UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

FORT FREDERICA HISTORIC SITE REPORT

by

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Castillo de San Marcos National Monument

With Special Reports

by

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1945
Plate 1 – Fort Frederica National Monument Location Map

FORT FREDERICA
NATIONAL MONUMENT
GEORGIA
INTRODUCTION

This study includes more specialized information than is usually found in a historic site report. We have attempted to put what we now know about Frederica—as well as things we do not know—between two covers. In so doing, our idea is to make readily available certain data that will be useful in developmental planning of the site.

This is not a purely historical study. Reports by administrator, archeologist and historian are included. The text therefore contains information on several specific problems.

For the reader interested only in certain sections of the study, we recommend the following suggestions: 1) read the table of contents carefully. It is almost an index. 2) For an excellent and brief over-all picture of the area, see Coordinating Superintendent Ray Vinten’s summary of the present status of Frederica. 3) Archeologists are referred particularly to Dr. J. C. Harrington’s “Recommendations for Archeological Research”, which also include stabilization suggestions. 4) The “Historical Narrative” is the story of the area. 5) “Technical Description” provides detailed physical description for the closer student.

It is easy to see in Frederica more than a few tabby ruins and a naturally beautiful site. The historical narrative (based mainly on secondary sources because it is yet too early for a detailed study) is a picture of general relationships. It attempts to give perspective to Frederica, and to suggest in the development of the monument certain relationships to other units in the national park system.

The “Technical Description of Frederica” required a word of justification. Hypothesizing is precarious indulgence for the historian. Yet, in this survey of 18th century fortification as it might apply to Frederica, we hope we have set down information that will enable the planners to do a better job. Our wish was to explore as far as we could, and if the archeologists trowel later proves some of our suggestions fantastic, still we feel obliged to mention them now. At the very least, perusal of the “Description” should give the reader a tangible picture of Frederica’s assets that for long have lain hidden beneath a tangle of military nomenclature. There is much meat—good, solid English beef—in even the apparently hypothetical paragraphs.

Numerous illustrations are in the study for clarification. Perhaps these illustrations may also give impetus to the planning of an interpretive display at
Frederica during the early stages of Service administration. We refer especially to the plates in the narrative section. The more technical drawings are generally unsuitable for public display.

In preparing this study we have labored under one serious handicap: the lack of a detailed, accurate topographical survey. Such a survey holds number one priority in the Frederica program. With that job once in hand, applications of the principles used here can be worked out more accurately and profitably. Additional time for study on the site itself, something that was not possible under present conditions, should also prove worthwhile.

Steps have already been taken toward beginning the next part of the historical research program, by conferring with Mrs. Margaret Davis Cate, Service Collaborator, about detailed researches to obtain specific 18th century descriptions and ownership data for historic buildings and lots within the town area.

On March 30, 1944, a memorandum entitled “Notes on Collecting Items for Frederica Museum” was sent to President S. Price Gilbert of the Fort Frederica Association, to be used as a guide in listing and collecting historic objects suitable for acquisition. Mrs. Cate, member of the Association’s museum committee, reported at the year that considerable progress had been made in listing available objects.

We are also indebted to Mrs. Cate for a review of portions of the present text, for many helpful suggestions, and for the loan of valuable historical sources. Likewise useful in this study were loans of pictorial materials by Mrs. K. G. Berrie of Brunswick and Mrs. S. Price Gilbert of Sea Island, and the donation of maps by Glynn County Engineer Harold Friedman.

A. M.

NOTE: This is an electronic version of Fort Frederica’s 1945 Historic Site Report. All misspellings, cross-outs, etc., are copied as is from the original document. Page numbers have been altered from original to reflect current navigation. Two of the images from the original report are missing and are noted on the List of Plates as "none".

Denise Spear
Cultural Resource Specialist
Fort Frederica Natural Monument
2007
# CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................3

CONTENTS .....................................................................................................................5

LIST OF PLATES .........................................................................................................8

AN INTERPRETIVE STATEMENT ..............................................................................10

VINTEN’S REPORT ON THE PRESENT STATUS OF FORT

FREDERICA NATIONAL MONUMENT .........................................................13

I. Existing Conditions ........................................................................13

II. Lands ................................................................................................14

III. Research ....................................................................................15

IV. Planning Policy .......................................................................16

V. Administration and Maintenance ...........................................17

HISTORICAL NARRATIVE ..............................................................................18

1. Guale—16th Century Georgia ........................................18

2. The Golden Age ......................................................................24

3. The Fight Begins ....................................................................28

4. Prelude to Georgia ..................................................................34

5. Founding the Colony .........................................................37

6. Frederica—“The Trustees Thought It Prudent”—........41

7. The Issues Explained .........................................................52

8. Professional Diplomacy .....................................................55

9. Oglethorpe Makes Ready .................................................62

10. The Drive into Florida ....................................................65

11. The Invasion of Georgia .................................................72

12. Bloody Marsh .......................................................................76

13. The Decoy ............................................................................79

14. “From Georgia to Augustine Again He Goes” ..........82

15. Significance of the War ..................................................83

16. Frederica’s Fate ...............................................................85

17. Work of the Colonial Dames .........................................94

18. Conclusion and Evaluation of the Site ..........................97
## TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF FREDERICA

### 1. The Fort

1. Contemporary Descriptions of the Fort ........................................... 98
2. Notes on the Citadel Site ................................................................. 100
3. 18th Century Fortification .............................................................. 105
4. Ramparts ....................................................................................... 109
5. Parapets ......................................................................................... 114
6. Banquettes (Firing Steps) ............................................................... 115
7. Fraises ............................................................................................ 115
8. Bastions .......................................................................................... 116
9. Guns and Embrasures ..................................................................... 117
10. Ditch .............................................................................................. 120
11. Covert Way ................................................................................... 121
12. Palisades ....................................................................................... 122
13. Gates and bridges ......................................................................... 126
14. Sentry Boxes and Boghouses ....................................................... 130
15. Powder Magazine ......................................................................... 131
16. Storehouses and Other Fort Buildings ........................................ 132
17. The “Spur-Work” ......................................................................... 134

### 2. The Town

1. Town Walls .................................................................................... 137
2. Bastions .......................................................................................... 144
3. Breastworks and Ditch .................................................................... 144
4. Tower Bastions ............................................................................... 149
5. The Town Gates ............................................................................... 153
6. Guardhouse .................................................................................... 155
7. Barracks .......................................................................................... 157
8. The Camp ....................................................................................... 161
9. Town Magazines ............................................................................ 162
# LIST OF PLATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plate Number</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>63</td>
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<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>none</td>
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<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>93</td>
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<td>20.</td>
<td>none</td>
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<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>110</td>
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<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>111</td>
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<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Method of Fortifying the Town –3 ............................................................143
30. Hypothetical Profile of the town Breastwork...........................................145
31. The Old Moat ..........................................................................................146
32. 18th Century Wharf Construction ............................................................148
33. Tower Bastion –1 .....................................................................................150
   Town Bastion –2 ........................................................................................151
34. Small 18th Century Gate ........................................................................154
35. An 18th Century Guardhouse .................................................................156
36. Barrack Ruins ..........................................................................................158
37. 18th Century Barracks and Storehouse ......................................................159
38. 18th Century Powder Magazines .............................................................163
39. Miller’s “Town and Commons of Frederica” ...........................................166
40. Tombs in the “Burying Ground” ................................................................180
41. Glynn County Map ..................................................................................none
42. General Development Plan ......................................................................197
The ruins of a colorful and important 18\textsuperscript{th} century English fortified settlement are included within the boundaries of Fort Frederica National Monument. Frederica is clearly representative of the Thirteenth Colony during the highly important years when Georgia existed as a buffer against Spanish dominions to the south. Historically, the site is perhaps most important for that single reason. But the coastal Georgia country also figures significantly and dramatically in the Spanish attempts at domination of the southeast long before that time, and Frederica may well be regarded as a focal point for interpretation of the colonial history of the entire region.

Started by James Oglethorpe in 1736 as a frontier outpost of the new Georgia colony, Frederica became both a defense and a springboard for offensive operations against the Spanish enemy in Florida. To the Spaniards, the new colony meant not only an encroachment on Spain's territorial claims, but something more immediate and practical – a definite threat to Spanish commerce. Each year the Spanish plate fleets, laden with American riches, sailed the gulf stream past Florida shores, uncomfortably close to the growing British settlements along the lower Atlantic seaboard. The Georgia coast was actually within striking distance of the treasure fleets. Spain kept Florida mainly as insurance for her commercial lifeline, and the threat to Florida from British establishment in George was a sword of Damosthanes visible to both Spaniard and Englishman.

So, in the Anglo-Spanish hostilities that followed its founding, Frederica played a prime part. From Frederica went the English to fight the Spaniards in Florida. To Frederica came the Spanish in their greatest attempt to destroy the southern colonies. And because Frederica had been built, the Spanish advance was checked.

Then, its purpose outlived, Frederica, like Jamestown, became a dead town.

The very fact of its short and lusty life makes Frederica of intriguing significance today. Unlike towns that have existed continuously over a long space of time, Frederica embraces, for its period of interpretive emphasis, a short and relatively unstudied period in American colonial history. Fairly typical of an 18\textsuperscript{th} century fortified coastal settlement, though larger and stronger than most, Frederica was built on a permanent basis. Since its death during the later 1700's it has lain relatively undisturbed. True, most of its buildings have disappeared; the few modern structures
have intruded on the historic site, and a wealth of history must lie buried a few inches below the ground, within the compact limits of the town walls.

Few historic sites in the national park system relate to pre-Revolutionary history. With the exception of Castillo de San Marcos and Matanzas in Florida, none illustrates the Spanish-English fight for control of the southeast. In itself, Frederica is unique. Taken together, the Castillo and Frederica are complementary sites where the national park visitor may visualize the story of an exciting and inspiring period of American history – and see this story from the widely separate viewpoints of the two major contestants.
REPORT ON THE PRESENT STATUS OF FORT FREDERICA NATIONAL MONUMENT

September 30, 1944
By C. Ray Vinten
Coordinating Superintendent
Southeastern National Monument

I. EXISTING CONDITIONS

Disturbance of Ruins Has Been Slight

The ruins of the old town of Frederica are still clearly visible over a large part of the site. The contours of the old moat and earthen breastworks, and bastions, are clearly defined on two of the three landward sides of the fortified town. The timber stockades and palisades are gone but the sharp slopes of the formal defenses are clearly defined although softened and molded by the erosion of time. Great live oaks and virgin pines have taken possession of the scene. Their spreading branches shade the ruins of two small tabby structures and numerous visible foundations which lie within the town defenses. Four large grave markers and a brick burial vault in the old graveyard east of the town gate are grim reminders of the struggles between Spanish and English colonists. The impressive character and stability of the tidewater country of Georgia is expressed in a very convincing manner in each of the 80 acres of this charming little site.

The western defenses of the town were developed along the banks of the Frederica River, which is a tidal stream at this point, bordered on the west by extensive salt marshes. Erosion has destroyed the southerly portion of this line of the fortified city, but the restored ruins of a portion of an old tabby building now stands on the shore, and numerous walls and foundations appear on the ground surface nearby. Reconnaissance surveys made recently have recorded the locations of these bits of evidence in order that hypothetical reconstructions might be developed in plan form as a guide to detailed archeological investigations. At Frederica, the archeologist will find a fertile field and we can anticipate many interesting discoveries of underground evidence that will
broaden our knowledge of thee fort and town.

Within the monument boundaries, several residences and numerous sheds and outbuildings exist which are characteristic of a small rural community. None of these structures has any historic interests and the owners have retained title to them and occupancy has been continued under special use permit pending their removal to other homesites. A paved county road runs through the southwestern corner of the town to give access to former owners as well as to visitors who come to view the citadel ruins. In time, this road as well as other evidence of modern occupancy and use will be obliterated.

The unused portions of the area have grown up to a heavy stand of young trees, shrubs and vines. Much of this volunteer growth will ultimately be cleared, but in the meantime nature is working with us by developing a protective screen which effectively guards the buried records of Frederica’s past against those who dig “unwisely but well”.

II. LANDS

The Authorized Lands Have Been Acquired

Acquisition of a tract of 80 acres, embracing the fortified town of Frederica, was authorized by the Congress on May 26, 1939. The responsibility for acquiring the necessary lands was accepted by a group of influential citizens of Georgia, incorporated under the name of the Fort Frederica Association and very ably directed by Judge S. Price Gilbert, President. During 1940 and 1941 this Association raised a fund of $45,000 by popular subscription, and during the years 1942 and 1943 negotiations with landowners and the execution of options and deeds were concluded by the late Olinus Smith, Land Acquisition Engineer of the National Park Service.

Since the time of the founding of Frederica by Oglethorpe in 1736, the lands within the monument boundary have changed hands a relatively few number of times. In spite of this fact, the abstracts of title to all the component parcels were defective because of breaks in the chains of title, and recourse has been taken through federal and state courts to correct all legal deficiencies. The most recent action has been the certification by the Supreme Court of Georgia, of the last three defective titles, by Court order of September 18, 1944. This certification is now being recorded in Glynn County.

During the course of land acquisition it was necessary to resort to condemnation in
only one case, and the suit was filed only after the purchase price had been agreed upon with the owner, Mr. E. T. Stevens. Condemnation was necessary because title had passed from generation to generation in the form of a life interest only. The declaration of taking was filed in Federal Court, Savannah, Georgia in February 1944, and title to this one acre tract is now in the name of the United States.

Several minor legal technicalities, in the form of affidavits and abstract supplements remain to be executed before the authorized lands can be accepted by the Department. According to present estimates the lands should be accepted and the area declared a National Monument during the present calendar year.

III. RESEARCH

Historian Albert C. Manucy Has Developed Much Valuable Information

The historical research program for Fort Frederica has passed the preliminary state. The first research project, a checklist or bibliography of records relating to the history of the area, was completed in 1942, and since that time a large number of important historical records have been microfilmed and deposited at Castillo de San Marcos for study.

The second preliminary project is now finished. It consists of this historic site report, describing the present condition of the site, summarizing and evaluating the historical story, and suggesting lines of development. One important part of the report describes in detail the town and fort of Frederica during the most important period of its existence (1736-1742), and should serve as a guide in planning archeological work at the area.

Future historical research will be governed to some extent by needs of the archeological program, and similarly, general development and museum development will both be greatly influenced by archeological findings. In order to assist the excavation program, perhaps the next research project should involve a careful combing of the records to bring to light all real estate information. Next, a detailed narrative of events is necessary for balanced interpretation of the area and for museum purposes. A relatively small amount of historical research on specialized topics as needed would then complete the research program for practical purposes.
IV. PLANNING POLICY

The Objective is Protection and Interpretation

Plans for the treatment of the area as a National Monument have been given considerable attention by all interested branches of the Service during the past two years. Wartime limitations have prevented the compilation of detailed topographic and archeological surveys, upon which final plans must be predicted, but sufficient field studies have been made to serve as a basis for the drafting of a preliminary general development study. Agreement has been reached through conferences and communications, regarding the major elements of the plan and according to our present knowledge the solution involves the following units:

1) Entrance, main road and parking area.
2) Administration and contact building.
3) Residence and utility areas (Custodian's Residence and work buildings.)
4) The Fortified Town.
5) The Old Burial Ground.
6) The Military Road.

The objective in planning has been established primarily from the standpoint of protection and interpretation. At Frederica we find intriguing ruins, an unusual atmosphere of antiquity, and an exciting story of Spanish-English colonial struggles of the early 18th century. Historic source material now available gives very little background for a restoration plan. However, scale models could be designed as hypothetical illustrations of the early development. Revisions could be made as more conclusive information became available, in order to give students and visitors a clearer understanding of the original design of the town and its defenses.

The protection program seems to begin with the stabilization of ruins of the citadel, barracks building and burial ground structures. Clearing of undergrowth, under careful supervision, and the mowing of high grass and weeds will be a preliminary step in acquiring adequate fire protection. Further steps in the protection program can be defined more accurately after archeological investigations have been made. It is reasonable to assume that many building foundations will be discovered and possibly the remains of timber stockades. Obviously the existing slopes of defensive earthworks will require stabilization and maintenance, and the final plan for the area will have to provide for the direction and guidance of visitors toward an experience in fields of
knowledge and inspiration. Plans for development of the area have been delineated with these things in mind.

V. ADMINISTRATION AND MAINTENANCE

Congress Has Appropriated Funds

An appropriation of $3,213.00 has been authorized for Fort Frederica National Monument for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1945. This allotment will provide for minimum personnel and equipment under restricted wartime operations. We shall be able to furnish a limited amount of protective and interpretive service under this allotment, and also accomplish some minor repairs and badly needed cleanup work. Encumbrance of these funds will be possible as soon as the area has been declared a National Monument by the Secretary. We hope to reach this goal in 1945.
1. GUALE – 16TH CENTURY GEORGIA

When the white man came to Georgia shores in the 1500’s he found the area from St. Andrew Sound to the Savannah River populated by the Guale Indians, of Muskogean stock. Guale, as the region was called, seems to have been relatively populous, and villages evidently were centered around St. Simons, Sapelo and St. Catherine Islands, and the neighboring mainland coast. Around St. Simons alone there were some 11 towns, with Talaxe (on the mainland west of the north end of the island) as a center. On the island itself was the town of Asao, which fact evidently accounts for the fact that St. Simons in early days was called Asao.

The Guale Indians were not sedentary, and their villages are hard to locate. Further, the Indian was largely dependent upon game and fish for sustenance. Like his Timucua neighbor to the south, the Gualean no doubt found it necessary to move his abode to the source of supply at certain seasons. Nevertheless, Indian houses, seasonal in some measure, were sometimes strongly built. Private houses were usually circular. The framework of wood was set up and closely fitted together, and spaces filled with reed or palmetto thatch. Every outstanding village, in addition to food storehouses and family buildings, had a communal house, usually wide and long, with reed seats along the walls.

In their semitropical clime, the Gualeans did not require much clothing. The nearly universal as well as the only garment was a breechclout, secured to the body by the simple expedient of passing it between the legs and drawing the ends up under a belt. The ends dangled decoratively fore and aft. The women fashioned skirts from Spanish moss. Feathers, shells and beads were ornaments, and the men painted their skins in red and yellow or russet and black individual designs. Both men and women wore their hair long, though the males used an upswept hair-do, tying a tuft at the crown that was said to have done utilitarian service as a sort of pincushion for arrows.¹

Not for many years after the discovery of Florida by Ponce de Leon in 1513 was the Indian seriously disturbed in his aboriginal pursuits by the white man. Leon’s death

¹ J. T. Lanning, *The Spanish Missions of George* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1935, ch 1; map facing _____). This work will be cited hereafter as *Spanish Missions*. 
Plate 3 – La Florida and the Treasure Fleets

Spanish Florida
from an Indian arrow was an omen. But the very intrusion of a new and foreign economy to any part of the New World was bound sooner or later to affect all inhabitants of the hemisphere. Each year Spain drew out millions of ducate worth of stolen wealth from the American treasury, and loaded with these riches and eagerly sought American merchandise, the galleons retraced their outward voyage, breasting the equatorial currents to sail eastward from the New World to the Old. Since the right of discovery and the Papal Bulls of Alexander VI legitimatized Spain and Portugal as the sole owners of the new discoveries, naturally other competitors anxious to profit by western wealth must do so illegitimately. The West Indies, by the wayside of the treasure route, became a pirates’ nest.

Then Leon’s discoveries opened a new and more efficient sailingway from the colonies, via the gulfstream and the Bahama Channel to Spain. For the moment, the sea wolves were foiled; but they soon caught on. By 1561 Spain was forced to adopt the convoy system.

Each year two armed fleets left Spain, one to load at Caribbean ports and the other at the Gulf town of Vera Cruz. These vessels rendezvoused at Havana, and sailed in united strength past Florida shores to Spain. Even then the English, Dutch and French freebooters trailed the fleets to plunder stragglers. The narrow Bahama Channel was doubly dangerous. A port was needed in Florida as security against the pirates as well as to provide storm refuge.

The colonization of Florida, or at least its pacification as commercial insurance, was only to be expected. The slowness of the process can be laid to the relative reluctance of the untamed North American Indian to accept the refinements of civilization, and to the fact that gold existed in the Florida region only by rumor. Spain perforce concentrated her efforts in the rich Central and South American regions, never finding the resources to make Florida more than an outpost protecting her commerce, and, what was equally important to at least some Spaniards, remembering this area as a fertile if somewhat rocky field for missionary endeavor. It should be further noted that in the mind of the more perspicacious Latin, the work of the friar among the Indians was identified with that same commercial insurance which Spain sought to secure for her fleets; Indians friendly to Spain would be unfriendly to Spain’s enemies.

Thus came about the founding of San Agustín (St. Augustine), the purge of the Frenchmen from Florida soil, and the development of a chain of missions along the
Atlantic seaboard as far north as Chesapeake Bay. To be sure, the northerly missions did not long survive, and even in the Guale (Georgia) country some of the brothers suffered martyrdom, but during the 17th century, missions in the southeast did achieve a golden age.²

Menéndez, the founder of San Agustín, had brought the first Jesuits to the Guale country in 1568, but a short two years later their missions were destroyed in an Indian uprising. Then in the early 1570’s came the Franciscans. Some of them went to Guale only to be driven out or slain. Not until 1595 did missionary efforts in this region reflect any gratifying success. Then in a few months, in seven towns along the coast old churches were restored or new ones built.³

In the village of Asao on St. Simons Island, Father Velascola took up his labors. This friar, a giant from the mountains of Cantabria, with simple humility and a powerful physique made a deep impression on the natives of St. Simons and the vicinity. His mission was just across St. Simons sound, in a village to the south of the spot where the English were to build Frederica.⁴

For two years, matters went well. Then Juanillo, an arrogant and quarrelsome young chief, became restless under the restraint of the religious. Juanillo brought his followers together and killed Father Corpa in his church at Tolomato, on the mainland across from Sapelo Island, on the morning of September 13, 1597.

Next day, Juanillo addressed a conference of chiefs, among whom was the chief of Asao from St. Simons. Playing upon the prejudices of these Indians, who considered themselves little less oppressed than himself, and pointing to the friars as destroyers of Indian customs and happiness, Juanillo was able to spread the insurrection. Within a week two other missions had been visited and their padres slain. Next on the list was Father Velascola on St. Simons.

Velascola was in San Agustín at the time, and a great uneasiness seized the

² For detailed discussion of Spanish commercial seas routes in this area, see Description of the Principal Objects of the Present Ware in the West-Indian (London 1741). Basic problems are outlined in V. E. Chatelain, Defenses of Spanish Florida (Washington 1941), chapters 2 and 10; general discussions are in Bolton and Marshall, Colonization of North America (N.Y. 1936), 61-66; and K. T. Abbey, Florida, Land of Change (Chapel Hill 1941), ch. II.
³ H. E. Bolton, Spain’s Title to Georgia (Berkeley, Cal., 1925), 10-11, 14-15. Cited hereafter as Bolton.
⁴ Bolton, 15; Spanish Missions, 71-72
conspirators. This was a poor, humble monk, but he was physically so powerful that
the Indians were much afraid of him. To their primitive notion, what had they
accomplished if this giant friar were left alive? So they learned the day of his return,
and they went to the spot where he would set foot ashore. They hid in a clump of reeds,
and they waited. When Father Velascola drew up to the water’s edge, some of them
approached him with friendship in their manner. Then they seized him by his
shoulders, and they killed him with their flint-edged clubs and their tomahawks,
mutilating his body beyond recognition.

The wave of revolt surged southward down the coast until it reached the shores of
Cumberland Island, not far from San Agustín. A small Spanish garrison waited there,
and the chief of the island, the Timucua India Don Juan, was himself a political rival of
Juanillo’s and therefore not friend to the rebel. On Cumberland a wooden cross was
pierced with five arrows – perhaps as reminders of the five missionaries who had been
slain. The chief of Asao met and challenged the Christian Indians of Cumberland,
displaying the robe and hat of murdered Father Velascola with the words, “Just see your
padres now. Come and give them bread.” But the first stealthy attack on Cumberland,
which might have been successful, was frustrated by the bark of a dog, and the
followers of Don Juan beat off Juanillo’s war parties. Some were captured and slain;
some, who managed to escape captivity, died of starvation; and the Indian who wore the
robe of Fray Francisco Velasco of Asao was among the dead.

The force of the rebellion was now broken, but to chastise the insurgents came
Governor Canzo from San Agustín with a troop of Spanish soldiers, some of them
wearing the heavy cotton armor against arrows. True, the natives fled in the face of
Canzo’s soldiery, but their punishment was perhaps more severe than if they had spilled
their blood in appeasement. Canzo destroyed their towns (including Asao), their canoes
and their cornfields.

In 1600, some of the Guale Indians formally swore fealty to Spain. Among the
towns committed to lasting fidelity was the village of Asao. Due to the turn of events,
Asao apparently replaced Tolomato as the principal town of the region. Tolomato,
involved in the murder of Father Corpa, refused to yield to Spain. Canzo persuaded the
chief of Asao to head an expedition to reduce the still rebellious Tomomatans. Asao
issued a general appeal for help to other Guale towns and to the Cusabo Indians of
Carolina, and many hitherto blameworthy Indians joined Asao in an about face to
punish their former allies. Juanillo and his followers retired to the interior, where they ensconced themselves in a stockaded town. The stronghold was assaulted, and Asao sent the scalp of Juanillo to San Agustín as proof of the success.\(^5\)

Governor Canzo planned to make Florida (which in the Spanish mind comprised the North American continent) an integral part of the Spanish Empire, rather than a mere frontier outpost to guard Spain’s lifeline. While to some of his fellows the revolt of 1597 appeared to be evidence that la Florida was a needless expense, Canzo clearly set forth the importance of the province, and more or less singlehandedly prevented the abandonment of its capital, San Agustín. Among Canzo’s arguments was one calculated to arouse interest in even the most indifferent mind; only 40 leagues from San Agustín and but 200 from New Spain (Mexico) lay Tama, the hinterland of Georgia, which abounded in minerals, precious stones, and fertile soils. There were, furthermore, rich fields for the missionaries. But while Canzo’s glowing reports were well received in Spain, hardheaded Spanish officials required proof of the statements. Canzo was able to send it in the form of reports on expeditions made some years before. One such report had been written by Fray Velascola, the martyr of St. Simons. Encouraged by bountiful harvests on the coast, Velascola and Father Chozas from the Cumberland Island mission journeyed eight days on horseback to distant Tama and Ocute, Creek towns near the upper Altamaha. Typical of the early exploratory narratives, these reports testified not only to the fertility and friendliness of the region, but to the presence of silver and gold in Tama, and to the existence of wonderful natural phenomena, not the least of which was a mountain of crystal.

In spite of his dreams, Canzo was a practical man. The province of Guale, he emphasized, was the very backbone of any movement toward the interior, as well as the mainstay of existing colonization. Without Guale, even the San Agustín presidio would be in straitened circumstance, for Guale furnished food to the garrison, and its natives responded with alacrity to the overtures of the governor to labor on the fortifications or to work the cornfields and gardens so necessary to Spanish existence. San Agustín itself was in a sandy, infertile location.\(^6\)

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\(^5\) This relation is based upon *Spanish Missions*, ch. IV; cf. Bolton, 15.

\(^6\) *Spanish Missions*, 111-113, 118; Bolton, 15-16, 18.
2. THE GOLDEN AGE

As the 17th century opened, Canzo appeared in a fair way to realize his dreams. In 1603 he began a personal inspection of the Guale region, partly with the idea of fully reestablishing the Guale missions, where there were reported to be some 1,200 Christian Indians. A model mission was started abuilding on Cumberland Island, while the Governor himself went northward to Talaxe, the village on the mainland opposite St. Simons. Here he was greeted by Don Domingo of Asao, he who had purged Juanillo a few years previous, and now head chief. The visit was most successful. It was but the first of a series of highly gratifying interviews that took Canzo as far north as St. Catherines Island. And with the completion and dedication of the Cumberland Island mission of San Pedro began that period of uninterrupted Spanish dominion that broke only before the waves of the English advance.

In 1604, with the appointment of Ibarra as Florida Governor, the inspection trip was repeated, this time with Ibarra in the role of inspector general. One stop was in the vicinity of St. Simons, where Don Domingo even agreed to live like the Spaniards with but a single wife, and see that other chiefs did likewise. This easy acquiescence to Ibarra’s expressed wish was perhaps due in some measure to the apparent fact that Domingo currently claimed but one spouse anyhow.

As far north as St. Catherines Ibarra went. There, after calling in the chiefs of the more northerly country, he heard one of the few complaints that came to his ears during this goodwill tour. The chief of Aluste complained that certain of his sub-chiefs had thrown off his authority, and gone to live with the chief of Asao. Ibarra promised to look into the matter, and on his trip back to San Agustín interviewed the culprits, evidently at Asao. They freely admitted the truth of the charge, claiming that they had left the Aluste chief to escape his abusiveness. Ibarra got them to renew their Aluste allegiance, promising them in turn to adjust what grievances they had.
Plate 4 - Spanish Missions in Guale
In a month’s time Ibarra had assured the friendship of scores of Indian villages, had located several churches, one of which was near St. Simons Island, and had prepared the way for the arrival of new Franciscan missionaries, some of whom were even then being recruited in Spain. And the chief of Asao was one of those who expressed a desire (or at least agreed with Ibarra’s pointed suggestion) to have a padre among his people. It was late in 1605 before the Franciscans arrived and Father Diego Delgado came to Talaxe, the village on the mainland, near the forks of the Altamaha and the South Altamaha Rivers, the mission post nearest St. Simons. But by December of 1605 churches and mission buildings were completed, so that the Georgia missions were established as they had been before they were driven back to the southern rim of the Guale country in 1597.

For long, Florida had been soliciting the visitation of a bishop of the Church. Finally after many vicissitudes, Bishop Altamirano from Cuba eluded the ubiquitous seawolves who were casting covetous eyes upon his person, and in March 1606 arrived off the bar of San Agustín. Ironically enough, his transport was a captured English corsair, a strong ship bristling with cannon, a vessel purchased by the Bishop himself in Santiago after the loss of the frigate sent from San Agustín to bring him to Florida.

The unprecedented number of confirmations recorded during Altamirano’s visitation (in the four Georgia missions, 1,070 neophytes were confirmed) is not necessarily indicative of barbarism before the Bishop’s arrival. All native inhabitants of the region, white, black and red, never having had a bishop, were candidates for confirmation. For instance, at Talaxe Father Delgado and the chiefs of the region, including Asao, welcomed the Bishop, and within a few days 262 Indians were confirmed. Like Ibarra, Altamirano went as far north as St. Catherines Island.7

Thus blessed in their work by this strengthening Episcopal visitation the missions of Guale embarked upon a half century of hectic, but essentially uninterrupted growth.

7 Bolton, 19; Spanish Missions, 126-157. For another Episcopal visitation of importance somewhat later, see L. L. Wenhold (ed.), “A 17th Century Letter of Gabriel Díaz Vara Calderón, Bishop of Cuba, Describing the Indians and Indian Missions of Florida”, Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections, v. 95, no. 16.
More padres came. It is possible that when the missions were built with any degree of permanency, they often presented a fortress-like aspect.

In thinking about the impact of missionary on Indian, J. T. Lanning, an authority on the Georgia missions, has visualized the Indians “like beings dropped from Mars, who had never heard of the Christian religion. This was a challenge to these holy men. . . . Without trying to teach the Indians the use of Latin and Castilian, the friar immediately began instruction in the native language, through an interpreter until he himself gained a mastery of it . . . . Beginning every day with devotionals and saying prayer dutifully at the end of every day, despite all obstacles, the Franciscans soon had their charges pattering their prayers by rote.”

Of the Franciscans themselves, and their attitude toward their neophytes, Lanning wrote: “The marvelous adaptability of the Catholic clergy was never more clearly demonstrated than in their contact with the subjugated American aborigine, on whose miserable life the greatest comfort and most softening influence brought the bear was the patronage of the church and its championship against ruthless exploitation. From the laws of Isabel the Catholic and Charles V had come the notion that the Americans were wards, perpetual minors because of ‘their ignorance and weak minds.’ Centuries of experience at the confessional had given the priest a savoir vivre seldom found among men so detached from the world, and this insight was now of great service. Those centuries of experience, when coupled with the deep-seated sincerity of the Spaniard’s absorption in religion, could not but produce results. Uncompromising rigidity and dogmatism might have ended in complete failure; the friars preferred indulgence, forbearance, and at least partial success. The toleration shown by them is yet a marvel.”

Yet the problem of sustaining missionaries in a poor province on meager allowance was great; “there was never time in the history of the Georgia missions when lamentations were not being sent up to Heaven that the country was poor, the distances to be traversed were great, the king’s stipend was only a modicum . . . . the friars and soldiers were afraid to introduce cattle for fear that they would eat the Indians’ patches of corn as well as for fear of thievery. Because of difficult living conditions and the scarcity of food, the petition for new contingents of friars and special appropriations was well-nigh perennial.” Aside from the purely sincere wish of the religious to bring the light of Christianity to the natives, Georgia missions were, Lanning summarized,
“an international safeguard, whose interests waxed with foreign pressure and waned with its abatement. The French, and later the English, were a constant challenge to throw the missions up the coast to Carolina and then across from the St. Marys and on into modern Alabama.”

3. THE FIGHT BEGINS

When in 1607 he heard of the Jamestown colony, Philip IV might easily have destroyed it. But complacently viewing the past record of English colonization on American shores, he left Jamestown to die a natural death. It was Spain’s mistake. For within a half century the contest for the Georgia country was in full swing.

Yet, while Spanish observers underestimated the Virginia threat, still it contributed to a new wave of missionary activity. The work of the Franciscan “was at once a crusade against heathendom and a defensive move to hold the border,” writes Bolton. In 1612 the Atlantic coast was included in a new missionary province called Santa Elena. New Franciscan fathers arrived. As many as 50 padres at a time comprised the corps in the Florida province, of which Guale was a part. By 1650 a mission had returned to Santa Elena (Port Royal, S. C.), a site that had been abandoned since 1587, the year after Drake’s raid on San Agustín.

The first half of the 1600’s was a period of steady growth. Nine missions were flourishing in Georgia by 1655, and beyond, in South Carolina, were two more. While establishing the names, number and location of the missions invariably constitutes a confusing problem, it seems apparent that in the Guale region around St. Simons there were at least four churches. On St. Simons itself was the mission San Buenaventura, and possibly a substation named Ocotonico. On Sapelo was San José de Zápala; and Jekyll, Santiago de Ocone.

Throughout the southeast, according to missionary claims, there were 30,000 Christian Indians, with 44 mission stations attended by some 35 friars. The number of converts may have been exaggerated, but the accounts of the rigors of missionary life appear to be accurate. The Indians were scattered, and the attending friars, unshod, often made countless routine marches – some of them long and cold – to work with

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8 Spanish Missions, 73-76, 160-163.
9 Bolton, 19-20.
10 Spanish Missions, 8,203, map facing ____ ; cf. Bolton, 21 and map facing xviii; Chatelain, op. cit., 123.
their naked, poverty-stricken charges.

It was unfortunate that the arrogant and hardheaded Diego Rebolledo came to the governorship of Florida. Rebolledo’s abuses were largely responsible for the revolt of the Florida Indians in 1656. While the Guale Indians were not directly involved in this rebellion, the chaotic condition of affairs was not conducive to their wellbeing. When in the same year of 1656 Rebolledo had word of marauders along the coast, the Guale Indians from St. Catherines south hurried to San Agustín, offering their services in defense of Spain’s la Florida. Rebolledo treated them like slaves, not soldiers. Their arms taken from them, fed meagerly if at all, kept long and unnecessarily in the governor’s service, many of the Gualeans became sick and some died. To top it off, cannibalistic Virginia Indians raided their home towns in Guale.¹¹

During the three decades after 1650, there was little or no change in the number of Georgia missions, though by the time of Charleston there were no missions north of St. Catherines Island. For the Englishman had gained his foothold. The shadow of Jamestown fell upon the hazy riches of the hinterland. Matters in the back country gradually became urgent, and it was an urgency that prevented Spanish concentration of effort on the coast. Missions and garrisons had to be pushed westward from San Agustín.

Meanwhile, in territory claimed by Spain, the British put Charleston in 1670 and legalized it by treaty. Charleston weathered the first tribulations of colonization, but for years these Carolina settlers lived precariously. Naturally enough, Indian disturbances were charged to Spanish complicity, especially since runaway white servants and Negro slaves found refuge in Spanish territory. And like the nut between the jaws of the cracker, it was certain that Guale and its missions must suffer.¹²

So Charleston and 1670 were the signal for intermittent heathen Indian sallies against the Spanish Christian Indians of Guale. Life for the Gualean was further disrupted by drafting him for work on the great Castillo de San Marcos under construction at San Agustín.

Only 10 years later, in 1680, a series of vitally important Indian wars began when the Yuchi, Creeks and Cherokees, allied with the English, attached the Guale missions.

¹¹ Spanish Missions, 203-205, 208-209.
¹² Id., 203,213; Bolton, 23-27, 32-34.
These churches had, in effect, but just become well established – established, that is, to the point of beginning to inventory their stores of religious equipment like any other going concern. Under the hostile onslaughts, the mission line was moved back from St. Catherines Island to the Altamaha and Sapelo Island, though the Christian Indians under the leadership of Spanish soldiery had done well in beating off the attacks.

A casa fuerte was built on Sapelo (possibly the “Old Sugar House” standing there today), in an attempt to hold the northern line. Captain Francisco Fuentes, commandant of the Guale garrison, took some of his troops to St. Simons to forestall an expected attack there. Unfortunately, the military were often at odds with the religious over the Indian problem, and this fact was not conducive to orderly defense of the mission territory. Some of the harassed Gualeans fled to the forests; others migrated to Florida towns. Governor Cabrera wanted to move the Indians out of the danger zone to islands near the mouth of the St. Marys. Many Indians on the more northerly islands around St. Simons apparently refused to go; some disappeared in the woods; and some went over to the new English settlements in Carolina. There, not a few of them were provided with firearms – a significant move on the part of the British – for raids in Spanish territory.

Nor was Anglo-Indian fighting all that bothered the defenders of the Georgia coast. In 1683 the notorious pirate Agramont sacked the helpless missions south of Sapelo, carrying off church bells and ornaments, and killing the neophytes. Other pirates came in the next few years, and their attacks were spaced by more and bloody Indian raids. By 1686 the north coast missions had been irretrievably lost. San Felipe, St. Simons, Tolomato, St. Catherine and Sapelo were gone. The mission frontier was pushed south to the St. Marys River.\(^{13}\)

But 1686 also marked the vengeful raid of Tomás de León from León wiped out the Cardross settlement at Port Royal, S.C., south of the 1670 treaty boundary, and burned the Carolina governor’s plantation on Edisto Island. A storm miraculously saved Charleston from León’s assault.

Reoccupation of the northern outposts by the Spanish was not feasible. Spain’s Florida, and indeed her other colonies too, continually suffered savage raids by English and French freebooters. British trade in Indian slaves mushroomed. And since the

\(^{13}\) Spanish Missions, 213, 215-221; Bolton, 36-37, 39-40; cf. also Spanish Missions, 226, and Bolton, 169, 346, n. 56.
Carolinians bought these captives, belligerent natives were ever encouraged to war on their southern neighbors. Thus it was that the Uamasees were won to the British side, and disaffection also spread to Christianized relatives in the Guale missions.

Further, most of the frontier activity had by now shifted to the western country, where Carolina trade vied with Spanish missionary and soldier for the favor of the savage. Leading the van of the English contingent was Dr. Henry Woodward, that colorful frontiersman who had lived long enough at San Agustín to understand the Spanish, and who sadly disappointed his Iberian friends by departing with the British pirates after their surprise raid on the Florida capital in 1668. Woodward expressed the English attitude in a mocking note to Antonio Matheos, the Spanish nemesis hot on his heels in the western country. “I trust in God that I shall meet you gentlemen later,” wrote Woodward, “when I have a larger following.”14

In spite of determined Spanish resistance, Indian trade with Carolina grew apace. Before long the English were way over in the Alabama territory securing, as part of their profitable business, salves. At the birth of the 18th century, new impetus was given this interior British commerce by the coming of the French to Biloxi. To the ambitious Englishman, Biloxi was both a deterrent and a challenge.15

The Spanish Indian, under pressure from Spaniard, Englishman and Indian alike, was pushed into rebellion. In 1702 there was a general uprising and many more Indians went over to the English side. The Yamasees, powerful and warlike, superimposed their name upon their Guale recruits, and by 1715 the term Guale had entirely disappeared.16

The outbreak of Queen Anne’s War brought some militant order to the chaos in the southeast. Governor James Moore of South Carolina set out in 1702 in a formal attempt to take San Agustín. The attack on the capital’s famed Castillo failed miserably, but the transplanted Guale missions at the St. Marys were burned. They were planted again on an insecure footing near the St. Johns River. The year of Moore’s raid, 1702, finally and completely brought to an end the epoch of the Spanish missions in Georgia.

