man-power. Sectional and personal loyalties divided men and units, a condition that was reflected in the shifts of command between Philip Schuyler and Horatio Gates. Crown Point and Ticonderoga at the northern terminus of the Champlain-Hendron line were still American, but every problem that plagued the Americans seemed to focus and compound there. Fort Stanwix was unfinished and while defensible against small arms and light artillery, it was vulnerable to a determined attack supported by heavier field pieces.

During the late winter, a new and little-known figure entered the story of the fort. A French officer, Captain B. De Lamarquise, who had been assigned to the Northern Department as an engineer, submitted to General Schuyler a plan for rebuilding the fort. The general accepted it and ordered the engineer to:

make the alterations agreeable to the plan you have laid before me, and to guard as much as possible against any misfortunes, that might be occasioned by an attack before the alterations are compleat, whilst the other is going on as possible that the garrison may be covered. Perhaps it will be best to begin with one bastion and the adjacent curtains and compleat as much as possible before another is begun.24

Lamarquise’s plan has not been located, and thus an important element of the construction history of the fort is missing. That it envisaged substantial changes as indicated in the general’s letter to Colonel Elmore in which he wrote: “Captain Lamarquise [?] has in charge from the general to New Moddle [model] Fort Schuyler and make some additional fortifications at that place.” 25

At the end of March, while preparing to leave for Philadelphia, General Schuyler ordered Col. Peter Gansevoort of the 3d New York Regiment of the Continental Line to Fort Stanwix to replace Elmore’s men of the Connecticut Line.26

The first detachment of the new garrison reached the fort on April 17. On May 3 Colonel Gansevoort arrived and took command. A week later, Elmore’s men, who had spent the winter on the frontier, marched out of the fort on their way to Albany. The remainder of Gansevoort’s regiment, under the command of Lt. Col. Marinus Willett arrived on May 28.27

Gates replaced Schuyler as Commanding General of the Northern Department. In his papers is an undated report from Captain de Lamarquise, written prior to Gansevoort’s arrival, detailing the latter’s work at the fort:

Capt. De Lamarquise’s proceedings at Fort Schuyler since his arrival at that post—

has made halves to the axes, pickaxes & spades & other implements

has made 200 embases on riviere

has made a guard house at the entry of the Fort which before his arrival was behind

has made sentry-boxes where necessary to keep centinels

has built a house by order of the general for one stefanny who is married to a squaw 24 ft long by 12 ft deep

has made a small store to put provisions under cover finished a house for the savages when they come to that post also arranged the Barracks which were of no service not being in a state without alteration to receive 200 men and he will put them in a state to receive 500 or at least 400 say.

The Garrison has not yet permitted him to undertake the putting the fort in proper order and were there men sufficient, the grass will not be of sufficient strength for 15 days, to cut turf he has therefore employed the few he has to open a road to the westward of the fort where he can get cedar and pine near at hand, whereas before they were obliged to go three miles to fetch a piece of wood as also firewood.

as soon as Colo Gansevoort arrives he will set about the fort and trim it up with turf &c from the bottom of the ditch &c.

He proposes to raise the parapet with cedar (as there is enough about a mile from the fort) by the end of next month he thinks it will be necessary to order 200 to 300 militia to assist in that work if no
other troops are to be sent but Gansevoort's.

He proposes next week to make a hospital for the sick for the want of which and a surgeon he will be obliged to send them down having already done it Major Cockran is now very ill.

When he arrived at Fort Schuyler the 20th of April with a company of 20 carpenters a few days after he was obliged to discharge 10 of them being shoemakers, tailors, & smiths who did not understand their business for which they engaged.28

Within three weeks, the engineer wrote General Gates proposing to build a new fort rather than repairing the existing one, saying:

I have received orders from General Schuyler to repair this fort in the same way form it was last war. It is absolutely necessary that I make it entirely new. Barracks, Ramparts, Parapet, Fosse and covered way, Fraise and Chevaux de fiesse; all is destroyed. If there is no more troops to come than Col. Gansevoort's Regiment, I can not absolutely repair this Fort so soon as I would wish it and necessity requires. I wish you would send a reinforcement as soon as it is possible and give orders to the Quarter Master General to supply the necessities of the Garrison, by means of which I can in a little time put the place in condition not to fear the enemy.29

Almost simultaneously, Gansevoort assured the departmental commander that he would cooperate with the engineer to the full extent of his capabilities, but that he simply did not have the personnel to do everything that was needed, "as the whole fort and barracks is to be new modelled." He also informed him that he needed at least ten more batteaus to transport boards.30

Before Gates could respond to Gansevoort's and Lamarquise's correspondence, Congress again shifted the Northern Department's command to Schuyler.31 At this point, the construction history of the fort becomes more confusing. The engineer had insisted that the old fort was beyond repair and that a new one would have to be built, and Gansevoort's memorandum to Gates indicated that the works were to be "new modelled." On May 26 Lt. Col. Marinus Willett arrived from Fort Constitution with the rest of Gansevoort's regiment, minus a detachment left at Fort Dayton.32 Colonel Willett prepared an account of his military career thirty years after the siege of Fort Stanwix, and that narrative makes the following contribution to the story of the fort's remodeling:

Instead of repairing the works after the manner of their original construction, which could easily have been done,—for though in a state of decay, the principal outlines of the old fort were sufficiently visible,—the engineer sent out large parties to procure logs from the swamp. Having ordered them to be drawn near the fort, he began to erect them in the covert way and not in the center of the ditch where they formerly had been placed. After having with much labor procured the logs, it appeared that each log was seven feet longer than was necessary; the logs being seventeen in length, when the pickets that were to be made of them only required ten feet. This blunder of the engineer, together with the remissness he showed, at so critical a moment, led Colonel Willett to suggest to Colonel Gansevoort the propriety of discharging him from the office he filled. Colonel Gansevoort, however, from the circumstance that the engineer had been appointed by the commander-in-chief of the Northern Department, General Schuyler, to superintend the fortifications, was reluctant to take the step.

The fortifications, consequently, continued to go on under the superintendence of the engineer. The barracks were repaired within the fort, and a large and commodious building intended for this purpose was erected a little beyond the foot of the glacis. But all of those works were of secondary importance; indeed the barracks out of the fort at the foot of the glacis, could be of no use in care of investment, but rather an injury. And so it actually proved: for the enemy set fire to this very building at a time, when the wind, blowing fresh toward the fort, occasioned considerable inconvenience to the garrison. In the meantime little was done to strengthen the fort, though there was every reason to expect the instant arrival of the enemy.

The anxiety of Colonel Willett, arising from a conviction of the incompetency of the engineer, in connection with the critical state of the fort, led him closely to inspect the progress of the state of the fortification. The engineer had begun to erect a salient angle to the gate, with two embrasures in it. He was also engaged in erecting pickets along the covert way. The pickets were placed about three feet from the parapet to the gate, with two embrasures in it. He was also engaged in erecting pickets along the covert way. The pickets were placed about three feet from the parapet of the glacis. Two of them were framed together with cross-pieces, and formed a kind of porthole which were intended to be placed opposite the embrasures. But it soon appeared from the manner in which the pickets were arranged that the portholes formed of the pickets with crosspieces would come opposite the neck of the embrasures. By this means the salient angle would be rendered wholly useless Colonel Willett at an early stage of the work, noticed the error, but thought it best to let the engineer take his own course until the line of pickets should be carried...
to that part of the salient angle where they would be opposite to the embrasures. When the engineer reached this part of his work, his ignorance would be without the least covering; and yet he never discovered his error until the pickets were erected opposite the neck of the embrasures. Then for the first time he saw that all his labor in erecting the salient angle had been in vain; and that it could not be used without first knocking away the neck of the embrasures. The case being stated to Colonel Gansevoort, he directed Colonel Willett to arrest the engineer, which was accordingly done. He was permitted to repair to headquarters; a letter at the same time being sent to General Schuyler assigning the reasons of the arrest.

It was not until some time in the month [July] that this step was taken. Information had already been received that the enemy were advancing toward the garrison.

Because the account was written so many years after the events took place and was rewritten by his son William, the colonel's story must be used cautiously and in conjunction with other, more contemporaneous sources. Returning to those sources, one can trace a part of the course of rebuilding of the fort. On June 15, in reply to a query of Schuyler's concerning the progress of the work, Gansevoort wrote that, in spite of the fact every available man was on fatigue details, progress was very slow and that:

there are about 2,000 Pickquettcs lying around the fort which we have Drawn out of the swamp through which we have been obliged to make Roads for that purpose and will soon be able to compleat that part of the business—nothing of any importance is yet done towards the strengthening of the fortification which at present has little more than the name of a fortification. The engineer at this place has just laid the foundation of a salient angle before the gate and the carpenters are employed in framing a Barracks to be raised just before the glacis opposite the south Bastion the Barracks at present being bad and the whole works insufficient to contain the few men we have here, the whole of the works which appear to me to be necessary and which Capt. Marquisie tells me are to be done at this place undoubtedly require more strength than we have at present. I, therefore, humbly request that part of my Regiment which is at present stationed at Fort Dayton may be relieved and ordered to this place.

He reported that the engineer appeared to be diligent, that many of the supplies went to “victualing” the Indians, that a number of his men were ill, and that he had to send as far as Conajohary for boards and to Little Falls for lime.

Suddenly, on July 10, General Schuyler wrote to Gansevoort directing him to “send Capt. Marquisie down & let Major Hubbel superintend the works.” Nothing in the contemporary correspondence reveals the reasons for this apparently abrupt action. Schuyler was not a man who gave his confidence lightly and he was equally slow to withdraw it. The reasons for ordering the Frenchman's replacement must have been weighty. Looking at it from the distance of nearly two centuries, some of Lamarquise's acts, and decisions, and statements certainly are hard to understand and defend. For one thing, he intruded himself into the field of Indian relations, as witness this report to General Gates:

I have the honor to write you this to inform you of the arrangements which I have made with the savages of the Six Nations, that after having held council with them of which Mr. Stephnes was the interpreter, they promised me neutrality, and that they will not meddle any more with the affairs of the King of England, and they are satisfied that the King of France was a friend of the Americans for which they will rest at peace.

The 26th of April last the savages of the Six Nations sent to the Fort for me, in consequence of which I was sent with them in Council with the savages that was arrived from Canada. These savages from Canada promised me also neutrality in the presence of Mr. Dean, the Interpreter, and told me that they will refuse General Carleton all sorts of propositions, and that they will not meddle more with anything, and they gave the following news:

At a place called La Gallette (Oswagatia I believe) [Oswego] where they are constructing a vessel of 28 pieces of cannon which ought to be finished. There is in the Fort 50 or 60 men, and 6 pieces of artillery mounted. At Niagara there is about 200 men which Mr. Johnson's son [Sir John Johnson] left when he was last fall at New York. At St. John's last winter they had there and at the Isle auxNois 1,000 men, and there they are constructing 12 batteaus of one mast, and several more large batteaus. When Messrs. Nermonet and the other gentlemen arrived, I had arrargned [arranged] all this on my good will and money, about a fortnight: being glad to have the occasion to oblige the country and render myself useful to the Continent.

I hope General this will give you pleasure, and that you will have some regard to my good intention; it has cost in presents to make them drink about one
hundred dollars which I expended with a good heart.

... I shall always be ready to execute your orders, and that will give much pleasure to the savages.\footnote{36}

In his undated memorandum describing the situation prior to May 5, the date of Gansevoort's arrival, he wrote concerning the conference with the Indians:

The 26 April 2 savages from the Sault St. Louis near Montreal arrived among the 6 Nations. As soon as they heard there was a French officer at the fort they sent for him to hold a council which lasted from 9 in the morning to 6 in the evening but not being accustomed to such councils he neglected to lay in a good breakfast. Therefore declares when he broke up had great occasion for a good dinner. In the counsel the savages from Canada agreed with the Six Nations and him not to take part with the English as they call our enemies but remain neutral.

When he went out to meet them they received him with the honors of war a salute of 3 cannons and each savage fired his fusil, which I answered with 3 discharges from the detachment I had with me. When I left them the same ceremony happened. They made him a present, but unfortunately not worth much. He did all he could to engage the Canadian Indians to come down but could not succeed . . . P.S.—If you send Capt. Florimant here I believe it will be of service first to assist in the works, secondly the right of another French officer will confirm to the savages what I have already told them—and also you may be assured he is an honest man.\footnote{37}

Lamarquise's reports pose some problems. First, Colonel Elmore, the fort's commanding officer and the official responsible for Indian affairs in that vicinity, and his successor, Colonel Gansevoort, never referred to the council, nor did General Schuyler, departmental commander and Indian commissioner. This is strange, if so important a conference as the engineer describes convened. Secondly, the only members of the Six Nations whose presence in any numbers is reported at or near the fort and with whom the Americans apparently had friendly contacts were the Oneidas. Thirdly, the conduct of the Six Nations, excepting the Oneidas, was exactly the opposite of what Lamarquise reported they had pledged. If the council took place, it probably included not representatives of the Confederacy, but only a few of the local bands; and the Indians succeeded in hoodwinking the Frenchman, playing upon his sense of importance. There are no documents authorizing the engineer to treat with the Indians and none that have been studied support his story; although a probable result was Schuyler's order to Gansevoort forbidding persons not employed by the Indian Department to make speeches to the Indians.\footnote{38}

Lamarquise's professional performance is not always easy to defend. As has been noted, he was commissioned to restore the fort "in the same way it was last war." Contending that it was beyond repair, he advised building a completely new one and apparently proceeded to act as though that was what he was doing. This would have been a very ambitious undertaking under the best of conditions, and one that would have demanded a severely imposed husbanding of men, time and equipment. However, he built a house for Stephen Degran, a local French squaw-man, a building to shelter the Indians who visited the fort, and erected a large new barracks outside the fort that had to be destroyed during the siege to prevent its screening the enemy's approach. His utilization of building materials was not what would have been expected of an engineer working against time in a wilderness environment. Instead of erecting log barracks, he used boards that had to be shipped by batteaux from Conajohary, a distance of almost fifty miles. In fact, if he intended building a new fort to replace the old one he failed. Nothing in the contemporary documents indicates that he razed the old ramparts; and as shall be noted, the evidence indicates that the old fort was still standing in August. Perhaps he intended to build a new one and that time, the approaching enemy, and his recall precluded his accomplishing his objective. The Gansevoort-Schuyler correspondence does not tell why he was replaced—perhaps Colonel Willett's account of Lamarquise's incompetence provides the answer.

The Americans continued working to strengthen their position under Hubbell's supervision. As the summer advanced, enemy activity in the vicinity increased. On June 25 a party of Indians attacked Captain Gregg and Corporal Madison while hunting. The corporal was killed and the captain almost fatally wounded.\footnote{39} On July 3 Ensign John Spoor and a party of seven men cutting sod at the ruins of old Fort Newport were attacked. One soldier was killed and scalped, one wounded and scalped, and the officer and four men were captured.\footnote{40} Not unnaturally, the fort's commander sus-
pected the neighboring Oneidas of having a share in these events; and, according to William L. Stone, Sr., the Indians denied any complicity, protesting their good-will and friendship, to which the Colonel replied:

Brother Warriors of the Six Nations: I thank you for your good talk.

Brothers: You tell us you are sorry for the cruel usage of Captain Gregg, and the murder of one of our warriors; that you would have immediately pursued the murderers, had not General Schuyler, General Gates, and the French general desired you not to take any part in this war; and that you have obeyed their orders, and are resolved to do so. I commend your good resolution.

Brothers: You say you have sent a runner to the Six Nations to inform them of what has happened, and that you expect some of the chiefs will look into the affair, and try to find the murderers. You have done well. I shall be glad to smoke a pipe with your chiefs, and hope they will do as they speak.

Brothers: I hope the mischief has been done, not by any of our good neighbors of the Oneida nation but by the Tories, who are enemies to you as well as to us, and who are ready to murder yourselves, your wives, and children if you will not be as wicked as themselves.

Brothers: When your chiefs shall convince me that Indians of the six Nations have had no hand in this wicked thing, and shall use means to find out the murderers and bring them to justice, you may be assured that we will strengthen the chain of friendship, and embrace you as good brothers. I will not suffer any of our warriors to hurt you.\(^{41}\)

The details of the work done after Lamarquise's departure cannot be traced in the correspondence that has survived. Thus a picture of what the fort looked like when Brigadier Barry St. Leger's men laid siege to it in August must be inferred from the data that we have reviewed and from two cartographic sources.

Captain Lamarquise had reported to General Gates that the original fort was beyond repair and that a new one would have to be built, and Colonel Gansevoort apparently acquiesced in this. Therefore, one question that needs answering is whether a new fort was indeed constructed. The engineer's and Gansevoort's letters to Schuyler and Willett's *Narrative* give the impression that was the objective of the work undertaken during the summer of 1776; but the same sources raise doubts that much progress was made toward that goal.

The reports and letters, and especially Willett's account, clearly indicate that the original ditch and glacis were retained. This meant that before a new fort could be constructed the old one would have to be razed, but there is no documentary evidence that this was done. In fact, the ramparts received scant attention. The engineer reported to Gates before May 5 that he intended to raise the parapet with cedar. He mentioned the laying of turf on the ramparts' exterior slopes, and beginning work on a "salient angle" in front of the main gate. Colonel Willett recalled that "little was done to strengthen the fort," and Colonel Gansevoort reported on June 15 that "nothing of any importance is yet done towards strengthening the fortification . . ."

The cartographic evidence argues strongly against the construction of a new fort. The most nearly contemporary plan or map was the one made by the French officer, Francois de Fleury, entitled, "A Sketch of the siege of FORT SCHUYLER Presented to Col. Gansevoort by L. Fleury." The original Map is lost, but two copies exist. One by G. H. Bowen is preserved in the Cornell University Library's Sparks Collection. Another was prepared by William Campbell for William L. Stone's *Life of Brant*. A later sketch of the fort was drawn by an unknown artist and presented to Colonel Gansevoort, in whose Albany home it hung for many years. It is now owned by the New York Public Library.\(^{12}\) This presents a view of the fort and its environs after the siege, possibly in 1778. These representational of the Revolutionary fort's curtains, bastions, glacis, and gates correspond closely with the earlier plans, especially numbers CXXI 99, 100, and 101 of the British Museum's Crown Map Collection.

From the correspondence of 1777 and the Fleury map, a general description of the historic fort as it existed at the time of the siege may be projected. The ditch and glacis conformed to the pre-Revolutionary design, i.e., a ditch that was about 40 feet wide and a glacis approximately 90 feet wide. However, Willett said that instead of being in the center of the ditch, the pickets were placed on the covered way, the space between the outside berm of the ditch and the glacis parapet. The pickets, according to Willett, were ten feet long,
of which approximately six or seven feet stood above ground. An unfinished salient angle stood opposite the main gate, which was located in the center of the south curtain. A drawbridge gave access to the gate. In the center of the east curtain was another gate, or sally-port, that gave access to a spring-fed stream. A small salient covered this entrance after 1764, and an unidentifiable symbol indicates that some type of work did so in 1777. A fraise of horizontal inclined pickets was near the top of the external slope of the ramparts. All reports agreed that a very limited amount of work was done on the ramparts, except for placing sod on the exterior slope and raising the parapet with cedar. The map's representation of the ramparts shows a heavy line for all sections except the south curtain and southeast bastion. This may indicate that the latter were in a less advanced state of repair. The flag staff was on the southwest bastion, where three cannon were mounted. Four guns were on the northwest bastion, three on the northeast, and four on the southeast. The bombproof was in the southeast bastion. The sources do not indicate whether the parapet was en barbette or had embrasures, although the post-siege plan shows embrasures. There is a tradition that because of the topography, the eastern curtain was shorter than the others; and this seems logical because a small stream flowed within a few yards of the fort on that side, and its west bank would appear to have required a weaker and shorter curtain. This is supported by St. Leger's description of the fort:

I found it a respectable Fortress strongly garrisoned with 700 men and demanding a train of Artillery we were not masters of for its speedy subjection.—Its form is a kind of Trapezium or four sided figure with four Bastions freized and picketed, without them is a good ditch with pickets nipping out a considerable way at the salient angles of the Bastions three nines four sixes two threes with a considerable number of wall pieces were all the Artillery the Enemy made use of during the Siege.43

The structures inside the fort are not easily identified. The key to the map uses letters to accomplish this, but they are not always distinct. In one instance, the guard house, no reference is found in the key. This building stood to the left of the main gate as one entered the fort. Opposite it was the store-house. The barracks stood east and west of the parade, and the commandant's quarters and headquarters stood north of it. The key also lists a "Laboratory," whose location may have been identical with the store-house or commissary. Because the conclusions that may be developed from the documentary and cartographic sources lack certitude, it is hoped that archeological study will enlarge knowledge of the physical features and correct any errors of interpretation.44

After the siege, repair and construction continued, because the threat to the frontier remained critical. The post-siege map shows a hospital, carpenter shop, blacksmith shop, "Indian House," and stable outside the fort's walls and a "Necessary House" built over the creek and connected to the southeast bastion by a bridge in the position that a similar facility occupied in 1759, as depicted on Crown Map CXXI, 99.
While the men of Colonel Gansevoort's command were repairing Fort Stanwix, the British government and two of its generals were preparing plans for a campaign that was to test the fort and its defenders. What they planned was an invasion of the northern frontier that would, among other accomplishments, redeem the aborted one of 1776. To understand that plan and what it did and did not contain, we need to go back to November of that year when William Howe proposed a plan for 1777 providing that 2,000 men would hold Rhode Island while 10,000 would move from there against New England and 5,000 would hold New York City and 8,000 would "cover New Jersey" while 10,000 would advance up the Hudson to cooperate with a renewed invasion from Canada. The 8,000 men covering New Jersey would also threaten Philadelphia, which Sir William intended to attack after being reinforced. If the American Capital fell and troops became available, he planned to attack Virginia during the autumn and South Carolina and Georgia in the winter. This plan was predicated upon his having available a total of 35,000 men, requiring a reinforcement of 15,000.1

On December 20, before a response to his initial plan could be received from London, the general wrote to Lord George Germain, the Secretary of State for Colonies and Lord Commissioner of Trade and Plantations, outlining a modification of his plan. This proposed opening the campaign with an offensive against Pennsylvania, where he believed the sentiments of the people were favorable to the British, and deferring "the offensive Plan towards Boston until the Reinforcement arrives, that there might be a Corps to act defensively on the lower part of Hudson's River to cover Jersey and to facilitate in some degree the approach of the Canada Army." He changed the proposed distribution of troops to 2,000 for Rhode Island, 4,000 in the New York City area, 3,000 to act on the lower Hudson, and 10,000 to operate in Pennsylvania, a total of 19,000.2

At the close of the northern campaign of 1776, one of Gen. Sir Guy Carleton's subordinates, Maj. Gen. John Burgoyne, like other officers who were members of Parliament, returned to England for the winter sessions and to advance personal professional interests. He arrived at an important point in the development of plans for the coming year. Between the Colonial Minister and Sir Guy there was an old and cherished enmity. The general's failure to prosecute the invasion of the northern frontier was grist in Lord George's mill, and even George III agreed that the command of the next campaign should be given to a more aggressive general.3

There were two candidates for the honor: Henry Clinton and Burgoyne. Clinton did not seek the assignment, at least in part because he expected Howe to give it to him when the invading force established contact with New York.4 Burgoyne was the more obvious choice, in spite of his association with the failed invasion. In fact, he turned that association to an advantage. Not only could he pose as being familiar with the American scene, but he also assiduously cultivated the impression that he had opposed the abandonment of Crown Point; and a precis in the American Department's papers shows that the account he gave of the campaign of the previous summer did not always place Carleton in the most favorable light. He had brought a letter from his commander recommending him to the secretary as a source of information and advice, and he took advantage of this, especially
in detailed observations on Sir Guy's requirements for the next campaign. He used a technique of moderate criticism and suggestive contrast to convey an impression of Carleton's inadequacy.

On New Year's Day Burgoyne wrote to Lord Germain telling him that he was leaving London for Bath:

My physician has pressed me to go to Bath for a short time, and I find it requisite to my health and spirits to follow his Advice. But I think it a previous duty to assure your Lordship that should my attendance in town become necessary, relative to information upon the affairs in Canada, I shall be ready to obey your summons upon one day's notice.

Your Lordship being out of town, I submitted the above intentions a few days ago personally to his Majesty in his closet, and I added, "that as the arrangements for the next campaign might possibly come under his royal contemplation before my return, I humbly laid myself at his Majesty's feet for such active employment as he might think me worthy of.

This was the substance of my audience of my part, I undertook it, and I now report it, to you Lordship, in the hope of your patronage in the pursuit, a hope My Lord, founded not only upon a just sense of the honour your Lordship's friendship must reflect upon me but also upon a feeling that I deserve it, inasmuch as a solid respect and sincere personal attachment can constitute such a claim."

Burgoyne was clearly soliciting the command of the army that would invade the Colonies' northern frontier.

As late as February 24, 1777, the day after the receipt of Howe's December 20 modification of plans for 1777, the King wrote to the Prime Minister, Lord North, that Germain was going to propose that the northern command be given to Sir Henry Clinton and that Burgoyne be sent to New York. However, on the following day, the Cabinet agreed to send Burgoyne back to Canada. Germain had made certain that Carleton would not conduct the campaign, and he flattered himself that, although he had failed in an attempt to effect the Governor-General's recall, the invasion would be directed by a general who possessed the qualities the Secretary found so lacking in Sir Guy.

Leaving Carleton in command in Canada and appointing Burgoyne to command the expedition created a strange and potentially dangerous situation of dual command with "Burgoyne dependent on Carleton for his base and transport, yet marching independently to place himself under the orders of another General [Howe], while Carleton disowned all responsibility for events beyond the frontier of Canada." 

General Burgoyne had not been idle while his professional future was being settled: he was busy preparing his own plan. On February 28 he sent to Germain his "Thoughts for Conducting the War from the Side of Canada."

In examining Burgoyne's plan, two matters are pertinent to this study: the basic purpose or objective of the invasion and how it involved the Mohawk Valley. A great deal of ink has been expended in identifying the first. The isolation of New England through a junction of three forces, Burgoyne's from Canada, Sir William Howe's from New York, and Brigadier Barry St. Leger's from Oswego at Albany was a time-honored, simplistic definition. Recent scholarship has made the story more complex and in so doing has redefined the strategic role that the campaign was intended to play. The heart of the solution of the problem lies in Burgoyne's plan.

That plan was, in the first place, a discussion of alternatives. After retaking the first British objectives, Crown Point and Fort Ticonderoga, "The next measure must depend upon those taken by the enemy, and upon the general plan concerted at home." If the Government's plan provided that Sir William Howe's entire army would act on the Hudson and if "the only object of the Canada army is to effect a junction with that force," Burgoyne recommended that the main invading column go to Albany by way of Lake George. If, as he believed probable, the Americans should "be in force on the lake," light infantry and Indians should act around the lake to "oblige them to quit it without waiting for naval operations." If that failed to clear the lake, the army should attempt to move southward by Lake Camplain's South Bay and Skanesborough [Whitehall, N. Y.]. Burgoyne expected this alternative to be very difficult and at best requiring a significant number of vehicles for his artillery and supplies. The vehicles had to come from Canada. If, at the same time, the Americans should continue to occupy Lake George, the British would have to leave a chain of posts as they moved southward to secure their communications.

While Burgoyne expected that the British would be able to rid Lake George of the Ameri-
cans, he advocated that the army "at the outset should be provided with carriages, implements, and artificers for conveying armed vessels from Ticonderoga to the lake."

His second alternative was based upon cooperation with the British force posted in Rhode Island by getting control of the Connecticut River. Such an expedition would be faced with serious transport, communications, and security problems, but "should the junction between Canada and Rhode Island armies be effected upon the Connecticut, it would not be too sanguine an expectation that all the New England provinces will be reduced by their operations."

The third alternative that Burgoyne suggested was that if the force available for service were too small to undertake an over-land expedition with a reasonable promise of success, it might be wise to send the army by sea to join Sir William Howe.

If the first alternative, the one Burgoyne preferred, were chosen, he defined the expedition's mission in these words: "These ideas are formed upon the supposition, that the sole purpose of the Canada army is to effect a junction with General Howe, or after cooperating so far as to get possession of Albany and open the communication to New York, to remain upon Hudson's River, and thereby enable that General to act with his whole force to the Southward." If the second alternative, providing for gaining control of the Connecticut River and cooperation with the troops in Rhode Island, were selected, the reduction of New England, which Britain saw as the heart of the rebellion, would certainly facilitate Howe's movements in other quarters. The third alternative, involving the transfer of the northern army by sea, would obviously be exclusively directed toward Howe's reinforcement. Nothing in Burgoyne's plan made holding the Camplain-Hudson line and isolating New England his mission, except in so far as "cooperating so far as to get possession of Albany and open the communication to New York, to remain upon Hudson's River, and thereby enable that General [Howe] to act with his whole force to the Southward" would contribute to attaining that end.

Burgoyne's proposals received careful attention; and when the King responded to them, he and his ministers had not only the general's comments but also Howe's letter of November 30 containing his first plan, the one of December 20 altering that plan by shifting the offensive from New England to Philadelphia, one dated December 30 and that reported the affair at Trenton, and one dated January 20. When Sir William wrote the last, his fragile optimism had evaporated in the face of the battles of Trenton and Princeton and the amazing recuperative power displayed by Washington's army, and he wrote: "I do not now see a prospect of terminating ye War but by a general Action, and I am aware of the difficulties in our way to obtain it, as ye Enemy move with so much more celerity than we possibly can with our foreign troops who are too much attach'd to their baggage, which they have in amazing quantities in ye field." 11

With all these documents before them, the King's advisors, members of the Cabinet, and George III made the choice from among Burgoyne's proposals. The King's decision is contained in a document entitled "Remarks on The Conduct of the War from Canada," containing the royal objections to the second and third alternatives, ending with this paragraph:

The idea of carrying the army by sea to Sir William Howe would certainly require the leaving a much larger part of it in Canada, as in that case the rebel army would divide that province from the immense one under Sir W. Howe. I greatly dislike the idea. 12

The decision was made by the ministry and Crown. The primary purpose of the invasion would be to bring a two-column army from Canada to Albany, where it would be at Gen. Sir William Howe's command to utilize in prosecuting the war. If in accomplishing this other benefits should accrue, such as the isolation of New England, destruction of the army of the Northern Department, and reconquest of a geographic area, that would be so much the better. Perhaps in the face of such a disaster, the rebellion would collapse.

The second matter, and the one more directly associated with Fort Stanwix, concerns the part the Mohawk Valley was destined to play in Burgoyne's strategy. He covered that subject in his "Thoughts" with these paragraphs:

To avoid breaking in upon other matter, I omitted in the beginning of these papers to state the idea of an expedition at the outset of the campaign by the Lake Ontario and Oswego to the Mohawk River, which as a diversion to facilitate every proposed operation, would be highly desirable, provided the army should be reinforced sufficiently to afford it.
It may at first appear, from a view of the present strength of the army, that it may bear the sort of detachment proposed by myself last year for this purpose; but it is to be considered that at that time the utmost object of the campaign from the advanced season and unavoidable delay of preparation for the lakes, being the reduction of Crown Point and Ticonderoga, unless the success of my expedition had opened the road to Albany, no greater numbers were necessary than for those first operations. The case in the present year differs; because the season of the year affording a prospect of very extensive operation, and consequently the establishment of many posts, patrols, etc., will become necessary. The army ought to be in a state of numbers to bear those drains, and still remain sufficient to attack anything that probably can be opposed to it.

Nor, to argue from probability, is so much force necessary for this diversion this year, as was required for the last: because we then knew that General Schuyler with a thousand men, was fortified upon the Mohawk. When the different situations of things are considered, viz, the progress of General Howe, the early invasion from Canada, the threatening of the Connecticut from Rhode Island, etc., it is not to be imagined that any detachment of such force as that of Schuyler can be supplied by the enemy for the Mohawk. I would not therefore propose it of more (and I have great diffidence whether so much can be prudently afforded) than Sir John Johnson's corps, and a hundred British from the second brigade, and a hundred more from the 8th regiment, with four pieces of the lightest artillery, and a body of savages; Sir John Johnson to be with a detachment in person, and an able field officer to command it. I should wish Lieutenant-Colonel St. Teger for that employment.

I particularize the second brigade, because the first is proposed to be diminished by the 31st regiment remaining in Canada, and the rest of the regiment drafted for the expedition being made also part of the Canada force, the two brigades will be exactly squared.

Burgoine's discussion is a strange combination of proposing a diversion by way of the Mohawk and a questioning of its wisdom. But, again, it is wise to remember that he was writing about alternatives. For a purely military perspective, there was really not too much to commend the Mohawk expedition. True, it would be diversionary, but did it promise to be effective enough to justify the commitment of the white troops that would be required, especially when so few could be spared? The Government's decision to operate in western New York was based upon political rather than military considerations operating in the valley and farther west.

The region was the gateway to the great western country whose importance had long been appreciated at Whitehall. Memories of Pontiac's conspiracy were fresh, and prudence dictated that the western tribes become accustomed to supporting British interests in the interior.

More immediately important was the retention of the loyalty of the Six Nations. Two of the tribes were refusing to support their old allies, the British; and one, the Oneidas, was actively assisting the Colonies. The presence of victorious royal troops would insure the steadfastness of the loyal and recall the allegiance of the alienated.

The local Loyalists were another factor—not only the active ones like the Johnsons and their associates, but also the inactive and wavering. The former had suffered self-exile for their principles, had raised a body of "provincials" in the British service, and had persuaded the authorities at home that the majority of the valley's people would rise for the Crown whenever a British army should appear.

On the basis of this combination of military and political interests, the ministry decided to make a commitment in the Mohawk-Ontario Country and Lt. Col. Barry St. Leger of the 34th Regiment of Foot was given its command with the local rank of brigadier.

General St. Leger was given 100 men from each of two regiments stationed in Canada, the 34th and the 8th; Sir John Johnson's Regiment (the Greens); a company of rangers under Walter Butler; and 342 Hanau Chasseurs (light infantry or jägers). To these were to be added "a sufficient number of Canadians and Indians." The expedition also had 40 artillerymen to serve the six-pounders, two three-pounders, and four 4.4-inch "Cochorn" mortars. Of the Hanau troops, only one company joined the expedition. Exact figures of St. Leger's strength cannot be established, but an estimated 700-800 white troops and, according to tradition, 800 to 1,000 Indians comprised his force.

The British regulars and militia left Lachine near Montreal on or about June 23. When he left Montreal, St. Leger had received intelligence about Fort Stanwix to the effect that "there were 60 Men in a picketed place." Upon this information, the commander formulated his plan to make a dash
through the wilderness and storm what he believed to be a very weak frontier post, which was consistent with his ordinance capability. Col. Daniel Claus was skeptical about the accuracy of this intelligence and he sent out a reconnaissance party that reported a very different situation:

Between 60 & 70 Leagues from Montreal by reconnoitering party returned and met me with 5 prisoners: (one a Lieut) and 4 scalps having defeated a working party of 16 rebels, as they were cutting Sodd, towards repairing and finishing the old Fort which is a regular Square, and garrisoned by upwards of 600 Men, the Repairs far advanced, and the Rebels expecting us, and were acquainted with our Strength and Rout [e]. I immediately forwarded the Prisoners to the Brigr. [Brigadier] who was about 15 Leagues in our Rear. On his Arrival within a few Leagues of Buck Island he sent for me, and talking over the Intelligence the Rebel Prisrs. gave, he owned that if they intended to defend themselves in that Fort, our Artillery were not sufficient to take it, however he said he was determined to get the Truth of these Fellows. I told him that [?] examined them separately they agreed in their Story; and here the Brigr. had still an Opportunity & time of sending for a better Train of Artillery, and wait for the junction of the Chasseurs which must have secured us Success as every one will allow, however he was still full of his Alert, making little of the Prisrs Intelligence.\footnote{18}

Although St. Leger refused to wait for more Germans and send back for additional artillery, he agreed to go to Oswego, which he had intended to by-pass, and join the Indians who were assembled there.

Since July 8, Claus had been superintendent of the expedition's Indians, and he wrote concerning the junction at with the Idians:

The Brigr. set out from ye Island [Buck Island] upon his Alert the 19th July. I having been ordered to proceed to Oswego with Sr. John Johnson's Regt. and a Compy of Chasseurs lately arrived, [?] to convene & prepare the Indians to join the Brigr. at Fort Stanwix, on my Arrival at Oswego 23 July I found Jose[ph] Brant there, who acquainted me that his party consi [sting] of abt. 300 Indns would be in that day, and having been more than 2 months upon Service, were destitute of Necessaries Ammunition & some Arms, Joseph at the same time complaining of having been very scantily supplied by Colo. Butler with Ammunition when at Niagara in the Spring . . .

The 24 of July I received an Express from Brigr. St. Leger at Salmon Creek to repair thither with what Arms & Vermilion I had, and that he wished I would come prepared for a March thro' the Woods, as to Arms & Vermilion I had none, but prepared myself to go upon the March and was ready to set off when Joseph came into my Tent and told me that as no person was on the Spot to take care of the Number of Indians with him, he apprehended in case I should leave them they would become disgusted & disperse, which might prevent the rest of the 6 Nations to assemble, and be hurtful to the Expedition, and begd I would first represent those Circumstances to the Brigr. by Letter. Br. St. Leger mentioned indeed my going was chiefly intended to quiet the Indns. with him who were very drunk & riotous, and Captn. Tice who was the Messenger informed me, that the Brigr. ordered the Indians a Quart of Rum apiece which made them all beastly drunk and in which Case it is not in the power of Man to quiet them: Accordingly I mentioned to the Brigr. by Letter the Consequences that might affect his Majesty's Indn Interest in case I was to leave so large a Number of Indns. that [were] come already, & still expected. Upon which Representation and finding the Indians disapproved of the Plan and w [ere] unwilling to proceed, the Brigr. came away from Salm [on] Creek, and arrived the next day at Oswego with the Compy of 8th & 34 Regt. and abt 250 Indians.

Having equiped Josephs party with what Necessaries and Ammunition I had, I appointed the rest of the 6 Nations to Assemble at the 3 Rivers a convenient place of Rendezvous & in the way to Fort Stanwix, and desired Col. Butler [to] follow me with the Indians he brought with him from Niagara and equip them all at 3 Rivers.\footnote{19}

Obtaining and holding the cooperation of the Indians was no easy matter. They were somewhat less than unanimous in their desire to commit themselves to the active support of British interest. There were too many memories of white men's breaking their promises and of using the Indian in advancing their own self-interest. The white man who had title to their affection and loyalty, Sir William Johnson, was dead, and there was no one who could really assume his mantle. Relations between Daniel Claus and John Butler were not harmonious.\footnote{20} Joseph Brant, who was uniquely able to relate to both races, endeavored to secure fair treatment for his fellows, at the same time binding them to the British cause. Neither Sir John, who should have inherited some of his father's great skill in dealing with the red men, nor St. Leger, whose training and background ill fitted him to deal with an aboriginal people, could through their personal leadership command the Indians' loyalty, much less
their obedience. There was never a time when St. Leger could depend upon his Indian allies’ unreserved cooperation—they were always an unknown quantity in the tactical equation.

While St. Leger’s composite force assembled and launched its invasion of the northwestern frontier, events took place in the Mohawk Valley that affected its outcome. One of these was a confrontation between Joseph Brant and Brig. Gen. Nicholas Herkimer, leader of the pro-American Germans and commanding general of the Tyron County militia. The details of the meeting are obscure and capable of contradictory interpretations. The general may have urged Brant to support the rebellion or at least remain neutral. The latter declared for the King and, without molestation from the militia, withdrew his people to Canajoharie Castle and, as had been noted, eventually joined St. Leger. At least some Americans believed that Herkimer had not conducted himself very well, and his leadership was compromised, a factor that was to have considerable influence when he attempted to support the fort a few weeks later.

Almost simultaneous with this event, General Schuyler, while Burgoyne’s main column was at Crown Point, learned something definite about the British plan. On June 29 he wrote Herkimer that he had heard that Sir John Johnson was on his way to Oswego and planned to attack Stanwix, and he ordered him to have the militia ready to support Gansevoort “at a moments warning.” During the next day, he wrote to Gansevoort: “A report prevails that Sir John Johnson intends to attack your post. You will therefore put yourself in the best posture of defence . . . I have written General Herkimer to support you with the militia, in case you should be attacked. Give him therefore the most early intelligence if any enemy should approach you.”

Intelligence that his fort was likely to be attacked did not take Gansevoort by surprise. As early as May 28, Oneida Indians reported that they had met hostiles on their way to Osewego who intended to attack the fort. He and his men drove themselves, working against time to make the fort defensible and felling trees to obstruct Wood Creek. His personnel problem was critical, and he feared a surprise while his men were on fatigue.

General Schuyler immediately took steps to relieve the man-power and ordered Herkimer to put 200 militiamen to clearing the road between Forts Dayton and Stanwix, so that reinforcement of Gansevoort might be expedited. Another 200 men were to be dispatched to reinforce the garrison.

The general was not leaning upon a very sturdy reed. The Tyron County Committee was begging him to send Continental troops to the valley at almost the same moment he was ordering Herkimer to call out 400 men to assist Gansevoort. This was at a time when Burgoyne was advancing southwest from Ticonderoga and Schuyler was desperately trying to impede that advance and save his army for a future stand. Writing from Fort Edward on July 10, he said:

I am sorry, very sorry, that you should be calling upon me for assistance of Continental troops, when I have already spared you all I could [the 3d New York] . . . For God’s sake do not forget that you are an overmatch for any force the enemy can bring against you, if you will act with spirit.

The committee acted with a spirit, but not the kind the general desired. Poor Herkimer, who had to implement Schuyler’s directions, wrote concerning the order to reinforce Gansevoort:

Necessity urgeth me to trouble you again with these to acquaint you of the present circumstances of our county. Agreeable to your direction, I ordered 100 men of my brigade for reinforcement of Fort Schuyler, but with great trouble I got them to assemble for march. The first arrived Party I sent along with some Officers to assist respectively with work and guard in repair of the road to Fort Schuyler, but instead of advancing of the others to be expected, I must hear to my surprise that they have been stopped in their march and countermanded entirely by an order of the committee chairman, Lt. Colo Wm Seebcr and a few members of the committee, as the inclosure will convince your honor clearly. I resented immediately these contrary proceedings, whereupon another committee meeting was called. I also renewed my orders that such a number of militia should march, and the committee at their last convention repealed the orders to the colonels, that the ordered militia should march on. But that stopping of the militia by the committee as aforesaid, made such a confusion and discouragement that I hardly got and was able to dispatch today a number of men sufficient to guard the battoes being loaded at German Flatts with provisions, arms and ammunition for Fort Schuyler. It appears a general disturbance and declining of courage in the militia of our county, for reason of which they allege that they see themselves exposed to a soon invasion of enemies and particularly of a large number of cruel savages.
and foresaken of any assistance of troops to save the country. They alone think themselves not able to resist such enemies, for if they would gather themselves to oppose their poor wives and children would be then left helpless and fall prey to merciless savages. I can assure you, that some are already busy moving away, some declare openly that if the enemy shall come, they will not leave home, but stay with their families, and render themselves over to the enemy, as they can't help themselves otherwise without succor. I may say, whole numbers of men in each district are so far discouraged, that they think it worthless to fight, and will not obey orders for battle, if the county is not in time succeeded with at least 1,500 men, Continental troops. The loss of the important Fort Ticonderoga and Mt. Independence made the greatest number of our affected inhabitants downhearted, and maketh the disaffected bold. ... I was urged to promise the men, I sent to guard the battoes, and on the road as above mentioned, they shall not stay longer than three weeks from home to home and the committee orders are but for 16 days.28

Schuyler ordered Wesson's Continental Massachusetts Regiment to move into Tyron County to encourage the people.29 Reinforcements for the fort's garrison arrived from the 3d New York and the New York militia on July 19.30

In an effort to improve both the strength and the morale of the people, Schuyler placed all of the troops in the county under the command of a senior colonel, Goose van Schaick, of the 1st New York, who had been wounded at Ticonderoga on July 6.31

The people at the fort became increasingly conscious of the dangers of the hour as work parties of militia labored under the protection of Continentals to obstruct Wood Creek, as the reports of scouts brought news of the approaching enemy, and as hostile Indians prowled the woods trying to waylay members of the garrison and local inhabitants. On Sunday, July 27, three girls went out to pick raspberries about 500 yards from the fort. A party of Indians fired on them, killing and scalping two and wounding the third. In order to protect his workers from ambush and to concentrate his manpower, Gansevoort called in the Wood Creek parties.32 During the next day, he sent away "those women which belonged to the Garrison which have children with whom went the Man that was Scalped the Girl that was Wounded Yesterday & Sick in the Hospital".33

Oneidas and Mohawks sent messages to the fort informing the commander of the progress of St. Leger's column and the whereabouts of Indian parties. These Indians were in a dangerous situation. The other nations of the Confederacy were not likely to be merciful to any of their ancient allies who took a pacifist's position. Neutrality in any war is difficult and often dangerous. In border warfare, it is practically impossible. If the Americans failed to turn back the British advance, the future of the friendly tribes would not be happy.

Capt. Thomas De Witt, who had been left at Fort Dayton by Colonel Willett, arrived on the 13th with about 50 men of Gansevoort's regiment, and Maj. Ezra Badlam brought in 150 men of Col. James Wesson's 9th Massachusetts. The fort's commissary, a man named Hanson, arrived the same day with word that seven batteaux, loaded with provisions and ammunition were on their way up-stream.34 Within 24 hours, Oneidas brought word that there were 100 "Strange Indians" at the old Royal Block House on their way to the fort. Fearing that they intended to intercept the batteaux, Gansevoort dispatched 100 men under a Captain Benschoten to reinforce the batteaux-guard.35

Gansevoort knew that it could be only a matter of hours before the fort would tried by the invaders, and he completed his preparations to receive them. Colonel Willett's Orderly Book records the disposition of the garrison:

August 1, 1777
A picquet guard to mount this evening consisting of 1 capt 3 sub [subalterns] 4 sergeants, 1 drummer & 80 privates who are in case of alarm by the firing of a gun to mount and man the bastions, 1 commissioned officer 1 sergeant 1 corporal and 20 privates on each bastion, and if the officer commanding the picquet should think the alarm of sufficient importance he is immediately to order the drums to beat the alarm, upon which the garrison is to turn out Immediately and to repair to the alarm posts, Major Badlam's detachment to man the S. E. bastion and adjacent curtain, Captains De Witt, Swartout and Bleeker to man the N. E. bastion Capt. Gregg's Company to repair to the parade till further order ...36

Blocking Wood Creek had been so effective that St. Leger's column was advancing too slowly to suit his purposes, and he feared that additional men and supplies would reach the fort before he could get into an investing position. In order to obtain intelligence and intercept any relief parties, he sent an advance guard under Lieutenant Bird
toward the fort. The lieutenant had difficulty with Indians, most of whom would not advance. Upon receiving the lieutenant's report that closed with the statement: "those with the scout of fifteen I had the honor to mention to you in my last, are sufficient to invest Fort Stanwix if you honor me so far as not to order the contrary," the commander replied:

your resolution of investing Fort Stanwix is perfectly right; and to enable you to do it with greater effect, I have detached Joseph [Brant] and his corps of Indians to reinforce you. You will observe that I will have nothing but an investiture made; and in case the enemy observing the discretion and judgment with which it is made, should offer to capitulate, you are to tell them that you are sure I am well disposed to listen to them: this is not to take any glory or honour out of a young soldier's hands, but by the presence of the troops to prevent the barbarity and carnage which will ever obtain where Indians make so superior a part of a detachment . . . .

It is easy to laugh at the brigadier's optimism in imagining that the garrison might surrender to so limited a display of force, but he shared two fairly common attitudes of his contemporaries: disdain for provincial arms and determination and a humane fear of what Indians might do to surrendered persons in the absence of a large number of regular troops. While he naturally hoped that a mere show of force would persuade the Americans to surrender, he probably did not really expect them to; and his orders to Bird simply provided for the eventuality.

After the advanced party reached the ruins of Fort Newport, the batteaux that Gansevoort was expecting approached Fort Stanwix. Colbrath's August 2 entry in his journal described the event:

Four batteaux arrived being those the Party went to meet having a Guard of 100 Men of Colonel Weston's [Wesson] Regiment from Fort Dayton under the Command of Lieut-Col. Millen [Mellen] of that Regiment The Lading being brought safe into the Fort the Guard marched in when our Centinels on the SW Bastion discovered the Enemys fires in the woods near Fort Newport, upon which the Troops ran to their Respective Alarm posts in this Time we discovered some Men Running from the Landing towards the Garrison On their coming they Informed us, that the Batteau Men who had staid behind when the Guard marched into the Fort had been Fired on by the Enemy at the Landing that two of them were wounded, the Master of the Batteaus taken prisoner and one

Man Missing. A party of 30 Men with a field piece was sent out in the Evening to set Fire to two Barns standing a Little distance from the Fort, Two cannon from the SW Bastion loaded with Grape Shott, were first Fired at the Barnes to drive of [f] the Enemys Indians that might have been Sculking about them when the party having Effected their Design Return'd

The advanced party had failed to accomplish its immediate mission, i.e., intercepting the supply boats, but the "investiture" of Fort Stanwix was begun. St. Leger was not able to commit all of his men to laying siege to the camp, because 110 of them were employed for nine days clearing the obstacles from Wood Creek and another party to cutting a temporary road from Fish Creek over which to bring artillery and stores.

On the day the siege opened, two or possibly three, important events have been reported as taking place. The first occurred early in the morning of Sunday, August 3, when a flag that has entered American folklore was raised on one of the fort's bastions. Briefly stated, the tradition developed during the nineteenth century that the news of the passage of the Flag Resolution by the Continental Congress on June 14 reached Fort Stanwix, either in a letter to Colonel Gansevoort or in a newspaper account brought in when the batteaux and one hundred men of the 9th Massachusetts Regiment arrived under Lt. Col. James Mellen on the second. Upon receiving this dramatic news, some of the people prepared a flag of thirteen stripes, alternating red and white, and thirteen stars on a blue field in compliance with the congressional resolution. This new national standard was then hoisted and a salute fired, marking the first time the Stars and Stripes flew over American troops. If true, this was certainly one of the most dramatically significant events of the American Revolution.

One of the early champions of this interpretation was Pomeroy Jones, a local scholar whose interest in Fort Stanwix's history had a lasting influence on the work of the later scholars. Jones was born several years after the siege; but he knew a number of veterans and their children, including Judge Joshua Hathaway and his son Jay, and invoked their memories in identifying the flag as the "Stars and Stripes." Jones's account was the basis for a number of assertions concerning the flag, including Dr. James Weise's, that the new national
flag was unfurled, a salute fired, and that an adju­tant read the resolution from the newspaper brought to the fort by the batteaux detail. Weise’s version was picked up by the New Larmed History, in which the following appears:

... the Journal of Capt. Swartwout of Col. Gansevoort’s regiment written August 3, 1777 in Ft. Schuyler shows beyond cavil when the first flag of Stars and Stripes of which we have record was made and hoisted, but it was in a fort (Schuyler), not in the field, or at the head of a regiment.

There is no Startwout Journal, just Weise’s publication, which was not based upon any original source.

John Albert Scott’s popular Fort Stanwix (Fort Schuyler) and Oriskany repeated the story of the newspaper report and the raising of the “first Stars and Stripes.” Although Fort Stanwix’s claims were frequently disputed in favor of other sites as Bennington, Brandywine, and Guilford Courthouse, many writers uncritically perpetuated the tradition.

A study of the evidence upon which to assess the Stanwix flag’s significance is in order. The basic document for the origin of the Stars and Stripes is the so-called Flag Resolution passed by the Continental Congress on June 14, 1777, which reads: “RESOLVED: that the flag of the United States be thirteen stripes, alternate red and white; that the union be thirteen stars, white in a blue field representing a new constellation.” This resolution was preceded and followed by matters brought to the Congress’s attention by its Marine Committee. Since the resolution was converting the unofficial Grand Union into an official standard, substituting thirteen stars upon a blue field for the canton derived from the British Union, which combined the crosses of Saints George and Andrew, it was appropriate that it emanate from that committee. This was the case because, following British precedent, flying the Grand Union was common to ships and permanent land installations. Thus, the Congress was providing for a new marine flag, not a national military standard.

Crucial to the examination of the Fort Stanwix tradition is the record of what happened immediately after the passage of the resolution. Thacher’s Military Journal’s entry for August 3, 1777, noted that: “It appears by the papers that Congress resolved on 14 of June last, that the flag of the thir­teen United States be thirteen stripes, alternate red and white, that the union be thirteen stars in a blue geld...” At first blush, Thacher’s statement seems to be evidence that the news of the resolution had reached Albany, where he was on duty at the hospital, if not Fort Stanwix, by August 3. However, so far as this writer has been able to determine, the first public notice of the resolution appeared in the Pennsylvania Evening Post on August 20 in the following item: “In Congress, June 14, 1777. Resolved that the FLAG of the United States be THIRTEEN STRIPES alternate red and white; that the union be THIRTEEN STARS white in a blue field. Extract from minutes, CHARLES THOMSON, sec.” Other papers printed the resolution between September 3 and October 2, and the first New York papers to publish it were the September 8 issue of the New York Journal and General Advertiser and the September issue of New York Patent and the American Advertiser. The papers to which Thacher most likely had access were the two from New York and the Boston papers, the Gazette and the Spy, in which the story appeared on September 15 and 18 respectively. The obvious conflict in testimony can only be explained by acknowledging that the doctor may have had access to a newspaper that is unknown to historians or, more probably, that when the Journal was prepared for publication prior to January 1, 1832, this was one of the instances in which alterations were made in organizing the material of the original manuscript.

More immediately pertinent to the Fort Stan­wix flag are the testimonies of William Colbrath and Marinus Willett. In the entry for Sunday, August 3, Colbrath wrote: “Early this morning a Continental Flagg made by the officers of Col. Gansevoort’s Regiment was hoisted and a cannon levelled at the Enemies Camp was fired on this occasion.” His calling the standard a “Continental” Union is important because that was the term applied to the Grand Union. It is also significant that he did not refer to the flag as a new one, as would have been natural if he was recording such a momentous event.

Lieutenant Colonel Willett wrote one of the earliest accounts of the siege in a letter to Jonathan Trumbull, Jr. He was probably also the author of the account that appeared in the August 28 issue of
the *Independent Chronicle and Universal Advertiser* under the title “Extract of a Letter from an Officer of Distinction.” In neither of these nor in his Oderly Book did he refer to the flag, a surprising oversight if it was as historically important as such a first would have been.50

Concerning the cloak from which the blue cloth had been cut, Willett wrote: “What Baggage the enemy had it consisting of only a few Blankets and Cloaks—A blue Camblot Cloak taken here [Peekskill] afterwards served to enable us to use it for blue strips of a Flagg which was afterwards hoisted during the siege of Fort Schuyler.”52 The statement about blue strips could only refer to a Continental flag, because the Stars and Stripes has a blue field, not blue stripes.

More than thirty years after the siege, Willett prepared the manuscript of his “Narrative,” in which he wrote:

The Fort had never been supplied with a Flagg—The importance of having one on the arrival of the enemy had set our Ingenuity to work, and a respectable one was formed the white stripes were cut out of ammunition shirts the blue strips out of the Cloak formerly mentioned taken from the Enemy at Peeks-Kill. The red strips out of different pieces of stuff collected from sundry persons. The Flagg was sufficiently large and a general Exhilaration of spirits appeared on beholding it Wave the morning after the arrival of the enemy.51

That Marinus Willett had an appreciation of his historic role is apparent in his letters and the “Narrative.” If he had been a party to or a witness of the manufacture and display of the first national flag, the fact would have been prominently recorded by him.

The papers of two other important American officials, Peter Schuyler and Peter Gansevoort, would be expected to throw some light upon such an important subject. General Schuyler was the commanding general of the Northern Department when the Flag Resolution was passed and continued in that office until August 19. If the Resolution had been published or become a matter of either official or common knowledge during that period and if it had the effect of authorizing a new national military standard, he would have been among the first to have known about it. Schuyler was a meticulous record keeper. His papers include all the correspondence he received from the Congress, General Washington, and every person with whom the had occasion to transact public or private business, as well as copies of all letters and documents that he sent to them. There is nothing in that important collection to indicate that the general or any of his correspondents knew about the Resolution before it was published on August 20.

Peter Gansevoort, the fort’s commanding officer, also left a valuable collection of papers. They contain no letter advising him of the passage of the Flag Resolution. Nor do they include any documents that would support the assertion that the flag raised at his post was one that reflected compliance with the congressional act.

One of the soldiers of the 3d New York Regiment was James (Alexander) McGraw, who had enlisted during July 1775 and been shot in a leg during the Canadian campaign of 1775-76. He re-enlisted in Capt. Leonard Bleeker’s company, 3d New York, and was confined to quarters at Fort Stanwix in March 1778 because of an “Ulcerous leg.” It may have been during that period of convalescence that he carved the powder-horn that has figured prominently in the flag controversy, although the date on the specimen is December 25, 1777.53

If the horn is genuine and McGraw made it, and its accuracy in depicting the fort and its components argues for its authenticity, it offers valuable evidence. Flying from the southwest bastion is a flag that, except for the absence of the cross of St. George, resembles the Grand Union very closely.

