Fort Craig, New Mexico, and the Southwest Indian Wars, 1854–1884

Durwood Ball

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr

Recommended Citation


This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in New Mexico Historical Review by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact disc@unm.edu.
Federal troops at Fort Craig, New Mexico, defended settlements and travelers from Indian raids in the middle Rio Grande valley and waged war to open Native American homelands to economic development. Fort Craig's strategic position in New Mexico's defensive network placed its garrison in the thick of southwestern warfare. Keeping the peace and regulating Indian-white contact were two day-to-day missions at Fort Craig, but waging war was the principal means of controlling Native Americans and terminating conflict. However uneven their combat record was, regular and volunteer troops at Fort Craig, campaigning simultaneously with soldiers across the Southwest, slowly eroded Indian resistance to Anglo and Hispano encroachment.

In 1854, the United States Army located Fort Craig on the western bank of the Rio Grande thirty-five miles below Socorro, New Mexico. The post stood at the northern entrance to the Jornada del Muerto, a ninety-mile waterless stretch of the Camino Real, the major north-south trade and travel artery through New Mexico Territory. Taking advantage of the arduous passage, Navajo and Apache warriors sometimes ambushed weak, tired travelers and poorly defended merchant caravans. From Fort Craig, regular troops ranged westward to the headwaters of the Gila River, northward to the Colorado Chiquito, northward to Albuquerque, eastward to the Pecos River, and southward to the opposite end of the Jornada.¹

¹ Durwood Ball is an acquisitions editor with the University of New Mexico Press and holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of New Mexico. His research areas include frontier military history.
Fort Craig stood in the Department of New Mexico, which included roughly all of present-day New Mexico and Arizona, the western tip of Texas, and southern Colorado. Administered generally from Santa Fe, the Department commander's jurisdiction—a boiling cauldron of Anglos, Hispanos, and Native Americans—was possibly the most ungovernable and turbulent military district on the western frontier. For two hundred years before the United States conquest, the Hispanos and Pueblos together had observed a complex relationship of war and trade with the Navajos, Apaches, Utes, Kiowas, and Comanches. Each side occasionally plundered, murdered, and enslaved members of the other. Any Pueblo or Hispano settlement beyond the valley encountered stiff resistance from their hostile neighbors. In the mid-nineteenth century, Anglo expansion intensified and complicated southwestern warfare. Between 1849 and 1890, the United States government would spend millions of dollars to defeat Apaches, Navajos, and others to bring an end to southwestern conflicts.

Fort Craig was a critical link in a slender network of defensive posts that roughly lined the Rio Grande and protected traffic on the Camino Real. Assigned to command the Ninth Military Department (New Mexico) in 1851, Lieutenant Colonel Edwin V. Sumner relocated regular-army garrisons from the principal towns to the frontier. A year after his departure in 1853, the defensive line was comprised of Fort Massachusetts in present-day southern Colorado, Cantonment Burgwin in Taos, Fort Union in the Mora River valley, Fort Marcy in Santa Fe, the depot at Albuquerque, Fort Craig, Fort Thorn at the southern edge of the Jornada, Fort Fillmore in the Mesilla valley, and Fort Bliss at Magoffinsville near El Paso, Texas. To harass the Navajos in their homeland, Sumner planted Fort Defiance at the mouth of Cañon Bonito in present-day northeastern Arizona. Over the years, the army abandoned some posts and added others in response to frontier exigencies, but on the whole, Sumner's design endured to the end of the century.

Fort Craig anchored the center of the defensive line. On 31 March 1854, Captain Daniel Chandler's command—one company of Third Infantry and one of First Dragoons—abandoned Fort Conrad and marched southward ten miles to the nearly completed Fort Craig. Recommended by Inspector General J. K. F. Mansfield, the site was a mesa of brush, cacti, and a few trees overlooking wooded and marshy banks of the Rio Grande. To the west stood the San Mateo and Magdalena Mountains; to the northeast loomed Chupadera Mesa; and to the east stretched the grassy plains of the Llano Estacado. In Mansfield's opinion, federal troops could protect travelers more successfully from this location than from Fort Conrad. Throughout its history, three to five companies generally occupied the post.
Figure I: Company Quarters at Fort Craig, New Mexico, ca. 1866. Photograph courtesy Museum of New Mexico, Santa Fe, neg. no. 14514.

Fort Craig was a formidable military installation. Completely enclosed by a ten-foot-high adobe wall, the rectangle was 1,050 by 600 feet, the longer wall running east to west. Most construction was flat-roofed adobe. Officers' quarters formed the north wall, enlisted men's quarters comprised the south. White-washed porticos fronted the parade ground. Running along the east wall were the hospital, quartermaster and commissary offices, the sutler's store, and blacksmith's shop. Behind them were located corrals and stables. The sally port opened to the west. Accustomed to shabby posts and primitive quarters, officers and men thought Fort Craig to be one of the most spacious and comfortable forts in the Far Southwest.  

When federal troops were not either laboring or drilling, they were waging offensive and defensive war on Indians. The geography and peoples of the American West defied the precepts of Euroamerican military science. There were no fixed lines of battle—only vast distances and punishing topography. Elusive and resourceful opponents, Indian warriors avoided pitched battles, preferring guerrilla warfare—lightning strikes and quick retreats—well adapted to desert and mountain terrain.
At Fort Craig, federal troops campaigned in brigades against entire tribes or villages and scouted the middle Rio Grande country in companies or squads. The latter mission, primary at Fort Craig, involved either the pursuit of stolen stock, the pre-emption of Indian incursions, or the reconnaissance of the area. Commanders of Fort Craig never enjoyed sufficient troop strength to interdict all Indian raids, but experienced commissioned and noncommissioned officers overcame their handicaps to conduct some successful operations.

