Lodge Urges Critical Changes Throughout Service Following Makuakane-Jarrell Shooting
Randall Kendrick
Executive Director

The tragic December murder of Ranger Steve Makuakane-Jarrell in Hawaii has galvanized a number of field rangers and a few at the administrative level to examine critically all aspects of our law enforcement program. Whether this reaction has occurred because it's the second murder of a park ranger in as many years, or whether it is the sheer and frighteningly ordinary nature of the original call – answering a complaint about dogs – this incident has created a wide-ranging and determined response from the Lodge and field rangers, demanding change in how we conduct business and how we're supported in our mission.

Within days of Makuakane-Jarrell's death, your Ranger Lodge began acting to change the deficiencies that exist in our law enforcement program and that may have contributed to this and other incidents. In the last 3 weeks, the Lodge Executive Committee has:

- Written to the Director of the National Park Service and Senator Craig Thomas criticizing the NPS for failing to follow its own recommendations in the wake of ranger Ken Patrick's murder in 1973 which would have created safer working conditions for park rangers. We offered other solutions and recommendations to our mutual problems in this area. (Pg. 11)

To the extent that better training, support and equipment can prevent future tragedies, the Lodge will not let "business as usual" be the result of this latest horrible episode.

- Made plans to have a Lodge Executive Committee member attend the February 7, 2000 meeting at FLETC which will set the agenda for the International Chiefs of Police study of NPS law enforcement practices that WASO has just funded.

- Contacted media outlets with our concerns over unsafe working conditions and less than professional management of the agency's law enforcement program.

- Asked that Maureen Finnerty meet with a Lodge Executive Committee member so she can receive in person our recommendations for positive change in the way the NPS law enforcement program is staffed, funded, and managed.

- Expanded talks with the United States Park Police union with the aim of working together with our allies to overhaul the way the NPS manages law enforcement.

- Widely distributed Ten Things The NPS Can Do To Prevent Ranger Fatalities But Hasn't. (Pg. 6)

We will be posting further actions and updates on the Lodge web site as they happen. Please visit it often and make copies for your fellow members who are not connected to the web. As Paul Berkowitz's article on page 3 makes clear this is, sadly, not the first time rangers have had to demand changes in how we do business following such a tragedy. Clear and reasonable recommendations were made following the murder of Pt. Reyes ranger, Ken Patrick, working alone and without a dispatch in 1973.

Few of those recommendations for change were carried out. There was no Ranger Lodge then, no one to speak for the field ranger. To the extent that better training, support and equipment can prevent future tragedies, the Lodge will not let "business as usual" be the result of this latest horrible episode. The Lodge is not taking a position on whether or not the promises made by the NPS are in good faith. We feel we owe it to the memories of Patrick, McGhee, Kolodski and Jarrell to press on for the benefit and protection of all NPS rangers before their collective sacrifice becomes only a bitter memory. Pursuing our course should not be taken as anything other than rangers united for the good of the agency and for the good of members of the FOP Ranger Lodge. As Paul wrote in his article: Enough.
Safety Concerns
From the Field

Editor's Note: Following the Makuakane-Jarrell shooting, a number of rangers wrote us with their own concerns about equipment and NPS policies and operations. Here are excerpts.

From The East
Brother Randall:
This morning when I came into work I found the repeater system which covered the lower end of the park was Out-of-Service. I advised dispatch via phone line and they in turn eventually, got a tech working the issue.

The end result was that a part has to be ordered, over Christmas weekend, and the repeater MAY be running again by Tuesday of next week, DEC 28.

Until then our boss has left instructions for us to continue business as usual having our “FEE COLLECTION” Staff listen for us on a repeater in a nearby park (a repeater which is itself not working properly). Correct me if I’m wrong but didn’t we just lose a park ranger at a park which was not covered by a full time law enforcement trained dispatch operation?

Follow Up 12/29/99:
We have our repeater back in service. It was fixed late Monday afternoon. Total down time amounted to about 4 days. It seems that the marching orders as related to the Field Troops (i.e. field level protection rangers) through our dispatch were muddled. We have talked to our Supervisor (who was off the whole downtime, coming back on duty Tuesday) who said that he did not advise to have us conduct business as usual as our dispatch passed on (this is a problem in and of itself).

From The West
Lots of interesting reading floating around after Steve’s death. Some of it from surprisingly high up in the chain. Did you see the article entitled “ENOUGH”, authored by Paul Berkowitz? I must say it stunned me.

Concerning safety issues, I will just say some things off the cuff:

- **Communications** hasn’t improved much in my travels, even though changes were to have been made. Maintenance, interp and other divisions still share mutual frequencies; dispatchers are still underpaid and continue to leave for higher pay and more professionally run operations; equipment is outdated

- **Annual refreshers** are lacking “hands-on”, “live action” scenarios that challenge us to be “uncomfortable” with an event. We all have varying levels of experience, but none of us knows it all. FLET-type training comes once in our career and is rarely repeated. Thirty-two plus hours sitting in a room listening to speakers drone on year after year, leads to complacency. I would like to see a FLETC Traveling Road Show with all the “top” trainers and all the “modern” training methods incorporated

- **Equipment** Expand our currently approved defensive gear to include back-up weapons; greater possibilities of patrol vehicle equipment, i.e. lighting, video, audio, remote emergency locating devices; portable radio panic buttons

- **Personnel** Get our safety out of the hands of non-LE trained personnel and into someone who knows that danger ALWAYS exists. Too many parks are dispatching from their control station desk, with whoever happens to be there at the time. Restore the ranger ranks to a national standard minimum!