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14 Bolton, 49-50.
15 Id., 38, and ch. IV; *Spanish Missions*, 223-224.
16 *Spanish Missions*, 226-227, n. 73.
next year Moore struck westward to destroy the Apalache missions.  

So, in effect, the British were successful in alienating the Indian from his Spanish guardian and removing Guale as a Spanish threat to the Carolinas. In Florida, administrative policy laid the Indian directly under Spanish care, which was “generally penurious with regard to presents, downright inflexible when it came to equipping the Indians with firearms, and avaricious in exacting forced labor,” Lanning judged. Obviously factors like these were conducive to insubordination. On the other hand, the English traders and frontier diplomats seldom subjected the native to the rigors of Christianity; they traded with him (more or less to his satisfaction), they supplied him with both Firearms and firewater, and they did not call upon him for labor (except, of course, when he had the bad luck to have been sold by his cousins into slavery). In fact, British prestige became such that at one time Englishmen could move among the Indians with little concern for their own hide and hair.

But success with the Indians made English officials complacent. And the Carolina traders were none too delicate in dealing with their copper-hued brothers. The slave trade, carried on more and more openly, finally brought the savages to the point of desperation. The spark to the powder is reported to have been the arrival of a party of British census takers. To the Indians, it looked as if they were being counted for enslavement. The result was the bloody Yamases revolt of 1715, which may or may not have been fathered by Spanish diplomacy. At least, the Spaniards looked on with approval; and when English defenses solidified and the Yamasees began to have trouble, they fell back to San Agustín, entered again into Latin allegiance and founded new towns near the Spanish stronghold.

The Indian disaffection in 1715 was general. However, many Indians recognized, reluctantly or no, the power of the English, and eventually either held to John Bull or else moved to territory where they hoped to be quit of both Spaniard and Briton – only to find the French. Georgia was no man’s land. There were forays from both sides, and if they had the unorganized character of provincial warfare, they were nonetheless bloody. The coastal tribes between Charleston and San Agustín were virtually

\[17\] Id., 227-228; Bolton 60-62; cf. Bolton, 167, 346, n. 56.

\[18\] Spanish Missions, 226.
Plate 5 – Prelude to Georgia

PRELUDE TO GEORGIA

French penetration splits Spain’s Gulf possessions and threatens English colonies.

Enemy settlement comes closer and closer to Florida.

Missions were both spiritual obligation and frontier defense.

Treasure fleets sail the Gulf Stream; Spain had to protect this life line.

KEY

X FORT
↑ MISSION AREA
▲ INDIAN TOWN
▲ PIRATE AREA

Based on Biddle map facing 719, with assistance thanks, map as.

Smugglers from Jamaica
exterminated, even though remnants of them long retained something of their old identities. After Palmer’s raid against the Yamasees in 1728, practically within sight of San Agustín, itself, the population of scattered Indian villages in Guale was truly pitiful in number, ranging from 66 souls to a mere family of half a dozen. Around San Agustín were less than 500. Not only had the white man driven the Gualean from the pleasant Georgia coast, but in doing so, he had destroyed him. 19

4. PRELUDE TO GEORGIA

In the great triangle formed by the Carolinas, Florida and southeastern Louisiana, Englishman, Spaniard and Frenchman came into close proximity. News of French preparations to colonize the Gulf coast had reached Madrid early in 1698. Before that year was out, a Spanish fortified settlement appeared at Pensacola. In January, a scant two months behind the Spaniards, Iberville’s French fleet appeared before Pensacola to demand admittance. Being politely refused, Iberville in some annoyance moved west and established Biloxi, 20 beginning the first in the series of Louisiana settlements that affected even the far-off Atlantic colonies of England. Spain’s Gulf possessions were split in two by this new intrusion, and equally important was Iberville’s hope to be able eventually to check and even annihilate Maryland, Virginia and Carolina. By 1714 Bienville had built Fort Toulouse, a trading depot and missionary station on the Alabama River. 21 New Orleans came by 1718. There was some friction with the Spanish, but Spain’s King Philip was fairly amenable to his French grandfather’s suggestion that colonization of Louisiana would protect Spain’s Gulf colonies from England. And on one point, both Frenchman and Spaniard were in complete accord. Neither wanted an Englishman to set foot on the Gulf coast. 22

19 Id., 218, 220, 222, 229-232, 235; Bolton, 63-64; Lanning, Diplomatic History of Georgia (Chapel Hill, 1936), 31. The latter is hereafter cited as Diplomatic History.

20 Biloxi was later moved to Mobile Bay.

21 Toulouse became the base for control of the native tribes in the region and an outpost against the Carolinians. It lasted until after the settlement of Georgia, when the English built Fort Okfuskee only 40 miles away on the Talapoosa River, and eventually induced the Creeks to destroy the French Jesuit missions centered around Toulouse. See Bolton and Marshal, op. cit., 278.

22 An illustration of this fraternal spirit came about in 1707. A large party of Indians led by 18 Carolinians came westward to the environs of Pensacola. The Spanish garrison was augmented by 120 Frenchmen from Mobile, and in the face of this combined force, the Carolinians withdrew. See Manucy, “Report on Historic Sites at Pensacola, Florida” (St. Augustine 1939),
Each of the three nations sought to acquire control of the powerful Indian tribes in the interior as a means of gaining both territory and trade. The resultant Indian warfare, encouraged and led by white men of three nationalities, was a major factor in awakening the Carolina colony to a sense of its insecurity. Naturally thoughts turned to defense of the southern border. But by the Treaty of 1670, England held not a foot of soil south of Charleston. Spain had emphasized that point with León’s destructive raid on 1686. Any southward move of the British inevitably brought on renewed struggles with the Spaniards. The Ponderous treasure fleets still sailed the swift flowing gulf stream past Florida shores almost to Carolina before they met the easterly winds that blew them over the Sargasso Sea toward the Azores.  

The Carolinian John Barnwell, a Beaufort planter, seems to have been instrumental in conceiving the English strategy. He, with numerous others, expressed concern over

23 Bolton and Marshall, 275-276, 279 ff., 295 ff., 315; I. J. Cox “Florida, Frontier Outpost of New Spain”, in A. C. Wilgus (ed.), Hispanic American Essays (Chapel Hill, 1942); for more specific discussion of French-Spanish relations on the Gulf coast, see Manucy’s “Pensacola”, cited above.

24 See plat 3; Bolton, 69; Objects of the Present War, 1-8. The following details drawn from the latter work aid in understanding the nature and purpose of Spain’s so called treasure fleets. Outward course of the fleet was from Cadiz to the Canaries, thence to the Antilles. Once there, the fleet separated into two parts, one sailing for Cartagena and Puerto Bello, and other for Vera Cruz. Meeting again in Havana, they sailed “through the Gulf of Florida and Channel of Bahama into the Ocean; so that there is no other way of their returning to Europe but through this Gulf . . . .” and this was the important fact to the English.

The King’s ships for Puerto Bello (where the Panama Canal now crosses the Isthmus) were called “the Galleons”, and were old fashioned men-of-war, “of prodigious Bulk, with three or four Decks.” Usually there were eight 50-gun galleons, and 12 or 15 large merchantmen. The part of the convoy going to Vera Cruz was called “the Flota”, and comprised three men-of-war and 16 merchantmen of from 400 to 1,000 tons burden. The Flota cargo was not usually as rich as that of the galleons. The men-of-war were supposed to carry only the king’s business; nevertheless they were “usually so encumbered with the Goods of other People, that it is seldom possible to defend them, when attacked.” The merchantmen carried out wines, figs, raisins, olives, oils, cloth, wools, linen, iron and quicksilver for the mines, and they brought back the merchandizes to be bought at the respective ports of call. In addition to the men-of-war and the large merchantmen, there were “register-ships” which had special licenses to trade with Spanish ports not usually touched by the main fleets. Then, after arrival at Havana, out of the Galleons and the Flota a third fleet would be formed, call the Flotilla. The Flotilla carried cargoes to Europe, as well as an inventory of all on board the Galleons and the Flota, which voyaged directly to Spain. The voyage out to the colonies and back usually took two years, though actual sailing time was much less. Sailing dates were scheduled to encounter best wind and weather, and were fairly consistent from year to year.
the possibility of French encirclement. The Savannah and Altamaha Rivers must be fortified – along with Pensacola, that Spanish town on the Gulf coast. There was strange logic in even the latter proposal; by the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, Spain was not to relinquish her American possessions to any nation; and England was pledged to help her keep them.

At the behest of the Carolinians, in 1716 a fort was built on the Savannah River. A few years later (1721) Barnwell built Fort King George on the Altamaha as a bulwark against French designs, a protection for the border, and an aid for the Charleston traders. Unfortunately, Governor Benavides of Florida regarded it as a flagrant intrusion.

The year of 1721, then, marked the beginning of a new chapter in Georgia history, and one of the first moves toward eventual establishment of an English buffer colony. Charles II’s grant of 1665 had set the southern boundary of Carolina down to 29 degrees, including a 150-mile line of Spanish settlements all the way from St. Catherines Island to San Agustín and beyond. True, this apparent inadvertence had been remedied by the Treaty of 1670, wherein both nations adopted the realistic principal of actual possession. But less than a half century after 1670, expediency revised the English viewpoint.

Opportunely ignorant of the fact that Spain’s settlements had extended to St. Catherines less than 40 years before, England bypassed the Treaty of 1670 with its guarantee of status quo and tacitly reverted to Charles II’s overly-extensive Carolina grant as the basis for her stand, though now it was conceded that including San Agustín itself in this grant was probably an oversight. Stubbornly, Spain held to the 1670 treaty; by that document, England had renounced her claims south of Charleston in 1670; ergo, Fort King George must be destroyed.

The court diplomats hit upon a plan; let the two American governors confer to determine on the spot the boundaries of the disputed area. If (and it was a big “if”) Fort King George were found to be in Spanish territory, it would be razed. But there was delay, and Anglo-Spanish relations in America were going rapidly from bad to worse. Already Benavides had complained to Madrid against constant border hostilities of Englishman and Indian. In due time the Carolina governor was instructed to permit no more such acts of violence. If the orders were not pigeonholed, at least they were difficult to carry out. When Barnwell built King George, Benavides protested
vehemently to Governor Nicholson of Carolina and sent numerous epistles to Spain.

Provincial negotiations failed; the Carolinians would not budge, so for the politicians across the sea, not-yet-name Georgia began to assume a paramount place in European diplomacy, and of itself Fort King George threatened to break the peace of Europe.

The opportune, if accidental burning of the problem fort temporarily removed some of the pressure. True, the fort was rebuilt; but its garrison was withdrawn in 1727. Abandonment of Fort King George by no means meant that England had relinquished her claim to the Altamaha boundary, though Spain professed to see it that way. Probably the evacuation was a result of border policy whereby rangers were substituted for stationary forts. Certainly the building of Frederica on St. Simons in 1736 was the logical fruition of the earlier ideas of the Carolinians.

Meanwhile, Spain and England continued at loggerheads over two major issues; the debatable land between Florida and Carolina and illegal commerce on the Spanish Main. Spain implicitly agreed not to molest the English so long as they kept their proper distance and lacked concern in any illicit trade; but for the Britisher of that day, these conditions were next to impossible.

And by 1732, the Carolina demand that the southern rivers be protected from both Spanish occupation and French fur trade monopoly found considerable support in England. The English position had been somewhat strengthened, too, by Cherokee Indian acknowledgment of British supremacy. A clear foreshadowing of the Georgia colony came in the grant given Sir Robert Montgomery for the proposed Azilia settlement between the Savannah and Altamaha rivers. The Azilia scheme, to quote Bolton, “went up in rhetoric”, and it remained for James Edward Oglethorpe to carry out the barrier project.²⁵

5. FOUNDING THE COLONY

Oglethorpe (1698-1785) was a man of considerable military experience, as well as a long-time member of the House of Commons, where he advocated an aggressive policy against Spain, as did, curiously enough, many of the future Trustees of the philanthropic Georgia venture. He had humanitarian sympathies which remained with

²⁵ Diplomatic History, 1-3, 9-14, 18-34; Bolton, 69-71; Bolton and Marshall, 315.
Plate 6 – James Oglethorpe, founder of Frederica
him his entire life, if we may judge from his refusal to accept command of the English forces in America in 1775; and he became interested in the debtor problem. Oglethorpe conceived the idea of planting a colony on the southern frontier to serve the double purpose of 1) protecting Carolina against Spanish and Indian attacks, and 2) offering a place of refuge for the debtor class. In 1732 he secured a charter conveying to himself and a group of interested persons (the 21 Trustees of the Colony of Georgia) the land between the Savannah and the Altamaha, and extending from the headwaters of these rivers to the western sea. If he knew, King George remained singularly unworried that the grant cut a wide swath through Florida, Louisiana, and Texas, and included within its limits Albuquerque, Socorro and other New Mexico towns.

Georgia’s government was proprietary, but the proprietors were not to receive any profits individually, and financial reports and legislation had to be approved by the crown. Further, the proprietorship was limited to 21 years, after which the province was to become a royal colony. Religious liberty was guaranteed to all but Catholics; provision was made to prevent large land holdings; slavery was prohibited (but subsequently permitted); importation of rum was forbidden, and so was unlicensed trade with the Indians.

In 1733 some 100 colonists settled at Savannah on land surrendered in treaty by the Creek Indians. Before long the colony was considerably strengthened by the arrival of German and Scotch immigrants.26

This new British hold on the Georgia country was far from secure. As a start to make it so, Oglethorpe scouted the coast south of Savannah early in 1734. It was on January 26, during a heavy rainstorm, that he landed at a bluff on St. Simons Island and found shelter under one of the great oaks. When he returned from that journey, quite likely he was turning over in his mind a plan for a chain of forts extending southward to the St. Johns River – fortifications that would either insure English possession of Georgia, or bring Spanish wrath swiftly down upon his head.

Back to England he went, there to secure authorization for beginning a fortified settlement to be called Frederica in honor of Frederick, the Prince of Wales, and to find

Plate 7 – Fortifications and Boundary Matters

Based on Bolton map facing p. 80
Coulten map, p.33, with additions
Expediency and the character of the man Oglethorpe seem to be the two prime reasons why Savannah and later Frederica were established and maintained successfully in that territory – “the debatable land” – to which England had only the flimsiest claim. But in no small measure, too, English success was due to the diplomats. The watchword of the English was delay. While ambassadorial battles were raging in London and Madrid, the Spanish in Florida, unsure of their ground, poorly supported and (what was perhaps more important) being of entirely different temperament than the more earthy settlers to the north, informed the crown of imminent dangers, and awaited orders.

Spanish official reaction to Georgia was naturally vigorous. But Oglethorpe was wily. Before he left London in 1735 he obtained from the Spanish minister his sanction of the appointment of a commissioner to act as a go-between for the Florida governor and himself. This commissioner, Charles Dempsey, embarked for America on Oglethorpe’s vessel in “The Great Embarkation,” the largest single group of colonists (257) to sail for Georgia. They set forth from Cowes in the Symond and the London Merchant on December 10, 1735, and reached the Savannah River on February 5, anchoring off Cockspur Island.

6. FREDERICA – “THE TRUSTEES THOUGHT IT PRUDENT –“

At Cockspur Island these prospective Frederica settlers divided – the Salzburgers wanting to join their brethren at Ebenezer and the Moravians going to the settlement at Irene. Oglethorpe agreed, though it meant the loss of half his Frederica population.

But Oglethorpe was not yet at Frederica, and his ship masters refused to take him. There was no pilot to guide them to harbor at St. Simons, and they were reluctant to sail those uncharted waters. Oglethorpe bought the cargo of the sloop Midnight, and sent it on to the Frederica site with 30 single men under the leadership of Mr. William Horton and a Mr. Tanner. Loaded aboard were cannon, arms, ammunition and entrenching tools, for in spite of the apparent tranquility of these coastal islands, who could know what might happen?

Col. Oglethorpe himself sailed the inland waterway in a scout boat and reached St. Simons on the morning of February 18, 1736. The Midnight was already waiting in the

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Margaret Davis Cate, “Fort Frederica and the Battle of Bloody Marsh,” Georgia Historical Quarterly, XXVII, no. 2, 111-112, Cited hereafter as Cate.
Plate 8 – "A Map of the Islands of St. Simon and Jekyll"
harbor. Oglethorpe lost no time in landing men and supplies, and starting work on palmetto-thatched booths for storage of supplies and temporary housing for the colonists. The very next day work began on the fort. Back at Cockspur, the ship captains still refused to bring their vessels to Frederica. The colonists, men, women and children, must make a 6-day journey in open boats down the waterway – or settle at Savannah. They chose Frederica. The trip was made successfully, and on March 16 Oglethorpe reported the presence at Frederica of 44 men and 72 women and children.\(^{28}\)

The site selected for the fort was a bluff on the western shore of St. Simons Island. It was on the inland waterway at a strategic spot where the river made two sharp turns so that approaching vessels would be at the mercy of Frederica’s guns; “for three miles below Frederica \([i.e., \text{the approach from Spanish Florida}]\) the river winds in such a manner that an enemy would be exposed to our fire without being able to return it.”\(^{29}\)

The fort progressed rapidly. Work began on February 19, 1736,\(^{30}\) when Oglethorpe “traced out a Fort with 4 Bastions by cutting up the Turf from the ground, dug enough of the Ditch & raised enough of the Rampart for a Sample for the men to work upon.”\(^{31}\) Little more than a month later Fort Frederica was almost finished, and a battery of guns commanded the river. As time and opportunity presented, the work was strengthened.

The town, according to the Georgia historian Jones, was “in the midst of an Indian field\(^{32}\) containing between thirty and forty acres of cleared land. The grass in this field yielded an excellent turf which was freely used in sodding the parapet of the fort. The bluff upon which it stood rose about ten feet above high-water mark, was dry and

\(^{28}\) Cate, 114-117; Diplomatic History, 36.

\(^{29}\) Colonial Records of the State of Georgia (Atlanta 1904-1916), v. 28, pt. 1, p. 215, cited in Cate, 117. All citations to volumes of the Colonial Records numbered beyond 26 refer to unpublished manuscript volumes. Hereafter the Colonial Records will be cited as CR. To save space, volume and page numbers will be listed respectively thus: 28/215.

\(^{30}\) Francis Moore, “A Voyage to Georgia Begun in the Year 1735; Containing an Account of the Settling the Town of Frederica . . .” (London 1744), in Collections of the Georgia Historical Society, I, 109. Collections of the Georgia Historical Society will be cited hereafter as Collections.

\(^{31}\) Collections, III, 15.

\(^{32}\) Oglethorpe had negotiated with the Creek Indian chief Tomachichi for St. Simons. “They agreed,” the Founder reported, “yt we shall possess ye Island of St. Simons, but reserved that of St. Catharines to themselves.” (CR 21/103)
Plate 9 – Miller’s 1796 “Plan of the Town of Frederica”
sandy, and exhibited a level expanse of about a mile into the interior of the island.”

An area of about 35 acres along the river was laid out in town streets, blocks and lots. The main street ran east and west, halving the town; its western terminus was the fort on the river bank; near the eastern end of the street was the burial lot. By the end of March each family had a “Bower” thatched with palmetto leaves, and these temporary structures were invariably located to the rear of the lots, saving the front of the property for the later erection of permanent homes. While some planting went forward immediately, it was late in the season for extensive agriculture, so Oglethorpe put many of the men on the payroll and set them to work on the fortifications and public buildings. On the southern end of Frederica bluff, Point Battery was thrown up, mounting a dozen 12-pounders.

Succeeding to the religious office once held by the martyr Velascola was Charles Wesley, the first Protestant minister of the Frederica settlement, as well as Oglethorpe’s secretary and the Secretary for Indian Affairs. For young Wesley, this was his first ministry. There was no house for public worship, and he preached in the open air. For about six months Charles Wesley stayed at Frederica, then left for England, carrying Oglethorpe’s dispatches to the Trustees. But John Wesley, who had been sent to Savannah by the Society for Propagating the Gospel, stayed almost two years in Georgia. On several occasions he was in Frederica to carry on the religious services begun by his brother.

33 C. C. Jones, Jr., “Dead Towns of Georgia,” Collections, IV, 55-56; also p. 53. (Cited hereafter as “Jones”.) Jones continued: “Surrounded by beautiful forests of live-oak, water oaks, laurel, bay, cedar, sweet-gum, sassafras, and pines, festooned with luxuriant vines, (among which those bearing the Fox-grape and the Muscadines were peculiarly pleasing to the Colonists,) and abounding in deer, rabbits, raccoons, squirrels, wild-turkeys, turtle-doves, redbirds, mocking birds, and rice birds, with wide extended marshes frequented by wild geese, ducks, herons, curlews, cranes, plovers and marsh-hens, -- the waters teeming with fishes, crabs, shrimps, and oysters, and the island fanned by South-East breezes with the regularity of the trade winds – the strangers were charmed with their new home.” Jones’ description is based upon Moore, Collections, I, 115-120. A contemporary description of St. Simons reads thus: “The Land of the Island is very fertile, chiefly Oak and Hickory, intermixed with Savannah’s, and old Indian Fields; and is about Forty-five Miles in Circumference.” (CR 3/387).

34 CR 21/103; Collections, I, 114-115; IV, 54-55; Cate, 119.

35 Cate, “John and Charles Wesley,” Flags of Five Nations, 43-45. Charles Wesley organized the “Holy Club”, which grew into the Methodist Episcopal Church, at Oxford early in the 18th century. John Wesley, the elder brother, later became the
Among the colonists was William Horton, a man of gentle blood who later went to Jekyll Island to carve out a plantation and operate the first Georgia brewery. Horton was the caliber man to be placed in charge of military affairs during Oglethorpe’s absence. Francis Moore, King’s storekeeper, secretary and town recorder, was an observant and valuable member of the little community. Dr. Thomas Hawkins, both medico and bailiff, has the aid of midwife Elizabeth Harrison on birthing cases – if indeed she did not supplant him entirely in such matters. Silversmith John Terry, the Samuel Pepys of Frederica, became town recorder. Samuel Auspourger was the surveyor, who had much to do with building the fort. There was Sam Perkins, none too reputable bailiff; Tom Sumner the tythingman, Campbell the tailor, Moore the tanner, Levally the shoemaker, Hughes the candlemaker, Stronaugh, King’s Armorer, carpenter Tom Walker, an even, as Mrs. Cate records, one John Bull, laborer in the king’s magazine. Not the least of these men were framers, such as Daniel Cannon, whose name is today preserved at Cannons Point, and Henry Myers, an industrious Dutchman.  

Work at Frederica had hardly started when word arrived that a road from Savannah to nearby (16 miles by water) Darien had been surveyed. And in the middle of March Oglethorpe left his people busy at Frederica and traveled southward “to see where his Majesty’s Dominions and the Spaniards joyn.” With him went Tomochichi, chief of the region, leading two score chosen warriors in a pair of scout boats, and a piragua under the command of Capt. Hugh Mackay. Highlanders and a detachment from the King’s leader of the movement, and exerted a profound influence on contemporary life and thought. Charles Wesley, though well known as a preacher, is best remembered for the hymns he wrote, including the universally sung “Jesus, Lover of My Soul.” Christ Church, which stands near the old town limits of Frederica today, is, according to Mrs. Cate, a direct descendant of the church organized by the Wesleys at Frederica 200 years ago. Incidentally, two other members of the “Holy Club” also served at Frederica; George Whitefield and Benjamin Ingham.

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36 Cate, 121-122.
37 The piragua was usually a long, flat-bottomed boat of 20 to 35 tons. Undecked, with a small forecastle and cabin, and stepping two removable masts, it was rigged something like a schooner, and had one or more pairs of oars besides. It was apparently developed from an earlier style large Indian dugout. These speedy, shallow draft vessels had been much used by the Spaniards in patrolling the waters of the inland waterway. The English usually called them “periaguas”, “piriaugours”, or similar corrupt spelling of the Spanish word, which in turn apparently derived from Cariban or Arawakan. The French form, “pirogue”, is sometimes used. Cf. Collection, I, 112; Chatelain, op. cit., 40.
Independent Company of South Carolina were along, carrying provisions and the ever-present entrenching tools. On the northwestern point of Cumberland Island, Oglethorpe marked out Fort St. Andrews, left Mackay and his men to build it, and continued south with the Indians to reconnoiter the Spanish outpost on the St. Johns River.  

Oglethorpe said Tomochichi told him that “the Lands as far as Augustine [San Agustín] belonged to the Creeks but that the Spaniards had taken forcible and unjust possession of it.” Oglethorpe was not one to argue the point. Tomochichi and his braves brooded over their loss. “It was with much difficulty,” wrote Oglethorpe, “I could prevent them from attacking the Spaniards.”

In order to hold his overly-anxious Indians in check, Oglethorpe established a marine garrison at the mouth of the St. Johns, based on San Juan Island (now called Fort George Island), the “Southwardmost point of his Majesty’s Dominions in North America which I called St. George’s Point”. The Spaniards were at first happy to receive this protection, but, Oglethorpe reported, they unaccountably changed their minds, and soon began to make things warm for his “Southwardmost” patrol. When Oglethorpe later revisited the boundary, he found his men mutinied and moving back to safer territory. He “resettled” them, went back to Frederica again for cannon, men, and provisions, and returned once more to the St. Johns to find Capt. Hermsdorff, commandant of the river patrol, fortified on the site of which (in British judgment) must be the “old Fort which was erected by Sir Walter Raleigh’s first Colony when Sir Francis Drake took St. Augustine”. Thus was born Fort St. George, a most painful thorn in Spanish ribs. It was a serious threat to Spanish communication with west Florida.

Other fortifications were feverishly thrown up in the first year or two of occupation. Fort William was built on southwest Cumberland Island. On the mainland, just across from Frederica, was Bachelor’s Redoubt, manned by rangers, and on the Altamaha a few miles above the redoubt was Mount Venture, another ranger station.

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38 Collections, III, 29; 58-59; Cate, 122.
39 Collections, III, 29.
40 Id., III, 29,33; I, 133.
41 Id., III, 33-35; see also id., I, 137, 140-141; Diplomatic History, 38-39, 51-52, 119-120.
On the future site of Brunswick, Capt. Mark Carr had a plantation with a corporal’s guard for protection. There were other small outposts.

On St. Simons, in addition to Fort Frederica, there was a guardhouse and a corporal’s guard on the west shore at Pike’s Bluff; 18 soldiers with their families were settled on the northwest point of the island at Newhampton (now Hampton or Butler Point), which was one of several small villages on the erstwhile Spanish island. Hardly less important than Frederica itself was Delegal’s battery, which after 1737 grew into the extensive layout of Fort St. Simons – the “Soldiers’ Fort” or “The Camp”, on the southern tip of the island commanding the harbor inlet.42

No better (nor more candid) contemporary analysis of the strategy behind the founding of Frederica and its related forte has been found than this extract from the 1736 official “Account Showing the Progress of the Colony of Georgia”:

“. . . the Trustees thought it prudent to strengthen the Southern Part of the Province by making a Settlement on the Altamaha River, to which they were strongly induced, by a Memorial sent to his Majesty from the Governor and Assembly of South Carolina, dated the 9th of April, 1734, wherein, after thanking his Majesty . . . for establishing the Colony of Georgia, and after representing the Practices of the French to seduce the Indians in Amity with South Carolina, the Attention of the French to the Improvement of their Settlements, and their late Inlargement of them nearer to Carolina; the defenceless Condition of their Province, and ruinous Situation of the West-India Trade in case the French should possess themselves of Carolina; they add, That the Harbours and Ports of Carolina and of Georgia enable his Majesty to be absolute Master of the Passage through the Gulph of Florida, and to impede, at his Pleasure, the Transportation home of the Spanish Treasure, which should his Majesty’s Enemies possess, would then prove so many convenient Harbours for them to annoy a great Part of the British Trade to America, as well as that which is carried on through the Gulph from Jamaica”43

Oglethorpe’s departure for America in 1735 had been the occasion for a promise by British ministers44 that the Colonel’s activities would be conducive to the “most

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43 CR 3/386-387.
44 As the diplomatic crises of 1739 approached, Spain was ruled (according to British opinion) by “three or four mean,
perfect understanding” between “Carolina and Florida.” The Spaniards, instructed to contribute to this praiseworthy design, were nonplussed when “Georgians” attacked a Spanish fortification within 8 leagues of San Agustín the Georgians built a fort (Frederica) “at the mouth of the River of St. Simon.” Ambassador Geraldino presented these matters in London with some force, evincing considerable disappointment in the aforementioned promise by the British ministers.

Faced with providing a satisfactory answer for Newcastle, Secretary of State, to give to Geraldino, the Georgia Trustees flatly denied everything. The March attack on the Spanish fort must have been made by Indians “in Revenge of Injuries and Hostilities offered to them by the Spaniards”; for Georgia forts were “all within the Territories of the King of Great Britain, and erected at the Desire of the Indians . . . “ Newcastle, however, did not present matters so baldly; his reply to Geraldino was noncommittal. The English had nothing to lose by delay, and at that moment Oglethorpe was negotiating a very satisfactory treaty with Sánchez in America.45

Had Oglethorpe been content with the Altamaha as a boundary, Commissioner Charles Dempsey’s mission might have been completely successful. But Oglethorpe had determined to colonize effectively all land to the Altamaha and to fortify even beyond. He intended to insist on the St. Johns River as the south boundary of His Britannic Majesty’s dominions.

Dempsey and Maj. William Richards set out for San Agustín in February 1736. Symbolically, their yawl capsized. After a struggle through the surf and a walk of several leagues through the sand, they reached the Spanish capital in rather bedraggled stubborn people with little minds and limited understandings.” This pungent description included Sebastian de la Quadra, Foreign Minister, Joseph de la Quintana, Secretary of Marine and Indies, and Casimiro Uztariz, economist and First commissioner of the War Office. For the English, Sir Robert Walpole, the Minister, was personally easy, good natured, and desirous of peace almost to a fault. He was at the head of a relentless political machine in an age when “standards of political corruption,” to quote Lanning, “were different from if not worse than those of today.” The principal Secretary of State was the Duke of Newcastle, a well balanced official whose influence was conspicuous. The ambassadorial position at Madrid was filled by Sir Benjamin Keene, fat, good natured and agreeable, resolute and adroit in a crisis, but somewhat handicapped by being both representative of the English crown and agent of the South Sea Company. His counterpart in London was Tomás Geraldine. See Diplomatic History, 124-126.

45 Diplomatic History, 88-94
condition. Here, in contrast to nature’s boisterous welcome to Florida, Dempsey was received with typical Spanish civility. And typically, nothing was accomplished. Three times in less than a year Dempsey went to San Agustín. Remarkably enough, each time he was cast ashore by the waves. If he gained anything other than knowledge of seamanship, it was delay.

But thanks to Oglethorpe’s stratagems, Spanish scouts saw coastal Georgia as dangerously well fortified and well manned. A Spanish delegation, received by Oglethorpe with considerable flourish aboard ship (to keep them from examining his forts too closely), visited Georgia in 1736. As they drank to the healths of their respective sovereigns, the 15 guns in the battery on St. Simons roared a salute, followed by the guns of St. Andrews, and the echoing rumble of cannon from Frederica and Darien. It was but one of many convincing demonstrations. The Spaniards returned home more respectful than they had come, and with them Charles Dempsey went again to negotiate a treaty.

But to Dempsey at San Agustín came news that men, munitions and money had arrived for the Spanish. Havana’s Governor Güemes had sent Engineer Antonio de Arredondo – a man not dissimilar to Dempsey – to talk to Oglethorpe. There was mounting evidence of a project to demolish Georgia. To Frederica sailed Arredondo, fortified with historical and logical evidence of Spanish claims to back up the demand that the English remove as far north as St. Helena Sound. Historical and logical Arredondo’s argument may have been, but it was not convincing to the Colonel. Oglethorpe replied with counter demands. The Spanish must evacuate all lands to the latitude of 29 degrees, for had not Francis Drake occupied the country that far south by capturing San Agustín in 1586?

Eventually Arredondo, Oglethorpe and Dempsey compromised. Fort St. George at the mouth of the St. Johns should be dismantled and the island itself remain unpopulated; all hostilities should cease; boundary disputes, they agreed, should be referred to Europe. Dempsey obtained the signature of Florida’s hapless Governor Don Francisco Moral Sánchez upon this Treaty of Neutrality. Madrid repudiated the treaty, and Sánchez was subsequently called back to Spain where, according to rumor, he was
hanged.\textsuperscript{46}

The latter news, however, was a somewhat unexpected incident of the future. “All matters with the Spaniards are regulated,” Oglethorpe wrote jubilantly, “and the governor of Augustine contented. Therefore all being safe I shall set out immediately for Europe.”\textsuperscript{47} Oglethorpe, however, realized that when the 1736 treaty was rejected or violated, he would need more strength in Georgia. He got it. His report on Georgia affairs was received with satisfaction by the Trustees, who fully appreciated the service he had rendered the colony.

Back in Florida, Oglethorpe’s antagonist had arrived in the person of Manuel de Montiano, new Governor of Florida. Montiano quickly achieved a grasp of the situation. A great plan for reannexation of Spanish land was already past the first stages. Thousands of troops were assembling in Havana; 400 came to Florida. Then at the last minute, orders suspending the campaign reached Havana. Again the matter would be decided in Europe.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{46} Id., 36-38, 40-48; Bolton, 74.
\textsuperscript{47} CR 21/236, cited in \textit{Diplomatic History}, 47.
\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Diplomatic History}, 47-50; Bolton, 75. In October 1735, when Georgia seemed both an established and increasing menace to Florida, a man named John Savy, alias Miguel Wall, appeared in Paris with information alleged to be of greatest importance to Spain. Wall was formerly an English officer, but apparently had fled as a criminal from Charleston to Georgia, from which province he escaped in 1735. With utmost secrecy and intrigue, Wall proposed to rout the English with a few troops under the command of a Spaniard, and to reduce Carolina and Georgia to satisfactorily Spanish limits. Early in the summer of 1736 he was sent to Cuba, where Governor Güemes, charged with supporting San Agustín and impeding English settlement, was instructed to use Wall’s experience to best advantage. “Oglethorpe’s old dictum,” says Lanning, “that the land belonged to the country with the best army now recoiled upon him to send shivers up and down his spine.” From May to July of 1736 were especially anxious weeks for Oglethorpe, seeking reinforcements from the mainland colonies for his skeletonized forces. But Güemes did not trust Wall. England learned of the plan, and Wall was suspected to be the informant. Yet the project might have been attempted had not the orders from Spain postponed it. Wall himself later found his way back to England and fought against the Spanish during the War of Jenkins’ Ear. He deserted, was arrested by English and – disappeared. The news of Wall’s intrigue and the proposed attack on Georgia in 1736-1737 very much helped Oglethorpe to win his demands for strengthening Georgia. In evaluating Wall’s part in the picture, Lanning writes: “the diplomatic haggling which John Savy [Wall] accentuated served to foment the agitation which resulted in the desultory War of Jenkins’ Ear. The incidents which Savy sponsored had far more immediate bearing upon the international situation than the more or less uncertain removal of an ear eight years prior to the outbreak of war. It was merely a capricious circumstance of history which gave to the
7. THE ISSUES EXPLAINED

Tomás Geraldino, the Spanish minister in London, was sure that by judicious play of opposition politics he could thwart Oglethorpe, ruin the Trustees, and force the abandonment of Georgia. Geraldino knew that the British Prime Minister, Sir Robert Walpole, and his cohorts were interested in only the political strength of the Georgia faction – not the welfare of the colony, nor its importance as a boundary fortification. Walpole evidently did not believe that Georgia was of any advantage to England. Consequently he thought that the Georgia charter gave the Trustees too much power and made them independent of the crown.

Geraldino’s weakness lay in his ignorance of Oglethorpe’s ability. Biding his time, Oglethorpe shrewdly, swiftly and silently maneuvered to gain the ear of the king. And when Col. Oglethorpe finally returned to Georgia in 1738, it was with a regiment and the title of General and Commander-in-Chief of the military forces of South Carolina and Georgia. Yet Walpole managed to assuage Spain’s fears at even this action by a promise that no hostilities against Florida were intended, and the ones left to worry were the Floridians. 49

The Georgia question was important, but it was only half of a very large problem. The root of the differences between Spain and England at this period grew out of the soil of commerce in the Americas. The Spanish colonial system was monopolistic. Had Spain possessed the resources to supply her monopoly, there might have been no room for foreigners. But trade between Spanish colonies was usually supplied by the galleons ferrying back and forth across the Atlantic, with Cartagena, Puerto Bello, Vera Cruz and Havana as ports of call. (See plate 3). When this system broke down, as it sometimes did, the colonies were left in straitened circumstances, and could not but welcome the “assistance” of foreign vessels. By the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) England gained the right to supply Spanish colonies with slaves and to send an annual cargo of 500 tons to Spanish ports. This paltry concession was not enough. Smuggling increased.

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49 Diplomatic History, 50-51, 86; Bolton, 76; Cate, 123.
European merchants found many ways to circumvent legalities. Their goods were sometimes carried under the reputed ownership of Spaniards. Dependent on individual honesty, such trade was precarious. English merchants sometimes found themselves divested of goods with neither money nor explanation. Seizure was the penalty upon proof of undeclared or illegally declared goods. Business often turned out to be both costly and vexatious.

The Jamaicans, off the southern coast of Cuba, were in a naturally strategic location to profit by Caribbean trade. Jamaican sloops could suddenly appear at the mouths of streams between the Río de la Hacha and the Chagres, and runs between Mexico, Puerto Rico, Hispaniola and Cuba, serving settlements off the path of the galleons, proved profitable, especially since the Jamaicans avoided the numerous Spanish taxes imposed upon legitimate trade. They could effect a quick turnover in flour, manufactured goods, woolens and Negroes, and in doing so they could undersell the market. The Jamaica sloop trade was conservatively estimated at some £300,000 per year at the outset of the 18th century.

Furthermore, breasting the gulfstream from the north came a steady flow of vessels from Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania and New England, to sell flour and other provisions at Curacao and St. Thomas, to the French, and to the Spaniards themselves. These hardy Americans were loved by the Jamaicans as little as they loved honest Spanish officials, but of such enterprise were these Americans, one contemporary declared, that “neither the Laws of their Islands, nor the Laws of England, nor the Laws of other Nations, can restrain them from trading wherever they foresee Advantage.” Men from England, New England and Jamaica blithely cut logwood on the forbidden shores of Campeche and Honduras with arms close by to fight Spanish soldiery that might swoop down to kill them or put them in chains.

England’s South Sea Company, which contracted for the limited Spanish trade permitted after the Treaty of Utrecht, was unsympathetic to the freelance traders, inasmuch as Company profits turned to loss in the face of rival activities by smuggling compatriots.

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50 Popular Prejudices against the Convention and Treaty with Spain, Examin’d and Answer’d, 23, cited in Diplomatic History, 128.
Plate 10 – 18th Century Diplomacy?
Spanish officials tried to regulate the Caribbean commerce by a rigorous coast guard. But the guarda costa often became careless in discriminating between smugglers and ships plying in good faith between England and the English West Indies. Sometimes the Spanish coastguardsmen even looked like pirates to English seamen. Spanish courts confirmed captures by condemning ships and cargoes and impressing English sailors thus touching England at two very tender spots – pride and pocketbook.  

After the founding of Georgia, there had been some five years of relative quiet. Then in 1737, the Spanish Queen Elizabeth Farnese, trying to get English help in the seizure of the Italian Ducky of Tuscany, was refused. As a consequence, guarda costa vigilance increased. Scores of British merchants turned in claims against Spain. They resented the implication that the discovery of logwood; coconuts and pieces of eight (all of which could be found in British possessions) meant illicit commerce, but perhaps they were most resentful of the way Spain interpreted the “right of search.” It is worth passing notice that the screeching anti-Spanish motto of “'No search,' my Lords, is a cry that runs from the sailor to the merchant, and from the merchant to Parliament, my Lords, it ought to reach the throne.”

This same cry was uttered again in American waters in later years, and under different circumstances. Be that as it may, for many years England’s ministry had been trying to establish the point that such goods were not proof of illegal trade. The attempts had met with but indifferent success. Spain insisted unequivocally that while British subjects might have a right to free commerce and navigation in the West Indies, if they altered their course “without necessity in order to draw near to the Spanish coasts,” they were naturally liable to seizure and confiscation.

The matter gradually resolved into a fairly clear cut definition of the two opposing views. English merchants insisted that unless they were actually caught smuggling, despite proof of their having engaged in questionable commerce and the presence of incriminating goods aboard, they were unjustly taken. The Spanish assumed a right to seize ships continually trading in their ports as well as to search them on the high seas for proof of fraud. Between these two opposing theses both governments were continually embarrassed. By 1737 the embarrassment was acute.

8. PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMACY

The news of Madrid’s repudiation of the Sánchez-Oglethorpe Treaty reached Oglethorpe in England. Diplomatic affairs were at a point where Spain agreed to a

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51 Diplomatic History, 126-131; Bolton and Marshall, 361.
52 Parliamentary History, x, 754, cited in Diplomatic History, 138.
53 Quadra to Keene, 10/21 Feb. 1737, Parliamentary History, x, 1181-1182, cited in Diplomatic History, 134-135.
54 Diplomatic History, 135
convention of commissioners to settle Georgia boundaries and maritime matters. Thus the convention idea replaced the stillborn Georgia Treaty of 1736.

And now for the sake of legality it was suddenly important to convince Newcastle and Walpole that Fort St. George at the mouth of the St. Johns had never been given up, for these two gentlemen were of a mind to relinquish to the persistent Spaniards all of Georgia they could. Oglethorpe, who had undertaken without success to convince the Spaniards that Fort St. George was on the Altamaha instead of the St. Johns by confusing it with Fort King George (which had been abandoned in 1727), was not above victimizing English ministers in England where the Spaniards in Florida had been too sharp for him. His soldiers were too illiterate and too distant to contradict him. The Trustees, who knew no better, would have supported the Machiavellian ruse in which the General proposed to indulge. Naming a few forts which had been demolished, the great frontiersman, after deliberately speaking of “Fort King George or Fort St. George”, subtly continued to draw the veil of haziness over the entire question by holding that the dismantled fortress stood upon “that Part of the Altamaha nearest to the river which the Spaniards call St. Johns.” Thus was the legality of the English title to the St. Johns established. It was at the price of duping the Prime Minister.55

Preparatory to the meeting of the convention, Oglethorpe had furnished information he thought would be most useful to the British commissioners in settling the boundary differences. His cardinal point was a staggering one from the Spanish point of view: since the English were in actual and quiet possession of Georgia, it was incumbent upon Spain to make out and prove her rights! The implication was that the Spaniards would have to show superior force. Spain seemed ready to do so. By 1738 there was news in England that warlike preparations were under way in Spain; ships began to move from Cadiz to the West Indies under utmost secrecy. The English were disturbed; but Oglethorpe’s departure for Georgia at this time was not less disturbing to the Spaniards.56

Meanwhile, the matter of British merchant claims against Spain was pressing. Official Spanish efforts to redress these claims were both faint and fruitless. England began to prepare for war. At this opportune moment Robert Jenkins of the Rebecca

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55 Id., 120,135
56 Id., 122-123, 136-137, 142.
appeared before Parliament, to exhibit his detached and pickled ear. This ear, he claimed, had been removed some seven or eight years ago off Florida by the Spanish coast guard Captain Juan de León Fandino. Cried Jenkins: as Fandino handed back the ear he said, “Carry it to your king and tell his majesty that if he were present I would serve him in the same manner.” Jenkins’ speech, whether prearranged or not, was under the auspices of the war faction; and if the relation were not wholly truthful, it did cause high excitement.57

In this turmoil, the convention of Pardo was finally agreed upon and signed, January 14, 1739. Two commissioners of each country were to met in Madrid to arrange the issue of the depredations and to settle the boundaries of Georgia.

The Spanish commissaries were instructed to negotiate on the basis of the Treaty of 1670, in hopes that the English could be confined to the territory they then held. Instructions to the British commissioners were apparently less clear, and confused by a number of issues. Domestic politics as well as the affairs of the South Sea Company entered the picture. Some of Georgia’s Trustees subscribed to Walpole’s casual attitude about Georgia: “if we may have peace with Spain by giving up Georgia, it were a good thing.”58 But others of the Trustees were not so timid, and the Georgia faction had been skilful enough to sell its support of the Convention to Walpole for a large subsidy to Georgia, which would naturally be of great benefit to Oglethorpe in his plans for the province. Walpole had looked at the larger problem, and wanted peace. To certain Trustees he gave the information that the Spaniards would give up everything, even searching English ships, if Georgia were surrendered to them; and he could see no good reason why an inconsiderable part of the province might not be conceded to Spain without injury to either Georgia or England. The Trustees, in fighting mood, replied that Sir Robert was ignorant of both the situation of the colony and its importance. Georgia included the harbor of Jekyll Sound, the best on the entire continent. They decided to lay a formidable array of papers before Parliament to

57 Id., 144-145, 176; Bolton, 78. Fandino, no ordinary captain, but a Spanish don, deserves a more illustrious niche than history has given him. It was Fandino who brought 6 galliots from Havana to San Agustín on the eve of Oglethorpe’s siege of the Florida capital. These galliots were instrumental in holding the British forces at bay. Fandino’s service throughout this period was conspicuous. See Collections VII, pt 1, 49 ff.
58 Diplomatic History, 150.
prevent the possible surrender of any part of Georgia. Walpole would not allow it until the Convention was signed, whereupon the Trustees had resolved to oppose the Convention. Walpole at once called upon Col. Martin Bladen of the Board of Trade. Bladen backed the Trustees in saying that England had a right to Georgia, could prove it, and that he himself would undertake the proof.

“Then,” said Sir Robert, “Bu G—d the Spaniards shall not have it.”

In the drift toward war, the protagonists of conflict defended Georgia nobly. The newest of England’s colonies could serve not only as a buffer to shield the Carolinas, but also as a commercial substitute for European rivals:

Now bid they Merchants bring they Wine no more
Or from the Iberian or the Tuscan shore;
No more they need the Hungarian Vineyards drain
And France herself may drink her best Champaign.

In the glowing language of the Trustees, Georgia became a veritable paradise. Such misrepresentation or false conception brought things to Georgia that she might otherwise have missed – an orphan house, appropriations, increased garrisons, the extension of the boundary to Fort St. George on the St. Johns. And while some Englishmen had doubts about England’s course, there was no changing it; as Newcastle said, “I fancy however the right may be, it will now be pretty difficult to give up Georgia.

59 CR 5/121, cited in Diplomatic History, 153; see also id., 149-151, 164. A contemporary and succinct statement of the English position is given in Objects of the Present War, 169ff. Writes the anonymous author: “According to the Charter of King Charles II, dated June 30, 1665, which fixes the Limits of South Carolina at 29 Degrees of Latitude, San Agustin is built within the English Dominions, and consequently belongs to us; as a Forfeiture. It is true, the Spaniards say, that Grant is an Invasion of their Right; they pretending a Right of Possession to all the Coast as high as Virginia. But if first Discovery gives a Title, which is that whereon the Spaniards generally ground their Pretensions to their American Dominions, we shall find that it belongs to us: For Sir Sebastian Cabot discovered it about the Year 1497; tho’ afterwards [admits the author with some magnanimity] it was more thoroughly navigated by John Ponce de Leon, a Spaniard from Puerto Rico in 1512.” (Objects, etc., 182.)

60 True and Historical Narrative of the Colony of Georgia in America, xii, cited in Diplomatic History, 183.

Even before the patriots and imperialists knew a word of the convention, they were resolved to ruin it. “England was never more misled and unreasonable,” according to a contemporary.\(^{62}\) The enthusiasm and petitions of merchants for war, eyes cast longingly in the direction of Zacatecas and Potosí, Newcastle’s promise of a share in the booty to American colonists who enlisted— all lend credence to the story of exploitative designs of certain English merchants and soldiers of fortune on Spanish America. Sentiment of merchant, political liberator, soldier of fortune and humiliated nationalist is crowded into these lines:

Our Merchants and ears a strange pother have made
With losses sustained in their ships and their trade;
But now they may laugh and quite banish their fears,
Nor mourn for lost liberty, riches and ears.

To this quatrain, Pope mechanically added:

And own the Spaniards did a waggish thing
Who cropped our ears and sent them to the king.\(^{63}\)

In this state of affairs, the more reasonable among the Spanish advocated sitting quiet (since their ports were well fortified) and thus preventing extraordinary strain on an exhausted treasury while the English expended their energy and resources on an expensive and unsuccessful war. In the light of this knowledge, it was uniformly urged in England that most damage could be done in America.\(^{64}\)

It is significant that without the possibility of troops and naval assets from the North American colonies, and without the fear of losing Georgia, there would probably

\(^{62}\) An Appeal to the Unprejudiced Concerning the Present Discontents, 6, cited in Diplomatic History, 177.

\(^{63}\) Diplomatic History, 178, citing R. Wright, Caricature History of the Georges, 116, and Alexander Pope, Poetical Works, I, 300.

\(^{64}\) Diplomatic History, 180. Cf. Objects of the Present War, a rather typical contemporary English publication, which significantly begins with a detailed definition of Spanish wealth in the Americas, and follows with a minute discussion of Spanish treasure fleet routes and timetables. Each important Spanish colonial city is described in all available detail, and the history of British buccaneering attacks on them is told in a way calculated to increase any Englishman’s patriotism. Spanish vessels leaving Havana “carry away with them more Riches than is to be found in any other Part of the World, the Total of their Cargo being seldom less than Seven Millions Sterling.” (Objects, 169.)
never have been a War of Jenkins’ Ear. But in the English colonies on the Atlantic, the prospect of stern interference with intercolonial trade caused as much trepidation as the idea of a Franco-Spanish diplomacy during the hectic period. For it had already been shown in America that the Gaul was a worse neighbor than the Iberian. “I must not omit to inform you Gentlemen,” spoke Governor Gabriel Johnston of North Carolina to his fellow colonial governors at the outset of the war, “that the French and Spaniards have taken of late uncommon pains to debauch all the friendly Indians who live in the neighborhood of his majesty’s Dominions.”

The English mob howled, the merchants petitioned, and the Trustees agitated. True, there was a more sober group who saw the picture clearly and realistically, unillumined by the dazzling light of conquest. Such violences as had occurred were the crimes of private persons – piracies, not hostilities. Only the refusal of Spain to do England justice would make them acts of state. Walpole and the peace faction were overwhelmed only after Spain withheld payment of £95,000 in claims until the counter claim of £68,000 against the South Sea Company was adjusted. Finally, on May 17, 1739, Spain suspended the Company’s contract. Admiral Haddock was forthwith ordered to Spain’s back door. Capt. Sir Yelverton Peyton was ordered to convey Oglethorpe’s regiment to Georgia. On June 14, privateering was authorized. There was no hope for agreement by the commissioners. Each nation wised to negotiate where injured, but never where it was the aggressor. Negotiations broke off by July 14, 1739. Newcastle and the king went into the war faction, and Walpole then helplessly gave Vernon instructions to sail against Spanish America. England declared war on October 23, 1739; Spain, on November 28. Oglethorpe’s dictum to dissemble and to hold, by force if necessary, now became the exclusive title whereby Georgia was retained in the British Empire.

The attack was directed almost exclusively at Spain’s commerce and her colonies. The main target was the Caribbean area, with Havana at the center and Puerto Bello, Cartagena and San Agustín on the perimeter. Vice-Admiral Vernon, “Old Grog,” was given the center of the naval stage; Oglethorpe had the land theater.

With a small fleet Vernon sailed to Jamaica, then on the Isthus to capture Puerto

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65 *Diplomatic History*, 182-185.

Plate 11 - Campaigns in the War of Jenkin’s Ear

**CAMPAIGNS IN THE WAR OF JENKIN’S EAR**

**AMERICAN COLONIAL PARTICIPANTS**

- New England
- Connecticut
- Rhode Island
- New York
- New Jersey
- Pennsylvania
- Maryland
- Virginia
- North Carolina

- English towns involved
- Spanish towns involved
- English moves
- Spanish moves

**Merchantmen from N. America and sloops from Jamaica traded legitimately with the British West Indies and illegitimately with Spanish colonies.**

**VERNON’S COMMAND AT CARTAGENA**

- English Regiments: 10,000
- Sailors &Marines: 900
- Americans: 3,000
- Jamaicans: 500

Total: 12,000 men
Bello -- “Fine Port”, said to have been named by Columbus in 1504, the north end of the Spanish causeway across the isthmus, and the receptacle for Peruvian and Chilean treasure. England was hysterical with the victory. A medal was struck bearing the words “Brave Vernon made us free; no search upon the seas shall be!” So Vernon won fame, and it was up to Oglethorpe to emulate him by capturing San Agustín.

9. OGLETHORPE MAKES READY

After a two year absence in England, Oglethorpe landed again on St. Simons in September 1736. Now he had the arms and the men to protect the Georgia colony, and he was General and Commander-in-Chief of the military forces in South Carolina and Georgia, as well as Colonel of his own regiment of infantry.

The first detachment of Oglethorpe’s Regiment, three companies under Lt. Col. James Cochran, had reached St. Simons in June 1738; the General brought the rest with him in September and stationed most of them at Fort St. Simons, on the south end of the island. This “Soldier’s Fort” soon developed into a military town covering some 200 acres, with about 120 clapboard houses for 500 men “with their wives and children and Officers”.

Soon after his arrival, Oglethorpe had a road cut through the woods from Frederica to Fort St. Simons to afford easy communication between. Before long there was mail service between these two settlements, as well as with Savannah, and through Savannah with Augusta, so that an important system of communications with all parts of the colony was early established.

The General set himself anew to the task of strengthening his forts and laying out new ones. Frederica was garrisoned by two companies of the Regiment – Oglethorpe’s and Capt. Hugh Mackay’s. At Fort St. Simons were four companies with their respective commandants, Lt. Col. Cochran, Maj. William Cook, Capt. Richard Norbury, and Capt. Alexander Heron. Detachments from these main stations went to the outlying positions. Headquarters was Frederica.

During these years of turmoil, Frederica was no place for the fainthearted. Some

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68 Cate, 123.
70 Cate, 123-125.
Plate 12 - St. Augustine, the Capital of East Florida.

Jeffers's 1759 map shows the wall surrounding the city as it appeared during the English occupation of St. Augustine. The wall was built soon after Moore's attack in 1702, and consisted of a ditch and earthwork planted with thick Spanish Baptize (cana). The wall extending from the fort westward was also palisaded. On the projecting redoubts, some of which were built of stone, cannon were mounted.
settlers built houses and cleared land only to find that frequent alarms, plus lack of labor, made it difficult to live on this frontier. Men commonly complained that infertile ground was included in their grants, and they left the settlement in spite of the glowing testimonials about sea island agriculture from some of the most reputable citizens of the province. Many discontented ones settled elsewhere in Georgia; a few went back to England. But the more hardy souls stuck by their investments.”

By 1740 the Frederica pattern was fairly clear. “Below the Town of Darien is the Town of Frederica,” a contemporary description summarizes, “where there is a strong Fort, and Store Houses; many good Buildings in the Town; some of which are Brick. There is a Meadow near adjoining that is ditched in, of about 320 Acres of which there is good Hay made. The People have not planted much there this Year, occasioned by the War, so near their doors; and chiefly Tradesmen, who make more by working, or selling to the Camp, than they can by Planting. There are some little Villages upon the Island of Saint Simons, and some very Handsome Houses built by the Officers of the Regiment, and there has been Potherbs, Pulse, and Fruit produced upon the Island, of great use toward supplying the Town and Garrison; But Corn, Beer and Meat they have from Elsewhere.” This, then shows the essentially military nature of the place. “No shipping or trade comes to the town,” said the Widow Germain.

Oglethorpe himself clearly appreciated the difficulties. “The Desertion of the People I have been obliged to remedy by filling up the Lots . . . and thereby keep up the Guard Dutys & Improvements,” he admitted. Withal, he remained an optimist; “I still think this Province is likelier to Succeed than ever and to become a strong Frontier.”

Frederica assumed more and more the aspect of a permanent, thriving town. Though the Spanish scares from time to time perturbed the inhabitants, some of them had already built substantial homes to replace their earlier “bowers”. There was at least one two-story brick-and-timber “magazine” or storehouse, evidently built within the fort walls, and late in 1738 the indentured servants began sawing timber for its third

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72 CR 35/311-312.
73 CR 5/171.
74 CR 23/23.
story, which was to be the chapel, completed about six months later.  

Early in November of 1738 Oglethorpe moved southward to supervise the construction of defenses at Fort St. Andrews on Cumberland Island. St. Andrews was garrisoned by troops detailed from Gibraltar, and for a limited time after their Georgia arrival, they had been allowed extra provisions from the King’s store. When these rations were discontinued the men became dissatisfied. One of them approached Oglethorpe, and such was his insolence that Capt. Mackay drew his sword on the fellow. Undaunted, the mutineer wrested the sword from Mackay, broke it in half, and flung the hilt at Mackay’s head. He rushed away to the barracks, only to return with guns and half a dozen other conspirators. He fired almost point blank at Oglethorpe. The ball whizzed by the General’s ear, and the powder scorched his face. Luckily, a second gun missed fire. A soldier drew his hanger and made for Oglethorpe, who parried the thrust with his own sword. As another officer came up and ran Oglethorpe’s opponent through, the mutineers fled. They were later captured court-martialed, and the leaders shot. It was fortunate for Georgia that the attempt on Oglethorpe’s life failed.

The very month (July 1739) that England and Spain finally halted the battles of diplomacy to make ready for the bloodier business of war, Gen. Oglethorpe set out for Coweta, an Indian town on the Chattahoochee River 300 miles from Frederica, for a conference with the Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws and others. As the king’s representative, Oglethorpe negotiated a treaty with these Indians that proved to be of vital importance, for it insured Indian aid in the hostilities which had begun even before the General returned to the coast. It was at Augusta on September 13, 1739 that Oglethorpe learned Spain and England were at war. Just a month later two Highlanders on Amelia Island were killed and mutilated by Spanish forces.

10. THE DRIVE INTO FLORIDA

Back at Frederica, Oglethorpe mustered some 200 men. On December 1, 1739, he made for the frontier. The foray took him down the St. Johns River to capture the small Spanish forts of Picolata and San Francisco de Pupo some 18 miles west of San

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75 CR 5/96, 190, 348; 22/360.
76 Jones, 73-74
77 Cate, 127; cf. Diplomatic History, 222.
Castillo de San Marcos overlooks the entrance to St. Augustine harbor. From the Castillo tower, the sentries looked out over the mighty Atlantic toward the treasure fleets on their way to Spain.
Agustin. At San Francisco, a cannon ball almost cut short the General’s illustrious career. But British troops occupied San Francisco on the west bank of the river; and Spanish communication from San Agustín with the west Florida granaries was severed.\textsuperscript{78}

With news of war, Oglethorpe had begun to strengthen Frederica with encircling defenses. “The Forts that I built were run to ruin, being mostly of earth,” he wrote pointedly to the Trustees, “having no means to repair them, and having also orders not to fortify . . .”\textsuperscript{79} By November 1739, before starting southward to avenge his Highlanders, and without waiting to discover whether he was going to be “repaid the Expences”, he began to build the town walls of Frederica. For, he wrote, “I could not think of leaving a Number of good houses and Merchants Goods, and which was more valuable, the Lives of Men, Women and Children, in an open Town at the Mercy of every Party, and the Inhabitants obliged either to fly to a Fort and leave their Effects, or suffer with them.”\textsuperscript{80}

By the end of December, the town fortifications had progressed to the point where Oglethorpe saw fit to describe the work. Frederica’s walls were to be “half an Hexagon, with two Bastions, and two half Bastions and Towers after Mensieur Vauban’s method upon the point of each Bastion. . . . I hope in three months it will be entirely finished, and in that time not only to fortify here, but to repair the Forts on Amelia and Saint Andrews.”\textsuperscript{81} His hopes were at least partially disappointed for more than a year later “the works making round . . . the Town” were described as “poor and unfinish’d.”\textsuperscript{82} Now Newcastle authorized an expedition against San Agustín. Oglethorpe planned it.

In May 1740 his expedition set out. There were about 2,000 mean in it. Half of them were Indians, and the remainder were made up from Oglethorpe’s Regiment, English Rangers, Highland Rangers, Highland footmen, and South Carolinians under Col. Vanderdussen. To transport the most of his troops from Frederica, Oglethorpe assembled a fleet of small boats. Mortars and ammunition from the Frederica store

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{78} Cate, 126-128; Jones, 78.
\item \textsuperscript{79} CR 22, pt. 2/288.
\item \textsuperscript{80} CR 30/202.
\item \textsuperscript{81} CR pt. 2/288-289.
\item \textsuperscript{82} CR 5/498-499.
\end{itemize}
were put aboard the men-of-war Phoenix and Flamborough.\textsuperscript{83}

In short order the English force took the outlying fortifications of San Agustín and laid siege to the town itself. But against the stone citadel of Castillo de San Marcos Oglethorpe’s small army was ineffective, and lack of coordination among his various units made the capture of the town impossible. A sortie from the Castillo recaptured a small outer fort, killed almost two score Highlanders, including Col. Palmer (remembered by the Spaniards for his destructive Florida raid in 1728), and brought many prisoners into the cárcel of the Castillo. The siege dragged along until the storm season approached. The fleet risked the fate which had overtaken Ribaut’s vessels on the surf-pounded beaches before San Agustín almost 200 years before. Morale among the soldiers, particularly the Carolinians, was low. So, after little more than a month, the English retired. Oglethorpe, reported to have sworn to leave his bones in front of San Agustín,\textsuperscript{84} went with them.

Yet, in a measure, the expedition was successful. The Spaniard had been driven into the gates of his stronghold, and his outlying defenses destroyed.\textsuperscript{85} On the other side, Oglethorpe had shown his hand. Spain knew what to expect.

Back at his home near Frederica, Oglethorpe fought off a fever contracted in the Florida campaign, and made ready to weather the storm. During the winter months of 1740-1741 work on the Frederica fortifications continued, and a large barrack building of tabby was started. The barracks were essentially finished early in 1742.\textsuperscript{86}

It was a war of failures. Oglethorpe’s retreat from San Agustín was followed by a

\textsuperscript{83} Cate, 128-129.
\textsuperscript{84} Diplomatic History, 222.
\textsuperscript{85} Cate, 129-130; Jones, 87-88. The 1740 campaign has not yet been adequately studied. Translations of documents presenting the local Spanish observations in fair measure are found in Collections, VII, pt 1. Englishmen looked at San Agustín in this light: “The Possession of San Agustín would certainly be of great importance [to] Great Britain: For first it would secure our Southern Settlements on the Continent against any Attempts of the Spaniards by Land; then it would be of great Service to our Trade, not only by depriving them of a Port from whence they might annoy us on that Side, but also as it would enable us to annoy them on occasion, by cruising on their homeward-bound Ships coming from the Gulf of Florida, and Straights of Bahama. However it lies at too great a Distance from the Mouth of those Streights (at least 70 Leagues) to be as serviceable on that Occasion as the Havana; besides the Harbour is too shallow to make a Station for Men of War.” (Objects of the Present War, 191-192.)
\textsuperscript{86} CR 35/358, 438; 36/107.
series of reverses to “Old Grog” in the Caribbean. While Oglethorpe was in Florida, Vernon was joined by 3,500 troops from the North American colonies, and later by 9,000 more men from England. A great fleet was assembled, perhaps the largest ever seen in the waters of the New World. Havana was next on the British list, but Spain sent Torres to the West Indies with a powerful fleet, and Vernon turned to Cartagena. There a deadly climate and dissension amongst the English command brought disaster. Vernon returned to Jamaica. Torres still blocked Havana, and Vernon looked to Santiago.

Land forces went ashore to take Santiago by land. They lost heart in the trackless swamps, and again the English returned to Jamaica.

The aggressive went to Spain. Privateers swarmed in Caribbean waters and played havoc with English commerce. From Georgia to New York these little vessels terrorized the coast. Carolina and Georgia plantations were sacked. Between 1739 and 1741, while Spain had about 50 privateers afloat, 316 vessels, each valued at £3,500, were seized by the Spanish enroute to or from northern colony ports. More than 30 prizes were taken into San Agustín alone. Exploits of the Spanish privateers are obscured in the English sources, but judging from results, neither their bravery nor activity can be reproached.

As for English privateers, a good three months before was declared Newcastle had directed the colonial governors to grant commissions of marque and reprisal to applicants qualified for fitting out ships of war. Massachusetts alone commissioned 32; according to Objects of the Present War (169-171), “it is become absolutely necessary for the English Government, if they have a Mind to secure the British Trade to the West-Indies, to possess themselves of some Place or Places there, which may curb the Depredations of the Spaniards on our Ships. For we being obliged to return home either through the Windward-Passage or the Gulph of Florida, and they being possessed of all the Island [of Cuba], and consequently commanding all the Outlets towards the Ocean, our Ships must always lie at their Mercy . . .” Havana was deemed to be the only port suitable for such and English station. And “the Havana might be kept by us without giving any just Cause of Offence, since the Obstruction of Trade would not be the necessary Consequence of our possessing it . . . So that our possessing the Havana could not be construed as a Conquest to enrich ourselves with the Spoils of Spain, but only as a Pledge for securing our Navigation . . .” Obviously, this was a difficult point for the Spaniard to see.

Bolton, 85-90. One of the soldiers with Vernon was Lawrence Washington. Sincere, able and loyal, he won the Admiral’s friendship and a Puerto Bello medal. He became ill at Cartagena, and returned to the colonies in 1742. When he erected his mansion on the banks of the Potomac, he named it Mount Vernon in honor of the unsuccessful hero of the Caribbean. See Diplomatic History, 219.
and other colonies, including Georgia, contributed not a few. Not many Americans know that the northern colonies played a vital part in the War of Jenkins’ Ear, and still fewer realize that the first great surge of American privateering, adding the last crushing blow to mercantilism and contributing to the abolition of the Spanish fleet system in 1748, occurred long before the American Revolution. In bravery and cunning the privateers of 1775 and 1812 did not excel American mariners in the 1740’s. As early as 1739 a Rhode Island privateer took a port and plundered a town on the northern side of Cuba. In 1740, New York’s Captain Massward, in a disabled vessel chased by a Spaniard, escaped in the dark by letting the Spaniard chase a tubful of burning tar. Capt. Bayard in the Cape Verde Islands outwitted a French man-of-war. Oglethorpe’s privateer sloop St. Philip took a Spanish privateer off the very bar of San Agustín and brought her to Frederica, as one incident in a long record of service.  

The indefatigable General, whose Indians were raiding up to the gates of the Florida capital, proposed a new drive on San Agustín. The ministry was favorable, and the campaign was planned for March 1742. As usual there were delays. England was too engrossed in other matters to help. Some still said Georgia was not worth a war. Sir John Cotton urged Parliament to make Port Royal the boundary, as Spain demanded. “In desperation,” writes Mrs. Cate, Frederica’s historian, “Oglethorpe sent a power of attorney to Verelst [accountant for the Trustees], authorizing him ‘to raise money on all his estate, real and personal, without limitation of the sum, as also to employ all his salary from the Government for answering the bills he should draw on him for the service of the public.’ Egmont [one of the Trustees] thought this showed ‘a Rare zeal for his Country.’”

The Trustees finally triumphed. Georgia was declared useful to England, and young Stephens, malcontent son of one of Georgia’s founding fathers, was publicly humiliated before Parliament, forced to bend both knees before his accusers on June 30, 1742. But while the Trustees were gloating over their critic’s degradation, Montiano’s vessels had already been sighted off the Golden Isles.  

90 Cate, 131-132; Bolton, 90-92.  
91 Ibid.
11. THE INVASION OF GEORGIA

Vernon’s failure at Santiago had released Torres somewhat from his arduous watch at Havana. England’s northern colonies were weakened by the drain of Vernon’s futile expeditions.

Juan Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas, Governor of Cuba, was entrusted with preparations. Havana was the supply and naval base. Manuel de Montiano, Governor of Florida, headed the expedition, with Rubiani in charge of the fleet and second in command. Antonio de Arredondo was chief of staff.

The expedition was designed to expel the English from Georgia and to devastate South Carolina. The main Georgia targets were St. Simons and Frederica. These destroyed, the fleet could continue by the inland waterway to Savannah and Port Royal.92

Güemes perfected the plans for the invasion, and on May 25, 1742, thirty vessels left Havana for San Agustín, where Florida Governor Montiano would assume command. Early in June, the fleet arrived off San Agustín, but the shallow bar of that place, so effective a defense, was also a hazard for friendly troops. Not until June 20 did the combined fleet of 52 vessels carrying some 3,000 men finally push off for Georgia. The next day a storm scattered the armada, and while some of the vessels were sighted off the coastal islands on June 22, some were a full week in beating back to St. Simons, and others did not reach the battle area until Bloody Marsh was over.93

Meanwhile, Oglethorpe’s spied had told him early in June that a fleet was assembling at San Agustín. He recognized the sign. Once more he looked to his defenses. The Spaniards, he wrote, “can’t pass by us into Carolina, so must take us in their way, but I believe they’ll meet with a Morsell not easily to be digested. Yet we are not in a situation we could wish, being very weak in cannon & shot . . . I have sent to raise men to the northward and to buy guns and ammunition of all kinds . . . 94 The officials “to the northward” did not rise to the alarm. Governor Bull at Charleston

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92 Id., 92-94; Cate, 133
93 Cate, 133-134, 137
94 CR 35/463, cited in Cate, 135.
Plate 15 - The Fight on St. Simons 1742
thought the Spanish ships at San Agustín were merely the usual annual relief vessels. Even when Oglethorpe’s messages grew urgent, Carolina took little notice.

Opportunely, the *Success* arrived from England with 100 Grenadiers aboard, together with military stores and some 50 civilians. Oglethorpe asked Savannah for help, called in the Rangers from their scattered posts, and sent for Indian allies.

It was on Tuesday morning, June 22, 1742, that strange sails were sighted off St. Simons. Word also reached Oglethorpe that enemy vessels had been beaten off at Amelia Inlet by the 18-pounders of Fort William and the cannon of the guard schooner *Walker*. Oglethorpe mounted his horse, and was soon at Fort St. Simons. In the harbor, a lookout in the masthead of the *Success* reported more vessels converging on the Plate.

After the attack on Fort William, part of the Spanish fleet maneuvered into the sound between Jekyll and Cumberland Islands, and on June 24 Oglethorpe went with reinforcements to the Cumberland Island Forts of St. Andrews and William. Fourteen Spanish ships were in the sound, and when Oglethorpe’s three boats came to cross it, there was a sharp engagement. One of the English boats retreated, but two of them fought their way through. Once on the island, the General decided to abandon Fort St. Andrews and strengthen Fort William.

In the face of certain attack, Oglethorpe somehow raised another troop of Rangers; he freed the indentured servants; he brought in the Highlanders from Darien, and Capt. Mark Carr’s Company of Boatmen from their post on Turtle River; he filled his Regiment until his guns gave out; and he received about 100 Indians as allies. His own regiment numbered about 650 British soldiers; Rangers, Marines, Highlanders, civilians and Indians brought his force to a total of about 900 men.

Lacking the warships that lay in such provoking strength at Charleston, Oglethorpe improvised a naval force by embargoeing the few vessels in St. Simons harbor, fitting them for service, and manning them with marines and some of his regimentals. At best it was a puny fleet to oppose the 36 vessels that on July 4 lay off the bar of St. Simons.

On Monday, July 5, the Spanish fleet maneuvered into battle line for the drive into the harbor, past the guns of the fort. There was an east wind, “a leading Gale”, and a spring tide. Two quarter-galleys carrying 9-pounders and a half-galley mounting a pair of 18-pounders in her bow led the Spanish line. Abaft the galleys was the rest of the
formidable fleet: 6 more galleys, a trio of 20-gun ships, the square-rigged snows and brigantines, and the fore-and-aft schooners and sloops. Over the bar with ample water beneath their keels, the Spanish navy came.

The batteries at Fort St. Simons opened fire, and the Spanish starboard guns answered. Spanish fire blew up a fort battery. The swift-moving ships were a poor target, boiling in with the wind fair. English gunners fired 49 rounds from the 18-pounders, but while there was some damage to Montiano’s fleet, finally the fort was passed.

Beyond lay the little British squadron of four vessels. Capt. William Thomson, master of the Success, was its commodore. Hurriedly Oglethorpe had put 20 guns aboard her, and manned her with 100 regimentals and a few marines. Off the port bow of the Success was the guard schooner Walker, a 70-foot fore-and-aft rig with 14 guns, under Capt. Dunbar with 80 men. The privateer sloop St. Philip lay off the port quarter, with Capt. Caleb Davis, 50 men and 14 guns. In addition there was a prize sloop under Capt. Gill, and near shore were 8 small York sloops, useless in battle, with men aboard to scuttle or beach the little vessels to keep them out of Spanish hands.

The armed merchantman Success, her guns roaring at the Spaniards, was attacked by the 22-gun commodore and a long sharp-prowed, lateen-sailed settee. Twice the Spaniards tried to board, but each time the English beat them off. A 16-fun snow made up to Capt. Dunbar’s Walker. Here, too, a boarding attempt failed. The St. Philip was disabled and sunk by enemy fire, and the small boats were destroyed at Oglethorpe’s order. Luckily, the wind came about, and the Success, the Walker, and the prize sloop broke away to sea, under orders to sail for Charleston. For half a day the guns fired, until the armada finally sailed far beyond range of the fort, up the river toward Frederica.

Late in the afternoon, the Spanish convoy anchored opposite Gascoigne Bluff, and the troops began to disembark.

Things looked black for the English. Gen. Oglethorpe called a council of war. Rather than oppose the enemy landing here, it was decided to leave the Indians to harass them and the rangers to watch them, while troops and supplies were withdrawn from Fort St. Simons and consolidated at Frederica, “to get there before the Enemy and

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95 Cate, 135-145; Jones, 106-107. Cf. Collection, III, 140, for Oglethorpe’s estimate of Spanish sea power.
defend that Place.” Late that night Oglethorpe and Capt. Carr were at Fort St. Simons supervising the bursting or the spiking of the guns, and at midnight Oglethorpe ordered the flag at the fort to be struck. A ranger took it to Frederica.

About daylight, July 6, Oglethorpe reached Frederica. None had been killed at Fort St. Simons, and the wounded had been successfully evacuated to Frederica. Attack was imminent, and Oglethorpe planned to send the women and children to a safer place. Few of them, however, would leave.

That day, Montiano’s forces occupied Fort St. Simons as headquarters. On the next, Wednesday, July 7, two reconnoitering parties were sent out. One, 25 men and 40 Indians under Capt. Nicolás Hernández, scouted the road to Frederica. The second party was a San Agustín company under Capt. Sebastian Sánchez, assigned to reconnoiter the road connecting Fort St. Simons and Frederica. By 9 o’clock they were only a mile and a half from Frederica itself. On the eastern shore of Gully Hole Creek they came upon a party of five rangers. One ranger was killed by gunfire, and the rest galloped posthaste to Frederica.

Oglethorpe at once ordered out the Highlanders (who at that moment were parading under arms), four platoons of his regiment, the rangers, and the Indians. He himself galloped with the Indians to the edge of the woods skirting a savannah where the Spaniards were advancing to a ditch that would serve as an entrenchment.

Without waiting for the Spaniards to dig in, the Frederica force charged. Capt. Grey commanded the Chickasaws, Capt. Noble Jones the Tomohetaus, Chief Toonahowi led his Creeks, and Oglethorpe had 6 Highlanders “who had outrun the rest.” Together this motley force engage the Spanish scouts in a short and bloody skirmish that ended in a precipitate Spanish retreat. The Spaniards lost half their men. Both Sánchez and Hernández were captured along with 14 other prisoners, a pair of whom Oglethorpe himself took. Two Spanish officers were slain on the field – one by the Creek chieftain Toonahowi. Pursuit of the fleeing Spaniards lasted until the General halted his force on a strategic piece of ground.

12. BLOODY MARSH

Oglethorpe went back to Frederica. Finding no immediate danger of a Spanish

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96 Jones 107; Cate, 145.
97 Cate, 145-148
attack on the town by water, he sent most of his remaining troops to support the
detachment he had posted on the military road. Before they arrived, the climax was
past.

For Montiano had determined on immediate action. Three hundred men set out
from the Spanish camp at Fort St. Simons under Grenadier Capt. Antonio Barba. About
3 o’clock in the afternoon battle was joined. The Spanish troops, reported Oglethorpe
(who was not an eyewitness), advanced “into the Savannah with Huzzah’s and fired
with great spirit but not seeing our men by reason of the woods none of their shot took
place but ours did.” 98

It is evident that the English and the Indians in this engagement were careful
fighters. Not a man was lost. Yet, in spite of the faulty Spanish marksmanship noted
by Oglethorpe, somehow the Spanish managed to win. “Some Platoons of ours in the
heat of the fight,” Oglethorpe succinctly continued, “the air being darkened with the
smoke and a shower of rain falling retired in disorder.” Two miles from the battle site,
Oglethorpe met “a great many men in disorder who told me that ours were routed and
Lieut. Sutherland killed.” Oglethorpe was successful in rallying some of them and
turning their faces again toward the south. Soon he heard musket fire. It was the
denouement. 99

The rear guard of the retreating Britons, a regimental platoon commanded by Lt.
Patrick Sutherland, a few Highlanders under Lt. Charles Mackay with some of the
ubiquitous rangers and Indians, reached a spot where the military road bent in a
crescent and skirted the marsh. 100 To the east was the marsh. To the west was heavy
brushwood – an ideal spot for an ambush. Mackay and Sutherland saw it, and with
some 50 men they dove into the brush and waited.

Barba’s men came on. In the sand of the road were unmistakable signs that the

98 Collections, III, 136; see also Cate, 148-149, 153
99 Collections, III, 136; Cate, 150.
100 For a discussion of the location of the Bloody Marsh battlesite, see J. W. Holland and R. W. Young, “Some Preliminary
Notes on the Location of ‘Bloody Marsh’, St. Simons Island, Georgia” (n.d.). In the past there has been some question as to
the accurate location of this site, as well as Oglethorpe’s homesite. Since neither of these areas is included within the proposed
limits of the monument, no definitive Service study of them has been attempted. According to Mrs. Margaret Davis Cate, who
has given the areas more intensive study than any other historian, the markers now identifying these two sites (Bloody Marsh
and Oglethorpe’s home) are correctly located and authenticated by documentary proof.
British were in full retreat. And here, where the road curved around the marsh and the brushwood was impenetrable, looked like a safe enough place. After the rout of the Englishmen, the soldiers were in high spirits, and hungry as well. They halted, stacked their arms, and began to enjoy a victory supper.

A Scotch cap raised on a stick was the signal for the massacre to begin. When it ended, two thirds of the Spanish force was reported lost. Capt. Barba was mortally wounded. The Battle of “Bloody Bend” (later called Bloody Marsh), July 7, 1742, was ended, and with it Spain’s hopes for recovering her lost dominions.\textsuperscript{101}

English casualties were zero, unless we may count the death of the Highland gentleman, Mr. Maclane, who ran so hard in pursuit of the enemy that he “spoiled the circulation of his Blood” and died later in Frederica.\textsuperscript{102} There they were joined by the garrison from Fort William, which had run the gauntlet of Spanish vessels at Gascoigne Bluff. All hands set to work to improve the defenses at Frederica.

Matters were at a stalemate. Indians and rangers so harassed the Spaniards that none was willing to venture outside camp. And though the Spanish were strongly ensconced at Fort St. Simons, they were short of water. The military road, over which Oglethorpe had in a single night transported many of the supplies formerly at Fort St. Simons, was regarded by the Spanish as a dangerous footpath through difficult underbrush, where in some places the soldiers had to hazard marching in single file!\textsuperscript{103}

Montiano decided to try the water route to Frederica. On July 11 three galleys rowed up the waterway with the tide to find a debarkation point near Frederica. They went too far.

Oglethorpe soon knew of the Spanish move. To prevent a land attack along the road, he posted an ambuscade of Indians. Two scout boats and a pair of smaller boats were manned. The unfinished town fortifications were lined with his musketeers. The General went to the fort. When the Spanish galleys came in sight they met with such a reception from the fort guns and howitzers that it appeared to Oglethorpe they had been disabled. Oglethorpe leaped aboard his cutter, but when the galley crews saw the English vessels approaching, their oars bent with a will and they were soon back under

\textsuperscript{101} Collections, I, 283-284; III, 136; Cate, 149-153.
\textsuperscript{102} Cate, 150.
\textsuperscript{103} Id., 153-154, 157-158.
the protection of their fleet. 104

Meanwhile, Oglethorpe’s “navy” had reached Charleston with the electrifying news of the invasion. There was a flurry of activity. Vanderdussen was put in command of a relief force – which was delayed in its departure. Then on July 9, after the Battle of Bloody Marsh, Oglethorpe dispatched a letter to Capt. Thomson of the Success: “the Spanish fleet,” he wrote, employing something of the persuasive diplomacy he had successfully used in England, “was not near so considerable as we first thought it; their strength being in land men. God hath pleased to give us a wonderful victory. Two men-of-war I believe would beat their whole fleet. I must beg of you to get your ship fully manned and come and cruise off the bar; the very appearance of a ship there would fright them away; I hope the men-of-war will come but if they are not ready do you come before them.” 105 In short order several British vessels bore away southward, but when they saw a Spanish fleet now numbering 51 vessels in possession of St. Simons harbor, their commanders, lacking Oglethorpe’s optimism, at once sailed them back to Charleston.

