Newton Drury and the Echo Park Dam Controversy

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In March 1951 National Park Service Director Newton Drury resigned the post he had held for more than a decade. Drury's departure from the park service came amidst one of the twentieth century's most important environmental battles: the controversy over the proposed construction of Echo Park and Split Mountain dams in Dinosaur National Monument. Among preservationists who rallied to defend Dinosaur there was little doubt that Drury had been forced from office because of his opposition to the powerful Bureau of Reclamation on the Echo Park matter. As preservationists clamored for Drury's reinstatement, however, one voice cautioned that the situation might not be quite as it appeared. Former Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes suggested to one of his preservationist friends that Drury had been compelled to resign not because he opposed the Dinosaur dams, but because he had failed to do so. Ickes hinted that embarrassing records in the possession of Secretary of the Interior Oscar Chapman documented that Drury betrayed Dinosaur National Monument as early as 1941.1

The documents to which Ickes referred included a 1941 memorandum of understanding between the National Park Service and the Bureau of Reclamation calling for conversion of Dinosaur National Monument into a multiple-use national recreation area, and a 1944 park service report that concluded such a change in the reserve's status was justified because flooding the Green and Yampa river canyons would create sufficient recreational opportunities to offset any loss of scenery. These documents are not secret, but their origins have yet to be well understood. In particular, Newton Drury's role in their development remains unclear. If Drury, widely perceived as a dedicated preservationist, acceded to reclamation development in Dinosaur, why did he do it? Examination of National Park Service policy toward reclamation in Dinosaur National Monument from 1940 to 1950 may help answer that question.

The Colorado River Basin Recreation Survey

Newton Drury first confronted the issue of potential dam construction in Dinosaur National Monument only months after becoming National Park Service director in August 1940. Both the park service's earlier policy toward reclamation in the Colorado River basin and Drury's own philosophy of preservation and resource management informed his response to the issue. Drury, who served many years as executive director of the Save-the-Redwoods League, came to the park service with a distinguished preservationist record. In her study of the league, Susan Schreper described Drury and his associates as typical of Progressive-era, middle-class reformers, dedicated to "traditional paternalistic philanthropy," preferring "state to federal initiatives" and "accommodation over confrontation."2

Background photo: Photo of Newton Drury courtesy of the National Park Service, Harpers Ferry Center.
Distaste for centralized government and fear that President Franklin D. Roosevelt intended to broaden the scope of federal power prompted Drury in 1933 to decline an offer to head the National Park Service. Like many preservationists, however, Drury grew alarmed by the direction the park service took during the New Deal. Both the size and nature of the agency’s jurisdiction expanded to include not only new national parkland (some of which many preservationists saw as less than worthy of the name), but also a host of monuments, historic sites, and buildings. Drury believed that much of what the National Park Service had engaged in since 1933 was properly the concern of state, not federal, government. Thus, in 1940, Drury accepted a second offer of the park service directorship out of conviction that the agency had strayed from its mandate to manage the “great primeval” parks, and in doing so violated the bounds of sound government. As Drury took the helm, he was determined to steer the service back on course and end its era of expansion.

Nowhere had the park service’s New Deal expansionism been more ambitious than in the Colorado River basin. Here the service sought not only to create new national parks and monuments but also to insinuate itself into management of all the region’s recreation resources. The service succeeded in establishing some new parklands in the basin, including the 1938 addition of the Green and Yampa river canyons to Dinosaur National Monument, but there had also been failures. The service’s most ambitious project, a seven-thousand-square-mile Escalante National Monument in Utah, stalled in the face of opposition from reclamation and livestock interests. In fact, the park service achieved expansion of Dinosaur National Monument only after making significant concessions to these special interests.

In response to these frustrations, in 1940 the park service launched an initiative designed to accommodate reclamation, preservation, and recreation in the Colorado River basin. The service proposed creating a system of multiple-use national recreation areas throughout the basin, including some existing national monuments. Dinosaur National Monument was one area the park service anticipated converting to a national recreation area. Due largely to opposition from the Utah congressional delegation, however, the service never implemented its 1940 recreation-area initiative.

Park service activities throughout the Colorado River basin during the late-1930s engendered considerable resentment and misunderstanding, particularly among state water officials and local civic leaders. Concerned by this growing hostility and by the Bureau of Reclamation’s initiation of field investigations along the upper reaches of the Colorado River system, National Park Service personnel responsible for the recreation-area initiative met with Newton Drury in late fall 1940. The two officials, Jesse Nusbaum and Milo F. Christiansen from the Region III Office in Santa Fe, New Mexico, impressed upon Drury that the Colorado River basin’s unique environmental conditions presented an especially difficult problem for the park service. They argued that in a region so arid, the value of scarce water resources clearly outweighed the value of the area’s scenic and recreation resources—with the single exception of Grand Canyon National Park.

Given past failures and regional antagonisms, the challenge for the park service late in 1940 was to establish itself as an influential participant in the planning process. During their meeting with the new director, Nusbaum and Christiansen offered a suggestion on how to proceed. They recommended that the agency undertake a comprehensive survey of the Colorado River basin, the purpose of which would be to “literally... weigh the monetary benefits” of utilizing water and scenic resources and to “establish a yardstick for evaluating the economic benefits of recreational use.” Only by arming itself with such information, Drury’s counselors warned, could the park service hope to be a credible player in the “comprehensive study and planning of the Colorado River Basin,” and thus influence decisions about recreational development and scenic preservation.

The idea of a detailed study of the Colorado River basin’s recreation resources appealed to Drury. The new director had a distinctive management style, particularly in his approach to conflict resolution, which derived from a personality ill-disposed to confrontation as well as his experience with the Save-the-Redwoods League. Drury believed that good public policy resulted not from interest group politicking but from reasoned dialogue among resource managers and users based on impartial data prepared by experts. The league often relied on expert studies as a springboard for negotiations with timber interests and as the basis for long-range management programs. An example of this approach was the league’s 1926 report on California’s
scenic and recreation resources, prepared by landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted (son of the designer of New York City’s Central Park).  