From The West
First, as all rangers, I am deeply saddened by the death of Steve Makuakane-Jarrell, and will pray for him and his family. However, I feel strongly that, as in the case of Ranger Joe Kolodski we need some kind of critique, or review of the incident in order to learn from it and not make the same mistake twice.

Here at Golden Gate, as many parks across the country, we have a number of homeless people who (according to my wife, a psychiatric nurse at the VA Hospital in San Francisco and who, until recently treated, worked with, and evaluated many Vietnam vets who are San Francisco street people on drugs, legal and otherwise, suffering from a number of mental disorders) present a possible threat to Rangers and USPP Officers on a daily basis. And again, many of these street people are not only in good shape from walking all the time and carrying packs, but also carry knives and other weapons. Further, we had a small female ranger, working alone, confront one of these, on a brushy cliffside area and, without backup attempted to confront and control one of these individuals. she ended up losing her PR-24 baton to this six foot tall 205 Lb. male individual and had to draw her sidearm to prevent further injury to herself (and him). Obviously this pertains to the Jarrell incident.

We still have not had a nation wide critique (or even availability to the evaluation of the incident with Ranger Kolodski in which a rifle was apparently the murder weapon. We here at Golden Gate (and I know a lot of other parks) face confrontations with suspects frequently. Yet we don’t have nationwide authorization to use AR-15s (Mini-14s) etc. This information needs to be presented, again, to NPS management in WASO. How many more deaths does it take?

Norm Simons
Park Ranger Law Enforcement
Field Training Officer Defensive Tactics Instructor

From The Lodge Web Discussion Forum
In the last 4 years I have seen an increase in visitation, a reduction in commissioned rangers, an increase in special events, an increase in programs to be coordinated, and an increase in the number of administrative duties staff has to perform. Supervisors are completing time and attendance and T&A supplements instead of reviewing field work. Staff spend time
administering VIP programs, special events, reconciling credit card statements, and conducting redundant monitoring because they won’t give the LE division non-commissioned staff to handle those duties. There is no administrative support for field offices. Maintenance and administration has an assistant to assist with budget tracking, T&A, and equipment inventories. We do it all ourselves. Too much time is spent inputting reports in the cumbersome CIRS system.

Our management feels that we handle small and insignificant incidents and downplays the part law enforcement plays in the park. While our equipment is excellent, we are in need of staff to handle the load. Commissioned rangers are on foot, bike, and road patrol. Rangers know intimately every inch of a park that is a patchwork of ownership within a legislated boundary. We are high profile and low key. Tickets which are legal are questioned because they are not in the spirit of the management of the park. No matter that the ranger gives 100 warnings for every citation ever written. We write legal tickets and the superintendent confronts a ranger in the field explaining WHY the ticket should not have been written. Our superintendent has even paid the ticket for a visitor who complained.

As rangers we do the best we can to maintain our training, review our work in the field, and keep officer safety in the foremost of our minds and actions. But after a while the “we’re not law enforcement, we’re protection” gets to everyone. That’s when we are in trouble. It’s OK if non-commissioned staff thinks that, but when we think it, we’re setting ourselves up for disaster. We don’t do what we can to help ourselves. We don’t support the FOP or work in mass to get things changed. We sit and wait while a handful work on our behalf. And we sign the sympathy cards when one of our own goes down in the line of duty.

From The Web Discussion Forum
I whole-heartedly agree with these eight items [First Draft of Ten Things The NPS Can Do To Prevent Ranger Fatalities But Won’t]. I have 7 years in big city/ big municipal law enforcement. I took a LE Park Ranger job six months ago to get back into federal service. I can only say that I am absolutely shocked that the NPS is so negligent. I had no idea that I was coming to work for an agency that is so unprofessional and irresponsible as I have found the Park Service to be. I hope that the coffers of the Ranger FOP are deep, because in judging what I hear from other parks and seeing how the park I work in operates, the FOP will need to start suing on behalf of widows and injured members for things that are no less than standard operating procedures in every other law enforcement agency in the country. No dispatch, no FTO program, no updated SOP’s, no uniformity on how one park operates compared to others, no career development program, no competent supervisors, no support for rangers doing their job by park administrations, and the list goes on. At this time, I have to consider getting out and I tell the young, new guys who have had being a park ranger their dream all of their life, to be sure to have a career plan B. I am amazed that the NPS is in such a state, going into the 21st century, with law enforcement as it is today.

ENOUGH?
By Paul Berkowitz

As we enter the new millennium and now mourn the loss of yet another Ranger struck down in the line of duty, it is particularly appropriate to reflect on the following statements made more than a quarter of a century ago:

―The major share of the responsibility [for the Ranger’s death] must rest with the Service. It is the Service, who by omission, neglect, or inattentiveness, operates an inadequate or sub-standard enforcement program...

―There appears to be a general reluctance in the Park Service to readily accept and visibly support the fact that effective enforcement services are vital to the successful operation of the Parks and their enjoyment by the many visitors.”

Consider the popular Park Service terms such as “soft image”, “low profile”, “resource education”, “resource stewardship”, “visitor and resource protection”, upon which the Service relies in concerted effort to avoid the use of more clear and commonly understood terms such as “law enforcement” or “police duties”:

―The most serious problems with such general descriptive terms are they leave many unanswered questions as to actual operating procedures. Thus, officers on borderline cases will try to maintain a “low profile” and get themselves involved in incidents which can escalate into dangerous situations for themselves and/or others they are trying to protect.”