Responding to recent "murders and robberies" committed by Mescalero Apaches on the San Antonio–El Paso road and in the Pecos River valley, Captain Chandler led a column of infantry and dragoons southeast to the Rio Bonito valley, Mescalero country, in late June 1854. His ultimatum was that the Mescaleros cease their raids and surrender the murderers. Alarmed by the heavily armed expedition, two Mescalero leaders, Palanquito and Santos, visited departmental commander Colonel John Garland in Albuquerque, but other Mescaleros continued raiding settlements in southeast New Mexico and west Texas with impunity. Having engaged no Indians, Chandler's column returned to Fort Craig on 7 August. The Apache attacks and Chandler's reconnaissance, however, convinced Colonel Garland to establish Fort Stanton on the Rio Bonito.

The construction and occupation of Fort Stanton in 1855 freed the commander at Fort Craig to focus his resources on the Mimbres, Mogollon, Warm Springs, and Copper Mine Apaches. Making their home around the headwaters of the Gila River, these Indians, collectively known as the Gila Apaches, raided and plundered the settlements in the Rio Grande valley between Albuquerque and El Paso. In late winter 1856, Colonel Garland dispatched Captain Chandler "to prevent the Apaches of the Gila river and Mogollon Mountains from depredating upon the property" of United States "citizens." From Fort Craig, Chandler and 100 men rendezvoused on the upper Gila River with a column of the same size from Fort Thorn. Chandler's brigade surprised a village of Mogollon Apaches in the Sierra Almagre, inflicted several casualties, and recovered "250 stolen sheep." On the return march along the Mimbres River, Chandler mistakenly unleashed his troops against an encampment of friendly Mimbres Apaches, killing several Apache women and children. Afterward, the embarrassed, chastened captain paid an indemnity of sheep.

Fort Craig commanders, although expected to control the Gila Apaches, had only an imperfect knowledge of their country. In fall 1856, the new commander of Fort Craig, Major George B. Crittenden of the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen (hereafter Mounted Rifles or riflemen), called the Gila country "Terra incognita" and requested permission to lead a reconnaissance expedition through the rugged country north of
the Gila River. Although the new departmental commander, Colonel Benjamin L. E. Bonneville, liked Crittenden’s proposal, he assigned the major and one company of Mounted Rifles and one company of Third Infantry at Fort Craig to a campaign that he led personally against the Mogollon Apaches during the summer of 1857. His men missed the Mogollons but crushed a band of Mimbres and one of the Coyoteros, an Apache people generally inhabiting the White Mountain country of present-day Arizona. The Fort Craig riflemen and infantry returned to their post in September of the same year.9

In the meantime, troops at Fort Craig deployed against Indian raids. On 22 July 1857, Captain Andrew Porter, Crittenden’s successor, detached First Sergeant Hugh McQuaide and seven Mounted Rifles from Company F to investigate a sighting of Indians below the post. An Irish immigrant, McQuaide joined the riflemen in 1851, learned to soldier in Texas, and developed into an outstanding frontier combat leader. His tenacity and skill earned him the respect of commissioned and non-commissioned officers alike. Fighting quality varied dramatically from company to company, but officers and men like McQuaide molded their outfits into superb fighting units.10

In the evening of 22 July 1857, Sergeant McQuaide led his squadron southward from Fort Craig, struck the trail of four Indians fifteen miles below the post, and ordered his men to encamp. The next morning, McQuaide and his troops crossed to the east bank of the Rio Grande, followed the trail of the Indians, and soon discovered several “Mexicans killed and scalped.” After burying the victims, the squadron pursued and overtook 700 head of stolen sheep, but the Indians had detected their pursuers and fled across the river.

McQuaide now tracked the four Indians, one of whom was on foot. Recrossing to the western bank of the Rio Grande, McQuaide’s squadron trailed the Indians’ “zig-zag course” to the west some thirty miles toward the Mogollon Mountains and then to the northwest toward either the Magdalena or the San Mateo Mountains. McQuaide knew the Indians would strike for a specific pass. After resting his men and horses at a waterless camp, he resumed the pursuit at 12:30 a.m. and reached the western entrance at daybreak. He rested his men and horses at a waterhole for an hour and then led them through the pass. After debouching onto the eastern slope of the range, McQuaide tracked the Indians to the northeast. At 3 p.m., he and his squadron came upon an Indian mount that had been killed in the previous thirty minutes. Ten miles farther, they discovered another abandoned horse. By sunset, all four of the Indians had dispersed on foot into the mountains behind San Antonio. McQuaide concluded that further pursuit was hopeless and encamped his men. He and his troops pulled into Fort Craig the following day. He had led the squadron on a scout of some 160 miles.11
Although McQuaide’s pursuit failed to strike a direct blow, he demonstrated the perseverance and experience that desert warfare demanded of all warriors—Indian, Hispano, and Anglo. McQuaide knew the locations of water and grass, the endurance and breaking point of his men and horses, and the practices of his enemy in flight. The sergeant drew on his experiences in Texas and in the Fort Craig sector and on those of other officers stationed at the post. When an officer or noncommissioned officer led a reconnaissance, he often kept field notes of the distance, direction, and terrain of the pursuit. He also carefully recorded the location, abundance, and quality of water and grass along his course. If a scout commander was unfamiliar with the middle Rio Grande country, he could usually rely on a civilian scout to guide his troops.\(^\text{12}\)

In addition to fighting the Mescalero and Gila Apaches, troops at Fort Craig waged war on the Navajos. During the second half of 1858 and part of 1859, the garrison focused its attention on Lieutenant Colonel Dixon S. Miles’ Navajo campaign. On 2 July 1858, Company F of the Mounted Rifles, under the command of Lieutenant William W. Averell, left Fort Craig to join the expedition. From Fort Defiance, Miles took the war into the Navajo homeland. Company F scouted mountains, valleys, and canyons, laid and sprang ambushes, burned crops and villages, took captives, confiscated livestock, and even marched through Cañon de Chelly. The pressure of Miles’ operations forced the Navajos to sue for peace at the end of the year.\(^\text{13}\) Although quiet throughout most of 1859, the Navajos stole vast herds of livestock below Albuquerque in early 1860. As they drove the animals down the east bank of the Rio Grande toward crossings below Fort Craig, Captain Porter, commanding the post, dispatched squadrons of riflemen in all directions to recover the herds and to chastise the Navajos.\(^\text{14}\)