Drury thought the same kind of “sensible and objective study and planning” that Olmsted provided the league in the 1920s was what the National Park Service needed for the Colorado River basin in the 1940s.  

Early in 1941 Drury asked his friend Olmsted to head a recreation survey of the Colorado River basin. Olmsted accepted the offer and drafted a plan for the survey outlining its goals and proposed implementation. He rejected conducting a comprehensive survey as neither realistic nor appropriate because the Colorado River basin was too vast and diverse. Olmsted thought many of the basin’s recreational resources were not of unusually high caliber and should rightly be the concern of state and local governments instead of the National Park Service. Olmsted suggested that the survey should “furnish a sound basis for decisions” on critical issues facing the Department of the Interior, the most pressing of which was water development. Olmsted’s plan for the recreation survey was designed to “help the Reclamation Service in its planning for the development of the water resources [of the basin], with a view to avoiding needless sacrifices of potential recreational values.”  

Under the 1936 Parks, Parkways, and Recreation Area Act, the National Park Service had authority to engage in recreation studies, but the law provided no money for such purposes. The park service believed, however, that another source of money might be used. In 1940 Congress instructed the Bureau of Reclamation to formulate a basinwide development plan for the Colorado River system, creating from Boulder Canyon Dam power revenues a special fund (the Colorado River Development Fund) for that purpose. Arguing that the Colorado River basin development plan ought to “integrate recreational use of a fair proportion of land [in] the region...with other uses,” Drury suggested to his counterpart, Reclamation Commissioner John C. Page, that it would be in the mutual interest of both agencies to pay for the recreation study out of the Colorado River Development Fund. Page agreed and instructed his staff to earmark up to 5 percent of the fund for a four-year park service study.  

Under federal law, one agency could transfer funds to another only through a memorandum of understanding setting out the purposes and obligations for the exchange. In order to draft such a document, Olmsted and S. O. Harper, chief engineer of the Bureau of Reclamation, along with several other bureau and service officials, met in mid-November 1941. Bureau officials pointed out that while Congress had authorized the ultimate expenditure of $1.5 million for basin studies, revenues in the Colorado River Development Fund would not reach that level for several years. The amount available for the recreation survey was much smaller than the park service had anticipated. Consequently, the initial phase of the study would have to be scaled back and the park service asked the reclamation bureau to recommend a priority of investigation.  

These priorities were discussed at the November meeting and incorporated into the formal memorandum of understanding. Under the agreement the park service would focus its initial work on three areas: the Grand Canyon National Monument and Lake Mead National Recreation Area, which would be affected by the Bureau of Reclamation’s proposed Bridge Canyon Dam; the region that had previously been considered for inclusion in the proposed Escalante National Monument (site of the bureau’s proposed Glen Canyon and Dark Canyon dams); and Dinosaur National Monument, which would prove central to the bureau’s proposed Colorado River Storage Project. The recreation survey’s objective was to formulate “a definite recreational policy and plan in conjunction with the water control developments [that would] effectively serve the purposes and objectives of both bureaus.” The park service also agreed “in principle” to convert Grand Canyon and Dinosaur monuments into multiple-use national recreation areas. “Although legislation would be required in both cases to effect this policy,” the memorandum stated, “the National Park Service does not believe such legislation would be difficult to secure.” Drury and Page signed this memorandum of understanding on 4 November 1941.  

Over the next several years National Park Service personnel conducted fieldwork for the Colorado River recreation survey. Olmsted provided general oversight. While the activities of the entire survey are beyond the scope of this paper, that portion of the study relating to Dinosaur National Monument was to have great significance for the unfolding Echo Park dam controversy and therefore requires close scrutiny. Olmsted and George F. Ingalls, chief of the Recreational Planning Division at Region II who conducted the actual fieldwork for the survey, prepared the Dinosaur recreation report. The report, completed in May 1944, concluded that much of the monument’s “geologic and scenic interest” would survive reclamation development. In fact such development would make the Green and Yampa rivers “of national importance from a recreational viewpoint.” The report said that “if and when it is shown that it would certainly be in the
greater national interest to develop the water resources of the Canyon Unit [of the monument],...the status of the unit should be changed to that of a multiple-purpose area in which water-control...would be the principal use, and recreation the secondary but also important use. 21

Administrators on Drury’s staff at park service headquarters in Washington, D.C., warmly received the Dinosaur National Monument recreation report. Conrad Wirth called it “an exceedingly fine work” and noted that the director’s staff “unanimously” shared his assessment. 22 There is no record of Newton Drury’s personal opinion of the report, but he did not object to its conclusions. In fact, on several occasions prior to the report’s release Drury made clear his position on potential development of the monument. In March 1942, for example, Drury wrote to John Page that the park service fully acknowledged that “the time may come” when the status of the monument would be altered to accommodate water development. 23 In December 1943 Drury wrote to Page’s successor, Commissioner of Reclamation Harry Bashore, saying that “so far as I am aware there is no misunderstanding between us as to the possible future of Dinosaur National Monument.” 24 On 27 June 1944 Drury transmitted a copy of the Dinosaur recreation report to the Bureau of Reclamation, marking a formal end to the Dinosaur section of the Colorado River basin recreation survey.

**Drury and the Debate over National Recreation Areas**

Newton Drury did not initiate the park service’s search for a way to accommodate use of the Colorado River basin’s recreation, scenic, and water resources. Nor did he originate the idea of converting Dinosaur National Monument into a multiple-use national recreation area. He did, however, accept and formalize both policies through the interagency memorandum of understanding and the cooperative recreation survey. The choice of Frederick Law Olmsted to head the recreation project indicates the importance Drury attached to the survey. Drury did not engage in these activities unwittingly or under political pressure either from within his organization or from the Bureau of Reclamation. On the contrary, evidence suggests that Drury saw the recreation study and its conclusions as logical steps in the process of establishing suitable land-use policies for the region. Drury’s acceptance of the 1941 memorandum of understanding and the 1944 recreation report is difficult to reconcile with his reputation as a staunch preservationist dedicated to correcting the excesses of previous park service policies and willing to sacrifice his own career to protest the damming of Dinosaur. Resolving the paradox of Drury’s actions requires an understanding of two issues central to the park service’s Colorado River basin policies: the relationship of national recreation areas to the national park system and the differing attitudes within the service over Dinosaur’s aesthetic qualities.