All of these comments were made in the official report from the board of review assessing the August 5, 1973 murder of a ranger at Point Reyes national seashore. At that time this was the fourth U.S. Park Ranger to be feloniously killed in the line of duty; though the NPS, itself, pronounced him to be the first, having “forgotten” about the three others before him. Since that time three other U.S. Park Rangers have been murdered in the line of duty...a significant number of law enforcement officers murdered for an agency of our size. Many others have suffered serious injury in assaults and “incidents” resulting from improper equipment, inadequate training, and poor candidate screening. This does not even include the killings, assaults, and kidnapings of other NPS employees who were targeted because they were readily
The service has learned nothing in the more than twenty-six years that have passed since the murder in 1973 or the others that came before and followed. These same comments cited above, and many of the other criticisms made by that board (i.e., substandard communications, inadequate staffing, lack of back-up, lack of access to proper equipment, and ambiguity over ranger “image”, etc.) could easily be applied to the subsequent murders of U.S. Park Rangers in 1990 at Gulf Islands NP and now, again, this December 14, 1999, in Hawaii. Dozens of other Rangers have suffered serious injuries and/or narrowly escaped death or injury as a result of these same and other unmitigated deficiencies in the way the NPS manages its “protection” program.

With every Ranger killed there has come the predictable declarations from the offices of the Secretary, the Director, and others that “...safety comes first”...and “...any lessons we can possibly learn...[from these killings]...we will certainly implement...” Yet nothing really changes, because it is fundamentally contrary to NPS culture and tradition to recognize law enforcement as a legitimate professional endeavor, and to change the way our law enforcement program is managed through the establishment of mandatory national standards that might diminish the autonomy and discretion superintendents have exercised over law enforcement for nearly a hundred years.

We cannot even say that the Service has “failed” to learn its lessons. That characterization is too kind and forgiving.

The Service has refused to learn any lessons from the literally hundreds of serious assaults, murders, shooting incidents, and wrecks through which U.S. Park Rangers have suffered over their nearly hundred year history; having summarily rejected the legitimate efforts of many dedicated employees and organizations to seize upon the lessons of the past (including the findings of our own review boards) in attempts to apply those lessons to effect much needed change to NPS policies, procedures, organizational structure, and management practices.

Perhaps it is time to respond to those who, in their resistance to change and the professionalization of our law enforcement program, have asked:

“Do we really have THAT many Rangers killed?...[that we need to change the way we run our law enforcement program]?

This very question was rhetorically posed by a superintendent and senior member of the current DO/RM-9 workgroup during a heated discussion, as justification to (successfully) whittle away at the mandatory standards and procedures that had been proposed by “the wrong people” in the draft policy they had prepared. Similar sentiments and statements have been echoed over the years by other managers throughout the Service, whether over the budget table or in passionate resistance to the adoption of policies and procedures that would reflect compliance with standards and practices of the broader “law enforcement” community.

So let us now respond, in kind, with the question:

HOW MANY RANGERS NEED TO DIE IN THE LINE OF DUTY BEFORE IT IS, “ENOUGH”?  
Copyright © December 20, 1999 by Paul Berkowitz

The recent murder of Ranger Steve Makuakane-Jarrell is actually the seventh time where an NPS ranger has been shot and killed in the line of duty. It is important to note that four of the seven killings occurred in small, low intensity parks. Steve's park is less than 1200 acres. Three of the four last rangers killed worked in small, low intensity parks: two National Seashores and one National Historical Park. The last three all were killed in the last ten years – the 90s. Now, sadly and for the first time, NPS rangers have been killed in successive years.

It is altogether fitting and proper for us to reflect now on these tragic deaths, to analyze the state of law enforcement in the NPS, and to search for ways to prevent these tragedies from again happening.

I address this letter to all park superintendents because you have considerable power to set the tone for how law enforcement is conducted in your particular parks. I urge you to honestly examine your consciences as you consider my remarks. Many of you have no background or training in law enforcement and may be uncomfortable with it. Law enforcement is really a lot like electricity. We all benefit from it but only a few of us need to understand how it works. We trust our power companies and electricians to know what they're doing and to provide us with this needed service. We also accept that their knowledge of electricity allows them to work with and around it safely. We would not presume to tell them how to do their jobs.

And so it is, or should be, with professional law enforcement. Protection rangers also work with and around a dangerous commodity... people, but can not always tell which wire is "hot" and therefore dangerous. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has provided them with the training, tactics,
Your rangers have been properly trained at FLETC. Please give them the freedom to do their job without the constant fear of being second guessed.

Many of these problem visitors are not immediately obvious and may pass into your park undetected. They may be discovered by your ranger in the course of what was otherwise an uneventful patrol, as was the case in all six of the rangers killed. Please face the fact that of all your employees, the protection ranger is the ONLY one routinely exposed to being assaulted and murdered directly because of his/her assigned duties. Law enforcement has always been an inherently dangerous profession. Working in a small "quiet" park is statistically more dangerous for rangers because they may go for days, weeks, or months without significant numbers of LE contacts, resulting in them becoming rusty in their tactics and possibly complacent in their attitudes. They are also far more likely to be working alone, without backup, and without the services of a dispatch center. This can be a formula for death when they suddenly find themselves in a dangerous situation that demands precise tactics and a survival attitude.

As Superintendents, you have both a legal and moral responsibility to do everything you can to ensure the safety of your protection rangers. You should insist that they receive top quality annual LE refreshers and be issued the very best LE equipment: patrol cars, radio communications, body armor, defensive equipment, etc.

Your rangers have been properly trained at FLETC. Please give them the freedom to do their job without the constant fear of being second guessed. Please trust their professional judgment and discretion. Don't quickly conclude that they have done wrong simply because you may have received a complaint letter; there are always at least two sides to every story. Don't tie their hands by discouraging them from issuing citations or making arrests. Don't make their jobs more dangerous by sending them the message that they may suffer political consequences if they don't limit themselves to law enforcement that doesn't generate any visitor complaints—an impossible standard. If they have to constantly worry about "getting in trouble" for taking legitimate and appropriate law enforcement actions in accordance with their FLETC training, they are far more likely to be assaulted and killed.

