BANDELIER NATIONAL MONUMENT
AN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

by

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The Tyuonyi ruin was the focus of visitor interest at Bandelier. Its location and visibility from the foot trail to the mesa-top made it the dominant feature of the monument. The Park Service program at the monument brought other features to the attention of visitors.
In memory of Lisa Eller Bruhn, who felt the spirituality of Bandelier.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Located in north central New Mexico, Bandelier National Monument encompasses an array of archeological, historic, and natural features. Its main attraction, Frijoles Canyon, contains ruins that include the community house called Tyuonyi and Ceremonial Cave. The canyon is a popular destination among American travelers, but it is not the only significant feature contained in the monument. In 1986, the monument included a designated wilderness area of 23,267 acres among its 32,737.2-acre total area.

At the turn of the century, the area that became Bandelier National Monument was of interest to preservationist constituencies. The region became the focus of attempts to establish a national park in New Mexico. Archaeologists saw the value of the region, as did local commercial interests, but the different groups were not able to reconcile the points of contention between them. Because the El Rito de los Frijoles was on its lands, the U. S. Forest Service (USFS) advocated the establishment of Bandelier National Monument as a way to circumvent efforts to establish a national park. Its maneuver succeeded, and the USFS administered Bandelier from 1916 to 1932.

Throughout the 1920s, however, the National Park Service lobbied for a national park in the region. Its primary effort failed as a result of resistance offered by Frank Pinkley, the superintendent of the southwestern national monuments group of the agency. He opposed the archeological national park on the grounds that the area did not fit the standards the Park Service established earlier in the 1920s and that the concept of an archeological national park violated the Antiquities Act of 1906. Pinkley's opposition led the agency to rethink its position. In 1932, the Park Service acquired Bandelier National Monument.

Since the 1930s, there have been a number of efforts to establish a national park in the region. The 100,000-acre Baca Location # 1, the Valle Grande, north and west of Frijoles Canyon, became critical to the conception of a park as the agency emphasized the geological attributes of the region instead of its archeology. In the early 1960s, the commitment of the agency to the concept of a park area with both natural and cultural values became evident when it transferred archeological ruins to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in exchange for the pristine Upper Frijoles Canyon area. Yet national park efforts failed to succeed, and in 1986, the Bandelier National Monument comprised the extent of agency holdings in the region.

Through the mid-1980s, development at Bandelier followed a "boom-bust" cycle. After the Park Service took over the monument, it embarked upon a program to create administrative and visitor facilities in Frijoles Canyon. A Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) camp facilitated the development of the park, and between 1933 and 1940, its workers built the entire Frijoles Canyon headquarters area. Between 1940 and the early 1960s, park administrators retrenched in the face of changing patterns of visitor use. With the implementation of the Mission 66 program for Bandelier in 1963, the agency again initiated development programs, culminating in a master plan that laid the basis for increased use of the back country. The
public adversely responded to the proposal, advocating the establishment of a designated wilderness area as an alternative. In the end, the agency went along with its constituency. Although the master plan continued to advocate development at the southern tip of the monument, a designated wilderness area was established at the site in 1976.

Until the 1970s, issues of resource management at Bandelier focused on its prehistoric assets. But the pressure of increased visitation and the establishment of the wilderness area caused the staff at the park to manage its resources as part of an integrated whole. A resource management unit, with responsibility for all the resources of the monument, was the result.

The 1980s saw a number of threats to the integrity of the park. The Department of Energy, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Public Service Company of New Mexico were all among the groups whose proposals threatened the monument. Although by 1987, the Park Service had successfully resisted many threats, problems on the Pajarito Plateau seemed likely to escalate. Limited by its location and the minute size of its primary feature, Bandelier served as a microcosm of the external threats facing the park system. The survival of its resources will require continued vigilance on the part of the agency.
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INTRODUCTION

When I moved to the Bandelier National Monument in the summer of 1985, I was struck by how much Frijoles Canyon was world unto itself. In the early morning sunshine, nestled under red rock cliffs, it seemed a place that existed outside modern concepts of time. Life continued there at its own pace, beyond the perils of the world around it. Opening and closing again within the space of a mile and one half, Frijoles Canyon became a prism through which to view a timeless world. Layers of humanity overlapped in the confined area between the north and south mesas. What was there must have always been there, from the community house ruins of Tyuonyi to the administrative structures built by the CCC camp. Even the electric power lines and security alarms seemed to belong to an undisturbed frozen moment.

As the stream of cars arrived each morning, afternoon, and evening, I realized that my early morning sense was an illusion. Frijoles Canyon was part of the larger world that surrounded it, and the site itself reflected that reality. The whirring of automobile engines, the noise of children shouting, and the people in each and every mystical place reminded me that while the canyon offered spiritual sanctuary from the world around it, it was not immune to the same kinds of pressures.

Ironically, I discovered by talking to visitors that many of them felt something special about the area. They, too, sought the serenity of its timelessness and felt lucky to have the opportunity to experience it. Yet they and I realized that our mutual presence eroded the unique qualities of the place. By seeking its spirituality, we encroached upon what we came to find and inexorably altered it.

This is the story of the tensions inherent in the process of bringing the unique places of the North American continent to the public, and of the seekers who came to Bandelier and linked it to the modern world. It begins in the open spaces of the plateau and spans the twentieth century, ending in a world crowded by people searching for something different than their everyday world held. It is the story of the efforts of the National Park Service to preserve and protect the unique qualities of the canyon and its surroundings.

My work has benefited from the assistance of many people. I would like to thank Superintendent John D. Hunter and his staff, including Kevin McKibbin, John Lissoway, Ken Stephens, Virginia Robicheau, and Rory Gauthier, for their patience and cooperation throughout the course of this project. They and everyone at the park answered my numerous queries, directed me to other sources, and generally tolerated an intrepid researcher asking strange questions in their midst. Their thoughtful suggestions have helped me tremendously. Chris Judson’s insightful comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript helped shape its focus. Dave Paulissen, Al de la Cruz, Sari Stein, and everyone else at the monument provided constant support and friendship, and I feel fortunate to have the opportunity to know the people who live and work at Bandelier. To all of you, many thanks.

Oral history interviews have played an important part in shaping this manuscript, and for these additional insights, I would like to thank those who gave of their time to allow their thoughts to be recorded. Richard Boyd of Chama, New Mexico, Paul
and Frances Judge of Albuquerque, and Homer Pickens shared their many memories of the Bandelier area with Virginia Robicheau and I. Dr. Milford R. Fletcher of the Park Service enlightened me about resource management and its ramifications. By telephone or letter, former Superintendents, Linwood E. Jackson, Fred Binnewies, and Jim Godbolt also offered their help. Linda Aldrich of the Los Alamos Historical Society, Theresa Strottman of the Museum of New Mexico History Library, and Laura Holt of the Laboratory of Anthropology offered the benefits of their experience in the study of the history of New Mexico. Barbara Greene Chamberlain provided a major hand in the editing of the manuscript.

Finally, I would like to thank the person whose efforts have had the most significant impact on this study. Melody Webb, the Southwest Regional Historian, has offered not only insightful criticism and thoughtful advice, but has also done much more to improve both this study and my scholarship. A young historian could find no one better under whom to work.

To all of these people, I am grateful. Any mistakes that remain are strictly my own.
CHAPTER 1
THE OPEN PLATEAU

The establishment of the Bandelier National Monument in 1916 was a direct result of conflicting pressures on the limited space of the Pajarito Plateau. Archaeologists, homesteaders, stockmen, and the Santa Fe business community all had a stake in the region. Each group thought its use should take precedence and none retreated from its position. The intervention of Federal agencies only complicated an already volatile situation, and the eventual establishment of the monument was a compromise that was a prelude to further conflict.

Between 1899 and 1916, the concept of a national park on the Pajarito Plateau frequently met solid opposition. By the time a park became a viable option, there were too many groups with interests in the region. Influential local residents periodically hindered the effort. Homesteaders upon the plateau worried that the park might threaten their livelihood. The rights of Native Americans also proved an insurmountable obstacle. Later, the United States Forest Service (USFS) posed a problem for park advocates and when an assistant secretary felt that a proposal compromised the integrity of the new park, even the Department of the Interior fought the effort.

The differing interests forced park advocates to trim their plans for the region. After 1906, a large national park, including archeological ruins, surrounding forest land, and mountain scenery was out of the question. Local stockmen and homesteaders saw to that. The resources of the region formed the basis for their living, and they fought every park effort that restricted use of land upon the plateau. Advocates never found a compromise that suited both economic and cultural interests. As a result, a 200,000-acre national park on the Pajarito Plateau was never authorized. Instead, Bandelier National Monument remains the focus of National Park Service interest in the region.

During the 1890s, southwestern archeological ruins attracted the attention of the American public as the conservation of natural resources became an important social issue. In the late 1890s, the General Land Office (GLO) began to study many of the ruins in the Southwest. After 1900, the perception that men like Richard Wetherill, a Colorado rancher who excavated throughout the four corners area, engaged in "pot-hunting" led the GLO to dramatically increase its inspections. Many sites its special agents visited later became national monuments. El Morro came to the attention of the Department of the Interior in 1899, as did other areas of peculiar interest, such as the petrified forest region of Arizona. In need of an immediate way to protect such obviously unique natural and cultural features, the GLO began to pursue a policy of "temporary withdrawal," under which it reserved land
from claims until the Government decided to what disposition each tract was best suited.¹

The attempts to create a national park on the Pajarito Plateau were a direct result of the policy of temporary withdrawal. Prior to 1906, establishment of a national park was the only available form of permanent reservation. When GLO inspectors found an area that they believed was worth preserving, the only option they had was a proposal to create a national park. As a result, before 1906, Congress considered many areas that did not fit later standards for park status.

Edgar L. Hewett, an educator and archeologist, was the catalyst for the initial park efforts in the Bandelier area. While superintendent of the Colorado Normal School in Greeley, Colorado, he became interested in archeology. In the 1890s, Hewett began to survey the ruins of the Pajarito Plateau. His activities intensified in 1898, when he became the president of New Mexico Normal University in Las Vegas, New Mexico. A scholar, albeit one without formal archeological training at that time, Hewett became famous throughout the Southwest.

By the end of the decade, Hewett believed that ruins throughout the Southwest were in serious danger, and he began to prod government agencies to take action. In his mind, the ruins of the Pajarito Plateau were particularly vulnerable. No longer protected because they were isolated and inaccessible, the ruins offered an easy target for depredators. Hewett wrote the Department of the Interior to see if it could protect the ruins. In 1899, John F. Lacey, the Chairman of the House Public Lands Committee, approached the Commissioner of the General Land Office to request a bill that would establish a national park on the Pajarito Plateau.

The GLO knew little of the region, and in late 1899, Commissioner Binger Hermann ordered J. D. Mankin, an agency clerk in New Mexico, to make an inspection of the ruins. Mankin was astonished to find himself in the midst of a lost civilization. "From a single eminence on the Pajarito," he wrote, "the doors of more than two thousand [cave and cavate lodge] . . . dwellings may be seen, and the number in the entire district would reach tens of thousands. If arranged in a continuous series they would form an unbroken line of dwellings of not less than sixty miles in length."²

During the course of the inspection, Hewett accompanied Mankin and significantly shaped his perspective. The report recommended the establishment of the "Pajarito National Park," encompassing 153,620 acres and including all the major ruins on land administered by the Department of the Interior. The bill suited Hewett's purposes. The establishment of a park would outlaw the wanton vandalism

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Hewett continued to worry about the fate of ruins in the region. While the GLO prepared a bill in early 1900, an urgent situation developed on the plateau. Hewett informed Mankin that "irresponsible parties are making preparations to invade the territory in the early spring, with a view to opening the rooms of the Communal Dwellings and exploring the caves for relics." He asked the department to establish a national park immediately. Mankin agreed and urged instant action. Nothing happened. On October 26, 1900, Hewett again wrote GLO Commissioner Binger Hermann to urge the establishment of the park. He reported an increase in vandalism during the summer of 1900 and claimed that depredators destroyed many valuable sites. Hewett believed that the best opportunity for an archeological national park was slowly eroding at the hands of miscreants.

GLO officials were ready to act and they sought out the House Public Land Committee. Late in 1900, the GLO transmitted Mankin's report and a draft of its bill to Lacey. On December 21, 1900, the Congressman proposed the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives. H. R. 13071 went to Lacey's committee, and on January 23, 1901, they reported favorably upon it. As the result of opposition in New Mexico, however, the committee added a number of clauses that indicated compromise. The most important allowed grazing at the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior. They also suggested changing the name of the proposed park from "Pajarito" to "Cliff Cities" on the grounds that an English-speaking public would mispronounce the former. Later, this innocuous suggestion became a major problem.

A national park on the Pajarito Plateau seemed imminent, and the Federal bureaucracy geared up for its proclamation. The Smithsonian Institution added its support to Mankin's proposal, and other government agencies followed suit. In accordance with Mankin's report, on July 31, 1900, Commissioner Hermann of the GLO ordered the temporary withdrawal of the 153,620-acre proposed tract in contemplation of national park status for the region.

Despite Hermann's withdrawal, the first serious attempt to create a national park on the Pajarito Plateau went no further than the proposal stage. The existing national parks were vast, spectacular areas, such as Yosemite, Yellowstone, and Mt. Rainier. There was little precedent for an archeological national park. Western congressmen questioned the efficacy of the proposal, and the House of Representatives did not act upon the bill. It expired along with the 56th Congress.

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3The "Pajarito" name became characteristic of the park proposals that Hewett orchestrated.


5Edgar L. Hewett to Hermann. October 26, 1900. Proposed National Park file 0-32, Pajarito. RG 79. NA.

Interest in the park possibilities of the Pajarito region did not end with the initial bill. On January 9, 1902, Lacey reintroduced the earlier measure to the 57th session of Congress as H. R. 8323. Opposition in the New Mexico territory quickly appeared. The Santa Fe newspaper, the *New Mexican*, expressed its fear that this was just another way for the Federal Government to seize control of large tracts of land in the state. The paper supported the principle of a national park filled with archeological ruins, but its editors expressed concern that the federal government already reserved too much land in New Mexico and further withdrawals would hamper local commerce. On March 4, 1902, the paper asked New Mexico Territorial Delegate Bernard S. Rodey to block the bill.\(^7\)

In the summer of 1902, Lacey visited the Southwest and discovered the depth of resistance to the proposal. Hewett served as his guide in northern New Mexico, and the men found that many New Mexicans opposed the project. Even the more "enlightened" factions of the Santa Fe community expressed reservations about the new park. An editorial in the *New Mexican* during Lacey's stay again supported the principle of the park, but cautioned: "Not an acre more than necessary . . . should be included in the area reserved. New Mexico is being plastered up with forest and other reservations which are at least three times the area necessary to serve the purpose for which they are created."\(^8\)

Westerners were responding to the aggressive conservation policies of Theodore Roosevelt. They long resented the power of the federal government over what they felt was their land, and Roosevelt's ascendance frightened western constituencies. The idea of withdrawing land from the public domain inevitably met strong resistance in the West. Many in the region believed that bureaucrats in Washington, D. C. too often made the decisions that determined their economic future.\(^9\) The national park idea was only taking shape, and except to the far-sighted, the establishment of the National Park Service offered little obvious benefit. To some, Lacey's Pajarito Plateau proposition seemed just another example of government officials whimsically taking away someone else's ability to make a living.

The astute Lacey recognized the importance of mustering support in the West. He already encountered western opposition to previous restrictions on public land that he proposed, and he knew that he would have to accommodate them if any of his future measures were to pass Congress. These factors, and Hewett's persistent coaxing, convinced Lacey to compromise. In 1903, he revised the bill, reduced the acreage drastically, and reentered it as H. R. 7269.\(^10\) A pragmatic accommodation, the new bill stood a better chance of passage than its predecessors. In order to appease local stockmen, the size of the proposed park was reduced from the original

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\(^7\)Santa Fe *New Mexican*, March 2 and 4, 1902.

\(^8\)"The Pajarito Cliff Dwellers National Park." Santa Fe *New Mexican*, May 20, 1902.


\(^10\)Cameron, "Proposed National Park," p. 4.
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153,620 acres to 55 sections, about 35,000 acres. Although the compromise satisfied local interests, park advocates were not pleased.

Anthropologists and Archeologists also recognized the significance of preventing vandalism in southwestern ruins. Headed by the Reverend Henry Mason Baum, the founder of the Records of the Past Society and the editor of its journal, they began to make inroads to establish a favorable intellectual climate in which to pass legislation to preserve archeological ruins. Americans began to recognize the cultural value of the North American continent, and the fervent nationalism of the turn of the century helped their cause. The perspective of the scientists, however, was often different from that of government officials looking to protect ruins or local merchants trying to attract tourists.

Baum found Lacey's revision unacceptable. In 1902, he headed an expedition of the Records of the Past Society to the Southwest that visited a number of archeological sites, including the Pajarito region. Despite his lack of formal training, Baum saw himself as the preeminent Americanist on the continent. While quite impressed with the Chaco Canyon region, upon his return he belittled the national park qualifications of the Pajarito bill in the society's journal, Records of the Past. The membership of the society included many influential archeologists, and Baum's contentions were the damning blow that soon came back to haunt the park effort.

New opposition also arose to Lacey's bill. The GLO transmitted the measure to other Government agencies that administered land in the region. In January 1903, Clinton J. Crandall, the Superintendent of the Santa Fe Indian School who doubled as the agent for area pueblos, tried to have the boundaries of Santa Clara Reservation extended. His superiors informed him that the lands he wanted were already reserved within the temporary withdrawal of 1900. Crandall expressed his dismay to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. He felt that the park proposal was inappropriate. "It is a locality not visited frequently by tourists or others," he wrote. "If instead of creating a national park, this land could be set aside for the benefit of the Santa Clara Indians ..., it would serve every purpose." The ruins were safer in Indian hands than as a national park, he contended, and cited Baum's article as evidence that the park idea was flawed. The Santa Clara claim antedated the park proposal, and Crandall believed that it should take precedence. Since both agencies were divisions of the Department of the Interior, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs requested an inspection of the area. GLO Special Agent Stephen J. Holsinger was appointed to the task.

Holsinger had long been the man in the field for archeological inspections by the Department of the Interior. Prior to the Pajarito proposal, Holsinger reviewed a wide range of cases. In 1900, he visited Chaco Canyon to report on Richard Wetherill's unauthorized excavations. He broke up a ring of "pot-hunters" in Arizona in late 1902 and inspected the Montezuma Castle and other archeological sites. He

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12Clinton J. Crandall to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, May 22, 1903, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities. RG 79. NA.
arranged to place a watchman at the proposed Petrified Forest National Park. When GLO officials wanted an important inspection in the Southwest, they nearly always called on Holsinger.

By 1903, a national park in the Pajarito region had become the focus of conflicting interests. Advocates of archeological preservation lined up in favor of the park. Local stockmen expressed the traditional western fear of centralized authority. The rights of Native Americans in the area also became a significant obstacle. Stockmen, area homesteaders, the Santa Fe community, and area Pueblos would all have to be satisfied with a proposal before a national park on the Pajarito Plateau had become reality.

Compromise was already an integral part of any solution. Park advocates sensed that they would have to make concessions to get what they wanted. At the turn of the century, the best national parks were large areas. Most allowed grazing under a system of permits. Stockmen were powerful in territorial New Mexico, and park advocates were willing to allow grazing in the proposed park in order to secure the support of this important constituency. Even Hewett understood this reality. Perhaps the most influential figure in American archeology in the first decade of the twentieth century, he envisioned a national park for archeological study. Grazing did not interfere with his objectives, and he placed his growing national influence behind the park effort.

Stephen J. Holsinger's job was to determine the validity of the various claims and come up with an equitable solution. His report evaluated the contentions of each group and strongly sided with park advocates. Holsinger characterized the Santa Claras as a "distinctly agricultural people," intimating that Crandall's assertion of the need of the Santa Clara Pueblo for more land was "not well-founded." Its agricultural economy made the addition of pasture land unnecessary. Holsinger noted that vandalism remained endemic, and there was strong support for the park in Santa Fe. Holsinger also discounted the notion that the area was too remote for a park, arguing that the difficulty would not deter the truly interested. He incorrectly claimed that existing national park regulations in 1904 provided for roads to be "speedily built." In his mind, a national park on the Pajarito Plateau was an important step forward.

Since Hewett supported Lacey's revision of the bill and Holsinger reported that the other objections were specious, there appeared to be no further obstacles to the establishment of the national park. Lacey's committee took Holsinger's report and revised it to allow the Secretary of the Interior to permit grazing within the boundaries of the park. They also decreased the size to a forty-section tract that included Otowi, Tsankawi, and Puye, but which left out the Rito de Los Frijoles ruins. The area that included Frijoles Canyon was proposed as a forest reserve, and privately owned land separated its ruins from the rest of the park. Given the limits of the compromise, there was no way to include the Rito as a contiguous section. The Department of the Interior was willing to take a park in the northern half of

the plateau. The Bureau of Forestry approved the new plan, as did the Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, A. C. Tonner, and GLO Commissioner W. A. Richards. All possible opposition was legislated out of the bill, and passage again appeared imminent.

Despite general concurrence among Federal agencies, many New Mexicans were still uncomfortable with the ramifications of a national park. From their perspective, the Government managed too much of New Mexico and residents of the state had little part in shaping their own destiny. They opposed any measure that gave Washington additional control over lands in the territory. When the newest edition of the park bill debated in a House of Representatives Public Lands Committee hearing on January 11, 1905, it was paired with a bill to establish the Mesa Verde [Verde] National Park. Both bills were closely tied to the movement to preserve American antiquities, which the Lodge-Rodenberg Bill personified in 1904-05.

The Lodge-Rodenberg bill, of which Henry Mason Baum was the major proponent, caused serious controversy at the end of the prior congressional session in 1904. The bill raised objections among westerners for it granted the Secretary of the Interior unlimited discretion over unreserved public lands. The Smithsonian Institution publicly opposed the bill and sent its representatives to the floor of Congress to lobby against it. The crisis fractured the preservation constituency. With Lodge-Rodenberg again current, opposition to national park bills became prominent.

By 1905, the archeological and anthropological communities made a serious commitment to the concept of preserving American antiquities. Scientists favored the idea of archeological national parks. At the Public Lands Committee hearing, such luminaries as Francis W. Kelsey of the University of Michigan and the Archeological Institute of America lined up to show their support of both the Mesa Verde and Pajarito park bills. Henry Mason Baum, whose views regarding the suitability of the Pajarito changed after a subsequent visit to the area in 1904, also addressed the committee. The professional community unequivocally supported the bills.

New Mexicans were less comfortable with the proposal. Although Edgar Hewett expressed reservations, in the end he favored the plan. The delegate from the New Mexico Territory, Bernard S. Rodey, felt otherwise. As a cattleman, Rodey resisted the intrusion of the federal government into state land matters. Hewett remarked that too much forest land in New Mexico was already withdrawn, and Rodey concurred loudly. The prospect of a law that allowed widespread reservation of archeological sites frightened him. If all the ruins were lined up, he said, an area ranging from Espanola to the Colorado border might be reserved and grazing in the northern half of the territory would end. To laughter, Congressman Eben W. Martin of South Dakota asked Rodey: "How would the size of the State of New York suit you as a limitation [on possible reservations for the preservation of antiquities]?" "Well, we have been reserving New Mexico for about sixty-eight years," Rodey replied. "[The Secretary of the Interior, Ethan Allen Hitchcock] might get in
reservations of that size. [He] is pretty radical [and] is liable to do almost
anything."\(^{14}\)

Sounding the concerns of his constituency about the nature of antiquities
legislation, Rodey damaged the case for the Pajarito park. He confused the Pajarito
proposal with the move to reserve antiquities in general. His stance typified
regional resistance to what westerners saw as the meddling of the federal
government in state and local affairs. A national park was not a large enough prize
to offset the animosity of local residents and New Mexico voters did not favor
extending the power of federal bureaucrats.

Simultaneously passing a number of bills to preserve antiquities at proved a
difficult proposition. Lacey's committee reported favorably on the Pajarito proposal
and it went to the floor of Congress. Along with a number of measures for the
preservation of American antiquities and the bill to establish the Mesa Verde
National Park in Colorado, there it remained throughout 1905. With a variety of
options, it seemed that Congress could not choose.

The spectra of Richard Wetherill, the self-trained rancher-turned-archeologist
from Mancos, Colorado, continued to shape the evolution of southwestern archeology.
An anathema to the professionalizing discipline of anthropology, Wetherill became
the subject of a widespread campaign to condemn him as a "pot-hunter." American
archeologists discounted Wetherill's discovery of the Basketmakers, the prehistoric
peoples that preceded the Anasazi, and Baum regularly defamed him in print. Edgar
L. Hewett also complained to the Department of the Interior about Wetherill's
digging. Places that Wetherill worked, such as Mesa Verde and Chaco Canyon,
became priority locations in the scheme of institutional preservation. The consensus
among government officials and accredited archeologists was that Wetherill had to
be put out of business once and for all. One of the best ways to restrict Wetherill
was to reserve the sites where he excavated.

When it became apparent that only one of the two archeological national park
bills was going to pass Congress, Lacey made the choice that the near-hysteria
regarding Wetherill dictated. He threw his support to the Mesa Verde project. When
he heard that Theodore Roosevelt added forty-seven square miles, including the Puye
ruins, to the Santa Clara reservation in July 1905, Hewett publicly followed. He
complained that the proposition was dead.\(^ {15}\) Without either Puye or the El Rito de
los Frijoles ruins, the archeological potential of the Pajarito Plateau national park
was minimal.

Enthusiasm for the project waned. On March 26, 1906, William H. Andrews,
Rodey's successor as the delegate from the New Mexico Territory, introduced another
measure to establish the Pajarito National Park. The bill, numbered H. R. 17459,
made little headway. Hewett's "Act For the Preservation of American Antiquities,"

RG 79. NA.

\(^{15}\)Executive Order 80218, July 29, 1905; Edgar L. Hewett. "Anthropological Miscellania: Preserving
Antiquities." American Anthropologist 7. (Fall 1905) 570.
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which allowed the President to proclaim any section of unreserved Federal land of significant pre-historic, historic, and scientific interest as a national monument, passed both houses and became law in early June, 1906. Mesa Verde National Park was authorized later the same month. There was no sign of a national park on the Pajarito Plateau.

In Congress, 1906 became the year of archeology and it offered the best opportunity to create an archeological national park. The passage of the Antiquities Act and the Mesa Verde park bill within three weeks of each other revealed a greater interest in establishing archeological national parks than before or since. As it stood in 1906, the park proposal for the Pajarito Plateau lacked a significant archeological component. The most important archeological sites on the plateau were within a forest reserve, an Indian reservation, and private land. Ironically, the archeology of the plateau was beyond the reach of park advocates at the best moment for the creation of an archeological national park. The series of compromises deprived the park bill of its primary features as well as the opportunity to be included in a unique moment in the history of American preservation.

As the pre-eminent archeologist of the Southwest in the early 1900s, Hewett should have been able to orchestrate the establishment of a national park on the Pajarito Plateau. Between 1904 and 1906, his influence over the GLO and the Department of the Interior was at its zenith. He served as an advisor to GLO Commissioner Richards on archeology and preservation and drew up a survey that identified four distinct river basins brimming with archeological remains. Hewett also wrote the Antiquities Act and received the approval of the American Archeological Institute and the American Anthropological Association for the project, testified frequently in front of Congress on archeological questions, and remained a close friend of John F. Lacey. In 1906, he was as close to the centers of power in disputes over land as any man in the country.

After Lacey's death, Hewett contended that the congressman abandoned the Pajarito project in favor of the Mesa Verde bill. Hewett was a capricious man, however, and a stronger likelihood was that after he inspected Mesa Verde for the Department of the Interior in March, 1906, Hewett himself gave up on the abrogated Pajarito project. Without either Puye or Frijoles Canyon, from Hewett's perspective, there was little point in establishing a national park. Better opportunities would certainly arise, but there would be no national park on the Pajarito Plateau in 1906.

With much of the earlier national interest dissipating, Hewett tightened his hold upon the ruins of the Pajarito Plateau. Following the lead of earlier archeologists, he came to see the area as his personal project. The failure of the first proposal strained local support badly, and advocates of the project needed time to regroup. Hewett stepped into this void and consolidated his position in the professional world. In 1903, Territorial Governor Miguel Otero forced him to leave the New Mexico Normal School, and Hewett changed careers. He pursued graduate work in archeology at the University of Geneva, where he received a Ph.D in 1908. He developed his power base with professional anthropologists and archeologists, and in 1907 became the director of the newly founded School of American Archeology in Santa Fe. This increased his prestige, and Hewett used his new position to acquire
simultaneous excavating permits from the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior. He became the only authorized excavator at Frijoles Canyon, Puye, and other sites within the area the GLO withdrew in 1900. In 1907, Hewett led an excavation of Puye, and in 1909, followed with similar at Tyuonyi, in Frijoles Canyon. He also held permits for other archeological sites throughout the Southwest.⁶⁶ Although the permits required his presence at all times, his prestige was such that the GLO, the Department of the Interior, and the Forest Service allowed him to violate the terms of the Antiquities Act.

The withdrawal of 1900 and the creation of the Jemez Forest Reserve [later the Santa Fe National Forest] in 1905 created a confusing situation upon the plateau. Because forest reserves and the public domain were under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior in 1900, the GLO made the original temporary withdrawal. In 1905, Theodore Roosevelt transferred the national forests to the new United States Forest Service (USFS), a division of the Department of Agriculture. The first United States Forester, Gifford Pinchot, advocated utilitarian conservation and sought to build grass roots support for his agency. He arranged for the passage of the Act of June 11, 1906, which opened arable land within forest reserves to homestead claims. With nearly 200,000,000 acres involved in the transfer, the USFS and the GLO paid little attention to specific cases like the Pajarito Plateau. Moreover, USFS personnel never understood exactly which lands in the region the GLO withdrew from entry. As a result, the Forest Service allowed settlers to file for ownership of land that was within the boundaries of the temporary withdrawal of 1900. When the error was discovered, a paramount western fear came to the forefront-- that an individual's property could be taken at the whim of the Federal government.

This became an important source of anti-national park sentiment in the region. In 1907, a tubercular homesteader from Illinois, Harold H. Brook, filed a claim on a tract at the base of the Jemez Mountains, where the Fuller Lodge stands in Los Alamos. When he tried to perfect his patent in 1909, he discovered that his property, which he called the Los Alamos Ranch, was within the temporary withdrawal of 1900. The enraged Brook blamed his predicament on the incompetence of the Forest Service for allowing him to apply and on the GLO, for granting him conditional title.⁶⁷ But he saved his real wrath for national park advocates.

Linked to the development of the national park, a small range war was brewing on the Pajarito Plateau. Brook had a sizable investment in his enterprise, and he was prepared to defend it. He brought the problem to the attention of the public, writing letters to newspapers and contacting influential people in the territorial government. His neighbors made him their spokesman and homesteaders in the Pajarito region gathered support for their cause.

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⁶⁶Edgar L. Hewett, Excavations at Puye. 1907 and Excavations at Tyuonyi. 1908. (Santa Fe: School of American Research, 1909). See also the Edgar L. Hewett papers. Box 22, Museum of New Mexico History Library, for copies of his permits.

⁶⁷Harold Brook to Edgar L. Hewett, November 11, 1909, Museum of New Mexico History Library, Hewett papers. Box 22.
As his influence grew, Hewett became an informal arbiter of land claims in the region. Brook asked Hewett to apply his influence to the situation. Hewett recognized that such conflict would not further his goals. With the primary ruins still unreserved and Brook stirring up opposition to future efforts, the status quo became intolerable. Hewett pressed the Department of the Interior to develop new options for the administration of the region.

In 1909, the Department of the Interior and the GLO had two options when it came to reserving archeological areas: a national park bill and the Antiquities Act of 1906. Hewett authored the latter, which allowed the president to reserve sections of public land as national monument without obtaining congressional sanction. Because it circumvented Congress, the Antiquities Act offered greater flexibility than a national park bill.

Even at the turn of the century, there were assumptions about the nature of national parks. Yosemite and Yellowstone were the models for the category. Although "porkbarreling" in Congress before 1906 led to a number of inferior national parks, afterwards Congress held to a rudimentary if ambiguous standard. Like Mount Rainier and Crater Lake, two turn-of-the-century additions, national parks had to include spectacular scenery.

National monuments were less clearly defined. Most of the ones created prior to 1909 were areas that the GLO withdrew before the passage of the Antiquities Act. They were often small areas, with archeological values or scenery less impressive than that in the national parks. More important from the local point of view, commercial use of natural resources was rarely restricted. Local ranchers could usually graze their animals within the boundaries of a nearby national monument.

As the author of the bill, Hewett was aware of the differences. Late in November 1909, he suggested that the Department of the Interior commission a survey of the region with an eye towards establishing a national monument. With a smaller area reserved in a national monument, the GLO could terminate the temporary withdrawal. Brook and the other homesteaders could then perfect their land patents. Such a compromise indicated that homesteaders and archeologists could co-exist upon the plateau. The homesteaders would continue their lives at the base of the Jemez Mountains, and the national monument would protect the most important ruins. It was precisely for cases like this that Hewett and Lacey created the Antiquities Act. The Department of the Interior concurred and sent the United States Examiner of Surveys, William B. Douglass, to the Pajarito Plateau.

Douglass was an important figure in the evolution of preservation in the West and Southwest. Responsible for land surveys in the Southwest, he was an ardent

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19 Secretary of the Interior Richard A. Ballinger to GLO Commissioner Fred Dennett, December 8, 1909; Ballinger to Secretary of Agriculture James Mason, December 8, 1909; Mason to Ballinger, December 11, 1909; and Assistant Secretary of Interior Eric C. Finney memorandum, attached to Mason’s December 11, 1909, letter. Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79. NA.
supporter of Federal attempts at the preservation of ruins. One of the first Anglos to see the Natural Bridges and Rainbow Bridge in Utah, he also visited Navajo National Monument as soon as the Government was informed that there were ruins there. In 1909, Douglass made an enemy of Edgar L. Hewett when he forced Hewett and Byron Cummings to cease their excavation in the newly established Navajo National Monument. Douglass felt that Hewett's use of the national monument as a place to train his students in archeological technique was nothing short of criminal. In essence, Douglass called the man who developed the label "pot-hunter" an officially sanctioned "pot-hunter." Hewett never forgave him. Their rivalry complicated the process of establishing a national park on the Pajarito Plateau.20

When Hewett discovered that Douglass planned to survey the portion of the Pajarito Plateau outside of the Jemez National Forest, he surmised that another attempt to take the Puye ruins away from the Santa Clara Indians was brewing. He immediately used his influence to stop Douglass. While in Washington, D.C. in the spring of 1910, he informed Frank Bond, the Chief Clerk of the GLO, that he strenuously objected to the idea of a national monument at Puye.21 On July 10, 1910, Hewett warned Clinton J. Crandall at the Santa Fe Indian School that Douglass was again surveying the Puye region. "Without my knowledge or consent," Crandall wrote the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, "Mr. Douglass proceeded to the vicinity of the Santa Clara Indian Reservation and spent some days or weeks surveying the Puye and other ruins." Crandall continued the objections he made in 1903, arguing that a national monument would abridge the rights of the Santa Clara Indians.

Hewett's sentiments had an important impact upon Crandall, and the two men obstructed the aims of the Department of the Interior. Crandall and the leaders of the Pueblo approved of Hewett's excavations, and he had nothing to gain from a change in status. His dislike for Douglass had not cooled. If Douglass advocated the reservation of Puye, then Hewett would oppose it. "Mr. Hewett . . . would regret very much to see any change made in the present management of these cliffs," Crandall informed his superior. "As a national monument there are no funds available for a custodian or caretaker, that they can be much better handled under the present arrangement. In order [to establish the monument,] it would be necessary to take away from the reservation some of the grazing land and upland timber."22 Hewett's support for area Indians was widely acknowledged, and if the most important archeologist in the Southwest believed that a national monument was not a worthy enough prize for the transfer of land away from the Pueblo, then Crandall agreed.

Hewett worked hard to stymie Douglass' efforts, and as a result, the General Land Office needed the concurrence of other Government agencies if it was to continue the project. As Hewett expected, Douglass filed a report on July 27, 1910,

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21 GLO Commissioner Fred Dennett to Secretary of the Smithsonian W.D. Walcott, October 19, 1910. Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities. RG 79. NA.

that recommended the establishment of a national monument which included the Puye ruins. Hewett's influence at the Bureau of Indian Affairs led that agency to oppose the project. On October 8, Assistant Commissioner for Indian Affairs F. H. Abbott requested that Puye and the other ruins on the Santa Clara reservation be eliminated from the proposed national monument. This left the proposed monument without its most important archeological feature. GLO Commissioner Fred Dennett referred the matter to the Secretary of the Smithsonian, W. D. Walcott, explained the conflicting claims, and asked Walcott to decide whether there ought to be a national monument at Puye.23

Hewett was also influential in Smithsonian Institution circles, and he continued to battle the monument idea. He communicated his objections to Walcott, who informed the GLO on October 26, 1910, that he thought a national monument was unnecessary. Walcott echoed Hewett's perspective, asserting that the ruins were managed responsibly and intimated that the Bureau of Indian Affairs was clearly cognizant of the need to preserve the ruins. Two days later, Dennett informed Walcott that he planned to drop the proposal.24 Without Frijoles Canyon, Navawi, Tschirege, and Puye, there seemed little point in pursuing the idea.

The effort to preserve the Frijoles Canyon and Puye ruins fragmented into attempts to reserve each area separately, foreshadowing the later establishment of the Bandelier National Monument. The Ramon Vigil Spanish land grant separated Puye and Frijoles Canyon, and there was already a consensus that non-contiguous areas ought not to be established as national parks. Without the cooperation of the United States Bank and Trust Company, which held title the grant, the project to unite Puye and Frijoles Canyon in a national park could not proceed.

Douglass' proposal for Puye was the first attempt to preserve discreet archeological features instead of the entire plateau. The history of failed national parks in the region and the urgent need for some form of archeological preservation induced the GLO to consider Douglass' idea. Its interest meant that the GLO committed itself to a broader ideal, articulating the belief that preservation of some of the ruins was better than none at all.

Following the demise of the first national monument proposal in 1910, the concept of a national park on the Pajarito Plateau remained dormant until 1914. Hewett's excavations continued at Puye and Frijoles, often as a part of the same type of archeological training project to which Douglass objected so vociferously in 1908. The Government agencies that renewed his multiple excavation permits every year did not challenge his archeological empire on the Pajarito Plateau. The status quo suited him. But the Federal Government revived its interest in the project, and in 1913, Department of the Interior Inspector Herbert W. Gleason made a cursory inspection of the region. Gleason advocated the idea of a park and wrote to New


24Walcott to Dennett, October 26, 1910; and Dennett to Walcott, October 28, 1910. Proposed National Park file 0-32. Cliff Cities. RG 79, NA.
Mexico Senator Thomas Catron to urge that the senator work for the establishment of a national park. Catron responded that he planned to put a bill forward in the coming session of Congress.\(^{25}\)

Attempts to establish a national park on the Pajarito Plateau again began in earnest. On February 14, 1914, Catron entered S. 4537, to establish the National Park of the Cliff Cities, which he soon replaced with S. 5176. On March 18, 1914, New Mexico Representative Harvey B. Fergusson authored and entered a companion measure, H. R. 14739. The new bills were ambitious proposals, consolidating ruins from the Santa Clara reservation, the Jemez National Forest, and the public domain into a 252,620-acre national park. This was nearly 100,000 acres larger than the original proposal and the temporary withdrawal of 1900. Instigated with the assistance of the Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce, the new bills seemed likely to revive every conceivable objection the earlier bills created.

After his inspection of Puye in 1911, Douglass remained in Santa Fe and became the premier advocate of the Pajarito Plateau national park. He continued to make inspections for the Department of the Interior, but also began a number of projects of his own. The park headed his list. He joined the Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce and awakened interest in the park there. If a park could be established while Americans were travelling to California for the Panama-Pacific Exposition in 1915, Douglass believed it provided an opportunity to help the local economy grow. With Douglass in the lead, support for the project galvanized.

When Catron proposed the new bill, Douglass effectively countered much of the prior opposition. The bill included Puye, but did not restrict the rights of Indians living within the proposed park boundaries. The Commissioner of the Office of Indian Affairs, Cato Sells, did not object.\(^{26}\) Douglass accommodated local grazing interests by including a clause in the bills that allowed the Department of the Interior to lease much of proposed park for grazing. He also tried to pacify USFS resistance with a provision that made the Forest Service responsible for the administration of grazing leases within the new park. The community of Santa Fe publicly favored the bill, and chances of passage seemed good.

Opposition arose in a new quarter. Clay Tallman, the Commissioner of the GLO, challenged the validity of the new proposal. He informed Undersecretary of the Interior A. A. Jones that he believed the proposed lands were too scattered for inclusion in a national park. The Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce only wanted a national park because Congress appropriated money for parks, Tallman insinuated, while it had not for monuments. "Doubtless if [the area] were incorporated into a forest reserve it would receive substantially the same protection and be of


substantially the same use," Tallman continued. "There appears to be no good objection to permitting it to remain a National Forest." 27

The Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce defended its position, responding quickly and vehemently to Tallman's assertions. In a scathing letter, G. H. Van Stone, the secretary of the organization, asserted that the lands it requested were contiguous and claimed that Tallman could not have looked at a map before he made his remarks. Van Stone also objected to the protection offered the area by Indian police and the Forest Service. "Under the present rules, any college that wishes a collection of pottery can get a permit to excavate. . . . [The] scientific value [of archeological parks and monuments] has been wholly or partly obliterated by the removal of unrecorded antiquities." Emotional and hyperbolic, Van Stone objected to uncontrolled excavation by men like Hewett. He asserted that the establishment of a national park would afford the "virgin" ruins of the Pajarito Plateau better protection than Indian police or the Forest Service could offer. 28

Despite Van Stone's veiled attack on his professional integrity, Hewett put his public support behind the proposals. 29 An all-encompassing archeological national park would further the ends of the School of American Archeology and certainly lend its director greater prestige. It also meant protection for the ruins, and since by 1914, Hewett had ceased to excavate the region himself, it offered a suitable finale to his efforts on the Pajarito Plateau.