A second powder-horn is one that apparently was carved by Christopher Hutton, who after serving in Meade’s Regiment of New York Militia, became an ensign in Cpt. Henry Tiebout’s Company of the 3d New York Regiment on November 21, 1776, and was made regimental adjutant on May 28, 1778. He subsequently received a lieutenant’s commission on February 6, 1779, transferred to the 2d New York on January 1, 1783, and was discharged on June 3, 1783.54 His tour of duty at Fort Stanwix presumably extended from the end of March 1777 to November 1780, the period during which the regiment garrisoned the post.

At an unknown date, but presumably 1777, he carved or had carved for him, the horn associated with his name. The specimen has several subjects incised into its sides, including “Chris. Hutton 1777”; a diagrammatic sketch of the Mohawk and
Schoharie Rivers; “Ft. Schuyler III Rege”; “Ft EWD”; a field cannon and a pyramidal stack of six balls; an Indian armed with a musket and Tomahawk; a mounted figure with the caption, “Peter.”; and most important to this study—a flag of stars and stripes.

The Hulton power-horn is more difficult to interpret than the McGraw specimen. It does not include such elements as the fort that make a comparison with documented data possible; and it poses several questions that defy easy solutions. The most obvious is whether it is what it is purported to be. Since there is no conclusive authentication, that question remains moot; although on the basis of design, lettering, and general appearance, it appears to be a late 18th century specimen. The second question is, what designer’s objective? Was he using the characters to illustrate events that occurred at Fort Stanwix in 1777? If so, why was the small legend “Ft EDW,” which must refer to Fort Edward, included? That fort was located at another important carrying place, the one between the Hudson River and Wood Creek that provided a portage to and from Lake Champlain. Why was the flag located where it was? It, obviously was not intended to mark Stanwix’s location in relation to the Mohawk River. While the mounted man captioned “Peter” may represent Colonel Gansevoort, it was a strange way for lowly Revolutionary period ensign to identify the regiment’s commander.

Ensign Hutton may have intended that the powder-horn present a graphic record of his military career. But that still does not solve the problem of the flag. The question of when the horn was carved remains. Does it really date from 1777, or is it a later exercise in nostalgia? Because there is almost overwhelming evidence that Hutton could not have known of the passage of the Flag Resolution until during the autumn of 1777, it must be assumed that the horn was made some time after the siege. There is no answer that satisfies all the canons for historical criticism.

Another of the powder-horns that depict Fort Stanwix and a flag is one attributed to James Wilson, a private in Col. Goose Van Schaick’s 1st New York Regiment, which garrisoned the fort from the end of 1778 until November 1780. Although it does not show the buildings that stood within the fort, it does include five sentry boxes, the necessary, and a structure on the southeast bastion that was demolished on December 20, 1780, after the 1st New York moved out. Along with other features, both historic and decorative, it also has an elaborate symbol of a hand grasping thirteen arrows surrounded by a floral scroll bearing the legend: “THE XIII UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.” There is also a flag flying over the fort, an ensign of eleven stripes without a canton and stars. The fact that this flag differed significantly from the Grand Union and the Stars and Stripes does not detract from the specimen’s value, but reflected the historic reality as will become apparent in the following paragraphs.

Turning from the power-horns, with their evidentiary problems to the sounder ground of documentary evidence, it should be remembered that the congressional resolution of June 14 concerned a maritime flag and was not intended to provide an official standard to troops in the field. This is confirmed by subsequent events.

Almost two years after the siege of Fort Stanwix, Richard Peters, secretary of the Board of War, wrote to General Washington that requisitions for drums and colors had not been filled because “we have not the materials to make either in sufficient numbers.” He went on to write concerning the flags:

... as to the Colours, we have refused them for another reason. The Baron Steuben [Inspector-General] mentioned when he was here [Philadelphia] that he would settle with your Excellency some Plan as to the Colours. It was intended that every Regiment should have two Colours—one a Standard of the United States, which should be the same throughout the Army, and the other a Regimental Colour which should vary according to the facings of the Regiment. But it is not yet settled what is the Standard of the U. States. If your Excellency will therefore favour us with your Opinion on the Subject we will report to Congress and request them to establish a Standard and as soon as this is done we will endeavour to get Materials and order a Number made sufficient for the Army. Neither can we tell what should be the Regimental Colours as Uniforms were by late Resolution of Congress to be settled by Your Excellency.

Peters’ letter makes it obvious that the resolution of June 14, 1777, did not authorize a national military standard, that as of May 1779, no such flag had been adopted, and that the Board of War would ask the Congress to establish one after Washington had expressed his opinion on the matter,
The Board continued to consider the design for a new national military flag during the summer of 1779 and by September had narrowed the choice to: “The one with the Union and Emblem in the middle . . . . as a variant from the Marine Flag.” The Marine Flag was the Stars and Stripes, and the Board favored a different form for military use.

The matter was still unsettled when the final shot of the war was fired in South Carolina in 1782. This does not mean that no flags of one design or another including stars and stripes appeared on the field. One of them, the so-called Bennington Flag, is believed by some students to be the oldest such color. While there is no contemporary record to confirm its Revolutionary vintage, a nineteenth century tradition claims that it was raised at Bennington by President Fillmore’s grandfather, Nathaniel Fillmore, who kept it until during the War of 1812, when he gave it to his nephew, Septa Fillmore, in whose family it remained until 1926. It does not conform to the Flag Resolution, having in the center of the union the number “76.” Nor could it have been carried in the field, being ten feet long by five and half feet wide.

Another claimant for honors is a flag that is said to have been carried by North Carolina militia at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse on March 15, 1781. Noted flag authority R. C. Ballard Thurston believed that this is the only such flag carried by troops during the war. It does not follow the color scheme defined in the Flag Resolution in that it has seven blue and six red stripes and thirteen blue stars on a white union.

That the Stars and Stripes flew at Yorktown is attested by a contemporary watercolor by Lt. Col. John Graves Simcoe of the Queen’s Rangers. It resembles the Guilford flag in having red and blue stripes and blue union with “a pattern figures, marks or, perhaps, stars in what seems to be a darker shade of blue.”

It might be argued that the flag flown at Fort Stanwix was also an unofficial version of the Stars and Stripes. However, that contradicts Colbrath’s testimony and strains Willett’s statement, to say nothing of the evidence, for what it is worth, of the McGraw powder-horn. If it was certainly not a result of the Flag Resolution, for there is not a scintilla of evidence that anyone in the fort knew of the Congress’s act in August 1777.

An exhaustive, if not comprehensive, search has failed to locate any claims identifying the Fort Stanwix Flag as the Stars and Stripes that date before the 1850’s, three-quarters of a century after the siege.

In the absence of testimony favoring the tradition that meets the minimum canons for historical accuracy, a careful study of the documentary sources leads to the conclusion that the fort’s flag was a locally made version of the Grand Union and could not have been the first Stars and Stripes to be flown over American troops in the presence of the enemy.

There is a tradition that on the day the siege was opened St. Leger paraded his troops to overawe the garrison. Hoffman Nickerson, as usual without citing a source, records it as follows: St. Leger’s first thought was to impress the garrison. Accordingly he held a review of his entire force within sight of the besieged. From their palisaded earthworks Gansevoort and his men could see the white breeches and scarlet coats of the British infantry, the blue coats of the British artillerymen, and green faced with red of the German chasseurs, and the green faced with white which gave Sir John Johnson’s regiment the name of Royal Greens. Here and there may have appeared the black skull cap fronted with a brass plate and the green coat faced vermillion which were the official uniform of Butler’s rangers. But for the most part these last seem to have been painted and dressed like Indians. If so they increased what must have been the deep-set impression made upon those within, that is, that of St. Leger’s command the greater number were savages. The sight of the Indians with their feathers, their hideous warpaint, tomahawks, and scalping knives, and the sound of their war whoop, showed the garrison vividly enough what would be their own fate should their resistance fail and what would happen to the settlements behind them.

At the same time the review must have shown them that in white men alone the numbers of St. Leger’s force were at most equal and if anything inferior to their own.

Christopher Ward, also without citing a source, told the same story in less detail. Contemporary American and British reports that have been consulted in the preparation of this study do not document such a review. Colbrath did record in his Journal for August 3 that “about three o’clock this after the Enemy shewed themselves to the Garrison on all Sides Carry’d off some Hay from a Field near the Garrison.” However, this falls
short of corroborating the dramatic show of force that Nickerson and Ward described.

At 3 p.m., St. Leger sent Captain Tice under a flag to demand the fort’s surrender and offered protection to the garrison. Colbrath recorded that the demand and promise were “Rejected with disdain.” William L. Stone, who was not above tampering with his sources in the interest of a good story, gave this text of the British general’s proclamation:

By BARRY ST. LEGER, Esq., commander-in-chief of a chosen body of troops from the grand army, as well as an extensive corps of Indian allies from all the nations, &c., &c.

The forces entrusted to my command are designed to act in concert, and upon a common principle, with the numerous armies and fleets which already display on every quarter of America, the power, justice, and, when properly sought, the mercy of the king.

The cause in which the British arms are thus exerted, applies to the most affecting interest of the human heart, and the military servants of the crown, at first called forth for the sole purpose of restoring the rights of the constitution, now combine with love of their country and duty to their sovereign, the other extensive incitements which spring from a due sense of the general privileges of mankind. To the eyes and ears of the temperate part of the public, and to the breast of suffering thousands in the provinces, be the melancholy appeal, whether the present unnatural rebellion has not been made a foundation for the completest system of tyranny that even God in his displeasure suffered for a time to be exercised over a froward and stubborn generation. Arbitrary imprisonment, confiscation of property, persecution and torture unquestioned in the inquisitions of the Romish Church, are among the palpable enormities that verify the affirmative. These are inflicted by Assemblies and committees who dare to profess themselves friends of liberty, upon the most quiet subjects, without distinction of age or sex, for the sole crime, often for the sole suspicion of having adhered in principle to the government under which they were born, and to which by every tie, divine and human, they owe allegiance. To consummate these shocking proceedings, the profanation of religion is added to the most profligate prosecution of common reason; the consciences of men are set at naught; and multitudes are compelled, not only to bear arms, but also to swear subjection to usurpation they abhor.

Animated by these considerations; at the head of troops in the full powers of health, discipline and valor, determined to strike when necessary, and anxious to spare where possible; I by these presents invite and exhort all persons, in all places, where the progress of this army may point, and by the blessing of God I will extend it far, to maintain such a conduct as may justify me in protecting these lands, habitations and families. The intention of this address is to hold forth security, not depredation to the country.

To those whom spirit and principle may induce them to partake the glorious task of redeeming their countrymen from dungeons, and reestablishing the blessings of legal government, I offer encouragement and employment; and upon the first intelligence of their associations, I will find means to assist their undertakings. The domestic, the industrious, the infirm, and even the timid inhabitants, I am desirous to protect, provided they remain quietly at their houses; that they do not suffer their cattle to be removed, nor their corn or forage to be secreted or destroyed; that they do not break up their bridges or roads; nor by any other acts, directly or indirectly, endeavor to obstruct the operations of the king’s troops or supply those of the enemy.

Every species of provision brought to my camp will be paid for at an equitable rate in solid coin. If, notwithstanding these sincere endeavors and sincere inclinations to effect them, the frenzy of hostility should remain, I trust I shall stand acquitted in the eyes of God and man, in denouncing and executing the vengeance of the state against wilful outcasts. The messengers of justice and of wrath await them in the field and devastation, famine and every concomitant horror that a reluctant but indispensable prosecution of military duty must occasion, will bar the way to their return.

Barry St. Leger

By order of the Commander-in-chief
Will., OSB. HAMILTON, Secretary.

This proclamation was an almost verbatim copy of General Burgoyne’s and it was equally effective.

The Americans continued to try to work at strengthening the fort against the assault that they were certain St. Leger would undertake whenever he was able to bring up his artillery and the men who were working on the temporary road and clearing a passage on Wood Creek. However, the continuing fire from the Indians harassed the working parties, forcing them to work at night. On the night of the 4th, details went out and brought in 27 stacks of hay for the cattle that were impounded in the fort’s ditch and to burn a house and barn that obstructed the field of fire. The Indians’ fire resulted in two deaths among the garrison on the 4th and 5th, and six were wounded during the former. The barracks that Lamarquise had erected outside
the fort was burned by the British during the late afternoon of the 5th.\textsuperscript{67}

On the same afternoon, St. Leger received word from the late Sir William Johnson's Indian wife, Molly Brant, that a relief column was on its way to the fort and would be within 10 or 12 miles of the British camp by that night. St. Leger now had a serious tactical problem to solve. He had to sustain the siege and destroy the relief column.

The relief column was General Herkimer's response to learning of St. Leger's advance on the fort. On June 30 he ordered the Tryon County militia to muster at Fort Dayton. By August 4, between 800 and 900 men assembled and the march to raise the siege was begun. On the night of the 5th Herkimer sent three or four scouts forward to inform Gansevoort of his advance and to ask the fort's commander to cooperate if the enemy should attack the militia. Gansevoort was asked to fire three shots to acknowledge receipt of the runners and to express his willingness to make a sortie when Herkimer's column approached, then to engage the enemy about the fort and prevent them from concentrating on the militia.

On the morning of the 6th, Herkimer had reached a critical point in his march to the fort's aid. No cannon shots had been heard from its defenders. Should he continue to advance or await the expected signal? He convened a council of war to discuss the matter. His preference was for waiting for the signal, but the overwhelming majority of his officers favored an immediate advance. The discussion became heated, and as the commander maintained his opinion with traditional Teutonic stubbornness some of the officers accused him of Tory sympathies or cowardice, making much of the fact that one of his brothers was an officer in Sir John's regiment. Berated and maligned, the old soldier-farmer yielded and gave the order to march.

When he received the news of Herkimer's advance, St. Leger dispatched about 400 Indians and the light infantry company of Sir John's regiment, under Sir John, Colonel Butler and Joseph Brant, to ambush the military relief force.

With surprisingly poor march security, the Tryon men marched to a place about six miles from the fort where the road crossed a broad ravine about 50 feet deep with very steep banks. There the Anglo-Indian party had laid an ambush with the light infantrymen on the west and the Indians along the ravine's margin in a curve, leaving the eastern side open to Herkimer's men. When the middle of the column was deep in the ravine, the light infantrymen were to check its head while the Indians closed the circle around the rear-guard.

The main body of the column made its way into the ravine and up the western side when the Indians east of the ravine opened fire and rushed the road-bound militiamen. The trap was sprung too early to catch the rear-guard, which fled. Herkimer, at the column's head, turned back to investigate the firing. The light infantry and Indians on the west rushed forward; and the general's horse fell dead and he suffered a wounded leg.

The circle was completed; and the Americans took cover behind trees, formed small circles, and fought with a valor born of desperation. After three-quarters of an hour, a cloudburst wet the muskets' priming and for an hour the fighting stopped. During the lull, Herkimer's men took cover by twos so that, when one had fired and was reloading, the other would be ready to shoot any of the enemy that attacked.

The Tryon County men gave a good account of themselves that day; and the Indians, who suffered severely, began to lose their aggressiveness. At this point, a second detachment of Sir John's regiment, under Major Watts, arrived on the scene. He ordered his men to turn their coats inside out, concealing their uniforms. Thus they advanced under the guise of a sortie from the fort. The militia discovered the ruse and attacked, and a fierce hand-to-hand fight followed that ended when the Indians retreated, followed by the white troops. The Battle of Oriskany was over. The militia was too badly mauled to pursue, and they gathered their wounded to begin the march back to Fort Dayton.\textsuperscript{68}

The morning of August 6 was a time of uncertainty at the fort. The garrison noted that the Indians, who had been maintaining a continual firing, were going away from the immediate area toward the lower landing on the Mohawk. Not knowing what was really happening, the officers and men feared that something was afoot in the river valley and that the loyalty of its inhabitants,
would weaken if the fort were reported taken. Colbrath expressed the men's fears in these terms:

This Morning the Indians were seen going off from around the Garrison towards the Landing as they withdraw we had not much firing. Being uneasy least the Tories should Report that the Enemy had taken the Fort Lieut. Diefendorf was Ordered to get Ready to set of [f] for Albany this Evening to Inf Gen ¹ Schuyler of our Situation.

But before the lieutenant could get away, the men whom Herkimer had sent with the message of his approach arrived, and Colbrath recorded that:

between 9 & 10 this morning three Militia Men Arrived here with a Letter from Gen ¹ Harkeman [Herkimer] wherein he writes that he had Arrived at Orisca [Oriskany] with 1000 Militia in Order to Re­lieve the Garrison and open the Communication which was then Entirely Blocked up and that if Colonel Should hear a Firing of small Arms desired he wou’d send a party from the Garrison to Reinforce Him. General Harkeman desired that the Colonel would fire three Cannon if the Three Men got safe into the Fort with his Letter which was done and followed by three cheers by the whole Garrison. According to Gen ¹ Harkemans Request the Colonel Detached two Hundred Men and one Field piece under command of Lieut. Colonel Willett with Orders to proceed down the Road to meet the Generals party.

In his letter of August 11, his first account of the events, Colonel Willett wrote:

Wednesday morning there was an unusual silence; we discovered some of the enemy marching along the edge of the woods downwards. About eleven o'clock, three men got into the fort, who brought a letter from Gen. Harkeman, of the Tryon county militia, advising us that he was at Eriska (eight miles from the fort) with part of his militia, and proposed to force his way to the fort, for our relief.—In order to render him what service we could in his march, it was agreed that I should make a sally from the fort with two hundred and fifty men, consisting one half of Gansevoort’s, and one half of Massachusetts men, and one field piece, (an iron three pounder) The men were instantly paraded, and I ordered the following dispositions to be made: Thirty men for the advanced guard to be commanded by Van Benscoten and Lieut. Stockwell; thirty for the rear guard under the command of Capt. Allen of the Massachusetts troops, and Lieut. Durfendreff; thirty for flank guards, to be commanded by Capt. from Massachusetts, and Ensign Chase. The main body formed into eight subdivisions, commanded by Capt. Bleaker, Lieutenants Conine, Bogardus, M’Clenme, and Ostrander, Ensign Bayley, Lewis, and Dennison, Lieut. Ball, the only supernumerary officer, to march with me. Capt. Johnson to bring up the rear of the main body—Capt. Swardwoundt, with Ensigns Magee and Arent, with fifty men to guard the field piece, which was under the direction of Major Badlam.

Thus the detachment from the fort set out down the old military road that lay between Albany and Oswego. When the column reached a point a little more than half a mile from the fort, it came upon Sir John Johnson’s camp and its mission was altered on the spot. The troops raidied this camp, the nearby Indian one, and perhaps Lieutenant Bird’s about half a mile away at the “Lower Landing Place.” The colonel reported:

Nothing could be more fortunate than this enterprize. We totally routed two of the enemy’s encampments, destroyed all their provision that was in them, brought off upwards of fifty brass kettles, and more than a hundred blankets (two articles which were much needed by us) with a number of muskets, tomahawks, spears, ammunition, cloathing, deer skins, a variety of Indian affairs, and five colours, which on our return to the fort, were displayed on our flagstaff, under the Continental flag. The Indians took chiefly to the woods, the rest of their troops to the river. The number of men lost by the enemy is uncertain, six lay dead in their encampment, two of which were Indians, several scattered about in the woods, but their greatest loss appeared to be in crossing the river, and no inconsiderable number on the opposite shore. I was happy in preventing the men from scalping even the Indians, being desirous, if possible, of teaching even the Savages humanity. But the men were better employed, and kept in excellent order. We were out so long, that a number of British regulars, accompanied by what Indians, &c. could be rallied, had marched down to a thicket on the other side of the river, about fifty yards from the road we were to pass on our return: near this place I had ordered the field piece. The ambush was not quite formed when we discovered them, and gave them a well directed fire.—Here especially, Major Badlam, with his field piece, did considerable execution—here, also, the enemy were annoyed by the fire of several cannon from the fort, as they marched round to form the ambuscade. The enemy’s fire was very wild, and though we were very much exposed, did not execution at all.

The loot taken from the camps included “several bundles of papers and a parcel of letters belonging to our garrison, which they had taken from our militia, but not yet opened. . . . There were likewise papers belonging to Sir John Johnson, and several others of the enemy’s officers, with letters
to and from Gen. St. Leger, their Commander; their papers have been of some service to us.”

From prisoners brought in from the camp, the garrison learned about the fight at Oriskany, the enemy’s strength, the number and type of his artillery.

The question of why Willett stopped to plunder the camp instead of obeying the order to meet Herkimer is not clearly answered—in fact, it is not broached in the contemporary documents. The men from the fort did not know that the militia had been engaged, but their curiosity must have been piqued by the absence of so large a part of the enemy. Apparently, Willett simply decided that the immediate and obvious benefits to be derived from attacking the camps outweighed any obligation to rendezvous with Herkimer. Although it could not have influenced Willett’s decision, it was too late to have done the militia much good. Adam Hellmer, one of Herkimer’s runners, testified that he entered the fort at one o’clock, although Colbrath wrote that the men came in by 10 a.m. and Willett put their arrival at “about 11 o’clock.” If, as is probable, Hellmer was correct, Willett’s detail did not leave the fort until nearly mid-afternoon, too late to have influenced the outcome at Oriskany. This fact, along with the results of his raid, probably muted criticism of his failure to execute his orders.

St. Leger, from his main encampment northeast of the fort, undertook to intercept Willett’s sortie, but arrived too late to prevent its successful return with the captured goods.

The raid on the Indian camp was to have especially significant results. The loss of their clothes, blankets, and provisions coupled with the loss of several of their chiefs at Oriskany dampened their enthusiasm for what was threatening to become a long, unrewarding siege, a type operation for which they rarely had an affinity. In fact, the British situation was not nearly good enough to give much promise of success, unless St. Leger could persuade the fort’s garrison that defence of the post was doomed to failure. Nevertheless, he put the best possible face on conditions when he reported to Burgoyne:

on the 5th I learnt from discovering parties on the Mohawk River that A Body of one thousand Militia were on their March to raise the Siege. On the confirmation of this News I moved a large body of Indians with some troops the same night to lay in ambuscade for them on their march—They fell into it—The completest victory was obtained. Above 400 lay dead on the field amongst the number of whom were almost all the principal Movers of Rebellion in that Country—There are six or seven hundred men in the Fort—The Militia will never rally—All that I am to apprehend therefore that will retard my progress in joining you, is a reinforcement of what they call their regular troops by way of Halfmoon up the Mohawk River. A diversion therefore from your army by that quarter will greatly expedite my junction with either of the grand armies.

Of course, Burgoyne was many miles north of Halfmoon and in no condition to send the Mohawk expedition assistance in any form.

The men in the fort enjoyed a respite from enemy fire during most of the 7th, although “at 11 o Clock this Evening the Enemy came near the Fort called to our Centinels, telling them to come out again with Fixed Bayonets and they should give us Satisfaction for Yesterdays work, after which they fired 4 small Cannon at the Fort we laughed at them heartily and they returned to Rest.” At midnight, the runners from Herkimer’s column and a militiaman who brought news of the fight at Oriskany set out for the lower valley.

The cannon fire that Colbrath reported indicated that St. Leger had finally brought up his artillery. More shots were fired into the fort during the day, and the garrison “in order to Return the compliment, they [the enemy] were Salluted with a few Balls from our Cannon.”

At about 5 p.m., St. Leger’s adjutant, Major Ancrum, Colonel Butler, and a surgeon came to the fort under a flag. Colonel Willett’s “Narrative” gives this dramatic example of total recall: The afternoon of the next day, the beating of the chimade and the appearance of a white flag, was followed by a request that Colonel Butler, who commanded the Indians, with two other officers, might enter the fort, with a message to the commanding officer. Permission having been granted, they were conducted blindfolded into the fort, and received by Colonel Gansevoort in his dining room. The windows of the room were shut and candles lighted; the table also was spread with crackers, cheese and wine. Three chairs placed at one end of the table, were occupied by Colonel Butler and the other two officers who had come with them; at the other end, Colonel Gansevoort, Colonel Mellon and Colonel Willett were seated. Seats were also placed around the table for as many officers as could be accommodated, while the rest of the room
was nearly filled with the other officers of the garrison indiscriminately; it being desirable that the officers in general should be witness to all that might take place. After passing around the wine, with a few commonplace compliments, Major Ancrum, one of the messengers, with a very grave, stiff air, and a countenance full of importance, spoke, in nearly the following words:

"I am directed by Colonel St. Leger, the officer who commands the army now investing the garrison, to inform the commandant, that the colonel has, with much difficulty, prevailed on the Indians to agree, that if the garrison, without further resistance, shall be delivered up, with the public stores belonging to it, to the investing army, the officers and soldiers shall have all their baggage and private property secured to them. And in order that the garrison may have a sufficient pledge to this effect, Colonel Butler accompanies me to assure them that not a hair of the head of anyone of them shall be hurt." (Here turning to Colonel Butler, he said:

"That, I think was the expression they made use of, was it not? To which the colonel answered, "Yes." ) I am likewise directed to remind the commandant that the defeat of General Herkimer must deprive the garrison of all hopes of relief, especially as General Burgoyne is now in Albany, so that, sooner or later, the fort must fall into our hands. Colonel St. Leger, from an earnest decision to prevent further bloodshed, hopes these terms will not be refused; as, in this case, it will be out of his power to make them again. It was with great difficulty the Indians consented to the present arrangement, as it would deprive them of the plunder which they always calculate upon on similar occasions. Should these, the present terms be rejected, it will be out of the power of the colonel to restrain the Indians, who are very numerous, and much exasperated not only from plundering the property but destroying the lives of, probably, the greater part of the garrison. Indeed, the Indians are so exceedingly provoked, and mortified by the losses they have sustained, in the late actions, having had several of their favorite chiefs killed, that they threaten—and the colonel, if the present arrangement should not be entered into, will not be able to prevent them from executing their threats—to march down the country, and destroy the settlement with its inhabitants. In this case, not only men, but women and children, will experience the sad effects of their vengeance. These considerations, it is ardently hoped, will produce a proper effect and induce the commandant, by complying with the terms now offered, to save himself from further regret when it will be too late."

With the approbation of Colonel Gansevoort, Colonel Willett made the following reply. Looking the important major full in the face he observed:

"Do I understand you, sir? I think that you say, that you come from a British colonel, who is commander of the army which invests this fort; and, by your uniform, you appear to be an officer in the British service. You have made a long speech on the occasion of your visit, which, stripped of all its superfluities, amounts to this, that you come from a British colonel to the commandant of this garrison, to tell him that if he does not deliver up this garrison into the hands of your colonel, he will send his Indians to murder our women and children. You will please reflect, sir, that our blood will be on your heads, not ours. We are doing our duty; this garrison is committed to our charge, and we will take care of it. After you get out of it, you may turn round and look at its outside, but never expect to come again, unless you come a prisoner. I consider the message you have brought a degrading one for a British officer to send, and by no means reputable for a British officer to carry. For my part, I declare, before I would consent to deliver this garrison to such a murderous'g' set as your army, by your own accounts consists of, I would suffer my body to be filled with splinters and set on fire, as you know has been practiced, by such hordes of women and children killers as belong to your army."

The deputation from the British commander presented a letter written by Colonel Peter Bellinger and Major Frey, who had been captured at Oriskany, that read:

"It is with concern we are to acquaint you that this was the fatal day in which the succors, which were intended for your relief, have been attacked and defeated, with great loss of numbers killed, wounded and taken prisoners. Our regard for your safety and lives, and our sincere advice to you is, if you will avoid inevitable ruin and destruction, to surrender the fort you pretend to defend against a formidable body of troops and a good train of artillery, which we are witnesses of: when, at the same time, you have no farther supports or relief to expect. We are sorry to inform you that most of the principal officers are killed: to wit—General Herkimer, Colonels Cox, Seeber, Isaac Paris, Captain Graves and many others too tedious to mention. The British army from Canada being now perhaps before Albany, the possession of which place of course includes the conquest of the Mohawk River and this fort."

Gansevoort believed the letter to be a forgery or prepared under duress, and it had no effect upon his determination to defend the fort.
Colonel Willett’s post-war account differs from his first reports of the conference in detail and mood. His first version of the event, which is contained in his important August 11 letter, related that:

This evening [August 8] they sent us a flag, with which came their Adjutant-general, Capt Armstrong [Ancrum], Col. Butler, and a surgeon, the surgeon to examine Singleton’s wounds; the principal business of the flag was to acquaint us, that Gen. St. Leger had, with much difficulty, prevailed on the Indians to agree, that if the Commanding Officer would give up the fort, the garrison should be secured from any kind of harm, that not a hair of their heads should be touched; but if not, the consequences to the garrison, should it afterwards fall into their hands, must be terrible; that the Indians were very much enraged, on account of their having a great number of their Chiefs killed in the late actions, and were determined, unless they got possession of the fort, to go down the Mohawk River, and fall upon its inhabitants. Our answer was, that should this be the case, the blood of their inhabitants would be upon the heads of Mr. Butler and his employers, not upon us, and that such proceedings would ever remain a stigma upon the name of Britain; but for our parts, we were determined to defend the fort.81

An account that appeared in August 28, 1777, issue of The Independent Chronicle and Universal Advertiser, Boston, entitled “Extract of a Letter from a Officer of Distinction,” who was probably Willett, read:

Friday,—Butler and a regular officer came into the fort, with proposals, representing that “Burgoyne was in Albany,—everything was lost—and it would be in vain for the fort to be obstinate, the militia were entirely routed,—the Indians were enraged at their loss, and that they feared the consequences of an obstinate resistance, as the fort must finally fall,—they were determined to have it,—that they had prevailed on the Indians so far that if the garrison would surrender immediately, they might march with their effects without molestation, and take themselves where they pleased; but otherwise they feared the consequences.

Col. Gansevoort answered, that he was surprised at their proposals, they implied a reflection upon the officers of the whole garrison—that they were not to be intimidated by threats—that he was determined to hold the fort as long as possible, and that he and his Men would die in the Trenches before he would surrender—at the same time took the occasion to remonstrate with Butler on the cruelty of their late practices, in scalping and murdering innocent inhabitants, particularly murdering the three little girls—Butler had little to say.82

The record is clear that the British made their proposal and that Colonel Gansevoort refused to entertain the idea of surrendering the fort. In fact, the only thing that would have persuaded him to do so would have been a loss of nerve. He knew that it was highly unlikely that Burgoyne had reached Albany, even if the main portion of the Northern Department’s army had been defeated, which was improbable. He also knew that the British artillery was incapable of breaching his works; and he had no confidence in the British ability to restrain the Indians. Daniel Claus accurately summed up the reasons for the Colonel's refusal when he wrote: “The Rebels knowing their Strength in Garrison as well as Fortification and the Insufficiency of our Field pieces to hurt them, and apprehensive of being massacred by the Indians for the Loss they sustained in the Action [at Oriskany]. They rejected the Summons said that they were determined to hold out to the last Extremity.” 83

 Shortly after mid-night, Colonel Willett, accompanied by Lieutenant Levi Stockwell, left the fort to go to Fort Dayton to raise a relief expedition. It was from there that the colonel wrote his August 11 and August 13 letters.84

During the first day of the cease-fire following the conference, St. Leger sent a flag to the fort with a written statement of the demands presented on the previous day by Adjutant-general Ancrum. That paper read:

Camp before Fort Stanwix, August 9, 1777.

Sir:

Agreeable to your wishes, I have the honour to give you on paper, the message of yesterday, though I cannot conceive, explicit and humane as it was, how it could admit of more than one construction. After the defeat of the reinforcement, and the fate of all your principal leaders, on which, naturally, you built your hopes: and having the strongest reason from verbal intelligence: and the matter contained in the letters that fell into my hands, and knowing thoroughly the situation of General Burgoyne’s army, to be confident that you are without resource—in my fears and tenderness for your personal safety, from the hands of Indians, enraged for the loss of some of their principal and most favourite leaders—I called to council, the chiefs of all the nations, and after having used every method that humanity could suggest, to soften their minds, and lead them patiently to bear
their own losses, by reflecting on the irretrievable misfortunes of their enemies, I, at last, laboured the point my humanity wished for; which the chiefs assured me of, the next morning, after a consultation with each nation, that evening, at their fire places—Their answer in its fullest extent, they insisted should be carried by Colonel Butler; which he has given you in the most categorical manner; you are well acquainted that Indians never send messages without accompanying them with menaces on non-compliance, that a civilized enemy would never think of doing: you may rest assured therefor, that no insult was meant to be offered to your situation, by the King's servants, in the message they peremptorily demanded be carried by Colonel Butler.

I am now to repeat what has been told you by my Adjutant-general.

That provided you will deliver up your garrison, with every thing as it stood, at the moment the first message was sent, your people shall be treated with every attention that a humane and generous enemy can give.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your most obedient humble servant
Barry St. Leger
Brig Gen of his Majesty's forces.

P.S. I expect an immediate answer, as the Indians are extremely impatient: and if this proposal is rejected, I am afraid it will be attended with very fatal consequences, not only to your and your garrison, but the whole country down the Mohawk River—such consequences as will be very repugnant to my sentiments of humanity, but after this, entirely out of my power to prevent.

Barry St. Leger
Colonel Gansevoort, commanding Fort Stanwix

The fort's commander replied immediately:

Fort Schuyler, Aug 9, 1777
Sir:
Your letter of this morning's date I have received, in answer to which I say, that it is my determined resolution, with the forces under my command, to defend this fort and garrison to the last extremity, in behalf of the United American States, who have placed me here to defend it against all their enemies.

I have the honour to be, in Your most ob't humble serv't
Peter Gansevoort
Col. commanding Fort Schuyler
Gen. Barry St. Leger

Although the armistice was to have lasted for three days, the British began to bombard the fort at 10:30 p.m. and continued a “well directed fire” all night. The fort's papers and money were stored in the bomb-proof in the southwest bastion. Artillery and small arms fire were exchanged at intervals during the next week with very limited effect on the garrison and none on the fort's fabric. On the 16th, Colbrath recorded that “the Enemy threw some Shells Horrisontally at our Works.” The explanation of this technique is found in St. Leger's report to Burgoyne:

it was found that our cannon has not the least effect upon the sodwork of the fort, and that our royals [mortars] had only the power of teasing, as a six-inch plank was a sufficient security for their powder-magazine, as we learnt from deserters. At this time Lieutenant Glenie of the artillery, whom I had appointed to act as assistant engineer, proposed a conversion of the royals (if I may use the expression) into howitzers. The ingenuity and feasibility of this nuance striking me very forcibly, the business was set about immediately, and soon executed, when it was found that nothing prevented their operating with the desired effect but the distance, their chambers being too small to hold a sufficiency of powder. There was nothing now to be done but to approach the fort by a sap to such a distance that the ramparts might be brought within their portice, at the same time all materials were preparing to run a mine under the most formidable bastion.

The Fleury map shows a portion of St. Leger's disposition of positions for the siege. The lack of a scale limits its usefulness in determining distances, but an estimate based upon the size of the square formed by the fort's bastions, 335 feet to the side, except for eastern face, the distance between the original battery positions and the fort was approximately 350 yards. The sap or approach directed toward the northwest bastion.

While St. Leger's men worked at the approach trench, the garrison and their enemies kept up the exchange of fire. The fort suffered little or no damage, although a few casualties occurred among its defenders. The effects of the American fire cannot be determined. On August 21 a woman in the fort who was “big with Child” was wounded in the thigh by the artillery fire. The next day, she gave birth to a daughter on the southwest bastion's bombproof, and Colbrath recorded that both and mother and child “do well with the Blessing of God.” The enemy diverted the stream that was
the main water source, and the garrison dug wells within the fort. Sorties went out for a variety of purposes, and both sides lost men through desertion.91

While the siege continued, the British did not ignore the country that the fort defended. After the Battle of Oriskany, Sir John Johnson proposed to his commander that he be permitted to take 200 men and "a significant body of Indians" down the valley to bring the people back to the royal cause, but St. Leger "said he could not spare the men, and disapproved of it."92 A few days later, Walter Butler took two regulars and three Indians to German Flats in an effort to enlist the assistance of the inhabitants in persuading the garrison to surrender. Butler carried with him a proclamation, signed by Sir John, Daniel Claus, and John Butler, that read:

Camp before Fort Stanwix, Aug. 13
To the Inhabitants of Tryon County
Notwithstanding the many and great injuries we have received in person and property at your hands, and being at the head of victorious troops, we most ardently wish to have peace restored to this once happy country: to obtain which we are willing and desirous, upon a proper submission on your parts, to bury in oblivion all that is past, and hope that you are or will be convinced in the end, that we were your friends and good advisers, and not such wicked designing men as those who led you into error, and almost total ruin. You have, no doubt, great reason to dread the resentment of the Indians, on account of the loss they sustained in the late action, and the mulish obstinacy of your troops in this garrison but in themselves, for which reason the Indians declare, that if they do not surrender the garrison without further opposition, they will put every soul to death, not only the garrison, but the whole country, without any regard to age, sex, or friends—for which reason, it is become your indispensible duty, as you must answer the consequences, to send a deputation of your principal people, to oblige them immediately, to what in a very little time they must be forced, the surrender of the garrison—in which case we will engage on the faith of Christians to protect you from the violence of Indians.

Surrounded as you are by victorious armies, one half (if not the greater part) of the inhabitants friends of the government, without any resource, surely you cannot hesitate a moment to accept the terms proposed to you, by friends and well-wishers to the country.93

The garrison at Fort Dayton captured the little party, and nothing came of this ploy.94

While St. Leger's and Gansevoort's men contended for the Mohawk country, events elsewhere were taking place that were to be decisive in bringing failure to British designs.

Gen. Philip Schuyler, whose command of the Northern Department placed upon him ultimate responsibility for the defense of the Mohawk Valley, was retreating southward along the Hudson before Burgoyne's hitherto victorious advance. He was struggling to retard that advance and prepare his main army for a stand that would halt the British invasion. Shortages, personality clashes, sectional animosities, political rivalries, and a succession of disheartening reverses conspired in making his task almost impossible. Yet he did not neglect his responsibilities in the western part of his command.

During July, he worked at trying to obtain additional Continental troops for the Tryon County area and sought the state's assistance in finding units that could be sent up the Mohawk. He wrote letters to the Tyron County committees and General Herkimer that endeavored to encourage and advise them.

On August 6 Schuyler's assistance took a more concrete form when he ordered a Continental force to move toward Fort Stanwix. This contingent was followed by others on and after August 9. The Continentals were Brig. Gen. Ebenezer Learned's brigade of Massachusetts troops, which had been posted at Van Schaick's Island near the junction of the Mohawk and Hudson Rivers.95 He also wrote to the Tryon County officials requesting that they cooperate with their militia.

The main body of Schuyler's army lay at the village of Stillwater, and from that place Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold departed on August 13 to direct the relief of Fort Stanwix. There is a well-known story of his assignment to the command that had its origins in Isaac N. Arnold's Life of Arnold and has been repeated by many other writers including Hoffman Nickerson in the classic, The Turning Point of the Revolution:

On receiving at Stillwater the news, first of St. Leger's arrival before Stanwix, then of Herkimer's retreat from Oriskany, Schuyler had determined to relieve the fort. According to the military custom of the time he called a council of war in which he proposed detaching a part of his own dis-spirited forty-five hundred to act against St. Leger.

The risk involved was high. Within twenty-four miles of them—a single day's forced march—Burgoyne lay
at Fort Edward with seven thousand victorious troops. He might come down upon them. Indeed, as the council sat he was issuing orders to his main body to advance eight miles to Fort Miller, and for Fraser and his advanced corps to go on four miles farther to the mouth of the Battenhill, where they would be only twelve miles from Schuyler and his unhappy little force. Of course Schuyler’s council did not yet know of this advance, which was intended merely to cover the Bennington expedition, but as they saw the situation it is not surprising that all except Arnold opposed Schuyler’s plan.

On the other hand, Schuyler undoubtedly reasoned from Burgoyne’s delay that the army from Canada was having trouble with its transportation. He knew that to the eastward patriot forces were gathering which would soon either reinforce him or cut in on Burgoyne’s left and rear. Finally, he thought it necessary to run risks on the Hudson in order to save the Mohawk. All along he had known the political situation in that district to be unsatisfactory. Should a Tory rising spring up there to assist St. Leger, the example might spread and the whole political basis of the Revolution in the North might go.

Schuyler’s argument failed to persuade his officers. In his agitation he walked to and fro in the room, a pipe in his mouth. While doing so he heard some of them say, ‘He means to weaken the army.’ He well knew the New England rumors that he was at heart a traitor. Was it possible, he thought, that officers under his command believed the slander? Almost as he heard their words he found that he had bitten his pipestem clean through. Never to the end of his life could he forget the bitterness of that moment.

Nevertheless he controlled himself quickly. Indeed his instant of rage helped him to make up his own mind. He made no further effort to persuade, but said that he would take upon himself the responsibility of the expedition. Whereupon the fiery little Arnold sprang up and volunteered for the command.97

Isaac Arnold’s version offers other details. After telling of the officers’ opposition and the general’s breaking the pipe, he wrote that Schuyler said: “Gentlemen: I shall take the responsibility upon myself; Fort Stanwix and the Mohawk Valley should be saved! Where is the brigadier who will command the relief? I shall beat up for volunteers tomorrow.” No brigadier offered his services, and Benedict Arnold:

Though a major general and second in command, ignignant that his friend should be so wronged, instantly volunteered. Impulsive, ever ready for deeds of daring, knowing how false and cruel were the imputations cast upon Schuyler, he at once offered his services, and they were gratefully accepted. On the next morning the drums were beaten through the camp for volunteers, and it was announced that Major General Arnold offered to lead them, and before noon 800 men had volunteered to follow him to the rescue of Gansevoort.97

Not a single contemporary source supports this story, and there are several facts that contradict it.

Starting with Nickerson’s first sentence, Schuyler was not at Stillwater when he received news of St. Leger’s arrival at Stanwix, of Herkimer’s retreat from Oriskany, and made his decision to relieve the fort. He was at his home in Albany, which was his headquarters until he went to Stillwater on or about August 10. General Learned was already on the march toward Stanwix, and another brigadier was not required to command the relief. What was needed was a higher ranking general officer, and Arnold was the only major general on hand.

The beating of the drum for volunteers simply did not occur. The Continentals that were committed were moved from Van Schaick’s Island, more than 20 miles away, from three to seven days before the legendary council; and Arnold’s instructions make it clear that he was to join those troops and take command of them—not that he was to take troops with him from Stillwater. In addition, Schuyler never referred to the fort as Fort Stanwix after it was renamed in his honor.

Schuyler’s instruction to Arnold appear to support the part of the story that related to the latter’s volunteering to command the relief expedition when he wrote: “It gives me greatest satisfaction that you have offered to go and conduct the military operations in the Tryon county.” However, the circumstances of his volunteering are not clear, especially in the light of a letter from Washington to Schuyler, dated July 24, in which he proposed that Arnold, “or some other sensible spirited officer,” be assigned to Fort Stanwix in case anything formidable should appear in that quarter.99 The proposal was couched in terms that in a normal military interpretation would be almost tantamount to an order.

There is no evidence for representing Schuyler’s general officers as opposed to the Mohawk undertaking. In fact, in one of his reports to
Washington, Schuyler wrote that the detailing of the Massachusetts regiments was done “by the unanimous advice of all the general officers here [Stillwater].” 100

Schuyler ordered Arnold to “repair thither [Tryon County] with all convenient speed and take upon you the command of all the Continental troops & such of the Militia as you can prevail upon to join your troops. Fort Schuyler is being besieged you will hasten to its relief and hope that the Continental troops now in the county of Tryon, if joined by some of the militia will be adequate to the business.”

Arnold set out immediately for Albany, where he met Colonel Willed, and together they hurried to Fort Dayton, which they reached on August 20. During the following day, he convened a council consisting of Brigadier General Learned; Colonels Willett; John Bailey, 2d Massachusetts; Cornelius Van Dycke, 1st New York; Henry Beeckman Livingston, 4th New York; James Wesson, 9th Massachusetts; and Lt. Col. John Brook; 8th Massachusetts. The official report in the Gates Papers reads:

The general [Arnold] informed the council that previous to his leaving Albany, General Schuyler had sent a belt and a message to the Oneidas to meet at Albany, and intrusted him, General Arnold, to engage as many of them as possible in our service, and had furnished him with presents for them, in consequence of which, he had dispatched a messenger to them, requesting they would meet him at German Flatts; as yesterday they did not arrive he has given orders for the army to march for Fort Schuyler this morning, since which a delegation from the Oneidas and Tuscaroras had arrived, acquainting him that the chiefs of both Tribes with their families would be here the day after tomorrow, requesting a meeting with us; one of the Oneidas, who had lately been at the enemy’s encampment also informed that all the Six Nations, except the two tribes above mentioned, had joined the enemy, the whole with foreign Indians amounting to 1,500 by the enemy’s account. The Oneida, who is known to be a fast friend of ours, says that from viewing their encampment he is fully convinced there is upwards of 1,000 Indians, and from the best authority their other forces are near 700, besides some Tories who have joined since their arrival. Colonel Willett, who lately left the fort, being present, is fully of opinion the above account is nearly true. The general then acquainted the council that by the returns delivered this morning, our whole force, rank and file, effectives, are 933, and 13 artillerymen, exclusive of a few militia, the whole not exceeding 100 on whom little dependence can be placed; at the same time requests the opinion of council whether it is prudent to march with the present force and endeavour to raise the siege of Fort Schuyler, or to remain at this place, until reinforcements can be solicited from below, and more of the militia turned out to join us, and until the Oneidas had determined if they would join us, of which they give encouragement.

Resolved, That in the Opinion of this Council, our force is not equal to that of the enemy, and it would be imprudent and putting too much to the hazard to attempt the march to the relief of Fort Schuyler, until the army is reinforced: the council are of the opinion that an express ought immediately to be sent to General Gates, requesting he will immediately send such reinforcements to us as will enable us to march to the relief of the fort, with a probability of succeeding and that in the meantime the army remain at the German Flatts, at least until an answer can be had from General Gates, and that all possible method be taken to persuade the militia and Indians to join us.101

Benedict Arnold has a reputation for audacity equalled by few if any of his contemporaries, but he approached the relief of Fort Stanwix with uncharacteristic caution. While it was true that the evidence indicated that St. Leger’s force outnumbered Arnold’s column, the total American strength, including the fort’s garrison, gave them a force more than equal to that of their enemy. At the most, St. Leger’s white troops numbered 700 to 800 men, of whom approximately 300 were Canadian militia, not the most reliable of troops. The Indians, who may have numbered 800 at this time, were of limited usefulness in a pitched battle; and even that number had been reduced by the fighting at Oriskany. Between Arnold and Gansevoort, the Americans had a maximum of 1,746, of whom all but about 100 were Continentals.102 St. Leger could not maintain the siege and repel the relief column; and if he abandoned the siege, the garrison would be free to cooperate with Arnold against him. The responsibilities of an independent field command had sobered the flamboyant general who so often made his superiors seem pedestrian when he did not have ultimate responsibility for the conduct of a campaign.

If he was not prepared to rush into battle, he was ready to sound aggressive, so he issued a proclamation:
By the Hon. BENEDICT ARNOLD, esq. Major-general and Commander in Chief of the army of the United States of America on the Mohawk River

Whereas a certain Barry St. Leger a Brigadier-general in the services of the———George of Great-Britain, at the head of a banditti of robbers, murderers, and traitors, composed of savages of America, and more savage Britons (among whom is noted Sir John Johnson, John Butler, and Daniel Claus) have lately appeared in the frontiers of this State, and have threatened ruin and destruction to all the inhabitants of the United States. They have also, by artifice and misrepresentation, induced many of the ignorant and unwary subjects of these States, to forfeit their allegiance to the same, and join with them in their crimes, and parties of treachery and paricide.

Humanity to those poor deluded wretches, who are hastening blindfold to destruction, induces me to offer them, and all others concerned whether savages, Germans, Americans or Britons PARDON, provided they do, within ten days from the date hereof, come in and lay down their arms, use for protection, and swear allegiance to the United States of America.

But if still blind to their own interest and safety, they obstinately persist in their wicked courses, determined to draw on themselves the first vengeance of Heaven, and of this exasperated country, they must expect no mercy from either.

B. Arnold, M.G.

Given under my hand, HeadQuarters, German Flats, 20th August, 1777.¹⁰³

Willett once again returned eastward to deliver to General Gates the council of war’s resolution August 21 along with a request for 1,000 light infantry men.¹⁰⁴

Without waiting for reinforcements, Arnold resorted to a stratagem that has few parallels in American history and folk lore. A Loyalist plot had been uncovered in the vicinity of German Flats, and among the prisoners taken was one of the less prepossessing members of the numerous Schuyler clan, a mentally retarded fellow named Hon Yost Schuyler. He had lived among the Indians, who apparently held him in some awe because of his affliction. He was condemned to death for his part in the plot, but his brother Nickolas and their mother came into Arnold’s camp to plead for the life of the unfortunate man. Nickerson’s account of how Arnold used him is probably more accurate than most that have come down to us:

Taking Hon Yost’s brother as hostage for his good conduct, Arnold told the half-wit that his life would be spared if he would go to St. Leger’s camp and frighten the Indians there by playing upon their emotions and especially by exaggerating the numbers of the relieving force. The half-wit, delighted at the chance of saving himself, prepared with considerable cunning for the attempt. In order to represent himself as an escaped prisoner who had been fired upon, he caused several bullet holes to be shot through his clothes. Such were the political relations of the various Iroquois tribes that it was possible for a friendly Oneida in Arnold’s camp to offer to follow Hon Yost and confirm his story.

Circumstances admirably set the stage for the half-wit. Rumors of the coming of Arnold ‘The Heap Fighting Chief,’ had already disturbed St. Leger’s Indians. St. Leger on his side seems to have committed the error of proposing that the red man should again take the lion’s share of resisting this new effort at relief as they had already done against Herkimer. They had refused. In order to persuade them to march at all he had to promise that he would lead them in person and support them with three hundred of his best white troops. Even so the incident had made them still more suspicious of them.

At this moment the half-wit appeared pointing to the holes in his clothes as proof of the story of his escape. When asked Arnold’s numbers he looked upward vaguely and pointed to the leaves on the trees. Such a message from one so mysteriously stricken by the Great Spirit was enough to put the Indians in commotion.

Brought before St. Leger, Hon Yost repeated his story with a wealth of detail. Arnold with two thousand men, he said, would be upon them within twenty-four hours.

About this time the Oneida appeared, and he too played his part well. On his way through the woods he had met certain other Indians whom he knew and persuaded them to follow him one by one in order to increase the effect of what he proposed to say. His message was that Arnold had no quarrel with St. Leger’s Indians, but proposed to attack only the British and Tories. One by one according to their agreement his friends took up the tale. One went so far as to say that a talking bird had warned him that great numbers of hostile warriors were on their way. On top of the existing discouragement among St. Leger’s Indians, all this was irresistible. Oriskany had taken all the fight out of them, and now they were determined to go.¹⁰⁵

St. Leger, Sir John, and the Indian superintendents, Claus and Butler, tried to prevent their allies from overreacting to the tales of Arnold’s advance. A council was convened, at which the
general learned that 200 Indians had already decamped. The chiefs then informed him that if he did not retreat, they would abandon him.  

Just how much Hon Yost's story played in influencing the Indians is open to question. The campaign certainly had not been profitable to the Iroquois, and they had little stomach for either a prolonged siege or another battle. The appearance of the half-demented white man must have seemed very fortitous. They now had an excellent excuse for doing what they wanted to: abandon the expedition. Daniel Claus put the best face possible on the affair when he wrote:

The Indians finding that our besieging the Fort was of no Effect, our Troops but few, a Reinforcement as was reported of 1500 or 2000 Men with Field pieces, by the way, began to be des[pi]rited & file off by Degrees: The Chiefs advised the Brigr to retreat [to] Oswego and get better Artillery from Niagara & more Men and return & renew the Siege, to which the Brigr agreed and accordingly retreated web, was on the 22 of Augt.

Everyone knew that the siege would not be renewed—that the expedition was a failure.

The British withdrawal was so precipitant that they left part of their equipment behind. Colbrath described the evacuation from the garrison's prospective:

Augt 22d. This Morning the Enemy bombarded very smartly The Sergeant Major and two privates were wounded. At Noon a Deserter came to us whose Examination was that the Enemy had news in the Camp that Burgoynes Army was Entirely Routed and that three Thousand men was Coming up to reinforce us and further that the Enemy was treating with great precipitation and that he with another was conveying off on Lieut Anderson's Chest when he had made his Escape and that most of their Baggage was gone—upon which the Commanding Officer Ordered all the Cannon bearing on their Works to Fire several rounds each to see whether they would return it which partly confirmed the Report of the Deserter. Some time after 4 Men came in and reported the same and that they had left part of their Baggage upon which the Col. ordered 50 Men & two waggons under Command of Capt. Jansen to go to their Camps where they killed 2 Indians and took 4 Prisoners one of them was an Indian. After they had Loaded the wagons with what Baggage they cou'd carry they returned but Night Coming on they cou'd not return to fetch what Baggage was still Left in their Camp. At Night two Men came in one of them was assisting the first Deserter in carrying off Lieut Anderson's chest the other John Yost Schuyler, who informed the Commanding Officer that he was taken prisoner at the German Flatts and confined at Fort Dayton 5 Days That Gener'l Arnold had sent him to General St. Leger commander of the King Troops to inform him that 2000 Continental with 2 Fields Pieces and a great Number of Millita were on their march for this place to Reinforce the Garrison that he informed General St Leger of it and in Consequence of which he Ordered his Troops to strike their Tents and pack up, and further after he had done his Errand he hid himself in the woods till Night and coming across the above Men they came in together, he likewise informed us that near 17 Indians were at Fort Newport quite drunk upon which the Col ordered a party of men under the command of Major Cochran to go and take them who in about an Hour Returned and informed the Colonel he had been there but did not find any and that he went to Wood Creek and found 8 New Batteaus which the Enemy had left behind While they were out the woman that was wounded with a Shell last Night was brought to Bed in our S W Bombproff of a Daughter She and the child are like to do well with the Blessing of God Our Bollcade Ended and the Garrison once more at Liberty to walk about and take the free Air we had for 21 Days been Deprived of At 12 o'clock this Night the Commanding Officer sent off 3 of his Regiment to inform General Arnold of the Precipitate retreat of the Enemy A deserter came in who said he just left the Enemy's Cohorns below Wood Creek Bridge

Augt 23d. This Morning the Col sent out a party under the command of Major Cochran to take them, who returned with three prisoners 4 Cohorns and some Baggage and reported there was 17 Batteaus lying there: another party was sent to the Enemy's N. Camp to bring in the rest of the Baggage left by us last Night containing of Ammunition camp equipage and entrenching Tools another party was sent to the Enemys S E Camp who brought in 15 Waggons a 3-pound field piece Carriage with all its Apparities most of the Wagon Wheels was cut to pieces as were the Wheels of the Carriage Several Scouts were sent out to Day one of whom took a German prisoner who Reported that the Enemies Indians had when they got about 10 Miles from this Fort fallen on the Scattering Tories, took their Arms from & Stabb'd them with their own Bayonets And that for fear of said Indians he and 9 more German Soldiers had took to the woods the rest are not yet found their Design was not to come to the Fort as Butler and Johnston told them when Orders were given to Retreat, that those who fell into our hands would be Hanged immediately Another Scout proceeded to Canada Creek found a Carriage for a Six pounder
& 3 Boxes of Cannon Shott which they brought in. This afternoon the Honble Major General Arnold arrived here with near 1000 Men. They were saluted with a discharge of powder from our mortars formerly the Enemys, and all the Cannon from the Bastions amounting in the whole to 13 Attended with three cheers from the Troops on the Bastions.

Colonel Gansevoort's official report to General Arnold confirmed Colbraths account, setting the time that he learned of St. Leger's withdrawal at 3:00 p.m.

The impedimenta abandoned by the retreating army included:

- 4 Royals.
- 4 2.5 inches diameter, 126 shells for ditto.
- 3 travelling carriages damaged.
- 2 damaged limbers for ditto.
- 135 three-pound round shot.
- 20 six-pound ditto.
- 72 three-pound shot flannel cartridges.
- 1 set horse-harness.
- 1 set of men's ditto.
- 4 sponges.
- 3 ladles.
- 3 wad-boks.
- 28 boxes musket balls.
- 2 powder-horns.
- 2 lanthorns.
- 4 handspikes.
- 3 haversacks.
- 1 drudging-box.
- 2 linstocks.
- 2 port-fires.
- 1 apron.
- 1 pair of good limbers.
- 27 oil-cloths.
- 1 coil-rope.
- A large quantity of junk.
- A large number of ditto damaged.
- 17 three-pound boxes of cartridges damaged.
- 5 six-pound ditto.
- 2160 good musquet cartridges.
- A large number of ditto damaged.
- 30 copper hoops.

General Arnold, at German Flats, had learned of the enemy's attempt to dig approach trenches nearer the fort; and fearful that an attack might carry the place, he decided to move to its relief. An express reached him when he had marched about two miles and informed him of St. Leger's withdrawal. He pushed about 900 men forward in an effort to catch up with the British rear. He reached the fort at 5 p.m., too late to press the pursuit. The next morning, he sent 500 men to continue the chase, but bad weather forced its abandonment, except for a small party that reached Oneida Lake in time to see the last of the British soldiers crossing it in boats. Arnold soon hurried back to the Hudson with Learned's brigade and participated in the decisive Battles of Saratoga.

Barry St. Leger intended to join Burgoyne on the Hudson and redeem the defeat he had suffered on the Mohawk. The distance were too great, and St. Leger did not get to join the main drive against Albany.