"Low profile" law enforcement, an ambiguous term at best, can and has resulted in dead rangers. Your LE rangers are already properly limited and controlled by state and federal law, supervision, SOPs, NPS-9, public scrutiny, their own ethics, and by their desire to protect their careers and retirement. Please don't add unnecessary additional political limitations that may further confuse them and compromise their personal safety. Sending a mixed message or negative message about law enforcement to your rangers can ultimately result in them hesitating at a critical moment, or being surprised by a threat that results in their death or the death of others.

I have been performing NPS law enforcement for fifteen years in a variety of park areas, large and small, both sleepy and very high intensity. It is my experience that most citizens and park visitors generally expect, respect and appreciate professional law enforcement in national park areas. If trained protection rangers are sufficient in number and doing their jobs properly, park resources are better protected and criminal activities are reduced significantly. In addition, better trained rangers will generate fewer complaints for unprofessional conduct.

It is not enough to say that you are supportive of professional law enforcement in your parks. The following actions by superintendents are absolutely essential:

- Increase law enforcement staffing so that no ranger has to work alone or without backup.
- Hire professional LE managers and insist that they run the park LE program professionally, with the best training, equipment, patrol vehicles, and modern communications. All rangers should have access to and be monitored by a dispatch center. Officer safety should always be the first priority.
- Support a Field Training Officer (FTO) program that would require that new rangers from small parks spend at least a pay period in a larger, more intense park early in their careers and periodically after that. Your park will benefit from the expertise they bring back with them and their safety will be greatly enhanced.

Your rangers must have faith in your support. You should pledge your support to them, the Chief Ranger, and district rangers at LE refreshers and other gatherings. They have undertaken a sacred oath to do their duty. A reciprocal commitment on your part to trust in and support their LE mission is absolutely essential, especially since they have so much more to lose than you. They are putting their lives on the line everyday to protect the park, its employees and visitors.

It is your duty to protect them. Please do your duty!

Author's note: Please make a copy of this and send it to your superintendent.
Ten Things The NPS Can Do To Prevent Ranger Fatalities But Hasn’t

1. Give Every Ranger Access to Dispatch
This is the 21st century, and the National Park Service fails this basic safety standard used by every department in the country. The NPS should stop violating Department of Interior policy that requires field rangers to have access to LE databases and, therefore, requires access to dispatch.

2. Stop Abandoning Our Rangers
The NPS should stop violating FLETC taught, universally accepted officer safety principles—officers shouldn’t work in a front-country situation without back-up available. This means no “one person” shifts—not even in the early morning hours when “nothing ever happens.”

The NPS has not made a case why this agency alone should be exempt from this accepted police practice.

3. Stop Cutting Ranger Staff Levels
The NPS should immediately stop cutting law enforcement staff while at the same time expanding the mission through more parks, more land, more pet projects, and less time for actually doing the job. We ask that the ranger workforce be re-built to its levels of a few years ago, and increase the workforce to 3,000 rangers within five years.

The NPS needs to stop the bloat in staff positions in Park headquarters and put the money back into field ranger and maintenance positions. It is as much a misallocation of funds as it is a lack of funds.

4. Stop Incompetency in the Management of Ranger Activities
We ask you to bring in new blood with leadership ability. We think reasonable goals include completing DO-9 and RM-9 within 60 days; funding and appointing a full-time EMS coordinator, medical director, and search and rescue coordinator; and modernizing the structural fire program before someone gets killed.

We further request that you ensure the integrity of these programs by making sure the top staff running the ranger activities program are Park Rangers, and that you support the role of Park Rangers and Special Agents in supervising regional programs, so careers can develop to manage national programs.

5. Quit Being Ashamed Of Law Enforcement
It is time for the NPS to stop de-emphasizing officer safety procedures for the sake of somebody’s version of what is politically correct. The NPS must re-emphasize to rangers and supervisors that our primary duty is law enforcement and resource protection, and that our priority is protection of our lives and the lives of the public first.

6. Give Rangers A Field Training Program
Each ranger should go through a field training program at an incident-intensive park before going into the field. This was the standard practice in the 70’s and must be re-implemented. This will give new rangers the experience they need in recognizing threats, dealing with a variety of people in a variety of enforcement situations. They can’t get this at FLETC. This is why every major law enforcement agency in the country has a field training program. Although this has been a long-sought goal from the field, all we’ve heard from management on this is years of talk.

7. Make The Bosses Responsible
Make Superintendents and Regional Directors directly accountable for maintaining standards of public safety in their parks, and require that they meet staffing, training, and logistical support levels before undertaking other projects.

Make management of the LE function a critical element on superintendent’s annual evaluation.

8. Re-Build the SET and ARM Teams
We know that these teams don’t get used often. Fund them. Subsidize their use so they gain experience. Support them. When things hit the fan, you’ll have a trained group of individuals to handle it in each region. If nothing happens, the Service will still gain better employees.

9. Treat Law Enforcement Needs Assessments Seriously
NPS has required annual law enforcement needs assessments in each park. Most superintendents have ignored this requirement. We have reaped what they have sown. Annual completion of document must be made mandatory, fully integrated into GPRA, and made part of the top workplan priorities of each park.

10. Conduct a Formal Review of the Service’s Law Enforcement Program
When firefighters were killed in Colorado, the USFS conducted a major safety review that reformed firefighting safety. The same thing needs to be done for park law enforcement. Not just “planning documents” and task forces, but actual implemented changes.