With Hewett's support, the project seemed even more likely to succeed. The Chamber of Commerce continued to barrage the Department of the Interior with testimonials to the advantages of the park. Letters from park advocates regularly covered A. A. Jones' desk, each announcing broad public support for the bill. On April 21, 1914, the Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution requesting the rapid establishment of the park, and its tenacity overwhelmed local opposition. 30

But passage of the bill required more than the support of the local business community. The Forest Service strongly opposed the measure, as did Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston. From his point of view, the bill lacked provisions to make a "real park," along the lines of Yosemite. Houston wrote that he did not object to a national park if the bill included clauses encouraging development, but he would not approve a national park that was essentially a national forest under the administration of the Department of the Interior. 31 The Forest Service had a clearly

27 Commissioner of the General Land Office Clay Tallman to Assistant Secretary of the Interior A. A. Jones, April 4, 1914, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.
29 Hewett to Jones, April 3, 1914, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.
30 Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce to Jones, April 4. April 11, May 9, 1914, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.
31 Secretary of Agriculture D. F. Houston to Chairman, Senate Public Lands Committee, Henry C. Myers. April 29, 1914, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.
defined sphere, and Houston did not want the Department of the Interior to encroach upon it.

When he learned of the opposition, Douglass tried to satisfy the USFS. He met with Don P. Johnston, the Forest Service Supervisor in the Jemez District, to work out the problems. Senator Catron was also in Santa Fe, and he, Johnston, and Douglass met with the park committee of the Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce. The group worked out an acceptable agreement. On May 14, 1914, Fergusson reintroduced the changed bill as H. R. 16546.

Douglass gushed over the popularity of the measure in letters to Fergusson and Catron. "Nearly everybody is 'for it,' [and, if the bill passed,] an appreciative public will reward you in the future," Douglass wrote Fergusson.32 From the perspective of the Chamber of Commerce, passage of the bill during the 1914 session was imperative. Its members were willing to meet any conditions the New Mexico congressional delegation thought would help.

Despite Johnston's cooperation, Secretary Houston was not convinced of the need for such restrictive protection of the Pajarito Plateau. In early 1914, he expressed his sympathy for the idea to New Mexico Governor William McDonald, but also asserted that he did not yet see the need for specific park legislation. Douglass immediately worked to alter the bill to fit Houston's objections, but before he could counter the objections completely, the Department of the Interior sent him to western New Mexico to make an inspection. By the time he returned, the Forest Service had solidified its position.33

There were still problems within the Department of the Interior. When he made his report on S. 5176 for the Senate Public Lands Committee that July, GLO Commissioner Clay Tallman gave the project a luke-warm endorsement. He suggested that 94,275 acres on the west and south should be excluded from the 252,620-acre proposal. Because the bill included the entire Santa Clara reservation, Tallman also recommended a report from the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Despite his slight objections, Tallman thought that the park was a good idea because it would "give uniform jurisdiction" to the ruins on reservation land and protection to those on the unreserved public domain.34

Although the Chamber of Commerce worked long and hard to please every constituency, S. 5176 was far from assured of passage. From the perspective of the Department of the Interior, the bill became too much of a compromise. It contained provisions that allowed the commercial use of resources in the park if later exploration revealed that economic potential existed. The Department of the Interior had begun to rid the national parks of commercial exploitation, and this vague clause

32William B. Douglas to New Mexico Representative Harvey B. Fergusson, May 9, 1914. Proposed National Park File 0-32, Cliff Cities. RG 79, NA.


presented evident future problems. Another unusual procedure allowed the Forest Service to retain its right to grant grazing permits and at the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior, the Forest Service could manage areas of the park as if it was a national forest. Houston previously objected to this clause, arguing that if the area was to be a national park, it ought to be reserved as such. The Department of the Interior agreed. From its perspective, the proposal suffered from unacceptable ambiguity.

Douglass' effort to appease the Department of Agriculture backfired. Not only did Houston object, the Department of the Interior could not live with the compromise either. In October 1914, Assistant Secretary of the Interior Bo Sweeney recommended that the Senate committee turn the bill back. He agreed that passage of the proposal would create a park with divided jurisdiction and asserted that the Department of the Interior wanted to wait until a bureau of national parks was established to pursue the project any farther. Then "competent persons connected therewith" could determine the feasibility of the project. Sweeney sent a copy of the letter containing the unfavorable recommendation along with his request that the House Committee also table the bill to Rep. Scott Ferris, the chairman of the House Public Lands Committee. 

Without the support of the Department of the Interior, the attempt to establish a Pajarito Plateau national park was finished. The bills on the floor of Congress did not meet the existing standards of the department. Threatened by the aggressiveness of Douglass and Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce and aware of the inferior national parks created during the first decade of the twentieth century, departmental officials backed off. Few representatives would vote to establish a national park of which the administering department did not approve, and efforts in Congress stalled.

The end of the park effort resulted in increased interest on the part of the Department of Agriculture. Secretary Houston continued to oppose the entire park idea, and realized that the failure of the existing proposal gave him an opportunity to terminate park proposals once and for all. He ordered an inspection of the region with an eye towards the creation of a national monument. Because Frijoles Canyon was included in the Jemez National Forest, a national monument established there became the responsibility of USFS.

Houston's idea resulted in the establishment of Bandelier National Monument. In early 1915, Will C. Barnes, the chief of grazing for the agency, and Arthur Ringland, the District Forester in Albuquerque, made an inspection tour of the area. They saw an "extraordinary exhibition of ruins and cliff-dwellings" and discussed the merits of national park status for the region. Ringland thought that a park was not warranted and the men agreed that a comparatively small monument, encompassing the important ruins in Frijoles Canyon, was. Barnes suggested naming the area for Adolph F. A. Bandelier, a recently deceased anthropologist who explored

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35 Assistant Secretary of the Interior Bo Sweeney to Myers, October 7, 1914. Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.
the region during the 1880s and 1890s. Secretary Houston thought that a monument would offer the ruins adequate protection, and would also protect Forest Service land from what that agency perceived as a 200,000+ acre land-grab. Houston expedited the proposal. On February 11, 1916, President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed the 22,400 acre Bandelier National Monument.

The USFS created the Bandelier National Monument as a way to circumvent the attempts to establish a national park on the Pajarito Plateau. The opposition of the Department of the Interior to Douglass' bill in 1914 offered the USFS an opening, and the earlier proposals to establish a national monument at Puye paved the way for the preservation of specific features in the region. Quick action on the part of Secretary of Agriculture Houston allowed the establishment of a national monument while pro-national park forces tried to regroup.

The creation of the monument was a victory for the utilitarian conservationism embodied in Forest Service policy. It removed what USFS officials and many local residents regarded as the prime threat to the commercial development of the region. The 22,400-acre tract established by statute did not lock up large areas of the Pajarito Plateau. The vast majority of the region was still open to homesteaders, stockmen, and other developers.

The proclamation, however, did not end disputes over land on the Pajarito Plateau. Edgar L. Hewett and William B. Douglass would once again find themselves on opposing sides of the park question. The new National Park Service would also try to establish a national park in the region, and the Forest Service would oppose its efforts as well. Disputes over the comparative value of the Pajarito Plateau were only beginning to become complicated.

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CHAPTER 2
THE COMING OF THE PARK SERVICE

Between 1916 and 1932, the move to establish a national park on the Pajarito Plateau again gathered momentum. After the establishment of the Bandelier National Monument, Edgar L. Hewett became an obstacle to the project, but by the early 1920s, he and the National Park Service joined forces to offer the most comprehensive proposal to date. The Forest Service resisted the takeover, but the Park Service was in a commanding position. Chances for a Pajarito Plateau national park looked excellent. Internal resistance within the NPS, however, thwarted the agency, and instead of a large national park, the agency assumed responsibility for the administration of the Bandelier National Monument.

The initial proclamation of the monument was no guarantee that attempts to create a national park on the Pajarito Plateau were over. Assistant Secretary of the Interior Stephen T. Mather, who became the first director of the National Park Service, did not regard the monument proclamation as final. Nor did William B. Douglass and the Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce. Douglass publicly lambasted the Department of the Interior for its "deaf ear" and to work for the park, he founded the New Mexico National Parks Association. The Chamber of Commerce appointed another committee to work for passage of the bill.\(^1\) It enlisted Senator Catron, and in December of 1915, he introduced another measure, S. 2542, to establish a national park on the Pajarito Plateau.

Although Catron believed that the new measure would receive the support the others lacked, S. 2542 had serious flaws. While the Department of the Interior deemed the previous bill unsuitable because of its compromises, the new one was sure to encounter resistance in New Mexico. It appeared to abrogate the rights of local constituencies.

Opposition to the new measure arose instantly. In December 1915, Douglass wrote a letter to the editor of the New Mexican that supported the bill, sight unseen. Harold Brook, by now firmly ensconced on the Pajarito Plateau, attacked Douglass' stand. "The settlers [of the region] contend," Brook wrote, "that the difference between the benefits gained by the judicious handling of the ruins, as they are, and the benefits gained by a park, would not justify, morally or commercially, the unfair unreasonable ruination of a great many homesteaders.\(^2\) Forced to again consider substantial local opposition, Douglass, Hewett, and the rest of the Chamber of Commerce met in February 1916, to iron out their differences.

Four clauses in the bill created obstacles for either Hewett or Douglass. No one was satisfied with the way the bill approached the rights of Native Americans.

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There was no clause to allow grazing within the boundaries of the park. This was sure to enrage Harold Brook and the powerful New Mexico Stockmen's Association. The name of the park was again to be "Pajarito." Hewett was pleased with that choice but it bothered other members of the Chamber of Commerce. "Pajarito" was no easier to pronounce in 1916 than it was in 1900. Two other clauses worried Hewett. The bill prohibited taking original and duplicate specimens outside of New Mexico, and it severely limited excavation. This was a distinct threat to Hewett's power base. S. 2542 appeared to be as questionable as earlier efforts.

As a result, the group offered a compromise that changed its strategy but not its ultimate goal. Instead of a national park on the plateau, the men proposed four national monuments. Along with the existing Bandelier, they requested the Pajarito National Monument, which would be north of the Ramon Vigil Grant and included the northern bank of the Guaje river and its ruins. Puye and Shufinne would become the Santa Clara National Monument, while ruins in the Jemez Mountains were included in the Jemez National Monument. Despite the change in tactics, the objective remained the same. From the perspective of the committee, the "creation of the four national monuments on the Pajarito Plateau will hasten the creation of the Pajarito National Park."³

But the fragile coalition dissolved. Hewett and Douglass could not stay on the same side of any issue for long. Although they both favored a national park, they had different ideas about its purpose. Douglass and the Chamber of Commerce wanted Santa Fe to develop as an important tourist center. In their view, the surface ruins in the region were a major attraction for visitors. Hewett was interested in what lay below the ground. He worried that the park would curtail his fieldwork. In April, 1916, published an attack on S. 2542 in El Palacio, the Journal of the Museum of New Mexico. He contended that the bill had little support in New Mexico and that it severely restricted the advancement of archeological science. The establishment of a national park offered little economic advantage, he asserted, and even the name suggested for the park, "Cliff Cities," was misleading. Differing perspectives upon the purpose of the park created divisions among those who supported the principle of a national park on the Pajarito Plateau.⁴

After reading Hewett's account of the shortcomings of the new measure, Douglass responded aggressively in the New Mexican. He contended that Hewett was misleading the public. While many influential people did not support S. 2542, nearly everyone supported the idea of a national park on the Pajarito Plateau. Douglass quoted letters from Bond & Nohl, a major livestock enterprise, revealing that the ranching community supported the project so long as the Department of the Interior permitted grazing within the park. Douglass had notes from the Governor of New Mexico and various departmental officials that also supported the concept of the park. He pointed out that the park would make a sizable economic contribution to the region, for the many visitors would have to be fed and lodged in the north central New Mexico region. In addition to countering Hewett's objections, Douglass


offered advantages of the proposal. He revealed that the new bill would compel excavators to leave the relics they discovered either in a museum run by the State of New Mexico or in a new museum at either the Puye or Frijoles site.

Despite all the challenges Douglass offered to Hewett’s arguments, he knew that S. 2542 was a mistake. Because the bill forbid grazing on the plateau, Douglass asserted that the New Mexico National Parks Association, of which he was the secretary, requested its withdrawal. In its current state, the bill would cause the livestock industry to oppose it. Yet in light of Hewett’s attack, Douglass had to defend the proposition. If he did not, Hewett’s prestige might turn the public against the project as a whole.

His rebuttal attacked Hewett personally, charging that malice inspired Hewett’s opposition. Douglass contended that Hewett wrote the disparaging article only because the Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce rejected his suggestion to call the park “Pajarito” instead of “Cliff Cities.” In Douglass’ view, Hewett behaved in a manner unbecoming a man of influence, and his petulance was inappropriate in such an important situation.

Douglass’ accusations were defendable. No stranger to controversy, Hewett once again placed his personal interests ahead of those of his neighbors. His article fragmented the coalition and led to public speculation that he had been working against the national park idea all along. Hewett’s real objection to S. 2542 was the provision that prevented him from doing as he pleased with what he uncovered in the ruins on the Pajarito Plateau. His contention that no serious depredations occurred there in the preceding decade was essentially true. Because he controlled archeological investigation on the plateau through Judge A. J. Abbott, Hewett’s friend who served as informal custodian of the monument from his summer home in Frijoles Canyon, and held simultaneous excavation permits for nearly every important ruin in the region, Hewett’s permission was an essential prerequisite for all excavators. In 1916, Hewett ruled the Pajarito Plateau. The existing national monument allowed him to continue his reign; the park proposition might have ended it. Douglass believed that Hewett wrote the article to confuse the public in hopes of turning them against the idea of a national park in the Bandelier vicinity.

The citizens of New Mexico, however, continued to support the idea of a park. The New Mexico Federation of Women’s Clubs offered its support in 1917, and the membership of the New Mexico National Park Association grew. The Department of the Interior took Douglass’ advice and adversely reported upon S. 2542. The bill died at the end of the 64th session of Congress. But Douglass continued to make important inroads in support of the concept of a park.

The 65th session saw the introduction of three new bills proposing a Pajarito region national park. Both political parties wanted credit for the establishment of the park. Republican Catron introduced S. 8326 on March 1, while on April 16, 1917, Congressman William Walton followed with House Bill 3216. On Mat 11, Senator A.

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5“Douglass has sizzling reply to opposition to National Park.” Santa Fe New Mexican, April. 1916.
A. Jones, a Democrat and the former Assistant Secretary of the Interior, introduced his own measure, S. 2291.

Propositions for a national park in north central New Mexico inundated the fledgling National Park Service. Even the New Mexico State Legislature overwhelmingly supported the national park idea. With the support of both houses, Governor W. E. Lindsey drafted a memorial to the United States Congress that urged its creation. In early 1918, the typically enthusiastic Douglass took the memorial to Washington to agitate in favor of the project.

Douglass was an effective lobbyist, but there were many obstacles to success. On February 26, 1918, he met with Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane and gave him the memorial. He also sent the memorial and the copies of Jones' proposal to the United States Forester and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. On March 8, 1918, Douglass met with Mather's assistant, Horace M. Albright, and found him anxious to proceed. The project, however, became tangled in the Department of the Interior. Puye was a part of the proposal, and Charles Burke, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, requested that the Park Service hold up its report to Congress. He wanted his superintendent in Santa Fe to evaluate the impact of the proposal on the Santa Clara Indians. Albright and Mather reluctantly agreed. The superintendent of the Santa Fe Indian School, Frederick Snyder opposed the project. Burke informally communicated this to Albright, who asked Burke to hold Snyder's report until he could investigate further. Until early 1919, the Bureau of Indian Affairs abided by Albright's request. But when Joseph Cotter of the NPS, apparently unaware of Albright's maneuvering, called Burke, the commissioner explained the delay and told Cotter that the Bureau of Indian Affairs had to oppose the inclusion of the pueblo in the park.6

When informed of the developments, Mather telegraphed Albright to tell him of the opposition of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. "Proposition now up to us," Mather telegraphed, "don't feel we should delay matter further by promising investigation."7 Albright responded in a telegram the following day: "regardless of Indian Office believe we should favor Cliff Cities project to extent of delaying final report to Congress pending investigation Cliff Cities region as wonderful as Mesa Verde in many ways[.]"8 The Park Service supported the bill, but because of Snyder's opposition, the Department of the Interior did not take the bill to Congress.

New bills bloomed during the spring of 1919, kindling the enthusiasm of the Park Service. Senator Jones offered S. 666, "Creating the National Park of the Cliff Cities" once again on May 23, 1919, and on July 1, he revived a bill approximating the offering of 1916 to which Hewett had objected so vehemently. With the new interest, the Park Service began to maneuver. Mather commissioned a new inspection

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7 Stephen T. Mather telegram. January 30, 1919. NA.

8 Horace M. Albright telegram. February 1, 1919. NA.
of the region and selected Herbert W. Gleason, a Department of the Interior inspector who was also an old friend of his, to visit the Pajarito Plateau as part of a tour of other proposed park areas in the Southwest during the summer of 1919.

Gleason reached the region in early June and made his tour. He visited the Bandelier National Monument, its detached sections, Otowi and Tsankawi, as well as Navawii, Tschirege, and other ruins. He also met with Douglass at his camp in Ojo Caliente, with Mary Austin, a noted author, in Espanola, and with Santiago Naranjo, the Governor of the Santa Clara Pueblo.

The region impressed Gleason, and protection of the Pajarito Plateau became an imperative in his mind. He labelled himself a "violent advocate" of the park proposal. Gleason found himself "righteously indignant in Otowi Canyon . . . to find that 'a woman from Philadelphia' had been at work there, upheaving the mounds, making no effort to preserve the walls [of the ruin]." Hewett had sponsored Mrs. L. L. W. Wilson, a teacher from Philadelphia, and between 1915 and 1917, she and a crew excavated Otowi under a School of American Archeology permit. She took the artifacts she collected to the Commercial Museum of Philadelphia. Gleason was appalled at what her crew left behind. They had been "heaping up rubbish in the effort to secure pottery relics," he indignantly informed Mather. Douglass convinced Gleason that the establishment of the park would stop this kind of work.10

Gleason cited stockmen as the major source of opposition to the project. In his view, the livestock industry was a more significant obstacle than the Forest Service, a mistake that revealed his superficial understanding of the situation. When he found that the public overwhelmingly supported the idea of a park, Hewett worked to ensure that the Forest Service opposed all proposals. Douglass convinced Gleason that Hewett's "opposition [concealed] is based on the fact he will be shorn of his present authority and prestige if the park is created." Gleason, moreover, failed to see Hewett's behind-the-scenes maneuvering.

Hewett had good reason to be afraid of the latest round of park proposals. While visiting the Santa Clara Pueblo, Gleason made an agreement with Santiago Naranjo that would have curtailed Hewett's privileges. Naranjo complained that "alleged archeologists" indiscriminately dug on the Santa Clara reservation and wanted "to be able to say to these would-be diggers just where they may dig and [where] they shall not dig." Based on Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane's prior support of Indian rights, Gleason promised the governor that he and his successors would have the authority to prevent the excavation of ancient tribal burials and other sacred places. Despite close relations between Hewett and the Santa Claras, had the Park Service assumed responsible for the Puye ruins, Hewett's excavations could have been curbed at Naranjo's request.

The other apparent obstacle to creation of the park was the grazing issue. As always, Douglass contended that a stance of "no grazing" by the department meant

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9Herbert W. Gleason to Mather. June 15. 1919. NA.

10Douglass to Albright. June 15. 1919. NA.
no park. He made a "strong plea" for retaining the grazing clause in the proposed bill. Mary Austin told Gleason that she believed in "intelligent grazing," and Gleason remarked that he did not think grazing would be a problem as he "saw no cattle during all [his] journeys through the territory . . . [as] all the cattle grazing is done in the winter." Sheep grazing was even less of an obstacle. The only sheep in the region grazed the Ramon Vigil Grant. Will C. Barnes of the Forest Service further diminished the potential for grazing when he indicated that rangeland within the national forest could not support sheep. Gleason told Douglass to muster the park supporters and "frame a bill which would incorporate their ideas and then thrash out with Mr. Albright the question of grazing" on the Pajarito Plateau.\(^1\) The following day, Douglass wrote Albright, imploring him to allow grazing permits within the new park. Douglass repeated his long-standing contention that the New Mexico Stockmen's Association controlled the political hierarchy in the state and without its support, the project was doomed. Albright believed Gleason's contention that grazing was not a threat to park values in the region. He told Douglass that the latest revision of the bill allowed livestock grazing.\(^2\)

Albright's concurrence elated Douglass. He believed that only one source of opposition remained: Edgar L. Hewett. Hewett continued to resist the "Cliff Cities" name, preferring instead his own "Pajarito National Park." Douglass asserted that Hewett joined forces with the "Forest Service in its effort to defeat this legislation," and the Park Service had to find a way around such an important adversary.\(^3\)

Again protecting his interests, Hewett was instrumental in creating the conflict between the Forest Service and the NPS that dominated the Pajarito Plateau throughout the 1920s. Almost from the day of the establishment of the National Park Service, the two agencies engaged in a spirited rivalry. The missions and constituencies of both were similar and the agencies often coveted the same parcels of land for their programs. Conflict was inevitable in situations like the one that existed on the Pajarito Plateau.

The Forest Service had also accommodated Hewett's requests for permission to excavate its lands. He had been the primary archeological client of the USFS since before the establishment of the Bandelier National Monument. Forest Service officials such as Will Barnes were his personal friends, and the district foresters and the supervisor of the Santa Fe National Forest, Don Johnston, had great respect for Hewett. He served as their unofficial advisor on archeological issues. By the early 1920s, his word on land matters carried great weight among foresters in the Southwest.

As a peripheral character in the drama, Gleason was not always aware of the conflicts that existed before his arrival in New Mexico. His assessments were too often based on surface analysis and the opinion of the last participant with whom

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\(^1\) Gleason to Mather, June 15, 1919, NA.

\(^2\) Albright to Douglass, June 25, 1919, NA.

\(^3\) Douglass to Albright, July 4, 1919. See also New Mexican editorial, June 25, 1919, NA.
he spoke. After speaking with Naranjo, he assumed that the Santa Clara Indians had no objection to the inclusion of their reservation in the national park. In fact, this issue would split the Pueblo badly. His focus upon the stockmen as the primary source of opposition was also off the mark. He did, however, correctly assess the issue in question. Commercial use of natural resources became the center of the dispute, but the adversaries of the Park Service were not the local stockmen. Instead, the NPS and the Forest Service battled over incommensurable land values. The Park Service contrasted its emphasis on archeological preservation and inspirational scenery with the timber and grazing policies of the USFS.

Gleason’s indiscretion contributed to the decline in relations between the two agencies. While in New Mexico, he gave interviews about the proposal that “very much disturbed” United States Forester Henry Graves. “It is best to be careful and not commit yourself on propositions like this,” were Mather’s words of caution to his old friend. But the damage was done. When Gleason, Douglass, and Mather met in Washington in October 1919, Forest Service officials in Washington were strenuously objecting to the project. They argued that the value of the commercial resources of the region outweighed the scientific value of preserving the ruins.

The Park Service tried a novel approach, compromising on the content of the park in order to avoid conflict with the USFS. Mather asked Douglass if he could create a park without taking in any national forest land. Douglass thought that it was possible but such a park would contain few important features. The group agreed that it would be best to get a national park no matter what the limitations and worry about extending it at a later date. Anxious for some kind of successful action, Douglass agreed to this new proposition and drew up a map and bill to present to Congress.

Such a rapid ad-hoc move created a completely new set of problems. The new proposal failed to address the preservation value of the plateau. Instead, the division of land among Federal agencies determined the boundaries of the park proposition. Someone had a claim on nearly everything on the plateau. Between national forest land, private grants, and Indian reservations, there was little left from which to create a national park. As a result, Douglass’ new proposal was “confined almost wholly to the Santa Clara Indian reservation.” It was small, insignificant, and inferior to every other national park established during Mather’s tenure.

The new proposal was unworthy of the national park designation. It had few supporters. Even Gleason thought it was specious. Mather had worked to exclude such atrocities from the system. Yet this latest proposal, drawn up at his request, did not even include the existing Bandelier National Monument, Otowi, Tsankawi, Navawi, or Tschirege. It contained few ruins, less scenery, and was minuscule in comparison to the other western national parks.

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14 Mather to Gleason. August 9, 1919. NA.

Instead, Gleason suggested a tactic that the NPS would come to favor: ask for a great deal more than could possibly be acquired and settle for more than was initially thought possible. From his perspective, Puye was the primary archeological attraction in the region, and the Park Service needed to begin there. It was more accessible than the road less Frijoles Canyon and received almost three times the annual visitation. As a result, Gleason believed that any national park established in the region must include the Puye ruins. A park with Puye as a central feature could become a foundation for the gradual acquisition of a significant park. Already reserved as a national monument, El Rito de Los Frijoles could become a later addition.

Even with Gleason's far-sighted suggestion, such a truncated proposition was of little interest to the Park Service. The Grand Canyon, Lafayette [Acadia], and Zion National Parks were the latest additions to the system, and Douglass' proposal was clearly inferior to the standards Mather and Albright insisted upon. Encompassing only 60,800 acres, instead of the 195,000 that Gleason suggested, the bill "practically eliminated all the features and ruins for which the national park was originally proposed to preserve." It was barely worth the effort to research the status of the lands involved.

The latest proposal was an example of taking the pragmatic approach of the Park Service too far. Peripherally acquainted with the issue, Mather made his suggestion in order to expedite the process. Exasperated after years of failure, Douglass was willing to try almost anything. Only Gleason was able to keep perspective under the circumstances. Although he also would have acquiesced, he pointed out the larger picture. The Park Service upheld its commitment to quality park areas, and Mather's "park game" remained complicated.

The elevation of New Mexico Senator Albert Fall to the position of Secretary of the Interior made it no less so. An advocate of anything which made his personal estate grow, Fall earlier proposed an "All-Year Round" national park, to be created from a horseshoe of land surrounding his ranch in southeastern New Mexico. Although Fall's project had neither the scenic nor archeological importance of the Pajarito proposals, Mather could only tactfully resist his superior's alternative. As a result, after the Pajarito and Cliff Cities bills of 1919 died at the end of the session, Mather focused the little time he had for a national park in New Mexico to quietly thwarting Fall.

In the meantime, enthusiasm for the park began to ebb. Senator Jones became "disgusted" with the entire project. With Hewett's assistance, he proposed the "Pajarita National Park" bill on July 1, 1919. Although Hewett called his offering "a radical revision . . . which will now make it acceptable to almost everyone," the bill completely banned grazing in the park. It revived all of the old livestock industry opposition. Understandably, Jones felt duped, and his interest in the project waned considerably. Hewett's opponents in Santa Fe called it an attempt to "muddy

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16 Arthur E. Demaray to Arno B. Cammerer, November 29, 1919, NA.

the waters" and stymie any future attempts to create a park in the region. By early 1920, there were no bills to establish the park on the floor of Congress. Even Douglass was out of ideas. At the end of 1921, the project looked hopeless.

But times were changing, and Hewett needed new allies. By the end of World War I, roads and automobiles began to crisscross the Southwest. Travel became an American preoccupation. The promotional efforts of the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad brought many visitors to Santa Fe and the Southwest, and The Pajarito Plateau ceased to be remote. The archeological ruins on the Pajarito Plateau were still unreserved and more people visited them each year. The opportunities for depredation increased dramatically. Hewett realized this and began to look for new friends to aid his cause. Although he initially feared Park Service restrictions upon his work, Hewett soon came to admire the breadth of Mather's vision, and the agency became a likely candidate for his attention.

By early 1923, Hewett had created an alliance with the Park Service. The relationship began during 1921 and 1922, when Hewett and the agency developed a cooperative agreement for excavation and maintenance of the Gran Quivira (Salinas) National Monument. Gradually, Hewett realized that the Park Service could offer him better opportunities to excavate than did the Forest Service. He liked the Park Service people, particularly the self-trained superintendent of southwestern national monuments, Frank "Boss" Pinkley.

Short, thin, and stern, Pinkley was a straight-forward perfectionist and self-trained archeologist who respected Hewett's professional contributions and deferred to him in matters concerning archeology at Gran Quivira. Pinkley efficiently handled the administration of the project, making one less headache for the perennially over-extended Hewett. Pleased with the support, he came to respect Pinkley, seeing in the superintendent something of himself. The Gran Quivira excavation laid the basis for cooperation between Hewett and the NPS.

There was little animosity toward Hewett within the Park Service. Most of his opposition preceded Park Service efforts in the area, and the agency had no real evidence that Hewett opposed its interests in 1919. Douglass made Hewett into a villain in his correspondence with Park Service officials, but after a point, their interest in Douglass' personal feelings evaporated. Mather cultivated important people, and Hewett's powerbase was as broad as any in the Southwest. Soon, Hewett and Associate Director Arno B. Cammerer were involved in correspondence concerning the Pajarito Plateau. The Park Service was in the process of redefining its policy on the Pajarito Plateau and sought Hewett's perspective. According to Cammerer, "neither the Department nor the Park Service has expressed itself on [the Pajarito] question;" the field was open. Hewett quickly filled the void. By the middle of the summer, he worked up his own proposal, which he transmitted to

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19 Cammerer to Hewett. February 1, 1923. Hewett papers. Box 44.

20 Cammerer to Hewett, February 14, 1923. Hewett papers. Box 44.
Robert Sterling Yard, the Executive Secretary of the National Parks Association in Washington.

Hewett wanted the entire range of natural features and archeological ruins upon the plateau within the boundaries of his park. This included the Baca Location #1, now known as the Valles Caldera, west of the monument, the existing Bandelier National Monument, the Ramon Vigil Grant, and the Santa Clara reservation, including the Puye ruins. It was, Hewett insisted, "the greatest thing possible in the way of a national park project that is left in America... The southwest should not be handed a 'lame duck' among National Parks. What I have indicated is of National size." Hewett thought that acquiring the private lands, including the Baca and Ramon Vigil Grants, sections of the Canyon de San Diego grant, as well as the portion of the Santa Clara reservation which contained Puye, were the main obstacles. "You indicated, when we talked this over in Washington, that you would like a big job for the Association to tackle," Hewett reminded Yard. "Well, here it is."21

The astute Hewett asked that the Washington Office of the National Parks Association make the proposal. He wanted to avoid the outpouring of the animosity that his earlier maneuvering might generate in Santa Fe. Hewett offered his map, suggesting that Yard make a new tracing and send copies to newspapers throughout New Mexico. He assured Yard that all would enthusiastically support the proposition.

Ironically, had Hewett joined the initiative prior to 1919, there would most likely be a national park on the Pajarito Plateau today. With his support, the park project stood a much better chance of passage than without it. But by 1923, the terms of the conflict changed, and even his advocacy was not sufficient. In the 1910s, Hewett helped the USFS develop its response to the Park Service, and by 1923, the Forest Service regarded the NPS as a threat to its status as an agency. Foresters firmly opposed any project that took commercially valuable national forest land and reserved it within a "single-use" national park.22 In northern New Mexico, Edgar L. Hewett was responsible for the perspective of the Forest Service. He drew the battle lines between the two agencies. One kind of opposition to the idea of a national park had disappeared. Another more potent kind emerged.

USFS opposition failed to prevent a reawakening of pro-park sentiment. Hewett was a powerful influence upon the press in New Mexico and as he predicted, the newspapers in the state endorsed his proposal. Preeminent in her support was Adela Holmquist of the Albuquerque Herald. Her article of July 15, 1923, supporting the

21Hewett to Robert S. Yard. August 4, 1923, NA.

22By the late 1920s, the Forest Service began to realize that competition with the NPS would require that it develop a recreational policy. Elements in the USFS began to agitate for such a policy in the early 1920s, but it took until 1929 for the development of the L-20 regulations. As part of the counterattack, the USFS took to calling the approach of the NPS to land management "single-use," to differentiate it from its own broad-based development of commercial resources. Like many other Forest Service jabs at the NPS, this one fell well short of the mark. See Harold K. Steen, The United States Forest Service (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976) and Sally K. Fairfax and Samuel T. Dana, Forest and Range Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980).
creation of a Pajarito Plateau park, was reprinted in *El Palacio* on August 1, 1923. With her reprint enclosed, Holmquist wrote the President of the United States to further the cause. Secretary of the Interior Dr. Hubert Work responded, telling Holmquist that the department had no active legislation to put in front of Congress. Holmquist and the other advocates began to develop a bill. In April, 1924, New Mexico Congressman John Morrow went to Cammerer to discuss boundaries for the bill he planned to propose.

Public support was a welcome addition that led to concerted Park Service interest in the park project. Prior to 1923, the agency invested tremendous time and effort in park proposals on the Pajarito Plateau. With little to show for their efforts and other important projects afoot, agency officials were not inclined to send out another investigator to explore the ruins and report one more time. At the National Parks Association, Bob Yard enlisted the assistance of Dr. Willis T. Lee of the National Geographic Society. Yard wanted Lee to make a "reconnaissance" of the region. Lee had just finished work at the new Carlsbad Cave National Monument, the focus of another drive for transfer to national park status and was an advocate of the National Park System. Yard realized that he could provide the spark that the NPS needed. "A lot of good . . . could be done without in the least forcing Mr. Mather's hand," Yard wrote John Oliver La Gorce, the vice-president of the National Geographic Society. Yard pointed out that there had been much resentment of the proposed "All-Year Round" National Park in northern New Mexico and that leaders in the northern half of the state supported the effort to topple Albert Fall two years earlier. Yard felt that the time had come to pay that debt by arranging for another examination of the area.

Although La Gorce specifically forbade involvement in the political side of the issue, he permitted Lee to go on a fact-finding tour of the Pajarito Plateau. Lee reported that the Hewett proposal was a good idea. Thus, while Morrow prepared his bill, Mather went to the Coordinating Committee on National Parks and Forests to propose the enlargement of a number of park areas and another national park for the Pajarito Plateau.

Again, the NPS pressured the Forest Service and the foresters resisted. Mather’s proposal involved the transfer of 195,000 acres from the USFS to the NPS. Skeptical from the outset, the USFS reviewed Mather’s proposal. On July 10, 1925, the Forest Service announced that in its view, the transfer was unjustified. The natural features were "admittedly . . . distinctive . . . but not of such grandeur or impressiveness as to meet the common construction of National Park standards." In the spirit of compromise, the Forest Service was willing to concede the existing Bandelier National Monument on the condition that the NPS place a full-time employee in Frijoles Canyon.

The Forest Service tried to protect its interests by becoming advocates of preservation of the area. The foresters took a dim view of Park Service development plans. They claimed to have the "requirements of the seriously-minded interested visitor in mind," and clearly stated that they would not encourage the building of

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23 Yard to John Oliver La Gorce, August 26, 1924, NA.
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an automobile road into Frijoles Canyon. The Forest Service believed that Mather and Albright abandoned preservation during the 1920s in an effort to garner public support for the fledgling agency. It left a gap its officials hoped to fill.

With such a distinct difference of opinions in the two agencies, resolution in Washington, D.C., seemed unlikely, and the Coordinating Commission on National Parks and Forests planned an inspection tour for September 1925. Congressman Henry W. Temple of Pennsylvania, a known park advocate, headed the committee, which included Park and Forest Service representatives. Mather's schedule did not permit him to participate, and he chose as his substitute Jesse L. Nusbaum, formerly one of Hewett's assistants and the Superintendent of Mesa Verde National Park. Arthur Ringland, the district forester at the Grand Canyon National Monument during the Forest Service tenure there, was also a member of the committee.

The committee wanted to gauge local sentiment about the national park that Mather proposed for the Bandelier region. On September 17, Nusbaum found a sympathetic audience in Albuquerque, where all who came to the public meeting "desired a National Park or Monument area and were not hesitant about saying so." According to Nusbaum, the people of Albuquerque recognized the economic value of the proposed park, and their support kept the two Forest Service representatives from offering any substantive opposition to the proposal.

The hearing the following night in Santa Fe began similarly. Edgar L. Hewett chaired another public meeting that looked to express more pro-park sentiment. Hewett traced the history of prior efforts to create a park in the region and pointed out the shortcomings of each. Congressman Temple stood up to explain the purpose of his committee and make clear that he wanted to get a reading of local sentiment on the question. As Temple sat, the Forest Service representatives took their cue, and the efforts to stymie the establishment of a national park in north central New Mexico began in earnest.

In the months preceding the visit of the committee, A. J. Connell, a former Forest Service employee who ran the Los Alamos Ranch School, about twelve miles from Frijoles Canyon, "started a campaign of defamation of the Park Service and the National Park idea." According to Nusbaum, Connell threatened to close his school if a national park was created and "in the course of his talk [at a local gathering] and in subsequent talks, made public personal statements which any person knowing anything of the Park Service would know as absolute falsehoods." Among other mistruths, Connell convinced some area landholders that the Park Service would seize their land, ban private cars in the park, forbid local residents to collect even dead timber, and force visitors to pay "to ride in the shrieking yellow busses of the transportation monopolies."25

24 United States Forest Service, "Memorandum for the members of the coordinating committee on national parks and forests," attached to Acting Forester L. F. Kneipp to Mather, July 10, 1925. NA.

25 Dr. Jesse L. Nusbaum’s confidential report to Director Mather, September 10, 1925. NA. Nusbaum wrote this nineteen-page indictment of the Forest Service immediately after the incident described. He was obviously distraught. No comparable USFS response to the meeting in Santa Fe exists.
Nusbaum felt that Connell maliciously misstated the objectives and policies of the National Park Service in an attempt to thwart the creation of the park. In fact, the agency followed a policy that allowed any reasonable compromise furthering the procurement of land in a region under consideration for national park status. In 1917, the Department of the Interior briefly allowed grazing in Yosemite, and the precedent for allowing the collection of dead timber for private use was established at Mukuntuweap National Monument [later Zion] in 1914.26 But Connell mustered strong and vocal resistance to the idea of a national park on the Pajarito Plateau.

Nusbaum found himself in a difficult situation. "The Forest Service had all the objectors to the plan lined up for the meeting," and because he chaired the meeting, Hewett felt compelled to remain neutral. Ambushed, the park advocates were leaderless and unorganized, and Nusbaum got little support. Barrington Moore, a former Forest Service employee and the editor of Ecology Magazine, and Assistant Forester Leon F. Kneipp mercilessly pounded Nusbaum with questions, while Ringland, who was responsible for the monument proclamation in 1916, was "apparently . . . bored to death [by talk of the region], and every remark he made belittled the area as a national park."27

The entire meeting proved uncomfortable for Nusbaum and the park constituency. Even with the support of Temple and New Mexico Congressman John Morrow, Nusbaum felt that the evening was a failure. He was ambushed because of his unpreparedness. As a result, the hearing weighed the question of a national park on the basis of innuendo and propaganda, not on its merits as an important piece of the archeological past of North America.

The Forest Service opposed the park because it did not believe that the preservation of archeological ruins required the reservation of large areas of timber and pasture land upon the plateau. Local residents, not tourists from afar, were its constituency, and its position dictated that the economic value of forest land was at least equal to the cultural value of archeological sites. From the local perspective, foresters contended, the timber and pasture lands were critical to the development of the region. If archeological ruins could be administered in conjunction with the commercial use of forest land, then a compromise was possible. A large national park, restricting the use of resources in the Santa Fe National Forest, was out of the question.

26During the First World War, Franklin K. Lane's feelings of patriotism inspired him to grant grazing leases in the Yosemite. The Sierra Club got wind of it and the project was promptly terminated. See Shankland. Steve Mather of the National Parks, 1970. p. 203. In National Parks such as Lassen Volcanic National Park, this type of multiple use was permitted. The precedent for grazing leases in the national monuments was established with the creation of the Mt. Olympus National Monument in 1909. See Shankland, Steve Mather, on Lassen, and Ise, Our National Park Policy, and the Mt. Olympus files in the National Archives. RG 79, Series 6. 0-35. 12-5. The issue of allowing area residents to collect dead timber came up at Mukuntuweap (Zion) in 1914. The General Land Office at first forbade collection, but quickly reversed itself. Timber collecting was also allowed at Natural Bridges and at other remote national monuments where there was some chance that establishment of a monument deprived locals of their livelihood. National Archives. RG 79, Series 6. Zion (Mukuntuweap) and Natural Bridges file 12-5.

27Nusbaum to Mather. September 10. 1925. NA.
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Although it was a despondent Nusbaum who continued with the committee to visit the ruins the following day, the damage to his cause was minimal. Despite the public battering he took, prospects for a national park in the northern half of New Mexico seemed excellent. Although the resistance of the Forest Service surprised Morrow, he and Temple remained strong proponents of the national park. The Forest Service representatives knew that Temple's support of the proposal put them at a disadvantage. As the only congress person on the committee and the only member without a vested interest in the outcome, his opinion outweighed all the others.

Kneipp, Moore, and Ringland sought opportunities to make their case without NPS interference. Nusbaum complained that the foresters kept him away from Temple during the visit to the Pajarito Plateau. Taking Temple to lunch at Connell's Los Alamos Ranch School, the Forest Service men "wasted much valuable time" during the meal in what Nusbaum interpreted as an attempt to steer Temple away from the El Rito de Los Frijoles ruins. By the time the party arrived, it was nearly dark, and the Forest Service custodian showed the visitors the ruins in what Nusbaum called "a very superficial way."

Finally, the group ended up at the cottage where Temple stayed. In a long impassioned speech, Kneipp claimed that the Forest Service could do everything the Park Service could and more for less money. He questioned the need to sacrifice large areas of forest land to allow a national park big enough to fit the arbitrary standards that Mather and Albright established in other cases earlier in the 1920s. Nusbaum then reiterated the Park Service position, that the agency needed the large area to protect the ruins and physical features of the region. The time to deal with the question head on arrived. "Maps were laid down," and the process of orchestrating an acceptable agreement began.

The two sides had very different ideas about an acceptable size for the proposed national park. The Park Service envisioned a large area, including the existing monument, the Otowi ruins, the Puye ruins, and the Baca Crater. "The boundaries I laid," Nusbaum wrote Mather, "made the Forestry people gasp." The Forest Service counter offer reflected its perspective. It included only the existing monument, the Otowi ruins, and a corridor connecting the two. Nusbaum immediately rejected the proposal. It did not fit the image of the size and stature of a national park that the agency held. The Forest Service made another offer, which included much of the area east of the Los Alamos school and portions of the national forest between the Santa Clara Indian Reservation and the Ramon Vigil Grant, which bordered the existing monument. This compromise offered the NPS archeological control of the Pajarito Plateau, but Nusbaum turned it back in hopes of being able to get everything the agency wanted at a later date.