If Porter’s reports were accurate, the Mounted Rifles inflicted serious casualties. On 7 February 1860, Hugh McQuaide and fifteen men of Company F trailed stolen stock from the northern mouth of the Jornada westward and northwestward, overtook the Navajos at the head of Cañon Alamosa, killed one warrior in the attack, and recovered 1,200 sheep. On the same day, Captain Porter and twenty-five riflemen rushed to cut off the retreat of a Navajo raiding party west of Fort Craig. Luck followed Porter’s men. The following day, unaware of the proximity of the troopers, forty Navajos drove 400 sheep and several cattle in full view of Porter’s camp “on a wooded knoll at the base” of the Luersas Mountains. Porter quickly but quietly mounted his men. Their pistols blazing, the riflemen charged into the Navajos. In a running fight of eighteen miles, Porter’s men either killed or wounded sixteen warriors and recovered the stock.\(^\text{15}\)
The Mounted Rifles were not finished. On 8 February, Captain George McLane and forty-one riflemen surprised a party of approximately seventy Navajos who were driving sheep and cattle through Cañon del Muerto below Fort Craig. McLane sent Lieutenant Edward Cressey's squadron after fifteen mounted Navajos fleeing back up the canyon. As forty-five warriors lodged themselves on a hillside, McLane dismounted his men and threw them against the Navajo position. In fifteen minutes of close combat, some hand-to-hand, McLane's men killed thirteen warriors and drove the others over the hill. At the river crossing, a corporal's detail concealed in the brush and trees ambushed approximately ten Navajos driving the herd, killed two warriors and recovered 2,000 sheep and forty-five cattle. In all that day, McLane's riflemen recovered 5,000 sheep and 100 cattle. At Fort Craig, Captain Porter was ecstatic. He crowed to departmental headquarters, "Those Indians killed by different detachments could not fall short of forty." His final tally is probably high, but with grit, determination, and good fortune, his riflemen had surprised and punished the Navajos.

Such successes, however momentarily impressive, were not decisive victories. In the following months, the Navajos intensified livestock thefts, besieged an army supply train, and assaulted Fort Defiance. Departmental commander Colonel Thomas T. Fauntleroy unleashed another expedition to Navajo country, this time under Major Edward R. S. Canby, in late summer 1860. On 10 September 1860, Captain Lafayette McLaws led 150 men from Fort Craig to a rendezvous at Fort Defiance. During the fall and winter, three heavily armed columns destroyed Navajo villages and crops in the Chuska Mountain country and beyond. Meanwhile, at Fort Craig, Captain Porter organized a unit to strike Navajo refuges supposedly located along the Colorado Chiquito, but Canby learned the Navajos were hiding along the Rio Puerco, and Fauntleroy cancelled Porter's orders. By March 1861, Canby's roving columns had impoverished the Navajos, who sued for peace, and the campaign wound down.

The tranquility was short-lived. During 1861, southern secession and preparations for civil war consumed regular and volunteer troops in New Mexico. Now a colonel commanding the Department of New Mexico, Canby prepared to repel the invasion of New Mexico by Confederate Texans under Brigadier General Henry Sibley. On 21 February 1861, a combined force of regulars and volunteers, sallying forth from Fort Craig, were defeated by the Texans at the nearby Battle of Valverde. A month later, Union forces repulsed the Texans at the Battle of Glorieta in northern New Mexico, and Sibley withdrew his army to Texas. Never again were the Texans a serious military threat to New Mexico.
Indian warfare complicated the Union mission in New Mexico. From his Santa Fe headquarters, Canby complained that the Navajos and Mescaleros were “exceedingly troublesome” and gave his troops “constant employment.” New Mexicans compounded the turmoil, he added, with their plunder, murder, and enslavement of the Indians—the Navajos in particular. Canby outlined a grim solution: isolate and civilize the Navajos on reservations or wage a long war of “extermination.” A fight to the death “would be costly and given the nature of Navajo warfare (and) the terrain of the homeland, be impossible.”

Summoned east in the summer of 1862, Canby handed the Department of New Mexico to Brigadier General James H. Carleton, a despotic, humorless, and brilliant veteran of the First Dragoons. A decade of service in the Far Southwest had endowed him with an exceptional understanding of frontier warfare. In his opinion, pacifying the Apaches and Navajos was a precondition to securing New Mexico from Texas. Carleton believed that federal troops, if adequately trained, supplied, and led, could defeat the Indians in their mountain and desert homelands. During the spring and summer of 1862, Carleton relayed his California Volunteer Infantry and Cavalry from California to Arizona and New Mexico Territories. After expelling the Confederates from Arizona, he left Colonel Joseph R. West in charge of the District of Arizona headquartered in Mesilla, New Mexico. Taking command of the Department of New Mexico in August 1862, Carleton pursued the Indian war with demonic energy.

Fort Craig was New Mexico’s primary bulwark against the Texas flank. Carleton envisioned one route of Confederate invasion passing through Fort Stanton, thence to Fort Craig, the department’s “chief magazine of subsistence.” Under his orders, the California volunteers immediately began renovating Fort Craig. Without exception, Lieutenant Colonel Edwin Rigg and his officers were expected to “set the example... of labor and industry morning and night.” Writing from Santa Fe, Carleton declared, “Fort Craig is to be held with the old flag flying over it as long as a man of the garrison can pull a trigger, it makes no odds what force comes against it [sic].” Apaches and Navajos, not Texans, were the principal military threat to Union New Mexico and Arizona.