We know that these programs will not come cheaply. But we believe that the Ranger Activities law enforcement program has been run on a shoestring budget for too long, with too many cuts in personnel and funding. Such a situation is bound to fail, and the recent deaths of Rangers Jarrell and McGhee are tragic symptoms of this failure.

We ask that you act on this promptly, because each day rangers are still going into the field in the same dangerous, preventable situations that contributed to the death of these fine men.

In the Line of Fire
Learning from Assaults on Law Enforcement Officers
By Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Ph.D.
Edward F. Davis, M.S.
and Charles E. Miller III

Editor's Note: this is reprinted, with permission, from the February 1998 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. Because of space limitations, citations and example situations had to be omitted.
The full article is available at the Lodge Web site and at:

On a spring Tuesday at noon, two officers in civilian dress, both assigned to investigative work, responded to an address to search for a robbery and burglary suspect. When one officer opened a closet door during the search, he was shot in the chest by a 41-year-old female hiding inside. A struggle ensued, and the officer returned fire, striking the offender. Both the officer and the assailant were transported to the hospital. The victim, a 28-year-old 4-year veteran, was released after 13 days and returned to duty. The assailant, who had a prior record for robbery, burglary, and assault, is confined to a wheelchair as a result of her wounds.

**Officer's preconceived ideas of the assailant profile were of little value in securing their personal safety.**

This scenario depicts 1 of 40 cases examined by the authors in an attempt to answer two important questions: Why and how are officers assaulted in the line of duty? Every year, more than 50,000 law enforcement officers are assaulted, one-third of those assaulted are injured, and about 70 are killed. Why do some officers die and other officers survive in substantively similar situations? No simple answers exist.

A previous study, *Killed in the Line of Duty*, scrutinized felonious killings of law enforcement officers, but by nature, it omitted a crucial perspective—that of the victim officers. In the continuing search for the best ways to prepare officers to face danger in the line of duty, *In the Line of Fire: Violence Against Law Enforcement* focuses on the survivors and presents extensive information on the victim officers, the offenders, and the incidents that brought them together in a potentially deadly mix.

**THE STUDY** Over a 3-year period, the authors examined 40 incidents selected from 625 closed cases submitted by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. Selection criteria included the size and type of the victim's agency, the type of assignment the officer was working at the time of the assault, and the region of the country in which the officer worked. The selected cases occurred between 1987 and 1994 and included 52 law enforcement officers and 42 offenders.

After choosing cases for the study, the authors gathered as much information as possible about each incident in order to elicit specific, useful responses during interviews. They reviewed the departments' case files, which included offense reports, statements made by assisting officers, witnesses, and offenders, and later, other documentation provided by the victim officers, such as reports, performance ratings, newspaper articles, and police radio transmissions. Interviews of the surviving victim officers focused on their background, family structure, law enforcement training, preassault behavior and experience, conditions at the time of the assault, and description of the incident.

The authors also reviewed and evaluated pertinent information obtained from law enforcement and correctional records on each offender. Interviews of the offenders focused on seven areas: background, family structure, attitudes toward authority, criminal history, weapons training and use, description of the incident setting, and perspective on the incident.

To protect the victim officers and their departments from unwanted attention and to encourage them to be as candid as possible, the authors granted anonymity to the study participants. Similarly, the offenders and the penal institutions that housed them were granted anonymity.

**THE FINDINGS** The sample for this study was small and not scientifically random; therefore, results should not be generalized. Nevertheless, the wealth of data the study presents on the officers, the offenders, and the incidents that brought them together can provide insight for administrators evaluating their departments' policies, training, and procedures, as well as for individual officers evaluating their own daily practices.

**The Officers** The 52 officers who agreed to participate in the study realized that their actions would come under intense scrutiny. They set aside their personal concerns and shared their information and insight, hoping to help their colleagues prevent serious injury or death during a line-of-duty assault.

**Demographics** The victim officers in the study were predominantly male (88 percent), married (62 percent), white (90 percent), and college educated (58 percent). They averaged 5 feet 9 inches tall, 186 pounds, 33 years of age, and 8 years of law enforcement service. This description closely resembles that of the officers killed in the line of duty from 1986 through 1995.

**Behavioral Characteristics** The demographic descriptions of the assault survivors were not the only factors that mirrored the characteristics of officers killed in the line of duty; the officers also shared many behavioral traits. To develop a behavioral profile of the victim officers, the authors reviewed the available written documentation and observed and evaluated the behavior and comments of victims during the interview process. Following the agreement of anonymity with the officers, the authors could not contact the officers' peers or supervisors, so these observations could not be validated independently. Nevertheless, the recorded behavioral characteristics offer some telling clues about the victim officers.

One frequently mentioned adjective was "hard-working." These officers sought to be the best cops possible, and they often took risks to achieve this objective. For many, being the best meant producing the most arrests, traffic citations, and reports. One officer, named "officer of the month" prior to his assault, described taking shortcuts to increase his productivity. For example, he often served warrants alone. He never requested backup, never advised the dispatcher of his plan or location, and never expected to be shot by the individual he attempted to arrest.
Nineteen officers studied were assaulted when they unilaterally took action in response to a situation. Would the outcomes have been different if help had been available? No one can say for sure. Nevertheless, such high-risk behaviors demonstrate that some hard-working officers might be ignoring rules established for their safety. The real question is whether boosting productivity statistics merits the risks involved.

If risk taking got them into trouble, the will to survive kept these officers alive. The authors observed a tremendous determination to live in virtually all of the officers interviewed. One officer said she was determined to survive so that her parents, who lived 700 miles away, would not be notified of her death by a telephone call. An officer shot in a dirty, trash-filled building refused to die in such a place. He used his shoestrings as tourniquets to stop the bleeding from serious arm and leg wounds, made his way out of the building, and found a citizen to call for help.

