The Needles area of Canyonlands. USHS collections, gift of Robert C. Mitchell.

The Canyonlands National Park
Controversy, 1961-64

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IN THE GROWING FIELD OF ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY few topics have drawn as much attention as the establishment of national parks. Scenic preservationists have often quarreled bitterly with commercial interests over the protection of pristine wildlands. The effort to create Canyonlands National Park in southeastern Utah proved no exception to that traditional clash of interests. U.S. Sen. Frank E. "Ted" Moss of Utah, who introduced Canyonlands legislation in 1961, attempted to strike a balance between preservation and resource development by creating a park that permitted limited commercial use. That proposal, however, provoked four years of discord and nearly jeopardized the establishment of the park. A detailed study of the Canyonlands controversy should provide insights into the conservation movement of the 1960s and add to our understanding of national park history and Utah politics.1

Remote, arid, and uninhabited, the canyon country surrounding the confluence of the Green and Colorado rivers in southeastern Utah is a land of rugged grandeur. It is characterized by buttes, pinnacles, arches, multicolored sandstone cliffs, serpentine gorges, and sweeping vistas. Besides this imposing scenery, pictographs and petroglyphs give archaeological testimony to the ancient Anasazi civilization.2

Efforts to protect the canyon country date back to the New Deal. In 1936 Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes proposed setting aside nearly 7,000 square miles of land as the Escalante National Monument, but opposition from state commercial interests and the coming of World War II doomed the Escalante project.3

During the 1950s, at the height of the uranium boom, a few individuals worked to safeguard the prominent features of the canyon country. Bates Wilson, superintendent of Arches National Monument, frequently explored the nearby canyon region and pushed for national protection. Kent Frost, who ran a jeep tour business out of Monticello, urged his guests to write their congressmen recommending park status for the area. He credited one of his clients, Frank Masland, Jr., with having done more to create Canyonlands National Park than any other individual. Masland chaired the National Parks Advisory Board, an

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1Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, 2d ed., rev. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987). This fine monograph does not deal with Canyonlands.
influential volunteer body that recommended areas for park status to
the National Park Service (NPS).  

Urged on by Masland and Wilson, the NPS in 1959 and 1960
undertook field investigations of three wild areas surrounding the
junction of the Green and Colorado rivers: the Needles, Island in the
Sky, and the Maze. A land of red sandstone spires and colossal natural
arches, the Needles is located southeast of the confluence. North of the
confluence, Island in the Sky features an expansive overlook of the river
bottoms nearly 2,200 feet below. The Maze, a virtually inaccessible
region west of the confluence, offers Indian ruins, a field of pillars
known as the Land of Standing Rocks, and a vast labyrinthine canyon
network. Impressed by the natural and archaeological wonders, NPS
planners recommended national protection of the three areas.  

Meanwhile, the state of Utah also had plans for the region. In the
late 1950s the newly formed State Parks and Recreation Commission,
under the direction of Harold Fabian, launched field studies of its own.
In 1959 C. J. "Chet" Olsen, Fabian's successor, recommended the
acquisition of federal lands in the Needles district in order to create a
state park that would permit the multiple uses of hunting, grazing, and
mineral development. Worried that the areas would be withdrawn by
the National Park Service and closed to commercial development,
Olsen asked U.S. Sen. Wallace F. Bennett of Utah to push for state
stewardship over the area. Agreeing that multiple use was "essential to
the welfare of the people of Utah and the West," Bennett promised to
use his influence to block the establishment of a single-purpose national
park. He proved prophetic when he predicted that any park proposal
would likely "involve considerable controversy." The controversy
began in 1961 when an energetic group of New Frontiersmen entered
the White House.  

Disdainful of the environmental achievements of the previous two
presidencies, the Kennedy administration, guided by forty-one-year-
old Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, promised "a new con-
servation effort in the 1960s worthy of the two Roosevelts." An
outdoorsman, Udall took a keen interest in preserving open space,

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interview, 1973, Brigham Young University Library, Provo, 13-14; telephone interview with Frank
Masland, Jr., September 18, 1990.

5Lloyd M. Pierson, "The First Canyonlands New Park Studies; 1959 and 1960," *Canyon Legacy* 1

6C. J. Olsen to Wallace Bennett, June 17, 1960, Bennett to Olsen, June 23, 1960, box 9, Wallace
Bennett Papers, BYU Library (hereafter BP).
protecting the wilderness, and enlarging the national park system. The administration actively supported the establishment of national seashores at Cape Cod, Massachusetts; Point Reyes, California; and Padre Island, Texas. And it championed the creation of a new national park in southeastern Utah.  

Early in 1961 Udall announced that two areas in southern Utah were being considered for national park status: Rainbow Bridge National Monument on the Arizona border and the “still untouched” canyon country near the junction of the Green and Colorado rivers.

Returning from an inspection tour to Rainbow Bridge on May 2, Udall had his Denver-bound plane fly over the Canyonlands area. Awed by the “scenic masterpiece” below, he promptly jotted a letter to Senator Moss: “These lands have an extraordinary diversity of physical features, and a wild beauty and color which make them, in my opinion, superior to most of our National Parks.” He strongly recommended “an on-the-ground survey of this extraordinary area” sometime in the summer.

More than thirty people joined Udall for the five-day inspection tour during the first week of July. Guests included Bates Wilson, Frank Masland, Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman, and several reporters. Utah’s Democratic congressional delegation, Senator Moss and Representatives David King and M. Blaine Peterson, made the trip. And George Clyde, Utah’s Republican governor, met the group for the final two days. The state’s senior U.S. senator, Wallace Bennett, declined to accompany the “two wandering secretaries” on a “publicity stunt” that would waste the taxpayers’ money. Like many Utahns, he was skeptical about any plan that might inhibit the opportunity of commercial interests to develop natural resources, produce jobs, and generate tax revenues.