The bargaining continued until well after midnight, spurred by Temple's declaration that a national park was necessary to "preserve a tremendous outdoor Museum." Nusbaum, a lower ranking official than his Forest Service counterpart, suggested that they table any permanent agreement until a meeting when Mather

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28 Jesse L. Nusbaum to John Morrow, September 12, 1925. NA.
could attend. He hoped that the NPS could parlay its advantage into success at a later date. But the Forest Service representatives, feeling that their advantage lay in the field, pressed hard for a settlement. Nusbaum refused, and Temple, tired after a long day and a longer evening, suggested that the delay might be a good idea, so that "others could be heard from." 29

Unhappy at what it regarded as an acquisitive, one-dimensional land policy, the Forest Service was not prepared to relinquish its holdings to allow the Park Service to administer the ruins as a national park. Even under pressure from Temple and Morrow, the foresters refused to acquiesce. They were willing to cede archaeological administration to the Park Service, but not at the expense of commercial use of resources and their own embryonic recreational programs.

The archeological and natural significance of the Bandelier area gave park advocates the ammunition they needed. In their view, the region contained an aggregation of values that made it worthy of national park status. Forest Service recalcitrance in the face of what the NPS regarded as obvious merit made it appear to the Park Service that the Forest Service was trying to do the work of both agencies. A Forest Service declaration in 1928 that added Bandelier to one of its wilderness preserves confirmed that sense. New Mexico Congressman John Morrow supported the NPS, stating that the Forest Service "(was) endeavoring to set up little national parks of their own." 30 The Park Service believed that the Forest Service did not belong in the recreation and tourist business; that was the province of the Park Service. The Forest Service had a multitude of interests in the region. In the view of the NPS, USFS personnel lacked the background and initiative to administer archeological sites for visitors. It appeared that the situation on the Pajarito could not be resolved to the satisfaction of both agencies.

The conflict with the Forest Service reduced itself to a comparison of incommensurable values. In 1925, the USFS offered Nusbaum the primary archeological features on national forest land. It was only a matter of time until the Park Service acquired Frijoles Canyon and the rest of the existing monument. The debate centered upon how much additional land the USFS would transfer to the NPS. Forest Service arguments were in its usual utilitarian vein. There was a quantitative economic value to the disputed timber lands in the Santa Fe National Forest. The Park Service held that a park containing ruins and natural features had cultural significance that outweighed the value of lumber and pasture land. Each agency felt its use and constituency should take priority, but there was no way to measure the comparative merits.

The pendulum slowly swung in favor of the Park Service. New Mexicans made the park a priority. Morrow was a long-time supporter of the various Pajarito Plateau proposals and state Government officials were also showing renewed interest.

29 Nusbaum to Mather. September 10. 1925. NA.
The Office of the Governor of New Mexico asked Edgar L. Hewett to provide a comprehensive report on the situation. With Hewett's continued support, the project stood an excellent chance of success. On December 8, 1925, he presented a preliminary report to Temple's committee that indicated that he still supported Nusbaum's conception of a park that "made the Forestry people gasp." His report to the Governor reaffirmed this stance, strongly emphasizing the need for more than archeological ruins to make a national park of the first order. Hewett echoed the mainstream perspective of the agency, and his support made it likely to prevail.

Under the auspices of the Coordinating Committee, conciliation became the order of the day. But even with representatives of both agencies trying to work out an acceptable solution, there was little progress in 1926. Neither agency offered reasonable concessions. Early that year, Arthur Ringland, who served as the secretary for Temple's committee, became impatient with the lack of progress. He informed Hewett that the National Park Service was going to send a "Park Officer . . . to determine the feasibility of a National Park in the [Bandelier] region." There was only one man with the degree of knowledge and the level of responsibility this job demanded. Frank Pinkley's Park Service credentials were impeccable. No one questioned his devotion and loyalty. He had been an integral part of the Service's most difficult decade. On April 4, 1927, he wired his acceptance to Cammerer. After receiving the files concerning the monument and the range of park proposals, he embarked on an inspection tour that included most of the leading southwestern national monuments and the Pajarito Plateau.

Although Pinkley's autonomy and outspokenness occasionally made the hierarchy of the agency uneasy, the central administration of the Park Service had great confidence in him. They expected that as a good Park Service man, Pinkley would echo the departmental line on the proposed park; that he would report that a large park, containing more than archeological ruins, was essential. According to the standards Mather and Albright established, a national park on the Pajarito must be archaeologically significant, scenically spectacular, and comparable to the rest of the flagship category. Anything less than a park that took in everything of interest on the Pajarito Plateau, from Puye to Otowi to the Baca Location #1, was unacceptable. These rigid requirements limited the options of the agency. The Park Service could not compromise about size if it wanted to achieve park status, for it might end up with a national park parallel to insignificant places like Platt or Wind Cave. A national park on the Pajarito Plateau had to rival the Grand Canyon, Yellowstone, and Yosemite.

But Albright did not count upon Pinkley's commitment to the concept of the national monuments as a distinct category. "Boiled down," Pinkley wrote after his trip, "my report on the proposed Cliff Cities National Park is that the scenery is not of park status and ruins do not make a national park, not in any number, kind or

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31 Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Coordinating Commission on National Parks and Forests. December 8, 1925. NA.

quantity; they make a monument." He reiterated his long-standing contention that the ruins were inferior to those at the Chaco Canyon and the Mesa Verde and suggested that Bandelier was of more interest to scientists than the general public. "It would be a distinct anti-climax for the average visitor to come from the Mesa Verde to the proposed Cliff Cities National Park," Pinkley told Mather, and there was little in the way of exceptional scenery in the proposed area. Most of it could "be duplicated several times over" in the Southwest. Since the Frijoles ruins were already protected as a national monument, Pinkley thought it best that the Park Service assume administrative responsibility for the area. But in a heretical stance, he asserted, "I would rather see them left as a monument under [the Forest] Service than be transferred to ours as a Park."

Pinkley found little support for his position in Santa Fe. In his view supporters of project thought of the "proposed park in monument terms for when I suggested that we make a monument out of Puye and Frijoles [Canyon] and let them make a park out of the fine scenery which . . . was back on the Jemez Mountains to the west and south, they immediately said that such an idea would weaken the park proposition." When Pinkley suggested that the ruins were national monument material, the park supporters pointed to Mesa Verde as evidence to the contrary. "I could only reply that national monuments are clearly defined by the [Antiquities] Act . . . while parks are not . . . so if Congress in its wisdom wanted to make a national park out of a duck pond that could be done but it would be no argument for making a national park out of every duck pond in the country."33

Pinkley's vision of the national monuments as equals of the national parks shaped his position. As far as he was concerned, the scenery and the ruins on the Pajarito Plateau were second-class, national monuments and national parks were two separate concepts, and the Bandelier conversion attempt represented an effort to minimize the differences. Pinkley could not condone the park effort. His position as superintendent of the national monuments made him feel as threatened as the Forest Service. The park idea was inflexible; it left no room for compromise. If the Bandelier region became a national park, Pinkley knew that the agency would soon look at other southwestern national monuments with the same purpose in mind.

Pinkley's report came as a major surprise to the strong pro-park element in the National Park Service. Horace Albright, the leading proponent of the park, thought that Pinkley took too narrow a view of the question, seeing it from an archeological perspective instead of from the "broader standpoint of a national park executive."34 Albright suggested Nusbaum, whom he could count upon, as a more qualified judge of the situation. Exhausted by the earlier fray, Nusbaum was too busy at Mesa Verde to take on added responsibilities.

The rift in the ranks posed a problem for advocates of the park on the Pajarito Plateau. They could not go on promoting the proposal as if they had the unanimous


support of the agency. The Park Service could not even approach the Coordinating Commission, for it lacked the unified front that was necessary to sway the Forest Service. As a result, the agency finessed the rest of 1927, allowing the term of the Coordinating Commission to expire and keeping Pinkley's report out of the public eye. Even friends of the agency were kept in the dark. On January 17, 1928, Hewett wrote the Park Service to find out if the project was still under consideration. More than half a year after Pinkley's report, the most important friend of the agency did not even know that the inspection was complete. Mather responded to Hewett's inquiry by offering the traditional response concerning park proposals on the Pajarito. He complained that "the lack of a definite proposal" hurt the project. If Hewett had a clearly defined proposal, the agency "would be glad to present [it] for some definite action."35

The question hung in a limbo imposed by the Park Service until late 1930, when Albright commissioned another study of the area. Roger Toll, the superintendent of Rocky Mountain National Park and the primary inspector of national park proposals in the West, M. R. Tillotson, the superintendent of Grand Canyon National Park, and Nusbaum went to Bandelier to make another report on the proposal. Surprisingly, their report supported Pinkley's position. In their view, the scenery was not "sufficiently unusual and outstanding" to merit national park status. "The choice," Toll wrote, "seems to be between having a large and important national monument and a rather small and unimportant national park."36 Although Associate Director Arno B. Cammerer thought that the agency should "aim high and then if necessary come down to what is possible to acquire," the report finally convinced Albright to put aside the park plans.37 On January 2, 1931, he wrote that he was "inclined to favor the national monument idea [because] the reports which we have now before us have quite convinced me that we had better not try to get a national park in this section, at least not now."38

Even experts hired by the agency supported Pinkley. On February 10, 1931, Dr. Clark Wissler of the American Museum of Natural History and a member of the Committee on the Study of Educational Problems in the National Parks, suggested that the Park Service should "emphasize the archeological function of the proposed park [which] relieves us of the necessity to combat the argument that the area lacks distinctive natural scenery. . . . The park can scarcely be defended on scenic grounds."39 Wissler effectively put the brakes on the idea of a national park on the Pajarito Plateau. Agency standards required not only archeological but scenic value

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37 Arno B. Cammerer to Albright, December 3, 1930. NA.

38 Albright memo. January 2, 1931. NA.

as well. An indictment from as impartial an observer as was available damaged the chances of the park.

Even though the park project seemed futile, strong support for the idea still existed within the agency. Two days after Wissler's letter arrived, Cammerer expressed both disappointment and optimism in a memo he attached to it. "On the basis of this letter, if it stood alone," he wrote, "there would be no justification for more than national monument status for this area. From what I have heard, however, a good point could be made on scenic values. ... I should like to inspect it some time with just that point in view." There was still a little life left for the Pajarito Plateau national park.

But late in 1931, Roger Toll again concurred with Wissler's judgment, suggesting that the existing monument would "would make a splendid addition to the archeological national monuments ... even if no other area were included." The Forest Service offered to turn over the existing Bandelier National Monument, but Toll believed that "they did not wish to lose any more area from the Santa Fe National Forest than was necessary for the protection of the ruins." Transfer of the monument offered an acceptable compromise to both sides, and Toll recommended accepting the offer.

If it could not get a national park, at least the National Park Service could get what Frank Pinkley desired—administrative control of the archeological ruins on the Pajarito Plateau. A rapid increase in travel to the monument followed the completion of a new approach road to the monument boundaries, and it expedited negotiations. The Forest Service realized that it was not prepared for the onslaught of tourists the new highway would bring. Thus its policy regarding the monument changed. United States Forester Major R.Y. Stuart wrote Albright that he was prepared to transfer the existing monument and 4,700 additional acres surrounding the Otowi ruins and Tsankawi Mesa as long as the access roads through the additional acreage were to remain open for the use of local residents. Stuart was willing to cede it to the Park Service if it appeared to remove the pressure to convert large sections of the Santa Fe National Forest into a national park.

On February 25 1932, the Park Service assumed administrative responsibility for the new Bandelier National Monument, which included 3,626.20 of the 4700 acres that Stuart offered. The agreement resolved years of difficulty on the plateau. The

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40 Cammerer memo for the files, February 12, 1931, Bandelier National Monument file 12-5. Series 6. RG 79. NA.

41 Roger W. Toll to Director, December 3, 1931, Bandelier National Monument file 12-5. Series 6. RG 79. NA.


43 United States Forester Major R.Y. Stuart to Horace Albright, November 10, 1931, Bandelier National Monument file 12-5. Series 6. RG 79. NA. During a two-year period, Albright and Stuart corresponded on the Bandelier issue. With Park Service assurance that it would remain a national monument, by early 1932, Stuart was more than glad to turn Bandelier over to the NPS.
Park Service had its ruins, but no national park; the Forest Service retained the majority of its holdings in the region.\textsuperscript{44}

Albright's aggressive stance toward the Forest Service created the climate in which the transfer could occur. After an onslaught which began with the very proclamation of the monument and with a slew of proposals that included large areas of the Santa Fe National Forest, the Forest Service was happy to accede to an NPS demand to transfer a national monument not much larger than the existing one. Instead of 200,000 acres, the Forest Service only gave up 26,026. Albright requested so much land that when his subordinates finally convinced him of the value of a pre-eminent national monument, orchestrating the arrangement became easy. His all-out frontal attacks made the USFS susceptible to a reasonable proposal.

By only giving up a monument, the foresters could also claim victory. They fought off a powerful attempt to cripple their interests in northern New Mexico. The Forest Service still administered most of the Pajarito Plateau and its policies were intact. Homesteaders and commercial interests continued to lease grazing and timber land from the USFS and in such circles, the foresters retained substantial influence.

Pinkley also emerged from the Bandelier transfer a victor. He held out for his definition of the national monument category, and in this case, the NPS followed his lead. As the result of the Bandelier case, Pinkley finally made his definition of the national monument category stick. Archeological sites, at least, were and would remain national monuments. Pinkley held out for the categorization of park areas according to the Antiquities Act and for quality national parks and monuments. No longer would he have to worry that the best of his archeological sites would become national parks. Although his budget problems in the Southwest continued, Frank Pinkley's archeological national monuments were safe from assaults within the agency.

The question of whether archeological, recreational, scenic or commercial values should take precedence on the Pajarito Plateau led to conflict between the National Park Service and the United States Forest Service. It was resolved politically, without actually comparing the relative merits of each case. Frank Pinkley's allegiance to the national monuments dominated his intellectual horizons, and he did not subscribe to the theory that an aggregation of values made a predominantly archeological area worthy of national park status. An expansive national park with the combination of important archeological ruins and average scenery was unacceptable to both Pinkley and the Forest Service. A much smaller national monument, focused primarily on its archeological component and administered by the NPS, was a better alternative. It posed no threat to the land management policies of the USFS because it required a comparatively small portion of national forest land. Pinkley's unlikely alliance with the Forest Service showed that commercial use of natural resources and archeological preservation were not mutually exclusive, particularly when contrasted to the threat scenic preservation presented to both.

\textsuperscript{44}Executive Proclamation 1991. February 25, 1932. See also U.S. Statutes At Large 47 Stat. 2503.
After finally achieving his objective, Pinkley began to implement his plans for the Bandelier National Monument. With the help of the Federal emergency relief programs, the monument would flourish under Park Service administration in the course of the 1930s.
CHAPTER 3

EXPANDING BANDELIER

The acquisition of the Bandelier National Monument was only a stepping stone for the Park Service. Although Frank Pinkley made a convincing case for keeping Bandelier in the monument category, agency officials retained a vision of a large national park in the region. The area surrounding the monument contained archeological and natural features that the agency coveted. Horace Albright set an aggressive tone that shaped acquisition policy long after he left the agency, and his successors followed his lead in places like the Pajarito Plateau.

As a result, the Park Service continued its efforts to acquire land in the region. During the 1930s, archeological areas dominated agency thinking about the plateau. Puye and the Ramon Vigil Grant became the focus of efforts to expand the monument. After 1939, the agency took a broader view of the attributes of the region. The Park Service developed its vision of a comprehensive national park that included natural and archeological features. The coming of the Manhattan Project put pressure upon the resources of the park, and the agency acquired a buffer zone around Frijoles Canyon. As its ecological perspective developed during the 1950s and 1960s, the Park Service again began to eye the Pajarito Plateau. Soon a new form of the old park proposals appeared, with the Baca Location # 1 as its center.

But with the exception of additions to the national monument during the 1960s and 1970s, acquisition efforts in the region met with little success. Competing interests, including the Forest Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and private landowners, thwarted the agency. Bad luck dogged Park Service attempts on the Pajarito Plateau, and the agency never acquired the lands it wanted.

Even after the transfer of the monument, land controversies continued to rage in the Bandelier area. Like so many of the national park proposals, the transfer itself was a compromise. Associate Director Arno B. Cammerer and, to a lesser extent, Director Horace Albright still believed that the area merited park status, but the compromise that ceded the monument to the NPS limited the options of the agency.

The first years of the Great Depression of the 1930s hurt the Park Service. There was little money for Federal agencies, travel decreased across the nation, and the agency was closely tied to the failing Hoover administration. The crash of the stock market and subsequent bank closures put pressure on the Federal budget, precluding expenditures for land acquisition by the agency. Small-town America was in desperate straits. Mustering the support necessary among local residents to establish new park areas was very difficult in a time when many did not know where their next meal was coming from. With powerful USFS opposition still extant and local economies in the West disproportionately dependent on that agency, Albright wisely put aside many of his plans and waited for a more favorable situation.
Many in the Park Service still regarded the transfer of the monument as a step on the road to eventual park status. The most obvious way to make the area more important in the overall scheme of the agency was to include the Puye ruins in a new national monument. If a new national monument was established at Puye in spite of adverse economic conditions, Albright would have a logical reason to continue to press for a national park that would encompass Puye, the detached Otowi Section, and the main portion of the monument. In this context, consolidation of the site by expansion became an efficient maneuver.

Although Frank Pinkley's report in 1927 undermined the Cliff Cities proposal, it also raised the question of the administration of Puye. Pinkley believed that Puye should be administered by the NPS. On this point, he and Albright agreed. After Roger Toll, Jesse Nusbaum and M. R. Tillotson recommended that the NPS accept the offer of the national monument transfer, Albright set his sights on Puye.

Albright's interest in Puye predated the 1930s. He first visited the area in 1919 and advocated the earliest agency efforts in the area. While still Mather's assistant in the late 1920s, Albright began to lobby for a Puye National Monument as way to get a Pajarito Plateau National Park. In 1928, he envisioned an "L" shaped [park], which would give [the NPS] all of the canyons, with their hundreds of ruins that lie between Puye and the Bandelier main section." The "monument-first, then-the-park" strategy was not new; William B. Douglass and the Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce advocated a similar idea in 1916. Throughout the 1920s, the Park Service used similar methods elsewhere in the Southwest. After he became director of the agency in 1929, Albright aggressively pursued the acquisition of Puye. By early 1931, a side issue to the Forest Service transfer of the existing Bandelier National Monument developed. At Albright's instigation, the Park Service pursued the acquisition of Puye.

The Santa Clara Indians were firmly entrenched at Puye and to avoid acrimony within the Department of the Interior, the Park Service needed a legitimate reason to propose the transfer. In March 1931, Dr. Harold C. Bryant, who headed the Educational Division of the Park Service, spoke with Dr. Bates of Cornell University, who assisted the rebuilding of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Bates made an extensive investigation of conditions at Puye, and determined that the ruins were in disgraceful condition. He advocated NPS administration of Puye if the Santa Clara Pueblo was allowed to keep the proceeds from the entry fee that visitors paid.

This was precisely the kind of ammunition the agency needed. According to an expert, the site required the professional care that the Park Service could offer. NPS officials moved quickly. Associate Director Arthur E. Demaray, the Park Service liaison to the Congressional Appropriations Committee and an early advocate of the proposal, was put in charge of the attempts to create the Puye National Monument.

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As liaison officer, Demaray pressed for a reevaluation of the status of the Puye ruins. He arranged for a group from the Congressional Appropriations Committee to make a trip to the Santa Fe area. They visited Puye, where Demaray reviewed the attempts to make a national park of the region. Although the committee was not favorably impressed with the idea of a national park, conditions at Puye convinced the congressmen that the NPS should administer Puye. Bowing to the realities of the situation, Demaray pushed the Puye National Monument idea. "Our principle stumbling block in the past has been our desire for a large national park," Demaray wrote Albright on June 8, 1931. "If we concentrate our efforts to better preserve and protect the prehistoric ruins under national monument administration, we can really get somewhere."3

Demaray's perspective shaped the Park Service view of its responsibilities in northern New Mexico. While he did not discount the value of a national park in the Pajarito region, Demaray was eternally a pragmatist. He believed that the Park Service ought to acquire Puye for the value of those ruins, not as leverage to create a national park. If a national park was the eventual result, it would be to the advantage of the NPS. If not, at least the safety of the Puye ruins would be guaranteed. Other opportunities for the Park Service would follow.

Jesse Nusbaum supported Demaray's position on the Puye issue. Prior to the Bandelier transfer, he began to explore the possibility of acquiring Puye. While working with Toll and Tillotson in 1930, Nusbaum approached Bureau of Indian Affairs Commissioner Hagerman and found him favorable to the concept of a Puye National Monument. Nusbaum informed his superiors and together they planned acquisition strategy.

In January 1932, after Demaray refocused agency policy, Albright wrote the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to follow up on Nusbaum's work. Charles S. Rhoades, the new commissioner, referred the matter to the Superintendent of the Santa Fe Indian School, Chester Faris. Nusbaum immediately went to Faris's office and discussed the matter with him. With a tentative commitment from the prior commissioner, the position of the Park Service looked strong. Its proposal was designed not to threaten the Santa Claras. As Bates suggested, the agency would only assume responsibility for the administration of the ruins. The Santa Clara Pueblo would continue to receive the revenue collected at the site and its council would retain veto power over potential excavations.

The resistance of the tribe to Government interference in their lives quickly dashed Nusbaum's hopes. On February 11, 1932, the Santa Clara Pueblo voted unanimously against turning Puye over to the National Park Service. As a result, Rhoades withdrew the support of the BIA, and Park Service attempts to add Puye to the system ended. There were, however, unanswered questions. For more than a decade, the Santa Clara Pueblo had been divided into a number of factions. Yet in the face of NPS acquisition attempts, the pueblo united. There was clearly more to the story than the vote itself revealed. Puzzled but undaunted, Nusbaum retrenched.

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At a dinner party in March 1932, Jesse Nusbaum found out what had happened to his hopes for Puye. Ed Lowrie, a Washington D.C. newspaperman working for the Brookings Institute, had been studying the problem of law and order in the pueblos. Lowrie and Nusbaum had become friends, and Lowrie often made use of Nusbaum's knowledge and contacts. Lowrie saw the factionalization of the Santa Claras as the greatest obstacle to the future development of the Pueblo, and he decided that the best way to get them to put aside their differences was to find a common adversary for them. Unfortunately for the NPS, the first opportunity that arose involved Puye. Nusbaum, now at the Laboratory of Anthropology, was not visibly involved with Park Service efforts to acquire Puye, nor had he informed Lowrie of his role in the project. At the dinner party, Lowrie boasted that his efforts were responsible for stopping the NPS. Nusbaum then explained his interest in the project. Lowrie, who was quite beholden to Nusbaum, was stunned. "It was a terrible blow [to Lowrie]," Nusbaum wrote afterward, "and I thought he would pass out completely." After coming to, Lowrie apologized profusely and professed his loyalty to Nusbaum. But the damage was done, and Nusbaum told Faris to put the project aside. Faris, whom Nusbaum believed approached the project half-heartedly, was glad to oblige.

Nusbaum counselled patience and suggested that the NPS let the issue drop until Lowrie returned to Washington. The Park Service had to "out-wait" the opposition. "We have just to match the patience of the Indian if we are to achieve success," Nusbaum wrote Albright. Then after the uproar died down, Nusbaum hoped the Park Service would begin new attempts to acquire Puye.4

But NPS enthusiasm for Puye waned as the reorganization of 1933 became imminent. The acquisition of the remaining national monuments of the Forest Service and War Department, as well as a broad array of other park areas, precluded Park Service interest in Puye. Horace Albright resigned to enter private business, and Arno B. Cammerer became director. Agency morale suffered; Cammerer was noticeably less aggressive than Albright and he faced an entirely different set of management issues. The reorganization of the Federal Government in 1933, which transferred a variety of park-like areas to the Park Service, forced changes in procedure and created confusion. With new responsibilities and an important role in implementing Federal emergency relief programs, NPS emphasis shifted away from acquiring more land in places like the Pajarito Plateau.

The failure to acquire Puye signaled the end of Park Service conceptions of an archeological national park on the Pajarito Plateau. All the proposals between 1900 and 1930 were predicated on the fact that the establishment of a park would affect a small number of people. Most of the land recommended for inclusion in the park belonged to Federal agencies. Before 1930, interagency cooperation could have established a national park on the Pajarito Plateau. By the 1930s, private citizens had a sizable stake in the region. Park proposals now affected the livelihood of

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more than a few remote settlers. Private landowners became a powerful force that agency planners had to address.

With their options limited by the series of failures, the Park Service moved in a new direction. The Pajarito Plateau also contained the Valles Caldera, one of the largest collapsed volcanic summits in the world. The Park Service had greater success developing natural national parks. As scenic, natural, and geological attributes became the primary features of post-1932 efforts, archeology became a secondary value on the Pajarito Plateau. All subsequent efforts to create a Pajarito Plateau national park focused on the Valles Caldera. The geological concept meant that the Baca Location #1, which contained the Valles Caldera, became the most important acquisition for the agency.

The first of the attempts to create a geologic national park occurred at the end of the 1930s. In 1938, H. E. Rothrock, Assistant Chief of the Naturalist Division in Washington, D.C., proposed an evaluation of the Jemez region for inclusion as a geologic national park. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) conducted investigations of the area. Based on the findings of Dr. Clarence S. Ross of the USGS and his own cursory inspection of the documents, Rothrock thought the resources warranted park status.

Rothrock's proposal differed from all the previous attempts to create a national park in the region. Aware of the failure of the agency to acquire the area on the basis of its prehistoric value, Rothrock redirected the focus of the Park Service to its natural attributes. He proposed the Jemez Crater National Park as a geologic reserve. In his scheme, archeology took second place to natural values. Instead of comparing the Pajarito to Mesa Verde, the Park Service would now try to compare it to the likes of Yellowstone, Yosemite, and the Grand Canyon.

Other issues complicated the evaluation of the area as a geologic region. Rothrock's suggested boundaries included over 1,000,000 acres of north central New Mexico, making the Jemez Crater proposal more than four times as large as the largest of the earlier proposals. It would have encompassed the entire Valles Caldera, as well as archeological areas both to the north and south of the crater. The Ramon Vigil grant, which the Soil Conservation Service acquired from cattleman Frank Bond in 1932, and the Canada de Cochiti grant were also included. Rothrock's rough boundaries would have required the purchase of almost 400,000 acres from private grants as well as the transfer of nearly 530,000 acres from the USFS, less than a decade after the Forest Service had fought the establishment of a 150,000-acre park in the region. The agency had to overcome major obstacles to land acquisition before a national park could be established.

In essence, the Jemez Crater idea was a proposal for a theoretical national park. Under the best of circumstances, the Jemez Crater proposal represented the "pipe dreams" of the NPS for the Pajarito Plateau. Created in Washington, the proposal took no account of the realities of interagency and agency-community relations. Outside of the Washington Office, no one in the Park Service believed that the proposal would become reality. It was sheer fantasy.
Nevertheless, from September 13-15, 1938, Southwest Region personnel explored the area and reported on the suitability of its geological, archeological, forestry, and wildlife attributes. Charles Gould, the Regional Geologist, believed the extinct volcanic crater was nationally significant enough for park status. Forestry and wildlife were secondary values in considering the merits of a national park. Regional Archeologist Erik K. Reed initially supported the Jemez Crater proposal, but changed his mind after consulting agency documents concerning the establishment of the Pajarito and Cliff Cities proposals. Reed decided that any of the many earlier proposals were more feasible than the Jemez Crater National Park.5

The major stumbling block for regional personnel was the fact that the agency had to acquire 95 per cent of the land from sources other than the public domain. There were nine Spanish land grants of which at least a portion was proposed for inclusion in the park. Small communities, including Coyote, Gallina, Youngsville, and Jemez Springs were also to be within the boundaries of the park.

Fortunately for the NPS, regional personnel realized that the park proposal was not politically realistic. Gould quite correctly viewed the transfer of large national forest areas as extremely unlikely. Moreover, funds for the purchase of the privately owned land were virtually non-existent. The NPS would have been on the offensive against both the Forest Service and the Soil Conservation Service, and all the old USFS arguments against the establishment of national parks would have been revived. Local residents would claim that the whims of the Federal Government intruded upon their lives, and area Native Americans would have felt their lifestyles limited.

The Washington office quickly became aware of the problems with the proposal. Arthur E. Demaray arranged conferences with officials of the Smithsonian Institution, and the participants decided that the old Pajarito National Park ought to be the agency's "real objective" on the plateau.6 With that, the Park Service set aside its plans for the inclusion of Valles Caldera in the Park System.

In accordance with the old Pajarito Park idea, the Park Service made one final attempt to acquire the Ramon Vigil grant. During the 1930s, Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) money financed the purchase of the grant from Frank Bond and the Soil Conservation Service assumed administration. In 1939, U. S. Senator Dennis Chavez introduced a bill to add the Ramon Vigil Grant and other lands in New Mexico to the Santa Fe National Forest. Dr. Arthur R. Kelly, Chief of the Archeological Sites Branch of the Division of Historic Sites, believed that because the grant included two important archeological sites, Tschirege and Navawi, NPS claims on the tract outweighed those of the USFS.


Although the rivalry between the NPS and the USFS again accelerated after 1933, the terms of the conflict changed. As a result of the reorganization of 1933, the Park Service held the upper hand. It controlled Federal preservation, including the national monuments that the Forest Service had previously administered. But the proposal to add large sections of the Pajarito Plateau to the national forest would have altered the existing balance of power in the region. Responding to the threat of an enlarged USFS domain, the NPS asserted its right to the places of archeological value within the area. Even if acquisition of the tract seemed unlikely, there was a chance that NPS opposition might thwart USFS plans.

Navawi and Tschirege were sacred places to the area pueblos. Thus, Bureau of Indian Affairs Commissioner John Collier believed his agency should be responsible for them. He was more powerful than anyone in the NPS or the USFS, and he opposed transferring the archeological sites to either agency. While the NPS and USFS squabbled, Collier worked behind the scenes. On September 18, 1939, Executive Order 8255 transferred the sacred areas to the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Undaunted, the Park Service still had ideas about acquiring land on the Pajarito. As a basis for converting the monument into a national park, NPS Director Arno B. Cammerer proposed adding to the monument 76,960 acres, including the remaining part of the Vigil grant, the Pajarito Division of the Santa Fe National Forest, north and west of the detached Otowi section, and the entire Baca location. Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes disliked Cammerer immensely and did not approve of the idea. The proposal to extend the monument went no further.\(^7\)

After the demise of the Jemez Crater and expanded monument proposals, there were no further attempts to acquire additional land in the Bandelier region for more than a decade and a half. The appearance of the Manhattan project, which developed the atomic bomb, the town of Los Alamos and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) forced park managers to respond to differing conditions. The system-wide influx of tourists that followed the Second World War also affected the administration of Bandelier. Such drastic changes meant that park managers had to serve an increasingly larger and more demanding constituency with pre-war staff and facilities. Acquisition of new land meant spreading already inadequate resources even more thinly. Even if the agency leadership in Washington wanted to acquire land, staff at many of the smaller parks were too busy with day-to-day responsibilities to get excited about the idea. Charged with a primary responsibility to preserve archeological resources, Fred Binnewies, the superintendent of Bandelier from 1947 to 1954, decided to concentrate on more efficient management of the resources already within the monument.

Binnewies recognized the beginning of development in northern New Mexico as a potential threat to the integrity of the Bandelier National Monument. Others had also foreseen the problem. After the Second World War, both Jesse Nusbaum and Acting Custodian Chester A. (Art) Thomas began to awaken the regional office to

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the problems that extensive development of the Bandelier vicinity might present.\(^8\) The monument went from being a remote, rural park to one surrounded by Los Alamos, a dynamically growing community that briefly captured the international spotlight.

By the middle of the 1950s, it was apparent that Los Alamos was going to be a permanent community and that it would continue to increase in size and significance. Binnewies' successor, a lanky wildlife biologist named Paul A. Judge (1954-1962) who had been on the front lines of conservation battles for two decades, was concerned that local demand for housing and recreational land might impinge upon the monument. In 1958, the Park Service began to negotiate with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to acquire the Frijoles Mesa tract, which stretched from the northern boundary of the monument to State Highway 4. Judge saw the 3,846-acre addition as a "protective barrier for Frijoles Canyon," as well alleviating crowding in the Canyon itself.\(^9\) The tract contained the existing entrance station as well as the approach road. The NPS planned to add new visitor use facilities atop the mesa, including a campground, a picnic area, and minor utilities.

Since the end of the Second World War, NPS-AEC relations had been characterized by a spirit of cooperation. The AEC offered little objection to the transfer of the Frijoles Mesa. It acquired the tract from the Forest Service in 1956. Since its closest point was four miles from Los Alamos, the AEC perceived the area as a buffer zone for its testing facilities.\(^10\) As long as the NPS would agree to limit development in the region, the local AEC office had no trouble with the transfer. The Park Service agreed to AEC terms and the transfer was expedited. On October 16, 1958, Associate Director E. T. Scoyen requested that John A. McCone, Chairman of the AEC, authorize the transfer.

Even with the concurrence of both agencies, there were obstacles to the transfer of land between Government agencies. A legal and acceptable way to transfer the land had to be found. In a March, 1959, meeting, the AEC suggested that there were three ways to affect the transfer: a specific act of Congress, a use of the statutory authority of the AEC, or a use of the existing acts of Congress that allowed the General Services Administration (GSA) to dispose of real property. The GSA method was chosen, for it meant that the NPS would not have to reimburse the AEC or GSA for the market value of the land.

As long as the NPS did not impinge upon the activities of the AEC, the Los Alamos AEC office remained cooperative. After the selection of the GSA method, Paul Wilson, the local AEC manager, expedited the transfer by recommending the

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\(^8\)Regional Director Hugh M. Miller to Director Conrad L. Wirth, July 29, 1958. File L1417. Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.


\(^10\)The transfer was affected in Public Law 1006, 70 Stat. 1069, Section 8. Act of August 6, 1956.
proposal to the Albuquerque AEC office. AEC officials even helped accommodate Park Service policies before the area was transferred. Although they allowed hunting there during the 1958 season, AEC officials in Los Alamos informed the NPS that their 1959 hunting map of the region would label the Frijoles Mesa a "no hunting" area. The AEC was less susceptible to public pressure than the Park Service, and its declaration of a prohibition of hunting paved the way for similar NPS sanctions. Gestures of this nature made interagency cooperation a simple task.

The paperwork regarding the transfer also went smoothly. The GSA reported shortly afterward that it would consider a qualified declaration of excess by the AEC, but that the declaration would have to be withdrawn if any agency besides the NPS made a claim on the land. At a meeting on June 25, 1959, Curtis A. Ross of the GSA told Park Service officials that the GSA would "probably" find that the addition to the monument would "constitute the highest and best use of the land." The GSA was amenable to the wishes of both agencies and the transfer appeared imminent.

In the meantime, Director Conrad L. Wirth began to express interest in another tract of AEC land. Adjacent to the Frijoles Mesa tract, the Upper Crossing area, west of the "back gate" road to Los Alamos and mostly south of Highway 4, was previously the subject of closed-door discussion. When Wirth brought up the possibility in a meeting on July 29, 1959, with his Assistant Director, E. T. Scoyen, the latter was not sure to what the Director referred. Judge immediately recognized Wirth's oblique reference and informed the regional office that the AEC was interested in acquiring parts of the Otowi section "on an exchange basis." Judge intimated that if the Park Service considered the elimination of portions of the Otowi section, the AEC would concede the Upper Frijoles tract.

The Park Service faced a difficult choice. It had to compare the relative value of two very different tracts of land. One was an area of pristine wilderness, the other a section of tremendous archeological value upon which the growth of Los Alamos encroached. From Judge's perspective, this meant that the NPS had to "decide how much, if any, of the Otowi Section we would be willing to exchange for the Upper Frijoles area." Otowi had been an administrative headache since its addition in 1932. Although it contained two important ruins, Otowi and Little Otowi, as well as a cave kiva with 14th century drawings, an aboriginal animal trap, and other archeological features, its distance from the Frijoles headquarters made it difficult to protect. During the

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1940s The AEC had cut authorized and unauthorized roads and installed power lines and other utility service structures. The area west of New Mexico Highway 4 was particularly compromised. Others within the Southwest Regional Office hierarchy believed that a portion of the detached section ought to be turned over to the AEC.

The Frijoles Mesa transfer was not yet official, and Judge believed that the completion of that transaction should precede any discussion of the deletion of Otowi from the monument. Hugh Miller, the Regional Director, concurred that two transactions were the best way to achieve the goals of the agency. Park Service officials tried to complete the Frijoles Mesa acquisition while simultaneously working out a policy regarding the possible transfer of Otowi.

Late in 1959, the Frijoles Mesa transaction was completed quickly and easily. On December 4, 1959, the AEC presented Assistant Director Jackson E. Price with the paperwork transferring the Frijoles Mesa tract to the Park Service. On January 9, 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower formalized the transfer in Executive Proclamation 3388.

Judge’s driving motivation in the acquisition was to prevent the development of the immediate area surrounding the monument. “It is not impossible to assume,” he wrote, “that future pressure from sources not now apparent would envisage the crest of Frijoles Canyon an ideal location for industrial or residential development.” Judge’s astute realization that development beyond the boundaries of the park could affect the experience foreshadowed later concerns of the Park Service. By moving in the 1950s, the agency precluded potential development controversies in the 1980s and 1990s, effectively insulating the primary visitor attraction at Bandelier—Frijoles Canyon—from the careless and uninspired development that has come to surround many parks and monuments.

The acquisition of Frijoles Mesa also afforded the agency additional options in administering the Frijoles Canyon ruins. The mesa provided the Park Service a safety valve through which future crowding in the canyon could be alleviated. The transfer of some employee housing and all of the camping to the top of the mesa meant reduced pressure on the limited space in Frijoles Canyon.

The Upper Frijoles tract, however, temporarily remained beyond the grasp of the agency, largely because the Park Service lacked a policy regarding the Otowi section. The AEC became more aggressive, and in 1960, NPS management personnel made a number of studies to determine the efficacy of NPS administration for the detached section. Bandelier Chief Ranger George Von Der Lippe and District Ranger Edward J. Widmer visited Otowi, and on March 4, 1960, filed a report that recommended that the Park Service either administer the section vigorously or release it to the AEC.


According to the report, Otowi was a disaster. The encroachment of a variety of vehicles damaged vegetation, there was a vast "network of non-designated roads," and there was evidence of substantial vandalism, pot-hunting, and target shooting. Benign activities such as picnicking and camping also existed. Otowi was not being administered as if it were a part of the monument. Because of a lack of visible Park Service presence, conditions in the detached section were abominable.

Von Der Lippe and Widmer felt that the residents of Los Alamos were responsible for most of the damage. Otowi was "a convenient outlet for that group of local residents bent on ignoring the town regulations." On a daily basis, the ruins were protected only by warning signs, which were flagrantly violated. Although rangers issued warnings during their patrols, these were also ignored. From the perspective of Von Der Lippe's and Widmer, the impact of the surrounding community upon the Otowi section was already too great. If the Park Service did not have the time and money to patrol it properly, in their opinion the agency should delete the area from the monument.

The AEC was interested in the Otowi section, the NPS had designs upon the Upper Frijoles tract, and it seemed that the two agencies could work out an agreement. But NPS sentiment about the portion of Otowi to be deleted was far from unanimous. On March 25, 1960, William L. Bowen, Southwest Regional Chief of Recreational Planning, headed a field trip to the Otowi section. Judge, Von Der Lippe, and Park Archeologist Edward Jahns represented Bandelier, while Regional Chief of Ranger Activities Thomas Williams, Regional Archeologist Charlie Steen, Regional National Park System Planning official Leslie P. Arnberger, and Recreational Planner Paul Wykert came from Santa Fe.

After an inspection tour, the group unanimously agreed that portions of the Otowi section should be deleted. There were, however, a variety of ideas concerning the retention of various areas. All agreed that the Tsankawi section of the monument, east and south of Highway 4 and away from AEC development, ought to be retained. One suggestion was for the AEC to administer Otowi and the Little Otowi ruins and turn them into a city park. Believing that these were major ruins under any circumstances, Steen resisted this proposal.

Another plan was that the NPS should retain the ruins, but would give up other land north of the truck road to Los Alamos. The major drawback to this idea was that the transfer would allow the development of Los Alamos to "envelope" the ruins, creating an even stronger possibility that the ruins would be further damaged and desecrated. The third proposal, inspired by Steen's objections, was a corridor arrangement that would allow the AEC to develop its access to a testing site west of Otowi. The corridor would include areas needed by the AEC for "logical expansion." Steen's idea was to enlist the support of the AEC by accommodating its needs.18


As Paul Judge pointed out in his report on the trip, the deletion of the section would relieve his staff of much of its guardianship obligation. "Other than archeological features," Judge wrote, "there are no significant Park Service values in the Otowi section." If the agency was to curtail illegal use, it had to consider "proper fencing and sufficient manpower." Without added protection, Judge implied that there was little point in a continued Park Service presence at the Otowi section. His solution was to transfer the section to the AEC, with the stipulation that it adequately protect the ruins. In return, Judge wanted to acquire the Upper Frijoles tract. "It is a scenic wilderness area," he wrote, "completely Government owned and is definitely of Park Service caliber." Since the AEC was willing to transfer the Upper Frijoles area whether or not the NPS decided to give up Otowi, Judge suggested taking over the Upper Frijoles area and then sorting out the Otowi question.

Judge's Boundary Status Report (BSR) of June 28, 1960, reflected his views. He recommended the addition of the Upper Frijoles tract, which was "entirely wilderness in character." He wanted to delete all of Otowi except the Tsankawi portion, "the only part of the Otowi Section which still has potential for orderly park development." Judge compared the value of the two tracts and made his decision. The addition of an unimpacted wilderness tract outweighed the value of keeping the severely impacted archeological area. From a management standpoint, the Upper Crossing tract was more valuable than the detached area.

Trading the parts of Otowi upon which Los Alamos impinged for the Upper Frijoles tract was a logical outgrowth of Judge's management philosophy. Before he came to Bandelier, he worked at Glacier National Park, Jackson Hole National Monument and Grand Teton National Park. A wildlife biologist by training, Judge had little experience with archeological areas and focused upon the natural side of Bandelier. In his view, the value of the upper canyon area far outweighed that of the Otowi section.

While the Park Service favored the acquisition of the Upper Canyon area, the Otowi question was not so easily resolved. When submitted to the regional staff, the boundary report evoked a broad range of response. Land managers in the regional office supported the deletion. Les Arnberger remarked that the Upper Crossing area was "marvelous wilderness country . . . [and] a particularly desirable objective," but he said little about the loss of the archeological values of the Otowi section. Jerome Miller thought the proposal was "radical . . . but o.k.," while George Kell wondered why the agency needed to retain even the Tsankawi section.