Yet, Oglethorpe had been very nearly right. This glimpse of British sailcloth was to prove highly disconcerting to the Spanish, after losses in two bloody actions. Morale was at a dangerous low. Dissension appeared. To Oglethorpe, it seemed an opportune moment for attack.

On the late afternoon of July 12, 500 men under Oglethorpe’s leadership marched out of Frederica and down the military road to within two miles of the enemy camp. With the English force was a Frenchman, recruited as one of Capt. Carr’s Marines. The Frenchman’s sympathies vacillated. He fired his gun and scuttled for the Spanish camp. Even the Indians failed to catch him. Oglethorpe realized that the shot must have alerted the Spanish, so the drums struck up the Grenadier’s March and the troops tramped back to Frederica. 106

13. THE DECOY

The General must have been preoccupied on that weary return march to Frederica. He knew the French deserter would give dangerous information to Montiano, and he

106 Cate, 155, 158-159, 161.
was right. The deserter pointed out both the strength and weakness of Frederica. (Bit, which was the more perturbing to Montiano as well as to his naval commander Castaneda and engineer Arredondo, he also related that Oglethorpe had sent letters “in all direction” asking for aid.)

Oglethorpe decided to use an old artifice. He wrote a letter. This letter, the General afterward related with some glee, “was wrote in French as if from a friend of his [the deserter’s] telling him he had received the money that he should strive to make the Spaniards believe the English were weak [as indeed they were]. That he should undertake to pilot up their Boats and Galleys & then bring them under the Woods where he knew the [nonexistent] Hidden Batterys were, that if he could bring that about he should have double the reward he had already received.”

Oglethorpe bribed a Spanish prisoner to take the latter and deliver it secretly to the French deserter.

As Gen. Oglethorpe expected, the “escaped” prisoner was at once conducted before Montiano. A search produced the bogus letter; the prisoner confessed that it was meant for the Frenchman. The poor Frenchman was between the devil and the sea. The Council of War called him a double spy, but Montiano, who had hired him, refused to “liquidate” him.

Just when Oglethorpe had complicated matters with the decoy letter, Spanish lookouts saw sails approaching from the north. The news arrived at noon on July 13, and halted the war council proceedings. But Montiano talked with Arredondo and his colonels, and the decision was to withdraw.

Oglethorpe’s stratagem apparently came at the very time Montiano’s men, hungry and thirsty, were ready to be dissuaded from further action. The appearance of the English ships clinched matters. Spanish consensus was that the Frenchman was truly Oglethorpe’s spy, and feeling themselves to be on infirm ground, professing to believe the oncoming vessels (which cautiously returned to Charleston at sight of the Spanish fleet) to be only the vanguard of a greater force which would close in upon them by land and sea, the Spaniards left St. Simons and crossed southward to Jekyll Island on July 13. Fort St. Simons was thus twice abandoned – once by English and once by Spanish. But when the Spaniards left on that July afternoon, not much of the fortified

107 Collections, III, 138.
108 Cate, 159-160.
settlement remained. They leveled it by fire. Beyond the fort, some 30 “houses in the country” were burned, and the farm fields ravaged.\textsuperscript{109} “The only Building they left standing,” lamented Kimber a few months later, “was a House which they had consecrated for a Chapel. How different the Proceedings of the more generous English!” he continued, forgetting the lessons in wanton destruction taught the Spaniards by Moore two score years ago, “even in these Parts, who never leave behind them such direful Remembrances…”\textsuperscript{110}

From Jekyll Island, the Cuban contingent boarded ship and set sail for Havana. Montiano and the San Agustín forces continued southward to the Florida capital, destroying English installations and delivering an unsuccessful assault n Fort William at Cumberland Island on the way.

So the invasion ended. And now from Carolina an English fleet bravely sailed southward “to the relief of Georgia”.\textsuperscript{111} On July 26, almost a week after Montiano was safely back at San Agustín, the British vessels appeared off St. Simons Island. Oglethorpe asked them “to come in in order to concert measures for the pursuit of the Spaniards.”\textsuperscript{112} Commodore Hardy of the man-of-war \textit{Rye}, however, sent the Carolina vessels back home, and told Oglethorpe that his vessel was scheduled for a cruise to the south. He left Oglethorpe stewing in his own juice.

Certainly the Boston rhymester may be excused for his levity:

“From Georgia to Augustine the General goes;
From Augustine to Georgia come our foes;
Hardy from Charleston to St. Simons hies,
Again from thence to Charleston back he flies.
Forth from St. Simons then the Spaniards creep;
’Say Children, Is not this your Play, Bo Peep?’”\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Id.}, 161-162, 165.
\textsuperscript{111} Cate, 162-165.
\textsuperscript{112} CR36/60, 61, 64, 65, cited in Cate, 165-166.
\textsuperscript{113} Bolton, 96
Upon withdrawal of the enemy, Oglethorpe bent his energies toward strengthening the Frederica fortifications and repairing damages to the southern forts, for by no means had the danger of attack evaporated. The tower bastions proposed by Oglethorpe in 1739 for the town walls – two of them, at least – were finally built, and could hold 100 men each. When his own house was again in fair order, the General once more resolved to put the Spanish abode in English order.

On Saturday, February 26, 1743, Oglethorpe's regiment at Frederica turned out under arms. After inspection, Oglethorpe marched them out into the fosse around the fortifications. Under the General's eagle eye, each platoon fired at a 100-yard mark for the prize of a hat and a machete. Beer was issued and the Regiment was ordered to be ready for the march by 9 o'clock Sunday morning.

By the night of March 16, in spite of a delay caused by having raised a skunk ("a PoleCat, like ours in Europe, but more remarkable in its horrid Scent") the small English troop bivouacked about three mile from San Agustin, within earshot of the Castillo drums beating tattoo. At 3 o'clock that night the sleeping soldiers were silently awakened – there was alarm that one of their guards had deserted – and the company marched circumspectly through the dark wilderness to a strategic spot in the rear. Here Oglethorpe prepared an ambuscade.

The day was Thursday, March 17. "I did all I could to draw them [the Spanish] to action," Oglethorpe reported, "and having posted the Grenadiers & some of the Troops in ambuscade advanced myself with a very few men in sight of the Town intending to skirmish & retire in order to draw them into the Ambuscade but they were so meek that there was no provoking them." With six or seven horsemen, Gen. Oglethorpe rode up to the out-sentries of the town. These gentlemen evidently "retir'd, without firing, into the Castle, pursu'd by him to the very Walls."

It was the English intention to hold the ambush for several days, sending out frequent parties to the very town gates. But the position of the soldiers was extremely uncomfortable. They lacked water, and they were "almost devour'd with Vermin".

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114 Itinerant Observations, 4; also see Jones, 117-120.
116 Collections, III, 151.
Furthermore, one of the soldiers, appropriately named Eels, did desert to the Spaniards. Oglethorpe at once realized that Eel’s information would make the English position highly dangerous, so on the very day of his almost singlehanded dash toward the Castillo, he gave orders for the return to Frederica. He himself boarded the schooner Walker on a cruise to alarm the coast from San Agustín to Matanzas. But this voyage, like the entire expedition, was merely a gesture.  

15. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WAR

Oglethorpe’s Gesture of 1743 was a fillip to the Georgia-Florida part in the War of Jenkins’ Ear. The Chronicler had already put his pen to a new chapter.

Since the ridiculously named war was purely an American war, and as significant as any in the 18th century – for out of it came in clear and unmistakeable stream the series of wars that were waged between England and France in the 18th century, it can be seen that the importance of North American participation did not depend altogether upon the small contingent of Americans in the besieging force at fever-ridden Cartagena. In its preliminaries and in its execution the continentals played an important role. At the beginning of mobilization in North America, the mainland colonists owned and navigated 1,855 vessels; the annual value of their produce was £2,190,000; their fighting strength 135,000 men. In the levy for troops to augment British forces in the Caribbean, only South Carolina and Georgia, for obvious reasons, were exempt. These American facts the English war faction saw with genuine foresight as media through which England could usurp Spanish commercial interests in the American seas. The proximity of the northern colonies to the coveted Spanish West Indies made them a great nautical, commercial, and even greater psychological advantage.

The reaction of all the colonies during the war clearly foreshadowed their attitude in subsequent colonial wars. That attitude reflected both eager response and strikingly typical opposition to imperial control which, without sane and sincere attempts at amelioration, might disrupt the empire. It was an imperial lesson assigned in the French and Indian War and learned in the American Revolution.

It is difficult to evaluate the significance of the military action in the southeast. This border struggle on the Continent, reaching a climax in the Battle of Bloody Marsh,

117 Journal of a Late Expedition, 27, 31 ff.
was of more than provincial importance. While England executed a distinct Caribbean campaign, the little colony of Georgia baffled and stalled the Spanish for four years. Georgia met with some defeats and won no offensives, but a mere handful of men under the leadership of the indomitable Oglethorpe actually achieved more than all England’s mighty fleet in the West Indies. 118

Like Manifest Destiny a century later, it seemed certain that English colonization should spread slowly and surely down the coast and back into the rich Indian country. The Atlantic colonists were, in the main, an enterprising and hardy people. Their star was in the ascendant. On the other side, Spain’s day was past. As a world power she had been slowly declining since the 1588 loss of the Armada in the English Channel. American riches had brought no fundamental stability to her unbalanced economy. Spanish colonization in America, while admirable in many respects, 119 was by now in strong contrast to the virile civilization represented by the individualistic merchants, the horny-handed farmers, and the pioneer traders in North America.

In Florida, especially, this contrast was notable. For Florida never achieved real colonial status. To the end, this province remained a military outpost and a mission center. It is a paradox that its capital enjoyed – or suffered – the reward of longevity; and the paradox must be laid to the Spanish characteristic of tenacity.

From our vantage, the Battle of Bloody Marsh seems to have been inevitable. True, it chanced to be the turning point in the Anglo-Spanish struggle for control of the region, and consequently it has been called “a Verdun for southern North America,” 120 a battle “as decisive for Spain as . . . the Plains of Abraham proved for France, or Yorktown [for] . . . Britain.” 121 Perhaps these evaluations are not far wrong. But that Oglethorpe by this victory “saved the thirteen American Continental Colonies to Britain, and so preserved the nucleus for the English-Speaking race . . . to become the United States of America” 122 is a claim difficult to support. The lot of the invader is always hard. In spite of Spain’s claims, Georgia was no longer Spanish land. The

118 Diplomatic History, 179, 181, 220, 229.
119 Cf., Chatelain, op. cit., Introduction.
120 Coulter, Short History of Georgia, 32.
121 Ettinger, Oglethorpe 245, cited in Cate, 174
122 Letter, Ettinger to Cate, Feb. 18, 1936, cited in Cate, 174.
Englishmen were, in effect, defending their homes. Even had Montiano driven Oglethorpe out of Georgia, Spain still lacked the resources to destroy the firmly rooted colonies to the north.

Yet, we cannot lose sight of the fact that because Frederica was built, the Spanish attempt to reestablish their claim to the southeast by force was summarily checked, even though in the larger sense the Battle of Bloody Marsh and Frederica’s part in the conflict are simply illustrative of the course of events.

Oglethorpe’s role brought him to the highwater mark of his career, and earned him a shining respect, little dimmed over the years. The inspiration of Mackay and Sutherland in planning the fatal ambush is a reflection of Oglethorpe’s leadership. Sometimes brash, always bold, demanding much of his men, yet solicitous for their welfare, the General was a colorful figure. Oglethorpe, says Lanning, “in many respects never appeared to have a direct interest in Georgia beyond the play it gave to his buccaneering spirit and the field which it offered for his military inclinations. . . [He] was more than a Georgian’ he was an Englishman – perhaps first of all an Englishman.”

16. FREDERICA’S FATE

Whilst Oglethorpe was absent on his derring-do Florida foray, events of some interest were transpiring at Frederica. A short, dapper man – as dapper as one could be in dress of deerskin jacket, G-string and moccasins – was sent in from the Georgia hinterland By Capt. Kent, commandant at Fort Augusta. Kent had perceived certain signs of “ill humours” among the Creeks, and by diligent and properly secret inquiry, had traced the trouble to the little man in the moccasins, Christian Preber (Pryber, Preiber).

As Oglethorpe later discovered, Preber was a German Jesuit with a pleasing, open countenance, a most penetrating look – a man of politeness and gentility who in strange contract to his Indian dress, spoke Latin, French, Spanish and German fluently. His English, however, was broken. But while this linguist’s brazen explanation of his plan to the English may have lacked rhetoric, it was nonetheless startling. Preber’s purpose was the organization of a confederation among all the southern Indians, “to inspire them with industry, to instruct them in the arts necessary to the commodity of life, and,

123 Diplomatic History, 36.
in short, to engage them to throw off the yoke of their European allies, of all nations.” It was evident that he had already met with considerable success.

The little man was confined in a barrack room, with a sentry at his door day and night. He was a curious figure in this frontier settlement, and attracted the more or less favorable attention of every gentleman in Frederica. “It is folly,” he would say, “to repine at one’s lot in life: -- my mind floats above misfortune; – in this cell I can enjoy more real happiness, than it is possible to do in the busy scenes of life.” His rations he ate sparingly, saving portions of fish, flesh and bread until he had enough for a gluttonous feast; “I am a Christian,” he said, “and Christian principles always promote internal felicity.”

Christian Preber had come to America in 1735, and almost immediately had found his way into the interior, where, after some years of diligent work among the savages he had in fact established something of a Red Empire. There is no evidence to show that he ever left the little barrack room prison in Frederica.

Oglethorpe had no opportunity to puzzle long over Preber’s case. The General had his own and personal worries. No leader is without enemies, and Oglethorpe had a sufficiency of them, even in his own camp. He had hardly returned from the 1743 campaign when he was called back to England to answer charges brought by Lt. Col. William Cook, one of his regimentals. On July 23, 1743, Georgia’s founder and defender boarded the Success and sailed for England. There he was completely exonerated, and George II made him a Brigadier General, but he never again returned to America.

After 1743, the country south of the Altamaha was what Newcastle had suggested, an “uninhabited tract.” Continued raids from the south left nothing English in the area except the slender island posts of Fort William on Cumberland and another outpost on Jekyll Island. The war settled nothing. Neither side relinquished its claims, but Spain had found an ally. British fears regarding France were finally realized. By the Treaty of Fontainebleau (1745) France pledged herself to “oblige the English to destroy the

124 London Magazine (1760), 444.
126 Cate, 173; Cate MS., untitled history of Frederica, 59-60. Oglethorpe had had similar troubles after the failure of his 1740 campaign. See the numerous pamphlets of the period.
new colony of Georgia and all forts built on Spanish soil.”

However, France did not keep the promise. True, she entered the war, but at her coming, the vortex of the colonial struggle moved northward. The St. Lawrence supplanted the St. Johns; Cape Breton overshadowed San Agustín and Havana. The American was merged into the great European War of the Austrian Succession.\(^{127}\)

On March 22, 1744, came the first abrupt augury of Frederica’s decline. The big bomb magazine and a smaller powder magazine, by a strange accident which some have attributed to the machinations of a vagabond Irishman, were set afire and blew up with a great explosion. It was as if the town were under bombardment. Some 3,000 bombs were bedded in the magazine. People fled from their homes. Bomb splinters flew through the air. Capt. Mackay, in command, opened the prison doors so that the captive Spaniards and Indians might run for safety. Even Preber was offered freedom, but with characteristic aplomb, he politely refused.

Fortunately the bombs were well bedded, and though the explosions lasted for some hours, no great damage was done. When finally the bursts diminished, Preber again came to mind. Gingerly the investigators sought out his cell, said to have been not 20 paces from the exploding magazine. They called Preber’s name. After some little while, Preber put forth his head from beneath his feather bed. “Gentlemen,” cried he, “I suppose all’s over; -- for my part, I reasoned thus: The bombs will rise perpendicularly, and, if the fuses fails, fall again in the same direction, but the splinters will fly off horizontally; therefore, with this trusty covering, I thought I had better stand the storm here, than hazard a knock in the pate by flying further.” And hePlate continued his explanation to the accompaniment of an explosion that was “enough to strike terror to the firmest breast.”\(^{128}\)

Along the southern coast, hostilities lapsed. Oglethorpe, now in Westminster, urged more troops for Carolina and Georgia, and fearing a combined advance of French and Spanish from the Mississippi, he made special efforts to hold the Chickasaws to English allegiance. There were peace proposals. Spain again demanded the evacuation of Georgia, and it was rumored that the concession might be made. But the war was

\(^{127}\) Bolton, 98-99; Bolton and Marshall, 364.

\(^{128}\) London Magazine (1760), 444-445; Itinerant Observations, 5; Jones, 119.
17. SOUTHEASTERN GEORGIA BOUNDARIES

NORTH BOUNDARY CLAIMED BY SPAIN AFTER 1670

THE GEORGIA GRANT 1732

THE NEUTRAL GROUND 1750 - 1763

1784 BOUNDARY

OGLETHORPE'S 1736 LINE

SOUTH BOUNDARY OF CAROLINA GRANT 1665

Present State Boundaries

Based on Bolton, map facing p.80; Covert, pp.85-86.
growing long, and neither side was successful. The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen), signed in October 1748, was a truce.

All conquests were restored and matters were like they had been before the war. But England and France began to make every effort to strengthen and extend their colonial possessions. Both nations entered a competition for the goodwill of Spain. On the Georgia frontier, however, it was not so easy to forget the past. 129

Oglethorpe’s Regiment was disbanded (May 29, 1749), and steps taken to transport the soldiers back to England. However, to avoid leaving the frontier entirely unprotected, three Independent Companies were formed out of the Regiment and placed under the command of the South Carolina Governor. One company of a captain, 5 non-commissioned officers and 52 privates was stationed at Frederica, with a small detachment on Jekyll Island. The breaking of the Regiment did not mean that all the other soldiers went back to England. Rather, they were encouraged to stay in the colony as settlers, and many of them did. Grants of land and other bounties went to them, and Frederica received a due share of the new population. 130

The mainland south of the Altamaha became, in English if not Spanish eyes, neutral ground. Pending adjustment, it must be left unoccupied. For a decade it was so, because England, preparing for a renewal of the conflict with France, must not offend Spain unnecessarily by invading disputed territory. Then in 1750 Spain and England made mutual concessions. Spain yielded extensive privileges to English merchants. The treaty was ordered published in Georgia with a warning to tread carefully so that the harmony between the two crowns might not be interrupted. The warning was not easy to heed. In 1751 uneasy Georgia settlers called for a garrison on the Altamaha. There were disturbing reports of new fortifications in Florida, and suspicious signs of Spanish activities elsewhere, especially among the Indians. On the other hand, unruly frontiersmen crossed the Altamaha without permission, seeking liberty on the Satilla River in the neutral ground. It was at a time when England was renewing the war with France, and extremely desirous of maintaining good relations with Spain. But while there was some Spanish reaction to the aforesaid interlopers, it later appeared that the Satilla settlement was more obnoxious to the English than to the

129 Diplomatic History, 230; Bolton, 100; Bolton and Marshall, 366.
130 Cate, MS., 60-61; cf. Bolton, 99.
Spanish authorities. \(^{131}\)

Meanwhile, Frederica had declined sharply in importance. By 1755 the place was reported to be in ruins. There was promise of new life in the plans instigated by the Georgia governors and drawn by William de Brahm, Surveyor General of the Province, but these plans came to naught. Matters were made worse by a fire in 1757 or 1758 that destroyed the greater part of the town. \(^{132}\)

When the French and English went again to war in 1755, Spain at first remained neutral, but her French sympathies eventually drew her into the conflict in 1761. Unfortunately for Spain, the outcome of the war was already decided. Quebec had fallen. Humiliation for Spain was inevitable. Havana fell to the English, and the vise at last was tightened. England offered to restore Havana in exchange for Florida or Puerto Rico. Florida could be spared better than the island, but to cede it would give England control of the Gulf and the Bahama channel, the bitter evil Spain had so long resisted. To save Florida for Spain, France offered England all of Louisiana. But England preferred Florida, and took it. With Florida vanished all of Spain’s claims to Georgia. As recompense, France’s Louisiana went to Spain.

So the Treaty of Paris ended the long contest between England and Spain for the southeast. Strangely enough, it also revived an old quarrel between Georgia and Carolina. Even before the treaty was ratified, the Governor of South Carolina granted large tracts of land south of the Altamaha to Carolinians. Governor Wright of Georgia suddenly became a good Spaniard. Carolina’s claim of land to the 29\(^{th}\) degree on the basis of the 1665 grant was ridiculous, said he. The home government likewise took the Spanish view of the question and denied Carolina’s claim. And Georgia’s southern boundary became not the St. Johns, once the “Southwardmost point of his Majesty’s Dominions,” but the St. Marys. \(^{133}\)

There had been spasmodic attempts to revive Frederica from time to time during the middle of the century. None was successful, except for a few repairs made to the guns and fortifications in the early 1760’s. By the time the Treaty of 1763 eliminated the Spanish threat for Georgians of Oglethorpe’s generation, a sergeant and 10 men

\(^{131}\) Bolton, 99-106.

\(^{132}\) Cate MS., 65-66. For Brahm’s plan of Frederica, see post, p. 152, n. 125, and plate 29, no. 1

\(^{133}\) Bolton, 107-110.
formed the complete garrison of Frederica.

Only the natural tendency to hold the now obsolete strategic site kept Frederica in the councils of the province. There were not more than 20 inhabitants in the town. The small garrison at the fort was maintained merely to keep the works in fairly defensible condition. Then in 1767 the Independent Company was disbanded, and from that time on, Fort Frederica was inactive. Many of its guns had already been removed to other fortifications.

With the outbreak of the American Revolution, Frederica was again briefly in the limelight. The Savannah Council of Safety had the military stores and the few remaining serviceable guns taken from Frederica to Fort Morris at Sunbury. During the war the coast was pillaged by the British. Frederica was taken by English scouting parties from vessels in the sound, and the walls of the fort were dismantled, the barracks burned and the few remaining inhabitants driven away. By the end of the conflict, very little remained at Frederica except the ashes of burned houses and heaps of brick and tabby ruins.

Attempts by the State Legislature in the post-war period failed to revive the corporate existence of the Town of Frederica. Town commissioners were appointed, the town was re-surveyed, there were efforts to raise taxes and encourage commerce. All came to naught.

Nearly all signs of the settlement vanished during the 19th century. While the rest of the Island prospered during much of this period, Frederica was forgotten – except when its rubble could be useful. In 1805 much of its ruined masonry was carted away to go into construction of the lighthouse at the south point of the island. During the war of 1812, the British were once again on St. Simons, but their visit to Frederica’s site had no special significance.

Fanny Kemble, the famous English actress who became the Harriet Beecher Stowe of the Georgia coast, spent 2 months (1839) at the Hampton Point plantation of her husband, Pierce Butler, and saw Frederica as “a very strange place; it was once a town – the town the metropolis of the island . . . . Mrs. A’s and one other house, are the only dwellings that remain in this curious wilderness of dismantled gray walls

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134 Cate MS., 66 ff.
Plate 19 - The “Citadel” about 1900
compassionately cloaked with a thousand profuse and graceful creepers.” Perhaps Aaron Burr was a visitor here too. Burr, fleeing arrest after his duel with Hamilton in 1804, was received at the Butler plantation and by John Couper at Cannons Point, both on the north shore of the island. One of Burr’s most remarkable notations: during his summer visit: “I have not even seen a cockroach.”

When another war struck the shores of St. Simons, the people hastily left. It was December 1861, in the face of advancing Federal forces. The Federals were on the island during most of the war, and pillaged even the ravaged ruins of Frederica.

The 1880’s ushered in a new era for many southern resorts, including St. Simons Island. Wealthy northerners discovered the charm of St. Simons, and no doubt many of them trampled over the ruins of Oglethorpe’s town.

17. WORK OF THE COLONIAL DAMES

Finally, in 1903 a movement to preserve the important site took shape. Mrs. J. J. Wilder, President of the Georgia Society of Colonial Dames, herself a native of St. Simons, proposed that the Society restore Fort Frederica. By that time, the tabby “citadel” was a crumbling ruin. The owner of the citadel property was Mrs. Belle Stevens Taylor, a friend of Mrs. Wilder, and she deeded “the site of said ancient fort or water battery, and extending for a distance of sixty (60) feet in all directions therefrom, and surrounding the same: and also the said ruins of said ancient fort or water battery; and also a right of way, or easement, of suitable width for vehicles, for affording access to said above described and conveyed piece of land from the main or public road near the present Christ church.” A year later, through membership contributions, the ruin on the river bank was reconstructed to the point evident today, and later a small breakwater was built around two sides of the structure to stop serious undermining of the foundations. The transfer of the property to the Colonial Dames, however, was not actually legalized until June 29, 1914, because not until 1914 was the charter of the Society amended to authorize the ownership of real estate.


136 Young, op. cit., 26-27.
In spite of the preservation work done at the citadel, its stabilization again soon became a serious problem, due to erosion of the river bank. The State Legislature failing to provide assistance, Georgia’s Senator Harris asked for Government aid in 1924. Maj. Sultan at Savannah, District Engineer of the U. S. Engineer Corps, surveyed the area and recommended a concrete bulkhead to be constructed around the entire fort. But this preservation measure could not be taken by the War Department unless the property were deeded to the Government.

Since the Society was willing to donate the old landmark for the purposes of preservation, Senator Harris introduced a bill on February 3, 1925, authorizing Government acceptance of title to the site. The bill was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. In September 1926, having knowledge of the Antiquities Act whereby the Secretary of the Interior was empowered to accept title to historic areas, Senator Harris made another attempt to secure action, but again without progressive results. 137

The matter was reopened on January 21, 1935, when Congressman Braswell Deen of the 8th Georgia district, introduced a bill (H.R. 4875) “to provide for the establishment of a national monument at Fort Frederica St. Simon, Ga., to be known as ‘Fort Frederica National Shrine --- ’.”138 The bill provided for Government acquisition of the citadel site and a small adjacent area, and the appropriation of funds for the purpose. The project was authorized by Congress on May 26, 1939, but the appropriation was turned down.

Attempts to raise the necessary money locally in Glynn County failed. In 1940 the President of the Georgia Society of Colonial Dames, Mrs. W. Walter Douglas, and Mrs. Frank Jones, Chairman of the Committee on Historic Activities, assigned Mrs. S. Price Gilbert to that Committee with a request that she study the Frederica problem. In discussion at Frederica in January 1941, the Committee realized that the necessary money required by the Society’s plans for Frederica must be raised by private subscription. But it appeared impossible to raise the amount within the membership of the Colonial Dames to provide for donation of the fort site and sufficient adjacent land to the Government. Furthermore it was apparent that the project would be difficult to

138 Young, op. cit., 27.
work out under the existing organization of the Society, since membership was scattered throughout the State. As a step leading toward solution of the problem, the Fort Frederica Association was chartered as an eleemosynary body with the object of assisting in the Frederica project. The Fort Frederica Association was formally organized June 3, 1941. Judge S. Price Gilbert, formerly of the State Supreme Court, was elected President. Other officers were Judge C. B. Conyers, Vice-President; B. N. Nightingale, Secretary-Treasurer; and the Executive Committee included Mrs. Frank Jones (Chairman of the Historic Activities Committee of the Colonial Dames), Alfred W. Jones, and Harold Friedman.

The charter of the Association provided that all subscriptions be held as trust funds to be applied only to the purpose for which they were made, and no expenses or salaries of any kind were provided for. Nor was any subsequently paid. Contributions, large and small, in cash and land amounted to $43,640, enabling a donation of 71.09 acres of land. The Association, particularly through the activities of President Gilbert, aroused virtually nation-wide interest in the project. 139

It was on the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Bloody Marsh (July 7, 1942) during commemorative exercises held at the site of the battle, that Mrs. Shelby Myrick, President of the Georgia Colonial Dames, presented the deed from the Society to C. Ray Vinten, Coordinating Superintendent of the Southeastern National Monuments, and representing the National Park Service at the occasion. 140 Mr. Vinten accepted the deed as a symbol of cooperation and unity of purpose between the Society and the National Park Service. Later, the document was handed to the Fort Frederica Association, since that body held title to all lands pending State certification under the Georgia law to clarify title defects.

The land acquisition fund was originally turned over to the Service for land purchase, but most of the fund (excepting a small amount retained to cover acquisition expenses and the award in a condemnation suit to acquire the E. T. Stevens one-acre tract) was returned to the Association to facilitate purchase of the land required for the Monument.

139 Gilbert, op. cit., 178-181. For a detailed list, see post, p. 208.
140 “Minutes of the Proceedings Held on St. Simons Island, Georgia in Commemoration of the Two Hundredth Anniversary of the Battle of Bloody March, on July 7, 1942, Georgia Historical Quarterly, XXVII, no. 2, 182 ff.
On January 1, 1945, revised boundary maps, title certificates and legal certifications were in form to be presented to the Secretary of the Interior for his approval, and for the issuance of the declaration establishing the nation monument.

18. CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION OF THE SITE

No great battle occurred at Frederica itself. From the standpoint of battle excitement and pure drama, Fort St. Simons, its guns roaring at the Spanish fleet charging into the harbor, far surpasses Frederica. Bloody Marsh – the battlesounds of which reverberated far beyond the limits of Georgia – took place miles away from Frederica. Yet Frederica means more than a wisely fortified colony. It means Fort St. Simons and Bloody Marsh too, and the hopes of the Georgians as well as the frustration of the Spaniards. Frederica means brightly uniformed English Regulars, lean Rangers, kilted Highlanders, merchants and traders, pioneer mean and women, the Indian enjoying the bounty of His Britannic Majesty – yes, and Oglethorpe himself – the whole kit and caboodle to be expected in an English frontier colony in 1740. With a moment’s thought, Frederica comes to mean the whole bitter story of the Struggle for the Southeast.
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF FREDERICA

In the text that follows, we shall examine the ruins at Frederica in the light of 18th century fortification standards, with some attempt at interpretation. Further, we shall define the technical terms found in the contemporary records which help to explain the nature of the Frederica works. We realize that such extensive hypothesizing as we attempt may render us open to criticism, especially if archeological work at the site produces discoveries at considerable variance with our theorizing. Nevertheless, by carrying discussion beyond the bounds of the records themselves, we have set down considerable information that may be useful background in planning investigation of the site.

I. THE FORT

1. CONTEMPORARY DESCRIPTIONS OF THE FORT

Early on the second day (February 19, 1736) of Frederica’s beginning, Oglethorpe and his men “traced out a Fort with 4 Bastions by cutting up the Turf from the Ground, dug enough of the Ditch & raised enough of the Rampart for a Sample for the men to work upon.” The fort was “in the Front of the said Town, commanding the River both ways, where the Town Guard was kept, which was built large enough upon Occasion to contain the Inhabitants of the said Town”, who numbered at least 116 souls in the early days. Within little more than a month, this fort was defensible. The indication is that in its first form, the fortification was entirely of earth, without any palisade or other timberwork whatsoever. But as time went by and the essentials were taken care of, additional strength was added.

From eyewitness and other descriptions, this fort appears to have been

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141 Collections of the Georgia Historical Society (Savannah, 1840-1916), III, 15 (hereafter cited as Collections); see also Francis Moore, “Voyage to Georgia Begun in the Year 1735”, in Collections, I, 109.
142 Colonial Records of the State of Georgia (Atlanta, 1904-1916; and MS. Volumes), XXXIX, 488. Hereafter cited as CR 39488.
143 Margaret Davis Cate, “Fort Frederica and the Battle of Bloody Marsh”, Georgia Historical Quarterly, XXVII, no. 2, 117. Cited hereafter as “Cate”.

conventional in design: a square with four regular bastions surrounded by a dry ditch and palisaded covert way. Within the earth walls were at least two large buildings. Philip Delegal, one of the military men associated with the early history of the settlement, furnished one of the most detailed descriptions of the fort in his deposition at London (1739): in 1736, stated Delegal, a “Fort was built at Frederica, consisting of a strong Mud Wall, with Frizes [fraises] all round, a Square with four regular Bastions, and a Spur-Work towards the river, and a dry Fosse palisadoed on the Outside, and stockaded in the Inside, defended by Cannon, and other Ordinance [sic].”

Samuel Augspourguer (Auspourget), surveyor employed in building the fort, made a similar deposition, in which he mentions specifically the existence of a covert way: “in the Year One thousand seven hundred and thirty-six, he [Augspourguer] built the Fort At Frederica, to which there is four Bastions, a Ditch palisadoed, and a covered Way defended by fifteen Pieces of Cannon . . .”

Charles Dempsey, Oglethorpe’s well qualified commission, told the gentlemen in London that “at Frederica there is another Fort built with four regular Bastions, and a dry Ditch palisadoed on the Out-side, and stockaded in the Inside, both which were erected and mounted with Ordinance [sic], before this Deponent left Georgia . . .” Another record, summarizing the progress of fortification work in Georgia prior to 1737, mentions “One at Frederica, with Four regular Bastions, and a Spur-work towards the river, and several Pieces of Cannon were mounted on it.”

Capt. William Thompson wrote to the Earl of Egmont that “Col. Oglethorpe has now render’d the Fort of Frederica very strong, with a ditch, rampier [rampart], parapet and Bastions, and there was only remaining to finish the Platforms for Canon.”

Not all descriptions of the fort are enthusiastic. A Frederica landholder named Carteret reported in 1741 that “Frederica Fort contains about 200 Men in garrison, but is ill mounted with Canon . . .” Thomas Stephens, a disturber, was quoted as saying that “the Forts we brag of are pitiful things not worth the mentioning . . .”

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144 CR 39/473.
145 CR39/479.
146 CR 39/483.
147 CR 3/388.
148 CR 5/558.
149 CR 5/499.
Fort is only some boards set up Musket proof with a ditch about it . . .”

About this same time (1739), the Earl of Egmont had occasion to talk with Charles Dempsey about the condition of Georgia’s forts. “After dinner I met Capt Demsey,” wrote Egmont, “and told him Sr Robt Walpole said publicly in the house of Commons that there had not yet been a shovel of Earth dug towards building Forts in Georgia. The Capt swore G--- d--- him, what did he mean to say so? That Fort Frederica is so strong it can’t be taken without Canon, having bastions, covert way, palisadoes & ditch, and when he was there, 20 cannon mounted.”

One valuable eyewitness description of the fort came from the pen of Edward Kimber, a traveler to Frederica late in 1742 or early in 1743: “The Town is defended by a pretty strong Fort, of Tappy, which has several 18 Pounders mounted on a Ravelin in its Front and commands the River both upwards and downwards; and is surrounded by a quadrangular Rampart, with 4 Bastions, of Earth, well stockaded and turfed, and a palisadoed Ditch, which include also the King’s Storehouses, (in which are kept the Arsenal, the Court of Justice, and Chapel) two large and spacious Buildings of Brick and Timber: On the Rampart are mounted a considerable Quantity of Ordnance of several Sizes. The Town is surrounded by a Rampart, with Flankers, of the same Thickness with that round the Fort . . .”

Doubtless there are other descriptions of the fort, buried in the mass of sources relating to Frederica. Those cited above will suffice for the purpose of the present study.

2. NOTES ON THE CITADEL SITE

On the east bank of the Frederica river stands a one-story masonry ruin popularly called “the fort” or “the citadel” (marked A in plate 21). The river bank rises here some 8 feet above the marsh level. In the yellow sand of this bluff or bank may be seen various interesting strata, including some humus layers, as well as apparent floor

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150 CR 5/308
151 CR 5/144
152 This casual reference to a tabby fort is difficult to accept literally. Evidently this observer, who was not an experienced military man familiar with military nomenclature, saw the masonry buildings within the earth fortification as a “Fort of Tappy”. For a definition of tabby, see post pp. 179-180, n. 200.
The “citadel” is a rectangular structure approximately 20 by 50 feet. Its foundations and walls are of tabby, consistent with other ruins in the vicinity. Height of the “citadel” is about 12 feet from foundation to top. The floor level is several feet below the level of the bluff. There are three rooms, the two larger almost identical, each ceiled with a round arch of brick, and the soffit of the arch at right angles to the length of the building. The third room is a small one, now ceilingless, at the north end of the structure.

By 1900 the south, west and north walls of the building, together with the south arch, had fallen. Almost the only parts of the ruin standing above the foundations were the east wall and the north arch. In 1904 the fallen walls were reconstructed, the workmen using as much as possible of the old masonry. To rebuild the south arch, however, new brick was used, and the method of laying was not entirely in accord with the style of the north arch.

It has not been possible to determine whether the structure originally was higher than its present single story. During the reconstruction, the walls were crowned with merlons of Portland cement containing an oyster shell aggregate (rather poorly resembling tabby), but it is doubtful that these merlons are historically accurate. Their design is inconsistent with 18th century principles. Perhaps they were based upon the obviously inaccurate sketches that appeared in Harper’s Weekly or Lossing’s Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution (see post, bibliography.)

About 100 feet north of the “Citadel” (Ruin A) in an eroded portion of the river bank, are tabby ruins (B) of a building that appears to have been similar in dimension and plan to Ruin A. The base of this foundation seems to be at higher elevation than that of Ruin A. Little of the building remains except lower portions of the east wall and fragmentary ground floor levels, partially protected by an accumulation of humus. Several partition foundations are displaced, and a section of the north foundation is also moved slightly from its original location by erosion.

154 See the accompanying photographs, plate 19.
Plate 21 - Sketch of the Citadel Site

SKETCH OF CITADEL SITE

KEY

- Masonry ruins
A. 'Citadel', tabby, with brick arches
B. Foundations, wall, tabby, part displaced
C. Foundations, tabby
D. Foundations, tabby
E. Earth mound, bastion conformation
F. Earth mound
G. Continuous depression, moat conformation

SCALE: 1 inch = 50 feet

This sketch should be regarded merely as a notation on the relationship of masonry ruins and ground conformations. Contours shown are approximate only.

Based on survey notes compiled in the field by C.R. Linton, J.C. Harrington, L. F. Mann, and the writer.
Other masonry ruins (C and D) are found within a 150-foot area east of Ruin A. Ruin C, a tabby foundation, shows approximately 50 feet northeast of Ruin A, and extends eastward for a distance of about 60 feet. Probing revealed the existence of underlying masonry which might be west and south walls for Ruin C.

About 130 feet south of Ruin C is Ruin D, the corner foundation of another tabby building.

Earthwork remains in the citadel area are not extensive, and a most careful observation of the site was necessary to discover what may be significant topography. Just north of Ruin B on the river bank, a swale or depression (G) opens into the marsh. This swale extends landward in a southeasterly direction for about 100 feet, where it angles to the northeast, circles a mound (E) about 200 feet east of Ruin B, and runs some 200 feet south until it becomes lost in an oak grove near the existing road. The grove appears to be a small mound (F₁).

The theory may be advanced that this running depression is an indication of the course of the fort moat. Its directions conform satisfactorily. But the first definite sign that the depression is significant develops at the point 200 feet east of Ruin B, where the swale circles toward the south. Here there is a well defined mound (E) that shows the figure of a bastion. Curtain angles and shoulders of the bastion, if such it be, are clear, though the salient is partly effaced. A shed now stands upon the crest of this mound.

Southward from Mound E, the careful observer can trace a fairly definite ridge which may be the east rampart of the fort. The depression (G) and the ridge terminate at Mound F₁ is in approximately the right location for identification as the southeast bastion.

Highest elevation of earth at the site is a third mound (F₂) adjacent to Ruin B. This mound is considerably eroded, but is in a location justifiable as the northwest bastion of the fort.

Lacking a detailed topographical survey of the vicinity, we cannot at present fully interpret these conformations, nor can we determine accurately the dimensions of the fortification which the contours may indicate. For purposes of discussion, however, we assume that the exterior side of Fort Frederica (i.e., the distance from the point of one bastion to the point of another) was between 250 and 300 feet (see plate 23). If our assumption is even approximately correct, it appears that river erosion has destroyed
the western front and part of the south front of the earth fort.

In a hypothetical plan of Fort Frederica, (plate 23) we have shown existing masonry ruins in certain relationship to the walls of the fort. Ruin A has been interpreted as a gate to the fort. Ruins B and C have been identified with the two 20-by 60-foot storehouses said to have been constructed within the fort walls, and Ruin D as a small magazine in the gorge of the southeast bastion. Archeological exploration is necessary to clarify the relationship of the masonry buildings to the trace of the fort.

While this hypothetical plan of the fort conforms generally to contemporary descriptions of the work, it has raised almost as many questions as it has answered. Ruin A (the “citadel”) stands in such a position that it must have some relation to a fort entrance. Yet, to have been a gate, Ruin A must almost certainly have had its north arch open like a passage. Due to the 1904 reconstruction, it is difficult to determine whether this arch was actually open. Even if this center room were a passage, its east doorway (seemingly original construction) is too narrow (5 feet) to be a standard gate opening.