Departing from Moab on July 2, 1961, a flotilla of thirteen motorboats carried Udall’s party down the Colorado. They spent three days on the Colorado and Green rivers and then, joined by Governor Clyde, they toured the landscape by foot, jeep, and helicopter. “I do not
believe there was a person on the trip who was not impressed by the grandeur of the country, by its loneliness, its beauty and its form,” Masland wrote, adding that “With complete unanimity all agreed that as a National Park it would rank second to none.” At a nocturnal news conference on the Green River, Udall declared his intent to establish a new national park in the canyon country.  

Utahns greeted the announcement with only modest enthusiasm. The Salt Lake Tribune, the state’s largest newspaper, considered the park

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11 Interview with Frank Moss, Salt Lake City, August 14, 1990; diary entry, July 22, 1961, Orville Freeman Papers, microfilm, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Mass.; memorandum, Frank Masland to members of the Advisory Board on National Parks, July 17, 1961, box 190, UP; Rocky Mountain News, July 10, 1961; Udall, Report to the President, July 11, 1961, box 88, UP.
plan "exciting and forward looking," but it was unwilling to forego resource development. Governor Clyde acknowledged the scenic splendor of the Canyonlands area but objected to its projected size of 1,000 to 1,200 square miles. And, like Senator Bennett, he raised the issue of commercial use. Utah, he warned, could not "afford to consent to locking up vast areas containing valuable natural resources." 12

Not surprisingly, the Canyonlands proposal alarmed mining and petroleum interests. R. Lavaun Cox, executive director of the Utah Petroleum Council, expressed his concern to Clyde. Since outright opposition would be unpopular, the two men decided to support a multiple-purpose park of limited size. Still, Cox fretted over Udall's commitment to a large park: "He's quite a young man. If someone gets a bit in his mouth, perhaps he'd be of a little more value." 13

Clyde acted quickly to mobilize opposition to Udall's large park scheme. In late July he invited 200 Utah civic leaders to hear his views on the Canyonlands proposal. "I am not against parks," he informed his audience, but parks must be small so as not to hinder resource development. The governor then appointed a committee to make recommendations on the park proposal. 14

Senator Bennett shared Clyde's hostility to the park plan. A graduate of the University of Utah, Bennett had operated a successful paint business and automobile dealership before entering politics. President of the National Association of Manufacturers, he first ran for public office as a Republican against Elbert D. Thomas who had served as U.S. senator for eighteen years. Victorious, Bennett went on to be reelected three times. A fiscally conservative Mormon with a vinegar tongue and a cactus personality, Bennett was user-oriented in terms of the public domain. He criticized Udall for attempting to lock up millions of acres in national parks. That "colossal empire" would permit only one use: viewing the scenery. "All commercial use and business activity would be forever banned and nearly all of Southern Utah's growth would be forever stunted," Bennett said. He sought to undercut Udall's "grandiose pie-in-the-sky scheme" by introducing legislation calling for the creation of a 75,000-acre multiuse national park in the Needles region. That measure was not given serious consideration. 15

13_Memorandum, George Clyde telephone conversation with R. Lavaun Cox, July 20, 1961, box 12, Clyde Papers, Utah State Archives, Salt Lake City (hereafter CP).
14_Deseret News, July 28, 1961; Clyde to Bennett, August 3, 1961, box 12, CP.
15_Memorandum, "Position of Senator Wallace F. Bennett on New National Parks in Utah," to Merrill R. MacDonald, August 14, 1961, box 17, BP.
Utah’s Democratic congressional delegation, Senator Moss and Representatives David King and M. Blaine Peterson, were infuriated by the “patently political” opposition of Clyde and Bennett to the Canyonlands project. Still, they wished to avoid a protracted battle between those who wished to protect scenic wonders and those who wanted to utilize natural resources in those same wildlands. Otherwise, Canyonlands might meet the same fate as the Escalante project twenty years before.\(^{16}\)

Udall considered the possibility of having the president declare the canyon country a national monument. The Antiquities Act of 1906 permitted the president to preserve historic and scientific landmarks on federal lands by proclaiming them national monuments. That act initially was used by president Theodore Roosevelt to protect Devil’s Tower in Wyoming and the Grand Canyon in Arizona. Because many members of Congress considered such executive action a usurpation of legislative authority, Udall did not wish to offend Congress and thereby

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\(^{16}\)Moss to Bennett, July 14, 1961, Bennett to Moss, July 20, 1961, Moss to M. Blaine Peterson, July 27, 1961, box 29, MP; Moss to Udall, July 17, 1961, box 156, UP.
jeopardize other New Frontier environmental measures. In addition, a national park had more tourist appeal than a national monument and would be regarded politically as a major conservation achievement for the Kennedy administration.¹⁷

Pushing for legislation, however, posed a dilemma—namely, Canyonlands would have to adhere to standards defined in the National Park Act of 1916. As interpreted by Congress and the NPS, that meant no hunting, grazing, lumbering, or mineral development. In the past, as historian Alfred Runte has shown, preservationists were able to obtain national park status only by showing that the proposed scenic wonder lacked economic worth except as a tourist attraction.¹⁸

Canyonlands enthusiasts could not dismiss the mineral potential of southeastern Utah. Consequently, they sought some middle ground between scenic preservation and commercial use. Udall did not want to be pinned down to "an either-or choice." And Moss believed that without some multiple use a park proposal stood little chance of success.¹⁹

The National Parks Advisory Board faced "a precedent establishing decision." Frank Masland, the chairman, preferred a park where a visitor could gaze upon nothing "except the work of the Master Architect." Yet, in defending that principle, the board might be gambling with the heritage of future generations. He recommended the establishment of a park with "hostile uses" that could be defined, regulated, and outlived. Udall and Moss agreed with the board's recommendation. Udall asked the Bureau of Economic and Business Research at the University of Utah to prepare a study of the impact of a national park on the economy of southeastern Utah. He hoped the study would show that the economic benefits brought by park tourism would outdistance the gains of unfettered mineral development. Senator Moss, meanwhile, began drafting Canyonlands legislation.²⁰