Charlie Steen led the "keep Otowi" faction. "I am strongly in favor of keeping the sw corner of Otowi section, (south of 'back' road.) Bandelier was established for


its archeological values. It is very well to add a patch of wilderness but at the same time this proposal will eliminate an unusual feature - the game trap. . . . [W]e have no other example of one in Bandelier, or so far as I know, in the National Park System." Steen's argument was based upon the organic legislation establishing Bandelier, and made important points concerning the future of the site. "There exists in the present southwest corner of the Otowi section . . . a very nice group of structures which could easily be developed for interpretation; the game-trap, some cavate rooms and a small, mesa-top pueblo. We do not need these now --but two or three generations hence they may be quite valuable." No other Federal agency had the archeological experience of the Park Service. Steen believed that turning the ruins over to the AEC was tantamount to suggesting that Otowi had no value. He effectively positioned the needs of the future against the expediency of the present.

Associate Regional Director George Miller agreed with Steen, saying that Otowi "was important enough for the Service in the 30s to have it set aside [and] there is nothing . . . to indicate that most of the values are not there now. Because Los Alamos is nearby - resulting in an additional protection problem, does not justify the deletion of any part of the monument." Steen and Miller argued that the encroachment of Los Alamos did not compromise the absolute value of the ruins.

In essence, the argument came down to comparing archeological and recreational values. The recreational planners could clearly see the advantage of an additional tract of mountain wilderness. While the wilderness was indeed a fine tract, Steen was right to point out that Bandelier was an archeological park. If the funds and work power to maintain Otowi were not forthcoming, Judge, Von Der Lippe, and the rest of the Bandelier staff had a valid point when they suggested that it might be better to let the AEC protect the ruins. Each proposed alternative fell within the boundaries of agency policy, and there was ample precedent for any combination of proposed courses of action.

Before the regional staff had a chance to comment, Regional Chief of Recreational Planning William Bowen initially approved the Boundary Status Report. In light of the objections, he reconsidered. On August 3, 1960, he laid out the options that he believed were available to the NPS. He preferred to approve Judge's report and be done with the issue, but listed three other possible alternatives. The most desirable of these was to modify the report to continue NPS management of the southwest corner of Otowi. Bowen's major objection to keeping the game trap was that it required that the NPS purchase adjacent private lands, in order to protect the "park values" of the ruins. Less advantageous was to approve the addition, but disapprove the deletion. The least effective option Bowen could see was to preserve the status quo by disapproving the entire Boundary Status Report. With the options clearly articulated, Miller turned the problem over to Regional Director Thomas J. Allen.

22 Charlie Steen memo to the Regional Director, July 26, 1960. File L1417. BAND.

23 George Miller memo to the Regional Director. July 28, 1960, File L1417, BAND.

24 William Bowen to Regional Director Thomas J. Allen, August 3, 1960, File L1417, BAND.
No stranger to questions of land acquisition, Allen passed on a recommendation of no concurrence with the boundary report to the Washington office. He knew how hard the Park Service fought to acquire Otowi and the rest of the monument during the 1920s and 1930s. Allen was instrumental in the acquisition of a number of southwestern parks. He was also a veteran of many controversies with the Forest Service and recognized the role of the Park Service in protecting archeological sites. In his view, good forest land did not constitute a significant enough reason to add the Upper Canyon area to the monument. Allen believed the threat of forest fire in the new addition would present a greater protection problem than the one that existed at Otowi. He presented the proposals as intrinsically linked. Either the Park Service would have Otowi or the Upper Canyon area. From his perspective, the whole project was flawed. The Park Service was merely trading one headache for another.25

In Judge's eyes, Allen's manner of presenting the issue to Washington narrowed the choices available to the agency. By not offering a recommendation on the proposal, Allen furthered the notion that one could not happen without the other. Judge objected to this, pointing out that the "AEC does not expect nor require the Otowi Section in exchange for the Upper Frijoles area."26 He urged that the agency evaluate the two proposals separately, on their individual merit. The separation of the two proposals made the acquisition of Upper Canyon likely even if the Park Service decided to keep all of Otowi.

On May 26, 1960, Bowen, Judge, Arnberger, Wykert, and John J. Burke, the AEC manager for the Los Alamos area, met and discussed the transfer. Agreement seemed close at hand, but on June 21, 1961, Burke wrote NPS Regional Director Allen that Forest Service Supervisor R. E. Lattimore requested that the same tract be added to the Santa Fe National Forest. Burke felt that AEC, NPS, and USFS representatives should meet to iron out the transfer. By the early 1960s, Forest Service animosity to Park Service attempts to enlarge Bandelier was legendary. Rather than battle it out with the USFS once again, on June 28, 1961, Allen put the entire proposal on hold.27

The proposal remained in limbo until early the following year, when high-level interest in the project put pressure upon the Forest Service. In January, 1962, Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, New Mexico Senator Clinton P. Anderson, United States Representative Joseph A. Montoya, USFS Regional Forester Fred Kennedy, and Allen met in Albuquerque to discuss lands on the Pajarito Plateau. The interest of such important officials put Kennedy in a difficult spot. He was pressured to relinquish all USFS claims to the Upper Frijoles tract.

Kennedy did not bow to the pressure and the USFS once again obstructed NPS plans for the Bandelier region. Regional Director Allen was adamant about completing the transfer quickly, for he was aware that a bill to include the Baca

25 Allen to Wirth. August 9, 1960. File L1417. BAND.

26 Judge to Allen. August 17, 1960. File L1417. BAND.

location in a Bandelier-vicinity national park was about to be introduced in Congress. The introduction of such a bill would immediately arouse the ire of the USFS, cause it to resist the Upper Canyon transfer, and make the entire project into a visible controversy. Although the Upper Frijoles transfer was really not the concern of the USFS, the AEC wished to maintain good relations with all Federal agencies in the Pajarito Plateau region. It was not prepared to offend the USFS to satisfy the NPS. Allen was aware of this and wrote Wirth that he believed the AEC would not make the transfer until the USFS relinquished all claims to the tract. Although he thought that the USFS position would delay the transfer, he wrote: "we will, however, keep trying."

But the AEC and the NPS circumvented the USFS. The two agencies created a compromise that gave both sides what it wanted. In June 1962, the Upper Frijoles tract was declared "excess to needs of [the] AEC." Local AEC officials informed Superintendent Albert Henson that they would try to acquire all of Otowi except the Tsankawi section. The NPS decided that this was an equitable transfer and the Acting Director of the Southwest Region, George W. Miller, opined that AEC officials believed that the proposed Valle Grande National Park bill, S. 3321, gave the AEC "justification for [the] transfer without USFS concurrence." There remained, however, a major problem. S. 3321 did not call for the deletion of Otowi and its passage would therefore not cause the simultaneous transfer of the two areas.

Director Wirth quickly solved this problem. He assured Miller that a Presidential Proclamation to exclude Otowi and restore it to the public domain could be arranged. The Secretary of the Interior would then issue a Public Land Order, reserving Otowi for the AEC. If the Valle Grande bill was not enacted, then the Presidential Proclamation excluding Otowi would also include the Upper Frijoles tract. After the Valle Grande bill died in Congress, a Presidential Proclamation on August 10, 1962, included the Upper Frijoles area. The GSA again applied the deletion procedure used to acquire the Frijoles Mesa, and on February 15, 1963, the GSA authorized the transfer. On May 27, 1963, after four years of maneuvering, President John F. Kennedy issued Presidential Proclamation 3539, accomplishing the transfer.

During the maneuvering aimed at arranging the transfer of the two tracts, the long-dormant effort to create a national park on the Pajarito Plateau began to revive. The new attempt, which proposed the inclusion of Valles Caldera, began when Bandelier concessionaire Mrs. Evelyn C. Frey wrote Senator Dennis Chavez on February 26, 1961, to inform him that the 100,000-acre Baca Location no. 1 was for sale. Chavez contacted the Park Service, and the agency began to dust off old plans for the region. Meanwhile, Chavez got Clinton P. Anderson, the other senator from New Mexico, interested in the project.

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28 Allen to Wirth, March 6, 1962. File L1417, BAND.

29 Burke to Bandelier Superintendent Albert Henson, June 19, 1962. File L1417, BAND.

30 George W. Miller to Wirth, June 29, 1962. File L1417, BAND.
The ranking Democrat on the Senate Public Lands Committee, Anderson was an influential figure on Capitol Hill. His conservation credentials stretched back to the 1920s, when he was instrumental in bringing the Teapot Dome scandal to light. Once in the Senate, Anderson became a power on Capitol Hill. By the 1960s, he was a fixture. Tall, forceful, and tubercular, Anderson began to promote the project.

NPS officials in Washington also explored the park possibilities of the Pajarito Plateau for the first time in a number of years. In June 1961, Director Wirth wrote a memo limited to office use to Regional Director Thomas J. Allen, to inform him that the agency was interested in acquiring the Baca and changing Bandelier from a national monument to a national park. "Confidentially," Wirth added, "Senator Anderson is very much interested in this and so is the Secretary of the Interior, Stewart Udall." The Baca was for sale, but the owners, the Bond family, held it off the market, waiting to see if a national park in the region was feasible. The Canyon De San Diego grant, also a part of the Jemez Crater proposal, was also for sale, but Wirth thought there was little in that tract suited for park status.

Conditions upon the plateau had changed since the Second World War, and as a result, the options of the agency were limited. Allen responded by informing Wirth that the one-million-acre Jemez Crater proposal of 1939, the basis upon which the agency relied for its justification of the new national park idea, was "certainly not feasible [in 1961]. . . . we should recognize that the proposal today is not the proposal recommended as nationally significant in 1939." Allen also believed that the Valle Grande bill was an extremely controversial measure, for it would encounter bitter resistance from the Forest Service. He pointed to the Frijoles Mesa acquisition as evidence. Although the land in question in that case belonged to the AEC, the Forest Service opposed the transfer to the NPS. "We ought to be very sure of our ground before we get further involved," the battle-seasoned Allen wrote. "We can expect a real fight on this larger proposal."

The Forest Service continued to oppose the idea of a national park on the Pajarito Plateau, while the Park Service explored new alternatives. Among the proposals advanced was one that made the larger area a national recreation area instead of a national park. The USFS had more trouble opposing the recreation area. It would not arouse the ire of the hunting constituency of the USFS, whose sport would be prohibited by the creation of a national park.

NPS regional officials, however, were not really interested in a national recreation area. They began to look for other ways to accommodate the USFS. The initial Bandelier-Valle Grande proposal, S. 3321, would have added a total of 185,383 acres to the existing monument to make it a national park. Of the total, 100,000 would be purchased from the owners of the Baca ranch, while the USFS would transfer another 67,500 acres. Forest Service opposition to a project of this

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31 Wirth to Allen, June 2, 1961. File 6, Land Records, BAND.

32 Allen to Wirth, June 29, 1961. File 6, Land Records, Bandelier National Monument Library, BAND.

33 Ben Thompson to Wirth, July 19, 1961. File 6, Land Records, BAND.
magnitude was sure to be fierce and unending. NPS officials knew they would have to cut back on the amount of land that they requested.

The Forest Service was no more interested in allowing the establishment of a large national park on the Pajarito Plateau in 1961 than it had been during the 1920s. Nevertheless, Park Service officials tried to get their old foes to acquiesce. On August 25, 1961, NPS and USFS regional officials met to discuss the issue. Both sides agreed to a joint study of the area, but there was little other common ground. The NPS could not yet count on the support of USFS officials.

NPS officials knew that a compromise that insured USFS support of the position of the Park Service was essential to the success of the park effort, but Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall was the person who found the middle ground. In October 1961, supporters of the park proposal, including Anderson, Udall, New Mexico Congressmen Joseph A. Montoya and Thomas G. Morris, USFS and NPS representatives, and George W. Savage, who represented the estate of Frank Bond, toured the Baca area. Aware of potential USFS resistance, Udall proposed that about 30,000 acres of the Baca be incorporated in the new national park, while the remaining 67,000 be attached to the Santa Fe National Forest. In essence, Udall's proposal gave both agencies what they wanted.

As a result of Udall's stance, the NPS modified its stance in hopes of achieving a compromise. The Department of the Interior and the Park Service reviewed the proposed Valle Grande National Park and reduced its size considerably. Instead of 185,383 acres, the new proposal included only 30,745 acres of the Baca tract, the 3000-acre Upper Frijoles tract which the AEC was still in the process of transferring to the NPS, and the 30,649 acres of the existing national monument. The new proposal called for the transfer of the remaining 69,000 acres of the Baca to the Forest Service.

After public hearings in Santa Fe in September 1962, the USFS and NPS appeared to be reconciled to Udall's compromise. Both agencies testified in favor of the bill, as did other Government departments and members of the public. Will Orndorff, the President of the New Mexico Cattle Growers Association, was the only important objector. Orndorff and the livestock lobby preferred to see the land put to unrestricted commercial purposes.

The existing legislation still posed an obstacle. The original bill, S. 3321, did not reflect the Udall's compromise and died at the end of the Congressional session. New bills followed when Congress reconvened at the beginning of 1963. At the opening of the new session on January 9, 1963, Anderson introduced S. 47, which incorporated many of the new changes. Morris followed it with H. R. 1941 a week later. All the objections to the proposal had been satisfied, and the chances of the bills looked good.

But disaster struck, and the project began to disintegrate. On January 29, 1963, the Santa Fe New Mexican reported that a group of Texas investors, headed by James P. (Pat) Dunigan, had purchased the entire Baca tract. Although he announced that "the Government [was] not precluded from negotiating for a portion of the tract,"
Dunigan upset the balance of power. The 66,000 acres that Udall wanted to add to the Santa Fe National Forest were no longer for sale, and the USFS had no reason to support Federal attempts to purchase 30,000 acres to create a new national park. The Forest Service lost interest. From its perspective, without something to sweeten the arrangement, it had no reason to support a proposal that enlarged the domain of its chief rival.

In any event, Dunigan had other plans, and he quickly encountered local animosity. He began work on a master plan for the development of the Baca. The local newspaper, the Los Alamos Monitor got hold of portions of his plan and publicly quoted it. In April 1963, the newspaper reported that Dunigan planned a ski area, racetrack, and resort community for the Baca. Upset at the prospect, representatives of Los Alamos County contacted state officials, and Dunigan’s project received considerable scrutiny. The following day, the newspaper reported that the state racing commissioner was not aware of plans for a racetrack. Dunigan was not used to having his private business discussed in public. He angrily responded that his representative got carried away. His plans were not that extensive, but this did little to quell rumors of the beginning of a "little Texas" on the Pajarito Plateau. The rumors escalated, and the pressure increased. Finally, Dunigan abandoned development plans in June 1963, deciding that a working cattle ranch offered a better alternative.

The attempt to establish a national park was not yet dead. On July 15, 1963, both New Mexico Senators, Anderson and Edwin Mechem, introduced a new bill, S. 1870, that allowed the purchase of the 30,000 acres for the national park while eliminating the part of the Baca that the USFS was to acquire. Entitled the "Valle Grande-Bandelier National Park bill," Mechem claimed that the proposed park would be the biggest thing ever to happen to northern New Mexico.

The bill seemed likely to pass Congress. On October 21, 1963, the Department of the Interior reported favorably on it, and Anderson called a Senate Public Lands subcommittee meeting on the subject. When Anderson's Senate Public Lands subcommittee met to consider the bill on May 29, 1964, Pat Dunigan's opposition strangled the proposal. He testified in front of the committee, opposing the project on the grounds that a national park would stifle the economic potential of the area. Even with the persuasive Anderson as an advocate, subcommittee members believed the bill should be put aside. The subcommittee authorized the Department of the Interior to offer Dunigan $750,000 for the 30,000-acre tract. He refused to consider the offer.

The Park Service was out of options. The land it wanted for the Pajarito Plateau national park was not for sale. Dunigan was angry at both the Federal Government and the Los Alamos community and held the trump card in the region. There was little that Congress, the Department of the Interior, or the National Park Service could do. Anderson felt that the opportunity to acquire the Valle Grande had

34-Texans Buy 100,000 Acre Jemez Tract." Santa Fe New Mexican, January 29, 1963.
Despite Mechem and Anderson's urgings of grass roots support, the bill died at the end of 88th Congress. No one reintroduced a bill in the next session.

After the demise of the Valle Grande proposal in 1964, interest in new acquisitions at Bandelier waned. Without congressional action of any kind, grass roots advocates could not maintain local enthusiasm for the project. Park Service officials were aware of the possibility of Forest Service resistance, and Pat Dunigan did not appear willing to negotiate. Once again, efforts to create a national park on the Pajarito Plateau were stymied.

Even though the plan to establish a national park in 1964 progressed no farther than a subcommittee hearing, acquiring the Valle Grande remained part of NPS thinking. Agency officials continued to eye the Baca. In October 1969, Bandelier Superintendent Stanley T. Albright overheard a conversation at a Los Alamos Rotary Club meeting that led him to believe that Dunigan planned to sell the Baca. Park Service acquisition machinery began to gear up, but Dunigan never put the ranch on the market. The NPS was again thwarted.

Yet attempts to enlarge the monument continued. In 1971, the Park Service made a feeble effort to reacquire the game-trap, the cave kiva, and the Otowi ruins. The AEC was under pressure to dispose of some its holdings in the Los Alamos area. By February 1971, area pueblos and the USFS already expressed interest in the land. "If the NPS desires certain of these lands," wrote Acting Chief of NPS Environmental Planning and Design John S. Adams, "it had better move immediately and stake claim." Park Service officials approached the AEC, and in a meeting on March 8, 1971, Los Alamos officials agreed to inform the NPS of any plans to dispose of the Otowi section.

But there was little pressure to dispose of Otowi. Thus, more than a year later, the NPS had no new information. On April 26, 1972, Bandelier Superintendent Linwood E. Jackson contacted "Bud" Wingfield of the AEC and found that the AEC had no plans to give up any part of the Otowi Section. Despite repeated attempts by Bandelier staff members to initiate negotiations, Otowi remained beyond the pale of NPS administration.

Dunigan did not fare as well as he had hoped with his ranch on the Baca. In 1964, he sued the New Mexico Timber Company, charging it with improperly caring for the land while it exercised its rights under a 99-year timber lease. According to the suit, the New Mexico Timber Company destroyed the surface value of Dunigan's land by cutting unnecessary roads, leaving the slash on the land, and denuding the region of mature trees. Dunigan was sensitive to the aesthetic values of his land and resented the tactics of the New Mexico Timber Co. In 1970, the court ordered the timber company to pay Dunigan $200,000 for damages to 5000 acres that it harvested.

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after he filed the suit. In the end, the suit was resolved to Dunigan's satisfaction. The court allowed him to purchase the lease of the New Mexico Timber Company.

The Park Service feared the destruction of the upper Frijoles Canyon watershed, and it tried to purchase a portion of the Baca. The insensitive land practices of the New Mexico Timber Company drove home the vulnerability of the park. In order to prevent the canyon from the flooding and large-scale erosion that would occur downstream the Park Service sought to include the entire El Rito de Los Frijoles watershed in the monument. If grazing and timbering were not restricted in the mountains, Bandelier was at risk.

On May 3, 1973, Brewster Lindner, the head of the Division of Land Acquisition, wrote Pat Dunigan to explain the long-term plans of the NPS to acquire a portion of the ranch. He wanted to avoid any chance of misunderstanding. Dunigan was interested in selling the small parcel that the Park Service wanted. After ordering an appraisal in early 1975, Lindner tendered an offer to purchase 3,076 acres of the southeast corner of the Baca for $1,350,000, subject to legislative approval.\(^{38}\)

Yet there were obstacles in the way of even this small acquisition. While Dunigan considered the offer, the Regional Office submitted the proposal to the NPS Washington Office for review. Three conditions concerned all levels of the Park Service. Dunigan previously conveyed a one per cent general royalty on the property to the Magma Power Company in 1963, and unidentified parties owned 11 1/4 per cent of all minerals, steam, geothermal and thermal energy. On April 4, 1971, Dunigan had granted Union Oil of California a 99-year lease of geothermal rights to the entire ranch. In response to questions from the Washington Office, Lindner opined that the 11 1/4 percent royalty was not a problem for the agency and said that Union Oil representatives expressed a willingness to release their claim on the 3,076-acre section unless an unusual find was discovered. Further correspondence with Dunigan convinced Lindner that the concession to Magma Power did not pose a problem for park management.

Satisfied with Lindner's assessment, Southwest Regional Director Joseph C. Rumburg Jr. recommended the acquisition in January, 1976. Rumburg believed that the cost of the tract would only increase if the project was delayed. Even though the agency had no written commitment from Union Oil, it would most likely follow through on its verbal commitment. After completion of the legislative process, the agreement was signed on January 28, 1977, and the acquisition of the headwaters of the Frijoles was complete.

The headwaters bill also gave the agency the authority to acquire the Canada de Cochiti Grant, south of the monument. A number of earlier park proposals included the tract. The building of the Cochiti Dam near the southern tip of the monument led the agency to consider a presence there. Moreover, the Park Service coveted the area for administrative purposes. It offered a potential buffer between the lake and

the delicate ruins in the Bandelier back country. It also presented the Park Service with a way to expand its interpretive scope.

Once again, the idea of a national park on the Pajarito Plateau gathered momentum. Dunigan's earlier suit against the New Mexico Timber Company was highly publicized. The controversy over the destruction of the forest resource led to another grass-roots move toward the creation of a park. New Mexico Congressional Representative Manuel Lujan received letters from Los Alamos area residents. Then on December 28, 1970, he requested that the National Park Service congressional liaison follow up on the issue.

During the middle 1970s, park proponents got a lift from a new law. The passage of PL 94-458, the General Authorities Act of 1976 required the NPS to select a minimum of twelve areas a year for inclusion in the National Park System. Although these were disparagingly called "the park-of-the-month" proposals, some important areas were included. The Valle Grande was on the first list the agency submitted to Congress. Among the evidence that the agency offered was the designation of the Valle Grande as a national natural landmark in 1975, and the recommendation of the National Parks Advisory Board in 1962 that the area be included in a national park.

In the late 1970s, Department of the Interior and Park Service officials took one more serious look at the merits of the Baca location. In August, 1978, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior David Hales, and Southwest Regional Director John Cook visited the Baca location as guests of Pat Dunigan. After the trip, Hales had the Fish and Wildlife Service and the NPS prepare a prospectus that summarized the discussion. As it would give him an excellent tax advantage, Dunigan appeared ready to work out an agreement with the agency.

But high-level Park Service officials had other priorities. Dunigan wished to meet with NPS Director William Whalen to discuss the transaction. Whalen, however, was not interested in the project, and Dunigan was deflected towards Assistant Director Ira J. Hutchinson. Quite rightly offended, Dunigan left Washington, withdrew his offer, and began negotiations with the Forest Service.

But despite Dunigan's anger, the park proposal gained credence on Capitol Hill. Rep. Phillip Burton, the Chairman of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, introduced a Valles Caldera National Park bill in early 1979 without approaching either the Park Service or Pat Dunigan. Dunigan discussed the proposal with Sierra Club Southwestern Representative Brant Calkin, and they decided the bill was "premature."

Even though the purchase of the entire tract would cost somewhere in the neighborhood of $60,000,000, the new proposal made headway. A new-area study


of alternatives was drawn up with a focus on the interpretation of geothermal and energy-producing activities. This was applauded by the manager of the Harper's Ferry Center of the agency as an "excellent area for industry and the National Park Service to get together and proceed in the same direction."  

But in the view of others in the agency, the Valle Caldera was already compromised, and they questioned the efficacy of the park proposal. Lorraine Mintzmeyer, Acting Regional Director of the Southwest Region, turned back the national park idea in favor of establishing a national preserve. "The almost blanket uses of the area for geothermal exploration and development," she wrote, "would make preservation and management of the area as a national park or monument very difficult." Her argument paralleled that of Paul Judge during the discussions over Otowi. The level of development in the Baca equaled that in the old Otowi section. Questions over its suitability for a place in the park system needed to be addressed.  

In an unfortunate coincidence, the option to purchase the Baca disappeared. In early 1980, Pat Dunigan collapsed and died of a heart attack. His death dashed the hopes of the Park Service. The Baca Location passed to the trust he set up for his two underage sons. The trustees were not interested in disposing of the property.  

After eighty years, the attempts to preserve large sections of the Pajarito Plateau within the boundaries of a national park ended. A number of opportune moments came and went, and a series of unusual coincidences and circumstances thwarted the plans of the agency. It was as if Park Service efforts in the region were jinxed. Every time the agency came close to acquiring its national park, something got in the way.  

The problems grew out of competing interests in the region. Each opportunity for the agency offered its competitors an equal chance. In many cases, other interest groups were more powerful than the Park Service. John Collier and the Bureau of Indian Affairs were influential during the 1930s, the creation of the Manhattan project in Los Alamos superseded Park Service interests in the region, and the Forest Service was always ready to thwart the NPS.  

Another problem was that the agency never fully accepted the concept of archeological areas as national parks. The Park Service did not exist when the only archeological national park, Mesa Verde, was established in 1906. From Mukuntuweap to the Petrified Forest, most of its efforts centered upon acquiring national park status for natural areas. While on occasion, archeological park areas received nomenclatural designations like national historic park, other than the Pajarito Plateau efforts, the NPS rarely proposed archeological areas for park status. As a result, its efforts to change its perception of the plateau seemed somewhat hollow, as if the emphasis on natural attributes was an elaborate rationale for the creation of a national park in the region. To outsiders like the Forest Service, the change in the focus of the agency offered evidence of the lack of merit in the entire
idea. The more the Park Service tried for a national park, the smaller its chances of success became.

Like many areas within the park system, Bandelier was the focus of a variety of land acquisition attempts. What makes Bandelier distinct was that attempts to acquire land at the park ultimately changed the purpose for which the monument was established. The early attempts to create a national park, as well as most of the land acquisition attempts, focused on acquiring archeological resources or providing a buffer area to protect them. Beginning with the Jemez Crater proposal, later efforts to establish a national park looked to create a national park that subsumed archeological values to natural ones. Handed a mandate when it assumed jurisdiction of the site in 1932, the Park Service repeatedly tried to expand boundaries of the monument as it widened its interests and responsibilities at Bandelier.
When the Park Service assumed responsibility for Bandelier National Monument in 1932, the development of visitor-use facilities played a significant role. Two major periods of development defined Bandelier. The initial phase, during which the major administrative and visitor-use facilities were constructed, lasted from 1933 until the Civilian Conservation Corp (CCC) camp closed in 1940. The second period began with the Mission 66 program for Bandelier, which led to major construction during the 1960s. In the 1980s, planning for the physical plant at the monument remained under the influence of the Mission 66 plan.

The three master plans designed for Bandelier revealed the evolution of Park Service attitudes towards development and accommodation of visitors. The initial plan, dating from 1934, was an unrestricted program of development. Its primary focus was to create facilities that allowed the monument to become an integral part of the southwestern national monuments group. Centered around the building of an entrance road into the Frijoles Canyon, the plan created a physical plant which made the site into a pre-eminent tourist attraction.

The master plan of 1953, revised under the auspices of the Mission 66 program, sought to alleviate the impact of the Los Alamos community upon the monument. Local residents came to see Bandelier as a "city park," causing serious overcrowding on the canyon floor. The master plan was a belated response to existing conditions, designed to address the conditions of the 1950s. Its emphasis on acquisition and development revealed a preoccupation with providing a buffer zone for the resources of the monument. Visitation at the site, however, quickly outgrew this plan.

After being caught short during the 1950s and early 1960s, Park Service planners tried to anticipate growth before it occurred. The master plan of 1977, in the works for a decade before its approval, planned for an expected increase in visitation. Confronted with the imminent opening of the Cochiti Dam recreation facility, Park Service planners took preventative action. Rather than wait for the impact, as they had in 1940s, NPS officials created a plan to facilitate what they expected to be the impact on the monument.

The Park Service and the powerful environmental community clashed over the proposal as the development ran afoul of another NPS program—the legally mandated evaluation of larger-than-5000-acre roadless areas for wilderness status. Wilderness areas were highly desirable to the environmental constituency. When the NPS recommended no wilderness for Bandelier, local and national organizations attacked the agency, claiming its stance would cause the degradation of the Bandelier back country. Although at the time the proposals seemed antithetical, in reality careful management made development of the facilities at the park and wilderness preservation into complimentary objectives.

Ironically, by the late 1980s, the expected growth of the Cochiti Lake region, the catalyst for the controversy, had not occurred. In 1986, the implementation of the...
proposals that exasperated local and regional environmental groups appeared to be a decade in the future. The Park Service took a more cautious approach to future plans of accommodating visitors at Bandelier. Agency focus shifted from trying to entice visitors to the site to providing visitors that arrived with a quality experience.

At Bandelier, the Park Service did not inherit a physical plant from the Forest Service. Although the concessioner's buildings were adequate, if ramshackle, there was little else in Frijoles Canyon. A small, dilapidated ranger cabin, with a telephone line that hooked into the network of the Forest Service, comprised the extent of Forest Service improvements in the canyon. The only access to the canyon was via a steep trail, preventing the sedentary, the infirm, and the old from visiting the main canyon ruins. To make Bandelier fulfill Frank Pinkley's dream of an entry point into the southwestern national monument group required extensive development.

After the Park Service assumed control at Bandelier, Frank Pinkley began to press for the construction of a physical plant. The only facilities in the monument belonged to the concessioners. Pinkley needed some place to base his operation. Although George and Evelyn Frey ran the Frijoles Canyon Lodge, Pinkley found their facilities inappropriate. From his perspective, the lodge area was too close to Tyuonyi, the community house ruins. The whole canyon floor looked too much like a homestead to Pinkley, with fruit trees, a large garden, chickens and ducks in the canyon, and cattle grazing on the south mesa.

Pinkley envisioned Bandelier as a prime attraction in the southwestern national monument group. More importantly, he saw it as the mouth of a funnel that would bring visitors to the other southwestern national monuments. As such, the monument required substantial development, the cornerstone of which was a road to the floor of Frijoles Canyon. Automobile accessibility would increase visitation dramatically, giving the agency justification for requesting substantial development funding.

For development purposes, the Park Service acquired Bandelier at precisely the right moment. It came into the Park System in 1932, ahead of the rash of park areas that Executive Order 6166, Franklin D. Roosevelt's measure to streamline the Federal bureaucracy, transferred to the agency. By the time New Deal programs, such as the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), were established, the Park Service, and particularly Pinkley, had specific plans for Bandelier. The Emergency Conservation Work (ECW) program of the Civilian Conservation Corp (CCC) gave the Park Service access to the necessary funding and work power to build administrative and visitor facilities from scratch. The Federal programs supplied funding and labor for the developments of the 1930s.

The most important feature of the development program was the construction of a road into Frijoles Canyon. Without a road to the canyon bottom, Bandelier would remain inaccessible. Although Forest Service officials opposed the idea of a road until the end of the 1920s, late in their tenure, they explored construction
Before the coming of the CCC camp, the few trails in the monument discouraged travelers who wanted to inspect the ruins. This photograph of the area including the restored Talus House reveals the condition of the trails in the park prior to 1933.
With his vision of Bandelier as a preeminent attraction among the southwestern monuments, Frank Pinkley advocated the construction of the road even before the Park Service assumed jurisdiction of the area. He weathered the opposition of a cadre of Santa Fe residents, to whom he referred as "mud-hut nuts," arguing that the road was a necessary improvement for a park area so close to an important tourist center. "We can't refuse 15,000 visitors admission" he wrote Horace Albright on October 8, 1932, "just because the Spanish didn't use automobiles 300 years ago: it just doesn't make sense."¹

According to Jesse Nusbaum, it was not only Pinkley's "mud-hut nuts" who opposed the project. Much of the Santa Fe community, including prominent citizens such as Bronson Cutting, the owner of the New Mexican, resisted the idea of a road into the canyon. The Park Service presence was a feature in the volatile political climate of northern New Mexico, and Nusbaum worried that a proposal for a road would create new opposition. As a long-time resident of Santa Fe, his "firm conviction" was that the NPS should wait until there was a permanent ranger in Frijoles Canyon before it proceeded with the road.²

Despite resistance in Santa Fe, the NPS decided the road was imperative. Advocating its construction was an easy way to differentiate NPS administration from that of the USFS. "It would be unfortunate, indeed," Acting Director Arthur E. Demaray responded to Nusbaum on November 18, 1932, "if we were to follow a no more vigorous policy [regarding construction of the road] than was practiced by the Forest Service."³ The road to Frijoles Canyon became a pivotal issue. Without it Bandelier would remain no different than the other Forest Service national monuments. Remote and unimportant, like many of the other national monuments, it would serve little purpose for an agency interested in attracting visitors.

During the 1920s, Stephen T. Mather and Horace M. Albright developed the Park Service by providing visitor service and in the early 1930s, the agency closely adhered to their doctrine. Park Service inspections stressed the problems that existing conditions created. The lack of access impeded visitation. According to George Grant, a Park Service photographer who inspected and photographed Bandelier on October 20, 1932, the trail into the canyon was an "actual barrier" for all but the most vigorous travelers. The existing trail discouraged four of every five visitors who approached the park. Many looked over the edge at the trail and abandoned their plans to visit the canyon floor. "The visitor," Grant wrote, "must

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Building the road from the mesa to the canyon was the single most important innovation in Frank Pinkley's development plan for Bandelier. As soon as CCC workers completed the initial truck trail, the Park Service opened it to visitor travel. Meanwhile, as this photo shows, CCC men continued to improve the road.
be able to get his car close to the points of interest.\^{5}

With a road to the canyon bottom, Bandelier could be as a popular as any park area in the Southwest. The Washington Office of the NPS favored the development of the park and discounted opposition; Demaray told Nusbaum that "the easiest way to get visitors to Bandelier is to build a good road."\^{6} "Looked at from the standpoint of keeping visitors out of a national monument," Pinkley wrote Hunter Clarkson, the proprietor of the Indian Detours guide service, "the present trail may be considered a complete success, although we could, by putting in a few more steep angles and digging some holes in the trail[,] cut the present four thousand visitors in half."\^{7} Pinkley's facetious tone indicated his position clearly. In 1933, there were few projects more important to his southwestern national monuments group than the road to Frijoles Canyon.

To mask his true objectives and combat local resistance, Pinkley initially presented the road as a service trail. He stressed the efficacy of the road in letters to CCC and ECW administrators. Without the road, building the structures he sought for the canyon verged on impossibility. It also provided him a convenient way to achieve his goals without arousing the rancor of those who opposed him.

There were a number of possible routes for roads into the canyon. National Park Service Historian Verne E. Chatelain visited Bandelier with George Frey, the concessioner, and looked at the options. The New Mexico state surveyor had laid out one possibility, which had steep grades and was visible from the canyon bottom. Park Service landscape architects did their own road survey. The route the agency proposed was longer, but its grades were less steep and according to Chatelain, the scar it left would be almost invisible from the canyon floor.\^{8} Despite the increased distance, a road that could not be seen from the canyon floor fit the philosophy of the Park Service. After a number of additional inspections, the longer, more scenic route was approved.

Construction began in November 1933, almost as soon as the CCC camp at the monument opened. On December 9, 1933, the first car went down the unfinished trail, carrying Mrs. Evelyn Frey and Walter G. Atwell, the Park Service engineer who oversaw the project.\^{9} The road, however, was far from complete. ECW regulations only permitted the construction of a truck trail twelve-feet wide with its funds. It took money from another New Deal agency, the Civil Works Authority (CWA) money

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\^{7}Pinkley to Hunter Clarkson. May 23, 1933. Bandelier National Monument File 12-5. Series 7. RG 79. NA.


Frank Pinkley's program created facilities for visitor service at Bandelier. By early in 1934, the trail through the main ruins of Frijoles Canyon had been substantially improved. This photo of the trail shows the importance of capital improvements to the Park Service. The road from the mesa top, the most important development in preparing the monument for visitors, is visible, as are the temporary structures of the CCC camp.
and most of 1934 to complete the 22-foot wide trail to the canyon.

Other development projects started as soon as the CCC camp was staffed. As work began on the initial master plan, Pinkley submitted a list of projects that he believed were necessary at the park. After the road, the priorities were water and sewer systems, renovation of the ranger's cabin, and trails--on the valley floor, to the Frijoles falls, and to the Ceremonial Cave. Fencing to protect the Frijoles section from cattle that wandered over from the nearby Ramon Vigil grant was necessary, as well as some sort of boundary protection for the detached Otowi section. Construction on many of these began when the camp opened in November 1933. Pinkley also wanted money to repair the ruins and remove the Frey's fencing, barns and outbuildings. The ECW appropriation, however, was too small to include his entire plan, and Pinkley was forced to wait until later enrollment periods.

The major planning problem at Bandelier was to find adequate space in the canyon for all of the necessary facilities. Spontaneous development at the monument aggravated the situation. While the Office of Planning and Design drew up a master plan for Bandelier, ECW money allowed Pinkley to begin other projects.

The ECW programs made it advantageous to the NPS to begin as many projects as possible. Projects already underway received nearly automatic renewal at the beginning of a new enrollment period; new projects required the approval of ECW administrators. As a result, Pinkley began every project he could, and despite the efforts of Assistant Landscape Architect Jared Morse to keep track of everything, programs funded through the ECW often began when ECW money arrived. NPS architects and planners accepted these projects as established fact and worked such faits accompli into their long-term plans.

The location of the parking area and administration building became the most divisive issue that emerged from the planning process. According to the initial plans of the Engineering Branch, the Frey's hotel operation was to remain across Frijoles Creek, southwest of Tyuonyi. For protective reasons, Pinkley was committed to the concept of providing visitors with guided tours through the ruins. He thought his program gave the visitors better understanding of the site than did self-guided visits. The two perspectives were irreconcilable.

If the Park Service were to eliminate the possibility of self-guided visits at the monument, agency facilities had to provide the only approach to the ruins. As a result, Pinkley suggested that the agency locate a combination administration building and museum, along with a widened parking area, at the base of the new road. Such a development would compel visitors to make contact with Park Service personnel before reaching the ruins, a program with which Pinkley had great success at Casa Grande. It also meant that tourists would have to walk about one-quarter of a mile to the Tyuonyi ruins.

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The original Frijoles Canyon Lodge, pictured here, offered the only accommodations and refreshments in Frijoles Canyon prior to the coming of the Park Service. In 1907, Judge A. J. Abbott and his wife Ada Patton Abbott built the structure directly across the creek from Tyuonyi. When George and Evelyn Frey took over concessions in the monument in 1925, they improved it. In addition to the main cabin, there were a number of guest cabins located behind the structure.
The Frey's development, however, presented a formidable problem for Pinkley. Its location threatened the proposed development. Besides the contemplated structures, Park Service plans called for a campground south of Frijoles Creek, with an auto trail that continued to the Frey's lodge. Frank A. Kittredge, the Chief Engineer of the agency, believed that the trail to the Frey lodge would allow visitors to circumvent the interpretation facilities of the agency. "No artificial obstacles . . . will long prevent the extension of the road [toward Tyuonyi]," Kittredge wrote Pinkley. "When the road is extended up the valley, then the parking area and museum will become merely a way-point and little used." In Kittredge's opinion, the camp road to the lodge would become the primary road in the canyon and make the proposed development obsolete. "If placed in the lower end of the valley," he wrote, [the administrative offices and museum] "will be by-passed almost from the start." This became a critical administrative issue. If Pinkley was to make Bandelier the entry point to the southwestern national monuments group, visitors had to understand that the Park Service was their host. The growth of the system he established in the Southwest depended upon the development of Bandelier. If the Freys answered the questions of visitors and provided them with water and shelter, it would defeat Pinkley's purpose. People would not see the relationship between Bandelier and his other monuments. Pinkley could not afford to let the Freys remain where they were.

Committed to controlled access to archeological sites, Pinkley envisioned the administration building as the permanent termination of vehicular access to the monument. If it was constructed as a portal to the ruins and "we make the parking ground the end of the journey and show the visitor he has arrived," Pinkley wrote, and "that here are the administration and museum buildings, . . . [and] the point of departure for guided trips," then visitors would stop. They would realize that they were at the place from which to begin their tour and would not continue to the lodge unless they planned to stay there.

In Pinkley's mind, if the hotel interfered with the ability of the Park Service to manage the site, it would have to be moved. The Freys were subject to NPS jurisdiction, and they would have to accede to the agency's wishes. "If . . . we find we can't handle the visitors but that they are determined to by-pass us and go to the lodge," Pinkley announced to Kittredge, "I will then propose to move the lodge down to the administration area." In Pinkley's view, concessioners were less important than presenting the ruins in a fashion that would ensure both protection of the site and a worthwhile experience for visitors. The Freys would have to accommodate the wishes of the agency.

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12 Ibid.


14 Ibid.
These two photos show the completed compound that the CCC constructed. In photo 1, the gateway by the administration building is blocked by posts. Note the CCC camp in the background. Photo 2 shows the relationship between the compound and Tyuonyi ruin. Note that the portal in the compound remained open at the time of this photo. At this time, visitors drove their vehicles into the portal, where a ranger greeted them. This practice was short-lived, for it violated the principal that Frank Pinkley insisted upon when he developed the first plan for the monument in the 1930s: control of access to the ruins.
From a technical standpoint, Kittredge and the engineering branch were laying long-term plans to preserve the agency's investment. They believed that the Park Service would continue to accommodate an increasingly sedentary public. Visitor service was the means through which the agency built its constituency. As long as the agency advocated that policy, Kittredge would offer plans that required little physical effort on the part of visitors.

Pinkley viewed the administration of archeological ruins in a more subtle fashion. More concerned with presentation and protection of the resource than the engineering branch, Pinkley drew a line at allowing the visitors so much leeway that his rangers could not fulfill their obligations. He felt that the quality of the experience at Bandelier would be preserved by keeping cars away from the ruins. "Almost all the visitors have heard of and seen pictures of the Ceremonial Cave; they want to see it above anything else in the canyon," Pinkley wrote in response to Kittredge's contentions. "Must we, therefore, build an automobile road up to it through the whole length of the canyon and deliver [visitors] there as soon as they arrive?" Instead, by controlling access through a gateway, Pinkley felt that visitors would get a better grasp of the meaning of the Frijoles Canyon ruins. From his perspective, education of that kind was the chief obligation of the agency.

Pinkley's stance tempered the Mather-Albright visitor accommodation edict, and Pinkley received praise from those in the Park Service who believed site development went too far towards comfort. His rigid control over the southwestern national monument group made him an important factor in decisions concerning Bandelier. Moreover, his extensive experience in the Southwest gave him the authority to contradict agency engineers and planners.