Orchestrating a war without mercy, Brigadier General Carleton first targeted the Mescaleros in southeastern New Mexico. In October 1862, Colonel Christopher “Kit” Carson and five companies of New Mexico volunteers reoccupied Fort Stanton. Carleton’s strategy was to converge columns from Forts Stanton, Mesilla, and Franklin (Texas) on Mescalero refuges in Dog Canyon and on the Peñasco River. In no uncertain terms,
Carleton instructed Colonels Carson at Fort Stanton and West at Mesilla, "All Indian men of that tribe are to be killed whenever and wherever you can find them." No cessation of hostilities would commence until the Mescalero chiefs personally begged for peace in Santa Fe.23

In two separate strikes, the New Mexico and California volunteers killed some three hundred men, women, and children. Mescalero leaders, Manuelita and Jose Largo, were gunned down enroute to negotiations with Carleton in Santa Fe. Opposed to the war on the Mescaleros, Carson relocated the survivors to Bosque Redondo, a federal reservation lying northeast of Fort Stanton on the Pecos River and guarded by Fort Sumner. By spring 1863, 415 Mescaleros were living at Bosque Redondo, which Carleton intended to make into a Mescalero "pueblo."24

The California volunteers at Fort Craig prepared to block the flight of Mescaleros to Mexico or to the Gila country. Carleton ordered Rigg to put his cavalry in fighting shape—"horses shod and in order, equipment repaired, and everything ready for active service." Rigg's staff departments—quartermaster, ordnance, commissary, subsistence, and medical—constantly assisted posts east, south, and west of Fort Craig. Forts Stanton, McRae, Selden, Cummings, Bayard, McLane, West, Bowie, and Goodwin received much of their supplies from or through the depot at Fort Craig. The primary mission of troops at those posts was military defense against the Apaches in southern New Mexico and eastern Arizona, and Carleton was determined to see them adequately provisioned.25

After crushing the Mescaleros, Carleton turned his attention to the Navajos, giving them two choices: relocate to Bosque Redondo or die in war. Navajo leaders were unmoved by his threat and Carleton loosed his troops, 1,000 combat-hardened New Mexico volunteers under Colonel Carson. From Forts Wingate at El Gallo and Fort Canby (formerly Defiance) at Cañon Bonito, Carson's scouting expeditions ranged far west to the Hopi mesas. Although the volunteers burned hogans, destroyed crops, and ran off horses and sheep, they took few lives. In January 1864 his destructive war, carried into Cañon de Chelly, drove the hungry, destitute Navajos to surrender. An exultant Carleton wrote Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas, "I believe this will be the last of the Navajo War." In March, he boasted that 6,000 Navajos either were on or en route to Bosque Redondo. That number rose to 8,000 by the end of the year.26

Anticipating retaliatory raids, Brigadier General Carleton advised his troops, including those at Fort Craig, on how to combat the Navajos and Apaches. The best tactic, Carleton advised Rigg, was "small parties moving stealthily to their haunts and lying patiently in wait for them" or "by following their tracks day after day, with a fixedness of purpose that never gives up." In Carleton's mind, Indians were the most
“wary” game animal in the wilderness and “must be hunted with skill.” A favorite small-unit tactic of his was the ambush at a desert spring or water hole. Carleton wrote, “A cautious, wary commander, hiding his men, and moving about by night, might kill off a good many Indians.” At one point Carleton exhorted Rigg, “I hope to hear that your troops have killed some Indians.”

Giving the Indians no rest, Carleton armed and militarized the civilian population. At Fort Craig, Colonel Rigg enlisted, organized, and supplied local militia. On 11 January 1864, he wrote Carleton, “I have now hopes, that within the next two months the Indians will find this District too hot to hold them.” Later that month, the colonel supplied 500 pounds each of flour and bacon, and 500 rounds of ammunition to a civilian expedition under General Stanislaus Montoya and Colonel Robert Stapleton. In Santa Fe, Carleton’s headquarters endorsed Rigg’s measure.

Leaving Fort Craig on 23 January, the Montoya-Stapleton expedition, a slave-raiding enterprise, struck out west and northwest and swept through a portion of the Navajo homeland. Back at Fort Craig by 4 February, Montoya and Stapleton reported killing twenty Navajos and holding twenty more in custody. Leading citizens in the Fort Craig area wanted to adopt the captives into their homes and “to impress them with the principles of civilization and domestic comforts that they may become useful members of Society.” With Union troops waging a war on slavery in the East, Carleton refused to endorse the enslavement of Navajos. Indeed, he ordered Rigg to deliver the captives to Bosque Redondo.

Subduing and incarcerating the Indians were two planks in Carleton’s grand design for the economic development of the Far Southwest. Apache, Navajo, Kiowa, and Comanche threats had contained frontier settlement and economic development largely in the Rio Grande valley. The object of his wars, Carleton wrote General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, was to open “arrable lands in other parts of the Territory” and “veins and deposits of precious metals.” The indefatiguable brigadier general was especially smitten with the gold mines in the Pinos Altos Mountains—“one of the richest auriferous countries in the world,” he claimed—at the headwaters of the Gila River in southwestern New Mexico. During 1862, Gila Apache attacks killed miners and slowed prospecting at Pinos Altos.

Determined to keep the mines operating, Carleton launched several columns at the Apaches around Pinos Altos in the dead of winter 1863. Outfitted at Fort Craig, eighty-five California volunteers marched overland to the Gila River headwaters in late January. A month later, suffering from exposure to “snow (and) exceedingly cold weather,” the men, some seriously ill, stumbled back into Fort Craig without finding
any Apaches. In mid-January at Fort McLane, fifteen miles south of Santa Rita, California volunteers under Colonel Joseph West captured and murdered Apache leader Mangas Coloradas. Leading four mounted companies to Pinos Altos, Captain William McCleave broke ground for Fort West on 23 January. Throughout February and March, McCleave and his men turned the neighboring mountains upside down, smashing at least one Gila Apache village on 22 March. With Mangas Coloradas dead and his immediate band destroyed, Pinos Altos enjoyed a small measure of tranquility unknown since the mines opened a few years earlier.31

Consumed with the Pinos Altos mineral deposits, Carleton instructed Colonel Rigg to pioneer a direct road between Forts Craig and West. The mission fell to Captain Allen Anderson of the Fifth Infantry. In March 1863, Carleton wrote Rigg, “Let me feel assured that no stone be left unturned to get Anderson well fitted out.” For one probe, the medical, quartermaster, and subsistence officers provided the Anderson expedition “with Medicines, Bandages etc.[,] stockings (three pairs)[,] warm under clothing, Blankets (one pair each)[,] plates, cups, knife and forks, (and) canteens.” Between April and December 1863, Anderson’s unit reconnoitered the mountains and deserts but failed to find a passage across the Mogollon Mountains. At one point, he wrote, “We have utterly failed.” Departmental supply trains continued to follow the well-worn far southern route from Mesilla to Tucson. 32