Another officer suffered a severe bullet wound directly below his eye. After being unconscious for an unknown period of time, he concentrated on observing his breath in the cold night air, believing that as long as he focused on breathing he would continue to live. Nearly blinded, he stuck the thumb of his weak hand into his wound and held it there to control the bleeding while he held his weapon in his strong hand. Without a portable radio to call for help, the officer struggled approximately 300 yards to his patrol unit to summon aid.

These officers walked, crawled, and limped away from the scenes of their assaults. They refused to give up. They were survivors.

The Offenders The victim officers in the study possessed a preconceived image of the kind of person they considered likely to assault them. The data suggest, however, that no singular profile exists of an individual who would assault, attempt to kill, or actually kill a police officer. Officers' preconceived ideas of the assailant profile were of little value in securing their personal safety.

To paint the clearest possible picture of the assaults and the people involved, the authors interviewed the offenders. Of the 42 offenders interviewed, 38 were still in prison at the time of the interview. The authors met with the remaining four offenders, who had been released from prison, in their local communities.

Demographics The offenders were generally male (93 percent), young (average age 27 years), nonwhite, single, and high school educated. Compared to the victim officers, the offenders were younger, less likely to have families, and less educated. Physically, the average offender was 5 feet 9 inches tall and weighed 170 pounds, a stature similar to that of the victim officers.

Authors asked the offenders to describe their family status and history. None of this information was corroborated with other family members. According to the offenders, their mothers were the most significant figures in their families; yet 43 percent reported that their natural fathers had been present most of the time. They frequently reported hostile and aggressive relationships with both the dominant male and female members of the household. Over one-half of the assailants said that their families solved problems by arguing, shouting, and initiating physical violence.

While the earlier study of police killers demonstrated parallel findings on family composition, the assailants tended to report less instability in family caretaking and less physical and psychological abuse within the family than did the killers. Also, although most assailants considered their pre-adult economic status to be marginal or lower, most of the killers in the earlier study considered their economic status to have been at least average or comfortable.

Criminal History The self-reported average age at which offenders committed their first crime was 11. For more than two-thirds of the offenders, this crime was larceny-theft. Across the board, they reported weapons violations with greater frequency than any other crime. The criminal histories of these offenders coincide with the predominant incarcerating offenses of all convicted felons. Twenty-four of the 42 offenders reported having been involved in shooting incidents (either firing or being fired upon) prior to the assault under study. Notably, 21 percent of the offenders reported having attempted to assault a police officer in the past.

Some of the offenders can best be described as street combat veterans, based on the frequency of their involvement in exchanges of gunfire with other criminals and police. In 8 of the 40 incidents examined, offenders used more than one weapon, including knives and blunt objects, as well as hands, fists, and feet, but firearms were far the weapons of choice in the incidents studied. Fifty of the 52 officers were assaulted with firearms, and availability was the overriding factor in weapon choice.

When questioned about their preferred method for carrying a handgun on their persons, 36 percent of the offenders reported carrying the weapons in the groin area. One-half of these felt this area was most overlooked by law enforcement personnel who conduct searches. When in a vehicle, 50 percent of the offenders carried their handguns directly on their persons. Over one-fourth of the offenders reported carrying a second weapon, usually a handgun, at least part of the time, with the expressed intent of using it against a law enforcement officer or anyone else who removed their primary weapon. Clearly, the offenders' familiarity, proficient use, and methods of carrying and concealing handguns should be considered when agencies develop procedures for approaching and searching suspects.

Alcohol or Drug Use Among the offenders studied, 62 percent were using drugs, alcohol, or both at the time of the incident. Simultaneous use of drugs, usually cocaine, and alcohol was most common. One offender described the effect of drugs on his behavior:

Heroin makes you feel invincible; cocaine makes you feel defensive and somewhat paranoid. Drugs do not hinder your ability to use a firearm. They make you quicker to shoot. When you’re on drugs, you’re irritable and cranky and may be quicker to use a gun.
This offender, involved in an armed robbery interrupted by a police officer, indicated that he did not necessarily intend to hurt the officer, just to avoid capture. If captured, he knew he would be unable to satisfy his need for more drugs, which motivated the robbery in the first place.

Offenders' Perspectives on the Incidents

While the opinions of the offenders are highly subjective and suspect, the manner in which an offender perceives a particular event emerged as an important issue. Although their perceptions might not be completely accurate, they based their actions on those perceptions.

The authors asked the offenders to describe the assault circumstances and to assess the victim officers involved in the study. Sixty-five percent of the offenders said the attack on the victim officer was impulsive, unplanned, or opportunistic. One-third (13) of the offenders stated that nothing the officers could have done would have prevented the attacks. The offenders reported a variety of intentions at the time of the assault, including to:

- Escape or avoid arrest, 38 percent
- Kill the victim officer, 19 percent
- Fracture the officer, 14 percent
- Wound the officer, 7 percent
- Immobilize the officer, 2 percent

In all but one case examined, the offender attacked first. Thirty-one percent of the offenders believed the officer was surprised by the attack. Nineteen percent of the offenders described the officer as capable or professional, while an equal number said the officer seemed unprepared or indecisive in the face of the attack.

Four of the offenders admitted membership in street gangs and exhibited a street gang mentality. Two of them were paid $50 to kill the next drug enforcement officer who entered a particular area. Regardless of whether the gang members were arrested, they still would receive status and respectability within the gang. In describing the contract shooting of the officer, one offender recounted the officer begging for his life and offering money as compensation. The offender reportedly responded, "We don't want your money, we want your life." He and a fellow gang member then shot the officer seven times and left him for dead. All four of the gang members interviewed exhibited this type of cold-blooded, remorseless mentality.