The British plan for 1777 went awry on the Hudson with more dramatic and far-reaching results than was the case on the Mohawk. As we have noted, Sir William Howe had proposed shifting his primary threat from New England to Philadelphia. The king and his ministers approved this change in priorities early in March, and he moved against the American capital, leaving Sir Henry Clinton in New York with about 3,000 men to defend the city and act on the lower Hudson. Burgoyne's main army advanced to the northern part of the township of Stillwater, where Gates had blocked the road to Albany. On two days, September 19 and October 17, he fought two engagements, called the Battle of Saratoga, on the American general's terms. Failing to drive or lure the Americans off Bemis Heights, he retreated northward to the village of Saratoga (Schuylerville), where he capitulated to Gates on October 17. The British grand design for 1777 was wrecked. A strategic and tactical turning point in the war was passed, and a family fight had become an international conflict.

The American victory at Fort Stanwix purchased temporary security for the troubled Mohawk valley that was shattered each of the remaining years of the war by raids by British regulars and, especially, their Loyalist and Indian auxiliaries. Except for the regulars, the people on both sides were fighting for their home country; and the fighting was often characterized by the mutual savagery of internecine warfare. The Americans retaliated in 1779 with the Sullivan-Clinton campaign that devastated the hostile Iroquois towns but failed to destroy the Indians' ability to fight. Although the tribes suffered severely during the winter of 1779–80, the heaviest of the century, they joined their white allies for even more serious raids, especially Joseph Brant's and Sir John Johnson's forays of 1780; and the northern frontier was a theatre for destructive but indecisive border war until the end of the Revolution.

Fort Stanwix continued to guard the Great Carying Place until the spring of 1781. During the fort's final years, the elements and fires worked havoc on its fabric and structures. A fire in April 1780 destroyed the guardhouse and threatened the nearest barracks so seriously that it had to be razed to prevent the fire's spreading. On May 14, 1781, another fire, preceded by a rainstorm, destroyed all the barracks; and the rain did extensive damage to the fort's walls. On May 27, Wash-
ing Place, as each had throughout the story of the white man's conquest of the frontier.

A decade after the second Treaty of Fort Stanwix was signed, the State of New York erected a blockhouse for housing military stores on the parade of the fort. Still standing in 1815, it disappeared at an unknown date, and the entire fort was leveled by 1830. The history of Fort Stan-had come to a close.

The general visited the Great Carrying Place in 1783 and in August directed Marinus Willett, by then a colonel of the New York Levies and Militia, to build one or two blockhouses at the portage between the river and Wood Creek. Apparently three such structures were erected near the site of the colonial Fort Williams near the river landing-place.

In 1784, the United States negotiated one of its first Indian treaties at old Fort Stanwix. The settlement of western lands was one of the new nation's most pressing problems. Efforts to reach a solution produced the Ordinance of 1785, one of the landmarks in American legislative and land policy history. The Ordinance provided for the division of western public lands into townships and sections and for their sale by auction. The minimum price was set at one dollar per acre, and the smallest plot to be sold at auction was one section, 640 acres. These terms effectively barred the frontier farmers from buying government land directly, because they had to attend an auction in the east and because 640 acres at a dollar each exceeded their needs and resources. Thus, the door was opened to speculators, who could purchase the lands and then divide them for sale at a profit and on interest-bearing credit.

While surveys mandated by the Ordinance were started, Congress turned to the next step required to open the West—Indian removal. One of the chapters in that story is the Treaty of Stanwix of 1784, by which the Iroquois surrendered all claims to their old lands in return for a few cheap presents. Altogether, the Indians had few reasons to remember the fort with affection. Yet, there are few historic sites whose story more nearly represent the history of the western frontier. Trade, settlements, war, diplomacy, heorism, cupidity, and suffering each played a role at the Oneida Carry-
Appendix I: "Plan of Forts at the Onondaga [sic] or Great Carrying Place," British Museum, Crown Collection, no. XXX. Copy in Map Division, Library of Congress.

Appendix II: "Return of His Majesty's Troops Detached from the Oneida Station—15th August 1758 under the Command of Lieut Colonel Bradstreet." Abercromby Papers, Huntington Library.
Appendix IV: "Plan of FORT STANWIX Showing what Works were done at that Post from July to December 1759."
Appendix V: "PLAN of FORT STANWIx Built at the Oneida Station 1758." British Museum, Crown Collection CXXI, 100. Copy in Map Division, Library of Congress.

Appendix VII: "PLAN of FORT STANWIX. Showing what is finished and what is to be done to compleat it." 1784. British Museum Crown Collection CXXI, 102. Copy in Map Division, Library of Congress.

Appendix VIII: Francois de Fleury. "A Sketch of the siege of FORT SCHUYLER," Copied By G. H. Bowen; Sparks Collection, Cornell University Library.
Appendix X: "Plan Showing the Putative Layout of Fort Stanwix in August 1777."
When the last ships came from Quebec, a report prevailed in Canada, said to have been founded upon positive evidence that the rebels had laid the keels of several large vessels at Skenessborough and Ticonderoga, and were resolved to exert their utmost powers, to construct a new and formidable fleet during the winter.

I will not, however, give credit to their exertions, in such a degree as to imagine the King's troops will be prevented passing Lake Champlain early in the summer, but will suppose the operations of the army to begin at Crown Point.

But as the present means to form effectual plans to lay down every possible difficulty, I will suppose the enemy in great force at Ticonderoga; the different works there are capable of admitting twelve thousand men.

I will suppose him also to occupy Lake George with considerable naval strength, in order to secure his retreat, and afterwards to retard the campaign; and it is natural to expect that he will take measures to block up the roads from Ticonderoga to Albany by way of Skenessborough, by fortifying the strong ground at different places, and thereby obliging the King's army to carry a weight of artillery with it, and felling trees, breaking bridges, and other obvious impediments, to delay, though it should not have the power or spirit to finally resist its progress.

The enemy thus disposed upon this side of Canada, it is to be considered what troops will be necessary, and what disposition of them will be most proper to prosecute the campaign with vigor and effect.

I humbly conceive the operating army (I mean exclusively of the troops left for the security of Canada) ought not to consist of less than eight thousand regulars, rank and file. The artillery required in the memorandums of General Carleton, a corps of watermen, two thousand Canadians, including hatchetmen and other workmen, and one thousand or more savages.

It is to be hoped that the reinforcements and victuall ships may all be ready to sail from the Channel and from Corke on the last day of March. I am persuaded that to sail with a fleet of transports earlier, is to subject government to loss and disappointment. It may reasonably be expected that they will reach Quebec before the 20th of May, a period in full time for the opening of the campaign. The roads, and the rivers and lakes, by the melting and running off of the snows, are in common years impracticable sooner.

But as the weather long before that time will have admitted of labour in the docks, I will take for granted that the fleet of last year, as well as bateaux as armed vessels, will be found repaired, augmented and fit for immediate service. The magazines that remain of provision, I believe them not to be abundant, will probably be formed at Montreal, Sorel and Chamblee.

I conceive the first business for those entrusted with the chief powers, should be to select and post the troops destined to remain in Canada; to throw up the military stores and provisions with all possible dispatch, in which service the above mentioned troops, if for operation to cantonments, within a few days march of St. John's as conveniently may be. I should prefer cantonments at that season of the year to encampment, as the ground is very damp, and consequently very pernicious to the men, and more especially as they will have been for many months used to lodgings, heated with stoves, or between decks of ships; all these operations may
be put in motion together, but they severally require some observation.

I should wish that the troops left in Canada, supposing the number mentioned in my former memorandum to be approved, might be made as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank and File</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The 31st regiment, British, exclusive of their light company of grenadiers</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maclean's corps</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 29th regiment</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ten additional companies from Great Britain</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunswick and Hesse Hanau to be taken from detachments or complete corps as Major General Riedesel shall recommend, leaving the grenadiers, light infantry and dragoons compleat</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detachments from the other British brigades, leaving the grenadiers and lights infantry companies complete and squaring the battalions equally</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My reason for selecting the 31st regiment for this duty is, that when I saw it last it was not equally in order with other regiments for services of activity.

I propose the 29th regiment as it is not presently brigaded.

I propose Maclean's corps, because I very much apprehend desertion from such parts of it as are composed of Americans, should they come near the enemy.

In Canada, whatsoever may be their disposition, it is not easy to effect it.

And I propose making up the residue by detachment, because selecting the men least calculated to fatigue or least accustomed to it, which may be equally good soldiers in more confined movements and better provided situations, the effective strength for operations is much greater and defensive strength not impaired.

I must beg to leave the expeditious conveyance of provisions and stores from Quebec, and the several depositories, in order to form ample magazines at Crown Point, as one of the most important operations of the campaign, because it is upon that which most of the rest will depend. If sailing vessels up the St. Lawrence are alone to be employed, the accident of contrary winds may delay them two months before they pass the rapids of Richelieu, and afterwards St. Peter's Lake; delays to that extent are not uncommon and they are only to be obviated by having a quantity of small craft in readiness to work with oars. From the mouth of the Sorrel to Chamblee, rowing and tacking is a sure conveyance if sufficient hands are found. From Chamblee to St. Therese (which is just above the Rapids) land-carriage must be used, and great authority will be requisite to supply the quantity necessary.

A business as complicated, in arrangement, in some parts unusual in practice, and in other difficult, can only be carried to the desired effect by the peremptory powers, warm zeal, and consonant opinion of the governor; and through the former are not to be doubted, a failure of the latter, vindicated, or seeming to be vindicated, by the plausible obstructions that will not fail to be suggested by others, will be sufficient to crush such exertions as an officer of sanguine temper, entrusted with the future conduct of the campaign and whose personal interest and fame therefore consequently depend upon timely out-set, would lead to make.

The assembly of the savages and Canadians will also depend entirely upon the governor.

Under these considerations, it is presumed, that the general officer employed to proceed with the army will be held out of reach of any possible blame till he is clear of the province of Canada, and furnished with the proposed supplies.

The navigation of Lake Champlain, secured by the superiority of our naval force, and the arrangements for forming proper magazines so established as to make the execution certain, I would not lose a day to take possession of Crown Point with Brigadier Fraser's corps, a large body of savages, a body of Canadians, both for scouts and works, and the best of our engineers and artificers well supplied with entrenching tools.

The brigade will be sufficient to prevent insult during the time necessary for collecting the stores, forming magazines, and fortifying posts; all of which should be done to a certain degree, previous to proceeding in force to Ticonderoga; to such a degree I mean as may be supposed to be effected in time of transporting artillery, preparing fascines, and other necessaries for artillery operation; and
by keeping the rest of the army back during that period, the transport of provisions will be lessened, and the soldiers made use of in forwarding the convoys.

But there would only be one brigade at Crown Point at that time, it does not follow that the enemy should remain in a state of tranquility. Corps of savages, supported by detachments of light regulars, should be continually on foot to keep them in alarm, and within their works to cover the reconnoitering of general officers and engineers, and to obtain the best intelligence of their strength, position, and design.

If due exertion is made in the preparations stated above, it may be hoped that Ticonderoga will then become a more proper place for arms than Crown Point.

The next measure must depend upon those taken by the enemy, and upon the general plan of the campaign as concerted at home. If it be determined that General Howe’s whole forces should act upon Hudson’s River, and to the southward of it, and the only object of the Canada army to be to effect a junction with that force, the immediate possession of Lake George would be of great consequence, as the most expeditious and most commodious route to Albany; and should the enemy be in force upon that lake, which is very probable, every effort should be tried, by throwing savages and light troops around it, to oblige them to quit it without waiting for naval preparation. Should these efforts fail, the route by South Bay and Skanesborough might be attempted, but considerable difficulties may be expected, as the narrow parts of the river may be easily choked up and rendered impassable, and at best there will be necessity for a great deal of land carriage for the artillery, provisions, &c. which can only be supplied from Canada. In case of success also by that route, and the enemy not removed from Lake George, it will be necessary to leave a chain of posts, as the army proceeds, for the securities of your communications, which may too weaken so small an army.

Lest all these attempts should unavoidably fail, and it become indispensible to attack the enemy by water upon Lake George, the army at the outset should be provided with carriages, implements and artificers, for conveying armed vessels from Ticonderoga to the lake.

These ideas are formed upon the supposition, that it be the sole purpose of the Canada army to effect a junction with Lord Howe, or after cooperating so far as to get possession of Albany and open the communication with New-York, to remain upon Hudson’s River, and thereby enable that general to act with his whole force to the southward.

But should the strength of the main American army be such as to admit of the corps of troops now at Rhode Island remaining there during the winter, and acting separately in the spring, it may be highly worthy consideration, whether the most important purpose to which the Canada army could be employed, supposing it is possession of Ticonderoga, would not be to gain the Connecticut River.

The extent of the country from Ticonderoga to the inhabited country upon the river, opposite Charles Town, is about sixty miles, and though to convey artillery and provision so far by land would be attended with difficulties perhaps more than those suggested, upon a progress to Skanesborough, should the object appear worthy, it is hoped resources might be found; in that case it would be advisable to fortify with one or two strong redoubts the heights opposite Charles Town, and establish posts of savages upon the passage from Ticonderoga to those heights, to preserve the communications and at the same time to prevent any attempt from the country above Charles Town, which is very populous, from molesting the rear or interrupting the convoys of supply, while the army proceeded down the Connecticut. Should the junction between the Canada and Rhode Island armies be effected upon the Connecticut, it is not too sanguine an expectation that all the New England provinces will be reduced by their operations.

To avoid breaking in upon the matter, I omitted in the beginning of these papers to state the idea of the expedition at the outset of the campaign by the Lake Ontario and Oswego to the Mohawk River, which, as a diversion to facilitate every proposed operation, would be highly desirable, provided the army should be reinforced sufficiently to afford it.

It may at first appear, from a view of the present strength of the army, that it may bear the sort of detachment proposed by myself last year for this purpose; but it is to be considered that at that time the utmost object of the campaign, from
the advanced season and unavoidable delay of preparation for the lakes being the reduction of Crown Point and Ticonderoga, unless the success of my expedition had opened the road to Albany, no greater numbers were necessary than for those first operations. The case of the present year differs; because the season of the year affording a prospect of very extensive operation and consequently the establishment of many posts, patrols, &c. will become necessary. The army ought to be in a state of number to bear those drains, and still remain sufficient to attack anything that probably can be opposed to it. Should it appear, upon examination of the really effective numbers of the Canada army, that the force is not sufficient for proceeding upon the above ideas with a fair prospect of success, the alternative remains of embarking the army at Quebec, in order to effect a junction with General Howe by sea, or to be employed separately to co-operate with the main designs, by such means as should be within their strength upon other parts of the continent.

Notes

The Construction and Military History of Fort Stanwix

Chapter I

2. Ibid., V, 726 ff.
3. Ibid., VI, 858 (London Document xxxi)
APPENDIX I.
11. C. O. 5/47, 97-98: "Plan of the Forts at the Oneida or Great Carrying Place."
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
15. C. O. 5/46, 236.
17. "Plan of the Forts at the Oneida Carrying Place;" Appendix I, Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, I, 419-20.

Chapter II

1. Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, I, 8-9; Bougainville, "Journal, Summary of M. de Beletre's Campaign," in O'Callaghan, Documents, X, 672.
2. Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, 90-91.
3. Ibid, 94-118; 137-70.
7. Ibid.
9. Abercromby Papers, ltrs., Stanwix to Abercromby, July 20, 1758; Abercromby to Stanwix, July 23, 1758.
10. Ibid., ltrs., Stanwix to Abercromby, July 20 and 24, 1758.
11. Ibid., ltr., Abercromby to Stanwix, 27 July, 1758.
12. Ibid., ltr., Stanwix to Abercromby, July 20, 1758.
13. Ibid., ltr., Stanwix to Abercromby, Aug. 20, 1758; "Return of His Majesty's Troops Detached from the Oneida Station—15th August 1758 under the Command of Lieut Colonel Bradstreet." Appendix II.
15. Ibid., ltr., Stanwix to Abercromby, Sept. 5, 1758.
16. Ibid., ltr., Stanwix to Abercromby, Sept. 7, 1758.
17. Ibid., ltr., Stanwix to Abercromby, Sept. 7, 1758.
18. Ibid., ltr., Abercromby to Stanwix, Sept. 12, 1758.
19. Ibid., ltr., Stanwix to Abercromby, Sept. 29, 1758.
22. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., ltr., Stanwix to Abercromby, Oct. 22, 1758.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., ltr., Abercromby to Stanwix, October 30, 1758.
28. En Barbette—built in such a manner that fire would be directed over a parapet rather than through embrasures.
30. Ibid. See plan opposite.
31. Abercomby Papers, Itrs., Stanwix to Abercomby, October 22, 1758.
32. British Museum, Crown Map Collection, CXXI.
33. British Museum, Crown Map Collection, CXXI.
34. Ibid., CXXXI, 100. Appendix V.
35. Sir William Johnson Papers.
36. Crown Collection, CXXXI, 103, "A Sketch of Fort Stanwix, with its Buildings & Outworks, November 18th, 1764." Appendix VI.
37. Supra., 19.
38. Francis Parkman's *The Conspiracy of Pontiac* is an old but beautifully written and generally useful study of the broad story of this rather neglected subject.
39. Crown Map CXXXI, 103. Appendix VI.
41. See Crown Map CXXXI, 102, Sections A.B. and C.D. Appendix VII.
42. Ibid.

**Chapter III**

1. Papers of the Continental Congress, National Archives, Itrs., Schuyler to President of Congress, June 8, 1776.
5. Ibid., Itrs., Schuyler to Dayton, June 27, 1776; Itrs., Schuyler to Washington, July 2, 1776.
7. Ibid., Itrs., Schuyler to Washington, July 17, 1776.
10. François de Fleury, "A Sketch of the siege of FORT SCHUYLER," copied by G. H. Bowen, Sparks Collection, Cornell University Library. Appendix XIII.
12. Ibid., Itrs., Schuyler to Washington, August 1, 1776. Italics the writer's.
13. Ibid., Itrs., Dayton to Schuyler, August 1, 1776.
15. Schuyler Papers, Itrs., Dayton to Schuyler, August 30, 1776.
16. Schuyler Papers, Itrs., Dayton to Schuyler, July 8, 1776; August 1, 1776; Sept. 1, 1776; Schuyler to Dayton, August 2, 1776; Ebeneezer Elmer, Journal, New Jersey Historical Society, August 26–September 5, 1776.
17. Ibid., Itrs., Dayton to Schuyler, September 14, 1776.
18. Ibid., Itrs., Dayton to Schuyler, September 17 1776.
19. Ibid., Itrs., Henry Glen to Schuyler, July 8, 1776; Schuyler to Washington, Aug. 1, 1776; Glen to Schuyler, September 25, 1776.
20. Ibid., Itrs., Dayton to Schuyler, October 5, 1776.
21. Ibid., Letters and Orders, Schuyler to Elmore, October 9 and November 12, 1776; Ebeneezer Elmer, Journal, New Jersey Historical Society, October 17, 1776.
22. Ibid., to Henry Glen, ADQM Genl., Dec. 21, 1776.
25. Ibid., Letters and Orders, To Elmore, March 18, 1777.
26. Ibid., To Col. Van Schaick, March 25, 1777.
27. William Colbrath, Journal of the most material occurrences preceding the Siege of Fort Schuyler (formerly Fort Stanwix) with an account of that siege, etc., negative photostat, New York Public Library.
29. Ibid., Itrs., Lamarquise to Gates, May 19, 1777.
30. Ibid., Itrs., Gansevoort to Gates, n.d.
32. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book; Colbrath's Journal May 28, 1777.
33. Marinus Willett, Narrative.
34. Schuyler Papers, Itrs., Schuyler to Gansevoort, June 9; Gansevoort to Schuyler, June 15.
35. Ibid., Schuyler to Gansevoort, July 10, 1777.
37. Ibid., memorandum, Lamarquise to Gates, n.d.
38. Schuyler Papers, Letters and Orders, to Gansevoort, June 8, 1777.
39. Ibid., Itrs., Gansevoort to Schuyler, June 26, 1777; Colbrath, Journal.
40. Ibid.
Chapter IV

2. C. O. 512812.
5. C. O. 5/253 ff; John Burgoyne, “Thoughts for Conducting the War from this Side of Canada,” copy in Germain Papers, Wm. L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan, and in John Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition, Appendix No. III.
9. See Appendix XI for complete text.
10. Italics added.
13. Italics added.
17. Ensign Spoor’s party. Supra., 76.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
22. Ibid., ltr., Schuyler to Herkimer, June 29, 1777.
23. Ibid., ltr., Schuyler to Gansevoort, June 30, 1777.
25. Schuyler Papers, ltr., Gansevoort to Schuyler, July 4, 1777.
26. Ibid., ltr., Schuyler to Herkimer, July 8, 1777.
27. Ibid., ltr., Schuyler to the Tryon County Committee of Safety, July 10, 1777.
28. Ibid., ltr., Herkimer to Schuyler, July 15, 1777.
29. Ibid., ltr., Schuyler to John Barclay et. al., July 18, 1777.
32. Gansevoort Papers, ltr., Gansevoort to van Schaick, July 28; Colbrath’s Journal.
33. Colbrath’s Journal.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Willett’s Orderly Book, August 1, 1777.
37. Gansevoort Papers, from among the captured British papers, Bird to St. Leger.
38. Ibid., St. Leger to Bird.
40. Germain Papers, St. Leger to Germain, August 27, 1777.
42. James Weise, Swartwout Chronicle (1899), 214.
43. The New Lamed History (1923), IV, 3109.
44. John Albert Scott, Fort Stanwix (Fort Schuyler) and Oriskany (Rome, 1927), 175.
46. James Thacher, A Military Journal During the Revolutionary War (Boston, 1823).
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98. Ibid., ltr., Washington to Schuyler, July 24, 1777.
99. Ibid., ltr., Schuyler to Washington, August 13, 1777.
100. Gates Papers, “Report of Council of War of German Flatts, August 21, 1777.” Gates has succeeded Schuyler to command of the Northern Department.
101. The size of Gansevoort’s garrison is difficult to determine. Two hundred men arrived with Willett, 200 with Badlam, 100 with Mellon. The number that accompanied Gansevoort is unknown, but was at least 200, making a total of 700. This is at odds with a return for provisions for Aug. 13 for 467 soldiers, but except for the contingent that arrived with Gansevoort, the numbers of the other elements are precisely documented.
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CXXI, no. 102. “PLAN OF FORT STANWIX, Showing what is finished and what is to be done to compleat it. 1764.”

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The scope of this study focuses upon the siege and repulse of Barry St. Leger’s British forces in August 1777, the major theme of the interpretive program. In addition, its attention focuses primarily on those areas of the fort scheduled by the interpretative prospectus for complete or partial furnishing. These areas consist of the parade ground, bastions, southwest and northwest bombproofs, bakehouse, guardhouse, headquarters, east barracks, and north, southeast, and west casemates.

This study is limited by a dearth of sources containing data on furnishings directly associated with Fort Stanwix. Where this scarcity has occurred, I have sought those sources that contain data on furnishings of other military posts of the period, particularly those in New York State. These sources proved of inestimable value. Archeological studies of Fort Stanwix and of other military posts of the period also proved to be valuable, although the basis for conclusions for a study of this nature must ultimately rest with the historical record. Obviously, because this study relies on much documentation not directly associated with the fort, many conclusions must necessarily be conjectural.

In preparing this study, I have first sought to identify furnishings that did, or might have, belonged to Fort Stanwix during the siege. These are treated in Chapters I through VI. In Chapter VII, I have brought all these furnishings together in an attempt to describe the appearance of those areas scheduled to be furnished.

For the sake of continuity and to avoid any confusion in the text, I have retained the name of Fort Stanwix throughout, even when sources have referred to the alternate name of Fort Schuyler.

My thanks go to many persons who have helped to make this study possible, but I wish especially to express my appreciation to Messrs. Luzader, Carroll, Hanson, and Hsu. Their knowledge, background, and long association with Fort Stanwix have produced scholarly studies and research without which the author would have been at a serious disadvantage. I would also like to thank the staffs of the following organizations for the assistance they gave me in seeking out possible sources: the New York Public Library, the New-York Historical Society, the New York State Library, the William L. Clements Library of the University of Michigan, the American Antiquarian Society, the Sterling Memorial Library of Yale University, the New Haven Colony Historical Society, the National Archives, the Connecticut Historical Society, the United States Military Academy, and the Queens Borough Public Library in Jamaica, New York. Finally, a word of thanks goes to the many individuals, too numerous to mention here, who were so kind as to answer my many queries.

Louis Torres
INTRODUCTION

Fort Stanwix is known in history for its dramatic role during the British siege of August 1777. In defeating the designs of Barry St. Leger, it was able to contribute to the defeat of General Burgoyne, leading to new developments in the Revolution. Nevertheless, its significance cannot be fully appreciated without first realizing the strategic position it commanded on the frontier—first as a British post and later as an American possession. Located in central New York State, in an area commonly known as the Oneida Carrying Place, it became the connecting link between the several western posts on the Great Lakes and those posts on Lake Champlain and the Hudson River. Gen. Thomas Gage appreciated its strategic importance when he noted that, because of Fort Stanwix, the Mohawk River and all points eastward as far as Schenectady were well secured against any attempt by the French. In regard to the role it would play in supporting communications westward, Gage noted that the fort would give “assistance to every person going with stores [and] refreshments to the several posts . . . to Niagara.”

After the French and Indian War had ended and after fears of French incursions had subsided, there was no longer any need for a fully garrisoned fort. In recommending that Fort Stanwix be demilitarized, General Gage argued that the fort had ceased to serve its original purpose. He said that:

The use of Fort Stanwix was, that being Situated upon a Carrying Place, the Garrison assisted in the Transportation of the Boats and Stores: but as the Stores formerly demanded are now greatly reduced I am of opinion that the Service can be carried on in the Manner proposed, without being at the Expence of Supporting a Fort, and Maintaining a Garrison at so great a Distance.

Soon after the outbreak of the Revolution, the fort’s strategic importance was again realized. With the failure of the American campaign in Canada in 1776, Fort Stanwix along with all those posts on Lake Champlain and the Hudson River began to attract attention. Encouraged by their success in Canada, the British would almost certainly begin a drive southward to cut off the New England colonies. Gen. Philip Schuyler, who commanded the Northern Department, saw the possible consequences of an enemy drive eastward along the Mohawk Valley and the need to retain the loyalty of the Oneidas, the only family of the Six Nations of the Iroquois to remain neutral. Prompted by the fears of the inhabitants of Tryon County, he ordered the reopening of Fort Stanwix.

During the Revolution, Fort Stanwix remained a frontier fort isolated from Albany and Schenectady, from which it received its direction and major supplies, by more than 90 miles. It found itself in the midst of Tories and unfriendly Iroquois. Because of this isolation it suffered more than its share of desertions. In 1776 the post commander complained that he was “not able to get any publick intelligence, unless I make Particular application for it at some place more publick.” To remedy the situation, he appointed a post rider to ride between Fort Stanwix and Albany once a week. His appeal for intelligence of any kind was almost desperate.

General Schuyler was convinced that the enemy would one day make its strength felt by way of the Mohawk Valley, and he resisted any attempt to weaken that part of the country. He objected strenuously to a request from Gen. Horatio Gates to transfer troops from Fort Stanwix to the Champlain region. “I cannot think,” he said, “of
moving Colonel Dayton’s Corps from Fort Stanwix. If I had any troops to spare I would strengthen that Quarter as all my Intelligence agrees that some Blow is Meditated."

Schuyler worked feverishly to strengthen the fort with much-needed supplies. Unfortunately, the results were not always equal to the effort. Although Col. Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Commander of the 3 New York Regiment, found it “extremely pleasant and agreeable” when he first arrived, he soon showed his annoyance at the lack of progress being made to strengthen the fort. He complained that construction was moving very slowly. Only two months before the siege, he noted with some disgust that “Nothing of any importance [had] yet been done toward the Strengthening [of] the Fortifications which at present has little more than the name of a Fortification.”

By the time the siege got underway, the fort was still largely unprepared. While the garrison expanded to an approximate strength of 700 on the eve of the siege, the same could not be said for the heavy guns that were promised. Although ordnance supplies were being shipped daily to Fort Stanwix, Schuyler was finally compelled to admit to Washington that the garrison was weak and poorly supplied with cannon. Meanwhile, the siege had come and gone, but the fort remained without adequate facilities and supplies.

In the final analysis, the British were largely to blame for their unsuccessful attempt against Fort Stanwix. Although they outnumbered the garrison, they had underestimated their task; by not bringing guns of a larger caliber with them, they missed an excellent opportunity. The problems they faced with a restless and uncertain ally in the Indian was another factor contributing to their defeat.

Although the records are silent, Fort Stanwix must have presented a chaotic scene during the siege. Sleeping quarters were inadequate to house the normal complement of 400 men. These facilities had been planned but never completed. On top of this, the garrison suddenly expanded to about 700 men just before the siege. Although supplies of all kinds were arriving daily, there were many shortages, from clothing and eating utensils to big guns. Faced with a shortage of normal day-to-day supplies, the men were forced to improvise, borrow, and share. They slept on floors and possibly in tents with little bedding and a minimum of comfort, sharing their cooking and eating utensils and wearing tattered clothes. Fortunately it was summer, but the cool nights of that region must have produced considerable discomfort.

Inadequate facilities and lack of supplies must have seemed intolerable at times, but they were not the only problems. The garrison during the siege was made up of Yorkers and Yankees, as well as continental and militia. Such a combination must have produced more than the normal amount of factionalism and jealousies. Mistrust of the Tryon County militia (whose members, after all, did come from an area where loyalties were divided) was inevitable, and must have added fuel to the fire.

The siege went on for 22 days under these conditions. In the final analysis, the fact that the siege was finally raised with the loss of so few men must be credited to the bravery, courage, and ingenuity of the garrison.
Providing food and supplies for the garrison at Fort Stanwix proved to be a job of considerable magnitude, frequently exhausting the patience of those who commanded the fort. All the logistical problems faced by Fort Stanwix were common to any frontier fort. The fort was separated from Albany and Schenectady by more than 90 miles of heavily wooded areas. In the spring, summer, and fall, provisions were loaded onto bateaux, which sailed westward on the Mohawk River. In the winter, when the river was not navigable, supplies were shipped on wagons and sleighs over inland routes that often proved treacherous. Even when the elements were conquered, supplies en route faced the uncertainties of the Tories and their allies, the Iroquois, who thrived in large numbers, particularly in Tryon County.

Nor was the enemy the worst offender; the men hired to operate the bateaux frequently proved to be untrustworthy, and often stole the supplies. General Schuyler decried these practices in the most vehement language, and when these thieves were caught redhanded, punishment was severely meted out.

When the provisions finally did arrive, the garrison had to contend with other problems. Often food would either arrive spoiled or would spoil shortly after its arrival, especially if packaging or storage facilities were inadequate. The quantity of food and supplies available at the fort was frequently insufficient because it was affected by the fluctuating number of men at the fort. Despite General Schuyler's attempts to make sure that supplies followed new assignments to the garrison, the complicated supply line made this difficult. Then there was the extensive pilfering at the fort itself. One member of the garrison noted that men frequently broke into the stores and stole provisions.

The inconsistency of the supply system often led to an imbalance in the diet of the soldier. As early as 1759, complaints were heard from Fort Stanwix that the "Scurvy begins to make its Appearance upon some ... men, who have now been reduced some time to pork and Flower [sic]."  

The food supplies consumed at Fort Stanwix consisted largely of salted pork and beef. At times when cattle were abundant, in an effort to avoid the ill-effects of too much salted meat, fresh beef was issued. Thus, in July 1776, while he was commanding the Northern Department, General Gates ordered his commissary to issue a 4-day ration of fresh meat and a 3-day ration of salted meat. As the number of cattle increased, the commissary was directed to issue a 5-day ration of fresh meat and a 2-day ration of salted meat a week.

Most important among the foods eaten at Fort Stanwix were beef, pork, bread, flour, oatmeal, rice, peas, butter, and salt. Of lesser importance were cheese, bacon, suet, fish, raisins, and molasses. Occasionally, different kinds of vegetables were shipped to the fort, such as potatoes, parsnips, carrots, turnips, cabbage, and onions, but these were intended mainly for the sick. Vegetable seeds were also sent to the fort to encourage soldiers to plant their own gardens, and, as a result, several gardens flourished outside the fort. Beverages usually seen at Fort Stanwix consisted of beer, cider, rum, and wine. Rum was a significant part of the soldier's ration, particularly while he was on fatigue duty.

With spring approaching in 1777, it became more apparent that the enemy would strike from the west through Fort Stanwix. The garrison worked feverishly to make the fort defensible. In the meantime, Schuyler had reported as early as August 1776 to Washington that almost 80 days worth of pork and flour were in store for the garri-
son. Moreover, a considerable quantity of flour was also being shipped from Schenectady, and because the garrison had 23 head of beef cattle, Schuyler believed it would have a constant supply of fresh meat on hand. "I am under no apprehensions," he concluded with some optimism, "that the garrison will be under any Difficulty in the article of provision."

In spite of these words of optimism and the effort made to supply the garrison with provisions, the desired goal was never reached. In fairness to Schuyler, however, it should be noted that at the time he made his statement the garrison numbered no more than 400 men, whereas the garrison continued to grow until mid-1777, when it reached almost 700. By June 1777 Schuyler had changed his tune, and he was now complaining that the quantity of provisions at Fort Stanwix was "very inadequate." He directed his subordinates to take the proper measures without further delay to convey to the fort whatever was needed. Colonel Gansevoort, meanwhile, noted on the eve of the siege that although his garrison was small, it was too large for the amount of provisions in store.

Salt provisions, such as salt beef and salt pork, were especially needed, and condemning more than 20,000 pounds of spoiled salt meat at Fort Stanwix did not help matters any. Nevertheless, every effort was being made to supply the fort. On July 10, 1777, John Lansing, aid to Schuyler, wrote to the commissary of the Northern Department that "The General wishes you to take the most effectual Measures to throw into Fort [Stanwix] as much provisions as will compleat what is now at that post to a Sufficiency for four hundred men for two months." At the same time Schuyler reassured Gansevoort that he would give him all the assistance in his power.

At the beginning of the siege, the commissary stores at Fort Stanwix consisted of 500 barrels of flour, 60 barrels of salted provisions, a quantity of peas, and 20 head of cattle. In addition, Colonel Gansevoort had procured 50 head of cattle from the inhabitants around the fort.

Salted meat was always at a premium, and frequently reliance was placed upon livestock, which was not always plentiful. One month after the siege, Lt. Col. Marinus Willett, second in command of the garrison, complained about the dismal situation due to the garrison's lack of provisions. The garrison, he said, had only an 8-day supply of salted pork. He had employed every possible method in his power to supply the garrison with provisions, but without effect. Although the problem had somewhat ameliorated with the promise of a shipment of 40 head of cattle and a quantity of salt, months later Colonel Gansevoort was complaining that ever since my Command at this place since the 6th Day of May last I have been only Supply'd from hand to mouth and during the Siege [sic] obliged to kill Mileh Cows Hogg[sic] etc & which I had retained in the Fort Ditch being the property of the late Inhabitants of this place when the Enemy opened the Seige [sic]: from whence this neglect proceeds I cannot tell.

A return of the provisions at Fort Stanwix in May 1778, only eight months after the siege, noted that the commissary stores consisted of the following items:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>106 barrels of beef</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160 &quot; &quot; pork</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>470 &quot; &quot; flour</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3¼ &quot; &quot; salt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3¾ &quot; &quot; soap</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 boxes &quot; &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2½ &quot; &quot; candles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 hogheads &quot; rum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 bushels &quot; beef</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4½ tierces &quot; rice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 fat cattle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A return of provisions made 7 weeks later by John Hansen, commissary at Fort Stanwix, noted the following items on hand:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 barrels of beef</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128 &quot; &quot; pork</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>433 &quot; &quot; flour</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 &quot; &quot; salt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 boxes &quot; soap</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 boxes of candles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 &quot; &quot; rice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>an unknown quantity of peas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; fat cattle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 gallons hogsheads of rum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⅓ &quot; hoghead of brandy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⅓ &quot; &quot; rum for the Indian Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One may conclude from these two returns that the items were more or less the same as those that
were probably on hand at the time of the siege. The quantity of some of these items might have been larger during the siege, since at that time there were about 700 people in the fort, whereas by May 1778 the number had been reduced to 451.15

To appreciate fully in what quantities provisions were consumed at Fort Stanwix, a brief word should be said about rationing. It was evident that those soldiers on heavy duty were entitled to more of the commissary stores. In 1780 garrison orders read:

The several Issuing Commissaries at this post and its Dependencies, are to Issue provisions as follows Viz, to Artificers waggoners, Colleirs [sic], Boatmen, wood Cutters, on Constant hard Duty 24 oz of Bread or flower [sic], 24 ditto of Beef or 18 oz of pork or fish, one Jill of Rum [per Day if it be had, Eight lb of Soape [per] hundred men, [per] Week one Quart of salt to Every hundred lb of Beef.

To the troops one lb of Bread or flour and one lb of Beef Soape salt and Candles as usual, one Jill of Rum to men on fatigue. When to be had.

When there is Vegetables in store, the Rations of flour is to be Reduced on Quarter of a lb and for every hundred Weight of flour so Reduced, two and half Bushells of peas or two and half ditto Beans or Eight ditto potatoes or twelve ditto Turnips, are to be issued in proportion for a Greater or Less Quantity.

If at any times the Commissaries are Destitute of flour at such times a half lb Beef is to be Added to the Ration of meat aggreable to the Orders of the 2nd Instant.16

Rum was a major part of the provisions at Fort Stanwix. As early as 1759 the importance of rum was clearly recognized when General Gage, speaking of bringing supplies through Wood Creek in November, complained that the garrison at Fort Stanwix "will not be well pleased to have their men up to the middle in Water at that season of the year & not a drop of rum to give them [and] I fear the King's Troops will suffer greatly from such Service."17 In 1777, at the height of construction, Colonel Gansevoort appealed to General Gates to have a "quantity of Rum . . . sent up immediately as our fatigue [details] have already been 7 Days with what little is left." 18 Three days later he signed an order for the purchase of 25 gills of rum for fatigue parties under the engineer's supervision.19 In 1776 and 1777, men on fatigue duty—much of which consisted of cutting down trees and clearing the forest surrounding the fort—wagoners bringing up supplies, and artificers working on the fort were always first to get whatever rum was available.

The quantity of rum issued to each man depended upon whether they were on fatigue duty, construction work, or some lighter detail. Moreover, the quantity issued to each man varied from time to time depending upon the quantity of rum on hand. Reflecting the shortage of rum, in August 1776 General Schuyler directed the commander of Fort Stanwix to distribute rum “at such times [and] in such portions as you may think proper to Fatigue men,” but cautioned that it should not exceed one gill a day “unless upon very Extraordinary occasions.” 20 In October 1777 the commissary was ordered to deliver a half gill of rum to each man before he went on fatigue duty and another after such duty. In February 1778 fatigue men engaged in cutting two cords of wood a day were permitted to have a half pint of rum a day.21

Although commissary provisions represented the major part of a soldier's rations at Fort Stanwix, they were not by any means the sole source of his nourishment. Sutlers who made their way to the fort and farmers living in the neighborhood of the fort sold their vegetables, alcoholic beverages, and wares to the commissary and to the soldiers directly. Receipts signed by Colonel Gansevoort on December 13, 1777, and March 7, 1778, reveal that he purchased peas, oats, and other grain for the use of his garrison.22 In addition to these items, cider, turnips, potatoes, cabbage, apples, sugar, fowl, geese, turkeys, butter, cheese, onions, and tobacco were also purchased from sutlers and farmers.

Because abuses in the sale of these items were flagrant, Colonel Gansevoort felt constrained to convene a "Court of Regulations" to fix prices on all items brought to the garrison for sale. Henceforth, no farmer, officer, soldier, or anyone else would be permitted to sell his articles at a price higher than that set by the court.23

An item that never appeared in the commissary stores, but which was sought by some men of the garrison, was milk. The milk was sold to the soldiers by farmers and even by the inhabitants of the fort who owned cows. Even in this instance there was price gouging, and the commandant of the fort was forced to issue a warning to these per-
sons. He reminded them that since “they receive their Feed from the Publick,” 6 pence a quart was the highest price they could receive for milk. If any person violated this rule, his cows were to be expropriated for the use of the sick at the hospital.

There was a variety of items that were either purchased from sutlers or received directly from home which reflected the personal preferences of the soldier. In this respect, officers, many of whom were from the upper class of society and financially able, had a greater selection of provisions to choose from. So good was this source of supply to Colonel Gansevoort that in June 1777, while he was complaining of serious shortages of commissary provisions for his men, he wrote to his future wife: “I must inform you that I have Exceeding [sic] good living here [with] plenty of Veal Pigion and Fish of Different Sorts.”

There is little doubt that these delicacies were purchased by Colonel Gansevoort through local sources. Another time Gansevoort upbraided his brother for not sending him some lemons when he had asked for them.

While rum was usually a part of the commissary stores and the most common alcoholic beverage of the enlisted man, wine, brandy, and other fine spirits were usually the drinks of the privileged officer. General Schuyler, a wealthy aristocrat, was careful to specify imported brandy when he ordered five kegs for himself and “a Gallon or two for Mrs. Schuyler at Saratoga.”

Another means of obtaining provisions, other than through the commissary, was by growing a garden. Gardens were encouraged at all times by providing the commissary at the fort with bushels of garden seed. At times the commissary ran low on seed, but when this happened individuals were able to acquire it by other means. Before the siege took place, guards were posted at the gardens to prevent anyone from stealing the crops. During the siege, potatoes were growing in the garden.

Medicines also comprised part of the provisions at Fort Stanwix. A fairly large hospital existed outside the fort, but once the siege got underway, this facility was no longer practical. Although some of the sick were confined to their quarters, the more serious cases, as well as the wounded, were sent to the southwest bombproof where a hospital had been set up.

Although it is difficult to give a precise description of the medicines that were employed at Fort Stanwix, there is a very interesting document, albeit illegible, prepared several months before the siege, which provides a good picture of what the situation probably was like. This document is significant not only because it gives us some idea of the medicines used, but also because it indicates the serious shortage of medicines that existed. A doctor who was at Fort Dayton in the German Flatts as part of a detachment from Fort Stanwix (and who later was stationed at Fort Stanwix) had requested medicines for one of his patients from Dr. Lewis F. Dunham, the surgeon at Fort Stanwix. Dr. Dunham was somewhat reluctant to part with them, but sent them nevertheless with the following advice:

By the Bearer you have Such Medicines as you mentioned, though I assure you I know not how to part with them being half of the kind I have with me and know not where to get any more this side of New York. For Mr. Giffords [billious] complaints I send you a few Pills Composed of [aloes] Soap [gum ammonia] & Squills three of which [are] to be taken night & morning Drastic carhart [sic]: [composed] of Aloe Soap and Calomel [is] to be taken as often as you may think necessary without paying any Respect to the Pills. Horse Radish [sic] [is] very essential with his Diet. . . . My Respect to Mr. Gifford and hope the Medicines may prove a Balsam to his Complaints, a Sweet Cordial to my Desires. . . .

If any Bayberry bark Could be procured with you & [kept] in Cyder [sic] or mild Vinegar a TeaCup full of which now and then might be of the utmost Service to Mr. Gifford.

Just before the siege, Fort Stanwix received a supply of medicines. In June 1777 Colonel Gansevoort’s brother Leonard, who was then in Albany, wrote to the Colonel that a Doctor Williams was headed for the fort with medicines and hospital supplies. Despite this heartening news and a later shipment, medicines continued to be at such a premium that only the most serious cases would get to use them.

There are several references in documents pertaining to other posts in the Northern Department which also describe medicines and related hospital supplies. There is no doubt that these medicines were also used at Fort Stanwix at one time or another. At Fort Ticonderoga, the doctor ordered chocolate and sugar for the sick in the hospital, and one-half the beef or other meat that a soldier normally drew. He also ordered the com-
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missary to purchase sheep for the sick. At the
general hospital in Albany, an inventory of the
stores, revealed, among other things, a gallon of
rum, a gallon of wine, a gallon of molasses, choco-
late, corn, and turnips. As in all logistical operations involving long
supply lines, containers and packages in which food
was stored played a major role. Numerous refer-
ces to different types of containers are made in
the manuscripts of this period. Barrels, bushels,
boxes, bags, and hogsheads, and to a lesser degree,
casks, tierces, firkins, and puncheons, were all con-
tainers in which provisions were shipped to and
stored at the fort in bulk. Glass containers, such
as gallon, quart, and pint bottles, though only
mentioned as units of measurement, must also have
existed in large quantities at Fort Stanwix.

Salted beef and salted pork, two large items,
were usually stored in barrels, but occasionally a
reference is made to “bushels of beef.” Other items
that also appeared in barrels were flour, rum, wine,
salt, and even soap. Usually stored in bushels
were corn grain, and peas, and sometimes salt.
The hogshead usually contained rum and brandy.
Rice containers were referred to as “tierces of
rice.” References are also made to “flour casks.”
Although no references were found to the employ-
ment of bags, the latter must have been used be-
cause the British Army constantly shipped bread
and peas in bags. Similarly, though no references
were found to the use of the firkin, it must have
been used because the British Army shipped and
stored its butter in firkins.

Glass containers, such as gallons, quarts, and
pints, were probably used to hold rum, brandy,
wine, beer, cider, and other liquids. Frequently,
these containers stored liquids purchased from sut-
ters or farmers.

Food spoilage represented a very serious logis-
tical problem to both sides in the Revolution. The
longer the lines of communication, the greater the
problem. It took several days by boat or wagon to
ship provisions and supplies to Fort Stanwix from
Albany and Schenectady. Such a long journey
without modern refrigeration caused considerable
spoilage. Proper containers and proper packaging
were imperative if spoilage, particularly of meat,
was to be avoided. In July 1777, on the eve of
the siege, Fort Stanwix found itself with more than
20,000 pounds of spoiled salted meat. Such in-
stances of spoilage must have been frequent, be-
cause in April 1778 Lt. Col. Willett issued orders
to fit up the southwest and northwest bombproofs
for the storage of beef and pork provisions. He
further instructed the commissary to take the neces-
sary precautions to see that the beef and pork were
properly examined and well coopered before they
were stored in the bombproofs.
II

ARMS AND ACCOUTERMENTS

A. Large Armaments

Although Fort Stanwix was a solidly built fort for its day, it was actually never fully armed with the proper number of cannon.

In 1758, while it was under construction, 50 cannon and mortars were proposed for the fort. Each of the four bastions was to carry eight cannon; the remainder were to grace the curtains and other sections of the fort. The type and size of guns to be employed were as follows:

- 6 eighteen pound iron cannons
- 12 twelve pounder
- 12 nine pounder
- 10 six pounder
- 2 eight inch Howitzers
- 2 " " mortars
- 2 thirteen " "
- 4 four and three-fifths iron coehorns

Total: 50

This plan to arm the fort with 50 guns was never realized. About a year later General Gage, who was superintending the construction of other forts on the Great Lakes and was desperately in need of any kind of assistance from Fort Stanwix, reluctantly admitted that the latter could provide little help in the way of guns having only one 12-pounder two 9-pounders, two 6-pounders, four 3-pounders, and two small mortars. One traveller through North America in 1765 noted that while Fort Stanwix was "calculated" for a good many guns, it had only 18 mounted. While the fort was undergoing reconstruction in 1776, an effort was made to supply it with the necessary guns, but the attempt was not any more successful than in 1758.

Anticipating the shipment of heavy guns, and before a detachment of artillerists could be assigned, General Schuyler directed the commander of Fort Stanwix to furnish the Officer of Artillery with such a number of Men, as will be fully sufficient to work the Cannon in case of an Attack & they should be constantly exercised in that Business. This will not only be an advantage to the Regiment In case they [sic] should be no Artillery men may be at hand, but be of service to the cause in general, that, one or more of your Officers, should also be instructed in the Management of Cannon.

It was not until January 1777 that a company of artillery was dispatched to Fort Stanwix. In the meantime, cannon and other guns, including related equipment and ammunition, were being shipped to Fort Stanwix. By June 1777 these supplies were leaving the quartermaster depot at Schenectady almost on a daily basis.

In spite of all this activity, however, a report issued the same month noted that the fort had only six "small" cannon and two field pieces to defend it. Schuyler unhappily complained to Washington that the fort was poorly supplied with cannon.

After learning that the enemy had reached Oswego and was soon to threaten Fort Stanwix, Schuyler quickly set about sending provisions and ammunition to the fort, but the effort, unfortunately, bore little fruit. At the end of the siege, one member of the garrison reported in his journal that Fort Stanwix had 13 cannon on hand besides several guns of varying sizes and types taken from the enemy.

Manuscripts reveal that from March through June 1778 the number and types of cannon at Fort Stanwix remained essentially the same. During this
period, the fort had three 9-pounders, four 6-
pounders, and four 3-pounders—a total of 11 can-
non. In addition, it had four 4-2/5 caliber Royal
mortars. It is very likely that the above cannon
were at least the same type of guns, if not the same
ones, used during the siege.

An excellent inventory of the ordnance, in-
cluding the cannon and mortars noted above, in
store at Fort Stanwix in May 1778 revealed the
following items in the quantities indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 cannon (three 9-pounders, four 6-pounders, four 3-pounders)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Royals, 4-2/5 caliber</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 traveling carriages for 3-pound cannon</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 garrison carriages for 6- and 9-pound cannon</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,269 round shot</td>
<td>2,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 cannister shot</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>393 case shot fixed with flannel cartridges (shot were in all 3 caliber)</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148 grapeshot (for 6- and 9-pounders)</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>640 wads (for 3-, 6-, and 9-pounders)</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360 tubes damaged (3- and 6-pounders)</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450 paper cartridges filled (3-, 6-, and 9-pounders)</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>849 empty paper cartridges (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)</td>
<td>849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 handspikes (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 spunes (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 ladles (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 wad hooks (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 caps for spunes (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 aprons for cannon (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 priming wires (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 tomkins (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 lind stocks (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 tube boxes (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 gin ropes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 set of men’s harness</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 coil of rope</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 spunes for Royals</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 aprons for Royals</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 trail spikes</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 post fire stocks</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 dozens of post fires</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 powder horns</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 pincher</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 hammer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 gimblets</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 coils of slow match</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16½ rheems of cartridge paper</td>
<td>16½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 sets of dragropes for 3-pounders</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 haversacks</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 set of spare wheels for 9-pound carriages</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 spare carriage for 9-pounders</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 spare carriage for 6-pounders</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 gin</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63 boxes of musket balls</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 oilcloths</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 hairclothes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127 shells for Royals</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000 flints</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 barrels of powder</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It may be of interest to compare the similarity
of the following partial list of heavy armament and
ordnance supplies, which appeared in a return of
ordnance needed in the Northern Department in
August 1777, with the preceding list of items:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 tons of 3-pound shot</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 tons of 4-pound shot</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 tons of 6-pound shot</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 dozens of large horns suitable for priming, cannon, with belts, bits, priming wires, etc.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 dozen post fires</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>½ ton of slow match</td>
<td>½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 tubes suitable for 3-, 4-, and 6-pounders</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 3-pound flannel cartridges</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400 4-pound</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 6-pound</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 paper cartridges for 4-pounders</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 &quot; &quot; &quot; 3-pounders</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 &quot; &quot; &quot; 6-pounders</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 sets of men’s harness</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 &quot; &quot; dragropes</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 dozen scissors for the laboratory</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 dozen pairs of pinchers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 yards of oil cloth for covering ammunition</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B. Small Arms and Ammunition**

Although the written evidence is meager, the
musket was probably the most common small
weapon employed at Fort Stanwix during the
siege. Whether the Brown Bess or some other English musket was used is not known, but in all probability, an English musket was extensively utilized. On the other hand, there is some concrete evidence that a French type of musket was also used. In June 1777, Leonard Gansevoort again wrote to his brother that "Lieut. Mc Clallen has desired me to inform you that he has drawn out of the Store sixty good new French muskets and the like number of Quality Bayonets, Cartouch Boxes and Bayonet belts." This written evidence may be corroborated by the discovery by archeologists of a single iron forward band said to have probably come from a French weapon.

Although there are few direct references to the use of the musket at Fort Stanwix, there are several references to musket ball and musket cartridges.

There are several documents pertaining to the Northern Department and to posts in other parts of the colonies that make references to small arms and related items. From these documents we can conclude that generally the same arms and related equipment were probably employed at Fort Stanwix. A resolution passed by the New York Provincial Congress in August 1776 directed that every person in the military, including the city and county of Albany and Tryon County, was to furnish himself with a good Musket or firelock & Bayonet Sword or Tomahawk, a Steel Ramrod Worm, Priming Wire and Brush fitted thereto, a Cartouch Box to contain 32 rounds of cartridges, 12 flints and a knapsack agreeable to the directions of the Continental Congress. . . . That every man shall at his place of abode be also provided with one pound of powder and three pounds of bullets of proper size to his musket or firelock.

Pistols, usually carried by officers, were also used at Fort Stanwix. Reference to such a weapon appears in a letter from Jermiah Van Rensselaer to Willett. Swivel guns also might have been items in use at the fort, but if they were, they were in small numbers. These guns, along with musket balls, powder, bullet molds, cartridge paper, and fuzes, were requested of the New York Provincial Congress by General Schuyler for the Northern Department in 1775. A return of ordnance at Fort Ticonderoga in July 1777 noted, among other types of supplies on hand, reams of musket cartridge paper, powder (in whole or half barrels), swivels (guns), wall pieces (guns), muskets, bayonets, pistols, bayonet belts, cartouch boxes, bullet molds, musket cartriges, priming wires, flints, boxes of musket ball, powder horns, and hand grenades. That same month General Schuyler appealed to Washington to send him, among other much-needed items, "a Quantity of fixed Musquet [sic] Ammunition, cartridge paper." The following month, while Fort Stanwix was under siege, the Northern Department made a note of ordnance stores needed. Among these items were lead for musket balls, bullet molds, reams of musket cartridge paper, and molds for buckshot.

C. Edged Weapons

There is little documentation, other than on bayonets and spears, regarding the use of edged weapons at Fort Stanwix. In July 1777 a soldier at Fort Stanwix was punished for stealing a bayonet. The use of bayonets is corroborated by the discovery of bayonets (one marked "U.S.") by archeologists in 1972. In describing his famous raid, Willett noted that in order not to be encumbered with too many weapons, his men left the fort with no other weapon "but a spear for each, 8 feet in length, which was intended to serve as a staff as well as a weapon of defense." Again, this evidence is supported by the archeologists who found six spear tips in 1972. A source dated May 24, 1781, refers to spears being thrown "out of their places." The small hatchet or tomahawk may have been a common weapon at Fort Stanwix, particularly in the hands of the militia. The New York Provincial Congress provided its troops with small hatchets, and insisted that each member of the militia be furnished with either a bayonet or tomahawk.

Swords, knives, and daggers were probably also common weapons at Fort Stanwix, although no specific references in documents have been found. There were probably a variety of swords used by officers, and noncommissioned officers must have used short sabers. Knives and daggers were especially plentiful, since they could be used for cutting food and other objects, as well as for in-close fighting. The Massachusetts and Tryon County militias were most likely to be seen with them.
D. Accoutrements

As in the case of small arms and edged weapons, specific documentation attesting to the existence of accoutrements of various sorts is also very meager. Nevertheless, the use of tents at Fort Stanwix seems to be established as early as 1759, and in 1776 one officer took umbrage at the fact that he was obliged to "lye in the tents along with the men whilst" his superior officer slept quietly indoors.26

Because the tent was indispensable during the periods that construction was going on, it is probable that it may have played a significant role in housing some of the men during the siege, when the garrison was overcrowded. Overcrowding at the fort was inevitable, although sources are silent on this subject. No doubt some room for the overflow was made available in barracks and casemates, but it is not unreasonable to suppose that the tent was employed within the fort in order to absorb some of this increase.

The knapsack and canteen were two items barely mentioned in documents; it is possible that they may not have been as plentiful as one would have liked. In fact, in April 1778, Lt. Col. Willett in writing to Colonel Gansevoort, who was temporarily away from Fort Stanwix, asked, "Don't you think the men ought to have each a Napsack [sic] of some kind or other in case anything should turn up to require us to march, as well as canteen..." 27 The conclusion that there were knapsacks and canteens is reinforced by the fact that just before the siege, men were arriving almost daily at the garrison. These men must have carried such items, because a long march was unthinkable without them.

Other accoutrements that were undoubtedly at Fort Stanwix were the powder horn, flints, and cartouch or cartridge boxes. It is inconceivable not to imagine these items at Fort Stanwix during the siege. In 1776 the New York Provincial Congress set down what each member of the militia should have in addition to weapons. It directed that each man furnish himself with a steel ramrod, worm, priming wire (with a brush attached thereto), and a cartouch box containing 23 cartridges, 12 flints, and a knapsack.28
As late as August 1776, while construction was underway, the garrison was experiencing a serious shortage of clothing. Col. Elias Dayton, then commanding the garrison, reported to General Schuyler that there were at least 250 men, more than half the garrison, without shoes, stockings, and shirts; facing the approaching winter without these basic items left him somewhat apprehensive. A year later the situation had hardly ameliorated—many of the men were still in dire need of some of these items. To partially relieve this situation, an inventory was ordered of all hides at the post, presumably for the purpose of providing substitutes for shoes.

Lack of adequate clothing continued to plague the garrison to the point of affecting morale. It seemed as if the problem would never improve, since the shortage was prevalent throughout the Northern Department. After a strong appeal for clothing in 1780, the commander at Fort Stanwix was told that there was not enough clothing in the public stores, and he was urged to use sparingly what he had. In order to magnify the seriousness of this shortage, soldiers were warned that any deliberate misconduct that led to the neglect of one’s uniform would lead to severe punishment.