In the mid-1940s Drury engaged in a bitter exchange with the Bureau of Reclamation over national recreation areas. The issue central to this dispute was administrative jurisdiction, not outright opposition—a distinction crucial to Drury’s position on Dinosaur National Monument. The confrontation occurred in 1945 when the Bureau of Reclamation requested that three new federal reservoirs be designated national recreation areas and the National Park Service be assigned management responsibility for the sites. The bureau cited as precedent for such an arrangement the Lake Mead National Recreation Area, which the park service had administered since 1936. For several months Drury, Secretary of the Interior Ickes, and Ickes’s special assistant for reclamation Michael Straus (who later became commissioner of reclamation) debated the bureau’s proposal. 25 Drury balked at the idea of having his agency manage the new reservoirs, arguing that assumption of responsibility for additional national recreation areas would “dissipate [park service] energies and divert [agency personnel] from the performance of our primary functions.” 26 Straus insisted that managing recreation on federal reservoirs should be part of the park service mandate. Ickes sided with Straus and ordered the park service to come down from its “ivory tower” and undertake the task of managing the three new recreation areas.

During an Interior Department conference on postwar resources planning in November 1945, Drury expressed dissatisfaction with the secretary’s decision. Drury told conference attendees that he had no general disdain for national recreation areas, noting that “[t]here surely is no national park policy that discourages the establishment of more recreation areas. The main question is where these areas should be established and administered, and by whom.” Drury believed that in areas of national significance recreation should be managed by agencies with existing jurisdiction. Thus, on federal reservoirs the Bureau of Reclamation should assume responsibility for managing recreation. Recreation areas of less than national importance, Drury insisted, ought to be managed by the states. Recreation was his agency’s business only in the national parks. The National Park Service should not be responsible for managing national recreation areas. 27

The question of park service jurisdiction over the envisioned national recreation area at Dinosaur was an issue during preparation of the 1944 recreation report. The initial draft of that report, submitted by Olmsted and Ingalls in March 1943, included a recommendation for negotiation of an interagency agreement establishing National Park Service jurisdiction over any future recreation areas on the Green and Yampa rivers. 28 The final version of the report, however, said nothing about which agency would have future management responsibility for recreation on the rivers. This reversed the park service position during the 1940 national recreation-area initiative, when the agency (headed by Arno Cammerer) actively sought such jurisdiction. 29 Revisions in the Dinosaur recreation report, completed during Drury’s tenure, illustrate the line he drew between acceptance of the need for national recreation areas and the role his agency should play in their management. 30
Although Drury did not want his agency to oversee a future Dinosaur recreation area, he accepted the existence of such a reserve. This willingness can be understood in the context of the landscape aesthetics to which Drury adhered. Drury’s personal opinion of the reserve’s scenery is not known, but evidence suggests that he did not value it highly. Drury shared with many of his contemporary preservationists a well-defined aesthetic derived from nineteenth-century Romantic notions of the western landscape. Historian Alfred Runte labeled this aesthetic “monumentalism”—a preference for spectacular geologic formations situated, primarily although not exclusively, in forested and mountainous settings. From the late-nineteenth century through the 1960s, monumentalism was the aesthetic ideal for the national park system. Only those rare and exceptional areas consistent with the accepted landscape aesthetic were considered worthy of preservation as national parklands. Throughout his career, Newton Drury adhered to this traditional aesthetic. As director of the National Park Service, he repeatedly emphasized the superiority of what he called the “primary national parks,” places such as Yosemite and Yellowstone that most clearly embodied monumentalism.

Different aesthetic standards stressing what are now called wilderness ecosystems began to emerge in the 1930s, a change reflected in the addition of such places as the Everglades to the park system. Drury, however, retained traditionalist aesthetic tastes. He was not alone, and new aesthetics influenced park creation and management only gradually during the 1940s and 1950s, particularly in the Colorado River basin. Unlike the desert landscapes of the Southwest, embraced within the Romantic paradigm since the late-nineteenth century, there was little aesthetic enthusiasm for the wild canyonscapes of the Colorado River basin until well after World War II. The exception proves the rule: the Grand Canyon was valued for its monumental qualities, not its wildness, until well into the 1960s. Much of the Colorado River basin, especially its remote and often foreboding canyons, remained relatively unknown through the 1940s. Aesthetic appreciation for places like Dinosaur National Monument emerged only as greater numbers of people visited the region and personally experienced the exquisite canyonscapes of the Colorado and its tributaries.

Such was the case within the National Park Service. Few park service personnel were intimately familiar with Dinosaur National Monument until well into the 1950s. The reserve had no on-site custodian until 1931 (an employee of the Federal Emergency Relief Agency) and no park service personnel were stationed there until 1940. The initial park service surveys of the Green and Yampa canyons, done in 1933 and 1935, had been cursory, designed only to determine boundaries for the expansion of the small existing dinosaur quarry reserve. The service admitted in 1939 that it knew relatively nothing about the region of the expanded monument called the Canyon Unit. As the park service began to explore Dinosaur over the course of the next few years, aesthetic appreciation of the reserve grew among those field personnel having the greatest exposure to the reserve and ultimately among higher management ranks.

Lawrence Merriam, director of the park service’s Region II office and under whose jurisdiction Dinosaur National Monument fell, provides an example of this emerging sensibility. Merriam visited Dinosaur for the first time in fall 1943. Before the trip Merriam had not considered Dinosaur to be of “particular scenic importance.” After his visit Merriam extolled it as “one of the most spectacular views that I have ever seen.” Having discovered Dinosaur’s aesthetic qualities, Merriam quickly regretted the park service position set out in the 1941 memorandum of understanding. “I am forced to admit,” he said, “that in my opinion a considerable portion of the spectacular features will be lost by the construction of dams.”