Unfortunately, Ruin A does not clearly resemble any part of an 18th century fort, except possibly a gate with guardrooms (see plate 34) or a magazine. For the latter purpose, the arches were dangerously thin for “bombproof” construction (see plate 38), even though they were well protected by earth.

The problem of identifying the masonry ruins is further complicated by the fact that they do not appear consistent with the buildings shown inside the fort by Miller’s plan. And while the plan dimensions of Ruins B and C conform reasonably well to specifications given in the records for the King’s Storehouses, yet their tabby masonry does not jibe with the description that the buildings were of “Brick and Timber.” Further, there is considerable doubt that Ruin B, tentatively located in the gorge of the northwest bastion, would be a three-story structure. Being in the gorge, it would probably be a low magazine. Perhaps the companion structure to Ruin C exists underground, undiscovered, some 100 feet south of, and parallel to Ruin C.


Specific dimensions for the Frederica fort are not given in available records. At present, the single plan representing the fort in any detail is the Miller “Plan of the “Town of Frederica”, made about 1796. While it is obvious that Miller’s drawing of the fort is a conventional representation, there may be some meat to his suggestion that the curtains of the work were 90 feet long. On the other hand, the 90-foot dimension is too small to include existing ruins at the fort site.

It is, of course, entirely possible that one or more of the tabby ruins at the fort site is a later intrusion.

3. 18TH CENTURY FORTIFICATION

Oglethorpe was acquainted with the maxims of fortification as adapted by the English from the famous French engineer Sabastien le Prestre Vauban, since the claimed familiarity with the master’s principles in building the town walls.

Most “textbook” forts, based on European practices, were much larger than was practicable for colonial frontier fortification. John Müller, one of England’s foremost military engineers, set forth the following dogma in 1746: “Forts are most commonly made square . . . at least, when the pass they are to guard, is of any consequence, or the place may easily be approached; the sides of this square are 100 toises [i.e., 100 fathoms or 600 feet] the perpendicular 10, and the faces 25; the ditch about this fort may be from 10 to 12 toises; the parapet is to be made of turf, and fraised, and the ditch palisaded when dry/ There may be made a covert-way about this fort, or else a row of palisades might be placed on the outside of the ditch.”

The following comparative dimensions may be useful in studying the design of Frederica’s fort. (next page after plate)

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158 Several contemporary plans of Frederica were made. It may be possible to locate them. For leads mentioning such maps, see: CR 1/425, 438; 2/313, 5/69, 279, 552-553; 22/279.

159 “Plan of the Town of Frederica on the Island of St. Simon,” cited above, n. 16. Miller’s instructions were to lay off the town as nearly as practicable according to the original plan.


Plate 22b - Nomenclature and Design (cont.)

**17th Century**

**Clairac**

- Perpendicular CD & E of Exterior Side AB.
- Place AE, BE, CE ¼ AT AB, Flanks DF.
- DF are at right angles to Lines of Defence.

**Ravelin**: At reentering angle S of counterscarp, erect Capital ST, 12 fathoms, perpendicular to the curtain. Set off 6 fathoms along the counterscarp for an irregular fortification, a variation of Vauban's method.

**Fort St. Simons, Georgia**

**Typical Profile - 18th Century**

- Exterior Side AB is 84 fathoms (252 feet). Bisect AB, drop perpendicular CD 5 fathoms (¼ of Exterior Side).
- Set off 5 fathom squares AE, EB, BF, and DF, parallel to curtain. From point E, describe arcs through H, marking point G in line ADG.
- From point H, describe arcs through E, marking point F in line BDF.

**Italian-Spanish - 18th Century**

- Note that curtain angle is 90°.

**Banquette (Firing step)**: Draw lines parallel to parapet, ¼ fathom in.

**Rampart**: Draw lines parallel to curtain, ¼ fathom in.

**Parapet**: Draw lines parallel to curtain, ¼ fathom in.

**Ditch**: Describe arcs at ½ fathom radius from A and B. Mark points W with lines from E and H.

**Cove**: Lines MM parallel to counterscarp, ¼ fathom out. O is reentering angle of covert way.

**Place of Arms**: At reentering angle O, set off 6 fathoms on MM at each side, Plane Q. From Plane Q draw arcs with ½-fathom radius to intersect at R. PRQ is Place of Arms.

**Traverse**: ¼ or ½ fathom broad, perpendicular to counterscarp at extremities of Place of Arms. Passage along traverse is 8 or 8 feet wide.

**Ravelin**: At reentering angle S of counterscarp, erect Capital ST, 12 fathoms, perpendicular to the curtain. Set off 6 fathoms along the counterscarp for a variation of Vauban's method.
### Dimensions of 18th Century Fortification Parts

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165. *Element*, 24 ff., 206, Basic dimensions for column 5 were computed from field observations at the site. For application of these dimensions, see plate 23. See also plate 22, showing the Clairac trace, which would provide a smaller bastion area; and Müller, *The Field Engineer of M. le Chevalier de Clairac* (London, 1760), 37. This work is cited hereafter as *Clairac*. See also plate 36, p. 264. in *Clairac*. This plate is evidently applicable in some measure to the design of Fort St. Simons (our plate 8). The fathom or toise (6 feet) was the standard unit of measure in 18th century fortification layout. In computing key dimensions such as perpendicular and face, it was customary to drop fractions. Thus the perpendicular in column 5 (1/8th of 42 fathoms) is 5 fathoms, not 5 ¼ fathoms. (See *Elements*, 29).
Plate 22 furnishes detailed notes on fortification design according to Vauban’s First Method (presumably that used by Oglethorpe) as well as other well known systems.\footnote{Based on Elements, 24-30, 42-43; New Method, 105, 108-109, 131-132, 172-173; Cf. Clairac, 37.} Basic dimensions for any bastioned fortification were 1) the exterior side, or the distance from the point of one bastion to the next; 2) the perpendicular, a geometrical line bisecting the exterior side, measuring (for a square fort) one eighth of the exterior side and determining the position of the line of defense;\footnote{The “line of defense”, first defined by Antoine de Ville in his work on fortification published in 1628, and its relationship to the flank (EF) of the bastion became of primary importance in the development of the various fortification “systems”. The line of defense (AG) actually represented part of the sector of fire from defenders’ guns mounted in the flank of the bastion; or in 18th century terminology, it was the line “represented by the discharge of the small shot, which uncovers the face of one bastion by razing [grazing] it.” (New Method, 78.) See also post, n. 51.} and 3) the face of the bastion, which for a square fort was two sevenths of the exterior side.

Lacking contemporary plans of Fort Frederica, of course we do not know to what degree its design varied from the Vauban method. But plate 8 (Fort St. Simons) and plate 22 (showing a simplified trace of St. Simons) may prove useful for interpreting certain archeological discoveries that may be made at Fort Frederica.

4. RAMPARTS

In 18th century lexicography, a rampart “is an elevation of earth raised along the faces of any work, of 10 or 15 feet high, to cover the inner part of that work against the
Plate 23 - Hypothetical Plan of Fort Frederica
HYPOTHETICAL PROFILES OF FORT FREDERICA

Profile with rampart and berm

Profile of Work without rampart

Table of Slopes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrain</th>
<th>Base of Slope</th>
<th>Height of Slope</th>
<th>% of Inclination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beach</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exterior</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brahm's Proposed Profile of a detached battery at Frederica may have been related to the "crownwork" built on the mainland or near the fort. From Brahm's plan, Frederica.

(Significant not to scale)
fire of an enemy." The rampart was "the principal Piece of a Fortification; and therefore the Rampart ought to be higher and broader than any of the rest of the Parts." On the basis of Vauban’s general rule that each work in a fortification should be at least 6 feet higher than the one before it, the height of the Frederica rampart should be 6 feet or more above the field. Since height of the rampart was measured from the bottom of the ditch, a ditch 6 feet deep plus a rampart 6 feet above the field would provide a total rampart height of 12 feet.

For a small fort, thickness of the rampart at its base was usually 30 feet. At the top, the breadth was somewhat less, due to necessary sloping or grading of the construction. The inside or parade slope of the rampart approximated 45°, the natural slope of the earth used in construction.

Exterior slope (the batter of the curtain) was 2/3 of the height. Thus, in a rampart 6 feet above the field, when the base was 30 feet, the crown would measure 24 feet or

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168 Elements, 229.

169 New Method, 146 ff. Though it was common practice to erect the “body or inner works of fortifications higher than the outworks in order to command enemy works in the field surrounding the fort, some engineers did not consider it essential to do so. True, the higher works were not so easily enfiladed by enemy ricochet batteries, but if all the works were of the same height, the interior ones could not be destroyed until the outworks were taken. Ricochet was “a kind of firing, with a small quantity of powder, by giving the gun an elevation of 10 or 12 degrees” in such a way that the shot cleared the parapet and struck the flank of the defending battery of guns to dismount them. (Elements, 47.)

170 Elements, 46,48, Cf. post n. 71. An interesting series of profiles is to be found in Clairac, pl. 36, p. 264.

171 New Method, 147-148; Elements, 48. Müller, A Treatise Containing the Practical Part of Fortification (London 1755), p. vi, suggests that the proper slope in a given locality should be determined by building a sample embankment 10 or 12 feet high. After a year’s exposure to the elements, the earth in this embankment will form its natural slope, and that angle or slope may then be taken as a guide for future construction.

In coastal Georgia, where the earth was sandy and it was difficult to obtain a steep slope without revetments, several methods appear to have been used. At Frederica, the fort curtain was stockaded and the town walls had wharf-like revetments. At Fort St. Andrews on Cumberland Island, where the ground was loose sand, in order to construct parapets “they used the same Method to support it as Caesar mentions in the Wars of Gaul, laying Trees and Earth alternately, the Trees preventing the Sand from falling, and the Sand the Wood from Fire.” (Collections, I, 126-127.) At Fort William on the south point of Cumberland, by 1743 a regular pentagon fort was built, “the Rampart twelve Foot high, and about fifteen Foot thick, of Sand, supported by [logs or] Puncheons.” [Edward Kimber,] Journal of a Late Expedition to the Gates of St. Augustine (Boston 1935), 8-9, f.n.) At Savannah, the soil being “a meer Sand, to make this keep in a breast work,” the engineer “was obliged to have the outside Talus [slope] faced with Pine Saplins set in the ground and inclined their tops in form with Talus of the Scarp . . .” (CR 39/453.) In other words, the saplings formed a revetment to hold the sand of the earthwork in a fairly steep slope.
less, depending upon the angles of the interior and exterior slopes. However, when walls or revetments were used to hold the earth in place, Vauban customarily made the slope of such a wall 1/5 of the height. Müller thought 1/6 was sufficient. 172

In view of the relatively small size of Fort Frederica, there is some question whether the fortification actually boasted a rampart as such or whether the wall consisted only of a parapet or breastwork some 6 feet high with a narrow ditch around (see plate 24). We incline toward the breastwork idea. Yet Oglethorpe himself, whether in loose expression or no, reported that “we . . . raised enough of the Rampart for a Sample for the men to work upon.”173 Moore mentioned “the ramparts raised with green sod”,174 and Capt. William Thompson, a military eyewitness, evidently told Egmont that the fort has a “ditch, rampier [rampart], parapet and Bastions . . .”.175 Kimber described “a quadrangular Rampart . . . of Earth, well stockaded and turfed . . .”176

Descriptions of Fort Frederica thus conform closely to 18th century standards as given by Müller: “The ramparts and parapets . . . are commonly made of turf, and the outside of the parapet fraised; that is a row of palisades are placed in about the middle of the slope, in an horizontal manner, the points declining rather a little downwards . . . “177 Additional details of construction, as given in an 18th century textbook, are illuminating: “To every Foot of Earth, where the rampart is raised, two Branches of Willow are to be set no bigger than a Man’s Thumb: Besides that, the Earth is to be so hard rammed down, that it may sink four or five Inches, and that there remain not above seven or eight. Lastly, You ought to soe with Hay-Seed and Weeds upon the outside in every Row, to the end the Earth may intermix with the Roots . . . When you plant Trees upon the Rampart, it is a great Ornament in Time of Peace, and a good Provision in Time of War. There are some Engineers that do not like this Advice; for they say that the Wind makes such a Noise, when the Branches hit one against another, that the Men can hardly hear one another: Besides that, it is a great Hindrance to the Centinel,

172 New Method, 147, 168-169; Elements, 229
173 Collections, III, 15.
174 Collections, I, 114.
175 CR 5/558.
177 Elements, 197.
which is a Consideration not altogether to be rejected.”

5. PARAPETS

“Parapet, is a part of the rampart of a work, of 18 or 20 feet broad, and raised 6 or 7 feet above the rest of the rampart; it serves to cover the troops, placed there to defend the work, against the fire of the enemy.” For a redoubt, the parapet might be only 9 or 10 feet thick at its base, and 5 to 7 feet high, depending upon the type of banquette or firing step. According to Frederica records, the thickness of the fort rampart was equal to the thickness of the town breastwork, and Verelst made a long range recording from London that the town “Breast Work above the Timber will be 12 feet thick with Earth.” At least 12 feet might be accepted as the minimum thickness of the town breastwork, since a military man said he “judged [them] strong enough to be Proof against Eighteen-Pound Shot . . .”

For the present purpose it may be assumed that Frederica parapets were probably at least 15 feet thick at the base (see plate 24). Fifteen feet was minimum standard thickness; 18, as recommended by Vauban, was preferred. For illustration we may say that measurements of a 6-foot-high parapet would be 15 feet at the base; the exterior slope had a base 2/3 of its height, or about 30°; the interior slope would be much steeper, having a base of only one foot. The crown of the parapet, then was 11 feet or less in breadth. The slope of the crown toward the field was 1/6 of the base, so that the outer face of a 15-foot parapet was 2 ½ feet lower than the inner fact. The

178 New Method, 148. Moore (Collections, I, 116) said that some oaks were left standing inside the fort.

179 Elements, 227.

180 New Method, 168.


182 Jones, 120, citing Capt. MacClellan’s statement in 1743. New Method, 185, gives penetrating power of various 18th century projectiles: At 600 feet, a 33-pounder would penetrate 12 feet or more of earth, depending upon the solidity of the work. “Poor and hungry” earth might be pierced as much as 24 feet. At 400 feet, a 48-pounder went through 20 feet of earth. A 24-pounder entered 12 feet of earth at 300-foot range, and at 200 feet, a 12-pounder went 7 feet into a good parapet. The source gives no data on 18-pounders.

183 New Method, 48, 49, 145, 173: Elements, 27. A parapet wider than 24 feet hindered vision toward the outworks; one less than 18 feet “cannot long resist the Force of the great Shot, which would soon level it with the Earth . . .” (New Method, 145, 185.) Clermont (ibid., 145) specified that the parapet should be 1/3 the base of the rampart, but obviously this principle would not apply in a small fortification.
resultant slope toward the field enabled the musketeer to command a clear view of the sector beyond the ditch in front of him. Like the rampart, the parapet was turfed.\footnote{184}

6. BANQUETTES (FIRING STEPS)

“Banquette, is a kind of step made on the rampart of a work near the parapet, for the troops to stand upon in order to fire over the parapet; it is generally three feet high and as many broad, and 4 ½ feet lower than the parapet.”\footnote{185} In this definition, Müller has left little room for misinterpretation. However, it might be added that width of the step could be two, three, or four feet, and sometimes there were two firing steps – one for short and one for tall soldiers! In the latter case, each step was about two feet broad. The first level was a foot above the rampart and the second six inches higher, “So that every one may have a View from the Parapet, and Discharge at his Ease.”

Banquettes were made of earth, and had an interior slope of about 45° or less.\footnote{186}

7. FRAISES

“Fraise, a kind of stakes or palisades placed horizontally on the outward slope of a rampart made of turf, to prevent the work being taken by surprise.”\footnote{187} Elsewhere Lexicographer Müller elaborates on the definition by explaining that the “points” of the fraises inclined slightly downward toward the field so “that the grenades or fireworks thrown upon them, may roll down into the ditch . . .” Fraises were about 7 or 8 feet long, and about half their length was laid into the earth of the rampart at a point slightly below the base of the parapet.\footnote{188} The protruding “points” were doubtless sharpened as in a typical palisade. (See plate 24.)

\footnote{184} “If you would line the Parapet,” reads an old text, “it must be allowed a little sloping, that the Soldiers may have the better Footing. The best Lining of Parapets is with Turf. As for the Earth or Mould which you are to make use of in erecting a Parapet, it is very requisite to mix it with Withy [willow] Twigs, or Brambles, and to sow it with any Weeds that take a deep Root, to bind the Earth together, so that the Cannon may not easily crumble it down . . .” (\newmethod, 145.)

\footnote{185} Elements, 211.

\footnote{186} Elements, 146. In the 18th century Cubo redoubt at St. Augustine, banquettes were made of palmetto logs. See Castillo de San Marcos plan file, serial no. 108, measured drawings of the Cubo Redoubt excavations.

\footnote{187} Elements, 221.

\footnote{188} Elements, 197; \newmethod, 77.
“Bastions, is a part of the inner enclosure of a fortification; making an angle toward the field, and consists of two faces, two flanks, and an opening towards the center of the place called the gorge.”

The bastions of Fort Frederica might have measured 72 feet on the face and 25 feet on the flank. The bastion representations on the 1796 Miller plan seem to be conventional, rather than to scale, since they show unusually small bastions – too small even for the Clairac style trace shown in plate 22. In our hypothetical plan of the Frederica fort (plate 23), the bastion angles conform fairly well to the specified angles for square forts. Small variations are to be expected: “As for the Angle of the

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189 Elements, 210. It is interesting to trace the development of these angles. According to data compiled by Dr. Hans Huth (“Fort Marion as an Architectural Structure” (Washington, 1942),
190 See ante, p, 129.
191 See New Method, 131-132:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Angle of the bastion</th>
<th>Standard 63° 00’</th>
<th>Frederica (hypothetical) 63°</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angle of the curtain</td>
<td>98° 30’</td>
<td>96°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angle of defense</td>
<td>81° 30’</td>
<td>83°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angle of the front</td>
<td>112° 30’</td>
<td>109°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angle of the angle</td>
<td>67° 30’</td>
<td>71°</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is interesting to trace the development of these angles. According to date compiled by Dr. Hans Huth (“Fort Marion as an Architectural Structure” (Washington, 1942), 17th century Italian-Spanish practice, as exemplified in Castillo de San Marcos (Fort Marion) and other similar Spanish colonial forts, made the angle of the curtain (EFG) a right angle, thus rendering the angle of the flank (EFB) an oblique angle. This 90° curtain angle is a mark of 16th century fortification built in the so called “new Italian” school. However, experience showed that soldiers fired most effectively when their target was directly in front of them – not at an angle. Said Clairac: soldiers “generally fire without aim, and directly before them.” (Clairac, 3.) As late as the early 1800’s instructions to Spanish soldiery of St. Augustine deplored this tendency to fire without aiming, and exhorted the musketeers to stand up bravely on the firing step long enough to draw a bead on the target. In order to utilize this human nature to best advantage, during the course of the 17th century, the bastion angles were modified. Count Pagan in 1645 established the angle of the flank (EFB) as 90°; that is, the bastion flank was drawn at right angles to the line of defense. While most 18th century engineers held to the desirability of retaining this maxim as a “true position” for the flanks, yet they regarded those flanks as being “too much exposed, and too easily ruined by the enemy’s counter-batteries . . .” (Elements, 134.) As a consequence, the 90° angle of the flank (EFB) was modified to 81°30’, and the angle of the curtain (EFG) became 98°, in the textbooks. Actually, as one anonymous author pointed out, “it depends upon the Knowledge of the Engineer to make the Flanks, so that they may form a good Angle of the Bastion, according to which almost all the rest take their Measures. But to
Bastion, and all the rest, it is impossible to know what their overtures are, in regard they are not always the same . . .”

9. GUNS AND EMBRASURES

“Embrasures, are openings made in the flanks of a fortification or in the breastwork of a battery, of about 2 ½ feet within, 8 or 9 without, and 3 from the bottom, for the guns to enter partly, and to fire through.”

Guns at Frederica during the decade of the 1730’s apparently numbered between 15 and 20 pieces, and Habersham’s report in 1763 stated that the “Fort mounted (at least there are embrasures for) 20 Guns besides a battery to defend the Channel below of twelve, 12 pounders now removed to Cockspur . . .” Habersham further indicated that few of the Frederica guns were serviceable, and recommended that “a few Hand 6 pounders” be supplied, “together with round and double headed shot for the several Calibres, and all implements for Actual Service.” Of all the cannon once at Frederica a single 12-pounder now remains at the fort site.

_speak the Truth, we ought to believe, that this Angle, whether right, acute, or obtuse, ought never to trouble our Thoughts, provided it be not less than sixty Degrees, nor much more than 100 . ” (New Method, 131, 136.) See also Elements, 24 ff.; New Method, 87, 131 ff.; Clairac, 37._

192 New Method, 131. See note above. The curtain angle (EFG) should not be less than 90° nor more than 110°. Further, the bastion face (AE) was seldom, if ever, less than one half the length of the curtain. (New Method, 87, 88.)

In summary, key to any variation in bastion design was probably in the angle of defense (EFB), or, as it was sometimes termed, angle of the flank, for many engineers held to the older idea of making this angle a right angle instead of the 81°30’ specified here. (See New Method, 134 ff.) Many engineers, protected the bastion flanks by retiring them behind orillons or “ears”. See Elements, 30 ff., for explanation of orillon construction. used for larger fortifications.

193 Elements, 218.

194 Collections, VI, 13; see also CR 3/388; 5/144, 252, 499; 21/115-116;39/473, 479, 483. In 1755 Governor Reynolds wrote that at Frederica “there still remains 20 pieces [sic] of Cannon, some of them 19 Pounders, but all are spoilt for want of Care; the rest of the Guns were removed to Savannah…and are also ruined by lying many years in the Sand without vents [vent covers] or Tompions.” (CR 27/148.) Mrs. Cate has found (Cate MS., 67-68). That in 1762 some of the guns were removed and mounted at Fort George, on Cockspur Island near Savannah, and at the outbreak of the Revolution the Savannah Council of Safety ordered all military stores at Frederica secured in a place of safety. Most of them were evidently taken to Sunbury and went into Fort Morris. One, used a salute gun at Himesville, burst. Another is at the Augusta home of C. C. Jones, Jr. The Fort Morris guns were sent to the Chicago Exposition of 1893 and never returned.

195 See plate 25.
Plate 25 - Iron 12 Pounder at Fort Frederica

IRON 12-POUNDER AT FREDERICA

This gun lies atop the "Citadel" at Frederica. Oxidization is severe. There are no identifying marks. Measurements lack final accuracy due to half-buried present condition of the gun. This piece is tentatively judged to be a garrison cannon, probably cast before 1760, since it appears to be conical from vent to muzzle in line with Muller's recommendations of 1750, yet longer than Muller's gun and fairly close to the Armstrong regulations of 1736-1748. It is probably a British cannon.
In small forts it was customary to mount guns only in the bastions, the most effective locations for defense. Such was the case at Castillo de San Marcos at St. Augustine during the early period of its construction, before the terreplein was sufficiently advanced to support artillery. And in the earlier wooden forts at Spanish St. Augustine, the majority of the defending ordnance was emplaced in bastions, or on cavaliers (raised platforms) within the walls.

Two difficult questions arise in connection with the armament of Frederica. If we accept the hypothetical dimensions for the fort, there was hardly room in the bastion to mount much more than a pair of guns. While in plate 23 we have shown six embrasures to the bastion, still the maximum width within the bastion from shoulder to shoulder is less than 40 feet – hardly sufficient for more than a couple of standard-sized gun platforms. On the other hand, there is not much indication that guns could have been mounted along the curtains, because the rampart is too narrow.

These questions can be brushed aside with the suggestion that the fort had no rampart, but consisted simply of a breastwork or parapet wall (see plate 24, “Work without rampart”). Lacking a rampart, our hypothetical plan becomes everywhere more roomy, and cannon could have been emplaced anywhere along the walls without difficulty.

The existence of gun platforms at the fort is specified, but the type is not clearly indicated. Moore, however, indicated standard construction: “platforms of two inch planks laid for the cannon upon the bastions”. A gun platform was “a floor made of strong planks, laid upon joists, on a battery, to place the guns or mortars upon, in order to prevent the wheels or mortar-bed from sinking in the ground.” Such platforms were about 9 feet wide and 18 feet long, with a rise of 9 inches from fore to rear to help check recoil. To insure accuracy in laying the gun, it was the universal custom to level platforms with the long mason’s level. Chalk marks on the planking at each wheel and at the trail or “hind part” of the gun carriage insured a precise return to the aiming point.

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196 CR 5/558.
197 Collections, I, 129.
198 Elements, 228.
199 Maximum axletree length of an English field piece of the period was 76 inches; that of a garrison carriage only 57 inches.
If this conventional type of platform were not practicable within the relatively narrow confines of the Frederica bastions, possible the entire terreplein of the bastions was floored.\textsuperscript{200}

In some fortifications, platforms were raised to within two feet of the parapet crown, with the requisite slopes and ramps to haul the guns into position on the platform. (See plate 8, “Plan of the Redoubt”, which shows swivel guns mounted similarly en barbette.) It might also be mentioned that if the bastions were full (\textit{i.e.}, filled in) and of any height, ramps of more gradual slope than that of the rampart would be found leading from the parade into the gorge of each bastion. Hurtors, 6-inch square timbers, were laid before all gun carriage wheels to prevent the wheels from damaging the parapet.\textsuperscript{201}

A variation of barbette emplacement was used by the school of “modern engineers” frowned upon by John Müller. These men, wrote Müller, “when they build any fort or battery near the sea or navigable rivers . . . make a parapet of three feet high only, in order to fire the guns \textit{en barbet}; the reason they give for this practice is, that they may point the guns which way they please, either down the river, to prevent the ships from approaching, destroy them when they are opposite, or firing after them in case they should pass.”\textsuperscript{202} Müller claimed the practice had obvious disadvantages due to its lack of protection for the gun crews.

10. DITCH

“\textit{Ditch}, is a large deep trench made round each work, and the earth dug out of it, serves to raise the rampart and parapet.”\textsuperscript{203}

From archeological excavation which should reveal the width and depth of the Fort Frederica ditch, it may be possible to determine accurately both horizontal and vertical

\textsuperscript{200} The ravelin at Fort William on Cumberland Island was reported to have a pair of 18-pounders mounted “upon curious moving Platforms [similar to Gribeauval type seacoast gun carriages?], that they can bring to bear any Way . . .” (\cite{Kimber} Journal of a Late Expedition to the Gates of St. Augustine, 8-9, f.n.)

\textsuperscript{201} Clairac, 226; Elements, 223.

\textsuperscript{202} Elements, 206.

\textsuperscript{203} Elements, 217.
dimensions of the fort ramparts and parapets. As a point of departure in explaining the nature of a fortification ditch or moat, we have shown the Frederica moat in plates 23 and 24 about 36 feet wide and 6 feet deep.\textsuperscript{204}

Most small fortifications had wet moats, since they were deemed better protection than dry moats. On the other hand, large forts were often built with dry mats to facilitate disposition of the defending troops.\textsuperscript{205} Apparently Fort Frederica had a dry moat, which probably meant that excavation was not deeper than 6 feet, since the water table was reported to be “about six feet under the surface of the Land”.\textsuperscript{207}

Slope of the moat banks probably approached the natural or $45^\circ$ angle, and these slopes were most likely lined with turf. It is probable, but not certain, that the stockade facing of the rampart started at the base of the ditch, so that the slope of the ditch below the rampart had the same batter or slope as the rampart itself. In some cases, where the earth of the rampart went to considerable height above the ditch, and was not held by a revetment, a berm 4 or 5 feet broad was left a the foot of the rampart “to prevent the Earth from falling into the Moat.”\textsuperscript{208}

11. COVERT WAY

“Covert-way, is a space five or six toises\textsuperscript{209} broad, going quite round the works of a fortification, and is adjoining to the counterscarp of the ditches, covered by a parapet 7 ½ feet high, terminating in an easy slope [glacis] towards the field, at a distance of 20 toises.”\textsuperscript{210} While 24 feet is specified for the breadth of the covert way in a field fort, a 30-foot width was conceded to be better – wide enough to accommodate the “great Guns and Men”, yet not so wide that it needed a higher parapet to give cover from enemy

\textsuperscript{204} Most textbook dimensions, however, specify 36 feet wide by 15 feet deep, though outworks such as redoubts might have ditches only 24 feet wide by 8 feet deep. Cf. sources cited ante, notes 22, 23. Obviously, small frontier forts had moats nowhere approaching the grandiose dimensions specified for the larger European fortifications, where a moat would be as much as 96 feet wide and 20 feet or so deep. Castillo de San Marcos at St. Augustine has a moat constructed on a radius of about 40 feet, and the height of the counterscarp is from 8 to 12 feet.

\textsuperscript{205} \textit{New Method}, 151.


\textsuperscript{207} CR 1/446.

\textsuperscript{208} \textit{New Method}, 69; cf. id., 153.

\textsuperscript{209} A toise is a fathom, or 6 feet.

\textsuperscript{210} \textit{Elements}, 214.
Designing a covert way was simple, and the method for a small square fort is shown in plate 22. At every re-entering angle of the counterscarp (the moat wall), a place of arms was laid out, where troops could muster to organize a maneuver. As with the covert way, this area was more or less standard in dimensions, and could be laid out in several ways, depending upon the shape and size of the fortification.

Wherever the faces of the place of arms crossed the covert way, traverses were built (plate 22). A traverse was a parapet as high as the crown of the glacis, 18 feet thick, and built across the length of the covert way to prevent enfilading fire. Traverse length was the same as the breadth of the covert way, so to get around the traverse, the engineers cut a passage some 6 or 8 feet wide in the glacis. Traverses were also usually built at every salient angle of the bastions and outworks, though we have not shown them in such locations in our plates due to the relatively small proportions of the hypothetical design. To determine the location for such traverses, however, the engineer “produced” or extended the face of the bastion. Where that line crossed the covert way was the proper location, and the traverse was made the same thickness as the bastion parapet.

The covert way was one of the most important parts of the fortification: “taking the covert-way,” stated Müller, “when it is in a good condition and well defended, is generally the most bloody action of the siege.”

In order for the defenders assembled in the place of arms to march into the field, there were one or two sally ports, 10 or 12 feet wide, through the glacis. In siege time these ports were shut with barriers or gates (plate 27).

12. PALISADES

It is evident from the Georgia records that there is a definite distinction between

211 New Method, 103, 154; Elements, 45, 48. In some cases the covert way was lower than ground level, in order to save the labor and expanse of raising the rampart to greater height.

212 Based on Elements, 42; the data following on places of arms and traverses comes from id., 42 ff., and New Method, 105-106.

213 “Re-entring angle,” wrote Müller (Elements, 229), “is that which turns its point towards the center of the place.”

214 See Elements, 24-30, 42-43, for constructional details; also see id., 231. In plates 22 and 23 we have used a 15-foot thickness for the traverses, since the fort parapets hypothetically measure only 15 feet in breadth.

215 Elements, 41-42.
Covert way palisade at Castillo de San Marcos. A double stockade probably filled with earth...

Cubo Redoubt, St. Augustine Defences

Typical cross section of palisade remains

Plan of typical corner

Based on Bache's 1797 Engraving I, and Plate C; Chatelain, map 18
“palisade” and “stockade”. Unfortunately, that distinction has not come down to us very clearly. We have not discovered the word “stockade” in any available 18th century military work, yet there is remarkable unanimity among the Frederica observers in describing the fort ditch as “palisadoed on the Out-side, and stockaded in the Inside”. \(^{216}\) One modern authority defines a stockade as a tight fence set in the ground, inclined to the front and used as a rampart.\(^{217}\) Merriam-Webster hints that a stockade was a tight fence serving in the nature of a rampart, usually with loopholes, whereas the palisade was used more or less as a simple barrier. Palisades were not necessarily tight fences; Müller defines “Palissades” as “a kind of stakes made of strong split wood of about 9 feet long, fixed 3 feet deep in the ground in rows about 6 inches asunder . . .” He says further that “they are placed in the covert-way at 3 feet from, and parallel to the parapet or ridge of the glacis, to secure it from being surprised.”\(^{218}\) One of Müller’s contemporaries specified that palisades were 5 to 7 feet high (i.e., 5 to 7 feet above the field), fixed before fortresses, curtains, ramparts and “Glaces”. Some of them were armed with two or three iron points.\(^{219}\) Palisades could be either vertical or inclined. Nor was it necessary to make them of “split wood”. At least some of the palisades in the defenses at St. Augustine consisted of palm logs, though there is some indication that the covert way palisade at the Castillo was square-hewn timber, and square-hewn pine was found in excavation of the palisaded Cubo Redoubt in one of the 18th century St. Augustine defense lines.\(^{220}\)

The stockade at Frederica was almost certainly part of the rampart, since it was erected to protect the earthwork – “to prevent our Enemies turning up the green sod”.\(^{221}\) Inasmuch as the rampart was fraised, it seems likely that the wooden stockade or revetment extended upward only to the base of the parapet, where the fraises overhung

\(^{216}\) CR 39/483; also see CR 5/144; 39/473; “Observations,” 4.
\(^{218}\) Elements, 227. See also Clairac, pl. 36; and our plate 22 (profile).
\(^{219}\) New Method, 80, 152.
\(^{220}\) See plate 26, nos. 1 and 2.
\(^{221}\) Collections, I, 129. “Green sod”, freshly cut, and not firmly rooted to the soil beneath, was liable to quick destruction from enemy batteries throwing bombs or heavy shot that drove seven or eight feet into the parapets. See ante, n. 42. The Frederica stockade, according to Moore (Collections, I, 129), was of cedar: “Mr. Oglethorpe had the works round the fort fraised or palisaded with cedar posts, to prevent our enemies turning up the green sod.”
Archeological excavations on the line of the St. Augustine town wall extending west from the Castillo revealed the remnants of early 18th century fortifications. This photograph shows the remains of the east wall of Redoubt Cubo. The horizontal base logs are palm, as is the palisade to the right. To left is a square-hewn pine palisade, evidently a British reconstruction of the redoubt circa 1780. The pine palisade was not found along other excavated sections of the town wall.
the ditch.\textsuperscript{222} (See plate 24). The slope of this stockade is a question to be settled, but it was probably $1/5$ of the height.\textsuperscript{223}

The palisade “on the Out-side” probably had the same relative location as a glacis; at least such is the indication from the fact that no observer mentioned a glacis at Fort Frederica, yet a covert way did exist.\textsuperscript{224}

The obvious interpretation is that the “cover” for the covert way was the palisade. It was good practice to place “a row of palisades . . . on the outside of the ditch”,\textsuperscript{225} though in most cases such a palisade was used to strengthen the glacis, and was located at the foot of the interior slope of the glacis. Length of a palisade post was the same as the height of the glacis ($7 \frac{1}{2}$ feet), with the banquette buying the lower 3 feet so that the visible height of the palisade from the inside would be $4 \frac{1}{2}$ feet. (It should be noted that this 3-foot-high banquette is not necessarily consistent with the 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ foot banquette standard for the interior works.) Palisades were sometimes placed in the middle of a dry ditch to prevent mining and surprise.\textsuperscript{226}

In plate 23, we have shown a symmetrical covert way palisade entirely around the fort. But it is problematical whether the palisade included the water sector (since the fort fronted on a marshy waterfront), or whether there may have been even a variation in the symmetry of design as appears to have been the case at Fort St. Simons, which was in a relatively similar location near the water’s edge. (See plate 8.)

13. GATES AND BRIDGES

Fort Frederica was in the nature of a citadel, and citadels usually had two gates – one for communication with the town, and the other toward the field. Into the first gate the garrison would retire after the town capitulated; through the other gate could come reinforcements, in case the town were captured.\textsuperscript{227} Though Frederica was a small fort and the available records mention no fort gate at all, it is likely that there were at least two gates (perhaps three, as we shall point out later) in the covert way palisade,

\textsuperscript{222} Cf., Müller, \textit{Practical Fortification}, 136.

\textsuperscript{223} See \textit{ante}, p. 123.

\textsuperscript{224} CR 39/479.

\textsuperscript{225} \textit{Elements}, 198; cf. \textit{New Method}, 227. See also our plate 22, profile.

\textsuperscript{226} \textit{Elements}, plate X, and 197.

\textsuperscript{227} \textit{Elements}, 191.
Barrier Gate
for Covert Way Passages (interior elevation)
(Practical Fortification, pl. XIV, fig. 5, pp. 205-206.
For locking bar, cf. U.S.E. Fort Jefferson, Pl 746.)

Gate with wicket
for covered Gateway (exterior elevation).
Dotted lines show interior framing.
(Practical Fortification, pl. XIV, fig. 4, p. 206.)
GATES AND BRIDGES

Caponier
for communication with outwork across dry ditch. (Practical fortification, pl. XI.)

Bridge Section
[Practical fortification, pl. XIV.]
one toward the town and the other toward the water, protected by the “Spur-Work towards the River.” The gate to the fort itself was usually placed in the middle of the curtain, where it could be defended from the flanks of two adjacent bastions. At Frederica, we are inclined to believe that the main gate was in the west curtain, protected by the spurwork or ravelin.

Since Fort Frederica was small, all gates were most likely the barrier type (see plate 27). Dimensions would hardly be less than 7 to 8 feet wide and 8 or 9 feet high (conventional sally port size), nor more than 14 feet wide by 10 feet high.

In plate 23 we have shown three gates in the covert way palisade. One is at the ravelin, and one in each of the places of arms behind the junction of the town wall with the covert way. These locations conform closely to placement of the gates at Castillo de San Marcos.

We have also shown Ruin A as part of the main entrance feature to the fort. As was emphasized previously, Ruin A does not fit this picture perfectly, especially since its central doorway is smaller than called for by 18th century gate construction. Likewise it is uncertain that the central arch of Ruin A was a passage instead of a room as it is now.

Plate 27 shows typical barrier gate construction. The gate was locked by means of an iron bar turning about a bolt secured to one of the doors. When one end of the bar was raised, the other end turned down, permitting the doors to be opened. In locking the gate, one end of the bar was caught by an iron hook; the other end was fastened with a padlock. Preferred material for the gate was oak. Large stones or similar buffers were laid at the foot of the side posts “to hinder the Carts from spoiling the Wall.”

In the case of a covered gateway such as an arched passage, one of the large doors (plate 27) had a wicket (small door) “to pass through, when there is any danger of surprise, and in the morning before the party of men, that is sent out to reconnoiter and wee whether any enemy appears, is returned . . .” Specifications call for covering the outside of the doors with iron bars to a height of 8 feet. Between the bars diamond-headed nails were driven into the planks “to prevent their being cut open”. Above 8

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228 New Method, 165. See also Practical Fortification, 205-206, plate XV, fig 4, 5; New Method, 164-165.
229 Practical Fortification, 206.
feet, the doors were left plain, “because there is no danger of cutting it there.”

The passage across the dry fort moat may have been in the nature of a caponier (plate 27) – a 100 or 12-foot wide communicating passage covered on each side by parapets, which sloped like a glacis.230

Or there may have been a bridge (plate 27) across the moat. Such a bridge would be from 10 to 14 feet wide, with a rise in the middle or at the counterscarp end so that “the Foot of the Gate may not be discovered.”231 Piers for this bridge could be either wood or masonry, but planks and rails were always of wood so that the bridge might easily be dismantled or destroyed in case of attack.

When the bridge was unprotected by outworks, as may have been the case at Frederica, it was customary to make the bridge comparatively wide and build a guardhouse at its counterscarp end. A variation would call for a guardhouse within the fort ramparts (Ruin A may perhaps be identified as such), and a sentry box or two at the head of the bridge.232

14. SENTRY BOXES AND BOGHOUSES

Sentry boxes were made of wood and were light enough to be moveable. They were either square or pentagonal, with sides 4 feet long by 6 feet high, excluding the roof. Timbers at the base projected about a foot each way to make a good broad foundation to prevent wind from overturning the box. These projections also made it easy to stake down the box. There were loopholes 4 inches wide by 8 inches high 4 ½ feet up on each side of the box.