Born to Mormon parents in Salt Lake City in 1911, Moss attended public schools and the University of Utah. Upon graduation he went to law school at George Washington University. Returning to Utah, he

¹⁸Runte, National Parks, pp. 48-64.
¹⁹Denver Post, July 16, 1961; Moss interview.
²⁰Memorandum, Masland to members of the Advisory Board on National Parks, July 17, 1961, box 190, UP; Masland to Clyde, August 30, 1961, box 12, CP; Udall interview.
served as an elected judge in the 1940s and an elected county attorney in the 1950s. In 1958 he was elected to the first of three terms in the U.S. Senate. As a liberal Democrat he was committed to civil rights and environmental causes.

In early August 1961 Moss introduced legislation to establish Canyonlands National Park. Like companion measures introduced into the House by Congressmen King and Peterson, the Moss bill called for a park of 300,000 acres, about half the size of Udall’s original proposal. It would protect the three major scenic areas—Island in the Sky, the Needles, and the Maze. Ninety percent of the land was federally owned. The remainder, held by the state of Utah, would be obtained by purchase or through an exchange of public domain outside the proposed park boundaries. The bill included multiple-use provisions that permitted grazing and mining but not hunting. Grazing permits held at the time of the bill’s enactment would be honored for the lifetime of the lessee. If permits were transferred to another party they would expire in twenty-five years. Mining claims held at the time of the measure’s enactment could be worked for as long as they were productive.  

21 Moss to Udall, August 4, 1961, box 30, MP; Congressional Record, 87 Cong. 1st sess., pp. 15120-21 (hereafter CR).
Initially, the Canyonlands bill received a warm reception. Pleased by the generally favorable public response, Moss chortled to Udall: "I think we have Bennett and Clyde on the run . . . ." Actually, the two Republicans were preparing a major offensive. Joined by sportsmen, they assailed the vast size of the park, the lack of connecting roads, and the ban on hunting.\(^2\)

In mid-August Governor Clyde's Canyonlands study group suggested an alternative to the Moss bill. It proposed a "string-of-pearls" plan that would create several noncontiguous small parks without multiple use. These pure parks would be surrounded by a large buffer area open to unrestricted commercial use and hunting. Influenced by that plan, Senator Bennett introduced legislation calling for the establishment of three such parks totaling 11,000 acres. Congress adjourned in September 1961 without considering either the Moss or the Bennett proposals.\(^3\)

During the remaining months of the year the Canyonlands controversy intensified. Udall sought to protect the proposed park lands from vandalism and the scars of commercial development by directing the Bureau of Land Management to deny any user application that did not meet the "high public values of the land." In all, Udall's directive covered 1 million acres in the Canyonlands regions. Bennett regarded the order as "an arrogant flaunting" of popular opinion and urged Utahns to resist lest the state "become a Udall-created wasteland." Udall eventually rescinded the order.\(^4\)

Weary of the carping over Canyonlands, Utahns urged the protagonists to work out their differences. Toward that end, Udall agreed to meet with Governor Clyde in Salt Lake City in October. Privately, Udall hoped "to get Clyde in a corner" so that he would "have to go along" with the park proposal. Both men left that meeting believing they had worked out a compromise. As Udall understood it, Clyde had agreed to support a large park with limited commercial use. Clyde assumed that he had persuaded Udall to accept a park of a minimal size with unrestricted multiple use.\(^5\)

\(^{2}\)Moss to Udall, August 26, 1961, box 29, MP; Clyde to Don R. Barton, September 19, 1961, box 12, CP; Bennett to Merrill R. MacDonald, August 14, 1961, box 17, BP.
\(^{3}\)New York Times, August 13, 1961; Bennett, press release, September 22, 1961, box 19, BP.
\(^{4}\)Department of the Interior, press release, September 26, 1961, box 30, MP; Bennett, press releases, September 26, 28, 1961, box 19, BP; memorandum, Clyde telephone conversation with Udall, September 26, 1961, box 12, CP.
\(^{5}\)Udall to Moss, by hand, undated, box 30, MP; Clyde to Udall, December 1, 1961, Udall to Clyde, February 1, 1962, box 156, UP.
Before the year was out Udall and park proponents also came under fire from conservationists. Devereux Butcher, publisher and editor of the *National Wildlands News*, scored Udall for his acceptance of multiple use in the proposed park. Allowing commercial activity in Canyonlands would violate traditional park values and set a dangerous precedent, Butcher asserted, rhetorically questioning the secretary: "Shall we drill for oil in Yellowstone, bulldoze for uranium in Big Bend, dam the Merced in Yosemite Valley and log the hemlocks of Crater Lake?" Udall, he said, should be commended for his "enthusiasm for new parks," but the concession on multiple use "was going too far."^{26}

Stung by the editorial, Udall sought to clarify his position. As a general rule, he explained, he opposed multiple use in the national parks. There were, however, occasions "when certain non-conforming uses" must be tolerated for certain lengths of time. In the past, grazing and mining had been permitted in some of the parks and monuments, "but these are unique exceptions to the principles on which our national park system is founded." That statement pleased neither the park purists nor the champions of multiple use. Still, Udall's middle of the road position had support even within the environmental community. David Brower of the Sierra Club pushed the Canyonlands project and became "boiling mad" with purists who insisted upon "100% standards or forget about new parks."^{27}

Concerned by the strength of the opposition, Udall worked to build "a conservation backfire" in Utah. He asked the prominent literary figure, Wallace Stegner, to try to organize Utah conservationists behind the Canyonlands proposal. A graduate of the University of Utah and regarded as a native son, Stegner enjoyed considerable influence. As he saw it, the Mormon church posed the greatest difficulty in securing park legislation. The church leadership, because of its wealth and conservatism, was user-oriented in terms of the public domain. Moreover, it controlled one of the state's largest newspapers, the *Deseret News*. "Since the hierarchy is generally on the Clyde-Bennett side," Stegner said, "and since it controls the media of communication, and since it absolutely controls Brigham Young University, largely controls Utah State University, and considerably dominates the University of

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^{26}Editorial, *National Wildlands News* 2 (October, 1961): 2; Butcher to Moss, October 3, 1961, box 29, MP.