Not long after his visit to Dinosaur, Merriam tried to revise the initial draft of the recreation report. He wanted excised from the draft several lengthy descriptions of recreational benefits that would potentially result from the construction of reservoirs. In place of this information Merriam suggested detailed descriptions of the reserve’s wildness, a characteristic not mentioned in the draft. In addition to these changes, Merriam argued that nothing should be included in the report (such as maps showing proposed boundaries or suggested names for a national recreation area) that would indicate Dinosaur might one day be flooded. Frederick Law Olmsted opposed Merriam’s efforts to change the report. Olmsted visited Dinosaur briefly during the recreation survey, but his age and poor health forced him to tour the area only by airplane. He was not much impressed by what he saw. The scenery in the monument, Olmsted told Merriam, was “generally pleasant but by no means extraordinary” and was “not so unique and precious... as to give very strong grounds for opposing... economic development, including dam construction.

In arguing against Merriam’s proposed revisions, Olmsted pointed to his original 1941 plan outlining the goals of the recreation survey. The plan noted that some existing reserves in the Colorado River basin did not “measure up to those high standards” that ought to characterize national parks and monuments. One purpose of the recreation survey was to identify such lands so that the National Park Service could discontinue “direct administration.” By 1944 Olmsted evidently considered Dinosaur National Monument in that category. He was adamant that the final recreation report include a recommendation to convert the reserve into a national recreation area, a designation suitable for lands that lacked the aesthetic qualities required of national parklands.

The final version of the report differed from the draft in including more extensive and laudatory descriptions of Dinosaur’s scenery, but Olmsted’s aesthetic assumptions, not Merriam’s, underlay the recommendation that the monument be converted into a national recreation area. Newton Drury’s position on the disagreement over the quality of Dinosaur’s scenery is unclear, but he had no personal basis for questioning his friend Olmsted’s
views until 1947—the year Drury saw the monument for the first time. While there is no record of Drury’s impressions during his brief visit to Dinosaur, his subsequent actions demonstrate that he did not undergo an aesthetic conversion similar to Lawrence Merriam’s. In fact, Drury was still willing to see much of the reserve flooded and transformed into a national recreation area.

This is not to say that Drury supported the construction of dams within the boundaries of Dinosaur National Monument. He believed that invasion of the reserve by reservoirs would constitute a violation of parkland integrity so severe as to compromise the and the National Park Service shifted from accommodation to confrontation in the late 1940s.

**Confrontation and Resignation**

Impetus for change in the relationship between the two agencies over the Colorado River basin resulted from broader transformations within the reclamation and preservation movements in the years following World War II. The preservation movement found a bigger base of public support among an increasingly prosperous, well-educated, and mobile middle class. Popularized ecological ideas and the ethical imperatives derived from them infused the movement with a sense of urgency and broadened the agenda to include concern for the environment as an integrated whole. These changes had important consequences for the Colorado River basin. Tourism in the region increased, and as it did more Americans came to value the distinctive aesthetic qualities of places like Dinosaur. Preservationists, who before the war gave little attention to Bureau of Reclamation activities in the region, began to question the ecological, economic, and aesthetic consequences of reclamation.

Emergence of antireclamation sentiment within the preservation movement coincided with, and in part responded to, growth of the federal reclamation program. At the end of World War II the Bureau of Reclamation entered what journalist Marc Reisner calls the “go-go years.” Under the aggressive leadership of Commissioner Michael Straus and fueled by the postwar economic boom, the bureau proposed a series of massive development projects. Among the most ambitious was the Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP). The CRSP envisioned a host of irrigation works, storage reservoirs, and power-generating dams on the Colorado River’s principal upper basin tributaries. Key elements in the CRSP were a dam at Echo Park and a smaller power-generating unit at Split Mountain, both within Dinosaur National Monument.

In this context of expanding reclamation ambitions and rising preservationist concern, Newton Drury began to question the efficacy of recreation studies as mechanisms for integrated water use, recreation, and scenic preservation planning. In November 1948 Drury confided to wildlife biologist and preservation activist Olaus Murie that while he thought the park service recreation studies of the mid-1940s had been “on the whole a force for good,” the program had been inadequate for integrating consideration of “recreational losses or gains” into federal reclamation planning. Prompted primarily by the Bureau of Reclamation’s escalating activities in the Colorado River basin during the summer of 1948, Drury moved to disengage the park service from the recreation studies program.

In September 1948 Drury’s office issued a new policy directive declaring that the park service would no longer prepare reports assessing recreation resources in any national park or monument threatened by Bureau of Reclamation projects. Instead the service would issue only brief and uncategorical denunciations of any proposed

*Newton Drury with his regional directors in Washington, D.C., 17 May 1949. Standing (from left to right) are Minor Tillotson, Herbert Maier, Preston Patraw, Elbert Cox, and Thomas Allen. Seated (from left to right) are Owen Tomlinson, Drury, and Laurence Merriam. Photo courtesy of the National Park Service, Harpers Ferry Center.*
water project that violated the sanctity of the park system.\textsuperscript{44} This directive was immediately tested when the Bureau of Reclamation requested economic data from the park service on the recreation potentials of the proposed CRSP, which directly affected Dinosaur National Monument because of the Echo Park and Split Mountain components of the project. The park service responded to the bureau's request with what came to be called the Reconnaissance Report. In accordance with the September policy directive, the Reconnaissance Report opposed construction of the Split Mountain and Echo Park units of the CRSP because they would "adversely and seriously" affect "highly important scientific, wilderness, and recreational values" in Dinosaur National Monument.\textsuperscript{45} Before transmitting the report to the Bureau of Reclamation, the regional park service officials responsible for drafting it alerted Drury to the implications. "We wish particularly to call your attention to that recommendation [not to build the Echo Park and Split Mountain dams]," Region II Director Merriam wrote, "since commitments made to the Bureau when the monument was enlarged may make such a position untenable."\textsuperscript{46}