The square box was used when the sentry had only one or two places to watch, such as at a site near the governor’s house, the powder magazine, storehouse, or such. On the ramparts, where the field of vision had to be broader, the pentagonal box was preferable. Sentry boxes atop the fort were not, by the 18th century, located at the salient angles of bastions for here they served as landmarks for the enemy. The 18th century engineer put them “upon the middle of the parapets of the faces; and wooden

230  Elements, 213.
231  New Method, 166.
232  New Method, 167,169; Practical Fortification, 180-182, 191-197, 205-206, plate XV. It seems unlikely that Frederica had a drawbridge. However, general information on drawbridges is readily available in Crowe, “Drawbridge Study” (National Park Service, 1940).
steps are made to get up, or slopes are sometimes cut into the parapet for that purpose . . .”\(^\text{233}\)

Boghouses (privies) were located over water, whenever possible. Otherwise they were put “on the curtain, where a passage is cut through the parapet; and supported with braces against the wall, so as to hand over the ditch: but care must be taken, not to place them too near the sally-ports, otherwise, they will make the passage disagreeable.”\(^\text{234}\)

15. POWDER MAGAZINE

Under one of the fort bastions a powder magazine was built of heavy timber, and covered with several feet of earth\(^\text{235}\) for bombproofing. Probably this magazine was located in one of the northern bastions, since it was conventional practice to build the magazine with the door facing the south, “in order to render the magazine as light as can be, and that the wind blowing in may be dry and warm.”\(^\text{236}\) Ordinarily, powder magazines were built of stone, with bombproof arches, but there is no indication that the early magazine in the Frederica citadel was of masonry. There is, however, a distinct possibility that a masonry magazine inside the fort was built later. If so, either Ruin B or D might have some association.

Magazines (plate 38) had air holes for cross-ventilation, and these holes were either screened or covered with iron plates containing ventilating holes small enough to prevent the entrance of animals (loosed by the enemy) which might have fire tied to their tails.

There was at least 8 feet of headroom in a magazine before the floor was laid. Then, to eliminate dampness as much as possible, the floor was built up 2 feet from the ground, leaving 6 feet of headroom when it was completed. The method of laying the floor: “beams are laid long-ways, and to prevent these beams from being soon rotten, large stones are , , , laid under them, these beams are 8 to 9 inches square, or rather 10 high and 8 broad, which is better, and 18 inches distant from each other; their interval is filled with dry sea coals [mineral coal], or chips of dry stones, then over these beams

\(^{233}\) Practical Fortification, 207-208.
\(^{234}\) Ibid., 208.
\(^{235}\) Collections, I, 134, 135.
\(^{236}\) Practical Fortification, 218.
are others laid cross-ways, of 4 inches broad, and 5 high, which are covered with two inch planks.”

French custom built magazine doors double, that is, with one door opening on the outside of the magazine, and the other opening into the structure, both locked by a strong double lock. Evidently the English seldom used the double doors, being satisfied with a single door “built in so slight a manner,” wrote Müller disapprovingly, “that it would be an easy matter to destroy them.”

In storing gunpowder, there had to be room enough to shift the barrels as necessary to keep their contents in good condition. Barrels could be piled six deep, but only “in case of necessity, because when they lie so much on each other, it is very troublesome to remove them, and change their position, which ought to be done once a year at least [some authors maintained the barrels had to be changed every three months]; otherwise the salt petre, being the heaviest ingredient, will descend into the lower part of the barrel, and the powder above will lose much of its goodness; but to prevent the barrels from rolling [they were laid on their sides], when some are taken off, two wooden posts are erected, of about 4 or 5 inches square, between every 10 or 12 barrels, by this means they may be piled up as high as you please, or taken off without any danger.”

16. STOREHOUSES AND OTHER FORT BUILDINGS

Within the fort were two 20- by 60-foot, three-story buildings of brick-and-timber. Moore described the beginning of one of them in 1736: “Within the fort a very large and convenient storehouse, sixty foot in front, and to be three stories high, was begun, with a cellar of the same size underneath, and one story already raised above ground.” A short time later – so short a time that it could not yet have become one of the tall brick-and-timber structures – Moore’s storehouse was flat roofed and covered with boards. “This,” wrote Moore, “was . . . to be laid over with turpentine, and above that a composition of tar and sand, the boards were already laid, but the tar and other things were not come from Carolina . . .”

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237 Ibid.
238 Id., 219; also see 218.
239 Id., 219.
240 Collections, I, 114, 134, 139; also “Observations”, 4: “The Town is defended by . . . a Fort . . . surrounded by a . . . Rampart . . . and a Ditch which include also the Kings’ Storehouses, (in which are kept the Arsenal, the Court of Justice, and
One of the storehouses was apparently called the “Chapel”, though only a portion of the building was set aside for that purpose.241 Late in 1738, Oglethorpe wrote: “The Men Servants . . . are now sawing Timber for the Church or rather Chappel at Frederica, which I have agreed to have built. The whole Building will be Sixty foot long by twenty foot wide, three Stories, the two Lower most Cellars and Rooms for Provisions, Books, &ca: and the Uppermost a Chappel.”242

By January of 1739, the building was framed and the bricks were burnt.243 The Trustees wanted in this chapel “no Pews but for the Minister and Magistracy, and the rest to be Benches as is at Tunbridge Chappel, which will be more capacious and less Subject to Disputes for Places.”244

The 1796 Miller plan indicates two tall structures within the fort walls, either surrounded by or connected with a tall palisade or fence.245 No specific data on this fence have been located, unless it be one obscure reference to the sum of 10£ paid “Mr. Carteret for Cedar Posts for fencing in the Storehouse”. The Trustees raised the question why their own timber was not cut, and their own Servants not employed in making the posts.246 It is not certain that the storehouse cited here was one of the structures inside the fort. It was customary to wall in town storehouses.

Storehouses (see plate 37) held various kinds of ammunition, guns, and, if necessary, cables, anchors, timber and so on for ship repair. On the ground floor may have been arched or fairly open rooms for easy air circulation, and here were stored the guns, gun carriages, tumbrels, ammunition wagons, mortars and mortar beds, blacksmith forges, carpenter shop and wheelwright shop,247 as well as storage space for

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241 During 1736 the “Boards and Frames of two Houses for the Fort” were readied. (CR 32/506.) Possibly the reference is to the storehouses.
242 CR 22/360.
243 CR 5/96.
244 CR30/87. See also CR 5/190, 348. For added cost and materials data, see CR 2/309, 311; 3/140, 213, 330. For construction of similar (?) churches elsewhere in Georgia, see CR 2/481.
245 Plate 9.
246 CR 2/310.
247 According to Moore, construction of a forge inside the fort and a wheelwright’s shop in an unspecified location early
iron and wood. On the next floor would be located the armory, and space for small irons, cordage, pontoons and other items light enough to be moved easily.

Location of storehouses depended upon the local situation. General rules were that they be separate from other buildings to reduce the fire hazard, close to the water if stores were to be brought by sea, near to the ramparts if their stores were to be used on the ramparts in case of a siege.

Müller gives the following constructional specifications: the wall should be 18 inches thick, with pilasters 15 feet distant from each other. Pilasters were 2 feet broad with a 9-inch projection. Gateways were to be 10 feet wide. Arches of the inside wall were 8 feet wide, with piers 8 feet high (from base to spring).  

Inside the fort was a well, said to have supplied “tolerable good water, and in plenty.” Likewise the fort contained a smith’s forge. Another essential early building was an oven for baking bread. It is not certain that the oven was inside the fort, but it was conventional practice to construct “ovens to bake the bread” in a bastion. As in the case of a powder magazine similarly located, there would be a passage from the center of the gorge toward the salient of the bastion. Rooms would branch off the passageway, and from each room there would be a chimney or airhole “coming out within the bastion”. There were perhaps other small buildings inside the fort. Moore specifically mentions “a lodgment bomb-proof in the hollow of another of the bastions”, which may perhaps be identified with either Ruin B or D.

**17. THE “SPUR-WORK”**

From the scanty evidence at hand, it is difficult to determine the exact nature of what observers during the 1730’s called the “Spur-Work toward the River”, forming

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248 *Practical Fortification*, 214, 226-229.
250 *Practical Fortification*, 182-183.
251 *Collections*, I, 135; Jones, 125; also see CR 2/343-344 (which may relate to Fort St. Simons rather than Frederica).
252 CR 39/473. Moore (*Collections*, I, 114) mentioned “a battery of cannon mounted, which commanded the river” – a description which may or may not refer to the spur. Later he makes specific reference to Oglethorpe’s taking “in a piece of marsh ground which lay before the fort, with a work called the spur, the cannon in which are upon a level with the water’s edge, and make it impossible for any boat or ship to come up or down the river without being torn to pieces.” (*Collections*, I, 129.)
an outwork of Fort Frederica. To Kimber, a later observer, the spur appeared as a ravelin mounting “several” 18-pounders in front of the fort.\textsuperscript{253} Lacking description of this work, we have drawn a ravelin in our hypothetical plan of the fort (plate 23).

No definition for “spur-work” appears in 18\textsuperscript{th} century texts, but Merriam-Webster indicates that one type of spur was a tower or blockhouse forming a salient in the outworks before the port or gate of a fortification. Thomas Spalding, who remembered the fort as it appeared during the early 1800’s, wrote that “A water battery separated it [the fort] from the river.”\textsuperscript{254} Mrs. Margaret Davis Cate expressed the opinion that the “fort” or “citadel”, which remains today on the river front, was the spur.\textsuperscript{255}

The spur might well have been in the nature of a detached redoubt, a work defined by Müller as “made at some distance from the covert-way, much in the same manner as ravelin with flanks”;\textsuperscript{256} or it might have been similar to an “arrow”, a “work placed at the salient angles of the glacis and consists of two parapets, each 40 toises long; this work has a communication with covert-way of about 24 or 30 feet broad, called caponier, and a ditch before it of 5 or 6 toises.”\textsuperscript{257}

The “arrow” came to a point like an arrow, and had no flanks. Such works were placed beyond the palisade or glacis “in order to occupy some spot of ground which might be advantageous to the besiegers . . .”\textsuperscript{258}

Apparently the work was in a strategic location to function as a shore battery. If the fortification were like a detached redoubt, conventional construction called for connecting it with the covert way by means of a caponier – a passage about 10 feet wide, protected by a glacis-like parapet on either side.

Another type of caponier that might well be called a spur consisted of a single parapet raised at the entrance to the ditch. It was a rudimentary ravelin, and small guns could be mounted behind it.\textsuperscript{259}

\textsuperscript{253} “Observations,” 4.

\textsuperscript{254} Collections, I, 257.

\textsuperscript{255} Cate, 119. See also Jones, 62.

\textsuperscript{256} Elements, 217.

\textsuperscript{257} Id., 209 and plate V. For caponier, see our plate 27.

\textsuperscript{258} Elements, 44 and plate V.

\textsuperscript{259} Id., 213. This is not the type caponier illustrated in our plate 27.
Plate 28 - Notes on Present Condition of Frederica Town

KEY
- Existing masonry remains
- Hypothetical location of non-existent features
- Modern buildings

Scale: 1" = 200'

NOTES ON THE PRESENT CONDITION OF FREDERICA TOWN
VI. THE TOWN

1. TOWN WALLS

On December 29, 1739, Oglethorpe wrote the Trustees: “The Forts that I built were run to ruin, being mostly of earth, having no means to repair them, and having also orders not to fortify . . . [After hostilities with Spain began, however, Oglethorpe continued,] I therefore began to fortify Frederica and inclose the whole Town, in which there are some very good Houses. It is half an Hexagon, with two Bastions, and two half Bastions and Towers after Mensieur Vauban’s method upon the point of each Bastion. The Walls are of Earth faced with Timer, 10 foot high, in the lowest place and in the highest 13, and ye Timbers from 5 Inches to 12 Inches thick. There is a wet Ditch 10 foot wide, and so laid out that if We had an allowance for it I can by widening the Ditch double ye thickness of the Wall, and make a covered way.260 I hope in three months it will be entirely finished, and in that time not only to fortify here, but to repair the Forts on Amelia and Saint Andrews. The Expence of these small above mentioned Works (wch. Is all that I can now make,) will not be great, Frederica will come with £500, St. Andrews £400 and Amelia £100.”261

The most detailed description of the town works came from the pen of Edward Kimber about 1743: “The Town is surrounded by a Rampart, with Flankers, of the same Thickness with that round the Fort, in Form of a Pentagon, and a dry Ditch; and since the famous Attempt of the Spaniards, in July 1742, at the N.E. and S.E. Angles are erected two strong cover’s pentagonal Bastions capable of containing 100 Men each, to scour the Flanks with Small Arms, and defended by a Number of Cannon; At their Tops are Look-Outs, which command the View of the Country and the River for many Miles: The Roofs are shingled, but so contriv’d as to be easily clear’d away, if incommodious in the Defence of the Towers. The whole Circumference of the Town is about a Mile and a Half, including, within the Fortifications, the Camp for General Oglethorpe’s Regiment, at the North Side of the Town; the Parades on the West, and a small Wood to

260 Müller perhaps had places like Frederica in mind when he wrote: “In new places built abroad [in the colonies] . . . the fortification often consists of the town-wall, and ditch only . . . ”(Practical Fortification, 212.

261 CR 22, part 2/288-238. Oglethorpe had previously written (Nov. 16, 1739): “I am fortifying the Town of Frederica and hope I shall be repaid the Expences; from whom I do not know, yet I could not think of leaving a Number of good houses and Merchants Goods, and which was more valuable, the Lives of Men, Woman and Children, in an open Town at the Mercy of every Party, and the Inhabitants obliged either to fly to a Fort and leave their Effects, or suffer with them.” (CR 30/202.)
the South, which is left for Conveniency of Fuel and Pasture, and is an excellent Blind to the Enemy in Case of an Attack; in it is a small Magazine of Powder.”

Capt. John MacClellan, who left Georgia in January 1743, described the work as in progress with “great numbers of Men . . . employed in compleating the Fortifications at Frederica, the Walls whereof are judged strong enough to be proof against Eighteen-Pound Shot . . . “ The Captain further reported that the two towers were capable of holding 100 mean each, and were designed to protect the flanks by means of smallarms.

In London late in 1741, Verelst, evidently taking the information from Georgia correspondence, reported: “The General has also carried on the Fortifications at Frederica so that the Fort is pretty near inclosed, the Works are 12 feet high besides the Breast Work and all round faced with stout Timbers 12 feet long secured with Land Types like a Wharf, & back’d with Earth insomuch, That the Breast Work above the Timber will be 12 feet thick with Earth.”

A pair of Georgia traders, come to England on business in 1747, wrote the London Magazine that Frederica had “a handsome Tower over the Gateway of twenty Feet square; That there are two Bastion Towers, of two storied each, in the Hollow of the Bastions, defended on the Outside with thick Earth-works, and capable of lodging great Numbers of Soldiers, the two long Sides being nearly fifty Feet, and the short Sides twenty-five . . .”

A cursory examination of the town fortifications now existing at Frederica (see plate 28) reveals that the line of the wet ditch on the north and east sides of the town is well preserved, though perhaps somewhat modified for the practical present day purpose of keeping it open for drainage. The south and west walls and their

262 “Observations,” 4-5.
263 MacClellan’s description is quoted in Jones, 119-120.
264 CR 35/357-358.
265 Jones, 126, quoting London Magazine, XYI, 484. When in 1755 William Gerard de Brahm, Surveyor General of the Province, was directed by the governor to draw plans for the refortification of Frederica, his plans evidently followed the original lines of the fortifications closely enough to be of value in confirming the dimensions of those original works. The town fortification in Brahm’s plan was “to be one half an Hexagon i.e. of three Poligons 960 ft. each, with two Whole and two Demi Bastions towards the land, two Demi Bastions and a Cittadel toward the River . . .” (Cate MS., 65, citing Jones’ History of Georgia, I, 507.) See also CR 3/402; 5/396, 498. Brahm’s plan is illustrated in plate 29, no. 1 (?)
accompanying features, however, seem to be obscured.

At the northwest angle of the town wall, near the marsh, indication of a half bastion seems reasonably clear, and at the northeast angle a bastion appears in exceptionally good definition, in spite of the intrusion of a narrow unpaved road.

In the east wall, the most spectacular of all the town wall ruins, the entire central portion of the wall appears to have been set back toward the town to provide a pair of flanks or “flankers” in the over-long curtains (see plate 29, no.3). Midway of the east curtain is evidence of a tabby foundation that may have some relation to the town gate installation.

The southeast bastion appears as a mound of earth, with some modification in adjacent walls due to paved road intrusion. The site of the southwest bastion has not been carefully inspected. We are not certain that it is included in the monument boundary. The “Point Battery”, some distance to the south of Frederica, is not within the monument bounds.

In Miller’s “Plan of the Town of Frederica” (plate 9), no side of the polygon appears equal. At present there is no way to tell whether this fact is due to a faulty layout by Oglethorpe’s engineers or to the possibility that Miller had difficulty locating the key points of the deteriorated fortifications. It is, however, apparent that the interior sides of the half hexagon were intended to be, at least on paper, 960 feet. Miller’s map shows the hexagon diameter (the west or long side of the half hexagon) as 1820 feet, just 100 feet short of the 1920 (2 x 960) feet that geometrically it should be; the east side measures 950 feet, and the north and south sides respectively 1000 and 990 feet, whereas each of these sides should be 960 feet.

To demonstrate the laying out of the work (plate 29, nos. 2, 3) we have assumed

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266 Which was entirely possible, depending largely upon the method used for tracing the oines on the terrain. See Practical Fortification, 157 ff.

267 This dimension was specified by Brahm. (See ante, n. 125.) Curtains were not usually made shorter than 360 feet nor longer than 600 feet, so that the line of defense would not exceed 750 (125 fathoms), “because a Musquet can carry no farther to do Execution.” (New Method, 88.) A musket ordinarily carried about 120 fathoms (720 feet), or 900 feet if it were charged double. It could kill a man at 300 yards. At close range, musket fire would penetrate a 3-inch plank. (New Method, 186.) An exception to length of the curtain occurred “where the front lies near a great river, and can hardly be attacked on that side, there they [thr curtains] are often made longer.” (Elements, 75.)

268 Cf. Joshua Miller, “800 Acres Including Town and Commons of Frederica” (1796), our plate 39.
960 feet to be the intended length of the interior side. As pointed out, minor variation in the actual field work of laying out the fortifications might be expected.

Oglethorpe’s casual reference to “Mensieur Vauban’s method” probably signifies the so called “Second Method” of the French master. Vauban’s Second Method was “adapted to the fortifying of places built already; for which reason he begins his construction inwards and fortifies outwards, contrary to his other methods, as being more convenient for that purpose.”

The elements of the method are worked out in plate 29, no. 2. We have shown no moat in this plate, but a standard moat would be 6 fathoms broad at the salient angles of the bastions.

Since the Frederica curtains were so long that a musketball would not carry effectively from one bastion to the next, the east curtain, if not the others, was modified in line with Vauban’s Third Method by introducing flanks, resulting in a trace similar to the one illustrated in plate 29, no. 3. It does not appear that the town ditch was ever excavated to the conventional width.

Laying out the bastions after Vauban’s precepts (plate 33, no. 1) shows a structure with a salient angle of 90°, a face of 70 feet, flank of 36, and a width from shoulder to shoulder of 98 feet. Since one description of the bastions indicates that parapets existed, if we allow a 12-foot breastwork, the space clear within the bastion remains 48 feet on the faces, and 27 feet in the flanks from shoulder to interior side (i.e., the line of the curtain). Within this clear area, the towers erected “in the Hollow of the Bastions”, which had “two long Sides being nearly fifty Feet and the short Sides twenty-five” fit remarkably well.

Observation of present remains at the site of the northeast bastion shows encouraging similarity to the hypothetical layout described above. Measurement from shoulder to shoulder of the existing earthwork is about 80 feet; flanks are between 40 and 50 feet. Faces are only 45 feet, and are at an obtuse angle, whereas the conventional bastion face should be about 70 feet long, and the angle 90°. However,

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269 See Elements, 51-52.
270 Ibid., 52 and plate VIII.
271 Jones, 126, quoting London Magazine, XVI, 484.
272 Ibid.
Plate 29 (Con’t) – Method of Fortifying the Town – 2

Method of Fortifying the Town...

Vauban's Second and Third Methods combined to show "Flankers" east wall. Fort after Vauban's First Method placed at Citadel location.
Vauban's Third Method, adapted to hexagon

Scale: 1" = 200'

Vauban's Third Method:

To determine the exterior side for Frederic's application; Interior side is known (60 fathoms). Ratio of exterior to interior in this method is 7:9. Therefore 205 fathoms, is length of exterior side.  Standard length, 200 fathoms, will be substituted. Standard perpendicular, 25 fathoms.

Draw hexagon with exterior sides of 205 fathoms. AB is one exterior side. Draw perpendicular CD 25 fathoms. Draw lines of defense and set off 60 fathoms as counterguard faces AK, BL. From L, draw arc to intersect K, M; from K, intersect L, N; BLK and AKM are faces and flanks of counterguards. Draw line MN parallel to AB. On MN, mark intersections (G, H) with capitals (FB, EA). Points G, H, locate salient angles of bastions. Draw EF parallel to EA, 9 fathoms in. E and F are centers of bastion towers. On EF set off 7 fathoms to a. For semi-gore. Through a, draw perpendicular to AB. Draw bastion flank JK, 60 fathoms, 40 fathoms, 30 fathoms.

A good form, half bastion.

Ditch is 6 fathoms, before salients G, H. Set off 10 fathoms from counter-guard flank M toward G, and from flank N toward N, to establish points K, L. Lines from ditch arc at G, L through YMN, form the counterscarp or ditch outline.

For flanks, produce perpendicular CD to intersect EF at M. Set off 6 fathoms to point p. Draw lines of defense, from bastion semi-gore a, b, through p. Produce flanks LN, KM of countertops to make little flanks p, q, r inside rampart, and join pq for the curtain.
this discrepancy might be accounted for in part by later disturbance or erosion, since the ditch around this bastion is wet, with water draining towards the river.

3. BREASTWORKS AND DITCH

It is a fundamental principle in fortification that the dimensions of a raised earthwork are dependent upon the extent of excavation for the ditch in front of it. Therefore, when Oglethorpe stated positively that “There is a wet Ditch 10 foot wide”\(^{273}\) it meant that the earthwork thrown up behind the ditch contained exactly the cubic yardage dug from the ditch. The ditch was wet, so it was at least 6 feet\(^{274}\) and possibly 8 or more feet deep. The excavation would therefore permit construction of a breastwork approximately 6 feet high and 15 feet broad at the base, with a slope on the crown of about 1/6, or 2 feet. (See plate 30.) The face of this parapet, including the height from the bottom of the ditch, would be 10 ½ feet. According to Oglethorpe, the “Walls are of Earth faced with Timber, 10 foot high, in the lowest place and in the highest 13 . . .”\(^{275}\) In rear of the parapet there was probably a conventional banquette or firing step, a platform of earth 4 feet broad and 1 ½ feet high.

In its simplest form, it seems likely that the town wall consisted essentially of this breastwork or parapet – not a rampart, as Kimber loosely termed it, though it is true that part of the east wall ruins do suggest fairly extensive construction. The town earthworks have been referred to variously as “Walls”, “Works”, and “Breast Work”.\(^{276}\) Miller’s “Plan of the Town” calls them “Parrapets”. Oglethorpe himself called them “Walls”.

Oglethorpe’s dimensions as given above jibe very well with the remains of Frederica’s north wall, where the existing ditch (judged to have been relatively undisturbed) is about 10 feet wide and some 5 or 6 feet deep, with a 2- or 3-foot high bank on the south side where the parapet should be. But the east ditch (plate 31) as it exists today is in some parts 30 feet or more wide and the earth ridge on its west bank


\(^{274}\) CR 1/446.

\(^{275}\) CR 22, part 2/288. *Cf. Elements*, 207: “the adding 10 or 12 feet of earth only to the [stone] wall . . . sufficient to protect the troops [from flying stone fragments] . . .”

HYPOTHETICAL PROFILE OF TOWN BREASTWORK

Showing adaptation of a "land tile." The wooden construction might also be facing for a rampart, with parapet unfaced above. Compare this hypothetical profile with the profile of Fort King George, on previous plate.

Scale: 1" - 4'
The Old Moat

Looking north along a spectacular portion of the town wall ruins
is corresponding broad. Since the 10-foot ditch was admittedly a temporary expedient,\footnote{Oglethorpe proposed to wide it, thicken the wall and make a covert way. (CR 22, part 2/289.)} it appears that additional work as planned was actually done on the east front, which, containing the land gate, was the main front. Further, it was not conventional practice for the ditch to parallel the faces and flanks of the bastion in the way that is evident at the northeast bastion. The narrow ditch remains at Frederica doubtless represent the primary stage of construction in a job that was never completed according to plan, and the existence of a wider ditch on the east front is most likely evidence that work was under way to standardize the lines of the ditch.\footnote{Cf. CR 5/499: in 1741 a Frederica landholder stated that “the works . . . which are design’d to inclose the whole Town, are poor and unfinish’d.” Cf. ante, p. 91} There is a distinct possibility that excavation of the eastern wall will reveal the existence of a low rampart in addition to the conventional parapet.

Little evidence remains of the west or long wall of the town along the waterfront. Our examination so far has not been close enough to determine whether any walls exist there, or even whether serious erosion has taken place. Neither do we know whether the marsh was regarded as sufficient barrier, eliminating the need for a waterfront wall. Nor is it clear where this wall, if such there were, joined the citadel. One of Miller’s plans shows it connected to the fort opposite the face of the eastern bastions; his other plan at smaller scale brings it to the western bastions.\footnote{See plat 9, Miller’s “Plan of the Town of Frederica”, and plate 39, “Town and Commons of Frederica”.} We have been no more consistent in our plates. Plate 28 shows the west wall running east of the fort; plates 23 and 29 show it in other locations.

The timber facing of this town wall may have been in the nature of a palisade, but from the descriptions given, it seems to have been of entirely different construction. Oglethorpe described the work as “of Earth faced with Timber 10 foot high, in the lowest place and in the highest 13, and ye Timbers from 5 Inches to 12 Inches thick.”\footnote{CR22, part 2/288-289.} Verelst, though not an eyewitness, must have had an authentic basis for his statement that the works were “all round faced with stout Timbers 12 feet long secured
Plate 32 - 18th Century Wharf Construction

18th CENTURY WHARF CONSTRUCTION

Frame for wharf

Scale: 1" = 10'

Basic data: Practical Fortification, xvii, 284-285, pl. xcv, fig. 1.
with Land Tyes like a Wharf, & back’d with Earth insomuch, That the Breast Work above the Timber will be 12 feet thick with Earth.”  

It is Verelst who has thus given the key to what is probably the type construction used (see plates 30 and 32).

An ordinary land tie is a tie rod or chain used to connect a retaining wall to an anchor plate embedded in the earth behind it, so that the wall will not be forced outward. In 18th century pier or wharf construction of wood, where the interior of the pier was to be filled with rubble, the major members of the pier were piling 14 inches square. (Plate 32.) This piling was not laid down in palisade fashion. Rather, three piles were driven, one on each side of the proposed pier, and one in the middle. These piles were bound together as a frame with 10-inch cross beams, so that the frame actually made a cross-section of the pier. Each frame was connected to its neighbor with 8- by 10-inch tie beams. Vertical timber facing was secured to the tie beams with treenails to form the sides of the wharf. Additional piling reinforced the structure, then the interior of the wharf was filled with rubble.

2. TOWER BASTIONS

Unusual features of the Frederica fortifications were the tower bastions built in the northeast and southeast angles. In principle, these bastions were identical with the tower bastions to be found in most U. S. 19th century coastal fortifications. The standard tower bastion of Vauban’s Second Method was a two-storied masonry structure containing a magazine in its center, casemates (gunrooms) for cannon in the lower story, and embrasures for cannon on its terreplein or roof. (Plate 33, no. 1.)

Contemporary descriptions of the Frederica towers reveal them as a frontier

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281 CR 35/357.
282 Merriam-Webster., Practical Fortification, xvii, 284-286, plate XXV, fig 2.
283 Müller describes the tower bastion as having “underneath a magazine in the form of a cross; all round this magazine are casemats, or cellars to hold both men and guns; those in the flanks have each an embrasure which opens into the ditch, and those in the faces have embrasures so as to fire out of one into the other when taken by the enemy; and above is a parapet of 12 feet thick with embrasures . . .” (see plate 33, no. 1) Müller seriously questioned their efficiency: “As these towers are almost a solid bulk of masonry; they must be of great expence, though their resistance can be but little; for it has been found by experience, that the casemats are but of little use, because as soon as they have fired once or twice, the smoak will oblige the defenders to leave them, notwithstanding their smoak-holes.” (Elements, 86, plate XI.) Such was the disadvantage of black powder.
Plan of Bastion
Vauban's Second Method

Exterior dimensions are standard for formula of design; see previous plate. Frederick's NE bastion plan appears to conform generally to this design.

G is hypothetical location for an octagonal tower.
Area of wxy is hypothetical location for a 5-sided tower as suggested on Miller's 1736 map.
Brahm’s plan for a “blockhouse in a redoubt” at Cockspur Island

Brahm’s plan of Fort George, Cockspur Island, a “Tower Bastion” in an earth redoubt faced with logs

Section of Spanish Fort Picolata on the St. Johns River, showing roof, rooms, and palisade construction

adaptation somewhat similar to a blockhouse: “at the N. E. and S. E. Angles are erected two strong cover’d pentagonal Bastions, capable of containing 100 Men each, to scour the Flanks with Small Arms, and defended by a Number of Cannon: At their Tops are Lookouts which command the View of the Country and the River for many Miles: The Roofs are shingled, but so contriv’d as to be easily clear’d away, if incommodious in the Defence of the Towers.”

These towers were “of two stories each, in the Hollow of the Bastions, defended on the Outside with thick Earth-works and capable of lodging great Numbers of Soldiers, the two long Sides being nearly fifty Feet, and the short Sides twenty-five . . .” A further lead on the structures comes from the pen of an engineer assigned to strengthen the defenses of Savannah. The Governor improved the Savannah fortifications, wrote this engineer, by adding wooden Tours [tower] Bastionees [author’s note: “Copied from the wooden Tour’s Bastionee’s executed and erected in the Bastion of Frederica.”] To each Bastion one of which was placed in the angle of each Gorge to serve as Cavaliere’s convertes [covered cavaliers], with strong in their first Storied for Cannons of twelve pounders to range and command the Country.”

From this evidence, it would appear that the Frederica tower bastion consisted of a quadrangular (that it was pentagonal is a remote possibility) wooden structure similar in external appearance to later Fort George on Cockspur Island (see plate 33, no. 2); the structure was erected in the hollow of the bastion, with the 12-foot bastion parapet protecting the lower portion of the timer walls. Whether cannon were emplaced within the tower, or at parapet embrasures outside the tower is not clear (see plate 33, no. 1, for hypothetical relationship of tower to bastion). The ground floor probably contained a small magazine. The second floor or terreplein was covered with a light shingle roof. The walls of the second floor may have extended upward only 4 ½ feet the height of a standard parapet above a firing step. However, drawings of Fort George show walls

285 “Observations,” 4. Kimber also furnishes the following note on shingles: “Shingles are split out of many Sorts of Wood, in the Shape of Tiles, which, when they have been some Time expos’d to the Weather, appear of the Colour of Slate, and have a very pretty Look; the Houses in America are mostly shingled.” See Elements, 206-207, for discussion of the advantages of covering batteries with planks or canvas.

286 Jones, 126, quoting London Magazine, XVI, 484.

287 CR 39/453.
constructed up to the roof plate.\textsuperscript{288}

Miller’s maps indicate that there were towers at each angle of the town walls but this representation seems to be at variance with the records.

5. THE TOWN GATES

“The Town has two Gates,” wrote Kimber in 1743, “call’d the Land-port and the Water-port; next to the latter of which is the Guardhouse . . .”\textsuperscript{289} According to Miller’s plans, the “Gate & bridge” were located in the center of the eastern town wall, and possibly the foundations remain there still. The center location was standard.\textsuperscript{290} Miller does not show a “Water-port”, which was probably a simple barrier gate (see plate 27) in the west wall of the town between the guardhouse and wharf.\textsuperscript{291}

Another eyewitness description specifies “a handsome Tower over the Gateway of twenty Feet square . . .”\textsuperscript{292} This reference is doubtless to the gate in the east wall.

Town gates were made variously. (See plate 34.) Sometimes they were nothing more than an open passage cut through the rampart, shut with a strong wooden gate, or with a drawbridge. Sometimes the passage was arched or covered, with a guardhouse built inside and a drawbridge, or gate, or both, on the outside.\textsuperscript{293} The outside front was usually ornamented with pilasters and a pediment, with such decoration depending chiefly on the engineer’s taste in architecture. A more or less typical gate might have a passage 10 feet wide, covered above by an arch. At the inside entrance would be a guardroom for soldiers on one side and a room for officers on the other.\textsuperscript{294}

In such a building, each room had a window in front (\textit{i.e.}, facing the town, 2 ½ feet from the ground, 3 feet wide, and 6 feet high; for, says Müller, “it is a general custom

\textsuperscript{288} Cf., Moncrief, “Plan of Fort Picalata on St. John’s River” [1765], reproduced in V. E. Chatelain, The Defenses of Spanish Florida (Washington, D.C., 1941), map 15. It is reproduced here in plate 33, no. 2.
\textsuperscript{289} “Observations,” 5.
\textsuperscript{290} New Method, 164.
\textsuperscript{291} For description of barrier gates, see ante, p. 140. The term “gate” applies loosely to all constructional features of an entrance, as well as specifically to the actual closure such as the doors.
\textsuperscript{292} Jones, 126, quoting London Magazine, XVI, 484.
\textsuperscript{293} See ante, pp. 139-141, for other details of standard gate construction.
\textsuperscript{294} Müller specified 12- by 12-foot rooms, but obviously rooms of this size would be too expansive for a 20-foot square building. Neither is it certain that the Frederica gate was of masonry, as town gates usually were.
34.

SMALL 18th CENTURY GATE
FOR TOWN OR FORT

Elevation of Interior Façade

Plan

LENTH OF PASSAGE = WIDTH OF TOWN OR FORT WALL

ARCH 2½ THICK

TOWN GATE WALL

FIREPLACE

SOLDIERS

OFFICERS

GUARD HOUSE

Basic Date:
Practical Fortification,
1771, p. 21, pl. 16, fig. 7.
in all buildings to make the windows on the ground floor twice as high as they are broad . . .” Chimneys in the rooms were 4 feet wide and a foot deep, “half of which is taken out of the thickness of the wall, and the other projects into the room, and is supported by piers of a foot thick . . .” Doors were 3 by 7 feet.

The building Müller describes was 15 feet high to the roof line. The walls supporting the arch were 8 feet high. Near the foundation they were 3 feet thick, but there was a slope to their outer face so that they measured only 2 ½ feet. Guardroom walls were 2 feet thick.

In decorating the town gate, Müller specified that “The Pediment ought to be ornamented either with the king’s arms, or with military ensigns, and above the gate under the arch, which joins the piers, the arms of the city, or else, of some particular person of note, who has mostly contributed to the building of the place.”

6. GUARDHOUSE

According to Miller’s “Plan for Frederica” (plate 9), the guardhouse was located about 80 feet west of the southwest town lot (no. 42). Its foundation may still exist. It was evidently a square or rectangular building about 50 feet on a side, with a chimney on the north wall. Elevation was about 25 feet to the roof line, and there was a gable or hip roof. It is doubtful, however, that the Miller representation is entirely dependable.

Little contemporary information about the guardhouse is available, beyond the statement that it was “an handsome building of Brick”, having “underneath it the Prison for Malefactors”.

Guardhouses were usually located in the town square, and since the area east of the citadel and west of the town lots corresponds roughly to a town square, the location of the Frederica guardhouse was more or less conventional.

Eighteenth century guardhouses (see plate 35) were not noted for comfort. True,
AN 18th CENTURY GUARDHOUSE

Front Elevation

Plan
they usually had at least one or two fireplaces, but sleeping facilities for the soldiers ordinarily consisted of “a little Theatre [platform] of Wood all along, about three Feet high from the Ground, and seven or eight Feet broad, for the Soldiers toile upon.”

7. BARRACKS

Miller’s plan of Frederica (plate 9) shows the barrack building fronting on a northern extension of the north-south street through the town, some 25 feet from the northern boundary of lots 38 and 39. He represents the structure as a rectangular building 70 by 90 feet, with the long side east and west, though most contemporary descriptions agree that the building was 90 feet square. It was built of tabby. A two-story portion of the walls stands today, and conformation of the surrounding ground suggests that extensive foundations may remain underground.

Early in 1742, Oglethorpe wrote that the “ . . . Barracks are built with Lyme and mortar and are 90 feet Square . . . now finished except the flooring the Officer’s Rooms.” From another source comes the notation that the structure was topped by a cypress shingle roof. Extensive repairs seem to have been made during the 1760’s.

The building was more than a barracks: at least in 1743 it served as a hospital and quarters for the Spanish prisoners of war. Most of the British troops at the time were quartered in camp facilities erected round about the barrack building, or elsewhere. Barracks (plate 37) were usually built near the rampart of a work, so that the soldiers might have easy access to the defenses in case of an alarm. There was plenty of open space before them so that the troops might be drawn up and exercised. And in time of war, this relative isolation made it easier to organize detachments “more privately” for various enterprises.

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299 New Method, 163.
301 CR 35/438.
302 Jones, 126, quoting London Magazine, XVI, 484.
303 CR 14/182, 204, 225, 243; 18/640-645.
304 “Observations”.
305 See post, p. 168.
18th Century Barracks & Storehouse

- Elevation of front section.
- Portion of Plan
- Military Storehouse, partial elevation

No scale
As important as anything was the principle that the troops should be kept separate from the townspeople, “with whom they do not always agree.”

Barracks were also thought to contribute to the morale of the troops and townspeople alike by doing away with the necessity of quartering the troops on the town, or the discomforts of camp establishments.\(^{306}\)

Barrack buildings were generally three or four stories high. Sometimes they had piazzas, which were an advantage in bad weather. At the ends of the buildings were “pavilions” (semi-detached units) for the officers. “Between every two rooms in the front” wrote Müller, “is an entry of 8 feet wide, with doors to the four contiguous room, and a stair-case leading to the upper stories; as to the bigness of the rooms, Mr. Vauban made them 22 feet long, and 18 broad, in order to hold four beds each; I have seen some large enough to hold six beds, and with two chimneys in them; there were three men to each bed, which is the custom in all the French garrisons, because it is supposed, that one of the three is always upon duty, so that there is never but two in one bed at a time.”\(^{307}\) At Woolwich, said Müller, the barrack rooms were 16 feet square, with 3 beds to a room to accommodate 6 soldiers. But on that basis, too large a building was required to quarter a whole regiment, so Müller specified a plan containing rooms 18 by 20 feet, with 4 beds to the room. In this plan the ground story was 11 feet high, the second story 10 feet and the top story 8 feet. The outside wall was two feet thick; the partitions, a brick and a half (about 18 inches). Outside doors were 3 ½ by 7 feet; inner doors 3 by 6 ½; windows were 3 by 6 feet on the ground floor, 3 by 5 on the second floor, and 3 by 4 on the third. Fireplaces were standard at 4 feet wide and 18 inches deep. They projected partly into the room.

Corner quarters were designed for officers. Each had an entry 6 feet wide, with a staircase and a 5- by 6-foot closet at the opposite end. Sometimes there were kitchens and cellars under the “officers’ houses”, but in soldiers’ barracks there was “no occasion to make either kitchen or cellars. . .”

The staircases generally went straight up from one floor to another; though there might be a turn halfway at a landing. The roof was divided into two ridges because “it is both customary, and more convenient, than if it was continued, which would make it

\(^{306}\) Practical Fortification, 214, 222.

\(^{307}\) Id., 223.
too high, and requiring longer timbers, makes it more expensive.”

Hospitals were usually separate buildings, and it is most likely that the use of the barracks at Frederica for hospital purposes developed out of the exigency of the moment. The hospital in a fort might be beneath one of the bastions. In a town, it was located “in some bye place or other, so as to be separate from the inhabitants, and noise of the workmen, especially near a brook or river, in case there is any that passes through the town.”

Size of the hospital was regulated by the number of troops to be handled in time of siege. Out of 25 men, usually one or more was sick, depending upon the healthfulness of the fort location. Frederica was reported to have been an exceptionally healthful situation. The main part of a hospital consisted of a long room, with perhaps another above it. Each room was 42 feet wide and would accommodate four rows of beds; or the dimension could be halved, providing 20 or 21 feet for two rows of beds. Each bed was 4 feet wide, 6 ½ feet long. Space between beds was four feet. In addition to these wards, there were quarters for doctors, attendants, nurses and servants, a kitchen, a laundry, and a yard for drying linen. Plans of hospitals were various, so it would have been no great task to adapt the barrack building for the purpose.