Meanwhile, fresh gold discoveries in the central Arizona mountains inspired Carleton to invigorate the war against the Gila Apaches during 1864. His push coincided with the punishing campaigns of U. S. Grant in northern Virginia and William T. Sherman in Georgia. On 16 May, Colonel Rigg left Fort Craig to lead seven companies of infantry and cavalry from Las Cruces westward to the Tularosa valley in eastern Arizona. A month later, army engineers began erecting Fort Goodwin a little north of Mount Graham and “2 1/2 miles south of the Gila river.” The position of the post, Rigg believed, would end “the reign of the murdering Apaches” and hasten their “extinction.” At the same time, Rigg and Carleton inundated the mountains with mobile squadrons of well-armed soldiers, miners, and Indian allies to pursue the Apaches.33

One of those offensive columns was deployed from Fort Craig. Colonel Oscar Brown, commanding in Rigg’s absence, begged to lead the expedition: “I would like much to have the opportunity of finding what may be my capacity for Indian fighting.” Brown got his wish. Shoving off in mid-September 1864, Brown’s unit marched westward to the White Mountains—an “Apache nest”—exhausted themselves in a futile hunt, and returned to Fort Craig with a mere four Apache captives in December 1864. His “capacity” amply demonstrated, Brown
sheepishly handed in a short and humble report. Waged with energy and ferocity, Carleton’s summer campaign killed a few Apaches and destroyed some villages but fell far short of breaking the back of Apache resistance in Arizona and New Mexico.  

Throughout the Civil War, local defense absorbed manpower and material resources at Fort Craig. Administered by Colonel Rigg, a network of picket posts from San Diego to Los Pinos protected civilian and government traffic along the Rio Grande. From such static posts, however, Carleton demanded offensive operations, the bedrock of his Indian-fighting doctrine. To Rigg, he wrote:

Picked men and officers, each striving to his utmost[,] will accomplish a good deal. To move silently; [sic] to hunt Indians, is the only way to accomplish anything at all. For God’s sake let the command move light.  

Federal troops had to become Indians in all but name to defeat them in their own country.  

In Carleton’s eyes, Captain Henry Green, commanding Fort McRae thirty miles south of Fort Craig, was a model frontier combat officer, unrelenting and fierce. On 9 August 1863, Green mounted twenty men on “Post team mules” at Fort McRae and led them on a three-day pursuit of Indians into the Alamancita Mountains. Near the end, Green threw his men forward onto the rims of the canyons and ordered them to fire down on the Indians, who then took cover behind rocks and trees. A year later, a scout under Green’s command rode into Fort Craig from the Gila River country, possessing six captives, nineteen head of cattle, and three scalps. Captain Clarence Bennett, commanding Fort Craig, wrote of Green, “He is a splendid officer and is truly deserving of great credit.”

The Indians handed the army its share of reversals. On 26 January 1864, Lieutenant Thomas Young led a scout into the San Andres Mountains after Apaches driving stolen stock. The following evening, at the summit of a gorge, sixty Apaches attacked his encampment, wounding five federals, one seriously. After collecting its gear, Young’s unit moved forward to “flat” ground, which the Apaches illuminated with two bonfires a couple hundred yards away. Their blood-curdling howls and intermittent sniping held the troopers by their nervous mounts in bone-chilling cold throughout the night. At daylight, forming his scout into a wedge, Young placed the wounded in the middle and ordered everyone forward at a gallop. Every few hundred yards, he barked a halt to rest the wounded and then resumed the charge. The Apaches fell away to the left and right before the charges and gathered again on
both federal flanks during the halts. Troopers and warriors repeated the maneuver for several miles until the Apaches gave up the pursuit. Reaching Paraje by sundown, Young’s men staggered into Fort Craig on the twenty-ninth.37

Taking command of Fort Craig in early June 1864, Colonel Oscar Brown filed unwelcomed complaints with Carleton’s headquarters. Without cavalry, Brown wrote, hunting the Indians was an impossible mission. An annoyed Carleton penned a stinging endorsement: Pressing all available private and public horses into federal service, Brown’s troops ought to be able to overhaul and “whip forty naked Indians mostly armed with bows and arrows.” The general continued, “If not[,] the troops had better be mustered out of the service and the country . . . Let the men go on foot, and dog a trail day after day, and the Indians will be caught.”38

During spring and summer 1864, the future of Carleton’s command looked bleak. His grinding campaigns had indeed mauled the Navajos and some Apaches but the Indians still invested roads and attacked settlements. Threatening from inside the department was the expiration of volunteer enlistments between August and November 1864. Carleton implored the War Department to send cavalry reinforcements, but his superiors in Washington, absorbed in Grant’s and Sherman’s climactic campaigns, ignored his pleas. Much to Carleton’s chagrin, few California volunteers re-enlisted. By March 1865, his once formidable army had dwindled to six companies of California infantry, one company of California cavalry, and a handful of New Mexico cavalry.39

The military reorganization of the Southwest succeeding the Civil war galled the megalomaniac Carleton. The Department of War lopped northwest Texas and Arizona off his command, leaving him New Mexico alone. His command, now a district, reported to the Department of the Missouri in St. Louis. With justification, Carleton angrily wrote Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas, “This country cannot be judged of by any rule applicable to any other portion of the United States.” The fierce deserts, rugged mountains, and angry Apaches shared by all three regions were best addressed by “one head.” A few New Mexico volunteers and reassigned regular-army regiments—the Third Cavalry, Fifth Infantry, and One Hundred and Twenty-Fifth Infantry (an African American regiment)—lodged 1,500 troops in the District of New Mexico. Carleton’s command was especially hamstrung by a shortage of cavalry mounts.40

Fort Craig stood in the middle of New Mexico’s postwar military turmoil. At Fort Sumner, the Bosque Redondo experiment began unravelling as soon as it started. The Mescaleros and Navajos, incarcerated together, feuded constantly. Warriors constantly left the reservation to steal livestock and make war. In December 1865, the
Mescaleros, en masse, deserted the reservation, some fleeing west to Mimbres River country, some south to the Davis Mountains. However, the majority vanished across the Pecos River into Texas. Federal authorities blamed the Mescaleros for depredations against commercial and government traffic on the San Antonio–El Paso road and against settlers in the Pecos River and Rio Grande valleys. From homelands in eastern Arizona and western New Mexico, Gila Apaches also raided Rio Grande settlements.