As Merriam understood, the Reconnaissance Report ran contrary to every agreement, formal and informal, that the park service had made with the Bureau of Reclamation since expansion of the Dinosaur monument in 1938. If the service reversed its position, Merriam warned, the agency must be prepared for a stiff fight, which might be lost and which would have far-reaching consequences for the entire national park system. Although Merriam was inclined to take the risk, his counterpart at Region III was more reticent. Minor Tillotson, Region III director, believed it would prove "extremely difficult and ultimately impracticable to block the contemplated projects" in Dinosaur. He recommended living up to prior promises and converting the reserve into a national recreation area.\textsuperscript{47}

In November 1948 Drury approved the Reconnaissance Report, telling Tillotson that it was "entirely acceptable."\textsuperscript{48} Within less than a year, however, Drury abandoned the report's position, a reversal compelled by the political circumstances that Tillotson and Merriam had foreseen. Drury's retreat was along the same route the park service had followed throughout the 1940s: an accommodation of preservation, recreation, and reclamation values through the conversion of Dinosaur (or at least substantial portions of the monument) into a multiple-use national recreation area.

Drury's resumed search for accommodation came in the face of growing support for the CRSP among upper basin reclamationists. During the late spring and summer of 1949 regional civic leaders and politicians barraged the Department of the Interior with telegrams, petitions, and telephone calls demanding prompt authorization of the CRSP. In August the Reconnaissance Report, which the park service intended to be confidential, was leaked to the public and the agency became the object of increasingly vitriolic outrage from upper basin boosters.\textsuperscript{49} Although the fervor was modest compared to what came during the height of the Echo Park dam controversy in 1954-56, it was too much for Drury. He instructed his special assistant, Ben H. Thompson, to formulate a compromise proposal.

Thompson travelled to Utah in September 1949. He toured the monument by airplane, met with local civic leaders and Bureau of Reclamation officials, and read the latest draft of the CRSP plan. When he returned to Washington, D.C., Thompson gave Drury the outline of a compromise. It called for park service acceptance of the Split Mountain dam provided that the Bureau of Reclamation agreed to substitute a dam at the head of Lodore Canyon (also in Dinosaur National Monument) for the one at Echo Park. Thompson believed that a dam at Lodore would flood less of the reserve's most impressive scenery while a dam at Split Mountain would actually "create significant recreational and scenic attractions." He recommended that the monument's boundaries be reduced to include only Echo Park and the original dinosaur quarry area. The nearly two hundred thousand remaining acres of the reserve, including Split Mountain Canyon, would become a national recreation area.\textsuperscript{50} Thompson's Lodore proposal sought to maintain the legal integrity of the monument—no reservoir would intrude beyond the reduced boundaries—while preserving what he believed were the region's unique and monumental scenery.

Frederick Law Olmsted, whom Drury asked to review the Thompson report, endorsed the idea.\textsuperscript{51} Drury accepted these recommendations and initiated compromise negotiations with the Bureau of Reclamation.\textsuperscript{52}

Drury's abandonment of the Reconnaissance Report in favor of compromise caught many park service personnel by surprise. The custodian at Dinosaur and his immediate supervisor at Rocky Mountain National Park had taken the Reconnaissance Report to heart, making management decisions consistent with what they believed was the agency's new policy of opposing dam construction in the reserve.\textsuperscript{53} They were stunned to hear of the Lodore negotiations. David Canfield, superintendent at Rocky Mountain, found the proposal "confusing and disconcerting" and he prepared a detailed memorandum opposing the compromise.\textsuperscript{54} Howard Baker, acting director at Region II, was equally dismayed, telling Lawrence Merriam that Drury had "more or less kill[ed]" any effort to save the monument. Baker also prepared a long memorandum urging the director to reconsider.

Drury defended his decision to seek a compromise, writing Baker that "[i]f our negotiations should result in the abandonment of the present Echo Park site and the selection of an alternate site elsewhere, even if it were in the upper end of Lodore Canyon, I believe that we would be justified in feeling that we had salvaged the major values for which the monument was established." Drury effectively forestalled further criticism by suggesting that Baker rethink the matter.\textsuperscript{55}

By early November 1949 dissenion within the ranks of his organization was the least of Drury's worries. For more than a month park service and reclamation officials had discussed the Lodore proposal, but at a Salt Lake City meeting on 8 November the bureau rejected the compro-
promise. Instead the bureau demanded that the park service make good on the 1941 agreement and immediately initiate legislation to abolish the entire monument. With negotiations deadlocked, Drury appealed to Interior Secretary Chapman. Stressing his desire to have the matter resolved quietly within the department, Drury explained that the park service would accept dams at Split Mountain and Lodore if Echo Park was spared. Such a compromise, he pointed out, "would minimize impairment of the national monument" while allowing the Bureau of Reclamation to proceed with its water development project. Chapman agreed to mediate the dispute and asked his two agency chiefs to submit their respective cases in writing.

Over the next several months Drury and Commissioner Straus lobbied the secretary with a series of increasingly argumentative memoranda. Incensed by what he interpreted as park service hypocrisy, Straus provided Chapman with copies of the 1941 interagency agreement and the 1944 Dinosaur recreation report. In doing this Straus shifted attention away from the proposed Lodore compromise to an examination of the park service record managing the Dinosaur reserve. Forced on the defensive, Drury responded with growing petulance and disingenuousness. He tried to discredit the Colorado River basin recreation study by characterizing it as the unofficial action of overzealous subordinates. "Avoidably," Drury wrote Chapman, "in frank discussions of Reclamation's proposals with their officials and perhaps otherwise, some of our people may have expressed thoughts, ideas, or personal opinions as to extent, calibre, worth and kind of recreational development that might be appropriate in the area if dams are built." This was not an accurate representation of a program Drury had championed for nearly a decade.