In the end, most of Pinkley's ideas for Bandelier were implemented. With ECW labor and funding, the old lodge was torn down. The 99-year lease that the Freys made with the Forest Service in 1925 still bound the agency. Thus it had to replace the facilities it destroyed. The new Frijoles Canyon Lodge soon appeared within the administrative compound. Other than the campground road which led to the old lodge, additional roads beyond the main parking area were not built. Pinkley's ideas about controlled access served well at Bandelier. Park Service personnel continued to control access to the ruins, which remain insulated from the noise and traffic of modern life in the area.

According to agency plans, the main compound area was constructed in the canyon. Despite the restriction to 1500 square feet on construction of individual units, the compound ultimately included visitor facilities, the administrative offices, the new lodge, employee residences, picnic and campgrounds, and a maintenance area.

The ECW project at Bandelier also constructed utility systems for the monument. An oil house and underground gasoline and oil storage tanks were added. In advance of the construction of a new telephone line to the monument, the NPS installed a telephone line to the administration building, residential, and utility areas. The old Forest Service line and the Frey's hotel line served in the interim.

15 Ibid.
These two photos of construction of the compound show the process of building the compound. The CCC buildings used stone from a quarry on the mesa-top and other indigenous materials. Construction was a labor intensive process that often employed more than 200 men.
Modern electrical and sewage systems were also part of the project. Workers constructed a power house near the utility area and ran power lines to the administration building, each of the residences, the maintenance and utility shops, and the lodge. A refuse burner made of reinforced concrete was located upon the north mesa, and two reinforced septic tanks, connected with 2150 lineal feet of service lines made of vitrified clay, handled sewage. After June 1939, when the last of this work was completed, the monument had the physical plant and utility capabilities of a small city.

After the completion of the road to the canyon, providing water also posed a problem. Prior to the road, the Abbotts and the Freys got their drinking water from the stream. Yet the increase in the numbers of people living in the canyon, combined with the influx of auto tourists upon completion of the road, posed the danger of fouled water. With the arrival of the CCC camp, Pinkley had the enrollees run a pipeline from above the Ceremonial Cave to avoid the chance of contamination. Later, permanent water lines to the lodge, residential area, headquarters, and campground were built, and two water storage tanks, with 10,000- and 20,000-gallon capacities, were constructed. With the completion of the project, water quality and pressure at Bandelier was better than anywhere else on the plateau.

When the CCC camp at Bandelier was disbanded in 1940, the physical plant in the canyon was complete. In seven years of concentrated effort, park planners designed the facilities and CCC enrollees carried out the massive building program that formed the basis of the physical plant at the monument in 1985. Made exclusively with indigenous materials and constructed in the style of the region, the stone masonry structures at Bandelier have acquired historic significance in their own right. In 1987, the Secretary of the Interior declared them National Historic Landmarks.

The physical plant that the agency built, however, was constructed to serve the needs of a remote park area. During the 1930s, there was no need to take into account local day use of the monument. The Pajarito Plateau had few residents and most made a living in ranching or farming. They had little need for the recreational facilities of Bandelier National Monument and little time to enjoy its cultural attributes. The coming of Manhattan Project, which developed the atomic bomb, and the growth of the town of Los Alamos changed Bandelier and the Pajarito Plateau forever.

During the development of the Los Alamos facility in the early 1940s, the military ran into stiff resistance from Custodian Art Thomas and the staff at Bandelier. When the secret facility at the old Los Alamos Ranch School began operations, Thomas visited the installation to offer his cooperation. He found barbed-wire gates in his way and the guards rudely rebuffed him. Surprised, he

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17Ibid.
informed his superiors and left the camp alone. But Thomas knew that the access routes to the installation passed through the Otowi section of Bandelier. Moreover, he heard rumors that indicated the "army," local slang for the people in charge of the secret project, planned to build an extensive facility at Los Alamos. While Thomas had no desire to obstruct the war effort, he had obligations of his own and was determined to protect the monument.

But the U. S. Army, whose officers administered the installation, took an aggressive approach to its needs in the area. The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers made plans to develop the road through the detached Otowi section of Bandelier. By February 5, 1943, the contractor drilled one hundred holes twenty to thirty feet deep in order to dynamite cliffs adjacent to the Otowi section and widen the road.

When he found out what was going on, Thomas became incensed. The army intended to "shoot the whole cliff off in one blast," he reported. If it did, he could "not see how it can help creating a terrific scar and do great damage to the trees and vegetation below the hill." In Thomas's view, military plans would damage the Otowi section irreparably.

The implications of military behavior on the plateau posed a threat to the monument. Thomas pushed his superiors for some kind of agreement with the army. The status quo put the Park Service at a disadvantage, Thomas believed, and he "dislike[d] the idea of letting [the military] proceed and then coming around later wanting a permit for what they have already done." He wanted a conference with the military officials to sort out decorum in the region.

Thomas had little success talking with the military. He began to visit the Otowi section every other day to keep an eye on its activities. His vigilance got Ray Bell, construction superintendent for the Sundt Construction Company, to pay closer attention to the desires of the Park Service. Rather than indiscriminately cutting through the monument, Bell ordered his trucks to use only one path through Otowi and promised to ensure that his men kept their warning fires under control. Thomas was not convinced and informed his superiors: "it goes without saying that the contractor is going to get things done as cheaply as he can and the fewer restrictions he has the more cheaply he'll get by . . . note that cooperation was promised, but it will probably take a good deal of watching to gain compliance."

Thomas continued to watch "The Hill" suspiciously and his vigilance paid dividends. In October 1944, the U. S. Army Corp of Engineers began clearing a power line right-of-way through the northern tip of the Otowi section without Park Service permission. On one of his trips, Thomas discovered a fifty-foot wide clearing and two unauthorized buildings on monument land, as well as a surveying party setting up stakes to mark the location of line poles. Thomas immediately "shut the work down," threw the surveying party out of the monument, and ordered them to

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tell Colonel Whitney Ashbridge, the commander of the post, that the army had to consult the Park Service before beginning such projects. Thomas then contacted his superiors and waited for the showdown. In the meantime, he arranged for the Director of Region Three, M. R. Tillotson, and the Superintendent of the Southwestern National Monuments, Charles A. Richey, to inspect the area on October 19.

The ability of the military to disregard the presence of the Park Service astonished Tillotson and Richey. Major Frank W. Salfingere of Project “Y” told the men that all the clearing work had been done in one day. Tillotson also noted that the army did not plan to inform the Park Service even after completion. The Park Service men realized that military plans meant permanent use of monument lands—another issue that Salfingere did not bring up.

Park Service officials found themselves in a difficult position. The development at the old Los Alamos ranch was the greatest threat to the integrity of the monument that had ever occurred. Yet, the Park Service faced a secret war-time project about which it knew little. Park Service officials had no desire to impede the war effort in any way. Carrying out the mission of the agency and assisting the war effort seemingly became antithetical.

All Park Service officials wanted was an acknowledgement of their right to administer the monument by the rules of their agency. But used to the preeminence it enjoyed during wartime, the military pressed ahead relentlessly, ignoring protestations about its disregard for Park Service rules and regulations. Salfingere apologized for the unauthorized construction and told Tillotson that he would see what he could uncover. Later, Salfingere met with Park Service officials and claimed he could not find out who authorized the construction of the right-of-way. Tillotson was disgusted and later referred to this as “a continuation of the old army game of ‘passing the buck’”. After considerable pressure, Salfingere finally relented and agreed “that it might be possible” to keep the power line out of the monument.

Rather than battle the feisty Park Service people, the military took a new approach. The army real estate suboffice began a move to have the Army Corp of Engineers take over portions of the Otowi section for the project. The area it wanted included the access road, Bayo Canyon, and Pueblo Canyon, the location of the Otowi ruins. According to rumors, the military planned to detonate explosives throughout the area.

Regional Director Tillotson refused to back down. He saw such development as gratuitous and noted in a confidential memo to NPS Director Newton B. Drury that experimental detonation near Otowi might irreparably damage the ruins. Tillotson strenuously opposed the project, although he realistically noted that because of the

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importance of the project, "we realize that our opposition might not carry much weight."21

Such stiff resistance from the Park Service forced the army to back down. The Corps of Engineers found a location outside monument boundaries for the power line. Saltinger promised Art Thomas that when the two sides agreed on road issues, the Corps of Engineers would apply for special use permits through the War Department to the Secretary of the Interior. The Corps of Engineers also abandoned its plans to acquire portions of the Otowi section.

Agency vigilance protected the Otowi section from indiscriminate destruction at the hands of the military. By asserting their position, Thomas and Regional Office officials forced Project "Y" to take into account the world that existed on the Pajarito Plateau before the arrival of the atomic age. While those in charge of the Los Alamos installation never became sensitive to cultural values, Park Service resistance meant that the military knew that there were other concerns on the Pajarito than its own.

Despite friction over the Otowi section, Park Service cooperation with the project was the rule rather than the exception. Whenever possible, the agency accommodated the needs of the project, particularly when officers at the installation followed the proper channels. The Park Service only asked for standard inter-departmental courtesy and respect for its own obligations.

After the Second World War, local use became an important factor in visitation at the monument. Frank Pinkley designed the physical plant for needs of the 1930s. The canyon area was limited, and its resources confined. There was a small parking area, and overnight guests and daytime users shared the combined picnic area and campground. But residents of Los Alamos began to see Bandelier as an outlet for their recreational needs. The staff at the monument had to address new forms of use.

The first indications of impending changes in visitor use occurred after the Second World War. Project "Y", the portion of the Manhattan Project for which the Los Alamos installation was created, was the catalyst for the explosion of the atomic bomb. The name "Los Alamos" became synonymous with atomic weaponry, and the wartime installation became permanent. The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory became the major employer on the Pajarito Plateau. By 1950, the surrounding communities grew to a population of 14,000.

Local residents quickly developed a view of the monument that was different from what Park Service personnel envisioned when they designed the site. After a few initial trips to the ruins, area residents became far more interested in the picnic and campground areas than they were in the ruins. Day-use trips to Bandelier became prevalent. On weekends, locals picnicking near Frijoles Creek filled the campground.

Interpretation of the prehistory of the region has always been an important part of the responsibilities of the Park Service. The spectacular backdrop of Frijoles Canyon and the ruins it contains have intrigued generations of visitors.
The existence of Bandelier offered residents of Los Alamos a release from the stress of life during the Cold War. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a race to develop superior weapons. Los Alamos was the focus of American efforts. The pressure was overwhelming, and Los Alamos itself offered few opportunities to relax. Its residents turned to the serenity of Frijoles Canyon. Superintendent Fred Binnewies recalled that he could "feel them being renewed physically and mentally" during their visits.22

Visitation also increased exponentially at most Park Service area after the war. Serious management problems throughout the system were the result. Americans had more money, better mobility, and more leisure time. They flocked to see their national park system in droves. Park facilities were quickly overwhelmed and overcrowding became common. Conditions at many parks deteriorated so badly that author Bernard DeVoto suggested closing the national parks if they were not properly maintained.

Bandelier was among the parks where overcrowding became a problem. Visitation rose from 9,312 in 1945 to 45,524 in 1950. The combination of local use and visitors from all over the nation aggravated the problem of facilities at Bandelier. It faced an enlarged traditional constituency and the new local one. The facilities designed during the 1930s could not comfortably handle the new levels of visitation.

The larger numbers posed a different kind of problem at Bandelier than at many other parks. Locals and visitors engaged in competition for the use of limited space and facilities. People from all over the world wanted to see the ruins. Accommodations in the vicinity were scarce, and many visitors expected to camp at the monument. These visitors were the original constituency of the agency, the ones for whom Frank Pinkley built the facilities. They were forced to compete for limited campground space with picnickers from Los Alamos and White Rock, who wanted to use the shaded campground/picnic area next to the creek. The CCC development, constructed to fill the needs of an earlier era, quickly became inadequate.

The Park Service, however, was in a difficult situation. Frijoles Canyon was an extremely small area, and the concentration of facilities at the southeast end of the canyon made expansion in that direction impossible. The campground/picnic area bordered the canyon wall on one side and the creek on the other. Its northwestern most point was within 650 feet of Tyuonyi, leaving little room for expansion in that direction. Ruins and trails covered much of the remaining area. With limited space available and users already overwhelming the existing facilities, Frijoles Canyon was becoming a major management problem.

When appointed Director of the National Park Service in late 1951, Conrad L. Wirth initiated a program to revise existing master plans at all agency park areas. He had been an advocate of visitor-service developments since he became involved with the Park Service in the early 1930s. Wirth orchestrated the planning and

execution of extensive developments, including the Mission 66 capital development program, during his thirteen years as agency director. The impact of his programs on Bandelier ultimately changed the administration of the monument.

Park Service personnel began from scratch. The existing Bandelier master plan preceded the Second World War. The issues confronting park managers were no longer the same. By the early 1950s, Bandelier was overwhelmed. It had acquired many of the characteristics of a city park. Residents of nearby communities accounted for more than half the annual visits, an eventuality that Frank Pinkley and the others who designed the site in 1930s could not have foreseen. The facilities at Bandelier were not constructed to accommodate the conditions that came to exist at the monument. Recreational day use was simply not an issue during the 1930s. The new master plan had to address the realities of the moment. Planning for the future had to be delayed.

Recognizing the problems and getting something done about them were two completely different tasks. In 1952, Superintendent Fred W. Binnewies carved out a master plan that identified the minute size of the concentrated headquarters area and the overcrowding of the canyon floor as the two most important problems facing the monument. But there was little funding available for development until the advent of the Mission 66 program in 1956. Binnewies's program was approved and began to gather dust.

In 1955, Binnewies's successor, Superintendent Paul Judge, began to compile a prospectus for Mission 66 at Bandelier. Following the guidelines set out in the master plan of 1952, Judge began to look for ways to address the perennial problem at the monument: its "urbanization" and the consequent overcrowding of the canyon floor.

Judge's solution suggested ways to shift the focus of visitors to the monument away from Frijoles Canyon. He advocated bringing the portion of Frijoles Mesa between Highway 4 and the existing boundary into the monument, as well as terminating additional development within the Frijoles Canyon. He also proposed a contact and information station on Highway 4, near the Los Alamos "Y", as well as a development in the Otowi section that included a museum, campground, ranger station, and employee residence as an additional part of a "gradual pulling back." Judge attempted to interest the public in more than the cultural resources of Frijoles Canyon.

Mid-level agency response was sympathetic to Judge's plan, but opinions differed on how to achieve his goals. Robert G. Hall, Acting Chief of the Branch of Design

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and Construction of the Western Office, concurred with the principal recommendations. He questioned the need for the dual development in the Otowi section and suggested changing the fee structure in order to discourage picnicking as a quick way to alleviate overcrowding in Frijoles Canyon. Acting Regional Chief of Operations Jerome Miller believed that if camping were eliminated, overnight lodging in the Canyon could also be removed. Oscar T. Carlson, Superintendent of Mesa Verde, agreed, as did K. M. Saunders of the Regional Office, who wrote: "Bandelier should be used as an archeological area, not a playground."26

Agency executives were less impressed. Regional Director Hugh M. Miller passed the proposals to Director Wirth. Miller agreed with Hall that the Otowi contact station and museum ought to be combined in one unit, but he did not believe that any other improvements in the detached portion were necessary. Although he concurred with the proposed addition of the Frijoles Mesa area, he questioned the need for campgrounds atop the mesa. Instead of restricting camping in Frijoles Canyon, Miller endorsed Hall’s proposal to change the fee structure in order to discourage picnicking.28

After the necessary revisions, Judge submitted the Mission 66 prospectus for approval. The document reflected Acting Regional Director Miller’s beliefs as much as those of the superintendent. The prospectus offered fee adjustments and reservations as the means of controlling day-use in Frijoles Canyon, and the detached Otowi section was slated for development. The campground, however, would remain in the canyon.

The prospectus also included substantive development of the physical plant. Seven housing units were included in the program, providing living space at the monument for the families of the entire permanent staff. Judge also proposed additional housing for seasonal employees. Other programs for Frijoles Canyon included 17.9 miles of trails, a new telephone system, and boundary fencing on the north side of the monument. The total cost was projected at $510,000, of which $347,000 was earmarked for building new quarters. Improvements at Otowi were expected to cost another $450,200.

Mission 66 for Bandelier also proposed dramatic increases in the number of staff members employed at the monument. The permanent administrative and protective staff was to be increased from the four existing members in 1956 to nine by 1966, seasonal staff, from eight to fifteen. Two additional positions in the maintenance division and one on the road and trail crew were also included in the plan.


The photograph suggests the frustration of visitors who arrived at Bandelier only to find the campground full. The growth of visitation inspired the development of a campground on top of Frijoles Mesa. This converted the old area to day-use and allowed the Park Service to accommodate larger numbers of visitors.
Judge erroneously believed that the Mission 66 program for Bandelier would solve the problems of the monument once and for all. After the completion of the program, Judge contemplated no more major development. If everything in the prospectus became reality, he believed that facilities at the monument would be capable of handling the projected increases in visitation well into the 1970s.  

On March 8, 1957, Associate Director E. T. Scoyen approved the document with one reservation. He recommended additional study of the camping/picnicking issue. Scoyen believed recreational uses at Bandelier ought to be provided only as a convenience for visitors. He requested a study to determine the feasibility of separating camping and picnicking facilities, as well as an assessment of the potential of lands outside the monument that might be developed into parks for local residents.

By far the most important consequence of the Mission 66 program at Bandelier was the acquisition of the Frijoles Mesa. The idea to acquire the mesa had occurred earlier, but the potential for capital development that Mission 66 inspired made the acquisition a necessity. The new area modified the original Mission 66 plan and gave Park Service officials a number of additional management options for the monument. By the early 1960s, Superintendent Judge and the regional planning staff envisioned the Frijoles Canyon as an area exclusively reserved for day-use. Agency officials believed that the completion of State Highway #4 through the Jemez Mountains, projected for 1965, would aggravate the eternal problem at Bandelier--the overcrowding of Frijoles Canyon.

The acquisition of the mesa provided additional space into which to expand and allowed the administration of the monument to rethink development plans. Judge codified all of the earlier objectives of the agency that had been passed over because of space limits in the monument. The new land allowed the old campground to be converted into a picnic area, furthering the day-use only ideal for Frijoles Canyon. Meanwhile, the Park Service sought to convert Mrs. Frey's lodge into a visitor center to handle the increased traffic.

The Frijoles Mesa tract allowed the Park Service to manage the historic structures in Frijoles Canyon as if they were a cultural resource. The structures built during the 1930s were unique, and unlike those at other parks, they had not been modified or rebuilt. The Park Service realized that they ought to be preserved, and a new policy emerged. The agency forbid additional new construction within the canyon area. All future developments were slated for the mesa-top. Many of the existing facilities, including the utility area, were also going to be removed from the canyon. Frijoles Canyon was to be frozen in time, as if to reveal what the visitors of earlier decades discovered when they came to the monument.

The acquisition of Frijoles Mesa meant changes in Park Service policy. Having found it impossible to discourage local residents from using the monument as if it were a city park, Park Service officials instead accommodated such use. Under the revised Mission 66 program for Bandelier, the Frijoles Mesa development became a

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reality. Construction of the new three loop, 93-site campground atop the mesa began in 1963 and was completed at the end of that summer. Workers converted the old quarry, from which the stone for the canyon buildings was cut during the 1930s, into an evening campfire circle. The staff housing area was built on a spur off the campground road. The removal of overnight campers from the canyon floor cut back daytime crowding. The new campground was close enough to hike to the ruins, but far enough away not to increase traffic problems. During the 1960s, the agency began to modify Frank Pinkley's controlled-access philosophy. The Park Service again practiced control by exclusion in an effort to make the canyon floor area a more pleasant place to visit.

Although the boundaries of the monument were again adjusted in 1963, the newest addition did little to alleviate the pressure on Frijoles Canyon. The AEC acquired the Otowi section, excepting the minimally developed Tsankawi area, and the NPS added the Upper Frijoles tract, exchanging a wilderness area for a damaged archeological area. Frijoles Canyon, however, remained the primary focus of visitation. Despite increasing NPS efforts to promote the back country, almost everyone who came to Bandelier still wanted to see the ruins in Frijoles Canyon. New facilities, better roads and conditions, and more staff made the monument an even more desirable objective for the American public. Visitation to the monument was likely to make even the new development obsolete.

From this perspective, Mission 66 for Bandelier was not a complete success. Although capital development improved conditions at the monument, it addressed the effects of overcrowding rather than its primary cause—the changing demographics and growing mobility and affluence of American society. Mission 66 provided facilities to support the park at the existing level of visitation, but it failed to address the problems of overuse. Thus there was little change in the situation. More people still wanted to be in Frijoles Canyon than it could support without sustaining damage. The future could only become more crowded.

The first development program at Bandelier created visitor use facilities; the second caught up with existing demand. By enlarging the monument and developing the mesa, Park Service officials hoped to alleviate long-standing problems in the canyon. The result of development, however, was another wave of visitors with only one objective—Frijoles Canyon.

But the agency learned an important lesson from the Mission 66 program at Bandelier. It became aware of the need to anticipate development needs at the park. If a new impact upon the site could be included in the planning process before it became reality, Bandelier would not have to suffer long periods of inadequate personnel and facilities. Planning in advance of actual conditions became an important component of agency strategy for Bandelier, and this "pre-emptive" planning became an important part of the creation of the master plan of 1977.

The plan began as a response to the threat of a dam on the Rio Grande south of the monument. In the late 1940s, Congress, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Bureau of Reclamation contemplated a flood-control and irrigation-management dam near Cochiti Pueblo. The dam had considerable support among the New Mexico congressional delegation; Senator Dennis Chavez was an
original advocate, and Senator Clinton P. Anderson, who became quite powerful in Washington, became a major supporter. The tone of the late 1950s encouraged the development of water resources in the West; the Colorado River Storage program envisioned dams along the length of the Colorado River, and the Rio Grande received considerable attention from the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation. Even the abandonment of the Echo Park Dam in the face of the opposition of conservationists did not alter the thrust of the era.

The Park Service objected to the project from its inception, but few in energy bureaucracy paid any attention. The Corps of Engineers ignored the objections of the Park Service. The dam had the support of much of the public, and the Park Service seemed out of step during this growth-oriented time. The agency reconciled itself to minimizing the damage from the project. During the Mission 66 program, regional planners began to prepare for the eventuality. "If the [United States Army Corps of Engineers] wins out and the Cochiti Dam is built," read an unsigned memo of March 3, 1960, "we will have to do something with the south portion of the monument." In February 1963, Anderson initiated a bill, and with the support of New Mexico Senator Edwin Mechem and U.S. representatives Joseph Montoya and Tom Morris, the Cochiti dam was authorized in 1964.30

The Park Service began to fashion a response to this imposing reality. In an effort to protect the park values of the southern portion of Bandelier, the agency played an instrumental role in convincing the New Mexico Parks and Recreation Department to designate the lake a "no-wake" area. This prohibited speedboats from using the lake, decreased the interest of boaters, and helped prevent unauthorized entry by water into the back country. But the construction of the dam and the expected recreational activity at the undeveloped south end of the monument meant that Park Service strategists needed to develop a plan that addressed the new reality.

Not to be caught short, the Park Service commissioned a planning team. Bandelier Superintendent Linwood E. Jackson, wilderness representative Douglas Knudson, interpretive planner William T. Ingersoll, landscape architect Harold Brown, and architect and team captain Philip Stuart Romigh, all of the Branch of Environmental Planning and Design of the Western Service Center, sought to create a new master plan. Dr. Charles Lange of Southern Illinois University and Albert H. Schroeder, an archeologist and an interpretative specialist for the Southwest Regional Office, served as consultants to the project.

The preliminary working draft of the document that they produced restructured administrative priorities for the monument. It proposed expanding the boundaries of the monument to include both the Canada de Cochiti grant to the south and the headwaters of the Frijoles area, northwest of the Upper Canyon area. The plan proposed the Cañada de Cochiti grant as the location of a major development to

accompany the visitors who would arrive via the new Cochiti Lake. The Cañada de Cochiti acquisition was also to broaden the interpretive scope of the monument. The tract contained a refuge from the Pueblo Rebellion, as well as traditional communities that survived into the early twentieth century. Other proposals included in the plan were the development of a transportation system to carry visitors from Frijoles Mesa to the canyon, a move designed to end the congestion plaguing the area for three decades. The agency also planned the elimination of overnight lodging in Frijoles Canyon.

The plan, however, inadvertently accelerated an existing conflict between the NPS and portions of its constituency. Under the terms of the Wilderness Act of 1964, the Park Service was required to evaluate all of its roadless areas containing more than 5,000 acres. Like many other park areas, Bandelier was reviewed. In 1970, the agency recommended that no wilderness be established at the monument, arousing the ire of many conservation and environmental groups.

The passage of the Wilderness Act of 1964 was a major victory for preservation advocates, and their zealous fervor persisted for years to come. In essence, the advocates of the concept of wilderness had a new option. The Bandelier backcountry gave them another place where they could implement it. The draft of the Bandelier master plan included provisions for a floating marina on the new lake, as well as means to connect the separate visitor facilities in Frijoles Canyon with those proposed for the south end of the monument. The pro-wilderness groups believed that the NPS sought an auto road between the two areas, an idea antithetical to their conception of the management of the backcountry. From their point of view, the issue was very clear: a development at the southern end of Bandelier would encroach upon any undesignated wild land in the area. A designated wilderness was necessary to protect the pristine character of the backcountry. Wilderness advocates played to the current biases of their supporters by presenting themselves as defenders of the wild. They presented the Park Service as a short-sighted bureaucracy, concerned more with its position than its mandate.

Park Service officials saw the development of the southern end of the monument as a trade-off. It allowed them to protect the wild areas of the monument by offering the backcountry the protection afforded by a permanent Park Service presence. The development at the south end would also allow the agency to monitor the inevitable increase in visitation that the lake would bring. The Park Service saw other drawbacks to a wilderness designation. The Wilderness Act of 1964 limiting the ways in which Government agencies could administer wilderness areas. At Bandelier, this meant that backcountry excavations would have to be carried out without the benefit of mechanized equipment, making archeological research more difficult. The mandate for Bandelier made the monument an archeological area, not a natural one. Thus, the Park Service believed that to uphold its mandate, it had to oppose the wilderness.

The prospect of a wilderness at Bandelier did not appeal to many within the Park Service. The idea was new, and its ramifications remained unclear. There had not yet been a wilderness established in a designated archeological area. From the management perspective, the potential for conflict between different kinds of
management objectives seemed too great. The administrative issues concerning archeological excavation and a designated wilderness seemed impossible to reconcile.

The no-wilderness recommendation of the agency, however, was not offered to allow the backcountry to be overrun with the curious from Cochiti Lake. The protection of resources in the backcountry was the agency's primary goal. There were many ways to uphold that obligation. The Park Service wanted to keep management options open, but the specific restrictions governing designated wilderness limited the options of the agency. According to Linwood E. Jackson, the superintendent at that time, the NPS had every intention of maintaining the roadless status of the backcountry. To do so without designating it as a wilderness made management of the area much easier.

Battle lines were clearly drawn. The wilderness constituency formed a private organization, the New Mexico Wilderness Study Committee (NMWSC), to evaluate wilderness proposals within the state. The Park Service previously recommended that no wilderness be established in the Chaco Canyon. The Wilderness Study Committee went along with the agency. Its members were not as supportive at Bandelier. Instead of concurring with the Park Service, the NMWSC proposed the establishment of a 22,133-acre wilderness that included the entire monument except for the area north of Frijoles Canyon.

The American environmental movement earned its spurs with the passage of the Wilderness Act of 1964. At Bandelier, it sought to apply a portion of its new power. Wilderness groups believed that the Park Service was compromising its principles in an effort to develop its constituency of sedentary tourists. Although they recognized the importance of the recreational visitor to the Park System, wilderness advocates could not condone developments designed to promote extensive use in previously pristine areas. In an era when Americans were suspicious of the motives of even the most benign of Government agencies, wilderness advocates sought safeguards to preserve the wild character of the Bandelier backcountry. From their point of view, the Park Service was not fulfilling the obligations of its mandate.

The issue came to a head on December 18, 1971, in a public hearing at the Los Alamos Inn in Los Alamos, New Mexico. Sixty-one people attended the meeting and forty spoke. Another 174 letters were placed in the record. Every one of the private citizens who spoke opposed the recommendation of the agency, as did all who wrote letters. "Why invite another Yosemite?" wrote Steve Schum, the President of the University of New Mexico Mountaineering Club. "Anthropologists can research and develop ruins without using mechanized equipment." Echoing the sentiment of many in the wilderness coalition, Elizabeth A. Jackson of Guilford, Connecticut, wrote that wilderness was "the only way to preserve [Bandelier's] pristine state."31

With the New Mexico Wilderness Study Committee leading the charge, private organizations overwhelmingly opposed the Park Service. Norman Bullard of the NMWSC expressed the view of the majority of the groups. He favored the wilderness

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designation because it would protect the backcountry from "changing administrative perceptions." Many others stressed the compatibility of wilderness and archeological management. Of the forty speakers in Los Alamos, fourteen supported the Wilderness Study Committee and its 22,133-acre proposal, while an additional twenty-five supported the general idea of a designated wilderness in the Bandelier backcountry.

The National Parks and Conservation Association (NPCA), provided the sole support for the agency. The authors of the NPCA report wondered if any portion of the monument were suited for wilderness status. They used the same rationale that the agency did, focusing on the archeological mandate at Bandelier and its incompatibility with the concept of a wilderness.

NPCA support of the NPS position, however, was not unequivocal. The organization stated that the existing values at the monument had to be protected before new ones could be developed. It opposed certain aspects of the new master plan, including the proposal for a floating marina and the possibility of connecting Cañada de Cochiti to Frijoles Canyon by road. The NPCA believed that the area was unsuited for wilderness, but conversely, did not want to see major development in the backcountry. Its support for the agency was predicated upon a less extensive development plan.

The full range of issues was more complex than most of the respondents realized. Many of the individual respondents advocated adding the Cañada de Cochiti grant to the proposed wilderness. The agency wanted to acquire it as a buffer for the backcountry. Unaware that the provisions of the Wilderness Act of 1964 limited wilderness areas to undeveloped land, some supporters even suggested that the entire monument, including the developed portions of Frijoles Canyon, be declared a wilderness.

The wilderness constituency, however, had a valid point. A designated wilderness guaranteed a pristine backcountry in the future. Its advocates sought to shape agency policy without clearly understanding the reasons the agency opposed the designation. Without agency affiliation and with a supportive public audience, they were free to challenge the plans of the Park Service without having to participate in subsequent daily administration.

Two viable management alternatives, easily construed as mutually exclusive, arrived at the same time and place. The newness of the wilderness designation and its appeal to vocal and visible interest groups made it an attractive option. It received considerable backing when compared to a plan that on the surface appeared to be another accommodation of sedentary America. In response to the public pressure, Park Service officials reconsidered. In August, 1972, the agency recommended a wilderness area of 21,110-acres for Bandelier. To the cheers of the environmental community and many within the Park Service, the Bandelier wilderness area was established in 1976.

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The wilderness proposal and the proposed master plan for the monument did not turn out to be antithetical. Nor did the reconsideration alter the Bandelier master plan. "The purpose for which the monument was established . . ." read the wilderness recommendation, "remains paramount."33 The Park Service was committed to the archeological resources of the monument. It also pursued the acquisition of the Cañada de Cochiti grant, as well as a development in the southern quarter of the monument.

The Park Service was determined to manage the proposed wilderness in conjunction with its proposed development, dispelling notions of the incompatibility of the two objectives. Despite changes in the attitude of the agency regarding the designation of a Bandelier wilderness, the Bandelier Master Plan of 1973 resembled the working draft of 1971. Only the most blatantly threatening features, the floating marina and the proposed "connection" between Frijoles Canyon and the Cañada de Cochiti grant, were excised from the plan. It seemed that a compromise had been reached.

Ironically, by the mid-1980s, much of the anticipatory strategy for the southern end of the monument had yet to be implemented. Little of the expected development in the surrounding area occurred. Cochiti Lake did not immediately spawn a flourishing city on its banks. In part because of the no-wake zoning, which the Park Service fought to keep, there was little pressure upon the monument from recreational users of the lake. There simply was no need for the facilities proposed in the master plan. Yet, the program remained a part of agency policy, ready to be implemented if ever needed.

In 1986, many of the programs that the master plan laid out for the Frijoles Canyon and Mesa areas remained in the planning stages. Despite the sanction of various restrictions in a transportation study by the Denver Service Center on the use of canyon, access to the Frijoles Canyon facilities continued to be uncontrolled. Private vehicle access to the canyon bottom continued unabated. In early 1987, no controlled transportation system existed to convey travelers to the Visitor Center. The picnic area that was to be phased out remained an important part of visitor accommodation in the canyon.

Yet the controlled-access policy that Frank Pinkley initiated has endured at the core of management philosophy for Bandelier. Park Service plans called for eventual limitations on access not only to ruins, but to the canyon itself. In keeping with the ideas Pinkley expressed during the 1930s, the Park Service constructed an ethic that will shape the manner that visitors experience the canyon and its ruins.

By 1986, the land acquisition facets of the master plan of 1977 were not yet implemented. Besides the acquisition of the Cañada de Cochiti grant, the plan envisioned reacquiring four sites from the old Otowi Section, the Big and Little Otowi ruins, the decorated cave kiva, and the game trap near Mortandad Canyon when the Department of Energy declared them excess. The Department of Energy,  

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however, clung to its holdings in the Los Alamos vicinity. Despite the continued efforts of a small group of enthusiastic advocates, no opportunity presented itself to the agency.

The most recent master plan was the first of three at Bandelier to prepare for the future. The plan remained a broad mandate, allowing for many kinds of expansion under appropriate conditions. The plan of 1977 allowed park managers a wide range of options and the discretion to determine when to press for the implementation of the programs. An anticipatory program, it left the Park Service with a mandate to serve in case of most eventualities.

Since the Park Service assumed management of Bandelier in 1932, agency personnel worked to accommodate the demands of diverse constituencies. Yet, agency philosophy continued to be strongly influenced by the overwhelming need to protect the ruins and ensure the quality of visitor experience at the park. What seemed like unnecessary restriction to the casual observer became a piece of a larger mosaic, designed to preserve the legacy of the monument while enlightening visitors in the present.
CHAPTER 5
CULTURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND
INTERPRETATION AT BANDELIER

As the Park Service built its physical plant during the 1930s, Frank Pinkley and others began programs to protect the monument and present its features to the public. From the outset of agency administration at the monument, these two programs were symbiotically linked. In the ensuing half century, the programs, practices, and policies of the Park Service changed dramatically, reflecting the evolution of agency policy and technological advances in resource management. Three distinct periods of management, each embodying a different administrative philosophy and addressing the specific problems of successive eras, have defined the management of Bandelier National Monument.

These periods mirrored the evolution of Park Service priorities at the area. Frank Pinkley's initiative shaped the first phase, which began in 1933 and ended when the CCC camp closed in 1941. Beginning with the onset of World War II in the early 1940s, a "hold-the-fort" or consolidation philosophy dominated NPS policy at the monument. This second phase continued during the massive influx of visitors throughout the late 1940s and the 1950s. In the mid 1960s, the Park Service itself underwent a transformation. While Mission 66, a ten-year capital development program initiated during the 1950s, provided new facilities to counter problems such as overcrowding at beleaguered parks like Bandelier, a new concern with preservation of the resources of the system took hold. An ethic that singled out preservation as the primary agency obligation emerged. The emphasis on cultural resources at Bandelier became part of a more inclusive concept of resource management.

Like many other archeological parks in the Southwest, Bandelier National Monument was excavated before the National Park Service existed. Edgar L. Hewett was the most important early excavator and one of the few who made any record of his work. Beginning in the summer of 1897, he led a group that surveyed the Frijoles Canyon ruins. Hewett dug at Otowi in 1905, and in 1907 initiated work in Frijoles Canyon. Excavations at Tyuonyi and the Ceremonial Cave began in 1908, as did limited work at Long House, the Great Kiva, and the House of the Water People. The following year, Hewett began work on Talus House while continuing to excavate Tyuonyi and other sites in the canyon.

Under Hewett's direction, his associates followed his lead on the plateau. In 1910, Jesse L. Nusbaum, Hewett's long-time assistant who later became the Superintendent of Mesa Verde National Park, completed the restoration of the kiva in Ceremonial Cave. Between 1908 and 1914, Alfred V. Kidder, who briefly studied under Hewett and became the most important American archeologist of the first half of the twentieth century, excavated Frijolito Ruin, on the south mesa of Frijoles Canyon. During the same period, Yapashi and San Miguel pueblos were also excavated by Hewett and his associates.
But for an empire-builder like Edgar L. Hewett, the Pajarito Plateau was only a base of operations. After 1912, when the Tyuonyi excavation was completed, his interests began to shift away from the Pajarito Plateau. By 1914, Hewett’s School of American Archeology summer school, which usually ran for about three weeks in August, was doing what little work was accomplished in the ruins of Frijoles Canyon.

The most visible achievement of the summer school program was the reconstruction of Talus House in the main canyon area. Nusbaum and Kenneth Chapman, another of Hewett’s associates from the New Mexico Normal School, supervised the crew of Tewa Indians from San Ildefonso Pueblo that did the actual digging. They gathered building stone from talus slopes and the dumps left from the excavation at Tyuonyi, mixed soil from the canyon floor with clay to create mortar, and made plaster for the interiors. Although Chapman and Nusbaum used some modern materials, such as tar paper and newspapers, the reconstruction offered a clear view of the prehistoric home.¹

Despite such restoration work, by the time the Park Service took over in 1932, many of the ruins in Frijoles Canyon were falling apart. Like many early archeologists, Hewett was more interested in artifacts than structures. He did little stabilization work, and the techniques of his era were inadequate when implemented. Nor was the Forest Service expert at archeological management. Catering mostly to Hewett and other specialists, the Forest Service did not use the ruins to try and attract tourists. By 1932, Tyuonyi had crumbled badly. Many walls had collapsed and those that remained were visibly unstable.²

For the Park Service, the protection of the ruins and their presentation were intrinsically linked. From the inception of the agency, Stephen T. Mather stressed visitation, and visitors who came to archeological areas like Bandelier wanted to see tangible evidence of the prehistory of the continent. To protect the structures and offer interpretation, the Park Service developed policies that straddled the preservation-use dichotomy embodied in the organic legislation that established the agency.

But when Park Service Custodian Edgar L. Rogers arrived in the summer of 1932, the ruins in Frijoles Canyon were poorly prepared for visits from the general public. Although the atmosphere of the canyon conveyed the mysteries of long-departed civilizations, the condition of the structures made it difficult for the uninitiated to grasp the nature of prehistoric life. If Bandelier was to serve as the

¹Edgar L. Hewett. The Excavations at El Rito de Los Frijoles, in 1909. Papers of the School of American Archeology 10 (Santa Fe: School of American Archeology, 1910). Hewett kept notes on his work although it took him almost thirty years to publish them.

Before the Park Service acquired Bandelier, Frank Pinkley had planned a broad-based program of development for the area, based on his work elsewhere in the Southwest. The program focused upon three facets of administration: ruins stabilization, capital development, and interpretation of the area for visitors. Pinkley's program called for vast commitment in all three areas. When the Park Service acquired Bandelier, Pinkley simply put his programs into action.

Pinkley's first archeological priority was the stabilization of the ruins. By 1933, conditions had deteriorated so badly that some of Tyuonyi was only one course of stone high. Pinkley needed more substantial structures to attract visitors. As soon as he could get clearance from the Civil Works Administration (CWA), he brought in archeologist Paul Reiter to supervise a crew of CCC workers.

Although they performed some restoration and a little excavation, Reiter's crew focused upon stabilization and preservation. In 1934, the workers excavated two additional rooms and began restoration and stabilization work in Tyuonyi. Reiter also removed the plaster from a preserved section of painted wall in Long House and installed a glass plate to protect it from vandalism. The program made the park more attractive to visitors. Travelers could begin to see the outline of prehistoric life in the ruins of Frijoles Canyon.

Stabilization programs continued throughout the 1930s. In 1937, Jerome W. Hendron, a seasonal ranger with archeological training, began the NPS ruins stabilization program at Bandelier. He directed a crew that replaced the roof in the kiva at Ceremonial Cave and continued stabilization efforts at Tyuonyi. Much of the mortar holding the rocks together had disintegrated, and Hendron's men reset the stones with a mixture laden with Portland Cement. They also reset fallen walls and rebuilt the lowest portions of the excavated semi-circle.

The large kiva, east of Tyuonyi in Frijoles Canyon, also received Hendron's attention. By 1937, its mortar had washed away, and the inner of the two walls of the structure had fallen. The crude outer wall seemed in danger of collapse. Previous excavators had left large mounds near the kiva that posed drainage problems. Brush and trees had overgrown the site, and windblown dirt and other debris covered the floor of the kiva to a depth of thirty inches. Hendron and his crew re-excavated the kiva and stabilized its walls. The upper levels of the outer wall were taken down and reset. Hendron used a cement mortar--five parts sand, one part fill, and one part cement--to set the stones adjacent to the inner wall. He and his men also rebuilt the ventilator shaft, forced mud between the stones in the inner

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3Frank Pinkley aggressively pursued the acquisition and development of Bandelier as early as 1923. His efforts culminated in his inspection in 1927, described in detail in chapter 2 of this manuscript. By 1928, he began to work on a "wish-list" of programs for the monument. When the Park Service acquired the site, he simply put it into action. See Bandelier National Monument file 12-5, Series 6, Record Group 79, National Archives.

After the initial excavations in Frijoles Canyon, the majority of ruins were not stabilized. By the time the Park Service assumed administrative responsibility for the monument, exposed ruins like Tyuonyi had crumbled.
wall to chink them, and treated much of the interior with a solution that stabilized adobe plaster.\(^5\)

Since Bandelier was a priority area in Pinkley's scheme, he continued to support the stabilization program. During the 1930s, ECW allocations made workforce easily available. In 1939, Robert F. Lister, an NPS archeologist, brought a crew to Bandelier to continue stabilization work. He stabilized the remaining walls of the Otowi ruin, caves on the Otowi Mesa, and 181 cave dwellings on the south side of Tsankawi Mesa. He also treated fourteen caves in Frijoles Canyon and remortared walls and reset stones at Long House in 1940.

Lister's work completed the first phase of stabilization at Bandelier. Its primary purposes were to prevent the ruins from further decline and give visitors a visual insight into prehistoric life. Some of the work was cosmetic in nature, but much was critical to the survival of the ruins. Most important, the first phase of stabilization gave Frank Pinkley the ruins that helped tell the story of Frijoles Canyon.