Carleton channeled his rage into a campaign of extermination. He exhorted the commanding officer at Fort Craig to “attack all parties of hostile Indians.” Deployed constantly, foot and mounted patrols should “hunt and kill” any Indians crossing their path and ambush warriors at water sources. To Major General Winfield Scott Hancock, the Gettysburg hero now commanding the Department of the Missouri, Carleton wrote, “The rifle is the only law which will ever govern the fierce Apaches.”

In spite of army “law,” the Apaches ran off most of the Fort Craig herd on 9 July 1867, eluding the initial hard pursuit. Drawing thirty days’ rations, Colonel William R. Gerhart led thirty-five infantry and nineteen cavalry troops—all mounted on remaining horses—into the field and followed a track nearly to the Arizona border, but the trail doubled back eastward, then turned northward toward Fort Wingate. At that point, the exasperated Gerhart realized that his quarry had been a Wingate patrol. His men never recovered the stolen horses and mules. Pulling into Fort Craig in early August, Gerhart’s men had endured a bruising desert march of 448 miles.

Such frustrations aside, army policy was to destroy off-reservation Apaches. Replacing Carleton in 1867, Colonel George Getty’s headquarters wrote Lieutenant Colonel Cuvier Grover, commanding Fort Craig, “All Apache Indians in this Territory are hostile; and all male adults capable of bearing arms should be killed . . . unless they give themselves up as prisoners.” In 1869, Getty ordered an infantry sweep against the Mescaleros, who were supposedly hiding in the Guadalupe and Sacramento Mountains. Troops from Fort Craig met with a punitive expedition at Fort Selden on the southern end of the Jornada del Muerto. Captain Alexander Moore led 180 troops, some African American, into the Guadalupe Mountains in northwest Texas but failed to strike the Indians.

The principal installation south of Santa Fe, Fort Craig was critical to President U. S. Grant’s Peace Policy, a concerted federal effort to settle and feed Indians throughout the American West instead of fighting and killing them. In southwestern New Mexico, federal Indian agents, led by United States Indian Commissioner Vincent Colyer, decided to transfer the Mimbres Apaches under Victorio and Loco from
their Cañada Alamosa reservation, upon which settlers were encroach­ing, to a new agency in the Tularosa valley. In September 1871, Colo­nel Gordon Granger, commanding the District of New Mexico, placed all Fort Craig troops and transportation at the commissioner’s disposal. The following month, picking up an armed escort at Fort Craig, Granger traveled westward to select a garrison site in the Tularosa valley. Cold, snowy weather during his tour, however, convinced Granger to recom­mend delaying the transfer until April 1872.45

With reluctance, the Mimbres went to Tularosa. Headquartered at Fort Craig, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Devin of the Eighth Cavalry was ordered to cooperate with Superintendent Nathaniel Pope and Agent Orlando Piper. In May 1872, Devin sent wagons to Cañada Alamosa and Ojo Caliente to transport supplies, belongings, and the aged and infirm. Under Devin’s orders, cavalry patrols swept the mountains “to scare the Indians from their old haunt and drive them toward the Reser­vation.” To facilitate the supply of the Tularosa agency, Devin ordered the survey of a road from Los Lunas across the San Agustin Plains to the Tularosa valley, but the exploration was unsuccessful, and Fort Craig remained the agency’s supply depot. Always unhappy with Tularosa, Victorio’s people moved to Ojo Caliente, Arizona, in mid-summer 1874. In wake of the transfer, the army reduced Fort Craig to a skeleton gar­rison.46

When Victorio, a brilliant war leader, led his Apache followers on raids across southern New Mexico and west Texas during late 1879 and most of 1880, the army temporarily regarrisoned Fort Craig to allay the fears of residents along the middle Rio Grande, but the old fort’s Indian-fighting days had come to a quiet end. The few western Apaches still at war with the United States engaged troops in west Texas, far­southern New Mexico, and southern Arizona. The army “deacti­vated” Fort Craig, once and for all, in September 1884.47

The regular troops at Fort Craig did not put an end to Indian depre­dations in their sector of the Rio Grande valley, but any sensible army officer knew that waging war with a small army against the western Indians was a crapshoot. At best, a commander who entered the field saw Native Americans one third of the time. What was remarkable was that the army endured a forty–year guerrilla war in the Far Southwest. Its commissioned and noncommissioned officers adjusted to the de­mands of the human populations and natural geography of the region. Soldiers like Andrew Porter, Hugh McQuaide, Edwin Rigg, and Henry Green learned the locations of the water holes and grazing patches that enabled them to scout the neighborhood of Fort Craig, anticipate the approach of Indian raiders during a full moon, track Indian depredators through the wilderness, and carry military force into the heart of Indian homelands.
The garrisons at Fort Craig in particular and other southwestern stations in general were armed national islands from which white settlements spread into southwestern river valleys and disrupted Indian communities. Insightful army officers understood that economic development was the strongest weapon in the army’s arsenal and that the War Department should promote the building of wagon roads, railroads, forts, and other infrastructures through which the nation could channel its human and economic power against the American Indians. For thirty years, Fort Craig played a principal role in the process of southwestern development that finally defeated the Apaches, Navajos, and other tribes, making the Indian wars a thing of the past.