^{27}Udall, letter to the editor, *National Wildlands News* 2 (November, 1961): 2; David Brower to Udall, December 8, 1961, box 190, UP.
Utah, the organization of any opposition opinion will be difficult and slow.” Stegner suggested forming a conservation council to mobilize public opinion behind Canyonlands. Headed by a partisan Democrat named William Bruhn, the council was not very effective. Fortunately for park proponents, Stegner had exaggerated the church’s resistance to the creation of a park.28

While Stegner worked to rally conservationists in Utah, Udall and Moss decided to adjust the boundaries of the Canyonlands preserve. They enlarged the size of the park to 332,000 acres, mainly by adding land in the Maze region west of the Green River. As a courtesy, Udall informed Clyde of the move, pointing out that the boundary revision included only “superlative” scenic territory located in “such a rough terrain” that it would be virtually inaccessible to mineral development.29

Clyde was not persuaded. The park, he argued, should be downsized to no more than 50,000 acres. He was also disturbed by Udall’s evasive stand on multiple use. All in all, the governor believed that Udall had violated his pledge to guarantee multiple use and to shrink the size of the park. Consequently, Clyde gave a series of speeches seeking to mobilize opposition to the park plan. Sportsmen swelled the ranks of the critics because the Moss bill forbade hunting. Mining interests considered the bill’s commitment to multiple use disingenuous. Finally, Clyde appointed another committee to devise a state plan for the Canyonlands region.30

The dissent from Utah prompted Udall to arrange a “strategy conference” with Moss, Peterson, and King. At that meeting the Democrats agreed to revise the Canyonlands bill to meet some of the objections raised against it. Informing President Kennedy of his meeting with the Utah Democrats, Udall pointed out that the Canyonlands “are equal to the most superb of our scenic places” and it “would be a major conservation accomplishment if this legislation were enacted.” But if Clyde and Bennett managed to kill the bill “for parochial special interest reasons,” he argued, then the president might wish to consider proclaiming it a national monument.31

28Stegner to Udall, October 23, 1961, box 190, UP.
29Udall to Clyde, December 11, 1961, box 156, UP.
30Clyde to Udall, December 11, 1961, box 156, UP; Deseret News, January 24, 1962. For opposition to the Moss bill see numerous letters in box 29, MP.
31Udall to Moss, December 21, 1961, box 30, MP; memorandum, Report to the President from Secretary Udall, December 27, 1961, box 88, UP; Udall, Report to the President, February 6, 1962, box 98, UP.
Moss’s revised bill, introduced on February 7, 1962, sought to compromise the differences between “scenery purists” and “resource hogs.” To placate environmentalists Moss made mining, grazing, oil drilling, and other uses secondary in importance to scenery. Commercial uses could be undertaken only with the approval of the secretary of the interior and with the understanding that they would not seriously mar the landscape. To win over mining groups Moss permitted the continued location and filing of mineral claims after the bill’s enactment. He sought to soothe sportsmen by adopting a program developed at Grand Teton National Park that permitted hunting under certain conditions. If the secretary of the interior and the Utah Department of Fish and Game jointly determined that the mule deer population was excessive, then licensed Utah hunters would be permitted to harvest the herd to a manageable level. Finally, Moss provided for the construction of access roads to the park.

On the very day that Moss introduced his revised Canyonlands bill, Bennett delivered a scathing attack on Udall. Unfortunately for park proponents, Bennett’s speech grabbed most of the publicity. Udall intended to create a “gargantuan” park “in keeping with the grandiose dreams of empire of his idol, Harold Ickes,” he charged. The park would lock up mineral resources of vast economic potential. Had Canyonlands been created a decade earlier Utah would have missed out on the economic benefits of the uranium boom. The park would deny Utahns the pleasure of hunting and the profits of water power development. In short, Bennett asserted, Utah residents were being “sold a bill of goods” by a “huckstering” secretary of the interior.

Bennett’s “insulting and irresponsible attack” enraged Moss. Privately, he referred to the speech as “vitiolic madness” because Udall was “the best friend that Utah ever had in the Secretary of Interior’s chair.” Convinced that the issue had “turned into a real political fight,” Moss determined that “we will have to defend our position in every way we can.” That meant resorting to political tactics of questionable propriety. Moss had his staff prepare letters to the editor assailing the positions of Clyde and Bennett. Then he had the state Democratic chairman find loyal partisans to plant those letters in newspapers.

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34 Memorandum from Moss to VR (Virginia Rishel, administrative assistant), undated, box 73, MP; Moss to William Bruhn, February 7, 1962, Moss to Lucy Redd, February 9, 1962, box 29, MP. Samples of the “plants” are attached to ibid.
For the most part Utahns remained noncommittal in the park dispute. The *Deseret News* and *Salt Lake Tribune* urged the adversaries to put aside partisanship and with "open minds and cooperative spirits" produce a compromise settlement in the best interests of the state and nation. Residents of San Juan and Grand counties, where the park would be located, offered similar counsel.  