Nor was Drury credible on another important point. He complained to Chapman that he had been unaware of the Bureau of Reclamation's interest in Dinosaur prior to 1948. Drury implied that the bureau surreptitiously conducted engineering studies in the monument and was trying to ramrod the CRSP through the department before the park service had a reasonable opportunity to respond. On another occasion Drury told a group of preservationists that the Bureau of Reclamation had only been allowed to conduct fieldwork in the monument "due to Secretary Ickes desire during the war." Drury's recollection on this point was not accurate. The bureau's studies, mandated by Congress and therefore requiring no secretarial order, began in 1939 with the park service's full knowledge.

Drury's subordinates were astonished by these claims, which seemed designed to defend the director more than the monument. "I was quite concerned with Director Drury's evident understanding that his Office had not been kept fully informed," Minor Tillotson confided to Lawrence Merriam. Bristling from the charge, Tillotson listed the documents, reports, and memoranda relating to water development in Dinosaur that Drury had signed since 1941. Surely, Tillotson suggested, "the Director should have had at least some knowledge of these projects in Dinosaur National Monument for a number of years."

Through December 1949 and into early winter 1950 Chapman sought to reconcile his two feuding bureau chiefs. The secretary appointed a special departmental committee to work out a solution, but Straus remained intransigent and refused to accept any compromise. CRSP public hearings in Washington, D.C., during April 1950 served only to polarize—and publicize—the issue further. The deadlock grew into a liability for the Truman administration. Those upper basin Democrats who faced reelection in the fall fell into near hysteria as Republicans began to charge that the lack of action on the CRSP was evidence that the administration intended to renege on all promises made to western reclamationists during the 1948 presidential campaign. Chapman decided to end the political hemorrhage and in June 1950 he authorized the Bureau of Reclamation to complete its project planning for the CRSP, including dams at Echo Park and Split Mountain Canyon.

By the time of Chapman's announcement, Newton Drury's position as director of the National Park Service was tenuous. Having engaged in half-truths and innuendos, he lost the confidence of subordinates who knew the facts and of his superior, who interpreted for himself the documents Drury had signed or accepted. Relations between Drury and Chapman deteriorated through 1950. In December Chapman asked Drury to take a new post as special assistant to the secretary. Ostensibly the change was meant to honor Arthur Demaray, who had worked for the park service since the Mather era, with a brief stint as director prior to his retirement. But Drury saw the move as a demotion, and in a confrontation over the new posting he openly quarreled with Chapman. Shortly thereafter Drury announced that he would resign from the National Park Service in order to oversee the California state park system.

**Conclusion**

The full story behind Newton Drury's resignation from the National Park Service may never be known, but the fight over Dinosaur National Monument certainly was a key factor, although in ways far different from what most preservationists assumed at the time. What was said (or not said) in those last meetings between Drury and Chapman are memories now lost—neither man ever spoke publicly about what happened. Before his death in 1975, however, Drury commented briefly on his resignation in an oral history interview. "The great Bureau of Reclamation," Drury said, "was like the state of Prussia in the German empire, where everything was weighted in its favor. That's about the essence of the situation." In that statement Drury revealed both the obvious and more subtle explanations for his decision to leave the federal government.

The problem confronting Drury in the late 1940s was not simply that the Bureau of Reclamation was bigger, richer, and more influential than the National Park Service. Drury, a preservationist of long experience, was accustomed to dealing with powerful
opponents. He had known losses before and victories, too—Drury was always a skilled player of the game. But Drury envisioned the nature of the game in very particular terms. For him, the old Progressive model of enlightened bureaucratic discourse based on impartial expertise was the best way for a democracy consisting of competing interests, some more powerful than others, to produce policies for the greater good of society. Drury’s earnest, willing engagement of this approach in the Colorado River basin is evident in his championing of the recreation survey and his acceptance of its conclusions, including (implicitly at least) the assessment of Dinosaur’s aesthetic qualities as insufficient and the call for the monument’s conversion into a multiple-use national recreation area.

After more than a decade of trying, however, Drury’s strategy culminated not in reasoned debate and judicious resolution but in an ugly and personally humiliating brawl. That fight, more fitting of Prussians than Progressives, revealed the futility of a policy-making and management style that Drury’s past experience and beliefs led him to see as reasonable and suitable. As the reclamation and preservation movements changed dramatically in the first few years after the Second World War, the park service’s traditional supporters and even many people within the agency found Drury’s way of doing things old-fashioned and ineffective. They turned to new modes of political action changing the world of environmental politics that Drury had known and in which he functioned for most of his public life. The confusion, anger, and self-deception evident in Drury’s actions during 1949 and early 1950 suggest how ill-suited he was for negotiating the changing terrain. In the fight over Dinosaur, as Ronald Foresta has suggested, Drury lost control of his own house.67 That, more than anything else, may explain why Newton Drury resigned.

Notes


2. Harold Ickes to Charles G. Sauer, 13 February 1951, Papers of Ira Gabrielson, Conservation Collection, Denver Public Library, Denver, Colorado (hereafter Conservation Collection). This letter was widely circulated within the preservationist community.


5. On preservation backlash against National Park Service policy, see Donald C. Swain, “The National Park Service and the New Deal, 1933-1940,” Pacific Historical Review 41 (August 1972): 312-32; and Conrad L. Wirth, Parks, Politics, and the People


7. Two provisions of the 1938 executive order adding the Green and Yampa canyons to Dinosaur embodied the concessions to reclamation interests. Although somewhat arcane in their terminology (and thus subject to differing legal interpretations), the National Park Service and the Bureau of Reclamation agreed prior to signing the proclamation that the reserve was subject to existing reclamation and power-site withdrawals and to the Water Power Act of 1922. See the origins and meaning of the water development provisions of the 1938 proclamation, see Neel, “Irreconcilable Differences,” pp. 177-206.