From time to time clothing supplies arrived at Fort Stanwix, but frequently they were not in the quantities desired. In the spring of 1778 Willett wrote with some pleasure that:

This day we had the pleasing satisfaction of receiving a number of shirts shoes etc for our soldiers. The shirts however are not quite sufficient to enable every man to be supplied with two. . . .

By the end of 1780 a fair amount of clothing had arrived in Albany, some of which was scheduled for shipment to Fort Stanwix. Items to be shipped consisted of 205 coats, 205 jackets, 400 shirts, 410 pairs of shoes, 274 pairs of stockings, 283 pairs of mittens, 205 hats, and a quantity of breeches and blankets.

It may be of value to review several documents, which, although not directly related to Fort Stanwix, may have some bearing on the understanding of clothing worn at that post. One of these documents is a letter to General Gates informing him that James Mease, Clothier General of the Continental Army, was shipping to the Northern Department, 1,000 coats and 380 shirts. This letter is important because it reveals the great variation in outer garments that existed in the Continental Army. The following types of coats are quoted verbatim:

300 privates brown faced red
16 sergeants do.
24 privates blue faced red
10 sergeants do.
100 privates brown faced white
95 brown turned green
19 sergeants do. do.
126 privates blue faced red
10 sergeants do. do.
50 privates drab faced red
10 sergeants do. do.
96 privates faced green
20 drummers & fifers green faced blue
18 privates brown faced white
36 brown faced white

In all likelihood some of these coats eventually found their way to Fort Stanwix in time for the cold weather.
Another document not directly related to Fort Stanwix but that might shed light on the type of clothing worn contains a list of clothing allowed the Continental soldier by an Act of Congress. This list, dated September 6, 1777, included coats, vests, breeches, shirts, hose, shoes, blankets, linen overalls (for warm weather), woolen overalls (for cold weather), hats, and hunting shirts.7

It might be of interest to compare this document with one issued in 1781, a resolution passed by the Continental Congress directing that all non-commissioned officers and soldiers who are or may hereafter be enlisted during the war be annually furnished with:

One Regimental Coat full made
One Cloth Vest
One pair of Cloth Breeches
One pair of Woollen Overalls
Two pair[s] of Woolen Hose
Two pair[s] of Woolen Socks
One Tall Hat or Leathercap
Four Shirts
Two Pairs of Linen Overalls
Four pairs of Strong Shoes
One Blanket
One Rifle Shirt &
One pair of Woolen Gloves
Also one pair of Shoe Buckles and one Clasp every two years.8

At this point it might be well to inject several pieces of evidence which may provide us with clues concerning the regimental uniform of the 3 New York Regiment. Just prior to the siege, Colonel Gansevoort received one of his frequent letters from his brother reassuring him that the commissary clothier for the Northern Department was in the process of sending him “76 Coats blue with Red facings and white lining just your Uniform together with the like Number of Infantry Hats.”9 In 1778 an officer at Fort Stanwix wrote to Colonel Gansevoort, who happened to be temporarily in Albany, to order 8 yards of broadcloth, for him at the commissary for clothing because his “blue cloak” had been used for colors at Fort Stanwix.10 This written evidence suggests that the uniform of the 3 New York Regiment was largely blue. The evidence produced by Mr. Frederick P. Todd, an authority on early American uniforms, appears to substantiate this conclusion, as does Colonel Gansevoort’s uniform, presently in the Smithsonian Institution. Dated 1776 the uniform is blue with a red facing. On the other hand, a portrait of Marinus Willett painted by Ralph Earl sometime between 1784 and 1795 and owned by the Metropolitan Museum of Art depicts the uniform as blue with a white facing.11

Another document sheds some light on the clothing worn by the militia in New York. The Provincial Congress of New York ordered the commissary to purchase coarse broadcloth for making 712 short coats, and crimson cloth for making cuffs and facing. In addition, the commissary was to purchase light brown coarse broadcloth to make 712 short coats, with blue cloth for cuffs and facings, and dark brown coarse broadcloth for making 712 short coats, with scarlet cloth for cuffs and facings.12

Watch coats were used at Fort Stanwix in 1781. These were heavy coats worn by the guard while on sentry duty. One watch coat, for which the corporal of the guard was accountable, was furnished each sentry box.13 Each guard that came on duty would use the same coat.

Snowshoes were also important items employed at Fort Stanwix during the winter months. Snowshoes were made at Fort Stanwix in fairly large quantities. In early 1777, General Schuyler ordered Colonel Elmore to “please to cause fifty pairs of Snow Shoes to be made.”14 When the guardhouse was consumed by fire in 1783, all the snowshoes stored there were destroyed.15

There were several items of clothing worn by members of the garrison which were not issued by the commissary. These were personal items either acquired from families or purchased from sutlers. The officers were usually in a better position to acquire these items because they had the money to buy them and the room to store them. Because of this fact, officers’ clothing was superior to that worn by the enlisted man. An excellent case in point was the clothing worn by the Army chaplain at Fort George. His inventory of clothing seemed endless, and it was apparent that much of it was not commissary issue. It consisted of:

hat
cloak
greatecoat
coat
jacket and breeches (thick cloth)
coat and jacket
knit breeches
striped jacket
blue waistcoat
2 pairs of black stockings
" " grey 
" " blue yarns
1 pair of Indian stockings
2 pairs of shoes
1 pair of boots
7 shirts
3 bands
3 long neck cloths
3 stocks
1 silk handkerchief
1 white  
1 check  
Gloves, mittens
buckles, etc.
1 bed of wool
1 Check woolen blanket
1 white  
1 pair of linen sheets
1 woolen sheet
1 pillow
2 pillow coats
2 towels
Situated in the midst of the Iroquois Confederacy, Fort Stanwix was literally at the crossroads of Indian traffic. Treaties were made there and Indians frequently visited. General Schuyler worked incessantly to improve relations with the Iroquois, and he used Fort Stanwix as his base of operations. He attached considerable importance to having goods for the Indians, either for purchase or gifts, a precedent long ago established by the British. He took special pains to see that all his posts in the Northern Department, especially Fort Stanwix, were adequately supplied with goods for this purpose. In 1776 Schuyler wrote to Congress that:

I should order to the value of about fifteen hundred pounds in Indian goods to Fort Stanwix to be there disposed of at such a price as to give no umbrage to the Indians and that the States may not lose above four hundred pounds upon them. ...  

In January 1777, Schuyler ordered Colonel Elmore to purchase 20 pounds of goods as gifts for the Indians. Fifteen months later the Board of Indian Commissioners for Indian Affairs at Albany sent a quantity of goods to Fort Stanwix, also to be used as gifts for the Indians. Meanwhile, members of the garrison were warned not to purchase these goods from the Indians on pain of being punished.  

So significant was this activity at Fort Stanwix that in December 1776 John Hansen, the commissary at the fort, requested Colonel Elmore to set aside a room for Indian goods. The room he received adjoined the one in which he resided. His plans were to connect the two rooms by means of a doorway so that there would be only one door from the outside leading to both rooms. Apparently he decided upon this plan in order to have better control over the supply in his charge. Hansen immediately sent word to Reverend Kirkland, who was both chaplain to the garrison at Fort Stanwix and missionary among the Indians, to pass on to the friendly Oneidas that he had received large quantities of supplies for them.  

From the sources on hand it is difficult to identify all the supplies available to the Indians, but rum was a major item. One Officer in Colonel Dayton’s regiment said that “Rum is an Article we are obliged to give them [viz Indians] & many of them cannot be pacified till quite drunk.”  

Next to rum, clothing and blankets were also widely sought by the Indians, particularly during the cold weather. General Schuyler told Congress that there were Indians in Albany who complained constantly because of lack of clothing and blankets. Schuyler said with some despair that “To transact Business with Indians at any Time is a most disagreeable Task. To do it with empty hands greatly increases the Difficulties.”  

Schuyler sought assistance from every quarter in obtaining Indian supplies, and in 1777 he requested blankets, blue strands, vermilion, knives, long and short pipes, and coarse white linen for shirts from Boston through an agent of Congress. Some of these items were destined for Fort Stanwix. Other items provided the Indians at Fort Stanwix were bread and beef. No doubt there were other provisions.
Livestock was employed in two ways at Fort Stanwix: first, as food, and second, as draft animals. Horses, beef cattle, milk cows, and hogs were found at the fort during the siege, and in all probability poultry was there also.

Beef cattle were a major food of the garrison, and were usually found in the commissary's returns. The number of cattle often fluctuated depending upon the number of people in the garrison and upon the erratic behavior of the supply line. In August 1776 the fort had about 23 head of cattle to provide fresh meat for the garrison.1 One year later, soon after the siege, Fort Stanwix complained about the shortage of provisions, but the general commissary in Albany could not understand the justification for this complaint when the latest commissary return revealed that the garrison had 42 head of cattle. He conceded, however, that the cattle "must have been small." 2 Despite what might have been a misunderstanding, 2 months later 40 head of cattle were on their way to Fort Stanwix.3 Meanwhile, as late as December 1780, 47 head of cattle were shipped to the garrison, but this was probably the last big shipment before the fort was evacuated.4

The cattle that were sent to Fort Stanwix were eventually slaughtered, salted, and barreled. Several barrels of salt were usually on hand for barreling cattle. The barrels were often made at the fort. Thus the commander was ordered in 1780 "to get at least 300 Beef Barrels made instantly." 5 The British often shipped staves, hoops and backings, along with other provisions, to their forces in America where barrels were then made. The same procedure was probably employed by the Americans.

Some of the cattle were served as fresh meat, and officers usually reaped the benefits. An order issued in 1780 directed the commissary at Fort Stanwix to issue a 3-day ration of fresh meat for the officers of the garrison.6 Milch cows and hogs also made up part of the livestock, but these were probably small in number. Moreover, this livestock was usually privately owned, either by members of the garrison itself or by neighboring farmers. During the siege Colonel Gansevoort was forced to slaughter milch cows and hogs, "the property of the late inhabitants" of Fort Stanwix, in order to supplement his inadequate provisions.7

The owners of milch cows sometimes presented problems to the garrison. Although milk was always welcomed, they often sold it at exorbitant prices. In September 1777 the commander was compelled to put a ceiling on the price of milk, setting it at 6 pence a quart. He reminded these owners that their cows received feed from the public lands, and he cautioned them that if the price ceiling was violated, he would have their cows expropriated and turned over to the hospital.8

Hogs proved to be a nuisance; they were frequently let loose about the fort, injuring the works. At one point owners of these animals were ordered to have their hogs "ringed" on penalty of having them expropriated.9

Records dating as early as 1765 indicate that horses as well as oxen were employed at Fort Stanwix for pulling wagons transporting boats and supplies from the Mohawk River to Wood Creek.10 Horses were also used for carrying couriers and the commander of the fort. In late 1776 there were sufficient horses to warrant the assignment of a blacksmith to the fort.11

Just prior to the siege, Colonel Gansevoort requested two horses to be kept at "My Place for any Sudden Emergency." 12 Whether they were finally made available to Colonel Gansevoort is not clear, but it is certain that at least seven horses were at Fort Stanwix during the siege, and they were used for pulling wagons. In Willett's famous raid, seven supply wagons from the fort were used to cart away the plunder.13
VI

HARDWARE, UTENSILS, FURNITURE, AND ACCESSORIES

A. Engineer Stores

Engineer stores, as at many forts of the period, made up a very large segment of the furnishings at Fort Stanwix. Since the time of its reoccupation by the Americans and long after the siege, it was constantly under construction. The result was that there were always large quantities of tools and construction materials at the site.¹

The situation was similar at almost every post in the Northern Department where the construction of fortifications was going on in contemplation of the attack that was expected from Canada. Tools such as axes (including the pickaxe, wood axe, and broadaxe), spades, and shovels, were always in great demand. So desperate was General Schuyler for axes at one time that he wrote to the committees of several towns and districts in the counties of Albany, Berkshire, and Bennington entreating them to procure whatever axes could be spared from the inhabitants.²

Perhaps the best available document, which details the kinds and quantities of engineer stores at Fort Stanwix close to the period of the siege, is an inventory of May 1, 1778. The following tools and building materials are listed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>picks</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bill hooks</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cross cut saws</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iron wedges</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grappling irons</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>axes</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spades</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crow bars</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>broad axes</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bars of iron</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bars of steel</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>barrels of nails</td>
<td>¼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>barrels of spikes</td>
<td>½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chest of carpenters tools</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iron squares</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adzes</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>barrels of tar</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>set of blacksmith tools</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wagons</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grindstones</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whip saws</td>
<td>7 ³</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is very probable that other types of tools were at Fort Stanwix besides those classified as engineer stores, but they may have been personal items. For example, because many of the gardens were maintained as an individual preference, it is quite likely that garden tools were private belongings.

There are other documents not directly associated with Fort Stanwix, but relating to other posts in the Northern Department, which provide additional examples of engineer stores that might have been employed at Fort Stanwix. Some of these consist of hoes, hammers, mill saws, trowels, and wheel barrows. The following items appeared at many posts in the Northern Department, and may also have been found in varying degrees at Fort Stanwix before, during, and after the siege: casks of penny nails and spike nails, oakum, barrels of pitch, bar iron, steel, twine, casks of tin plates, paint brushes, barrels of oil, boxes of tin, kegs of white lead, gimlets, gin blocks, and wire.⁴

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<td>3</td>
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B. Housewares, Utensils, and Glassware

There are few historical records that specifically refer to the housewares and utensils used at Fort Stanwix. Nevertheless, we are able to determine what was probably used at the fort by examining documents pertaining to other forts of the period.

The members of the garrison did most of their own cooking in their rooms and they needed pots, kettles, and pans in addition to plates, bowls, platters, cups, knives, spoons, and forks. They also probably had salt and pepper shakers, as well as vinegar to spice their food. As early as 1776 when construction was begun to retore Fort Stanwix, the garrison suffered from a shortage of cooking equipment. Almost on the eve of the siege, Colonel Gansevoort complained to General Schuyler that his garrison was so destitute of utensils for cooking that the men either had to double up on the use of utensils, and thus wait a long time to eat, or else they had to cook by other less sanitary means. He attributed the large number of sick men in his garrison to the unsanitary preparation of food.5

A document originating in 1768 describes the cooking and eating utensils employed by soldiers in South Carolina and notes that each room occupied by soldiers was to have a pot, frying pan, ladle, flesh fork (fleshook), trivet, pothook, platters, bowls, pitchers, mugs, and trenchers. Because it was shared by several persons in a room, the brass kettle was very much in demand and received considerable attention at Fort Stanwix, as well as at other posts.7

Little is known about the kind of spoons, forks, knives, cups, and plates employed at Fort Stanwix. Some of these items may have been made of tin, pewter, wood, and earthenware. Fortunately, there is a 1778 reference to the use of one-pint tin cups at Fort Stanwix.8 Documents relating to other posts generally refer to wooden bowls and wooden spoons. This later reference may have been intended to describe ladles rather than spoons. Ceramic dishes were also common, but such items were probably found in the officers’ quarters, where many may have been personal items. In archaeological explorations conducted at Fort Stanwix, restorable plates, bottles, and cutlery were discovered.9

C. Furniture and Accessories

Those items of furniture that were made of wood are difficult to document at Fort Stanwix. On the other hand, those items made of iron are easier to trace. Despite the paucity of documents related to Fort Stanwix on this subject, however, there are documents relating to other posts that may lead to some reasonable conclusions.

In 1776 General Schuyler issued orders to his deputy quartermaster general to make available to garrisons at all posts in the Northern Department undergoing construction, including Fort Stanwix, sufficient “bedding or straw,” “firewood,” and “barrack utensils,” the latter to include items such as pails, tongs, shovels, and trammels. These items were to be delivered to the barrack master of each garrison, who was to be accountable for them.10

Several other documents make isolated references to bedding, straw, bunks, pails, “benches” or a bench bed,” and to gridirons, but the information is far too meager to obtain a comprehensive picture of the furnishings of rooms in Fort Stanwix.

In 1768 South Carolina provided each room with 1 pair of dog irons, 1 shovel, 1 pair of tongs, 1 broom, 1 tub or box to carry out dirt, 1 long table, 2 forms (chairs), 12 trenchers, 1 hatchet, 1 candlestick, a rack for firearms, wooden pegs to hang knapsacks or clothing, 2 chamber pots, and for every two men 1 bedstead, 1 bed, 1 bolster, and 3 blankets.11

Another source originating in 1767 describes an almost identical list of furniture and accessories in use at posts in the northern region. This document lists such items as 36 beds, 36 bolsters, 107 blankets, 24 berths, 3 tables, 7 forms, 12 pairs of dog irons, 12 pairs of tongs, 12 fire shovels, 12 candlesticks, 12 iron pots (possibly chamber pots), 2 chimney ropes, 123½ cords of wood, candles and hay. The reference to 12 pairs of dog irons and tongs, and to 12 shovels, candlesticks, and iron pots may be an indication that there were 12 rooms.12

A return of furniture for the same post 6 months later noted that there were 48 beds, 48 bolsters, 12 rugs, 131 blankets, 26 berths, 3 tables, 7 forms, 12 pairs of dog irons, 12 pairs of tongs, 12 fire shovels, 12 candlesticks, 12 iron pots, and 2 chimney ropes.13

In 1776 the Committee of War of New York
State instructed its barrack masters to furnish each officer's room with one pair of andirons, one pair of tongs, one table, two chairs, and one candlestick. For each noncommissioned officer's and soldier's room containing 20 men, he was to furnish 10 cribs (2 men to a crib), 10 bedcases, and 10 bolsters (to be filled with straw every 3 months), 2 iron pots, 2 trammels, 1 pair of tongs, 1 wood axe, 1 iron candlestick, 1 table, 2 benches, and 1 bucket. It is obvious from these sources, even taking into account the difference of 8 or 9 years between them, that the general furnishings of military posts in South Carolina were not materially different from those in New York.

That same year the Committee of Safety in New York delivered barrack furniture to Continental troops amounting to a total of 680 benches, 393 tables, 85 ½ cords of wood, 261 cots, some lanterns, 249 ½ pounds of candles, and 65 candlesticks.

From what has been learned of the furniture and accessories in use at various posts within the colonies, a convincing picture can be established of the furniture employed at Fort Stanwix.

Personal items of furniture, although few, might well have adorned parts of the fort, but in all probability if any such furniture did exist, it would have been found in the officers' quarters. It is known, for example, that Colonel Gansevoort had his "camp stool" sent to him at Fort Stanwix by his mother.
A. Parade Ground and Bastions

For purposes of this study the parade ground includes not only the square of the fort, but the four bastions as well. In order to describe the appearance of this extensive part of the fort's exterior surface, an attempt should be made to locate the large guns, the sentry boxes, the flagpole and its flag (or flags), the whipping post, wells, woodpiles, haystacks, wagons, sleighs, animal life, and any other object, short of buildings, existing on the fort's surface, particularly during the siege.

1. Guns

In addition to the buildings within the fort, cannon were perhaps the most conspicuous objects. Although the fort had been constructed with as many as 35 embrasures to receive an equal number of cannon (6 to each of the 4 bastions, 2 to each of the 4 curtains, and 3 in the ravelin), there were never were that many fixed, because cannon were always extremely difficult to acquire in the Northern Department.

Although there is some doubt as to whether all four bastions were completed at the time of the siege, there is every reason to believe that all four bastions were manned at the beginning of the battle. Hence, Willett records that 1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 4 sergeants, 1 drummer, and 80 privates were to man the bastions in case of an alarm—1 officer, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, and 20 privates to a bastion. If there was a total of 80 privates to man the bastions—20 to a bastion—then there had to be 4 bastions manned. The captain, who was the fourth officer, in addition to commanding the whole detachment, also assumed charge of one of the bastions. The orders issued at this time also directed that in case of alarm the whole garrison was to turn out immediately and assume their posts as follows:

Major Bedlam's Detachment to man the S. E. Bastion and adjacent Curtain, Captains Aorson and Jansen to man the S. W. Bastion, Capt. Benshousein and Tiebout to man the N. W. Bastion Captains Dewitt Swartout and Bleeker to man the N. E. Bastion. Capt. Greggs Company to repair on the Parade till further Orders.

Even if a fourth bastion had not been completed, the evidence is fairly conclusive that there were probably cannon on all four bastions. There might have been a difference, however, in the type of carriages employed in the unfinished bastion. Whereas the three completed bastions probably had stationary carriages mounted on platforms, the unfinished one might have had cannon mounted on movable carriages.

Although several documents record the number and types of large guns at Fort Stanwick, there is one that, because of its timeliness, is of great importance. This document, dated August 23, 1777, immediately after the siege was lifted, records that "mortars formerly the Enemy's, and all the Cannon from the Bastions amounting in the whole to 13" were fired as a salute to General Benedict Arnold and his troops upon their arrival at the fort.

The same source noted that in the early days of the siege "Two Cannon from the S. W. Bastion loaded with Grape Shott [sic] were fired at the Barnes [sic] to drive of[f] the Enemy's Indians that might have been Sculking [sic] About." This indicates that there were at least two cannon on the southwest bastion.

Six months after the siege had been lifted, Fort Stanwick reported in its ordnance returns three
9-pounders, four 6-pounders, and four 3-pounders— a total of 11 cannon in addition to four 4-2/5 caliber mortar Royals.7

A contemporary map of Fort Stanwix depicts the southwest bastion with 3 cannon, the northwest bastion with 4 cannon, the northeast bastion with 3 cannon, and the southeast bastion with 4 cannon—a total of 14 guns.8 This map appears to be in conflict with other contemporary sources. The two ordnance returns of March and May 1778 show 11 cannon, whereas the de Flury map delineates 14. It should be noted, however, that the ordnance returns were prepared from seven to nine months after the siege, while de Flury’s map, though prepared sometime after the siege (possibly 1778), was actually depicting the situation as it was during the siege, albeit from memory. Nevertheless, the map comes closest to corroborating Colbraith’s journal.

In 1780 orders were issued directing that a “Brass Field Piece” be placed in the center of the parade ground opposite the main gate.9 The implication is that the gun had been at another location within the fort. Thus, while it was customary in most forts to place the brass field cannon in the center of the parade ground facing the sally port, it would appear that at Fort Stanwix the practice was to place it at other points within the fort. From this it can be assumed that the same practice of moving the field piece could have prevailed during the siege. In view of the cannon shortage, it is difficult to conceive of this one cannon being stationed in the center of the parade ground facing the sally port, when it could have served a more active role on a bastion, curtain, or ravelin. It may be that this cannon was employed on the unfinished bastion where embrasures were yet to be constructed.

The precise size of cannon during the siege is difficult to determine in the absence of more timely documentation. It is known, however, that just before the siege there were only small cannon. The returns of ordnances of March and May 1778 reveal that there were 3-pounders, 6-pounders, and 9-pounders. It is very likely that the 13 or 14 guns that were at the fort during the siege were not bigger.

To place the guns in their exact locations is also difficult without more precise documentation. The de Flury map does show that 11 guns were distributed among the four bastions. The other two or three were probably near the curtains or ravelin of the fort. The three or four mortars that were at the fort during the siege may have filled in the more critical gaps along the curtains.

Most of the cannon were stationary, their carriages constructed of oak and iron. They were probably painted black with the cannon resting on a platform. The cannon balls were mounted on the ground in a pyramidal shape alongside the cannon. The cannon balls, including the powder kegs, might have been covered with oilcloth when not in use to protect them from the weather. Artillery equipment needed to operate the cannon, much of which is listed in Chapter II, also remained in readiness alongside the cannon.

2. Sentry Boxes

There are several early references to sentry boxes at Fort Stanwix. A statement by the engineer in 1777 indicates that he had sentry boxes constructed,10 although he did not say how many or where they were built. An order in May 1778 directs the “Superintendent of the Engineers Department” to see that all sentry boxes were in good order and fixed so that they could not be blown down.11 Once again, there is no hint of the number or the location of such structures, although one might infer from this last reference that they might have been located in areas subject to strong winds.

The first reference to the number of sentry boxes appears in January 1781, although indirectly, in an entry in an orderly book. It read as follows.

A watch Coate [sic] will be furnished for Each Sentry Box on the Basteens [sic] for which the Corpl of the Guard is to be Accountable.12

This statement infers that there were at least four sentry boxes, one on each bastion, but sentry boxes may also have been located in other areas, as for example adjacent to the guardhouse, at the entrance to the sally port, or even at the entrance to the headquarters. There is evidence that guards and sentries were posted at these locations.13 A drawing on a powder horn belonging to James Wilson, depicting Fort Stanwix in 1779-80, while Wilson was stationed there, shows five sentry boxes—one on each of the bastions and one in front of
the entrance to the main gate. According to this very crude illustration, the sentry boxes were located at the extreme points of the bastions.

The sentry boxes were probably very plainly furnished with few comforts for the soldier performing sentry duty. There was one item, however, furnished each sentry box—a watch coat to be used by soldiers on sentry duty—although the evidence may not be contemporary with the siege. A watch coat was a fairly common item employed throughout the Northern Department where the climate was extremely cold.

3. Wells and Water Barrels

A reference from a contemporary account leaves some idea as to how the garrison got its water. Written midway in the siege, this account says that:

This Day the Enemy having Observed that we brought water from the Creek altered its Course so that it became dry. This would have done us much Damage had we not been able to open two wells in the Garrison which with one We had already proved a Sufficient Supply.

It is obvious from this account that before the siege the garrison obtained its water from the creek. In anticipation of what actually happened, the garrison wisely constructed two wells. The very same day that Colbraith recorded this event in his journal, orders were issued to keep barrels constantly filled with water, presumably not only for drinking but for cooking and washing.

Undoubtedly there were three wells at the time of the siege, but their manner of construction and location cannot be precisely determined on the basis of written evidence. An original bank note issued by the Bank of Rome, Rome, New York, in 1832 depicts an oversimplified Fort Stanwix, with a blockhouse and a magazine, and with one well near the center of the north casemate. Judging from this very simplified version, this evidence cannot be taken as the last word.

Mr. John Luzader may have the answer to the other part of the question, that is, the wells' construction. He says that

While it would be easy to generalize, we can be safe in assuming that the wells mentioned in documents relating to the fort referred to relatively shallow ones, perhaps lined, at least near the top, with local stone and capped by a wooden pump. Pumps were relatively easy to construct and were capable of a steadier supply of water in case of fire or other emergency. If a pump was not used, the well was equipped with a windlass and well-box. In connection with the lining, there were occasions when, in the absence of adequate stone, barrels were employed.

The wording in the directive of August 11, 1777, clearly suggests that barrels filled with water were used extensively at the fort. These were located as close as possible to sites where groups congregated, inside or outside of buildings. There were probably one on each of the bastions, one or two inside the guardhouse, one in the storeroom, one in the headquarters, one or two in each of the barracks and casemates, and some located around the ramparts of the fort.

4. Whipping Post

Punishment at Fort Stanwix took many forms—confinement, running the gauntlet, performing heavy duty with their legs bound with blocks and chains, and flogging. Aside from confinement, flogging was perhaps the most common form of punishment. There are several references to flogging at the whipping post in contemporary accounts. Unfortunately, no mention is made of such punishment during the siege, maybe because flogging was done on the parade ground in the presence of a formal review of the garrison, and the siege did not permit this. Instead, men punished for a violation were confined.

Because flogging took place in full view of the garrison, the whipping post was probably in the center of the parade ground. There is no historical evidence showing the whipping post's appearance, but one document related to Fort Stanwix notes that

4 [men] were brought in and sentenced by the Lieut. Col. to stand 1 hour stripped and tied altogether at the whipping post, which was immediately put in execution.

From this account it can be concluded that the whipping post was constructed to facilitate the whipping of at least four men at one time. Mr. Orville W. Carroll has researched the details of a whipping post and may therefore have the solution.
5. Woodpiles and Haystacks

Firewood for cooking and heating and hay for feeding livestock were two important items frequently mentioned at Fort Stanwix. In January 1777, General Schuyler, very much aware of the cold winters at Fort Stanwix, ordered the deputy quartermaster general “to take Measures for providing” the garrison with firewood. Fatigue parties, at least before and after the siege, were always getting firewood in great quantities. The following will give some idea as to how fatigue parties worked: the officers who commanded these details daily divided their men into three groups—the first to cut trees, the second to split logs with wedges, and the third to pile the wood. At one time, men assigned to cut wood were given orders that each man was to cut at least 1½ cords of wood a day, and “Whoever is found Deficient of that Quantity Shall be Mult [sic] of their whole pay from the time they first began to Cutt.”

Even while the siege was underway, fatigue parties were sent out in the middle of the night to bring in firewood, sometimes in great quantities. The distance they went could not have been very far for obvious reasons, and moreover it was sound policy to clear the ground around the fort of trees as much as possible.

The trees around the fort were of several kinds. The swamp on the southwest side of the fort consisted largely of pine and white cedar. There were also white pines in the swamp on the east side of the fort. The rest of the woods surrounding the fort consisted of elm, beech, rock maple, birch, poplar, and a few wild cherries.

There is considerable evidence to show that after the wood was cut, it was driven by wagon or sleigh, depending on the time of the year, to the fort. There is no historical evidence, however, to indicate whether the wood was piled inside or outside the fort. It can be concluded that during the siege there probably existed one or more woodpiles centrally located within the fort, because, as with water, the garrison had to make sure it would be continually supplied with this important provision. In this respect it may be of interest to note that in November 1780 the quartermaster sergeant was directed to distribute firewood every other day “to Enable him to Make a Beginning for a Magazine,” and because the weather was moderate, a small quantity of wood was sufficient for each room. Although this source is dated well after the siege, it provides sufficient evidence that a magazine for firewood was probably nothing new inside the fort. It is fairly reasonable to suppose that one or more woodpiles were probably placed close enough to the buildings to make firewood easily available.

Hay, like firewood and water, needed to be on the inside of the fort in sufficient quantities to feed the horses. This was especially true during the siege. However, there are several references to hay stacked outside the fort during and after the siege. This was logical because haystacks would have taken up too much room on the parade ground. In an entry of August 3, 1777, Colbraith recorded in his journal that on that afternoon the enemy carried off some hay from a field near the fort. Again on August 10, 1777, he recorded that around 3 o’clock that afternoon the enemy was seen running across a field adjoining the fort and setting fire to some haystacks. In still another entry of August 4, 1777, Colbraith noted that on that night a party from the garrison was sent out to bring back 27 stacks of hay, which were then placed in the “trench” (probably the ditch), setting a house and barn on fire so that the enemy could not use them to its advantage.

One month after the siege Willett referred to a party of men collecting hay “which lies in the fields” and having it properly stacked for use of the garrison.

Evidence of haystacks outside the fort is conclusive. Nevertheless the situation being what it was—the fort under siege and several horses and possibly other animals confined inside—logic would have dictated that haystacks should have been stored on the inside. Some attempt must have been made either prior to or during the siege to keep enough hay inside the fort. At least one sizeable haystack must have been close to where the horses stood.

6. Temporary Storage of Provisions and Ammunition

From time to time the parade ground became the temporary storage place for provisions and ammunition. Ammunition and equipment employed in the firing of a cannon were located next to each gun, where they could be quickly reached.
In order to protect the exposed ammunition and powder, they were sometimes covered by oil-cloths. A most unusual event occurred on August 9, 1777. Colbraith tells us that on "This Day the [Colonel] ordered all the Provisions to be brought upon the Parade for fear of the Shells Setting Fire to the Barracks and thereby destroying it . . ." How long the provisions remained on the parade ground is not known, but apparently the practice was not an unusual one. Several months later Willett records a similar incident:

Garrison being destitute of proper Stores for the provisions, Lieut Tapp is to see, that a Number of spars are provided and Laid along the Parade in Order to Roll the Beef and Pork upon, which are to be Cover’d with Boards in the best manner possible, until proper stores are provided for that purpose. The Adjutant will Supply him with a Sufficient Number of Men for this Business.

How often such incidents happened is hard to say. It is not too difficult to envision in the midst of the siege, when the fort was so congested, a parade ground covered with provisions, arms, and ammunition sometimes in complete disorder.

7. Wagons and Sleighs

In a previous section, it was explained how horses were used at Fort Stanwix chiefly for pulling wagons and sleighs loaded with supplies. Colonel Gansevoort felt it necessary to request two horses for himself and his staff in the event of a "sudden emergency." Willett wrote several years after the siege that there were seven wagons with horses in the fort during the battle. Wagons and sleighs were used extensively for bringing in firewood and hay gathered from the surrounding woods and fields. They were also used extensively for bringing in supplies brought up by bateaux on the Mohawk River. In one instance horses and wagons were sent as far as Oriskany—some 20 miles—to pick up hay.

Sleighs were used when snow prevented the use of wagons. Frequently sleighs, which brought up supplies from the east when the river was unnavigable, were temporarily housed at the fort, adding to the congestion. These sleighs were immediately put to use by the garrison in bringing in firewood. In February 1781 a caravan of 50 sleighs arrived at the fort, and these were quickly employed for the next few weeks in carrying wood for the garrison.

Records reveal that before and after the siege, horses and wagons as well as cows were kept inside the fort. In September 1777 the Officer in charge of the guard was ordered to see that no horses or cattle "are Suffered to go in the Ditch." Of far greater interest is a later directive issued to the Officer in charge of the guard to see that "all the Slays [sic], Horses & Cows are turn’d out of the Garrison, before the Gates are shut as they are a Nusance [sic] to the Garrison." One can interpret this to mean that up to this time horses, cows, and wagons were kept inside the fort. It can also be concluded after reviewing the evidence that horses, cows, and wagons were kept outside as well as inside the fort, depending on circumstances and the whims of those in command. Logic certainly dictated that during the siege they would have been kept inside the fort.

8. Tents

There is no historical evidence that tents were used inside the fort during the siege. There is considerable evidence, however, indicating they were used before and after the siege. There are several references to the use of "markees" in late 1776. Ebeneezer Elmer, a member of the 3 New Jersey Continentals, records that he retired to "Colo. Whites Markee & to Rest." Several weeks later he again recorded with some resentment, that he was "obliged to lye in the Tents along with the men whilst the [his commanding officer] in quietude sleeps etc. in House." Several days later Elmer was still sleeping in a markee, and he noted that as many as 51 men were "employed in getting & Halling [sic] Shingles & Wood etc.—Besides the Artificers & Sawyers [sic] Lodged in the Markee with the Serjiants [sic] etc as Usual."

In 1780 orders were issued to "Collect the tents and put them in Store." This can be interpreted to mean that tents had probably been used from time to time within the fort, although these tents may also have been used after a long march. There was always a shortage of sleeping quarters in 1776, and General Schuyler was deeply concerned about the approaching winter.
other hand, as long as the weather was relatively mild, as during the summer months when the siege took place, tents could readily be used. Moreover, the 700 or more people at the fort during the siege were too many for permanent facilities to absorb, and tents were the best substitute. In the several references to crowding in the barracks at Fort Ticonderoga, General Schuyler made a strong plea to Congress for more tents to relieve the congestion.

9. Necessary

Historical evidence clearly indicates the existence of a necessary outside the fort's ramparts and elevated above the ditch. Of greater interest to this study is that some evidence reveals the existence of at least one additional necessary within the fort. The question is whether or not this necessary existed at the time of the siege. A reference dated September 17, 1777, notes that the quartermaster was directed “to have another Necessary built within the Fort to be set about directly.” He was to consult with Major Hubble, the engineer, concerning the best place to have it erected. A directive issued only 3 days later cautioned the garrison “not to make use of the Necessary House within the Fort in the Day Time. The one in the Ditch being designated for that Purpose.”

A quick consideration of this statement might lead one to the hasty conclusion that the necessary the men were prohibited from using in the daytime was the one referred to in the directive of September 17. But upon more serious reflection it would seem unlikely that the necessary ordered to be built on September 17 would have been completed in 3 days. It would seem more likely that a necessary had already existed in the fort before September 17—probably during the siege—and that a second one had been ordered.

A garrison consisting of about 700 men during the siege could not rely solely on the necessary elevated above the ditch, particularly when that necessary was exposed to enemy fire. Moreover it is known that there were women who sought refuge within the fort. Considering these circumstances, therefore, it is more likely that at least two necessaries existed at the time of the siege—one elevated above the ditch and a second within the fort. Having experienced difficulties during the siege because of inadequate facilities, those who commanded the garrison may have given orders after the siege to construct a third necessary (a second one inside the fort).

10. Flagpole and Flags

The location of the flagpole in 1777 has been established as being at the tip of the salient angle of the southwest bastion. For a description of its appearance reference to the architectural data section of the Fort Stanwix historic structure report must be made.

The question of which flag flew over Fort Stanwix during the siege is a controversial one. The proponents of the traditional account are very strong in their conviction that the flag was the official standard of the United States, and consequently the first official standard to fly in battle. Historian John F. Luzader of the National Park Service has taken the opposite view. His study of the flag at Fort Stanwix is so exhaustive that it is fruitless to carry the research further. It seems that Mr. Luzader’s research—both that which appears in The Construction and Military History of Fort Stanwix and in his typewritten manuscript “The ‘Stars and Stripes’ at Fort Stanwix: A Summary of The Evidence”—establishes beyond any doubt that the flag which flew during the siege was not the official standard of the United States. Instead, a “locally made version of the Grand Union” flew over Fort Stanwix.

B. Bombproofs

The interpretive prospectus proposes to refurbish only three of the four bombproofs at Fort Stanwix: the southwest, southeast, and northwest ones. Hence, this section is only concerned with the furnishings of these three structures.

During the years of their existence, the bombproofs were used for many different purposes—sometimes for brief intervals, at other times for more extensive periods. An attempt will be made to establish the more permanent uses made of the bombproofs, particularly during the siege.
1. Southwest Bombproof

Historical evidence has proven that there were at least two structures both inside and outside the fort that were used for hospitals, although perhaps not simultaneously. One hospital that is clearly identifiable in records existed outside the fort and was marked “Hospital” on the “Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix.” There are several references to a hospital in manuscripts practically up to the time of the siege. An entry in the journal kept by Ebeneezer Elmer refers to a visit he made to the “old lousy hospital, which represents such a scene of wretchedness that one could hardly bear to behold the abject souls therein confined.” Another manuscript speaks of a sergeant “being sick in the barracks and being carried to the hospital and there remaining sick for some time and being somewhat recovered of sickness was returned to his barracks being still unfit for duty.”

There seems little doubt that the hospital referred to in these manuscripts was the hospital located outside of the fort. Yet, there is also evidence of a hospital inside the fort at the time of the siege. During the battle one officer reported that a “woman was wounded with a shell last Night was brought to bed in our [southwest] Bombproof [giving birth to] a Daughter.” It would seem that before the siege the hospital outside the fort was used. When it became impossible to use this facility during the fighting, a place inside the fort—the southwest bombproof—was used to handle the sick and wounded.

Consistent with the practice of employing the bombproofs to serve several purposes, the southwest bombproof was also used to store official papers and provisions. In the midst of the siege, and thus while the southwest bombproof was being used as a hospital, it was felt necessary to store valuable papers in this bombproof for their protection against shell fire. The order directing this read:

all the public papers and money in the hands of Mr. Hansen, and the papers in the hands of Mr. Van Vechten belonging to the paymaster to be lodged in the bombproofs in the southwest bastion.

The amount of room used for these records is hard to say, but it is obvious that the bombproof served two purposes.

If the southwest bombproof was largely a hospital, what did it look like? First of all, it had to contain beds and bedding for the sick and wounded, similar perhaps to those in the barracks. The mattresses, or “sacks” as they were sometimes called, held straw “for the Sick to lay on,” and whenever a sick person died or was discharged from the hospital, the sack with all its straw would be burned.

In addition to beds and bedding, the hospital probably contained a doctor’s bench and an operating table. There were also medicine chests containing drugs and supplies. Medical kits, containing scissors, scalpels, drugs, needles, suture materials, scales and weights, and mortar and leg splints, as well as an operating kit, containing forceps, bullet extractor, retractors, and amputating knives, might also have been found in the hospital. Other significant items that probably appeared in the hospital were a barrel of water, firewood, and pails.

There is a very interesting document, which although not directly related to Fort Stanwix, nevertheless gives some idea of the furnishings of a post hospital. This document consists of an inventory of supplies belonging to the general hospital at Albany in 1777. Because of the documents’ timeliness and the geographic location it concerns, a very convincing argument can be made for the hospital furnishings employed at Fort Stanwix, but perhaps with one reservation. Because Fort Stanwix was a frontier fort, it probably did not possess all the items on this inventory, which contained:

178 blankets in wards; 40 in store  
70 bed tucks in wards; 94 in store  
195 pillows in store  
41 bed gowns  
51 caps in store  
324 wooden bowls; 67 in the wards  
4 water buckets; 13 in the wards  
3 rugs in store  
54 camp kettles; 18 in wards  
3 bedpans  
19 chamber pots  
1 branding iron  
1 box of soap  
15 gallons of rum  
15 " " wine  
15 " " molasses  
candles
chocolate
Indian meal
turnips

Chocolate and sugar were important items in a hospital, and at Fort Ticonderoga the doctor ordered them for the sick and “Such other suitable Regimens as may be on the ground & one half the Beef, or other Meat.”

One last question concerning the furnishings of the southwest bombproof should be resolved and that is the source of heat the hospital needed for its sick. Unlike the freestanding structures or casemates in the fort, the bombproofs had no chimneys for fireplaces. How then did the hospital get its heat? The answer might well have been an iron stove, although there is no mention of one at Fort Stanwix. Iron stoves were employed throughout the Northern Department, although it was a difficult item to acquire. In November 1776 General Schuyler made a strong plea for 50 stoves for barracks in his department.

2. Northwest Bombproof

Historical and archeological evidence indicates the magazine was placed in the northwest bombproof after the Americans reoccupied the fort in 1776. Like its location, we know little about the appearance of the powder magazine when the fort was occupied by the Americans. As a place of storage it was probably simply furnished. Fortunately an early map, is available, albeit drawn during the British occupation, which clearly depicts the shelving employed in the powder magazine. Shelves were off to one side of the bombproof, and they were sufficient to hold 2,000 barrels of powder.

The rest of the magazine must have contained various ordnance stores. A document dated August 19, 1777, lists a number of different ordnance pieces in the Northern Department, besides powder, which might have been stored in the magazine at Fort Stanwix. They are:

bars of lead for musket balls
bullet molds
large powder horns for priming cannon, with belts, bits, priming wires
post fires
tubes for 3, 4, and 6-pounders

3-pound flannel cartridges
4-pound flannel cartridges
6-pound flannel cartridges
paper cartridges for 4-pounders
" " 6-pounders
" " 3-pounders
scissors for the laboratory
molds for buckshot
paint brushes of different sizes
pinchers
hammers
sheep skins for covering spunges
gun flints
grape shot for quilting cannon
Spanish brown paint
oil cloth for covering ammunition

Another document originating in the Northern Department provides additional information on what might have been stored in the powder magazine. Paint, apparently, was used to identify specific ordnance items. Thus such paints as were “ground . . . of the proper colour for painting Cannon carriage . . . Spanish Brown for Painting the Boxes which Contains the Cannons Cartridges in the Laboratory, & ½ of white Lead for painting & numbering those Boxes to lay them on” were ordered.

3. Southeast Bombproof (Bakehouse)

Like the northwest bombproof, there is practically no written evidence to indicate what the southeast bombproof was used for. It is known, however, that it was once the powder magazine used by the British, which by 1764 had fallen into ruin. A bakehouse was built in its place, and although it is not known exactly when, it is certain that it existed in the southeast bombproof at the time of the siege. Archeological studies conducted in 1965 and 1971 show beyond any doubt that the bakehouse was located there.

There are several references to a bakehouse and bakers at Fort Stanwix. One document refers to the baking of bread. Baking bread was probably a sizeable function since there were at least three bakers at one time. A later document noted that a soldier was tried by a court-martial for taking ovenwood for his own private use while pretending he was taking it to the bakehouse.

The bakehouse was probably simply furnished.
Besides a brick oven sufficiently large to supply bread for as many as 700 people during the siege, it must have contained barrels of flour, pails of water, tables for rolling dough, benches, candles, brooms, scales, weights, and other equipment and supplies essential for baking bread.

C. Guardhouse

A new guardhouse was constructed around April 1777. The guardhouse appears frequently in contemporary accounts and maps.

The new guardhouse consisted of two sections: one for the confinement of prisoners, and the other, a lean-to, for housing the main guard. The section used for confining prisoners consisted of two rooms separated by a partition in which a central fireplace stood to heat both rooms. The two rooms together measured 16 by 20 feet, and probably housed several prisoners. One document referred to two prisoners, and another referred to a court-martial that was to take place for "all the prisoners in the guardhouse." There is little historical evidence to indicate what the guardhouse furnishings looked like. Thus many conclusions are conjectural and are based upon the little information extracted from archeological studies and historical documents. The main guardroom, or place of confinement, was probably simply furnished, containing the barest of necessities. Since most confinements were brief, prisoners had few clothes with them. Probably the only clothing they had were fatigues.

The two fireplaces had andirons, tongs, trammels, and a kettle hung over a fire. A frying pan and the usual eating utensils (fork, spoon, possibly knife, dish, and cup) made up a prisoner's eating equipment. Simple bunks or cribs, containing two men to a bed, and chamber pots made up the furniture. In all probability, the bedding may have consisted of only a blanket without sacks, straw, or bolsters. The rooms probably had no tables or benches. In short, they contained few comforts.

The guardroom, which housed the guard while on duty, was perhaps no more lavishly furnished than the prisoners' room, although one might expect more comforts. Since it was only a temporary quarter for the soldier, one could hardly expect to find the furnishings normally seen in a permanent quarter like the barracks. Arms, possibly muskets, were no doubt stored in this room in some sort of gunrack. Besides guns there were blocks and chains stored here. The block consisted of a piece of heavy wood, two feet long by six inches in diameter. The block was chained to the legs of the prisoner to prevent his escape when on a work detail.

In addition to the normal equipment found in a fireplace (that is, andirons, tongs, trammels, shovels, and pail) and some eating utensils, there were also bunks, possibly each holding two men. Unlike those used by the prisoners, however, these bunks may have had straw for mattresses, or maybe even sacks, blankets, and bolsters. One document contains a reference to an officer sleeping on a "Bench in the Guard Room" at Johnstown, New York. The following morning the same officer noted that he arose from "my Bench Bed as much refreshed as [though] I had Slept on a Bed of [downfeathers] in a King's Palace." A "bench" and a "bench bed" are probably the same as the bunks or cribs found in barracks.

The guardhouse at Fort Stanwix, particularly the room occupied by the guard, was also used to post general orders, garrison orders, and instructions of a general nature. Marinus Willet noted this practice at a number of posts to which he was assigned. In Fishkill, New York, he noted that general orders "are to be placed in the Main Gaurd Room, And Officers are hereby Requested to have all their Men acquainted with it." Because all soldiers went on guard duty, all could see the orders. At a later date, while at Fort Constitution and just before leaving for Fort Stanwix, Willett issued strict orders prohibiting anyone from "tearing down any Orders that may be placed up in any Guard House." These orders were probably hung by a nail on the inside of the room occupied by the guard.

D. Headquarters

A headquarters building at Fort Stanwix is clearly established in six contemporary drawings made between 1777 and 1781, and in one or two drawings made much later from memory. Moreover there are at least two references in documents to the word "headquarters." Much of what can be determined concerning the arrangement of rooms and furnishings must be conjectural.
Architect Orville Carroll of the National Park Service, after studying the features of this building, has concluded that it was divided into four rooms of equal size. One room was for the commander, another room was occupied by the second in command, a third was a dining room doubling as a staff room, and a fourth was occupied by two staff officers. A lean-to room was used either for a woodshed or an officer's privy, or both, or for lodging an orderly, or finally, for the storage of supplies for the staff officers.

The commander's room, Colonel Gansevoort's, was probably neatly furnished with a writing table, two or three chairs, and a bed bunk of the type used by officers. His bedding was probably complete, consisting of a sack, blankets, and bolster. Colonel Gansevoort would also have had personal items received from home. Two of these items were a silver spoon and campstool, which his mother had sent to him. Other objects lying about his room may have been items that his family had requested of him from time to time. At one point his mother had requested "Oswego Oil" and his brother wanted beaver fur to make a hat. Colonel Gansevoort may have had these items in his room waiting to be shipped.

His fireplace probably had the usual tools, for example, andirons, tongs, trammels, a shovel, and a broom. Several pieces of firewood would probably have been piled next to the fireplace.

Usually high-ranking officers had their own personal chests containing liquors and wines. Pegs on which to hang clothing, a sword, a holster, and other accoutrements must have adorned the walls, perhaps close to his bunk.

It is not certain whether Colonel Gansevoort smoked, but if he did, clay pipes would have been found on his table or above his fireplace. One, or possibly two, candlesticks on his table provided light. Several pieces of writing paper, quills, and inkwell would also be found on his table.

The room occupied by the second in command, Lt. Col. Marinus Willett, would not have been too different from the first. In addition his famous orderly book might be seen on the table, where he made entries from time to time.

The third room—the dining room—might have been furnished with items present on that auspicious occasion when the British submitted their surrender terms to the garrison. There is an excellent account of this event in Willett's "Narrative":

The afternoon of the next day, the chimeade and the appearance of a white flag, was followed by a request that Colonel Butler, who commanded the Indians, with two other officers, might enter the fort, with a message to the Commanding Officer. Permission having been granted, they were conducted blindfolded into the fort, and received by Colonel Gansevoort in his dining room. The windows of the room were shut and candles lighted; the table also was spread with crackers, cheese and wine. Three chairs placed at one end of the table, were occupied by Colonel Butler and the other two officers who had come with them; at the other end, Colonel Gansevoort, Colonel Mellon and Colonel Willett were seated. Seats were also placed around the table for as many officers as could be accommodated, while the rest of the room was nearly filled with the other officers of the garrison indiscriminately; it being desirable that the officers in general, should be witness to all that might take place.

There can be little doubt that this meeting took place in the headquarters, because it was the most logical place for a meeting of such importance. The dining room could be in no other place but the headquarters.

Based upon the account given by Willett, it can be assumed that in the dining room was a large table surrounded by chairs. On the table were candlesticks, writing paper, quills and inkwells, crackers, cheese, wine, and glasses. The room might have had a rug, although this kind of luxury may not have existed at a frontier fort like Fort Stanwix. A dining room would have contained dishes, utensils, and glasses, as well as servers. These were probably stored in a cupboard somewhere in the room, although shelves might have served the same purpose.

The fireplace, meanwhile, would have contained the usual tools, including a large brass kettle hanging over the fire. Firewood would be piled alongside the fireplace in addition to a pail, shovel, and broom.

The fourth room, which was probably occupied by staff officers, was perhaps not too different from the first two, except that there were two of nearly everything—two beds, two tables, at least two chairs, etc. Each table would have had a candlestick, writing paper, quill, and inkwell.

In January 1777 General Schuyler gave commissions to members of Colonel Elmore's regi-
ment, one of whom was the adjutant and the other the quartermaster. A contemporary publication outlining military instructions for soldiers during the Revolution describes official books kept by the adjutant and quartermaster of a post. It instructs the adjutant to keep a “regimental book wherein should be entered the name and rank of every officer, the date of his commission, and the time he joined the regiment, etc.” Finally, it states that the quartermaster “is to make out all returns for camp equipage, arms accoutrements, ammunition, provisions, and forage, and receive and distribute them to the regiment taking the necessary vouchers for the delivery, and entering all receipts and deliveries in a book kept by him for that purpose.”

Such books were probably kept by staff officers at Fort Stanwix, and could therefore be found in this room. The regimental book would have been on the adjutant’s table, and the book kept by the quartermaster would have been on his table.

Each officer would have had a bed bunk with such bedding as a sack, blanket, and bolsters. Next to his bunk on the wall would have been pegs for hanging clothing, swords, and accoutrements. The fireplace would have had the usual tools plus a pail, shovel, broom, and firewood next to it. Personal items would probably be seen everywhere. Clay pipes, for example, would be found on tables or over fireplaces.

The furnishings of the lean-to must depend upon what the room was used for. If it was used for storage, then it would have contained firewood and supplies of various kinds. It might also contain a privy for the commander and his staff. Because it had no fireplace, it is unlikely that this room would have housed an orderly, unless it had an iron stove.

E. East Barracks

According to early documents and recent archeological studies, the east barracks measured approximately 20 by 120 feet. From the architectural features of the structure, Mr. Carroll has been able to conclude that the building contained seven rooms in addition to a hallway about 4 feet wide which divided the structure into almost two equal parts. Due to the absence of written and archeological evidence, it is not possible to determine the size of each room. The sizes must therefore be conjectural, but since both officers and enlisted men occupied these rooms, it may be logical to assume that because the enlisted men made up by far the largest number, they probably occupied the larger rooms. In any case, the difference may not have been too great. All seven rooms must have varied anywhere from 20 by 19.3 feet to 20 by 14.5 feet, assuming the existence of a 4-foot-wide hall. The interior walls of each room contained a fireplace.

Like the sizes of the rooms, the number of beds occupied by enlisted men must be conjectural. It is very likely that because of the crowded conditions of the fort during the siege, there were not enough beds or bunks for everyone. Consequently some people may have slept on the floors of the barrack when not sleeping in tents on the parade round. Several months after the siege, complaints were heard that the garrison had never been supplied with sufficient beds.

The bunks that were in the enlisted men’s rooms would hold two men. They were lined up against and parallel to the walls of the room. This arrangement was adopted from the time that the fort was first constructed. Straw or sacks, but probably the former, made up the mattresses for the enlisted men. During the siege, sacks may have been a luxury, which only officers could afford. Because hay was the simplest form of mattress, it was an object sorely needed; however, it was not always available in sufficient quantities to serve both the personal needs of the men, and as food for livestock. The result was that at one point orders were given to the quartermaster to maintain a strict account of the hay by not permitting it to fall into the hands of anyone without his approval.

The rest of the bedding consisted of bolsters and blankets, but like sacks, even these were in short supply.

The fireplaces in the enlisted men’s rooms probably contained the barest of necessities, since just before the siege there were serious shortages of tools. General Schuyler directed the quartermaster general in Albany to supply, without further delay, Fort Stanwix and other posts in the Northern Department with “Fire Wood & Barrack Utensils, such as pails, Tongs, Shovels, Trammels, axes & kettles.”

Other supplies may have also been authorized for enlisted men’s rooms at Fort Stanwix. In 1768
each room occupied by provincial troops in South Carolina was allowed 1 pot, 1 frying pan, 1 ladle, 1 flesh fork, 1 trivet or pot hook, 1 pair of dog-irons, 1 shovel, 1 pair of tongs, 1 broom, 1 tub or box to carry out dirt, 1 long table, 2 forms, 2 platters, 2 bowls, 12 trenchers, 2 pitchers, 2 mugs, 1 hatchet, 1 candlestick, 2 chamber pots, a rack for arms, and wooden pegs to hang knapsacks, haversacks, and clothing. Every two men were to be given 1 bedstead, 1 bed, 1 bolster, 3 blankets, and a reasonable amount of firewood, candles, beer, pepper, salt, and vinegar.86

In 1776 the New York Provincial Congress authorized for its enlisted men’s rooms almost similar items. For each room containing 20 men, it allowed 10 cribs, 10 bedcases, 10 bolsters “to be filled with straw every 3 months,” 2 iron pots (probably chamber pots), 2 trammels, 1 pair of tongs, 1 wood axe, 1 iron candlestick, 1 table, 2 benches, and 1 bucket. In addition each room was supplied with three-eights of a cord of wood each week between October 1 and April 1. For the five weeks preceding October 1 and the 5 weeks following April 1, three-sixteenths of a cord of wood was to be supplied each week. For the remaining 16 weeks of the year, only one-eighth of a cord was to be supplied each week.87

In 1775 and 1776 New York’s Committee of Safety delivered the following furniture and equipment:88

- 680 benches
- 393 tables
- 85⅛ cords of wood
- 261 cots
- a quantity of lanterns
- 249½ pounds of candles
- 65 candlesticks
- 168 spoons
- 650 bails of straw

A return of barrack furniture in 1767 at such posts as Oswegatchie and Fort William Augustus listed such items as beds, bolsters, blankets, berths, tables, forms, dog irons, tongs, fire shovels, candlesticks, iron pots, and rugs.89

It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that whether the authorization of supplies originated in South Carolina or in New York, the furnishings allowed the enlisted men’s barracks were similar. Because of shortages, these items were not always present in each enlisted men’s room.

As close to the time of the siege as June 15, 1777, Colonel Gansevoort complained to General Schuyler about how destitute his garrison was of cooking utensils. The men, he said, were frequently obliged to wait for their meals because they had to share equipment. So much improvising was going on that he attributed to the unsanitary practices in cooking the high number of men being sick.90 A shortage of pails in barracks prompted the commander of the fort to order cedar pails made.91

Chamber pots were common items in Army barracks and other areas where men slept. However, there was a shortage of these pots at Fort Stanwix, and the few that existed were probably in the officers’ quarters. Finding themselves without such essentials, and the necessary being too inconveniently located, enlisted men relieved themselves in various parts of the fort. Although the men were warned that if caught they would be severely punished, the practice continued for several months. The quartermaster sergeant was finally instructed to have “Tubs placed at the Several Corners of the Barracks for the Men to make Water in which are to be Emptied and Washed every Morning.”92

Shortages of many items frequently led soldiers to improvise. It has already been demonstrated how a shortage of cooking utensils led some to cook their meals in unsanitary ways. At huts uncovered in the Washington Heights section of New York City it was found that soldiers employed barrel hoops for holding kettles in fireplaces.93 This practice might well have been prevalent at Fort Stanwix.