That advice went unheeded as each side maneuvered to win public support for its position. Utah Republicans, especially Clyde and Bennett, reiterated the charge that a large park would lock up resources

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and impair economic development. Moss continued to portray opponents as obstructionists who were the tools of special interests.\(^{36}\)

On March 19, ten days before the commencement of Senate hearings on the Canyonlands bill, Governor Clyde released the report of his special study commission. Not surprisingly, the commission opposed locking up 332,000 acres of rich mineral resources in the canyon country. It recommended the creation of a "hybrid" reserve. Approximately 102,000 acres would be zoned as a single-purpose national park. That pure park, made accessible by federally built roads, would be surrounded by a 208,000-acre national recreation area open to mining, oil drilling, grazing, and hunting. Both areas would be administered by the NPS. Senator Bennett hailed the report and promised to introduce legislation implementing its recommendations. Utah's Democratic congressional delegation and Udall dismissed the commission's recommendations. Angered at being "dry-gulched" with some new plan virtually every month, Udall privately described the commission's report as an "anti-park study thinly disguised." Canyonlands had consumed more of his attention than any other park proposal, and he would not make additional concessions.\(^{37}\)

Udall counterattacked by releasing the University of Utah study of the economic ramifications of a new national park in the canyon country. The detailed report stressed the tourist potential. In its first twenty-five years, the study predicted, Canyonlands would generate $220 million in expenditures from tourists and the Interior Department. To be sure, the extractive industries would also produce wealth, but mineral resources were exhaustible whereas tourism was not. The study was a ringing economic endorsement of a large national park.\(^{38}\)

The Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands, chaired by Alan Bible of Nevada, held hearings on the Canyonlands proposal in Washington, D.C., on March 29 and 30, 1962. The day before the hearings began Moss again amended the Canyonlands bill, eliminating 1,000 acres in the northeast corner of the park because a producing oil well had been

\(^{36}\)Salt Lake Tribune, March 2, 1962; Department of the Interior, press release, March 9, 1962, box 55, MP.


discovered and excluding another 1,000 acres in the south because they might be flooded by Glen Canyon Dam. A final change permitted the secretary of the interior to exchange federal lands outside the park for state lands within.39

On the first day of the hearings, Moss, Udall, and King testified in favor of the bill. The stunning wild beauty of the Canyonlands, they argued, qualified it for national park status. As might be expected, Canyonlands was compared favorably with the Grand Canyon. Proponents defended the size of the park as the absolute minimum necessary to protect its many scenic landmarks. It took up less than 1 percent of all land in Utah and was only 15 percent the size of Yellowstone and 39 percent the size of Grand Canyon. The proposed park contained no private land to be purchased, and the 26,000 acres of state land would be exchanged for public land of equal value. In short, the cost to taxpayers would be inconsequential. The principle of multiple use, they declared, had precedent. Mount McKinley National Park in Alaska permitted mining, and Grand Teton National Park allowed controlled hunting.

While defending multiple use, park proponents simultaneously downplayed the commercial value of the park lands: It was too dry to be farmed. It had no trees to lure loggers. The Federal Power Commission had no plans to erect dams in the area. And its mineral potential was suspect. True, there were potash, oil, and uranium developments on the outskirts, but no known discoveries inside the proposed park. The remoteness of the region militated against exploration. A shortage of water and grass made it inhospitable to livestock and game. In the previous year the government had collected only $2,000 in grazing fees from the area and only 41 deer had been killed. Finally, Canyonlands supporters dismissed the Bennett-Clyde hybrid park proposal as inconsistent with park standards and vastly inferior to the Moss bill. Surrounding a national park with a recreation area open to commercial use would be regrettable, Moss contended, because “there would be no effective way to prevent for long the despoiling of the natural wonders by a honkey-tonk of roadside stands and motels, or by oil derricks or slag heaps, outside the park limits.”40

Clyde and Bennett vigorously assailed nearly every provision of the proposed bill. Utahns would not support a huge park that locked up

resources and hindered commercial use. Only the most distinct and spectacular scenic areas should be protected, they insisted. Both Utah Republicans wanted the area open to hunting. They also stressed the mineral potential of the region. Virtually the entire area was under oil, gas, and mineral lease. The region was rich in uranium, and no doubt the Atomic Energy Commission would be looking for new sources in the future. Sen. Clinton Anderson, chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, discounted that notion: “We have got more uranium rolling out of our ears than we know what to do with.”

Despite their zeal for commercial development, Clyde and Bennett saved their severest criticism for the multiple-use provisions of the bill. They regarded the section relating to mining as a sham. Mining and oil drilling would be permitted only if, in the opinion of the secretary of the interior, they did not “impair the primary use of the park.” Since Udall and the National Park Service were “openly hostile to mining,” secondary uses would never be allowed. In brief, the bill gave too much discretionary power to the secretary of the interior.

To the delight of Clyde and Bennett, conservation groups also raised objections to the Moss bill. Permitting grazing, hunting, and mining, they argued, would contradict national park values and set an intolerable precedent.

After a three-week recess, the subcommittee reconvened in Utah. The hearings began in Monticello on April 20, moved to Moab the following day, and concluded in Salt Lake City on April 23. More than 100 Utah witnesses testified. Not surprisingly, the vast majority favored both scenic preservation and resource development.

Proponents argued that the primary purpose of the bill was to create a park of grand size in order to protect scenery and to lure tourists. That argument swayed Democratic subcommittee members Bible, Oren Long of Hawaii, and Lee Metcalf of Montana who suggested enlarging the park. “Let me tell you,” Moss asserted, “I haven’t been criticized very often for making it too small.” An admirer of the American frontier tradition, Metcalf wanted to include the Six Shooter Peaks. Bible agreed and recommended renaming one of the mountain ranges after Metcalf. Bennett sarcastically interjected: “I’m delighted with the Chairman’s generosity in renaming the North Six Shooter

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41Ibid., 22-47, 99-143.
42Ibid.
Peak, and I think we could find a narrow neck of land somewhere in here that we could call the Bible Belt." **

Canyonlands enthusiasts tried diligently to persuade preservationists to accept the concept of secondary use because the population was growing and resources were diminishing. Purists should recognize the "changing situation" and accept limited secondary uses as the price for new parks. Utah conservation groups, like their national counterparts, were not won over. 