The Situations

To understand the incidents fully, the authors thoroughly assessed the circumstances surrounding the assaults. This assessment included the type of call being handled, the location, the modes of transportation used by officers and offenders, the environment, and the weapons used.

Of the 40 cases examined, 50 percent involved responses to disturbance calls, 20 percent occurred while officers investigated suspicious persons or circumstances, and 18 percent happened during traffic stops or pursuits. Sixty percent of the assaults took place on a road or in an alley. Eighty percent of the officers and nearly half of the offenders arrived at the scene in motor vehicles. In more than 75 percent of the incidents, the assault occurred at the same location as the initial encounter between the offenders and the officers.

Most assaults occurred at nighttime, with 62 percent between the hours of 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. One-fourth of the assaults occurred between noon and 6 p.m. The timing of the assaults raises visibility as a possible issue warranting training considerations. In some instances, officers also had to contend with fog, rain, total darkness or only partial lighting during the assaults. While these environmental factors did not precipitate the attacks, they did affect the officers' ability to respond effectively.

The authors also examined the principal weapons used by both parties in the assaults. As noted, offenders used firearms, mainly handguns, to assault 50 of the 52 officers in this study. Some also struck officers with blunt objects or cut them with knives. All of the victim officers were armed with handguns; three also had personally owned shotguns and one was armed with a submachine gun. Forty percent of the officers fired their weapons. None of the victim officers had rifles, chemical agents, or tasers. Seven officers were disarmed and had their firearms used against them. Offenders firing handguns hit their intended targets 91 percent of the time; officers, 41 percent. It should be noted, however, that the offenders fired first in most cases. With shotguns, the offenders fired with 43 percent accuracy and the officers with 100 percent accuracy.

In most situations, the victim officers initially perceived that they were dealing with minor offenders who were reluctant to go to jail. The offenders, on the other hand, were fighting for their lives and their freedom. Approximately two-thirds of the officers reported having no indication of the impending attack. Only after being injured seriously did some of them realize they were engaged in life-and-death struggles, not just minor physical altercations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Several significant issues related to officer safety emerged from the authors' analysis of these incidents. The full report recommends policy and training reviews in such areas as use of force, traffic stops, and searches.

Use of Force

During the assaults, the officers in the study generally recalled what not to do and when not to use force, but some had difficulty recalling when the use of force was an appropriate, timely, necessary, and positive decision. Some had problems recalling their agencies' deadly force policies and determining when to progress to the next level of force, and many officers experienced great difficulty recognizing the point at which they actually were fighting for their lives.

Clearly, agencies should review their use-of-force policies to ensure that all elements of the policy are clearly articulated and easily understood. Further, officers should be tested regularly to ensure their proper recall of the policy, and trainers should stress positive aspects of the policy, especially the proper time to use deadly force, while not overemphasizing the negative aspects, such as when not to shoot.
The victim officers in this study also reported that repetitive safety training reflecting real-life circumstances enabled them to survive potentially lethal situations. In contrast, they believed training that reinforced improper procedures or was deficient in some element could endanger officers.

Traffic Stops This study and the 1992 study of officers killed both serve as reminders that traffic stops—tasks frequently viewed as routine and repetitive—pose a potentially grave threat to officers. Few officers considered that someone they stopped for a minor infraction of the law would consider taking their lives in an effort to escape. The officers' desire to produce statistics, whether internally or externally motivated, sometimes caused them to take safety-related short-cuts, such as failing to inform dispatchers of their actions. In addition, officers rarely considered the physical surroundings when they chose to make traffic stops. Finally, on very hot days, officers were more reluctant to wear their soft body armor.

In light of the high risk of traffic stops, departmental enforcement policies should include sections dealing with officer safety. These sections should address proper selection of a stop location, required notification of the police dispatcher, and required wearing of soft body armor. Where two-officer units are employed, departments should ensure that the responsibilities of each officer are clearly established and understood. Departments also should review policies that allow officers to bring the driver of a stopped vehicle back to the police car.

Searches Searches proved to be problematic for several reasons with severe consequences. Officers experienced problems remaining focused while conducting searches, often because of their perceived need to gain physical control of the offender. In addition, when they recovered items of contraband during a search, the officers' attention often shifted to making an arrest. This caused them to overlook weapons that could then be used against them.

Concerns over contracting communicable diseases, such as AIDS, often superseded officers' concerns for immediate physical safety. They also expressed displeasure at searching the groin area of male subjects, and while they would pat down this area on the outside of the clothing, they were reluctant to go into the subject's clothing there. Several offenders, aware of the officers' reluctance, reported that the groin area was normally where they secreted weapons and contraband. Male officers expressed similar hesitation at thoroughly searching female subjects for fear of complaints. In the absence of written directives regarding this practice, the officers were unsure when thorough searches would be justified.

Searches proved to be problematic for several reasons with severe consequences.

To overcome these problems, proper training should simulate realistic situations, including procedures for searches conducted during the day, at night, under low levels of lighting, in residences and other locations, and with resisting subjects. Departments should establish a core policy governing the proper search of all persons arrested for violations of the law. Prisoners should be searched thoroughly by each officer accepting responsibility for custody of the prisoner. Such a policy should also address thorough searches of police vehicles at the beginning of duty tours, especially if cars are used on a rotating basis. Administrators should ensure adequate supplies of proper safety equipment—especially for officers who regularly arrest and transport drug law violators—to reduce officer concerns about searching offenders who present an offensive or questionable appearance.