NOTES


5. Grinstead, *Life and Death*, 7–8; Andy Gregg, “Fort Craig” in *Drums of Yesterday: The Forts of New Mexico* (Santa Fe, New Mexico: The Press of the Territorian, 1968), 24–26; and Herbert M. Hart, “Fort Craig, New Mexico,” in *Old Forts of the Far West*


8. Nichols to Chandler, 24 February 1856, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 5 (9/6 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 1; Chandler to Nichols, 11 July 1856, Fort Craig, C29/1856, Letters Received, Department of New Mexico, Record Group 393, United States Army Continental Commands, 1821–1920, National Archives (hereafter LR, DNM, RG 393, NA), Registers of Letters Received and Letters Received by Headquarters, Department of New Mexico, 1854–1865, National Archives Microfilm Publication 1120 (hereafter M1120), roll 5; Fort Craig, March and April 1856, PR, RG 94, NA, M617, roll 261; Utley, Frontier Regulars, 82, 154; and Frederick Webb Hodge, “Gila Apaches,” in Handbook of the American Indians North of Mexico, part 1 (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1971), 492.


13. Nichols to Chandler, 24 June 1858, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 6 (10 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 2; and Fort Craig, July 1858, PR, RG 94, NA, M617, roll 261. For a discussion of the Navajo campaign in 1858, see Utley, Frontier Regulars, 168–70. The participation of Company F of the Mounted Rifles is recounted in Averell, Ten Years in the Saddle, 155–211.


20. Edward R. S. Canby to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the West, 1 December 1861, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 7 (11 NMex) and [Canby] to Adjutant General of the Army, 10 August [18]62, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 8 (12 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 2.


22. James H. Carleton to Edwin A. Rigg, 5 December 1862 and Carleton to Rigg, 3 October 1862, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 9 (13 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3.

23. Carleton to Lorenzo Thomas, 30 September 1862; Carleton to Christopher Carson, 12 October 1862; Carleton to Joseph R. West, 11 October 1862, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 9 (13 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3.

24. Carleton to Thomas, 9 November 1862, Santa Fe; Carleton to Carson, 25 November 1862, Santa Fe; Carleton to Thomas, 19 March 1863; Carleton to Thomas, 12 April 1863, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 9 (13 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3; Frazer, "Summer," Forts of the West, 104; and Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue, 235–37. For Carson's opposition to the Mescalero campaign, see Worcester, The Apaches, 84.

25. Carleton to Rigg, 19 October 1862; Carleton to Rigg, 8 October 1862, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 9 (13 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3.

26. Carleton to Thomas, 23 August 1863; Carleton to Thomas, 7 February 1864; Carleton to Thomas, 27 February 1864; Carleton to Henry W. Halleck, 20 March 1864, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 10 (14 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3. The term destructive war is borrowed from Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans (New York: Knopf, 1991). Against the southwestern Indians, Carleton waged the total war that Sherman inflicted on the South during the Civil War.

27. Carleton to Rigg, 4 August 1863; Carleton to Rigg, 6 August 1863, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 9 (13 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3; and Carleton to Rigg, 14 August 1863, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 10 (14 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3.

28. Rigg to Benjamin C. Cutler, 11 January 1864, Fort Craig, R6/1864; Stanislaus Montoya to Rigg, 20 January 1864, San Antonio, R10[enclosure]/1864; Rigg to Cutler, 24 January 1864, Fort Craig, R10/1864, LR, DNM, RG 393, NA, M1120, roll 25.
29. Montoya and Stapleton to Carleton, 4 February 1864, Fort Craig, R21/1864; Rigg to Montoya, 14 February 1864, Fort Craig, R23/1864, LR, DNM, RG 393, NA, M1120, roll 25; and Carleton to Rigg, 19 February 1864, Albuquerque, LS, DNM, vol. 10 (14 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3. For a history of slave raiding in New Mexico, see McNitt, *Navajo Wars*.

30. Carleton to Halleck, 10 May 1863, Santa Fe; Carleton to Thomas, 2 January 1863, Fort Craig, LS, DNM, vol. 9 (13 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3; Carleton to Thomas, 13 September 1863, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 10 (14 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3.

31. Carleton to West, 14 October 1862, confidential; Carleton to Rigg, 6 March 1863, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 9 (13 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3; Rigg to Cutler, 23 February 1863, Fort Craig, R[illegible number]/1863, LR, DNM, RG 393, NA, M1120, roll 20; and Rigg to Cutler, 24 January 1863, Fort Craig, R12/1863, LR, DNM, RG 393, NA, M1120, roll 20. For a summary of this campaign, see Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue*, 251–52.

32. Carleton to Rigg, 17 March 1863, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 9 (13 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3; Allen L. Anderson to [Carleton], 5 May 1863, Fort Craig, A86/1863, LR, DNM, RG 393, NA, M1120, roll 18; Anderson to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of New Mexico, 11 May 1863, Fort Craig, A91/1863, LR, DNM, RG 393, NA, M1120, roll 18; Carleton, Memorandum, 18 September 1863, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 10 (14 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3; Rigg to Cutler, 26 September 1863, Fort Craig, R[illegible]/1863, LR, DNM, RG 393, NA, M1120, roll 20; Carleton to Thomas, 2 August 1863, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 9 (13 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3; and Carleton to Thomas, 20 September 1863, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 9 (13 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3.

33. Rigg to Carleton, 18 April 1864, Fort Craig, R102/1863; Rigg to Carleton, 19 May [18]64, Las Cruces, R119/1864; Rigg to Cyrus H. De Forest, 27 May 1864, Las Cruces [sic], R125/1864; Rigg to Carleton, 30 June 1864, Fort Goodwin, R150/1864; Rigg to C. A. Smith, 2 July 1864, Fort Goodwin, R155/1864; Rigg to De Forrest, [n.d.], Fort Goodwin, R152/1864; Rigg to Carleton, 20 August 1864, Fort Goodwin, R172; Rigg to Cutler, 27 August 1864, Fort Craig, R185/1864; and Rigg to Cutler, 14 September 1864, Fort Craig, R212/1864, LR, DNM, RG 393, NA, M1120, roll 25. A synopsis of Rigg's expedition to establish Fort Goodwin is Jacqueline Meketa, *One Blanket and Ten Days ' Rations: 1st Infantry New Mexico Volunteers in Arizona, 1864–1866* (Globe, Arizona: Southwest Parks and Monuments Association, 1980), 49–50. Frazer, "Goodwin," in *Forts of the West*, 8–9; and Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue*, 257–59.