For entirely different reasons, resource interests were dissatisfied with the provisions relating to multiple use. Cattlemen objected to the termination of leasing permits after twenty-five years if they were transferred to another party. Nor did they understand why grazing sheep and cattle were considered hostile to national park standards. Hunters protested that the southern portion of the park contained valuable mule deer territory and wanted it excluded from protection. Commercial interests insisted that multiple use was "a pig in a poke" because the Interior Department would never allow mineral or oil production in national parks. 

Strong support for the park, if not for secondary use, left Moss ebullient. The hearings clearly demonstrated, he wrote to a friend, "that Bennett and Clyde are on the wrong side of this one." Flushed with confidence and enthusiasm, he suggested to Udall that they should seek the "orderly development" of other natural wonders that would "make Southern Utah the tourist mecca" that was "its manifest destiny." For Moss, that meant enlarging and conveying national park status on Arches, Capitol Reef, and Natural Bridges National Monuments. Udall advised caution, warning that efforts to implement that plan might "seriously impair" Canyonlands legislation. 

In late August 1962 the Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands approved the Moss bill by a vote of 9 to 2. Unfortunately for park proponents, the subcommittee action occurred too late in the session to permit the full Senate to act. Nor had the House considered the measure. 

**Hearings, pp. 218, 379-80. En route to Utah, Moss asked his Democratic subcommittee colleagues to fly over the canyon country. They agreed and were "completely won over," Moss later recalled. Moss interview.

*ibid., 205, 237, 274-77, 381-85, 480-81, 502-03.


*Moss to William Thurman, April 30, 1962, box 29, MP; Moss to Udall, May 16, 1962, Udall to Moss, June 11, 1962, box 55, MP.

Meanwhile, Moss and Udall worked to build momentum and support for their version of the park. "If everyone could see it," Udall lamented, "the controversy would evaporate." Toward that end, Udall asked the NPS to make a film on the Canyonlands. The Sculptured Earth, produced by Charles Eggert, was the product of that request.49

Udall scheduled the premiere for Salt Lake City in late October. His request to show the 45-minute color film at the University of Utah was denied. A. Ray Olpin, president of the university, and Governor Clyde refused to permit the use of Kingsbury Hall because it was an election year and the film might be considered political. After all, in Utah, Canyonlands was one of the most controversial issues in the congressional races, with Democratic candidates supporting and Republicans opposing the Moss bill.50

49Udall, handwritten notes, March, 1962, box 156, UP.
Udall was stunned by the decision. His staff, however, helped him laugh off the incident with the following spoof:

Now!
The picture they banned in Utah!
Eartha and the sculptor
(Formerly the Sculptured Earth)
What was the mile-high secret they shared?
Frank! Revealing! Stark!
The story all Washington is whispering!
What was the governor’s strange practice of multiple use?
They dared to make it!
No one under 18 admitted!  

With Udall there to deliver the introduction, the film was shown before a packed house at the Hotel Utah. The response was overwhelmingly favorable. One influential member of the audience, President David O. McKay of the Mormon church, remarked privately that “Bennett was on the wrong side of the road this time.”

Though well received, the film hardly ended the controversy. In late October, Udall and Bennett engaged in a verbal brawl over park legislation. Udall berated Bennett for opposing the administration’s environmental proposals. In a scathing rebuttal, Bennett scored Udall for being hostile to the mining industry and for intruding himself into Utah politics. The showing of the Sculptured Earth was pure “political propaganda” designed to make Udall and Democratic candidates “look good.” Udall’s repeated trips to Utah for political purposes had wasted at least $200,000 in taxpayer’s money. Bennett claimed: “The people of Utah still remember the original oriental opulence which surrounded your July 4, 1961, safari to Utah accompanied by Air Force planes in regal splendor with six mammoth helicopters also manned by Air Force personnel.”

As the year drew to a close the prospects did not look promising for Canyonlands legislation. The Salt Lake Tribune gave its editorial support to the Bennett small park bill. All three of Utah’s Democratic congressional candidates who had backed the Moss bill lost to Republicans in the fall election. Bennett retained his Senate seat by defeating David

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51Box 156, UP.
52David O. McKay to William Davoren, October 22, 1962, Elva Bell (Moss’s assistant) to Udall, October 22, 1962, box 29, MP.
53Udall to Bennett, November 2, 1962, Bennett to Udall, November 2, 1962, box 16, BP; Ogden Standard Examiner, November 4, 1962.
King, and Republicans Sherman Lloyd and Laurence Burton were elected to the House.\textsuperscript{54}

Realizing that the Canyonlands proposal was in trouble, Moss again revised it to meet some of the criticism brought out in the committee hearings. Introduced on January 14, 1963, the amended measure reduced the size of the park from 330,000 to 258,000 acres. The cuts were made primarily in the Maze, because lands there would be naturally protected by their inaccessibility, and in the southern portion of the park, because lands there were prized for grazing and hunting. Shrinking the size of the park risked alienating conservationists, but Moss believed “it more important to establish a smaller park than to stir again the fires of controversy . . . .”\textsuperscript{55}

Moss also made the multiple-use provisions more palatable. Because prime mule deer range had been excised from the proposed park, the revised bill prohibited hunting. He liberalized the section on grazing. Permits held at the time of the bill’s enactment could be extended for the lifetime of the holder. If the original lessee had died, the immediate heirs would have lifetime grazing privileges. But if the permit was transferred, grazing rights would end after twenty-five years. Existing oil, gas, and mineral claims could be worked indefinitely. Prospecting, however, would be phased out after twenty-five years. Any minerals found during the phase-out period could be extracted until they were exhausted.\textsuperscript{56}

Moss also sought an accommodation on Canyonlands with Utah’s Republican congressional delegation and Governor Clyde. The conference took place at the governor’s mansion on April 6, 1963. All of the principals attended except Lloyd who had to remain in Washington on legislative business. At a lengthy breakfast discussion, the participants agreed to take a “bipartisan cooperative approach” to the Canyonlands issue. The Republicans agreed to support the concept of a sizable park with limited multiple use. In return, they wanted further modifications in the bill.