Gunracks, like other conveniences, were probably not common at Fort Stanwix, and in many cases muskets were stacked in a pyramidal fashion in various parts of the room. The enlisted man had few items of clothing, and the few he had were probably hung on pegs just above his bunk. Unlike officers, the enlisted man had few personal items that could make life a little more bearable.

Of some interest, particularly since it was issued at the height of the siege, was an order to the quartermaster to have barrels constantly filled with water.94 This water was used for drinking, washing, and fighting fires, and the barrels were placed at various locations, wherever people slept or congregated. They may have been seen on the parade ground and bastions as well as in barracks,
casemates, and bombproofs. A local place for such a barrel in the east barracks would have been in the hall, where it was centrally located and quickly reached.

The four officers’ rooms in the barracks represented a more orderly appearance than the rooms occupied by the enlisted men. There was little crowding in these rooms, even at the height of the siege. At most there were probably three or four officers assigned to each room. A summary of a few contemporary accounts will give us some general idea of the number of officers quartered in each room. On October 17, 1776, Dr. Ebenezer Elmer records in his journal that Captain Walker and his subalterns lodged in the room that he and another officer occupied. The following day Elmer notes that Captain Walker “liveth with us in the Room [that] we have all along occupied.” It is obvious from these accounts that only two officers were permanently quartered in one room, while Captain Walker and his subordinates were only temporarily quartered in the same room.

In a much later document one officer records that soon after his arrival at Fort Stanwix he “drew for the Rooms and Lieut Hyatt and I drew No. 1 on the Left of the North Side of the Fort.” One week later the following appeared, again establishing beyond doubt that there were two officers to a room in 1780:

the Duty being so Very heavy in the Garrison the Commandant is Reduced to the Necessity to Direct that Wherever there is two officers in A Room together: one visitor must be Detailed in his proper [our] to do Duty only on Couvering [sic] parties.

While the written evidence may be strong in establishing that there were two officers to a room at Fort Stanwix before and after the siege, the crowded conditions of the post during the siege made it very likely that there were three and sometimes four officers in one room. Even with an increased number of officers during the siege, the rooms presented a much more orderly appearance than the enlisted men’s rooms. Moreover, if any of the more scarce items of furniture were available, it is certain that the officers got them.

In 1776 the New York Provincial Congress had each officer’s room furnished with one pair of andirons, one pair of tongs, one table, two chairs, and one candlestick. In addition, it allotted the same amount of firewood to officers as it had to the enlisted men.

Officers usually enjoyed greater conveniences than the enlisted man. They probably slept on single bunks, and in most instances their mattresses consisted of sacks, with bolsters and blankets available. One chamber pot was provided for each room. The tables contained writing paper, quills, and inkwells, as well as candlesticks. Clay pipes might be seen on tables or hanging above the fireplaces. In addition to the usual fireplace tools and cooking and eating utensils, officers frequently kept personal items. Chests containing liquor and wine were probably among these personal items. There are several references to parties and gatherings among officers in their rooms, which attest to the abundant use of alcohol beverages. One such reference notes that:

After they had concluded the Business Laid before them being a number of Colts among them; they began upon Drinking wine which they Continued Successfully till about Ten o Clock at Night. With a good Creature many of them got very Happy upon [which] appointing Capts. Dickinson & Potter & Major Barber Sachins [sic] they Knocked up an Indian Dance at [which] they yelled much...”

One month later the same person reported that “At Evening Colo. White & Dr. Dunham came into our Room Drank & Conversed.” Another officer in later years reported a “Frolick [sic] at our Room” on Christmas Day. The same officer, at the New Year’s Day dinner which he and at least 10 others attended, noted that several toasts were given.

Other personal items kept in the officers’ rooms were beaver, otter, martin, and deer skins—articles usually purchased from the Indians. In January 1777 John Hansen, the quartermaster at Fort Stanwix, complained to General Schuyler that he had been unsuccessful in getting Colonel Elmer to stop his officers and men from buying anything from the Indians. He at last... put a Notice on the Front gate which I think has never been adhered to. The men in the Sight of their officers daily carrying them in their rooms & buying of them at a much larger price... In several of the Officers Rooms you will find Beaver, Otters, Martins, Deer Skins etc.

Buying from the Indians and indeed from sutlers was certainly not prevalent during the siege, but there can be little doubt that the practice had been carried on up to the time of the siege, and
that therefore many of these items may have still been in their rooms.

Swords, holsters, accouterments, and various objects of clothing were probably hung on pegs within the rooms.

Archeologists Lee Hanson and Dick Hsu of the National Park Service have concluded in their studies that there were four cellars under the east barracks. There is only one piece of historical evidence that shows provisions were stored in barracks. On August 9, 1777, Colonel Gansevoort "ordered all the provisions to be brought upon the parade for fear of shells setting fire to the barracks and destroying it." Whether he was speaking about the east barracks or west barracks is not clear. Nor is it clear in what part of the barracks the provisions were stored; however, the cool cellars were the most logical place for storing provisions. Messrs. Hanson and Hsu have reported finding charred oats and wheat in one cellar of the west barracks—evidence that it was used extensively as a grainary. It might well be that the cellars in the east barracks were also used for storing provisions.

The containers in which the provisions were packed have been discussed at some length in an earlier chapter, and it would be redundant to describe them here. Suffice it to say that most provisions stored in cellars were packed in one kind or size of container or another. One final word should be said about these containers. At Fort George in the Northern Department, it was customary to paint the word "Stores" on all barrels. It may be that a similar procedure was employed at Fort Stanwix.

Archeologists have found the remains of several cannon balls, mortar bombs, cannister shot, and flints in the cellars of the east barracks, an indication that the cellars may also have been used as a magazine or laboratory.

F. Casemates

According to an early definition, a casemate was a "work made under the rampart, like a cellar or cave with loop-holes, to place guns in it." Before the Revolution, however, this concept was modified so that the casemate became primarily either a soldiers' quarters or a place for storing provisions and ordnance. The casemates at Fort Stanwix conformed to this principal.

The interpretive prospectus proposes to furnish two rooms (on the west side) of the north casemate as officers' quarters, the whole southeast casemate as enlisted men's quarters, and about one-third of the west casemate as enlisted men's quarters.

1. North Casemate (Officer's Quarters)

There is no written evidence that shows the number of rooms in the north casemate; however, archeological studies have indicated that there were six fireplaces equally spaced, which leads to the conclusion that there were probably six rooms of equal size. Both the artifacts that were uncovered and the evidence of one document indicate that this casemate was used as an officer's quarters. A diary notes in 1780 that its owner "drew for the Rooms and Lieut. Hyatt and I drew No. 1 on the Left of the North Side of the Fort." Undoubtedly this room was the one on the left of the north casemate.

The furnishings of these rooms were essentially the same as those in the officers' rooms of the east barracks, with single bunks or beds, and sacks to give the officer extra comfort. Occasionally, the arrangement of an officer's room may have been improvised during the siege because of the increase in people. Some officers may have simply slept on loose straw on the floor, since there were not enough cribs. At least one chamber pot could be found in each room.

A table was in the middle of the room with at least two chairs or campstools around it. The table held a candlestick, inkwell, and quill. There were the usual cooking and eating utensils to be seen. Junior officers may have had the cheaper variety of utensils, whereas senior officers might boast of something better. The latter might have had porcelain dishes. Rum and wine bottles could also be seen on these tables, if not an occasional liquor chest.

The fireplaces contained the usual assortment of tools and accessories such as andirons, tongs, trammels, kettle, firewood, pail, and shovel. Clothing as well as weapons and accouterments were hung on pegs near the bunks. Finally, personal
items such as clay pipes and skins of various sorts could be seen on tables, bunks, stools, and fireplaces.

2. **Southeast and West Casemates**  
   **(Enlisted Men’s Quarters)**

Life in the casemates for the enlisted men may have been a little more severe than in the barracks, but the furnishings were essentially the same. At the time of the siege there were probably more men assigned to a room than normally, without sufficient beds, bedding, utensils, and dishes to take care of everyone’s needs. Field beds, two to a crib, were lined up against and parallel to the walls.

The casemates were designed to house 400 men, and the sizes of the east and north casemates were approximately 20 feet deep by 132 feet long (measured from center to center lengthwise). We also know that the three rooms in the west casemate were of equal size, which made the north room (the room to be furnished) about 20 by 44 feet. A room of this size probably had about 20 cribs around its four walls, holding two men to a crib, or a total of 40 men. During the siege this number may have been higher, with people sleeping on the floor.

The southeast casemate was 58 by 60 feet. This casemate had two rooms utilizing a double fireplace. The two rooms in the southeast casemate together had about 50 cribs, sleeping 100 men.

Bedding was probably similar to that of the enlisted men’s quarters in the barracks; those more fortunate than others had sacks, the rest had only straw. Blankets and bolsters may have been insufficient in number for everyone during the siege.

The room in the west casemate probably had one table surrounded by benches, and since the southeast casemate was divided into two areas by a double fireplace, there were two tables, one for each area. Benches also surrounded these tables. Each table had a candlestick as well as eating utensils, dishes, cups, and bottles.

The few clothes the enlisted men had, as well as their accouterments, were hung on pegs whenever available, but some clothing may also have lain on bunks. Personal items were few, but whatever was available was kept out of sight for fear it might be stolen.

Gunracks might have been located in these areas, but more often than not muskets were stacked in pyramidal fashion in various parts of the room. Chamber pots may have been rare items in enlisted men’s quarters, although an occasional one might be found.

Fireplaces contained the usual tools, firewood, and cooking utensils. Although large kettles may have hung over the fire, frying pans, when not in use, were hung on the wall above the fireplace.

All in all, the rooms occupied by enlisted men, especially during the siege, presented a chaotic and disorderly scene.

APPENDIX

The "Stars and Stripes" at Fort Stanwix
A Summary of the Evidence

by John F. Luzader

Introduction

The purpose of this brief report is to present the results of a study of the evidence concerning whether the flag flown at Fort Stanwix during the siege of August 1777 was the first "Stars and Stripes" flown in combat. This is not a history of the genesis of the national flag; nor is it an evaluation of the claims put forth in support of the Bennington and Guilford Courthouse flags.

The Tradition

Briefly stated, the traditional association of the flag that became the national standard with the Siege of Fort Stanwix is that the news of the passage of the "Flag Resolution" by the Continental Congress on June 14 was brought to the fort either in the form of a personal letter to Colonel Peter Gansevoort, the post's commanding officers, or in a newspaper by the batteaux that delivered a 100-man reinforcement from Wesson's Regiment at Fort Dayton under Lieutenant Colonel Mellen. Upon receiving the dramatic and important news, some of the people in the fort prepared a flag of thirteen stripes, alternating red and white, and thirteen stars on a blue field in compliance with congressional resolution. Early in the morning of Sunday, August 3, the first day of the siege, this flag was raised on one of the fort's bastions and a salute was fired, marking the first time the new national emblem was flown over American troops. If true, this was one of the most dramatically important events of the American Revolution.

One of the early champions of this interpretation was Pomeroy Jones, a local student whose interest in the fort had a lasting influence on the work of later scholars. Jones was born several years after the siege; but he knew a number of veterans of the Revolution, and he cited their recollections to the effect that the flag at Fort Stanwix was indeed the "Stars and Stripes." ¹ Jones's stories were the basis of a number of 19th century assertions concerning the flag, including Dr. James Weise's account that the new national flag was unfurled, a salute fired, and that an adjutant read the Congress's resolution from the newspaper the batteaux detail had brought to the fort on August 2.² Dr. Weise's account was picked up by The New Larmed History, in which the following appears.

... Journal of Capt. Swartwout of Col. Gansevoort regiment written August 3, 1777 in Ft. Schuyler shows beyond cavil when the first flag of Stars and Stripes of which we have record was made and hoisted, but it was in a fort (Schuyler), not in the field, or at the head of a regiment.³

John Albert Scott's popular Fort Stanwix, (Fort Schuyler) and Oriskany repeats the story of the newspaper report and the raising of the "first Stars and Stripes." ⁴ Although Fort Stanwix's claims were frequently disputed in favor of other sites such as Bennington, Cooch's Bridge, Brandywine and Guilford Courthouse, many writers have perpetuated the tradition.

Evidence

Let us now take a look at the evidence upon which an evaluation of the tradition must be based. The basic document for the origin of the "Stars and Stripes" is the so-called Flag Resolution of
June 14, 1777, which reads: “RESOLVED: that the flag of the United States be made of thirteen stripes, alternate red and white; that the union be thirteen stars, white in a blue field representing a new constellation.” The resolution was preceded and followed by matters brought to the Congress’s attention by its Marine Committee. Since the resolution was converting the unofficial Grand Union Flag into an official standard, substituting thirteen stars upon a blue field for the canton derived from the British Union, which combined the crosses of Saints George and Andrew, it was appropriate that it emanate from that committee. This was the case because, following British precedent, flying of the Grand Union had been normally limited to ships and permanent land installations. Thus, what Congress was providing for was a new marine flag, not a national military standard.

Crucial to the story of the Fort Stanwix flag is the record of what happened immediately after the passage of the Flag Resolution. Thacher’s Military Journal’s entry for August 3, 1777, notes that: “It appears by the papers that Congress resolved on 14 June last, that the flag of the thirteen United States be thirteen stripes, alternate red and white, that the union be thirteen stars, white in a blue field. . . .” So far as this writer has been able to determine, and this has been supported by the findings of other students, the first public notice of the resolution appeared in the Pennsylvania Evening Post on August 30 in the following item: “In Congress, June 14, 1777. Resolved That the FLAG of the United States be THIRTEEN STRIPES alternate red and white; that the union be THIRTEEN STARS white in a blue field. Extract from minutes, CHARLES THOMSON, sec.”

Other papers printed the resolution from September 3 to October 2, and the first New York papers to print it were the September 8 issue of the New York Journal and General Advertiser and September 11 issue of the New York Patent and The American Advertiser.

The papers to which Dr. Thacher at Albany was most likely to have access were the two New York and two Boston papers, the Gazette and the Spy, in which the story appeared in the September 15 and 18 issues respectively.

There is an obvious conflict in evidence that can only be explained by acknowledging that the doctor may have had access to a newspaper that is unknown to historians or, more likely that when the Journal was prepared for publication prior to January 1, 1823, this was one of the instances in which alterations were made in the organization of the original manuscript.

More immediately pertinent to the Fort Stanwix problems are the testimonies of Lt. William Colbrath and Lt. Col. Marinus Willett. In his Journal, Colbrath noted in the entry for August 3: “Early this morning a Continental Flagg made by the officers of Col. Gansevoort’s Regiment was hoisted and a cannon levelled at the Enemies Camp was fired on the occasion.” It is important to note that the lieutenant called the standard a “Continental Flagg,” a term frequently applied to the Grand Union. It is also significant that he did not refer to the flag as a new one, as might be expected if he was witnessing such a memorable event.

Lt. Col. Marinus Willett wrote of the earliest accounts of the siege on August 11 in a letter to Jonathan Trumbull, Jr. He was also probably the author of another account entitled “Extract of a Letter from a Officer of Distinction” that appeared in the August 28 issue of the Boston paper, The Independent Chronicle and Universal Advertiser. In neither of these did he refer to the Fort Stanwix flag, a surprising oversight if it was as historically important as such a “first” would have been. His Orderly Book is equally silent on the subject.

A quarter of a century after the siege, Willett wrote his “Narrative,” which his son edited and published after the colonel’s death. This is what the father wrote concerning the flag:

The Fort had never been supplied with a Flagg—The importance of having one on the arrival of the Enemy had set our Ingenuity to work, and a respectable one was formed the white stripes were cut out of ammunition shirts and blue strips out of the Cloak formerly mentioned taken from the Enemy at Peeks-hill. The red stripes out of different pieces of stuff collected from sundry persons. The Flagg was sufficiently large and a general Exhilaration of spirits appeared on beholding it Wave the morning after the arrival of the enemy.

When William Willett edited his father’s manuscript, he altered the wording of the sentence describing the flag’s components to read:

“The white strips were cut out of ammunition shirts, the blue of the cloak taken from the enemy at Peeksill; while the red stripes were made of different pieces of stuff procured from one or another of the garrison.”
Marinus Willett’s manuscript had this to say about the cloak from which the blue portion of the flag derived:

What Baggage the enemy had they left it consisting of only a few Blankets and Cloaks—A blue Comblot Cloak taken here afterwards served to enable us to use it for the blue strips of a Flagg which was afterwards hoisted during the siege of Fort Schuyler. . . .

Willett’s statement about red, white stripes and blue stripes can only have reference to a Grand Union Flag, because a “Stars and Stripes” would have had a blue field, not blue stripes.

Two powder horns that are purported to date from the historic period at Fort Stanwix have been offered in evidence concerning the flag. I have seen neither of the specimens, my knowledge of them being limited to photographs and written descriptions. At the same time, I would have to say that seeing them probably would not materially increase my knowledge, because in spite of several years of experience in museum work, I would not be able to date them with much precision, beyond noting whether the horns and their lettering conform to types representing a period, or to determine whether the engravings are contemporaneous with the purported date or are more recent additions. I have seen specimens whose provenience has been documented alongside known fakes whose workmanship resembles the authentic so closely that no “expert” could have identified the genuine. Thus I suspect that most other students share my limitations.

One of the horns is rather elaborately carved with a stylized representation of a fort that conforms to the general outlines of Fort Stanwix and bears the inscription “Fort Schuyler; Dec’r 25, 1777, J. McGraw.” Flying from the northwest bastion is a flag that, except for the absence of the St. George, resembles the Grand Union. John Albert Scott dismissed the powder horn’s evidence, largely on the basis that John McGraw, whom Scott identified as the man who did the carving, was enrolled in Visscher’s regiment of New York levies, which was not posted at the fort in December 1777. However, there was a James McGraw in the 3rd New York, which was there, and this man may have made the powder horn.14 If the horn is genuine and if John McGraw carved it, the evidence that it presents argues strongly that the Fort Stanwix flag was a copy of the Grand Union.

The other powder horn is attributed to Lt. Christopher Hutton on the Third New York Regiment of the Continental Line. If it is authentic, this specimen is the strongest piece of evidence that I know of in favor of the Stars and Stripes tradition. Several subjects have been carved on the horn’s sides. These include: Chris. Hutton 1777; a diagrammatic sketch of Mohawk and Schoharie Rivers; Ft. Schuyler III REGT; Ft. EDW (small and shallow cut), a field cannon with a pyramidal stack of six balls; an Indian armed with a musket and tomahawk; a man mounted on a horse with a caption PETER, and most important to this study—a flag that shows stripes and a field of stars.

Some questions are appropriate concerning the Hutton powder horn. The most obvious is whether it is what it is purported to be. Since there are no conclusive authentications, the question remains moot; although on the basis of design, lettering, and general appearance, I am inclined to accept it as a late 18th century specimen. The second is, what was the designer’s objective? Was he using the characters as symbols to interpret the events that occurred at the fort in 1777? If that was his purpose, why was the small legend “Ft Edw.,” which must refer to Fort Edward, included? That fort was located at the carrying place on the Hudson River between that river and Wood Creek. Why did the maker locate the flag where he did? It, obviously, was not intended to mark the fort’s location in relation to the river. The answer to what his purpose was cannot be found in the characters, even the equestrian figure, who probably was intended to represent the Third’s commander, Peter Gansevoort.

On the other hand, the characters may merely be decorative, a form of doodling. But that still does not solve the problem of the flag. And the question of when the carvings were executed remains. Do they date from 1777, or are they later, done after the war as an exercise in nostalgia? There seems to be no satisfactory answer. However, after all the questions have been asked, one must conclude that, whatever its merits, the evidence offered by the horn contradicts that offered by the McGraw specimen, which has as good a claim to authenticity, and more significantly it is at odds with the documentary evidence. Perhaps, we should not afford either horn much credit and rely exclusively upon documentary evidence. Neither
horn can really be authenticated in a manner that will satisfy all the canons of evidence. With the documents, we are on safer ground. Their histories can be traced beyond reasonable doubt, and they can be tested by standards of internal and external criticism. So, let us continue to consult them.

As has been noted, the congressional resolution of June 14 concerned a maritime flag and was not intended to provide a national standard for use by troops in the field. This is borne out by subsequent events.

Almost two years after the siege, Richard Peters, secretary of the Board of War, wrote to General Washington that regimental requisition for drums and colors had not been filled because “we have not the materials to make either in sufficient numbers.” He went on to say concerning the flag:

... as to the Colour, we have refused them for another reason. The Baron Steuben mentioned when he was here that he would settle with your Excellency some Plan as to the Colours. It was intended that every Regiment should have two Colours—one the Standard of the United States, which should be the same throughout the Army, and the other a Regimental Colour which should vary according to the facings of the Regiment. But it is not yet settled what is the Standard of the U. States. If your Excellency will therefore favour us with your Opinion on the Subject we will report to Congress and request them to establish a Standard and as soon as this is done we will endeavour to get materials and order a Number made sufficient for the Army.15

Peter’s letter makes it so clear as to be obvious that the resolution of June 14 did not authorize a National military standard, that as of May 10, 1779, no such standard had been chosen, and that Congress would be requested to establish one after Washington had expressed his opinion on the matter.

The Board of War continued to consider the design during the summer of 1779, and by September had apparently narrowed its choice to between “one with the Union and Emblem in the middle” and a variant of the marine flag authorized by the 1777 resolution. Between the two, the Board preferred the former.16

The matter was not settled by the time fighting ended in 1781, and Congress never supplied the troops with a national color. This does not mean that no variants of the “Star and Stripes” motif appeared on the field. The Bennington and Guilford Courthouse flags may have been carried in those engagements, but they were not the products of Congressional authorization, nor were they copies of a national standard, because none existed. They were local products that used an unofficial design that enjoyed a degree of popularity. But even in those instances, the evidences for their authenticity, while stronger than the Stanwix case, fall short of being conclusive.

It might be argued that the flag flown at Fort Stanwix was, like the Bennington and Guilford ones, an unofficial standard, designed independently of Congressional authority. However, that contradicts Culbrath’s identifying it as a “Continental Flagg” and strains Willett’s statement that the cloak was the source of the flag’s blue stripes, to say nothing of the testimony, for what it is worth, of the McGraw powder-horn.

Negative evidence may be adduced from the absence of any reference to the appearance of a new flag in any of the German or British documents that have been studied. Of course, that omission is not conclusive evidence, but one could expect that at least some member of the besieging force would have been sufficiently impressed by the event to have noted it in some form.17

For what it is worth, and that is not much, Lieutenants Digbley and Anburey wrote that the new American flag was flown at Ticonderoga and Fort Anne before the siege of Fort Stanwix took place. Their testimonies in this matter can be dismissed because they compiled their accounts, partly from notes made in the field and partly from other sources, some of which were post-war, sometime after the war.18

### Conclusions

On the basis of the documentary evidence, identifying the Fort Stanwix flag as the “first Stars and Stripes to fly over American troops in combat” had its origins in 19th century local tradition; it is not supported by contemporary evidence; such evidence contravenes it; and there is no conclusive evidence identifying the first instance of the flag’s use in combat.
Notes

Historic Furnishing Report

Introduction

3. Philip Schuyler Papers, New York Public Library, Caldwell to Schuyler, June 27, 1776; ibid., Schuyler to Committee of Tryon County, July 1, 1776.
4. Thomas Gage Papers, Gage to Campbell, May 13, 1764.
5. Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., Papers, Connecticut Historical Society, Elmore to Trumbull, Jr., Nov. 21, 1776.

Chapter I

2. Thomas Gage Papers, Gage to Amherst, Feb. 18, 1759.
5. Ibid., Schuyler to Lewis, June 6, 1777.
7. Philip Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Congress, July 5, 1777; ibid., Dayton to Schuyler, Sept. 4, 1776; Philip Schuyler Orderly Book, American Antiquarian Society, Lansing to Lewis, July 8, 1777; ibid., Lansing to Cuyler, July 10, 1777; ibid., Schuyler to Gansevoort, July 10, 1777. Schuyler complained to Congress that great sickness prevailed in the Army as a result of relying too much on fresh meat and not enough on salted meat. He noted that there was practically no salted meat in the Northern Department, and the little that was available was retained for scouting parties only. The problem, therefore, was not just common to Fort Stanwix, but was present at all posts in the Northern Department. See Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Congress, Aug. 8, 1777.
8. Philip Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Congress, Aug. 8, 1777.
9. Schuyler complained that it was impossible to obtain much fresh beef because of high prices. See Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Trumbull, June 29, 1777.
11. Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Military Papers, Cuyler to Gansevoort, Nov. 28, 1777.
12. Ibid., Gansevoort to Gates, Dec. 12, 1777.
15. This number consisted of 402 men of the 3rd New York Battalion, 32 men of the artillery detachment, and 17 civilians, who were listed as artificers. See "A Monthly Return of the State of the Garrison at Fort Schyler [sic] May 1st, 1778."
17. Thomas Gage Papers, Gage to Amherst, August 21, 1759.
22. Henry Glen Papers, 1770-1801, New York Public Library, Glen to Fonda, ca. Nov. 1777; Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Military Papers, a small booklet showing various accounts.
24. Ibid., Sept. 23, 1777.
25. Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Military Papers, Gansevoort to Caty Van Schaik, June 1, 1777.
26. Ibid., Gansevoort to Gansevoort, Dec. 16, 1777.
28. Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Military Papers, Willett to Gansevoort, Apr. 20, 1778; Miscellaneous American Revolution (Wendell Family Papers), Lender to Bradt, Apr. 6, 1779.
29. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book, June 24, 1777.
30. William Colbraith, "Journal of the most material occurrences preceding the Siege of Fort Schuyler (formerly Fort Stanwix) with an account of the siege, etc.," negative photostat. New York Public Library, Aug. 2, 1777, (hereafter cited as Colbraith, "Journal").
D.C.: Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation, National Park Service (1969), Appendix IX.


33. Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Military Papers, Gansevoort to Gansevoort, June 13, 1777.

34. Ibid., Glen to Gansevoort, Dec. 5, 1777.

35. Journal of Ebenezer Elmer, Nov. 19, 1776; United States Revolution Collection, “Inventory of all Stores Belonging to the General Hospital at Albany etc March 29th 1777,” American Antiquarian Society.

36. Philip Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Congress, July 5, 1777.

37. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book, Apr. 16, 1778.

Chapter II


2. Thomas Gage Papers, Gage to Amherst, Aug. 21, 1759.


4. Philip Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Dayton, Aug. 8, 1776.

5. Ibid., General Orders, Dec. 30, 1776.


8. Ibid., Aug. 23, 1777.


10. Ibid.


21. Memorandum, Lee H. Hanson, Jr., to Director, New York District, National Park Service, June 1, 1972, copy filed in Denver Service Center, NPS, under A2615.


23. Memorandum, Lee H. Hanson, June 1, 1972.


27. Ibid., Sept. 10, 1776; Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Military Papers, Willett to Gansevoort, Apr. 20, 1778.


Chapter III

1. Philip Schuyler Papers, Dayton to Schuyler, Aug. 30, 1776.


4. Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Military Papers, Willett to Gansevoort, Apr. 20, 1778.


6. It may be of interest that while this letter indicated that coats and shirts were to be shipped, it also revealed that such was not the case with shoes. See Horatio Gates Papers, Mease to Gates, Aug. 21, 1777.

7. Miscellaneous American Revolution, “An Estimate of the Average Price in December 1778 of the different Articles of Clothing allowed the Soldiery by the Act of Congress, September 6th 1777.”

8. Ibid., “Resolution of Congress of the Clothing Department,” June 18, 1781.


10. Ibid., Swartwout to Gansevoort, Aug. 29, 1778.


12. Historical data on Fort Stanwix collected by Orville W. Carroll, Denver Service Center, National Park Service. Mr. Frederick P. Todd is fully convinced that the militia wore no uniforms. See letter to author. Apr. 22, 1974.


15. V. Dyck to Van Schaik, Apr. 17, 1780, furnished by Lee Hanson, Archeologist, NPS.

Chapter IV

1. Philip Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Congress, Nov. 19, 1776.
2. Ibid., Schuyler to Elmore, Jan. 5, 1777; Marinus Willett’s Orderly Book, Apr. 23, 1778.
3. Philip Schuyler Papers, Hansen to Schuyler Dec. 30, 1776. In a document dated Jan. 31, 1777, mention is made of a “store where Mr. John Hansen has the disposal of Indian Goods.” The room set aside for this purpose was probably a lean-to connected to the store, a building standing next to the guardhouse. See ibid., certificate signed by John Post et al., Jan. 31, 1777, with letter, Hansen to Schuyler, Feb. 1, 1777.
5. Philip Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Congress, Jan. 25, 1777.
6. Ibid., Schuyler to Livingston, Feb. 7, 1777.

Chapter V

2. Marinus Willett Miscellaneous MSS., Cuyler to Willett, Sept. 20, 1777.
3. Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Military Papers, Cuyler to Gansevoort, Nov. 28, 1777.
7. Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Military Papers, Gansevoort to Gates, Dec. 12, 1777.
9. Ibid., Apr. 5, 1778.

Chapter VI

1. It may help one to understand a little about the kinds of tools employed at Fort Stanwix by learning what kinds of artificers, both military and civilian, were employed there. In early 1778 there were 15 carpenters, 6 sawyers, 12 brickmakers, 4 colliers, 2 coopers, 2 gardeners, 2 blacksmiths, and 2 armorers. See “A Monthly Return of the State of the Garrison Fort Schuyler May 1st 1778.”
2. Miscellaneous American Revolution, Schuyler to Committees in Albany et al., July 14, 1776; ibid., Schuyler to Gansevoort, Oct. 27, 1776.
5. Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Military Papers, Gansevoort to Schuyler, June 15, 1777.
8. Marinus Willett Miscellaneous MSS., Van Renselaer to Willett, Apr. 1, 1778.
9. Hanson and Hsu, “Casemates and Cannonballs,” passim.
10. Philip Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Lewis, Nov. 9, 1776.
13. Ibid., “Return of Barrack Bedding and Furniture etc at Oswegatchie and Fort William Augustus 25th March 1768.”
15. Ibid., p. 47.

Chapter VII

3. Ibid.
6. Ibid., Aug. 2, 1777.
Historic Furnishing

27. Marinus Willett’s Orderly Book, Sept. 28, 1777.
30. Philip Schuyler Papers, Glen to Schuyler, July 8, 1776.
35. Willett’s Orderly Book, Sept. 28, 1777.
40. Journal of Ebeneezer Elmer, Aug. 29, 1776; *ibid.*, Oct. 8, 1776.
41. *Ibid.*, Oct. 10, 11, and 12, 1776. In later entries Elmer notes that he occupied a room, presumably in the barracks or casemates, an indication that some construction had been completed. See *ibid.*, and also Oct. 14, 17, and 18, 1776.
42. Philip Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Congress, Sept. 8, 1776; *ibid.*, Schuyler to Elmore, Nov. 12, 1776.
45. Marinus Willett’s Orderly Book, Sept. 17, 1777.
49. Luzader, “Construction and Military History of Fort Stanwix.” Appendix IX.
55. On Mar. 13, 1778, six men were directed to collect cedar wood in order to make pails for the garrison. Pails had many uses and were mostly found in quarters. See Marinus Willett's Orderly Book, Mar. 13, 1778.
57. United States Revolution Collection, “Inventory of all Stores Belonging to the General Hospital at Albany etc. March 29th 1777.”
58. Philip Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Livingston, Nov. 2, 1776; *ibid.*, Extract of Minutes by John M. Nelson, Sec., Committee to Safety for State of N.Y., Nov. 13, 1776.
63. Hanson and Hsu, “Casemates and Cannonballs,” 1:37–42.
66. Scott, *Fort Stanwix* (Fort Schuyler) and Oriskany, p. 100.
67. Marinus Willett’s Orderly Book, June 5, 1777; *ibid.*, June 9, 1777; *ibid.*, June 12, 1777; *ibid.*, March 22, 1778; “Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix,” cited in Luzader “Construction and Military History of Fort Stanwix,” Appendix II.
68. For a detailed description of this building, see Carroll, *Fort Stanwix*, pp. 78–79; A return of the main guard at Fort Stanwix in Nov. 1778 noted that there were 2 prisoners in confinement and a guard consisting of 1 subaltern, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, 2 drum and fifes, and 39 privates. There were also 13 daytime sentinels and 12 nighttime sentinels. See Philip Schuyler Papers, “Report of Main Guard, November 1, 1778.”
71. Journal of Ebeneezer Elmer, June 14, 1776; *ibid.*, June 15, 1776.
72. Marinus Willet’s Orderly Book, Mar. 6, 1777.
74. The 6 drawings are the McGraw powder horn, 1777: De Witt powder horn, 1778; Cornelius Chatfield powder horn, 1780; De Fleury map; Gansevoort map; and the map accompanying Willett’s narrative of 1831. all cited in Carroll, *Fort Stanwix*, p. 80, fig. 135. One written reference appears in Scott, p. 95 and another on the Gansevoort map, also cited in Carroll, p. 80, fig. 136.
Fort William Augustus 25 Sept. 1767.

Soldiers n.d., pp. 81, 83, owned by the New Haven Colony.

January 5, 1777.

2:81.

November 9, 1776.


Hut Camp of 17th Regiment of Foot, prior to recon­struction.

Photograph, fireplace in reconstructed military hut, Dyckman House Park (negative 2644). New-York His­torical Society, see Illustrations Nos. 1 and 2.

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Appendix


2. James Weise, Swartwout Chronicle (1899), 214.


4. John Albert Scott, Fort Stanwix (Fort Schuyler) and Oriskany (Rome, 1927), 175.


9. William Colbrath, “Journal of the most material occurrences preceding the Siege of Fort Schuyler (formerly Fort Stanwix) with an account of the siege, etc.” micro­film, New York Public Library.

10. The Remembrances; or, Impartial Repository of Public Events For the Year 1777 (London 1778), 448-49; ltr. Willett to Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., August 11, 1777; The Independent Chronicle and Universal Advertiser, (Boston), August 28, 1777; Marinus Willett, “Orderly Book,” New York Public Library.


13. Willett, “Narrative.”


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FORT STANWIX

HISTORIC STRUCTURE REPORT

Orville W. Carroll

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Fort Stanwix was originally constructed by British forces in 1758, during the French and Indian wars. Like most of the British fortifications it was of timber and earth construction, and always required a great deal of repair work in order to prevent decay.

The fort was repaired and remodeled by the British troops in 1764; three years later the garrison was withdrawn. When the American troops arrived in 1776, they found only a rotted shell of fortification works remaining.

We have good documentation in the form of engineer's drawings for 1758, 1759, and 1764, but very little documentation done on a professional level for the years following 1776. Drawings were completed but seem to have been lost. The information on hand is contradictory at times.

Archeological explorations of the site during 1970-72 have turned up invaluable evidence relating to the ground plan of the fort, but fall short of providing the needed information to plan the structure above ground level. Additional research was carried out by the writer and John Luzader, N.P.S. historian, in an attempt to find documents relating to other Revolutionary war forts. While this effort was helpful, it did not produce the great reservoir of information anticipated.

In determining the fort plan the evidence presented by the archeologists concerning the location and basic shape of the fort features has taken precedence. Documentation surviving from the letters, orderly books, journals and diaries kept during the American occupation of Fort Stanwix, 1776-1781, has been the secondary source of information. Where information is lacking from the American occupation, the fort plans drawn by the British engineers in 1758, 1759, and 1764 have been employed.

There will still be much conjecture and therefore some possibilities for disagreement regarding the appearance of the proposed fort. The current plans are to reconstruct the fort using building details from several sources: Crown Maps Nos. 99–103, the McGraw and Wilson powder horns, the “Gransevoort Map of Fort Stanwix,” and additional drawings from other contemporary forts. The reconstruction will therefore have log ramparts and parapets, surrounded on three sides by a ditch, covered way and glacis. Other major features will be a log ravelin, a wooden bridge with a draw span, an elevated “necessary” or latrine outside the fort walls, five free-standing buildings on the parade, casemates at the curtain walls, filled bastions having three underground bombproofs, and a bakehouse.

It is hoped that one or more of the three wells, the location of the whipping post, and possibly other features will be located when grading of the parade ground begins.
STUDIES COMPLETED TO DATE

A. Architect's Preliminary Report of 1963

Plans were renewed once again by the citizens of Rome, in the early 1960's to reconstruct at least a portion of Fort Stanwix. The site was classified by Congress as a National Monument in 1935, although the original intent of the bill was not to rebuild the fort.

One thrust in this direction was initiated by Gilbert Hagerty, curator of the Fort Stanwix Museum. In 1963 Mr. Hagerty contacted Charles M. Stotz, a practicing architect in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Since the early 1940s Mr. Stotz had been involved in extensive research on pre-revolutionary war forts in western Pennsylvania, and in 1947 he was commissioned by the Fort Ligonier Memorial Foundation to supervise the research and planning for the reconstruction of Fort Ligonier. With this background in military fortifications, Mr. Stotz was a likely candidate to choose for consultation on the proposed reconstruction of Fort Stanwix.

Messrs. Stotz and Hagerty spent several days together traveling through New York State and the lower Canadian provinces studying military forts of this area. Utilizing this information and the military maps from the "Crown Collection," Stotz and Hagerty worked out a preliminary design concept for the development of the Fort Stanwix site. Mr. Stotz' report, dated November 18, 1963, is included in the Appendices of this report.

William Penn Museum at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, to conduct a spot exploratory study on the site of Fort Stanwix to determine the feasibility of carrying out a full-scale archeological project.

The results of Colonel Campbell's efforts can be read in two reports: "Archeological Survey Site of Fort Stanwix" by J. Duncan Campbell, August 20, 1965, containing 14 pages of typescript and six sheets of drawings; and "Illustrative Report of 1965 Archeological Explorations at Fort Stanwix," having a preface written by John R. Hurley, Director, Rome Urban Renewal Agency, dated September 17, 1965, and containing eight progress photographs and one sheet of drawings. Both reports can be seen at the Jervis Library in Rome.

B. Archeologist's Report of 1965

In 1965, the Urban Renewal Agency of Rome authorized Col. Duncan Campbell, Director of the

C. N.P.S. Archeologists' Reports, 1970–73

A program of full-scale archeological excavations on the site was begun by the National Park Service in July 1970 and continued through November 13, 1972. The archeological report was published by the National Park Service as No. 14 in the series Publications in Archeology, by Lee Hanson and Dick Ping Hsu.

D. The Master Plan of 1967

A Master Plan for Fort Stanwix National Monument was developed by the National Park Service at the request of the City of Rome in 1964. This Master Plan, issued in 8” x 10½” booklet form, was approved on March 14, 1967, by Associate Director Howard W. Baker.
Because the Master Plan was prepared prior to N.P.S. ownership and before the historical and archeological research was completed, its contents regarding the fort and its construction features are vague and partially inaccurate. Presumably the 1967 Master Plan will be revised, utilizing all the new information gathered since 1967.


Archival research, concentrating on the story of Fort Stanwix (1758-1781), was conducted by N.P.S. historian John F. Luzader.

The results of this research can be read in his 182-page report entitled “The Construction and Military History of Fort Stanwix,” printed in 1969 by the Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation, N.P.S.

Included in the text of the report are seven contemporary British plans of the fort, two American drawn plans (post-siege of 1777), and one diagram showing the layout of Fort Stanwix in August of 1777, as hypothecated by Mr. Luzader according to date available to him at the time.

F. H.A.B.S. Survey of 1970

In the spring of 1970, the Rome Urban Renewal Agency contracted with the Historic American Buildings Survey to prepare a historical-architectural report entitled “History of the 19th Century Urban Complex on the Site of Fort Stanwix.” This report was researched and written by Diana S. Waite of Albany, New York, and was submitted in typescript form in June of 1970. Photographs included with the text were taken by Jack E. Boucher for H.A.B.S. After final editing and arrangement of subject matter, the report was published in 1972 by the New York State Historic Trust.

G. Further Research on the Empire House in 1971

The Empire House had a reputation for being the oldest standing structure in Rome. It stood on the glacis opposite the southwest bastion of the fort and, traditionally, the small two-story wing was said to have been built around 1796. There were some persons interested in saving this part of the house if it were actually old. Conclusive documentation was not found during Mrs. Waite's research.

In August 1971 the Urban Renewal Agency contracted with Mr. Charles E. Peterson of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to investigate the fabric of the Empire House in order to determine its date of construction. Mr. Peterson examined the structure on August 11-12 and found it to date from the 19th century. His report was mailed to the URA and Fort Stanwix NM on August 25, 1971.

H. Interpretive Development Concept, 1971

An eight page report was written by Nan V. Rickey, Interpretive Planner, N.P.S., for the Eastern Service Center, Office of Environmental Planning and Design, in March 1971.

This report, based on the information available in 1971, attempts to establish guidelines for the future interpretation and use of the site. Continued excavation work on the site by the archeologists in 1972 and additional research into the historical documents by several interested persons have culled much new data. The guidelines of 1971 will be revised to incorporate these findings.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FORT STANWIX

A. The British Occupation, 1758-1775

On July 16, 1758, General Abercromby ordered Brig. Gen. John Stanwix to build a “post” at the Oneida Carrying Place, according to a plan drawn up by Col. James Montresor.1

General Stanwix arrived with his troops at the Carrying Place shortly after August 1, accompanied by at least three engineers—Maj. William Eyre, Capt. William Green, and Lt. Thomas Sowers.2

The first order of business was for Major Eyre to mark out and supervise the construction of an entrenchment surrounding the site of the proposed post.3 These outer fortifications, consisting of trenches protected by log breastworks, were later dismantled when the fort works were sufficiently completed.4

Major Eyre and Lt. Sowers left the area shortly after the entrenchments were finished, leaving Captain Green in charge of constructing the new fort. Due to Captain Green’s ill health he could not fully cope with the situation; thus Lt. John Williams was dispatched to the Carrying Place by General Abercromby. After Williams’ arrival on August 14, he and Capt. Green conferred together and revised the Monresor plan to fit the existing terrain. Later Lt. Williams “marked out a small fort within the Intrenchment marked out by Majr Eyer’s . . . ”5 On August 23, 1758, the first foundation log for the new fort was laid.6 Two months later Gen. Stanwix wrote that he expected to have the fort completed en barbette before winter set in.7

The original fort was laid out in the form of a square measuring approximately 220 feet x 220 feet. Pentagonal bastions with flanks of 36 feet and faces of 90 feet were planned off each corner. This gave the fort an overall measurement from bastion tip to bastion tip of 330 feet.8 The initial intent of the engineers was to orient the square of the fort precisely north-south and east-west. Today the fort walls have an inclination of 15° east of true north.

The fort of 1758 was intended to garrison 400 men in the casemates located under the terrepleins of the curtain walls, while the officers were quartered in small houses built on the east half of the parade ground. An underground powder magazine was constructed parallel to the east face of the southeast bastion. In this somewhat tenable position, the British army weathered the winter of 1758-59.

Work on the fort resumed in July 1759 and continued until December.9 Still the fort was not completed. Sir William Johnson, writing in 1761, stated that “The fort [Stanwix] . . . will require another summer to finish it. . . . ”10 In the meantime, the fort was deteriorating and in 1764 conditions became so bad that an effort was made to repair and remodel the works. A total of £140.5.10 of New York currency was expended for work completed between July 1 and December 31, 1764.11 Crown Maps Nos. 102 and 103 show the extent of repair work accomplished. Some of the construction work must have been supervised by Lt. George Demler, an engineer, who signed his name to Crown Map No. 103. Demler had been ordered to Fort Stanwix in May of 1759 by Col. Montresor.12

An important change was made to the parade ground prior to 1764, which gave the fort a formal military air. The loosely arranged officers’ houses were removed and in their place three buildings were erected within ten feet of the casemate walls on the north, east, and west sides of the parade ground. These buildings are not identified on the
Crown Maps but were probably a headquarters building and two combination storehouse-officers' quarters. These buildings scale 20 feet x 120 feet off the Crown Maps and are identical in size to the east and west barracks found in the recent archeological explorations.  

In addition to the erection of barracks buildings, three other major changes were made to the fort prior to 1764: a ravelin, main bridge, and caponiere or covered passageway off the east end of the sally port were added. A slight modification was also made to the earth embankment along the east side of the fort. With a few exceptions, no further repairs or alterations were made to the fort during the final 12 years of British occupation.

The Fire of 1774

In 1774, Fort Stanwix suffered a disastrous fire which destroyed the barracks:

... I hope to be able to go and reside there [Fort Stanwix] myself—the people who live on the ground are one John Roof, Thomas Mayers, William Cloyne, Bartholomew Broadhock—John Steers and Stephanus Delryod a Frenchmen—who trades there for Major Fonda—the Fort is all in ruins, and the barracks by an accident last Fall was burnt to the ground, nothing now remains—but a Room which the officers use to mess in. . . .

B. The American Colonists Take Over

American troops arrived at Fort Stanwix on July 13, 1776, as the result of a rumor that the westward passageway through the Mohawk Valley was about to be invaded by British troops advancing toward Albany. The American plan was to fortify and occupy old Fort Stanwix, thereby effecting a blockade of the British forces.

When the American troops arrived, they found the fort in poor condition. Lt. Elmer recorded in his journal on August 27, 1776: “The ruins of five houses and barracks in the inside, built for the accommodation of the stores, officers and soldiery.” This description suggests that at least two more buildings were erected on the parade ground after 1764, unless Elmer was referring to the five casemates as houses.

Aided by “artificers of every kind,” the American troops, under the command of Col. Elias Dayton, started immediate repair work on the fort. By October 3, the barracks had been partially rebuilt but not finished off on the inside. Nails, boards, and other building materials were in short demand and had to be boated up the Mohawk River from as far away as Albany.

Jonathan Lawrence, passing through Fort Stanwix on June 8, 1777, found it “... to be a palizaded Fort with an Intrenchment round it and piqueted round, with six sm[a][ll] Canon and two pieces of Field Artillery to Defend it the Fort forming a square with Barrack[s] all around the parade which is large a[nd] looked very neat.”

C. The Fires of 1780 and 1781

Fort Stanwix was the victim of fires in 1780 and 1781. The fire of 1780 destroyed the guardhouse and threatened the barracks before it was brought under control. Part of the barracks standing next to the guardhouse was torn down by the garrison to prevent the fire from spreading. The next day, according to reports from the commandant, the barracks had been repaired and the following Saturday a new guardhouse was to be rebuilt.

A heavy rain, which did considerable damage to the fort, preceded the fire of May 14, 1781. The fire consumed all the barracks buildings, but the powder magazine, the cannons, and part of the provisions were saved. The extent of the damage by fire and flood was such that repair work would have meant reducing the remaining works to the ground and beginning with new foundations. On May 27, 1781, General Washington informed the President of Congress:

There has been a necessity of abandoning the post of Fort Schuyler (Stanwix) and removing the Garrison and Stores to German Flats. The Barracks had been the beginning of this month consumed by fire and the Works so exceedingly damaged by the heavy rain storm that they were rendered indefensible, nor could they be repaired in any reasonable time by the number of Men who can be spared as a Garrison.

Orders arrived on June 1 for the garrison to evacuate the post. The women and children had already been taken by boat to German Flats on May 21. On June 3, the convoy set out in boats
down the Mohawk River for Fort Herkimer, arriving there the next day. On June 6, a convoy left Fort Herkimer destined for Fort Stanwix, where it arrived the following day at 4:00 p.m. The next two days were spent demolishing the fort, after which the troops returned to Fort Herkimer.

D. The Blockhouses of 1783 and 1794

General Washington visited the site of Fort Stanwix in 1783. In August of that year he ordered Col. Marinus Willett to build "... one or two small Block Houses, at the Portage between the Mohawk River and the Wood Creek. ..." Orders filtered down from Col. Willett through Capt. Pearse to Capt. Newell, who was eventually assigned the job of superintending the construction work. The project got under way early in October, hindered by the age-old problem of procuring necessary supplies.

Eventually the project was completed. Apparently, three blockhouses were built about one half mile below the site of Fort Stanwix, probably near the upper landing site on the Mohawk River near old Fort Williams. When a meeting with the Indians was held at Fort Stanwix in 1784, the casks of liquor were locked up in one of these blockhouses.

In 1794, a committee consisting of local inhabitants sent a petition to Governor Clinton stating:

resolved ... that a Fort should be erected at Fort Stanwix as a place of rendezvous for the Troops and Inhabitants and as a deposit for Stores. ... it would be proper for us only to erect Palissadoes sic round, and a Block house within the Body of the Place. ... The ditch, the Ramparts and the Glacis are yet in good preservation.

Sufficient information is on hand to be sure that the blockhouse was constructed, although no evidence of its construction was found in the archeological exploration work. Rev. John Taylor, relating his visit to Rome in 1802, stated: "The old Fort Stanwix stands about 30 rods from the river. It is regularly built, the intrenchment is very deep. In the center of the Fort stands the old blockhouse."

The blockhouse was still standing in 1815, when William Dunlap visited Rome. He reported that from a window in James Lynch's house he "... made a drawing of the remains of the fort. The block house still occupies the centre of the fortification, and the mounds of earth which formerly made the ramparts of the fort, were beyond."

No record has been found to date that pinpoints the exact year when the blockhouse was razed but by "... 1830 the whole fort was levelled sic & ditches filled up."

E. Powder Horns and Related Pictorial Matter

Quite a few powder horns have survived from the mid-eighteenth century that were engraved with regional maps showing towns and forts of the New York area. Of special interest to the project are the powder horns which have the plan of Fort Stanwix engraved on them. Not all of the powder horns carved at Fort Stanwix (or Schuyler) have been located and examined. But of those either examined personally or through drawings and photographs, the most convincing are those identified as belonging to: Christopher Hutton, 1777; James McGraw, December 25, 1777; Thomas DeWitt, 1778; James Wilson, c. 1779; and Cornelius Chatfield, November 5, 1780.

The authenticity of the McGraw powder horn is the most convincing to the author. James (or Alexander) McGraw enlisted in July of 1775. He was with Capt. Thomas Dorsey's Company in the battle for Quebec and was shot through the leg on the retreat from Canada.

McGraw then enlisted on April 13, 1777, in Capt. Bleecker's Company under Colonel Peter Gansevoort. This company arrived at Fort Stanwix on May 26, 1777, and stayed until approximately Dec. 31, 1779. A return of the sick in the garrison at Fort Stanwix on March 1, 1779, states [James] McGraw, Capt. Bleecker's Company, was confined to his quarters with an ulcerous leg. It seems very likely that James McGraw's old war wound became infected and that during this time of convalescence he had time to engrave the plan of Fort Stanwix on his powder horn.

In 1897, P. F. Hugunine of Rome completed a painting of Fort Stanwix, based upon his impressions following an extensive period of research on the subject. He arrived at the conclusion that the
The earthwork around the fortification is the silent or covert way, a dry ditch, 12 to 14 feet deep, with perpendicular pickets in its center, and 24 feet wide to the walls of the Fort. The parallel pickets project from the rampart and follow around the walls. The parapets are made of heavy sods cut from the swamps, which form the outer part of the wall. The inner parts are logs and filled between with earth. The whole construction is of earth for the exterior and logs for the interior.53

The Hugunine painting differs in many aspects from what is proposed for the reconstruction. The chief differences are: sod rampart walls and parapets vs. log construction; open passageways vs. covered; pickets located in the ditch vs. on the covered way; no buildings on the parade ground vs. five structures; no ravelin vs. a ravelin.

In 1897 a new twist to the Fort Stanwix story took place. Apparently unimpressed by the efforts of Mr. Hugunine’s research, Mr. Thomas H. Stryker of Rome was instrumental in getting Charles C. Hopkins, an engineer with the Stanwix Engineering Company in Rome, to study all the existing records pertaining to the actual construction of the fort. Mr. Hopkins then drew up a plan of the fort as he understood it to exist, not as it was actually proposed. His plan, submitted with a signed affidavit, was presented before the Rome Common Council, the D.A.R., and the S.A.R. on September 15, 1899.34

The revised plan of 1899 is reasonably accurate in locating two of the fort’s bastions and curtain walls, but it distorts the angles and lengths of the northeast and southeast bastions and curtain walls. This contorted plan of the fort received widespread support publicly and has been used ever since as the symbolic representation of Fort Stanwix.

Public interest in the fort was aroused during the 150th year observance of the siege of Fort Stanwix. John Albert Scott, editor of the Rome Sentinel newspaper, prepared a series of articles for the sesquicentennial edition entitled Fort Stanwix and Oriskany, published in book form in 1927. There is very little information omitted from this book pertaining to the siege; it probably represents the best effort to date to present the history of Fort Stanwix during 1777.

Another project finished in time for the sesquicentennial was a painting of Fort Stanwix done by Edward Buyck. The theme of the painting is the purported first raising of the “Stars and Stripes” by the American troops in battle against enemy fire on August 3, 1777.35

Like the Hugunine painting of 1897, the fort is shown as an earthen fortification faced with sod. In order to achieve the dramatic effect of the garrison standing at attention on the parade ground, the five free-standing buildings were left out of the picture.
PROPOSED USE OF THE FORT STRUCTURES

On January 22–24, 1973, representatives from the Denver Service Center, the Northeast Regional Office, the New York District Office and the Harpers Ferry Center met in Rome, New York, to formulate plans for the interpretation of Fort Stanwix.

It was generally agreed that the guidelines to be used in the reconstruction of the fort structures would be as follows:

1. The major theme of the interpretive program at Fort Stanwix would center about the siege of the fort and the repulse of the British forces commanded by St. Leger. This would encompass a short period of time on each side of August 2–22, 1777, when the siege took place, or from May through December 1777.

2. Fort Stanwix should be totally reconstructed on the exterior with all visible construction adhering to the historic scene. In other words, there should be no deviation on the exterior from the building details and dimensions as found in the historic period of 1758–1781.

3. All structures found within the fort area related to the historic period should be reconstructed either for visitor interpretation or use by management.

A tentative plan was developed for the utilization of the structures proposed in the forthcoming reconstruction of Fort Stanwix. The following recommendations for building use were proposed:

1. Totally reconstructed areas would be as follows:
   a. Glacis, covered way, picket line, ditch, and log ramparts.
   b. Ravelin, ravelin gates, picket gates and bridge over the covered way.
   c. Main bridge, draw span, and main gates.
   d. Elevated necessary with connecting bridge.
   e. Restore the stream bed on the east side of the fort.
   f. Sally port (covered communication, redoubt and gate.)
   g. Parade ground with whipping post, gun platform, and wells.
   h. Guardhouse (used in the winter months for interpretative station).
   i. East barracks with four officers’ rooms and two soldier’s rooms.
   j. Headquarters building with a Commandant’s room, combination dining room and headquarters, and two staff officer’s rooms.
   k. Bakehouse and passageway in southeast bastion.
   l. Southwest bombproof and passageway. Used during the siege as a hospital and for the safekeeping of valuable papers (Colbraith Diary).
   m. Northwest bombproof and passageway. May have been used for a powder magazine during the siege.
   n. Northeast bombproof and passageway. Not to be exhibited unless visitation requires an additional underground exhibit.
   o. All bastions to be restored with ramps, gun platforms, banquettas, parapets, and embrasures.
   p. The flagstaff on the southwest bastion.
   q. Sentry boxes.
   r. Southeast casemate to be shown as a soldier’s barracks.
s. All exterior surfaces of the casemates, the storehouse and west barracks to be restored to plans.

(2) Partially restored areas and/or adaptive use areas for management should be utilized as follows:

a. The storehouse is to be used for a visitor comfort station.

b. The west barracks is to be adapted for use as an audio-visual station. A heating plant could be located in this building.

c. The southwest casemate, all or in part, could be used for a cooperative association sales area.

d. The west casemate should have the north room restored as a soldier's barracks and the south two-thirds of the casemate adapted as office space for management.

e. The east casemate should be adapted for use by the park staff and should contain an eating-lounge area; change room, and storage area in the south half of the casemate. Storage of the artifacts excavated from the fort site could be placed in this space.

f. The north casemate should have two west end rooms restored as officer's quarters. The remaining area should not be used immediately.

(3) Lighting: A minimum of exterior lighting is planned for the fort. It was recommended that we floodlight the exterior of the bastions at night for protection purposes. Also, it is possible that lighting of the flagstaff will be required. One recommendation was made that portable lighting devices be used whenever evening activities occurred.

(4) Proposed utilities:

a. Electrical service should be placed underground into the fort area and underground service or a conduit should be laid to all fort structures.

b. Telephone service should be placed underground into the fort area, sales area, management and staff areas.

c. Fire and smoke detection systems should be placed throughout the fort and connected to underground telephone wires relayed to the Fire Department.

d. Burglar detection system. A possible combination of audio and silent alarm systems could be connected by underground telephone wires to the local police station.

e. Water system. Underground water pipes should be connected to existing city water lines and extended into the fort area. A fire fighting-water hose and stand pipe system could possibly be placed on the parade ground utilizing the rain barrels as points of concealment.

f. Sewer lines should be connected to the city system. City-owned storm sewer lines can be used if needed.

g. Heating. There should be one centrally located heating plant consisting of a boiler and one standby plant for use within the fort area. Hot water would be circulated in underground pipes to the various areas that we propose to heat. It is recommended that the following restored exhibit areas not be heated east barracks, headquarters building, elevated necessary, sally port, guardhouse (only one room to be heated), the three bombproofs, bakehouse, southeast casemate, north room of west casemate, west two rooms of north casemate, (remaining part of north casemate not to be heated), north half of east casemate, the sentry boxes and ravelin.