34. Oscar Brown to Cutler, 23 August 1864, Fort Craig, B450/1864; Brown to Cutler, 25 August 1864, Fort Craig, B451/1864; Brown to Cutler, 5 September 1864, Fort Craig, B487/1864; Brown to Cutler, 10 December 1864, Fort Craig, B675/1864; and Brown to Cutler, 19 December 1864, Fort Craig, B685/1864, LR, DNM, RG 393, NA, M1120, roll 22.

35. Rigg to Cutler, 3 January 1864, Fort Craig, R3/1864, LR, DNM, RG 393, NA, M1120, roll 25; Carleton to Rigg, 1 April 1864, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 10 (14 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3; and Carleton to Commanding Officer, Fort Craig, 12 August 1864, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 11 (16 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3.

36. Clarence Bennett to Cutler, 8 August 1864, Fort Craig, B418/1864, roll 22; Henry Green to Rigg, 19 August 1863, Fort Craig, R194/B/1863, roll 20; and Green to Rigg, 17 November 1863, Fort McRae, G157/1863, LR, DNM, RG 393, NA, M1120, roll 19.

37. Thomas Young to Rigg, 30 January 1864, R19/[enclosure]/1864, Rigg to Cutler, 17 February 1864, R19/1864; Rigg to De Forrest, 3 April 1864, Fort Craig, R78/1864, LR, DNM, RG 393, NA, M1120, roll 25.

38. Brown to De Forrest, 5 July 1864, Fort Craig, B306/1864; Bennett to Cutler, 27 October 1864, Fort Craig, B599/1864, LR, DNM, RG 393, NA, M1120, roll 22.
39. Carleton to Thomas, 16 August 1863; Carleton to Thomas, 8 May 1864, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 10 (14 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3; Carleton to Thomas, 27 August 1864, LS, DNM, vol. 11 (16 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3; Carleton to Thomas, 9 October 1864, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 11 (16 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3.

40. Carleton to Adjutant General of the Army, 16 September 1865; Carleton to Adjutant General, United States Army, 28 October 1865; Carleton to Richard C. Drum, 22 October 1865; Carleton to John P. Sherburne, 7 October 1866; Carleton to Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, 29 April 1866, LS, DNM, vol. 11 (16 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3; and Carleton to Winfield S. Hancock, 3 February 1867, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 12, RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 4. Utley outlines the reorganization of the military Southwest in *Frontier Regulars*, 168–71.

41. Palmer G. Wood to Commanding Officer, Fort Craig, 18 June 1865; Carleton to Rigg, 4 July 1865; Carleton to Pope, 25 April 1866, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 11 (16 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3. Sonnichsen explains the movement of the Mescaleros after their flight from Bosque Redondo in *Mescalero Apaches*, 120–21.

42. Carleton to Commanding Officer, Fort Craig, 7 July 1865; De Forrest to Francisco Abreu, 11 May 1866; Carleton to Commanding Officer, Fort Craig, 9 February 1866, [circular letter], LS, DNM, vol. 11 (16 NMex), RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 3; and Carleton to Hancock, 8 January 1866 [1867], Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 12, RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 4.

43. William R. Gerhart to De Forrest, 12 July 1867, C59/1867; Gerhart to De Forrest, 18 July 1867, Fort Craig, C62/1867; and Gerhart, *Journal of a Scout*, 18 July–9 August 1867, C77/enclosure/1867, LR, DNM, RG 393, NA, *Letters Received by Headquarters, District of New Mexico, September 1865–August 1890*, M1088, roll 5.


45. Lafferty to Commanding Officer, Fort Craig, 22 September 1871; Lafferty to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, 10 October 1871; Gordon Granger to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, 20 November 1871; Granger to Robert Williams, 11 December 1871; William J. Sartle to Commanding Officer, Fort McRae, 23 December 1871, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 14, RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 4.

46. Orlando Piper to Thomas Devin, 19 April 1872, Cañada Alamosa, D13/enclosure/1872; Devin to Sartle, 21 April [18]72, D13/1872; Devin to Sartle, 9 May 1872, Fort Craig, D23/1872; Devin to Acting Assistant Adjutant General, District of New Mexico, 13 May 1872, Fort Craig, D25/1872; Devin to Acting Assistant Adjutant General, [n.d.] [mid to late July 1872], [n.p.] [Fort Bayard], D31/1872, LR, DNM, RG 393, NA, M1088, roll 15; John P. Willard to Acting Commissary of Subsistence of Fort Craig, 9 June 1873, Santa Fe, LS, DNM, vol. 15, RG 393, NA, M1072, roll 5. For a sketch of the Tularosa Reservation, see Worcester, *The Apaches*, 208–13.

47. Grinstead, *Life and Death of a Frontier Fort*, 32.
Great Plains Research, a biannual multidisciplinary international journal, publishes original scholarly papers in the natural and social sciences dealing with issues of the Plains environment. It includes articles from symposia, information on upcoming conferences, and reviews of books addressing topics pertaining to the Great Plains.


PUBLISHER: Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska

We invite manuscripts from regional scholars reporting original data in scientific or social scientific approaches, and of interest to a diverse audience. Interested scholars please contact the editor for information about style and submission procedures.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES PER YEAR: U.S. Individual $25.00, U.S. Library/Institution $50.00; Canada Individual $28.00, Canada Library/Institution $53.00; Other Foreign Individual $35.00, Other Foreign Library/Institution $60.00. Submit check or money order in U.S. currency to Great Plains Research.

ADDRESS: Great Plains Research, 1215 Oldfather Hall, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588-0317. Phone: 402-472-6970. FAX: 402-472-0463. E-mail: gpr@unlnfo.unl.edu. Webpage: http://www.unl.edu/plains/gpr.htm.

ORDER FORM

☐ Please enter my subscription to Great Plains Research
☐ Enclosed is a check or money order payable to Great Plains Research in US$
☐ Please send me author information on publishing research in Great Plains Research
☐ Please send me information about the Center for Great Plains Studies

Name ________________________________

Address ________________________________

City ____________________ Province/State ____________________

Zip ___________________ Country ___________