Moss agreed to delete thousands of acres of known mineral lands from the northeastern corner of the park, but to compensate for that loss he would expand the park boundaries in the south. He would make it clear that commercial interests had a right to use park access roads. He

\textsuperscript{54}Salt Lake Tribune, editorial, October 19, 1962.
\textsuperscript{55}CR, 88th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 242-43.
\textsuperscript{56}Ibid.
also agreed to consult with his colleagues on the redrawing of park boundaries. Indeed, Bennett offered to accompany Moss when he went to the NPS to set the boundaries. “Of course if they see us walking together,” Bennett joked, “they will all probably drop dead.” Finally, Moss agreed that he would fight any congressional attempt to establish the park without multiple use. “Creation of a Canyonlands National Park,” noted one newspaper, “appears closer than at any time since the idea was born.”

Confident of success, Moss rushed back to Washington to put the agreement into effect. He added two amendments. The first adjusted the park boundaries by removing 18,000 acres of mineral land in the north and adding 19,500 acres of scenic land in the south. The second added clarifying language relating to park access roads. Moss informed Clyde of the changes over the telephone. The governor expressed disappointment that more mineral lands had not been withdrawn but gave his tentative approval. Delighted, Moss predicted quick Senate passage of the bill. His optimism was misplaced.

The Canyonlands compromise collapsed on the eve of the Senate hearings. Upset that he had not been consulted in the preparation of the amendments, Bennett withdrew his support. He criticized Moss for not excluding more mineral lands. He doubted that the amendment granting developers access to producing wells and mines went far enough. He rebuked Moss for not inviting state officials and Republican congressmen from Utah to join with NPS personnel in drawing the park boundaries. Finally, Bennett asked Moss to delay the hearings in order “to develop wholehearted support behind the park.” Moss refused the request.

Chaired by Moss, the hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands proceeded as scheduled on April 25. Witnesses on both sides of the issue reiterated familiar arguments. Expressing regret over the collapse of the Canyonlands compromise, Bennett, Burton, and Lloyd asked for more time in order to “continue our search for a united front on the bill.” Moss was reluctant to grant the request. Three years of deliberations had already occurred and it was time to “get down to cases.” Moreover, further talks and amendments might delay con-

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57 Provo Herald, April 6, 7, 1963; Ogden Standard Examiner, April 6, 7, 1963; Clyde, notes on meeting, April 6, 1963, box 12, CP.
58 Clyde, confidential notes on telephone conversation with Frank Moss, April 17, 1963, Clyde to Bennett, April 19, 1963, box 19, BP, Deseret News, April 18, 1963.
59 Bennett to Moss, undated, box 19, BP. See also several news clippings in ibid.
gressional action until 1964. He also raised the specter of vandalism: Indian ruins and artifacts were being defaced. Natural wonders, too, were threatened. One formation, the Goblet of Venus, had been destroyed when vandals hooked a chain around its fragile stem and pulled it over with a jeep. The area needed protection, he pleaded, “before it is too late.” Moss, frustrated by the “tactics of delay” but hoping for an accord, agreed to keep the record open until May 15.60

Bennett and Clyde seemed to take pleasure in Moss’s discomfort. “Well, Ted is heartbroken,” Bennett chortled to Clyde over the telephone. “He is telling the newsmen the bill is dead.” Bennett attributed the bill’s demise to the collapse of the compromise and Moss’s failure to win over “the birds and the bee boys.” To force additional concessions from Moss, Bennett suggested another meeting of the Utah congressional delegation and the governor. That meeting would be followed by a field trip to explore additional areas that might be cut from the park. If Moss boycotted the conference then he could be portrayed as a “difficult man” who refused to compromise. “We’ve really crossed him up,” Bennett bragged. “Well, that’s good,” responded Clyde. Canyonlands, one newspaper lamented, had gone “back on the political see-saw.”61

Moss did refuse to participate in such a meeting and field trip. Instead, he called for the congressmen to meet with the NPS in Washington. The meeting concluded without an agreement.62

Unable to win further concessions from Moss, Bennett prepared several amendments to reduce the park’s size, permit hunting, and guarantee commercial access to natural resources. The Senate subcommittee rejected them all. Undaunted, Bennett persuaded Burton to prepare a House bill based on these amendments. Introduced in early June, the Burton bill withdrew 960 acres in the north and 19,500 acres in the south, thus reducing the size of the park to 238,000 acres.63

Already under fire from a variety of sources, the Moss bill was further threatened by an unexpected cause in the summer of 1963. Moss learned that the Defense Department was about to begin a

61Memorandum, morning telephone conversation between Bennett and Clyde, April 25, 1963, memorandum, afternoon telephone conversation between Bennett and Clyde, April 25, 1963, box 12, CP, Ogden Standard Examiner, April 26, 1963.
62Moss, telegram to Clyde, April 29, 1963, box 29, MP.
classified project calling for 84 Athena missiles to be fired over the canyon country from a launch site near Green River, Utah. The impact area for the first stage of the booster rocket included parts of the proposed park. Irate, Moss asked the Federal Aviation Administration to deny the Defense Department the use of the air space. He argued that utilization “of the airspace over the proposed park would be wholly inconsistent with its best use as a scenic and spectacular national park. For reasons of safety, it would be impossible to combine the proposed use of airspace over the park with normal operation of a national park. Visitors would be discouraged from visiting the area, and the whole reason for the establishment of the park would be thwarted.”