8. THE CAMP

On Miller’s map (plate 9) are shown the “Camp” buildings, 48 separate structures laid out in fairly regular pattern between the town lots and the north wall, to east, north and west of the barracks. “The Camp is also divided into several Streets,” wrote

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308 Id., 223-225.
309 Id., 214; see also 182
310 Cf. CR 5/1170, where the Widow Germain reported that “the Country is healthy, in so much that she is the only widow of 60 families in Frederica.”
311 Adds Müller: “I had forget that there is often a chapel built at one end of the great room, to perform divine service, and then there are two rooms above one another, the upper one has a gallery looking into it, for the sick to sit in without being obliged to come downstairs.” (Practical Fortification, 226.)
312 Id., 225-226.
313 Mrs. Cate points out: “surely that small settlement was not the camp which contained the Regiment after Fort Saint Simons was destroyed and which contained the streets named after the officer, etc….I believe all the references to this date after the Spanish Invasion, when the Regiment was stationed at Frederica. Too, tradition – though I am the last person to ‘bank’ on
Kimber, “distinguish’d by the Names of the Captains of the several Companies of the Regiment; and the Huts are built generally of Clapboards and Palmetto’s, and are each of them capable to contain a Family, or Half a Dozen single Men.”314

The “Huts” or “Cleft Board Houses” were built originally to house the two companies stationed at Frederica, and on the basis of 30 houses for each company of 100 men, “with their Wives and Children and Officers”, as specified in the record, there would have been about 60 houses in the Frederica “Camp”. The cost was £5 sterling for each house.315

9. TOWN MAGAZINES

(See plate 38.) Near the northwest angle of the town wall, Miller’s map (plate 0 shows a “Magazine”, a rectangular structure some 30 feet on a side and about 25 feet from ground level to roof plate.316 A hip or gable roof is drawn in dotted lines. It appears that this building was the “Bomb Magazine” near the barracks, which blew up on March 22, 1943, though with little damage.317 As with other permanent buildings in Frederica, its foundations should be discoverable.

Another powder magazine was built in a small, partially cleared wood south of the town.318

Both these magazines were satisfactorily located according to 18th century rules, insofar as they were away from other building, fairly close to the rampart where they might be needed, and away from gate.319

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316 Cf. Miller’s “Town and Commons of Frederica” (plate 39), which appears to show a doorway in the west elevation.
318 Id., 5,6.
319 Practical Fortification, 213-214; for specifications in masonry construction, see id., pp 216 ff. For general remarks on magazine constructions, see ante, pp. 142-144. For other magazines (storehouses) in the town, see post, p. 178-179.
18th Century Powder Magazines

Small Magazine
(“after Vauban”)
Capacity: 600,000 lbs.
Interior dimensions: 25’ x 60’

Large Magazine
Showing arch design.
Interior dimensions: 25’ x 72’

Based on: Practices of Artillery, pp. 216-224, plate XXII, pp. 4-8.
10. ESPLANADE

On Miller’s plan (plate 9), the “Parade” is a 120- by 400 foot area west of the “Camp” and parallel with the west wall of the town. It seems possible, however, from Kimber’s statement that there were “Parades of the West” of the town, that even a larger portion of the area west of the town lots may have been available as parade ground or esplanade, which was nothing more than a cleared section between town and citadel.

Says Müller: “An Open space, of some hundred yards broad, should be left between the works of the citadel and the town, called an Esplanade; which serves chiefly to draw up the troops or garison [sic], to muster and exercise them there; as likewise to prevent any hidden approach that might be carried on from the town against the citadel.”

The area between town lots and citadel at Frederica conforms well to this specification; at least plate 9 shows a space of over 200 feet between the lots and the fort. It is evident that the space was left intentionally, since town blocks to north and south of the citadel were extended farther toward the river bank.

11. WHARF

There is indication of considerable erosion on the east river bank, and it is reasonably certain that the wharf site has disappeared. Virtually no description of the wharf is available. We may deduce from the few notes we have that it was located on the shore opposite the guardhouse and the western gate in the town wall. (See plate 29, no. 2.) In fact, the location of the wharf may have dictated the location of the gate. Another suggestion of wharf location is found later in John Perkins’ petition to build his lumber yard between the guardhouse and the shore. Presumably he selected the site on account of the proximity of docking facilities. By that time, the wharf was probably in fair condition, since it had been repaired about 1748.

This wharf was not necessarily long. Oglethorpe once reported that a vessel could

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320 “Observations,” 5; Elements, 189; cf. New Method, 75.
321 Cf. post, p. 179.
322 CR 8/15; 36/455.
ride “in three fathom water within ten yards of ye Fort walls.” Wharf construction may have been similar to that of more or less permanent quays, or entirely of piling (see plate 27). Describing harbor facilities generally at Frederica, Kimber observed that “a Branch of the famous River Alatamaha forms a Kind of a By before the Town, and is navigable for Vessels of the largest Burden, which may lie along the Wharf in a secure and safe Harbour; and may, upon Occasion, haul up to careen and refit, the Bottom being a soft cozy Clay, intermix’d with small Sand and Shells.”

12. THE TOWN PLAN

“Frederica [wrote Moore in 1736] is situated in the island of St. Simons, in the middle of an Indian field, where our people found thirty or forty acres of land cleared by them. The ground is about nine or ten foot above high water mark, and level for about a mile into the island; the bank is steep to the river, which is here narrow but deep and makes an elbow, so that the fort commands two reaches. The woods on the other side of this branch of the Alatamaha are about three miles distance. All that three miles is a plain marsh, which by small banks might easily be made meadow: when I was upon it, it was so hard that a horse might gallop, but most part of it is flooded at very high tides. The open ground on which the town stands, is bounded by a little wood to the east, on the other side of which is a large Savannah of above two hundred acres, where there is fine food for cattle. To the South, is a little wood of red bay trees, live oaks, and other useful timber, which is reserved for the public service. In the fort also are some fine large oaks preserved for shade. To the north are woods, where the people have leave to cut for fire and building, for all that side is intended to be cleared. To the west is the river, and the marshes beyond it as I said before. The soil is rich sand mixed with garden mould, the marshes are clay. In all places where they have tried, they find fresh water within nine foot of the surface. The grass in the Indian old field was good to cut into turf which was useful in sodding the fort.”

Miller’s “Plan of the Town” (plate 9) shows Frederica laid out in a rectangle, divided by streets into 16 blocks. The blocks were divided into 60- by 90-foot lots. From

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323 Collections, III, 19.
324 See ante, p. 158, and plate 32.
326 Collections, I, 115-116.
citadel to town gate, through the center of the town, ran Broad Street,\textsuperscript{327} 82 feet wide,\textsuperscript{328} dividing the town into “North division” and “South division”, or north and south “Tything Wards”.\textsuperscript{329} There were six other east-west streets, the two widest ones being 23 feet, two 17 feet, and two 14 feet broad. There was a single north-south street some 32 feet wide. Along the sides of these streets, orange trees were planted, “which, in some Time,” wrote Kimber in 1743, “will have a very pretty Effect on the View, and will render the Town pleasingly shady.”\textsuperscript{330}

This regular layout was no doubt the result of military knowledge Oglethorpe and his engineers possessed. Town planning, especially in relation to the methods for fortifying towns, occupied space in almost every textbook on fortification.

The usual town plan called first of all for a town square, on which, or surrounding which, could be built the governor’s house, church, guardhouse and other important public structures, including the town wells. Storehouses and magazines might be built in the gorges of the bastions. Principal streets ran from the square to the town gates, to the ramparts, and to the citadel or harbor. Cross streets were to be parallel, and all buildings at right angles to these streets. Main streets were 36 feet wide, so that three carriages could pass abreast, and other streets were from 18 to 24 feet wide.

The distance from street to street, according to Vauban, should be three houses wide, but Müller specified a greater distance of about 144 feet, especially in “new places built abroad, in plantations where there is sufficient room, and where the fortification often consists of the town-wall, and ditch only . . .” In such cases, said Müller, “I would make the intervals between the streets greater than what we have represented here in this plan,\textsuperscript{331} as likewise all the bye streets about 30 feet wide: For

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{327} CR 9/316; Cate, 118, citing the \textit{Georgia Gazette}, Oct. 26, 1768. The street was usually referred to as the “high” or “main” street.
\item \textsuperscript{328} Cf. post, p. 179.
\item \textsuperscript{329} Cate, 118. Incidentally, Moore (\textit{Collections}, I, 114) stated that the lots fronting the river were only 30 by 60 feet. See post, p. 179.
\item \textsuperscript{330} “Observations,” 6. Kimber added this footnote: “The inhabitants begin to plant this charming Fruit [the orange] very much, and, ‘tis to be hop’d, will banish their numerous Peach Trees to their Country Settlements, which are Nurseries of Musketos, and other Vermin.” Today, Georgia is noted for its peaches! Cf. Spalding’s description of the town, \textit{Collections}, I, 272-273.
\item \textsuperscript{331} See his plate XVI, in \textit{Practical fortification}.
\end{itemize}
nothing contributes more to the wholesomness [sic] of the place, as well as agreeableness, than fine large streets, and great openings behind the houses, planted with trees, especially in warm climates; besides, all the shops to work in, should be built there, and no other ought to be permitted in front of the streets, than those for the selling goods . . .” In Europe, where outworks were extensive, Müller continued, house crowding was more or less necessary, but the engineer who laid out Halifax, Nova Scotia, made a mistake in building the streets so close to each other. “It was said,” argued Müller from his far vantage, “the few people that went there, were not sufficient to clear a larger spot of ground; but in answer to this, I say, they need not clear more ground at first than to build upon; and leave the openings behind, for another opportunity, when they have more time; by doing this, the wood left may serve for timber to built out-houses, and the branches for fewel to burn, when perhaps, they must go far for it, and are exposed to the insults of the Indians at the same time.”

The “small wood to the South” of Frederica served the latter purpose for Oglethorpe’s establishment; the growth was “left for Conveniency of Fuel and Pasture” and was also said to be “an excellent Blind to the Enemy in case of an Attack . . .” though it was “so far clear’d, as to discover the Approach of an Enemy at a great Distance . . .”

The location of the fort or citadel in relation to the layout of the town conforms perfectly with 18th century rules. A citadel was a fort or small fortification of four, five or six sides, joined to a town for one or more of several reasons. Citadels were commonly built in newly conquered country, or where the loyalty of the inhabitants was somewhat suspect. In such cases the citadel served “to keep them in awe, and prevent all attempts they may make to shake off their dependency; as likewise to secure the garrison from their treachery . . .” And (as seems to have been the particular case at Frederica) citadels were built to secure the town against the enemy, when for various reasons it was not possible to fortify the town itself. Citadels were located at commanding sites – on high ground, if possible, to command the entire town; or near the waterway by which enemy approach might be expected. In relation to town streets, the citadel location was such that all the main streets lay open to fire from the fort, “to

332 Practical Fortification, 212-213. Pensacola, Fla., developed from a typical 18th century British town plan.
333 “Observations,” 5-6.
prevent the approach of an enemy . . . after the town is taken” as well as to disperse “the mob that might rise and flock together in time of a sedition . . .”  

13. TOWN LOTS AND PRIVATE BUILDINGS

To each freeholder at Frederica 50 acres of land were promised, the settler agreeing to clear and cultivate the land, build houses and necessary defenses. The following extracts from the “Rules for the year 1735” show quite clearly the status, the privileges and the obligations of the Frederica settler:

“The Trustees intend this year to lay out a county, and build a new town in Georgia.

“They will give to such persons as they send upon the charity, To every man, a watch-coat; a musket and bayonet; a hatchet; a hammer; a handsaw; a shod shovel or spade; a broad hoe; a narrow hoe; a gimlet; a drawing knife; an iron pot, and a pair of pot-hooks; a frying pan; and a public grindstone to each ward or village . . .”

“The said persons are to enter into the following covenants before their embarkation, viz . . .

“That for the first twelve months from landing in the said Province of Georgia they will work and labor in clearing their lands, making habitations and necessary defences, and in all other works for the common good and public weal of the said colony; at such times, in such manner, and according to such plan and directions as shall be given.

“And that they, from and after the expiration of the said last mentioned twelve months, will, during the two succeeding years, abide, settle, and inhabit in the said Province of Georgia, and cultivate the lands which shall be to them and their heirs male severally allotted and given, by all such ways and means, as according to their several abilities and skills they shall be best able and capable. And such persons are to be settled in the said colony, either in new towns, or new villages. Those in the towns will have each of them a lot of sixty feet in front, and ninety feet in depth, whereon they are to build an house, and as much land in the country, as in the whole shall make up fifty acres.

“That those in the villages will have each of them a lot of fifty acres, which is to lie all together, and they are to build their house upon it.

“All lots are granted in tail male, and descent to the heirs male of their bodies

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forever. And in case of failure of heirs male to revert to the Trust, to be granted again to such persons, as the common council of the Trustees shall think most for the advantage of the colony; and they will have a special regard to the daughters of freeholders who have made improvements on their lots, not already provided for, by having married, or marrying persons in possessions, or entitled to lands in the Province of Georgia, in possession, or remainder.

“All lots are to be preserved separate and undivided, and cannot be united, in order to keep up a number of men equal to the number of lots, for the better defence and support of the colony . . .”

“If any of the land so granted shall not be planted, cleared or fenced with a worm fence or pales six feet high, during the space of ten years from the date of the grant; then every part thereof not planted, cleared, or fenced as aforesaid, shall belong to the Trust, and the grant, as to such parts shall be void.

“There is reserved for the support of the colony, a rent-charge forever of two shillings sterling money for each fifty acres; the payment of which is not to commence until ten years after the grant.

“The wives of the freeholders, in case they should survive their husbands, are, during their lives, entitled to the mansion house and one half of the lands improved by their husbands; that is to say, inclosed with a fence of six feet high . . .”

At the beginning of the settlement, temporary shelters were put up. Oglethorpe himself reported: “We immediately got up a house and thatched it with Palmettoes, dug a Cellar, traced out a Fort with 4 Bastions by cutting up the Turf from the ground, dug enough of the Ditch & raised enough of the Rampart for a Sample for the Men to work upon.”

Francis Moore, Recorder of Frederica, with the obvious interest of a man to whom this was adventure, wrote a more detailed account: the General set all hands to work; the tall grass growing upon the bluff was burned off, and a booth marked out “to hold the stores, digging the ground three foot deep, and throwing up the earth on each side by way of bank, raised a roof upon crutches with ridgepole and rafter, nailing

335 Collections, I, 80-83. No map showing 18th century grants outside the Town of Frederica is available, with the possible exception of the “Plan of the Town of Frederica” (Collections, IV, facing p. 45). Though the origin of this plan is unknown, it purports to show land divisions on St. Simons Island.

336 CR 21/75.
small poles across, and thatching the whole with palmetto leaves . . . Mr. Oglethorpe afterwards laid out several booths without digging under ground, which were also covered with palmetto leaves, to lodge the families of the colony in when they should come up; each of these booths were between thirty and forty foot long, and upwards of twenty foot wide.”

Moore went on: “The town was building, the streets were all laid out, the main street that went from the front into the country, was twenty-five yards wide. Each freeholder had sixty foot in front by ninety foot in depth, up the high street, for their house and garden; but those which fronted the river had but thirty foot in front by sixty foot in depth. Each family had a bower of palmetto leaves, finished upon the back street in their own lands; the side towards the front street was set out for their houses. These palmetto bowers were very convenient shelters, being tight in the hardest rains; they were about twenty foot long, and fourteen foot wide, and in regular rows, looked very pretty, the palmetto leaves lying smooth and handsome, and of a good color. The whole appeared something like a camp; for the bowers looked like tents, only being large, and covered with palmetto leaves instead of canvass. There were three large tents two belonging to Mr. Oglethorpe, and one to Mr. Horton, pitched upon the parade near the river.”

Oglethorpe reported the digging of two wells, and a corn house and horse stables existed.

Gradually permanent houses appeared on the town lots. Some were “built entirely of Brick, some of Brick and Wood, some few of Tappy-Work; but most of the meaner sort, of Wood only.” Many of these building foundations should remain. A careful

338 Id., 114. See also CR 21/103.
339 CR 35/22; Collections, I, 135, 139. A fence around the town was started, but never finished.
340 “Observations,” 6. Spalding gives a detailed description of tabby in Collections, I, 273 n.: “Tabby (not tappy, as some have named it) is a mixture of lime, sand, and shells, or lime, sand and gravel, or lime, sand and stones, in equal proportions, with an equal proportion of water to mix the mass. This mass, well mixed together, is placed between two boards, kept apart by wooden plugs, with double heads, of a length proportionate to the thickness of the intended wall. These planks or boards may run all around your building, rising about one foot at a time. When your tabby mass, being placed between these planks, and settled down with a spade or rammer, has two or three days to harden, the planks are taken away by drawing out the plugs. You may generally with safety go with this wall two rounds or feet a week in the summer, covering over your work in stormy or rainy weather. The task I have required in this work is thirty cubic feet per day, to mix the material, fill in, and settle down,
study of the records should reveal many details on ownership of property within the town, as well as more or less detailed descriptions of the improvements on the property. But for the present purpose, we shall attempt to furnish only a general description derived from the more easily available sources.

There is an indication that the north division, that is, the area north of Broad Street, was settled first. In fact, there seems to be some question as to whether the south half of the town was ever entirely cleared and settled. Malcontents claimed that not more than 50 lots had houses by 1740, and population did not exceed 120 civilians.341

One of the most meaningful descriptions of conditions at Frederica is to be found in the impersonal language of an official report on the state of the “Province of Georgia” in 1740: “Below the Town of Darien is the Town of Frederica, where there is a strong Fort, and Store Houses; many good Buildings in the Town; some of which are Brick. There is a Meadow adjoining that is ditched in, of about 320 Acres of which there is good Hay made. The People have not planted much there this Year, occasioned by the War, so near their doors; and being chiefly Tradesmen, who make more by working, or selling to the Camp, than they can by Planting. There are some little Villages upon the Island of Saint Simons, and some very Handsome Houses built by the Officers of the Regiment, and there has been Potherbs, Pulse, and Fruit produced upon the Island, of great use towards supplying the Town and Garrison: But Corn, Beer and Meat they have from Elsewhere.”342 In this single paragraph is apparent the nature of the town is its heyday, as well as an indication of why Frederica later died.

As to the types of buildings and improvements made on the various town lots within the plank moulds. This is about equal, in quantity of wall, to six hundred common bricks, the laying of which alone, exclusive of the cost of the bricks, would be quite equal to the mixing and placing the tabby wall, moving the boxes, &c &c. Nor is there any comparison in beauty or durability between a brick wall and a tabby wall so constructed after time has been given for cementing the matter. The whole becomes a mass of stone almost imperishable under the operations of time, and only to be re-dissolved by fire... This was the material which General Oglethorpe employed in all his civil and military works...”

341 CR 24/266-267; Jones, 94-95, quoting Tailfer, Anderson and Douglas, A True and Historical Narrative of the Colony of Georgia in America. Cf. CR 5/529. Accurate representations of true conditions should be obtainable from various plans of the town or of individual lots sent to England during the 1730’s and 1740’s. For notice of several such plans, see ante, n. 18.

342 CF 35/311-312.
perhaps the following data will suffice for a general picture: One of the earliest records of improvements is found in Elisha Dobree’s letter to the Trustees on December 17, 1736. “I have a Small house with a Brick Chimney built on my Town Lot which is Fenced with Palisades & Clapboards well dungd [dunged] & now every way fit for the Propagation of all Fine plants . . .”\(^{343}\) Harry Buckley reported to Oglethorpe: “. . . I have Fenc’d in my Town Lott & built a Clapboard Hutt upon it . . .”\(^{344}\) Late in 1737 Thomas Hird wrote Oglethorpe that several people were busy building houses and others were improving their lots. The brickmakers, wrote Hird, “are Constantly making bricks of a much better Compossession than formerly . . .”\(^{345}\) In the same year, Dr. Thomas Hawkins gave a fairly detailed report on constructional progress: “Of Buildings, I am sorry I cannot give a Better account than that one Sinclare formerly a Servant to Mr. Houston at Savannah has Built a small Timber house of saw’d work. Will: Moor Tanner is about Building and fitting up Conveniences for his Trade. Henry Michel a Duch Servant of their Honours and Henry Myers a Duch Freholder have Built them houses of Squar’d Timber Loggs and I have Finish’d my house At my own Expence in great measure, and added half as much more in Length the Brickmakers have about 40000 Bricks of good Clay.” Dr. Hawkins further said that 21 people cleared and planted their “home Acres last Season”, and a half dozen had cleared, fenced, and planted “their 5 Acres”.\(^{346}\)

By 1739 Thomas Upton had received a part payment for sale of his house and land for the use of the minister at Frederica. Upton had evidently built “convenient Housing”, and had cleared and planted some of his ground. But he had grown discouraged, and decided to leave Frederica.\(^{347}\)

Even before 1740, Frederica had grown to the extent that three “Publickhouses” existed. These establishments were probably taverns, rather than simple lodging houses. The proprietor of one was Samuel Davison, and it is his complaint that furnishes the information: “In June last [1739] the Magistrates finding that the Town

\(^{343}\) CR 21/283.

\(^{344}\) CR 22/14.

\(^{345}\) CR 22/21-22

\(^{346}\) CR 22/16-17. See also Collections, I, 135.

\(^{347}\) CR 2/309; 4/166.; for further data on the minister’s house and church land,, see CR 2/200, 259-260; 3/213; and others.
began to be Populous, though it necessary to Licence another Publickhouse (one not being sufficient) & in regard to May [sic] Family they Licensed me, but the Doctr. [Hawkins?] & his wife daily threatens to pull me down & in Spight to me has L8icenced another Publick house . . .”\textsuperscript{348}

A few years later, the Widow Germain of Frederica appeared before the Trustees in London to tell the gentlemen, among other things, that Frederica was a “healthy” place; she was only widow amongst 60 families there. She had a house and garden, evidently on a town lot. The garden was enclosed and cultivated and sale of her greens profited her to the extent of 40 shillings. The Widow further said that “the timber fell’d on the land, the grain raised, and other produce of the peoples labour, are carry’d to the Publick Store, and the people have credit thereon for the same: for otherwise, there is no shipping or trade comes to the town, and they should not know what to do with their goods; That the timber thus fell’d, and made into scantlings planks & clapboard, was emply’d (that excepted used by themselves in building their hutts and fencing) by Mr. Oglethorpe’s command in Public works.”\textsuperscript{349}

One of the big difficulties appeared to be finding the labor needed to improve the land. John Terry, Recorder at Frederica in 1742, wrote the Trustees explaining the situation in some detail. One practice, he said, was to hire soldiers to do the labor, if a military company was available. But not many of the settlers had the requisite money to hire such labor. In some cases, it was evident that Oglethorpe himself helped in various ways: “its true that Genl. Oglethorpe did Spare me men from the Kings works to build me My house,” wrote Terry, “there being here Neither houses nor Lodging to be had. And when my house, & Outhouses &ca. will be finished, wch. I hope will be In a very few days, then all my works & Clearing will be at an End my Cash Being quite Exhausted, Consequently Incapable to proceed without the help of Servants & that of a little Money . . . its true Great many Have build [sic] Little hutts on their Lots but as for improuvements they Can Make None for want of Servants wch is a Genl. Tye to all our hands and what Stops Clearing & planting . . .”\textsuperscript{350} Terry’s “very Good house & out houses”, in which he proposed to live as soon as they were finished, were “two very

\textsuperscript{348} CR 22, part 2/353.
\textsuperscript{349} CR 5/170.
\textsuperscript{350} CR 23/356.
sort Miles” out of town. Oglethorpe had favored Terry with “Many Gratificatons”, including “2 Men’s Labour for 30 Days, 5000 Shingles to Cover my house, the Carriage of 7 or 800 Bushells of Lime & Oyster shells, the Loan of a Little Money And Many Other things Worthy of Acknowledgment.” Terry asked the Trustees a few years later for two town lots – one for himself and the other for a relative living with him. Wrote John: “... I intend to build Good Brick or Tappy [sic] house on them ... [If] the place called the South wood wch is a piece [sic] of Ground Laid out for a part of the Town and Not yet Granted, be Agreeable to Yr. Pleasure”, continued the writer, “I should be glad to have the two first Lotts Next to the Guard house, for I am in Great want of a Lott And house in town ...” Another petitioner for land near the guardhouse was John Perkins. He asked for 100 feet along the bluff between the guardhouse and the river bank to build a lumber yard. Perkins’ petition was granted, but it is uncertain whether his lumber yard was ever built.

There is an interesting parallel to modern contracting work in the example of Thomas Sumner. Sumner was a carpenter. By 1743 he had built a pair of “good Houses” on his town lots. He asked the Trustees for a permit to sell his property so that he could “take up others with an intent to build upon and improve the same, Which will be Advantage to the Town, as some are willing to buy Houses ready built, but do not care to build themselves ...” Incidentally, the sawpit at Frederica, manned by the “Trust servants”, who were “so expert as to saw 120 foot a day”, evidently furnished timber for most of the public buildings, and very likely for many of the private homes.

During the score of years after 1740, there seem to have been miscellaneous improvements, such as Alexander Heron’s purchase of lots in Frederica, whereon he “built a very good house and made Gardens planted a large quantity of Orange and other Trees and many other improvements to a considerable value ...” In the records, lots are usually identified by the name of the contemporary or the

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351 CT 23/361; see also 1/501-502.
352 CR 24/266/267.
353 CF 8/15.
354 CR 1/422.
355 CR 5/348.
356 CR 25/490
previous owner (such as “John Mason’s lot”, or “the lot of Mrs. Bosomworth”), or by a title explaining its use, as in the case of the “Butcher’s Lot”, the “Old Barrack Lot”, and such. Occasionally a lot is identified more exactly, as “Number three on the North side of broad Street”, which belonged to John Calwell, Oglethorpe’s “Surveyor Gunner”, who served as the General’s engineer in the 1740 expedition against St. Augustine; or Lot 2, 1st Tything, lower New Ward, sold by Samuel Clee to John Lawrence. 357

14. AGRICULTURE

In 1741 Oglethorpe wrote the Trustees: “The Town contains [sic] of Freeholders & there is more likelihood of planting upon this Island than there has hitherto been, being about One hundred & Fifty Acres already Planted besides 40 Acres of clear Meadow enclosed for Hay, & some Teams of Oxen and Horses, besides a great many rideing Horses most of E’m taken from the Spaniards.” Oglethorpe significantly continued: “The Desertion of the People I have been obliged to remedy by filling up the Lots in the enclosed form and thereby keep up the Guard Dutys & Improvements. I shall think this Province is likelier to Succeed than ever and to become a strong Frontier...” 358

Lt. Col. Alexander Heron, of Oglethorpe’s regiment, stated to the Trustees “That the Land of the said Island [St. Simons] has a mixture of sand in it, but is fertile enough. That he has been at Virginia, South and North Carolina, and Other Parts of America, and that he has seen at Frederica on St Simon’s Island as good Indian Corn Pease Beans Cabbages Turnips Carrots Onions and Other Garden Stuff as at any of the former Places, And that the Soil is good for any sort of Garden Stuff. That Soldiers by their Planting have made three times more than their Pay on One or two Acres of Land. That five Acres of his own were cultivated by the labour of One Man (a soldier) two or three days in the Week. That Daniel Mackullan and Archibald Wright two of the Soldiers have together rais’d about fifty pounds Value a Year on their Plantation by

357 CR 1/496; 2/480; 8/19; 9/316; 10/79; 24/174. For other general notes on town lots and other ownership in the vicinity, see among others CR 1/423-424; 2/198, 233, 488; 5/190, 525; 7/770 (a grant on the East Marsh about four miles from Frederica at a place called the “lime Kilns”).

358 CR 23/23. See also CR 5/507. The “Plan of the Town of Frederica” (Collections, IV, facing p. 45) may be an agricultural layout.
joint labour, Poultry and Other things included. That he has often seen Capt. Carr’s
Plantation, and never saw so fine a One in all Virginia That William Ruff, Who lives
at the said Plantation, produced last Year a barrel of Tobacco as good as any in
Virginia, Which was purchas’d for the Regiment. . . . That Widows among these
Palatines [a small German village on St. Simons] have supported themselves and
Families on their Plantations, but that he do’s not know any except them who support
themselves only by planting. That there are considerable Numbers of Cattle Hogs and
Poultry, and great plenty of Bees on the Island, and he has seen Walker’s hives of them
which are very numerous. That the water of the Island is very good, is about six feet
under the surface of the Land and is not at all brackish, and that the town of Frederica
is supplied from two wells.”

Capt. George Dunbar of the same regiment, went even further than Heron; “the
Land of St. Simon’s”, said he, “is as good as any in North America.” Capt. Dunbar said
that “all sorts” or garden stuff, “particularly Asparagus” grew all year round “without
Dunging the Lands.” The settlers grafted European vines on the wild vines, and Dunbar
thought that wine, silk, oil and cotton had possibilities in future development of the
island. On Oglethorpe’s farm, Dunbar remarked that he had seen “very good European
Wheat”; and in his own garden at Frederica in one year he had 100 bushels of peaches
and nectarines.

Sam Davison, one of the town innkeepers, raised 60 bushels of corn, 50 or
potatoes, and 8 or peas on 6 ¼ acres he had cleared and fenced. Archer Wright, resident 6 years at Frederica as a soldier, said: “the Lands mends every year by
turning, especially if dress’d with Oyster Shells.” Incidentally, during his Georgia
stay, Wright had made 100 bushels of lime from oyster shells.

Not all the colonists had such happy experiences, however. Sam Perkins gave a
sad but interesting account: “... I have also done my endeavour in Planting, and was
one of the first ten that Petitioned to have a Tything run out together, in order to make

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359 The site of present Brunswick. (Cate, 125.)
360 CR 1/446.
361 CR 1/446-447.
362 CF 22, part 2/354.
363 CR 1/448-449.
a fence round the whole, which was granted, and when we had bestow’d upwards of
four Months hard labour upon it, and the fence near finish’d we were alarm’d the
Spaniards were comeing upon us, which occasion’d Mr. Horton (our then Governour) to
give Orders that not a Man among us, shou’d go out of sight of the town, which Order
we readily Obey’d, by which reason all that labour was lost, and no consideration has
been made for it -- before the next planting season I had Improv’d my self in the
Knowledge of lands, and found that there are good and bad here as well as in other
parts, and that I had not above one Acker [sic] upon my great Lott that would answer
planting, upon which, I intirely Clear’d my five acker Lott which prov’d to be better
Land, and I fenced and planted, as much as my self and Man could manage, and so have
continued every Year And am now leaving a Crop upon the Ground of several kinds, As
well as Orange trees, Peach trees &c. I had also rais’d me a very good Stock of Hoggs,
but after the fortifications round the town were begun, an Order was Issued by his
Excellency, that no hoggs should be kept in the town, upon which I sent mine to my
little Plantation, but after they had been there about six Months, they by change stray’d
to town, and before I had notice given me, there 3 sows big with pig, and 3 Barrones
Shott, by one of your Honours Servants, the rest I gott home, tho a Servant of the
Genlls. Was sent to Shoot them as I was getting them into my Yard, and all my other
Hoggs which were out in the Woods, are all kill’d since the Soldiers came to be in this
town, which has made an end of that sort of Stock . . .” 364

Furthermore, some of the settlers maintained that “the land will bear only 3 crops
of Indian Corn . . .” After that, it was barren. 365 Yet, “Pot-herbs, Pulse, and Fruit”
sufficient to supply both town and garrison were grown near Frederica, and the people
of Frederica early began “to malt and to brew”. The wives of soldiers spun the cotton
of the area into yarn which they knitted into stockings. 366

Among the exotic plants introduced were 6,000 mulberry trees that Oglethorpe
bought for distribution amongst the Frederica inhabitants and their neighbors. Dr.
Hawkins had two ornamental hedges of pomegranates on his property at Frederica. 367

365 CF 5/524-525.
366 Jones, 96, citing An Impartial Enquiry, 251-252.
367 CR 2/390; 22, part 2/453.
One unusual grant of land was the 300 acre tract made over in trust to several Frederica citizens, “to be cultivated in order to raise a Maintenance for a Minister at Frederica and for other Religious Uses”; and to the minister himself a 5 acre lot was to be granted. The lot was to be fenced and cleared by the “Trustees Servants appointed to cultivate the three hundred Acres for Religious Uses at Frederica.”

15. THE CEMETERY

The “Burying Ground” is shown on the Miller map as an area about 100 years square, some 100 yards northeast of the town gate and beyond the town wall. Here Charles Wesley preached the first funeral at Frederica, and John Wesley himself later ministered at many such ceremonies. It is apparent that in colonial days, the oak grove, the shrubs, vines and Spanish moss that shade the cemetery ruins today did not exist. “To the East. . .” wrote Kimber, the town “has a very extensive Savannah (wherein is the Burial Place). . .” Today, beneath the gloom of the trees, there remain only four raised burial tombs and a sizable vault of brick and tabby (see plate 40).

16. THE MILITARY ROAD AND OGLETHORPE’S FARM

Traces of the military road connecting Frederica with Fort St. Simons, and along which the Battle of Bloody Marsh occurred, still exist. Through the extensive savannah east of Frederica this road was cut “to the other Side of the Island, which [i.e., the road] is bounded by Woods, save here and there some opening Glades into the Neighboring Savannah’s and Marshes, which much elucidate the Pleasure of looking. Down this Road are several very commodious Plantations . . . Preeminently appears Mr. Oglethorpe’s Settlement, which, at a Distance, looks like a neat Country Village, where the Consequences of all the various Industries of an European Farm are seen. . .”

Oglethorpe’s establishment was regarded more or less as a model farm; “if I Mistake not Genl. Oglethorpe’s farm is worth all the rest . . .” wrote John Terry in

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368 CR 2/200, 260.
369 “Town and Commons of Frederica”, plate 39.
370 Cate, 120.
372 Ibid.
Plate 40 - Tombs in the “Burying Ground”
The “cottage” which was the General’s residence was a one-and-a-half of two-storied structure. Thomas Spalding, who later lived on the Oglethorpe property, described it: A little south of Frederica, the military road “entered a prairie of a mile over. Upon the shore of that prairie, just where the road entered the wood, General Oglethorpe established his own homestead. It consisted of a cottage, a garden, and an orchard for oranges, figs and grapes. The house was overshadowed by oaks of every variety. It looked westward across the prairie (the common pasturage of the town’s herds), upon the entrenched town and fort, and upon the white houses, which had risen up as by the enchanter’s will. . . . And what though in time the spoiler came? The hand of unjust power first tore the soldier from his embattled hall; fire fell upon his dwelling, when there was none to arrest its force; and the smouldering ruin and the ivied wall are all that remain to where General Oglethorpe lived, or how he labored . . . “This cottage, and fifty acres of land attached to it, was all the landed domain General Oglethorpe reserved to Himself, and after the General went to England, it became the property of my father; so that I am only describing a scene, traveled over by infant footsteps, and stamped upon my earliest recollections. After the Revolutionary war, the buildings being destroyed, my father sold this little property. But the oaks were only cut down within four or five years past, and the elder people of St. Simon’s yet feel as it if were sacrilege, and mourn their fall.”

A monument erected in 1933 today marks the site of Oglethorpe’s “cottage”.

373 CR 23/356.
374 Cate, 130.
375 Mrs. Cate adds the following information: “‘the farm,’ which is generally called ‘Oglethorpe’s farm’, was a very large area. Spalding asked for 50A. of it, Raymond Demere asked for 5 A. of ‘the farm’, and elsewhere it is called the farm. . . . The 50A. which James Spalding received was the only 50 A. grant he had in St. James Parish, for I looked it up when I was in Atlanta last. Thomas Spalding, the son of James, makes it plain that this is where he was born and spent his youth.” )Cate to Vinten, Sept. 28, 1944.)
376 Spalding dated his manuscript March 20, 1840, which would indicate that the oaks were felled about 1835.
377 Collections, I, 273-274.
378 There has been some controversy over the location. For a study of Oglethorpe’s property on St. Simons, see Georgia Historical Quarterly, XX, 239 ff. Mrs. Margaret Davis Cate, who is responsible for the location of the monument, has amassed an impressive amount of documentation for the site. She sketches the justification for the site in her Sept. 28, 1944 letter, cited above.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ARCHEOLOGICAL RESEARCH
AT FORT FREDERICA
By J. C. Harrington
Superintendent
Colonial National Historical Park
I. Proposed Archeological Program

The historic site of Ft. Frederica on St. Simons Island, Georgia, presents a most interesting and intriguing problem to the historian and archeologist, and appears to be an excellent example of the type of site on which combined documentary and archeological research should prove most effective. Available manuscript materials relating to the site have been studied in relation to the visible remains of historic structures, and this information has been assembled in both descriptive and graphic form. As indicated in the preliminary historical report by Historian Albert C. Manucy, the general features and layout of the fortified town and the fort have been determined. However, the original plans for the fortifications have not yet come to light, and consequently there are many construction details that cannot be determined from the documentary materials at hand. It is possible, and indeed likely, that certain of this information can be secured by archeological research. In addition to rounding out the incomplete historical record, archeological excavating should provide material objects which would add greatly to the interest and interpretive value of the museum exhibits.

It is strongly urged that the excavating be undertaken slowly and on a modest scale, particularly at the outset. In planning the archeological program, due consideration must be given to the plans for development and administration of the area, and to the need of securing certain key historical information concerning the site as early as possible. It is probable that before the archeological program, as outlined in this report, is initiated, or while it is in progress, certain decisions will be made as to the general plan for the interpretive development of the site which will necessitate alterations in the research program. More intensive excavating of certain sections of the site, or a change in emphasis, might be required, which, of course, cannot be anticipated at the present time.

On the basis of recent discussions with the Coordinating Superintendent and the Historical Technician, and inspection of the site,* the following program is recommended.

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* The writer spent November 15, 1944 at the site in company with Coordinating Superintendent C. R. Vinten and Historian A. C. Manucy.
1. Preliminary surface study and topographic survey.

In order that the visible remains may be studied in relation to the documentary data, an accurate, large scale topographic map is essential. The Coordinating Superintendent has already made plans to secure such a map, along the lines suggested below, in conjunction with a general cleaning up of the site.

It would be desirable to show contours at half-foot intervals and to locate all surface indications of previous use of the land, as well as visible structural remains. Modern buildings, roads, fences, etc., should be located accurately so that any evidence remaining after their removal will not confuse the archeological study. After the survey traverse has been run and computed, a coordinate system should be established and permanent monuments set throughout the area. For the convenience of the archeologist, it is preferable to provide such monuments on even coordinate lines and at intervals not to exceed 500 feet. All trenches and excavated features will be located in reference to the coordinate system thus established. A desirable scale for such a map, from the standpoint of use by the archeologist, would be 40 feet to the inch. Possibly a supplementary map of the Fort area should be drawn in greater detail and at a larger scale.

Upon the completion of the survey of the site and preparation of a topographic map, the historical evidence assembled to that date should be correlated with the historic remains, the topography, and other features shown on the map. This restudy of the entire layout of the site may clear up certain problems and will aid materially in directing the subsequent archeological program.

2. Emergency stabilization.

Just as soon as funds and adequate supervisory personnel and labor are available, certain ruins on the site should receive emergency stabilization. This work should not wait until the archeological excavating is done, although it could be carried out concurrently with the preliminary archeological explorations outlined in section 3 below.

The structures requiring emergency stabilization are the Barracks ruin and the vaults in the Burying Ground. The “Citadel” will probably not have to be included in this program. A complete photographic record of these structures should be made before any work is done. The work proposed is solely for the purpose of preventing collapse of the walls, arches, lintels, or roofs before adequate research and permanent
stabilization can be accomplished. Such emergency stabilization should be structurally sound, but installed in such a manner that it can be replaced or concealed, if desirable, at a later time. No attempt at restoration should be made at this stage. Braces or supports should be placed in such a manner that they will not interfere with subsequent excavating and study of the ruins.

3. **Archeological exploration preceding the development of the Administration Area.**

The area of prime historical importance is that within the outer defensive works of the town, which, even in its present condition, has great appeal to the visitor. The first tasks in developing the site, therefore, are to make these historic features more accessible to the visitor, to remove irrelevant structures and the more conspicuous signs or recent occupation, and to prepare for the proper administration and protection of the area. To accomplish these objectives an entrance road, parking facilities, headquarters building, custodian’s residence, and utility building should be provided as soon as possible. Before such development is undertaken, however, a certain amount of archeological exploration should be carried out in the area to be affected by the proposed administrative development.

Historical research indicates that this general area lying just east of the fortified town probably was not occupied by houses or other structures in historic times, but was laid out in small garden plots for use by the residents living within the town. The documentary records are not sufficiently complete, however, to permit too much reliance to be placed on this conclusion. It would be desirable, therefore, to explore these areas sufficiently to settle any doubt as to the possibility of archeological evidence being destroyed during the construction of roads, buildings, and other structures. Although the location of the Burying Ground is apparently fixed within relatively small limits, it is possible that the proposed parking area may encroach upon it. Trace of the old road is sufficiently clear so that excavating will not be required to establish its location. It may be found desirable, however, to run one or two narrow trenches across this road trace to secure any information which might be revealed beyond what is evident on the surface.