CONCLUSION This study clearly shows that an arrest for an apparently minor infraction of the law might well result in a felonious assault against a police officer. All members of a law enforcement agency, from administrator through patrol officer, must be aware of the risks and actively prepare for them. Administrators must devise policies and provide the types of training and equipment that address the safety needs of their officers. They must also ensure that seemingly unrelated policies or procedures, such as the system of rewards for performance, do not unwittingly undermine officer safety. Similarly, officers must use all of the resources available to them to ensure their own safety, as well as that of their partners, innocent bystanders, and the subjects they encounter. In order to serve and protect the community, law enforcement officers must first be prepared to protect themselves.

Dr. Pinizzotto and Mr. Davis serve as instructors in the Behavioral Science Unit of the Training Division at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. Mr. Miller serves as an instructor in the Education/Training Services Unit of the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services Division in Clarksburg, West Virginia.
Secretary's Report
By Randall Kendrick

Bylaws Amendment Proposed
The Lodge Executive Committee wants to amend our Lodge constitution to permit the formation of Labor Committees than can be bargaining units in individual parks. There is a preferred 3 page wording from the Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police. We want to adopt this wording. There will no raise of our dues and no change in our professional/fraternal organization. We will just be permitted to sanction a ranger-only, park-only, bargaining unit. If you have comments, write, email or phone the Lodge.

Editor's Note: The second part of Chris Cessna's article on Required Occupancy will appear in the next issue or read it in full now on the Lodge Web Site.

Recruiting

Numbers Talk. Our successes come not only from the hard work of many of our Board and other Lodge members, but from the fact that hundreds of law enforcement rangers throughout the Service are members of the Ranger Lodge. We give you a voice and, we hope, informative articles and commentary on issues that concern you. You can help yourself and your Lodge by recruiting your colleagues to join.

Call the Lodge for extra newsletters to put in the coffee room or wherever your colleagues gather.

FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE
NATIONAL PARK RANGERS
P. O. BOX 151
FANCY GAP, VA 24328
December 28, 1999

Dear Director Stanton:

Our Lodge is deeply concerned at the death of park ranger Steve Jarrell and the circumstances that we believe contributed to his death.

We believe that the National Park Service through both poor management and obsolete practices has contributed to a law enforcement program that is so undervalued, mismanaged, and misdirected that it has become ineffective in serving the public and protecting park resources. It has also become unacceptably dangerous for its employees. In the past decade, four of its 1500 park rangers have been killed in the line of duty, making it one of the most dangerous of federal law enforcement agencies.

The National Park Service has often ignored its own recommendations for securing the safety of its employees and the public. Thoughtful recommendations for change were first made by the NPS after ranger Ken Patrick was murdered in 1973 at Pt. Reyes National Seashore. Few were adopted. The shooting deaths of ranger Jarrell this year and ranger McGee in 1990 were remarkably similar and, we believe, might have been prevented if the NPS had adopted its own recommendations of the 1973 Board of Review.

Our goal is a safer work environment for park rangers, allowing us to effectively carry out the mission of serving the public and protecting park resources. We believe that this goal can be achieved through a better managed and organized law enforcement program, appropriately funded and staffed, and driven by the type of leadership a fully professional law enforcement organization deserves. It is indisputable that the NPS has, within its ranks of veteran rangers and special agents, the experience and expertise necessary to redirect, restructure, and oversee its law enforcement program. Now is the time to seize upon the talents and wealth of experience and knowledge possessed by these law enforcement professionals.

We hope that you share these goals and look to you for leadership. We want to see a program that incorporates our proposals including plans for a complete review of the Ranger Activities Division and service-wide enforcement operations. We are asking you to commit the agency to positive change and take actions that will make a statement that will be heard and understood. We are asking for new leadership and a new philosophy of doing business to bring us up to the standards of a professional law enforcement agency.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Randall Kendrick
Executive Director

Behavioral Characteristics of Officers Killed

- Friendly to everyone
- Well-liked by community and department
- Tend to use less force than other officers felt they would use in similar circumstances
- Hard-working
- Tend to perceive duties as more public relations than law enforcement
- Service-oriented
- Use force only as last resort
- Do not follow all of the rules, especially in regard to arrests, confrontations with prisoners, traffic stops, and waiting for available backup
- Feel able to read people and situations and will drop guard as a result
- Tend to look for good in others
- Laid-back and easygoing

Behavioral Characteristics of Officers Assaulted

- Friendly
- Hard-working
- Service Oriented
- Willing to use force when justified
- Do not follow established rules and procedures, especially in regard to arrests, traffic stops, and calling for or waiting for available backup
- Feel able to read situations or persons and will drop guard as a result
- Survivors

Source: In the Line of Fire
Lodge Website:
Brother Duane Buck has built and maintains the Lodge website. We keep it updated with notices, news, and links to other sites that we think are interesting and/or helpful to resource based law enforcement officers. Visit it often between issues of the Protection Ranger to keep current on things that affect you and your job. The address is:

www.rangerfop.com

Lodge Phone: 800-407-8295
10 am to 10 pm Eastern time
or, use our e-mail address:
randallfop@ls.net

Application for Membership
I, the undersigned, a full-time regularly employed law enforcement officer, do hereby make application for active membership in the U.S. Park Rangers Lodge, FOP. If my membership should be revoked or discontinued for any cause other than retirement while in good standing, I do hereby agree to return to the Lodge my membership card and other material bearing the FOP emblem.

Name: ____________________________
Signature: _________________________
Address: __________________________
City: ______________________________
State: ____________________ Zip: ______
DOB: ______________________________

☐ Permanent Rangers: $52/year
☐ Seasonals and Retired Active Members: $35/year.
☐ Associate (non-Commissioned) Membership (newsletter only): $35/year.

Renewals: You do not need to send in this form to renew. Enclose a copy of your Commission (new members only).

NPS Area: _______________________

Mail To: FOP Lodge, POB 151, Fancy Gap, VA 24328