Eventually, Moss and Udall reached an accord with the Defense Department. The interests of national security, they admitted, must temporarily prevail over the protection of scenery. As it was unlikely that a park would be established until 1964 at the earliest, the missile firings would continue until the park bill passed.

Despite the many obstacles to the park proposal, Moss remained optimistic. He was heartened by the continued public support of David Brower, executive director of the Sierra Club. Conservationists, Brower asserted, needed to undergo “heavy soul-searching” about multiple use. He felt that limited nonconforming uses in national parks must be tolerated in order to acquire more park lands. “We believe firmly,” Brower said, that the Moss bill “will help immeasurably to resolve land use conflicts and at the same time to provide a major addition to the National Park system.” Utahns, he concluded, must recognize “their national responsibility” to help Moss achieve that goal.

In late July 1963 the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs unanimously endorsed the Moss bill and forwarded it to the floor for action. Bennett considered proposing amendments but eventually decided against that move because it “would be interpreted as opposition to the basic park idea.” He then gave his support, and the Canyonlands measure passed by a unanimous vote on August 2. “My long fight ended up with everyone being for the bill,” Moss wrote, “even with Senator Bennett coming along reluctantly.” The legislative battle in the House, however, still needed to be won.

64 Moss to Najeeb Halaby, director of the FAA, June 5, 17, 1963, box 29, MP.
65 Moss interview.
Wayne Aspinall, chairman of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, was in no hurry to move on the Canyonlands bill. The proposal, he explained to a constituent, did “not conform to the idea of a national park area. A national park is supposed to be pretty much a single use area and mining is not permitted. The Senate bill would permit mining and mineral development. If we are going to have this kind of operation, then it should be a recreation area and not a national park area.” The House adjourned in December without acting on the bill.68

Aspinall eventually scheduled hearings for the Canyonlands bill in the early summer of 1964. The House Subcommittee on National Parks, chaired by Thomas Morris of New Mexico, took testimony on the park proposal in Monticello, Utah, on June 20 and in Washington, D.C., on June 29.

Most of those who gave testimony shared the sentiments of a Mexican Hat resident who wanted Congress to remove the legislation from its political “bog hole” and create a park. Witnesses generally preferred the Moss bill over the Burton version because it called for a larger park. All favored multiple use, but few were willing to risk the loss of the park to defend that principle.69

The House subcommittee struck multiple use when it reported the bill to the Committee on Interior Affairs. When the full committee received the bill, it added several amendments and reported it to the House for floor action. The first amendment slightly reduced the size of the park by removing 960 acres of mineral lands in the northeastern corner of the park. It rejected all of the other provisions of the Burton bill. A second amendment called for the prompt phasing out of grazing by refusing to grant permit renewals. A third scratched all provisions that allowed the production and exploration of minerals. A fourth omitted a provision permitting the commercial use of access roads. And a fifth did away with the interior secretary’s timetable for the exchange of state and federal lands. On April 19, 1964, the House unanimously approved the amended Moss bill which, in effect, created a single-purpose park.70

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68 Wayne Aspinall to Peter C. Pumphrey, December 23, 1963, box 141, Aspinall Papers, University of Denver.
Disappointed that Burton and Lloyd had not done more to retain multiple use, Moss nonetheless resigned himself to support the bill with its "crippling" amendments. Senator Bennett, however, reminded him of his earlier promise to fight for multiple use in the Senate if the House rejected it. Moss reluctantly called for a House-Senate conference on the bill. 71

As a conferee, Moss fought to retain multiple use, but the House conferees, including Burton, would not budge. Their lone concessions related to grazing and the time period allowed for the exchange of state

71 Moss to Ben Stong, August 13, 1964, Bennett to Moss, August 21, 1964, box 29, MP.
and federal lands. They gave the secretary of the interior 120 days to make the land exchange. As for grazing, they permitted the renewal of leases for a period not to exceed ten years. After a four-year battle, the Moss bill was passed on September 3, 1964. Two weeks later, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed it into law. Canyonlands became the first national park since the creation of Virgin Islands National Park in 1957. Fittingly, Bates Wilson was named park superintendent.\(^72\)

Having secured the park, Moss moved during the next few years to expand its borders. He introduced legislation, eventually approved and signed into law in November 1971, that added four parcels totaling 79,618 acres to the park. Horseshoe Canyon, a noncontiguous tract of 3,178 acres seven miles west of the park, was included to preserve prehistoric pictographs. Three other additions adjoined the park. The Maze, included in Moss's original bill, was a remote canyon area of 47,313 acres west of the confluence. Lavender Canyon, located in the southeast corner of the park, included 11,952 acres. And the North Side added 17,175 acres to the northern boundary. With these additions, Canyonlands totaled 337,258 acres, about 5,000 more than Moss's proposal of 1962.\(^73\)

Most of the credit for the creation of Canyonlands must go to Moss. Colleagues praised his patience, persistence, and vision. He also proved willing to compromise to obtain his objective. Nothing in his career, he later noted, was "more satisfying" than being known as "the father of Canyonlands." Udall, too, contributed significantly to the establishment of the park. He worked harder for Canyonlands, he recalled, than for any other park, monument, seashore, or recreation area. He drew national attention to the area and helped spark park legislation with his visit to Utah in the summer of 1961. He made Canyonlands a priority item on the administration's environmental agenda. Park proponents, frustrated by delays and attempts to establish a park of minimal size, received in the end a large park without the deleterious effects of multiple use. The crown jewel in the sandstone kingdom, Canyonlands remains one of the major monuments of the 1960s conservation movement.\(^74\)


\(^{74}\)Moss interview; Udall interview.