8. On the national recreation-area initiative, see Susan Rhoades Neel, “Recreation, Reclamation, and Preservation: National Park Service Policy in the Colorado River Basin, 1933-1940” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, Pacific Coast Branch, Salt Lake City, Utah, August 1990). The origins of the national recreation-area concept are described in Unrau and Willis, Administrative History, pp. 153-55. The 1940 initiative was embodied in a proposed amendment to the Antiquities Act of 1906.

9. Christiansen, supervisor of the Region III Recreation Planning Division, and Nusbaum, senior archaeologist for Region III, served from 1938 to 1941 as National Park Service delegates on the Colorado River Drainage Basin Committee, an arm of the National Resources Committee. Their meeting with Drury is described in Thomas Allen to Drury, 23 December 1940, Dinosaur National Monument File, Central Classified Files, Records of the National Park Service, Record Group 79, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter DNM File).


11. On the league’s use of expert studies of recreation resources, including the 1926 Olmsted report, see Schreper, Fight to Save the Redwoods, pp. 31-32.

12. “The Relation of the Park Service to the Colorado Basin,” address by Newton Drury to a joint meeting of the Colorado River Drainage Basin Committee and the Committees of 14 and 16, 21 October 1941, p. 30, Recreation, Land Use, and State Cooperation File, Region II Files, Records of the National Park Service, Record Group 79, National Archives, Kansas City Branch, Kansas City, Missouri (hereafter Recreation File).
13. “Draft of Preliminary Notes in Regard to Proposed Survey of Recreational Resources of the Colorado River Basin,” 22 July 1941, National Park Service Cooperation File, Records of the Chief Engineer’s Office, Branch of Research and Engineering, Records of the Bureau of Reclamation, Record Group 115, Denver Federal Record Center, Denver, Colorado (hereafter NPS Cooperation File). Although this document does not bear Olmsted’s name, the memorandum accompanying it identifies him as the author. See Drury to John C. Page, 29 August 1941, NPS Cooperation File.


15. The Colorado River Development fund was established by the Boulder Canyon Adjustment Act, U.S. Statutes at Large 54 (1939-41): 775.

16. The quotation is from Drury, “Relation of Park Service to Colorado River Basin.” On Drury’s proposal and the Bureau of Reclamation’s response, see Drury to Harold Ickes, 24 January 1941; Drury to John C. Page, 22 May 1941; Arthur Demaray to John C. Page, 22 May 1941; John C. Page to Drury, 1 July 1941; W. H. Nalder, file memorandum, 7 August 1941; and John C. Page to S. O. Harper, 6 and 18 September 1941, all in NPS Cooperation File. On the Bureau of Reclamation’s motives for cooperating with the park service on gathering recreation data for the Colorado River basin, see Neel, “Irreconcilable Differences,” pp. 288-304; and “A Forward-looking Step,” Reclamation Era 32 (February 1942): 39.


19. Given Harold Ickes’s later criticism of Drury’s signing of this memorandum, it should be noted that copies of the agreement included a space for the signature of the secretary of the interior. Copies signed by Drury and Page exist in several Bureau of Reclamation and National Park Service files; however, I have not located any copies signed by Ickes or even bearing a stamp signifying the approval of the Office of the Secretary. The agreement was renewed without modification in 1942 and 1943. See Harry Bashore to Drury, [26 August 1942], and the attached “Memorandum of Agreement Between the Bureau of Reclamation and the National Park Service Concerning the Coordination of Work in the Colorado River Basin During the Fiscal Year 1943,” 25 August 1942; and Harry Bashore to Drury, 30 July 1943, and the attached “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Bureau of Reclamation and the National Park Service, Department of the Interior,” all in NPS Cooperation File.


23. Drury to John C. Page, 12 March 1942, P&M File. Drury’s letter was prompted by a request from the chief engineer that a statement about the park service’s position be included in a preliminary Bureau of Reclamation report on its project investigations. Drury urged Page not to state the park service’s position in so preliminary and public a forum. “Anything placed in your report regarding this,” Drury said, “would almost certainly result in immediate confusion of motives and objectives in the minds of many conservation groups, whereas, later on, if your report and recommendations are approved, the position of this Service can more logically be explained to the public.” Harry Bashore, who soon took over as Reclamation Commissioner, agreed to continue to keep National Park Service cooperation at an “informal level.” Harry Bashore to S. O. Harper, 24 August 1942, NPS Cooperation File.

24. Drury to Harry Bashore, 1 December 1943, DN M File. Drury’s assurance that “no misunderstanding existed” came after a first form reclamation withdrawal was issued in July 1943 for a large section of Dinosaur National Monument. The withdrawal was made without notifying the park service. The park service legal staff recommended that the matter be ignored because most of the area was already covered by power-site withdrawals, but on the urging of Region II officials Drury asked the Bureau of Reclamation to provide an explanation for having acted without prior consultation.

25. Drury to Harold Ickes, 25 January 1945; Harry S. Bashore to Harold Ickes, 5 January 1945; Michael Straus to Harold Ickes, 6 February 1945, copies of which are included in Drury, “Parks and Redwoods.”


29. When Jesse Nusbaum discussed the 1940 recreation-area proposal with the members of the Colorado River Drainage Basin Committee he stressed that the National Park Service would be responsible for the recreational aspects of federal reclamation projects. See Nusbaum, “General Policies Applicable to Establishment of a National Recreation Area,” n.d., attached to Milo F. Christiansen, report on the 3 June 1940 meeting of the Colorado River Drainage Basin Committee, Recreation File.

30. Evidence that this distinction had been critical to Drury’s thinking on Dinosaur National Monument can be found in Drury to Owen Stratton, 13 September 1955, Sierra Club Records. Stratton, a political scientist, submitted a draft report on the Echo Park dam controversy to Drury for comment. Taking issue with what he believed to be the report’s implication that he had agreed to construction of dams in Dinosaur, Drury wrote: “The record will show that I was never in favor of these so-called multiple-use recreational areas as a part of the National Park System, and again and again drew attention to the fact that to introduce non-conforming uses in areas of this category, under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service, would tend to break down all National Park standards” (emphasis added).