The work involved in securing archeological clearance for this area east of the town site for administrative development should be relatively small, and would serve to break in the archeological crew before more critical areas were excavated.
4. **Archeological excavation of the Fort and Town Site.**

The historical research undertaken thus far indicates quite clearly the general course that should be followed in the archeological program for Ft. Frederica. Certain specific problems are indicated for early investigation as an aid to the historian in interpreting the available manuscript material. As mentioned before, any program set up at this point may have to be altered as new evidence comes to light and more detailed studies are made. At the present moment, however, it would appear that the archeological investigation of the site should proceed in the following order.

a. **Excavation of the Fort.**

Except where trees prevent, it is proposed to excavate the entire area within the parapet and bastions of the Fort, an area of approximately one acre. At the same time, sufficient excavation of the earthworks would be carried on to determine their original plan and construction details. Entrance to the Fort, gun emplacements, and other special fortification details should be looked for especially in the excavating. Within the Fort are evidences of masonry ruins, in addition to the “Citadel”, which will be uncovered and incorporated in the interpretive development if feasible.

This project will be one of the most critical in the entire site, since all conclusions as to the original appearance of the Fort must be based on archeological evidence, unless future research should bring to light the original plans for this structure. The relation of the masonry remains, especially the “Citadel”, to the earthworks is a problem of major concern, and one which will doubtless tax the ingenuity and perception of the technicians engaged on this project.

b. **Fortified town walls.**

The visible remains of the original fortified town walls constitute one of the most interesting and impressive exhibits in the area. Although the general location and plan of these earthworks can be determined from the existing evidence, it is desirable to fill in certain gaps and to determine exact construction details, such as the profiles and plan of the walls, the bastions and bastion towers, and the location and original appearance of the town gate.

Growing along the moat and the parapets are beautiful specimens of trees which may hinder the excavating to some extent, and the archeological work will have to be planned accordingly. It is possible that some archeological features will be considered of sufficient importance to warrant the sacrifice of an occasional tree, but this should
be avoided if at all possible. These trees contribute a great deal to the present dramatic appeal of the area.

c. Military buildings within the town.

Masonry walls mark the location of the Barracks and Guard House, the former being a conspicuous above ground ruin of considerable interest. There is also known to have been a camp site with probable wooden buildings. Information is desired as to the original size and architectural details of these masonry buildings and the location and layout of the camp site. Such research must be completed at the Barracks ruin prior to its permanent stabilization.

It is possible that future documentary research will reveal the existence of other such structures within the town walls, but it would not be feasible to conduct an extensive archeological search for buildings of this nature beyond the immediate vicinity of the known sites.

Construction details of these military structures and artifacts recovered from their excavation should be compared with other structures within the Fort and objects recovered form them as a possible means of identifying and dating these structures.

d. The Town Site.

The Town Site itself has been located generally from old manuscripts. It consisted of a main street leading from the town gate to the Fort, with secondary streets on each side. There were apparently 84 lots, each possibly occupied by a dwelling. It is reasonable to assume that there would also have been a great number of miscellaneous out buildings, wells, and other structures that would go to make up a town of this sort.

The purpose of excavating within the town would be to confirm the documentary evidence, if possible, as to the layout of the town, to determine the type of houses constructed, and to secure material objects for use in museum exhibits. This could probably be accomplished by the excavation of a few exploratory trenches, supplemented by exhaustive excavation of selected areas as determined from the exploratory work.

Much of the town site is open fields, recently under cultivation. This will permit adequate sampling of the site without destroying trees within the area. It is probable that much of the evidence has been lost through farming and building, but experience at similar sites would indicate that much may remain to be found. If too much has been lost, it may be desirable to carry on some excavating in selected areas that have been
protected from disturbance by the presence of trees.

e. The Burying Ground.

This area is most interesting, and should be developed as part of the site. To do so, it will be necessary to repair and stabilize the exposed structures. This work, except for the emergency stabilization mentioned earlier, must be preceded by a certain amount of archeological research. Because of the existing vegetation, it would not be feasible to do much excavating within the graveyard, with the exception of that necessary in connection with the permanent stabilization of the vaults and tombstones. It would also be desirable to determine the exact boundaries of the Burying Ground. The site was probably enclosed by a wall or a fence, and it should be possible to determine the nature of such an enclosure with relatively little excavating.

5. Interpretive development and stabilization of ruins.

Following the systematic excavation of the site, as outlined briefly above, the next step would be to incorporate the results of the archeological research in the interpretive development of the area. Just what course such development will take will depend upon how much is learned from the combined documentary and archeological research, and on the general interpretive policy administratively determined as most desirable for this particular site. Whatever course is decided upon, however, certain projects must be carried out, and these should be anticipated in so far as they will affect the archeological program.

Of foremost concern in this respect is the preservation of the existing ruins and the prevention of further erosion of the river bank. Ruins stabilization procedure has been formulated fairly well within the National Park Service, and need not be reviewed here. Most important is that an over-all stabilization program be established for this site and that the archeological and historical research be correlated at every point with the physical accomplishment of the repair or restoration work. Likewise, the placing of shore protection must be properly correlated with the research program and the actual excavating so as to facilitate the archeological work, to prevent any further erosion of the river bank, and to insure results which will conflict as little as possible with historical evidence.

Many details of the interpretive development, possibly even determination of the general scheme itself, may have to await the results of archeological research, but in so far as possible such decisions should be made before the excavating is undertaken.
Such matters as exhibiting exposed foundations, restoration of structures, and removal of trees, should be settled as soon as possible for the best conduct of the archeological program.

II. Organization and Conduct of the Archeological Program

The following suggestions and recommendations are offered as a guide in setting up and carrying out the archeological program as outlined in Section 3 and 4 of the first part of this report.

The archeological work should be under the immediate and continuous supervision of an archeological technician, preferably one with experience in the examination of sites of this nature. Adequate equipment, laboratory work room, and storage space should be provided at the site before excavating begins. Proper provisions must be made for photography and surveying, and if the archeologist is not qualified to carry on these tasks, additional technical assistance should be provided.

For the initial phase of the excavating, in the Administration Area, as outlined in Section 3 above, a crew of five or six laborers should be sufficient. It is unlikely that very much cultural material will be recovered, and this will give the archeologist a chance to set up his laboratory and prepare for the more important phase of the work that will follow. It is estimated that this first part of the program will take about two months, using approximately 300 man days of labor.

Following this preliminary exploration, the more important excavating in the Town Site (Section 4) could be started. Because of the possible necessity of stock piling and screening a large part of the excavated earth and probable recovery of artifacts requiring laboratory work, a larger crew could profitably be employed. Possibly as many as 10 or 12 laborers could be used to advantage.

Assuming that a crew of 10 laborers is used, rough estimates for the time required to excavate the different units, and the man days of labor involved, are shown in the table below. These estimates, of course, include no work involving ruins stabilization, restoration, or other development of the site, but simply the archeological excavating and care of the objects recovered.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Total Time</th>
<th>Labor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Fort</td>
<td>2-1/2 months</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Town Walls</td>
<td>1 month</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Military buildings</td>
<td>1 month</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Town Site</td>
<td>3 months</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Burying Ground</td>
<td>1/2 month</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To carry out the archeological program, as outlined in Sections 3 and 4 of this report, would require, therefore, a total elapsed time of approximately 10 months, using 2300 man days of labor. The archeologist would require at least another two months to finish up the field work and an additional six months should be allowed for the preparation of the final archeological report.

In the following estimate of cost it is assumed that surveying and photographic equipment can be borrowed, but allowance is made for the purchase of excavating tools, photographic and drawing supplies, laboratory supplies, etc. No allowance is made for permanent storage facilities of catalogued artifacts. This item should be included in the cost of furnishing the Headquarters Building where it is assumed the material will be stored and exhibited.

**Estimated cost of archeological project.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Estimated cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Archeologist (salary- 1-1/2 years at $2600)</td>
<td>$ 3,900.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and other expenses</td>
<td>500.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor (2300 man days at $4.00)</td>
<td>11,200.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor (additional for foreman)</td>
<td>500.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment and supplies</td>
<td>900.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$17,000.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yorktown, Virginia

November 30, 1944
PARK DATA
1. OWNERSHIP AND VALUE OF LANDS

Lands within the boundaries of Fort Frederica National Monument were purchased with funds raised by the Fort Frederica Association. Ownership, at the time of acquisition, is given in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Vendor</th>
<th>Acres</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frances P. and Allen A. Burns</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>$3700.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. A. Gould, Administrator of the Estate of Mrs. A. D. Dodge</td>
<td>19.87</td>
<td>1927.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs. Edna Taylor McCaskill</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>238.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. H. and Zoe A. Postell</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2050.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Georgia</td>
<td>24.50</td>
<td>9500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur A. Taylor</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3800.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. and Mrs. A. R. Taylor</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>3600.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. and Mrs. H. D. Taylor</td>
<td>6.21</td>
<td>11000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. and Mrs. R. A. Taylor</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>7400.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. T. Stevens, et al</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>425.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Island Company</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>Donation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia Society of Colonial Dames of America (Citadel Site)</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>Donation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Island Development Company (Franklin Horne)</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>Donation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>71.09</td>
<td>$43,640.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In cases where tracts were developed as residential sites, the vendors retained title to the buildings and have the right to remove them from the monument area. Special use permits for continued occupancy for one year from the date of monument establishment have been executed by the Service in favor of the owners of buildings. These permits are revocable upon 90 days notice by the Director of the National Park Service and they may also be renewed at his discretion.

Acceptance of land titles by the United States during 1942-1943 and 1944 was delayed by legal deficiencies in abstracts. In 1943 the Fort Frederica Association secured state certification of all but three tracts, under the Georgia Land Registration
Law. The remaining three tracts, which were omitted by error from the first certification, were filed for certification by the Association early in 1944, at the request of the Solicitor of the Interior Department.

2. ACCESSIBILITY

Off the southern coast of Georgia lie “the Golden Isles”, a chain of coastal islands famous not only for their resort climate and natural beauty, but for a recorded history beginning in the 16th century. On St. Simons, the only one of the Golden Isles not now in private ownership, is the site of Frederica, about 10 miles from the city of Brunswick, in Glynn County.

The drive into the national monument from Brunswick is characteristic of the best coastal Georgia scenery. To reach the island, the motorist drives over the Brunswick-St. Simons Highway (toll bridge). Frederica is located about midway up the western shore of St. Simons, at a sharp turn of the Frederica River, which is a link in the inland waterway. The drive up the island through pine woods and oak groves, past historic Christ Church to the fort site remains almost entirely unspoiled. Paved roads similar to the Frederica drive traverse the entire island, and each of these parkways is attractively and clearly marked with rustic signs.

The road network is part of the Glynn County system on St. Simons and Sea Islands. The Frederica spur of this system runs through the town line about 100 feet north of the southeast corner, and terminates at a small paved Y at the river bank south of the “Citadel”. This road is shown on our map NM-FRE 7001. The Commissioners of Glynn County have agreed to the relocation of this road along the east boundary of the monument area, and the Sea Island Company proposes to deed a right of way of 150 feet for this purpose. Access to the monument area is proposed on plan NM-FRE 2001A by means of an entrance feature and short access road leading to an informal parking area west of the Frederica “Burying Ground.”

In line of detailed information, tentative planning and development suggestions have been outlined in the form of an interim general development plan NM-FRE 2001A (plate 42) and a preliminary Project Construction Program.*

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* See post, p. 214.
3. PRESENT CONDITION

At this writing, the area is open to visitors, but there are no public facilities or services.

The present Frederica road terminates within 100 feet of a one-story tabby building called “the Citadel” (plate 20), the most conspicuous ruin at the fort site. The river waters lap at the foot of its walls, and tangled grass hides a rusted old cannon lying upon its roof. The entire site is shaded by huge live oaks. Nearby are the faint traces of earthworks, and the tabby foundations of several buildings.

A few hundred yards to the north, along the marshy shore, begin the visible remains of the wall surrounding the town. A walk through the forested undergrowth along these earthworks gives to even the uninitiated the impression of an extensive fortification. Along the eastern moat, the forest becomes more open, and towering pines and ancient oaks lining the moat banks combine in a beautiful vista (plate 31).

Within the town limits, there is but one outstanding historic ruin (excepting the structures at the fort site). In a grass-grown pasture stand the impressive tabby walls of the barracks, their outline hidden by a mantle of vines (plate 36).

A few hundred feet outside the town gate is the burying ground of Frederica (plate 40). Here there is such a cover of moss-draped oaks, vines and shrubs that the sun seldom penetrates. It is a very picture of lost, neglected ruins associated with human life and death. Four raised burial tombs built of brick and tabby are visible, and there is also a sizable burial vault of the same materials.

A major part of the monument area is heavily wooded and great oaks and virgin pines are generously scattered within and around the town lines. The “open fields” shown on plan NM-FRE 7001 have grown up to young pines and native undergrowth to a great extent in recent years.

An accurate, detailed topographic survey should locate these important trees and areas of young growth, as preservation of the former and careful clearing of the latter will be an important phase of the monument plan.

At the south end of the island, Fort St. Simons was built. It was a rather extensive earthwork, with surrounding wooden houses to quarter the soldiers and their families. This fort was the scene of the battle to prevent the Spanish sailing into St. Simons harbor in 1742, and subsequently became Spanish headquarters on the island. Little trace of it remains today.
Connecting Frederica and Fort St. Simons was a military road, parts of it still discernible today. Some 5 miles from Frederica, on a sweeping curve of marsh, a bronze marker commemorating the Battle of Bloody Marsh has been placed. Closer to Frederica, a similar marker locates the site of Oglethorpe’s home.

The site of Fort St. Simons, the Bloody Marsh battlesite, and Oglethorpe’s plantation are not included within the monument boundaries. Nor is the Point Battery, a work thrown up several hundred feet south of Fort Frederica. In fact, there is some doubt that the south-western bastion of the town wall lies within the present authorized boundary.

4. CARE

At the present time the former owners, who still reside on the site, are cooperating in protecting the area from vandalism and from treasure diggers and pot hunters. An appropriation of $3212.00 has been approved by Congress for the 1945 fiscal year, which will be available for maintenance and operation as soon as the lands have been accepted by the Secretary. This appropriation will permit the employment of a Custodian and per diem labor for the establishment of a preliminary operation and maintenance setup.

5. POSSIBILITIES OF PRESERVATION

Application of standard techniques should permanently stabilize the ruins at Frederica which now show above ground. Early action, however, must be taken at the “Citadel” site (cover, plate 20), where river erosion is a problem, and in some of the ruined masonry walls – particularly the barracks (plate 36) – within the boundaries. These ruins are unstable, and immediate bracing is needed to prevent failures in some portions of the walls and openings.

Stabilization of earthwork fortifications (plate 31) as they exist today presents no serious problem, but it is deemed advisable to anticipate conditions which may develop during the course of archeological exploration. It is most likely that archeological discoveries will reveal earth and possibly wooden fortification construction of definite value for in situ interpretation, and such remains may present a difficult preservation problem.

Perhaps one typical National Park problem may be preservation of trees within the monument area. At Frederica, however, the tree problem may have more relative importance than in purely scenic areas, for the loss of even one of the giant trees in this
comparatively small park makes a material difference in the appearance of the site. More than any one thing, the great trees give Frederica its appearance of authentic antiquity.

6. DEVELOPMENT

The early needs for the Frederica program include an accurate and detailed topographic survey, followed by an archeological investigation, and the development of plans based on these surveys. An accurate determination of a development program will depend on these surveys and plans.

A tentative developmental program, based on plan NM-FRE 2001A (plate 42) has been submitted, but has not yet received approval by the Director. This program is as follows:
The development of Frederica must certainly take the line which nature has already pointed out. The area is now one of great beauty, and its ruins have the appearance of
hallowed antiquity which both impresses and inspires the visitor. To enhance nature’s treatment of the site and to emphasize the ruins, calls first of all for a removal of anachronisms such as modern roads and buildings from the historic area, and then for careful landscaping to such limited extent as may be needed to clarify the Frederica town layout for the visitor. Obviously, necessary new construction should be kept out of the historic area, and in this connection it is noted that the service buildings proposed in the general development plan (plate 42) are uncomfortably close to the southeast bastion of the town fortifications.

At this time it is hardly practicable to suggest ways and means of interpretive development, inasmuch as archeology promises to reveal numerous items of historical and interpretive interest, such as house foundations and possibly earthworks and palisades. When there is a more definite indication of the type of in-place exhibits that may be expected at Frederica, a stable policy can be worked out.

Meanwhile, as interpretive service can be set up at Frederica, it is expected to take the form of a small narrative museum, supplementing a guided or self-guided walk through the historic sections of the park.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Thanks to preliminary bibliographical work done by James W. Holland, formerly superintendent of Fort Pulaski National Monument, and Russell A. Gibbs, formerly Historical Aide at Castillo de San Marcos, it has been possible to collect in microfilm the most important primary sources for the study of the Frederica area. These materials are now in the Castillo library, where they are useful for both Frederica and the Castillo. Many significant records, however, are still scattered, and some attention should be given to their collection before any definitive Frederica study is attempted.

In the main, the historical narrative of the present text is based upon three secondary works: J. T. Lanning’s *Spanish Missions of Georgia* and *Diplomatic History of Georgia*, H. E. Bolton’s *Spain’s Title to Georgia*, and Mrs. Margaret Davis Cate’s “Fort Frederica and the Battle of Bloody Marsh.” These sources have been supplemented by notes and quotations generally from primary materials in the *Georgia Colonial Records* and *Collections of the Georgia Historical Society*.

Most of the Frederica information in the section entitled “Technical Description” is derived directly from the latter two major primary sources. Portions of the text relating to standard English fortification of the period depend for the most part upon John Müller’s *Elementary Part of Fortification*, his *Practical Fortification*, and the anonymous *New Method of Fortification*.

The complete list of sources consulted follows:

I. Bibliographies


II. **Primary Sources**

A. Frederica


4. *Geographical and Historical Description of the Principal Objects of the Present War in the West-Indies*. (London, 1741.) 1 v., 192 pp., maps. The work (c. 1500-1740) deals with Spanish American colonies and the routes of Spanish commerce. It contains a historical summary of each important Spanish settlement in the Americas along the Caribbean, with descriptions. It is a valuable indicator of Spanish-English relations at the outset of the War of Jenkins’ Ear. (Castillo library.)

64 pp. Narrative and description of the southern coast of America from Maryland to Georgia (1742-1743). Kimber was an observant writer, and his Frederica notes are particularly valuable. (Castillo library microfilm).


11. Oglethorpe, James E. “Letters from General Oglethorpe.” *Collections of the*
Georgia Historical Society, III, 1-156. Covers the period 1735-1744, with considerable material on fortification of and operations along the Georgia coast, including the 1740 and 1743 expeditions to St. Augustine, and the 1742 invasion of Georgia by the Spanish. The collection is principally valuable for pointing out developments in the English colony and relations with Indians and Spaniards. The letters are transcripts from the Public Record Office, and many of them are duplicated in the Colonial Records of Georgia. (Castillo library.)


B. 18th Century Fortification

1. Clairac. (John Müller, translator.) The Field Engineer of M. le Chevalier de Clairac, Translated from the French, with Observations and Remarks on each Chapter. (John Millan, London, 1760.) 1 v., 9 plus x plus 264 pp., 36 plates. Explanation of early 18th century field fortification principles. Müller’s additional remarks are illuminating. (Castillo library.)

2. Müller, John. A Treaties Containing the Elementary Part of Fortification, Regular and Irregular. With Remarks on the Constructions of the most celebrated Authors, particularly of Marshal de Vauban and Baron Coehorn, in which the Perfection and Imperfection of their several Works are considered. For the Use of the Royal Academy of Artillery at Woolwich. (J. Nourse, London, 1746.) 1 v., xvi plus 232 pp., 34 plates. The title is descriptive. This is a summary of 18th century fortification principles, clearly explained and profusely illustrated. The latter pages contain a useful dictionary of fortification terms. Müller was professor of Artillery and Fortification at Woolwich. This work is one in his series of 6 v. on fortification, artillery and mathematics. (Castillo library.)
3. _______________. A Treatise Containing the Practical Part of Fortification.  
(A. Miller, London, 1755.) 1 v., xxiv plus 304 pp., 4 tables and 28 plates. The work is of great value, and is divided into 1) theory of walls, arches and timbers, with tables of their dimensions; 2) knowledge of materials: their properties, qualities and manner of use; 3) method of laying out a fortification on the ground, making estimates of materials and expenses, and executing the work; 4) method of building “aquatics” such as stone bridges, harbors, quays, wharves, sluices and aqueducts. Contains an immense amount of detail on 18th century construction practices. (Castillo library microfilm.)

4. _______________. A Treatise of Artillery: Containing I. General Constructions of brass and iron Guns used by Sea and Land, and of their Carriages. II. General Constructions of Mortars and Howitzes, their Beds and Carriages. III. The Dimensions of all other Kinds of Carriages used in the Artillery. IV. The Exercise of the Regiment at home, and its Service abroad in a Siege or a Battle. V. Its March and Encampment; Ammunition, Stores, and Horses. VI. Lastly, the necessary Laboratory Work, To which is prefixed, A Theory of Powder applied to Fire-Arms. For the Use of The Royal Academy of Artillery. John Millan, London, 1756.) 1 v., xvi plus 309 pp., illus. This is the standard English textbook for the period, and as the title shows, is fairly comprehensive. The work should also be read for sidelights on 18th century fortification practices. Müller became the standard for the American Field Artillery during the Revolution. The book was republished in Philadelphia in 1779. (Castillo library microfilm.)

5. The New Method of Fortification, As practiced by Monsieur de Vauban, Engineer-General of France. Together with a new Treatise of Geometry. The fifth Edition, Carefully revised and corrected by the Original. To which is now added, A Treatise of Military Orders, and the Art of Gunnery, or throwing of Bombs, Balls, &c. to hit any Object assigned. (S. and E. Ballard, C. Hitch, and J. Wood, London, 1748.) 1 v., 14 plus 216 pp., 32 plates. This is a description of early 18th century fortification practices, but it is not, as the title may seem to indicate, a translation of Vauban. The thought of the book is considerably earlier than that of Müller’s works, particularly in gunnery. (Castillo library microfilm.)
III. Secondary Sources

A. Published Materials


2. Bolton, Herbert E. *Arredondo’s Historical Proof of Spain’s Title to Georgia*. (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1925.) 1 v., xvii plus 382 pp., documented, illus., bibliography, index. Transcription and translation of Arredondo’s argument for Spanish claims as pointed up by events in the southeastern part of the continent to 1737. Bolton has given, as introduction, a clear and concise summary of the English-Spanish struggle with Florida problems (1566-1763). The work has valuable editorial notes pointing out sources related to the period.


5. __________. “Fort Frederica and the Battle of Bloody March.” *Georgia Historical Quarterly*, v. XXVII, no. 2., pp. 111-174. A documented narrative of Oglethorpe’s sojourn in Georgia, with particular emphasis on St. Simons Island and Frederica. Mrs. Cate is the foremost authority on the history of Frederica and...
the island. The above article is a condensation of material to appear in a new edition of Mrs. Cate’s *Our Todays and Yesterdays* (Brunswick, 1930).

6. Chatelain, Verne E. *The Defenses of Spanish Florida 1565 to 1763.* (Carnegie Institution of Washington, Washington, 1941.) 1 v., vii plus 192 pp., documented and annotated, illus., bibliography, index., 22 maps. An eclectic work relating primarily to the military aspects of Florida, but so fully annotated as to serve as an encyclopedia of Florida history for the period. It includes considerable original material, and is to a large degree a new approach to the early history of Florida. Results of certain archeological work on St. Augustine fortifications are also included.


8. Coulter, E. Merton. *A Short History of Georgia.* (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1933.) 1 v., xiii plus 457 pp., illus., select bibliography, index. Undocumented, it is nevertheless authoritative because of the reputation and extensive researches of the author.


15. Jones, Charles C., Jr. “The Dead Towns of Georgia.” *Collections of the Georgia Historical Society,* IV. (Savannah, 1878). 263 pp., illus., annotated, index. Frederica (pp. 45-136) is chapter II in the book. Jones’ account, drawn mainly from Moore’s *Voyage to Georgia* and half a dozen other contemporary sources, is the standard history of Frederica. He should, however, be read critically. (Castillo library microfilm.)


17. _________________. *Spanish Missions of Georgia.* (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1935.) 1 v., xv plus 321 pp., documented, illus., bibliography, index. A comprehensive and perspicacious history of the missions through the first quarter of the 18th century. Lanning does not attempt specific location of missions, though he does recognize the controversies relative to such location problems in the southeast.
18. Lossing, Benson J. *Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution.* (Harper Bros., N. Y., 1852.) 2 v., illus., annotated, index. A detailed and profusely illustrated work, to be read critically.


20. Spalding, Thomas. “A Sketch of the Life of General James Oglethorpe.” *Collections of the Georgia Historical Society,* I, 239-295. Dated Sapelo Island, March 20, 1840. In addition to biographical information on Oglethorpe, in this annotated sketch Spalding has given considerable attention to events that took place on St. Simons Island, and has identified several historic sites as well furnished contemporary (1840 and earlier) descriptions of them. Of special interest is publication of a letter from George Washington (Jan. 15, 1790) to the Marquis de Bellegard, including an eulogy of Oglethorpe. Spalding’s father purchased the Oglethorpe plantation, and Spalding was reared in the Frederica region. (Castillo library microfilm.)

B. Manuscript Materials

1. Appleman, Roy E. “Fort Frederica, St. Simons Island, Georgia. Inspection Report and Recommendations.” (National Park Service, Richmond, Va., 1938.) Typescript, 8 pp., illus. Brief description of conditions at Frederica town site in 1938, with excellent record photographs by Hugh Awtrey. (Castillo file 105-01.1.)

2. Cate, Margaret Davis. Manuscript for revised edition of *Our Todays and Yesterdays.* Frederica section only. Typescript, 68 pp. This documented paper is the most detailed study yet made of the history of the area during the 1736-1743 period. It is superseded in part by Mrs. Cate’s “Fort Frederica” article in the *Georgia Historical Quarterly,* XXVII, no. 2, but contains some material not found in the latter. (Castillo library microfilm.)
3. Crowe, F. H. “Drawbridge Study, Fort Marion National Monument.” (National Park Service, St. Augustine, 1940.) Typescript, 63 pp., documented, illus., bibliography. This report contains general information on drawbridge construction based on fragmentary Spanish, English and French sources. For Castillo de San Marcos it is not definitive, inasmuch as the Castillo section is predicated upon investigations conducted by Historical Technician Thor Borresen at the Castillo, and these investigations were not completed. (Castillo library.)

4. Fort Frederica Notes and Correspondence. Typescript and manuscript. Miscellaneous materials relating to research on Frederica. (Castillo file 105-01.1.)

5. Holland, James W. “‘Key to Our Province’ 1736-1776. A Study of a Marsh Island of Georgia in the Mouth of the Savannah River, Site of Fort Pulaski National Monument.” (National Park Service, Savannah, 1937.) Typescript, 128 pp., documented, illus., bibliography. A careful and readable study of early fortifications on Cockspur Island. Applicable to Frederica in showing similar type constructions. (Castillo library.)

6. _______________. “Some Preliminary Notes on the Location of ‘Bloody Marsh’, St. Simons Island, Georgia, with Resume and Extract of the Sutherland Account by Rogers W. Young. (National Park Service, [Savannah], n.d.) Typescript, 13 pp., documented, bibliography, map. Approach to a controversial subject. (Castillo library.)


historic sites in the Pensacola vicinity, with indications of their significance. There is a 27-page resume of the area history, drawn largely from Spanish sources. (Castillo library.)


IV. Maps, Plans and Pictures.

A. Maps and Plans

1722. Anonymous [Stollard?]. Fort King George and west coast waterway of St. Simons Island (no title). (Public Record Office, London, Colonial Office, Georgia 5.) MS., August 1722, scaled, oriented, key. Contains “An Abstract of the Journall of the Voyage from Fort King George in South Carrolina to St. Simons Island & Barr in the Elizabeth Sloop Capt Stollard Commander.” Mrs. Margaret Davis Cate advances the theory that this map and its companion pieces were useful to Oglethorpe in selecting the site for Frederica. (Castillo library microfilm.)

[1722.] Anon. [Stollard?]. No title. (Public Record Office, Colonial Office, Georgia 6.) Similar to, but rougher than companion map Georgia 5. (Castillo library microfilm.)


c. 1722. Anon. Plan of Fort King George (no title). (Public Record Office, Colonial Office, Georgia 8.) MS., n. d., scaled, no orientation; key. (Castillo library microfilm.)

1726. Anon. “A Plan of Fort King George as it’s now Fortified, 1726.” (Public Record Office?) MS., no scale, no orientation; key. (Castillo library microfilm.)

[1737.] Arredondo, Antonio de. “Plano de la entrade de Gualquini Rio de. Sn. Simon situado a 31 Grados y 17 mins. de latitude Septentrional.” (Madrid, Min. War. 8a-1a-a43.) MS., n.d., scaled, oriented, key. Coverage: vicinity of St. Simons Sound, showing channels, southern part of St. Simons Island, and northern part of Jekyl Island, with fortifications and population centers on shores of the Sound. It does not include territory as far north as Frederica. This map was made to accompany Arredondo’s report dated Havana, Jan. 22, 1737 to the Governor of Florida, relative to official inspection of forts from Canaveral to Carolina, and is apparently fairly accurate. As on most maps of this type, harbor soundings are given. (Castillo library Photostat.)


1738. Anon. (transmitted by Col. Bull, Commander-in-Chief of South Carolina). Map
of East and West Florida, Georgia and Carolina (no title). (Public Record Office, Colonial Office, Florida 2.) MS., May 25, 1738, oriented, scaled, key. The map includes the area south of Albermarle Sound to the Florida Keys and east of the Mississippi River to the Bahama Islands. Indian country is shown and informative notes are written in relative to fortifications figuring in the Ango-Spanish border conflicts after 1700. (Reproduced in Chatelain’s Defenses.)

1740. Anon. A New Map or Chart of the Western or Atlantic Ocean, with part of Europe Africa & America: Shewing the Course of the Galleons, Flora &c. to and from the West Indies. (E. Cave, London, 1740.) Scaled, oriented, captions. This map is unusually clear. It is important not only for geographical and historical data, but also contains portraits of Robert Blake and Edward Vernon, admirals of England, together with decorations depicting war implements of the period. Coverage: Shetland Islands south to below Cape Verde Islands; France west to Labrador. (Castillo library original.)

1740. Thomas, John. “A Map of the Islands of St. Simon and Jekyl with the Plans and Profils of their Fortifications as proposed by the late John Thomas Engineer and design’d to be Executed under his Directions for the Deffence and Security of the said Islands and Town of Frederica . . . 1740.” (Jekyl Island Club has original.) MS., 1740, scale, oriented, key. The topography of the said islands, including channels into St. Simons Sound, detailed plans of Fort St. Simons, a redoubt to be erected on St. Simons near the fort, a second redoubt for Jekyl Island, as well as a plan of the land surrounding Fort St. Simons. Of particular value for Frederica in showing the military road from Fort St. Simons to Frederica, and contemporary fortification ideas. Cf. Clairac, plate 36, for illustration of certain elements of fortification design which seem to apply to Fort St. Simons. (Castillo library Photostat.)

The following note from CR 1/425 (Sept. 6, 1743) clarifies the purpose and the authorship of the map: “Read a Memorial from Mr. John Thomas Engineer, employ’s as a Sub Engineer in Georgia on the Works under the late Captn John Thomas Engineer; Setting forth, That on his Arrival in England from Georgia in the Year 1740; he was employ’d to draw for the Trust Some Plans, and the Plans and Profils of the several different Fortifications Design’d by the late Captain John Thomas for the Defence of
Georgia, With Surveys of those Island for Which they were intended to be in one compleat Plan; But that the Memorialist being appointed One of the Engineers to attend the Expedition to the West Indies, he recommended Mr. Lexry to compleat the said Plan, Who agreed to do it for the sum of twelve Guineas, but dying abroad the same remain’d Unfinish’d till the Memorialist’s Return from the West Indies, Who having now completed the same, offers this Work for the Acceptance of the Trust as a Mark of his Zeal and Integrity for his Majesty’s Service, and his Good Wishes for the Prosperity of Georgia. And Mr. Thomas being called in presented the said Plan [to the Trustees].”

[1741.] Anon. [Thomas Jefferys?]. *A Map or Chart of the West Indies, drawn from the best Spanish Maps, and regulated by Astronomical Observations.* (Description of the Principal Objects of the Present War in the West Indies, London, 1741.) N.d., color, scaled, oriented, key. Coverage: Carolina to Tierra Firme (northern South America), New Spain to east of Antilles. Unusually valuable in summarizing Anglo-Spanish strategy in relation to Florida. Extensive key relates principally to commercial routes. There is an insert entitled “Harbour of San Augustin on the Coast of Florida” which is valuable, and another entitled “Bay of Honda or the deep Bay in Cuba.” Historical notes (especially dates) on the map are not reliable. The map is designed to clarify lengthy discussion in the text of the book in which it was published, and as such contains considerable background material antedating 1741. (Castillo library original.)

1755. Anon. *A New Chart of the Vast Atlantic Ocean; Exhibiting the Seat of War, both in Europe and America, likewise the Trade Winds & Course of Sailing from one Continent to the other: with the Banks, Shoals and Rocks; drawn according to the latest discoveries, and regulated by Astronomical Observations.* (London Magazine, 1755.) Scaled, oriented, key. Detailed coverage from Minorca Island west to Havana, and from Newfoundland south to beyond the Orinoco River. Contains historical notes. (Castillo library original.)

Brahm was in the southeast from 1751 to 1771, and worked on many Georgia fortifications. In 1764 he was appointed His Majesty’s Surveyor General for the Southern District of North America.

1755? Brahm, John Gerard William de. Plans for fortifications at Frederica, Savannah and Hardwick, Georgia. (No title.) (Collections of the Georgia Historical Society, VII, part 3.) MS., n.d., scaled, oriented, key. The Frederica project was never carried out, but is nevertheless of interest. Close study may reveal the plans of some value in suggesting contemporary conditions at Frederica, and the plans and profiles show typical 18th century fortification design. (Castillo library.)

1764. Bowen, Emanuel. A New Map of Georgia, with Part of Carolina, Florida and Louisiana. (John Harris, Collection of Voyages and Travels, London, 1765, v. II, facing p. 323.) N.d. [c. 1748?], scaled, oriented, key. Especially valuable in indicating British activity and place names. (Reproduced in part in Bolton, Spain’s Title to Georgia, 208.)

1765. Martínez, Fernando. “Descripción Geográfica de la parte que los Españoles poséen actualmente en el continente de la Florida. Del Dominio en que están los Yngleses con legítimo Título solo en virtud del Tratado de Pazes del año de 1670, y de la Jurisdicción que indebidamente han Ocupado después de dicho Tratado en que se manifiestan las Tierras que usurpan y se definen lot límites que deven prescribirse para una, y otra Nación, en conformidad del derecho de la Corona de España.” (Brit. Mus. Add. Mss. 17.648A.) MS., Madrid, 1765, color, scaled, oriented, key. Coverage: southeastern North America, west to Mississippi River. As the title indicates, it shows Spanish claims to Florida territory. The map appears to be based upon Arredondo’s map (1737?). (The Martínez map is published in Chatelain, Defenses.)

[1765.] Moncrief, James. “Plan of Fort Picalata on St. John’s River Distant from St. Augustine Seven Leagues.” (Public Record Office, Colonial Office, Florida 9.) MS., n.d., scaled, not oriented, no key. Ground plan and section of the stone fort erected after 1755. The stone tower is surrounded by a palisade and dry ditch. Though small, the plan shows details clearly. (Published in Chatelain, Defenses.)

1769. Jefferys, Thomas. St. Augustine
the Capital of East Florida. (W. Stork, *A Description of East Florida*, London, 1769.) N.d., scaled, not oriented, no key. The map covers the area of the town west and south of the Castillo, including details of fortifications, town lots and buildings. Apparently based upon the earlier surveys by John Solís, which are more pretentious in draftsmanship than the Jefferys’ plan. (Castillo library photostat.)


1796. Miller, Joshua. “800 Acres Including Town and Commons of Frederica.” (Georgia Archives, Atlanta.) MS., 1796, scaled, oriented, key. Shows contemporary conditions of a considerable area outside the town limits, as well as the town itself. Jones (*Dead Towns of Georgia*, pp. 132-133) sketches the background of Miller’s two maps of the Frederica town site: On Dec. 17, 1792, commissioners of the towns and commons of Frederica and Brunswick were appointed and directed to have surveys made of these towns, according to their original plans, the surveys to be recorded in the Surveyor General’s office, and office of the Surveyor of Glynn County. In February 1796 special commissioners were named for Frederica town. They were to lay off the town as nearly as practicable to the original plan, open streets, mark or stake lots, resurvey the commons and prepare and accurate map. Miller’s maps were evidently the result. (Castillo library photostat.)

[1796.] Miller, Joshua. “Plan of the Town of Frederica on the Island of St. Simon.” (Georgia Archives, Atlanta.) MS., n.d, scaled, oriented, key. Shows Frederica according to Miller’s interpretation of the original plan, with indication of contemporary condition of fortification and public building ruins. Town lots are delineated. (Castillo library photostat.)


1938. Glynn County, Georgia (State Highway Board of Georgia.) 1938, scaled, oriented, key. Detailed topographical map of Glynn County, adopted May 7, 1940, as official county road map.


1941. Atlantic Ocean. (National Geographic Society.) 1941, scaled, oriented, key.


N.d. Anon. Plan of the Town of Frederica, on St. Simon’s Island, Georgia. (J. Bien Photo, Lith. N. Y. [1878].) Collections of the Georgia Historical Society, IV, facing p. 45. No scale, no orientation, no key. Shows east-west width of St. Simons Island at Frederica, with plots laid out over a large area. Presumably these plots are grants made to Frederica settlers. A small house some distance out of Frederica to the south may be Oglethorpe’s house. An area north of the town may be an indication of the military camp at Frederica after 1742. If its provenance can be determined, and a key discovered, the map would be of value. (Castillo library microfilm.)

N.d. Cate, Margaret Davis, and Virginia and Jake Blanton, Jr. Historic [al] Map, Brunswick, Georgia, Saint Simons Island, Sea Island. (Brunswick Board of Trade folder.) N.d., color, roughly scaled, oriented, key. A rough but satisfactory graphic statement of the historicity and points of interest on St. Simons Island. (Castillo library.)

B. Pictures

1851. Hazzard, W. W. “Ruins of the Fort at Frederica as it appeared in 1851.” (B. J. Lossing, Pictorial
Field-Book of the Revolution, N. Y. 1860, p. 516, with footnote explanation.) Also reproduced
without note in Coulter, Short History of Georgia. (Chapel Hill, 1933, p. 50.) Small line sketch. Its
accuracy is questionable. Lossing furnishes this information: “This is from a sketch made by W. W.
Hazzard, Esq. in 1851. Mr. Hazzard writes, ‘These ruins stand on the left bank or bluff of the south
branch of the Alatamaha River on the west side of the St. Simon Island, where steamers pass from
Savannah to Florida. This fort was the scene of hostilities during the war of the Revolution and also of
1812; and is one of the most interesting military relics of our county.’ Mr. Hazzard states that, in his field
in the rear of it, his men always turn up bombshells and hollow shot whenever they plow there. The
whole remains are upon his plantation at West Point.” Mrs. Cate suggested that the engraver has
attempted here to portray both fort and barracks in the same sketch, with results that are confusing.

c. 1858. Anon. [W. W. Hazzard?] “Ruins of General Oglethorpe Barracks at Frederica.” (Harper’s
Weekly, Mar. 5, 1859.) A large and clear line sketch of the barrack ruins, but of questionable accuracy.
(Castillo library microfilm.)

c. 1858. Anon. [W. W. Hazzard?] “Oglethorpe’s Tombs at Frederica.” (Harper’s Weekly, Mar. 5,
1859.) A clear, large representation of presumably fair accuracy, showing a scene of desolation in the
Frederica cemetery. (Castillo library microfilm.)

c. 1780. Anon. “James Oglethorpe.” Line caricature, evidently autographed by Oglethorpe, representing
Oglethorpe as a parliamentary hanger-on in his declining years. Compare the similar but more crudely
done engraving in George White, Historical Collections of Georgia, facing p. 48. Provenance of the
caricature is not now know to the writer, but see Georgia, A Pageant of Years (Garret and Massie, Inc.,
Richmond, Va.), frontpiece. (Castillo library photostat.)

c. 1750. Anon. James Oglethorpe. Engraving from portrait. (Collection of the St. Augustine Historical
Society.)

c. 1900. Four photographs of the “citadel” at Frederica. (Collection of Mrs. Margaret Davis Cate.)
Include 1) east elevation (anonymous); 2) east elevation by A. V. Wood; 3) north elevation by William
Moore; 4) west elevation by W. W. Thomas. (Castillo library prints F 173-176.)
photographs of Frederica ruins. These views include the “citadel”, the barracks, eastern moat, burial
ground, and the cannon at the “Citadel”. The best of these photographs are used as plates in the present
study. (Castillo library prints, F 94-105.)