With stabilization programs in place, Pinkley turned his attention to his primary focus—programs of education and interpretation. From his point of view, the stabilization and management of archeological ruins was only a prelude to an interpretation program for the public. This philosophy led to the initiation of programs for visitors to Bandelier. Pinkley remained dedicated to the concepts he promulgated throughout the Southwest. He insisted upon guided tours through all archeological areas under NPS administration, and Bandelier was no exception.\(^6\) As soon as Custodian Edgar Rogers and his wife Gay arrived in Frijoles Canyon in the summer of 1932, Pinkley demanded that they show visitors through the ruins.

When it came to visitor service, Pinkley dictated strict policies. As long as visitors still used the winding foot trail, Pinkley insisted that Rogers greet visitors as they reached the canyon bottom and stay with them throughout their tour. At first this caused few problems. With only intermittent visitation, Rogers could easily fulfill the demands of his superior. After the completion of the road to the canyon bottom, however, his successors had a more difficult time keeping up with the increased traffic. In practice, later custodians did not always adhere to Pinkley's rigid standards.

Pinkley also needed a museum to facilitate the interpretive program at Bandelier. The ECW program made it easy to fund such a project. In 1934, Pinkley added museum plans to the development in Frijoles Canyon. In 1935, Robert H. Rose, Pinkley's assistant at Casa Grande, followed up on Pinkley's initiative by drawing a plan for a museum at the park.

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These two photographs show parts of Tyuonyi prior to and during stabilization.
From Rose's perspective, the museum provided a major avenue for reaching the constituency of the agency. The State of New Mexico relied upon tourism for much of its economic base. Bandelier attracted the best class of visitors, Rose intimated, because it took special effort to make the forty-mile trip from Santa Fe. Residents of Santa Fe also promoted Bandelier, believing that the ruins were a "cultural and economic asset." The promotional efforts of the Indian Detours guide service, established by the Fred Harvey Company during the 1920s, also helped bring interested and educable visitors to the site. Echoing Pinkley's long-established perspective, Rose argued that the Park Service needed specific programs to serve this constituency.

At the same time, Frank Pinkley challenged the Educational Division of the agency. The Educational Division had grown out of efforts to broaden the appeal of the Park Service. In 1929, Director Horace Albright hired a number of museum specialists as advisors. These men became the core of the new division that promoted the educational possibilities of the park system. Pinkley believed that such "arm-chair" experts did not understand the nature of visitor traffic through museums. He fought Dr. Harold C. Bryant, the head of the division, and his assistant, Ansel F. Hall, over museum plans for Tumacacori National Monument. Pinkley attacked Bryant and Hall in the pages of the Southwestern National Monuments Monthly Report, a magazine that offered detailed information about the activities of Pinkley and his staff. The Educational Division responded, and relations between the two cliques deteriorated. Museum development became a heated issue.

The museum at Bandelier escaped much of the rancor. Although the debate concerned traffic flow within museums, the experts in the Educational Division were not yet powerful enough to challenge Pinkley's domination of the archeological areas. They were more comfortable designing plans for a Spanish-era mission like Tumacacori. While fireworks flew in southern Arizona, the museum at Bandelier proceeded along the lines suggested by Pinkley and Rose.

The museum at Bandelier showed much more than the archeology of the Rio Grande Valley. Rose suggested displays that explained the geology, ethnology, natural features, and flora and fauna, as well as the archeology of the Pajarito Plateau. This broad view indicated how central the development at Bandelier was to the southwestern national monument group. Pinkley wanted the museum at an archeological area to explain the gamut of features visible throughout his group of monuments. The museum at Bandelier provided another way to do what Pinkley did best: attract and maintain the attention of intelligent visitors. Not only was Bandelier the gateway to the southwestern national monuments, it also became a central point for disseminating information about all the monuments.

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In contrast, the early interpretive programs at Bandelier had only limited scope. They focused directly on Frijoles Canyon. During the 1930s, archeological science and analysis were still developing, and great gaps existed in knowledge of the prehistoric Southwest. The custodians and seasonal rangers relied heavily on the interpretations of early southwestern archeologists such as Edgar L. Hewett and Alfred V. Kidder. Kidder developed stratigraphy, the analysis of layers of soil and its relationship to various cultures. Its implementation at the Pecos ruins led to the first chronology of prehistoric pueblo culture. Astronomer Arthur E. Douglass developed dendrochronology, or tree-ring dating, which became another crucial tool for the interpretation of prehistory. Park Service personnel gradually incorporated the information from these new methods to show how the inhabitation of Frijoles Canyon fit into the larger picture of the prehistoric Southwest.

One of the people instrumental in developing an interpretive program at the monument was Custodian L. Earl Jackson. Pinkley had trained the tall, gangly young man at Casa Grande, and Jackson closely followed his superior's guidelines. Before coming to Bandelier, Jackson had been the first paid custodian at the Montezuma Castle National Monument in Arizona. When Edgar Rogers committed suicide in October, 1933, and subsequent administration at Bandelier deteriorated, Jackson repaid Pinkley's faith by stepping into the breech. He was the most enthusiastic of Pinkley's custodians and became quite adept at the innovations his job required.

As visitation increased, it posed problems for Jackson. Pinkley wanted him to guide each visitor through the ruins. Jackson and his seasonal rangers were often busy with different tours while visitors continued to arrive at the administrative station. During the summer of 1937, Jackson found himself swamped with visitors. In order to uphold Pinkley's standards, Jackson enlisted a number of the brightest members of the CCC camp as guides. According to Jackson, the men served admirably.

Under Pinkley's very visible guidance, Jackson sought new ways to serve the visitor at Bandelier. He kept a record of every question that visitors asked for an entire month and tried to incorporate the answers into the interpretive strategy. Jackson also followed Pinkley's lead in other areas. He collected artifacts, compiled complete descriptions of where he found them, and used them in the museum.

The first eight years of NPS administration at Bandelier transformed the monument. The Park Service acquired a monument with untapped potential in 1932. When the CCC camp closed in 1941, the excavated ruins in Frijoles Canyon had been stabilized, and Bandelier had become an important interpretive showplace. Besides building interpretive facilities such as the museum and administration building, the CCC presence freed some uniformed agency personnel from maintenance work. Custodians like Earl Jackson had the time to concentrate on resource management.

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and interpretation. By the end of the decade, they had developed a program equal to any in the Southwest.

But the termination of the CCC project and the impending involvement of the U. S. in the growing European war slowed the development of cultural resource management programs at Bandelier. The exquisite structures the CCC built required maintenance. Without 200 pairs of hands to take care of details, Custodian Art Thomas spent his time fixing leaky roofs, unplugging drains, and working on electrical malfunctions. Throughout the tense year that preceded American intervention in World War II, Federal policies that limited travel, and gasoline and rubber consumption, meant a decrease in tourism all over the nation. The dismal condition of roads on the plateau further impeded travel. Cultural resource development seemed futile in the face of diminishing visitation and a leaking, crumbling physical plant.

The war itself and the coming of the Project "Y" division of the Manhattan Project also hampered the development of Bandelier. A "hold-the-fort" mentality developed. Custodian Thomas tried to minimize Park Service losses in response to the demands of the Los Alamos project. Representatives of the Los Alamos project leased Mrs. Frey's Frijoles Canyon Lodge to house physicists, further inhibiting visitation at the monument. In the face of restrictions from the Government and the war abroad, the Park Service retrenched and sought to hold its ground for better times.11

Yet J. W. Hendron continued his excavations at the monument. In 1943, he excavated five masonry rooms and cave dwellings in Group M and a large cave dwelling on the north wall of Frijoles Canyon. In 1945, Hendron excavated Potsui'ai II, a ten-room one-kiva site in the Otowi section.12 During the war, these piecemeal efforts were the extent of archeological investigation.

After the end of the war, the removal of travel restrictions and the massive influx of visitors that followed changed the role of cultural resource development at Bandelier. In 1946, visitation totals were five times those of 1940, and throughout the late 1940s, the numbers grew. The number of staff members remained constant, and the seemingly endless stream of cars entering Frijoles Canyon kept park rangers busy. The new realities at Bandelier seemed insurmountable. The ruins required intermittent stabilization, but the Park Service had little money for such programs. Maintaining the physical plant in the face of dramatically increased usage took considerable energy. Since most Park Service areas faced postwar visitation levels with prewar staffing, there was little time for innovation. Rangers told visitors the same story they had a decade earlier.


In order to keep pace, the agency needed the support of scientific and educational institutions. The preservation vs. use balance that characterized the prewar era at Bandelier had slipped away. To fulfill their objectives, Park Service officials looked outside the agency. At Bandelier, this led to a new excavation, conceived and directed outside of the Park Service.

In 1948, Frederick C. V. Worman of Adams State College in Alamosa, Colorado, received permission to excavate ruins in Frijoles Canyon. In 1947, Worman had proposed a plan for the unexcavated mounds southeast of the administrative compound in the canyon. He planned a field school that would ascertain the boundaries of occupation in the area, determine the distribution of different groups, assist the Park Service with interpretation, and train students. During the excavation, Romalo Cordero, a Cochiti Indian on the NPS staff, named the ruins "Rainbow House."

The actual excavation at Rainbow House did not equal Woman's plans, and in 1950, after two seasons, it ceased. Only eighteen rooms had been excavated. A hired crew continued that summer, excavating thirty-six rooms and one kiva. Nor did the Park Service acquire much new knowledge from the project. The site map, notes, and other documentation disappeared. For unrelated reasons, Worman lost his job at Adams State. He moved to Los Alamos to work as the archeologist for the Atomic Energy Commission.

The excavation of Rainbow House solved none of the cultural resource management issues that faced the monument, and in fact increased the responsibilities of the Park Service. Its location outside the main compound area made it difficult to administer, and the public perceived it as less interesting than the ruins beyond the visitor center. Few visitors stopped to inspect it. Despite the lack of public interest, the newly excavated ruin required stabilization and constant maintenance.

The Rainbow House excavation revealed that the strict management policies of the 1930s would not work in the postwar era. Under the strain of new responsibilities, the rigid distinctions upon which Pinkley insisted began to blur. Changes in the way the agency regarded the monument were the result. Frank Pinkley would never have permitted the Rainbow House excavation. Located east of the main parking area, it was outside the barrier between the prehistoric and modern worlds that Pinkley so consciously erected. It violated his premise about controlled access.13

Pressure on the resources of Frijoles Canyon forced permanent changes in interpretive policy. The first postwar superintendent, Fred Binnewies, recalled that in 1952 he had to break Frank Pinkley's rule about guided tours in archeological parks. Except for himself and his secretary, his entire staff was ill. Faced with a usual summer day of visitation, Binnewies wrote out a facsimile of the daily ranger's tours, mimeographed copies, and handed them to arriving visitors. The self-guided

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tour idea caught on quickly at Bandelier. Soon as many visitors read the guide book as heard the rangers speak.\footnote{Fred W. Binnewies to the author, November 26, 1984.}

During the 1950s, archeological investigation continued at Bandelier. In 1952, John F. Turney surveyed the Otowi section, locating and describing fifty-five separate sites. Between 1957 and 1959, Charles H. Lange conducted a horseback archeological survey of mesa tops within the monument and on the adjacent Cañada de Cochiti grant. Lange documented nearly 150 sites, collecting ceramic materials from the surface and cataloging sites. Again, the approach to investigation was piecemeal, while elsewhere, a new synthesis of southwestern archeology led to a refined vision of prehistory in the region.

The new synthesis grew out of the evolution of southwestern archeology. Between 1930 and the late 1950s, archeologists performed a number of surveys in central New Mexico, and by 1955 Fred Wendorf and Erik K. Reed published articles that detailed a new chronology of the prehistory of the middle Rio Grande Valley. The framework that this research provided reshaped the way archeologists saw the prehistory of the region.\footnote{Powers, "Draft Research Design." pp. 28-30.}

But the realities of the 1950s precluded the immediate integration of the new information into interpretation at Bandelier. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, retrenchment became the dominant administrative sentiment at Bandelier, and cultural resource management reflected the situation. Overworked and outnumbered, park staff held its ground in the face of hordes of visitors and a broadening range of responsibilities. The Los Alamos residents who used Frijoles Canyon placed additional demands upon park personnel. The influx of visitors increased the chances of accidental fire in the summers, and everyone had to be vigilant. With stabilized ruins, a guide book, and a status quo that barely sufficed, there was little chance for the staff to develop new programs. Relief for the besieged monument was a long way off.

The ascendance of Conrad L. Wirth to the directorship in 1951 spelled the beginning of changes throughout the agency that ultimately affected Bandelier. Wirth initiated the Mission 66 program in response to deteriorating conditions in the system. It began in 1956 with the goal of rejuvenating the park system in time for the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Park Service in 1966. The Mission 66 program was popular on Capitol Hill. The most dynamic development for the Park Service since the New Deal, it funded capital development and personnel increases at most Park Service areas. Once again, the agency had funding for its programs. As it expanded, the agency renewed its earlier vitality.

The search for a solution to crowding in Frijoles Canyon shaped the development of cultural resources under the Mission 66 program for Bandelier. Park Service planners devised major innovations in an effort to shift the focus of visitors away from Frijoles Canyon. The development of the detached Otowi section headed the
program, with plans calling for a new visitor center, ranger station, and museum. Under the plan, visitors would learn about another facet of prehistoric culture. Interpreting Otowi required a different point of view than the one rangers used for Frijoles Canyon. Otowi had a different chronology and different surface attractions.

But decisions at the highest levels of the agency squashed the Otowi development. From an administrative perspective, the proposal was inefficient. It called for nearly a million dollars of construction, a twofold increase in staff, and new facilities, all within fifteen miles of Frijoles Canyon. In light of encroachment upon the detached section during and after the war and the attendant deterioration of the ruins, the Otowi proposal seemed a great expense that offered little benefit.

Despite attempts to broaden the interpretive perspective at Bandelier, the programs that the agency offered during the 1950s changed little. The same information that the visitor of the 1930s heard had to satisfy his counterpart two decades later. Although planning for Mission 66 at Bandelier began in the 1950s, actual development did not occur until the early 1960s. Within the system, the national parks came first. Like many archeological areas, Bandelier lagged behind the recreation areas and parkways that Conrad Wirth had favored since he joined the Park Service during the 1930s.¹⁶

Plans to alter the boundaries of the monument during the late 1950s created problems in the management of cultural resources. The proposal to delete portions of the Otowi section bothered archeologist Charlie Steen of the Southwest Regional Office. He advocated keeping an unimpacted portion of the detached section, south of the truck road to Los Alamos. The area contained an aboriginal game trap, a mesa-top pueblo, numerous cave dwellings, and a well-preserved collection of fourteenth-century cave drawings. Steen believed that the collection of features in Mortandad Canyon offered the agency future interpretive options and was well worth keeping. Agency politics dictated otherwise. Mortandad Canyon was included in the transfer of the Otowi section to the Atomic Energy Commission.

Despite its failure to provide a way to protect the Otowi section, Mission 66 laid the basis for future plans to develop cultural resources at Bandelier. It upgraded the physical plant at Bandelier and gave park administrators a larger staff. It left the basic problem of overcrowding unsolved, opening the door to future proposals that broadened the interpretive program at Bandelier. Park Service administrators realized that if they were going to alleviate crowding in Frijoles Canyon, they had to offer the visitor something new to see. Site interpretation was the most effective tool for this purpose.

As the construction of the Cochiti Dam became a growing possibility in the early 1960s, the Park Service initiated an archeological survey of the areas that would be submerged by water from the reservoir. Along the southeastern boundary of the monument, Park Service archeologists surveyed 361 acres and recorded thirty-seven sites. The Museum of New Mexico directed surveys outside of the monument

boundaries. Between 1962 and 1965, archeologists identified twenty-eight sites, and in 1963, Charles H. Lange headed a team that excavated three.  

Meanwhile, archeological stabilization became more sophisticated. In the 1960s, Park Service archeologists discovered that Portland Cement, the primary material used to stabilize ruins at Bandelier, was harder than the tufa with which the prehistoric inhabitants constructed their homes. As a result, when the material expanded and contracted in changing weather conditions, the mortar used to stabilize the ruins damaged the prehistoric stones. Archeologists worked to develop a new mortar that did not include Portland Cement. They also found that damage to the ruins could be minimized by more careful maintenance in bad weather. If the park could keep snow from covering the ruins in the winter, the damage from moisture was minimal.

Cultural resource management at Bandelier also benefited from technological innovations at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory [LASL until the 1980s when it became the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)]. In the early 1970s, the lab developed a subterrene laser. This device could disintegrate rock beneath the surface of the ground, allowing water to drain away from the surface. Drainage had always posed problems at the monument. The roofless ruins required constant maintenance to protect them from moisture. A team from LASL used the subterrene laser at Rainbow House and Tyuonyi to bore holes in the ground that helped drain off excess water. This made the ruins less susceptible to damage from moisture. The subterrene laser solved a long-standing cultural resources management problem at the monument.

In the late 1970s, the NPS planned to broaden the interpretive message of the monument by acquiring new areas. The 1977 master plan, created in response to the Cochiti Dam, was the culmination of these efforts. Park Service plans called for the acquisition of the Cañada de Cochiti Grant, the location of a stronghold from the Pueblo Rebellion of 1680 and numerous Spanish and Indian communities that had survived into the twentieth century. The new plan also included construction of a visitor center at the south end of the monument.

Again the agency planned to develop new attractions to relieve the burden upon Frijoles Canyon, this time by acquiring land that extended the scope of its interpretation into the historic period. The Park Service planned guided tours to Kotyiti, the fortified rebellion-era pueblo, and Cañada Village, within the boundaries of the grant. Trails from the visitor center to two sites in the southern section of Bandelier, the Painted Cave and San Miguel Pueblo, were also planned. The increased ease of access required more intensive management on the part of the Park Service.

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The La Mesa fire in 1977 also inspired innovations in resource management. Fire-fighting operations threatened archeological resources in the burn area. Archeologists and fire-fighters worked in concert to fight the fire without damaging subsurface remains. In this photo, archeologists precede bulldozers along the fire lines to identify archeological resources.
The southern tip of the monument offered a new realm of possibilities for the members of the interpretive staff. They finally had visible evidence to dispel the myth that abandoned pueblos were evidence of a lost civilization. Kotyiti and Cañada Village showed that pueblo culture survived the arrival of the Spanish and adopted elements of the incoming Spanish tradition. The new sites showed pueblo life in the historic period and validated the argument that the members of the other northern pueblos--particularly the Cochiti, Santa Clara, and San Ildefonso groups--were the descendants of the aboriginal inhabitants of the Pajarito Plateau.

A major environmental disaster disrupted Park Service plans on the Pajarito Plateau. During the summer of 1977, a vast fire of human origin destroyed much of the forest in the northwestern portion of the monument, adjacent national forest lands, and portions of Department of Energy land. The La Mesa fire began in the late afternoon of June 16, 1977. It raged for nearly a week, burning more than 15,000 acres of the plateau.

As a result of quick thinking by regional office personnel and park staff, the cultural resources of the burning area were scrutinized by archeologists who preceded the fire-fighting bulldozers. This plan came about almost serendipitously. On his way to visit an archeologist friend at the Park Service regional office on Old Santa Fé Trail in Santa Fé, Dr. Milford R. Fletcher, the regional scientist of the Southwest Region, looked up and saw smoke on the Pajarito Plateau. He told Cal Cummings, the deputy chief of the Division of Cultural Resources in the region, that because Bandelier was an archeological park, the construction of fire lines required archeologists. Archeologists could locate buried archeological sites and direct the bulldozers away from the ruins. Cummings, Superintendent Hunter, and the Forest Service agreed; Cummings found and scheduled volunteers, and Fletcher provided on-site supervision. In the end, nearly forty archeologists worked in front of the bulldozers during the La Mesa fire.20

The fire cleared the way for cultural resource management on the plateau to expand into new realms. Prior to 1977, the Park Service, Forest Service, and LASL operated their cultural resource programs independently. The agencies had different management objectives, and often their perspectives seemed antithetical. The fire promoted new cooperation and awareness of the value of the ruins. There were, however, tense moments. In one case, Fletcher turned off a Forest Service bulldozer, telling its driver: "We don't care if the trees burn. They'll grow back. Ruins won't." But on the whole, each organization respected the primacy of the ruins. Veterans of the fire remembered the shared objectives as superseding the occasional conflicts.21

The concern with preservation set new precedents for Federal handling of fires in archeological areas. Superintendent John D. Hunter received one of the highest awards offered by the Department of the Interior, the Meritorious Service Award, for service that included his handling of the La Mesa situation. For other Federal

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20 Dr. Milford R. Fletcher conversation with the author. August 21, 1986: Senior Archeologist Cal Cummings to Chief Anthropologist, WASO, January 24, 1986. Dr. Fletcher was kind enough to send the author a copy of this letter.

21 Dr. Fletcher conversation with the author, August 21, 1986.
agencies, the response of the Park Service provided a "consciousness-raising" experience. Fletcher and Park Service archeologists spoke to other agencies about the La Mesa fire and the ramifications of their response. Although the fire burnt surface ruins, it made a survey of the archeological resources of the park much easier. The Park Service also acquired a wealth of new information about patterns of plant succession after fires, and in the early 1980s began to organize it.

After the fire, the agency shifted its focus to other cultural resource needs at the monument. Vandalism remained a problem. Despite the best efforts of the Park Service, graffiti regularly marred the cavates in Frijoles Canyon. To limit its affect on visitors, park staff burnt fires in the caves to cover the scrawl of insensitive vandals with a new layer of char. But this type of solution could only address the effects of callous behavior, not its causes.

"Pot-hunting" also remained endemic. The unstaffed Tsankawi Mesa was a particularly tempting target for thieves of prehistoric artifacts. Comparatively few people visited the mesa, and the park had no uniformed ranger stationed there. Except for occasional patrols, signs and guidebooks were the only evidence of the presence of the Park Service. The wilderness area in the main section also revealed scattered evidence of digging. As in the 1910s and 1920s, when many southwestern archeological areas were in a similar state, the unpatrolled parts of the monument remained vulnerable to both pilfering visitors and professional depredators.

The CCC buildings constructed during the 1930s also attracted the attention of cultural resource managers. The structures became a historic resource. Park rangers had always received questions about the buildings, and informally, the story of the CCC and Mrs. Frey's Frijoles Canyon Lodge became part of the interpretive story at the monument. The buildings were nominated for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places, and two Park Service employees, Laura Soulliere Harrison, an architectural historian, and Randy Copeland, an historical architect, prepared an historic district nomination for the buildings in Frijoles Canyon. On May 28, 1987, the Secretary of the Interior designated the CCC complex as National Historic Landmarks, the highest level of significance authorized outside of congressional mandate. Yet the structures required cyclic maintenance.

During the 1980s, the Park Service undertook a major rehabilitation program for the structures. The program began in 1979, when Robert Butcher, the Chief of the Division of Maintenance at the monument, began a fund drive to rehabilitate the Visitor Center. Russell Butcher of the National Parks and Conservation Association, no relation to Robert Butcher, spearheaded the fund raising campaign to which corporations and private citizens contributed. During a three-year period, the program raised nearly $60,000, approximately one-tenth of the entire maintenance cost. The money went toward an intensive program of repatching, repointing, and replastering the structures. Many vigas, the wood roof beams that protruded from

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22Ibid.


24Lissoway telephone interview, February 20, 1987: see also Harrison and Copeland, "Historic Structures."
the sides of the buildings, and canales, the open rooftop drains, had rotted, and these were replaced. During 1985-86, crews worked on many of the buildings.

Maintenance of the historic structures seemed a constant struggle. In the mid 1980s, park staff noticed dampness in the walls of many of the buildings. The staff found that runoff from the flat roofs of the buildings caused the problem. After the roofs and parapets had been foamed in 1981, some water ran down the outside of the walls, causing damage. In 1987, the park experimented with angling the parapets on the roof differently so as to channel the water from these to the inner roof.\textsuperscript{25}

The desire for more comprehensive interpretation led to expanded archeological research in the 1980s. Most of the excavating done at Bandelier dated from the first two decades of the twentieth century, and since that time, southwestern archeology had matured considerably. Yet no one knew the range of archeological resources contained in the monument. Without that information, a coherent plan of administration was impossible. In the 1940s, superintendents began to clamor for a site survey. Until the 1970s, they had little opportunity to undertake such an extensive project, but late in the decade, developments within the Southwest Region set the stage for a site survey at Bandelier.

During the 1970s, the agency developed the Chaco Center to expand archeological horizons at Chaco Canyon. The excavations there broadened archeological knowledge and led to the enlargement of the Chaco Canyon National Monument and its reclassification as a national historical park. After the completion of the Chaco project, and at the request of Superintendent J. D. Hunter and staff, the archeologists turned their attention to a site survey of Bandelier National Monument. During the summer of 1985, they began fieldwork at the monument.

Between 1932 and the 1980s, the range of cultural resource responsibilities at Bandelier changed dramatically. In the 1930s, the NPS thought only of its obligation to preserve and protect the ruins. But in the subsequent fifty years, the methods of the agency became more sophisticated, new technology and ideas were implemented, and a wider range of cultural resources became important at Bandelier. By the 1980s, the management of cultural resources at the monument included historic and prehistoric facets.

Yet cultural resources were not the only important feature of the monument. The establishment of the Bandelier wilderness and the La Mesa fire helped show that Bandelier had two futures, one archeological and one natural. The new planning practices of the agency offered visible evidence of the interrelatedness of these two facets of management. By the middle of the 1970s, the practices of the Park Service revealed an increasing emphasis upon the natural resources at the Bandelier National Monument.

\textsuperscript{25}Lissoway telephone interview. February 20, 1987.
CHAPTER 6
NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN MESA
AND CANON COUNTRY

During the 1970s, the Park Service broadened its view of its responsibilities at Bandelier. As a result of a number of factors, including changing attitudes within the agency, the establishment of the Bandelier wilderness on October 20, 1976, the burro issue, and the La Mesa fire, the management of natural resources took on new significance. After years of adhering strictly to the mandate in the organic legislation that established Bandelier, the Park Service developed an integrated program of resource management at the monument. In 1980, cultural and natural resource management were merged into one division headed by a natural resource manager.

Although an innovative concept, the idea of integrated management raised problems. Cultural resource managers often felt that budgetary allocations did not reflect their concerns. Many in the park and the regional office questioned the efficacy of a program that centered on anything but the archeological ruins that the monument was established to protect. Natural resource managers presented a different picture. In the words of Regional Scientist Dr. Milford R. Fletcher, the two entities were "different ends of the same piece of string," and an integrated program of management was the only way to preserve the integrity of the entire monument.¹

Much of the tension over resource management at Bandelier resulted from the changing cultural climate in the U.S. After the passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964, the public and its legislators articulated strong concerns about the state of the American physical environment. Throughout the 1960s, burgeoning national awareness of the concept of ecology brought parks to the attention of a powerful grass roots movement. Expanding environmental groups like the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society and many others began to promote an environmental agenda. After a decade in which use of the park system overwhelmed preservation of its resources, the Park Service began a dramatic shift in the opposite direction.

The environmental movement was part and parcel of a heightened sensitivity to preserving the natural beauty of the U.S. The "Keep America Beautiful" campaign that Lady Bird Johnson initiated during her husband's presidency became the basis of a groundswell in that late 1960s and early 1970s. "Back-to-nature" movements flourished, the Federal Government proclaimed "Earth Day" in 1970, and the concept of preservation took on social significance previously paralleled only during the Progressive Era. Americans cared about their land, and the Park Service was one beneficiary. Droves of enthusiastic young preservationists sought to enter the agency. Ironically, while many of these people valued the natural attributes of the system, the tone of the era dictated the protection of nature from the depredations of

¹Dr. Milford R. Fletcher, interview with the author, August 21, 1986.
natural resource management in mesa and cañon country

humanity. Visitor use of the park system played a small and unimportant role in this concept of preservation.2

Directors Stephen T. Mather and Horace Albright had initially promoted the park system because of its scenic beauty. During the 1920s and 1930s, use of the parks was their goal, but they promoted the parks to a public that lacked the opportunity and affluence of later generations. Only after World War II could millions of Americans visit the park system. When their impact overwhelmed the system, the NPS responded with capital development programs like Mission 66. By the 1970s, the increases in visitation made management of natural resources like cultural resources, imperative. If the natural resources of the park system were to survive, they required close attention.

Increasing sophistication in the sciences also prompted new directions in natural resource management. For many years, natural resource management and protection had been synonymous. Resource managers simply preserved; they suppressed fires, protected flora and fauna from damage, and arrested poachers. But as the concept of the dynamics of ecological communities gained credence, scientists began to view the natural world from a different perspective. Sophisticated techniques offered a way to move into new realms of management. During the 1960s and 1970s, the genetic diversity of the planet became an important cultural issue, and the scientific public and the environmental community came to regard the park system as the best collection of natural diversity. New ideas of this nature hastened the implementation of up-to-the-minute scientific programs.

This led to a broadening of the range of responsibilities for resource managers within the agency. In the early 1970s, Chief Scientist Roland Wauer of the Southwestern Region implemented a program to assess the natural attributes of cultural areas. Armed with the latest scientific knowledge and technique, natural resource managers began to look at archeological and historical parks.3

Beginning in the early 1970s, this translated into more prominent interest in the natural resources of Bandelier. Rather than simply focusing on the cultural resources of the monument, the Park Service began looking at the natural resources of the undeveloped backcountry. Increasingly attuned to preservation responsibilities and spurred by the interest in the designated wilderness area, in 1973-74 the Park Service began designing a comprehensive resource management plan for Bandelier.

The new plan represented a departure from previous practices at the monument. Until the 1970s, concern for natural resources played a secondary role in the management of the park. The Park Service regarded Bandelier primarily as an archeological area. The proclamation establishing the monument did not refer to its natural attributes, Frank Pinkley paid little attention to the backcountry, and the postwar influx of visitors precluded attention to other issues. Despite the fact that


the CCC workers cut trails and did some maintenance, there was little evidence of a coherent plan of natural resource management.

Prior to the 1970s, the Park Service simply reacted to most natural resource questions. When a problem occurred, the staff at the monument dealt with it as best they could. During the 1930s, webworms threatened the trees in Frijoles Canyon, and the custodian developed an eradication program. When small fires broke out, staff members rushed to put them out. A major windstorm damaged trees in 1952, and the agency responded by clearing out the downed timber. Despite frequent inspections, such isolated incidents comprised the extent of natural area management at Bandelier. Archeology and the needs of visitors simply superseded the management of the Bandelier backcountry.4

The feral burros that inhabited the backcountry offered the issue on which the need for natural resource management at the monument focused. The presence of the burros preceded NPS administration at Bandelier, but the first Park Service wildlife inspection in 1934 did not mention them. In 1940, however, NPS biologist W. B. McDougall saw approximately twenty during his visit. He recommended that the burros be eliminated, and later that year the regional office approved the first burro control plan for the Bandelier Monument. Slowly, the plan became practice. In September, 1946, rangers shot fifty-two burros, halving the population at the monument. In October and November, 1946, twelve more were destroyed, and burro eradication became policy at Bandelier.

Feral burros became a perennial issue at the monument. After a long period in which other issues diminished the importance of the burros, a "Long Range Wildlife and Range Management Plan," prepared in 1964, initiated new action. The plan recommended that rangers use high-powered rifles to eliminate burros in the higher elevations of the monument. The program also suggested trapping burros at watering holes throughout the backcountry.

In the fall of 1964, the Park Service hired the Los Alamos County Sheriff's Mounted Patrol to hunt burros at the monument. Despite confident predictions, they caught few animals. The rough terrain of the Bandelier backcountry thwarted the mounted hunters. Trapping agile burros in open canyons and mesas while on horseback was not an easy task.

With a mandate to eliminate exotic animals from park areas, agency personnel continued to try to get rid of the burros at Bandelier. In December 1966, rangers observed fifty-eight burros, and visitors reported twenty more. At about the same time, backcountry inspections reported damage to above-ground ruins and increased

4 Information on reactive natural resource responses at Bandelier is widely scattered. I will include a sampling of citations. Information about webworm control can be found in the "Southwestern National Monuments Monthly Report," May, June, and July, 1935, and June, 1936, in the Bandelier National Monument Library. The Bandelier Library contains reports on forestry under its "Y" heading, as well as much other information about natural resources under a variety of headings. The Denver Federal Records Center contains much information in this vein in its "Y" series reports under the Bandelier heading. Because the Park Service did not think of natural resource management as a unified concept prior to the 1970s, the information is scattered under the most appropriate heading. Flooding can be found in water-related files. Windstorms in natural disasters, and others usually in the most likely place.
soil erosion. After viewing the evidence, the staff at the monument decided that there was a correlation between burro grazing and increased soil erosion, particularly in the vast area southwest of Alamo Canyon. The burros ceased to be merely unattractive residents of the backcountry. They became a menace to its ecological and archeological values.

In 1969, Superintendent Stanley T. Albright drew plans to combat the increasing numbers of burros. The plan reported that one hundred burros ranged over three-fourths of the 23,000-acre backcountry, and Albright advocated burro elimination by any available means. Despite his proposal and general acceptance of the idea that the burros had to be removed from the backcountry, there were no burro eliminations between 1969 and 1972. Additional sightings were reported, however, in 1970 and 1971, and the staff estimated the monument population at between fifty and two hundred animals.

The passage of the Wild Horse and Burro Act of 1971 complicated the management of burros within the national park system. The law protected wild horses and burros on BLM and Department of Agriculture (U.S. Forest Service) land. Soon the number of burros on the national forest land adjacent to Bandelier increased, and some crossed the boundary into the monument. The Park Service had to contend with a growing herd of burros in the Bandelier backcountry.

The burros posed a problem for the agency. Although NPS lands were exempt from the jurisdiction of the Wild Horse and Burro Act, the Park Service policy of removing exotic animals that altered ecosystems from park areas offended animal advocacy groups. The agency needed to devise a strategy that removed the burros and did not hurt its public image. For regional office and park staff, the burro issue became a no-win situation. No matter what stance the agency took, portions of its constituency were sure to resent its actions.

At Bandelier, the Park Service found itself "working on a natural problem," Fletcher remarked, "to protect a cultural resource." Many park employees suspected that the burros were responsible for much of the damage to archeological sites in the backcountry. Erosion in the backcountry had increased to an estimated thirty-six tons of soil per acre per year, an astonishingly high rate that threatened unexcavated archeological sites.

The Park Service started "from the beginning" in its efforts to assess the affect of the burros on the monument. The agency hired professional researchers, including John R. Morgart of Arizona State University, to determine the extent of the damage caused by the animals. Morgart's study offered a catalogue of the sins of the burro. A non-native species, burros had a profound impact on the ecosystems of the backcountry. Burros and deer competed for the same food during winter months, and the burros were so successful that USFS Supervisor John Hall complained to NPS Regional Director Frank Kowski that the they were destroying deer habitat.

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throughout the region. The evidence piled up against the burros. With a mandate to preserve the resources of the monument, there was little choice. The animals had to go.6

Between 1974 and 1977, the Natural Resources Division of the Southwest Region spent $130,000 on burro research and removal at Bandelier. In the process, the Park Service removed 130 burros, but its research showed that the agency barely held its own. The proximity of the protected burro herds on Forest Service and BLM land and the imperfect fencing on the western and southern boundaries of the monument allowed a constant ingress of burros. The animals also proved to have an astonishing rate of reproduction—29 percent. A rate of 25 percent meant that burro population doubled every fourth year. The Park Service seemed unable to win the battle, and what had been an issue became a crisis.7

During the summer of 1977, the La Mesa fire provided an opportunity to reduce the burro population at Bandelier substantially. During the third day of the week-long fire, Fletcher explained to Regional Director John Cook that the fire offered an "excellent opportunity to remove burros." Fletcher indicated that by destroying seventy-five to one hundred animals, the Park Service could nearly eliminate burros from the monument. After the fire, park staff members saw that the fire had driven deer out of their summer range, and deer and burros competed for the same forage. From the perspective of the Park Service, there was little doubt which animal was more desirable. Cook approved Fletcher's suggestion. Fletcher brought in a crew of "steady men," many of whom previously had worked at Bandelier and knew its canyons and mesas. He did not have to worry about them getting lost in mesa and cañon country. During the week that followed the fire, they shot sixty-six burros.8

But an intemperate remark cost the Park Service some public support. During the fire, a reporter spoke with Roland Wauer about the burro eradication program. During the conversation, the reporter wondered if shooting the animals bothered park rangers who primarily sought to preserve resources. Wauer responded by acknowledging the difficulty of the job, but also asserted that Park Service people were professionals who understand that unpleasant tasks were part of their obligation. Besides, he remarked casually, "our people don't suffer from the Bambi complex." The press seized on the remark, and it made headlines in a number of western newspapers. The public image of the Park Service suffered.9

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6The Park Service commissioned a number of reports on the burro situation at Bandelier. These include John R. Morgart, "Burro Behavior and Population Dynamics." (M. A. Thesis. Arizona State University. 1978); Roland H. Wauer, "Feral Burro Control Program for Bandelier." and David Koehler, "Preliminary Reconnaissance Report-Feral Burro Ecological Impact Project." Of these authors, only Wauer was an employee of the agency. All the reports and a number of others are available in the Interpretation Library. Southwest Regional Office. Santa Fe. New Mexico.

7Fletcher interview. August 21, 1986.

8Lissoway telephone conversation. February 17, 1987; and Fletcher interview. August 21, 1986.

After the fire, burro eradication efforts continued. In 1979, the Park Service reviewed its original alternatives from 1976 in an Environmental Assessment of the burro issue and found that it had no other options. The agency started a public review period that ended on March 7, 1980. The eradication program resumed, and on March 12-13, thirty-seven burros were shot.

The eradication program bothered animal advocacy groups such as the Fund for Animals, Inc. (FFA). An association devoted to protecting wild and domestic animals, the Fund for Animals believed that there was a better way to solve the problem. Nor were its members strangers to the burro issue. When burros posed a problem at the Grand Canyon National Park, the organization proposed a solution that led to the successful removal of many of the burros there. After the animals were captured, they were put up for private adoption. The project solved the burro problem at the Grand Canyon and attracted favorable media attention.

Flushed with success, the Fund for Animals wanted the opportunity to try similar tactics at Bandelier. They and two other animal advocacy groups, the American Horse Protection Association and a small group from Tucson, the Animal Defense Council, filed a suit against the Park Service. On March 13, the Albuquerque District Court enjoined the Park Service from continuing the eradication program. The three-day reduction program, however, had already ended before the restraining order was served on Superintendent John D. Hunter.

Park Service strategists had to grapple with the lawsuit before the burro reduction could continue. The Fund for Animals, their allies, and the Park Service reached an agreement that allowed the FFA an opportunity to implement a live-capture program at the monument. The Fund for Animals subsequently withdrew from the suit, and after representatives of the Animal Defense Council failed to appear in court, the American Horse Protective Association became the sole plaintiff. The defections weakened the suit considerably. On August 18, 1980, the Federal district court in Albuquerque overturned the restraining order, and in December 1982, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver dismissed the suit. In early 1983, the Park Service made plans to proceed with its program.

Under the terms of the agreement with the Fund for Animals, FFA began its efforts to remove the burros from the monument. In May 1983, two cowboys from Bishop, California, arrived at the monument. In the company of a backcountry ranger, they tried to rope burros, and caught one. They followed with attempts to catch the burros in a foot snare, a snare hidden in small hole into which they hoped the burros would walk. They caught only two or three more. After two weeks, the two cowboys withdrew.

The Fund for Animals then brought in Dave Erickson, an Arizona cowboy who had been responsible for their success at Grand Canyon. He used dogs to hold the burros at bay while his crew roped the animals. This novel approach netted more burros than previous efforts, but even with increased success, the removal of burros from Bandelier looked to be an arduous process. The closed box canyons within Grand Canyon National Park made catching burros a relatively easy task. Pilots chased the animals up the canyon until the burros ran out of room. Trapped against
During the 1970s, feral burros became a major environmental problem at Bandelier. Roaming the backcountry, they damaged both the cultural and natural resources of the monument. The Park Service spent large sums on studies, control, capture, and eradication of the burros. This photograph suggests the elusive quality of the animals.
a three-sided canyon, the animals were easy to capture. But as the members of the Los Alamos County Sheriff’s Mounted Patrol discovered in their effort to trap burros in 1964, the canyons in Bandelier National Monument were open-ended. In the canyons, the agile animals escaped their captors regularly.

Many in the Park Service believed that Erickson imported burros to fulfill his contract. As the height of tourist season approached, park rangers could not stay with Erickson as closely as they had with the earlier cowboys. Soon the burro corral on Frijoles Mesa began to fill. But there was one problem: most of the animals in the corral were tan with a dark cross running down their spine and across their shoulders. They were unlike any burros ever found in Bandelier, not at all similar to the larger black animals previously seen at Bandelier. “If those weren’t Arizona burros, mister,” Dr. Milford R. Fletcher later exclaimed, “then I’ve never seen one!”

Others in the Park Service called the burros “ringers,” and they had plenty of circumstantial evidence to support their feelings. One park staff member arose at 2 AM and waited all night on Highway 4 in hope of catching a truckload of burros on their way to the corral on Frijoles Mesa. Seasonal Ranger Kevin Rodgers observed an Erickson horse trailer coming to the park late one evening, but did not realize its significance until too late. He also spoke with Erickson by telephone in his motel room around 11:00 PM the evening before the burros appeared in the corral. Since the animals appeared by 5:00 AM, so Erickson supposedly caught between fifteen and eighteen burros in unfamiliar country, along miles of backcountry trails, in less than six hours. No one succeeded in proving that Erickson did anything improper, but the circumstantial evidence was overwhelming.

Nevertheless, the origin of the burros was not an issue for the Park Service. The transaction between FFA and its contractor did not involve the agency. “The Fund for Animals made the deal,” Fletcher pointed out nearly a decade later, “the Park Service was just letting them do it.” Shortly afterward, Fund for Animals officials asserted that the twenty-nine burros they had captured, included at least sixteen whose status was termed “controversial,” were the last in the monument. Claiming its work completed, the Fund for Animals left Bandelier, giving tacit approval to further agency programs to reduce the burro population in the monument. The Park Service continued its eradication policy, shooting an additional twenty-two burros. The park also received money to rehabilitate its fences along the western boundary of monument, adjacent to the protected burro range on national forest land. By the end of 1983, there were few left within the monument.