(5) Maintenance. It is recommended that a small maintenance area be set aside within the fort area for storing supplies, cleaning equipment and small tools. A room in one of the casemates as well as one or more of the lean-tos belonging to the storehouse would be suitable for this purpose. Heavy equipment should be kept outside the fort area and be brought in only when needed.
A glossary of military terms as they apply to the proposed construction work at Fort Stanwix is incorporated into this section of the report. These terms are listed in alphabetical order and do not, by any means, represent the full complement of terms found in a military engineer's vocabulary.

A. Bakehouse

The bakehouse site was first excavated in 1965, and again in 1971. The archeologists have concluded from a study of their excavations that this structure was built by the Americans after 1776. We have reference to a bakehouse in use at Fort Stanwix in 1781, but no solid evidence as to where it was located.

The bakehouse occupied the center of the southeast bastion. At least five other contemporary forts of this period have been found with a bakehouse built within a bastion. When the powder magazine of 1758 collapsed sometime after 1764, the earth fill surrounding this structure fell into the original excavated area. After the Americans arrived, they apparently completed the filling in of the old magazine, leveled off the ground, and constructed a bakehouse over part of the filled area. Evidence is on hand that the bakehouse structure stood completely below the terreplein of the bastion. Its floor level started at 450.05 feet, or 12 inches below the parade ground. With its ceiling height of seven feet, roof thickness of two feet, plus two feet of earth fill, the elevation of the terreplein above should be close to 461.00 feet.

The bakehouse measured 18.5 feet x 20 feet. A doorway, 3.75 feet wide, was located in the center of the west wall. Three wooden steps were found at the entrance: the first step started outside the wall of the structure and was elevated six inches above the parade ground, the second step was located within the wall, and the third step was built entirely within the room. In the 1965 excavations portions of a door and door jamb with two pintles in place were found in their fallen position on the floor.

A brick fireplace and hearth were uncovered in the center of the east wall. Immediately in back of the fireplace, 1.6 feet above the hearth, a beehive oven was constructed measuring 10 feet wide and 12 feet long. It was built of brick and had a brick lined floor. Flues to serve the fireplace and oven were probably combined into one chimney that extended through the roof and earth fill and terminated in a chimney cap just above the terreplein.

According to the archeologists' report of 1965, the corners of the bakehouse were built with a saddle and notch type construction, indicating that the structure was made from either round or squared logs. The report also implied that the exterior walls were covered with clapboards (actually boards measuring 1 inch x 1.1 inches). Window glass fragments and shutter pintles were reported found in the excavations along the east wall. If the bakehouse were completely backfilled with earth, the only logical location for a window would be in the door.

The roof of the original structure was probably covered with two tiers of 12-inch squared timbers, sloped to one side to provide drainage. The floor of the bakehouse, except for the brick hearth, was thought to be of hard packed earth.

No evidence was found during the excavations to indicate passageways, etc., in front of the bakehouse. It is assumed that a short passageway was
built off the steps, turning to the south and continuing another 30 feet. The passageway roof would have been covered with heavy timbers and earth would have been placed over the roof whenever it was needed to fill out the terreplein surrounding the gun platforms.

B. Banquette

Banquette, whether single or double, is a kind of step made on the rampart of a work near the parapet, for the troops to stand upon, in order to fire over the parapet: it is generally 3 feet high when double, and 1 1/2 when single, and about 3 feet broad, and 4 1/2 feet lower than the parapet.\(^{43}\)

... the surface should slope backwards 2 inches in 3 ft., 3 inches in the 5 ft., so as to discharge water freely and keep the banquette dry. ...\(^{44}\)

Banquettes first appear on the plans of 1764, in the northeast and northwest bastions, in the ravelin and in the redoubt of the sally port.\(^{45}\) In the cross section through the redoubt, the banquette appears as an earthen firing step having a ramp to the rear. They may be similarly constructed in the bastions where the terreplein is of earth construction, but on the timber terrepleins of the curtain walls and over the wooden platform of the ravelin, they would be constructed of wood. Sod or clay would have been used to stabilize the surface of the earthen banquettes.

Plank construction was probably used in building the wooden banquettes running along the curtain walls. These would be three feet wide, and 1 1/2 feet high with a two inch slope toward the rear. All of the banquettes would be canted back at a 40° angle whenever they stopped at an embrasure. No construction details for wooden banquettes have been found up to the present time except for those built along the walls of the sally port passageway.\(^{46}\) These appear in sections A-B and C-D, Crown Map No. 102. It is assumed that the banquettes running along the curtain walls of the fort and on the ravelin would be constructed in a similar manner.

C. Barracks

Background Information

There were no free-standing barracks built for the soldiers at Fort Stanwix in 1758–59.\(^{47}\) Casemates to house 400 soldiers were constructed under the terreplein of the four curtain walls, while twenty-one “Huts for Officers” were built on the east half of the parade ground. The room arrangement of the casemates and the plan location of the officers’ huts can be seen in Crown Maps Nos. 99, 100, and 101.

Prior to November 1764, the officers’ huts had been removed from the parade ground, and in their place three buildings were constructed around the perimeter of the parade ground. While the buildings are not identified on the plan, they were probably two barrack buildings and a commandant’s house.\(^{48}\) Crown Map No. 102 shows the chimney arrangement and hip roof construction of the barracks, which scale 20 feet \(\times\) 120 feet.

By 1767 the fort was described as being in a ruinous situation and not worth the expense of repairing and of maintaining a garrison there. The British government did see fit, however, to retain at least two half-pay officers to take care of the buildings, in the event they should be required for the King’s use.\(^{49}\)

In 1774 the fort suffered a disastrous fire which consumed all the buildings except a “Room which the officers used to mess in. . . .”\(^{50}\) This was the situation confronting the American Army, under Col. Elias Dayton, when it arrived at Fort Stanwix on July 13, 1776. The above description given of the fort’s condition tallies with that written by Dr. Ebenezer Elmer in August of 1776:

Fort Stanwix, so called after the General who built it in 1758, is large and well situated, having a glacis, breastwork, ditches, and a picquet fort before the walls, which are also well guarded with sharp sticks of timber shooting over the walls, on which is four bastions. The fort also has a sally port, covert way, bridge and ravelin before the gate at the entrance. The ruins of five houses and barracks in the inside, built for the accommodation of the stores, officers and soldiers.\(^{51}\)

Dr. Elmer implies in his journal that there were still not enough barracks to house the men on September 18, since he had to sleep outdoors. It was not until October 3 that Dr. Elmer was able to move into the barracks, sharing a room with a captain.\(^{52}\) This room was apparently only a verbal division of space since the entry on October 5 states that there was no partition between the rooms.\(^{53}\) Many of the artificers and soldiers continued to lodge in tents after this date.\(^{54}\)

It is still not certain how much construction
work was done on the fort under the direction of Col. Dayton between July 13 and October 17. There are conflicting reports written about the condition of the fort at this time, one of which stated that Fort Stanwix was the strongest fort on the continent. Reports such as these must have been gross exaggerations. It seems more likely that a garrison of such small size could do little more than maintain guard and fatigue duty during its four month stay.

Colonel Dayton's regiment was replaced on October 17 by Colonel Samuel Elmore's four companies of Connecticut troops consisting of some 23 officers and 283 men. According to the historian's report, part of the garrison was returned to German Flats to winter because not all the barracks had been completed. The period of time in which Col. Elmore's regiment occupied Fort Stanwix—October 17, 1776 to May 10, 1777—must have been one of inactivity as far as construction work was concerned. However, there was probably a great deal of future planning during the winter and early spring months by the French engineer, Capt. de Lamarquise, who had been sent by General Schuyler to take charge of the fort works. Sometime in late April, de Lamarquise reported that the barracks were able to house only 200 men, but with alterations they could accommodate 400 to 500 men.

After the arrival of Col. Gansevoort's 3rd New York Regiment on May 3, construction activity increased. Again there seems to be a difference of opinion among the various reports of this time regarding the condition of the fort buildings. On May 19, the engineer wrote that it was absolutely necessary to build new barracks. Colonel Marinus Willett recalled many years later that the barracks within the fort were repaired, and another barracks was erected outside the fort on the glacis. This latter building was burned by the British army during the siege.

Barrack Construction

There are several contemporary drawings that depict the barracks at Fort Stanwix (Schuyler). Six of these sources include in their delineation five buildings standing on the parade ground; two of the five structures were probably barracks, and are in the same location as they are on the British plan of 1764. Unfortunately, all of the drawings disagree in detail and there is little indication of how the buildings were constructed.

A number of references to barracks prior to the siege can be found at Fort Stanwix, but only one specifically uses the phrase "framing a Barracks." Four references to fetching, transporting, and receiving boards suggest that boards would have been used on "framed" buildings as opposed to the long and heavy squared timbered casemates incorporated into the ramparts.

A materials order submitted by B. Romans in September of 1775 for the construction of barracks on Constitution Island, N.Y., lists piece by piece the dimensions and quantity of framing stock, lumber, shingles, nails, bricks, etc., required for this project.

Another material order submitted by Col. Moylan to the Albany Committee of Correspondence in September 1776 lists similar materials required to build "Barracks for 20,000 men." There are also numerous references extracted from correspondence written to other forts in the northeast area that describe the building of barracks by means of frames covered with boards. Thus it seems that the majority of barracks built during the Revolution were constructed of a post, sill, and beam system with the walls covered with boards and the roofs with shingles; fort Stanwix was probably no exception.

East Barracks

Archeological excavations during the summer of 1972 uncovered the foundation sills for the north wall and portions of the east wall of this barracks. Three cellar holes were also excavated, two of which are thought to be related to the American occupation. The dimensions of the barracks measured approximately 20 feet × 120 feet, which corresponds to the size of the 1764 barracks. The foundations of the barracks were found to be wooden sleepers set directly on the ground; no stone was used and no evidence of fireplace bases was uncovered. Portions of three hinges, one door latch (?), six spikes, six nails, one pintle having a threaded end with a nut, and a half dozen other miscellaneous metal items were retrieved from the cellar holes.

Since it has been assumed that the McGaw powder horn is the most credible source of information regarding the exterior form of the
barracks during the siege, the building would have had the following characteristics:

1. Foundation dimensions of 20 feet × 120 feet (from archeological findings).

2. A frame structure consisting of sleepers, posts, beams, and joists; walls covered with wide horizontal feather-edged boards with lapped ends; and a gable roof covered with wood shingles. The exterior weatherboarding would have been left unpainted.

3. Four chimney stacks as shown on the powder horn.

4. Eight doorway openings as shown on the powder horn. We have plans from four other contemporary forts that show a passageway running through the barracks opposite the sally port. It is believed that one of the eight doorway openings represents a passageway, four feet wide, cut through the barracks for easy access to the sally port. Board and batten doors, hung on strap hinges, were probably the type of entrance used, each door supplied with hand wrought thumb latches.

5. Only one window is shown on the powder horn and that is in the south gable end. Window openings must have been an oversight on the part of the artist. There were probably two or more windows per room, depending upon the size of each room. It is likely that outside window shutters were used to conserve heat during the cold weather.

6. The interior room arrangement is conjectural. Two officers' rooms on the south end and two more on the north end are proposed. Between these would be three rooms for soldiers plus the passageway to the sally port. Each room would be heated by a fireplace. The room arrangement has been worked out by placing the fireplace foundations beyond the edges of the cellar holes.

It is assumed that the cellars were dug out after the barracks were constructed and were probably used for the storage of dry provisions.

7. The interior room finish is conjectural. A garrison order issued on October 16, 1777, reads in part: “The Commandant wou'd be very Glad the Engineer wou'd carry on the Barracks with all possible speed, as he is afraid the Inclemency of the Weather, will much injure the Mens Constitutions unless soon provided with good Quarters.” Assuming that the above order applies to the barracks standing on the parade ground, then they were still not completed nearly two months after the siege was over.

On the basis of the scanty information cited above, it is recommended that the interior walls of the room occupied by the soldiers not be lined with boards. Instead, the rough sawn weatherboards nailed to the exterior wall studding should be the completed finish. The ceiling can be finished off by laying boards loosely over the top of the joists without nailing. This would mean that the framework of the barracks building, the posts, plates, and ceiling beams would be hand hewn while the wall studding, braces, ceiling joists, and boards would be mill sawn.

The floors should be rough-sawn wide boards, face-nailed into the joints with “T”-headed, hand-wrought nails. According to garrison orders, the floors were to be washed down every Saturday.

A different wall treatment is proposed for the officers' rooms located within the barracks. These walls should be lined with tongue and grooved boards that have been hand planed and nailed with small hand wrought “T” headed nails. The ceilings should have hand planed boards laid loosely over the top of the joists.

Closets in which the officers could hang their uniforms, swords, etc., were probably built into the rooms—a small luxury not afforded the common soldier. Lighting should be furnished by candles, and shoe scrapers might be provided on the outside wall of the officers' rooms.

8. Possibly eave troughs could be used to catch rainwater and funnel it into barrels.

West Barracks

Archeological excavations uncovered the foundation sills of the south wall and a portion of the east wall at the south end of the barracks. Six cellar holes were excavated along the entire length.

The dimensions of the west barracks correspond with those of the east barracks—about 20 feet × 120 feet. The construction of the two buildings was similar. Wooden sleepers, used for the foundation, were set directly on the ground. Parts of ten sleepers, apparently used as joists, were uncovered at the south end. These were placed approximately three feet on centers and set directly on the ground at parade ground level, 451.00 feet.
Excavation of the west barracks yielded only one fireplace base, located in the south end wall of the building, while the McGraw powder horn shows five chimney stacks extending above the roof. Three spikes, one pintle (with a threaded end), and two staples were the only hardware recovered from the site.

Using the McGraw powder horn again as the source of information, the west barracks would have appeared as follows:

1. Foundation dimensions of 20 feet \( \times \) 120 feet (from archeological findings).
2. A frame structure identical in construction to the east barracks as described earlier. (See item No. 2 under east barracks.)
3. Four chimney stacks (spaced to avoid the six cellar holes).
4. Four doorway openings.
5. The powder horn shows two windows in the east wall, but it seems certain that there would have been two or more window openings into each of the rooms. It is probable that exterior board and batten shutters were used.
6. The interior room arrangement is conjectural. Two small rooms for officers at each end of the barracks and two large rooms for soldiers in the center of the building are proposed. Each room would be heated by a fireplace and lighted by candles. At least one cellar hole should be excavated and shown as an exhibit. This could be done by leaving the trap door open and covering the opening with a metal grille.
7. The interior room finish should be similar to that proposed for the east barracks; that is, the walls in the soldiers’ rooms should be unplined on the interior, while those in the officers’ rooms should be lined with boards. Ceiling boards should be laid loosely over the joists. The framework should be exposed mortice and tenoned timbers. The floor should be wide boards throughout, face-nailed with handwrought nails.
8. As at the east barracks, eaves troughs could have been used during the historic period for catching and diverting rainwater from the roof into rain barrels.

D. Bastions

Bastions are the pentagonal sections of the ramparts which extend beyond the square of the fort at each corner. At Fort Stanwix, the original drawings show that the bastions were made full, that is, filled with earth up to the base of the parapet. Access to the terreplein of the bastion from the parade ground was by means of a ramp located in the throat or gorge of the bastion.

The terreplein of the bastions consisted mainly of the sloping gun platforms with earthen banquettes built along the base of the parapet between each platform. Sod was probably laid between the platforms and on the banquettes to prevent erosion of the topsoil. Drains for catching rainwater were usually dug into the terreplein at the lowest point next to the parapet.

The outer part of the bastion beyond the terreplein consisted of the parapet, built to a height of six feet above the terreplein in its completed form or to a height of 2½ feet when finished en barbette. It was the usual military practice to place a sentry box on the tip of each bastion. Access to the superior slope of the parapet where the sentry box stood must have been provided by a set of steps.

There is good evidence to believe that only three of the bastions at Fort Stanwix were completed at the time of the siege and up until February of 1778, when a report was written describing the conditions of the fort. Probably the parapet of one bastion had not yet been raised to its entire height of six feet.

Names were given to each bastion as it was completed in 1758. Only the northwest bastion can be positively identified, and it is designated as the “Flag Bastion” on Crown Map No. 101. The remaining bastions were called the “Onida,” the “New York” and the “Rodsland.” The Americans apparently never gave names to their bastions, since on August 1, 1777, orders were given to man the S.E., S.W., N.W., and N.E. bastions. This order was repeated on December 11. By November of 1780, this designation was further simplified by referring to the bastions as south, east, north, and west. On December 30, 1780, “The Morning Gun is to be fired in the Southeast Bastion to Morrow Morning and at the Same place a New Year Morning and Evening.”

Only one structure was built within the bastions in 1758 and that was a powder magazine located in the southeast bastion. It was built approximately seven feet below the parade ground level, although its bombproof roof extended some four feet above grade and was topped with five feet of earth fill.
In 1759, a small cellar was constructed in the same bastion; both of these structures are shown on Crown Map No. 101. By 1764 both the root cellar and powder magazine had fallen into disrepair. Whether the powder magazine was rebuilt as part of the repair work done in 1764 is uncertain, but when the Americans arrived in 1776 the magazine had probably fallen in and become filled over with earth from the bastion.

At one time or another the Americans built a structure under the terreplein of each bastion. This fact has been established by evidence uncovered during the archeological excavations and by documentation found in orderly books and diaries. What are certain to be bombproofs were found in the northwest, northeast, and southwest bastions. A bakehouse was uncovered in the southeast bastion and is considered by the archeologists to have been built during the American occupation.

The McGraw powder horn shows a rectangular block located in the throat of each bastion. These blocks can be interpreted in two ways—either as bombproofs or ramps. Since ramps are usually indicated on plans by a different symbol, it can almost be said that the powder horn artist was showing underground bastion structures.

It is proposed to show the fort with the four bastions completed, having full height parapets containing embrasures, banquetttes, fraise, gun platforms, ramps and sentry boxes. It is recommended that three bombproofs and passageways be reconstructed.

A reconstruction of the bakehouse and passageway in the southeast bastion is recommended based on the archeological evidence found in 1965 and 1971.

F. Bombproofs and Passageways

As stated in the section entitled Bastions, it appears that bombproofs were built under three of the bastions—those to the northeast, northwest, and southwest—and that a bakehouse was constructed under the southeast bastion.

Bombproofs were so constructed as to enable them to withstand direct artillery fire. Further precautions were taken to ensure the safety of their contents by covering their heavily constructed roofs with three to four feet of earth fill. Each of the bombproofs at Fort Stanwix was constructed in a different manner. Archeological evidence obtained from the northwest bombproof site suggests that the construction features of this particular building are very similar to those described in the Willett Narrative.

Northwest Bombproof

This structure is probably the magazine that Willett describes as having been built from the "seven spare feet which were left of the pickets." Round posts were found forming the walls of the bombproof and of the passageway into it. The shape of the structure was found to be irregular with unequal lengths and angles to each wall. The south end of the bombproof measures approximately 13 feet, while the north end measures about 15 feet. The east and west walls measure 20 feet and 21 feet respectively.
The passageway enters the bombproof at the northeast corner. Its overall width was found to be approximately 5 feet, while the overall length along the shortest side measured 55 feet. Ten feet east of the bombproof, the passageway made a 42° turn to the south and extended 45 feet until it reached the end wall of the north casemate. A pair of strap hinges was found at the beginning of the passageway indicating that a door had been located at the entrance way. Both bombproof and passageway floors were found to be about 1.23 feet below the level of the parade ground. This means that the height of the bombproof roof determined the height of the terreplein within the bastion. It also means that with a ramp running alongside the passageway, most of the side walls would be covered by the earth fill.

The passageway was floored with planks (laid over cross sleepers) running parallel to the walls, and the roof was spanned by 5 foot beams. Floor planks were found in the bombproof and its roof was covered with an earth fill. There was no indication that interior posts were used to help support the roof, whose timbers were probably sloped to permit drainage.

Southwest Bombproof

This bombproof measures approximately 20 feet square with a passageway located at the center of the east wall. As with the northeast bombproof, this structure and its passageway were constructed above the parade ground level. The walls of the bombproof were built of horizontal members, thought by the archeologists to be squared timbers. A doorway was framed into the cast wall by means of two vertical posts mortised into the foundation timber. The ends of the wall timbers on each side of the opening were fastened to the uprights, probably by mortise and tenon work. This would also apply to the passageway walls where the timbers seem to end against the two vertical posts.

As the passageway left the bombproof, it continued for 5 feet before turning north at a 60° angle. Unfortunately, only 8 feet of the second leg of the passageway have survived the many years of modern construction work on the site. The remaining length and direction are conjectural. The overall width of the passageway measured 6 feet, and it was floored with planks (nailed to cross sleepers) laid parallel to the walls. The roof of the passageway was probably covered with white pine timbers, squared off and hand adzed, similar to the heavy roof beams found in the bombproof.

Good evidence for a board floor in the bombproof was found. The widths of the boards and the directions that they were laid can be determined directly from the archeologists' drawings.

In 1778 this bombproof was described as being "the most airy, and agreeable." This statement can be interpreted to mean that the bombproof probably had a "funnel" or "air hole" built through the roof extending a foot or two above the terreplein of the bastion. The roof timbers were probably sloped to permit good drainage.

Northeast Bombproof

The floor level of the northeast bombproof was established at 448.00 feet, or three feet below the parade ground level. The floor level of the passageway leading to the bombproof was found to be 449.00 feet.

The northeast bombproof scales 15 feet × 17 feet off the archeologists' plan and had a passageway entering into the center of the south wall, of which approximately 22 feet was found. Its walls extended five feet to the southwest before turning almost due west another 15 feet, where the passage terminated approximately 14 feet from the east wall of the north casemate. Three steps were found just outside the entrance way into the passage. The elevation of the top step was recorded at 451.68 feet or 8 inches above the parade ground. This extra height probably created a curb which kept ground water from running into the passageway.

Floor boards were found in the passageway (nailed to cross sleepers) parallel to the side walls. Above the floor, a collapsed section of wall was found. It appears that the original wall was constructed of round posts spaced several feet apart with horizontal boards nailed to the outside—not a very substantial method of construction.

No evidence of floor boards were found in the bombproof, although it would seem that a wood floor had been used. Remains of the roof timbers covering the passageway and bombproof were found—cross timbers were used to span the
six foot wide passageway, while the bombproof timbers spanned 17 feet. These roof timbers were probably sloped to permit good drainage.

G. Bricks

Bricks used in the fortifications at the Oneida Carrying Place from 1756-58 were made near the upper landing on the Mohawk River, where a brick kiln was constructed. In 1756 General Craven reported “40,000 Bricks made & burned to build chimneys for the Barracks & Hospital.”

The practice of making bricks locally probably continued long after the Revolution ended. Brickmakers were undoubtedly one of the many kinds of artificers sent to Fort Stanwix between 1776-81 when the American troops occupied the fort. A large supply of bricks was required to build the many chimney blocks found in the course of the excavation work.

There seems to be a similar quality and size to all the bricks found on the site that were used for fort features. The average size of the bricks is 2 inches × 4 inches × 8 inches (±¼ inch). The color is red running to gray depending upon kiln conditions at the time of firing. The clay used contained a heavy concentration of sand with some pebble aggregate, and straw was introduced occasionally as a binder. The final product was a brick which had numerous air pockets, a very soft consistency, and warped surfaces.

The mortar consisted of burned lime and sand and was white in color due to the concentration of lime to sand. Samples of the brick and mortar are available at the site.

H. Bridge

Fort Stanwix was originally constructed without a bridge at the main entrance to the fort. The ditch was stopped short on both sides of the roadway which entered the fort through the south curtain wall. (See Crown Maps Nos. 99 & 100.)

Sometime between 1759 and 1765 the roadbed in front of the south curtain wall was excavated as deep and as wide as the adjoining ditch. This excavation may have been done in 1764 when work was carried on between July 1 and December 31. The bridge first appeared on plans drawn in 1764—Crown Maps Nos. 102 & 103—but there is no indication on these plans that a drawbridge was built at this time.

The “Ganesvoort Map of Fort Stanwix” and the Cornelius Chatfield powder horn are two drawings completed after 1777 that show a bridge with supporting posts and braces. The deFleury map lists a “draw bridge” which implies an existing bridge structure to go with it. Except for three other references cited under the section entitled Drawbridge, the orderly books, journals, and diaries all omit references to a bridge.

The ground in front of the south curtain wall was excavated by the archeologists in 1972 and parts of two sleepers, one of them 40 feet long, that supported the bridge at the bottom of the ditch were uncovered. At a higher level, four posts were found that the archeologists interpret as being supports for the bridge. These were found in pairs about 10 feet apart and approximately 10 to 12 feet in from each end of the bridge. The sleepers in the bottom of the ditch were spaced 10 feet 6 inches apart, outside dimensions. This measurement was used to determine the width of the bridge and to establish the positions of the two outer posts.

By determining the slopes of the scarp (43°) and counterscarp (37°), the archeologists have determined the length of the bridge to have been 74 feet. Approximately 1.5 feet of the south end rested on the covered way.

Further information on the design of the bridge will have to be gleaned from the post-siege drawing. This drawing also includes a detailed sketch of the bridge to the necessary. One bridge drawing done at Fort Niagara in 1769 is helpful in understanding the construction techniques used in the building of bridges.

The proposed bridge is supported by six posts anchored to the sleepers and stringers by diagonal braces. A 3½ inch plank deck is laid over eight inch stringers which in turn are supported by 10-inch beams. A handrail, which shows up on the post-siege plan, should be built along both sides of the bridge and a wood curb placed along the base of the posts. At the north end, a draw span should be constructed, 10 feet 6 inches × 12 feet. A ramp is required off the south end to ease the bridge elevation of 450.60 feet down to 448.00 feet at the base of the ravelin.

It is recommended that the bridge be made from squared timbers and planks that have a hand
adzed finish. The handrail may have had a plane finish on its posts, rails, and cap pieces. The bridge should be left unpainted but all the pieces should be pressure treated after final cutting and fitting.

The major joints of the bridge should be mortised and tenoned and pegged, while the bridge planks should be nailed with 100d spikes having rose heads.

I. Casemates

A casemat e, according to Muller, "is a work made under the rampart, like a cellar or cave with loopholes to place guns in it." Casemates built by the British and American armies, prior to and during the Revolution, were slightly modified from the above description. They were not built to hold guns, nor did they have loopholes or embrasures, but were used primarily as soldiers' barracks or as a place for the storage of provisions and ordnance. Casemates built by the British and American armies, prior to and during the Revolution, were slightly modified from the above description. They were not built to hold guns, nor did they have loopholes or embrasures, but were used primarily as soldiers' barracks or as a place for the storage of provisions and ordnance.

Early in 1758 a proposal for the construction of Fort Stanwix was submitted by Lt. Col. John Montresor, a British engineer. He proposed "Barracks to be made underneath the Rampart, with the Flues of the Chimneys, to come 'tho the Top."

Capt. William Green commented that a "Reasonable Breadth for the Barracks underneath cannot be less than 20 ft."

Writing in November 1758, Col. Montresor described the completed work as follows: "The logs of we^th the fort is built are generally 2 F thick, flatted on the upper and under sides. The Casemates (at present Barracks) are covered w^th two teer of Square timber from 12 to 24 In^b broad by 12 In^s thick as Represented in the Profil."

This description agrees with the plans and drawings completed in 1758 and 1759.

An elevation drawing and a cross section taken through the north casemat e are shown on Crown Map. No. 99, while another cross section taken through the north casemate is shown on Crown Map No. 101. These plans included building details for the casemates. A description of the four casemate areas shown on these early plans can be read in the historian's report of 1969.

Very little evidence of the casemate foundation walls was found during the archeological work. Sufficient portions of the wall foundations of all casemates except the one on the east were uncovered to establish their relationship to the rampart walls.

According to the historian's report, the casemates were rebuilt in 1764. If this was the case, it might account for the differences that were noted between the plans of 1758-64 and what was actually found as archeological evidence. There is also the possibility that these changes were made between 1776 and 1781 when the Americans occupied the fort. A letter written by Col. Gansevoort in October of 1777 was concerned about the proposed building of bombproof barracks (possibly casemates):

Major Hubbell the present Engineer is now busy to lay the Foundation of a bombproof Barrack, the Timber he has brought in for that purpose in my opinion is insufficient against a 13 Inch Shell. . .

If the above timber was to be used for casemates, it would seem that no work was accomplished that winter. Another account written on February 3, 1778, describes the condition of the fort:

The Fortification is far From compleat. The Curtains & one Bastion remain to be finished, Magazines & Casements are to be built, the Ditch to be Picqueted and the present Barracks must necessarily be pulled down. . . (Emphasis added.)

If the above account is an accurate description of the fort, it leaves the impression that the casemates, at least in part, were not completed in 1777. Because of a lack of solid documentation for identifying the uncompleted parts of the fort, it is recommended that all casemates be reconstructed as they might have appeared in a completed fort.

General Construction Details for all Casemates:

(1) Walls should be constructed six logs high with their upper and lower faces flatted. The foundation log should be not less than 24 inches in diameter and pressure treated to refusal after all joints are cut and fitted. The remaining five logs should measure approximately 23, 21, 20, 19, and 17 inches in diameter from bottom to top. Two additional wall logs along the front wall should be squared into 8 inches × 12 inches timbers with a hand adzed finish on the exposed sides. Splicing at the ends of logs and timbers should be done with
half-lapped joints, and dove-tailed at the corners. Partitions should be constructed of 6 inches thick squared logs, 22 feet long; exposed surfaces should be hand adzed and the ends half-lapped and fastened to the front and rear walls.

(2) Doors and windows should be cut through the log walls. Doors should be board and batten, hung with strap hinges on pintles and have thumb latches. They would measure four feet wide and five feet high (as scaled off the 1758 drawing). Window openings are based on a glass size of 7 inches $\times$ 9 inches (as assembled by the archeologists from window glass fragments). Using this glass size, the casemate window openings measure 24$\frac{3}{4}$ inches $\times$ 31$\frac{1}{4}$ inches based on a nine-light casement-hung sash. Exterior shutters should be board and batten, hung on strap hinges.

(3) Roofs of the casemates should be composed of two tiers of squared timbers, each tier 12 inches thick, 8 inches to 24 inches wide and 23 feet long—all pressure treated to point of refusal. A waterproof membrane is proposed between the two tiers with the surface joints and weather checks caulked with oakum and pitch. Banquettes with a concealed drainage system should be built on the roof of the casemate against the parapet. The casemate roofs slope 9 inches down to the parapet from 9 feet to 6 inches to 8 feet 9 inches interior ceiling heights should be 2 feet lower.

The archeologists have determined that the floor level throughout the casemate was approximately the same as the hearths. No evidence was found by the archeologists to indicate that bricks were used either for the floor of the fireplaces or of the hearths; it is assumed that packed soil or clay was used for this purpose.

In order to minimize the danger of weakening the exterior log wall by cutting a door opening into each of the six rooms, it is proposed to use only three openings with air locks or enclosed entries on the interior. The use of air locks in this instance is conjectural, but three contemporary fort drawings have been located that illustrate this feature.97

After evaluating the artifacts found in the north casemate, archeologists have concluded that these rooms were occupied by officers rather than by soldiers. An entry from John Barr's diary for 1780, reads “drew for the Rooms and Lieu Hyatt and I drew N° 1 on the Left of the North Side of the Fort.”98

Based upon the number of officers stationed at Fort Stanwix, there would be three rooms with three officers (Ensigns) and three rooms with two officers of a higher rank. Closets are a feature that have been found in other fort plans and should probably be included in these six rooms.

North Casemate

The basic shape of the north casemate, as uncovered by the archeologists, conforms to that found on the historic drawings. Pieces of wood foundation (logs) were uncovered along the entire length of the north wall, and along the west end wall. The location of the south wall was based on evidence related to changes in soil levels and color graduation. A number of evenly spaced cross trenches were found that were thought to be sleeper locations for the support of floor boards.

The archeologists discovered that a major deviation from the floor plans drawn in 1758-59 was the number and placement of fireplaces. Six brick bases for fireplaces were uncovered in a line abutting the north log wall.

Since all of the fireplace bases were practically identical in size, and evenly spaced, the archeologists have assumed that the casemate was divided into six rooms of nearly equal size.

East Casemate

No trace of this casemate was found during the excavation work. About midway between the northeast and southeast bastions, a trench was found that related to a drain running through the rampart walls and into the extended passageway of the sally port located in the ditch. The archeologists seem certain that the drain also paralleled the sally port passageway through the casemate.

The floor plan of the proposed east casemate is based on that found in the drawings of 1758-59; that is, two rooms of about equal size on both sides of the sally port passageway. Each room should have a centrally located chimney with a double fireplace and a sand floor for both fireplace and hearth. These rooms are shown on the original plans as having field beds (bench beds) built in along two sides of the room. Two exterior doors and eight windows are drawn on the plan of 1758–59, and this number is proposed for the
reconstruction. A planked floor throughout is also suggested.

South Casemate

Because the main entrance (12 feet 6 inches wide) into the fort passed through the south curtain wall, the proposed south casemate is subdivided into southwest and southeast rooms. Traces of the wood foundation forming the entrance passageway were found as well as the west end of the southwest room. The archeologists’ report should be consulted for a complete description of this area.

The remains of a centrally located brick fireplace were found in the southwest casemate, the only evidence remaining of any of these early chimney blocks built in the 1758-59 period. Reconstruction of the two south casemates is based on the plan of 1758-59, which incorporates the central chimney as found.

The two reconstructed casemates are approximately the same size, each one having a centrally located chimney block containing two back-to-back fireplaces. According to the early drawings, there should be one exterior door and six window openings in each casemate. Field beds should be built along the side walls as shown on the plans of 1758. The floor in the southeast casemate should be wood, but the floor in the southwest casemate was found to be packed clay.

West Casemate

Portions of the log foundation were found at the north end of this casemate, although modern building foundations had intruded into this area and eliminated practically all of the structure at parade ground level. The reconstructed floor plan of the west casemate agrees with that shown on the plans of 1758-59. The casemate should be divided by squared log partitions into three rooms, each room containing a centrally located chimney block with back to back fireplaces. The fireplaces and hearths should be of sand and the floors of the casemates should be made of planks.

In accordance with the original plans there should be one exterior door and three window openings into each room. Field beds should be built along the west wall of the three rooms and across the end walls of the north and south rooms.

J. Covered Way

The covered way was a shelf of ground running along the counterscarp or outer edge of the ditch, and was protected from enemy fire by the parapet of the glacis. It was used as a place to station sentries and as a first line of defense.

The term “Cover’d way” appears on Crown Map No. 102, dated 1764. The earlier plans of the fort, if drawn to scale outside the ditch, show a covered way measuring two feet wide on Section E-F, Crown Map No. 99, but only one foot wide on Section E-F, Crown Map No. 101. The covered way must have been extensively widened by 1764, since these plans indicate a width of 10 feet in addition to what appears to be two firing steps built into the parapet of the glacis.

The covered way occurred only on three sides of the fort where the ditch was dug, although the deFleury post-siege map and the “Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix” show it on all sides. A portion of the covered way opposite the southwest bastion was exposed by the archeologists. A distinct ledge, 10 feet wide, was found between the counterscarp of the ditch and the parapet of the glacis. At the base of the glacis, a trench, 2½ feet deep and approximately 3 feet wide, was excavated and interpreted to be the location of the picket line, although no trace of the pickets were found. No evidence of the 1764 firing steps was left in the parapet at this location.

Based on the evidence submitted by the archeologists, the proposed covered way is 10 feet wide. It follows the counterscarp of the ditch on the north, west and south sides of the fort. Opposite the tips of the northeast and southeast bastion, it angles directly toward the rampart walls and connects to the berm on an elevation of 451.00 feet. The picket line should also turn and follow the covered way, then continue along the berm on the east side of the fort.

A covered way is shown on the old plans in front of the ravelin and so it is proposed to run a covered way, 10 feet wide, along the exterior faces of the ravelin. The picket line should also turn and follow the base of the glacis surrounding the ravelin. At the intersection of the road into the ravelin, there should be a picket gate and a small bridge spanning a shallow ditch eight feet wide. The covered way should be finished off with sod and sloped toward the ditch to provide drainage.
K. Curtain Wall

Curtain, in fortification, is that part of the body of a place, which joins the flank of one bastion to that of the next.11

The curtain walls are part of the ramparts. At Fort Stanwix the curtain walls were constructed to include casemates under the terreplein. A sally port was built through the center of the east curtain wall and the main entrance into the fort was built through the center of the south curtain wall. Embrasures were possibly built into the parapet of the curtain walls. For a discussion of how the curtain walls were constructed, see the sections entitled Ramparts and Casemates.

L. Ditch

The idea of a ditch surrounding a fort was a holdover from the moats around the medieval fortified towns and castles. This principle was kept in use by military engineers because it served to extend the exterior slope of the ramparts without adding height to the construction relief of the works.

A natural scrap occurring in the land formation to the east must have influenced the selection of the original site of Fort Stanwix. The military engineers could easily see the advantage of placing the rampart walls along the edge of this scarp and thus avoiding the construction of a ditch and glacis along the east side. A study of the plans and written documents seems to verify this approach.

After the trace of the fort was laid out, the construction of the cribbing for the rampart walls was begun. Earth from the ditch was then taken out and thrown into the cribbing as it was being raised, until the proper height of the rampart walls was reached. The remaining earth from the ditch was removed to fill the inner part of the bastions (terreplein and ramp) and the parapet walls, and to construct the glacis beyond the ditch.

An original drawing of 1758 (Crown Map No. 99) indicates, in plan and section, a ditch extending around four sides of Fort Stanwix. Section A-B shows how poorly the counterscarp of the ditch along the east wall was constructed. The ditch ended in plan when it reached the face of the northeast bastion.

The building of a ditch along the east side of the fort probably represents an attempt on the part of the engineer to carry out the principles of fortified works as listed in military handbooks. Apparently, by 1764, the poorly constructed ditch had deteriorated to the point where it was considered not worth restoring, since it does not appear on the plans from this period.

The ditch on the south side of the fort was enlarged in 1759 (see note F on Crown Map No. 101). By 1764, the open end of the ditch at the southeast bastion was closed off by an earthen counterscarp and covered way which were built across the gap. The open end at the northeast bastion may have been closed in a similar manner.

Several angles of the scarp and counterscarp were measured after they were exposed during the excavation work. These angles varied from 37° to 44°. The archeologists established 40° as the angle to use for the scarp and counterscarp of the ditch, and for the scarp of the glacis and sally port, while the angle of the scarp under the drawbridge was found to be 43°.

The following widths have been proposed for the ditch on the north and south sides: 42 feet across the top and 18 feet at the bottom opposite the bastions, 58 feet across the top and 34 feet at the bottom opposite the center of the curtain walls. On the west side of the fort the widths of the ditch are: 39 feet across the top and 15 feet at the bottom opposite the bastions, 55 feet across the top and 31 feet at the bottom opposite the curtain walls. An indentation of 10 feet into the scarp was found at the entrance to the fort. Depth of the ditch is 10 feet, or at an elevation of 441.00 feet.

The ditch is circular opposite the salient angles of the northwest and southwest bastions. The radii of the two arcs that define the inner and outer limits of the counterscarp scale 20 feet and 32 feet off the tip of the scarp of the bastion.

It is proposed to sod the scarp and counterscarp. The bottom of the ditch should be left with its natural soil exposed. The archeologists feel certain that with the type of pebbly soil found at the bottom of the ditch, there will be no drainage problem.

M. Drawbridge

Draw-Bridge, that which is fastened with hinges at one end only, so that the other may be drawn up; in which case the bridge is almost perpendicular, to hinder the passage of a ditch, &c.
The earliest known use of drawbridges in military fortification is obscure. By the thirteenth century, entranceways into fortified castles and towns of Europe were protected by one or more drawbridges. Several methods of raising and lowering drawbridges, which were employed by the medieval engineer, survived into the 18th century and were put to use at military posts in America.

Eighteenth century military handbooks usually included a description of several types of bridges, including the drawbridge. Descriptions of drawbridges were published as late as 1862, and military installations in use during the American Civil War were frequently equipped with this feature.

Drawbridges appear more often on fort plans drawn during the French and Indian War than on those drawn at the time of the American Revolution. The writer has found a total of 22 drawbridges in use between 1739 and 1781.

Only four references were found on the drawbridge at Fort Stanwix during the Revolution. The post-siege deFleury map includes “a drawbridge,” in its legend, while Willett’s Narrative makes only a brief mention of such a feature: “In front of the gate there had been a drawbridge, covered by a salient angle, raised in front of it on the glacis.” There is no mention of a drawbridge in either the Willett Orderly Book or Colbraith’s Diary, but two references to a drawbridge can be found in the Orderly Books for the 4th and 2nd New York Regiments in 1780:

p. 541: the Outside Gate and the Draw Bridge are to be shut at Retreat Beating, and the Sallee post at Dusk.

p. 542: the officer of the Guard is to Instruct the Sentinals at the Draw Bridge and Sallee port not to Suffer any Strangers nor Indians to Enter the Fort without the Command’s permission.

Based upon the above four references to drawbridges at Fort Stanwix, it is proposed to incorporate this feature as part of the main bridge at the north end adjacent to the rampart passage-way. The draw span would measure roughly 10 feet 6 inches × 12 feet and have a double tier of 3 inches planks supported over stringers. A hurter or curb should be laid along each side and bolted through the construction work. Reproduction hinges should be made to match the large pintle type hinges found during the excavation work and these should be driven into the end of the hurter, then bolted in place.

The lifting mechanism for the drawbridge has not been designed yet, but will probably incorporate a set of counterweights, pulleys, and a winch operating a wrought iron chain connected to the draw span.

N. Embrasures

General Stanwix, writing in 1758, envisioned his fort with eight embrasures in each bastion and three embrasures in two of the curtain walls. He left the outpost in November of that year without completing this part of the fortification. Work continued the following year, but by the end of December only the northwest bastion was finished off with a parapet containing six gun embrasures, as shown on Crown Map No. 101.

Work on the parapet must have continued sporadically throughout the ensuing years. Crown Map No. 103, dated November 19, 1764, shows an uneven number of embrasures in the four bastions and curtain walls. On Crown Map No. 102, dated the same year, the embrasures are omitted from the plan, although other work is listed as having been completed. For the first time in plan, three embrasures appear in the ravelin that protected the main entrance. These are mentioned in the Willett Narrative.

It can only be assumed that with the size of cannon anticipated to be used by the Americans at Fort Stanwix after 1776, a substantial parapet with embrasures would have been built to protect not only the cannon but also the artillerymen. This fact seems to be substantiated by studying the three powder horn plans carved in 1777 and the “Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix.” because embrasures are shown in each one of these plans, although their number varies. The Thomson and McGraw powder horns and the Gansevoort Map show six embrasures in each of the bastions. Thomson and Gansevoort also place two embrasures in each of the four curtain walls. A fort plan published in Willett’s Narrative in 1831 places two embrasures in each of the four curtain walls. A fort plan published in Willett’s Narrative in 1831 places two embrasures in each of the bastions, and three embrasures in the ravelin. This same plan shows ten embrasures in each of the bastions, a condition which would not meet the specifications for the spacing of embrasures (10 to 12 feet apart).
The only written source located to date mentioning embrasures is Willett's Narrative:

The engineer had begun to erect a salient angle to the gate, with two embrasures in it. He was also engaged in erecting pickets along the covert way. The pickets were placed about three feet from the parapet of the glacis. Two of them were framed together with cross-pieces, and formed a kind of porthole which were intended to be placed opposite the embrasures.

By the first day of August the wall around the whole of the fort was repaired: the parapets were nearly raised; embrasures made on three of the bastions: horizontal pickets fixed around the walls, and perpendicular pickets around the covert way. The gate and the bridge were also made secure, though the time had been too short to make any material alteration in the salient angle, so as to derive any benefit from it. The garrison had just finished laying the horizontal pickets at night, as the enemy invested the fort the next day: but at the time of the arrival of the enemy, none of the parapets had been completed. It was necessary, therefore, to finish these after the fort was regularly invested.

Willett seems to imply that the parapets were completed after the siege had begun, but he fails to mention if embrasures were used throughout the ramparts.

The embrasures should include the following: the genouillère, the sole or glacis, the throat, and the cheeks or side walls. Embrasure shutters were also used on occasion. Embrasures were built either direct or oblique to the parapet walls. Oblique embrasures were to be avoided whenever possible as they were prone to weaken the parapets.

The writer envisions the embrasures constructed much like those at Fort Edward, (see Illustration No. 18 in the Appendices). The log work of the rampart walls should continue another six feet above the terreplein to form the interior slope of the parapet. From this point, the top surface of the parapet slopes down 12 inches to the front rampart wall to form the superior slope. Within this construction the embrasures should be laid out from 10 to 12 feet apart, with their 2 feet wide throats starting 2½ feet above the gun platforms or terreplein. The width of the embrasures at the exterior slope is 9 feet. The sole or glacis should be given a slope of 1½ feet to the outside or slightly steeper than the angle of the superior slope. It was usually sodded. The cheek walls should be built with logs dovetailed into the outer and inner parapet walls. As a result of the logs being stacked up one on another, these side walls should be nearly vertical and not splayed as we see in some reconstructions.

If embrasure shutters are used, they should be constructed at one side of the throat and either hinged to swing or made to slide in front of the embrasure, theoretically to protect the artillerymen while loading the cannon.

O. Flagstaff

Location of the Flagstaff

The earliest known location of the flagstaff at Fort Stanwix is shown on the plan of c. 1759. In this drawing the northwest bastion is designated on the plan as “C . . . Flag Bastion . . . .” The small circle located in the extreme tip of the salient angle may be interpreted as representing the flagstaff.

By 1777, however, the location of the flagstaff had changed to the southwest bastion, a position much closer to the main entrance of the fort. Documentary evidence found to support the fact that the flagstaff was located in the southwest bastion comes from at least six sources: the post-siege deFleury map and the five carved horns. Four of the five powder horn sketches place the flagstaff directly on the southwest bastion, while the fifth horn, belonging to James Wilson, places the staff near the southwest bastion, but on the parade ground. The artist may have taken a certain liberty and moved the pole aside in order to show a sentry box. The McGraw and DeWitt powder horns appear to be the most decisive of the lot in locating the flagstaff at the tip of the salient angle, a position identical to that shown on the plan of c. 1759.

Design of the Flagstaff

Contemporary sketches of the period indicate that many of the military posts used a flagstaff consisting of an upper and lower pole. There appears to be a marked similarity between a ship’s masts and flagstaffs. It has been concluded that flagstaffs were originally built by ship’s carpenters. This would account for the carryover of the basic design of an upper and lower pole, complete with cheek boards, trestle trees, cross trees, caps, trucks, etc.—all component parts of a ship’s mast.
The flagstaff used at Fort Stanwix apparently was no exception. The double-masted staff shows up on four powder horn carvings, the most distinctive of these being that of James McGraw. McGraw depicts the flagstaff as having an upper and lower mast with the flag supported by ropes (rather than lashed to the mast). One feature shown on the McGraw flagstaff which does not conform to period construction drawings is a truck-like object appearing just above the top of the lower mast. This would seem to indicate that a truck was used on both upper and lower masts.

The James Wilson powder horn is less illustrative than the McGraw horn. It portrays another element found on a ship's masts—the check boards—but other essential parts of the pole's construction are omitted. The flag is shown supported by a rope running to the base of the pole, a feature found on all the other powder horn carvings.

Assuming that flagstaffs were constructed on the order of ships' masts, the component parts would be as follows: the main mast; the top mast with its truck and sheave; and the connection between the two masts comprised of trestle trees, cross trees, bibs and check boards, bolsters, and cap piece.

The height of a ship's main mast was determined on the basis of an arithmetical relationship; it was equal to one half the sum of the length of the ship plus its width. All other masts were of proportional length to the main mast. Thus, the top mast should be three fifths of the main mast in height. Diameters of the masts were computed in the same manner. The main mast was sized according to the type of ship it served and the remaining masts were sized proportionately to the main mast.113

Flagstaffs at military posts would, by their very nature of being secured in the ground, have a different base than that of ships' masts. The flagstaff base found at Fort McHenry in 1958 was in the shape of a "Christmas tree stand." Possibly two of these cross piece frames were used at Fort Stanwix, one at parade ground level, +451 feet, and the other nearer the terreplein level of the bastion, at +458 feet.

P. Fraise

"The fraise is a horizontal or very inclined palisading, placed on the sides of the work or on their exterior slopes."114 Its purpose was to prevent a direct escalation of the rampart walls by enemy foot soldiers.

A fraise was first used at Fort Stanwix in 1759. It appears on Crown Map No. 101 as part of Profile A-B, taken through the northeast bastion. Since the fraise does not appear in the other two profile drawings, it is assumed that only the northeast bastion was completed in this manner. The fraise is shown in profile at the top of the rampart wall where the parapet ends en barbette. It was placed at the same angle as the superior slope and must have been nailed or pegged into the top logs of the rampart walls. The fraise projected slightly beyond the berm width of six feet.

The fraise appears in one other plan of Fort Stanwix, Crown Map No. 102. Section A-B, taken through the rampart walls at the sally port, shows a pointed fraise anchored to the superior slope (12°) of a seven foot high parapet. The projection of the fraise measures six feet beyond the rampart walls. It is possible that the parapet was elevated an additional 12 inches as it passed over the roof of the sally port in order to provide more height between the roof and fraise. This could also be the case in the south curtain wall as the fraise approached the main entrance way. It may have to be elevated to the superior slope in order to clear the drawbridge and gateway.

There are several written accounts after the American occupation mentioning a fraise at Fort Stanwix.115 There are no drawings or powder horn engravings from this period that show the fraise; therefore, the position of the fraise along the rampart wall is conjectural.

At the present, it can be assumed that the fraise will be placed about 12 inches below the sole of the gun embrasures. This location will permit sod to be laid on the soles of the embrasures and will keep the fraise concealed within the ramparts. The fraise was probably elevated to the level of the superior slope over the main entrance way and sally port.

The fraise should be constructed from pointed poles (without the bark) about five inches in diameter, spaced 5 to 6 inches apart, and project beyond the rampart walls seven feet. The overall length of the fraise will depend upon how the poles are secured in place. After cutting and shaping
of the pointed ends are completed, the poles should be pressure treated.

Q. Gates

GATE, in a military sense, is made of strong planks with iron bars to oppose an enemy. They are generally made in the middle of the curtain, from whence they are seen and defended by the 2 flanks of the bastions. They should be covered with a good ravelin, that they may not be seen or enfiladed by the enemy. The palisades and barriers before the gates within the town are often of great use.\textsuperscript{116}

Most military posts observed a regular routine in the opening and closing of gates, which was usually outlined very thoroughly in the military handbooks.\textsuperscript{117}

Outer Gate

The outer gate was also referred to as a barrier or “picket” gate and was usually constructed as part of the palisades or picket wall that surrounded the ramparts. The pickets of the gate were generally spaced three to four inches apart and were held in place by an upper and lower horizontal rail and diagonal strut. Outer gates were either made singly or in double sections hinged to side posts.\textsuperscript{118} Most outer gates were secured with one or more horizontal wood bars slipped into staples or the like. Additional locks would be used, either a chain and padlock or an iron rim lock with a keeper.

A picket gate such as the one described above was probably used at Fort Stanwix. Crown Maps Nos. 99 and 101 both indicate where the outer gate was located in the picketed redan. Unfortunately, the symbol for a gate does not appear on either plan so there is no way of knowing whether it was built singly or in double sections. Crown Map No. 102 also has outer gate posts shown near the crest of the parapet cutting through the glacis southeast of the ravelin. Again no gate symbol is shown but one can assume that a gate was hung in this location.

The Americans found Fort Stanwix without a gate in 1776,\textsuperscript{119} but by August 27 of that year gates had been erected.\textsuperscript{120} While it is uncertain where these gates were located, word association of “pickets and gate” suggests one gate made of pickets was erected.

A garrison order written in the Willett Orderly Book on September 2, 1777, states:

The out Gates to be shut at Dusk on beating the Long Roll. . . . The Keys of the Gates to be delivered to the Captain of the Day as soon as Tattooe beating is over, who is to be careful in observing that the Gates are well locked. . . .

On September 20, 1777, another garrison order read:

The Piquet Gates are to be shut at Dusk & the inner Gates of the Fort immediately after Tattooe beating and not to be Open’d untill the Revalle is beat, nor the Piquet Gates untill the seating of the Troop in the Morning—which is to beat at Sun Rise.

Still another garrison order issued on November 3, 1777, reads:

Order’d that the outside Gates be shut every Time for the future by dusk in the Evening and not be Open’d till Roll call in the Morning, at all Times the Guards are to parade before the Gates are Open’d.

Based upon the foregoing information, it is proposed to place a picket gate in the picket line running around the ravelin in order to close off the roadway entrance into the fort. The pickets used in the outer gate should be five to six inches in diameter, seven feet long, pointed at the top and spaced 31/2 to 4 inches apart. The pickets should be nailed to two horizontal rails and a diagonal strut partly let in. The nails should also be driven through the strap hinges mounted to the rails and clinched on the outside. The gate should be built in two five foot sections and hung on oversize pickets. Two horizontal wood bars are proposed for obstruction purposes in addition to a chain which should be threaded around the pickets of the gate, the hinge post, and the horizontal bar, and then padlocked in place.

Ravelin Gate

Although no ravelin gates are mentioned as such, from a military point of view it would be desirable to have a solidly planked gate hung in the passageway through the ravelin opposite the outer picket gate.\textsuperscript{121} When this inner gate was closed it would protect the stairway entrance to the gun platforms overhead. This gate would be constructed in a manner similar to the main gate discussed below.
Main Gate

The writer is almost certain that there were main gates located within the passageway through the ramparts. The most conclusive proof of this that we have is found in a garrison order dated November 23, 1780: “... and the Brass Field Piece, is to be placed in the Center of the parade opposite the Gate. ...” The Willett Orderly Book mentions on September 20, 1777, an inner fort gate but it is less definitive as to its location: “The Piquet Gates are to be shut at Dusk & the inner Gates of the Fort immediately after Tattooe beating. . . .”

A number of existing forts built after the Revolution have two sets of doors located within the main passageway. Some of these are: Fort McHenry, Md.; Forts Warren, Independence, and Pickering, Mass.; and Fort Ontario, N.Y. (although the second set was never hung, there were provisions made for this action). The stone blockhouse built near the entranceway to Fort Niagara was equipped with two sets of gates in 1770. While this may not be conclusive proof that double sets of gates were used at Fort Stanwix, we can be reasonably sure that one set of gates was hung. The writer assumes that the proposed drawbridge would serve the same purpose as the second set of gates when it was raised against the outside wall of the ramparts.

When the main entrance way and bridge area was excavated in 1972, 97 handwrought nails were found, concentrated primarily in two areas located under the proposed drawbridge. There were two kinds of nails, clinched and straight, with chisel points and somewhat of rose head. The majority of nails (63) were clinched over between 6½ inches and 7 inches in length. Those nails were probably used in the construction of the main gate which would, in effect, make each leaf of the gate 7 inches thick.

A smaller T-strap hinge was also found in the Beauséjour excavation, suggesting that a wicket door was built into one leaf of the main gate. Wicket doors provided access through the main gate and at the same time provided more security for the fort by allowing the main gates to remain closed. At least two other accounts have been found of wicket doors used in the 18th century fortifications.

The following construction is proposed for the main gates: planks 3½ inches thick should be used, with leaves approximately 6 feet 3 inches wide and 10 feet high, composed of two layers of plank held together by nails clinched through on six inch intervals; a wicket door, 24 inches X 48 inches, should be cut into one leaf and the main leaves hung with “U” shaped strap hinges, measuring 3¼ inches X 4½ inches ± 5 feet 3 inches. The wicket door should be hung with a pair of “T” strap hinges and furnished with sliding metal dead bolts. Two wooden bars should be used to secure the main gates after they are closed and a large iron rim lock should be mounted on the interior of the main gate.

Sally Port Gate

A single picket gate is proposed for the gap shown in the redan which protects the sally port. This gate should be constructed from 6 inches diameter pickets held together by two rails and a diagonal strut, and should be hung to the side picket post by strap hinges. This gate should be barred and secured with a chain and padlock much like the outer picket gate.

R. Gate Locks

Some sort of locks were used on the gates at Fort Stanwix. An entry in Willett’s Orderly Book on September 2, 1777, reads: “The Keys of the
Gates to be delivered to the Captain of the Day as soon as Tattooe beating is over, who is to be carefull in observing that the Gates are well locked. . . .” A garrison order issued by the 4th New York Regiment on November 27, 1780, reads: “. . . the Command expects that the Officers Appointed for Duty will be Very Circumspect in Examining the works, Gate Locks, and Everything Which may come under their Inspection. . . .”

Six or more keys, two of which were small (padlock?) keys, were uncovered in the excavation. One of these smaller keys was found at the ravelin passageway and one near the redan of the sally port, which tends to support the theory that padlocks were used on the outer picket gates. One seven inch key was found in the trench fronting the ravelin and appears to have been made for a large iron rim lock which would had to have been mounted on a reasonably smooth surface such as that of the plank gates proposed for the passageway through the ravelin and ramparts (the main gates). As a result of these discoveries it is proposed to use large iron rim locks on the ravelin gates and the main gates, and a smaller iron rim lock on the east door to the sally port passageway. In most instances small wood cased stock locks could be substituted for the iron rim locks. In fact the wooden stock lock would be more appropriate on the doors opening into bombproofs where powder might be stored.