32. Criteria other than aesthetics guided decisions about which lands ought to be part of the park system, including scientific and cultural significance. A host of pragmatic
considerations ranging from local politics to the economics of tourism also influenced parkland creation.


That this was true in the case of Dinosaur National Monument can be seen not only in the changing attitudes of park service personnel, but also within citizen-activist conservation groups, such as the Sierra Club. On the club's postwar "discovery" of the Colorado River basin, including Dinosaur National Monument, see Michael P. Cohen, The History of the Sierra Club, 1892-1970 (San Francisco, California: Sierra Club Books, 1988), pp. 146-47; and the records of the Sierra Club Conservation Committee (1950-52), especially those relating to the river trips of Harold C. Bradley and David Brower, Sierra Club Records.

35. John S. McLaughlin to Arno Cammerer, 19 January 1939, P&M File. To rectify the problem, McLaughlin pointed out, the park service undertook an extensive field survey of the monument during summer 1939. This became the basis for the monument's master plan.

36. Another good example can be found in the informal report of the 1939 park service team sent to survey the monument and prepare a management master plan. Thomas J. Allen to Arno Cammerer, 29 June 1939, DNM File; and "Planning and Development Report for Dinosaur National Monument Prepared as the Result of Inspection Trip to the Area, June 12-23, 1939," P&M File.

37. Lawrence Merriam to Drury, 7 October 1943, P&M File.

38. Lawrence Merriam, "Outline for Final Report, Dinosaur National Monument, Colorado River Basin Survey Study," n.d., copy attached to Merriam to George Ingalls, 23 February 1944; see also Merriam to Drury, 6 and 10 March 1944, all in P&M File.

39. An aerial perspective tends to flatten the convoluted stratigraphy of the landscape and obscure the delicate colorations of rock formations. The most distinctive and aesthetically compelling features of Dinosaur are not easily seen from the air.

40. Frederick Law Olmsted to Lawrence Merriam, 29 December 1943, P&M File.

41. Olmsted, "Draft of Preliminary Notes," pp. 5-6. See also Frederick Law Olmsted to Lawrence Merriam, 29 December 1943, P&M File.


43. Drury to Olaus Murie, 2 December 1948, Papers of Olaus Murie, Conservation Collection.

44. Policy directive, 8 September 1948, a copy of which is attached to Lawrence Merriam to Minor Tillotson, 10 September 1948, P&M File.

45. Minor Tillotson to E. O. Larson, 21 April 1949, and attached "Reconnaissance Report: Echo Park, Split Mountain, Flaming Gorge and Cross Mountain Units, Colorado River Storage Project, Upper Colorado River Basin," P&M File. Because the Flaming Gorge and Cross Mountain dams would not directly affect any parklands, the Reconnaissance Report did assess in some detail the recreation potential of those units, but included no economic data.

46. Lawrence Merriam to Drury, 26 January 1949, P&M File.

47. Minor Tillotson to Lawrence Merriam, 9 November 1948, P&M File.


49. David Canfield to Howard Baker, 23 August 1949, P&M File. There is no indication who gave the report to the Ver- nal boosters, but the park service believed that bureau field personnel had circulated it.


51. Olmsted's comments were reported in Ben Thompson to Drury, 27 October 1949, P&M File.


54. David Canfield to Howard Baker, 7 October 1949, P&M File.

55. Howard Baker to Drury, 29 September 1949; Howard Baker to Lawrence Merriam, 28 September 1949; and Drury to Howard Baker, 4 October 1949, all in P&M File.

56. The negotiations can be traced through Conrad Wirth to Drury, 28 October 1949; Leo Diederich to Lawrence Merriam, 10 November 1949; and Leo Diederich, "Matters Relating to the Bureau of Reclamation's Colorado River Storage Project Which Adversely Affects Dinosaur National Monument," 16 November 1949, all in P&M File. For the Bureau of Reclamation perspective, see Wesley R. Nelson to E. O. Larson, 28 October 1949, UCRB File.

57. Drury to Oscar Chapman, 18 November 1949, PS Papers.

58. Strauss made his case in two memos to Chapman dated 20 December 1949 and 24 February 1950, copies of which can be found in the Colorado River File, Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior, Record Group 48, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as Colorado River File). Drury submitted four lengthy memoranda to the secretary: 30 December 1949, Colorado River File; 28 February and 3 March 1950, PS Papers; and 3 March 1950, P&M File (the two 3 March memos covered different topics).


60. Drury to Chapman, 30 December 1949.

61. Drury is quoted in E. M. Hilton, memo for the file, 9 March 1950, P&M File. In subsequent years, Drury repeated the charge that the Bureau of Reclamation's planning of the CRSP had been conducted in secret and that the National Park Service had been taken by surprise on the whole Dinosaur matter. See Drury to Phillip Sirotkin, 17 September 1955, Sierra Club Records.


63. Minor Tillotson to Lawrence Merriam, 5 May 1950, P&M File.

64. B. H. Stringham to Elbert Thomas, 30 January 1950; Florence Cook to Thomas, 30 January 1950; Sterling Price to Thomas, 30 January 1950, all in Papers of Elbert D. Thomas, Utah Historical Society, Salt Lake City, Utah (hereafter Thomas Papers); Harold Linke to J. Benken Lee, 17 February 1950, Papers of Governor J. Bracken Lee, Utah State Archives, Salt Lake City, Utah; Reva Beck Bosone to Oscar Chapman, 8 February 1950, Papers of Reva Beck Bosone, Special Collections Department, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah; Walter K. Granger to Oscar Chapman, 8 February 1950, Colorado River File; Ben Thompson to Newton Drury, 25 January 1950, PS Papers; and Vernal (Utah) Express, 9 & 16 February 1950. Senator Thomas's administrative assistant told the White House that "our opposition in Utah is trying to create the impression that the Administration is unfriendly toward the reclamation program and that orders have been given to slow things up." Paul L. Badger to David E. Bell, 22 February 1950, Thomas Papers.


67. Foresta, America's National Parks, p. 51.