The La Mesa fire of 1977 provided another watershed in natural resource management at Bandelier. No one understood the historic role of natural fire in the region. Every eight to twelve years, natural fires would clear different areas on the plateau. Over time, this pattern created a mosaic of burned areas, leading to collections of trees of different age classes. Among mixed conifer environments like that of the Pajarito Plateau, this kind of burning led to a healthy ecosystem, but for the previous one hundred years, fire suppression remained the dominant mode of fire management for individuals and Federal agencies.

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10 Ibid.
The Mesa fire in 1977 also inspired innovations in resource management. Fire-fighting operations threatened archeological resources in the burn area. Archeologists and fire-fighters worked in concert to fight the fire without damaging subsurface remains.
By the 1970s, a process of changing attitudes towards fire within the Park Service had begun. Scientists understood that the accumulated fuel loads of a long period of suppression presented a real danger to the resources of park areas. "With fire," Dr. Milford R. Fletcher asserted, "you can pay me now or you can pay me later." The idea of a controlled, human-induced fire to clear out areas of high fuel load gained credence. By 1977, some natural parks such as Yellowstone and Sequoia had controlled fire programs in place. These programs generally allowed natural fires to burn within boundaries that fire specialists predetermined. If the fires exceeded certain prescribed conditions, then the Park Service would respond. Otherwise, the fire simply burned on with careful monitoring.

Despite a growing body of scientific evidence, people who had fought fires all their lives still resisted the idea. Fire had always been anathema—particularly to people in the arid Southwest—and a program that allowed fires to burn unchecked violated every principle they knew. Yet the scientists had considerable influence. In the spring of 1977, Regional Director John Cook approved a controlled burn program for the La Mesa area. Ironically, the fire started the month before the program was scheduled to begin.

The La Mesa fire provided the Park Service with vast quantities of new information about fire. Terralene Foxx, a contract researcher, had set up vegetative plots to document the differences between areas that had been burned with some degree of frequency and those that had not. The fire burned all of her plots, but Foxx was able to use the plots to see how the fire affected areas with different levels of fuel loading. What she found was that areas that had recently burned were not affected as severely as those with higher accumulations of fuel. Her work fit with the growing body of fire research and helped convince many in the Park Service and in northern New Mexico of the value of programs of controlled fire.11

The establishment of the Bandelier wilderness in 1976 also forced the reassessment of management policies. In the aftermath of the environmental decade, wilderness experiences became an important part of growing up for many Americans, and enthusiastic backpackers flocked to designated wilderness areas. The number of backcountry users at Bandelier jumped dramatically as soon as it became a designated wilderness. Visitation increased ten-fold the first year, and it added new responsibilities to the burden of the staff.12 Not only did they have to protect Frijoles Canyon, they also had to maintain the pristine nature of the backcountry in the face of human encroachment. At the same time, they had to make sure that visitors were satisfied with their experience. In essence, the agency had to protect the wilderness area and its visitors from each other. The need for more sophisticated management became increasingly apparent.

The combination of the new resource management plan, which included provisions for the management of natural and cultural resources, the establishment of the

The La Mesa fire occurred during June of 1977. Large portions of the Upper Canyon and Frijoles Mesa area were destroyed by the fire, as were extensive areas beyond the boundaries of the monument. Because of the large number of archaeological sites within the area of the fire, archaeologists from the Park Service Regional Office in Santa Fe and the School of American Research joined fire fighters in front of the bulldozers on the fire lines. This extraordinary effort resulted in the protection of numerous cultural resources that might otherwise have been damaged or destroyed.
wilderness area, the burro question, and the La Mesa fire pointed to the need for a resource management entity at the monument. Careful planning and management of the backcountry could ensure its survival and prevent situations that aroused public opposition against Park Service policies. Superintendent John Hunter and his staff planned a management unit that would included cultural and natural resource management responsibilities.

Under the leadership of John Lissoway, the first person that the Southwest Regional Office specifically trained in natural resource management, the resource management unit debuted in 1980. Its responsibilities included cultural and natural resource management as well as the wilderness area, and the park archeologist position also became part of resources management. This was an unusual practice. In most parks, wilderness responsibilities fell to the enforcement division, but as a result of the many research programs mandated for the wilderness, administration by resource managers seemed desirable.\(^{13}\)

During the 1980s, the resource management unit grew in significance. It became equal in function to other divisions like protection and administration. But funding at the regional level for natural and cultural resources came from different and not interchangeable "pots" of money. Natural resources at the park received money from the regional natural resources funds while cultural resource money came from its counterpart in the region. During the early 1980s, Bandelier was a focus of natural resource activity and funding, while cultural resources had little to offer Bandelier. This contributed to a changing perception of the significance of the monument.

Funding at the regional level led to the perception of a lack of balance at the park. Because of the trend toward natural preservation in the agency, the increased sophistication of earth sciences, and the great need for management of natural resources at Bandelier, the disparity created tension. Lissoway went to "the well with the most water," natural resource and fire management funding. Cultural Resources at the regional level did not have the funding to match the expenditures on natural resources, and cultural resources managers in the Regional Office and at the park expressed concern that the bulk of spending at an archeological park went for programs directed at the natural resources of the monument. Without clearly understanding NPS allocation procedures, some park observers expressed frustration, wondering how the park could spend such a large portion of its budget on an area used by such a small percentage of its visitors.

The management of the backcountry also involved a sizable cultural resource component. Thousands of unexcavated archeological sites dotted the area, and these areas were better protected as a result of the burro reduction program, the new fire management policies, and other natural resource innovations. They did not help the park address the overcrowding of Frijoles Canyon, but they did further long-term goals of preservation.

\(^{13}\)Lissoway conversation with the author. January 22 and February 18, 1986.
The natural-cultural resource dichotomy closely mirrored the long-standing preservation vs. use issue within the agency. Visitation remained a major force at the monument, and this characteristic dichotomy again appeared, unfortunately in the guise of natural resource versus cultural resource management. When some suggested that the backcountry received too great a percentage of funding, they intimated that the process left the main attraction, Frijoles Canyon, without the resources necessary to protect and explain it. From that point of view, larger expenditures on natural resources favored preservation over use. No one suggested that the backcountry programs were inappropriate; instead in an era of decreasing funding and limited options, greater attention for the features that bore the brunt of the effects of visitation seemed appropriate. But again, cultural resources at the regional level lacked the ability to provide the funding that its counterparts in natural resources could.

During the mid-1980s, there were signs of a returning balance in funding between the two arms of resource management. Cultural Resources at the regional level began to receive a larger portion of the monetary pie, which translated into more funding for cultural resources at the park. The initiation of an archeological survey at the monument meant a broader approach to cultural resource management and possibly a wealth of new interpretive information. As the head of the Resource Management Division, John Lissoway took steps to ensure a "holistic framework" in cultural and natural resource management policy. Regional natural resource managers also expressed willingness to accommodate cultural resources. "Put a cultural resources person in Lissoway's job [as the head of the Resources Management Division]," Milford Fletcher contended, "and we'll work just as closely with them."

By 1987, cultural resources had more money for its programs, and an equitable situation existed. Between the arrival of the Park Service at Bandelier in 1932 and the middle of the 1980s, resource management at the monument became an increasingly professional discipline. From its initial focus upon the ruins in Frijoles Canyon, it came to include both a larger area and scope. The backcountry and its resources, archeological and natural, became more important, and the philosophy of management at the park reflected the new priorities. Resource management became a function of specialists, who were assisted by contract researchers and an all-encompassing form of resource management was the result. By the late 1980s, balancing the different values of the monument offered the greatest internal challenge for park managers, while the world that surrounded the monument offered the greatest challenge to its future.

\[^{14}\text{Fletcher interview. August 21, 1986; and Lissoway telephone conversation. February 20, 1987.}\]
CHAPTER 7

"AN ISLAND BESIEGED": THREATS TO THE PARK

During the 1970s and 1980s, the pressure on Bandelier National Monument from the matrix of interests on the Pajarito Plateau mounted greatly, and park managers found themselves in a difficult situation. The plans of neighbors of the park often threatened the ability of park managers to uphold their mandate. Superintendent John D. Hunter described his position when he addressed a town meeting that evaluated road development in nearby White Rock in June 1985. Bandelier, he told the audience, was "an island besieged by external threats."\(^1\)

By the mid-1980s, Bandelier had become an outpost of preservation threatened by the needs of the world around it. Throughout the twentieth century, the Pajarito Plateau had been the focus of conflicting interests. As each constituent group, Government agency, and private interest laid claim to portions of the region and attempted to implement their programs, the amount of available open space diminished. What had been a snarl of assertions of needs became an impasse that resembled the gridlock of urban traffic. A situation emerged in which the gains of any group were counterbalanced by the losses of another one.

Changing perceptions of American society contributed to more aggressive vigilance on the part of the Park Service. Beginning in the 1960s, the conservation movement in the United States took a more holistic approach to preservation. Its concerns stretched beyond the protection of the park system into the beautification of ordinary landscapes. For the Park Service this translated into a concern for lands beyond the borders of park areas.

By the middle of the 1970s, the National Parks Association [later the National Parks and Conservation Association (NPCA)] and other groups that supported the park system had expressed concern for the lands surrounding park areas. In 1976, Director Gary E. Everhardt declared that the most severe threats the system faced were external. By 1980, this position had become an integral part of agency policy. Park Service documents such as the State of the Parks 1980 report to Congress focused on external threats such as commercial enterprises and industrial development outside park boundaries with the potential to affect park units. The Park Service began to develop ways to identify and counteract the broadening range of potential threats. The issue became prominent on the agenda of the agency, and individual park units stepped up responses to new threats.\(^2\)

The combination of the new perception of threats and the tremendous pressure upon resources in the region demanded considerable attention from the staff at Bandelier. Protecting Park Service holdings meant more than preserving


archeological ruins and wilderness values. Superintendent Hunter and his staff had to track the plans of Federal agencies, private companies, and other interest groups and assess the manner in which their implementation could affect Bandelier. As elsewhere in the park system, encroachment on surrounding scenic vistas, noise pollution, the threat of acid rain, damage from sulfur dioxide emissions, and other similar concerns spurred active response from the administration at Bandelier National Monument.

On the Pajarito Plateau, myriad interests posed problems. The demands of the growing population of Los Alamos meant impingement on the values of the park. The various Federal agencies in the area, most notably the Department of Energy [DOE] and the United States Forest Service [USFS until the late 1970s, when it changed its name to USDA Forest Service], had objectives that often conflicted with those of the Park Service. Native American groups also exerted influence, as did private land owners and industrial concerns that sought to develop the economic potential of natural resources in the area. By the middle of the 1980s, the administration of Bandelier found itself in the vortex of a whirlpool of competing interests, each of which had the ability to affect the future of the resources preserved within park boundaries.

The people who lived in the town of Los Alamos were both the source of many of the threats to the park and the most vocal supporters of preservation efforts. The needs of the community put considerable pressure on the resources of the plateau and the park. But the highly educated, civic-minded citizens of the town also valued the beauty of Bandelier and its environs and consistently sought to protect the aesthetic and cultural values of the area as their community grew.

This internal conflict in Los Alamos often produced paradoxical situations. Los Alamos had a unique timbre of life, a style all its own. Yet its individuality grew out of conflicting factors. Los Alamos was an enclave of scientific America located in a more traditional world. The average level of education in the community was unusually high. The relative inaccessibility of the town and its outdoor-oriented culture contributed to the dissatisfaction many residents felt about the comparatively few cultural amenities available in Los Alamos County. The long commuting time between "the Hill" and Santa Fe also frustrated local residents. Social change and development offered the promise of new experience while simultaneously threatening to destroy the insular world of Los Alamos.

Little was new about the nature of this conflict over the use of space. Again, the people of the Pajarito Plateau faced the classic conflict of incommensurable values. They had to weigh the relative merits of the tangible and intangible benefits each change might bring. A number of interest groups had plans for the limited space available on the plateau and deciding which use would take priority involved an intricate tangle of public, private, aesthetic, economic, and quality of life issues.

The question of the development of the old Girl Scout retreat called Camp Evergreen or Westgate, a fifty-acre tract opposite Apache Springs in the Jemez Mountains, at the outset of the 1980s typified the nature of the problems within the community and the threats the growth of Los Alamos presented to Bandelier National Monument. As the population of the Pajarito Plateau grew, so did the demands upon
the limited space of the region. New residents needed housing, utilities, sewerage, and other services. As the area available for development in and around Los Alamos diminished, remaining sections attracted the attention of everyone on the plateau—from potential developers to the Park Service and the Forest Service.

Camp Evergreen had a history of recreational use. In 1967, the Sangre de Cristo Girl Scout Council acquired the tract from the AEC and used the two structures on the property as the basis for a summer camp and retreat. In the ensuing decade, vandalism increased considerably. Buildings on the property were burglarized, vandals destroyed fences and latrines, and the leaders of the Girl Scouts worried about the safety of their charges. They made plans to sell the tract, surmising that it held promise for small-scale development.3

A prime piece of land on the Pajarito Plateau rarely appeared on the market. Just as the Park Service became aware that the land was for sale, a buyer purchased it. In October 1980, John Umbarger, a LANL employee, and his wife Kathy, Dennis and Linda Perry, and Larry and Sandy Luck delivered a down payment of $25,000 out of a total selling price of $275,000. Calling themselves Westgate Families, the partners planned a high-density development in the area. They sought to rezone the tract to accommodate their desires.4

The Park Service responded quickly to the challenge of a new "Bandelier Acres" subdevelopment. The regional office devised a strategy that included contact with the national offices of Girl Scouts of America and efforts to work with state and local Government to restrict uses of the land. The suggestion that the Park Service purchase the land with donated funds also arose. On December 22, 1980, Superintendent Hunter met with Umbarger, who had become the spokesman for Westgate Families, to review the plans to develop the Camp Evergreen property. Hunter expressed his concerns, which included the impact of more intensive use of an area of the monument that had previously received little visitation, increased threat of fire that a larger number of visitors posed, the interruption of the existing fire management plan, problems resulting from utility service, and noise and visual pollution brought on by the development. Despite the number of concerns, however, Hunter told Umbarger that the Park Service "had no real grounds to oppose [either] the rezoning or the project." Since the land fell outside of park boundaries, Hunter believed that agency policy prevented vigorous opposition.5

Umbarger and his partners carried their project forward. On January 14, 1981, they asked the Los Alamos County Planning and Zoning Commission to rezone the fifty-acre tract from W-2, wilderness and recreation status, to 13.2 acres of

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3 Girl Scout Camp will turn into Three Homes. Los Alamos Monitor, October 19, 1980.


residential and agricultural, and 36.6 acres of planned development at 3.5 units per acre. The county commission scheduled public hearings on the issue.

The people of Los Alamos were upset by the idea of the development. Although Linda Perry remarked that the owners wanted to "preserve the integrity of the area," local residents were suspicious of their plans. The sale of the Camp Evergreen property also affected the plans of the Los Alamos Ski Club to engineer an exchange of land with the Forest Service to expand its ski runs. At the suggestion of the USFS, the skiers had purchased a 40-acre tract of wilderness along the Jemez River in the hopes that its value would equal that of a 150-acre parcel of national forest land the skiers coveted. But the $275,000 price of Camp Evergreen had driven up the value of land on the plateau, and a new appraisal of the relative worth of the two tracts left the skiers with a shortfall of approximately $350,000 in the proposed swap. This inadvertent complication by the Westgate Families in a matter of considerable local interest inspired antipathy towards the development, and the editorial page of the Los Alamos Monitor filled with anti-Westgate letters.\(^6\)

The staff at Bandelier viewed the developments with interest and concern. Hunter reported that the "issue [was] heating up" and that people from Los Alamos requested more visible involvement on the part of the Park Service. "Some," he wrote regional director Robert Kerr, "are quite perplexed by our lack of involvement." Even Hunter's public articulation of the stance of the Park Service did not stem the requests for more action.

The issue aroused much interest in Los Alamos, and local people took the lead in opposing the project. At a time when the leadership of the Department of the Interior unequivocally favored the development of public land in the West, Hunter and the regional office kept a low profile as Westgate became the most important local development issue of 1981. After considerable public scuffling and a number of legal challenges to the process by Westgate Families, the rezoning issue landed on a referendum ballot.

On June 30, 1981, the public turned back the zoning changes for the Westgate tract. Each of the three ballot issues failed by an average of about four percent of a total of 5,200 votes. The vote effectively terminated the development planned by Westgate Families.\(^7\) During the following years, the community of Los Alamos battled over the development. The staff at Bandelier monitored it closely, but little fell within the realm of agency actions.

Westgate continued to pose a threat to the park. Westgate Families continued to press its case, and over time, won concessions from both the city and the county. In August 1984, the tract cleared the final zoning hurdle, and the county permitted a density of 3.5 units per acre over the entire fifty-acre tract. The owners announced that they would initiate studies to determine the most appropriate use of the land,


\(^7\)The referendum became a headline issue in Los Alamos. For weeks preceding the referendum, it dominated the local newspaper. See the Los Alamos Monitor for the weeks preceding June 30, 1981.
and hoped to begin construction during the following building season, the spring of 1985. But after they received final clearance for utilities on the tract, Westgate Families sold the tract to Paul Parker, a local developer. The Forest Service sought to acquire the tract by an exchange of land, and Parker held up his plans to see what the foresters would offer. Throughout 1986, the USDA Forest Service searched for an appropriate tract to exchange, but found none. Parker remained patient. By late 1986, he had not begun to build.8

Yet the primary issue, reconciling the needs of the Los Alamos community with those of its neighbors on the plateau, remained. Los Alamos County would grow, and to a certain degree, the Park Service remained defenseless against such growth. In the 1980s, its best defense against impingement was to ensure use of the park by the local community. With Bandelier as a visible asset to the unique lifestyle of Los Alamos, the Park Service could rely on local people to point out the sensitivity of the values of the park and resist efforts that threatened to destroy the unique character of the region.

Interest in a new road from Santa Fe to the plateau area also pitted progress against protection of the region. New Mexico Highway 4 provided the only access from Santa Fe to the plateau. From Pojoaque to the Rio Grande, the road was only two lanes; from the river to the Los Alamos "Y", only three. As commuting to Los Alamos became standard for many of the employees of the various facilities there, congestion on the road increased. The thirteen-mile trip from the "Y" to the four-lane U.S. 84/285 often turned into thirty-five minutes of "stop-and-go" traffic. Local wags who worked on the hill referred to their trek as the "Frijoles 500." Particularly in the evenings, bumper-to-bumper traffic down to the valleys became the rule. For the people who sought easier travel to the Pajarito Plateau, a new and shorter road had considerable allure.

The idea of a direct route from Santa Fe to the plateau was not an innovation. Earlier roads to the region were the result of specific enterprises. Most were built without the benefit of road grading equipment and other technological innovations of the twentieth century. They were often roundabout routes that went from one specific feature to another. From before the arrival of the Park Service at Bandelier, advocates clamored for a direct road from Santa Fe.

The original modern road to the plateau that Harry Buckman built to facilitate his timber cutting wound up White Rock Canyon. It stretched from the town of Buckman on the east side of the Rio Grande in Cañada Ancha to the Buckman sawmills in Water Canyon. Early travelers to the monument followed its course. In 1912, the road was extended from Water Canyon to the north rim of Frijoles Canyon. After the demise of the post office in the town of Buckman during the early 1920s, the Los Alamos Ranch School received its mail at Otowi Crossing, and the emphasis shifted away from the trail that Buckman constructed. The school received an easement from the Forest Service to build a road between the crossing and the school, and soon there were two ways to take an automobile to the Pajarito Plateau. The Ranch School road was the antecedent of New Mexico Highway 4 that began in

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Pojoaque and finished at the Ranch School. Yet both roads were unpaved, cumbersome, and rutted, and often discouraged travel to the region.  

When the Park Service made efforts to acquire Bandelier National Monument from the Forest Service during the late 1920s, NPS officials perceived that new road facilities would increase the number of visitors to the monument. The roundabout trip across the Otowi Bridge encouraged sentiment for a shorter route between Santa Fe and the plateau. During the early 1930s, Jesse Nusbaum reported that the construction of a direct road from Santa Fe to the vicinity of Bandelier had become a strong likelihood. Nusbaum suggested that its path might follow the old Buckman road, eliminating a number of miles from the Otowi Crossing-Ranch School route and shortening the trip to Frijoles Canyon. Persistent rumors were all that ever came of this effort.  

The creation of Los Alamos also affected the chances of a road. The military cut its own road, which became known as the Los Alamos spur or truck road, through the Otowi section. While the coming of the Los Alamos facility brought substantial capital development to the plateau, the secrecy associated with it considerably dimmed prospects for a public road. During and after the Second World War, the Los Alamos facilities were top secret, with a manned security gate. Officials wanted to make access to the area as difficult as possible. The 54,000+ acres that Los Alamos controlled limited the range of possible locations for any additional roads. But as traffic congestion on New Mexico Highway 4 increased during the 1960s and 1970s, so did rumors of the imminent construction of a new road.

In the early 1980s, the New Mexico State Highway Department studied the issue and found three routes from Santa Fe to the Los Alamos area that merited additional study. The southernmost of these, called the Montoso Peak route, proposed a 2,900-foot bridge across the Rio' Grande that would join the existing Highway 4 at Los Alamos Technical Area-33 [TA-33], adjacent to the northeast boundary of the monument. The middle route, the Potrillo alternate, would meet the existing Highway 4 loop south of the town of White Rock, while the northernmost route, titled the Buckman road, roughly followed its namesake from the turn of the century and passed between the detached Tsankawi section of the monument and the town of White Rock.

From the point of view of the highway department, the shorter distance of any of the three routes offered the major advantage. From the intersection of Diamond and Trinity Drive in Los Alamos to the Cerillos-Airport Road interchange in Santa Fe, the existing Highway 4 route covered thirty-nine miles. The Montoso Peak route, however, was projected to save approximately ten miles.

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9 Reconstructing the roads to the Pajarito Plateau required much historical legwork. The papers of L. Bradford Prince contain letters from Harry Buckman that describe his efforts. They are located at the New Mexico State Archive and Record Center in Santa Fe. A number of diaries that detail travel routes to the Pajarito Plateau exist. The best of these were written by Grace Spradling Ireland and Ida Patton Abbott, the wife of Judge A.J. Abbott. The Bandelier National Monument Library contains copies of both in its vertical file. The Los Alamos Historical Society possesses much information about the Ranch School and its roads under its "Los Alamos Ranch School" headings.

alternative cut that to thirty-two miles, while both the Potrillo and Buckman Road proposals measured twenty-seven miles.

The proposals offered other benefits besides decreased distance. The New Mexico Highway Department suggested that any of the options would provide easier access to recreational areas like Bandelier and that the reduction of traffic congestion would make both the new road and its predecessor more safe. The new options also allowed the Los Alamos facility to avoid a number of winding roads in populated areas while it transported hazardous waste. Yet the project seemed likely to divert business from concerns along Highway 84/285, and the question of air, noise, and sight pollution merited consideration.11

Two of the three routes posed difficulties for the staff at Bandelier National Monument. The proximity of the Montoso Peak route to the main section of Bandelier presented a major threat to the resources of the park. TA-33 adjoined the monument. From any high point in the monument, a visitor could easily see the planned 2,900-foot bridge. The noise and pollution from automobile traffic would make portions of Bandelier into a freeway rather than a park, an impression enhanced by a proposed widening of the part of the Highway 4 loop that crossed Bandelier. The construction of the Montoso Peak road also indicated an increase in visitation at the already overcrowded Frijoles Canyon. Superintendent Hunter viewed the proposal "with some alarm."12

The Buckman Road proposal also made the Park Service wary. It passed close to the detached Tsankawi section, already an island amid the noise of the modern world, and Hunter feared that a road that close to the area with the anticipated volume of traffic "would destroy all the park values and reduce the area to (little more than) a significant archeological site for scientific study."13

Nor did the Park Service offer the only opinion on the question of the new road. The Forest Service expressed its concern about the location of the Montoso Peak route. The proposal divided national forest lands into two distinct parcels, a situation that did not suit Santa Fe National Forest Supervisor Maynard T. Rost. It also passed directly through the Caja [Del Rio Grant] Wild Horse Territory, separating approximately 1000 acres from the remainder of the designated area. Rost worried that the road would encourage people to use an area largely reserved for feral animals and that some kinds of new use might not be appropriate.14


Residents of White Rock held a different view. The one alternative that the Park and Forest Services did not protest, the Potrillo route, did not please townspeople. Many thought it would bring too much traffic into their small community, adding a variety of hazards to their lives. Most agreed that the new road was a necessity, but from the local point of view, a route north of White Rock offered the best alternative.15

The interests of the Park Service, the Forest Service, and many of the people of White Rock were at odds. The Park Service sought to protect the values of the monument, and a road that impinged on either the main portion or the detached Tsankawi section was unacceptable. The foresters also had obligations to fulfill. The people of White Rock wanted the advantages of shorter travel time to Santa Fe, but did not want their community turned into a freeway exit. Resolution of the differing points of view would require compromise and in all likelihood, a degree of dissatisfaction on all sides.

During the fall and winter of 1985-86, public support for the road grew in Los Alamos County. Petitions in favor of the road circulated, and some businesses, including the Los Alamos Credit Union, allowed advocates of the road to place their petitions on the premises. Local residents overwhelmingly believed that in the near future they would need the road. Although the issue had not been resolved by the end of 1986, the prospect of a new road loomed large.

Many advocates did not appear to have considered the long-term consequences of an additional route to Los Alamos. Seduced by the convenience of a shorter road to Santa Fe, they failed to see that the new road could have a profound effect on life on "the Hill." The culture of Los Alamos was predicated upon its isolation. With only one viable way both in to and out of the community, it remained a sheltered, isolated place. Those who valued the quality of life above all else suggested that the shorter travel distance would affect that reality. The tight-knit feeling of community that characterized Los Alamos was a likely casualty. The desirability of real estate in Los Alamos County would decrease, as a result, increases in property values would presumably slow. The social problems that were endemic throughout the nation seemed likely to become more evident in Los Alamos. "They don't know what they have up there," one long-time resident of the plateau growled, "but they sure won't like it when it changes."

The plans of other Federal agencies often posed threats to Bandelier National Monument. The Park Service shared the Pajarito Plateau with the U.S. Department of Energy and the USDA Forest Service. The plans of these agencies created issues that threatened the park. The Department of Energy (DOE) was the most powerful of the three. While generally a model neighbor, the DOE sometimes acted as if it was the only entity on the Pajarito Plateau. As the agency responsible for the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the DOE wielded tremendous power in the region.

In the late 1970s, one of its many projects, a joint venture with Public Service Company of New Mexico [PNM] and Union Geothermal Company of New Mexico,

15Schomisch. "White Rock Wants Bypass."
presented a complicated matrix of problems for the Park Service. The three entities agreed to develop a 50-megawatt demonstration geothermal plant in order to illustrate "the reliability, economic feasibility, and environmental acceptability of generating electricity from a hot water source." Union Oil of California, the parent company of Union Geothermal, already held a lease for the geothermal rights to the Baca Location, and the companies decided to locate the project near Redondo Creek in the southwestern corner of the Baca, about twenty miles from Los Alamos and sixty from Albuquerque.16

The administration at Bandelier responded to the threat. The construction of the plant presented traditional problems: the Park Service recognized that noise, increased traffic, and other similar effects were likely results. The three sponsoring entities wielded significant power in New Mexico, and NPS officials wondered how sensitive they would be to the concerns of the agency. On private land, the companies faced fewer strictures than they did on Government land, and the DOE had a track record that dated from the 1940s of paying only lip service to NPS complaints. The Park Service could only request that the planners respect park values; it had little power to compel either James P. (Pat) Dunigan, the owner of the Baca Location, or the DOE, PNM, and Union Geothermal. A third major concern, the possibility of emissions of sulfur dioxide and the resultant potential for acid rain, also concerned the NPS. The transmission of power from the plant posed another kind of threat to Bandelier. The power from the proposed plant was to be transported to Technical Area-3 [TA-3] in Los Alamos, about two miles north of the Ponderosa campground. PNM and the DOE surveyed a number of possible routes from Redondo Creek to TA-3, but with strictures imposed by Pat Dunigan, they focused on routes that approached Los Alamos from the southwest.

The alternative they preferred crossed Bandelier National Monument, leaving the Park Service in a difficult position. Dunigan favored a route that went south from Redondo Creek across the Santa Fe National Forest and the monument and approached TA-3 from the southwest. He wanted to protect both the aesthetic value of his land and its grazing capabilities. From the perspective of PNM, the southern route had additional advantages. Much of the geothermal capability of the Jemez region centered around the Redondo Creek area. PNM officials believed that when new sources of power generation materialized, the route through Bandelier would prove safest and most economical. The cost of power line averaged $100,000 per mile, and the eighteen-mile route through Bandelier offered the shortest alternative. Beginning in November 1978, PNM explored the possibility of a right-of-way through Bandelier.17

From the point of view of the Park Service, the reasoning of PNM was specious. Although PNM claimed to have tried to "avoid as much environmental and visual impact as possible" when they considered routing alternatives, NPS officials felt that PNM ignored their concerns. The Park Service termed the proposed route the most environmentally damaging of the options. PNM's idea of significant values differed


from that of the Park Service; among the advantages of the Bandelier route that PNM cited was that "the sensitive Pajarito Mountain Ski Area and the City of Los Alamos" could not see the transmission lines. Park Service people sensed that PNM sought the path of least resistance, recommending routes based on a principle of inverted opposition. The most desirable routes to PNM were those that imposed on the least powerful constituencies. From PNM's point of view, the NPS and the USDA Forest Service were the least powerful entities on the Pajarito Plateau.

Park Service officials sought to counter this direct threat to the monument. Domestic energy sources were a primary national concern in the mid 1970s, and geothermal power offered a "clean," non-polluting alternative. Most environmental groups supported the principle of power sources that did not pollute the environment and could not protest too vociferously without risking a label of extremism. This limited the effectiveness of the usual cadre of NPS supporters. Park Service officials also worried about resisting; they feared that Congress and others would perceive the NPS position as obstructionist. Yet the agency needed a clearly defined position as soon as possible. Regional officials feared that if they delayed, the DOE and PNM would go over their heads to the Department of the Interior, and the Park Service would have little say in the final citing of the transmission line.

If it chose to oppose the corridor, the Park Service had sixty-five years of congressionally established mandate to support its decision. Denying permission was "consistent with the mission of the Service as it relates to the protection of park lands and associated resources," an NPS briefing document on the question noted. Park Service policy also supported a decision to deny permission, as did its stated rationale for acquiring the headwaters section in 1976. The suggestion of multiple power lines across the monument in the future posed an even greater long-term threat to protection of the monument. In 1915, the president reserved the land within Bandelier National Monument for specific purposes, and conveying electrical power was not one of them. Even more importantly, capitulation on the Pajarito Plateau might weaken the resistance of the Park Service in similar cases at other park areas.

In the view of the Southwest Regional Office, PNM seemed "reluctant to fully explore" other possibilities. The Park Service viewed the Environmental Impact Statement for the project as an incomplete document that did not accurately reflect the impact of the transmission lines or the range of alternatives available to PNM. The Jemez Valley offered a solid option, but PNM expressed little interest. When PNM announced that the visual impact of the transmission line in the valley offered one reason for the recommendation of the other route, Park Service officials suspected that opposition by owners of summer homes in the area and the fact that the Jemez route crossed land belonging to Native Americans accounted for the sudden sensitivity of PNM.

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20 Ibid.
The Park Service held its ground against the proposed transmission line. After the agency reviewed the preliminary environmental analysis of the project, Wayne B. Cone, the Acting Regional Director of the Southwest Region, informed Ray Brechbill of the Department of Energy that "the proposed transmission line fails to meet any of the required conditions that would allow [the NPS] to grant a right-of-way for a corridor in an area of the National Park Service." The highest echelons of the National Park Service supported the decision of the regional office.

The Park Service also recommended against building the power transmission line across the Valles Caldera, the central valley area of the Baca Location. The area had become a national natural landmark in 1962, and the Park Service hoped to purchase the entire location and convert Bandelier National Monument and the additional area into a national park. Ira J. Hutchison, Deputy Director and the Acting Director of the National Park Service, informed Union Oil of the objections of the Park Service. Hutchison recommended to the Department of the Interior that it suggest that the Department of Energy not support development of geothermal energy on the Baca Location.

The project died for reasons other than the resistance of the NPS. The geothermal reserves of Redondo Creek simply did not generate enough power to make the project economically feasible. In the face of NPS resistance and marginal production potential, PNM and the DOE relented. They capped the well at Redondo Creek and terminated the project.

But at Fenton Hill, about twenty miles west of Los Alamos in the Jemez Mountains, the DOE initiated another test site. Instead of trying to harness naturally produced steam, the DOE drilled deep holes to hot dry rock formations deep below the surface. Under pressure, cold water was pumped into the holes, creating steam as it came in contact with the rock. A pressure system forced the steam up another hole, where it drove a turbine. In 1986, the plant produced a portion of the power the communities of the Jemez required, and Fenton Hill remained the extent of DOE involvement in geothermal excavation in the vicinity of Bandelier.

But the Redondo Creek plant had a long-term ramification. The final Environmental Impact Statement for the Geothermal Demonstration program in the Baca included provisions for the construction of a new 345-kilovolt powerline to Los Alamos. When the program died, PNM looked at other alternatives for power transmission corridors. In 1985, the Ojo Line Extension program became another in a seemingly endless series of threats to Bandelier National Monument.

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PNM had other reasons for interest in the line extension. Early in the 1970s, PNM and Plains Electric Generation and Transmission Cooperative (PG&T) determined that they needed to expand the 345-kilovolt transmission system to meet the increasing demand of northern New Mexico. Originally, the two companies planned a line from the Ojo Caliente Station to Norton Station, between Santa Fe and Los Alamos, and on to the Bernalillo-Algodones Station outside of Albuquerque. The prospect of a geothermal plant whetted the appetite of the two power companies. By the early 1980s, they believed that they could wait no longer to begin the new transmission line and installed a 345-kilovolt line between the Bernalillo-Algodones and Norton locations. To serve the needs of northern New Mexico including Los Alamos County, the companies believed they needed an additional line.\(^{24}\)

Two possible routes for the extension of the Ojo line existed. One followed the path of the earlier line through the Española Valley to the Norton Station and bent back north toward Los Alamos at a forty-five degree angle. The other bypassed the Ojo Station, departing from Coyote directly across the Jemez Mountains toward Los Alamos. From there it would continue to the Norton Station in a direct line that grazed the southern tip of White Rock.

Each proposal had advocates and detractors, and a power struggle ensued. Initially the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Park Service, the Forest Service, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish, the Sierra Club, and a local environmental group, Save the Jemez, all favored the valley route. The DOE, LANL, and Los Alamos County favored the mountain route. The two sides quickly became polarized.\(^{25}\)

Concerns about the mountain route focused on the environmental impact of the transmission line. The project included power transmission structures that were the equivalent of thirteen stories high, a serious threat to the aesthetic values of the Jemez Mountains. The line would also affect archeological sites and the "ecological coherence" of the mountains and would perhaps infringe upon the rights of Native Americans to visit religious shrines in the Jemez. The valley already had one high voltage power line argued activists such as Tom Ribe, a local freelance writer who also volunteered at the monument. Combining the lines would spare thousands of acres of mountain wildland. The Park Service concurred, suggesting that the Coyote-Los Alamos route would require the clearing of too much vegetation and would present a threat to the extensive concentrations of archeological sites along the corridor.\(^{26}\)

In contrast, the DOE, LANL, and Los Alamos County presented economic and technical reasons for favoring the mountain route. The shorter distance between

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Coyote and Los Alamos made that route a desirable option for Los Alamos. Although their reasons for the mountain route were less compelling than those of their opponents, the DOE and LANL wielded considerable power. Some thought that they would prevail no matter what kind of resistance arose.

The Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for the project aroused the opponents of the mountain route. The Park and Forest Services took the lead, with James Overbay, the acting regional forester, informing BIA that the studies of PNM lacked objectivity. The Park Service echoed many of the concerns of the USDA Forest Service, while environmental groups wondered if the project was really necessary. Some contended that the DEIS rejected viable alternatives for no reason. Others believed that the entire proposal was the result of faulty strategy on the part of PNM. Everyone expected that the final EIS would offer a more balanced perspective.27

When the final EIS appeared in August 1986, critics of the mountain route were outraged. The final copy barely addressed the concerns of the opponents. Superintendent John Hunter labeled it "an absolute disaster," and other opponents of the project loudly expressed their disapproval. After an interlude, the State of New Mexico filed a suit against the mountain route. Early in 1987, opponents were optimistic about their chances to defeat the proposal. "I think it's going to be beat," one remarked in February of that year.28

The DOE and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) projects also threatened the monument. Since the 1940s, the needs of Los Alamos had dominated the Pajarito Plateau. The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and the subsequent initiation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, the defensive missile shield proposal of the 1980s, made LANL even more significant, for Federal scientific organizations were expected to handle much of the research in the so-called "Star Wars" program. Its importance and power made the DOE less sensitive to the concerns of other agencies in the region, and during the middle of the 1980s, the department planned a number of projects that would have serious consequences for Bandelier National Monument.

The two most evident of these were the Overblast Program, designed to test the effect of artillery on human hearing, and a proposed firing range near Tsankawi in Los Alamos Canyon. These two cases revealed the difficulty of maintaining preservation values in proximity to a powerful entity that often saw its objectives as the only valid ones in the area. Both the projects were well into the planning stages when DOE officials first contacted the park. In May and June, 1985, the DOE area office in Los Alamos briefed Superintendent John D. Hunter and Chief Ranger Kevin McKibbin on the two projects. Hunter and McKibbin again explained the


position of the Park Service and requested documents that explained the environmental impact of the project.\textsuperscript{29}

The implications of the two projects were vast. The Overblast Project was scheduled for Technical Area-49, located on the northern boundary of the monument about two miles east of the Ponderosa campground in the Upper Canyon area. The program would include between thirty and one hundred explosive blasts during regular work hours each weekday for a period of up to three years. The DOE hoped to initiate the program by August 1985. Its proximity to the park meant that the noise from repeated explosions would be audible across Frijoles Mesa, at the Ponderosa campground, and most likely in Frijoles Canyon. The proposed firing range in Los Alamos Canyon would be visible from Tsankawi Mesa, and even though the shooting would be directed away from the detached area, anyone on the mesa would hear the sound of gunfire.

From the point of view of the Bandelier administration, the projects threatened the values of the park, but Los Alamos officials did not seem to understand their concern. The DOE and the Park Service brought different value systems to the question, and communicating the perspective of the Park Service became difficult. Engineers could not quantify intangible values. Without a clear understanding of such ideas, DOE tended to ignore the merits of the position of the Park Service. “How do you explain what a tranquil setting is in scientific terms?” a weary John Hunter asked Robert Kerr, the Regional Director of the Southwest Region, as he explained the difficulties in communicating with Los Alamos personnel.\textsuperscript{30}

Despite persistent efforts by the Park Service to influence its procedure, the DOE continued with little concern for park values. Although park and regional office staff members repeatedly offered to cooperate to ensure an equitable solution, the DOE ignored them. When Park Service evidence showed that the noise would be audible on Frijoles Mesa, where the majority of monument employees lived, Harold Valencia, the Area Manager for the DOE at Los Alamos, informed Kerr that he was “confident that there will be no health and safety hazards at Bandelier from noise associated with the . . . project.” The Park Service had suggested a number of alternative locations; Valencia categorically ruled out other possible locales.\textsuperscript{31}

The two organizations were locked in a conflict of incommensurable values. To a degree, their perspectives were mutually exclusive. The Park Service showed the aesthetic merits of the peace and serenity of Bandelier; the cold logic of the DOE could not figure such intangible concepts into its quantitative analysis. DOE officials measured the noise within the park and found that it fell within the range their graphs designated as acceptable. Yet to the Park Service, levels acceptable to the DOE presented a clear nuisance. The DOE simply ignored challenges to its


position and proceeded. A power struggle emerged. Because of its vast influence, the DOE looked like an easy victor.\textsuperscript{32}

But the DOE had not considered the effects of public opinion. In November 1985, Tom Ribe, who had challenged the mountain route of the Ojo Line Extension, published similar articles detailing the struggle between Bandelier and the Los Alamos National Laboratory in both the \textit{High Country News} and \textit{Santa Fe New Mexican}. LANL officials made a number of insensitive comments to Ribe. When referring to the noise levels of the project, one official, Don Peterson remarked that "most of our critics wouldn't know a decibel if they tripped over one." This callous attitude awakened preservationist sentiment in Los Alamos and Santa Fe, prompting an editorial against the project in the \textit{New Mexican}. Sandi Doughton-Evans of the local newspaper, the \textit{Los Alamos Monitor}, also began to pursue the story. On November 14, 1985, Hunter reported that conservation groups had begun to respond to the threat and "things (were) heating up." When NPS Director William Penn Mott came to Bandelier that month, he added his voice to the opposition to both projects.\textsuperscript{33}

Over the ensuing months, the issue generated so much interest that the DOE changed its plans. By February 1986, LANL had aborted both the Overblast Project and the firing range near Tsankawi. Park Service people rejoiced. "We did it," trumpeted a memo from Janet E. Schmitt, an Environmental Specialist in the Division of Environmental Coordination who played an important part in shaping the response of the agency, to Bandelier Superintendent John Hunter. Russell D. Butcher, the Southwestern and California representative for the National Parks and Conservation Association, found the success "amazing! We are thrilled," he wrote Hunter at the monument.\textsuperscript{34} Indeed, carrying a policy debate to the public offered the Park Service a powerful weapon with which to resist the occasional insensitivity of the DOE.

Other Federal agencies in the region also initiated programs that affected Bandelier, and the USDA Forest Service often collided with the NPS. The roots of conflict between the two agencies dated back to the founding of the Park Service in 1916, and relations on the Pajarito Plateau could rarely have been characterized as friendly. The Park Service regularly sought Forest Service land to expand, and the foresters consistently opposed NPS efforts. After 1960, however, relations became cordial, and the two agencies cooperated with some regularity as they pursued often antithetical missions. The values and cultures of the two agencies dramatically differed, and each side viewed the other with considerable mistrust.


The Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE I & II) processes of the 1970s clearly revealed the difference in perspective between the Park and Forest Services. RARE I, the initial stage in evaluating national forest land for inclusion in the national wilderness system under the terms of the Wilderness Act of 1964, began in 1973, but it was an incomplete, slow process that frustrated both preservation advocates and those who wanted to develop national forest land. In 1977, the Forest Service came out with the RARE II proposal, designed to speed up the review process and include all national forest land in the U.S.\(^5\)

Although a solid idea in principle, the implementation of RARE II offended wilderness advocates in the West. The emphasis of the Forest Service on multiple-use—the doctrine of balancing a number of different kinds of uses of national forest land—angered the wilderness community, as did the quantitative nature of the assessment of roadless areas. The Forest Service proposed a formula that assigned numeric values in each of four categories to each roadless tract of more than 5,000 acres. On that basis, the Forest Service compared the areas and placed them in one of three categories: instant wilderness, further review, or unsuited for wilderness designation.