S. Glacis

The glacis is that part of the sloping earthworks built outside the ditch surrounding the ramparts. The purpose of the glacis was to provide a long uninterrupted section of ground which faced the fortifications, was easily observable by the sentries, and was capable of being covered by gunfire from within.

Only one section of the glacis was located during the excavation work. The parapet of the glacis started ten feet away from the counterscarp of the ditch and rose to a height of six feet at an angle of 40°. From the crest of the parapet the earth was gradually sloped down to the original ground level in a distance of 75 feet (as scaled off Crown Map No. 102).

In the early plans of Fort Stanwix, the glacis is shown only on three sides of the fort: north, west, and south. The engineers apparently selected this site because the land to the east dropped off some 19 feet to the lowlands fronting the banks of the Mohawk River, and this sharp drop-off of land eliminated the need for a glacis on the east side of the fort. Plans drawn in 1764 show that the glacis terminated in a blunt end as it reached the tips of the northeast and southeast bastions.

The glacis was also built around the salient angle of the ravelin that protected the main entrance to the fort. A roadway was cut through the glacis on the southeast side of the salient angle to provide the only means of access into the fort other than the sally port.

A secondary glacis was constructed around the small triangular redoubt protecting the sally port and scaled about 32 feet in width off the north and south flanks of the picket line (Crown Map No. 102). The parapet or scarp of the glacis began at the top surface of the interior earth banquette and rose 4½ feet in height at an angle of 40°.

According to the notes found on Crown Map No. 102, the scarps and covered way were sodded. After the glacis has been built up with earth, it is proposed to sod its scarp (or parapet) and seed the remaining ground.

T. Guardhouse

This building stood on the left or west side of the main entrance gate on the parade ground, but no physical evidence of the structure was found during the archeological work. The first known written reference to a guardhouse at Fort Stanwix is that found on October 6, 1776:

“The Colonel expects for the future the relief will turn out without so much noise, as every one is to keep at the guard house and turn out at the first call.”

The above garrison order is interpreted as specifying a guardhouse where the change of guard stays while on duty, not where prisoners are confined.

The second mention of a guardhouse is early in 1777 in an engineer’s report to General Gates: “. . . has made a guard house at the entry of the Fort which before his arrival was behind.” This report suggests that a new guardhouse was erected at the entry to the fort possibly in the same location as that shown on the various post-siege
maps and powder house—that is, on the west or left hand side of the main entrance.

It is not clear how the new guardhouse was used. According to Willett's Orderly Book, kept for the 3rd N.Y. Regiment, the building was used in part for confining soldiers who were sentenced by the military court. During the occupation of Fort Stanwix by the 4th and 2nd N.Y. Regiments, sometime between November 20, 1780, to June 10, 1781, soldiers under sentence were apparently confined to one of the bombproofs. The explanation for this change in usage might be attributed to the burning of the guardhouse in April 1780 and the rebuilding of a new structure within two weeks time. Perhaps the new guardhouse was too small to confine soldiers and still provide room for those on guard duty.

The pictorial evidence found on the James McGraw powder horn has been used as the basis for the design of the exterior of the guardhouse:

1. Foundation dimensions of the main building should be 16 feet x 20 feet; dimensions of the west lean-to, 8 feet x 12 feet. (Conjectural measurements.)
2. The building should be frame, utilizing post and sill construction; walls should be covered with weatherboards and the gable roof with wood shingles; there should be a central chimney in the main building and a single end wall chimney in the lean-to; wood sleepers should be used for underpinning (based in part on the powder horn).
3. There should be three exterior doorways with board and batten doors; five windows with outside shutters (based in part on the powder horn); and two interior doors.
4. As suggested by the location of the central chimney, the interior of the main guardhouse should be divided into two rooms separated by a double fireplace, while the lean-to would consist of one room with a fireplace against the west wall. The powder horn shows a gabled roof over the lean-to which is a determining factor when figuring the width and height of the addition.
5. The interior room finish should be similar to that of the barracks, with the walls and ceilings lined with unpainted horizontal boards. Each room should have a fireplace and lighting should be furnished by candles. The floor should be covered with wide floor boards, and planed and face nailed with "L" or "T"-headed, handwrought nails. There should be access to an attic room (probably a wall ladder and trap door were used) according to the description available of the guardhouse fire in 1780. See footnote No. 133.
6. The use of eave troughs is recommended for catching rainwater and diverting it into rain barrels.

**U. Headquarters Building**

No remains of this building were found during the excavation period, but two written references to the headquarters have been found, in addition to the six drawings. The exterior appearance, at least on the south and east walls, is based on the McGraw powder horn drawing and should be as follows:

1. Foundation dimensions of 20 feet x 56 feet with a lean-to 10 feet x 14 feet (conjectural measurements).
2. It should be a frame building with a gable roof and two chimney stacks as shown on the powder horn. (See Item No. 2 under East Barracks.) Sleepers should be set directly on the ground for the underpinning.
3. There should be four doorways into the main building and one doorway into the lean-to along the south wall as shown on the powder horn.
4. No windows are shown on the powder horn drawing but there is mention of closing windows in the Gansevoort's dining room. Two window openings equipped with board and batten shutters are proposed for each room.
5. The interior room arrangement is conjectural. The chimney stacks suggest four rooms in this building: one room for the commandant, one for the officer second in command, one dining room doubling as a staff room, and one room for two staff officers. The lean-to room could have one or more uses: for wood storage and an officers' privy: for lodging of an orderly assigned to the commandant (although it is not heated); or for storage of supplies for the staff officers.
6. The interior room finish is conjectural, but as suggested for the barracks building, the walls and ceilings could be lined with horizontal boards; hand planed and unpainted. Perhaps the wall posts and ceiling beams (summers) could also be encased with smoothed boards having a small
beaded edge. Closets should be provided in these rooms on one side of the chimney stack at least. Lighting should be furnished by candles and lanterns.

(7) The use of eave troughs to catch rainwater is recommended.

V. Hospital

HOSPITAL, a place appointed for the sick and wounded men, provided with a number of physicians, surgeons, nurses, servants, medicines, beds, &c.

Regimental-Hospitals are frequently in barns, stables, graneries, and other out-houses... 137

The first mention after 1758 138 of a hospital at Fort Stanwix is in 1776: “Visited the sick in their old lousy hospital, which represents such a scene of wretchedness that one could hardly bear to behold the abject souls therein confined.” 139

Another reference to a hospital was found on June 2, 1777: “No provisions to be issued to the Sick belonging to the Hospital but by the Orders of the Surgeon.” 140

It is thought that the southwest bombproof served as a temporary hospital during the siege of the fort. Colbrath’s Dairy reads on August 22: “While they were out the woman that was wounded with a shell last Night was brought to Bed in our S W Bomb proof of a Daughter She and child are like to do well with the Blessing of God.” 141

Copies of two returns list the sick in the garrison at Fort Stanwix for March and April of 1778. The March return lists 10 men sick in the “Hospital” and 22 men sick and confined to quarters. 142

The April term lists 8 men sick in the “Garrison Hospital,” 12 sick in “Genl. Hospital,” and 22 men sick in Quarters. 143

A garrison order for 1781 reads in part: “The Drummers and Fifers are ordered to practise in the old hospital from the hours of ten in the morning till twelve O’clock, and from three in the Afternoon till four, when not on Duty, Sundays excepted.” 144

The post-siege “Gansevoort May of Fort Stanwix” shows a building marked “Hospital” standing at the foot of the glacis opposite the southeast bastion. It appears that this is the only building that can be positively identified as a hospital. The 1778 return for the sick lists a garrison hospital and a general hospital. More information is needed on the period of fort occupancy from 1776-1781 before areas within the fort can be designated as hospital rooms.

W. Laboratory

LABORATORY, signifies the Place where the Fire-Works and Bombardeers prepare their Stores. 145

Laboratory and armory were terms used interchangeably by the military engineers. They denoted a place where bullets were molded, mortar shells and grenades filled and fuses prepared. The deFleury map is our only source of documentation that uses the word laboratory, referring in the legend to a “G-Laboratory” which occupied part of the west barracks. Other than a brick hearth, no evidence was found during the excavations to support the statement that a laboratory was located in this building.

More conclusive evidence was found in the southwest bombproof where sprue was uncovered at the floor level. A laboratory could also have been located in the southwest casemate, where there was a hard packed clay floor and a centrally located double fireplace, both useful in the manufacture of musket balls, etc.

Lacking sufficient evidence, the archeologists have not been able to designate any particular area or room as a laboratory. Perhaps more evidence will be found at a later date to substantiate its location.

X. Merlon

MERLON, in fortification, that part of the parapet which is terminated by 2 embrasures of a battery, so that its height and thickness are the same with those of the parapet. It serves to cover those on the battery from the enemy, and is better when made of earth, well rammed and beat close, than of stone, because these fly about, and wound those it should defend. 146

The construction of merlons is discussed under the headings Embrasures and Parapet.

Y. Mess

“The men of each Company should be divided into messes, each mess consisting of four or six men, or according to the number in each room...” 147

The practice of dividing soldiers up into small groups or messes, in which each man would take
his turn cooking, continued after the Revolution. Provisions were issued one day each week to the garrison. Food was cooked in the fireplaces and the men were expected to eat their meals in the barracks. Each room was to be provided with 2 iron pots, 2 trammels, 1 pair tongs, 1 wood axe, 1 iron candlestick, 1 table, 2 benches and 1 bucket.

The officers were assigned "waiters" who were responsible for cooking their food, which was probably prepared for most of the officers in the barrack room where each of the "waiters" was assigned. The Commandant and his top staff members probably ate together in a dining room located in the headquarters building.

Iron pots with bails and "S" shaped hooks were found in the excavations. Although no trammels were found, the pots and hooks uncovered imply that trammels were used to suspend the iron pots over a fire. All fireplaces should have an iron bar placed across their throat from which to hang cooking utensils.

Z. Necessary

One, if not two, necessaries appear on the initial plan of Fort Stanwix drawn in 1758. The smallest of the 19 buildings shown no the parade ground is interpreted as being an officers' privy. It is located near the center of the small "huts" built "for officers" and is drawn with a floor plan similar to that of the second necessary, that is, with a seat containing two holes. The structure may have lasted until c. 1764, when the interior fort buildings were removed and two new barracks and possibly a headquarters building were constructed. None of the other plans drawn during the British occupation of 1758-c. 1772 record the existence of a necessary.

The second necessary shown on the plan of 1758 is the one of greater concern. Although its existence is not recorded in other plans dated between 1758 and 1764, this structure could have very easily survived the nineteen-year span from 1758 to 1777 without a great deal of deterioration. This is because the structure was built completely above the ground where little rotting would occur and secondly, it would have been important for the garrison to keep this particular building in good repair. Even though the British army dismantled its regular garrison at Fort Stanwix in 1767, two or more soldiers were stationed here as late as 1771, and probably gave some attention to the maintenance of this building.

The 1758 plan shows this necessary as projecting beyond the east rampart wall of the southeast bastion. The building scales 12 feet × 22 feet and it was apparently divided into two compartments, possibly for use by both officers and soldiers. Included in the same drawing is an elevation view of the structure that shows it to have been built 20 feet above the ground and reached by a footbridge, scaling 7 feet wide and 58 feet long.

The colonial draftsman does not provide enough information in his drawing to make it possible to distinguish if the structure was of squared logs or frame construction. It appears to have had a bombproof ceiling constructed of planks about eight inches thick. The only indications of wall and roof construction are the double lines drawn at the two building corners and those drawn parallel to the roof slope. They could mean that the walls, including the gable ends, were constructed of squared logs, or that the building was framed in the traditional way using the sill, post, and girt system. If the walls were built with squared logs, the artist has failed to show the dovetail jointing at the corners that appears in the accompanying casemate drawing. Yet if the ceiling was bombproof it would seem logical that the walls were made equally as strong. This was the construction method used when the sally port passageway was built in c. 1764. It seems to be a matter of choice between log and frame construction.

At the base of the necessary, a small run of water was apparently diverted from one of the nearby prevailing streams and channeled directly under the structure to provide a continuous flushing away of human discharge. During the siege of 1777, the British managed to block off this stream of water and probably prevented the use of the necessary, even possibly to the point of destroying it.

Three weeks after the siege ended, another necessary was ordered to be built within the fort. Soldiers were forbidden to use the "Necessary House within the Fort in the day time, the one in the Ditch being designed for that Purpose." While this garrison order does not explicitly refer
to the elevated necessary, it does suggest that there was one located outside the rampart walls.

At least three documented sources exist that either suggest or prove that an elevated privy existed after the siege. The most conclusive evidence on hand is a perspective plan drawing of Fort Stanwix executed some time after the siege. An elevated structure connected by a footbridge to the east rampart wall of the southeast bastion is identified as a "Necessary House." The drawing shows a much longer and more complicated bridge structure than does the plan of 1758, and the privy itself has just a simple shed roof. This difference could mean a second construction.

The James Wilson powder horn, dated between November, 1778, and November, 1780, also shows an elevated necessary projecting off the same bastion. Like the post-siege drawing mentioned above, it shows a long footbridge, but the privy building is drawn with a gable roof, not a shed roof. Both drawings depict two doorways which indicates the interior was divided into two compartments. The powder horn carving reveals another significant feature—a sentry box located near the entrance to the footbridge. All soldiers using the necessary after 9 p.m. were required to identify themselves to the sentry on duty. This garrison order would not have been needed if the privy had been located on the parade ground.

There is precedent in military fortifications for building necessary houses beyond the protection of the rampart walls. Early French fortifications in Europe were commonly built with latrines overhanging the exterior walls, as was Fort Chartres, the French built fortification located in the Illinois country. One early English built fort having a necessary overhanging the parapet was William and Mary, erected in 1705, and two elevated necessaries having an almost identical appearance to the ones built at Fort Stanwix were located at Fort Edward (1756) and at Saratoga (1757).

AA. Parade

The parade within a fort is the open area where troops are assembled for mounting guard, for exercising, for reviewing the guard, for inspecting arms, for holding divine services, or for witnessing the execution of punishment. Artificers were also assembled on the parade and at times parleys were held there with the Indians. During 1778, provisions were stacked on the parade ground for want of room elsewhere.

It is probable that a gun platform existed on the parade ground prior to and during the siege, which would accommodate the three pound field piece that was used on the two or more sallies from the fort. In 1780 a new platform was directed to be built for the brass field piece. In part, the garrison order read:

Cap' Moody will Guard the Magazine by his men. and the Brass Field Piece, is to be placed in the center of the parade opposite the Gate. . . .

Capt Moody will apply to M' Tucker for to have a platform made for the Brass field piece in the place Directed.

Other features that must have been located on the parade ground were two or more wells and a whipping post. The exact locations of these features were not found during the excavation work but there is a possibility that they may be uncovered when construction work strips off the present topsoil down to parade ground level.

On or more necessaries were located on the parade ground either during the siege or shortly thereafter. The archeologists have identified one excavation near the center of the parade as a necessary pit.

The parade ground level has been established by the archeologists as 451.00 feet. As best as can be judged, its top surface was the hard packed alluvial soil found at the site.

BB. Parapet

Parapet, in fortification, is a part of the rampart of a work, of 18 or 20 feet broad, and raised 6 or 7 feet above the rest of the rampart: it serves to cover the troops placed there to defend the work against the fire of the enemy.

The first parapet at Fort Stanwix was built around the northwest bastion. It was constructed of two walls of squared timbers, twenty feet wide, held together by cross ties and filled with earth topped off with sod to a height of 5 feet 6 inches. The parapet in this instance was just an extension of the basic log cribbing built from the ground upward. This same construction shows up in a cross section through the sally port that was drawn in 1764, except that here the height of the parapet
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scales seven feet. A fraise is shown fixed to the top of the parapet.172

Without any construction drawings of the fort after 1764, it can only be assumed that the Americans would build their parapets in the same manner as their former British compatriots. In late April 1777, Capt. de Lamarquise wrote that “He proposes to raise the parapet with cedar. . . .”173 Willett, writing from Fort Dayton on August 11, 1777, stated: “On the enemy’s arrival before the fort the parapet was still uncompleted and for several days and nights the garrison labored at this task as best it could. . . .”174 In Willett’s Narrative (1831), he speaks of the engineer placing pickets having framed portholes “opposite the neck of the embrasures.”175 This statement would imply that part of the parapet was constructed and possibly completed before the siege began.

The “Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix” shows embrasures in the bastions and curtain walls. Since this plan was completed after the siege, it is less reliable as to the condition of the fort prior to August 22. The powder horns owned by Thomson and McGraw show embrasures, again indicating the existence of a parapet.

Because of a lack of conclusive evidence concerning the parapets during the siege, it is recommended that the fort be presented in its completed condition. This would mean raising the log cribbed walls of the ramparts six feet above the terreplein. Their thickness should correspond with that of the log cribbing below (from ten to twenty feet). The logs should be flatted on the upper and lower surfaces, half-lapped and pegged at the splices, but dovetailed at the intersection with the cheek walls of the embrasures. The top surface or superior slope should then be covered with sod.

CC. Pickets

Pickets were used to prevent the enemy foot soldier from having direct access to the rampart walls. Pickets at Fort Stanwix were first placed in the center of the ditch in 1758. In 1764 when repair work was done on the ditch, the pickets were left in the bottom of the ditch except along the east side of the fort, where they were placed on the berm.176

In 1777, the French engineer assigned to the works by General Schuyler decided that the proper place for the pickets was on the covered way. Willett’s Narrative carries a running account of the difficulty encountered by the engineer in carrying out his plans. Ultimately, the engineer was relieved of his post as a result of his miscalculations.177

Good documentary evidence exists that the pickets still stood on the covered way in 1781 when the fort was destroyed,178 although the post-siege deFleury map is the only plan available of the fort that shows the picket line standing here. It even has one questionable feature—the covered way and pickets are shown encircling all four sides of the fort. However it is doubtful that a covered way was ever built on the east side.

In 1862, a newspaper article was written describing Fort Stanwix. In part it states that the east side of the fort was “not protected by earthworks; but instead three rows of pickets, ten to 12 feet in length and sharpened at the top were placed in the ground. . . .” The article continues on to describe the blockhouse that was built in 1792.179 It is probable that the picketed east wall, if it ever existed, was built at the same time as the blockhouse. No evidence of a three row palisade was found within the limited amount of ground excavated on the east side of the fort.

The picket line of 1758 was located in the bottom of the ditch on the north side of the fort where the butt ends of forty-one pickets have been found lined up near the center of the ditch. The diameters of the pickets varied between 6 and 12 inches while the most common spacing between post was found to be 6 inches.

The archeologists did not find any evidence of the picket line built in 1777, although a short section of the covered way was exposed opposite the southeast bastion. The only clue found that indicated where the picket line might have stood on the covered way was a trench, 2.5 feet deep, dug at the base of the scarp to the glacis. The archeologists believe that this trench represents the location of the palisade.

According to Willett’s Narrative, the length of the pickets was 10 feet.180 This would leave 7.5 feet of the post extending above the ground, minus whatever amount was axed to form a point on the end. This would place the tip of the picket about 12 inches above the glacis, a height comparable to that shown in Section A-B on Crown Map No. 102.

Section A-B also shows the method used in 1764 of setting up a picket line. In this particular
drawing, the section is taken through the center line of the redoubt at the east end of the sally port. The pickets measure $5\frac{1}{2}$ feet high, are spaced approximately six inches apart, and have a horizontal ribband attached to them at a distance of $1\frac{1}{2}$ feet below their pointed tips. The pickets may have been notched to receive the ribband which was either nailed or pegged to each post.

Eleven of the pickets used to form the redoubt were found in a location very similar to that shown on the 1764 plan. They measured about six inches in diameter and were placed at random intervals ranging from three to six inches apart. This irregular spacing suggests that the pickets were placed in a trench one at a time rather than erected in a pre-fabricated panel. It should be noticed in the engineer's drawing that the tops of the pickets are shown at a uniform height above the ground and about 12 inches above the crest of the glacis scarp.181

While the pickets of the sally port redoubt were found to have random spacing, the archeologists believe (based on evidence found during excavation of the 1758 picket line) that the pickets placed on the covered way were spaced more uniformly at six inches.

It is proposed to place the picket line on the covered way around three sides of the fort—north, south, and west—while along the east side the pickets should be placed on the berm as shown on Crown Map No. 103. The pickets should consist of ten foot long, peeled poles, 6 to 8 inches in diameter, with one end sharpened to a point with an axe. They should be spaced approximately six inches apart and held in place with a $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches X 6 inches ribband let into the post $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet above the ground. The ribband should be rough sawn, showing vertical saw marks, and should be fastened to each picket with a treenail. Pickets, treenails, and ribband should all be pressure treated to the point of refusal after cutting and fitting is completed. The pickets should be placed in a vertical position rather than inclined.

DD. Platforms

Crown Map No. 101 is the only known drawing that shows the type of gunnery platforms used at Fort Stanwix. It indicates that six gun platforms were built in each bastion during 1759, although in the preceding year General Stanwix had ordered a total of 40 iron guns, 8 mortars, and 2 howitzers to be sent to the fort. A note added to this ordnance demand lists 8 embrasures in each bastion and 3 embrasures in two of the curtain walls, making a total of 38 pieces.182 It is unlikely that the fort was ever equipped with such a formidable arsenal.

Crown Map No. 102, drawn in 1764, has a reference note that reads: "The Bastions 1 and 2 are compleatly finished, at the others, Platforms must be laid also the Banquets made." No information is given as to whether the platforms were to be made for cannon or mortars. If platforms had been built in 1759, as stated, and needed replacing by 1764, the life expectancy of the exposed woodwork was only 5 years.

It is believed that the roofs of the casemates were intended to be utilized as gun platforms. If one examines the plans of 1758 and c. 1759, a cross section through the casemate and curtain wall can be seen which shows the roof sloped down toward the parapet. If there was no intention of using the top surface of the casemates as gun platforms, it would seem likely that the roof slope would pitch slightly away from the parapet to permit drainage of water. The ordnance list mentioned above indicates that two of the curtain walls were to have three embrasures.

Again, if we examine Crown Map No. 103, dated 1764, which looks very much like a field drawing, embrasures are shown in all of the curtain walls. On Crown Map No. 102, also dated 1764, a section drawn through the east curtain wall and sally port shows the casemate roof (level rather than sloped) at the same height above the ground as in 1758. In 1764, all of the casemates are described as "in very bad order and mostly irreparable."

The ravelin protecting the main gate and bridge area is shown in 1764 as having embrasures built into its parapet wall.

It appears to have a continuous wood platform built around its inner salient angle with a stairway shown at the north end. Very little information is available on the ravelin or "salient angle" prior to or after the siege of August 1777.

On November 24, 1780, Captain Moody, officer in charge of the artillery, was instructed "to have a platform made for the Brass field piece . . . placed in the Center of the parade opposite the Gate. . . ."183 The placement of a field piece on the parade ground pointing toward the main gate
seems to have been a standard procedure carried out by most military posts. There was probably a platform built in this same location soon after the occupation of the fort in July 1776; certainly by the time of the siege in 1777, a platform must have existed on which to station the field piece used in the sallies outside the fort on August 2 and 6.\(^{184}\)

Gun platforms were still in use at Fort Stanwix in 1781 when a garrison order was issued to the officers "... to not suffer their men to incumber the platforms or alarm posts in the Bastions."\(^{185}\)

The construction of gun platforms is well described in several military dictionaries of the 18th and early 19th centuries.\(^{186}\)

Platforms were of two kinds—"common platforms for gun batteries" and "platforms for mortar batteries"—both being built as separate units and spaced according to the directions of the engineer or artillerist in charge of the works.

A few military posts were planned with solidly built platforms, in addition to these separately built platforms, but they were the exception rather than the rule.\(^{187}\)

Platforms were of two basic shapes; trapezoidal forms used for gun batteries, and square forms used for mortar batteries. There is no record of mortars being used at Fort Stanwix from June 16, 1776, through August 23, 1777, at which time four royals or mortars were captured from the retreating British Army.\(^{188}\) Therefore it is assumed that all of the platforms built in the bastions would have been trapezoidal in shape and used exclusively for guns.

Dimensions given for gun platforms vary somewhat in the military dictionaries, but generally they were 18 feet long, 8 feet wide along the short side near the embrasure, and 15 feet wide at the opposite end. They consisted of five basic parts: sleepers, stakes, the heurtoir, planks, and battery nails.

The average sizes for these various component parts are as follows: (1) sleepers, 6 inches square, 18 feet long, held in place by wooden stakes driven on each side of each piece at both ends, then cut off flush with the top surface of the sleeper; (2) the heurtoir, 8 inch square, 8 feet long, laid on top of the sleepers against the embrasure; (3) oak plants, 2½ inches thick ± ½ inch), 12 inches wide (±3 inches), and varying in length from 8 feet to 15 feet; (4) battery nails made from oak, 1½ inches (±½ inch) in diameter, tapered and about 9 inches long.

Five or more sleepers, laid in trenches, were used to support the planks. They were given a slope of 9 inches from the back of the platform down toward the embrasure, which afforded the proper amount of resistance to the gun recoil and prevented its rolling off the platform after firing. It also permitted the artillerists to move the gun carriage back into position when loading was completed. After the sleepers were properly sloped and staked, earth was rammed between the sleepers flush with the top surface. This prevented further movement of the platform and provided additional support under the planks in case the gun carriage had to be shifted off its directrix.

The heurtoir was placed directly over the sleepers and abutting the embrasure. The purpose of the heurtoir was to prevent the gun carriage wheels from damaging the parapet.

Oak planks were fastened directly to the sleepers, with battery nails or treenails (tapered wooden pins) used instead of iron spikes in order to prevent sparks from the ironbound carriage wheels. Ends of the planks were cut on a bias conforming to the angular shape of the sleepers. Earth was then tamped around the edges and ends of the planks to give a smooth surface to the platforms and terreplein.

Wherever it was found necessary to make an embrasure oblique, the platform was so placed that its center line would fall under the directrix of the oblique embrasure. One end of the heurtoir was moved away from the embrasure and fixed with stakes, and then the space between the embrasure and the heurtoir was filled with rammed earth.\(^{189}\)

The earth between the platforms must be smoothed over and if possible sloped to the rear of the battery. If this is not possible, then drainage must be provided at the base of the embrasure in the form of cesspools—shallow holes filled with stones, twigs, etc., into which surface water enters and is absorbed by the earth.\(^{190}\) Modern construction should incorporate a concealed catch basin and drainage system as an integral part of each cesspool.

Midway of the space between each platform and to the left side, a rack must be provided to hold the implements used to service each cannon. Two wooden frames, placed 9 feet apart, should be constructed consisting of two stakes, 2½ feet long, driven about a foot into the ground and crossing
EE. Ramp

RAMPs, in fortification, are sloping communications, or ways of very gentle ascent, leading from the inward area, or lower part of a work, to the rampart or higher part of it.102

Ramps were usually constructed of earth, then covered with sod to prevent erosion. They were used principally in the throats of bastions where their sloping surface provided the easiest way of moving cannon in and out of the bastions. Ramps also provided an unobstructed path for the artillerymen to move from parade ground level to their gunnery positions on the terreplein. Earthen banquette required ramps as the most practical and economical way of stabilizing the soil from which they were built.

Symbols for ramp construction at the bastions are shown on Crown Maps Nos. 99, 100, and 101, for 1758 and 1759. All the ramps are depicted as occupying the full throat of the bastion except at the southeast bastion which contained a powder magazine and root cellar. The ramp here was built in the center of the throat between the entrance ways to these two features.

Only one ramp symbol is shown on Crown Map No. 102, drawn in 1764. None of the other plans, including the powder horn engravings, show ramps but it is assumed that they were used. The Americans apparently erected bombproof structures with long passageways in each bastion, thereby complicating the construction of the ramps up to the terreplein level. The proposed ramps will have to be built around the walls and ceilings of the bombproofs after they are finished.

If the sodded ramps start to erode after they are built, there are two ways of correcting this within the historical context: one method would be to corrugate the ramp with small poles 3 inches to 3½ inches in diameter; the second method would be to place small oval shaped stones in the ground 2 or 3 inches apart and permit grass to grow in between.

FF. Ramparts

By the 17th century, the high, fortified masonry walls and towers used in European defenses were giving way to lower but thicker earthen walls more easily defended against cannon fire. Ditches were dug around the exterior of the walls and various other protective devices were introduced that were intended to repel or impede the opposing army during its siege of the fortification. Changes were constantly required in all fortified works as the nature of attack shifted from the battering rams and engines to guns and mortars. Military handbooks that explained in detail the complexities of military warfare soon appeared in large numbers during the 18th century. Many of these handbooks were carried to America and immediately became the basic guide used in all fort construction. The classic textbook example of a fortification was, however, very rarely carried to its completion by the military engineer in America.

Fort Stanwix never required, in its construction, the complex geometrical designs and theorems or the application of mathematical equations as developed by Marshal de Vauban, Baron Coehorn, and other military experts. Instead, it was the product of many minds and many plans, and a result of the labor of many men.

Small military outposts, such as Fort Stanwix, depended upon ramparts as their primary means of protection against enemy attacks. Because the ramparts formed the principal line of defense, their composition can be broken down into individual component parts for study purposes. The ramparts for forming the four curtain walls and bastions can be divided into the terreplein, the banquette, the parapet, and the escarpe.

A study of the Crown Maps and other historical documents reveals that the rampart walls of Fort Stanwix from 1758 to 1767 were constructed of logs in filled with earth. The thickness of these walls varied from ten to twenty feet depending upon their degree of exposure to artillery fire. The thickest rampart walls were constructed along the north and west side of the fort which overlooked the land approach from the west. The thinner walls, built along the remaining part of the fort, faced lower and swampy ground to the south and east.

Three nearly vertical walls formed the ramparts. The two outer walls, spaced ten to twenty feet apart, were constructed of logs flatted
on their upper and lower surfaces and locked together with cross ties. This log work was built around the entire circuit of the fort’s bastions and curtain walls. The interior of this log cribbing was filled with soil taken from the ditch and thrown into the structure as the wall progressed in height. When the final wall height was reached, the summit was laid with sod to prevent erosion.

The third wall was constructed only along the four curtains. It was spaced another twenty feet away from the earth-filled cribbing and was also built of logs flatted on two sides. The resultant enclosed area formed the casemates that were intended to house 400 men. Transverse partitions were notched into the inner and outer walls to provide the necessary lateral stability needed to withstand the pressure exerted upon the wall by the weight of the terreplein roof or that of any cannon that might be mounted there. The roof of the casemates was formed of a double tier of squared timbers, each 12 inches thick and 20 feet to 22 feet long.

The ramparts of 1758 were constructed en barbette, that is, without a parapet. Additional work went ahead in July of 1759, resulting in a permanent wooden parapet with six gun embrasures around the northwest bastion on which the flagstaff was placed. In addition, the remaining ramparts were raised with a makeshift parapet consisting of weighted wooden barrels and sandbags. Wooden gun platforms were built in each of the four bastions and where the temporary parapet existed, embrasures were formed by leaving an opening between the barrels and sandbags. Apparently a fraise was built only around the northeast bastion, as the fraise detail appears in only one profile drawing.

Very little information is available to date on the activities of the British army stationed at Fort Stanwix after 1759. Some construction work must have been carried out each summer. Sir William Johnson, writing in 1761, states that “The fort [Stanwix] ... will require another summer to finish it.” Despite whatever work was done, the fort was in poor condition in 1764. The faces of the southeast and southwest bastions with their connecting curtain wall had rotted and were falling down. The failure of the east rampart walls was probably due in part to the periodic flooding of the Mohawk River. In any event, if we can believe another plan of Fort Stanwix prepared in 1764, some repair work was accomplished producing newly made bastions and curtain walls.

When the Americans occupied Fort Stanwix in 1776, they immediately began to repair and rebuild the fort using soldiers and “artificers of every kind.” Work was carried on with great diligence throughout August, until word arrived on the 30th that the British forces were no longer gathered at Oswego. After that date interest lagged among the garrison, leaving the burden of work up to the artificers.

The garrison became involved again in repair work during the spring of 1777, and after the third New York Regiment arrived under the command of Col. Gansevoort and Lt. Col. Willett, this activity continued at a steady rate from May until August. After the siege, several buildings were constructed for the garrison’s use outside the fort area, and these buildings are identified on the “Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix.” In the previous drawings mentioned, the foundation logs of the rampart walls were laid directly on the ground. Unfortunately, no outer foundation logs of the ramparts were uncovered during the archeological work. Undisturbed foundation timbers were found laid directly on the ground along the north and west walls of the north casemates.

The rampart walls were built in a pyramidal form. The outermost walls were begun with a log between three to four feet in diameter, flatted on the upper and lower surfaces. As each successive course of logs was laid up, their diameters got progressively smaller in size until the desired height of the rampart walls was reached. At Fort Stanwix the height of the ramparts along the curtain walls was determined by the height of the casemate roof (terreplein) plus six feet added on for the parapet. On the plan of 1759 the top surface of the terreplein scales 8 feet 9 inches above the ground at the parapet; six feet more gives a total height of 14 feet 9 inches to the crest of the parapet. Allowing a one foot drop for the superior slope, and exterior wall of the rampart should be 13 feet 9 inches above the elevation of the parade ground (451.00 feet) or 464.75 feet. This agrees very closely with the original specifications of 1758.

The rampart walls of the bastions, particularly of the northwest and southwest bastions, may have to be raised higher than the adjoining curtain walls due to the fact that the bombproofs were built...
above the parade ground level. In order to build these structures with adequate headroom (6 feet 9 inches) and a protective shell around them, the top surface of the terreplein will have to be at an elevation of 460.45 against the parapet. The crest elevation of a parapet, that is, with six more feet added on, comes to 466.45 feet in these two bastions.

**GG. Ravelin**

RAVELINS [or demi-lunes], in fortification: are works raised on the counterscarp before the curtain of the place, and serve to cover the gates of a town, and the bridges. They consist of two faces, forming a salient angle, and are defended by the faces of the neighbouring bastions.

A ravelin first appears at Fort Stanwix in 1764, and is shown on Crown Map No. 102. It was constructed on the west side of the ditch opposite the south curtain wall and took the place of an earlier picketed redan built in 1758. The purpose of the ravelin at this point was to protect the main entrance gate and the newly built bridge to the fort.

No sectional drawings are available showing the construction details of the ravelin. Instead, our interpretation of how the structure was built is derived by comparing its plan details with the plan and sectional details of the fort and the archeological evidence found at the site.

The proposed reconstruction plans make one major change in the ravelin of 1764, and that is to increase the salient angle from 75° to 110° and to extend the length of each face from 67 feet to 77 feet. This change was made to the 1764 plans by the archeologists after they uncovered a trench eight feet wide and approximately 50 feet long running in an east-west direction in the vicinity of the ravelin. The archeologists have used the longitudinal axis of the trench to establish the direction of the salient angle. They have also determined that the trench was located in the covered way at a point where the roadway passes through the southeast face of the ravelin. All of the British and American plans, without exception, are drawn with the roadway located within a few feet of this vicinity.

There is no positive information from the time of the American occupation on the condition of the ravelin before, during, or after the siege. Elmer's eyewitness account of 1776 reads in part: "The forth also has a sally port, covert way, bridge and ravelin before the main gate at the entrance." On June 15, 1777, Col. Gansevoort wrote General Schuyler that "The engineer at this place has just laid the foundation of the salient angle before the gate. . . ." Willett's Narrative of 1831 describes the construction of the ravelin in this manner: "The engineer had begun to erect a salient angle to the gate, with two embrasures in it." The plan of Fort Stanwix that accompanies Willett's Narrative shows a ravelin containing three embrasures—identical to what is shown on the plan of 1764.

The post-siege deFleury map, while too small to include significant details, not only shows a ravelin but a significant "horn work begun" around it. The Gansevoort Map shows only a salient angle where the ravelin stands. The powder horn engravings do not show the outer works.

It is proposed to reconstruct the ravelin much as it appears on the plans of 1764, but using the field evidence as submitted by the archeologists to determine the size and direction of the salient angle.

The walls of the ravelin should be constructed like the rampart walls, that is, with flattened logs formed in a cribbing, eleven feet wide at the base. The wall logs should be half lapped at the splices, but dovetailed joints should be used at the corners of the passageway and the flank or end walls. Cross ties should be let into the inner and outer log walls as the construction work progresses. These walls should be raised to provide enough head room for a rider mounted on a horse to pass through the ravelin.

A wood platform is shown on the 1764 plans, and it is proposed to reconstruct this feature along the re-entrant angle as shown in the 1764 plans, but with the length of the platform adjusted to the new dimensions established. It should be constructed from one tier of twelve-inch squared timbers supported by beams and posts and should be sloped eight inches down toward the parapet. The parapet should be raised six feet above the platform and banquettes built along the base of the parapet. One embrasure should be built into the southeast face and two embrasures built into the southwest face. A stairway is shown on the 1764 plans, located off the left or northwest side of the platform; this should be rebuilt in the proposed work.
No mention has yet been found of how the space under the ravelin platform was used, but it might have been a storage area for wagons, gun carriage wheels and parts, empty barrels, etc.; a sentry box; or even a small guardhouse.

The archeologists have determined that the elevation of the ravelin near its interior base is 448.00 feet or 2.6 feet lower than the bridge. The ground would have to be sloped from the bridge elevation of 450.60 feet down to the ground level of the ravelin and covered way. Ground gutters or drains would be required along the base of the ravelin, then would be turned through the passageway to empty into the ditch fronting the ravelin.

**HH. Sally Port**

SALLY-ports, in fortification, or postern-gates, as they are sometimes called, are those under-ground passages, which lead from the inner works to the outward ones; such as from the higher flank to the lower, or to the tenailles, or the communication from the middle of the curtain to the ravelin. When they are made for men to go through only, they are made with steps at the entrance, and going out. They are about 6 feet wide, and 8½ feet high. There is also a gutter or shore made under the sally-ports, which are in the middle of the curtains, for the water which runs down the streets to pass into the ditch; but this can only be done when there are wet ditches.²⁰⁵

A sally port was included in the earliest plans made for Fort Stanwix. It is shown midway in the east curtain wall as an open passageway, five feet wide, running perpendicular through the casemate than turning and continuing through the rampart wall at an angle of 21°.²⁰⁶

There is no indication on these plans of how the scarp wall was extended from the berm to the bottom of the ditch where a palisaded wall was located. Gate posts are shown in the palisaded wall opposite a covered way that led to a small stream where water was obtained for use within the fort.

During the interim, probably in 1764, a covered passageway, 10 feet wide, was constructed against the east entrance of the sally port.²⁰⁷ Starting at the log rampart wall, it descended the slope of the scarp by means of wooden steps, then extended eastward some 65 feet. A door located in the east end wall was protected by a small triangular shaped redoubt built from palisades. Earth was banked up against the sides of the passageway and extended around the redoubt to form a protective glacis.

On Crown Map No. 102, further details of the passageway can be seen in the transverse and longitudinal sections: the 12 inch thick beams forming the bombproof ceiling; the gable roof and 12 inch thick wall construction; the banquets and loopholes. A general idea of how the palisaded redoubt was constructed can be obtained by studying both plan and section. The drawings are done rather accurately at a scale of 20 feet to the inch.

Archeological evidence of the sally port found in 1972 compares favorably with the engineer’s drawing of 1764. This evidence suggested a structure 9 feet 6 inches wide and 60 feet long, with a wall thickness of approximately eight inches. Two additional posts were added to the passageway walls by the archeologists as a result of their interpretation of the underground remains. The passageway was built perpendicular to the rampart wall.

Evidence remaining from the log rampart and casemate wall construction in this vicinity was virtually non-existent. A short section of the sally port floor and walls was found in the rampart area starting at the berm at the 15° angle and extending as far as the center casemate wall. From this point the sally port seemingly took another turn at a 24° angle and extended to the front or west wall of the casemate. This apparent turn of the sally port midway through the rampart walls is based on the existence of a trench, four feet deep, which ran parallel to the excavated sally port remains in the outer wall.²⁰⁸ It is assumed that the trench and sally port ran somewhat parallel through the casemate and that a wooden box drain was laid in the bottom of the trench. The theory of a drain running under the sally port floor can be supported by directions given in military handbooks of the day.

The width of the passageway running through the casemate and rampart walls was found to have an inside dimension of four feet. The wall construction appears to be squared logs and evidence of ground sleepers indicates that the passageway was floored with planks.

The archeologists have determined that the four foot passage extended past the exterior rampart wall and into the covered passageway for a distance of 3 feet 6 inches, but no military application for this feature can be located.

Only the vaguest evidence of what might be
parts of four steps descending the scarp was found, and this was used to determine where the steps began. Ten steps are thought to have existed and this agrees with the number drawn on Crown Map No. 102. Each step had eight inch risers and 19 1/2 inch treads within a height of 6.64 feet and a horizontal distance of 14.67 feet. The lower two steps may have been cut away along the north wall to permit the sally port drain to enter the ditch above grade. The top of the drain butting the steps probably would have been covered with a board at this point rather than being left open. The drain continued along the north wall under the banquette for about 16 feet before penetrating the north wall at a slight angle as shown in the preliminary plans.

The 1764 section shows six loopholes cut through the side walls above the steps, so that obviously the steps were also utilized as firing platforms. These loopholes scale off the drawing approximately 4 inches X 16 inches on the exterior and 15 inches X 20 inches on the interior. The top surfaces were level while the interior sides splayed out and the bottoms splayed down.

A cross section drawn on the above plan shows that 24 inches wide banquets were built against both side walls of the lower passageway. Above the banquets at a height of about five feet off the floor a 10 inch space was left running the length of the passageway. Soldiers thrust their muskets through this space whenever it was necessary to enfilade the ditch. The drawing shows that the bottom of the wall opening slopes downward at the same angle as the earth embankment.

The roof structure of the c. 1764 passageway seems to have been constructed of rafters spaced four to seven feet apart and covered with boards. It is possible that the final roof covering was either exposed lapped boards or roof boards covered with shingles. Since the Americans were making shingles at Fort Stanwix in 1776, the latter theory seems more acceptable. Protection against leaks of the sloping roof which extends up the angle of the scarp presents a problem using either method of roof covering. By using shingles, however, the roof slope could be handled much like a valley, that is, the shingles could be swirled in the direction of the water runoff.

II. Scarp and Counterscarp

SCARP, in fortification, is the interior talus or slope of the ditch next the place, at the foot of the rampart. COUNTERSCARP, in fortification, is properly the exterior talus, or slope of the ditch, on the farther side from the place, and facing it. Sometimes the covertway and glacis are meant by this expression.

The scarp and counterscarp formed the sloping sides of the ditch surrounding the rampart walls. The term scarp was also applied to the interior slope of the glacis. Three distinct profiles of the scarp were found at the north, east, and south curtain walls, while three scarp profiles were measurable on the southeast, northeast, and northwest bastions. The scarp and counterscarp were also discernible under the main bridge. Only one counterscarp angle was measurable, on the west side of the fort ditch.

Small wood pickets or pegs, originally used to hold the cut sod in place as it was laid on the scarp and counterscarp, were found in the excavations on the north flank of the northwest bastion. They measured one inch in diameter and were placed about 12 inches on centers in horizontal rows spaced 1.0 to 1.8 feet apart. Sod would have been used on the scarps of the glacis surrounding the ditch and sally port.

In the fall of 1970, the archeologists laid sod on the flank of the northwest bastion as an experiment in durability. Now into its third winter, the sodded scarp seems to be holding its own. In the reconstruction work, it is proposed to sod the scarps, counterscarps and covered way, pegging them down in a manner similar to that of 1777. The angle of the scarp and counterscarp has been determined by the archeologists as a 40° slope.

J.J. Sentry Boxes

Pre-Revolution

The use of the sentry box, also called guérite or échauguettes, in fortifications predates the fourteenth century and may even go back to the beginning of warfare. In America, by the late 16th and early 17th centuries, the Spanish and French had already begun the construction of fortresses that incorporated the sentry box as a major element in their overall design. The English-settled town of Boston had authorized the “erecting of a wall or wharfe upon the flats [sic] before the town...” as a defense precaution as early as 1673. These de-
sentries became known as the "North and South Battery," and sentry boxes were built as an integral part of the masonry walls of these fortifications.215

A number of English-built forts were constructed along the coast of New England in the late 17th and early 18th centuries.216 Of particular interest was the fort built on the Piscataqua River in New Hampshire. One drawing of the fort labeled as "The Fort upon Great Island. . . ." dated 1699, shows sentry boxes standing on the atips of each bastion. Another undated drawing, identified as a "... Prospect Draft of Fort William & Mary on Piscataqua River. . . ." has listed in its explanation: "B. The new made Centry boxes."217 There seems little doubt that the early military engineers in America had universally adopted the methods of fortification as perfected by their European counterparts.

There were several military handbooks in use at the time of the American Revolution, of which some were more specific than others in describing the use, location, and method of constructing sentry boxes.218 Very little written information has been found about sentry boxes dating from this period. A number of sketches, spanning the period between 1673 and c. 1875, have been located that include the sentry box as part of the overall scene. One French draft, obtained from the Fortress of Louisbourg NHP, was especially helpful, although the drawing should be used with caution since its publishing date was 1739.219

Fort Stanwix

Only four references have been found to sentry boxes at Fort Stanwix. Fortunately these references date between early 1777 and January 8, 1781, and can be used as solid documentation supporting the conclusion that sentry boxes were used during the occupation of Fort Stanwix by the American colonists. The first known reference to sentry boxes is found in a letter written by the French engineer, Capt. B. De Lamarque to General Gates, probably in April 1777. It simply states that he [Lamarque] "has made sentry-boxes where necessary to keep centinels." 220 The second reference is found in the Willett Orderly Book which reads "The Superintendent of the Engineers Department will see that all the Centries Boxes are in good order and fix’d so as not to be blown down with every trifling wind." 221 The third reference is a drawing found on the James Wilson powder horn. Wilson was stationed at Fort Stanwix between November 1778 and November 1780; hence, it has been assumed that the engraving was done during this time.222 The fort plan is depicted in a very elementary form but the artist has shown five sentry boxes, one placed on each of the four bastions and the fifth located at the ravelin end of the main bridge.

The fourth reference to sentry boxes was found in the Orderly Books of the 4th New York Regiment. The entry, made on January 8, 1781, reads in part "A watch Coate will be furnished for Each Sentry Box on the Basteens [Bastions] for Which the Corp 1 of the Guard is to be Accountable." 223

Additional sentry boxes may have been furnished at other guard post positions. An Orderly Book entry written on April 11, 1781; reads:

The Command' observes some Irregularity in the duty of the Guards which he wishes to correct. The Sentinals on their posts after Tattoo beating are to call all is well once in a quarter of an Hour, but not till ordered, which order is to be Given by the officer of the Guard, to the Sergeant Who is to order Number one at the Guard house to call all is well, which call is to be answered distinctley in Rotation, as they are Numbered except the Sentinel at the Commanding officers door, who is not to answer, he is in case of an alarme to call the Commanding officer.224

An entry on the following day is as explicit:

The Sentinals without the gates are in case of an alarm are to shut and barr the outside gates and Remane their till further orders and not open the gates for any person Unless ordered by the Commanding officer the officer of the Day or officer of the Guard.225

The above several references are interpreted to mean that sentries were definitely placed at the guardhouse, on each of the four bastions, and just outside the Commandant's door. Other possible locations for posts would be at the sally port entrance and just beyond the outside gates. There is also a possibility that a guard room could have been built under the gun platform of the ravelin.

Construction of the Sentry Box

Only one military dictionary was found listing the dimensions for a sentry box: "They ought to be about six Foot high, and their Breadth three and
These dimensions are identical with the French drawn sentry box. Practically all of the roof shapes were found to be pyramidal, that is, with four sloping roof surfaces terminated at the peak with a finial. The roof covering was probably wood shingles swirled at the juncture of the hip angles. The walls were probably sheathed with one inch thick vertical boards nailed into a ground sill, a rail at mid-point and into the plate. One side of the sentry box would have been used as the entry and was possibly hung with a door which could be removed during the summer months. Small openings would be cut through the three side walls to permit the sentry to observe his post while under cover in inclement weather.

The French drawings of a sentry box show two methods of base frame construction. One method is to be used for a portable sentry box while the other method is to be used for a sentry box which might be exposed to the forces of a high wind. This latter method involves the addition of a perpendicular frame attached to the basic chassis and sunk underground. The latter type sentry box would be mounted on the exposed ramparts of the bastions.

**KK. Storehouse**

This building stood on the east or right-hand side of the main entrance gate on the parade ground, but no physical remains of this building were found during the archeological excavations. No reference has been found to a storehouse or commissary building being built at Fort Stanwix between July 13, 1776, and April 1777. In the engineer’s report of late April, he states that he “... has made a Small Store, to put provs under Cover.” By February 7, 1778, “... farmers Soldiers Officers & Others” were allowed to sell vegetables and other produce “brought to the Garrison...” On February 24, a garrison order was issued stating:

The Officer of the Day will see that there are no unnessary Lights in any of the Barracks, after Tattooe Beating, and the Serg. of the Different Squads see that the Men belonging to their Squads retire to their Births It is expected that the Sutler will Shut up his Shop and entertain no Company after the beating of the Tattooe.

The above order implies that a sutler was permitted to occupy shop space within the fort. Unfortunately, there is no known record of where the shop was located.

There are entries in the orderly book kept between 1780-81 at Fort Stanwix that imply a commissary was in use, but the wording is not explicit. Reconstruction will have to rely primarily upon the five contemporary drawings that show the identify this building. The so-called “Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix” identifies three of the five buildings standing on the parade ground, one of which is marked “Commissy House.” On another drawing of Fort Stanwix, apparently the original from which the Gansevoort Map was copied, the same building is marked Commiss'y Store.” The three powder horns all show a building comparable to the storehouse.

The design of the proposed storehouse is based on information interpreted from the drawing found on the McGraw powder horn of December 1777:

1. Foundation dimensions of the main building are 16 feet × 22 feet; two lean-tos of equal size are attached to the east and west ends, measuring 8 feet × 10 feet. (All are conjectural measurements.)

2. It is a frame building utilizing post and still construction; walls are covered with horizontal boards; there is a gable roof with a central chimney on the main building; shed roofs are built over the lean-to additions and there is an end wall fireplace in the west lean-to; roofs are wood shingled; wood sleepers are used as underpinning.

3. The powder horn drawing shows three exterior doors and two window openings along the north wall, with no openings shown in the west end walls. The window openings in the south and east walls are conjectural. There should probably be board and batten shutters hung on the exterior of the windows.

4. Four drawings agree that there was a central chimney, which would indicate that the main building, 16 feet × 22 feet, was divided into two rooms (or one room) separated by a centrally located chimney block containing two fireplaces. The McGraw powder horn is the only drawing that shows a lean-to attached to both end walls. While the existence of the lean-tos cuts sharply into the overall size of the main storehouse, they do reflect the hurried building construction of the fort in 1777.

The interior room finish of the storehouse might be one that leaves the post and beam con-
struction exposed, in contrast to the headquarters and guardhouse, which should have the walls and ceilings lined with boards. It is quite possible that the rough mill-sawn outer weatherboards, studding, ceiling boards (laid over the joists), and ceiling beams were whitewashed. Shelves should be furnished for the Quartermaster and possibly a counter of sorts. The west lean-to room with the fireplace could have been the living quarters for either the Sutler or the Quartermaster Deputy, Mr. Hansen. The walls and ceiling of the west lean-to, if it had been used as quarters, would have been lined with boards to insulate as well as decorate this room.

Most likely there would have been a door opening between the main storehouse and each of the lean-tos. All rooms would have wood floors. The Quartermaster would have taken advantage of the storage space found in the attic; hence, a trap door and a wall ladder would have been required to gain access to this area.

**LL. Timber**

The chief tree species found in the Fort Stanwix area in 1758 were white pine, white cedar, elm, beech, maple, birch and poplar. In 1793, other species of trees listed were sugar trees, buttonwood, white walnut, pitch pine, elm, oak, shellbark hickory, and hemlock.

Of the 42 wood samples submitted by the archeologists to the State University of New York for identification, 24 samples were white pine, 11 samples hemlock, four samples white cedar, one sample white ash, and one sample slippery elm. Except for the predominant use of hemlock in the northwest bombproof (nine samples) there was an indiscriminate use of tree species in construction.

In 1777 the engineer, de Lamarquise, proposed to raise the parapet with cedar which was found about one mile from the fort. On the deFleury map there is an area about one mile to the southwest of Fort Stanwix marked “Cedar Swamp.”

It is proposed to build the outer rampart walls with logs. Starting with a 30–36 inch diameter foundation log, each tier of logs would be reduced in diameter until the height of the parapet is reached, at which point a 12–14 inch diameter log should be used. The inner rampart walls forming the walls to the casemates should start out with a 24 inch diameter foundation log, and end with a 15–17 inch diameter log at the top of the wall. Smaller trees will be needed to construct the faise, pickets, bombproofs, passageways, bakehouse, etc., but a variety of local species can be used as long as pressure treating is specified after cutting and fitting.

For the heavy squared timbers used on the roofs of the casemates, etc., it will probably be necessary to use West Coast Douglas Fir.

Douglas Fir (or white pine if available in wide widths), can be used for the exterior boards of the barracks, headquarters, guardhouse, and storehouse. From 1776–1781, the roofs of these buildings were probably covered with shingles rived from white cedar or white pine, then tapered and smoothed. We can substitute sawn white cedar shingles for the handmade variety since the saw marks will weather out in a few years.

Southern yellow pine may be substituted for the local white pine. Hemlock still grows in some of the remoter areas of up-state New York and should be acceptable for wall logs. It will have to be cut in the spring of the year if the bark is to be removed.

**MM. Wells**

Water for the use of the garrison at Fort Stanwix was obtained from a branch of “Teochnowat Creek” which ran along the east side of the fort. Members of the garrison had to carry water from the creek, which was protected by a short covered way and an earthen redan, through the sally port into the fort. This method of furnishing fresh water for the fort’s consumption was kept in use after the Americans arrived in 1776.

The military engineer realized that a good supply of water was of paramount importance during a time of siege. This fact must have been realized by the Americans shortly before August 1777. Colbrath’s Diary records the chain of events that took place on August 11:

This Day the Enemy having Observed that we brought water from the Creek altered its Course so that it became dry This wou’d have done us much Damage had we not been able to open two wells in the Garrison which with One we had already proved a Sufficient Supply

The same day Colonel Gansevoort issued a garrison order stating: “... The Quarter Master
will Likewise Order as many Barrels filled with Water, as he can procure and see that they are Constantly full." Not only were the barrels of water used for cooking, drinking and washing purposes, but they were also useful in case of fire.

No evidence of wells was uncovered in the archeological excavation work of 1970–72. The only plan of Fort Stanwix showing a well appears on an original banknote issued by the Bank of Rome in 1832. The plan shows a blockhouse, a magazine, and a well located near the center of the north casemate.

When grading work begins on the parade ground, an attempt should be made to locate the well(s), if indeed they were dug in this area.

The aboveground well structure will have to be conjectural since neither a description nor a drawing exists from the military period.

NN. Whipping Post

Flogging, as a form of corporeal punishment, continued in use throughout the Revolutionary War. At Fort Stanwix, the three most commonly mentioned forms of punishment were flogging, confinement in either the guardhouse or bombproof, and running the gantlet.

Flogging was executed at a whipping post. The first mention of a whipping post at Fort Stanwix is in 1776, when four men were tied together and whipped. Throughout the Willett Orderly Book kept from May 30, 1777, through May 19, 1778, and the 4th and 2nd New York Regiment's Orderly Books kept from November 22, 1780, through June 10, 1781, whipping is mentioned continually. During the twenty day siege of Fort Stanwix, however, whipping is not mentioned.

The writer has not found an early description of a whipping post, but reproductions at Fort George, Ontario, and at Fort William Henry and New Windsor Cantonment in New York State. Of the three, the post at New Windsor seems to be the most convincing. It is a peeled wooden post approximately nine inches in diameter and 7½ feet high terminated at the top with a round finial. Four iron rings, 2½" in diameter, are stapled at equal distances around the post near the top and four more rings are stapled into the post about 12 inches off the ground. Thus the hands and feet of four persons could be tied or manacled to the ring at one time.

The location of the whipping post is undetermined, but it would probably have been somewhere near the center of the parade ground, as the punishment was to be executed in full view of the garrison.

Reconstructed forts such as George, William Henry, and others have included a stock in addition to the whipping post as part of their exhibit. Evidence that a stock was used at Fort Stanwix was not found. Unless reliable documentation is found for this feature, it has been recommended that the stock should not be included.

Another form of punishment used at Fort Stanwix in 1781 was chaining a block two feet long and six inches in diameter to the leg of a prisoner.
PROPOSED USE OF BUILDINGS

A  PARADE
B  BARRACKS
C  HEADQUARTERS
D  GUARD HOUSE
E  STOREHOUSE
F  CASEMATES
G  DRAWBRIDGE
H  BOMBS PROOF
I  BAKEHOUSE
J  NECESSARY
K  HELM
L  DITCH
M  COVERED WAY
N  GLACIS
O  SALLY PORT

- FURNISHED EXHIBIT AREA
- RESTORED BUT NOT EXHIBITED
- MANAGEMENT, STAFF & STORAGE
- AUDIO-VISUAL
- COMFORT STATION
- COOP, ASSOC, SALES AREA
The Fort Stanwix Historical Center—
A Preliminary Report

A preliminary report was prepared by Mr. Charles M. Stotz, Architect from Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, on November 18, 1963, outlining in detail a proposal for the partial reconstruction of Fort Stanwix. The report's recommendations were either adopted or were so necessary to reconstruction of the fort that the Park Service's master plan addressed the same points made by Mr. Stotz. A copy of the following report was given to the writer by Mr. Stotz in August 1971.