Despite the efforts of the Forest Service to involve the public, wilderness advocates found the process unsatisfactory. From the perspective of organizations like the New Mexico Wilderness Study Committee, the term "multiple-use" was a euphemism for development. Environmentalists believed that the RARE II process was designed to move quickly in order to placate development interests, and the quantitative measurement system was a threat to any equitable assessment of the aesthetic value of wild land.\(^6\)

The Park Service favored the goals of RARE II, but believed that the selection process was cumbersome and ineffective. Additional wilderness areas fit the objectives of the Park Service. But in the Southwest, where relations remained rancorous, numerous problems grew out of the evaluation process. The two agencies perceived differing qualities of the same tracts of land.\(^7\)

The Forest Service reviewed two areas of the Santa Fe National Forest adjacent to Bandelier—the St. Peter's Dome area west of the Bandelier wilderness and the Caja del Rio area, east of the Rio' Grande—for possible inclusion in the national wilderness system. From the point of view of the Park Service and the pro-wilderness community, the areas offered important additions to the wilderness.


area already enclosed in the monument. The New Mexico Wilderness Committee strongly advocated a recommendation of instant wilderness for both.

In contrast, the wilderness values of the areas did not impress the Forest Service. "Wood-hauler rut roads" crisscrossed the Caja del Rio section, and the "high water level" of Cochiti Dam separated it from the Bandelier wilderness. The Forest Service valued the wild character of the Dome section even less. Of the fourteen areas within the Santa Fe National Forest assessed by the quantitative formula, the Dome section rated the lowest.

Again the values of the two agencies differed. While the aesthetic qualities of the two areas did not meet the criteria of the Forest Service, the Park Service saw these two areas as logical extensions of the established wilderness within the monument. The designation of the area surrounding the park as wilderness had the added benefit of offering additional protection for the area within park boundaries. It guaranteed that the wilderness area within the monument would not be damaged by the development of its watershed.

In June 1978, the Park Service received the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for RARE II from the Forest Service, and made its comments. Despite the negative appraisals, the draft document included two areas adjacent to Bandelier: the 15,000-acre Dome tract and the 9,000-acre Caja area. John Hunter indicated that the inclusion of both tracts in designated wilderness areas would benefit the wilderness within the monument.

When the final Forest Service RARE II plan emerged in early 1979, the regional office of the Park Service and the administration at Bandelier were both unhappy with the results. The Forest Service proposed the designation of only 6,000 acres of the Dome area as wilderness, slicing seventy-five percent of the total wilderness acreage near Bandelier recommended in the draft proposal. The decision of the Forest Service did little to reconcile the differences between Federal agencies on the Pajarito Plateau.

RARE II also displeased the environmental movement and its followers. Earlier in the process, a coalition of the most important conservation and environmental groups, including the Wilderness Society, the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, and the National Audubon Society recommended wilderness designation for thirty-six million of the sixty-two million acres reviewed by the Forest Service. The final proposal of the USDA Forest Service included the designation of slightly more than fifteen million acres, less than one fourth of the acreage reviewed. The coalition pronounced the proposal "an acute disappointment."
The question of timber sales on land adjacent to Bandelier offered another classic forum for conflict between the Park and Forest Services. RARE II complicated the relationship between the two agencies on the Pajarito Plateau; the suggestion that the Forest Service convert areas adjacent to the monument into designated wilderness made foresters wary of what they perceived as the policy of incremental additions practiced by the Park Service. This issue played an integral part in the long-standing tension between the two agencies. The NPS regarded development of adjacent roadless lands as part of a plot by the Forest Service to disqualify the areas from future consideration as wilderness. A polarization of relations between the two agencies resulted.

The La Mesa fire of 1977 served as a catalyst for renewed discord over the issue of timber cutting on land adjacent to the monument. The fire damaged more than 15,000 acres of land, including portions of the monument, the national forest, and Department of Energy land. Immediately following the fire, Cristobal Zamora, the Supervisor of the Santa Fe National Forest, held a salvage timber sale of questionable legality for Sawyer Mesa, part of the watersheds of both Alamo and Frijoles canyons. The area to be salvaged was part of the proposed St. Peter's Dome wilderness, and the impacts of the salvage operation made the area unsuitable for wilderness.

Superintendent John Hunter viewed the event with consternation. The Forest Service had not consulted the NPS before letting the contract, and its lack of concern for the position of the NPS perturbed Hunter. He wrote Regional Director John Cook that the Park Service spent more than $1,300,000 to purchase the watershed in Upper Frijoles Canyon "to prevent this same event from occurring on private lands and now it is taking place on Federal lands." Hunter wanted the Park Service to attempt to "curtail" the salvage operation and convince the Forest Service that Bandelier needed some kind of buffer zone along the joint boundaries to protect the monument from adverse affects.41

Yet Hunter's remarks also revealed the suspicion that characterized the relationship between the two agencies. He noted that the Wilderness Society had suggested the addition of the Dome area to the designated wilderness in Bandelier, and mused that the "entire action may be an action by the [Santa Fe National] Forest to remove [the Dome area] permanently from future consideration."42

The two agencies remained at loggerheads. Cook instructed Hunter to open channels of communication with the foresters. Despite the efforts of the Park Service, the Forest Service continued to let salvage timber in the area surrounded Bandelier. The issue became a point of contention between the Santa Fe National Forest and the staff at Bandelier National Monument. The National Parks Conservation Association and other conservation groups recommended that the two agencies work out a cooperative plan for the administration of the area, but they made little progress toward that objective.


Because of a lack of access roads, some tracts could not be leased. One 2,650-acre tract of national forest land on the western edge of Bandelier needed a road that crossed the Headwaters of the Frijoles section of the monument to allow a lessee to remove the timber. In 1979, the Forest Service approached John Hunter to request a right-of-way for a road to facilitate the sale. "On the basis of agency policy and congressional intent," Hunter denied the request.43

In 1981, the Forest Service reapplied for a right-of-way for a road across the headwaters section. This time, however, Deputy Regional Forester James C. Overbay circumvented Hunter and took his request to John Cook's successor as regional director, Robert Kerr. Overbay enclosed Forest Service studies that showed of the ten possible road courses the foresters proposed, the route across NPS land offered the only feasible alternative. Economic, environmental, and engineering reasons made the other choices untenable.44

The Forest Service had a precedent for a right-of-way across Bandelier. In 1964, the foresters requested a right-of-way for Sanchez Canyon in the far southwestern corner of the monument. The portion of the Santa Fe National Forest to the west of the monument had little access; the Baca Location #1 bordered its north side, the Cañada de Cochiti grant was to the south, Bandelier closed off access from the east, and steep canyons made passage from the west too difficult. While the owners of the Baca and Cañada de Cochiti tracts allowed intermittent access, they sometimes locked the gates and prevented passage by the foresters. In early 1964, the owners of the Baca Location granted the Forest Service a right-of-way, and construction of a road in the national forest near the western boundary of the monument began. This development pleased the administration at Bandelier. Some visitors to the monument wanted to use the Dome road to gain access to backcountry trails. But continuing the road to the south presented intricate problems.

The Forest Service needed access to Sanchez Canyon as a result of the actions of Jim Young, the owner of the Cañada de Cochiti grant. Young offered the USFS a right-of-way across his land, but his stipulations made Sanchez Canyon the only feasible way to complete the route. With the support of U.S. Senator from New Mexico Joseph P. Montoya, the Forest Service began to survey the right-of-way, and pressed the Park Service for an answer.

Although in 1962-63, the Bandelier-Valle Grande National Park proposal and the sale of the Baca Location #1 out from under the Park Service had chilled relations between the Park and Forest Services, Bandelier Superintendent Albert G. Henson had no objections to the proposal. The road would only cross an "isolated tip" of the monument, he wrote the regional office, and it seemed a small price to pay for a chance at meaningful cooperation. The regional office concurred with Henson, and


by July 1964, the two agencies reached an agreement. The Forest Service enlarged an old wagon trail through Sanchez Canyon, and used the road until 1971.45

In response to the request for a right-of-way in 1981, Robert Kerr organized a meeting that included himself, John Hunter, and James Overbay with the premise that "we can work out something beneficial to both agencies." At the meeting on April 28, 1981, Kerr granted a permit across NPS lands for one year following the date of the timber sale. On August 12, 1981, the Park Service issued the Forest Service a permit for a one-quarter-mile road across park lands.46

Despite the seeming insignificance of a small road through the park, the action set dangerous precedents. Under the sympathetic Carter administration and its Secretary of the Interior, Cecil Andrus, Hunter and the park staff had resisted the overtures of the Forest Service. When James Watt became Secretary of the Interior, the agency found itself in a defensive position. Many in the park believed that the Department of the Interior dictated the course of action, revealing interference in a local issue that contradicted the states-rights rhetoric of the "New Federalism." Worse, the precedent meant that in the future, the NPS would have a more difficult time when it insisted on the sanctity of its mandate. Little actions like the timber road across the monument could become pieces of evidence for increasing attempts to make commercial use of the resources of the national park system.

Surrounded to a large extent by national forest land, Bandelier also faced the threat of visual pollution. During the 1980s, the Caja del Rio section of the Santa Fe National Forest, across the Rio Grande from the park, remained largely undeveloped. A large section of the area was designated wild horse and burro territory. Although the USDA Forest Service permitted wood harvesting, the foresters restricted permits for the tract so as not to disturb the wild horses and burros. In 1985, however, officials of the Santa Fe National Forest came under increased pressure to open up the area for more wood cutting. Stands of piñon trees on the tract caught the attention of New Mexicans as the prized wood became harder to find.

Dorothy Hoard, the National Parks and Conservation Association representative for Bandelier, began to stress the protection of the Caja section. The building of roads and the noise of vehicles, she wrote, would be "devastating" to the backcountry. Hoard, a long-time supporter of the park, also communicated with Forest Supervisor Maynard T. Rost of the Santa Fe National Forest. After her intervention, Rost included a statement that recommended protecting the visual quality of areas


adjacent to Bandelier in the revised draft of the Environmental Impact Statement for the Santa Fe National Forest.\textsuperscript{47}

Other Federal agencies had the ability to affect Bandelier. During the 1980s, the flood easement that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers held for the Cochiti Dam presented a substantive threat to the park values of Bandelier. The legislation that established the dam granted the Corps of Engineers the right to flood as much as 361 acres of Bandelier National Monument. Because the easement came from Congress, the Park Service had little recourse. In 1979, runoff backed up into Bandelier; reaching an elevation of 5,388 feet above sea level, within the legal limits set by Congress. The water threatened the Kiva House ruin at the base of Alamo Canyon. Prior to the dam, the elevation of the river was 5323 feet above sea level.\textsuperscript{48}

As early as 1958, the Park Service had recognized the potential of damage from the proposed dam. On November 14, 1958, Southwest Regional Director Hugh Miller, members of his staff, and Superintendent Paul Judge of Bandelier met with representatives of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. Miller raised his objections to a portion of the proposal that allowed the dam to impound water to a level of 5,473 feet, backing water up each of the canyons in the monument. Although the engineers did not change the proposal, the Park Service entered its objection in the record.

The tenor of the late 1950s supported wholesale economic development of the Southwest, and Miller recognized the precariousness of the objection of the NPS. Throughout the 1950s, dam projects sprouted along western rivers; the billion-dollar Colorado River Storage Program and the construction of the Glen Canyon Dam typified the era. Nor did the Park Service have compelling grounds to oppose the easement. Regional Archeologist Charlie Steen assessed the prehistoric sites within the area of the easement and pronounced them "not particularly significant." In the late 1950s, the Cochiti Dam also underwent a transformation from flood control dam to "multi-purpose" dam with an emphasis on attracting tourists to northern New Mexico. Miller opined that "our position will be difficult to maintain when the economic benefits of the project to Albuquerque are considered."\textsuperscript{49} The Corps of Engineers received its easement, putting a portion of the monument permanently at risk. The flooding in 1979 was only a precursor to a more severe threat.

During the summer of 1985, the Corps of Engineers announced plans to use its easement and flood the lower reaches of Capulin, Alamo, and Frijoles Canyons in Bandelier National Monument. A warm spell in April, causing an unusually high amount of snow melt early in the year, prompted their decision. By early May,


Elephant Butte and Caballo reservoirs in southern New Mexico had reached ninety percent of capacity, the highest levels in forty-three years. The Bureau of Reclamation asked the Corps of Engineers to store additional water in the Cochiti and Abiquiu reservoirs. In the opinion of the two Federal agencies, the level of water in the southern reservoirs threatened to flood a portion of the town of Truth or Consequences, five miles from the Elephant Butte Dam. The Corps carried out the request, and water began to back up into Bandelier.50

The array of water regulations in the arid Southwest further complicated the situation. The Rio Grande Compact of 1937 set up a commission to regulate water use along the river. Its members—New Mexico, Colorado, and Texas—developed an intricate system to divide the resources of the river. The terms of the compact granted the extra runoff to farmers below Elephant Butte, most of whom were in Texas. But the Rio Grande Compact Commission could not release the extra water from Cochiti, for the courts had not established the rights of farmers in the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District (MRGCD), between Cochiti and Elephant Butte. As a result, the commission asked Congress to limit the flow of water through the district between July 1 and November 1 of each year to 1,500 cubic feet of water per second (cfs), the traditional amount tapped by farmers in the middle district. With as much as 8,300 cfs entering the northern reservoirs, and only 5,000 cfs before July 1 and 1,500 after leaving, Cochiti and Abiquiu dams filled beyond capacity, and the portions of Bandelier nearest the Rio Grande were inundated.51

The creeping ascendance of the water throughout May and June posed serious environmental problems. When the water receded, the inundated areas would be, in the words of John Lissoway, an "aesthetic mess." A "bathtub ring" of drowned vegetation would remain. Lissoway thought the natural recovery of the region might take four to five years. Tree species like juniper and ponderosa pine were particularly vulnerable. If inundated for more than several weeks, they were unlikely to recover. Among the ponderosa pines that were threatened were a group of 450-year old trees that provided a winter roost for about twenty-five bald eagles. The park staff wondered whether the eagles would return after the flooding. The area would become "a vegetative wasteland," lamented Terrell Johnson, a contract biologist for the Park Service who studied the eagles.52

The date of July 1 loomed especially large for the NPS. Many of the threatened areas could survive inundation for a few weeks. But if the water stored in Cochiti did not go over the dam before July 1, the terms of the compact held it there until November 1, after the end of the irrigation season in central New Mexico. This protected the interests of farmers below the Elephant Butte and Caballo reservoirs, but threatened Bandelier. If the water remained in the Cochiti Reservoir after July


Throughout late May and early June, water backed up into the canyons. By early June, it reached within two vertical feet of the Kiva House ruin, and the hiking trails along the Río Grande washed away. The Park Service watched in dismay. "We hate to see it," Chief Ranger Kevin McKibbin told the press, "but there's not much we can do about it. . . . Our hands are tied." John Hunter pointed out that resistance was futile. Congress had made the decision during the 1960s, and as much as he did not like the situation, he had little recourse. The Park Service had nowhere to go with its complaints.

The flooding of Bandelier in 1985 attracted local, regional, and national interest. A vocal portion of the public expressed outrage. In a symbolic gesture of opposition, a bucket brigade went to Cochiti Dam to throw buckets of water over the top of the dam to flow downstream. Phone calls lit up the switchboard at the monument, many asking if the ruins in Frijoles Canyon were underwater. The New York Times ran a feature story on the issue, as did The Denver Post, The Philadelphia Inquirer, and a number of other daily newspapers across the nation. Although some of the excess water was released from the dam, the lower reaches of the monument remained flooded.

Even after 1985, the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers retained the easement to fill the lower reaches of Bandelier with water. By June 8, 1987, high water was estimated to reach 5,444 feet above sea level. Despite public outcry at local, regional, and national levels, the law allowed the flooding of the monument. The presence of the dam and its potential to affect the monument presented a major long-term problem for the administrators of the monument. It offered one of the first cases of actual overlap between the groups that managed the Pajarito Plateau.

Yet the flooding was only the first of many similar collisions. The collection of threats to Bandelier offered a microcosm of the problems facing the park system. The limited space on the Pajarito Plateau and the needs of various constituencies created a matrix of conflict. Protecting the park from a variety of threats required constant vigilance, broad public support, and occasional Machiavellian politicking. At Bandelier, the Park Service held its own. But as the Pajarito Plateau became more crowded and more people sought to live, work, and play there, the problems continued to escalate.

The lesson of Bandelier was not its problems per se; the real story was in the exponential increase in the severity of threats to its integrity. The sheer onslaught of threat after threat by powerful individuals, corporations, and Government agencies was unparalleled. They appeared almost simultaneously in a brief period in the history of the park. Nor was there any guarantee that new threats would not arise. The story of Bandelier and its surroundings served as a barometer of problems.

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and responses. As the amount of open space in the U.S. decreased, more and more park areas faced similar levels of pressure and layers of threats. The story of Bandelier will likely be repeated throughout the park system.
Administrative histories are different than most other kinds of history. They require emphasis on issues that more broad-based projects rarely address. Yet a good administrative history also requires knowledge and understanding of the context surrounding the events at any particular park area. In the case of Bandelier National Monument, this meant a knowledge of the Park Service and its history and American archaeology and its evolution as well as a documentary search for the specific details of the story of Bandelier.

In recent years, scholarship about the National Park Service, its leaders, and its policies has proliferated. Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience. 2nd ed.(Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1987), remains the top book in the field. This synthesis offers the most comprehensive look at the evolution of American attitudes about the national park system. Runte is less complete when looking at the Park Service as an agency. John Ise, Our National Park Policy: A Critical History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961), offers a look at the legislative history of the park system. Ise's book is marred by inconsistency both in the text and the footnotes, and his interpretation often seems dated. Ronald Foresta America's National Parks and Their Keepers (Washington D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1984), is an ambitious book that focuses on Park Service policy during the last two decades. Although valuable in certain areas, the book does not live up to its title. It is an account of the parks and their policy makers, not their keepers, and the idiosyncratic perspective of the author often interferes with the presentation of the material. Foresta is not a historian, and his work reflects that fact. Hal Rothman "Protected By a Gold Fence With Diamond Tips": A Cultural History of the American National Monuments (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 1985), covers the evolution of monument category. The Park Service has also produced general studies of its history. Harlan D. Unrau and G. Frank Williss, Administrative History: Expansion of the National Park Service in the 1930s (Denver: Denver Service Center, 1983), is a helpful account of the growth of the system during the Great Depression. John C. Paige, The Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Park Service, 1933-1942: An Administrative History (National Park Service, 1985), looks closely at the impact of the CCC on the system.

Biographies of leading Park Service figures provide another means to locate events at a specific park in their milieu. Donald C. Swain, Wilderness Defender: Horace M. Albright and Conservation is an excellent if laudatory look at the second director of the Park Service. Swain's "Harold Ickes, Horace Albright, and the Hundred Days: A Study in Conservation Administration," Pacific Historical Review, 34 (November 1965), 455-465 is an outstanding analysis of Albright's maneuvering during the early days of the Roosevelt administration. Horace M. Albright as told to Robert Cahn, The Birth of the National Park Service: The Founding Years, 1913-1933 (Salt Lake City: Howe Brothers, 1985), tells the story of the early years of the Park Service in Albright's own words. An interesting and informative account, this study suffers from the problems that plague oral histories. A check of documentary sources reveals that Albright's memory is often selective, and in many cases, he engages in myth-making and self-promotion. Robert Shankland, Steve Mather of the National Parks (New York: Knoph, 1951), tells the story of the early
years of the agency and the dynamic leader who brought the parks to the attention of the American public in an engaging fashion. Unfortunately, the Shankland book lacks footnotes.


Despite his importance, Edgar L. Hewett, the leading archeologist of the first two decades of the twentieth century, remains largely unstudied. Hewett's own writings, particularly *The Pajarito Plateau and Its Ancient People* (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1938), give considerable insight into this volatile and influential figure. One pseudo-biography, Beatrice Chauvenet, *Hewett and Friends: A Biography of Santa Fe's Vibrant Era* (Santa Fe: Museum of New Mexico Press, 1983) falls far short of the mark. Derived strictly from Hewett's papers and almost completely devoid of any context or interpretation, it does not do justice to the complexity of Hewett, his time, or the early years of southwestern archeology. Curtis M. Hinsley Jr., "Edgar Lee Hewett and the School of American Research in Santa Fe, 1906-1912," in David J. Meltzer, Don D. Fowler, and Jeremy A. Sabloff eds., *American Archaeology Past and Future* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986), does a much better job, but his article looks at only a small story within a much larger picture. Hewett's influence on southwestern archeology and tourism was immense; the scholarly record is far from complete.

The administration of Bandelier itself has not been the subject of a great deal of scholarship. Two articles pertaining to the Pajarito Plateau have recently appeared. Hal Rothman, "Conflict on the Pajarito Plateau: Frank Pinkley, the Forest Service, and the Bandelier Controversy," *Journal of Forest History*, 29 (April 1985), covers the issues presented in chapter two of this manuscript. Thomas L. Altherr, "The Pajarito of Cliff Dwellers National Park Proposal, 1900-1920," *New Mexico Historical Review*, 60 (July 1985), is an incomplete and inconsistent look at the early park efforts covered here in the initial chapter.

The conflict between the Park and Forest Services has been the subject of an increasing amount of scholarship. Most authors have studied the conflicts from one side or the other, and as a result, their premises embody bias that the other side finds untenable. In recent years, a number of efforts to synthesize the material on this issue in an objective form have occurred. Ben Twight, *Organizational Values and Political Power: The Forest Service Versus the Olympic National Park* (University Park, PA.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983), is an interesting start in this direction. Rather than follow the traditional stand of the USFS, that the NPS aggressively encroached on its domain, Twight posits that the values of the USFS and the kind of people attracted to a career in forestry gave the Forest Service a point of view that it found difficult to defend when faced with NPS arguments. Although Twight relies too heavily on social science theory to make
his point and does not really look at the actions of the NPS, his work is a start. Another study that builds off Twight's work is Hal Rothman, "Shaping the Nature of a Controversy: The Park Service, The Forest Service, and the Cedar Breaks National Monument," *Utah Historical Quarterly*, 55 (Summer 1987). This piece looks at the interplay of factors that led to the establishment of the Cedar Breaks National Monument from a tract of the Dixie National Forest. Again, this is an area with plenty of room for future scholarship.

Administrative histories necessarily rely on primary source documents and reports, and this example is no exception. Record Group 79 of the National Archives, the Records of the National Park Service, contain a wealth of information on all facets of the administration of Bandelier National Monument. The information is divided among the proposed national park files, file O-32, and the Bandelier National Monument files. The collection of material in the National Archives ends in approximately 1949. The National Archives material is listed under the old Park Service filing system. The Denver Federal Records Center, which contains records that the park and the regional office have sent there for storage, follows the modern system of classification. The material from the Denver Center is less valuable than that from other places; it is in Denver because earlier park officials perceived it to be unimportant. The Southwest Regional Office library in Santa Fe has some important documents pertaining to Bandelier. These consist of copies of reports commissioned by the Park Service on subjects such as feral burros, soil erosion, and other topics. The library at Bandelier contains much valuable information, including the paperwork pertaining to the exchange of lands with the Atomic Energy Commission that gave up most of the Otowi section of the monument. In addition, other reports that cover a variety of topics are also housed in the park library. These include material for interpretation, natural and cultural resource management, and other similar topics. The superintendent's active files, referred to in the notes as "park files," provide a wealth of information on current topics. Without the excellent record-keeping at the monument, chapter seven of this manuscript could not have been written.

A number of studies produced by the Park Service provided particularly valuable information. Foremost were Laura Soulliere Harrison and Randy Copeland, "Historic Structures Report: CCC Buildings, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico," draft manuscript at National Park Service's Denver Service Center and Robert P. Powers, "Draft Archeological Research Design for a Sample Inventory of Bandelier National Monument," draft manuscript in Division of Anthropology, Southwest Regional Office, National Park Service, Santa Fe. Both these documents are detailed reports by experts that provide the administrative historian with an inside picture of the nature of specific activities at the park.

Finally, oral history has contributed greatly to this study. Interviews with Richard Boyd, Paul and Frances Judge, Homer Pickens, and Dr. Milford R. Fletcher offered important perspectives to that augmented documentary research. In addition, day-to-day conversations with Superintendent John D. Hunter, Chief Ranger Kevin McKibbin, Resource Manager John D. Lissoway, and other members of the staff at Bandelier contributed greatly. These people were participants in many of the activities covered in this manuscript; including their perspective is an essential part of authoring an administrative history.
## Appendix A

### Visitation Statistics for Bandelier National Monument 1932-1987

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<th>Year</th>
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<td>1961</td>
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Appendix B

Custodians and Superintendents of Bandelier National Monument

**Custodians**

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Edgar Rogers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Martin O. Evensted (Acting)</td>
<td>October 17, 1933-June 20, 1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luther E. (Earl) Jackson</td>
<td>June 21, 1934-January 31, 1937</td>
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<td>Clinton G. Harkins</td>
<td>February 16, 1937-January 16, 1939</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chester A. (Art) Thomas (Actg.)</td>
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**Superintendents**

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<td>Fred W. Binnewies</td>
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<td>Paul A. Judge</td>
<td>May 16, 1953-March 31, 1962</td>
</tr>
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<td>Albert G. Henson</td>
<td>May 27, 1962-July 6, 1964</td>
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<td>Thomas B. Hyde</td>
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<td>James W. Godbolt</td>
<td>January 29, 1966-April 7, 1968</td>
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<td>Stanley T. Albright</td>
<td>April 21, 1968-March 22 1970</td>
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<tr>
<td>Linwood E. Jackson</td>
<td>April 5, 1970-June 22, 1974</td>
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<tr>
<td>John D. Hunter</td>
<td>July 21, 1974-February 27, 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jose A. Cisneros</td>
<td>February 29, 1988-</td>
</tr>
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</table>
A CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS  
AT BANDELIER NATIONAL MONUMENT

February 1916—Bandelier National Monument is established; under the terms of the Antiquities Act of 1906, administration falls to the United States Forest Service.

February 1932—Administration of the monument transferred to the National Park Service.

November 1933—Civilian Conservation Corps camp opens in Frijoles Canyon.

December 1933—First automobile traverses the road to the floor of Frijoles Canyon.

1934—First six-year master plan for Bandelier developed.

1939—Jemez Crater National Park proposed for Bandelier area.

July 1940—CCC camp in Frijoles Canyon closes.

December 1942—The U.S. Army acquires the Los Alamos Ranch School in preparation for the establishment of a secret research facility.

1944—Bandelier and Regional Office officials protest after the "army" builds a road through the Otowi section without permission.

August 1945—The secret of Los Alamos becomes public after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

August 1947—Fred Binnewies becomes first superintendent of Bandelier.

1952—Visitation tops 50,000; Second master plan developed.

March 1957—Mission 66 for Bandelier approved.

January 1961—Frijoles Mesa transferred to the National Park Service.

1962—Proposal to create Valle Grande-Bandelier National Park; NPS attempt to purchase Baca Location #1 thwarted by sale to private parties.

May 1963—Park Service acquires the Upper Canyon area, while turning administration of the portion of the Otowi section west of Highway 4 over to the Atomic Energy Commission.

1963—Visitation at Bandelier tops 100,000.

1964—Wilderness Act of 1964 passes Congress; it mandates that Federal roadless areas of more than 5,000 acres be reviewed for their suitability for inclusion in a system of designated wilderness areas.
1970--New draft master plan developed; it includes the recommendation that no designated wilderness area be established at Bandelier.

1970--Visitation at Bandelier tops 200,000.

December 1971--Public hearing in Los Alamos shows extensive support for the idea of a wilderness at Bandelier.

1974-1977--$130,000 spent on studies and removal of feral burros at Bandelier.


October 1976--Designated Wilderness area at Bandelier is established.

June 1977--La Mesa fire occurs. Burro eradication program implemented during the fire. Archeologists precede bulldozers along fire lines in an effort to save cultural resources.

1980--Resource Management unit, combining cultural and natural resource management, is formed.

1980-1983--Park Service is enjoined from continuing burro eradication program; an agreement with the Fund for Animals Inc. allows for a live capture program; after completion of the program, Park Service removed remaining burros.

June 1985--Cochiti Dam floods area along the Rio Grande; flooding continues during following summers.

Fall 1985--Proposal for alternate road to Los Alamos gathers momentum. Proposed routes include one adjacent to the eastern boundary of the monument and another south of Tsankawi.

November 1985--Public outcry to protect Bandelier from Project Overblast; the Los Alamos National Laboratory subsequently rescinds the proposed development.

7. Bandelier National Monument

Establishment: Proclamation (No. 1322) of February 11, 1916

Enlarging the area: Proclamation (No. 1991) of February 25, 1932

By the President of the United States of America

A PROCLAMATION


WHEREAS, certain prehistoric aboriginal ruins situated upon public lands of the United States, within the Santa Fe National Forest, in the State of New Mexico, are of unusual ethnologic, scientific, and educational interest, and it appears that the public interests would be promoted by reserving these relics of a vanished people, with as much land as may be necessary for the proper protection thereof, as a National Monument;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the power in me vested by section two of the Act of Congress approved June 8, 1906, entitled “An Act for the Preservation of American Antiquities”, do proclaim that there are hereby reserved from appropriation and use of all kinds under all of the public land laws, subject to all prior valid adverse claims, and set apart as a National Monument, all the tracts of land, in the State of New Mexico, shown as the Bandelier National Monument on the diagram forming a part hereof.

The reservation made by this proclamation is not intended to prevent the use of the lands for forest purposes under the proclamation establishing the Santa Fe National Forest. The two reservations shall both be effective on the land withdrawn, but the National Monument hereby established shall be the dominant reservation, and any use of the land which interferes with its preservation or protection as a National Monument is hereby forbidden.

Warning is hereby given to all unauthorized persons not to appropriate, injure, remove, or destroy any feature of this National Monument, or to locate or settle on any of the lands reserved by this proclamation.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this eleventh day of February in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and sixteen, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and forty-eighth.

Woodrow Wilson.

By the President:
ROBERT LANSING,
Secretary of State.
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION


WHEREAS it appears desirable, in the public interest, to add to the
Bandelier National Monument as established by proclamation of February
11, 1916 (39 Stat. 1764), certain lands of the United States within the
Santa Fe National Forest, in the State of New Mexico, and to exclude
said national monument as enlarged from the Santa Fe National Forest;

Now, THEREFORE, I, Herbert Hoover, President of the United States
of America, by virtue of the power in me vested by section 2, act of June 8,
1906 (34 Stat. 225; U. S. Code, title 16, sec. 431), and the act of June 4,
1897 (30 Stat. 11, 34; U. S. Code, title 16, sec. 473), do proclaim that the
boundaries of the Bandelier National Monument be, and they are hereby,
changed so as to include certain additional lands in T. 19 N., R. 7 E., New
Mexico principal meridian, subject to all valid existing rights, and that the
reservation as so enlarged is hereby excluded from the Santa Fe National
Forest, the lands within the reservation as enlarged being described as
follows:

NEW MEXICO PRINCIPAL MERIDIAN

T. 19 N., R. 7 E., south half of secs. 7, 8, and 9;
sections 16 to 21 inclusive;
fractional secs. 28, 29, and 30;

All lands in unsurveyed Tps. 17 and 18 N., R. 6 E., lying north of the
Canada de Cochiti Grant, south of the Ramon Vigil Grant, and west
of the Rio Grande River.

Warning is hereby given to all unauthorized persons not to appropriate,
injure, remove, or destroy any feature of this national monument, nor to
locate or settle on any of the lands reserved by this proclamation.

Nothing herein contained shall modify or abridge the right of the public
to travel over any or all public roads now existing within or upon the lands
herein described or roads subsequently constructed to take the place of such
existing roads, nor shall public travel over said roads be subject to any
restriction or condition other than those generally applicable to the use of
public roads in the State of New Mexico.

The Director of the National Park Service, under the direction of the
Secretary of the Interior, shall have the supervision, management, and
control of this monument as provided in the act of Congress entitled “An
act to establish a National Park Service, and for other purposes,” approved
August 25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535–536), and acts additional thereto or amendatory
thereof.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of
the United States to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 25th day of February, in the year
of our Lord nineteen hundred and thirty-two, and of the
[seal] Independence of the United States of America the one hundred
and fifty-sixth.

HERBERT HOOVER.

By the President:
HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of State.
PUBLIC LAW 94–567—OCT. 20, 1976

Public Law 94–567
94th Congress

An Act

To designate certain lands within units of the National Park System as wilderness; to revise the boundaries of certain of those units; and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in accordance with section 3(c) of the Wilderness Act (78 Stat. 890; 16 U.S.C. 1132(c)), the following lands are hereby designated as wilderness, and shall be administered by the Secretary of the Interior in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Wilderness Act:

(a) Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico, wilderness comprising twenty-three thousand two hundred and sixty-seven acres, depicted on a map entitled “Wilderness Plan, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico”, numbered 315–20,014–B and dated May 1976, to be known as the Bandelier Wilderness.


(c) Chiricahua National Monument, Arizona, wilderness comprising nine thousand four hundred and forty acres, and potential wilderness additions comprising two acres, depicted on a map entitled “Wilderness Plan, Chiricahua National Monument, Arizona”, numbered 145–20,007–A and dated September 1973, to be known as the Chiricahua National Monument Wilderness.

(d) Great Sand Dunes National Monument, Colorado, wilderness comprising thirty-three thousand four hundred and fifty acres, and potential wilderness additions comprising six hundred and seventy acres, depicted on a map entitled “Wilderness Plan, Great Sand Dunes National Monument, Colorado”, numbered 140–20,006–C and dated February 1976, to be known as the Great Sand Dunes Wilderness.

(e) Haleakala National Park, Hawaii, wilderness comprising nineteen thousand two hundred and seventy acres, and potential wilderness additions comprising five thousand five hundred acres, depicted on a map entitled “Wilderness Plan, Haleakala National Park, Hawaii”, numbered 162–20,006–A and dated July 1972, to be known as the Haleakala Wilderness.

(f) Isle Royale National Park, Michigan, wilderness comprising one hundred and thirty-one thousand eight hundred and eighty acres, and potential wilderness additions comprising five thousand five hundred acres, depicted on a map entitled “Wilderness Plan, Isle Royale National Park, Michigan”, numbered 139–20,004 and dated December 1974, to be known as the Isle Royale Wilderness.

(g) Joshua Tree National Monument, California, wilderness comprising four hundred and twenty-nine thousand six hundred and ninety acres, and potential wilderness additions comprising thirty-seven thousand five hundred and fifty acres, depicted on a map entitled...
"Wilderness Plan, Joshua Tree National Monument, California", numbered 156-20,003-D and dated May 1976, to be known as the Joshua Tree Wilderness.

(b) Mesa Verde National Park, Colorado, wilderness comprising eight thousand one hundred and ninety-one acres, depicted on a map entitled "Wilderness Plan, Mesa Verde National Park, Colorado", numbered 307-20,007-A and dated September 1972, to be known as the Mesa Verde Wilderness.

(i) Pinnacles National Monument, California, wilderness comprising twelve thousand nine hundred and fifty-two acres, and potential wilderness additions comprising nine hundred and ninety acres, depicted on a map entitled "Wilderness Plan, Pinnacles National Monument, California", numbered 114-20,010-D and dated September 1975, to be known as the Pinnacles Wilderness.


(k) Point Reyes National Seashore, California, wilderness comprising twenty-five thousand three hundred and seventy acres, and potential wilderness additions comprising eight thousand and three acres, depicted on a map entitled "Wilderness Plan, Point Reyes National Seashore", numbered 612-90,000-B and dated September 1976, to be known as the Point Reyes Wilderness.

(l) Badlands National Monument, South Dakota, wilderness comprising sixty-four thousand two hundred and fifty acres, depicted on a map entitled "Wilderness Plan, Badlands National Monument, South Dakota", numbered 137-29,010-B and dated May 1976, to be known as the Badlands Wilderness.

(m) Shenandoah National Park, Virginia, wilderness comprising seventy-nine thousand and nineteen acres, and potential wilderness additions comprising five hundred and sixty acres, depicted on a map entitled "Wilderness Plan, Shenandoah National Park, Virginia", numbered 134-90,001 and dated June 1975, to be known as the Shenandoah Wilderness.

Sec. 2. A map and description of the boundaries of the areas designated in this Act shall be on file and available for public inspection in the office of the Director of the National Park Service, Department of the Interior, and in the office of the Superintendent of each area designated in the Act. As soon as practicable after this Act takes effect, maps of the wilderness areas and descriptions of their boundaries shall be filed with the Interior and Insular Affairs Committees of the United States Senate and House of Representatives, and such maps and descriptions shall have the same force and effect as if included in this Act: Provided, That correction of clerical and typographical errors in such maps and descriptions may be made.

Sec. 3. All lands which represent potential wilderness additions, upon publication in the Federal Register of a notice by the Secretary of the Interior that all uses thereon prohibited by the Wilderness Act have ceased, shall thereby be designated wilderness.

Sec. 4. The boundaries of the following areas are hereby revised, and those lands depicted on the respective maps as wilderness or as potential wilderness addition are hereby so designated at such time and in such manner as provided for by this Act:
Appendices

Isle Royale National Park, Mich.

(a) Isle Royale National Park, Michigan:
The Act of March 6, 1942 (56 Stat. 138; 16 U.S.C. 408e–408h), as amended, is further amended as follows:

(1) Insert the letter "(a)" before the second paragraph of the first section, redesignate subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of that paragraph as "(1)", "(2)", and "(3)" respectively, and add to that section the following new paragraph:

"(b) Gull Islands, containing approximately six acres, located in section 18, township 69 north, range 31 west, in Keweenaw County, Michigan."

(b) Pinnacles National Monument, California:

(1) The boundary is hereby revised by adding the following described lands, totaling approximately one thousand seven hundred and seventeen and nine-tenths acres:

(a) Mount Diablo meridian, township 17 south, range 7 east: Section 1, east half east half, southwest quarter northeast quarter, and northwest quarter southeast quarter; section 12, east half northeast quarter, and northeast quarter southeast quarter; section 13, east half northeast quarter and northeast quarter southeast quarter.

(b) Township 16 south, range 7 east: Section 32, east half.

(c) Township 17 south, range 7 east: Section 4, west half; section 5, east half.

(d) Township 17 south, range 7 east: Section 6, southwest quarter southwest quarter; section 7, northwest quarter north half southwest quarter.

(2) The Secretary of the Interior may make minor revisions in the monument boundary from time to time by publication in the Federal Register of a map or other boundary description, but the total area within the monument may not exceed sixteen thousand five hundred acres: Provided, however, That lands designated as wilderness pursuant to this Act may not be excluded from the monument. The monument shall hereafter be administered in accordance with the Act of August 25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535; 16 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), as amended and supplemented.

(3) In order to effectuate the purposes of this subsection, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to acquire by donation, purchase, transfer from any other Federal agency or exchange, lands and interests herein within the area hereafter encompassed by the monument boundary, except that property owned by the State of California or any political subdivision thereof may be acquired only by donation.

(4) There are authorized to be appropriated, in addition to such sums as may heretofore have been appropriated, not to exceed $955,000 for the acquisition of lands or interests in lands authorized by this subsection. No funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to this Act shall be available prior to October 1, 1977.
Sect. 5. (a) The Secretary of Agriculture shall, within two years after the date of enactment of this Act, review, as to its suitability or nonsuitability for preservation as wilderness, the area comprising approximately sixty-two thousand nine hundred and thirty acres located in the Coronado National Forest adjacent to Saguaro National Monument, Arizona, and identified on the map referred to in section 1(j) of this Act as the “Rincon Wilderness Study Area,” and shall report his findings to the President. The Secretary of Agriculture shall conduct his review in accordance with the provisions of subsections 3(b) and 3(d) of the Wilderness Act, except that any reference in such subsections to areas in the national forests classified as “primitive” on the effective date of that Act shall be deemed to be a reference to the wilderness study area designated by this Act and except that the President shall advise the Congress of his recommendations with respect to this area within two years after the date of enactment of this Act.

(b) The Secretary of Agriculture shall give at least sixty days' advance public notice of any hearing or other public meeting relating to the review provided for by this section.

Sect. 6. The areas designated by this Act as wilderness shall be administered by the Secretary of the Interior in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Wilderness Act governing areas designated by that Act as wilderness areas, except that any reference in such provisions to the effective date of the Wilderness Act shall be deemed to be a reference to the effective date of this Act, and, where appropriate, any reference to the Secretary of Agriculture shall be deemed to be a reference to the Secretary of the Interior.

Sect. 7. (a) Section 6(a) of the Act of September 13, 1962 (76 Stat. 538), as amended (16 U.S.C. 459c-6a) is amended by inserting “without impairment of its natural values, in a manner which provides for such recreational, educational, historic preservation, interpretation, and scientific research opportunities as are consistent with, based upon, and supportive of the maximum protection, restoration and preservation of the natural environment with the area” immediately after “shall be administered by the Secretary”.

(b) Add the following new section 7 and redesignate the existing section 7 as section 8:

"Sect. 7. The Secretary shall designate the principal environmental education center within the Seashore as ‘The Clem Miller Environmental Education Center,’ in commemoration of the vision and leadership which the late Representative Clem Miller gave to the creation and protection of Point Reyes National Seashore.”.

Sec. 8. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any designation of the lands in the Shoshone National Forest, Wyoming, known as the Whiskey Mountain Area, comprising approximately six thousand four hundred and ninety-seven acres and depicted as the “Whiskey Mountain Area—Glacier Primitive Area” on a map entitled “Proposed Glacier Wilderness and Glacier Primitive Area”, dated September 23, 1976, on file in the Office of the Chief, Forest Service, Department of Agriculture, shall be classified as a primitive area until the Secretary of Agriculture or his designee determines otherwise pursuant to classification procedures for national forest primitive areas. Provisions of any other Act designating the Fitzpatrick Wil-
As the nation's principal conservation agency, the Department of the Interior has basic responsibilities to protect and conserve our land and water, energy and minerals, fish and wildlife, parks and recreation areas, and to ensure the wise use of all these resources. The department also has major responsibility for American Indian reservation communities and for people who live in island territories under U. S. administration.