Primary Purpose

To make the Rome region a better place in which to live by fostering in the residents the desire for a full and true knowledge of and pride in their cultural heritage so that both they and visitors to the region may better understand the planting and development of civilization in the region.

To accomplish this, it is intended to memorialize and to instill an understanding of the events, personalities, military installations and other historical aspects of the French and Indian, and Revolutionary Wars that transpired in the region of modern Rome, New York, with emphasis on the principal fortified stronghold, Fort Stanwix.

Secondary Purposes

To also present later phases of military activity in the War of 1812, to memorialize the life of Francis Bellamy and his Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag, to develop a knowledge of all phases of the social and economic life of the region from its geological origin and prehistoric residents to its leading role in road, canal and steam transportation of the early 19th century, by comprehensive modern museum techniques. This calls for emphasis on interpretation and a major effort in exhibit preparation.

Site

The site is bounded by Black River Boulevard, an un-named alley east of North James, East Liberty, and East Dominick Streets. Under the basic proposal all of this land is to be utilized except the business properties fronting on North James Street. It is further proposed that a portion of the parcel lying between East Dominick Street, Erie Boulevard and North James Street be considered. See site diagram herewith.

Site Preparation

The basic site would be cleared of all buildings except the Rome Club. North Spring Street, East Willett Street and the un-named alley would be abandoned and the land absorbed in the plot.

The Rome Club is a good example of a Corinthian Order of the Greek Revival period and this building, with some restoration, could serve a useful purpose in the project plans.

The existing museum building is of combustible construction and is unsuitable to modern museum use as well as unattractive in design. The
cost of rehabilitation would not be justified. We recommend that it be razed.

There are in this site several buildings of some historic and architectural character, the preservation of which might be desirable. However, from our experience in this field we believe that their rehabilitation and maintenance would present a major charge on the community in cost and management and would constitute a serious distraction from the essential purposes of the project. The only exception is the facade of the American Legion Building, an excellent example of an Ionic Order of the Greek Revival period. It is a possibility this portico, that is, the columns and the pediment over them, with some restoration might be preserved as a museum exhibit.

The Empire House is said to have been built in the early thirties but its exterior character shows considerable alterations of a later period and is not judged to be worthy of preservation from an historical-architectural point of view.

It is suggested that the museum contain an area devoted to the early architecture of Rome in which would be displayed pictures and drawings of buildings in their original unspoiled condition together with exhibits of details or portions that have been preserved.

**Topography**

While we do not yet have a topographical survey of the site, there appears to be little variation in grade and we visualize no hazards in layout from this source.

**Program**

The several physical elements of the program, as shown on the site diagram and to be discussed in detail later, are as follows:

1. Full size reconstruction of the southeast quarter of Fort Stanwix.
2. Restoration of the Rome Club.
4. Provision for on-site parking of 75 to 100 cars.
5. Landscape development of the entire area.

**Full-Size Reconstruction of Fort Stanwix**

The principal source of information on the original condition of Fort Stanwix is the military engineer’s drawing made in 1758, and now preserved in the Crown Collection of American Maps in the British Museum. It was a simple square with bastions at the corners. The walls were of horizontal logs. There is adequate information to accomplish a reasonable faithful reproduction.

The 18th century frontier forts were made of the materials most readily available, earth and wood. They deteriorated readily under the effects of rain, frost and rot, as we have learned in the reconstruction of the contemporary Fort Ligonier 50 miles east of Pittsburgh. It is therefore recommended that reconstruction be restricted to the southeast quarter of the fort. This includes the flag bastion with its cannons and the powder magazine beneath it, half of the east and south curtain walls, each backed by a barracks building and several buildings within the parade ground. The life of the wood may be lengthened by certain precautions in treating the wood with preservatives. The moat with its picket line is to be built around the restored portion of the fort. Thus all of the essential and typical features of the fort may be examined by the visitor. The trace of the remaining portion of the fort will be shown by a narrow stone path on the ground, except of course where concealed by the buildings.

As will be described later a small scale model of the entire fort is to be built in a location that will afford a view both of the model and the full size portion. While the bastion will be visible from the surrounding streets, visitors will be admitted to the fort area only from the museum building, after viewing the model.

**Restoration of the Rome Club**

The Rome Club will form a distinguished background for the exhibit of typical furnishings of the early homes of Rome. Additional uses for this building have been recommended but this aspect of the program remains to be defined. It must be recognized that the fire and panic laws of most states, including New York, restrict the use of residences as places of public assembly. Any use
of the second floor by the public requires drastic alterations to provide fireproof stairways at extreme ends of the building, although it is likely that quarters for a resident caretaker would be permitted on the second floor without such construction. The degree of restoration needed to return the building to its original condition must await further study and research. Access to the building will be provided from the adjacent museum, as all persons must enter and exit through the main lobby for reasons of security.

New Museum Building

The existing museum building was originally constructed as a tennis court, later altered by the introduction of a second floor of wood construction, and finally adapted to use as a museum, utilizing the first floor only. In a project of such importance and permanence as we are now considering it would seem shortsighted to reuse or extend this building which is inadequate in size, combustible in character and undesirably located.

A new building is proposed in the general area shown on the site diagram. It would be a one-story building of fireproof construction, with a flexible plan that will permit readjustment and extension of museum exhibits as required. As in modern museums of this type, lighting will be artificial and subject to control to suit the exhibit needs. However, windows will light the offices, lobby and certain staff areas while a large open landscaped central court will provide a welcome foil to the interior areas. This court would provide a dramatic setting for the principal theme, our Hag, with a memorial to Francis Bellamy or other feature as determined by the committee. It is important to maintain simplicity and unity to achieve an effective memorial.

The entrance to and exit from the building is by a spacious lobby on the western front, accessible by a new street. The lobby will be served by public rest rooms. A gift sales area opens off the lobby. This facility provides important funds for the maintenance of the project as has been amply demonstrated in many similar institutions throughout the country.

This lobby also provides direct access to one of the principal features of the museum, an Information Center, or Theater of History, to seat 300 persons, provided with a large stage or exhibition area. Special techniques are contemplated by which all phases of history represented in the museum may be presented here in synoptic form and with telling dramatic effect by an interesting new method conceived by your curator, Gilbert Hagerty. As at Williamsburg, Virginia, this Information Center will prepare the visitor for a full appreciation of what he will later see. The use of this center for groups of school children will provide a vital regional educational feature as well as a visitor attraction of great value.

The important adjuncts of storage and preparation workshops will be provided with a separately controlled delivery entrance off East Liberty Street.

As one reaches the southeast corner of the museum he enters an elevated room looking down through a large window directly on the restored portion of the fort. This room will contain a model about 20 feet in diameter of the entire fort and its immediate environs at the scale of 3/8 inch to a foot. Here the significance and character of the restored fort will be fully explained so that when the visitors walk out of the model room they are prepared for the visit to the restoration.

Similar models might be considered for the historic portage area from the Mohawk River to Lake Oneida. Also a model of the Mohawk-Oswego military route would explain why Fort Stanwix was a fortified place of strategic importance.

In addition to the exhibits pertaining to the French and Indian and Revolutionary Wars and the War of 1812, there is a significant story to be told of water transportation from the early bateaux to the canal days. A model of the early Erie Canal, including the Black River branch, may do much to help the modern visitor visualize structure, as well as the social and economic impact of this vanished system.

It is desirable to establish a building that may be operated with a minimum staff and suited to year-round operation.

On-Site Parking

It is presumed that the Urban Renewal Agency will require adequate parking to serve the museum. We recommend a parking compound of 75 to 100 cars on the western extremity of the property as shown on the site diagram.
Landscape Development

The borders of the project area are to be planted in a park-like manner and the entire lot surrounded by an attractive fence or barrier that will prevent access but yet afford an uninterrupted view from the bordering street.

It is suggested that appropriate outdoor exhibits be distributed through the area surrounding the museum, including a garrison garden and such fort adjuncts as a forge, outdoor bake oven, saw-pit, and the like.

It may be desired to consider a light and sound program now so popular at historic sites throughout Europe, and presently being considered for Point State Park in Pittsburgh. If so, provisions must be made for a proper installation.

We recommend that an intensive archaeological program be conducted before construction of the new building. It is likely that valuable artifacts, essential for the new museum exhibits, may be recovered from the ground, as at Fort Ligonier and other fort sites.

Cost

It is not possible to make a reliable estimate of cost until the completion of preliminary studies, showing the plans, elevations and sections of the buildings, layout of the grounds and outline specifications. When this is known, revisions may be made to accommodate a practical budget. We suggest now that an outside figure of one and one-half million dollars be considered for the construction cost of the above described project including architect’s fees but exclusive of land acquisition and exhibits. It is impossible at this stage to estimate the cost of the exhibits themselves which, except for the fort model and possibly the museum cases, lie outside the architect’s responsibility. We suggest tentatively that the sum of $250,000 be allocated for exhibits. Thus the total cost would be approximately $1,750,000.

If land acquisition is not disproportionately high in cost, we suggest inclusion in the project of the strip of business properties fronting North James Street.

Land Between Dominick Street and Erie Boulevard

It is suggested that consideration be given to the acquisition of the area east of Montgomery Ward, leaving in place the more valuable buildings on the western portion. The eastern section would be graded and made into a landscaped public parking area which would provide an open, dignified foreground to the project. We assume that the cost of this would not be borne by the Fort Stanwix Historical Center project.

Architectural Services

This report is provided without obligation to the committee and as an assistance in resolving the main features of the project. Our firm now proposes that we be engaged to perform the necessary architectural services and submit a schedule of fees for such work. We base these fees as percentages of contract cost according to the schedule adopted by the Pennsylvania Society of Architects of The American Institute of Architects.

For the museum building, the fee would be 7¾ percent of the contract cost, while the remainder of the work, including the restoration of the Rome Club, reconstruction of Fort Stanwix, and site development would be at 10 percent of the contract cost.

The standard form of agreement as issued by The American Institute of Architects is submitted herewith for your inspection. You are encouraged to raise any questions concerning the details therein. This project will be handled in the name of Charles M. Stotz on behalf of the firm of Stotz, Hess and MacLachlan.

Upon execution of an agreement the architects will proceed with preliminary studies, which, as mentioned above, will provide a clear statement of the project by plans, sections, outline specifications, perspective views and detailed cost estimates. Upon review of these studies and after making any alterations or budget adjustments after consultation with the client, the final working drawings and specifications may be prepared.

Throughout this process, the architect will consult with the client through a building committee to establish a well-defined program, acceptable to the Urban Renewal Agency. The architect
will likewise consult the local and state building codes and secure all preliminary approvals that may be required.

To expedite the work and simplify communication, we suggest the work building committee be restricted to three persons. Of course all decisions, as represented by the architect's drawings and data, will be presented for ratification by the committee as a whole.

We believe the project has a sound and justifiable basis for becoming a civic asset of great worth. Our impression is that the citizens who conceived this worthy enterprise have developed an enthusiastic backing among the people of Rome. We trust that the momentum thus produced will carry us to an early and successful accomplishment of the project. In sharing your enthusiasm, we will bend every effort to this end.

Respectfully submitted,

Charles M. Stotz

Charles M. Stotz

CMS/dds
November 18, 1963
APPENDIX B

Class C — Cost Estimates

Reconstruction of Fort Stanwix, Rome, New York
Based on Preliminary Drawings NPS No. 015/25000, 4 Sheets
March 22, 1973

Site Preparation

Excavation Work

Area east of the fort:
- 200' × 700' × 2.5' ave. depth: 13,000 cu. yds. $1.60 $20,800.00

Excavate Parade Ground to original elevation:
- 240' × 240' × 2.0' ave. depth: 4,266 cu. yds. 1.60 6,825.00

Cellars in east barracks, two each, hand excavation: 300.00

Area south of the fort:
- 160' × 50' × 1.0' ave. depth: 300 cu. yds. 1.60 480.00

Deepen & widen ditch on south & west sides of fort:
- (400' × 2.0') + 400' × 17' × 10' 2,800 cu. yds. 1.50 4,275.00

Excavate area between east scarp and Liberty Street:
- 400' × 40' × 5.0': 3,000 cu. yds. 1.60 4,800.00

Excavate remaining ditch area:
- 600' × 10' × 35': 8,000 cu. yds. 1.60 12,800.00

Excavate stream bed east of the fort:
- 800' × 2.0' × 1.0': 60 cu. yds. 7.40 444.00

Install catch basin at outlet & connect to storm sewer: 480.00

Excavate trench for pickets & backfill: 1,020 cu. yds. 7.40 7,541.00

Removal of eleven house foundations on site: 5,000.00

Removal of existing pipe lines, disconnect & cap off: 700.00

Removal of asphalt curbs & walks left on fort site: 800.00

Removal of existing trees and tree stumps: 1,700.00

$66,945.00
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<th>Description</th>
<th>Cubic Yards</th>
<th>Rate</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Earth Fill</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Level parade ground and cellar holes on fort site:</td>
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<td>Sally port, glacis of passageway:</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sod Work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parapet of Glacis: 1522' X 8'</td>
<td>1,353</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
<td>$5,412.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covered Way: 1275' X 10'</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>5,668.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covered way-Ravelin: 80' X 6'</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>216.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterscarp-scarp: 2,515' X 15'</td>
<td>4,192</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>16,768.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parapet of redoubt:</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>112.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banquette of redoubt:</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>44.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East scarp of fort: 560' X 10'</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2,488.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berm: 1,550' X 6.5'</td>
<td>1,070</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4,280.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bastions, terreplein, ramps, banquettes:</td>
<td>1,376</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>5,504.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parapet of ramparts: 1,535' X 12'</td>
<td>2,046</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>8,184.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parapet of ravelin: 110' X 8'</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>392.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49,068.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$227,703.00</td>
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</table>
### Slope Work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trim scarp, counterscarp, parapets</td>
<td>5,000 lin. ft.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$1.00</td>
<td>$5,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$232,703.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Seeding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Glacis</td>
<td>3 acres</td>
<td></td>
<td>$800.00</td>
<td>$2,400.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditch</td>
<td>.65 acres</td>
<td></td>
<td>800.00</td>
<td>540.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glacis of redoubt &amp; passageway</td>
<td>650 sq. yds.</td>
<td></td>
<td>800.00</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area east of the fort</td>
<td>3.2 acres</td>
<td></td>
<td>800.00</td>
<td>2,560.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>5,520.00</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Note</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$238,223.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Construction Work

#### Concrete Work

Excavation work:
- Footings, foundation walls & piers:
- Retaining walls within ramparts:
- Retaining walls, roof & floor slabs around bombproofs and passageways, ends of casemates:
- Floor slabs where needed in remaining buildings:
- Precast “pan” construction under sod & soil of ramparts:

**Total**: $200,000.00

**Note**: Estimate prepared by Rome, N.Y. firm

### Building Construction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Building</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Barracks</td>
<td>20' × 120'</td>
<td>2,400 sq. ft.</td>
<td>$60.00</td>
<td>$144,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Barracks</td>
<td>20' × 120'</td>
<td>2,400 sq. ft.</td>
<td>65.00</td>
<td>156,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>20' × 54'</td>
<td>1,080 sq. ft.</td>
<td>65.00</td>
<td>64,800.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ell addition: 15' × 10'</td>
<td>150 sq. ft.</td>
<td>65.00</td>
<td>9,750.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard House: 16' × 19.5'</td>
<td>312 sq. ft.</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>18,720.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ell addition: 12' × 8'</td>
<td>96 sq. ft.</td>
<td>65.00</td>
<td>6,240.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storehouse: 16' × 21.5'</td>
<td>344 sq. ft.</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>20,640.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ell addition: 10' × 8' × 2 ea.</td>
<td>160 sq. ft.</td>
<td>65.00</td>
<td>10,400.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Casemate: 22' × 148' trapezoidal</td>
<td>2,860 sq. ft.</td>
<td>80.00</td>
<td>228,800.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Casemate: 22' × 145' trapezoidal</td>
<td>2,904 sq. ft.</td>
<td>85.00</td>
<td>246,840.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Casemate: 22' × 137' trapezoidal</td>
<td>2,794 sq. ft.</td>
<td>85.00</td>
<td>237,490.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Casemate: 22' × 144' trapezoidal</td>
<td>2,794 sq. ft.</td>
<td>85.00</td>
<td>237,490.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NW Bombproof: 14.5' × 21'</td>
<td>305 sq. ft.</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>15,250.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passageway: 6' × 55'</td>
<td>330 sq. ft.</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>16,500.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>Price</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE Bombproof: 16' × 16'</td>
<td>256 sq. ft.</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>12,800.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passageway: 6.5' × 25'</td>
<td>163 sq. ft.</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>8,150.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SW Bombproof: 19.5' × 20'</td>
<td>390 sq. ft.</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>19,500.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passageway: 6.5' × 40'</td>
<td>260 sq. ft.</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>13,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakehs. &amp; oven: 19' × 21' + 80</td>
<td>480 sq. ft.</td>
<td>80.00</td>
<td>38,400.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passageway: 6' × 30'</td>
<td>180 sq. ft.</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>9,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessary: 12' × 22'</td>
<td>264 sq. ft.</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>15,840.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridge to Necessary, 7' × 58'</td>
<td>406 sq. ft.</td>
<td>35.00</td>
<td>14,210.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main bridge: 10.5' × 62.5'</td>
<td>657 sq. ft.</td>
<td>35.00</td>
<td>22,995.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawspan: 10.5' × 12' lifts/chain</td>
<td>126 sq. ft.</td>
<td>150.00</td>
<td>18,900.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Gate &amp; Entrance: 13.5' × 18'</td>
<td>243 sq. ft.</td>
<td>80.00</td>
<td>19,440.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentry Boxes: 3.5' × 3.5' × 7 ea.</td>
<td>80 sq. ft.</td>
<td>80.00</td>
<td>6,800.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Platforms: 11.5' × 18' × 25 ea.</td>
<td>5,175 sq. ft.</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>51,750.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whipping Post w/final 9&quot; w/staples:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>250.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood Barrels, watertight:</td>
<td>20 ea.</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>1,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flag Pole, double mast: 14&quot; × 40'</td>
<td>1 ea.</td>
<td>2,000.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wells w/wood curb:</td>
<td>3 ea.</td>
<td>1,000.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banquettes, wooden, pressure treated:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curtain Walls: 516' × 3'</td>
<td>1,548 sq. ft.</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>15,480.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ravelin Walls: 80' × 3'</td>
<td>240 sq. ft.</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>2,400.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flashing under: 600' × 3.5'</td>
<td>2,100 sq. ft.</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>3,150.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraise: 6&quot; dia. 12&quot; o.c. 1,800 poles, pointed</td>
<td>25.00 ea.</td>
<td></td>
<td>45,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pickets, main palisade w/ribband and pointed ends, pressure treated: 1,822 poles</td>
<td>30.00 ea.</td>
<td></td>
<td>54,600.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pickets in redoubt w/ribband:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 poles, pointed</td>
<td>30.00 ea.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer picket gate, double: 10' × 10'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,200.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sally Port picket gate, single: 3' × 7'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>450.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ravelin gate, double, solid: 10' × 10'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,800.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log retaining wall at redoubt 24 lin. ft. pressure treated:</td>
<td>500.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log retaining wall at entrance 80 lin. ft. pressure treated:</td>
<td>1,800.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pickets for ends of earth banquettes:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800 @ 3&quot; × 2.5' @ 0.50&quot;</td>
<td>900.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steps to sentry boxes: 4 sets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>355.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ravelin, Log work in walls, pressure treated: 55,030 b.m. × $800.00</td>
<td>110,060.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M + labor costs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>595,136.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ravelin, platform &amp; frame:</td>
<td>450 sq. ft.</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>58,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramparts, Log work, pressure treated after fitting:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>110,060.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exterior walls below embrasures:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>595,136.00</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>371,960 b.m. @ $800.00</td>
<td>900.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M + labor costs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>491,400.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parapets, embrasures, cross ties:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204,750 b.m. @ 800.00</td>
<td>491,400.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M + labor costs</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,058,871.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST $3,497,094.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Utilities

Telephone: 4” plastic, 720’ @ $6.00
   + one pullbox
Water supply: 4” D.I.P., 400’ @
   $8.00 + controls
Storm sewer: 15” R.C.P., 440’ @
   $14.00 + drop inlet
Sanitary sewer: 8” A.C.P., 400’ @ $11.50
Primary electrical service: 3 phase,
   120/208 v 400 amp.
   6” A.P.C., 465’ + one pullbox @ $18.00
Secondary electrical service:
   8” A.C.P., 280 lin. ft. + one
      pullbox @ $20.00
Electrical distribution, fixtures, outlets:
Fire extinguishers: 10 @ $30.00

Estimate by DSC $ 57,000.00

Heating: electrical; provisions for future A.C.
   For future A.C., 4” gas line, DIP. 680’—DSC 100,000.00
Plumbing: —DSC 90,000.00
Fire Detection System in separate conduit:
   Intrusion Alarm System: 5,000.00

   252,000.00

Inflation factor: @ 5.5% per year for 3 years
   ST 3,749,094.00
      618,600.00
Contingencies: @ 5.0%  ST 4,367,694.00
      218,385.00
Contractor’s Overhead & Profit: @ 16%  ST 4,386,079.00
      733,772.00
Balance brought forward: ST 5,319,851.00
   $5,319,851.00

N.P.S. Personnel on project: 3 yrs.
   @ $20,000.00  60,000.00
Transportation for NPS personnel for 3 years: 4,500.00
Office expenses for NPS personnel, heat,
   electricity, photos: 7,000.00
Architect’s fee for consultation and
   inspection: 8,000.00  79,500.00

Grand Total: $5,399,351.00

Note: Working drawings, specifications writing and contract documents included in
F.Y. 1974 program and is not included in the above estimate.

Submitted by O. W. Carroll
March 22, 1973
Addendum—

Lumber Procurement and Preservation

The use of large logs, 12 inches to 30 inches in diameter, and large squared timbers as proposed in the reconstruction of Fort Stanwix, poses some logistical problems in the procurement and preservation treatment of these items.

The writer has personally contacted several owners and managers of lumber mills in central New York as well as two wood preservation plants. Most mill owners agree that procurement will require at least one year’s time. The wood preservation plant managers say that a minimum of one year should be allotted for air drying of the timber prior to pressure treatment. The logs should be peeled before pressure treatment begins.

Pressure treatment of the logs, large timbers, pickets, fraise, etc., should be done after cutting and fitting of the joints are completed. This would require dismantling, hauling, pressure treating and re-erection, which could be accomplished if a portion of the fort were constructed a section at a time. Such a time table might also fit into the schedule necessary for procurement of the logs and the air drying time needed.

As an aid in preparing the working drawings, the hiring of a local carpenter to fashion full-scale dovetail joints would be in order. These large scale models would then serve as a guide for the contractors bidding the job.

It appears at this time that timber of the size required is only available on the West Coast. The nearest pressure treating plant of any size is in Ohio. Resawing of the timbers will need to be done with a band saw. Some salvage of the slabbled boards from the flatted logs can be realized.

owc 3–23–1973
"PLAN of Fort STANWISE" possibly drawn by James Montresor, engineer, in 1758. If this drawing is the Montresor plan, it is our first scaled and dimensioned document of Fort Stanwix. The lengths of the flanks and faces as well as the overall distance between the salient angles of the bastion tips, as shown on this plan, compare very favorably with the proposed reconstruction dimensions. Reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
"PLAN OF FORT STANWIX, Built at the Onnida [sic] Station 1758." This plan was probably drawn in 1759 or 1760 since it shows the two additional buildings on the parade ground constructed "from July to December 1759." Note the storehouse to the northwest, built outside the fort. Reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

"PLAN OF FORT STANWIX BUILT at ONIEDA STATION by PROVINCIAL TROOPS in 1758" signed by Jn. Williams, Sub. Engineer. This plan probably represents Fort Stanwix as it looked after the initial round of construction by the colonial troops supervised by regular British and Provincial Army officers. Construction details for the ramparts and casemate walls as well as for the footbridge and necessary structure were taken from this plan. Reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
Plan of Fort Stanwix

Front view of the fort. The layout includes various labeled sections and annotations.

Notes:
- Plan of Fort Stanwix showing what works were done at that Point from July to December 1778.
- British Museum, Crown Collection CXXI, 301.
- Copy in Map Division, Library of Congress.
Historic Structure

"Plan of FORT STANWIX showing what Works were done at that Post—from July to December 1759." The original plans at the British Museum, were colored to show the extent of new work as listed in the explanation at the lower left of the drawing. The National Park Service should obtain color reproductions of these original drawings to complete this part of the fort story. This is one of two plans that show the location of the fraise; see "Profill thro A B." It also shows the earliest type of construction of the parapet in "Profill thro E F."
Reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

"Plan of FORT STANWIX, Showing what is to be done to compleat it." Dated (in another script) 1764. Unsigned. A black and white copy of another original colored plan kept in the British Museum. Compare this plan with the previous ones to see the changes that were made to the buildings on the parade ground. A new covered communication (caponière) was added to the east end of the sally port and a newly built ravelin constructed opposite the main gates and bridge. This plan furnished the primary construction details above ground level for the sally port and redoubt beyond. (See sections A B and C D.) Reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
"A Sketch of Fort Stanwix, with its Buildings & outworks November 19th 1764" signed by Geo. Demler. This and the previous plan are the only two drawings found to date that indicate the work done by the British at For Stanwix "between the 1st of July 1764, and 31st of December followg." This plan was used to locate the placement of the picket line along the east berm of the fort. Also, the method of closing off the northeast and southeast ends of the ditch as shown on this plan was adapted in the proposed preliminary plans. Reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
The James Wilson powder horn of Fort Schuyler. James Wilson was a private in the 1st Company of the 1st New York Regiment commanded by Col. Goose Van Schaick. The 1st New York Regiment replaced the 4th New York Regiment at Fort Stanwix near the end of 1778. The regiment stayed at the fort until November of 1780; thus, the Wilson powder horn has a probable date of 1779 or 1780. The Wilson powder horn is unique in that it shows the location of five sentry boxes, four of them found on the bastions. The structure shown on the southeast bastion is surely the shed that “the Carpenters are to pull down . . . Built Over the bomb proof.” (Garrison order, Dec. 20, 1780.)

“Fort Schuyler: Decr 25: 1777, J: Mc Graw.” A two dimensional drawing of the original McGraw powder horn now owned by Chester Williams of Rome, New York. Drawing by John McManagle of Rome, New York, in 1963. James (Alexander) McGraw enlisted in the American army during July of 1775. He participated in the invasion of Canada in 1776 where he was shot through the leg. On June 13, 1777, McGraw reenlisted in Capt. Bleecker’s Company of the 3rd New York Regiment, which arrived at Fort Stanwix on May 26, 1777. Although we are not positive that James McGraw was here at the fort during the siege, it seems very likely that he was. Our first account of McGraw actually being at the fort is found in a hospital return dated March 1, 1778, which lists (James) McGraw, Capt. Bleecker’s Company, as having been confined to his quarters with an “‘Ulcerous leg.’” This was surely the old leg wound of 1776 acting up again. During McGraw’s period of convalescence, he would have had time to carve the fort plan on his powder horn. McGraw was discharged on May 30, 1778, “as unfit for duty from his wound and old age.” Source: Original sketch at Fort Stanwix Museum, Rome, New York.

Plan of Fort Stanwix dated 1802. The original drawing of this plan has not been located to date. Presumably it was drawn on the spot by the Rev. John Taylor, but not published until 1850. Rev. Taylor writes in his journal on the 18th: "The old Fort Stanwix stands about 30 rods from ye river. It is regularly built: the intrenchment is very deep. In the centre of the fort stands the old block house. This can better be described by my drawing." Another eyewitness report of 1815 placing the blockhouse of 1794 in the center of the old Fort is solid evidence that this was the location of its construction.

Plan of Fort Stanwix, dated 1810. The original drawing of this plan has not been located as yet. It first appeared in a local newspaper, the Rome Citizen in 1871. Later, in 1878, it was published in book form. The description, in part, of Fort Stanwix reads as follows: "Fort Stanwix originally extended through from Dominick Street to what is now Liberty Street, and the block-house was in the centre (about where Dr. Kingley’s barn is)." The plan shows that the leveling of the Fort proper started in the southeast bastion where Mr. Dominick Lynch built a house between 1802 and 1810. Source: History of Onieda County, New York, by Samuel W. Durant, 1878, p. 382. (Jervis Library, Rome, N.Y.)

Plan of Fort Stanwix as engraved upon an original Bank of Rome note in 1832. An octagonal blockhouse, a well and magazine are shown on the plan. The fort and the blockhouse were probably gone prior to 1832; thus, the engraving probably represents the fort as someone remembered it. Source: From the Rome Directory of 1857, p. 131. (Jervis Library, Rome, N.Y.)
Drawing of Fort Stanwix, dated 1793, attributed to Peter Hugunine. Actually misdated, as the blockhouse was not constructed until 1794. This sketch represents the artist's conception of Fort Stanwix in 1793. We have very little information on the blockhouse of 1794. In 1815, William Dunlap made a drawing of the remains of Fort Stanwix, showing the blockhouse that occupied the "centre of the fortification." An unsuccessful attempt was made to locate the drawing, which may have perished in the Dominick Lynch house fire of c. 1824. Source: From a 4" x 7" negative owned by Chester Williams, Rome, New York.

Fort Stanwix as it appeared August 6, 1777, as interpreted by the artist, Peter Hugunine, in 1897. The original oil painting has not been located. Source: From an engraving owned by the Fort Stanwix Museum, Rome, New York.
"Sunrise at Fort Stanwix August 3, 1777."
An oil painting by Edward F. Buyck in 1927. Funds to pay Mr. Buyck for this painting were raised by the citizens of Rome. The theme of the painting is the raising of the "Stars and Stripes" above Fort Stanwix during the siege of August 2-22. Both Hugunine and Buyck elected to show the rampart walls as constructed from earth covered with sod. Source: Copied from an 8" x 10" B & W photograph owned by Chester Williams, Rome, New York.

"The Fort upon Great Island in Piscataqua River, 1699, New Hampshire." This particular sketch has been included to show the location of the Sentry boxes on the tips of the bastions. A sketch of Fort George, in the New York Harbor, by Archibald Robertson, dated 1776, also shows a sentry box placed on the tip of each bastion. This location agrees with the military handbooks of the day. Crown Map Collection, Mss. Room, New York State Library, Albany, New York.
Plan of Fort Edward, New York, c. 1757. The profile drawing through T-U, showing the exterior construction of the rampart wall and an embrasure, is the method of construction proposed for Fort Stanwix. Note the dovetail joints at the corner of the embrasure and rampart end wall. Along the superior slope can be seen the tie beams, dovetailed into the inner and outer log walls. Library of Congress, No. 45215, January 1973.

A drawing of a French designed sentry box, dated 1739. We are indebted to Mr. John Fortier, Head Research Historian at Fortress of Louisbourg NHP, Canada, for providing us with a copy of this sketch. Since De LaMarquisie was the French engineer in charge of building the sentry boxes at Fort Stanwix in 1777, the writer assumes that he would use a drawing having a French origin. The sentry boxes proposed for use at Fort Stanwix follow this design. Source: Fortress of Louisbourg, Canada. From La science des ingénieurs dans la conduite des travaux de fortification et d'architecture civile...
Notes

Historic Structure Report

1. Copy letters of correspondence between Generals Abercromby and Stanwix received from Richard Mattice, Pennellville, N.Y., November 1971. From the Bureau of Archives, Ottawa, Canada, hereinafter called Canadian Archives. Reference to order is found in letter dated July 27, 1758.

2. Ibid. Letters dated July 20, 23, 24, 27. Correspondence, Stanwix with Abercromby, in which the three engineers are mentioned as being at the Carrying Place in July 1758.

3. Ibid. Letter dated August 20, 1758, Stanwix to Abercromby.


5. Canadian Archives, letter dated August 30, 1758, Abercromby to Stanwix. "Yesterday Evening I receiv'd from Lieut. Col. Montresor; Engineer Williams's Opinion in regard to the Impracticability of finishing this Season the intended Fort at the Oneida Carrying place, and accompanying the same with the plan of another he and Capt. Green had pitched upon. . . ." Lt. Williams's signature is affixed to Crown Map No. 99, dated 1758.

6. Ensign Moses Dorr Diary: "... about four o'clock the first Stock of timber was Layd of the fort." Copy obtained from the Rome Sentinel.

7. Canadian Archives, letter dated October 22, 1758, Stanwix to Abercromby. Meanwhile, Thomas Sowers had returned from the Col. Bradstreet expedition on September 8 and stayed on to help with the supervisory work at Fort Stanwix. His signature (and Lt. Williams') is affixed to the ordnance demand dated September 14, 1758.


9. See notes on Crown Map No. 101 for work completed in 1759.


11. Canadian Archives. From Col. Harry Gordon's itemized list of expenses.


13. See Illustrations Nos. 5 and 6 in the Appendices, Crown Maps No. 102 and 103.


16. Elmer Journal, p. 32: "In the evening Capt. Potter with his officers moved into the room contiguous to ours, and between which there is no partition. . . ."

17. Jonathan Lawrence Diary, New York State Library, Miss. Room.


23. Willett Levies, kept in New York State Library.

24. Diary of Griffith Evans, October, 1784. From the Fort Stanwix Museum File No. 3124.


27. We have two maps drawn of Rome, New York, one dated 1802 (Journal of Rev. John Taylor's Missionary Tour Through the Mohawk and Black River Countries in 1802, published in Documentary History of New York, Vol. III, 1850, p. 72) and one dated 1810 (History of Oneida County, New York, by Durant, 1875, p. 382). Both maps show a blockhouse in the center of the parade ground of Fort Stanwix. The blockhouse is also shown on an original Bank of Rome note printed in 1832, as published in the 1857 Rome Directory, p. 130. See Illustrations Nos. 10, 11 & 12, included in the Appendices of this report.


30. Documents Relating to the Colonial History of the State of New York, State Archives (Albany, 1887),

31. Capt. Bleeker’s Company was stationed at Fort Constitution under Col. Willett before marching to Fort Stanwix, where they arrived on May 26, 1777 (Willett Orderly Book). The exact day the 3rd N.Y. Regiment left Fort Stanwix is not known but the 1st New York Regiment arrived around January 1, 1779.

32. Copied from the files of Fort Stanwix Museum, folder marked Muster Rolls.

33. Description found in FOST files; source unknown.


35. See Illustration No. 15 in the Appendices of this report.

36. Excavated by J. Duncan Campbell for Rome Urban Renewal Agency in 1965. The bakehouse area was reopened by the National Park Service in 1971.


39. Fort Herkimer, N.Y.; Fort Ticonderoga, N.Y.; Fort Chartres, III.; Fort Conde, Ala.; Fort Du Quesne, Pa.

40. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg’t., p. 555. December 30, 1780: “The Morning Gun is to be fired in the Southeast Bastion to Morrow Morning. . . .” We also have the deFleury map and two powder horn plans drawn not long after the siege that place cannons and/or embrasures in the southeast bastion.

41. Ibid., Hanson and Hsu.

42. The height of the chimney cap above the terreplein follows those shown in the casemate drawings of 1758–59. The writer has found an existing chimney cap that is identical in construction at Fort Putnam, West Point, N.Y.


45. Crown Map No. 102.

46. Crown Map No. 102. See section C-D for detail of wooden banquettes.

47. Crown Map No. 100 shows a barracks-like building scaling 20 feet \( \times \) 118 feet located about 300 feet west of the fort. The structure is identified as a “Storehouse.”


Tuesday May 19th, 1767. Continued our course to Fort Stanwix . . . It is a regular square fortification, with a Fossee [sic] covered way, Glacis, and Ravellin sic, and calculated for a Garrison of 1000 or 1500 men. The works being of wood are now falling to decay.

Extract of a letter from Major Gen. Gage to the Earl of Shelburne dated New York, May 27, 1767. Documents Relating to the Colonial History of the State of New York, Vol. VII, p. 985:“The Fort is in a ruinous situation and I dont judge it of consequence enough at present to deserve the repairs it would require to make it defencible. It is proposed as soon as the military stores can be removed, to withdraw the Garrison, and to grant the Place with the ground dependant on the Fort, to an old half pay officer on condition that he shall take care of the Buildings for the Kings use and return every thing again to the Crown when required for the use of the Kings Service, and that on consideration of a small salary he shall likewise take charge of all the Stores destined for the Lakes, and to see them forwarded over the Portage for Fort Ontario.

50. Extract of a letter from Richard Duncan to William Livingston as printed in the Rome Sentinel, Rome, N.Y., March 3, 1969: I hope to be able to go and reside there (Ft. Stanwix) myself—the people who live on the ground are one John Roof, Thomas Mayers, William Cloyne, Bartholomew Brodhock—John Steers and Stephens Deelyford a Frenchman—who trades there for Major Fonda—the Fort is all in ruins, and the barracks by an accident last fall was burnt to the ground, nothing now remains—but a Room which the officers used to mess in now—occupied by the Frenchman above ment.—there is Fifty Acres of land enclosed about the Fort, it is chiefly meadow, and Five little huts of houses with a couple of barns. . . .


52. Ibid., p. 32.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., p. 411.


56. For a complete list of the Connecticut soldiers stationed at Fort Stanwix under Colonel Elmore, see Muster Roll from Connecticut Men in the Revolution, compiled by the Adjutant-general’s office. (Hartford, 1889).

57. Luzader, p. 62.


59. Luzader, p. 66.

60. Luzader, p. 68.

61. Gansevoort map of Fort Stanwix; plan from Willett’s Narrative (1831); deFleury map (post-siege); and three powder horn maps: McGraw, DeWitt, and Chatfield.

62. Scott, p. 113. Letter from Gansevoort to Schuyler written June 15, 1777: “The Engineer at this place has just laid the foundation of a salient angle before the gate and the carpenters are employed in framing a Barracks to be raised just before the glacis opposite the south Bastion the Barracks at present being bad. . . .

63. Scott, p. 113: “I have been obliged to send for boards as far as Foxes at Canajohary.”


Willett Orderly Book, May 30, 1777: “1 Sub. 1 Sergt and 15 privates are to hold themselves in Readyness to Embark tomorrow at ten o Clock, in Six Batteoux to fetch boards for Use of this Garrison.”

Willett Orderly Book, June 16, 1777: “The Batteaus that arrived here this day with Boards are to be ready to set out again, with the other four Batteaus that are at this place. . . .”

The writer assumes that the casemates of 1777 were constructed in the same manner as the original fort work of 1758.
64. American Archives, 4th Series, Vol. 3. Copy of B. Romans' Estimate and Expense of erecting forts in the Highlands, September 18, 1775.


66. Archaeologists' report in draft form at Fort Stanwix.

67. Elmer Journal, p. 411, October 10, 1776: "The fatigued men are employed in getting and hauling shingles. . . ."

68. Scott, p. 239. Willett's Narrative speaks of shutting the windows of the dining room.

69. The room arrangement for the east and west barracks was suggested by Lee Hanson.

70. Willett Orderly Book.

71. The post-siege deFleury map lists a "laboratory" as being located in the west barracks. This military function not included as part of the proposed barracks layout. The southwest casemate with its packed soil floor best suits the purpose of a laboratory space.

72. Other contemporary forts having officers and soldiers housed in the same barracks building are: Forts Erie, Niagara, Johnston, Mount Pleasant, Half Moon, Lawrence, and Saco.


75. Moses Dorr Diary. Entries for October 7, 20, 22, 1758.

76. Willett Orderly Book.

77. Ibid.

78. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg't., p. 544.

79. Ibid., p. 555.

80. Willett Orderly Book.

81. Capt. Smith, p. 29.


83. See Crown Maps Nos. 102 and 103, dated 1764.

During the repair and remodeling work of 1764, a berm was constructed across the open ditch opposite the south­east bastion and the pickets extended from the covered way across the berm and along the east side of the fort.

84. Willett's Narrative, p. 49.

85. Willett Orderly Book, April 16, 1778.

86. See Crown Map No. XXX, 1756, noting "D". The brick kiln is located on the south side of "Little Creek" not far from the Mohawk River. The clay used in making the bricks probably came from a river deposit nearby.

87. Information on the bricks was furnished by Lee Hanson, January 4, 1973.


89. Observation by the writer based on the study of plans from other colonial forts in the northeastern part of the United States.

90. Luzader, p. 20.

91. Ibid., p. 21.

92. Ibid., p. 41.

93. Ibid., p. 43.

94. Ibid., p. 50.


96. Ibid., taken from microfilm reel No. 4. Letter from James Wilkinson to Gates.

97. Forts Ontario, N.Y.; Mount Pleasant, Md.; Fort George, N.Y.C.


100. Capt. Smith, p. 35.


102. Ibid., pp. 200-201. Pulleys and chains; platform pivot with pit, the overhead counterpoise; port cullises; counterweights and pulleys.


104. Willett's Narrative, p. 43.

105. Hinge (½ pr) found near the main entrance way to the fort; currently kept at FOST. See archaeologists' report.


108. Willett's Narrative, p. 49.

109. See Crown Map No. 101 included in the Appendices of this report.

110. There are several powder horns depicting Fort Stanwix or Schuyler. The Fort Stanwix Museum has collected a number of drawings and photographs of powder horns showing Fort Stanwix, yet we know of additional horns listed in Stephen V. Grancsay's book, American Engraved Powder Horns (New York, 1945), that have not been located for study purposes. The five powder horns we now have sketches of which show the flagstaff are those identified with Jeams Thomson, Oct. 8, 1777; J. McGraw, Dec. 25, 1777; Capt. T. DeWitt, 1778; James Wilson, n.d., c. 1780; and Cornelius Chatfield, Nov. 5, 1780.

111. A short list of sketches illustrating the double masted flagstaff is as follows: Fort William and Mary, N.H., 1699 (Crown Collection map); fort at Crown Point, N.Y., 1759; Fort Stanwix, 1777, 1778, 1780; Fort Mackinac, 1820; Fort Howard, c. 1840; and Fort McHenry, Md., c. 1862. In addition, we have an eyewitness account of the flagstaff at Fort Pitt in 1759, as follows: "... on ye South East Bastion stands a High Poal like a Mast & top Mast to Hoist ye flag which is Hoisted on the first Day of ye Week from about Eleven to One o'clock & on State Days &c." (From the Kenny Journal as found in Drums in the Forest by Charles Stotz, p. 160.)

112. For a complete description and set of construction drawings of a ship's mast, see Steel's Elements of Mastmaking, Sailmaking & Rigging (London, 1794), Plates III and IV.

113. Ibid., Plates III & IV.


115. Elmer Journal, p. 134: "Fort Stanwix [in 1776] . . . is large and well situated, having a glacis, breastwork, ditch and a picquet fort before the walls, which are also well guarded with sharp sticks of timber shooting over the walls. . . ."
St. Leger, the British commander, described the fort in 1777, as follows: "Its form is a kind of Trapezium or four sided figure with four Bastions freized and picketed, without them as a good ditch with pickets nipping out a considerable way at the salient angles of Bastions. . . ."

Luzader, p. 81.
117. Humphrey Blank, A Treatise of Military Discipline (London, 1759) pp. 201, 203:
Half an hour before the gates are to be shut, which is generally at the setting of the sun, a Serjeant and four men must be sent from each port to the main-guard for the keys; at which time, the drummers of the port-guards are to go upon the ramparts, and beat a Retreat, to give notice to those without, that the gates are going to be shut, that they may come in before they are. As soon as the Drummers have finished the Retreat, which they should not do in less than a quarter of an hour, the Officers must order the barriers and gates to be shut, leaving only the wickets open; after which, no Soldier should be suffered to go out of the town, though port-liberty should be allowed them in the day-time.

He must order a Corporal and four men more with arms to escort the keys to the outermost barrier, and to place two men with rested arms, on every drawbridge, till they return from locking the barriers. He must send likewise a sufficient number of men without arms to assist in the locking of the gates and drawing up the bridges.
118. The names "Swing Gate," "back gate," "great gate," and "folding gate," have been used to describe gates constructed at various New York forts during this period.
119. Elmer Journal, August 16, 1776, p. 179: "Almost finished the fort, but could not enclose it for want of some pickets and the gate, carpenters making the gate and about repairing the barn."
120. Elmer Journal, August 27, 1776, p. 188: "The Fort Schuyler or Stanwix is exceedingly well situated. . . . the gates are strong, without any ravelling to the front. . . ."
121. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg't., p. 575: "The Sentinels without the gates are in case of an alarm to shut and barr the outside gates and Remane their till further orders and not open the gates for any person. . . ."
122. Ibid., p. 541.
123. Charles Lamb, An Universal Military Dictionary in English and French, etc. 4th Ed. (London, 1816) p. 994:
WICKET, a small door in the gate of a fortified place, through which people go in and out, without opening the great gate: likewise a small door within a gate, or a hole in the door; through which what passes without may be seen.
124. The Revolutionary Journal of Col. Jeduthan Baldwin, 1775-1778, edited by Thomas W. Baldwin (Bangor, Me., 1906). p. 27. February 27, 1777: "went to mount Independance the forenoon, ordered the wicket gates to be hung and the Gates Barred."

An elevation of the "New Fort" to be built at Schohary, N.Y., (mid-18th century?) shows a wicket gate built within the main gate (Crown Map No. CXXI, photocopy of the original kept in Crown Collection, New York State Library).
125. Orderly Books of the 4th New York Reg't., p. 543.
126. American Archives, 5th Series, Vol. I, p. 1119. Extract of a letter dated Elizabeth-town, August 23, 1776: "A wide ditch is sunk round it (Fort Stanwix), about ten feet deep, the glaces on the outside are raised six feet above the surface. . . ."
127. As determined by archeology.
128. As scaled and projected off Crown Map No. 102, Section A-B.
129. Elmer Journal, p. 33. Dr. Elmer was stationed at Fort Stanwix with Colonel Dayton's Regiment.
130. Scott, p. 100. Letter from Capt. De Lammarque to General Gates, no date, but probably written in late April of 1777.
131. Willet Orderly Book:
June 5, 1777: "... John Baker to be releas'd from the Guard House. . . ."
June 9, 1777: "And Richard Watson Ordered to be Releas'd from the Guard House. . . ."
June 12, 1777: "... James Rogers and Cornelius Swartwout Ordered to be Releas'd from the Guard House—as also James McCormick. . . ."
March 5, 1778: "Serg: Myers of Capt Tiebout company confin'd by Lieut: Bowen for defrauding the Publick was Order'd back to the-Guard House till the Arrival of Lieut Stockwell—a principal Evidence. The Commanding Officer approves of the Suspending the Tryal, but Orders the prisoners Releas'd from his Confinement in the mean Time. . . ."
132. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg't., p. 548: December 3, 1780: "Charles Kinney to [be] Dismiss'd from Confinement, and John Holmes and Eph'l White to be shut in the Bomb proof for the space of six hours."
133. Letter from Corn's V. Dyck to Col' Van Schaick, April 17th 1780. (We owe thanks to the Fort Stanwix files for this letter.)

Dr Sir
I am sorry I must inform you of an unluck circumstance which happened to use on the night between the 13th & 14th InsT, & between the Hours of twelve & one, some fire had unhappily lodged itself between the Chimney and the Chamber floor of the Guard House which caught so violenty & it being on the Chamber so that the Gaurd did not perceiue it until it had got so far that it was impossible to extinguish it, but consumed with the Snowshoes, and all the Arms unfit for use belonging to the Garrison; we were necessiated (in order to save the rest of the Garrison from being consumed) to also haul down part of the rest of the Barracks, immediately in the morning I had all the Carpenters collected & employed who have now nearly again repaired the Barracks that were knock'd down and hope if nothing extraordinary falls in our way to have the Guard House also rebuilt by next Saturday—This accident might have destroyed the whole Garrison had it not been for the Dexterity of the Officers & Soldiers who by taking down part of the Barracks, & the constant applying of Water (to that part which was on fire) which was conveyed thro the Sally Port prevented the fire from catching in any of the other Buildings, not a man was hurt saving a few who lamed themselves by treading Nails in their feet—
I remain
Sir

134. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Regiment, op. cit., p. 544: "... The officer of the Main Guard, is not to Suffer any Damage to be Done to the Flours sic of the Guard Hous sic. . . ."
135. The six contemporary drawings showing the headquarters building are as follows: McGraw powder horn, 1777; DeWitt powder horn, 1778; Cornelius Chatfield powder horn, 1780; DeFleury map, n.d., but post-siege; Gansevoort map, n.d., but post-siege; map accompanying Willett's Narrative of 1831. One written reference can be found in John Scott's book entitled Fort Stanwix and Oriskany, p. 95, as follows: "The adjutant was ordered to make three copies and 'fix one at Head Quarters, one at the fort gate and the other at Mr. Roof's.' " The second written reference is the word "HeadQ's" labeled beside the north fort building drawn on the "Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix." See Appendices for this map plan.

136. Scott, p. 239:

... Permission having been granted, they were conducted blindfolded into the fort, and received by Colonel Gansevoort in his dining room. The windows of the room were shut and candles lighted; the table also was spread, covered with crackers, cheese and wine.

137. Capt. Smith, p. 131.

138. Moses Dorr Diary, August 25, 1758: "I Ges came of Dutey and ordered to oversea the Building of a Hopatal for the Sick... ."

139. Elmer Journal, October 5, 1776, p. 32.

140. Willett Orderly Book, June 2, 1777.


143. Clinton Papers, Vol. IX, p. 120.

144. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Regt., p. 574.


146. Capt. Smith, p. 175.


148. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Regt., p. 541: "for the future Provision for the Garrison, Staff officers, and the Dependants for Publick supplies, are to Draw always on one Day as no Provision Return will be allowed on other Days."

149. Documents Relating to the State of New York in the Revolution, p. 81. The Committee of War, acting upon orders from the Provincial Congress, issued the following instructions to the Barrack Master in March of 1776:

That the Field Officers of each Corps in this Colony be supplied with one Room: the Captains with the Subalterns of each Company together with the Quarter Master and Adjutant to be entitled to a Room between each two.

The Officers' Rooms of the said Corps to be furnished each with 1 pt. Tongs, 1 Table, two Chairs and one Candlestick.

For every Room for Non Commissioned Officers and Soldiers of the said Corps, each room to contain 20 men, 10 Cribs, 10 Bedcases and 10 Boulsters to be filled with straw every three months, 2 Iron Potts, 2 Trammells, 1 pt. Tongs, 1 Wood Axe, 1 Iron Candlestick, 1 Table, 2 Benches and 1 Bucket.—and with firewood as follows:

For every Room for Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates from the 1st day Octr. to the 1st April 3-16th of a Cord of Wood per week for each room so occupied as aforesaid—and for 5 Weeks preceding the 1st Octr. and 5 Weeks after the 1st April 3-16th of a Cord of Wood per week and for the remaining 16 weeks 1-8 of a Cord per week... .

150. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Regt., p. 541: "no Officer Waiter to be absent at Roll Calls in the Evening on pain of being punished."

151. Luzader, p. 133 (Willett Narrative): "Permission having been granted, they were conducted blindfolded into the fort, and received by Colonel Gansevoort in his dining room."

152. Crown Map No. 99. This drawing is interpreted as having two necessary houses drawn on the fort plan. Without question the elevated privy is shown in plan projecting off the southeast bastion and is marked with a dotted line called C-D which is called a section, but actually is an elevation view of the necessary and footbridge. The plan of the elevated privy is almost identical to that of what is called the officers' privy, located near the center of the officers' huts. The elevated privy contains two compartments; one side could have been used by the soldiers and the other side used by officers. During the day the officers would be required to use the elevated privy, but at night a privy located on the parade ground would have been used. The soldiers, meanwhile, would be required to use the exterior privy at all times.


154. Richard Day, Calendar of Sir William Johnson Manuscripts in the New York State Library (University of the State of New York, Albany, 1909) p. 357. May 26, 1767, letter from Daniel Campbell to Sir Wm. Johnson stating that Capt. Stevens is to dismantle the garrison at Fort Stanwix; p. 361, June 20, 1767, letter from Hugh Wallace to Johnson stating that Major Goreham and 2nd Lieut. Galland are to reside at Fort Stanwix; p. 485, May 16, 1771, letter from Edward Wall to Johnson describing Lieut. Galland's condition (at Fort Stanwix). Johnson was still concerned about the pay of the batteauxmen serving to bring provisions up to Fort Stanwix during the treaty of 1768. (Johnson to Gage, letter dated April 26, 1773, p. 518).

155. The last remaining soldiers' cabin built at the New Windsor Cantonment in New York State during 1782-83 was constructed with logs used to fill in the gable ends. The corners of the walls were not dovetailed but simply half lapped and pinned together.

156. Crown Map No. 102, dated 1764. See drawings of cross sections.

157. Colbrath Diary, pp. 99-100: "Augt. This Day the Enemy having Observed that we brought water from the Creek altered its Course so that it became dry."

158. Willett Orderly Book, entry dated September 17, 1777.

159. Ibid., entry dated September 20, 1777.

160. A photostat of the original plan, undated, is kept in the Oneida County Historical Society, Utica, New York. The Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix is thought to be a copy of this plan.

161. See Illustration No. 8 for a view of the James Wilson powder horn.

162. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg't., pp. 575-76: Fort Schuyler Fryday 13th April 1781 The Sentinels after Nine OClock are to Chalence every Person and not suffer them to pass unless they give the Countersign except those who are going to the Necessary House who are not to pass or Repass without giving their Names.

217. Copies of three different drawings of this fort, built on the Piscataqua River, were obtained from the Crown Collection kept in the Mss. Room, New York State Library, Albany. See Illustration No. 16.

218. The most useful of the military dictionaries concerning sentry box descriptions are:

*Gentleman's Compleat Military Dictionary* (Boston, 1759).

GUERITE, is a small tower of stone or wood, generally on the Point of a Bastion, or on the Angles of the Shoulder, to hold a CENTINEL, who is to take care of the Foss, and to watch to prevent Surprizes; some call ECHAUGETTE those which are made of Wood, and are of a square Form, for the GUERITES of Stone are roundish, and are built half without the Wall, and terminate at a Point below, which ought to be at the CORDON, that the CENTINEL may discover along the Faces, Flanks and Curtins, and all along the Foss: They ought to be about six Foot high, and their Breadth three and a half.

Charles Lamb, *An Universal Military Dictionary in English and French in which are explained the Terms of the Principal Sciences that are Necessary for the Information of an Officer*, 4th Ed., (London, T. Egerton, 1816), pp. 96, 301.

CENTINEL

Centrel . . . No centry to move more than 50 paces to the right, and as many to the left of his post; and let the weather be ever so bad, he must not get under any other cover, but that of the centry-box.

CENTRY-box, a sort of wooden box, or hut, to shelter the centinel from the injuries of the weather; but in fortifications made of masonry, they are of stone in a circular form.

SENTRY . . . Sentries are placed before the arms of all guards, at the tents and doors of general officers, colonels of regiments, &c.


GUERRITTE sic, "a fort or small tower of stone or wood, on the point of a bastion, or on the angles of the shoulder, to hold a sentry. (A sketch of a masonry sentry box is included with this explanation.)


CENTRE-box, a sort of wooden box, or hut, to shelter the centinel from the injuries of the weather.

ECHAUGETTE sic, in military history, signifies a watch tower or kind of a sentry box. (The term "tower of duty," found in many soldiers' diaries may have meant duty served in one of the early fortified towers in England. Later, this term probably became known as tour of duty.)

219. This drawing was provided by Mr. John Fortier, Head Research Historian at Fortress of Louisbourg NHP, Canada. Its source is Bernard Forest de Belidor, *La Science des ingénieurs dans la conduite des travaux de fortification et d'architecture civile . .* (Paris, Jambert, 1739). See Illustration No. 19.

220. Scott, p. 100. Also checked against the original letter found in the Gates papers, microfilm, reel No. 3. 221. Willett Orderly Book, May 15, 1778.

222. For a short biographical sketch of James Wilson, see "Hobbies, The Magazine for Collectors," May, 1951, pp. 146-147. Mr. Chester Williams of Rome, N.Y. was the person responsible for calling attention to this article and for permitting the power horn drawing to be photocopied. See Illustration No. 8.

223. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg't., p. 556.
224. Ibid., p. 575.
225. Ibid.
226. See footnote No. 218.
227. See Illustration No. 19.
228. Storehouses were built at the Oneida Carrying Place during the British occupation. See Crown Map No. 100 for location of a storehouse in 1758.

230. Willett Orderly Book.
231. Ibid., February 24, 1778.
233. Letter from Hansen to Schuyler, dated December 30, 1776, (Fort Stanwix), commenting on the fact he had been assigned a room for stores by Col. Elmore. This extract furnished by NPS historian John Luzader: The moment it is clean I will have proper shelves to lay the goods to advantage. I am happy that the Room which is to contain the goods adjoins the one in which I live alone. Threw sic which I intend to make a Passage and so use only one Door to the Two Rooms.

The above comments suggest that the commissary store in 1776 might have been located in one of the barracks buildings. This is one instance where an alteration was made between two interior rooms of a building.


236. Scott, p. 100.
237. Also called at various times Mill Creek and Garden Creek.
238. Willett Orderly Book, August 11, 1777.

240. Elmer Journal, p. 135:

Orders which were much needed in our camp at this time, as guns were frequently heard in the bush, which were no doubt fired by soldiers; but we were not able to find out the particular persons till this day, when 4 were brought in and sentenced by the Lieut. Col. to stand 1 hour stripped and tied altogether at the whipping post, which was immediately put in execution.
